The 1945 Charter of the United Nations gives the UN Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. UN peacekeeping operations have traditionally been associated with Chapter VI of the charter, which outlines provisions for the peaceful settlement of disputes. However, in recent years, the Security Council has increasingly used Chapter VII to authorize the deployment of peacekeeping operations into volatile environments where the government of the host country is unable to maintain security and public order. Chapter VII allows the peacekeepers to take military and nonmilitary action to maintain or restore international peace and security. Chapter VIII authorizes regional organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the African Union (AU), to resolve disputes prior to intervention by the UN Security Council, so long as the activities of the regional organizations are consistent with UN principles. In this report, we differentiate between traditional and multidimensional mandates for peacekeeping operations. Traditional operations generally monitor or supervise cease-fire and other peace agreements between formerly warring parties. Their tasks can include monitoring of border demarcation, exchange of prisoners, and demobilization efforts. Multidimensional operations tend to go beyond traditional peace monitoring tasks by attempting to restore or create conditions more conducive to a lasting peace. On two occasions since 1998, the UN Security Council granted multidimensional operations the executive authority to direct and carry out the construction or reconstruction of political, legal, and economic institutions in Timor L’este and Kosovo. Multidimensional mandates generally include one or more of the following tasks in their mandates: Monitoring, supervising, training, or reconstructing police forces and otherwise supporting efforts to restore rule of law; monitoring, assisting, or instituting efforts to improve human rights; supporting, facilitating, coordinating, or safeguarding humanitarian relief monitoring, supporting, coordinating, or safeguarding assistance provided to help refugees or internally displaced persons return home and reintegrate into the society of the affected country or region; and conducting, supporting, or coordinating elections and other democracy- building efforts. In general, the United States has supported the expansion of UN peacekeeping operations as a useful, cost-effective way to influence situations affecting U.S. national interests without direct U.S. intervention. For example, in 2006, the United States voted for UN operations to ensure that Southern Lebanon was not used for hostile activities; to assist with the restoration and maintenance of the rule of law and public safety in Haiti; and to contribute to the protection of civilian populations and facilitate humanitarian activities in Darfur. These operations support U.S. national interests by carrying out mandates to help stabilize regions and promote international peace. The UN manages 16 peacekeeping operations worldwide as of September 2008, 6 of them in sub-Saharan Africa. Figure 1 shows the location of UN peacekeeping operations as of September 2008. The United States contributes the greatest share of funding for peacekeeping operations. All permanent members of the Security Council—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—are charged a premium above their assessment rate for the regular budget (22 percent for the United States). For the 2008-2009 UN peacekeeping budget year, the UN assessed the United States about $2 billion according to a State official, or about 26 percent of the total UN peacekeeping budget. This represents an increase of over 700 percent in the budget since 1998 (see fig. 2). The U.S. government also makes significant voluntary contributions in support of countries providing UN peacekeeping forces. For example, State obligated about $110 million in fiscal year 2007 and 2008 funds for countries providing forces for the UN operation in Darfur. In addition, the United States had provided 308 troops, police, and military observers to six UN peacekeeping operations as of September 30, 2008. The extent and nature of U.S. support for UN peacekeeping is largely contained in Section 10 of the UN Participation Act of 1945. For example, it limits total U.S. contributions to 1,000 troops at any one time. It also limits the U.S. government to providing free of charge to the UN no more than $3 million worth of items or services—such as supplies, transportation assistance, or equipment—to each operation per year. UN guidelines call for DPKO to undertake planning and predeployment tasks before the approval of a UN Security Council mandate authorizing an operation. These include drawing up operations plans to address the expected mandate, estimated sector responsibilities, and force requirements. DPKO also assesses the availability of forces from potential contributors and then validates the estimates through visits of UN military and police officials to the host country and to troop and police contributing countries to assess unit readiness and availability. The Secretary General then issues a report on establishing the mission, including its size and resources. On the basis of the report, the Security Council may then pass a resolution authorizing the operation’s mandate and number of troops and police. According to U.S. officials, this is the maximum level allowed. Although the Security Council may authorize the mission’s mandate, its full budget must still be prepared and approved. In this process, the UN Department of Field Support prepares a draft budget and the UN Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions reviews it. According to the UN, considerable scrutiny of the proposed budget occurs during this process and there is debate among member states that pay the bulk of costs of the operation and the top troop contributors. The General Assembly then approves the budget for the amount agreed upon. UN guidelines note that the lead time required to deploy a mission depends on a number of factors, particularly the will of member states to contribute troops and police to a particular operation and the availability of financial and other resources due to long procurement lead times. For missions with highly complex mandates or difficult logistics, or where peacekeepers face significant security risk, it may take several weeks or even months to assemble and deploy the necessary elements. The UN has set a 90-day target for deploying the first elements of a multidimensional UN peacekeeping operation endorsed by the UN Security Council. Over the past decade, the UN has undertaken a number of assessments and initiatives to improve its peacekeeping organization, doctrine, planning, logistics and conditions of service for peacekeeping staff, as well as its efforts to establish a capacity to rapidly deploy peacekeepers. For example, the 2000 report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, or Brahimi report, made recommendations to the Secretary General to improve the strategic direction, planning, organization, and conduct of peace operations. In response, the UN consolidated all peacekeeping responsibilities into DPKO, substantially increased its staff, and took steps to improve and integrate mission planning. Moreover, the Secretary General’s 2001 No Exit Without a Strategy noted that missions’ mandates should include elements such as institution building and the promotion of good governance and the rule of law to facilitate sustainable peace. The Peace Operations 2010 initiative announced by the Secretary General in 2006 focused on further reforms in the area of personnel, doctrine, partnerships, resources and organization. As a result, the UN took steps to strengthen its capacity to direct and support peacekeeping operations that included splitting DPKO into two departments in 2007 by creating the separate Department of Field Support; establishing integrated operations teams to integrate the daily direction and support of peacekeeping operations; and, in 2008, issuing a consolidated statement of peacekeeping operations, principles, and guidelines and a field guide to assist senior staff address critical mission startup tasks and challenges. GAO has reviewed the status of a number of UN reform initiatives, most recently the UN’s efforts to clarify lines of authority for field procurement between DPKO and DFS. Since 1998, UN peacekeeping operations have taken on more complex and ambitious mandates, taken place in increasingly challenging environments, and grown in size and scope. As shown in table 1, the operations have more mandated tasks and are increasingly authorized under Chapter VII of the UN charter to use all means necessary to carry out the mandate. The locations of the operations also are in less developed areas, as measured by the UN’s index of health, economic, and education levels, and the operations are deployed in some of the most politically unstable countries in the world. Finally, current operations with multidimensional mandates have an average of nearly 9 times as many troops, observers, and police as those in 1998, and more than 13 times as many civilian staff. Appendix V provides details on current UN peacekeeping operations. Appendix VI provides details on the military capabilities of UN peacekeeping operations as of November 2008. Since 1998, the United Nations has undertaken operations with broader and more complex mandates than before. The 16 operations in 1998 had mandates averaging three tasks or objectives each. The mandates of 10 of these operations were limited to such traditional peacekeeping tasks as monitoring cease-fire agreements and boundaries between formerly warring parties. The other 6 operations had a small number of tasks, which went beyond traditional peace monitoring by calling for the restoration or creation of conditions more conducive to a lasting peace. In September 2008, the UN also had 16 ongoing peacekeeping operations, but 11 had multidimensional mandates with political, security, social, and humanitarian objectives. Also, 15 of the 17 UN Peacekeeping Operations begun or augmented