In May 2007, the Army issued a solicitation for body armor designs to replenish stocks and to protect against future threats by developing the next generation (X level) of protection. According to Army officials, the solicitation would result in contracts that the Army would use for sustainment of protective plate stocks for troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. The indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contracts require the Army to purchase a minimum of 500 sets per design and allow for a maximum purchase of 1.2 million sets over the 5-year period. The Army’s solicitation, which closed in February 2008, called for preliminary design models in four categories of body armor protective plates: Enhanced Small Arms Protective Insert (ESAPI)—plates designed to same protection specifications as those currently fielded and to fit into currently fielded Outer Tactical Vests. Flexible Small Arms Protective Vest-Enhanced (FSAPV-E)—flexible armor system designed to same protection specifications as armor currently fielded. Small Arms Protective Insert-X level (XSAPI)—next-generation plates designed to defeat higher level threat. Flexible Small Arms Protective Vest-X level (FSAPV-X)—flexible armor system designed to defeat higher level threat. In figure 1, we show the ESAPI plates inside the Outer Tactical Vest. Between May of 2007 and February of 2008 the Army established testing protocols, closed the solicitation, and provided separate live-fire demonstrations of the testing process to vendors who submitted items for testing and to government officials overseeing the testing. Preliminary Design Model testing was conducted at Aberdeen Test Center between February 2008 and June 2008 at an estimated cost of $3 million. Additionally, over $6 million was spent on infrastructure and equipment improvements at Aberdeen Test Center to support future light armor test range requirements, including body armor testing. First Article Testing was then conducted at Aberdeen Test Center from November 10, 2008, to December 17, 2008, on the three ESAPI and five XSAPI designs that had passed Preliminary Design Model testing. First Article Testing is performed in accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation to ensure that the contractor can furnish a product that conforms to all contract requirements for acceptance. First Article Testing determines whether the proposed product design conforms to contract requirements before or in the initial stage of production. During First Article Testing, the proposed design is evaluated to determine the probability of consistently demonstrating satisfactory performance and the ability to meet or exceed evaluation criteria specified in the purchase description. Successful First Article Testing certifies a specific design configuration and the manufacturing process used to produce the test articles. Failure of First Article Testing requires the contractor to examine the specific design configuration to determine the improvements needed to correct the performance of subsequent designs. Testing of the body armor currently fielded by the Army was conducted by private NIJ-certified testing facilities under the supervision of PEO Soldier. According to Army officials, not a single death can be attributed to this armor’s failing to provide the required level of protection for which it was designed. However, according to Army officials, one of the body armor manufacturers that had failed body armor testing in the past did not agree with the results of the testing and alleged that the testers tested that armor to higher–than–required standards. The manufacturer alleged a bias against its design and argued that its design was superior to currently fielded armor. As a result of these allegations and in response to congressional interest, after the June 2007 House Armed Services Committee hearing, the Army accelerated completion of the light armor ranges to rebuild small arms ballistic testing capabilities at Aberdeen Test Center and to conduct testing under the May 2007 body armor solicitation there, without officials from PEO Soldier supervising the testing. Furthermore, the decision was made to allow Aberdeen Test Center, which is not an NIJ-certified facility, to be allowed to conduct the repeated First Article Testing. In February 2009 the Army directed that all future body armor testing be performed at Aberdeen Test Center. According to Army officials, as of this date, none of the body armor procured under the May 2007 solicitation had been fielded. Given the significant congressional interest in the testing for this solicitation and that these were the first small arms ballistic tests conducted at Aberdeen Test Center in years, multiple defense organizations were involved in the Preliminary Design Model testing. These entities include the Aberdeen Test Center, which conducted the testing; PEO Soldier, which provided the technical subject-matter experts; and DOD’s office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, which combined to form the Integrated Product The Integrated Product Team was responsible for developing and approving the test plans used for the Preliminary Design Model testing and First Article Testing. Figure 2 shows a timeline of key Preliminary Design Model testing and First Article Testing events. The test procedures to be followed for Preliminary Design Model testing were established and identified in the purchase descriptions accompanying the solicitation announcement and in the Army’s detailed test plans (for each of the four design categories), which served as guidance to Army testers and were developed by the Army Test and Evaluation Command and approved by PEO-Soldier, DOD’s office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, and others. Originally, PEO Soldier required that testing be conducted at an NIJ-certified facility. Subsequently, the decision was made to conduct testing at Aberdeen Test Center, which is not NIJ-certified. The test procedures for both Preliminary Design Model testing and First Article Testing included both (1) physical characterization steps performed on each armor design to ensure they met required specifications, which included measuring weight, thickness, curvature, and size and (2) ballistic testing performed on each design. Ballistics testing for this solicitation included the following subtests: (1) ambient testing to determine whether the designs can defeat the multiple threats assigned in the respective solicitation’s purchase descriptions 100 percent of the time; (2) environmental testing of the designs to determine whether they can defeat each threat 100 percent of the time after being exposed to nine different environmental conditions; and (3) testing, called V50 testing, to determine whether designs can defeat each threat at velocities significantly higher than those present or expected in Iraq or Afghanistan at least 50 percent of the time. Ambient and environmental testing seek to determine whether designs can defeat each threat 100 percent of the time by both prohibiting the bullet from penetrating through the plate and by prohibiting the bullet from causing too deep of an indentation in the clay backing behind the plate. Preventing a penetration is important because it prevents a bullet from entering the body of the soldier. Preventing a deep indentation in the clay (called “back-face deformation”) is important because the depth of the indentation indicates the amount of blunt force trauma to the soldier. Back-face deformation deeper than 43 millimeters puts the soldier at higher risk of internal injury and death. The major steps taken in conducting a ballistic subtest include: 1. For environmental subtests, the plate is exposed to the environmental condition tested (e.g., impact test, fluid soaks, temperature extremes, etc.). 2. The clay to be used to back the plate is formed into a mold and is placed in a conditioning chamber for at least 3 hours. 3. The test plate is placed inside of a shoot pack. 4. The clay is taken out of the conditioning chamber. It is then tested to determine if it is suitable for use and, if so, is placed behind the test plate. 5. The armor and clay are then mounted to a platform and shot. 6. If the shot was fired within required specifications, the plate is examined to determine if there is a complete or partial penetration, and the back-face deformation is measured. 7. The penetration result and back-face deformation are scored as a pass, a limited failure, or a catastrophic failure. If the test is not conducted according to the testing protocols, it is scored as a no-test. Following are significant steps the Army took to run a controlled test and maintain consistency throughout Preliminary Design Model testing: The Army developed testing protocols for the hard-plate (ESAPI and XSAPI) and flexible-armor (FSAPV-E and FSAPV-X) preliminary design model categories in 2007. These testing protocols were specified in newly created purchase descriptions, detailed test plans, and other documents. For each of the four preliminary design model categories, the Army developed new purchase descriptions to cover both hard-plate and flexible designs. These purchase descriptions listed the detailed requirements for each category of body armor in the solicitation issued by the Army. Based on these purchase descriptions, the Army developed detailed test plans for each of the four categories of body armor. These detailed test plans provided additional details on how to conduct testing and provided Army testers with the requirements that each design needed to pass. After these testing protocols were developed, Army testers then conducted a pilot test in which they practiced test activities in preparation for Preliminary Design Model testing, to help them better learn and understand the testing protocols. The Army consistently documented many testing activities by using audio, video, and other electronic means. The use of cameras and microphones to provide 24-hour video and audio surveillance of all of the major Preliminary Design Model testing activities provided additional transparency into many testing methods used and allowed for enhanced oversight by Army management, who are unable to directly observe the lanes on a regular basis but who wished to view select portions of the testing. The Army utilized an electronic database to maintain a comprehensive set of documentation for all testing activities. This electronic database included a series of data reports and pictures for each design including: physical characterization records, X-ray pictures, pre- and post-shot pictures, ballistics testing results, and details on the condition of the clay backing used for the testing of those plates. The Army took a number of additional actions to promote a consistent and unbiased test. For example, the Army disguised vendor identity for each type of solution by identifying vendors with random numbers to create a blind test. The Army further reduced potential testing variance by shooting subtests in the same shooting lane. The Army also made a good faith effort to use consistent and controlled procedures to measure the weight, thickness, and curvature of the plates. Additionally, the Army made extensive efforts to consistently measure and maintain room temperature and humidity within desired ranges. We also observed that projectile yaw was consistently monitored and maintained. We also found no deviations in the monitoring of velocities for each shot and the re-testing of plates in cases where velocities were not within the required specifications. We observed no instances of specific bias against any design, nor did we observe any instances in which a particular vendor was singled out for advantage or disadvantage. We identified several instances in which the Aberdeen Test Center did not follow established testing protocols. For example, during V50 testing, testers failed to properly adjust shot velocities. V50 testing is conducted to discern the velocity at which 50 percent of the shots of a particular threat would penetrate each of the body armor designs. The testing protocols require that after every shot that is defeated by the body armor the velocity of the next shot be increased. Whenever a shot penetrates the armor, the velocity should be decreased for the next shot. This increasing and decreasing of the velocities is supposed to be repeated until testers determine the velocity at which 50 percent of the shots will penetrate. In cases in which the armor far exceeds the V50 requirements and is able to defeat the threat for the first six shots, the testing may be halted without discerning the V50 for the plate, and the plate is ruled as passing the requirements. During Preliminary Design Model testing, in cases in which plates defeated the first three shots, Army testers failed to increase shot velocities, but rather continued to shoot at approximately the same velocity or lower for shots four, five, and six in order to obtain six partial penetrations and conclude the test early. Army officials told us that this deviation was implemented by Aberdeen Test Center to conserve plates for other tests that needed repeating as a result of no-test events, according to Aberdeen Test Center officials—but was a practice not described in the protocols. Army officials told us that this practice had no effect on which designs passed or failed; however, this practice made it impossible to discern the true V50s for these designs and was a deviation from the testing protocols that require testers to increase velocities for shots after the armor defeats the threat. In another example, Aberdeen Test Center testers did not consistently follow testing protocols in the ease-of-insertion test. According to the testing protocols, one barehanded person shall demonstrate insertion and removal of the ESAPI/XSAPI plates in the Outer Tactical Vest pockets without tools or special aids. Rather than testing the insertion of both the front and the rear pockets as required, testers only tested the ability to insert into the front pocket. Testing officials told us that they did not test the ability to insert the plates into the rear pocket because they were unable to reach the rear pocket while wearing the Outer Tactical Vest. The cause for this deviation is that the testers misinterpreted the testing protocols, as there is no requirement in the established testing protocols to wear the Outer Tactical Vest when testing the ability to insert the plates in the rear pocket of the Outer Tactical Vest. Officials from PEO Soldier told us that, had they been present to observe this deviation during testing, they would have informed testers that the insertion test does not require that the Outer Tactical Vest be worn, which would have resulted in testers conducting the insertion test as required. According to Aberdeen Test Center officials, this violation of the testing protocols had no impact on test results. While we did not independently verify this assertion, Aberdeen Test Center officials told us that the precise physical characterization measurements of the plate’s width and dimensions are, alone, sufficient to ensure the plate will fit. In addition, testers deviated from the testing protocols by placing shots at the wrong location on the plate. The testing protocols require that the second shot for one of the environmental sub-tests, called the impact test, be taken approximately 1.5 inches from the edge of the armor. However, testers mistakenly aimed closer to the edge of the armor for some of the designs tested. Army officials said that the testing protocols were unclear for this test because they did not prescribe a specific hit zone (e.g., 1.25 – 1.75 inches), but rather relied upon testers’ judgment to discern the meaning of the word “approximately.” One of the PEO Soldier technical advisors on the Integrated Product Team told us he was contacted by the Test Director after the plates had been shot and asked about the shot location. He told us that he informed the Test Director that the plates had been shot in the wrong location. The PEO Soldier Technical advisor told us that, had he been asked about the shot location before the testing was conducted, he could have instructed testers on the correct location at which to shoot. For 17 of the 47 total designs that we observed and measured, testers marked target zones that were less than the required 1.5 inches from the plate’s edge, ranging from .75 inches to 1.25 inches from the edge. Because 1.5 inches was outside of the marked aim area for these plates, we concluded that testers were not aiming for 1.5 inches. For the remaining 30 designs tested that we observed and measured, testers used a range that included 1.5 inches from the edge (for example, aiming for 1 to 1.5 inches). It is not clear what, if any, effect this deviation had on the overall test results. While no design failed Preliminary Design Model testing due to the results of this subtest, there is no way to determine if a passing design would have instead failed if the testing protocol had been correctly followed. However, all designs that passed this testing were later subject to First Article Testing, where these tests were repeated in full using the correct shot locations. Of potentially greater consequence to the final test results is our observation of deviations from testing protocols regarding the clay calibration tests. According to testing protocols, the calibration of the clay backing material was supposed to be accomplished through a series of pre-test drops. The depths of the pre-test drops should have been between 22 and 28 millimeters. Aberdeen Test Center officials told us that during Preliminary Design Model testing they did not follow a consistent system to determine if the clay was conditioned correctly. According