In the past, DOD, USAID, and State were the federal agencies primarily responsible for national security. Over the past decade, however, events such as 9/11 and the ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have underscored the need for a broader and more integrated national security effort. One of the first structural changes Congress made to address this need was to integrate 22 separate agencies with domestic national security responsibilities to create DHS. Today, greater emphasis is being placed on identifying whole-of-government approaches to developing national security policies and carrying out operations. Such an approach emphasizes the contributions of agencies not traditionally associated with national security. For example, Commerce plays a role in monitoring exports of technology to make sure that sensitive items with military uses do not fall into the hands of our enemies. In light of the challenges that the U.S. government continues to experience in its efforts to coordinate the actions of the agencies involved—whether it be preventing a terrorist attack or overseeing reconstruction and stabilization efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan—there is an ongoing policy debate on how to enhance and sustain interagency collaborative efforts. Among the range of proposals for reform, there is a growing consensus that the government’s professional development efforts could contribute to more effective interagency collaboration, which is seen as key to U.S. national security. Specifically, a number of reports—such as the Project on National Security Reform’s Forging a New Shield and the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, written by experts working in the national security field—recommended establishing a cadre of national security specialists from all relevant departments and agencies, and placing them in a long-term career development program designed to provide them with a better understanding of the processes and cultures of other agencies. Proponents contend that such a program would help the U.S. government prepare personnel with national security responsibilities to plan, execute, and lead national security missions. More recently, in September 2010, Congressmen Ike Skelton and Geoff Davis introduced the Interagency National Security Professional Education, Administration, and Development Systems Act of 2010 which seeks to create a system to educate, train, and develop interagency national security professionals across the government. Agencies have historically defined their own professional development activities for their national security personnel. In 2007, however, the Bush Administration launched the National Security Professional Development (NSPD) initiative to integrate professional development activities for national security personnel as part of a larger effort to enhance interagency collaboration. Executive Order 13434, May 17, 2007, entitled National Security Professional Development, required the heads of all agencies with national security responsibilities to identify or enhance current professional development activities for their national security personnel. In addition, the order established an Executive Steering Committee composed of 15 agency Secretaries or Directors (or their designees) to facilitate implementation of the National Strategy for Professional Development. To coordinate NSPD-related activities among agencies, the Executive Steering Committee established the NSPD Integration Office, which created an online repository of information on available training and other professional development activities for national security professionals. Recently, two studies have been launched to reexamine NSPD and to take a more comprehensive look at the skills, education, training, and professional experiences that interagency national security professionals need at various career stages. While awaiting the results of these studies, the NSPD executive staff is reviewing issues related to the scope and definition of national security professionals and revising the NSPD strategy and implementation plan. Several agencies reported putting implementation of their NSPD-related training and professional development activities on hold pending the results of these reviews, or other direction from the administration. In addition, the online repository of information is no longer available. We identified 225 professional development activities intended to improve participants’ abilities to collaborate across organizational lines. These ranged from 10-month joint professional military education programs and year-long rotations to 30-minute online courses. Because these activities varied so widely across dimensions such as length and learning mode, we grouped them in a way that would allow us to analyze their characteristics and make appropriate comparisons. These five general groups included training courses and programs, training exercises, interagency rotational programs, Joint Professional Military Education (JPME), and leadership development programs. We provide further description of these groups in figure 1. Additionally, six of the eight agencies represented on the Executive Steering Committee established by the executive order—DOD, DHS, Justice, Commerce, State, and DOE—identified training related to the National Security Professional Development (NSPD) initiative. We categorized NSPD separately because, although the developmental activities created under its auspices to date have included mostly online training courses, when fully implemented, NSPD was intended to include a range of activities from training courses to interagency assignments, fellowships, and exchanges. NSPD was intended to play a critical role in informing national security professional development activities, and as such, is included in our review in addition to the five groups listed above. Overall, we found that DOD, State, and DHS provided most of the professional development activities that met our criteria. We found some variation within the different types of activities, mostly related to provider, mode of delivery, or participation levels. DHS, DOD, and State provided the majority of training activities, which primarily consisted of short-term, online, or classroom courses. DOD provided most of the exercise programs and all of the JPME programs. DOD and State provided the majority of interagency rotational programs and all of the leadership development programs that met our criteria. Each of the other agencies we reviewed provided at least one relevant professional development activity. All of the agencies we reviewed reported sending personnel to participate in one or more activities in fiscal year 2009. Among the activities for which agencies provided