since 1998 were multidimensional missions. According to the November 2000 report by the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, the mandated tasks of these operations reflected the more comprehensive approach to restoring security the UN had adopted as part of its ongoing efforts to improve the strategic direction and conduct of peace operations. This report noted that the effective protection of civilians and assistance in postconflict environments requires a coordinated strategy that goes beyond the political or military aspects of a conflict if the operation is to achieve a sustainable peace. We reported that since 1999 the UN has increasingly focused on a more comprehensive approach to making a transition from peacekeeping to a sustainable peace. Reflecting this trend, our analysis of the 17 UN operations since 1998 shows that operations averaged nine mandated tasks, with the most frequent tasks calling for the UN to monitor a peace or cease-fire agreement, use all means necessary to carry out the mandate (Chapter VII), help restore civil order with police support, train and develop the police force, support development of the rule of law, ensure human rights/women’s rights and protection, and support humanitarian assistance for internally displaced persons. Moreover, since 2006, the UN Security Council has mandated that peacekeeping operations include a responsibility to protect civilians from “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity,” with force if necessary, when national authorities fail in this task. According to UN documents and officials, peacekeeping operations initiated after 1998 were deployed in less secure and more volatile postconflict situations. Since then, the Security Council has frequently deployed new operations into areas where the government of the host country was unable to maintain security and public order. For example, most of the UN operations ongoing as of September 2008 were deployed in locations that had among the highest levels of instability as measured by the World Bank’s index of political instability. Moreover, the Security Council has increasingly authorized peacekeepers to take all steps necessary to carry out their mandate, including the use of force, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In 1998, four UN missions operated under Chapter VII authority; in 2008, nine operated under explicit Chapter VII authority. UN operations currently are also being conducted in countries that are relatively less developed on average than the countries in which they were deployed a decade ago. This has increased the level of effort and resources needed to sustain peacekeeping operations, according to UN officials. In 1998, the average UN peacekeeping operation was deployed to a country with aggregate levels of knowledge, standard of living, and life expectancy that placed them in the medium category of development, as measured by the United Nations Development Program’s (UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI). Ten of the 17 operations initiated since 1998 were deployed to sub-Saharan Africa, of which 7 were in countries falling within the HDI’s lowest category of human development. As of September 2008, about 78,000, or 72 percent of the UN’s uniformed and civilian peacekeepers were in sub-Saharan Africa. As peacekeeping operations have taken on more ambitious mandates in challenging environments, the operations have become larger and more complex, with expanded troop deployments and sophisticated capabilities. Seven of the 11 ongoing multidimensional UN operations in 2008 had deployed from 7,000 to over 17,000 troops. In 1998, multidimensional operations averaged fewer than 1,000 troops and military observers. UN troops also are being deployed in larger and more capable units, according to UN officials. As of November 2008, the UN had approximately 76 battalion-sized infantry units deployed, including 21 mechanized infantry battalions. Most recent operations require major troop-contributing countries to deploy at least one 800-person infantry battalion with armored vehicles and supported by its own engineer and logistics units. A March 2008 UN report noted that the UN’s peacekeeping deployments included over 5,000 engineers, 24,000 vehicles, and 200 aircraft. Appendix VI provides more information on the military capabilities required by ongoing multidimensional UN peacekeeping operations as of November 2008. The UN also has deployed more police to peacekeeping operations over the past 10 years. In June 1998, the UN deployed 2,984 police, compared with 11,515 police deployed as of September 2008. The UN also has come to rely more heavily on formed police units (FPU), armed units of approximately 125 to 140 officers trained in crowd control and other specialized tasks and equipped with armored personnel carriers. These units, which are deployed to UN operations as cohesive units by contributing countries, were first utilized in small numbers in 2003 but now compose about 40 percent of all UN police deployed. FPUs are intended to perform three main functions—protection of UN facilities and personnel, provision of security support to national law enforcement agencies, and national police capacity building—and the increase in their use reflects the trend toward operations with more complex mandates taking place in less secure situations. In contrast, UN police are individually selected and deployed by the UN to monitor host nation police activities or supervise local police training. The increasingly large and complex operations also require larger civilian staffs with a diverse range of skill sets to execute the mandate and coordinate with other UN and international organizations. In 2000, the average multidimensional operation deployed about 125 international civilian staff; in 2008, the average rose to 445 international civilian staff. A global survey of international peacekeeping reported that as of October 2007, international UN civilian staff deployed on UN peacekeeping operations worked in 22 occupational groups, including administration, aviation, engineering, rule of law, security, and transportation. The task of sustaining and supplying operations launched since 1998 has grown increasingly complicated due to their larger size and deployment in less developed and more unstable environments. Under these circumstances, units need more equipment, use it more intensively, consume more fuel, and require more maintenance due to increased wear and tear . According to a senior UN official, such operations must bring in more international staff because skilled local personnel are scarce. They also must bring in more of their own food and water, and build their own roads, buildings, and accommodations from the ground up and then maintain them. The United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) is an example of an operation that is heavily dependent upon aircraft to move and supply forces over a large area because the country lacks adequate roads. According to a July 2006 UN report, MONUC required 105 aircraft, distributed among 60 airports; maintenance of 150 landing sites; and aviation support staff of 1,600. This effort consumed 21 percent of MONUC’s total 2007-2008 budget, compared with an average of 11 percent for all UN peacekeeping operations. As a way to assess UN capacity, we developed a potential new peacekeeping operation to illustrate the detailed and likely resources the UN would need to deploy a new operation. Based on our analysis of the evolution of peacekeeping operations and UN planning scenarios, this operation would likely be large and complex and take place in sub- Saharan Africa. The potential new operation would be consistent with the mandates of the 17 operations launched since June 1998 and have nine security, political, and humanitarian tasks. Based on the most appropriate UN planning scenario, the potential new operation would likely require 21,000 troops and military observers and 1,500 police. We estimate that this operation would require 4,000 to 5,000 civilian staff, and UN officials noted that it would have logistical needs comparable to those of other large, complex operations in similar environments. Like other peacekeeping operations located in sub-Saharan Africa, the potential new mission likely would confront limited roads, other infrastructure, and water, thereby requiring greater logistical planning and support. Furthermore, according to the UN, in the majority of post-conflict scenarios, mine clearance is necessary to begin rehabilitating roads and other infrastructure. Our analysis is not intended to predict the size, scope, or location of a new UN peacekeeping operation. A new operation’s mandate and resource needs would be determined by the UN Security Council and the circumstances particular to the country to which the operation is deployed. Therefore, the requirements of a new operation could differ from those of the potential new operation presented here. The potential new operation would likely have a multidimensional mandate, with nine tasks related to security, political, and humanitarian efforts. The operation could be mandated to provide a secure environment, protect civilians and UN staff, monitor a cease-fire or peace agreement, and promote reconciliation. Political tasks could include supporting elections; helping establish rule of law and assisting in the reform of military, police, and corrections systems; and assisting in disarmament and demobilization of combatants. Humanitarian tasks could include monitoring human rights and developing the capability of the government. To derive these tasks for a potential new operation, we reviewed UN planning scenarios for a new operation in sub-Saharan Africa and selected the scenario that best matched our trend analysis of the 17 UN operations initiated or augmented since June 1998. The potential new operation likely would be located in sub-Saharan Africa because 10 of the 17 operations started or expanded since 1998 were deployed to the region. Like the areas of other peacekeeping operations in sub-Saharan Africa, the potential new mission’s area of operations would have limited infrastructure