According to agency officials and guidance posted on State’s public website, applicants can apply for a U.S. passport in one of three ways: in person at an acceptance facility, by mail (for renewal applications), or at a passport facility that offers acceptance services (typically expedited applications). Applicants submit documents, such as a birth certificate or driver’s license, to passport acceptance agents to provide evidence of citizenship, or noncitizen nationality, and proof of identity. The acceptance agents are to watch the applicant sign the application, review submitted documents for completeness, and check for application inconsistencies. For example, acceptance agents are to assess whether photographs and descriptions in the identification documents match the applicant. If an acceptance agent suspects that an applicant has submitted fraudulent information or exhibits nervous behavior, the acceptance agent is instructed to accept the application and complete a checklist indicating the reason for suspected fraud. The agents are to then send the application, checklist, and photocopy of the identification to State’s Fraud Prevention Manager (FPM). Acceptance agents are not State employees; however, State provides training, as well as detailed guidance that governs their work. State also conducts periodic inspections and audits of acceptance facilities to ensure compliance with regulations and policies. According to State officials, the most common way to renew a passport is by mail. An individual with a passport issued during the previous 15 years may renew it by submitting a mail-in application, along with the previously issued passport, a recent photograph, and documentation of a name change, if applicable. Applications submitted by mail or at an acceptance facility are sent to a Department of the Treasury contracted lockbox service provider for data entry and payment processing. The lockbox service provider converts handwritten or typed text into electronic data and deposits passport fees paid by the applicant. Once the lockbox data entry and payment are complete, the electronic data and paper passport application are sent to passport-issuing facilities around the United States for adjudication. Applicants who demonstrate a need for in-person expedited service for either a first-time issuance or a renewal may submit their applications directly to a passport-issuing facility. State employees at these facilities accept passport fees and enter application data directly into State’s electronic processing system, called the Travel Document Issuance System (TDIS), before forwarding the application for expedited adjudication. Figure 2 provides an overview of the passport application and adjudication process for applications received in person at an acceptance facility, by mail, or at a passport facility that offers acceptance services (see app. 2 for static version of this figure). As we have noted in previous products, each passport application is to be individually reviewed by a passport specialist during a process known as adjudication. State’s FAM specifies the steps passport specialists must take to address various fraud indicators. According to State documents, specialists are responsible for reviewing applications and documents establishing the applicants’ identity and citizenship, as well as conducting various checks, as described below. Depending on the results of the adjudication, passport specialists may approve or deny the passport issuance, conduct additional checks, request more information from the applicant, or forward the application for additional review by their supervisor, the FPM, or by offices in Passport Headquarters. Once a passport has been issued, the application is scanned and archived. Passports issued to individuals 16 years or older are generally valid for 10 years. Several federal statutes and regulations either require or permit State to withhold a passport from an applicant in certain situations. For example, State must withhold passports from individuals who are in default on certain U.S. loans, who are in arrears of child support in an amount determined by statute, or who are imprisoned, on parole, or on supervised release as a result of certain types of violations of the Controlled Substances Act, Bank Secrecy Act, and some state-level drug laws. Likewise, State may choose to refuse a passport to applicants who are the subject of an outstanding local, state, or federal warrant of arrest for a felony, or the subject of probation conditions or criminal court orders that forbid the applicant from leaving the country and the violation of which could result in the issuance of a federal arrest warrant. During the adjudication process, passport specialists are to review applications and results of checks against various databases to detect fraud and suspicious activity, and for other purposes. Application data are entered into TDIS, State’s electronic processing system. TDIS automatically checks applicants’ names against a number of sources, including SSA’s death records and a database of warrants. For example, TDIS automatically checks key identifying information of all passport applicants against SSA’s full death file, as well as a database of felony warrants for certain crimes. Passport specialists are to compare the application to the information in TDIS to make sure it was entered properly and to identify missing information. Passport specialists are also to review the results of automatic checks during a process State refers to as “the front-end” process of adjudication. For instance, during this process, passport specialists are to determine whether an applicant currently holds a passport, has a history of lost or stolen passports, or has already submitted a passport application. According to State officials, such checks are intended to facilitate the identification of suspicious activity and prevent multiple passport issuances to the same person. Passport specialists also are to consider the results from facial recognition technology which is used to help prevent the issuance of passports to individuals using false identities and people who should be denied passports for other legal reasons, such as terrorists in