to Aberdeen Test Center officials, in cases in which pre-test drops were outside the 22- to 28-millimeter range, testers would sometimes repeat one or all of the drops until the results were within range—thus resulting in the use of clay backing materials that should have been deemed unacceptable for use. These inconsistencies occurred because Army testers in each test lane made their own, sometimes incorrect, interpretation of the testing protocols. Members of the Integrated Product Team expressed concerns about these inconsistencies after they found out how calibrations were being conducted. In our conversations with Army and private body armor testing officials, consistent treatment and testing of clay was identified as critical to ensure consistent, accurate testing. According to those officials if the clay is not conditioned correctly it will impact the test results. Given that clay was used during Preliminary Design Model testing that failed the clay calibration tests, it is possible that some shots may have been taken under test conditions different than those stated in the testing protocols, potentially impacting test results. Figure 3 shows an Army tester calibrating the clay with pre-test drops. The most consequential of the deviations from testing protocols we observed involved the measurement of back-face deformation, which did affect final test results. According to testing protocol, back-face deformation is to be measured at the deepest point of the depression in the clay backing. This measure indicates the most force that the armor will allow to be exerted on an individual struck by a bullet. According to A rmy officials, the deeper the back-face deformation measured in the cla backing, the higher the risk of internal injury or death. During approximately the first one-third of testing, however, Army testers incorrectly measured deformation at the point of aim, rather than at the deepest point of depression. This is significant because, in many instances, measuring back-face deformation at the point of aim results in measuri ng at a point upon which less ballistic force is exerted, resulting in lower back-face deformation measurements and overestimating the effectiveness of the armor. The Army’s subject matter experts on the Integrated Product Team were not on the test lanes during testing and thus not made aware of the error until approximately one-third of the testing had been completed. When members of the Integrated Product Team overseeing the testing were made aware of this error, the Integrated Product Team decided to begin measuring at the deepest point of depression. When senior Army leadership was made aware of this error, testing was halted for 2 weeks while Army leadership considered the situation. Army leadership developed many courses of action, including restarting the entire Preliminary Design Model testing with new armor plate submissions, but ultimately decided to continue measuring and scoring officially at the point of aim, since this would not disadvantage any vendors. The Army then changed the test plans and modified the contract solicitation to call for measuring at the point of aim. The Army also decided to collect deepest point of depression measurements for all shots from that point forward, but only as a government reference. During the second two-thirds of testing, we observed significant differences between the measurements taken at the point of aim and those taken at the deepest point, as much as a 10-millimeter difference between measurements. As a result, at least two of the eight designs that passed Preliminary Design Model testing and were awarded contracts would have failed if the deepest point of depression measurement had been used. Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the difference between the point of aim and the deepest point. Before Preliminary Design Model testing began at Aberdeen Test Center, officials told us that Preliminary Design Model testing was specifically designed to meet all the requirements of First Article Testing. However, Preliminary Design Model testing failed to meet its goal of determining which designs met requirements, because of the deviations from established testing protocols described earlier in this report. Those deviations were not reviewed or approved by officials from PEO Soldier, the office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, or by the Integrated Product Team charged with overseeing the test. PEO Soldier officials told us that the reason for a lack of PEO Soldier on-site presence during this testing was because of a deliberate decision made by PEO Soldier management to be as removed from the testing process as possible in order to maximize the independence of the Aberdeen Test Center. PEO Soldier officials told us that it was important to demonstrate the independence of the Aberdeen Test Center to quash allegations of bias made by a vendor whose design had failed prior testing and that this choice may have contributed to some of the deviations not being identified by the Army earlier during testing. After the conclusion of Preliminary Design Model testing, PEO Soldier officials told us that they should have been more involved in the testing and that they would be more involved in future testing. After the completion of Preliminary Design Model testing, the Commanding General of PEO Soldier said that, as the Milestone Decision Authority for the program, he elected to repeat the testing conducted during Preliminary Design Model testing through First Article Testing before any body armor was fielded based on the solicitation. According to PEO Soldier officials, at the beginning of Preliminary Design Model testing, there was no intention or plan to conduct First Article Testing following contract awards given that the Preliminary Design Model testing was to follow the First Article Testing protocol. However, because of the fact that back-face deformation was not measured to the deepest point, PEO-Soldier and Army Test and Evaluation and Command acknowledged that there was no longer an option of forgoing First Article Testing. PEO Soldier also expressed concerns that Aberdeen Test Center test facilities have not yet demonstrated that they are able to test to the same level as NIJ-certified facilities. However, officials from Army Test and Evaluation Command and DOD’s office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation asserted that Aberdeen Test Center was just as capable as NIJ- certified laboratories, and Army leadership eventually decided that First Article Testing would be performed at Aberdeen. PEO Soldier maintained an on-site presence in the test lanes and the Army technical experts on the Integrated Product Team charged with testing oversight resolved the following problems during First Article Testing: The Army adjusted its testing protocols to clarify the required shot location for the impact test, and Army testers correctly placed these shots as required by the protocols. After the first few days of First Article Testing, in accordance with testing protocols, Army testers began to increase the velocity after every shot defeated by the armor required during V50 testing. As required by the testing protocols, Army testers conducted the ease- of-insertion tests for both the front and rear pockets of the outer protective vest, ensuring that the protective plates would properly fit in both pockets. The Army began to address the problems identified during Preliminary Design Model testing with the clay calibration tests and back-face deformation measurements. Army testers said they developed an informal set of procedures to determine when to repeat failed clay calibration tests. The procedures, which were not documented, called for repeating the entire series of clay calibration drops if one of the calibration drops showed a failure. If the clay passes either the first or second test, the clay is to be used in testing. If the clay fails both the first and the second series of drops, the clay is to then be placed back in conditioning and testers get a new block of clay. With respect to back-face deformation measurements, Army testers measured back-face deformation at the deepest point, rather than at the point of aim. Although the Army began to address problems relating to the clay calibration tests and back-face deformation measurements, Army testers still did not follow all established testing protocols in these areas. As a result, the Army may not have achieved the objective of First Article Testing—to determine if the designs tested met the minimum requirements for ballistic protection. First, the orally agreed-upon procedures used by Army testers to conduct the clay calibration tests were inconsistent with the established testing protocols. Second, with respect to back-face deformation measurements, Army testers rounded back-face deformation measurements to the nearest millimeter, a practice that was neither articulated in the testing protocols nor consistent with Preliminary Design Model testing. Third, also with respect to back-face deformation measurements, Army testers introduced a new, unproven measuring device. Although Army testers told us that they had orally agreed upon an informal set of procedures to determine when to repeat failed clay calibration tests, those procedures are inconsistent with the established testing protocols. The Army deviated from established testing protocols by using clay that had failed the calibration test as prescribed by the testing protocols. The testing protocols specify that a series of three pre-test drops of a weight on the clay must be within specified tolerances before the clay is used. However, in several instances, the Army repeated the calibration test on the same block of clay after it had initially failed until the results of a subsequent series of three drops were within the required specifications. Army officials told us that the testing protocols do not specify what procedures should be performed when the clay does not pass the first series of calibration drops, so Army officials stated they developed the procedure they followed internally prior to First Article Testing and provided oral guidance on those procedures to all test operators to ensure a consistent process. Officials we spoke with from the Army, private NIJ-certified laboratories, and industry had mixed opinions regarding the practice of re-testing failed clay, with some expressing concerns that performing a second series of calibration drops on clay that had failed might introduce risk that the clay may not be at the proper consistency for testing because as the clay rests it cools unevenly, which could affect the calibration. Aberdeen Test Center’s Test Operating Procedure states that clay should be conditioned so that the clay passes the clay calibration test, and Army officials, body armor testers from private laboratories, and body armor manufacturers we spoke to agreed that when clay fails the calibration test, this requires re-evaluation and sometimes adjustment of the clay calibration procedures used. After several clay blocks failed the clay calibration test on November 13, 2008, Army testers recognized that the clay conditioning process used was yielding clay that was not ideal and, as a result, Army testers adjusted their clay conditioning process by lowering the temperature at which the clay was stored. On that same day of testing, November 13, 2008, we observed heavy, cold rain falling on the clay blocks that were being transported to test lanes. These clay blocks had been conditioned that day in ovens located outside of the test ranges at temperatures above 100 degrees Fahrenheit to prepare them for testing, and then were transported outside uncovered on a cold November day through heavy rain on the way to the temperature- and humidity-controlled test lane. We observed an abnormally high level of clay blocks failing the clay calibration test and a significantly higher-than- normal level of failure rates for the plates tested on that day. The only significant variation in the test environment we observed that day was constant heavy rain throughout the day. Our analysis of test data also showed that 44 percent (4 of 9) of the first shots and 89 percent (8 of 9) of the second shots taken on November 13, 2008, resulted in failure penalties. On all of the other days of testing only 14 percent (10 of 74) of the first shots and 42 percent (31 of 74) of the second shots resulted in failure penalties. Both of these differences are statistically significant, and we believe the differences in the results may be attributable to the different test condition on that day. The established testing protocols require the use of a specific type of non-hardening oil-based clay. Body armor testers from NIJ-certified private laboratories, Army officials experienced in the testing of body armor, body armor manufacturers, and the clay manufacturer we spoke with said that the clay used for testing is a type of sculpting clay that naturally softens when heat is added and that getting water on the clay backing material could cause a chemical bonding change on the clay surface. Those we spoke with further stated that the cold water could additionally cause the outside of the clay to cool significantly more rapidly than the inside causing the top layer of clay to be harder than the middle. They suggested that clay be conditioned inside the test lanes and said that clay exposed to water or extreme temperature changes should not be used. Army Test and Evaluation Command officials we spoke with said that there is no prohibition in the testing protocols on allowing rain to fall onto the clay backing material and that its exposure to water would not impact testing. However, these officials were unable to provide data to validate their assertion that exposure to water would not affect the clay used during testing or the testing results. Army test officials also said that, since the conclusion of First Article Testing, Aberdeen Test Center has procured ovens to allow clay to be stored inside test lanes, rather than requiring that the clay be transported from another room where it would be exposed to environmental conditions, such as rain. With respect to the issue of the rounding of back-face deformation measurements, during First Article Testing Army testers did not award penalty points for shots with back-face deformations between 43.0 and 43.5 millimeters. This was because the Army decided to round back-face deformation measurements to the nearest millimeter—a practice that is inconsistent with the Army’s established testing protocols, which require that back-face deformation measurements in the clay backing not exceed 43 millimeters and that is inconsistent with procedures followed during Preliminary Design Model testing. Army officials said that a decision to round the measurements for First Article Testing was made to reflect testing for past Army contract solicitations and common industry practices of recording measurements to the nearest millimeter. While we did not validate this assertion that rounding was a common industry practice, one private industry ballistics testing facility said that its practice was to always round results up, not down, which has the same effect as not rounding at all. Army officials further stated that they should have also rounded Preliminary Design Model results but did not realize this until March 2008—several weeks into Preliminary Design Model testing—and wanted to maintain consistency throughout Preliminary Design Model testing. The Army’s decision to round measurement results had a significant outcome on testing because two designs that passed First Article Testing would have instead failed if the measurements had not been rounded. With respect to the introduction of a new device to measure back-face deformation, the Army began to use a laser scanner to measure back-face deformation without adequately certifying that the scanner could measure against the standard established when the digital caliper was used as the measuring instrument. Although Army Test and Evaluation Command certified the laser scanner as accurate for measuring back-face deformation, we observed the following certification issues: The laser was certified based on testing done in a controlled laboratory environment that is not similar to the actual conditions on the test lanes. For example, according to the manufacturer of the laser scanner, the scanner is operable in areas of vibration provided the area scanned and the scanning-arm are on the same plane or surface. This was not the case during testing, and thus it is possible the impact of the bullets fired may have thrown the scanner out of alignment or calibration. The certification is to a lower level of accuracy than required by the testing protocols. The certification study says that the laser is accurate to 0.2 millimeters; however, the testing protocols require an accuracy of 0.1 millimeters or better. Furthermore, the official letter from the Army Test and Evaluation Command certifying the laser for use incorrectly stated the laser meets an accuracy requirement of 1.0 millimeter rather than 0.1 millimeters as required by the protocols. Officials confirmed that this was not a typographical error. The laser certification was conducted before at least three major software upgrades were made to the laser, which according to Army officials may have significantly changed the accuracy of the laser. Because of the incorporation of the software upgrades, Army testers told us that they do not know the accuracy level of the laser as it was actually used in First Article Testing. In evaluating the use of the laser scanner, the Army did not compare the actual back-face deformation measurements taken by the laser with those taken by digital caliper, previously used during