In April 1991, and in concert with United Nations Security Council Resolution 688, military units from a coalition of the United States and 12 other countries began providing direct emergency care and assistance to Kurds and other ethnic groups in northern Iraq following a revolt against the Iraqi government. This emergency relief effort was named Operation Provide Comfort. Coalition forces secured an area of northern Iraq that excluded Iraqi aircraft above the 36th parallel—the tactical area of responsibility (TAOR),or no-fly zone—and prepared transit camps within Iraq for the return of the people who had fled from the advancing Iraqi army. To provide a secure environment for the returnees, the coalition established a security zone within the TAOR into which Iraqi forces could not enter. Coalition air forces from France, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States were assembled to conduct frequent air operations in the TAOR. A Military Coordination Center was established in Zakhu, Iraq, located inside the security zone, to provide a direct communications link with the Iraqi military, humanitarian relief agencies, and Kurdish leaders. Figure 1.1 illustrates the location of pertinent points in and around the TAOR. The U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe, delegated operational control of assigned U.S. Army and Air Force units to the Combined Task Force Commander located at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey. The Combined Task Force Commander also had tactical control of participating Turkish, French, and British forces; but operational control of those forces was retained by their parent commands. On July 20, 1991, the Combined Task Force Commander issued an operations plan governing the conduct of the Operation Provide Comfort. The plan delineated the command relationships and organizational responsibilities within Combined Task Force Operation Provide Comfort. The Combined Task Force was headed by U.S. and Turkish co-commanders and included a Combined Task Force staff; a Combined Forces Air Component (CFAC); and the Army component, including the Military Coordination Center. CFAC coordinated air operations for Operation Provide Comfort. It had operational control of air assets—such as Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft (AWACS) and F-15 and F-16 fighters—and tactical control of Army helicopters. The Military Coordination Center at Zakhu was supported by a Black Hawk helicopter detachment at Diyarbakir, Turkey. (See fig. 1.1.) Air operations were conducted by planes and personnel assigned to Operation Provide Comfort on a temporary duty basis. Fighter aircraft performed the bulk of the Operation Provide Comfort flying mission. A typical “mission package” contained as many as 30 to 40 fighter aircraft and a variety of aircraft with specific mission capabilities. The fighters flew two- and four-ship formations and provided the following capabilities: visual and sensor reconnaissance of military targets, defensive counter air operations, suppression of enemy air defenses, and on-call precision-guided munitions delivery. At the beginning of each mission, no other aircraft was supposed to enter the TAOR until fighters with airborne intercept radars had searched, or “sanitized,” the area. During the daily operations, the AWACS was responsible for (1) controlling aircraft enroute to and from the TAOR; (2) coordinating air refueling; (3) providing airborne threat warning and control for Operation Provide Comfort aircraft operating in the TAOR; and (4) providing surveillance, detection, and identification of all unknown aircraft. The AWACS took off about 2 hours before the rest of the fixed-wing package and eventually entered an orbit in Turkish air space slightly north of the TAOR. (See fig. 1.1.) The AWACS mission crew was headed by a Mission Crew Commander who had overall responsibility for the AWACS mission. The Mission Crew Commander directly supervised an Air Surveillance Officer; Senior Director; and various communications, radar, and data processing technicians. The Air Surveillance Officer supervised air surveillance technicians who were responsible for identifying and monitoring non-Operation Provide Comfort aircraft. The Senior Director supervised and directed the activity of the controllers. The Enroute Controller was responsible for Operation Provide Comfort aircraft going to and from the TAOR. The Tanker Controller was responsible for coordinating the refueling of Operation Provide Comfort aircraft. The TAOR Controller was responsible for Operation Provide Comfort aircraft in the TAOR. In addition, a Turkish controller was present on each AWACS mission flight. Military Coordination Center Black Hawk helicopters stationed at Diyarbakir provided air transportation for the Military Coordination Center liaison team and conducted resupply missions at Zakhu, as required. The Black Hawks also used Zakhu as a stage for flying missions further in the TAOR to visit Kurdish villages, monitored conditions in the security zone, and conducted search and rescue missions. On April 14, 1994, two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters and their crew assigned to the Military Coordination Center were transporting U.S., United Kingdom, French, and Turkish military officers; Kurdish representatives; and a U.S. political advisor in the TAOR. The Black Hawks had departed Zakhu enroute to Irbil, Iraq. (See fig. 1.1.) At the same time, two F-15s were sanitizing the area that the Black Hawks were in; and the AWACS was over Turkey providing airborne threat warning and control. The AWACS was aware that the Army Black Hawk helicopters had departed Zakhu and were proceeding east into the TAOR. However, the F-15 pilots were unaware that Black Hawk helicopters were already in the area and were not advised of the presence of friendly aircraft. The fighters twice informed the AWACS that they had unknown radar contacts in the TAOR, and the AWACS had access to electronic information regarding the presence of friendly aircraft in the vicinity of the F-15s’ reported radar contacts. Throughout the incident, the helicopters were unable to hear the radio transmissions between the F-15 pilots and the AWACS because they were on a different radio frequency. According to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board President’s opinion, when the F-15 pilots were unable to get positive/consistent electronic responses, they performed a visual intercept with each making a single identification pass over the Black Hawks to identify the “unknown” aircraft. However, the Board President concluded that the identification passes were carried out at speeds, altitudes, and distances at which it was unlikely that the pilots would have been able to detect the Black Hawks’ markings. The pilots said that they did not recognize the differences between the U.S. Black Hawk helicopters with wing-mounted fuel tanks and Hind helicopters with wing-mounted weapons. The Board President determined that the pilot in the lead F-15 aircraft had misidentified the U.S. Black Hawks as Iraqi Hind helicopters and the wingman did not confirm, when asked by the lead pilot, that he had been unable to make a positive identification. The flight lead fired a single missile and shot down the trailing Black Hawk helicopter. At the lead pilot’s direction, the F-15 wingman fired a single missile and shot down the lead helicopter. All 26 individuals aboard the two helicopters were killed in the fratricide. When the Combined Task Force Commander learned that the Black Hawks had been shot down on April 14, 1994, he appointed the former CFAC Commander to conduct a Safety Board Investigation. The appointee assembled a staff and began to collect relevant information. Later on April 14, the Secretary of Defense ordered an Aircraft Accident Investigation, which provides more disclosure to the public than does a safety investigation. As a result, the safety investigation was discontinued; and an Aircraft Accident Investigation Board was convened under Air Force Regulation 110-14, since replaced by Air Force Instruction 51-503. The investigation’s main objectives were (1) to gather and preserve evidence for further investigations and inquiries by conducting a thorough investigation and preparing an accident report and (2) to determine if possible, through the Board President’s opinion, the accident’s main causes. The House Committee on National Security held a hearing in August 1995 related to the April 14, 1994, incident. Subsequently, the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Committee’s Subcommittee on Military Personnel and Representative Mac Collins asked us, not to reinvestigate the shootdown but, to determine whether (1) the Board investigation of the Black Hawk shootdown had met its objectives and goals, (2) subsequent Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) investigations had followed established guidelines, and (3) any Department of Defense and/or Air Force officials had improperly or unlawfully influenced these investigations. The Subcommittee also requested that we consider concerns raised by victims’ families and others. We did not evaluate the appropriateness of resultant disciplinary or corrective actions. We interviewed family members of the U.S. victims and others with concerns about how the military had handled the incident. In general, they had questions about the process and results of the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board and the UCMJ investigations. We examined thousands of documents, including over 2,000 classified documents; interviewed over 160 individuals; and visited localities in the United