the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) terrorist In addition, passport specialists may employ commercial database.databases and other tools during the adjudication process to assist in confirming an applicant’s identity or citizenship. In April 2007, State and SSA signed an information-exchange agreement that allows State to query SSA’s records for verifying applicants’ identities and identifying deceased individuals. In accordance with this agreement, State’s TDIS automatically queries SSA’s Enumeration Verification System (EVS) to verify that a passport applicant’s SSN, name, and date of birth match the records at SSA. EVS includes a death indicator based on SSA’s full death file of approximately 98 million records, which aids State in identifying applicants using the identity of a deceased individual to apply for a passport. In most cases, State’s controls will not flag an applicant as deceased unless certain fields such as the SSN, name, and date of birth all match the identifying information of a deceased individual. According to State’s procedures, passport specialists must refer any applications with a positive death indicator to State’s FPM for additional review, since the match may indicate a case of stolen identity. The FPM reviews all applications referred to it by passport specialists to determine whether the identifying information on the passport application is in fact associated with a deceased individual. The FPM can approve the passport application once it has reviewed and resolved any indicators of potential fraud. See appendix III for additional details on State’s use of SSA’s records for death checks. In fiscal years 2009 and 2010, the years of passport issuances we reviewed, State did not have access to federal and state prisoner databases in order to check whether applicants’ identities matched those of incarcerated individuals. Since then, State has taken steps to explore access to such databases. For example, in June 2013, State entered into a data-sharing agreement with the BOP in order to access federal prisoner data. In addition, officials told us that in December 2013, State completed the first phase of a pilot project using prisoner data from two states, Florida and Rhode Island, to identify whether applicants are fraudulently using identities of state prisoners. We provide additional details on State’s initiatives to improve data checks for incarcerated individuals in a subsequent section. In 2002, the Marshals Service began transmitting certain warrant data to State for use during the passport adjudication process. Since then, the information State receives has changed to include additional warrants from the FBI, as described in detail below. To help State determine whether an applicant may have an active warrant for a felony charge, TDIS automatically checks applicants’ identifying information in State’s Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS), a database that TDIS indicates a possible match if certain data maintains warrant data.elements from the passport application, such as the name, SSN, date of birth, place of birth, or gender, matches information in CLASS within certain parameters. State’s policies require that passport specialists refer likely matches in CLASS to State’s passport legal office. Officials said paralegals in the passport legal office are to review the information and contact the warrant issuer to confirm the identity of the subject in the warrant against the passport applicant, verify that the warrant is active and related to a felony charge, and further coordinate, as necessary. The passport legal office may also use commercial databases, or photographs obtained from the warrant issuer, to confirm applicants’ identities. In technical comments, State officials clarified that the passport legal office is authorized to deny the passport issuance when it determines, or is informed by a competent authority, that the applicant is the subject of an outstanding federal, state, or local warrant of arrest for a felony crime. In addition, the passport legal office can authorize the passport issuance if it determines, upon additional review, that there was not in fact a legitimate match in CLASS. The legal office may approve an issuance in cases where the warrant was closed, associated with a misdemeanor charge, or for other reasons, such as a request by law enforcement agencies. Of the combined total of approximately 28 million passport issuances we reviewed from fiscal years 2009 and 2010, we found instances of issuances to individuals who applied for passports using identifying information of deceased or incarcerated individuals, as well as applicants with active felony warrants. The total number of cases we identified represented a small percentage of all issuances during the two fiscal years, indicating that fraudulent or high-risk issuances were not pervasive. We also determined that State’s data contained inaccurate SSN information for thousands of passport recipients. Most of the instances in which there was inaccurate SSN information appeared to be applicant or State data-entry errors, rather than fraud. Since fiscal years 2009 and 2010, State has taken steps to improve its detection of passport applicants using the identifying information of deceased or incarcerated individuals. In addition, State modified its process for identifying applicants with active warrants, and has expanded measures to verify SSNs in real time. Out of a combined total of approximately 28 million passport issuances we reviewed from fiscal years 2009 and 2010, we identified 181 passports issued to individuals whose name and SSN both appeared in SSA’s full death file, suggesting that the applicant may have inappropriately used the identity of a deceased person. To ensure that our matches did not contain legitimate applicants who died shortly after submitting their applications, we included only individuals who had died more than 120 days before the passport issuance.our matching analysis and sample results. It is not possible to determine from data matching alone whether the passport issuance was appropriate or fraudulent without reviewing the facts and circumstances for each individual case from the 181 passport issuances. Thus, we randomly selected