participation data, we found that short-term, online training tended to have the highest participation levels. Participation levels associated with longer-term activities—such as interagency rotational programs—were much lower. Figure 1 below summarizes these and other findings and provides more detailed descriptions of our six activity groups. This page left blank intentionally. Planned learning for acquiring and retaining skills, knowledge, and attitudes. In our review, most were online courses provided by DHS’s EMI or DOD’s Joint Forces Command, or classroom courses provided by State’s FSI. Scenario-based training that allows for the development, improvement, or display of specific capabilities or skills. In our review, most were DOD joint military exercises. Work assignments at a different agency from the one in which the participant is normally employed, with an explicit professional development purpose. In our review, most involved sending personnel between civilian agencies and the military. ■ Most exercises intended to bring participants together to practice working collaboratively within a range of national security-related scenarios. ■ Fiscal year 2009 participation: 240 ■ Most courses provided a common framework for understanding national security topics or information on how to work with an agency with national security responsibilities. ■ Most rotations provided participants opportunities to learn about organizational culture and build networks among partner national security agencies. Photo: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. Photo: State. In or review, the mjority of trining was throgh DHS Emergency Mgement Intitte’s online co on integrted ntionl emergency repone topic (fr left) or throgh Ste Foreign Service Intitte’s classroom co (not pictred). A few other gencie nd orgniztion o provided trining co on pecilized topic. For exmple, DOJ provided coe for lw enforcement offici on condcting pot-ast invetigtion (fr right), nd Ste’s Office of the Coordintor for Recontrction nd Sabiliztion provided coe thdevelop the kill plnner need to condct intergency conflict assssment in the field (center). According to our analysis, DHS, DOD, and State provided the majority of the 101 short-term training courses that met our criteria. Over half of these courses were provided in a classroom setting; most of the other courses were provided as online independent study courses, and several courses either mixed or offered a choice between the two modes. State’s Foreign Service Institute (FSI) provided most of the 52 classroom directed-study courses, which typically lasted several days or longer and covered the range of policy issues that State addresses, such as post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization and commercial and trade activity. DHS’s Emergency Management Institute (EMI) and DOD—through its Joint Knowledge Online system—provided the 43 online courses, most of which lasted less than 3 hours. These online courses covered topics ranging from the National Response Framework, which is a framework for how agencies collaborate on national preparedness planning efforts, to the roles and responsibilities of different agencies involved in interagency planning efforts such as Joint Interagency Coordination Groups.16, 17 DOD’s Information Resources Management College at the National Defense University (NDU) provided the six courses that mixed classroom and online learning or offered participants a choice between the two modes. These courses, such as Multiagency Collaboration and Enterprise Strategic Planning, covered organizational management topics in the context of national security and interagency collaboration, and could be taken either in a 10- to 12-week online format or as a 5-day classroom seminar on the NDU campus. Some of the courses targeted participants of certain career levels or with certain areas of responsibility. For example, EMI’s introductory national response framework course targeted executive-level personnel from government and other organizations with responsibilities for emergency response. Other courses, such as FSI’s Foundations of Interagency Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations course, did not target a specific employee level or rank but were open to anyone preparing to deploy to Afghanistan, Iraq, or other conflict-prone countries. The National Response Framework presents the guiding principles that enable all response partners to prepare for and provide a unified national response to disasters and emergencies—from the smallest incident to the largest catastrophe. Joint Interagency Coordination Groups, housed within DOD combatant commands, are intended to serve as a coordinating body among the civilian agencies in Washington, D.C., the country ambassadors, the combatant command’s staff, and other multinational and multilateral bodies within the region. The vast majority of participation in short-term training courses—95 percent—was associated with DHS online courses offered through EMI, which is housed within the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). EMI tracks participation in two categories: (1) FEMA, and (2) all other entities, including participants from other DHS agencies. Therefore, we could not determine how many participants were from DHS and how many came from other agencies. State and most of the other agencies providing classroom courses did track interagency participation. Data show that interagency participation varied widely; some courses had none at all, while others featured a mix of participants from various agencies. For most courses, interagency participation was less than 15 percent. See table 1 for additional information on training courses we identified. In addition to individual training courses, there were also three long-term programs associated with advanced degrees that met our criteria. The College of International Security Affairs at DOD’s NDU provides a part- time certificate or 10-month full-time master’s program that teaches students how to develop and implement whole-of-government national and international security strategies for conditions of peace, crisis, and war. The Interamerican Defense College provides an 11-month Advanced Course on Hemispheric Security and Defense. Although the majority of the participants are from other countries, State and DOD also send personnel to this program, and one of its stated objectives is to foster connections among participants. Finally, DOD’s Naval Postgraduate School provides graduate programs ranging from month-long courses to multiyear master’s and doctoral programs that focus on various aspects of the defense and national security arenas within an interagency and intergovernmental context. According to officials in