States, Europe, and the Middle East. To assess compliance with regulations, we reviewed the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board’s report, its exhibits, and applicable regulations. We interviewed Board members, both legal and technical advisors to the Board, accident recovery team members, and many of those interviewed by the Board concerning their role in the incident. In particular, we examined how the Board investigated the incident, conducted its analyses, and produced its report and the Board President’s opinion. We also reviewed information developed by the Inquiry and Investigating Officers under UCMJ and the court-martial trial transcripts and exhibits. To address questions raised by victims’ family members and others regarding the actions of the two F-15 pilots, the AWACS crew, and command officials, we reviewed the then existing rules of engagement, operations plan, pertinent orders (Airspace Control Order, Air Tasking Order, and Aircrew Read Files), and guidance. We interviewed F-15 pilots and Air Force officials to determine their understanding of the existing orders and guidance for fighters in Operation Provide Comfort. We questioned these individuals regarding the two F-15 pilots’ actions during, and statements concerning, the April 14, 1994, incident. We also interviewed the F-15 pilots involved in the shootdown. Further, we interviewed senior board members of the Flying Evaluation Boards that were convened. We reviewed the two F-15 pilots’ flight and military records and interviewed former instructors and fellow pilots to gain additional insight into their qualifications and abilities. Regarding the Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) system and its operation on April 14, 1994, we reviewed the (1) Airspace Control Order and the Air Tasking Order authority by which the IFF system was to be employed; (2) statements of the two F-15 pilots regarding their operation and responses received from the systems on April 14, 1994; and (3) subsequent Air Force task force studies. We also interviewed other pilots, IFF technicians, and other technical experts to better understand the limitations and performance of the incident F-15 IFF systems. With regard to AWACS operations, we reviewed the applicable procedures for AWACS operations on the date of the incident. We interviewed crew members aboard the AWACS during the shootdown to determine their knowledge of the events and their understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the crew members. We also interviewed other AWACS crew members who had served in Operation Provide Comfort to determine the general understanding among AWACS crew members of their roles and responsibilities; the commanders and other command personnel of the 552d Air Control Wing, which operated the AWACS in Operation Provide Comfort; and Air Combat Command personnel responsible for identifying and instituting changes in AWACS operations following the investigations. To gain an understanding of command and control issues at the Combined Task Force, we interviewed personnel who were stationed at Operation Provide Comfort both before and after the incident. With respect to Black Hawk operations, we examined the procedures used by Military Coordination Center personnel in scheduling helicopter activities and the Center’s integration with the other Operation Provide Comfort mission components. In addition, we interviewed individuals responsible for developing the procedures for Black Hawk flights; those who prepared the helicopters for their mission on April 14, 1994; and responsible Combined Task Force officials. We also reviewed documents concerning the Combined Task Force and the Black Hawk helicopters at the Center for Army Lessons Learned at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Further, we interviewed Combined Task Force and European Command officials and reviewed directives and files at Incirlik, Turkey, and Stuttgart, Germany. Regarding improper or unlawful command influence during the Board’s investigation process, we interviewed the Board President and Deputy, members, and advisors. We also contacted the Commander, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, who had convened the Aircraft Accident Board Investigation. In addition, we reviewed records that cautioned against unlawful influence. Regarding improper or unlawful command influence during the UCMJ investigations process, we reviewed the record of decisions made by the Inquiry Officers and Investigating Officers in the UCMJ investigations to determine whether they were in compliance with provisions in the UCMJ and the Manual for Courts-Martial. These records of decisions included the suspected violations, the facts considered, and the analyses used to arrive at the conclusions and recommendations reached. The Department of Defense would not allow us to interview the Convening Authorities or the Inquiry and Investigating Officers. The Department of Defense provided written comments on a draft of this report. Those comments concur with our primary conclusions and agreed that the few differences between our report and the Board report would not have affected the Board President’s conclusions. The following chapters discuss the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board report and subsequent findings, subsequent investigations under the UCMJ, the results of Flying Evaluation Boards, and corrective actions taken. The congressional requesters asked us, among other points, to (1) determine if the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board’s investigation had met its objectives, (2) determine whether improper or unlawful command influence had occurred during the investigation, and (3) consider concerns raised by victims’ family members and others. We found that the Board, in a limited time frame, conducted an extensive investigation that fulfilled the requirements of Air Force Regulation 110-14 to obtain and preserve evidence and, with a few exceptions, to report the factual circumstances relating to the accident. Also consistent with the regulation, the Board President stated his opinion of the accident’s causes. In addition, our interviews of the Board President and other Board members, as well as technical and legal advisors, disclosed no evidence of improper or unlawful command influence during the Board process. During our review of the Board’s investigation/report and subsequent Department of Defense reviews, plus our interviews of Operation Provide Comfort officials and participants, we noted that the Board report and/or opinion (1) did not discuss the incident F-15 pilots’ responsibility, under the Airspace Control Order, to report to the Airborne Command Element aboard the AWACS about the unidentified helicopters; (2) cited a CFAC Commander statement that inaccurately portrayed the Airborne Command Element as not having authority to stop the incident; and (3) erroneously concluded that the Black Hawks’ use of an incorrect electronic code prevented the F-15 pilots from receiving electronic responses from the helicopters. Last, victims’ family members and others at the August 1995 congressional hearing raised concerns that included possible discipline problems in the F-15 community in Operation Provide Comfort at the time of the shootdown and the incident F-15 pilots’ perceived urgency to engage during the shootdown. While Air Force Regulation 110-14 did not require the Board to examine these issues, it did not preclude the examination; and we determined that the issues were pertinent to our review. Indeed, discipline problems did exist in the F-15 community in Operation Provide Comfort, and some Operation Provide Comfort officials questioned the incident F-15 pilots’ haste to engage the unknown helicopters. At the direction of the Secretary of Defense on the day of the shootdown, the U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe, ordered the Commander, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, to conduct an Aircraft Accident Investigation. The Aircraft Accident Investigation Board was properly convened under Air Force Regulation 110-14. The Board’s investigation met its goal to obtain and preserve documentary, testimonial, and physical evidence for possible claims, litigation, and disciplinary and administrative needs. On May 27, 1994, also in accordance with Air Force Regulation 110-14, the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board issued a 60-page summary report including the Board President’s opinion that, with three exceptions, provided a summary of the most important facts and circumstances of the incident. Those deficiencies—involving the incident F-15 pilots, the incident Airborne Command Element, and the Black Hawks’ use of an incorrect electronic identification code—are discussed later in this chapter. The Board President’s opinion, which was also required by the regulation and was included in the summary, identified the accident’s causes as a chain of events that began with the lack of a clear understanding among the Operation Provide Comfort organizations about their respective responsibilities and culminated with the F-15 lead pilot’s misidentification of the Black Hawks as Iraqi Hinds and the F-15 wingman’s failure to notify the lead pilot that he had not positively identified the helicopters. (The Board President’s opinion appears as app. I.) The Board report was transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense. On April 15, 1994, the Commander, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, appointed the Commander, 3d Air Force (a major general), as President of the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board. The