Calls to reform the UN began soon after its creation in 1945. Despite cycles of reform, UN member states have had concerns about inefficient management operations. As one of the 192 member states, the United States played a significant role in promoting UN reform, calling for financial and administrative changes. The United States, through the Department of State and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, continues to take measures to advance reform of UN management processes. In 1997 and 2002, the Secretary-General proposed two separate sets of management reform initiatives in the areas of human resources, budgeting, and human rights. In July 1997, the Secretary-General proposed a broad reform program to transform the UN into an efficient organization focused on achieving results as it carried out its mandates. Although the Secretary- General does not have direct authority over specialized agencies and many funds and programs, the reforms at the Secretariat were intended to serve as a model for UN-wide reforms. In May 2000, we reported that while the Secretary-General had substantially reorganized the Secretariat’s leadership and structure, he had not yet completed reforms in human resource management and planning and budgeting. In September 2002, to encourage the full implementation of the 1997 reforms, the Secretary- General released a second set of reform initiatives with 36 reform actions, some expanding on previous reform initiatives introduced in 1997 and others reflecting new priorities for the organization. In February 2004, we reported that 60 percent of the 88 reform initiatives in the 1997 agenda and 38 percent of the 66 initiatives in the 2002 agenda were in place. In 2004-2005, a series of UN and expert task force reports recommended the need for comprehensive reform of UN management and the UN human rights apparatus. These studies included a 2004 report of a high-level panel convened by the Secretary-General to recommend ways to strengthen the UN, a March 2005 Secretary-General report to the General Assembly, a June 2005 report by a task force mandated by the U.S. Congress to recommend how to improve the effectiveness of the organization, as well as several reports of the Independent Inquiry Committee established to investigate the Oil for Food Program. In September 2005, world leaders gathered at the UN World Summit in New York City to discuss global issues such as UN reform, development, and human rights, as well as actions needed in each of these areas. The outcome document from the World Summit, endorsed by all members of the UN, outlines broad UN reform efforts in areas such as oversight and accountability, and human rights. The document also called for the Secretary-General to submit proposals for implementing reforms to improve the management functions of the Secretariat. In April 2006, we reported on weaknesses in the UN’s internal oversight unit and procurement system, both of which have been identified as important areas for reform. In the internal oversight area, we found that UN funding arrangements adversely affect OIOS’s budgetary independence and compromise the office’s ability to audit high-risk areas. For example, OIOS depends on the resources of the funds, programs, and other entities it audits, and the managers of these programs can deny OIOS permission to perform work or not pay OIOS for services. In the procurement area, we found that UN procurement resources are vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse because of weaknesses affecting the control environment. For example, the UN has not established a single organizational entity or mechanism capable of effectively and comprehensively managing procurement. In addition, the UN has not demonstrated a commitment to improving the professionalism of its procurement staff in the form of training, a career development path, or other key human capital practices critical to attracting, developing, and retaining a qualified professional workforce. The management reform decision-making process at the UN involves multiple entities. Member states or the Secretary-General can introduce management reform initiatives at the UN. The Secretary-General can implement certain management improvements that are within his authority. In addition, the Secretary-General submits proposals to the General Assembly. In these cases, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, reviews the proposal. The ACABQ then advises and reports to the Administrative and Budgetary Committee (the Fifth Committee), the General Assembly’s committee for administrative and budgetary matters that is composed of all 192 member states. The Fifth Committee holds discussions on the proposals and makes its recommendation to the General Assembly. The General Assembly makes the final decision. For the past 20 years, most decisions in the Fifth Committee and in the General Assembly have been made by consensus among all the member state representatives. The UN has initiated reforms in five key areas: (1) modernizing the management operations of the Secretariat, (2) improving oversight, (3) promoting ethical conduct, (4) reviewing and updating programs and activities, and (5) creating a Human Rights Council. However, most efforts are awaiting General Assembly review or have been recently approved. In addition, many proposed or approved reforms do not have an implementation plan that establishes time frames and cost estimates. Appendix II summarizes the status of major management reforms. Proposals to improve the management operations of the Secretariat have either been approved or are awaiting General Assembly review. To improve the management operations of the Secretariat, the September 2005 outcome document requested that the Secretary-General develop proposals to ensure that the existing policies, regulations, and rules used to manage budgetary, financial, and human resources are aligned with the current needs of the UN. In response, the Secretary-General submitted a report to the General Assembly in March that included 23 proposals to improve the UN’s effectiveness. However, the ACABQ recommended that the Secretary-General provide more details, including specific costs and administrative implications, and time lines for implementation. In April 2006, members of the Fifth Committee voted and approved a proposal introduced by the G-77 countries that the Secretary-General elaborate on the proposals and give concrete examples of how the initiatives could correct deficiencies and make the organization’s work more effective. The vote signified the breakdown of the policy of making decisions by consensus, a practice used for 20 years. Further, the United States expressed concern that the G-77’s proposal was a way to scale back the reforms proposed in the Secretary-General’s March 2006 report. In May 2006, the General Assembly voted and approved a resolution that incorporated the recommendations made by the Fifth Committee. See figure 1 for key dates for reform initiatives related to improving the management operations of the Secretariat. In response to the General Assembly’s request for more information, the Secretariat issued seven detailed reports in May and June 2006 that included information on various initiatives, such as information and communication technology, financial management practices, and procurement reform. In July 2006, member states approved a resolution that, according to UN officials and member state representatives, was a positive step toward addressing several management reform initiatives. The status of several reforms to improve the management operations of the Secretariat is as follows: Since the Secretary-General has limited authority to shift resources between programs without the approval of the member states, the Secretary-General in his March 2006 report noted that more flexibility in this area could enable the Secretariat to respond more effectively to the changing needs of the organization. In July 2006, the General Assembly gave the Secretary-General, on an experimental basis, limited discretion over budgetary commitments up to $20 million per biennium. The impact of this reform will be reviewed in 2009. According to the Secretary-General, the UN has outdated and fragmented information technology systems that have limited capacity for processing and sharing data. Moreover, at least six departments have disparate information