Preliminary Design Model testing and by NIJ-certified laboratories. According to vendor officials and Army subject matter experts, the limited data they had previously collected have shown that back-face deformation measurements taken by laser have generally been deeper by about 2 millimeters than those taken by digital caliper. Given those preliminary findings, there is a significant risk that measurements taken by the laser may represent a significant change in test requirements. Although Army testing officials acknowledged that they were unable to estimate the exact accuracy of the laser scanner as it was actually used during testing, they believed that based on the results of the certification study, it was suitable for measuring back-face deformation. These test officials further stated that they initially decided to use the laser because they did not believe it was possible to measure back-face deformations to the required level of accuracy using the digital caliper. However, officials from PEO Soldier and private NIJ-certified laboratories have told us that they believe the digital caliper method is capable of making these measurements with the required level of accuracy and have been using this technique successfully for several years. PEO Soldier officials also noted that the back-face deformation measurements in the testing protocols were developed using this digital caliper method. Army testing officials noted that the laser certification study confirmed their views that the laser method was more accurate than the digital caliper. However, because of the problems with the study that we have noted in this report, it is still unclear whether the laser is the most appropriate and accurate technique for measuring back-face deformation. Although we did not observe problems in the Army’s determination of penetration results during Preliminary Design Model testing, during First Article Testing we observed that the Army did not consistently follow its testing protocols in determining whether a shot was a partial or a complete penetration. Army testing protocols require that penalty points be awarded when any fragment of the armor material is imbedded or passes into the soft under garment used behind the plate; however, the Army did not score the penetration of small debris through a plate as a complete penetration of the plate in at least one case that we observed. In this instance, we observed small fragments from the armor three layers deep inside the Kevlar backing behind the plate. This shot should have resulted in the armor’s receiving 1.5 penalty points, which would have caused the design to fail First Article Testing. Army officials said that testers counted the shot as only a partial penetration of the plate because it was determined that fibers of the Kevlar backing placed behind the plate were not broken, which they stated was a requirement for the shot to be counted as a complete penetration of the plate. This determination was made with the agreement of an Army subject-matter expert from PEO- Soldier present on the lane. However, the requirement for broken fibers is inconsistent with the written testing protocols. Army officials acknowledged that the requirement for broken fibers was not described in the testing protocols or otherwise documented but said that Army testers discussed this before First Article Testing began. Figure 6 shows the tear in the fibers of the rear of the plate in question. Federal internal control standards require that federal agencies maintain effective controls over information processing to help ensure completeness, accuracy, authorization, and validity of all transactions. However, the Army did not consistently maintain adequate internal controls to ensure the integrity and reliability of its test data. For example, in one case bullet velocity data were lost because the lane Test Director accidentally pressed the delete button on the keyboard, requiring a test to be repeated. Additionally, we noticed that the software being used with the laser scanner to calculate back-face deformation measurements lacked effective edit controls, which could potentially allow critical variables to be inappropriately modified during testing. We further observed a few cases in which testers attempted to memorize test data for periods of time, rather than writing that data down immediately. In at least one case, this practice resulted in the wrong data being reported and entered into the test records. According to Army officials, decisions to implement those procedures that deviated from testing protocols were reviewed and approved by appropriate officials. However, these decisions were not formally documented, the testing protocols were not modified to reflect the changes, and vendors were not informed of the procedures. At the beginning of testing, the Director of Testing said that any change to the testing protocols has to be approved by several Army components; however, the Army was unable to produce any written documentation indicating approval of the deviations we observed by those components. With respect to internal control issues, Army officials acknowledged that before our review they were unaware of the specific internal control problems we identified. We noted during our review that in industry, as part of the NIJ certification process, an external peer review process is used to evaluate testing processes and procedures of ballistics testing facilities to ensure that effective internal controls are in place. However, we found that the Aberdeen Test Center has conducted no such reviews, a contributing factor to the Army’s lack of unawareness of the control problems we noted. As a result of the deviations from testing protocols that we observed, three of the five designs that passed First Article Testing would not have passed under the existing testing protocols. Furthermore, one of the remaining two designs that passed First Article Testing was a design that would have failed Preliminary Design Model testing if back-face deformation was measured in accordance with the established protocols for that test. Thus, four of the five designs that passed First Article Testing and were certified by the Army as ready for full production would have instead failed testing at some point during the process, either during the initial Preliminary Design Model testing or the subsequent First Article testing, if all the established testing protocols had been followed. As a result, the overall reliability and repeatability of the test results are uncertain. However, because ballistics experts from the Army or elsewhere have not assessed the impact of the deviations from the testing protocols we observed during First Article Testing, it is not certain whether the effect of these deviations is sufficient to call into question the ability of the armor to meet mission requirements. Although it is certain that some armor passed testing that would not have if specific testing protocols had been followed, it is unclear if there are additional factors that would mean the armor still meets the required performance specifications. For example, the fact that the laser scanner used to measure back-face deformation may not be as accurate as what the protocol requires may offset the effects of rounding down back-face deformations. Likewise, it is possible that some of the deviations that did not on their own have a visible effect on testing results could, when taken together with other deviations, have a combined effect that is greater. In our opinion, given the significant deviations in the testing protocols, independent ballistics testing expertise would be required to determine whether or not the body armor designs procured under this solicitation provide the required level of protection. The Army has ordered 2,500 sets of plates (at two plates per set) from those vendors whose designs passed First Article Testing to be used for additional ballistics testing and 120,000 sets of plates to be put into inventory to address future requirements. However, to date, none of these designs have been fielded because, according to Army officials, there are adequate quantities of armor plates produced under prior contracts already in the inventory to meet current requirements. Body armor plays a critical role in protecting our troops, and the testing inconsistencies we identified call into question the quality and effectiveness of testing performed at Aberdeen Test Center. Because we observed several instances in which actual test practices deviated from the established testing protocols, it is questionable whether the Army met its First Article Testing objectives of ensuring that armor designs fully met Army’s requirements before the armor is purchased and used in the field. While it is possible that the testing protocol deviations had no significant net effect or may have even resulted in armor being tested to a more rigorous standard, it is also possible that some deviations may have resulted in armor being evaluated against a less stringent standard than required. We were unable to determine the full effects of these deviations as they relate to the quality of the armor designs and believe such a determination should only be made based on a thorough assessment of the testing data by independent ballistics testing experts. In light of such uncertainty and the critical need for confidence in the equipment by the soldiers, the Army would take an unacceptable risk if it were to field these designs without taking additional steps to gain the needed confidence that the armor will perform as required. The Army is now moving forward with plans to conduct all future body armor testing at Aberdeen Test Center. Therefore, it is essential that the transparency and consistency of its program be improved by ensuring that all test practices fully align with established testing protocols and that any modifications in test procedures be fully reviewed and approved by the appropriate officials, with supporting documentation, and that the testing protocols be formally changed to reflect the revised or actual procedures. Additionally, it is imperative that all instrumentation, such as the laser scanner, used for testing be fully evaluated and certified to ensure its accuracy and applicability to body armor testing. Furthermore, it is essential that effective internal controls over data and testing processes be in place. The body armor industry has adopted the practice, through the NIJ certification program, of using external peer reviews to evaluate and improve private laboratories’ test procedures and controls. This type of independent peer review could be equally beneficial to the Aberdeen Test Center. Without all of these steps, there will continue to be uncertainty with regard to whether future testing data are repeatable and reliable and can be used to accurately evaluate body armor designs. Until Aberdeen Test Center has effectively honed its testing practices to eliminate the types of inconsistencies we observed, concerns will remain regarding the rigor of testing conducted at that facility. To determine what effect, if any, the problems we observed had on the test data and on the outcomes of First Article Testing, we recommend the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to provide for an independent evaluation of the First Article Testing results by ballistics and statistical experts external to DOD before any armor is fielded to soldiers under this contract solicitation and that the Army report the results of that assessment to the office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation and the Congress. In performing this evaluation, the independent experts should specifically evaluate the effects of the following practices observed during First Article Testing: the rounding of back-face deformation measurements; not scoring penetrations of material through the plate as a complete penetration unless broken fibers are observed in the Kevlar backing behind each plate; the use of the laser scanner to measure back-face deformations without a full evaluation of its accuracy as it was actually used during testing, to include the use of the software modifications and operation under actual test conditions; the exposure of the clay backing material to rain and other outside environmental conditions as well as the effect of high oven temperatures during storage and conditioning; and the use of an additional series of clay calibration drops when the first series of clay calibration drops does not pass required specifications. To better align actual test practices with established testing protocols during future body armor testing, we recommend that the Secretary of the Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to document all key decisions made to clarify or change the testing protocols. With respect to the specific inconsistencies we identified between the test practices and testing protocols, we recommend that the Secretary of the Army, based on the results of the independent expert review of the First Article Test results, take the following actions: Determine whether those practices that deviated from established testing protocols during First Article Testing will be continued during future testing and change the established testing protocols to reflect those revised practices. Evaluate and re-certify the accuracy of the laser scanner to the correct standard with all software modifications incorporated and include in this analysis a side-by-side comparison of the laser measurements of the actual back-face deformations with those taken by digital caliper to determine whether laser measurements can meet the standard of the testing protocols. To improve internal controls over the integrity and reliability of test data for future testing as well as provide for consistent test conditions and comparable data between tests, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to provide for an independent peer review of Aberdeen Test Center’s body armor testing protocols, facilities, and instrumentation to ensure that proper internal controls and sound management practices are in place. This peer review should be performed by testing experts external to the Army and DOD. DOD did not concur with our recommendation for an independent evaluation of First Article Testing results and accordingly plans to take no action to provide such an assessment. DOD asserted that the issues we identified do not alter the effects of testing. However, based on our analysis and findings there is sufficient evidence to raise questions as to whether the issues we identified had an impact on testing results. As a result, we continue to believe it is necessary to have an independent external expert review these test results and the overall effect of the testing deviations we observed on those results before any armor is fielded to military personnel. Without such an independent review, the First Article Test results remain questionable, undermining the confidence of the public and those who might rely on the armor for protection. Consequently, Congress should consider directing the Office of the Secretary of Defense to either require that an independent external review of these body armor test results be conducted or that DOD officially amend its testing protocols to reflect any revised test procedures and repeat First Article Testing to ensure that only properly tested designs are fielded. In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD takes the position that our findings had no significant impact on the test results and on the subsequent contracting actions taken by the Army. DOD also does not concur with what it perceives as our two overarching conclusions: (1) that Preliminary Design Model testing did not achieve its intended objective of determining, as a basis for contract awards, which designs met performance requirements and (2) that First Article Testing may not have met its objective of determining whether each of the contracted plate designs met performance requirements. DOD commented that it recognizes the importance of personal protection equipment such as body armor and provided several examples of actions DOD and the Army have taken to improve body armor testing. DOD generally concurred with our findings that there were deviations from the testing protocols during Preliminary Design Model testing and First Article Testing. We agree that DOD has taken positive steps to improve its body armor testing program and to address concerns raised by Congress and others. DOD also concurred with our second recommendation to document all key decisions made to clarify or change the testing protocols. DOD did not concur with our first recommendation that an independent evaluation of First Article Testing results be performed by independent ballistics and statistical experts before any of the armor is fielded to soldiers under contracts awarded under this solicitation. Similarly, DOD did not agree with our conclusions that Preliminary Design Model testing did not meet its intended objectives and that First Article Testing may not have met its intended objectives. In supporting its position, DOD cited, for example, that rounding back-face deformation measurements during First Article Testing was an acceptable test practice because rounding is a practice that has been used historically. It was the intent of PEO Soldier to round back- face deformations for all testing associated with this solicitation, and the Integrated Product Team decided collectively to round back-face deformations during First Article Testing. However, as stated in our report and acknowledged by DOD, the rounding down of back-face deformations was not spelled out or provided for by any of the testing protocol documents. Additionally, it created an inconsistency between Preliminary Design Model