other Board members included a Deputy Board President (an Army colonel), a Chief Investigator who was an F-15 pilot, an AWACS expert, a Black Hawk pilot, a Black Hawk maintenance officer, a flight surgeon, a Board recorder, and a public affairs officer. The Board also included 13 technical advisors and 4 legal advisors (3 Air Force and 1 Army). The Board conducted its investigation from April 15 to May 27, 1994,when it issued its report, including 25 volumes of evidence containing testimony from 137 witnesses. The Board reviewed directives on command and control; rules of engagement, pertinent orders (Airspace Control Order, Air Tasking Order, and Aircrew Read Files), aircrew preparation, and scheduling; aircraft maintenance documentation on the involved aircraft; aircrew qualification and training records and materials; physical and medical examinations; data on the sequence of events for each of the aircraft, such as flight plans, communications tapes, and briefing and preflight preparations; search and rescue activities; and integration of Army and Air Force operations. The Board also reviewed classified documents, video tapes, and magnetic tapes relating to the accident. To assess the possible malfunction of the Air-to-Air Interrogation (AAI) and Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) system components, the Board commissioned testing of the incident fighters’ AAI systems and the helicopters’ transponders. It also commissioned a filmed re-creation of the incident with an F-15 fighter approaching a Black Hawk helicopter at various elevations, distances, and approaches. Section 104 (a)(2) of the Rules for Court-Martial (RCM), Manual for Courts-Martial, defines unlawful command influence as an attempt to coerce or, by any unauthorized means, influence the action of a court-martial or any other military tribunal or any member thereof, in reaching the findings or sentence in any case or the action of any convening, approving, or reviewing authority with respect to such authority’s judicial acts. We found no evidence of improper or unlawful command influence exerted during the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board process. The Board members and technical and legal advisors we interviewed stated that they had had free rein to examine all facets during the investigation. According to the Commander, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, when the U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe, tasked him to convene the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board, he was told to uncover the facts and get all the details. Also according to the Commander, when he assigned the Board President, he told the president to leave no rock unturned and bring up every fact during the investigation. According to the Board President, his directions to the Board members were to let the “chips fall” where they may and to hold back nothing. He stated that there was “absolutely no command influence” and that the Board was extremely careful to avoid even the appearance of any influence. Although the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board reported that incident participants, including the Black Hawk pilots, lacked knowledge of command and control guidance, such as portions of the Airspace Control Order, it did not discuss the F-15 pilots’ responsibility under the Airspace Control Order to report to the Airborne Command Element when encountering an unknown aircraft during Operation Provide Comfort missions. Further, although it had evidence to the contrary, the Board, through its report, cited a CFAC Commander’s inaccurate testimony that the Airborne Command Element had no decision-making authority regarding aircraft encounters in the TAOR. According to the Board’s Senior Legal Advisor, the Board did not report the F-15 pilots’ nonadherence to that aspect of the order because the Airborne Command Element was aware of the intercept; thus the Board did not consider the pilots’ nonadherence to be a significant cause of the shootdown. The Senior Legal Advisor stated that, in the Board’s opinion, Operation Provide Comfort management had allowed operations to degrade to such a point that the Board report, partly for this reason, focused on command and control problems. Combined Task Force flying operations were conducted according to an Airspace Control Order published by the CFAC Director of Operations (CFAC/DO). The two-volume Airspace Control Order, which provided the rules and procedures governing all Operation Provide Comfort aircrews, was required reading for those aircrews. Volume II augmented volume I by providing detailed and specific guidance and procedures for conducting Operation Provide Comfort air operations. The CFAC/DO directed the Operation Provide Comfort flight operations through a ground-based Mission Director at Incirlik Air Base and an Airborne Command Element aboard the AWACS. The Airborne Command Element, according to the Board report, was to act as the “’eyes and ears’ of the CFAC/DO” aboard the AWACS. In support of this, as excerpted from the Airspace Control Order, “ will contact who will then pass the information to the CFAC/DO” concerning any unusual circumstances, such as an unidentified aircraft in the TAOR. The Board report and Board President’s opinion did not address that the pilots were required to report to the Airborne Command Element in an “unusual circumstance” as specified by the following excerpt from volume II of the Airspace Control Order. (For the sake of clarity, we have used titles in place of code names.) “Aircrews experiencing any unusual circumstances/occurrences while flying [Operation Provide Comfort] missions will report the incident to [the Airborne Command Element] or [the AWACS crew] if is unavailable.” The list of six such unusual circumstances/occurrences contained in the Airspace Control Order included “ny intercept run on an ’Unidentified aircraft.’” According to Operation Provide Comfort officials, the Airspace Control Order was specifically designed to slow down a potential engagement to allow CFAC time to check things out. In response to questions we raised, the Board’s Senior Legal Advisor said that the Board had reviewed that provision and evidence showing that the F-15 pilots had read both volumes of the Airspace Control Order containing the requirement to contact the Airborne Command Element for guidance. He added that the contact-requirement issue was not significant to the Board because the Airborne Command Element was aware of the discussion between the F-15 pilots and the TAOR controller about the intercept. He also said that the Board concluded that the F-15 pilots had reason to believe that the Airborne Command Element was monitoring the conversation and that the Airborne Command Element was, in fact, aware of the intercept and did not intervene. Further, the Operation Provide Comfort management, in the Board’s opinion, had allowed operations to degrade to such a degree that it “may not have been common practice” at the time for F-15 pilots to contact the Airborne Command Element. He said that partly because of this degradation, the Board’s focus turned to the command and control failures that had created an environment that allowed the incident to occur. However, this duty to contact the Airborne Command Element for directions concerning unusual circumstances had been reemphasized by an oral directive issued because of an incident about a week before the shootdown. In that incident, F-15 pilots had initially ignored an Airborne Command Element’s directions to “knock off,” or stop, an engagement with a hostile fighter aircraft they thought was in the no-fly zone. The Airborne Command Element overheard the pilots preparing to engage the aircraft and contacted them, telling them to stop the engagement because he had determined that the hostile aircraft was outside the no-fly zone and that he was also leery of a “bait and trap” situation. After several unsuccessful attempts to call off the engagement during which the F-15 pilots did not respond to him, he ordered the pilots to return either to their assigned patrol point or to base. The F-15s returned to their assigned patrol point. The CFAC/DO issued the resultant oral directive to the F-15 detachment representative at the next Detachment Commander meeting following the incident. At the meeting, the CFAC/DO listened to the complaints of the F-15 representative and then told him that the word of the Airborne Command Element was final. He also told the F-15 representative that the Airspace Control Order was very clear and must be followed. While the Board did an extensive investigation, it was unaware of this oral directive. The Aircraft Accident Investigation Board report cited as fact the former CFAC Commander’s testimony that the Airborne Command Element “had no decision-making authority.” The Board justified citing the statement as fact in its report because it was made by the Commander, from whom the Board believed all authority for CFAC operations stemmed. The Board did not include in its report, testimony from the CFAC Commander at the time of the shootdown, the CFAC/DO, a Mission Director, and others with more knowledge of actual Operation Provide Comfort air operations that contradicted the former CFAC Commander’s reported testimony concerning Airborne Command Element authority. The CFAC/DO told the Board and us that he had delegated time-sensitive decision-making authority to his Mission Directors and Airborne Command Elements. He testified to the Board that he had given the authority to the Airborne Command Element to terminate the mission package “and bring the entire operation back.” He