technology units with no integrating mechanism in place. The Secretary-General’s March 2006 report recommended the creation of a chief information technology officer position to oversee the creation and implementation of an information management strategy for the Secretariat. In July 2006, the General Assembly agreed to create the position of a chief information technology officer and upgrade certain elements of the UN’s computer systems. In addition, the Secretary- General’s information technology detailed report did not include a comprehensive implementation plan for this proposal. According to State and UN officials, the Secretary-General plans to submit a comprehensive report that includes cost estimates in March 2007. GAO and others have reported that UN procurement resources are unnecessarily vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse. The Secretariat’s June 2006 procurement report included several proposals that could be implemented over an 18-month period to strengthen UN procurement practices. However, the report does not specify milestones that need to be completed during the 18 months. The General Assembly is expected to discuss this report in fall 2006. In the meantime, in July 2006, the General Assembly authorized funding of approximately $700,000, which UN officials plan to use for six new temporary procurement positions for 6 months. However, according to a senior U.S. official, these temporary posts are not sufficient to address weaknesses in the procurement system, and qualified procurement officers are not likely to accept temporary jobs. As of September 2006, one temporary procurement staff member had been hired. According to the Secretary-General, staff skills are not aligned with the current needs of the organization. The Secretary-General’s March 2006 report included proposals to improve recruitment processes, facilitate staff mobility between headquarters and field offices, and dedicate resources to conduct a one-time staff buyout. In late September 2006, the Secretary-General issued a detailed human resources report. The General Assembly is expected to discuss the report in fall 2006. Some of the proposed or approved reforms to improve the operations of the Secretariat do not have an implementation plan that establishes time frames and cost estimates. Of the Secretary-General’s seven detailed reports issued in May and June 2006, only the proposal for adoption of the International Public Sector Accounting Standards includes a detailed timetable for implementation. The Secretary-General’s June 2006 procurement report included several proposals that could be implemented over an 18-month period, but the report does not include specific milestones. Reforms proposed to create an independent oversight advisory committee and to strengthen the capacity of OIOS are awaiting review by the General Assembly in fall 2006. In the outcome document, member states agreed to consider the creation of an independent oversight advisory committee. In November 2005, the Secretary-General proposed the creation of the Independent Audit Advisory Committee and drafted provisional terms of reference for this entity. In December 2005, the General Assembly approved the creation of the committee and requested an external evaluation of the proposed terms of reference. In addition, in the September 2005 outcome document, member states recognized the urgent need to strengthen the expertise, capacity, and resources of OIOS’s auditing and investigative functions We and others have reported that OIOS’s independence and ability to perform as the principal auditing and investigative body of the UN have been hampered by the UN’s funding process and lack of resources. Moreover, in the outcome document, member states requested an independent external evaluation of the UN’s auditing and oversight system. The Secretary-General submitted the external evaluation in July 2006. See figure 2 for key dates associated with oversight reform initiatives. The July 2006 external evaluation reviewed the draft terms of reference for the Independent Audit Advisory Committee and recommended several changes, specifically with respect to the number, appointment criteria, terms, and compensation of members of the committee. The external independent evaluation also recommended the complete and prompt implementation of the committee. In addition, the evaluation recommended that the committee be responsible for presenting the budget for OIOS to the Fifth Committee, thereby relieving the ACABQ of its advisory role in this regard. The July 2006 external evaluation included a detailed review of OIOS that found that OIOS is not able to function effectively under its current mandate and made 23 recommendations in nine areas to strengthen its capacity. The external review stated that OIOS’s current structure is impeding its independence and reducing its effectiveness. It also stated that OIOS should focus on internal auditing and recommended shifting several OIOS functions, such as investigations, to departments in the Secretariat. However, various UN and U.S. officials stated that a shift of functions such as that proposed in the external review could significantly diminish the UN’s oversight functions and the independence of its investigations. For example, these officials said that moving investigations to the Secretariat could create a potential conflict of interest. However, according to UN Secretariat officials, the Secretariat has a positive view of the results of the independent external review and supports most of the recommendations, and not all UN Secretariat officials view the proposed recommendation as a way to diminish the UN’s oversight functions or the independence of its investigations. In addition, in a report submitted to the Secretary-General in July 2006, OIOS strongly disagreed with the restructuring proposals but recognized the need to reassess the functions and work processes of its Investigations Division. OIOS indicated that it will undertake a review of that division that will be completed by the end of 2006. OIOS’s July 2006 report included its own proposals for strengthening its capacity. The OIOS report indicated that some recommendations of the external review will require consideration by the General Assembly, but that many are being considered for implementation under the authority of the Under Secretary-General for Internal Oversight Services. The OIOS report discussed 14 of the recommendations made by the external review and generally agreed with most of them, such as training of OIOS staff, human resource management, and information and communications technology. However, as discussed above, OIOS strongly disagreed with the recommendations that would restructure it. The UN established an ethics office in January 2006 but, as of September 2006 it continues to operate with interim staff, and some experts, including a panel commissioned by a UN staff union to review the UN’s internal justice system, have questioned the sufficiency of the number of staff in the office. Since January 2006, the office’s six interim staff members have developed and implemented activities associated with the ethics office’s four areas of responsibility: (1) administering the UN’s financial disclosure program, (2) implementing the new UN whistleblower protection policy, (3) providing guidance to staff on ethics issues, and (4) developing ethics standards and training. For example, the interim staff members have undertaken preliminary reviews of claims of retaliation for whistleblowing and have collected financial disclosure forms from UN managers. As the office is new and in the process of hiring permanent staff, it is too early to determine whether the office will be able to fully carry out its mandate. See figure 3 for key dates associated with the establishment of the ethics office. Before creating the ethics office, the UN Secretariat did not have a way to coordinate ethics-related initiatives within the organization and to ensure that all staff are aware of and updated on ethics issues. The 2005 outcome document specifically requested that the Secretary-General develop a detailed proposal for an independent ethics office. The Secretary-General developed and submitted this proposal in November 2005, and the General Assembly approved it in December 2005. The ethics office began operating in January 2006 as an independent entity reporting directly