DOD’s Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (OUSD-Readiness), in fiscal year 2009, the military services or combatant commands led an estimated 84 joint- military exercise programs that addressed a range of national security matters and sought to improve the ability of participants to work across agency lines by encouraging interagency participation. In addition, First Army, which is responsible for U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard training, led an exercise program for military and interagency civilian personnel preparing to deploy to Afghanistan provincial reconstruction teams. DOD’s Center for Applied Strategic Learning at NDU also provided an exercise program for mid- and senior-level federal personnel and members of Congress, which included crisis simulations in a range of national security areas such as the Horn of Africa, international water rights, and space policy. During fiscal year 2009, there were also four exercise programs provided by civilian agencies, including State, USDA, and DHS’s FEMA, which is responsible for coordinating the National Exercise Program (NEP). Officials from DHS Headquarters and FEMA said that FEMA had conducted five NEP exercises in fiscal year 2009, including one national- level exercise and four principle-level exercises, which targeted senior officials. They also said that although FEMA does not track information on all levels of NEP exercises, up to three more federal strategy or policy- focused exercises are required annually, and there may have been many more conducted regionally throughout the country during fiscal year 2009. Some of the exercises, such as those conducted by the Center for Applied Strategic Learning, targeted mid- and senior-level leadership of federal agencies and other organizations. However, most of the exercise programs did not specify a rank or career level for their target participant population. See table 3 for more information on the subject matter and number of military and civilian-agency-led exercises. DOD OUSD-Readiness officials identified 84 exercise programs which reported 212 individual joint-military exercises during fiscal year 2009. Although the joint-military exercises were not necessarily created to facilitate interagency collaboration, officials from both OUSD-Readiness and the Joint Forces Command acknowledged the importance of such interagency participation. They recognized that shared training experiences strengthen the collaborative partnerships between the military and civilian interagency communities by making the exercises more realistic and establishing interagency networks among participants. Joint Forces Command has taken steps to increase interagency participation, creating a “Partnership Opportunities Catalog” of joint exercises open to interagency and other partners. It has also begun to collect and assist with requests for interagency participation from military services and combatant commands looking for participants from specific agencies or other partner organizations. According to DOD, in fiscal year 2009, about 50 percent of the exercise programs—43 of 84—had some interagency participation. However, because DOD included state and local personnel in its definition of interagency participation, it is possible that there were fewer exercise programs with interagency participation as it is defined in this report. Also, even though participation data were not systematically tracked for the two First Army-led fiscal year 2009 Afghanistan provincial reconstruction team predeployment exercises, an Army official estimated that approximately 2,500 military personnel participated. In addition, a USAID official estimated that approximately 40 civilians from USAID and other agencies, such as State and USDA, participated in the interagency modules of these exercises during the same time period. An official at NDU’s Center for Applied Strategic Learning reported that in fiscal year 2009, through its Strategic Policy Forum and its other policy- related exercises, the Center provided 18 crises simulations for personnel from a range of agencies. Examples of participating agencies include DOD, State, DHS, DOJ, USAID, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and others. Both State and USDA provided participation data on their fiscal year 2009 exercises, which reported 24 participants for one State-led exercise and 170 for the USDA exercise. While DHS’s FEMA did not provide NEP data that differentiated between federal, state, local, and other participants, one FEMA official estimated that approximately 2,500 personnel from more than 230 organizations participated in the 2009 national-level exercise. We identified seven interagency rotational assignment programs that supported participating agencies’ efforts to achieve their missions while explicitly seeking to develop participants’ abilities to collaborate on national security. Five of these rotational assignment programs involved sending personnel between civilian agencies and the Pentagon or military learning institutions. For example, State’s Foreign Policy Advisors program places Foreign Service Officers in the Pentagon and military commands worldwide as personal advisors to senior military commanders. State participants work alongside DOD civilians and officers on a range of national security issues such as international relations and diplomatic practices. The other two programs involved sending civilian agency personnel to other federal agencies or executive offices. Only one of the rotation programs is open to all levels of personnel. The other programs target personnel at specific ranks or career levels. The three State-sponsored programs target mid- and senior-level personnel, while the DOD-sponsored programs are intended for junior or mid-level personnel and are associated with educational programs. For example, the Military Academic Collaborations program sends select midshipmen, cadets, and some instructors from military officer development programs such as the Academies and university Reserve Officers’ Training Corps programs to DOE NNSA laboratories for summer internships. Table 4 describes selected characteristics of each rotational program. One of the programs, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College’s Interagency Fellows Program, went beyond the scope of a typical rotation, temporarily assigning military personnel to a civilian agency to enable civilian personnel from that agency to attend a long-term JPME program. See figure 2 for more information on that program. Officials from DOD, USAID, State, and other agencies say that the disparity in the size of the military and civilian workforces can make it difficult for civilian agencies to “keep up” with the military in participating in longer-term training programs. In