testing, where back-face deformations were not rounded down and in First Article Testing, where back-face deformations were rounded down. Of greatest consequence, rounding down back-face deformations lowered the requirements that solutions had to meet to pass testing. Two solutions passed First Article Testing because back-face deformations were rounded down, meaning that the Army may be taking unacceptable risk if plates are fielded without an additional, independent assessment by experts. DOD also did not agree with our finding that a penetration of a plate was improperly scored. DOD did agree that figure 6, which shows the tear in the Kevlar fibers of the rear of the plate in question, appears to show evidence of a perforation and that an Aberdeen Test Center ballistics subject matter expert found particles in the soft backing material behind the plate. Nevertheless, DOD did not concur with our finding because it asserted that no threads were broken on the first layer of Kevlar. However, as we stated in the report, the protocols define a complete penetration as having occurred when the projectile, fragment of the projectile, or fragment of the armor material is imbedded or passes into the soft under garment used behind the protective inserts plates, not when threads of the Kevlar are broken. The fragments found by the Aberdeen Test Center subject matter expert, as well as the three frayed, tattered, and separated Kevlar layers that we and Army testers observed, confirm our observations during testing. DOD also stated that the first layer of soft armor behind the plate under test serves as a witness plate during testing and if that first layer of soft armor is not penetrated, as determined by the breaking of threads on that first layer of soft armor, the test shot is not scored as a complete penetration in accordance with the PEO Soldier’s scoring criteria. We disagree with DOD’s position because the protocols do not require the use of a “witness plate” during testing to determine if a penetration occurred. If this shot would have been ruled a complete penetration rather than a partial penetration, this design would have accrued additional point deductions causing it to fail First Article Testing. DOD did not agree that the certification of the laser scanner was inadequate and made several statements in defense of both the laser and its certification. Among these is the fact that the laser removes the human factor of subjectively trying to find the deepest point, potentially pushing the caliper into the clay, and removing the need to use correction factors, all of which we agree may be positive things. However, we maintain that the certification of the laser was not adequately performed. As indicated in the certification letter, the laser was certified to a standard that did not meet the requirement of the testing protocols. Additionally, DOD stated that software modifications added to the laser after certification did not affect measurements; however, Army testers told us on multiple occasions that the modifications were designed to change the measurements reported by the laser. DOD added that the scanner does not artificially overstate back-face deformations and relies on the verified accuracy of the scanner and the study involving the scanning of clay replicas to support its claim. Based on our observations, the scanner was certified to the wrong standard and the certification study was not performed in the actual test environment using actual shots. DOD asserts that the scanner does not overstate back-face deformations and that it does not establish a new requirement. However, DOD cannot properly validate these assertions without a side-by-side comparison of the laser scanner and the digital caliper in their operational environment. Given the numerous issues regarding the laser and its certification, we maintain that its effect on First Article Testing should be examined by an external ballistics expert. DOD also stated that it did not agree with our finding that exposure of the clay backing to heavy rain on one day may have affected test results. DOD challenged our statistical analysis and offered its own statistical analysis as evidence that it was the poor designs themselves that caused unusual test results that day. We stand by our analysis, in combination with statements made by DOD and non-DOD officials with testing expertise and by the clay manufacturer, that exposure of the clay to constant, heavy cold rain may have had an effect on test results. Further, in analyzing the Army’s statistical analysis presented in DOD’s comments, we did not find this information to demonstrate that the designs were the factor in unusual test results that day or that the rain exposure could not have had an effect on the results. More detailed discussions of the Army’s analysis and our conclusions are provided in comments 13 and 24 of appendix II. DOD partially disagreed that the use of an additional series of clay calibration drops when the first series of drops were outside specifications did not meet First Article Test requirements and added that all clay used in testing passed the clay calibration in effect at the time. However, we witnessed several clay calibration drops that were not within specifications. These failed clay boxes were repaired, re-dropped, and either used if they passed the subsequent drop calibration series or discarded if they failed. The protocols only allow for one series of drops per clay box, which is the methodology that Army testers should have followed. DOD stated that NIJ standards do permit the repeating of failed calibration drops. However, our review of the NIJ standards reveals that there is no provision that allows repeat calibration drops. DOD states in its comments that NIJ standards are inappropriate for its test facilities, stating that these standards are insufficient for the U.S. Army given the expanded testing required to ensure body armor meets U.S. Army requirements. NIJ standards were not the subject of our review, but rather Aberdeen Test Center’s application of the Army’s current solicitation’s protocols during testing. Further, DOD acknowledged in its comments that National Institute of Standards and Technology officials recommended only one series of drops for clay calibration. However, DOD stated that it will partner with the National Institute of Standards and Technology to study procedures for clay calibration, to include repeated calibration attempts, and document any appropriate procedural changes, which we agree is a good step. Based on our analyses as described in our report and in our above responses to DOD’s comments, we believe there is sufficient evidence to raise questions as to whether the issues we identified had an impact on testing results. As a result, we continue to believe that it is necessary that DOD allow an independent external expert to review these test results and the overall effect of DOD’s deviations on those results before any armor is fielded to military personnel. Without such an independent review, it is our opinion that the First Article Testing results will remain questionable. Consequently, we have added a matter for congressional consideration to our report suggesting that Congress consider either directing DOD to require that an independent external review of these body armor test results be conducted or require that DOD officially amend its testing protocols to reflect any revised test procedures and repeat First Article Testing to ensure properly tested designs. DOD partially concurred with our third recommendation to determine whether those procedures that deviated from established testing protocols during First Article Testing should be continued during future testing and to change the established testing protocols to reflect those revised procedures. DOD recognized the need to update testing protocols and added that when the office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation promulgates standard testing protocols across DOD, these standards will address issues that we identified. As long as DOD specifically addresses all the inconsistencies and deviations that we observed prior to any future body armor testing, this would satisfy our recommendation. DOD stated that it partially concurs with our fourth recommendation to evaluate and recertify the accuracy of the laser scanner to the correct standard with all software modifications incorporated, based on the results of the independent expert review of the First Article Testing results. We also recommended that this process include a side-by-side comparison of the laser’s measurement of back-face deformations and those taken by digital caliper. DOD concurred with the concept of an independent evaluation, but it did not concur that one is needed in this situation because according to DOD its laser certification was sufficient. We disagree that the laser certification was performed correctly. As discussed in the body of our report and further in appendix II, recertification of the laser is critical because (1) the laser was certified to the wrong standard, (2) software modifications were added after the certification of the laser, and (3) these modifications did change the way the laser scanner measured back-face deformations. DOD did not explicitly state whether it concurred with our recommendation for a side- by-side comparison of the laser scanner and the digital caliper in their operational environment. We assert that such a study is important because without it the Army and DOD do not know the effect the laser scanner may have on the back-face deformation standard that has been used for many years and was established with the intention of being measured with a digital caliper. If the comparison reveals a significant difference between the laser scanner and the digital caliper, DOD and the Army may need to revisit the back-face deformation standard of its requirements with the input of industry experts and the medical community. DOD generally concurred with our fifth recommendation to conduct an independent evaluation of the Aberdeen Test Center’s testing protocols, facilities, and instrumentation and stated that such an evaluation would be performed by a team of subject matter experts that included both DOD and non-DOD members. We agree that in principal this approach meets the intent of our recommendation as long as the DOD members of the evaluation team are independent and not made up of personnel from those organizations involved in the body armor testing such as office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, the Army Test and Evaluation Command, or PEO Soldier. DOD’s comments and our specific responses to them are provided in appendix II. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of the Army. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff has any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix III. Our review of body armor testing focused on testing conducted by the Army in response to specific concerns raised by the House and Senate Armed Services Committees and multiple members of Congress. During our review, we were present during two rounds of testing of body armor designs that were submitted in response to a May 2007-February 2008 Army contract solicitation. The first round of testing, called Preliminary Design Model testing, was conducted from February 2008 through June 2008 with the objective of determining whether designs submitted under the contract solicitation met the required ballistic performance specifications and were eligible for contract award. The second round of testing, called First Article Testing, was conducted between November 2008 and December 2008 on the body armor designs that passed the Preliminary Design Model testing. Both tests were conducted at Aberdeen Proving Grounds in Aberdeen, Md., and were performed by Aberdeen Test Center. During the course of our review, we observed how the Army conducted its body armor testing and compared our observations with the established body armor testing protocols. We did not verify the accuracy of the Army’s test data and did not provide an expert evaluation of the results of testing. To understand the practices the Army used and the established testing protocols we were comparing the practices with, we met with and/or obtained data from officials from the Department of Defense (DOD) organizations and the industry experts listed in table 1: To determine the degree to which the Army followed established testing protocols during the Preliminary Design Model testing of body armor designs, we were present and made observations during the entire period of testing, compared our observations with established testing protocols, and interviewed numerous DOD and other experts about body armor testing. We observed Army testers as they determined whether designs met the physical and ballistics specifications described in the contract solicitation, and as encouraged by Aberdeen Test Center officials, we observed the ballistics testing from inside a viewing room equipped with video and audio connections to the firing lanes. We also were present and observed the physical characterization of the test items and visited the environmental conditioning chambers, the weathering chamber, and the X- ray facility. We were at Aberdeen Test Center when the designs were delivered for testing on February 7, 2008, and were on-site every day of physical characterization, which comprises the steps performed to determine whether each design meets the required weight and measurement specifications. We systematically recorded our observations of physical characterization on a structured, paper data-collection instrument that we developed after consulting with technical experts from Program Executive Office (PEO) Soldier before testing started. We were also present for every day except one of the ballistics testing, observing and collecting data on approximately 80 percent of the tests from a video viewing room that was equipped with an audio connection to each of the three firing lanes. To gather data from the day that we were not present to observe ballistic testing, we viewed that day’s testing on video playback. We systematically recorded our observations of ballistics testing using a structured, electronic data-collection instrument that we developed to record relevant ballistic test data—such as the shot velocity, penetration results, and the amount of force absorbed (called “back-face deformation”) by the design tested. Following testing, we supplemented the information we recorded on our data collection instrument with some of the Army’s official test data and photos from its Vision Digital Library System. We developed the data collection instrument used to collect ballistics testing data by consulting with technical experts from Program Executive Office Soldier and attending a testing demonstration at Aberdeen Test Center before Preliminary Design Model testing began. After capturing the Preliminary Design Model testing data in our data collection instruments, we compared our observations of the way the Aberdeen Test Center conducted testing with the testing protocols that Army officials told us served as the testing standards at the Aberdeen Test Center. According to these officials, these testing protocols comprised the (1) test procedures described in the contract solicitation announcement’s purchase descriptions and (2) Army’s detailed test plans and Test Operating Procedure that serve as guidance to the Aberdeen Test Center testers and that were developed by the Army Test and Evaluation Command and approved by Program Executive Office Soldier, the office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, the Army Research Labs, and cognizant Army components. We also reviewed National Institute of Justice testing standards because Aberdeen Test Center officials told us that, although Aberdeen Test Center is not a National Institute of Justice-certified testing facility, they have made adjustments to their procedures based on those standards and consider them when evaluating Aberdeen Test Center’s test practices. Regarding the edge shot locations for the impact test samples, we first measured the area of intended impact on an undisturbed portion of the test item on all 56 test samples after the samples had already been shot. The next day we had Aberdeen Test Center testers measure the area of intended impact on a random sample of the impact test samples to confirm our measurements. Throughout testing we maintained a written observation log and compiled all of our ballistic test data into a master spreadsheet. Before, during, and after testing, we interviewed representatives from numerous Army entities—including the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; Aberdeen Test Center; Developmental Test Command; Army Research Laboratories; and Program Executive Office Soldier—and also attended Integrated Product Team meetings. To determine the degree to which the Army followed established testing protocols during First Article Testing of the body armor designs that passed Preliminary Design Model testing, we were present and made observations during the entire period of testing, compared our observations with established testing protocols, and interviewed numerous DOD and industry experts about body armor testing. As during Preliminary Design Model testing, we observed Army testers as they determined whether designs met the physical and ballistics specifications described in the contract solicitation. However, different from our review of Preliminary Design Model testing, we had access to the firing lanes during ballistic testing. We also still had access to the video viewing room used during Preliminary Design Model testing, so we used a bifurcated approach of observing testing from both the firing lanes