a nongeneralizable sample of 15 cases for additional analysis. For each case, we attempted to verify death information from SSA’s full death file by obtaining a copy of the death certificate and confirming that SSA’s most-current records listed the individual as deceased. We also requested TECS travel data from FinCEN and reviewed open-source information to search for additional fraud indicators. The following information provides additional details on the 15 cases. In one case, the applicant applied for and received an expedited passport by mail in January 2009 using the SSN, name, and date of birth of a deceased individual. The SSA’s full death file and the death certificate indicated that the purported applicant had died in May 2008. According to TECS travel data, the passport was used in June 2009 to fly to the United States from Mexico and had not been used again as of June 2013. As a result of information we provided, State reviewed this case in 2013 and determined that the applicant appeared to be an imposter. State officials noted that the application should have been referred to the FPM during adjudication, because it contained multiple fraud indicators. State officials said this case should be referred to the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) for further investigation. In another case, the applicant’s passport issuance was delayed by more than a year because her name mistakenly appeared in SSA’s full death file. In our May 2013 testimony, we found that SSA’s data contained a small number of inaccurate records, and SSA has stated, in rare instances, it is possible for the records of a person who is not deceased to be included erroneously in the death file.where a living individual is inappropriately listed as deceased in SSA’s records can create a hardship for the person who has been falsely identified as deceased. This case highlights one of the challenges State encounters when querying SSA’s full death file, and illustrates why State reviews applicants with death indicators on a case-by-case basis. In 4 of the 15 cases, the applicant used a similar name to, as well as the same SSN as, a deceased individual. For each of the four cases, we verified the death information in SSA’s full death file by obtaining a copy of the deceased person’s death certificate. However, State officials said fraud could likely be ruled out in all four cases for various reasons, such as the inadvertent use of an incorrect SSN. In 9 of the 15 cases, we could not verify the death of the applicants because we were unable to identify the state in which the individual’s death was recorded (possibly because the applicant was not deceased) or because state officials would not or could not provide the death certificate to us. State’s subsequent review of these cases indicated that fraud could likely be ruled out in four cases, and that five of the cases should be referred to DS for further investigation. As of May 2014, we have referred all 181 passport issuances we identified from our matching analysis using SSA’s full death file, including the 15 cases we examined in more detail, to State for further review and investigation. Out of the combined total of approximately 28 million passport issuances we reviewed from fiscal years 2009 and 2010, we identified 68 issuances to individuals who used an SSN, name, and in some cases, date of birth of a state prisoner on their passport application. Without reviewing the facts and circumstances for each case, it is not possible on the basis of data matching alone to determine the extent to which these instances represent fraudulent issuances. Thus, from the group of individuals related to the 68 issuances, we selected 14 cases for further review.each sample case, we obtained additional documentation from state departments of corrections to verify key data fields for these passport recipients. Figure 4 summarizes our matching analysis and sample results. From our nongeneralizable sample of 14 cases, we identified seven passport applicants who may have fraudulently used the identities of state prisoners, since the incarcerated individuals could not have physically appeared at a passport facility to submit their applications. The seven remaining cases in our state prisoner sample of 14 individuals were either not incarcerated at the time of application submission, applied for passports using mail-in applications, or represented possible identity theft by the prisoner prior to incarceration. Federal regulations do not prohibit State from issuing passports to prisoners; however, according to officials, State’s policy is to deny passport issuances to individuals who are incarcerated at the time of application submission. We could not conclusively determine that all our sample cases or matches represented passport fraud, because for instance, it is possible that the state prisoner may have stolen the identity of the applicant prior to incarceration. For example, we identified two cases involving data from the same prison facility in which the prisoner had an alias name, in addition to an SSN and date of birth, that matched the information of the passport applicant. We provided information on all our matches, including the 14 state prisoner cases in our sample, to State for review. According to officials, State’s review of these cases included, but was not limited to, an assessment of fraud indicators in the passport applications, and review of the applicants’ information in commercial and internal databases. State determined that fraud could likely be ruled out in eight cases. Officials initially said they should refer the remaining six cases to DS for further investigation. In their technical comments on a draft of this report, State officials said they conducted a second review of the six remaining cases and determined that two individuals used their true identities on their passport applications, and they ultimately referred four cases to DS for investigation. Of the four cases in our state prisoner sample that State officials referred to DS, we identified three instances where the passport was used to cross an international border during the prisoners’ periods of incarceration. These cases highlighted the active use of passports obtained by potentially fraudulent means. We verified this travel activity by comparing the names, dates of birth, and passport numbers in State’s passport data for these cases with TECS travel data provided by FinCEN. The TECS travel log for the three cases showed that the individuals used the passports for international travel at least once during the prisoners’ periods of incarceration. In one case, an individual used the passport obtained by potentially fraudulent means to cross the U.S.