to the Secretary-General and by March 2006 it was staffed with one director, four staff members, and a consultant, all temporarily assigned to the office. These staff have been establishing and documenting the procedures the office follows in carrying out its duties. The UN is in the process of hiring permanent staff to replace the interim staff. The office has four main areas of responsibility and has made some progress in fulfilling each as follows: The ethics office is responsible for administering the UN’s financial disclosure program to ensure that staff comply with applicable conflict of interest rules and standards of conduct. Designated UN staff— those at and above the director level and all staff carrying out procurement and investment functions—are required to file an annual confidential statement of their financial interests. This policy applies to about 1,800 UN staff and as of July 31, 2006, the ethics office had received 90 percent of their financial disclosure statements. The ethics office is currently reviewing bids from contractors to carry out the review and audit of these forms. The Secretariat recommended that the review be conducted by independent financial experts, as is the practice at the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), to safeguard the confidentiality of senior officials’ private financial information. The ethics office will keep these financial disclosure forms confidential, but a report by a panel of experts reviewing the UN’s internal justice system recommended that the office maintain the forms in a public register. The ethics office is implementing the UN’s new whistleblower protection policy, which took effect in January 2006. When a staff member contacts the ethics office with a complaint that he or she has been retaliated against for reporting misconduct, the office conducts a preliminary review to determine if the case should move forward for formal investigation by OIOS. The ethics office staff review the evidence presented by the claimant, interview the party accused of retaliation, and talk to other staff involved. If the ethics office determines that the case is an interpersonal problem within a particular office, rather than a case of retaliation for whistleblowing, it advises the staff member concerned of the existence of the Office of the Ombudsman and other informal conflict resolution mechanisms within the organization. If a case of retaliation is established after investigation by OIOS, the ethics office takes into account any recommendations made by OIOS and recommends appropriate measures aimed at correcting the negative consequences suffered as a result of the retaliatory action. As of July 31, 2006, the office had received 45 complaints of retaliation for reporting misconduct, one of which they submitted for further investigation. Ethics office staff told us that they track all whistleblowing complaints that are brought to their attention, including those referred to other offices. Staff also said that the time they spend on each case of whistleblower retaliation varies from several hours to more than 45 days. As part of its regular duties, the ethics office provides confidential guidance to staff on ethics issues. To fulfill this responsibility, the ethics office operates an ethics helpline to answer questions from and provide advice to UN staff. UN staff have used the helpline to make whistleblower retaliation complaints. Staff can also contact the office in person, by mail or e-mail, or by fax. The ethics office is responsible for developing ethics standards and content for training, which all UN staff will be expected to take annually, and it is working to provide clear guidance to staff on ethics regulations, rules, and standards. The Office of Human Resources Management, in consultation with the ethics office staff, has developed a half-day ethics workshop for all staff and has worked to ensure that ethics issues are incorporated into courses on other topics, such as procurement. The ethics office has developed an intranet site for UN staff that provides general information about the office as well as UN ethics issues and standards. While the interim staff in the ethics office have been undertaking activities consistent with their responsibilities, questions have been raised about the capacity of this office to fulfill its mandate. One nongovernmental organization said the UN’s whistleblower protection policy created a new benchmark for such policies in other intergovernmental organizations, such as the World Bank and IMF. However, it questioned the UN’s implementation of the policy, citing the low number of staff in the ethics office and the amount of time it is taking to conduct preliminary reviews of whistleblower retaliation cases. In addition, in a report endorsed by a UN staff union, a commission of experts criticized the UN’s implementation of the whistleblower protection policy and made several recommendations that, if adopted, would change the responsibilities and structure of the ethics office. The U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN has also cited the UN staff union’s concerns about the capacity of the ethics office to fulfill its responsibilities. The appropriate number of staff assigned to the ethics office has been in question since the office’s inception. The Secretariat originally requested funding for 16 staff positions for the ethics office, including liaison posts in UN offices in Vienna, Nairobi, and Geneva, to provide the office with greater proximity to the two-thirds of UN employees located in field offices around the world. However, the General Assembly, following the recommendation of the ACABQ, approved funding for only six positions, with no posts in the field. The ACABQ reported that the office could operate with fewer staff than requested, given the office’s uncertain workload at its inception, and that its workload would be reduced after the initial work of developing standards and training was complete. The Special Advisor to the Secretary-General for the ethics office, who is overseeing the new office, stated that the number of staff assigned to the office is currently appropriate. The interim staff said that the office needs more resources, particularly additional staff, given its number of responsibilities and activities. A representative from a nongovernmental organization with expertise in whistleblower protection also stated that the ethics office has too few resources to carry out its duties. In addition, the panel of experts commissioned by a UN staff union to review the UN’s internal justice system stated that it is critical that the ethics office be given adequate resources, including representation in the UN’s regional offices, to fulfill its responsibilities. The ethics office submitted a status report to the General Assembly in September 2006 that suggested that the office may need additional staff and resources in the future. Member state review of all UN programs and activities has been slow because of disagreements on both the scope and process; therefore, it is unlikely that the December 2006 deadline to complete the review will be met. In the 2005 outcome document, member states requested a review of all UN programs and activities, or mandates, that were created 5 or more years ago (see fig. 4 below for key dates in the review process) to strengthen and update UN programs and activities to more accurately reflect the current needs of the organization. The UN does not have a system for regularly evaluating the effectiveness of its mandates, which make up its main body of work. The General Assembly, Economic and Social Council, and the Security Council each adopt new mandates every year on many of the same issues, which can lead to interrelated and overlapping mandates. As a result, the Secretariat’s implementation of these mandates may be uncoordinated and inconsistent. UN member states agreed at the 2005 World Summit to undertake in 2006 a review of UN mandates older than 5 years to update the UN’s programs and activities so that they respond to the current needs of member states. Member states did not establish milestones for this review, but said it should be completed by 2006. In March 2006, the Secretary-General issued a report that provided a framework for conducting this review, including a recommendation to conduct the review in two phases, and compiled an electronic inventory