and the video viewing room. We were present for every day except one of First Article Testing—from the first day of ballistics testing on November 11, 2008, until the final shot was fired on December 17, 2008. We noted the weights and measures of plates during physical characterization on the same data collection instrument that we used during Preliminary Design Model testing. For the ballistics tests, we revised our Preliminary Design Model testing data collection instrument so that we could capture data while in the firing lane—data that we were unable to confirm first hand during Preliminary Design Model testing. For example, we observed the pre-shot measurements of shot locations on the plates and the Aberdeen Test Center’s method for recording data and tracking the chain of custody of the plates; we also recorded the depth of the clay calibration drops (the series of pre-test drops of a weight on clay that is to be placed behind the plates during the shots), the temperature of the clay, the temperature and humidity of the firing lane, the temperatures in the fluid soak conditioning trailer, and the time it took to perform tests. We continued to record all of the relevant data that we had recorded during Preliminary Design Model testing, such as the plate number, type of ballistic subtest, the charge weight of the shot, the shot velocity, the penetration results, and the back- face deformation. Regarding the new laser arm that Aberdeen Test Center acquired to measure back-face deformation during First Article Testing, we attended a demonstration of the arm’s functionality performed by Aberdeen Test Center and also acquired documents related to the laser arm’s certification by Army Test, Measurement, and Diagnostic Equipment activity. With a GAO senior methodologist and a senior technologist, we made observations related to Aberdeen Test Center’s methods of handling and repairing clay, calibrating the laser guide used to ensure accurate shots, and measuring back-face deformation. Throughout testing we maintained a written observation log and compiled all of our ballistic test data into a master spreadsheet. Following testing, we supplemented the information we recorded on our data collection instrument with some of the Army’s official test data and photos from its Vision Digital Library System to complete our records of the testing. After capturing the testing data in our data collection instruments, we compared our observations of the way Aberdeen Test Center conducted testing with the testing protocols that Army officials told us served as the testing standards at the Aberdeen Test Center. In analyzing the potential impact of independent variables on testing, such as the potential impact of the November 13th rain on the clay, we conducted statistical tests including chi-square and Fisher’s Exact Test methods to accommodate small sample sizes. Before, during, and after testing, we interviewed representatives from numerous Army agencies, including Aberdeen Test Center, Developmental Test Command, Army Research Laboratories, and Program Executive Office Soldier. We also spoke with vendor representatives who were present and observing the First Article Testing, as well as with Army and industry subject matter experts. We conducted this performance audit from July 2007 through October 2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 1. The Department of Defense (DOD) stated that undertakings of this magnitude are not without flaws and that what was most important was fielding body armor plates that defeated the threat. While DOD may have identified some flaws that may not be serious enough to call the testing results into question, several of the deviations to the testing protocols that we observed do call the testing results into question for the reasons stated in our report. An independent expert has not evaluated the impact of these deviations on the test results and, until such a study is conducted, DOD cannot be assured that the plates that passed testing can defeat the threat. DOD also noted several actions DOD and the Army have taken to improve procedures associated with body armor testing. Our responses to these actions are included in comments 2 through 6. 2. The office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation’s efforts to respond to members of the Armed Services Committees and to address issues raised by the Department of Defense Inspector General were outside the scope of our audit. Therefore, we did not validate the implementation of the actions DOD cited or evaluate their effectiveness in improving test procedures. With regard to the office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation’s establishing a policy to conduct First Article Testing at government facilities, using a government facility to conduct testing may not necessarily produce improved test results. 3. Regarding the office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation’s oversight of testing, the office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation led the Integrated Product Team and approved the test plans. However, while we were present at the Aberdeen Test Center during Preliminary Design Model testing and First Article Testing, we did not observe on-site monitoring of the testing by the office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation staff beyond incidental visits during VIP events and other demonstrations. 4. Regarding the procedures and policies DOD stated were implemented by the Army Test and Evaluation Command to improve testing: Only two of the test ranges were completed prior to Preliminary Design Model testing. Two additional test ranges were completed after Preliminary Design Model testing. Regarding the certification of the laser scanner measurement device, as noted in our report, the Army had not adequately certified that it was an appropriate tool for body armor testing (see our comment 12). The Army’s Test Operating Procedure was not completed or implemented until after Preliminary Design Model testing. New clay conditioning chambers inside each test range were not constructed until after all testing was completed (see our comment 13). The improved velocity measurement accuracy study was not conducted until after all testing was completed. Regarding the implementation of electronic data collection and processing for body armor testing, as stated in our report, we observed that not all data are electronically collected. Many types of data are manually collected and are later converted to electronic data storage. 5. Regarding Program Executive Office (PEO) Soldier’s efforts to improve the acquisition of personal protection equipment: The contract solicitation allowed all prospective body armor manufacturers to compete for new contracts. We observed that PEO Soldier did transfer expertise and experience to support Army Acquisition Executive direction that all First Article Testing and lot-acceptance testing be conducted by the Army Test and Evaluation Command. The task force that focused on soldier protection was not initiated until February 2009, after all Preliminary Design Model testing and First Article Testing was completed. According to Army officials, PEO Soldier instituted a non-destructive test capability that became operational after Preliminary Design Model testing, but prior to First Article Testing. PEO Soldier’s personal protection evaluation process was described in our previous report—GAO-07-662R. Although we recognized the strength of PEO Soldier’s personal protection evaluation process in our earlier report, not all the protections that were in place at that time remain in place. For example, the requirement that testing be conducted at a National Institute of Justice (NIJ)-certified facility was waived. 6. DOD stated that many of the actions by Army Test and Evaluation Command and PEO Soldier were initiated and improved upon during the course of our review. However, as discussed above, several of these actions were initiated before and during testing, but many of them were not completed until after testing was completed. 7. DOD and the Army stated that Preliminary Design Model testing had achieved its objective to identify those vendor designs that met the performance objectives stated in PEO Soldier’s purchase description and that “it is incorrect to state that ‘at least two’ of the preliminary design models should have failed as they passed in accordance with the modified solicitation.” We disagree with these statements. As stated in our report, the most consequential of the deviations from testing protocols we observed involved the measurement of back-face deformation, which did affect final test results. According to original testing protocols, back-face deformation was to be measured at the deepest point of the depression in the clay backing. This measure indicates the most force that the armor will allow to be exerted on an individual struck by a bullet. According to Army officials, the deeper the back-face deformation measured in the clay backing, the higher the risk of internal injury or death. DOD and the Army now claim that these solutions passed in accordance with the modified solicitation, which overlooks the fact that the reason the solicitation had to be modified was that Army testers deviated from the testing protocols laid out in the purchase descriptions and did not measure back-face deformation at the deepest point. DOD and the Army also stated in their response that they decided to use the point of aim because they determined it was an accurate and repeatable process. Yet in DOD’s detailed comments regarding edge shot locations, DOD acknowledged that there were “potential variances between the actual aim point and impact point during testing.” Army Research Laboratory and NIJ-certified laboratories use the benchmark process of measuring back-face deformation at the deepest point, not at the point of aim. As set forth in our report, at least two solutions passed Preliminary Design Model testing that would have failed if back-face deformation had been measured to the deepest point. This statement came directly from Aberdeen Test Center officials during a meeting in July 2008, where they specifically told us which two solutions would have failed. We said “at least” two because Army testers did not record deepest point back-face deformation data for the first 30 percent of testing, and therefore there could be more solutions that would have failed had the deepest point been measured during this first portion of the test. Because the Army did not measure back-face deformation to the deepest point, it could not identify whether these two solutions in particular and all the solutions in general met performance requirements. As a result, Army could not waive First Article Testing for successful candidates and was forced to repeat the test to ensure that all solutions did indeed meet requirements. By repeating testing, the Army incurred additional expense and further delays in fielding armor from this solicitation to the soldiers. During the course of our audit, the Army also acknowledged that the Preliminary Design Model testing did not meet its objective because First Article Testing could not be waived without incurring risk to the soldiers. DOD and the Army stated that, upon discovery of the back-face deformation deviation from the testing protocols described in the purchase descriptions, the Army stopped testing. The Army’s Contracting Office was informed of this deviation through a series of questions posed by a vendor who was present at the Vendor Demonstration Day on February 20, 2008. This vendor sent questions to the Contracting Office on February 27 asking whether testers were measuring at the aim point or at the deepest point. This vendor also raised questions about how damage to the soft pack would be recorded and about the location of edge shots. Based on our observations, all of these questions involved issues where Army testers deviated from testing protocols and are discussed in our responses to subsequent comments. The Army did not respond until March 19 and replied that its test procedures complied with solicitation requirements. It was not until Army leadership learned of the vendor’s questions and of the deviation in measuring back-face deformation that testing was finally halted on March 27, a full month after the issue came to the Army Test and Evaluation Command’s attention. 8. DOD stated that in 2007, prior to the initiation of Preliminary Design Model testing, the Army Test and Evaluation Command, the office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, and Army leadership all agreed that First Article Testing would be conducted as part of the Army’s body armor testing. However, DOD did not provide any documentation dated prior to April 2008—that is, prior to the discovery of the back-face deformation deviation—that suggested that DOD intended to conduct First Article Testing following Preliminary Design Model testing. In July 2008, the Army Test and Evaluation Command and PEO Soldier stated in official written responses to our questions regarding Preliminary Design Model testing that the conduct of First Article Testing became essential following Preliminary Design Model testing because of the Army’s measuring back- face deformation at the point of aim as opposed to at the deepest point of deformation. In fact, because of this deviation, DOD could not waive First Article Testing as originally planned and was forced to conduct subsequent tests to verify that the designs that had passed Preliminary Design Model testing met testing requirements. DOD asserted that a multi- phase concept including Preliminary Design Model testing, First Article Testing, and extended ballistic testing to support the development of an improved test standard was briefed to a congressional member and professional staff on November 14, 2007. We were present at this November 14 test overview and strategy/schedule briefing and noted that it did not include plans for First Article Testing to be performed in addition to Preliminary Design Model testing. Excerpts from the slides briefed that day showed Preliminary Design Model (Phase 1) testing and a subsequent ballistic and suitability testing (Phase 2). As indicated in the slides (see fig. 7 and fig. 8) from that November 14 briefing, the Phase 2 test was designed to test the form, fit, and function of those solutions that had passed Preliminary Design Model testing as well as the ballistic statistical confidence tests. According to information we obtained, Phase 2 was never intended to be First Article Testing and was to have no impact on whether or not a solution received a contract. It was not until after the back-face deformation deviation was discovered that briefing slides and other documentation on test plans and schedules started describing First Article Testing as following Preliminary Design Model testing. For example, as stated by DOD in its comments, the October 2008 briefing to a congressional member and professional staff clearly showed First Article Testing as following Preliminary Design Model testing (Phase 1) and preceding Phase 2. Therefore, it is not clear why DOD’s test plan briefings would make no mention of a First Article Testing prior to the back-face deformation measurement deviation while including First Article Testing in subsequent briefings if the plan had always been to conduct both Preliminary Design Model testing and First Article Testing. Furthermore, it is not clear why DOD would intentionally plan at the start of testing to repeat Preliminary Design Model testing (which was supposed to be performed in accordance with the First Article Testing protocol) with an identical test (First Article Testing) given that it has been the Army’s practice to use such Preliminary Design Model testing to meet First Article Testing requirements – a practice that was also supported by the DOD Inspector General and the Army Acquisition Executive after an audit of the Army’s body armor testing program. DOD also stated that First Article Testing waivers were not permitted under the body armor solicitation. However, the solicitation and its amendments are unclear as to whether waivers of First Article Testing would be permitted. Nonetheless, in written answers to questions we posed to the Army in July 2008, the Army Test and Evaluation Command and PEO Soldier in a combined response stated that due to the fact that back-face deformation was not measured to the deepest point of penetration during Phase I tests, there would be no waivers of First Article Testing after the contract award. DOD also stated that it and the Army concluded that First Article Testing had achieved its objective of verifying that contracted vendors could produce, in a full-rate capacity, plates that had passed Preliminary Design Model testing. DOD further stated that it is incorrect to say that First Article Testing did not meet its objective and it is incorrect to assert that three of five vendor designs should have failed First Article Testing. However, our analysis showed that two solutions that passed First Article Testing would have failed if back-face deformations had not been rounded and had been scored as they were during Preliminary Design Model testing. The third solution that passed would have failed if Army testers had correctly scored a shot result as a complete penetration in accordance with the definition of a complete penetration in the purchase description, rather than as a partial penetration. Because questions surround these scoring methods and because DOD and the Army cannot confidently identify whether these vendors can mass produce acceptable plates, we restate that First Article Testing may not have achieved its objective. See comments 12, 10, and 11 regarding DOD’s statements about the certification of the laser scanning equipment, the rounding of back-face deformations, and the Aberdeen Test Center’s scoring procedures, respectively. We agree with DOD that an open dialog with the DOD Inspector General, external test and technology experts, and us will improve the current body armor testing. However, we disagree with DOD’s statement that NIJ- certified laboratories lack expertise to provide reliable information on body armor testing issues. Before the current solicitation, the Army relied on these NIJ-certified laboratories for all body armor source selection and lot acceptance tests. The Marine Corps also conducts source selection tests at these facilities. As these independent laboratories have performed numerous tests for the Army conducted in accordance with First Article Testing protocol, we assert that the credentials of these laboratories warrant consideration of their opinions on body armor testing matters. 