The Army has completed its drawdown of active forces in accordance with the Bottom-Up Review (BUR) force structure and defense guidance calling for a force of 495,000. To ensure that the Army will be able to maintain the minimum strength necessary to successfully respond to two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRC), Congress established a permanent legislative end strength floor of 495,000 in its fiscal year 1996 National Defense Authorization Act. However, the Department of Defense’s (DOD) fiscal year 1997 Future Years Defense Program (FYDP)reduced active Army end strength 20,000 below the congressionally mandated floor by 1999. A key impetus behind this plan is the concern within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) that funding the existing active Army force level of 495,000 will prevent the Army from buying the new equipment it needs to modernize the active force for the 21st century. The BUR strategy called for a force of 10 active Army combat divisions and 2 active armored cavalry regiments to fight and win 2 nearly simultaneous MRCs. This force was far smaller than the Cold War Army, which comprised 18 active divisions and 770,000 personnel in fiscal year 1989, as well as the Base Force, which in fiscal year 1994, consisted of 12 active combat divisions and 540,000 active personnel. Following the BUR, the Army reorganized its active combat division structure. Two division headquarters were eliminated, thus reducing the number of active divisions from 12 to 10 as specified in the BUR. Another significant change was that the Army discontinued its reliance on reserve component “round-up” or “round-out” units to bring the active divisions to full combat strength for wartime deployment. Instead, the Army determined that each of the remaining 10 combat divisions would comprise 3 fully active ground maneuver brigades. This decision was endorsed by the Secretary of Defense during development of the BUR out of concern that relying on reserve brigades could slow down a U.S. response to aggression. Therefore, as a result of the BUR, only two active maneuver brigades were eliminated from Army force structure— 12 combat divisions with a combined total of 32 active brigades were reduced to 10 divisions with 30 active brigades. Also, the Army decided that all 10 remaining divisions would be authorized 100 percent of their wartime military personnel requirement. Overall, the reduction in forces, when combined with the force reductions resulting from the withdrawal of 20,000 military personnel from Europe between fiscal years 1994 and 1995, brought the force level down to within 10,000 of the fiscal year 1996 end strength goal of 495,000. The remaining personnel reductions came from the institutional portions of the active Army. No cuts were made in “non-divisional” level support forces that would deploy with combat divisions, since the Army had previously found that support shortages already existed in these forces. A comparison of fiscal years 1994 and 1996 active Army force structure is shown in table 1.1. The active Army force of 495,000 is comprised of both deployable and nondeployable forces. The deployable force (63 percent) includes the combat divisions, separate brigades, armored cavalry regiments, and special forces groups, as well as the Corps level combat support and combat service support forces that would accompany them to the war fight. Taken together, these deployable operational forces are organized according to Army Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE) and are commonly referred to as TOE forces. Combat forces are referred to as “above-the-line” TOE, and combat support/combat service support forces are referred to as “below-the-line” TOE. Combat support includes such specialties as engineering, military intelligence, chemical, and military police, while combat service support includes specialties such as transportation, medical, finance, quartermaster, and ordnance. The generally nondeployable portion of the Army (historically about 25 percent) is often referred to as the “institutional” force that supports the Army infrastructure by performing such functions as training, doctrine development, base operations, supply, and maintenance. These forces are organized according to Army Tables of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) and are simply referred to as TDA forces. Another 12 percent of the active Army force is in a temporary status at any given time and is referred to as “trainees, transients, holdees and students” or TTHS. These forces are also considered to be nondeployable. Historically, the percentages of the active force devoted to TOE, TDA, and TTHS have remained relatively constant. (See fig. 1.1.) The Army uses different resourcing processes for each portion of the active Army (see table 1.2). Defense guidance specifies the number of active divisions the Army must have in its structure. The elements of these divisions are sized according to Army doctrine. The Army’s 10 divisions range in size from 10,000 to 15,000 active personnel, depending on mission (e.g., light and heavy) and type of equipment. The Army uses a biennial process known as the Total Army Analysis (TAA) to determine the number of support units needed to support these combat forces, and how available personnel authorizations will be allocated to these requirements. TDA resources are allocated in a separate resource management process, primarily driven by the Army major commands but subject to some Department of the Army headquarters oversight. TTHS is essentially an allocation rather than a managed resource, although Army policy decisions can influence its size. TAA determines the number and types of support units needed to support war-fighting missions, regardless of whether active or reserve positions would be used to meet these requirements. The process then allocates forces from the active Army, the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserve to fill those requirements. The results of TAA 2003 were reported in January 1996 and fed into the 1998-2003 Army Program Objective Memorandum. A detailed discussion of the TAA process, assumptions, and results can be found in chapter 2. Chapter 3 discusses the TDA requirements process. Although Congress established a permanent active Army end strength floor of 495,000 in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, DOD’s fiscal year 1997 FYDP reduced active Army end strength below this level beginning in fiscal year 1998. Congress established a permanent end strength floor to ensure that each service, including the Army, had the minimum force necessary to fulfill the national military strategy. However, DOD may reduce forces below the floor if it notifies Congress and may also increase authorized end strength as much as 1 percent in any given