further told us that the week before the shootdown he had supported the Airborne Command Element’s decision to knock off the F-15 pilots’ intercept and had commended the Airborne Command Element on his actions. The Combined Task Force Commander also supported the Airborne Command Element’s decision. The Board President’s opinion erroneously concluded that the Black Hawks’ use of a wrong code prevented the F-15s from receiving a response in one of the electronic identification modes. We agree with an Air Force analysis, using information that was also available to the Board, that determined that the F-15 pilots should have received a response despite the wrong code. The analysis based its finding on the manner in which the pilots testified that they had interrogated the helicopters. During their sanitization sweep, the F-15 pilots, using radar, located unknown, slow-moving contacts in the TAOR that were subsequently identified as helicopters. In an attempt to identify if the helicopters were friendly, the F-15 pilots interrogated the aircraft with their AAI/IFF systems. An F-15’s AAI/IFF system can interrogate using four identification signals, or modes: I, II, III, and IV. In the TAOR, the transponders on Black Hawk helicopters transmit Modes I, II, and IV. However, two Mode I codes were designated for use in Operation Provide Comfort at the time of the incident: one inside, the other outside the TAOR. As stated in the Board report, the Black Hawk pilots were using the Mode I code for outside the TAOR, and the F-15 pilots’ systems were set to the Mode I code for inside the TAOR. The Board report and its President’s opinion noted that the Black Hawks’ use of the wrong Mode I code had resulted in the F-15 pilots’ failure to receive a Mode I response. The Aircraft Accident Investigation Board took testimony from the pilots who had flown the same F-15s on flights immediately before and after the shootdown, in addition to testimony from the incident lead pilot and wingman, to determine whether they had experienced any problems with the IFF systems. All said that they had had no problems and had successfully interrogated other aircraft using Modes I and IV. The Board also had operational tests performed on the F-15s’ AAI/IFF components a few days after the incident. The tests revealed no problem that would have prevented the lead aircraft from interrogating and displaying Modes I, II, and IV. The wingman’s AAI system was found to be capable of interrogating Modes I, II, and IV and of displaying Mode I and II signals. However, it could not display Mode IV signals generated by the test set. After the operational testing, the Board removed the AAI components from the F-15s and sent them to two Air Force laboratories for teardown analysis. The laboratory tests were performed without recalibrating the components, and the reports showed no problems that would have affected the performance of the equipment. Because of weapons impact, the resulting crash, and/or the subsequent fire, the transponder on one helicopter was completely destroyed. The transponder in the other helicopter was partly destroyed and was sent to a Department of Defense laboratory. The report of the teardown analysis of this transponder concluded that it had been on at the time of the incident but that the testing could not determine conclusively whether the system had been fully operational at the time. The Board President’s opinion concluded that the Black Hawks had been using the wrong Mode I code inside the TAOR after they departed Zakhu for Irbil, Iraq, and that the incorrect code was responsible for the F-15 pilots’ failure to receive a Mode I response when they interrogated the helicopters. However, the Air Force special task force’s subsequent review of the IFF component revealed that, based on the descriptions of the system settings that the pilots testified they had used on several interrogation attempts, the F-15s should have received and displayed any Mode I or II response, regardless of code. Thus, the helicopters’ use of the wrong Mode I code should not have prevented the F-15s from receiving a response. In reaching his conclusion, the Board President relied on the evidence collected by the Board, which included the pilots’ testimony as well as other information about the IFF system settings and how the system should perform. In its report, the Board cited three of four interrogation attempts about which the lead pilot had testified on April 23, 1994. One of the three was performed in a way that should have displayed any Mode I or II response, as later noted by the Air Force special task force. The task force also found that the additional interrogation attempt described on April 23 was identical to the one that should have displayed any Mode I or II response. The additional interrogation, not reported by the Board, took place during the period in which the AWACS was receiving friendly Mode I and II returns from the helicopters at an increasingly frequent rate and when the lead pilot was closer to the helicopters than during his initial interrogation attempt at the same settings. The Board President recalled discussions about the F-15 IFF-system settings and said the Board report had included the interrogation attempts about which the Board was certain. He told us that because of the difference between the lead pilot’s incident-day statement and his testimony, it was difficult to determine the number of times that the lead pilot had interrogated the helicopters. Victims’ family members and others raised concerns about the lack of discussion in the Board report concerning the discipline of F-15 pilots in general in Operation Provide Comfort and the F-15 pilots’ perceived urgency to engage during the shootdown. Although Air Force Regulation 110-14, under which the Board’s investigation was conducted, did not require the Board to examine such environment issues, neither did the regulation rule out an examination. However, the two issues were relevant to our review. According to Operation Provide Comfort officials, the pilots’ failure on April 14, 1994, to contact the Airborne Command Element was a product of a lack of F-15 mission discipline, as demonstrated by the incident a week before the shootdown when F-15 pilots initially ignored Airborne Command Element instructions to “knock off” an engagement with an Iraqi aircraft. According to the Combined Task Force Commander, the pilots’ failure was also related to a rivalry-induced urgency to engage “hostile” aircraft. The Mission Director during the shootdown and the Airborne Command Element involved in the knock-off incident told us that they had had problems with mission discipline issues involving F-15 pilots assigned to Operation Provide Comfort during the time period leading up to the shootdown. The Airborne Command Element stated that on the evening of the knock-off incident, several F-15 pilots, including the pilots whom he had ordered to cease their proposed engagement, approached him and questioned whether he was a “combat player” and whether Airborne Command Elements were perhaps too conservative. According to CFAC officials, the F-15 pilot community was “very upset” about the intervention of the Airborne Command Element during the knock-off incident and felt he had interfered with the carrying out of the F-15 pilots’ duties. The Airborne Command Element from the knock-off incident also told us that so many flight discipline incidents had occurred that CFAC held a group safety meeting in late February or early March 1994 to discuss the need for more discipline. The flight discipline issues included midair close calls, unsafe incidents when refueling, and unsafe takeoffs. The Combined Task Force Commander said that he had recognized a potential supervisory problem with the F-15 Detachment because no F-15 pilots were on the Combined Task Force staff. He had made several unsuccessful requests to the Commander, 17th Air Force, to have an experienced F-15 pilot—on flying status—assigned to the Combined Task Force staff. According to the Combined Task Force Commander, the 17th Air Force Commander told him that the available number of F-15 slots was limited and one could not be spared for Operation Provide Comfort. We noted, however, that as part of the corrective actions taken following the shootdown, an F-15 pilot was assigned to the Combined Task Force staff. Further, the shootdown occurred, according to the CFAC/DO’s statement to us, because of a lack of training and aircrew discipline in following established guidelines on the part of the two F-15 pilots involved in the incident. He stated, “he pilots made a terrible mistake” and with greater discipline—coupled with the multiple safeguards designed to prevent such an incident—this fratricide may have been avoided. The Combined Task Force Commander and other Operation Provide Comfort officials acknowledged that a rivalry existed between the F-15 and F-16 communities, including those in Operation Provide Comfort detachments. Operation Provide Comfort officials told us that while such rivalry was normally perceived as healthy and leading to positive professional competition, at the time of the shootdown the rivalry had become more pronounced and intense. The Combined Task Force Commander attributed this atmosphere to the F-16 community’s having executed the only fighter shootdown in Operation Provide Comfort and all shootdowns in Bosnia. In the opinion of the Combined Task Force Commander, the shootdown pilots’ haste was due in part to the planned entry of two F-16s into the TAOR 10 to 15 minutes after the F-15s. He said that if the F-15 pilots had involved the chain of command, the pace would have slowed