-Mexico border more than 300 times. In addition to our analysis of state prisoners, we also identified 206 passport issuances to individuals who used an SSN, name, and date of birth in their applications that matched identifying information in the BOP’s federal prisoner data. However, the data we received included individuals residing in halfway houses. Unless otherwise stated in the conditions of release for parole, passport issuances to individuals living in halfway houses are legally permissible. Since we focused our in-depth analysis on a nongeneralizable sample of 15 cases, we did not determine the extent to which the 206 cases represented individuals in federal prison facilities as opposed to halfway houses. Figure 5 summarizes our matching analysis and sample of 15 cases. From our sample of 15 cases, we did not identify any individuals who applied for a passport using the identity of a federal prisoner in their passport application. We determined that at least 9 of the 15 individuals were living in BOP halfway houses when the passport application was submitted. Moreover, we did not find any indications of identity theft. The other six individuals were either not in a halfway house at the time of application submission, or we were unable to determine, on the basis of the information provided, their location after they were released from a federal prison facility. However, the documentation for these six individuals indicated that they were not incarcerated when the application was submitted. In fiscal years 2009 and 2010, officials said State did not have access to federal and state prisoner databases in order to check whether applicants’ identities matched those of incarcerated individuals. In June 2013, State entered into a data-sharing agreement with the BOP that will allow it to access federal prisoner data, including information about individuals incarcerated in federal facilities or halfway houses. In addition, State obtained data-sharing agreements with two individual state departments of corrections, Florida and Rhode Island, as part of a pilot project to identify whether applicants fraudulently used the identities of state prisoners. State officials said these states represent different geographical regions and a large and small inmate population, and both had technical capabilities to transfer data efficiently and securely to State for adjudication purposes. Officials said in their technical comments that State completed the first phase of the pilot project in December 2013. This phase included the development of search criteria for detecting the fraudulent use of prisoners’ identities. According to officials, State referred three potential fraud cases to DS for further investigation as a result of this effort. Officials also reported in their technical comments that State plans to acquire prisoner data from other states, and that it is developing best practices for obtaining such data. In addition, officials noted that State is in the early stages of planning a second phase of the pilot project. State officials highlighted various challenges with respect to using prisoner data during adjudication, including technical requirements and issues related to data transmission, as well as potential legal limitations. For example, according to BOP officials, State and the BOP will have to develop a technical infrastructure to facilitate sharing of federal prisoner data, which officials expected to occur no later than the end of fiscal year 2014. Similarly, with respect to state prisoner data, State officials noted that data from state departments of corrections would need to be automatically transmitted to allow for the updating of information on a consistent basis. In technical comments, State officials clarified that they would prefer to receive data from individual state departments of corrections on a real-time basis; however, the frequency with which State receives these data is not a factor in determining whether State enters into a data-sharing agreement with a department of corrections. State officials also highlighted issues regarding the compatibility of systems from various states, as well as concerns about poor data that could lead to false matches and delays in processing passport applications. Moreover, State officials told us legal limitations may prevent the transfer of state-level inmate data; however, State did not report having such challenges working with Florida and Rhode Island during its pilot project. Out of a combined total of approximately 28 million passport issuances we reviewed from fiscal years 2009 and 2010, we identified 486 issuances to individuals using the SSN, name or alias, and date of birth of people with active warrants on their passport applications. We could not determine from matching analysis alone whether all warrants were associated with felonies, but our analysis excluded warrants with a description of either a “traffic crime” or “misdemeanor” in data provided by the Marshals Service (see app. IV for additional details). The type of warrant data State has received for detecting active felony warrants through CLASS has changed over time. In 2002, the Marshals Service began providing State with certain warrant information in CLASS. These only included Class 1 warrants, which is a designation for warrants the Marshals Service enters and maintains in the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database, a criminal database that provides the warrant data to CLASS.State with federal felony warrants in 2005 for use during the adjudication According to State officials, the FBI began providing process. In late July 2009, officials said State began receiving state and local warrants from the FBI for crimes of varying degrees of severity, including