particular, officials point out that military staffing levels take into account the need for extended training at standard career intervals, while civilian agency staffing levels do not. According to officials at the Army Command and General Staff College and USAID, the Interagency Fellows Program was created to help alleviate such resource limitations, while providing Army participants with valuable developmental opportunities. agencies where they work, and share with their colleagues the Army’s approach to planning and decision-making. Military and civilian officials concur that it is important to bring students together from a mix of organizations to provide a realistic whole-of-government perspective. A USAID official involved in the program said that it is not a perfect exchange, and that the agency is still learning how to most effectively make use of the Interagency Fellows. For example, she explained that there is a learning curve for people on rotation to a new agency, and that it can take a while to get them up to speed. She also said that Interagency Fellows are not always of an equivalent rank to the USAID personnel away at the College, which means they cannot always truly cover their responsibilities. However, despite these challenges, she said, she believes that the program provides a creative solution to participation barriers and will continue to improve over time. An Army official at the College agreed that it’s a “win-win situation” for the College, the agencies, and the participants. Photos: Noah Albro, Army Command and General Staff College. A dent from the Deprtment of Ste prticipte in the Intergency Fellow progrm (above). Intergency dent join militry dent in class t the Army Commnd nd GenerSff College (elow). According to our analysis, DOD provides relevant JPME programs through 13 academic institutions operated by one of the four military services or NDU. These programs must meet specific JPME curriculum requirements established for intermediate, senior, and executive-level education, which include learning objectives related to a whole-of-government approach to national security, among other objectives. Such whole-of-government approaches seek to identify or incorporate all agencies’ contributions to addressing national security challenges. The Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines each have command and staff colleges that provide intermediate- level JPME and war colleges that provide senior-level JPME, within military service-specific graduate programs. NDU has three colleges—the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, the National War College, and the Joint Forces Staff College—that incorporate senior-level JPME curriculum into 10-month-long master’s programs, among other offerings. NDU also administers Capstone, an executive-level JPME program that met our criteria. The program length and target participant populations varied depending on the level of education, as described in table 5. Six of the nine agencies we reviewed—DOD, DHS, State, USAID, DOJ, and DOE—said they sent personnel to one or more of DOD’s JPME programs. According to information DOD provided for academic year 2009, some programs, such as those at Air University, had few or no participants from federal agencies outside of DOD. NDU’s National War College and its Industrial College of the Armed Forces, which offered senior-level JPME programs, had the greatest number of interagency participants. See table 6 for information on participation levels at each institution. According to our analysis, DOD and State offer 11 leadership development programs that include a focus on interagency collaboration in the national security arena. Several programs include participation in other activities described elsewhere in this report, such as JPME or interagency rotations. For example, the Defense Senior Leadership Development Program combines specialized courses with attendance in a 10-month JPME program and a short-term rotation, as indicated by the participant’s individual development plan, to help participants gain the competencies needed to lead people and programs and achieve national security goals in joint, interagency, and multinational environments. These programs varied in length, mode of delivery, target population, and interagency participation. The length of time and mode of delivery of these courses ranged from 1 day of classroom training to 14 weeks of in-resident training to a series of courses and seminars to be completed over a 3-year period. Most of the programs targeted personnel at GS-12 or above, because, according to officials at several agencies, these employees had the experience needed to benefit from and contribute to training and development programs with an interagency focus. For more information about the target population and interagency participation of these programs, see table 7. Of the 11 reported programs, 6 leadership development programs were open to and encouraged interagency participation. Two of these 6—the Program for Emerging Leaders at NDU’s Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and State’s National Security Executive Leadership Seminar—intended to create an interagency cohort of leaders who can work together seamlessly on national security issues. For example, to promote a professional network among future U.S. government leaders in the field of weapons of mass destruction, NDU’s Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction offered Program for Emerging Leaders students a variety of ways to connect outside the classroom, such as a members-only Web site for online dialogue, school-sponsored social events, and off-campus site visits. Five of the 11 programs were closed to participation from other agencies. For example, the Ambassadorial Seminar offered by State’s FSI only prepares ambassadors-designate for their unique positions of leadership at the head of an embassy, which requires extensive collaboration with personnel from multiple agencies and other organizations. Six of the eight agencies represented on the Executive Steering Committee—DOD, DHS, State, Justice, Commerce, and DOE—reported making NSPD-related training available to their personnel with national security responsibilities. DOD and DHS reported developing some training specifically for their NSPD programs, which consisted primarily of online courses on key national security policies and procedures. Some agencies, however, directed their national security personnel to take existing training, such as EMI’s various online courses on national emergency response topics. Other agencies augmented existing training with NSPD-specific materials. Several of the existing courses that agencies used or modified under the auspices of NSPD were included in previous sections