of about 9,000 total mandates, over 6,900 of which are older than 5 years, originating from the three principal UN organs—the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, and the Security Council. The General Assembly, which has responsibility for about 80 percent of the mandates, began discussions on the mandate review process in November 2005 and started substantive discussions on specific mandates in April 2006. The Security Council and Economic and Social Council began their respective reviews in May 2006. During these discussions, countries and groups of countries made proposals on the process for the review and on how to handle specific mandates. For example, one country proposed that the mandate review process involve roundtable discussions and informal debates. Another proposal, with regard to a specific mandate, was to consolidate the Secretariat’s working papers on individual and small island territories. During the discussions, some countries requested more information from the Secretariat on certain mandates, such as how one mandate might be duplicative of another, or which UN departments or entities are involved in implementing each mandate. Throughout the review process, member states have disagreed about which mandates to include in the review and what to do with any savings generated by the potential elimination or consolidation of mandates, which has led to slow and limited progress. Members of the G-77 contend that the scope of the review should include only those mandates older than 5 years that have not been renewed since they were adopted. This represents about 626 mandates, or 7 percent of the total number of mandates (see fig. 5). The United States and other developed countries, including Japan, Australia, Canada, and the European Union, argue that the review should include all mandates older than 5 years, whether or not they have been renewed. Using these criteria, the review would include an additional 6,347 mandates. The G-77 established several criteria under which it would consider reviewing mandates that are older than 5 years: (1) member states must first agree that any savings derived from the mandate review will be reinvested in the areas from which they were derived, or in UN activities in the development area and (2) all politically sensitive mandates must be excluded from the review process. The United States has stated that a decision about the use of cost savings from the mandate review should be made once the review is complete. In addition, the United States maintains that no mandates older than 5 years, including those that are controversial, should be excluded from the review. Despite disagreement on which General Assembly mandates to review, member states decided in June 2006 to move forward with the first phase, which consists of reviewing 399 mandates that are older than 5 years and have not been renewed within the last 5 years. Mandates that are older than 5 years and have been renewed could be reviewed in a second phase. Mandates in phase one include completed projects, such as a 1965 resolution requesting that the Secretary-General convene a conference on the World Food Program. Although most of the mandates in this category do not require any further action or resources from the UN, member states could only agree to set aside 74 of them, which they classified as completed, meaning they have been acted upon and completely implemented and do not require further action at this time. Additionally, they decided that 33 mandates are not applicable to the review. The remaining 292 mandates included in phase one may be reviewed in phase two if member states believe they need further discussion. See table 1 for details on the status of mandates considered in phase one. As of September 2006, after beginning discussions on specific mandates in April 2006, member states had not agreed to change, eliminate, or retain any mandates. On September 1, 2006, leaders of the working group on mandate review developed a proposal suggesting terms under which member states would move forward into phase two of the review, but as of the end of September member states had not accepted it. The proposal suggests that member states reallocate within the UN budget any savings from mandate review according to normal budgetary procedures and that they reinvest any savings from development activities into other development activities. In addition, the proposal recommends that member states agree to address politically sensitive mandates carefully and take into account the positions of member states concerned. Given the volume of mandates still to be discussed and the contentious nature of the review process, the prospects for completing the review by the end of 2006 are unlikely. In March 2006, the UN voted to create a new UN Human Rights Council to replace the Commission on Human Rights; however, significant concerns remain about the council’s structure. UN member states generally agreed that the Commission on Human Rights should be improved as it was no longer seen as a credible institution for protecting human rights, due to a number of weaknesses. For example, according to human rights organizations, countries known to be human rights violators were consistently selected for membership to the commission and used their membership to protect themselves against criticism of their human rights records. Furthermore, the commission did not criticize the actions of several countries that were found to be abusers of human rights, including Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and Zimbabwe. As a result, the member states agreed at the 2005 World Summit to create a new Human Rights Council that would improve upon these deficiencies. UN member states voted to establish the council in March 2006 and elected members in May 2006. (See fig. 6 for key dates for the Human Rights Council.) In establishing the new Human Rights Council, UN member states aimed to address some of the deficiencies in the 53-member Commission on Human Rights. The 47 members of the new council must be elected individually to the body by a majority of UN members. Previously, candidates were grouped into slates of countries representing regions, and members would vote on the entire slate rather than for an individual country on the slate. The United States sought a significantly smaller body and advocated that to gain membership on the council, members should be elected by the higher standard of a two-thirds majority, rather than an absolute majority, to make it more difficult for repressive countries that have not demonstrated a commitment to human rights to gain seats on the council. Members can now be suspended from the council by a two-thirds majority vote if they are found to have committed gross violations of human rights. When voting for candidates to the council, UN member states are instructed to take into account each country’s human rights record, a measure that was not called for when voting for candidates to the commission. The United States wanted to automatically exclude from council membership any country under Security Council sanctions, but that provision was not included in the final design of the body. When elections to the council were held in May 2006, several countries with questionable human rights records were elected, including China, Russia, and Cuba. However, other countries that previously served on the commission and have questionable human rights records did not even run for election, including Zimbabwe, Sudan, and North Korea. In addition, Iran campaigned for a seat on the Council but did not win. The Human Rights Council will also operate differently from the commission. The council will meet more frequently and can more readily call special sessions to address emerging human rights situations than could the commission. The council will meet at least three times a year for a total of 10 weeks, while the commission met once a year for a total of 6 weeks. Furthermore, the council is required to periodically review the human rights records of all UN member states, a procedure the commission lacked. Members of the council will be the first to undergo these reviews and will be required to cooperate with investigators. The council is currently developing the procedures it will follow when conducting the reviews. Finally, member states made the council a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, elevating