misdemeanors, serious felonies, and nonserious felonies. According to State officials, the high volume of warrant cases was unmanageable and State had no authority to take action on misdemeanor warrants. Thus, in November 2010, State officials said they updated CLASS so that it included only state or local warrants connected to more- serious felonies they selected. Officials also said CLASS is updated daily with information provided by the Marshals Service and the FBI, and currently contains information for federal, state, and local felony warrants related to State’s selected felony charges. Figure 6 illustrates the evolution in State’s data checks for warrants. From the population of 486 issuances with active warrants that we identified through matching, we randomly selected a nongeneralizable sample of 15 individuals for additional analysis. Figure 7 summarizes our matching analysis and sample results. According to the Marshals Service, all 15 of the individuals in our nongeneralizable sample had warrants related to felony charges, 3 of which the Marshals Service was responsible for executing. Fugitives with felony warrants may pose a risk to public safety, and passports could help them evade capture by law enforcement agencies. State may choose to refuse a passport to applicants who are the subject of an outstanding felony warrant. In our analysis of the 15 cases, we took into account the evolution in State’s controls. Figure 8 summarizes our review of the cases in our sample. Among the 13 applicants we reviewed in detail, we found five cases with warrants that State identified during the adjudication process. For instance, after detecting the warrant in one case, State’s passport legal office ultimately determined the passport applicant was a victim of identity theft and was not the subject of the warrant. In another case, State identified a warrant at the state or local level for an applicant who applied for a passport at a time when State’s controls had begun checking for such warrants. In this case, State’s passport legal office authorized the passport issuance to the individual after concluding the associated charge was for a misdemeanor crime, as opposed to a felony offense. We also identified five cases where the applicants had outstanding state or local felony warrants on the application date, and State’s CLASS did not have data for such warrants when the individuals applied. In the other 3 of the 13 sample cases we reviewed, we found no indications that State was aware of or alerted to the individuals’ warrants at the time they applied for passports, even though it appeared that CLASS should have included the We referred all passport issuances we identified from our warrant data.matching analysis, including our sample cases, to State for further review and investigation. Out of the combined total of approximately 28 million passport issuances we reviewed from fiscal years 2009 and 2010, we found 13,470 passport issuances to individuals who submitted an SSN associated with a deceased individual, but where the name used in the passport application did not match the name of the deceased individual. As we previously noted, we analyzed these cases to determine whether the applicant provided the correct SSN and State recorded it incorrectly, or whether the applicant provided the wrong SSN and State recorded the incorrect SSN its system. Specifically, from this population, we selected a stratified random sample that consisted of 140 passport issuances, evenly divided between fiscal years 2009 and 2010 (see fig. 9). We refer to these cases below as deceased-SSN errors. We estimated that approximately 50 percent of the 13,470 cases with deceased-SSN errors were instances where the applicant provided an SSN that did not belong to him or her. We did not identify any other evidence of potential fraud in this group of cases, which suggests that applicants may have made mistakes in filling out the passport application. We estimated that in approximately 44 percent of the 13,470 cases with deceased-SSN errors applicants provided the correct SSNs, but State entered them incorrectly into TDIS. State officials could not provide an explanation for the errors related to these cases, which included applications with handwritten SSNs that were difficult to read, as well as typed SSNs. The remaining 6 percent of cases did not fall into either of these categories. Such cases included instances where the applicant did not provide an SSN, or where we were unable to ascertain the applicant’s actual SSN. Figure 10 summarizes the issuances we reviewed involving deceased-SSN errors. State may issue multiple passports to the same individual, such as when the applicant applies for both a passport book and a passport card. These 24,278 passport issuances were associated with 22,543 unique SSNs. In some cases, more than one individual used the same likely invalid SSN to apply for a passport. have included an applicant who used that SSN in this population. We randomly selected a nongeneralizable sample of 15 cases from the population of unique, likely invalid SSNs for additional review (see fig. 11). In seven cases, State improperly recorded the applicants’ SSNs in TDIS. In six cases, the applicant provided an incorrect SSN, five of which were close to the applicant’s actual SSN.cause of the invalid SSNs in the remaining two cases, because they involved minors for whom we could not ascertain the passport recipient’s actual SSNs. We provided a draft of this report to State and the Department of Justice for comment. State provided technical comments, which we incorporated into the report, as appropriate. The Department of Justice did not have any comments. As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to interested congressional committees, the Secretary of State, and the Attorney General. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-6722 or lords@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V. You asked that we assess potential fraud in the Department of State’s (State) passport program. This report examines potentially fraudulent or high-risk issuances among passports issued during fiscal years 2009 and 2010. To examine potentially fraudulent and high-risk passport issuances in fiscal years 2009 and 2010, we matched State’s passport-issuance data for approximately 28 million passport issuances to databases containing information about individuals who were (1) deceased, (2) incarcerated in a state prison facility, (3) in the custody of the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), or (4) the subject of an active warrant at the time of the passport We conducted this matching on the basis of common data issuance.elements including Social Security number (SSN), name, and date of birth. We also analyzed the passport data to identify issuances to applicants who provided an invalid SSN, which was defined as an SSN that had not been assigned at the time of the passport application, or had a high risk of misuse. Because our review focused on passport issuances with certain fraud indicators, we did not review other types of passport fraud, such as identity theft involving individuals who were not deceased or imprisoned. Similarly, since we focused on high-risk issuances involving applicants with active warrants, we did not match the passport data against all databases with individuals at risk of misusing a passport, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Terrorist Screening Center data. We only reviewed data with passport issuances, therefore we did not examine passport applications that were rejected or abandoned by the applicant. In addition, our unit of analysis was passport issuances, instead of passport holders. Some individuals in our sample may have been issued multiple passports. In addition, we examined policies, guidance, including the Foreign Affairs Manual, and other materials provided to passport specialists. We reviewed changes to State’s controls since fiscal years 2009 and 2010 with respect to preventing certain fraudulent or high-risk passport issuances. We also assessed the reliability of State’s passport data, TECS travel activity data provided by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) full death file, prisoner databases provided by the BOP and by departments of corrections in 15 selected states, as well as data on individuals with open warrants provided by the Marshals Service, by reviewing relevant documentation, interviewing knowledgeable agency officials, and examining the data for obvious errors and inconsistencies. We concluded that all but four of these databases were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. Through data tests and interviews, we concluded that state prisoner data from Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, and Pennsylvania were not sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We did not assess the reliability of state prisoner data from North Carolina because they were not provided in time to be included in our analysis. To identify individuals using the SSN of a deceased individual, we matched State passport data to SSA’s full death file as of September 2011. The full death file contains all of SSA’s death records, including state-reported death information. We included only those individuals who died more than 120 days before the passport was issued to ensure that our matches did not include legitimate applicants who died shortly after submitting an application. We further divided these passport applications into two groups on the basis of whether the name in the passport file matched the name in the corresponding death file record. From 13,470 passport records with names that did not match the corresponding record in the full death file, we selected a stratified random sample that consisted of 140 passport issuances, evenly divided between fiscal years 2009 and 2010. For each case, we examined a copy of the original passport application and submitted the SSN from State’s passport data to SSA for verification. We analyzed these cases to determine whether the applicant provided the correct SSN and State recorded it incorrectly, or whether the applicant provided the wrong SSN and State recorded the incorrect SSN in its system. Our estimates had a margin of error of at most +/-9 percentage points for the entire population, at the 95 percent confidence level. From 181 passport records with names that matched the corresponding record in the death file, we randomly selected a nongeneralizable sample of 15 records for additional analysis. To verify that these individuals were deceased at the time their identity was used to apply for a passport, we attempted to obtain a death certificate for each applicant. In some cases, we were unable to obtain a death certificate because we could not identify the state in which the individual’s death was recorded or because state officials could not or would not provide the death certificate to us. The results of this sample are not generalizable to the entire population of applicants using the SSN and name of a deceased person. To identify individuals incarcerated at the time of passport issuance, we matched State passport data to a database of federal prisoners provided by the BOP and prisoner databases from Alabama, Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Missouri, New York, Ohio, Texas, and Virginia. Federal prisoner data included individuals incarcerated during fiscal years 2009 and 2010. State prisoner data included individuals incarcerated as of the date the state provided data to us, which ranged from May to November 2011. We identified records for which the passport applicant’s SSN, name, and date of birth matched that of a person who was incarcerated on the date of passport issuance. State prisoner data from Florida, New York, and Texas did not contain dates of birth. For these states, we matched passport data to state prison data by SSN and name only. From our matches, we randomly selected 15 federal prisoners and up to 2 prisoners incarcerated in each of the states for additional analysis. If a state had two or fewer valid matches, we selected all matches from that state, for a total of 14 cases from eight different states. Three states did not have any matches. We obtained documentation from BOP and prison officials from the eight states to confirm that the selected individuals were incarcerated on the dates of passport application and issuance. The results of these samples are not generalizable to the