of this report. Officials from Commerce and DOE reported that in addition to taking advantage of existing courses, they also sent their personnel to attend in- person orientation sessions or seminars, where they had the opportunity to network with personnel from other agencies. According to officials at most of these agencies, although they have continued to work on planning and implementation efforts, much of the actual training activity has slowed or stopped altogether since fiscal year 2008. As mentioned previously, many of these agencies have put implementation of their NSPD-related training and professional development activities on hold pending the results of executive-level review of this governmentwide initiative. Based on our analysis, the relevant professional development activities were intended to improve the ability of national security personnel to collaborate across agency lines by focusing on three general approaches: providing foundational knowledge, developing skills, and providing networking opportunities. We found that the activities included one or more of these approaches to improving their participants’ abilities to collaborate: Building common foundational knowledge of the national security arena. Some of the activities establish a common foundation of shared knowledge for understanding partner agencies’ roles, responsibilities, authorities or capabilities, or specific national security subject matters. According to agency officials, such training can help reinforce a common vocabulary or framework for understanding complex policy issues. This is important for allowing personnel who may normally approach national security issues from sometimes disparate diplomatic, defense, commercial, or law enforcement perspectives to employ a whole-of-government approach to national security. For example, DHS offers an introductory online course on the National Incident Management System, which is available to personnel across federal, state, and local government and provides an overview of the roles and responsibilities of various agencies and how they are supposed to work together in different emergency situations such as responding to terrorist attacks and other national security-related incidents. Developing skills for interagency collaboration on national security. Some of the activities agencies identified build specific skills needed for interagency collaboration, such as how to plan, lead, and execute interagency efforts. For example, the Whole-of-Government Planning for Reconstruction and Stabilization course, offered by NDU in cooperation with State, teaches skills to coordinate, facilitate, or participate in the planning process for reconstruction and stabilization operations. These skills include the ability to work effectively with federal agency and other partners involved in whole-of-government planning. Establishing networks across national security agency lines. Some of the activities were explicitly designed to facilitate networks among personnel from two or more national security agencies. For example, NDU’s Capstone course for Generals, Flag Officers, and members of the civilian Senior Executive Service brings together participants from the four military services and a range of federal agencies to deepen their understanding of the whole-of-government-approach to national security, among other things. One of Capstone’s learning objectives is that participants establish a peer network for future cooperation and the program is designed to maximize peer-to-peer interaction. The way these approaches manifest themselves in the activities we reviewed varied. For example, activities that required the least time commitment, such as EMI’s online courses and NSPD online orientations, primarily provided basic foundational knowledge of a specific partner agency or national security topic. Conversely, more time-intensive activities, such as JPME and some of the leadership development programs and classroom courses that lasted several months or brought participants together on a recurring basis tended to incorporate two or more approaches to improving participants’ abilities to collaborate across agency lines. For example, a 10-month program at NDU’s College of International Security Affairs included coursework on foundational knowledge of national security issues and specific skills related to interagency planning and management, along with interagency networking events. According to human capital and training officials we interviewed at several agencies, the level of interagency participation may affect how a given professional development activity can improve its participants’ abilities to collaborate. Agency officials noted that interagency collaboration in the development and design of activities can lead to a more accurate portrayal of different agencies’ policies and processes. Moreover, agency officials said a mix of interagency participants can provide a realistic perspective of their respective agencies’ cultures, capabilities, and constraints. Greater interagency participation can also lead to the development of professional networks, and improve working relationships. Several military officials we interviewed emphasized that in order to work effectively side by side, civilian and military personnel should train together to learn how operate before they are out in the field. Several agency officials agreed, noting that even when a professional development activity is designed to build foundational knowledge, skills, or networks, lack of interagency participation can limit the extent to which this occurs. For example, as a DHS official pointed out, if only one agency participates in an exercise, there is clearly no opportunity to establish a network that could facilitate future interagency collaboration. Training, interagency rotations, exercises, and other professional development activities can help to improve participants’ abilities to collaborate in an increasingly complex national security arena. However, with national security responsibilities and associated personnel located throughout the U.S. government, it could be challenging for agency officials to identify the relevant training and professional development opportunities available to the national security community. Our review is a first step in describing the broad spectrum of professional development activities that are intended to build foundational knowledge, skills, and networks among federal national security professionals. According to agency officials who develop and oversee these professional development activities, interagency participation can be key to the activities’ success, enhancing the knowledge and skills participants acquire and the professional networks they establish. Although agencies could not