and utilities, lacking roads, buildings, and water, and would thus require increased logistical planning. Using the assumptions contained in the selected UN planning scenario, the potential new operation would be in a high-threat environment, political factions would recently have been fighting for control of the country, and there would be large numbers of internally displaced persons. As a precondition for deployment of the potential new operation, the UN would likely secure political and security agreements among the parties to the conflict and a clear statement of support from the host country for the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation. To accomplish the political, security, and humanitarian tasks in the mandate, the potential new operation would require 21,000 troops and observers distributed among five sectors. Both combat capable and supporting units would be required, including troops with armored personnel carriers, engineers, truck transport companies, and medical, aviation, and logistics units. The force size would be derived from a threat assessment that would determine how the UN troops could ensure a safe and secure operating environment while protecting civilians and UN staff. According to UN planners, a potential new force would likely require units with the capability to deter threats from armed factions supported by international terrorist groups, which previous operations did not have to take into account to the same degree. The force would need special troops to detect and defeat the threat of improvised explosive devices and would need significant intelligence resources. The operation would be mandated to provide area security for an estimated 1.5 million internally displaced persons (IDP). Table 2 presents the composition of a potential new peacekeeping operation. The force’s operational units (14 infantry battalions and 1 mechanized battalion) would be distributed among five sectors. Each sector would contain all the civilian and uniformed components necessary to carry out the mandated tasks. Four of the sectors would require two battalions each. The infantry battalions in these sectors would be deployed in mobile company-sized groups to provide wide coverage by patrolling, establishing checkpoints, and enforcing buffer zones and demilitarized areas. The plan envisions a larger force of 5infantry battalions for the fifth sector, encompassing the capital city; these units would not require as many vehicles because much of their patrolling would be done on foot in urban areas. This sector would also maintain a mechanized battalion in reserve to serve as a rapid reaction force. The size of the helicopter force would be based on the need to provide aerial observation and firepower support 24 hours per day, 7 days per week, for all sectors, as well as the capability to transport infantry battalions and conduct search and rescue operations as needed. Many of the operational units would need to come from countries capable of providing supplies for the first 60 days after deployment, given the limitations of local infrastructure expected in this environment. The force would require five specialized logistics units to provide a number of base camp service and supply functions, five to six engineering companies, and four airfield support units to assist aviation operations. According to a UN planning scenario and UN officials, the potential new operation would likely require 1,500 police, including 700 officers in five FPUs. The police units will eventually assist with the reactivation of the potential new country’s police force; provide mentoring, skills training, and professional development assistance; advise on police reform and restructuring; and support capacity building and police oversight. However, as with the operation in Darfur, a large police force with a high profile would likely be needed to build confidence among the population. Furthermore, as in other UN operations, police officers must speak the official language (English), know how to operate four-wheel drive vehicles, and have about 5 years of police service and a background in country development activities. We estimated that the potential new operation would require 4,000 to 5,000 civilian staff, based on discussions with UN officials and analysis of UN planning documents. International staff of other complex UN operations ongoing in sub-Saharan Africa constitute between 20 and 30 percent of total civilian staff. According to UN officials, operations initially have a higher percentage of international staff. A more precise estimate of the number of civilians needed for the potential new operation would require detailed information, such as information about the skills available in the local labor market. The potential new operation’s international civilian staff would likely include the following: a special representative of the Secretary General; Assistant Secretary Generals, including the force commander; directors, including police commissioner, judicial affairs, political affairs, and civil affairs; professional staff for legal affairs, rule of law, judicial affairs, child protection, finance, and mission support functions (logistics and administration, finance, budget, human resources and management, procurement); and a substantial allocation of field service officers to provide technical/administrative support. In addition to international staff, the potential new operation would need national support staff and national professional officers. Furthermore, according to UN estimates, between 20 and 25 percent of the civilian force of the potential new operation could be needed to provide security for its civilian staff and facilities in the expected high-threat environment. UN officials could not provide an estimate of the logistical needs for the potential new operation without detailed planning in the field that precedes actual deployments. However, they stated that total logistical needs would likely be comparable to those of other large, complex operations, such as the operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or Darfur. For example, the potential new operation would likely need to establish and sustain camps and other facilities; manage major contracts for transport, food, fuel, water, and property and other services; and plan and coordinate the use of engineering, transportation, and other specialized assets provided by troop-contributing countries. The potential new operation, as with other sub-Saharan operations, would be dependent upon specialized military support units to meet its logistics needs. The potential new force would likely have to build roads, buildings, and other infrastructure and would be heavily dependent on helicopters and other relatively expensive aviation units for movement and supply. For example, as of June 2008, the operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (the Congo) allocated 21 percent of its annual budget on air operations, compared with a UN-wide average of 11 percent. The UN would likely face difficulty in obtaining troops, military observers, police, and civilians for the potential new operation. As of September 2008, the UN was about 18,000 troops and military observers below the level of about 95,000 authorized for current operations. In addition, several peacekeeping operations needed specialized military units, such as units for logistics, helicopters, and transport. There are a limited number of countries that provide troops and police with needed capabilities to meet current needs, and some potential contributors may be unwilling to provide forces for a new operation due to such political factors as their own national interests and the environmental and security situation in the host country. The UN also has a large vacancy rate for international civilians, and the UN is considering proposals to address the difficulty of obtaining and retaining international civilian staff. Figure 3 illustrates the authorized and deployed levels of troops, police, and civilians. Moreover, the UN would likely face the logistics challenges that have confronted other large UN operations in sub-Saharan Africa. UN officials and performance reports note that the difficulty of obtaining needed personnel and other resources has had an impact on the ability of ongoing operations to fully execute their mandates. As of September 2008, about 77,000 troops and military observers were deployed to existing UN peacekeeping operations, an overall gap of 18,000, or about 20 percent, below the authorized level of approximately 95,000. Of the 18,000, approximately 11,000 are attributable to the operation in Darfur. According to the State Department, the UN has secured pledges of troops to fill most of the authorized numbers for Darfur and the UN planned to deploy a majority of them by the end of the year. However, a UN report in October stated that the troop deployment would be delayed. The UN further reported that it had received no commitments from member states for some of the critical units required for the Darfur mission to become fully operational, including an aerial reconnaissance unit, transport units, a logistics support unit, and attack and transport helicopters with crews. Other operations have significant gaps between their deployed and authorized troop levels. For example, Lebanon has about 2,500 troops fewer than its authorized levels as of September 2008, and a UN report stated that the UN was seeking these troops from member countries. In addition to existing needs, a September 2008 UN report estimates that 6,000 troops will be needed, along with specialized units, for an augmented operation in Chad and the Central African Republic in the first quarter of 2009. However, the Secretary General requested the Security Council not to authorize the mission until the UN obtained firm troop commitments. The UN would confront three critical issues in obtaining needed military resources for a potential new mission in sub-Saharan Africa. First, a relatively small number of countries have demonstrated the willingness and ability to provide the UN with units of sufficient size and capability. As of November 2008, 120 