entire population of applicants using the name, SSN, or date of birth of an incarcerated person. However, the cases offered insights on applicants who potentially used the identity of prisoners to apply for passports, and related efforts by State to identify such individuals. To identify individuals with active warrants at the time they applied for a passport, we matched State passport data to warrant data provided by the Marshals Service. We identified records for which the passport applicant’s SSN, name (or alias), and date of birth matched that of an individual with an open warrant on the date of passport issuance. From this population, we randomly selected 15 warrants for crimes other than misdemeanors and traffic violations for additional analysis. We confirmed with the Marshals Service that all 15 individuals had warrants related to felony charges. In addition, we referred to documentation provided by the Marshals Service that had warrant information for each case. We compared the warrant dates, the SSNs, names, and dates of birth, if available, in the warrant data we received from the Marshals Service for our matching analysis to the hard-copy documentation. For all 15 cases, the warrant issuance dates, as well as the names and fugitive unique identifiers, in the hard-copy documentation matched the information in the warrant data we used to match with the passport database. In addition, for 12 cases, at least one date of birth and SSN noted in the hard-copy documentation matched the warrant data used for our matching analysis. The dates of birth and SSNs in the documentation for 3 of the 15 individuals were redacted, and therefore the match was based on name and unique identifier only. The results of this sample are not generalizable to the entire population of applicants using the name (or alias), SSN, and date of birth of a fugitive, but provided insights about State’s efforts to identify such individuals during the adjudication process. Because we matched passport data to databases of deceased individuals, prisoners, and fugitives using two or more identifiers—SSN, name, date of birth—we are generally confident in the accuracy of our results. However, in some cases, our matches may include applicants who were not deceased, incarcerated, or the subject of an active warrant. This can occur when a passport applicant has an SSN, name, and date of birth that are similar to an individual listed in one of the other databases or when the applicant is listed in the other database erroneously. In addition, our matches may be understated because we may not have detected applicants whose identifying information in the passport data differed slightly from their identifying information in other databases. Moreover, federal warrant data do not contain information on all individuals with an open warrant issued by a state court. We analyzed State passport data to identify issuances to individuals using an invalid SSN. We defined invalid SSNs as SSNs that had not been issued as of fiscal year 2010 or commonly misused SSNs. SSNs with certain digit combinations, such as those starting with 000 or 666, had never been issued as of fiscal year 2010. Commonly misused SSNs include single-character SSNs, or SSNs that have been publically disclosed in advertisements. From this population, we selected 15 cases for additional analysis. The results of this sample are not generalizable to the entire population of applicants using an invalid SSN, but the cases provided insights on State’s controls related to identifying inaccurate SSNs on passport applications. In total, we selected 214 cases for additional analysis, as shown in figure 12. In all, we selected a total of 214 passport issuances for additional review for our five nongeneralizable and one generalizable samples. For each of the 214 passport issuances selected, we reviewed a copy of the original passport application, verified the SSN in State’s passport data using SSA’s database, and obtained records of the passport holder’s travel activity from FinCEN. We also reviewed State documentation of additional investigative activities taken in any of our cases. Where applicable, we obtained additional documentation about the death, incarceration, or fugitive status of applicants from federal and state agencies, and follow- up actions planned or taken by State. We could not determine whether the passport issuance was inappropriate or fraudulent without additional investigation of the facts and circumstances for each individual case. We were not able to perform these investigations due to restrictions on the use of State’s passport data. The period required for our review was a result of various factors, including a data-sharing negotiation with State, time required to receive requested data and documentation, extensive data preparation and analysis involving multiple databases, and the necessity for resource-intensive reviews of information on-site, given the sensitivity of certain information. We performed this audit from March 2010 through May 2014 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. This figure is a printable version of the interactive graphic presented above, which provides an overview of the passport application and adjudication process. In April 2007, State and SSA signed an information-exchange agreement that allows State to automatically query SSA’s Enumeration Verification System records for verifying applicants’ identities and identifying deceased individuals. SSA provides State the death status of an applicant when all identifying fields—the Social Security number (SSN), name, and date of birth on the passport application—match an SSA record. However, if one of these identifying elements does not match, SSA will not provide a response with respect to death status. For example, SSA would not provide State a death status if an applicant submitted the SSN of a deceased individual but used a different name. Figure 14 summarizes the potential responses State receives from SSA. Out of the approximately 28 million combined passport issuances we reviewed from fiscal years 2009 and 2010, we identified 1,096 individuals whose Social Security number (SSN), name, and date of birth were associated with 1,309 warrants in data provided