down, ruining the pilots’ chances for a shootdown. Further, CFAC officials stated that the Airspace Control Order was specifically designed to slow down a potential engagement to allow CFAC time to check things out. They said that the presence of the helicopters, which were flying southeast away from the security zone, posed no threat to the mission and there was no need for haste. For example, the Mission Director stated that, given the speed of the helicopters, the fighters had time to return to Turkish airspace, refuel, and still return and engage the helicopters before they could have crossed south of the 36th parallel. According to the F-15 Squadron Operations Officer at the time of the shootdown and the Board’s Senior Legal Advisor, the tactical environment did not warrant a rush to judgment. The Operations Officer added that the F-15 pilots had acted too hastily and should have asked more questions. The Senior Legal Advisor said that, in his opinion, the pilots had an unnecessarily aggressive attitude toward the intercept and shootdown. The lead incident pilot told us that he was concerned about going low to check out the unknown aircraft. His primary concerns at the time were (1) being fired on from the ground, (2) flying into the ground, and (3) a possible air threat. Because of these concerns, he remained high for as long as possible and dropped down briefly for a visual identification that lasted, according to the lead pilot, “between 3 and 4 seconds.” He told us that he saw no Iraqi flag on the helicopters and that the helicopters were not acting in a hostile manner. He assumed they were Iraqi Hinds because they were in the middle of Iraq, although he acknowledged that they could have been Syrian or Iranian Hinds. The incident wingman told us that his visual identification was not as close to the helicopters as was the lead pilot’s. His visual identification lasted “between 2 and 3 seconds.” He said, in hindsight, “We should have taken another pass; but at the time, I was comfortable with the decision.” The Board report and Board President’s opinion would have presented a more complete record of the incident’s events had they discussed the incident F-15 pilots’ requirement to report to the Airborne Command Element, accurately assessed the Airborne Command Element’s authority, not concluded that the Black Hawks’ use of an incorrect code had prevented Mode I electronic responses from the helicopters, and addressed F-15 pilot discipline issues. This more complete information, in turn, may have raised additional questions about the actions and inaction of the F-15 pilots and the Airborne Command Element and, therefore, could have influenced subsequent disciplinary or corrective actions. However, if the information had been included, it would not have affected the Board President’s conclusion: that a chain of events, whose final actions were the lead pilot’s incorrect identification and the wingman’s failure to clarify his lack of identification, caused the fratricide. Further, it is difficult to predict if the incident’s outcome would have differed had the F-15 pilots contacted the Airborne Command Element directly. The congressional requesters also asked us to (1) determine whether military justice investigations, conducted after the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board completed its work, had complied with provisions in the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ); (2) determine if improper or unlawful command influence had been exerted during the UCMJ process; and (3) answer general questions raised by family members and others regarding actions taken following the investigations. First, we found that the subsequent UCMJ investigations complied with provisions in the UCMJ and the Manual for Courts-Martial. Preliminary inquiries, under the Rules for Court-Martial (RCM), were conducted into the actions of 14 officers. The Air Force used two separate investigative paths, one for seven AWACS-related officers and the other for the two F-15 pilots and five Operation Provide Comfort officials. The former were investigated by a command separate from the one to which they were assigned. This command developed evidence beyond the material contained in the Board’s report. As a result of the preliminary inquiry, charges were preferred against four AWACS crew members and the Airborne Command Element. An Investigating Officer investigated these charges under Article 32, UCMJ; one officer was determined to be blameless; and the Commander, 963d Air Control Squadron retired as a Lieutenant Colonel although he had been selected for promotion. After the Article 32 investigation, one officer—the Senior Director of the AWACS crew—was tried by general court-martial and acquitted, and one officer received nonjudicial punishment in the form of a letter of reprimand. The remaining three officers received administrative letters of reprimand. On a separate path, the actions of the two F-15 pilots and five Operation Provide Comfort officials were reviewed under RCM in a preliminary inquiry conducted by the pilots’ Wing Commander. The Wing Commander relied on the Board report and filed dereliction-of-duty and negligent homicide charges against the F-15 wingman that were the focus of an Article 32 investigative hearing. Subsequently, charges against this pilot were dropped; however, he later received a letter of reprimand. Administrative action was taken against four other officers: the lead pilot received a letter of reprimand, two other officers received letters of admonition, and one received a letter of counseling. No action was taken against the remaining two officers. The Air Force also convened Flying Evaluation Boards for the two F-15 pilots involved in the shootdown. In addition, 16 months after the incident and 6 days after the House Committee on National Security hearing, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force found that a number of performance evaluations of personnel involved in the incident (1) were inconsistent with administrative actions taken by higher-level commanders and (2) failed to reflect that some officers had not met Air Force standards. Accordingly, the Chief of Staff prepared negative letters of evaluation regarding seven officers involved in the shootdown and implemented additional actions against five of them. Second, based on our review of the summary reports of investigation and statements made by cognizant officials, we found no evidence of improper or unlawful command influence in the investigative or judicial process. However, we were unable to complete our investigation and determine whether the consideration and disposition of suspected offenses under the UCMJ were the result of improper or unlawful command influence. Department of Defense officials would not allow us to interview the key officials—Convening Authorities, Inquiry Officers, and Investigating Officers—involved in the UCMJ investigations. On July 12, 1994, the Secretary of Defense approved the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board report. The Secretary of the Air Force thereafter forwarded the report to the Commander, Air Combat Command, and the Commander, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, as well as to the Commander, U.S. Army in Europe, for appropriate action under the UCMJ and any administrative actions. Thus, the Air Force UCMJ investigations followed two separate paths—through Air Combat Command (AWACS-related personnel) and U.S. Air Forces in Europe (Combined Task Force Operation Provide Comfort personnel and F-15 pilots). The AWACS mission crew and 963d Squadron Commander involved in the shootdown were assigned to the 552d Air Control Wing, which was under the jurisdiction of the 12th Air Force. However, the Staff Judge Advocate to the 12th Air Force had served as Legal Advisor to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board. As a result, the Air Force considered him disqualified from conducting an RCM investigation or serving as staff judge advocate to the Convening Authority during the disciplinary review. Therefore, the Commander, Air Combat Command, designated the Commander of the 8th Air Force as the court-martial Convening Authority.The Commander, 8th Air Force, appointed an Inquiry Officer to conduct an RCM 303 inquiry regarding the actions of seven officers under Air Combat Command’s command. The seven officers were the CFAC Mission Director, Airborne Command Element, 963d Squadron Commander, AWACS Mission Crew Commander, AWACS Senior Director, AWACS Enroute Controller, and AWACS TAOR Controller. On July 18, 1994, the Convening Authority appointed an Inquiry Officer to conduct the RCM 303 investigation. The Commander, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, designated the Commander of the 17th Air Force as the court-martial Convening Authority. On July 22, 1994, the Convening Authority appointed an Inquiry Officer to conduct a preliminary inquiry under RCM 303 into the roles of the following seven officers in the shootdown: Combined Task Force Commander, CFAC Commander, CFAC/DO, Combined Task Force Director of Plans and Policy, Combined Task Force Intelligence Officer, and the two F-15 pilots. The F-15 pilots were assigned to the 53d Fighter Squadron at Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany. The Inquiry Officer was the Commander of the 52d Fighter Wing at Spangdahlem Air Base to whom the F-15 pilots’ squadron reported. The Commander, U.S. Army in Europe, directed the Judge Advocate, U.S. Army in Europe, to determine whether administrative or disciplinary action was warranted against any Army personnel for their role in the incident. The actions of one person—the