provide participation data in every instance, the data we were able to obtain indicated that overall, interagency participation was lower in activities that required a longer time commitment, such as rotations and full-time joint professional military education. This raises questions about barriers to participation and other factors that may influence the success of such professional development activities, which we will explore in a subsequent review. We provided a draft report for review and comment to the Secretaries of State, Defense, DHS, the Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, and Energy, the Administrator of USAID, and the Attorney General. State, DHS, Commerce, Energy, USDA and USAID provided technical comments which we incorporated where appropriate. DOD, DOJ, and Treasury did not provide comments. As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the date of this letter. We will then send copies of this report to the Secretaries of State, Defense, Homeland Security, the Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, and Energy, the Administrator of USAID, and the Attorney General, and other congressional committees interested in improving collaboration among agencies involved in national security issues. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-6543 or steinhardtb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix III. The objectives of our review were to identify: training and other professional development activities intended to improve the abilities of personnel from key agencies involved in national security issues to collaborate across organizational lines and how these activities were intended to improve participants’ collaboration abilities. To address our objectives, we first reviewed our prior work and other literature and interviewed experts on workforce development, education, national security, organizational culture, and collaboration to define the types of activities relevant to our topic. We then selected key agencies involved in national security issues—the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of State (State), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Treasury (Treasury), the Department of Justice (Justice), the Department of Energy (Energy), the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the Department of Commerce (Commerce)—based on a review of our prior work and other literature and interviews with subject- matter experts. We excluded the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and its member agencies because it overlapped with similar work we have underway. In order to identify and obtain key information on national security collaboration-related professional development activities, we undertook extensive data collection efforts involving both formal data collection instruments and intensive interactions with the agencies noted above. There were two main phases to this effort. In each, several steps were taken to ensure the reliability of the information obtained, including its consistency, completeness, and accuracy. In the first phase, we developed a data collection instrument (DCI) to obtain a broad list of activities potentially applicable to our review as well as a number of key general characteristics of the activities including, for example, overall goals, how the program prepares participants to collaborate across department lines, agencies involved, and general information about participation levels. We validated the DCI by conducting pretests of the instrument with points of contact (POCs) in four agencies. These pretests included in-depth probing on the clarity of instrument, the criteria for including activities in the instrument, respondent burden, and usability of the instrument spreadsheet. The GAO engagement team staff worked with their technical advisors to revise the DCI as appropriate to address issues that arose over these topics during the pretesting process. A key element of this first phase of data collection was defining the criteria to guide agency POCs in determining the appropriate professional development activities for submission. These criteria were included in the instrument itself, with instructions to the POCs to include all programs open to their staff that met all of the following four criteria: (1) The activity explicitly prepares federal civilian and/or military personnel to collaborate with personnel of other federal departments. In particular, the activity: (a) can involve personnel of other entities—such as contractors or NGOs—or can include only personnel from the POC’s department; (b) may be provided by the POC’s department or it may be provided by another organization; and (c) must prepare personnel for interagency collaboration. POCs were not to include activities that focused solely on intraagency collaboration (e.g., collaboration among DHS component agencies or among other services within DOD). This criterion excludes programs that bring personnel of multiple agencies together for specific assignments but did not have preparation for future interagency collaboration as an explicit purpose. (2) The activity targets agency personnel involved in developing or implementing national security policy, strategy, missions, or operations, but not support functions such as administration, financial management, or procurement. (3) The activity relates to the agency’s national security activities. In particular, an activity can and should be included despite having a broader focus than interagency national security collaboration as long as it includes a component on this topic; for example, a leadership development program may have a module on interagency collaboration or provide an interagency rotation to a national security mission. (4) The activity is ongoing and sustained, not a one-time event. We identified POCs in each of the selected agencies who were to determine which activities met our criteria and complete the DCI for each. We identified the POCs during our initial conference with agency personnel and then in subsequent meetings or conversations, in which we requested the names of individuals who could work with us to identify the appropriate offices, bureaus, or functional areas that should receive our questionnaire, disseminate our questionnaire to the appropriate contacts throughout the agency, and consolidate their responses. We sent DCIs to POCs and asked them to provide the requested information for all activities that met our criteria. In addition to completing the DCIs, POCs also provided other relevant information including course manuals and evaluations. We then compiled all of the DCIs received from the nine agencies into one master file. A key element of this effort was to eliminate from the master list duplicate activities reported