it from the commission’s status as part of the Economic and Social Council. While the United States voted against the creation of the new Human Rights Council, stating that it did not sufficiently improve upon the former commission, many nongovernmental organizations and other UN members have stated that the council is better equipped than the commission was to address urgent, serious, and long-running human rights situations around the world. Of the UN member states participating in the vote on the creation of the council, 170 voted in favor, while 4 voted against. The United States did not run for election to the body but has agreed to provide funding for it. Representatives from one group of member states said that they were disappointed the United States did not run for election because it was important to have the United States on the council from its inception, to show support for the new body. The council meets in Geneva and met for the first time in June 2006 and a second time in September 2006. It plans to meet again in November 2006. The council held special sessions in summer 2006 on the situation of human rights in Palestine and other Arab territories. It is too early to determine the impact of the new council on the UN and human rights worldwide. We identified several factors that may impede the UN’s progress toward full implementation of management reforms: (1) considerable disagreement within the General Assembly over their overall implications; (2) absence of an implementation plan for each reform that includes time frames and cost estimates; and (3) administrative guidance that may complicate the process of implementing certain human resource initiatives. Disagreement between G-77 and developed countries over the broader implications of management reforms may affect the UN’s ability to fully implement them. According to UN and member state officials, the G-77 is concerned that some of the reforms could increase the authority of the Secretariat at the expense of the General Assembly, thus decreasing the G-77’s influence over UN operations. Further, according to several UN and member state officials, most developed countries view management reform as a way to increase organizational effectiveness, whereas the G-77 countries perceive that developed countries view certain reform initiatives, such as mandate review, as cost-cutting exercises. Moreover, UN officials and member state representatives told us that a disagreement over a 6-month spending cap served to unify the G-77 countries and weaken the cohesion between developed countries. According to UN and member state representatives, the budget cap initially served to focus attention on the need to make progress on the reform initiatives. However, according to member state representatives, the spending cap made it more difficult to reach consensus on management reforms. On June 30, 2006, the General Assembly decided to lift the spending cap. According to UN officials and member state representatives, now that the cap is lifted, implementation of the reforms can continue, but questions remain about the pace and priorities for implementation of the reforms. Disagreement between the G-77 countries and the developed countries over the details of implementing the initiatives could continue to affect their progress. Member states disagree on some of the specifics of the reforms in areas such as the review of programs and activities and the details for creating the Human Rights Council, as discussed earlier, as well as the role of the Deputy Secretary-General. For example, two independent studies recommended the creation of a chief operating officer position and the Secretary-General’s March 2006 report recommended that the Deputy Secretary-General assume formal authority and accountability for the management and overall direction of the Secretariat’s operations. However, the spokesperson for the G-77 countries has stated in the Fifth Committee and in the General Assembly that, according to the UN charter, the Secretary-General is the UN’s Chief Administrative Officer and thus responsible for the organization’s management. In May 2006, the General Assembly passed a resolution that noted that the function of the post of Deputy Secretary-General should not diminish the role or responsibilities of the Secretary-General. The resolution further noted that the overall responsibility for management of the Organization rests with the Secretary-General. Therefore, it will be up to the discretion of the next Secretary-General to decide on the delegation of authority to his/her deputy. (App. II provides more information on the disagreements specific to each reform.) For many of the management reform proposals, the UN has not developed comprehensive implementation plans with associated time frames, cost estimates, and potential savings. Setting an implementation time line is a key practice for organizations undergoing change. However, many UN proposals we reviewed that are related to management reform do not include specific time frames. For example, although a senior U.S. official said that the July 2006 resolution is a positive step toward implementation of certain reforms, he noted that the section on oversight does not provide concrete actions. In addition, the resolution does not include specific time frames for implementing a fully operational ethics office or the Independent Audit Advisory Committee. Without establishing deadlines, it is difficult to hold managers accountable for completing reform efforts. Moreover, without comprehensive implementation plans, the total budgetary implications of the reform efforts are not clear. The UN has not developed or refined cost estimates for many of the initiatives, including improving certain field staff benefits and conditions to mirror those of headquarters staff; increasing investments in human resource development; introducing a new information communications technology system; and approving a staff buyout program. However, the Secretary-General has developed preliminary cost estimates for three key initiatives that alone could cost over $500 million—the proposed new information communications technology system ($120 million over several years), a one-time staff buyout ($50 to $100 million), and efforts to improve field staff benefits ($280 million annually). Moreover, the UN Secretariat said that these estimates will require further assessments before reliable estimates and a plan of action can be determined. Without determining cost estimates, it is difficult to ensure that financing will be available when needed. Likewise, the UN has not yet developed savings estimates because certain initiatives will require further assessment and then approval by the General Assembly. The Secretary-General anticipates that the costs for the reforms could be offset by savings from efforts such as relocation and outsourcing and the long-term benefits of a more efficiently run organization. However, the UN has not yet produced any concrete savings estimates, and efforts to produce savings have faced significant challenges. For instance, the Secretary-General said that the cost could be partially offset by savings in procurement reform. However, UN officials said that the UN Secretariat has not yet developed firm procurement savings estimates. In addition, proposals to streamline the way in which the organization delivers its services, which may result in savings, have experienced resistance from member states and staff members. In May 2006, the G-77 did not authorize the Secretary-General to conduct a cost- benefit analysis of his proposal to relocate translation, editing, and document production services. Public documents do not specify the G-77’s reason for not allowing a cost-benefit analysis to be undertaken. Further, the outsourcing of internal printing and publishing processes could generate savings but, according to UN officials, it could also face challenges from member states and staff to implement. To develop or refine cost and savings estimates, the Secretariat is conducting cost-benefit analyses and assessments in areas such as the proposed new information communications technology system, outsourcing and relocation, staff buyout, and public access to UN information. Appendix IV provides information on the reviews, assessments, and cost-benefit analyses that the Secretariat is preparing, including their