nations provide troops or police to UN operations; however, only 30 countries provide at least 1 of the 76 battalion-sized infantry units these operations require. A standard UN infantry battalion has 800 troops; U.S. government officials note that countries generally must commit 2 additional battalions for every battalion currently deployed to ensure sufficient units are available for the rotation cycle, entailing a total commitment of 2,400 troops. As of November 2008, UN operations lacked 8 battalion-sized infantry units for Darfur. The potential new operation discussed in this report would likely increase the potential need by 15 battalions. A UN official indicated that the UN would approach its major contributors, such Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan, which have provided an increasingly large portion of total UN peacekeeping forces since 1998, if confronted with the challenge of staffing an operation similar to the potential new operation. Second, the potential new operation would require military logistics units, hospitals, military engineers, and military transport units. The UN relies on 37 countries to provide these specialized units in company strength or greater as of November 2008. The potential new operation would require 24 utility helicopters, 12 armed helicopters, and crew to fly them. However, according to US officials and UN documents, these types of units and resources are difficult to obtain and are currently being sought for existing operations. As of December 2008, the UN has been unable to obtain any of the 28 helicopters needed for the operation in Darfur, according to a State official. A UN official said it would be reasonable to assume an inability to obtain helicopters for the potential new operation. Third, member state decisions to provide troops for UN operations depend on factors such as the state’s national interest, the operation’s mandate, and the host country’s environment and security situation. For example, concerns over the security situation in Rwanda in 1994 resulted in member states not providing additional troops for the UN operation. Member states were unwilling to provide needed troops and reinforcements for operations in Bosnia and Somalia for similar reasons. The government hosting the UN operation also can impose political restrictions. For example, the government of Sudan insists that the UN force in Darfur be composed primarily of troops from African member states. This led to the withdrawal of an offer by Norway and Sweden to provide a needed joint engineering unit to the operation, a decision that the Secretary General noted undermined operations. The potential new operation would require deployment of 1,500 police— 800 individual UN police and 700 officers in five FPUs. However, as of September 2008, UN peacekeeping operations had a 34 percent gap between deployed and authorized levels of police. The total number of police authorized for all operations was 17,490, but the number deployed was 11,515. Moreover, the UN required 46 FPUs as of June 2008, but the UN had deployed only about 31 FPUs. The gap between deployed and authorized FPUs stems mainly from the lack of units for operations in Darfur. The UN encounters difficulties in obtaining qualified UN police with the special skills its operations may require. For example, according to a November 2007 Stimson Center report, some UN operations require experienced police officers capable of conducting criminal investigations or officers with supervisory or administrative skills. According to this report, unlike states contributing troops or FPUs, potential police contributing countries lack incentives because the UN does not reimburse them for their individual police contributions. In addition, a UN official noted that it is difficult to find police for the UN with the necessary skills because these officers are in demand in their home countries. Limited resources for recruiting individual UN police add to this difficulty. In contrast with its reliance on member states to contribute and deploy FPUs as a unit, the UN recruits and deploys UN police individually. A senior UN police official stated that this task is time-consuming; he noted that he reviews an estimated 700 applications to find 30 qualified police officers for an operation. Recruitment is the responsibility of the 34-strong Police Division of the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations, which also helps deploy the police components for new UN operations, sends members of this staff to the field to help with start-up of new operations, and supports and assists police components of existing UN operations. According to a senior UN official, current staff levels are not adequate to support these functions and undertake all recruitment, and the UN should have three to four times the support personnel that currently reside in the division. UN police officials also noted that supporting an additional operation would be beyond their current capacity. However, a strategic review of the functions and structure of the Police Division, which will include an analysis of the adequacy of current resources levels, is ongoing. Obtaining needed FPUs required by its operations presents the UN with additional difficulties. These units, which are composed of law enforcement officers with expertise in crowd management and other policing tactical activities, require special training and equipment. For example, FPUs must undergo training in several areas before being eligible for deployment to a UN operation, including emergency medical services, use of nonlethal weapons and firearms, and crowd control and behavior. As of June 2008, only 11 countries provide full-sized FPUs to the UN, compared to the much larger number of countries that contribute UN police. According to a UN official, obtaining even one additional FPU is difficult. For example, it took a year to obtain an additional unit for the mission in Haiti. According to a conference report on international police issues co-sponsored by the U.S. government, if the UN plans to continue increasing its use of FPUs, this will require the development of a greater international capacity to deploy units that have been properly prepared for the demands of peacekeeping operations. The UN would likely need between 4,000 and 5,000 civilian staff for the potential new operation but would have difficulty obtaining these staff and retaining them once in place. Recruiting enough international civilian staff to fill the number of authorized positions in peacekeeping operations is difficult. From 2005 through early 2008, UN peacekeeping operations have had an average vacancy rate for international civilian staff of about 22 percent. As of April 2008, the vacancy rate for all civilian staff for the sub- Saharan operations in Chad/Central African Republic and Darfur was over 70 percent, and the vacancy rate for international civilian personnel in the adjoining UN operation in southern Sudan, was approximately 30 percent of its authorized level. Operations outside sub-Saharan Africa also have experienced high international civilian staff vacancy rates; the average vacancy rate for these operations ranged from 14 to 25 percent from 2005 through 2008. Some specialties are difficult to fill. In 2000, a UN report found critical shortfalls in key areas including procurement, finance, budget, logistics support, and engineers. In addition, a 2006 UN report found a 50 percent vacancy rate for procurement officers in the field. The UN also has difficulty retaining the existing civilian staff in peacekeeping operations. About 80 percent of international staff have appointments of 1 year or less, and the turnover rate in the field is approximately 30 percent. In addition, about half of professional staff serving in peacekeeping operations have 2 years or less experience. In September 2008, we reported that limited career development opportunities have contributed to the UN’s difficulties in attracting and retaining qualified field procurement staff. According to UN officials, turnover among field procurement staff has continued to hurt the continuity of their operations and peacekeeping missions continue to face challenges in deploying qualified, experienced procurement staff, especially during the critical start-up phase. The UN has identified several problems in obtaining and retaining civilian staff for peacekeeping. First, nearly all civilian staff deployed to UN operations hold appointments limited to specific missions or are on loan from other UN offices as temporary duty assignments. Most of these civilians cannot be redeployed from one mission to another in response to urgent needs at one of the operations, which limits the UN’s ability to launch new operations. Second, the UN has reported that the terms and conditions of service for civilians at field missions create inequities in the field. In March 2008, the UN reported that it has nine different types of employment contracts for field civilians, which set differing terms of service. Some operations do not offer the incentive of hardship pay. According to a UN official, it would be difficult to attract international staff and contractors to the potential new operation without better conditions of service. The UN has developed proposals to address these challenges. For example, in 2006, the UN Secretariat proposed establishing 2,500 career- track positions for expert and experienced technical civilian staff to serve in field missions. These staff would have the flexibility to move to different operations as needed. The UN Secretariat also proposed reducing the types of contracts offered to civilian staff and harmonizing conditions of service so that civilians serving in UN operations have similar benefits. As of September 2008, the UN was considering these proposals, according to a State official. The recent experiences of other UN operations in sub-Saharan Africa illustrate the challenges the potential new operation may face in terms of logistical requirements. First, it is likely that the UN will not be able to draw upon preexisting buildings for office space and staff accommodations. For example, UN planning