by POCs in multiple offices or agencies. In general, we relied on submissions from the agency we determined to be the “lead agency” for administering the activity. In some cases, however, an activity was identified by an agency that participated in, but did not provide, the activity. For example, although officials at three agencies said their personnel participated in the National Exercise Program, the two agencies chiefly responsible for organizing the program did not initially include the program in their responses. To reconcile such differences, which may have occurred because agencies have different working definitions of “national security” and “collaboration,” and different ways of understanding how these concepts might intersect, we followed up with our POCs. In some cases, the titles of activities were similar but not identical and to determine whether they were the same we contacted the relevant POCs for clarification. This process resulted in more than 350 total activities. The final step in phase 1 of our work was to review the entire list of activities identified to verify that they conformed to our four criteria. To make this assessment and to ensure its reliability, two analysts separately analyzed the list, identifying those activities that conformed and did not conform to our criteria. In cases where the analysts differed they had a third analyst review the information and then met to reconcile these differences. In cases where the data provided were ambiguous we contacted our agency POCs to obtain additional information in the form of additional interviews and/or documentation. This process reduced the number of activities in our review to 225. In the second phase, we collected more detailed information on the activities that met our criteria for inclusion, as follows: (1) The number of participants in each activity in fiscal year 2009, both from the agency that hosted the activity and from outside the agency; (2) The levels or ranks of staff targeted for participation in the activity, if any. Agencies described target populations in terms of General Schedule (GS) levels, Foreign Service (FS) levels, and/or Officer grade (O) levels. At the executive level, target populations were described as Senior Executive Service (SES), Senior Foreign Service (SFS) , Senior-Level and Scientific or Professional (SL/ST), or Generals/Flag Officers (O-7–O-10). In some cases, the equivalent levels from other federal pay schedules or personnel systems were noted; and (3) The methods of evaluation the agency might use to evaluate the effectiveness or impact of the activity. A second DCI was developed for this purpose. For each POC, we customized this data collection instrument with information about activities they had reported to us in phase 1. Like the first phase of data collection, this second phase involved close interaction with the POCs, and in some instances POCs provided information to us in forms other than the data collection instrument (e.g., published program materials, or e-mails containing the information we requested). Data collected during this phase were compiled and combined with data from the first phase to yield an overall set of data on activities that met our criteria for inclusion. We analyzed data for these activities, such as typical duration, eligibility criteria, participation rates, and participating agencies, to identify groups of activities, patterns, themes and other information. We determined these data to be reliable for the purposes of identifying and describing such activities. Upon reviewing the data the agencies provided, we found that activities varied widely across dimensions such as length and learning mode, and decided to group the activities in a way that would allow us to analyze their characteristics and make appropriate comparisons. To develop these categories of training and professional development activities, we reviewed activity data, conducted a limited literature search of GAO reports and agency guidance, and met with human resource professionals. These five general groups included training courses and programs, training exercises, interagency rotational programs, Joint Professional Military Education, and leadership development programs. After the data had been compiled, we conducted a series of follow-up interviews with POCs to gauge the completeness and accuracy of the participation data we had received. POCs were asked about the sources of counts of participants, how these counts had been stored, whether they had been checked for accuracy, and other topics relevant to verifying the reliability of these data. All of the participation data used in the present report were judged reliable for the purpose of establishing approximate levels of participation in the national security collaboration activities. As part of the data collection instrument used in phase I, we asked agency officials to describe how each activity they submitted was intended to improve the ability of national security personnel to collaborate across agency lines. We reviewed the answers they provided as well as other materials such as course descriptions and catalogues of exercises and JPME programs to identify common themes. Based on our analysis, we determined that these activities generally employed one or more of the following approaches: building foundational knowledge of the national security arena such as other agencies’ roles, responsibilities, authorities or capabilities; developing skills for interagency collaboration, such as how to plan, lead, and execute interagency efforts; or establishing networks among national security professionals. We also discussed these approaches with agency officials during our interviews, and they concurred that they were appropriate and accurate. Appendix II: Inventory of Professional Development Activities Intended to Foster Interagency Collaboration This entry for joint military exercises represents 84 individual exercise programs which conducted multiple exercises during fiscal year 2009. In 2010, USAID changed the name of this course from Tactical Conflict Assessment and Planning Framework to District Stability Framework. Elizabeth Curda and Laura Miller Craig managed this assignment. Jessica Nierenberg, Kate Hudson Walker, Albert Sim, Melanie Papasian, David Dornisch, and Russ Burnett made key contributions to all aspects of the report. Esther Toledo, Mark Kehoe, David P. Owen, Lauren Levine, Andrew Stavisky, John Mingus, Jr., John Pendleton, Marie Mak, Alissa Czyz, William Trancucci, Judith Kordahl, and Crystal Robinson also provided assistance. In addition, Lois Hanshaw and Karin Fangman provided legal support and Donna Miller developed the report’s graphics. Defense Management: DOD Needs to Determine the Future of Its Horn of Africa Task Force. GAO-10-504. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2010. Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Take Actions to Enhance Interagency Coordination for Its Homeland Defense and Civil Support Missions, GAO-10-364. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2010. Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight of National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce, and Information Sharing. GAO-09-904SP. Washington, D.C.: September 25, 2009. Military Training: DOD Needs a Strategic Plan and Better Inventory and Requirements Data to Guide Development of Language Skills and Regional Proficiency. GAO-09-568. Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2009. Influenza Pandemic: Continued Focus on the Nation’s Planning and Preparedness Efforts Remains Essential. GAO-09-760T. Washington, D.C.: June 3, 2009. U.S. Public Diplomacy: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight. GAO-09-679SP. Washington, D.C.: May 27, 2009. Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve Oversight and Interagency Coordination for the Commander’s Emergency Response Program in Afghanistan. GAO-09-61. Washington, D.C.: May 18, 2009. Foreign Aid Reform: Comprehensive Strategy, Interagency Coordination, and Operational Improvements Would Bolster Current Efforts. GAO-09-192. Washington, D.C.: April 17, 2009. Iraq and Afghanistan: Security, Economic, and Governance Challenges to Rebuilding Efforts Should Be Addressed in U.S. Strategies. GAO-09-476T. Washington, D.C.: March 25, 2009. Drug Control: Better Coordination with the Department of Homeland Security and an Updated Accountability Framework Can Further Enhance DEA’s Efforts to Meet Post-9/11 Responsibilities. GAO-09-63. Washington, D.C.: March 20, 2009. Defense Management: Actions Needed to Address Stakeholder Concerns, Improve Interagency Collaboration, and Determine Full Costs Associated with the U.S. Africa Command. GAO-09-181. Washington, D.C.: February 20, 2009. Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. GAO-08-860. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2008. Information Sharing: Definition of the Results to Be Achieved in Terrorism-Related Information Sharing Is Needed to Guide Implementation and Assess Progress. GAO-08-637T. Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2008. Highlights of a GAO Forum: Enhancing U.S. Partnerships in Countering Transnational Terrorism. GAO-08-887SP. Washington, D.C.: July 2008. Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Are Needed to Develop a Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the Civilian Reserve Corps. GAO-08-39. Washington, D.C.: November 6, 2007. Homeland Security: Federal Efforts Are Helping to Alleviate Some Challenges Encountered by State and Local Information Fusion Centers. GAO-08-35. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2007. Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve DOD’s Stability Operations Approach and Enhance Interagency Planning. GAO-07-549. Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2007. Combating Terrorism: Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to Assist Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists. GAO-07-697. Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2007. Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies. GAO-06-15. Washington, D.C.: October 21, 2005.

Summary: Agencies must engage in a whole-of-government approach to protect the nation and its interests from diverse threats such as terrorism and infectious diseases. However, GAO has reported that gaps in national security staff knowledge and skills pose a barrier to the interagency collaboration needed to address these threats. Training and other professional development activities could help bridge those gaps. GAO was asked to identify: (1) training and other professional development activities intended to improve the ability of key national security agencies' personnel to collaborate across organizational lines and (2) how these activities were intended to improve participants' collaboration abilities. To address these objectives, GAO asked nine key agencies involved in national security issues to submit information on professional development activities that were explicitly intended to build staff knowledge or skills for improving interagency collaboration. In addition, GAO gathered and analyzed other information such as target audience, participation levels, and participating agencies. GAO also interviewed responsible human capital and training officials. GAO will explore how interagency participation and other factors may influence the success of these activities in a subsequent review. GAO identified 225 professional development activities intended to improve participants' ability to collaborate across agency lines. These ranged from ten- month joint professional military education programs and year-long rotations to 30-minute online training courses. Because these activities varied widely across dimensions such as length and learning mode, the activities were grouped to allow for appropriate analysis and comparisons of their characteristics. Overall, we found that DOD, State, and DHS provided most of the professional development activities that met our criteria. We found some variation within the different types of activities, mostly related to provider, mode of delivery, or participation levels. DHS, DOD, and State provided the majority of training activities, which primarily consisted of short-term, online, or classroom courses. DOD provided most of the exercise programs and all of the JPME programs. DOD and State provided the majority of interagency rotational programs and all of the leadership development programs that met our criteria. Although agencies could not provide participation data in every instance, the data obtained indicated that overall, interagency participation was lower in activities that required a longer time commitment, such as rotations and full-time joint professional military education. Analysis of the activities GAO identified showed that they are intended to provide opportunities to (1) build common foundational knowledge of the national security arena; (2) develop specific skills, such as how to plan, lead, and execute interagency efforts; and (3) establish networks among personnel from national security agencies that could lead to improved interagency collaboration. According to human capital and training officials at several agencies, the level of interagency participation may affect how a given professional development activity can improve its participants' ability to collaborate. GAO does not have any recommendations in this report. Technical comments from the agencies reviewed were incorporated where appropriate.