expected time frames for completion to the extent stated by the UN. However, some of the cost-benefit analyses and assessments will not be available until March 2007 for member states to consider, and these will have a bearing on the overall reform package and, ultimately, the total cost of the reform. To date, the additional cost to member states to implement certain management reform initiatives has been about $40 million, which primarily reflects start-up costs for efforts such as the adoption of the International Public Sector Accounting Standards, the new ethics office, additional costs for the new Human Rights Council, and an increase to the working capital fund (see table 2). Therefore, based on the slow pace of the reform process and the time frames for completion of the assessments and cost-benefit analyses, the total budgetary implications of the reform effort, including the U.S. government’s share, remain unclear. Administrative guidance, such as staff regulations and rules that implement General Assembly resolutions, could complicate and sometimes restrict the process of implementing certain human resource initiatives. According to the Secretary-General, the existing human resources management framework was designed for a stable, largely headquarters-based environment, and currently more than half of the UN’s 30,000 staff members are serving in the field. The Secretary-General also said that the Secretariat’s increasingly complex mandates require a new skills profile that will enable it to respond in an integrated way to new needs in diverse areas such as peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance. In addition, salaries and other human resource costs comprise almost 80 percent of the UN regular budget. As such, UN officials state that it would be impossible to achieve meaningful management reform without reforming human resources. The Secretary-General has proposed several human resource reforms, such as a staff buyout, replacing permanent contracts with open-ended appointments, better integration of staff worldwide, and outsourcing. However, administrative guidance may complicate the process of implementing some initiatives, such as: In September 2005, member states agreed to consider a proposal from the Secretary-General for a one-time staff buyout. According to the Secretary- General, to target staff for buyout the UN Secretariat must analyze and determine the skills needed in the organization, taking into account proposed reform efforts such as relocation of work, outsourcing, and mandate review. Staff performing administrative functions that are targeted for outsourcing may be offered a buyout if their skills are no longer needed by the UN. The Secretary-General must also conduct consultations with UN staff representatives. UN officials said that it may be difficult for the Secretary-General, staff representatives, and member states to agree on the skills required to realign staff with the UN’s priorities. In addition, some of the cost-benefit analyses for the relocation and outsourcing initiatives will not be completed until March 2007. The UN Secretariat is developing a more integrated approach for staff to serve worldwide. However, UN officials said that staff may find ways to resist efforts to be transferred, especially if a transfer would result in leaving UN Headquarters or other desirable duty stations. According to the Secretary-General, staff are not sufficiently mobile, and their movement is hampered by multiple and restrictive mandates. The Secretary-General proposed the integration of field and headquarters staff into one global Secretariat with competitive conditions of service. This would include changing the staff rules to create one staff contract to mirror that of headquarters staff. Based on a study prepared in January 2006 by the International Civil Service Commission for the General Assembly, this proposed integration raises a number of complicated policy questions that will need to be addressed, including long-term contractual obligations, cost implications related to differences in the compensation packages, distortion of geographical distribution and gender balance, and complications for merit-based, transparent, and open selection procedures. Further, according to UN officials, proposals to reconsider a change in the way the UN delivers its services by relocating and outsourcing certain headquarters functions may meet with resistance from some member states and staff as jobs may be lost. According to the Secretary-General, the General Assembly established a number of conditions for outsourcing that severely restrict the circumstances under which it can be contemplated. One of those restrictions includes avoiding possible negative impact on staff. Thus, restrictive conditions such as these could complicate the process of implementing certain human resource initiatives. During the past few years, the inadequate oversight of the Oil for Food program and mismanagement of UN procurement activities have demonstrated the urgent need for UN management reform. Several independent reports in 2005 found that inefficient UN management operations persist and discuss the immediate need for management reform given the growth in complexity and significance of UN worldwide operations within the past decade. Despite several past reform efforts, long-standing concerns about weak UN management functions remain. As the largest financial contributor to the UN, the United States has taken a leadership role in calling for improved management processes. In addition, the United States, through the Department of State and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, continues to take measures to advance reform of UN management processes. However, progress in management reform efforts has been slow. Proposals awaiting review cannot progress until the General Assembly approves them through a process that traditionally requires agreement by all 192 UN member states, and consensus building can be a difficult and lengthy process. Moreover, the UN has not agreed upon implementation plans for each reform effort that include established time frames and cost estimates—practices that increase the transparency and accountability of the reform process. The Secretary-General’s proposal for the adoption of International Public Sector Accounting Standards is a step toward increased transparency and accountability because it includes a detailed timetable for implementation. Until the UN undergoes successful management reform, its ability to respond effectively and efficiently to increasingly complex international crises is diminished. We recommend that the Secretary of State and the U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN work with other member states to encourage the General Assembly and the Secretary-General to include cost estimates and expected time frames for implementation and completion for each reform as it is approved. We also recommend that the Secretary of State’s annual U.S. Participation in the United Nations report to the Congress include a section on the status and progress of the major UN management reforms. The Department of State provided written comments on a draft of this report (see app. V). The Department of State agreed with our recommendations and stated that it will continue to work toward creating a more effective and accountable United Nations. In particular, it noted that it has seen too little in terms of results since the September 2005 Summit. Moreover, the Department of State also said that the Secretariat should be held accountable for implementing these reforms and will continue to work with other member states toward ensuring that a transparent reporting mechanism to the General Assembly is established. The Department of State also concurred fully with the need to keep the U.S. Congress informed of these management reform initiatives and will continue to monitor and inform the Congress as recommended. The UN did not provide written comments. In addition, the Department of State and the United Nations provided technical comments on our draft report, which were incorporated into the text where appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to interested members of the Congress, the Secretary of State, and the U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-9601 or melitot@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI. To