standards assume that a host country could provide 40 percent of a new operation’s required accommodation space; however, a panel of UN officials from the Departments of Peacekeeping and Field Support stated that a host country in sub-Saharan Africa would likely be unable to provide any of the office space or accommodations needed. As a result, a new operation such as the potential new operation could face the task of constructing accommodations from the ground up for approximately 10,000 people in and around the force headquarters. Second, poor infrastructure conditions would likely hinder the activities of the potential new operation; UN officials noted that road conditions for the potential new operation could resemble those facing Darfur, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where the poor or nonexistent road networks strained the UN’s ability to move people, goods, and equipment. According to UN reports, the roads in Darfur are especially poor, supplies take an average of 7 weeks to travel the 1,400 miles from port to operation, and banditry along the roads compounds the problem. As a result, according to a UN official, the potential new operation would likely require engineering units with substantial road-building capabilities for each sector, but as noted earlier, engineering units are difficult for the UN to obtain. According to the UN, the four month rainy season in the sub-Saharan region also complicates the challenge of supplying missions. Third, commercial opportunities for procuring goods and services will likely be limited given the potential new operation’s location in sub- Saharan Africa. Lack of local commercial opportunities has caused problems for other operations in the area. When items cannot be procured locally, they must be imported from abroad and sent to the operation, a fact that causes delays and compounds the burden on the operation’s transport assets. For example, the Darfur mission’s slow deployment is partially due to lack of capacity in the local market to meet the cargo transport requirements of the operation. These challenges also would likely delay the start-up of the potential new mission. As of September 2008, UN mission planning factors call for UN operations to begin with a rapid deployment phase in which the force would achieve an initial operational capability within 90 days of Security Council authorization. However, according to UN planning staff and documents, this objective is unrealistic. Operations in the Congo, Sudan, Darfur, and Chad required a substantial buildup of logistical military units before achieving initial operating capability. According to a UN report, arranging for the commitment and deployment of these units requires an expeditionary approach—the establishment and progressive buildup of the personnel, equipment, supplies, and infrastructure. One UN military planner estimated that arranging for and coordinating these complex logistical arrangements with existing UN planning resources added 6 months to the deployment process. The gaps between authorized and deployed levels of troops, police, and civilians—compounded by the logistics challenges—have affected ongoing operations. Some State and UN officials note that some gaps simply may be due to the time lag between securing and deploying forces. However, interviews with some officials from selected operations and our review of operation performance reports have demonstrated that the lack of troops, police, and civilians for existing operations has delayed or prevented some operations from undertaking mandated activities. The operation in Darfur, for example, has been unable to fully undertake many of its mandated activities, such as protection of civilians, due to a lack of military personnel. According to UN reports, lack of critical support units, such as helicopter, logistics support, and transport units has limited the operation’s ability to provide for its own protection, carry out its mandated tasks effectively, and transport equipment and supplies necessary to house and maintain the troops it has deployed so far. Moreover, the inability to secure these support units has delayed the deployment of some of the troops already committed to the operation for several months. The operation in Haiti lacked required levels of police, according to a UN official, and this lack decreased the support that could be provided to the Haitian National Police. Several operations have recently experienced civilian vacancies in key areas, affecting operation activities in the areas of public information, property management, medical services, and procurement. For example, officials at some missions stated that vacancies in procurement staff positions, particularly in supervisory positions, have impeded procurement actions and heightened the risk of errors. In general, according to a UN Secretary General report, the UN has not made progress in solving the problems with civilian staffing and the resulting high civilian vacancy rates have put the organization at managerial and financial risk. In addition, challenges in the areas of logistics have also had an impact on existing operations. Lack of local procurement opportunities required the operation in Haiti to procure most needed goods and services from outside the country, creating delays for the operation that are difficult to overcome. For example, it took the operation some time to find a suitable headquarters building, and it required outside resources to bring the building up to UN standards of safety and security. The U.S. government, along with those of other countries, has taken some steps to help address UN challenges in obtaining troops and police for peacekeeping operations, primarily through the Global Peace Operations Initiative. The United States has also provided logistics support to specific UN operations and is supports, in principle, UN proposals to address gaps between the number of authorized and deployed civilians. State is required to report to Congress on the status and effectiveness of peacekeeping operations and provides some of this information through its monthly briefings to Congress. However, State has not provided information about troop and other gaps between authorized and deployed force levels— important elements of status and effectiveness—in its notifications or annual UN report to Congress. The U.S. government, along with those of other countries, has provided some help to address UN challenges in obtaining peacekeeping troops, police, civilians, and logistics requirements through both GPOI and in response to specific UN mission needs. GPOI is a 5-year program begun by the U.S. government in 2004 in support of the Group of Eight (G8) countries’ action plan to build peacekeeping capabilities worldwide, with a focus on Africa. According to the State department, efforts are underway to extend this program’s activities beyond 2010. The key goals of the program are to train and, when appropriate, equip military peacekeepers and provide nonlethal equipment and transportation to support countries’ deployment of peacekeepers. In June 2008, we reported that as of April 2008 GPOI had provided training and material assistance to about 40,000 of the 75,000 peacekeeping troops it intends to train by 2010. Approximately 22,000 of these troops, predominantly African soldiers, have been deployed to 9 UN peacekeeping operations, one UN political mission, and 2 AU peacekeeping operations. We also reported that GPOI is unlikely to meet all of its goals and that State was unable to assess how effectively its instruction was improving the capacity of countries to provide and sustain peacekeepers. In addition, the United States has initiated actions to address mission-specific gaps. For example, State and DOD formed the Missing Assets Task Force to conduct a global search for 28 attack and transport helicopters, logistics units, and other assets for the operation in Darfur. As of December 2008, the task force was unable to obtain commitments for the helicopters. Through GPOI, the United States also supports efforts at the international Center of Excellence for Stability Police in Italy to increase the capabilities and interoperability of stability police to participate in peace operations. As of June 2008, the center had trained more than 1,300 of the 3,000 stability police instructors it intends to train by 2009. Moreover, State has allocated about $10 million for training and equipping FPUs deploying to Sudan. According to State and DOD officials, the United States has done little to help the UN address gaps between deployed and authorized civilian levels. According to State officials, the United States supports, in principle, UN internal efforts to address chronic gaps between civilian deployment and authorized staff levels by improving the terms of service for civilian peacekeeping staff, improving contracting arrangements and incentives for UN civilians, and developing a rapidly deployable standing civilian corps. However, a U.S. official noted in late September 2008 that these initiatives are still undergoing review by the UN and member states and the U.S. position on the final initiatives could be influenced by the projected costs and other factors. In commenting on a draft of this report, State wrote that it is supporting reforms in personnel policy that will mitigate the difficulty the UN is having in recruiting critical international staff. However, the UN comments on the draft stated that the general expression of U.S. support for the Secretary-General’s human resources management reform proposals is welcome, but is somewhat at dissonance with the position presented by the U.S. delegation to the fifth Committee of the General Assembly and on-going regular sixty-third sessions of the General Assembly. The UN stated that the U.S. delegation did not join the consensus reached by all other member states to streamline contractual arrangements, offer greater job security to staff in field missions, and improve their conditions of service. The UN also commented that at the regular sixty-third session of the General Assembly, the U.S. delegation proposed to significantly reduce allowances and benefits to