9. DOD did not concur with our recommendation for an independent evaluation of First Article Testing results before any armor is fielded to soldiers because the First Article Testing achieved its objectives. We disagree with DOD’s position that First Article Testing and Preliminary Design Model testing achieved their objectives because we found numerous deviations from testing protocols that allowed solutions to pass testing that otherwise would have failed. Due to these deviations, the majority of which seem to make the testing easier to pass and favor the vendors, we continue to believe that it is necessary to have an independent external expert review the results of First Article Testing and the overall effect of DOD’s deviations on those results before the plates are fielded. An independent observer, external to DOD, is best suited to determine the overall impact of DOD’s many deviations during the testing associated with this solicitation. Consequently, we have added a matter for Congress to consider directing DOD to either conduct this external review or direct that DOD officially amend its testing protocols to reflect any revised test procedures and repeat First Article Testing. 10. DOD did not concur with our recommendation that the practice of rounding down back-face deformations should be reviewed by external experts because the practice has been used historically by NIJ-certified laboratories. Although DOD acknowledged that the practice of rounding is not adequately described in the testing protocols, it stated that rounding is permitted under American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) E-29. The purchase descriptions (attachments 01 and 02 of the solicitation) referenced five ASTM documents, but ASTM E-29 is not referenced and therefore is not part of the protocol. The detailed test plans state that solutions shall incur a penalty on deformations greater than 43 millimeters, and the Army is correct that neither the purchase description nor the detailed test plans provide for rounding. During Preliminary Design Model testing, Army testers measured back-face deformations to the hundredths place and did not round. Any deformation between 43.00 and 43.50 received a penalty. During First Article Testing, deformations in this range were rounded down and did not incur a penalty, so the decision to round effectively changed the standard in favor of the vendors. Two solutions passed First Article Testing that would have failed if back-face deformations had been scored without rounding as they were during Preliminary Design Model testing. We recognize that there are other factors, such as the fact that the new laser scanner may overstate back- face deformations that might justify the decision to round down back-face deformations. However, as a stand-alone event, rounding down deformations did change the standard in the middle of the solicitation between Preliminary Design Model testing and First Article Testing. That is why it is important for an independent external expert to review the totality of the test and the Army’s deviations from testing protocols to determine the actual effect of this and other deviations. 11. Regarding the incorrect scoring of a complete penetration as a partial penetration, DOD stated that the first layer of soft armor behind the plate serves as a witness plate during testing. If that first layer of soft armor is not penetrated, as determined by the breaking of threads on that first layer of soft armor, the test shot is not scored as a complete penetration in accordance with the PEO Soldier’s scoring criteria. However, DOD’s position is not consistent with the established testing protocols as evidenced by the following: (1) We did not observe the use of and the testing protocols do not require the use of a witness plate during testing to determine if a penetration occurred; and (2) The testing protocols do not state that “the breaking of threads” is the criterion for determining a penetration. The language of the testing protocols, not undocumented criteria, should be used in scoring and determining penetration results. The criteria for scoring a penetration are found in the current solicitation’s protocols. Paragraph 6.6, of each of the purchase descriptions state, under “Definitions: Complete Penetration (CP) for Acceptance Testing-- Complete penetrations have occurred when the projectile, fragment of the projectile, or fragment of the armor material is imbedded or passes into the soft under garment used behind the protective inserts plates” (ESAPIs or XSAPIs). Our multiple observations and thorough inspection of the soft armor in question revealed that black-grayish particles had penetrated at least three Kevlar layers as evidenced by their frayed, fuzz-like and separated appearance to the naked eye. The black-grayish particles were stopped by the fourth Kevlar layer. DOD acknowledged that figure 6 of our report appears to show evidence of a perforation on the rear of the test plate in question and that the Aberdeen Test Center’s subject matter expert found dust particles. These particles are fragments of the projectile or fragments of the armor material that were imbedded and indeed passed into the soft undergarment used behind the protective insert; therefore, the shot should have been ruled a complete penetration according to the testing protocols, increasing the point penalties and causing the design to fail First Article Testing. DOD’s comments stated that we acknowledged there were no broken threads on the first layer of the soft armor. We made no such comment and this consideration is not relevant as the requirement for broken fibers is not consistent with the written testing protocols as we have stated. Of consequence, DOD and Army officials acknowledged that the requirement for broken fibers was not described in the testing protocols or otherwise documented. In addition to the DOD acknowledgement that an Aberdeen Test Center subject matter expert found particles on the soft body armor, more convincing evidence is the picture of the subject plate. Figure 6 of our report clearly shows the tear in the fibers that were placed behind the plate in question allowing the penetration of the particles found by the Aberdeen Test Center subject matter expert. These particles can only be fragments of the projectile or fragments of the armor material that passed into the soft under garment used behind the protective inserts (plates), confirming our observations of the event and the subsequent incorrect scoring. The shot should have been scored a complete penetration, and the penalty incurred would have caused the design in question to fail First Article Testing. 12. DOD did not concur with our recommendation that the use of the laser scanner needs to be reviewed by experts external to DOD due to the lack of a full evaluation of the scanner’s accuracy to measure back-face deformations, to include an evaluation of the software modifications and operation under actual test conditions. DOD asserted that the laser scanner measurement device provides a superior tool for providing accurate, repeatable, defensible back-face deformation measurements to the deepest point of depression in the clay. We agree that once it is properly certified, tested, and evaluated, the laser may eliminate human errors such as incorrectly selecting the location of the deepest point or piercing the clay with the sharp edge of the caliper and making the depression deeper. However, as we stated, the Army used the laser scanner as a new method to measure back-face deformation without adequately certifying that the scanner could function: (1) in its operational environment, (2) at the required accuracy, (3) in conjunction with its software upgrades, and (4) without overstating deformation measurements. DOD asserted that the software upgrades did not affect the measurement system of the laser scanner and that these software changes had no effect on the physical measurement process of the back-face deformation measurement that was validated through the certification process. The software upgrades were added after the certification and do include functions to purposely remove spikes and other small crevices on the clay and a smoothing algorithm that changed back-face deformation measurements. We have reviewed these software functions and they do in fact include calculations that change the back-face deformation measurement taken. Furthermore, Army officials told us that additional upgrades to the laser scanner were made after First Article Testing by Aberdeen Test Center to correct a software laser malfunction identified during the subsequent lot acceptance testing of its plates. According to these officials, this previously undetected error caused an overstatement of the back-face deformation measurement taken by several millimeters, calling into question all the measurements taken during First Article Testing. Also, vendors have told us that they have conducted several studies that show that the laser scanner overestimates back-face deformation measurements by about 2 millimeters as compared with measurements taken by digital caliper, thereby over-penalizing vendors’ designs and causing them to fail lot acceptance testing. Furthermore, the laser scanner was certified to an accuracy of 1.0 millimeters, but section 4.9.9.3 of the purchase descriptions requires a device capable of measuring to an accuracy of ±0.1 millimeters. Therefore, the laser does not meet this requirement making the certification invalid. The laser scanner is an unproven measuring device that may reflect a new requirement because the back-face deformation standards are based on measurements obtained with a digital caliper. This raises concerns that results obtained using the laser scanner may be more inconsistent than those obtained using the digital caliper. As we stated in the report, the Aberdeen Test Center has not conducted a side-by-side test of the new laser scanner used during First Article Testing and the digital caliper previously used during Preliminary Design Model testing. Given the discrepancies on back-face deformation measurements we observed and the overstating of the back- face deformation alleged by the vendors, the use of the laser is still called into question. Thus, we continue to support our recommendation that experts independent of DOD review the use of the laser during First Article Testing and that a full evaluation of the laser scanner is imperative to ensure that the tests are repeatable and can be relied upon to certify procurement of armor plates for our military personnel based on results of body armor testing at the Aberdeen Test Center using the laser scanner. Lastly, DOD stated that the laser scanner is used by the aeronautical industry; however, the Army Test and Evaluation Command officials told us that the scanner had to be customized for testing through various software additions and mounting customizations to mitigate vibrations and other environmental factors. These software additions and customizations change the operation of the scanner. 13. DOD does not concur with our recommendation that experts examine, among other items, “the exposure of clay backing material to rain and other outside environmental conditions as well as the effect of high oven temperatures during storage and conditioning,” because it believes that such conditions had no impact upon First Article Testing results. As detailed in the report, we observed these conditions at different points throughout the testing period. Major variations in materials preparation and testing conditions such as exposure to rain and/or violations of testing protocols merit consideration when analyzing the effectiveness and reliability of First Article Testing. As one specific example, we described in this report statistically significant differences between the rates of failure in response to one threat on November 13 and the failure rates on all other days of testing but do not use the statistical analysis as the definitive causal explanation for such failure. We observed one major environmental difference in testing conditions that day, the exposure of temperature-conditioned clay to heavy, cold rain in transit to the testing site. After experts confirmed that such variation might be one potential factor relating to overall failure rates on that day, we conducted statistical tests to assess whether failures rates were different on November 13 compared to other dates.. Our assertion that the exposure of the clay to rain may have had an impact on test results is based not solely on our statistical analysis of test results that day; rather, it is also based on our conversations with industry experts, including the clay manufacturer, and on the fact that we witnessed an unusually high number of clay calibration failures during testing that comprised plate designs of multiple vendors, not just the one design that DOD points to as the source for the high failure rate. We observed that the clay conditioning trailer was located approximately 25 feet away from the entrance to the firing lane. The clay blocks, weighing in excess of 200 lbs., were loaded face up onto a cart and then a single individual pulled the cart over approximately 25 feet of gravel to the firing lane entrance. Once there, entry was delayed because the cart had to be positioned just right to get through the firing lane door. Army testers performed all of this without covering the clay to protect it from the rain and the cold, and once inside the clay had significant amounts of water collected on it. With respect to the unusually high number of clay calibration failures on November 13, there were seven clay calibration drops that were not within specifications. Some of these failed clay boxes were discarded in accordance with the testing protocols; however, others were repaired, re- dropped, and used if they had passed the second drop series. These included one plate that was later ruled a no-test and three plates for which the first shot yielded a catastrophic back-face deformation. These were the only three first-shot catastrophic back-face deformations during the whole test, and they all occurred on the same rainy day and involved two different solutions, not just the one that DOD claims performed poorly. The failure rates of plates as a whole, across all plate designs, were very high this day, and the failures were of both the complete penetration and the back-face deformation variety. Water conducts heat approximately 25 times faster than air, which means the water on the surface cooled the clay considerably faster than the clay would have cooled by air exposure alone. Moreover, Army testers lowered the temperature of the clay conditioning trailers during testing on November 13 and told us that the reason was that the ovens and clay were too hot. This is consistent with what Army subject matter experts and other industry experts told us— that the theoretical effect of having cold rain collecting on hot clay may create a situation where the clay is more susceptible to both complete penetrations because of the colder, harder top layer and to excessive back-face deformations because of the overheated, softer clay beneath the top layer. Finally, the clay manufacturer told us that, although this is an oil-based clay, water can affect the bonding properties of the clay, making it more difficult for wet clay to stick together. This is consistent with what we observed on November 13. After the first shot on one plate, as Army testers were removing the plate from the clay in order to determine the shot result, we observed a large chunk of clay fall to the floor. This clay was simply swept off to the side by the testers. In another instance, as testers were repairing the clay after the calibration drop, one of the testers pulled a long blade over the surface of the clay to smooth it. When he hit the spot where one of the calibration drops had occurred and the clay had been repaired, the blade pulled up the entire divot and the testers had to repair the clay further. Regarding our use of no-test data, we were strict in the instances where we used this data, see our comment 24. DOD stated that it was the poor performance of one solution in particular that skewed the results for this day and that this solution failed 70 percent of its shots against Threat D during First Article Testing. DOD’s statistic is misleading. This solution failed 100 percent of its shots (6 of 6) on November 13, but only 50 percent for all other test days (7 of 14). Also, the fact that this solution managed to pass the Preliminary Design Model testing but performed so poorly during First Article Testing raises questions about the repeatability of DOD’s and the Army’s test practices. Finally, DOD’s own analysis confirms that two of the four solutions tested on November 13 performed at their worst level in the test on that day. If the one solution whose plate was questionably ruled a no-test on this day is included in the data, then three of the four solutions performed at their worst level in the test on this day. DOD said that after testing Aberdeen Test Center completed the planned installation of new clay conditioning chambers inside the test ranges precluding any external environmental conditioning interacting with the clay. We believe it is a step in the right direction that the Aberdeen Test Center has corrected this problem for future testing, but we continue to believe that an external entity needs to evaluate the impact of introducing this new independent variable on this day of First Article Testing. 