identify and track management reforms, we reviewed key documents proposing United Nations (UN) management and human rights reforms and interviewed key officials. We obtained and reviewed official reports of the Secretariat and the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) documents, General Assembly resolutions, Secretary-General bulletins, Web sites, related budget documents, and statements from UN officials. We interviewed senior officials from UN departments in New York City. Specifically, we met with officials from the General Assembly Office of the President, the Office of the Deputy Secretary-General, the Departments of Management and Policy and Planning, ACABQ, the Office of Program Planning and Budget (OPPBA), and OIOS. During the course of our review, we also discussed the status of UN reforms with Department of State officials in Washington, D.C., and New York City. We selected reforms in the areas of management operations of the Secretariat, oversight, ethical conduct, review of programs and activities, and human rights to track in more detail. We determined that these were key areas of management reform through our review of UN documents and in our discussions with UN and U.S. officials. We focused our work on management reforms that began in 2005 and did not specifically address the 1997 and 2002 reform agendas. The 2005 reforms applied to the Secretariat and the UN’s governing bodies, including the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, and the Security Council. We did not include UN specialized agencies or funds and programs in our review. Other reform efforts such as the UN Peace Building Commission, Security Council reform, and governance were beyond the scope of this review. To determine the factors facing the implementation of UN reforms, we reviewed reports and documentation of the Secretariat, General Assembly, OIOS, Joint Inspection Unit, and International Civil Service Commission. In addition, we spoke with UN officials in New York. These included officials from the Office of the Deputy Secretary-General, the Department of Management, ACABQ, OPPBA, and OIOS. We also met with representatives from several member states and spoke with U.S. officials in Washington, D.C., and New York. We also interviewed outside observers of the UN system, including nongovernmental organizations and members of academia. Many cost estimates for the proposed reform initiatives are preliminary, and detailed cost estimates are being developed; therefore, we did not analyze the assumptions underlying these estimates to determine whether they are reasonable and reliable. To determine the reliability of data in the UN’s inventory of about 9,000 programs and activities (mandates) that are older than 5 years, we interviewed UN officials and performed some basic cross checks. The scope of the mandate review covers mandates of the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, and the Security Council that are older than 5 years and are active or potentially active. According to the Secretary-General, the resolutions adopted from year to year by each of the principal organs are the primary source of mandates. The Secretary-General also said that mandates are not easily defined or quantifiable, and a concrete legal definition of a mandate does not exist. In addition, the UN updates its inventory of mandates on a regular basis. We performed our analysis as of September 2006. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of establishing the approximate number of mandates and comparing the approximate number of mandates that have and have not been renewed in the last 5 years. Further, we believe that the cost estimates and the associated funds that the General Assembly appropriated to date for reform efforts are sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We performed our work between January and September 2006 in accordance with generally accepted U.S. government auditing standards. We identified and tracked the status of management reform initiatives in five key areas—management of the Secretariat, oversight, ethical conduct, review of programs and activities, and human rights—and identified disagreements among member states that may affect their implementation. Table 3 provides information on the status of major United Nations (UN) management reform initiatives, actions that are still pending, and points of disagreement. All dates are in 2006 unless otherwise indicated. The United Nations (UN) ethics office is implementing the UN’s new whistleblower protection policy, which took effect in January 2006. The policy protects UN staff from retaliation for reporting misconduct of any other staff. Retaliation, as defined in the policy, includes any detrimental action recommended, threatened, or taken because an individual reported misconduct or cooperated with an authorized audit or investigation. The policy shifts the burden of proof for retaliation to the UN organization and away from individuals, requiring the organization to prove in each case that the alleged retaliatory action is unrelated to the report of misconduct. According to the policy, the ethics office is responsible for receiving complaints about threatened or actual acts of retaliation against staff and keeping confidential records of all complaints received. The office is also responsible for conducting a preliminary review of the complaint to determine if the complainant engaged in an activity protected by the whistleblower protection policy, and there is sufficient evidence that the protected activity was a contributing factor in causing the alleged retaliation or threat of retaliation. In order for an individual to receive protection under the whistleblower protection policy, the report of misconduct should be made as soon as possible and no more than 6 years after the individual becomes aware of the misconduct. The individual reporting misconduct must submit information or evidence to support a reasonable belief that misconduct has occurred. UN staff may make reports of misconduct through established internal mechanisms including Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), the Assistant Secretary-General for Human Resources Management, and the head of the department or office concerned. The whistleblower protection policy also protects staff who report misconduct to external mechanisms, such as the media or outside organizations, provided that all internal mechanisms have been exhausted. The UN is the first intergovernmental organization to provide such protection. Staff who believe that retaliatory action has been taken against them because they have reported misconduct or cooperated with an authorized audit or investigation are directed to forward all information and documentation to support their complaint to the ethics office. The whistleblower protection policy states that such complaints can be made in person, by regular mail, e-mail, fax, or through the ethics office helpline. Once the ethics office receives a complaint, it conducts a preliminary review, which should be completed within 45 days. According to staff in the ethics office, they try to complete their reviews within that time frame, but, in some cases, they need more time to speak to everyone involved in the case. In reviewing a case, the ethics office reviews the evidence presented by the complainant and interviews the individual being accused and any other witnesses of the alleged retaliation. If the ethics office finds that there is a credible case of retaliation or threat of retaliation, it refers the matter in writing to OIOS for investigation and immediately notifies the complainant, in writing, that his or her case has been referred. According to the whistleblower protection policy, OIOS seeks to complete its investigation and write a report within 120 days. The report is submitted to the ethics office. Once the ethics office receives the investigation report, it informs the complainant, in writing, of the outcome of the investigation and makes recommendations on the case to the head of the department or office concerned and to the Under-Secretary-General for management. The ethics office may recommend that disciplinary actions be taken against the retaliator. It may also recommend that measures be taken to correct the negative consequences suffered by the complainant as a result of the retaliatory action, including reinstatement or