Combined Task Force Chief of Staff (an Army colonel)—were considered as possible for review. On July 18, 1994, the Convening Authority appointed legal, F-15, and AWACS advisors to assist the Inquiry Officer. The investigation was conducted from July 18 to August 18, 1994. The inquiry team obtained testimony from AWACS personnel, flew in an AWACS, observed simulated Operation Provide Comfort missions, and interviewed senior directors and controllers not on the incident flight. The Inquiry Officer prepared a 77-page report, largely consisting of an analysis of the charges against the officers, with 2 volumes of supporting material. The report also reflected the Inquiry Officer’s logic for selecting the appropriate articles of the UCMJ that might be applicable to the actions of the AWACS-related personnel, including manslaughter, negligent homicide, and dereliction of duty. The Inquiry Officer said that voluntary or involuntary manslaughter charges would be inappropriate against the AWACS-related officers for their involvement in the shootdown. The Inquiry Officer concluded that negligent homicide charges could be made against some of them for their involvement in this matter; but he recommended against this course of action, because “the occurrence of an independent, unforeseeable, intervening act, namely the incorrect identification of the helicopters by the F-15 pilots . . .” would not support a conviction for negligent homicide. On August 30 and 31, 1994, the Inquiry Officer preferred dereliction-of-duty charges against the following AWACS-related officers: the Airborne Command Element, the Mission Crew Commander, the Senior Director, the Enroute Controller, and the TAOR Controller. No charges were preferred against the 963d Airborne Air Control Squadron Commander or the Mission Director. The Inquiry Officer concluded that no adverse action should be taken against the Mission Director because he had not failed to take any required actions. On September 7, 1994, the Convening Authority appointed an Article 32, UCMJ, Investigating Officer, who was assigned to the U.S. Air Force Trial Judiciary, to examine the charges against the five charged officers, in accordance with RCM 405. The Convening Authority directed the Investigating Officer to inquire into the truth of the matters set forth in the charges, secure information to determine what their disposition should be, and issue a report and advisory recommendations. The Investigating Officer held a joint Article 32 investigative hearing involving all five officers from October 11 to October 26, 1994. Forty-eight witnesses testified at the hearing; and the government and defense attorneys entered 271 exhibits, including 54 classified exhibits, into the hearing record. The Investigating Officer issued his report on November 12, 1994, and recommended that the dereliction-of-duty charge against the Senior Director be referred to a general court-martial. He also recommended that the Enroute Controller receive nonjudicial punishment under Article 15, UCMJ, and that the charges against the remaining three officers be dismissed. In his appointment letter, the Commander, 17th Air Force, directed the RCM 303 Inquiry Officer to (1) determine if any of the seven officers (Combined Task Force Commander and staff and two F-15 pilots) had committed acts related to the shootdown that amounted to offenses punishable under the UCMJ, (2) recommend disposition of any offense and whether administrative actions were warranted, and (3) file charges if warranted. He also appointed two legal advisors and a technical advisor to assist the Inquiry Officer. The Inquiry Team reviewed the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board report and supporting documentation. It neither obtained oral testimony nor collected any additional evidence; instead, it relied on witness interviews conducted by the Board. On August 29, 1994, the Inquiry Officer issued a 66-page report on his investigation. The report identified the following as “possible” offenses: dereliction of duty by all seven officers, involuntary manslaughter by the F-15 pilots, and negligent homicide by all the officers except the Intelligence Officer. After concluding that three officers had committed violations under the UCMJ, the Inquiry Officer preferred dereliction-of-duty charges against two Operation Provide Comfort senior officers and dereliction-of-duty and negligent homicide charges against one F-15 pilot, the wingman. On September 8, 1994, the Commander, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, appointed an Article 32 Investigating Officer, who was assigned to the U.S. Air Force Trial Judiciary, European Circuit, to investigate the charges against the F-15 wingman. In accordance with RCM 405, Manual for Courts-Martial, the Commander directed the Investigating Officer to inquire into the truth of the matters set forth in the charges by the Inquiry Officer, secure information to determine what disposition should be made of the charges, and issue a report with advisory recommendations. The Investigating Officer held an Article 32 hearing on November 7-9, 1994. The government attorneys called one witness—the F-15 flight leader—and entered 18 exhibits into the hearing record. The exhibits included (1) the transcript of the F-15 wingman’s taped account of the shootdown made in the cockpit approximately 45 minutes after the shootdown, (2) the wingman’s testimony before the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board, and (3) the flight leader’s testimony during the investigation of the aircraft accident and the AWACS Article 32 hearing. The defense attorneys called no witnesses and entered 116 exhibits into the hearing record, including a prepared statement read by the wingman during the hearing and a detailed, 102-page factual and legal presentation of his theory of the case. The Investigating Officer issued his report on November 12, 1994, and recommended dismissal of the charges against the wingman. His analysis focused on whether the lead pilot had called the AWACS announcing the engagement before or after the wingman responded to the lead pilot’s directive to confirm whether the helicopters were Iraqi Hinds. He concluded that if the call was made before the wingman’s response, the lead pilot had relieved the wingman of the duty to independently identify the helicopters. Based on his review of the pilots’ testimony and the wingman’s experience, he concluded that it was more likely that the lead pilot’s engagement announcement had preceded the wingman’s alleged “nonresponsive” confirmation. On September 30, 1994, the Judge Advocate, U.S. Army in Europe, advised the Commander, U.S. Army in Europe, that consideration was warranted concerning whether the Combined Task Force Chief of Staff was responsible for the breakdown in staff communication that had been cited in the Board report. After reviewing the relevant Board testimony and other evidence, however, he recommended that no adverse action be taken against the officer because he had (1) focused his attention according to the Combined Task Force Commander’s direction, (2) had neither specific direction nor specific reason to inquire into the transmission of information between his Director of Operations for Plans and Policy and the CFAC, (3) been the most recent arrival and the only senior Army member of a predominately Air Force staff and therefore generally unfamiliar with air operations, and (4) relied on experienced colonels under whom deficiencies had occurred. The Flying Evaluation Boardsconvened as a result of the shootdown, made findings concerning the proficiency, professionalism, care, and judgment of the two pilots, and made recommendations concerning their suitability for future aviation responsibilities. Upon review of the Boards’ findings and recommendations, the Commander, 17th Air Force determined that both pilots should be reassigned to noncombat aircraft. He further recommended that the F-15 lead pilot, Captain Eric A. Wickson, should be assigned next as an instructor pilot in basic flight training. The Commander, U.S. Air Forces in Europe concurred with this determination and also concluded that the F-15 wingman, Lieutenant Colonel Randy W. May should be reassigned to a nonflying aviator staff position. On the basis of his review of administrative actions taken by higher-level authorities regarding Air Force personnel involved in the shootdown, the Air Force Chief of Staff determined that the personnel records of some involved personnel did not reflect their failure to meet Air Force standards. Accordingly, for seven of those involved in the incident, he wrote letters of evaluation that addressed how each of the officers had failed to meet these standards and took additional action against five officers. On January 20 and 25, 1995, the Commander, 17th Air Force, appointed separate Flying Evaluation Boards for Captain Wickson and Lieutenant Colonel May. Each board consisted of a senior board member and two board members, all of whom were pilots; a legal advisor; a recorder; and a reporter. The Commander, 17th Air Force, directed the two senior board members to make special findings on whether the pilots had shown lack of judgment in performing their duties on April 14, 1994, and whether they were unsuited for duty in a combat aircraft role. The Commander, 17th Air Force, also directed the boards to make recommendations on whether the pilots had potential to continue flying. Captain Wickson’s Flying Evaluation Board was held on February 6, 1995; and Lieutenant Colonel May’s, on February 9-10, 1995. The pilots were the only witnesses in their Flying Evaluation Board hearings. The government