by the Marshals Service from the Justice Detainee Information Center database. Of these 1,309 warrants, we identified 486 passport issuances to individuals who may have had active felony warrants at the time of application submission. Over half of the 1,309 warrants were for offenses such as misdemeanors and traffic violations. According to officials at the Department of State (State), the department has no regulatory authority to take action on misdemeanor warrants. Officials from the Marshals Service said the agency tracks other warrants for federal agencies, including those related to misdemeanors and traffic offenses, as well as cases at the state level that require the assistance of the Marshals Service. Officials of the Marshals Service also said they do not have responsibility for entering information about such warrants into the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database, and therefore such warrants are classified as non–Class 1 warrants. On the other hand, Class 1 warrants are those that the Marshals Service is responsible for entering into NCIC and that it transmits to State’s Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) for adjudication. Marshals Service officials told us that of the 1,309 warrants we identified in our matching analysis, 111 (9 percent) were Class 1 warrants. Because the Marshals Service only transmits Class 1 warrants into CLASS, State would have identified the non–Class 1 warrants only if it received them from another source, such as warrants provided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Table 1 lists the types of open warrants we identified from our matching analysis. Some of the 1,309 passport issuances we identified with active warrants were associated with felony offenses, including violent crimes ranging from assault to homicide. Ten of the warrants were associated with border and immigration crimes such as smuggling aliens and immigration violations. State may have identified and reviewed these warrants during the adjudication process, and decided to issue the passport after reviewing and resolving the circumstances of the case. We referred all our matches to State for further review and investigation. In addition to the contact above, Heather Dunahoo (Assistant Director); Hiwotte Amare; James Ashley; Patricia Donahue; Richard Hillman; Leslie Kirsch; Maria McMullen; Sandra Moore; Anthony Moran; James Murphy; Rebecca Shea; and Gavin Ugale made key contributions to this report.

Summary: Fraudulent passports pose a significant risk because they can be used to conceal the true identity of the user and potentially facilitate other crimes, such as international terrorism and drug trafficking. State issued over 13.5 million passports during fiscal year 2013. GAO was asked to assess potential fraud in State's passport program. This report examines select cases of potentially fraudulent or high-risk issuances among passports issued during fiscal years 2009 and 2010—the most recently available data at the time GAO began its review. GAO matched State's passport data from fiscal years 2009 and 2010 for approximately 28 million issuances to databases with information about individuals who were deceased, incarcerated in state and federal prison facilities, or who had an active warrant at the time of issuance. GAO also analyzed the passport data to identify issuances to applicants who provided a likely invalid SSN, which had not been assigned at the time of the passport application, or had been publically disclosed. From each of these five populations, GAO selected nongeneralizable samples for additional review. GAO also randomly selected a generalizable sample from a population of passport issuances to applicants who used only the SSN of a deceased individual. GAO reviewed State's adjudication policies, and examined passport applications for these populations to further assess whether there were potentially fraudulent or high-risk issuances. State provided technical comments and generally agreed with our findings. This report contains no recommendations. Of the approximately 28 million passports issued in fiscal years 2009 and 2010 that GAO reviewed, it found issuances to applicants who used the identifying information of deceased or incarcerated individuals, had active felony warrants, or used an incorrect Social Security number (SSN); however, GAO did not identify pervasive fraud in these populations. The Department of State (State) has taken steps to improve its detection of passport applicants using identifying information of deceased or incarcerated individuals. In addition, State modified its process for identifying applicants with active warrants, and has expanded measures to verify SSNs in real time. GAO referred, and State is reviewing, matches from this analysis. The following summarizes GAO's findings: Deceased individuals. As shown in the figure, GAO identified at least 1 case of potential fraud in the sample of 15 cases, as well as likely data errors. State reviewed the cases referred by GAO, and indicated fraud could likely be ruled out in 9 of the 15 cases; State plans to further review 6 cases. State prisoners. GAO found 7 cases of potential fraud among the sample of 14 state prisoner cases. State noted fraud could likely be ruled out in 10 of the 14 cases, and intends to conduct additional reviews of 4 cases. Federal prisoners. None of the 15 cases in this sample had fraud indicators, since all individuals were not actually in prison when applying for passports. Individuals with active warrants. GAO found five cases where State identified the warrant and resolved it prior to issuance. As the figure shows, GAO also identified three cases with warrants that State was not aware of or alerted to, but should have been in State's system for detection during adjudication. In addition, GAO found 13,470 passport issuances to individuals who used the SSN, but not the name, of a deceased person, as well as 24,278 issuances to applicants who used a likely invalid SSN. GAO reviewed a 140-case generalizable sample and a 15-case nongeneralizable sample for these two populations, respectively, and determined the cases were likely data errors. State has taken steps to capture correct SSN information more consistently.