transfer to another office or function for which the individual is qualified. If the ethics office is not satisfied with the response from the head of the department or office concerned, it can make a recommendation directly to the Secretary- General, who then provides a written response to the ethics office and the head of the office concerned. The whistleblower protection policy states that retaliation against an individual for reporting misconduct is itself misconduct and will lead to disciplinary action. The United Nations (UN) Secretariat is currently conducting a number of assessments, cost-benefit analyses, and comprehensive reports. We identified a number of key studies that include a detailed cost study for the proposed new information communications technology system, assessments of a staff buyout, and cost-benefit analyses of outsourcing internal printing and publishing processes, and the relocation of information technology support services. Some of these assessments will not be available for member states to consider until early 2007. In addition, the projected completion dates represent the dates when the UN Secretariat is expected to complete the reports and forward them to the legislative bodies for review. It is not clear when the General Assembly will review and make a decision on these initiatives. Table 4 lists the key assessments, cost-benefit analyses, and comprehensive reports that the UN Secretariat is currently conducting. The UN Secretariat did not provide us with detailed information, such as status and projected completion date for each initiative. In addition to the individual named above, Phillip Thomas, Assistant Director; Jeanette Espinola, Stephanie Robinson, and Barbara Shields made key contributions to this report. Debbie J. Chung, Martin De Alteriis, Etana Finkler, and Grace Lui provided technical assistance. United Nations: Weaknesses in Internal Oversight and Procurement Could Affect the Effective Implementation of the Planned Renovation. GAO-06-877T. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2006. United Nations: Oil for Food Program Provides Lessons for Future Sanctions and Ongoing Reform, GAO-06-711T. Washington, D.C.: May 2, 2006. United Nations: Internal Oversight and Procurement Controls and Processes Need Strengthening. GAO-06-710T. Washington, D.C.: April 27, 2006. United Nations: Funding Arrangements Impede Independence of Internal Auditors. GAO-06-575. Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2006. United Nations: Lessons from Oil for Food Program Indicate Need to Strengthen Internal Controls and Oversight, GAO-06-330. Washington, D.C.: Apr. 25, 2006. United Nations: Procurement Internal Controls Are Weak, GAO-06-577. Washington, D.C., April 25, 2006. Peacekeeping: Cost Comparison of Actual UN and Hypothetical U.S. Operations in Haiti. GAO-06-331. Washington, D.C.: February 21, 2006. United Nations: Preliminary Observations on Internal Oversight and Procurement Practices, GAO-06-226T. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2005. United Nations: Sustained Oversight Is Needed for Reforms to Achieve Lasting Results, GAO-05-392T. Washington, D.C.: March 2, 2005. United Nations: Oil for Food Program Audits, GAO-05-346T. Washington, D.C.: February 15, 2005. United Nations: Observations on the Oil for Food Program and Areas for Further Investigation. GAO-04-953T. Washington, D.C.: July 8, 2004. United Nations: Observations on the Oil for Food Program and Iraq’s Food Security. GAO-04-880T. Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2004. United Nations: Observations on the Management and Oversight of the Oil for Food Program. GAO-04-730T. Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2004. United Nations: Observations on the Oil for Food Program. GAO-04- 651T. Washington, D.C.: April 7, 2004. Recovering Iraq’s Assets: Preliminary Observations on U.S. Efforts and Challenges. GAO-04-579T. Washington, D.C.: March 18, 2004. United Nations: Reforms Progressing, but Comprehensive Assessments Needed to Measure Impact, GAO-04-339. Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2004. Weapons of Mass Destruction: U.N. Confronts Significant Challenges in Implementing Sanctions against Iraq, GAO-02-625. Washington, D.C.: May 23, 2002. United Nations: Reform Initiatives Have Strengthened Operations, but Overall Objectives Have Not Yet Been Achieved, GAO/NSIAD-00-150. Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2000. United Nations: Progress of Procurement Reforms. GAO/NSIAD-99-71. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 1999. United Nations: Status of Internal Oversight Services, GAO/NSIAD-98-9. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 1997.

Summary: Despite various reform efforts, significant inefficiencies in United Nations (UN) management operations persist. In September 2005, heads of UN member states approved a resolution that called for a series of reforms to strengthen the organization. As the largest financial contributor to the UN, the United States has a strong interest in the progress of UN reform initiatives. GAO was asked to (1) identify and track the status of UN management reforms in five key areas and (2) identify factors that may affect the implementation of these reform initiatives. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed documents proposing UN management reform and interviewed U.S. and UN officials. Most of the UN management reforms in the five areas GAO examined--management operations of the Secretariat, oversight, ethical conduct, review of programs and activities, and human rights--are either awaiting General Assembly review or have been recently approved. In addition, many proposed or approved reforms do not have an implementation plan that establishes time frames and cost estimates. First, in July 2006, the General Assembly approved proposals to improve the management operations of the Secretariat, such as upgrading information technology systems and giving the Secretary-General some flexibility in spending authority. In addition, in fall 2006, the General Assembly will review other proposals, such as procurement and human resource reforms. Second, implementation of proposals to improve the UN's oversight capabilities, such as strengthening the capacity of the Office of Internal Oversight Services and establishing the Independent Audit Advisory Committee, are pending General Assembly review in fall 2006. Third, the UN established an ethics office with temporary staff in January 2006 that has developed an internal timetable for implementing key initiatives. However, it is too early to determine whether the office will be able to fully carry out its mandate. Fourth, UN member states agreed to complete a review of UN programs and activities in 2006, but progress has been slow and the results and time line for completion remain uncertain. Fifth, the General Assembly created a new Human Rights Council in April 2006, but significant concerns remain about the council's structure. GAO identified several factors that may affect the UN's ability to fully implement management reforms. First, although all UN member states agree that UN management reforms are needed, disagreements about the overall implications of the reforms could significantly affect their progress. Most member states are concerned that some of the reforms could increase the authority of the Secretariat at the expense of the General Assembly, thus decreasing their influence over UN operations. Member states also disagree on some of the specifics of the reforms in areas such as the review of programs and activities and the role of the Deputy Secretary-General. Second, the general absence of an implementation plan for each reform that establishes time frames and cost estimates could affect the UN's ability to implement the reform initiatives. Without establishing deadlines or determining cost estimates, it is difficult to hold managers accountable for completing reform efforts and ensure that financing will be available when needed. Third, administrative guidance, such as staff regulations and rules that implement General Assembly resolutions, could complicate the process of implementing certain human resource reform proposals. For example, according to the Secretary-General, the General Assembly established a number of conditions for outsourcing that severely restrict the circumstances under which it can be contemplated.