new recruits and to staff to serve on temporary appointments in UN peacekeeping operations. The United States has helped the UN address logistical challenges both through GPOI and on a mission-specific basis. For example, GPOI supports an equipment depot in Sierra Leone that has provided nonlethal equipment to support the logistical training and deployment of African troops. State and DOD officials stated that they also have responded to specific logistics needs of UN operations. For example, State provided $110 million in fiscal year 2007 and 2008 funds to help troop-contributing nations deploy or sustain their forces in Darfur, including about $20 million worth of support to equip and deploy Rwandan troops as of September 2008. The U.S. government also responded to requests to provide transport and logistics assistance in 2006, resulting in the provision of additional support to help deploy troops from two countries to the UN operation in Lebanon. Federal law requires the President to report, to notify, and consult with Congress on UN peacekeeping operations. When the President submits his annual budget report to Congress, the law requires the President to provide Congress an annual report that assesses the effectiveness of ongoing international peacekeeping operations, their relevance to U.S. national interests, the projected termination dates for all such operations, and other matters. The law also requires that the President provide Congress written information about new operations that are anticipated to be authorized by the UN Security Council or existing operations where the authorized force strength is to be expanded or the mandate is to be changed significantly. The information to be provided is to include the anticipated duration, mandate, and command and control arrangements of such an operation, the total cost to both the UN and the United States, the planned exit strategy, and the vital national interest the new operation is to serve. The law also requires the President to consult monthly with Congress on peacekeeping. To comply with these requirements, State consults with Congress about peacekeeping through monthly briefings. At these briefings, State officials update Congress on the status of peacekeeping operations, such as progress being made in Darfur, the Congo, and Haiti, as well as the problems encountered, such as kidnappings in Port au Prince or incursions along the Chad-Sudan border discussed in the April 2008 monthly briefing. In some briefings, State provides updates on the progress in obtaining needed troops, police, and other resources. State also provides written notification to Congress about new peacekeeping operations that the United States expects to vote for in the Security Council and for operations where the mandate is significantly revised. For example, on August 30, 2006, State provided written notification to Congress that it had voted to approve the expansion of the UN operation in Lebanon, including increasing the troop level from about 2,000 to 15,000. Although they provide information about UN peacekeeping operations and their mandates, the annual reports to Congress and the notifications do not discuss potential successes or difficulties in obtaining the resources necessary to carry out the mandates. For example, between January 2006 and October 2008, the Congress received 17 notifications about new or expanded peacekeeping operations, including missions in Haiti, Timor L’este, Lebanon, Côte d’Ivoire, Sudan, Darfur, and others. All 17 provided information about the operations’ mandates, the forces authorized, the U.S. national interest served, and the exit strategy. None of the 17 reported on whether the UN had commitments for the troops, police, and the other resources required to carry out the mandate; whether there might be problems in obtaining them; or whether this information was known. Moreover, just 4 of 20 notifications regarding reprogramming of State Peacekeeping Operations funds in support of UN peacekeeping operations provided to Congress between January 2006 and September 2008 cited possible UN gaps in troops or equipment as part of the justification for this reprogramming. Furthermore, State’s 2006 and 2007 annual reports on peacekeeping included one sentence each on potential difficulties in attaining needed resources. This sentence stated that an ongoing challenge will be to ensure sufficient qualified troops for present and possible new missions. Information about the resources available to carry out the operations is not specified in the law. However, as this report has discussed, important elements of assessing the effectiveness, exit strategy, and mandate of operations would necessarily include a discussion of commitments made to provide the troops, police, and other resources needed to carry out the mandate; whether there would be problems in obtaining them; or whether this information is known. Through its peacekeeping operations, the UN is trying to build sustainable peace in some of the most unstable countries in the world. However, the UN has at times been unable to obtain the authorized level of resources, particularly specialized military units, police, and civilians. This has hindered some operations from fully carrying out their mandates. In some cases, these gaps reflect the inability of member states to provide the needed resources. However, the gaps between authorized and deployed levels of civilians, specialized military units, full battalion strength contingents, and formed police units pose challenges to current UN operations as well as to the UN in deploying another large multidimensional operation. The United States government, along with other member countries, is helping the UN address the resource challenges. However, gaps in needed resource levels for current operations still exist and State has not reported to Congress about this issue. Congress may lack the critical information it needs to assess the effectiveness of ongoing operations or the challenges the UN may face when considering or fielding proposed new UN peacekeeping operations. Congress needs this information when considering Administration requests for funding and support for UN peacekeeping operations. To ensure that Congress has the information needed to conduct oversight and fully consider Administration budget and other requests for UN peacekeeping, we recommend that the Secretary of State include in the department’s annual report or in another appropriate written submission to Congress information about UN resource challenges and gaps in obtaining and deploying troops, police, and civilians authorized to carry out peacekeeping operations. The information should include commitments to provide these resources, difficulties in obtaining them, and whether the gaps have impeded operations from carrying out their mandates. If the information is not available when an appropriate written submission is sent to Congress, we recommend that State ensure the information is provided, as available, during its consultations with Congress. The Department of State and the UN provided written comments on a draft of this report, which are reprinted in appendices III and IV. State commented that the report reflects a very thorough inquiry into the increase in and developing nature of international expectations of United Nations peacekeeping. State also commented that our recommendation should not specify in which reports to Congress the information on peacekeeping gaps should be included. Our draft recommendation specified that State should provide the information in annual reports to Congress and Congressional notifications. We agree that this may be too prescriptive but believe the information should be provided in writing; therefore, we modified our recommendation so as to allow the information be provided in appropriate written submissions to Congress. The UN commented that it fully concurred with the conclusions of our report and appreciated recognition that UN peacekeeping operations should be properly resourced and that mandates should be aligned with said resources. State and the UN also provided technical and general comments which we addressed in the report as appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional committees, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the United Nations. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix VII. Our review focused on four objectives related to the evolution of peacekeeping operations and the United Nations’ (UN) capacity to deploy new operations: Specifically, in this report, we examine (1) the evolution of UN peacekeeping operations in the past 10 years; (2) the characteristics of a potential new peacekeeping operation, given this evolution and UN planning scenarios; (3) the challenges, if any, the UN would face in deploying this potential new operation; and (4) U.S. efforts to support and report on UN peacekeeping. We analyzed the evolution of peacekeeping operations from 1998 to 2008. We chose this timeframe because it is the most recent 10-year time period and the period during which the UN initiated major peacekeeping reforms, such as the response to the Brahimi report. Also, during this time period, the UN articulated its approach and rationale to multi-dimensional peacekeeping. In the Secretary General’s report, No Exit without Strategy, the UN states that to facilitate sustainable peace a peacekeeping mission’s mandate should include elements such as institution building and the promotion of good governance and the rule of law. To analyze the evolution of UN peacekeeping operations from 1998-2008, we reviewed UN documents, including UN Security Council resolutions containing operation mandates; budget documents with information on resource requirements; and other UN reports. We also obtained UN data on troop, police, and civilian deployments and World Bank data on political instability. We analyzed the variation in troops, police, and civilians from 1998 to 2008 to analyze trends in mission size and scope. We analyzed the variation in civilian deployments from 2000 to 2008 as complete UN civilian data by operation was not made available for earlier periods. We