14. DOD concurred that it should establish a written standard for conducting clay calibration drops but non-concurred that failed blocks were used during testing. DOD asserted that all clay backing material used during testing passed the calibration drop test prior to use. We disagree with this position because the calibration of the clay required by the testing protocols calls for “a series of drops,” meaning one series of three drops, not multiple series of three drops as we observed on various occasions. DOD stated that, as a result of our review and the concerns cited in our report, the Aberdeen Test Center established and documented a revised procedure stating that only one repeat of calibration attempt can be made and, if the clay does not pass calibration upon the second attempt, it is reconditioned for later use and a new block of clay is substituted for calibration. Based on the testing protocols, this is still an incorrect procedure to ensure the proper calibration of the clay prior to shooting. The testing protocols do not allow for a repeat series of calibration drops. DOD also says that, upon completion of testing under the current Army solicitation and in coordination with the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation and the Army will review the procedures for clay calibration to include repeated calibration attempts and will document any appropriate procedural changes. DOD goes on to say that the NIJ standard as verified by personnel at the National Institute of Standards and Technology does not address specifically the issue of repeating clay calibration tests. However, the Aberdeen Test Center’s application of the Army’s current solicitation’s protocols during testing, and not the NIJ standards, was the subject of our review. In its comments, DOD acknowledged that the National Institute of Standards and Technology officials recommend only one series of drops for clay calibration, but the Aberdeen Test Center did multiple drops during testing. We are pleased that DOD has agreed to partner with the National Institute of Standards and Technology to conduct experiments to improve the testing community’s understanding of clay performance in ballistic testing, but these conversations and studies in our opinion should have occurred prior to testing, not after, as this deviation from testing protocols calls the tests results into question. We reassert that an external entity needs to evaluate the impact of this practice on First Article Testing results. 15. DOD partially concurred with our recommendation and agreed that inconsistencies were identified during testing; however, DOD asserted that the identified inconsistencies did not alter the test results. As stated in our response to DOD’s comments on our first recommendation, we do not agree. Our observations clearly show that (1) had the deepest point been used during Preliminary Design Model testing, two designs that passed would have failed and (2) had the Army not rounded First Article Testing results down, two designs that passed would have failed. Further, if the Army had scored the particles (which in their comments to this report DOD acknowledges were imbedded in the shoot pack behind the body armor) according to the testing protocols, a third design that passed First Article Testing would have failed. In all, four out of the five designs that passed Preliminary Design Model testing and First Article Testing would have failed if testing protocols had been followed. 16. DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that, based on the results of the independent expert review of the First Article Testing results, it should evaluate and recertify the accuracy of the laser scanner to the correct standard with all software modifications incorporated and include in this analysis a side-by-side comparison of the laser measurements of the actual back-face deformations with those taken by digital caliper to determine whether laser measurements can meet the standard of the testing protocols. DOD maintains that it performed an independent certification of the laser measurement system and process and that the software changes that occurred did not affect the measurement system in the laser scanner. However, as discussed in comment 12, we do not agree that an adequate, independent certification of the laser measurement system and process was conducted. Based on our observations, we continue to assert that the software changes added after certification did affect the measurement system in the laser. 17. DOD partially concurred with our recommendation for the Secretary of the Army to provide for an independent peer review of the Aberdeen Test Center’s body armor testing protocols, facilities, and instrumentation. We agree that a review conducted by a panel of external experts that also includes DOD members could satisfy our recommendation. However, to maintain the independence of this panel, the DOD members should not be composed of personnel from those organizations involved in the body armor testing (such as the office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, the Army Test and Evaluation Command, or PEO Soldier. 18. DOD stated that Aberdeen Test Center had been extensively involved in body armor testing since the 1990s and has performed several tests of body armor plates. We acknowledge that Aberdeen Test Center had conducted limited body armor testing for the initial testing on the Interceptor Body Armor system in the 1990s and have clarified the report to reflect that. However, as acknowledged by DOD, Aberdeen Test Center did not perform any additional testing on that system for PEO Soldier since the 1990s and this lack of experience in conducting source selection testing for that system may have led to the misinterpretations of testing protocols and deviations noted on our report. According to a recent Army Audit Agency report, NIJ testing facilities conducted First Article Testing and lot acceptance testing for the Interceptor Body Armor system prior to this current solicitation. Another reason Aberdeen Test Center could not conduct source selection testing was that in the past Aberdeen Test Center lacked a capability for the production testing of personnel armor systems in a cost-effective manner; the test facilities were old and could not support test requirements for a temperature- and humidity-controlled environment and could not provide enough capacity to support a war- related workload. The Army has spent about $10 million over the last few years upgrading the existing facilities with state-of-the-art capability to support research and development and production qualification testing for body armor, according to the Army Audit Agency. Army Test and Evaluation Command notes that there were several other tests between 1997 and 2007, but according to Army officials these tests were customer tests not performed in accordance with a First Article Testing protocol. For example, the U.S. Special Operations Command test completed in May 2007 and cited by DOD was a customer test not in accordance with First Article Testing protocol. The Aberdeen Test Center built new lanes and hired and trained contractors to perform the Preliminary Design Model testing and First Article Testing. 19. DOD stated that, to date, it has obligated about $120 million for XSAPI and less than $2 million for ESAPI. However, the value of the 5-year indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contracts we cited is based on the maximum amount of orders of ESAPI/XSAPI plates that can be purchased under these contracts. Given that the Army has fulfilled the minimum order requirements for this solicitation, the Army could decide to not purchase additional armor based on this solicitation and not incur almost $7.9 billion in costs. DOD stated in its response that there are only three contracts. However, the Army Contracting Office told us that there were four contracts awarded and provided those contracts to us for our review. Additionally, we witnessed four vendors participating in First Article Testing, all of which had to receive contracts to participate. It is unclear why the Army stated that there were only three contracts. 20. DOD is correct that there is no limit or range specified for the second shot location for the impact subtest. However, this only reinforces that the shot should have been aimed at 1.5 inches, not at 1.0 inch or at various points between 1.0 inch and 1.5 inches. It also does not explain why the Army continued to mark plates as though there were a range for this shot. Army testers would draw lines at approximately 0.75 inches for the inner tolerance and 1.25 inches for the outer tolerance of ESAPI plates. They drew lines at approximately 1.0 inch for the inner tolerance and 1.5 inches for the outer tolerance of XSAPI plates. We measured these lines for every impact test plate and also had Army testers measure some of these lines to confirm our measurements. We found that of 56 test items, 17 were marked with shot ranges wholly inside of 1.5 inches. The ranges of 30 other test items did include 1.5 inches somewhere in the range, but the center of the range (where Army testers aimed the shot) was still inside of 1.5 inches. Only four test items were marked with ranges centered on 1.5 inches. DOD may be incorrect in stating that shooting closer to the edge would have increased the risk of a failure for this subtest. For most subtests this may be the case, but according to Army subject matter experts the impact test is different. For the impact test, the plate is dropped onto a concrete surface, striking the crown (center) of the plate. The test is to determine if this weakens the structural integrity of the plate, which could involve various cracks spreading from the center of the plate outward. The reason the requirement for this shot on this subtest is written differently (i.e., to be shot at approximately 1.5 inches from the edge, as opposed to within a range between 0.75 inches and 1.25 inches or between 1.0 inches and 1.5 inches on other subtests) is that it is meant to test the impact’s effect on the plate. For this subtest and this shot, there may actually be a higher risk of failure the closer to the center the shot occurs. PEO Soldier representatives acknowledged that the purchase descriptions should have been written more clearly and changed the requirement for this shot to a range of between 1.5 inches and 2.25 inches during First Article Testing. We confirmed that Army testers correctly followed shot location testing protocols during First Article Testing by double-checking the measurements on the firing lane prior to the shooting of the plate. We also note that, although DOD stated the Preliminary Design Model testing shot locations for the impact test complied with the language of the testing protocols, under the revised protocol used during First Article Testing several of these Preliminary Design Model testing impact test shot locations would not have been valid. DOD stated that there was no impact on the outcome of the test, but DOD cannot say that definitively. Because shooting closer to the edge may have favored the vendors in this case, the impact could have been that a solution or solutions may have passed that should not have. 21. The Army stated that “V50 subtests for more robust threats…were executed to the standard protocols.” Our observations and analysis of the data show that this statement is incorrect. Sections 2.2.3.h(2) of the detailed test plans state: “If the first round fired yields a complete penetration, the propellant charge for the second round shall be equal to that of the actual velocity obtained on the first round minus a propellant decrement for 100 ft/s (30 m/s) velocity decrease in order to obtain a partial penetration. If the first round fired yields a partial penetration, the propellant charge for the second round shall be equal to that of the actual velocity obtained on the first round plus a propellant increment for a 50 ft/s (15 m/s) velocity increase in order to obtain a complete penetration. A propellant increment or decrement, as applicable, at 50 ft/s (15 m/s) from actual velocity of last shot shall be used until one partial and one complete penetration is obtained. After obtaining a partial and a complete penetration, the propellant increment or decrement for 50 ft/s (15 m/s) shall be used from the actual velocity of the previous shot.” V50 testing is conducted to discern the velocity at which 50 percent of the shots of a particular threat would penetrate each of the body armor designs. The testing protocols require that, after every shot that is defeated by the body armor, the velocity of the next shot be increased. Whenever a shot penetrates the armor, the velocity should be decreased for the next shot. This increasing and decreasing of the velocities is supposed to be repeated until testers determine the velocity at which 50 percent of the shots will penetrate. In cases in which the armor far exceeds the V50 requirement and is able to defeat the threat for the first six shots, the testing may be halted without discerning the V50 for the plate and the plate may be ruled as passing the requirements. During Preliminary Design Model V50 testing, Army testers would achieve three partial penetrations and then continue to shoot at approximately the same velocity, or lower, for shots 4, 5, and 6 in order to intentionally achieve six partial penetrations. Army testers told us that they did this to conserve plates. According to the testing protocols, Army testers should have continued to increase the charge weight in order to try to achieve a complete penetration and determine a V50 velocity. The effect of this methodology was that solutions were treated inconsistently. Army officials told us that this practice had no effect on which designs passed or failed, which we do not dispute in our report; however, this practice made it impossible to discern the true V50s for these designs based on the results of Preliminary Design Model testing. 22. DOD agreed that Army testers deviated from the testing protocols by measuring back-face deformation at the point of aim. DOD stated that this decision was made by Army leadership in consultation with the office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, because this would not disadvantage any vendor. We agree with DOD that this decision was made by Army leadership in consultation with the office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation. We did not independently assess all factors being considered by Army leadership when they made the decision to overrule the Integrated Product Team and the Milestone Decision Authority’s initial decision to measure to the deepest point. DOD also stated that measuring back-face deformation at the point of aim is an accurate and repeatable process. As we pointed out in our previous responses, DOD’s own comments regarding DOD’s Assertion 3 contradict this statement where DOD writes that there were “potential variances between the actual aim point and impact point during testing.” Furthermore, we observed that the aim laser used by Army testers was routinely out of line with where the ballistic was penetrating the yaw card, despite continued adjustments to line up the aim laser with where the ballistic was actually traveling. DOD stated that it is not possible to know the reference point on a curved object when the deepest deformation point is laterally offset from the aim point. We disagree. DOD acknowledges in its response that PEO Soldier had an internally documented process to account for plate curvature when the deepest point of deformation was laterally offset from the point of aim. The use of correction factor tables is a well-known industry standard that has been in place for years, and this standard practice has been used by NIJ laboratories and is well-known by vendors. DOD and the Army presented several statistics on the difference between aim point back-face deformation and deepest point back-face deformation in testing and stated that the difference between the two is small. We do not agree with DOD’s assertion that a difference of 10.66 millimeters is small. In the case of Preliminary Design Model testing, the difference between measuring at the aim point and at the deepest point was that at least two solutions passed Preliminary Design Model testing that otherwise would have failed. These designs passed subsequent First Article Testing but have gone on to fail lot acceptance testing, raising additional questions regarding the repeatability of the Aberdeen Test Center’s testing practices. DOD asserts that the adoption of the laser scanner measurement technique resolves the problems the Army experienced in measuring back- face deformations completely. We would agree that the laser scanner has the potential to be a useful device but when used in the manner in which Aberdeen Test Center used it – without an adequate certification and without a thorough understanding of how the laser scanner might effectively change the standard for a solution to pass – we do not agree that it resolved back-face deformation measurement issues. Aberdeen Test Center officials told us that they did not know what the accuracy of the laser scanner was as it was used during First Article Testing. 