and defense attorneys submitted eight volumes of evidence in the Wickson hearing and seven volumes of evidence in the May hearing, including the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board summary of facts and executive summary; the Operation Plan for Operation Provide Comfort; the Aircrew Read File; each pilot’s testimonies before the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board and Article 32 hearings; the transcript of Lieutenant Colonel May’s aircraft videotape of the incident; a Kurdish citizen’s videotape of the incident; and each pilot’s medical and training records, ratings, and awards. On April 5, 1995, the Commander, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, concurred with the boards’ recommendations that Lieutenant Colonel May and Captain Wickson remain qualified for aviation service. He also directed that Lieutenant Colonel May be reassigned to a staff position not involving flying duties and that Captain Wickson be reassigned to flying duties (1) as an instructor in basic flying training or (2) in other noncombat aircraft. On July 25, 1995, the Secretary of the Air Force requested that the Air Force Chief of Staff review the administrative actions taken in regard to the Air Force personnel involved in the shootdown. On August 9, 1995, the Air Force Chief of Staff advised the Secretary of the Air Force of the actions he had taken. The Chief of Staff said that the military justice process had worked as it was supposed to after the incident and that he was comfortable with the military justice actions taken. He concluded that a proper balance between command involvement and individual rights had been maintained throughout the military justice process. Further, the administrative actions taken by commanders were within an appropriate range of options available to them. However, he said that a number of performance evaluations of involved personnel were inadequate because they were inconsistent with administrative actions taken by higher-level commanders and failed to reflect that the ratees had not met Air Force standards. Accordingly, pursuant to authority granted him by the Secretary of the Air Force, he prepared the following letters of evaluation regarding seven of the Air Force personnel involved in the shootdown and implemented additional actions against five. Combined Task Force Commander, Brigadier General Jeffrey S. Pilkington. A letter of evaluation addressed his failure to meet Air Force standards and became a permanent part of his record. CFAC Commander, Brigadier General Curtis H. Emery. A letter of evaluation was placed in his permanent record to reflect his failure to meet Air Force standards. F-15 Wingman, Lieutenant Colonel Randy W. May. A letter of evaluation was placed in his officer selection record to reflect his failure to meet Air Force standards. He was disqualified from aviation service for 3 years. F-15 Lead Pilot, Captain Eric A. Wickson. A letter of evaluation was placed in his officer selection record to reflect his failure to meet Air Force standards. He was disqualified from aviation service for 3 years based on his demonstrated lack of judgment associated with flight activities. AWACS Senior Director, Captain Jim Wang. A letter of evaluation detailing his failures to meet Air Force standards was included in his officer selection record and disqualified him from assignment to duties involving control of aircraft in air operations for at least 3 years. AWACS Enroute Controller, Captain Joseph M. Halcli. A letter of evaluation reflecting his failure to meet Air Force standards was placed in his officer selection record and disqualified him from assignment to duties involving control of aircraft in air operations for at least 3 years. AWACS TAOR Controller, First Lieutenant Ricky L. Wilson. A letter of evaluation reflecting his failure to meet Air Force standards was placed in his officer selection record. It recommended that he not be assigned to duties involving control of aircraft in air operations for at least 3 years. Our review of the summary reports of investigation during the UCMJ process and statements by officials knowledgeable of that process revealed no evidence of command influence. However, we were unable to confirm that the consideration and disposition of suspected offenses under UCMJ had not been subject to unlawful command influence because we were denied our request to interview applicable UCMJ Convening Authorities, Inquiry Officers, and Investigating Officers. The Investigating Officer in the AWACS Article 32 hearing stated that he had not been subject to command influence during the proceedings. The counsel for the Senior Director, Captain Wang, had filed a motion to dismiss the charges against the Senior Director based on an allegation of unlawful command influence by the Secretary of Defense on the Secretary of the Air Force. In response to that motion, six officials provided either a Stipulation of Expected Testimony, a memorandum, or an affidavit stating that they had neither been the subject of improper command influence nor taken action to improperly influence military justice officials. These officials were the Secretary of the Air Force; Air Force Chief of Staff; Commander, Air Combat Command; Deputy Staff Judge Advocate, Headquarters Air Combat Command (Legal Advisor to the RCM 303); the RCM 303 Inquiry Officer; and the General Court-Martial Convening Authority, the Commander, 8th Air Force. The convening judge denied the motion, ruling that the defense had failed to meet its burden of establishing at least the appearance of unlawful command influence. Further, to address the question of command influence in the case of the Senior Director, Captain Wang’s military attorney told us that he interviewed the Secretary of the Air Force about whether she or the Secretary of Defense had intervened in the court-martial. The attorney was satisfied that neither of them had exercised command influence during the UCMJ process. However, our request to the Air Force and the Department of Defense to interview military officials involved in the Black Hawk UCMJ proceedings was denied. These officials included the Convening Authorities, RCM 303 Inquiry Officers, and Article 32 Investigating Officers for investigations by both the Air Combat Command and the U.S Air Forces in Europe. The Department of Defense voiced the belief that “any Congressional intrusion into the deliberative process . . . endangers the actual and perceived independence of the military justice system.” We assured the Air Force that we would ask those officials only about the presence of unlawful command influence and would not intrude into the deliberative processes they had used in the proceedings, but we were denied access to those decision-makers who might have knowledge of possible influence. Consequently, we were unable to confirm whether the consideration and disposition of suspected offenses under the UCMJ were the result of improper or unlawful command influence. In accord with concerns voiced by victims’ family members and others, we also looked at the corrective and other actions taken after the shootdown. Military officials took immediate actions to help ensure that the Black Hawk accident was not repeated. Further, after the issuance of the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board report, the European Command; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Air Combat Command; and the Air Force instituted a large number of corrective actions. These actions included modification of the Rules of Engagement; inclusion of Black Hawk flight times on the Air Tasking Order; reviews of command structure and operations, plus operating doctrines and procedures; revision of AWACS training programs and certification procedures; and modifications of visual and electronic identification training. In transmitting the Board report to the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff made the following observation: “For over 1,000 days, the pilots and crews assigned to Operation Provide Comfort flew mission after mission, totalling over 50,000 hours of flight operations, without a single major accident. Then, in one terrible moment on the 14th of April, a series of avoidable errors led to the tragic deaths of 26 men and women of the American Armed Forces, United States Foreign Service, and the Armed Forces of our coalition allies. In place were not just one, but a series of safeguards—some human, some procedural, some technical—that were supposed to ensure an accident of this nature could never happen. Yet, quite clearly, these safeguards failed.” According to an Air Combat Command official who was familiar with the Board’s report and who participated in the Command’s UCMJ investigations, over 130 separate mistakes were involved in the shootdown. A discussion follows of some corrective actions spawned by the shootdown and the Aircraft Accident Investigation report. Beginning April 15, 1994, the European Command and Combined Task Force Commanders instituted immediate corrective actions designed to prevent a recurrence of the shootdown. The actions included, among others, modification of the Rules of Engagement, to restrict procedures for engaging Iraqi helicopters; inclusion of Black Hawk flight times on the Air Tasking Order; requirement for verbal confirmation of a positive IFF Mode IV check on all Operation Provide Comfort aircraft prior to their entry into the TAOR; reorganization of the Combined Task Force to designate one U.S. Air Force Colonel exclusively as the Commander, CFAC; further definition of AWACS responsibilities for coordination of air operations; placement of radios on Black Hawk