categorized each mission as traditional or multidimensional, based on the number of mandated tasks and whether the mandated tasks were traditional, such as observing cease-fires or whether they were ambitious, such as helping restore government institutions. We met with UN officials in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support to discuss changes in the nature of operations. We also reviewed previous GAO reports and used the distinction they had made between traditional and multidimensional operations. To illustrate the change in the types of countries where the UN launched peacekeeping operations in 1998 and 2008, we collected and analyzed data from the United Nations Development Program’s Human Development Index from within 5 years of the start date of each operation. To show the specialized capabilities and increased number of civilians required by recent operations, we used the 2008 Annual Review of Global Peace Operations conducted by the Center on International Cooperation’s Global Peace Operations program at the request of and with the support of the Best Practices Section of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, augmented by UN operation deployment maps. To describe the stability of the countries in which peacekeeping operations are deployed in 2008, we used the World Bank’s Governance Matters. To determine the characteristics of a potential new peacekeeping operation, we used a combination of trend analysis and UN contingency planning documents. The trend analysis described in the preceding paragraph provided us with an average of nine mandated tasks. We then reviewed current UN contingency plans for a multidimensional operation that included these tasks and selected this plan to provide detailed requirements for the potential new operation. In developing requirements for a potential new operation, we worked with UN peacekeeping officials from several offices, including military planning, budget, logistics, civilian personnel, and police, to review the parameters of the operation. For further details on the potential new operation, see appendix II. To assess the challenges the UN would face in deploying the potential new operation, we reviewed a variety of UN documents, met with UN officials in New York, held teleconferences and interviews with UN officials deployed to operations, and met with State Department officials in Washington, D.C., and New York and DOD officials in Washington, D.C. Our analysis discusses challenges to deploying a potential large, multidimensional operation. It does not assess challenges to deploying a smaller, less capable operation. To determine the challenges the UN might face in obtaining troops, we analyzed UN data on troop contributions; consulted academic research on troop contribution patterns; spoke with various UN officials in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, including officials in Force Generation Services; consulted a variety of UN reports, including Secretary General reports on particular operations; and reviewed past GAO reports. We assessed the gap between authorized forces and deployed forces by comparing current authorized UN force levels with monthly deployment data for troops, military observers and police up through September 2008. We assessed the number of infantry battalions and specialized units deployed by assessing the most current individual operation deployment maps available—ranging from March to October 2008. We reported the number of leased and contributed aircraft based on September 2007 data augmented with September 2008 data for the Darfur operation. To address challenges in the realm of obtaining police, we analyzed UN data on police contributions; met with officials in the Police Division of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations; consulted reports and studies completed by research institutions and training centers; and spoke with a UN official at the mission in Haiti. To assess challenges in recruiting and deploying civilians, we analyzed UN data on civilian vacancy rates by mission and position; spoke with UN officials in the Field Personnel Division of the Department of Field Support; and reviewed the large number of UN reports addressing civilian staffing issues that have been released between 2000 and 2008. To describe potential challenges in the realm of logistical requirements, we met with several UN officials in the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support, including at a roundtable discussion of our potential new mission; reviewed UN reports on particular peacekeeping operations; and analyzed UN documents related to Strategic Deployment Stocks and the UN Logistics Base. We determined that data from the UN’s peacekeeper troop- and deployment- reporting systems are sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our report, which is to support findings concerning the challenges the UN may encounter when addressing the gaps between authorized and deployed levels of uniformed and civilian UN peacekeepers. To analyze U.S. efforts to help support UN peacekeeping, we reviewed U.S. reports on peacekeeping, including GAO reports and State Department budget submissions and reports on peacekeeping. We also obtained all notifications to Congress on reprogramming funds for peacekeeping from January 2006 through September 2008. There were a total of 77 notifications, 17 of which were to announce new or expanded peacekeeping operations. The others provided information on reprogramming funds in the Peacekeeping Operations Account. We analyzed these notifications for funding shifts and the information provided to Congress about the peacekeeping operations, such as operations’ mandates, exit strategies, U.S. national interests served, and gaps between the level of resources required and the level provided. We also obtained the annual 2006 and 2007 peacekeeping reports to Congress and reviewed them for the same issues. We compared our analysis of these documents with the reporting standards for peacekeeping under 22 U.S.C. § 287b. We conducted this performance audit from September 2007 to December 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. These standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. To identify requirements for the potential new operation, we reviewed UN planning scenarios for one that provided a reasonable basis for a potential operation, as validated by (1) our analysis of trends in peacekeeping since 1998 and (2) our examination of the scenarios’ components. Our analysis is not intended to predict the size, scope, or location of a new UN peacekeeping operation. A new operation’s mandate and resource needs would be determined by the UN Security Council and the circumstances particular to the country to which it is deployed. Therefore, the requirements of a new operation would likely differ from those of the potential new operation presented here. We first examined the 17 operations deployed or enlarged since 1998 and identified 18 categories of tasks included in the mandates of one or more of these operations. We then determined these 17 operations had on average nine mandated tasks. To construct a possible mandate for our potential new peacekeeping operation reflecting these trends, we selected nine tasks from the list of 18 categories of tasks that most frequently appeared in the mandates of the previous 17 operations. These include restoring the rule of law and supporting elections (each included in the mandates of 11 of the 17 operations), and also restoration of government institutions (present in 10 of 17 mandates). We identified one UN planning scenario that was a close match to these trends. As table 3 shows, this planning scenario has nine mandated tasks that are consistent with the most common historical tasks since 1998. Seven of the tasks were similar or identical. Two tasks in the UN planning scenario—facilitating political agreements and supporting disarmament and demobilization—were not among the nine most common historical tasks, but were frequent tasks of the 17 operations since 1998. The UN planning scenario is located in sub-Saharan Africa. We validated that sub-Saharan Africa is the modal location for a potential operation. That is, 10 of the 17 operations deployed or expanded since 1998 were in this region. Also, 7 of the 11 operations deployed since 1998 and still ongoing are located in sub-Saharan Africa. We thus used this UN planning scenario as the basis for the potential new operation. This analysis acknowledges that the mandate, resource requirements, and location of a new UN operation would be contingent on actual events, and its characteristics may differ to an unknown extent from those presented in the UN planning scenarios used for this assessment. The UN planning scenario identified political and environmental conditions in the area of operation and specified the troop and police numbers for the operation. The assumptions in the UN planning scenario are that the government is weak, the location would lack roads and other infrastructure, UN troop contingents would operate in a high-threat environment, and the operations would function at a high tempo with active military patrols. We validated these as reasonable assumptions by (1) reviewing U.S. and UN reports about locations in sub-Saharan Africa, (2) reviewing UNDP reports on political instability and level of development in sub-Saharan Africa, and (3) interviewing UN officials who had surveyed the area. The UN planning scenario calls for 27,000 troops and military observers deployed in six locations in the country. The scenario also calls for specialized military units, such as logistics, transport, and aviation units. To validate whether this scenario was reasonable, we met with UN officials in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations Offices of Military Affairs, Police Affairs, Planning Service, Strategic Military Cell, Force Generation Services, and others. We discussed, in detail, the planning scenarios and the planning process to generate the scenarios, including the fact that some field survey work had been conducted. We obtained and reviewed documents on force requirements for