23. DOD acknowledged the shortcoming we identified. DOD then asserted that once the deviation of measuring back-face deformation at the point of aim, rather than at the deepest point of depression was identified, those involved acted decisively to resolve the issue. We disagree based on the timeline of events described in our response to DOD’s comments on Preliminary Design Model testing, as well as on the following facts. We were present and observed the Integrated Product Team meeting on March 25 and observed that all members of the Integrated Product Team agreed to start measuring immediately at the deepest point, to score solutions based on this deepest point data, to conserve plates, and then at the end of the testing to make up the tests incorrectly performed during the first third of testing, as needed. We observed Army testers implement this plan the following day. Then, on March 27, Army leadership halted testing for 2 weeks, considered the issue, and then reversed the unanimous decision by the Integrated Product Team and decided to score to the point of aim. The deviation of scoring solutions based on the back-face deformation at the point of aim created a situation in which the Army could not have confidence in any solution that passed the Preliminary Design Model testing. Because of this, the Army had to repeat testing, in the form of First Article Testing, to determine whether the solutions that had passed Preliminary Design Model testing actually met requirements. 24. DOD did not concur with our finding that rain may have impacted the test results. DOD stated that such conditions had no impact upon First Article Testing results. Our statistical analysis of the test data shows failure rates to be significantly higher on November 13 than during other days of testing, and our observations taken during that day of testing and our conversations with industry experts familiar with the clay, including the clay manufacturer, suggest the exposure of the clay to the cold, heavy rain on that day may have been the cause of the high failure rates. Our analysis examined the 83 plates tested against the most potent threat, Threat D. The testing protocols required that two shots for the record be taken on each plate. We performed a separate analysis for the 83 first shots taken on these plates from the 83 second shots taken on the plates. These confirmed statistically that the rate of failure on November 13 was significantly higher than the rate of failure on other days. Further, of the 5 plates that experienced first-shot catastrophic failures during testing, 3 of them (60 percent) were tested on November 13 and all 3 of these were due to excessive back-face deformation. Given that only 9 plates were tested on November 13, while 74 were tested during all the other days of testing combined, it is remarkable that 60 percent of all catastrophic failures occurred on that one day of testing. DOD objected to our inclusion of no-test data in its calculation of first- and second-shot failure rates on November 13. We believe that the inclusion of no-test data is warranted because the Army’s exclusion of such plates was made on a post hoc basis after the shots were initially recorded as valid shots and because the rationale for determining the need for a re-test was not always clear. Additionally, we conducted an analysis excluding the no- test plates identified by DOD and that analysis again showed that the failure rate on November 13 was statistically higher than during the other days of testing, even after the exclusions. Excluding the no-test plates, 38 percent of first shots on November 13 (3 of 8) and 88 percent of second shots (7 of 8) failed. In its response, DOD reports that Aberdeen Test Center’s own statistical analysis of test data for Threat D reveals that the observed failure rate on November 13 is attributable to the “poor performance” of one design throughout testing. DOD asserts that its illustration indicates that “Design K was the weakest design on all days with no rain as well as days with rain.” DOD’s data do not support such a claim. As we have observed, excluding no-test plates, DOD’s data are based on 10 tests of two shots each for each of 8 designs (160 cases total). Each shot is treated as an independent trial, an assumption we find tenuous given that a plate’s structural integrity might be affected by the first shot. To account for date, DOD subdivides the data into cell sizes far too small to derive reliable statistical inferences about failure rates (between 2 and 6 shots per cell), as evidenced by the wide confidence intervals illustrated in DOD’s visual representation of its analysis. Among evidence DOD presented to support its claim that Design K was the weakest performing design on both November 13 and other days is failure rate data for four designs that were not tested on the day in question. For two of the three designs tested on November 13 there were only one or two plates tested on November 13, far too few to conduct reliable statistical tests on differences in design performance. For the other type of plate tested on that day (Design L), the three plates tested had a markedly higher failure rate (3 of 6 shots, or 50 percent) on that day than on other days (when it had, in 14 shots, 5 failures, or a 36 percent failure rate). Design K had a failure rate of 6 of 6 shots (100 percent) on the day in question, compared with 8 of 14 shots (57 percent) on other days. Overall, it is impossible to determine from such a small set of tests whether the lack of statistical significance between different designs’ failure rates on November 13 and other days results from small sample size or a substantive difference in performance. Overall, the Army Test and Evaluation Command’s design-based analysis cannot distinguish between the potential effects of date and design on failure rates because sufficient comparison data do not exist to conduct the kind of multivariate analysis that might resolve this issue. Because the data alone are inadequate for distinguishing between the potential effects of date and design, we continue to recommend that independent experts evaluate the potential effects of variations in materials preparation and testing conditions, including those occurring on November 13, on overall First Article Testing results. Additionally, DOD stated that the clay is largely impervious to water. However, as stated in our report, body armor testers from NIJ-certified private laboratories, Army officials experienced in the testing of body armor, body armor manufacturers, and the manufacturer of the clay used told us that getting water on the clay backing material could cause a chemical bonding change on the clay’s surface. DOD stated that one of its first actions when bringing in the clay is to scrape the top of the clay to level it. However, this only removes clay that is above the metal edge of the box. Clay that is already at or below the edge of the box is not removed by this scraping. We witnessed several instances in which the blade would remove clay at some points, but leave large portions of the clay surface untouched because the clay was below the edge of the box. 25. See comment 11. 26. The DOD is correct that the one particular example regarding deleting official test data only happened once. Fortunately, the results of the retest were the same as the initial test. After we noted this deficiency, Army officials told us that a new software program was being added that would prevent this from occurring again. DOD also stated that only two persons are authorized and able to modify the laser scanner software. We did not verify this statement; however, we assert that DOD needs to have an auditable trail when any such modifications are made and that it should require supervisory review and documentation or logging of these setting changes. 27. DOD acknowledged that the Army did not formally document significant procedure changes that deviated from established testing protocols or assess the impact of these deviations. 28. In our report we stated that the requirement to test at an NIJ-certified laboratory was withdrawn because the Aberdeen Test Center is not NIJ- certified. DOD’s comments on this point do not dispute our statement. Instead, DOD discussed NIJ certification and stated that it does not believe that NIJ certification is appropriate for its test facilities. However, we did not recommend that any DOD test facilities be NIJ-certified or even that NIJ be the outside organization to provide an independent review of the testing practices at Aberdeen Test Center that we did recommend. However, we believe NIJ certification would meet our recommendation for an independent review. Regarding DOD’s comments regarding NIJ certification, DOD asserted that NIJ certification is not appropriate for its test facilities and asserted that there are significant differences between NIJ and U.S. Army body armor test requirements. NIJ certification of a test laboratory and NIJ protocol for testing personal body armor primarily used by law enforcement officers are two distinct and different issues. Similar to a consumer United Laboratories laboratory certification, an NIJ laboratory certification includes an independent peer review of internal control procedures, management practices, and laboratory practices. This independent peer review is conducted to ensure that there are no conflicts of interest, and that the equipment utilized in the laboratory is safe and reliable. This peer review helps to ensure a reliable, repeatable, and accurate test, regardless of whether the test in question is following a U.S. Army testing protocol or a law enforcement testing protocol. NIJ-certified laboratories have consistently proven to be capable of following an Army testing protocol, which is demonstrated by the fact that NIJ-certified laboratories have conducted previous U.S. Army body armor source selection testing in accordance with First Article Testing protocol, as well as lot acceptance tests. The slide DOD included in its comments is not applicable here because it deals with the difference between testing protocols – the protocols for Army Interceptor Body Armor tests and the NIJ protocol for testing personal body armor primarily used by law enforcement officers. NIJ certification of a laboratory and NIJ certification of body armor for law enforcement purposes are two different things. 29. DOD stated that we were incorrect in asserting that the Army decided to rebuild small arms ballistics testing facilities at Aberdeen Test Center after the 2007 House Armed Services Committee hearing. Instead, DOD stated that the contract to construct additional test ranges at the Aberdeen Test Center Light Armor Range was awarded in September 2006 and that construction was already underway at the time of June 2007 hearing. DOD also stated that this upgrade was not in response to any particular event but was undertaken to meet projected future Army ballistic test requirements. Army officials we spoke with before testing for this solicitation told us that this construction was being completed in order to perform the testing we observed. As of July 2007, the Light Armor Range included two pre-WWII era ballistic lanes and four modern lanes partially completed. However, we noted that, as of July 2007, the lanes we visited were empty and that none of the testing equipment was installed; only the buildings were completed. In addition to the physical rebuilding of the test sites, the Amy also re-built its workforce to be able to conduct the testing. As stated on page 4 of DOD’s comments, PEO Soldier has instituted an effort to transfer testing expertise and experience from PEO Soldier to the Army Test and Evaluation Command. Prior to the start of testing we observed that Aberdeen Test Center hired, transferred in, and contracted for workers to conduct the testing. These workers were then trained by Aberdeen Test Center and conducted pilot tests in order to learn how to conduct body armor testing. We observed parts of this training, in person, and other parts via recorded video. In addition, we spoke with officials during this training and preparation process. From our observations and discussions with Army testers and PEO Soldier officials, we believe this process to have been a restarting of small arms ballistic testing capabilities at Aberdeen Test Center. Based on DOD’s comments, we clarified our report to reflect this information. In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report were Cary Russell, Assistant Director; Michael Aiken; Gary Bianchi; Beverly Breen; Paul Desaulniers; Alfonso Garcia; William Graveline; Mae Jones; Christopher Miller; Anna Maria Ortiz; Danny Owens; Madhav Panwar; Terry Richardson; Michael Shaughnessy; Doug Sloane; Matthew Spiers; Karen Thornton; and John Van Schaik.

Summary: The Army has issued soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan personal body armor, comprising an outer protective vest and ceramic plate inserts. GAO observed Preliminary Design Model testing of new plate designs, which resulted in the Army's awarding contracts in September 2008 valued at a total of over $8 billion to vendors of the designs that passed that testing. Between November and December 2008, the Army conducted further testing, called First Article Testing, on these designs. GAO is reporting on the degree to which the Army followed its established testing protocols during these two tests. GAO did not provide an expert ballistics evaluation of the results of testing. GAO, using a structured, GAO-developed data collection instrument, observed both tests at the Army's Aberdeen Test Center, analyzed data, and interviewed agency and industry officials to evaluate observed deviations from testing protocols. However, independent ballistics testing expertise is needed to determine the full effect of these deviations. During Preliminary Design Model testing the Army took significant steps to run a controlled test and maintain consistency throughout the process, but the Army did not always follow established testing protocols and, as a result, did not achieve its intended test objective of determining as a basis for awarding contracts which designs met performance requirements. In the most consequential of the Army's deviations from testing protocols, the Army testers incorrectly measured the amount of force absorbed by the plate designs by measuring back-face deformation in the clay backing at the point of aim rather than at the deepest point of depression. Army testers recognized the error after completing about a third of the test and then changed the test plan to call for measuring at the point of aim and likewise issued a modification to the contract solicitation. At least two of the eight designs that passed Preliminary Design Model testing and were awarded contracts would have failed if measurements had been made to the deepest point of depression. The deviations from the testing protocols were the result of Aberdeen Test Center's incorrectly interpreting the testing protocols. In all these cases of deviations from the testing protocols, the Aberdeen Test Center's implemented procedures were not reviewed or approved by the Army and Department of Defense officials responsible for approving the testing protocols. After concerns were raised regarding the Preliminary Design Model testing, the decision was made not to field any of the plate designs awarded contracts until after First Article Testing was conducted. During First Article Testing, the Army addressed some of the problems identified during Preliminary Design Model testing, but GAO observed instances in which Army testers did not follow the established testing protocols and did not maintain internal controls over the integrity and reliability of data, raising questions as to whether the Army met its First Article Test objective of determining whether each of the contracted designs met performance requirements. The following are examples of deviations from testing protocols and other issues that GAO observed: (1) The clay backing placed behind the plates during ballistics testing was not always calibrated in accordance with testing protocols and was exposed to rain on one day, potentially impacting test results. (2) Testers improperly rounded down back-face deformation measurements, which is not authorized in the established testing protocols and which resulted in two designs passing First Article Testing that otherwise would have failed. Army officials said rounding is a common practice; however, one private test facility that rounds told GAO that they round up, not down. (3) Testers used a new instrument to measure back-face deformation without adequately certifying that the instrument could function correctly and in conformance with established testing protocols. The impact of this issue on test results is uncertain, but it could call into question the reliability and accuracy of the measurements. (4) Testers deviated from the established testing protocols in one instance by improperly scoring a complete penetration as a partial penetration. As a result, one design passed First Article Testing that would have otherwise failed. With respect to internal control issues, the Army did not consistently maintain adequate internal controls to ensure the integrity and reliability of test data. In one example, during ballistic testing, data were lost, and testing had to be repeated because an official accidentally pressed the delete button and software controls were not in place to protect the integrity of test data. Army officials acknowledged that before GAO's review they were unaware of the specific internal control problems we identified.