flights to enable communication with fighter aircraft; and painting of white recognition stripes on the Black Hawk rotor blades to enhance their identification from the air. In response to a directive from the Deputy U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe, an Air Force/Army team assessed Operation Provide Comfort’s mission, organization, and operations. The assessment was conducted from May 31 to June 8, 1994, and placed particular emphasis on the adequacy of European Command guidance and oversight; the Combined Task Force command structure and organization, manning, and support; and operating doctrine and procedures. The assessment team flew missions with F-15, Black Hawk, and AWACS units; interviewed key personnel and random unit personnel; and reviewed organizational plans, procedures, and directives. The team issued a 59-page classified report that contained over 40 recommendations for operations improvements. During October 14-22, 1995, a second team conducted another operational assessment of Operation Provide Comfort and made 166 additional recommendations in a classified report. A number of recommendations made by both teams have been implemented. On July 7, 1994, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense, directed that (1) all Commanders in Chief review their Joint Task Force operations to ensure that they were conducted in accordance with published joint doctrine; (2) the Commanders in Chief establish a program of regular oversight of all their Joint Task Force operations; and (3) his staff review the curricula of all appropriate professional military education institutions to ensure proper emphasis on Joint Task Force organization, procedures, and operations. The Chairman also recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the Air Force Chief of Staff to review the adequacy of AWACS training programs and certification procedures, develop a retraining program based on the lessons learned from the shootdown, and ensure that all mission aircrews underwent this training. The Chairman further convened a conference of the Joint Chiefs and all Commanders in Chief on September 15, 1994, to discuss actions being taken to prevent a recurrence of the shootdown. On October 6, 1994, the Chairman advised the Secretary of Defense that all Commanders in Chief had completed reviews of their joint operations, aggressively implemented changes where required, and established programs to ensure regular oversight of those operations. Further, the Joint Staff found shortcomings in how Joint Task Force operations had been addressed in professional military education systems. According to the Chairman, each of the shortcomings was being addressed and corrections implemented. At the direction of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of the Air Force tasked the Air Combat Command to investigate the specific operational issues identified in the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board report. The Air Combat Command assembled a “Tiger Team” consisting primarily of Air Combat Command headquarters staff augmented with representatives from the 8th Air Force, Air Force Weapons Center, Air National Guard, and the 552d Air Control Wing. The team divided into three groups: AWACS/Airborne command and control, visual and electronic identification, and ground command and control. The three groups used the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board report as a frame of reference and identified 90 issues, which they studied in depth. The Air Combat Command Tiger Team issued its report on September 14, 1994, making about 140 recommendations, most of which had been completed or were underway when the report was issued. The report also proposed six recommendations for consideration by the Air Staff or the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Concurrent with the Air Combat Command tasking, the Secretary of the Air Force appointed an Air Force special task force to assist all Air Force commands in identifying potential problem areas and implementing appropriate corrections. The task force effort, which included the Air Combat Command Tiger Team work, involved over 120 people and over 30,000 hours in 6 major Air Force commands and Air Force Headquarters. The task force’s primary emphasis was to determine if the shootdown was an isolated incident or indicative of a bigger problem. It issued its report to the Secretary of Defense on September 30, 1994. The report concluded that the incident was not indicative of a larger Air Force problem and that the following two breakdowns in individual crew performance had contributed to the incident: (1) the AWACS failed to build and provide an accurate air picture and (2) the F-15 pilots misidentified the target. The report also recommended a one-time retraining and recertification program for all AWACS aircrews and a plan to reduce the temporary duty of AWACS crews to 120 days per year. The report concluded that the Air Force had corrected, or was in the process of correcting, training programs to address the shortcomings noted. On July 27, 1995, the Commander, Air Combat Command, informed the Air Force Chief of Staff that the Air Combat Command had completed a majority of the Tiger Team recommendations and that efforts were on target in achieving the desired results. He said that all AWACS crews had been recertified by October 13, 1994, and that the certification process was being applied to all AWACS crews deploying to any location. He further stated that AWACS temporary duty rates had been decreased from 166 to 135 days per year from January 1995 to July 1995. He also said that Air Combat Command planned to increase the number of AWACS crews. However, he noted that the Air Combat Command was continuing to work on the following three areas: computer-based training devices, visual identification, and electronic identification. For example, he stated that the Air Combat Command had updated visual identification training material, provided computer hardware for the Air Force-improved computer-based training developed by an Air Force contractor, and distributed the material to all Air Combat Command fighter units. The Commander, Air Combat Command, noted that the new product was an improvement over previous training materials (35MM slides and video) but that it did not fully meet the Command’s needs. He said that the Air Combat Command, in conjunction with the Air Education and Training Command, was pursuing an enhanced visual training program that would expand capabilities and allow aircrews to view three-dimensional or animated images against a variety of backgrounds from multiple aspects in all configurations and camouflage paint schemes. This new program was distributed to all Air Combat Command units in January 1996.

Summary: Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed military investigations made subsequent to the April 14, 1994, shootdown by U.S. Air Force F-15 fighters of two Army Black Hawk helicopters over Iraq in which 26 individuals died. GAO noted that: (1) the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board conducted an extensive investigation that complied with evidentiary requirements and guidelines in collecting and preserving evidence and produced a report that, with a few exceptions, provided an overview of the factual circumstances relating to the accident; (2) the report focused on command and control problems, including individuals' lack of knowledge of specific procedures, but: (a) did not discuss the F-15 pilots' responsibility to report to the Airborne Command Element when encountering an unknown aircraft; and (b) cited a statement that inaccurately portrayed the Airborne Command Element as not having authority to stop the incident, even though evidence that the Airborne Command Element had the authority was available to the Board; (3) the Board President erroneously concluded that the Black Hawks' use of an incorrect electronic identification code resulted in the F-15 pilots not receiving an electronic response; (4) family members and others raised concerns about a perceived general lack of discipline in the F-15 pilot community in Operation Provide Comfort and a perceived urgency by the pilots to engage during the shootdown, but the Board's report and opinion did not discuss these issues; (5) Operation Provide Comfort officials stated that the pilots' failure to contact the Airborne Command Element was the result of a lack of F-15 mission discipline at the time of the incident; (6) the officials stated that, in their view, there was no reason for the F-15 pilots' urgency to engage; (7) these issues are not inconsistent with the Board President's conclusion regarding the chain of events, but including them in the Board's report may have raised additional questions about the pilots' actions and the Airborne Command Element that could have been useful in subsequent proceedings; (8) during its review of the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board process, GAO found no evidence of improper or unlawful command influence; (9) the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) investigations complied with provisions of the UCMJ and the Manual for Courts-Martial; (10) GAO found no evidence of improper or unlawful command influence in the UCMJ investigations, but was unable to confirm whether the consideration and disposition of suspected offenses under the UCMJ were the result of improper or unlawful command influence; and (11) the Air Force Chief of Staff took additional personnel actions after finding that a number of individuals' performance evaluations had not reflected their failure to meet Air Force standards.