similar operations, such as Darfur. We found that the requirements, such as the need for special military units, were consistent for these operations and the UN planning scenario. We reviewed the UN planning guidelines, the UN survey mission handbook, and lessons learned reports for procedures, requirements, and best practices for standards in planning operations. On the basis of this work, we validated as reasonable the deployment of 21,000 troops in five sectors for the potential new operation. As table 4 shows, we eliminated one sector from the potential new operation because it was primarily mandated to observe and monitor a cease-fire and thus this sector constituted an independent operation with a different mandate rather than part of the potential new operation. The UN planning scenario calls for 1,500 police, of which 700 would be deployed in five formed police units. We validated this as reasonable based on interviews and briefings with UN officials in the police division and our review of reports and data on UN police in peacekeeping operations. According to the UN officials, the estimate is based on their experience, a technical assessment mission, the population size, the tasks for the UN police, and the capacity of the local police. These officials also said that more information about the local police would be important in developing a more precise estimate of required police and formed police units. The UN scenario did not estimate the needed civilian staff. We estimated that the potential new operation would require 4,000 to 5,000 civilian staff, based on interviews and data provided by UN officials. UN officials noted that a lower bound estimate for a large operation would be about 3,000 civilian staff. However, these officials also stated that considering the potential new operation’s mandated tasks, force size, and security environment and comparisons with operations in the Congo, Darfur, and Sudan, a more reasonable estimate is 4,000 to 5,000 civilians. In comparison, the 2008 to 2009 proposed budget for the operation in the Congo had an authorized military component of 18,931 and an authorized civilian component of 4,934, 24 percent of whom were international civilians The proposed budget for the operation in Sudan had a military component of 10,715 and a civilian component of 4,260, 23 percent of whom were international civilians. The proposed budget for the Sudan operation had a military component of 25,507 and a civilian component of 5,557, 27 percent of whom were international civilians. The UN planning scenario did not estimate logistics requirements. In discussions with UN officials, they stated that due to the absence of detailed planning in the field, resource requirements for the potential new operation are difficult to calculate and infrastructure costs are unknowable at this time. These officials stated that the best estimate of logistics requirements and challenges would be from the experiences of other operations in sub-Saharan Africa, such as Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In the 2007-2008 peacekeeping fiscal year, those operations had budgeted between about $420 million and $425 million for supplies, transport, and facilities. However, these operations have been close to full deployment levels for 2 or more years and the actual logistics requirements for a potential new force could be significantly less in the first year, depending upon rate of deployment for the troops, the resources required to achieve initial operational capability for each mandated task in each sector, whether sectors would be established simultaneously or in sequence, and many other factors. In Darfur, for example, less than 50 percent of authorized forces had been deployed as of October 2008, about 10 months after the start of the operation. In contrast, the augmented force in Lebanon deployed 70 percent of its authorized force level within the first 4 months. On the other hand, some logistics requirements, such as the transport in and establishment of facilities for the initial force, may be greater for a new operation in its first year in comparison with these mature operations, according to UN officials. Moreover, UN officials indicated that the equipment needs and initial logistics capabilities of individual infantry battalions would be comparable to those deployed to Darfur; they provided mission resource requirements for those units. For example, as in the case of Darfur, we found it reasonable to assume that many of the operational units for this potential new peacekeeping operation would need to come from countries capable of providing supplies for the first 60 to 90 days after deployment, given the limitations on local infrastructure expected in this environment. 1. We agree that the UN has conducted large peacekeeping operations prior to 1998. However, we selected the time period 1998 to 2008 for our review because it represents the most recent decade of growth in UN peacekeeping activities as well as major UN initiatives to reform peacekeeping operations. Most notably, this period reflects the implementation of the Brahimi peacekeeping reform efforts and the UN’s No Exit Without Strategy approach that the UN articulated in 2001. 2. We added information that describes UN peacekeeping reform efforts. 3. We have expanded our discussion of the process for establishing a peacekeeping operation. 4. We have reworded the sentence to reflect this comment. 5. We added this information to the report. 6. We agree and have noted the limitation in the report. 7. We added this information to the report. 8. We have reworded the section to reflect the UN’s comment. 9. We have substituted alternative language. 11. We added this information to the report. 12. We added information to the report to reflect the UN and U.S. positions on UN human resource reform policy. 13. We added information to the report to reflect the UN and U.S. positions on UN human resource reform policy. 14. We modified the text to delete the word “failure.” We already discuss UN field staff proposals in another section. The United Nations deployed approximately 109,000 personnel to 16 UN peacekeeping operations as of September 2008. Table 5 indicates the location, personnel distribution, and mandate type and size of each operation. UN peacekeeping operations have required increasingly large numbers of combat capable battalions, aircraft for both transport and combat support, and other support units. As of November 2008, 30 countries are providing 76 battalions of infantry peacekeeping troops, including 21 battalions of mechanized infantry. Twenty-five of these same countries also provide helicopters or support units in addition to infantry battalions; another 12 countries provide only helicopters or support units. Table 6 reflects the current number and type of operational battalions and support units company-sized or larger required by 9 of the 16 UN peacekeeping operations ongoing as of November 2008. The data for the UN operation in Darfur (UNAMID) includes units authorized but not yet deployed. Unit numbers and country of origin reflect deployment data reported by the individual UN operations between March and November 2008. In addition to the person named above, Tet Miyabara, Assistant Director; B. Patrick Hickey; Marisela Perez; Jennifer Young; Lynn Cothern; and David Dornisch made key contributions to this report. In addition, Ashley Alley, Jeremy Latimer, and Monica Brym provided technical assistance.

Summary: The United Nations (UN) supports U.S. interests in maintaining international security by deploying and operating 16 peacekeeping operations in locations in conflict, including Darfur, Lebanon, and Haiti. Over the past 10 years, the number of deployed UN personnel increased from about 41,000 peacekeepers and civilian staff to about 109,000 in 2008. In this report on the UN's capacity to deploy further operations, GAO was asked to examine (1) the evolution of UN peacekeeping operations in the past 10 years; (2) the likely characteristics of a potential new peacekeeping operation, given this evolution; (3) the challenges, if any, the UN would face deploying this operation; and (4) U.S. efforts to support and report on UN peacekeeping. GAO reviewed UN documents, developed a methodology to assess the requirements for a potential new operation with UN assistance, interviewed UN headquarters and mission officials, and assessed U.S. government documents on UN peacekeeping. UN peacekeeping operations since 1998 have taken on increasinglyambitious mandates, been located in more challenging environments, and grown in size and scope. UN operations in 1998 averaged three mandated tasks, such as observing cease-fires; in 2008, they averaged nine more ambitious tasks, such as restoring government institutions. Operations in 2008 were located in some of the world's most unstable countries, were larger and more complex than in 1998, and deployed thousands of civilians. Based on trends in peacekeeping and recent UN planning options, GAO analysis indicates that a potential new operation would likely be large and complex, take place in sub-Saharan Africa, and have nine mandated tasks. This potential new operation would likely require member states to contribute 21,000 troops and military observers, including those in engineering and aviation units, and 1,500 police to carry out the mandate. The UN would likely need to deploy 4,000 to 5,000 civilians. The operation's logistics needs also would be large and complex. The ability to fully deploy any potential new operation would likely face challenges, in view of current UN resource constraints. As of September 2008, ongoing UN operations had about a 20 percent gap between troops and military observers authorized to carry out operations and actual deployments. For police, the gap was about 34 percent; it was similar for civilians. Some gaps reflect UN difficulties in obtaining and deploying resources to carry out operations. Lack of these resources, such as special military units, prevented some operations from executing mandates. Lack of infrastructure in the potential new operation's environment would challenge the UN to provide logistical needs.