fiscal year. According to the 1997 FYDP, DOD intends to keep Army military personnel appropriation dollars relatively flat from fiscal years 1995 to 2001. Because these appropriations will not sustain a force level of 495,000, DOD planned to reduce the Army’s end strength by 10,000 in fiscal year 1998 and an additional 10,000 in fiscal year 1999. DOD’s 1997 FYDP increases the percentage of the Army budget devoted to procurement from 10 percent in 1995 to 16 percent by 2001. This increase is consistent with DOD’s view that modernization is key to long-term readiness. In his March 1996 testimony, the Secretary of Defense said that in recent years, DOD had taken advantage of the drawdown and slowed modernization in order to fully fund those expenditures that guarantee near-term readiness, such as spare parts, training, and maintenance. As a result, modernization funding in fiscal year 1997 was said to be the lowest it had been in many years, about one-third of what it was in fiscal year 1985. To reverse this trend, DOD plans to increase funding to procure new equipment, including funding for “everyday equipment” ground forces needed in the field, such as tactical communications gear, trucks, and armored personnel carriers. Likewise, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff has expressed concern about the future readiness of Army forces given reduced levels of modernization funding. As required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, we reviewed (1) the extent to which TAA 2003 resulted in sufficient combat support/combat service support force structure to meet the support requirements of the two-MRC scenario and also operations other than war (OOTW), (2) whether the Army’s streamlining initiatives have identified opportunities to further reduce Army personnel resources devoted to institutional Army (TDA) functions, and (3) the feasibility of further reducing active Army end strength. In conducting our assessment, we did not examine DOD’s rationale for requiring 10 active combat divisions or the Army’s rationale for using three full active brigades per division instead of round-out or round-up reserve brigades. We also did not fully assess ongoing studies concerning the future use of reserve forces or analyze potential changes to the current national military strategy. Since much of the Army’s analysis in TAA 2003 is based on the combat forces assigned to it by the BUR and the then current defense planning strategy, any changes in this guidance would likely alter Army support force requirements. To determine the extent to which TAA 2003 resulted in sufficient combat support/combat service support force structure to support the two-MRC scenario and OOTWs, we reviewed the Army’s documentation on TAA processes, assumptions, and results. We interviewed Army officials at Department of the Army Headquarters, Washington, D.C.; Concepts Analysis Agency, Bethesda, Maryland; U.S. Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia; and U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Fort Monroe, Virginia, and Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Our review of TAA 2003 included analyses of the risks associated with the number and type of active and reserve support forces allocated to support war-fighting requirements; how the Army’s assumptions compared to those in defense guidance, previous TAAs, or used in other DOD, Army, or external defense studies; and how the major assumptions used in TAA can affect force structure outcomes (including measures of risk). We also examined TAA processes to determine if the Army (1) obtained adequate participation by stakeholders in the process, including major commands and commanders in chief (CINC) and (2) scrutinized data inputs used in its war-fight models to determine if they were free from error. In addition, we discussed TAA 2003 results and methodology with OSD officials. Further, to better understand how the requirements of the joint war-fighting commands are considered in the TAA process and how CINCs are affected by TAA results, we requested information and received formal responses from the CINCs of the U.S. Atlantic Command, the U.S. Central Command, the U.S. European Command, and the U.S. Pacific Command. To assess Army streamlining initiatives and their potential for reducing military personnel devoted to institutional Army functions, we obtained documentation and held discussions with officials from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs; the Army’s Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation; the Army Budget Office; Department of the Army Headquarters; the U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency, Washington, D.C.; U.S. Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia; U.S. TRADOC, Fort Monroe, Virginia, and Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; the U.S. Army Medical Command, Fort Sam Houston, Texas; and the U.S. Army Materiel Command’s Management Engineering Activity, Huntsville, Alabama. We reviewed major commands’ TDA requirements processes and discussed proposals for increased use of workload-based management to assess the TDA requirements determination process. To assess TDA streamlining, we identified and reviewed Army streamlining studies, including Force XXI, major command reengineering, and Army headquarters policy initiatives that resulted in reductions in military and civilian resources, as well as budgetary savings. We also assessed limitations to further streamlining of the TDA force due to legal, cultural, and operational requirements. We did not review the justification for TDA positions that are required by law or controlled by other agencies. To assess the implications of DOD’s planned reduction in active Army end strength, we examined the objectives and implementing guidance for the Army’s Force XXI campaign,which DOD cited as justification for the reduction, and the personnel reductions realized or anticipated as a result of these initiatives. We also considered OSD’s internal assessment of the Army’s TAA 2003 process and the potential for changes in defense strategy resulting from the Quadrennial Defense Review. Lastly, we considered the current status of TDA streamlining and the results of TAA 2003. DOD provided written comments on a draft of this report. These comments are discussed and evaluated in chapters 2 and 3 and are reprinted in appendix V. Additional comments from the Army are discussed and evaluated in chapter 4. We conducted our review from September 1995 to October 1996 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. The Army believes that it can provide support forces for two MRCs at a moderate level of risk. However, in assessing risk, the Army found that 42 percent of all support forces required in the first 30 days of the first MRC would be late arriving to theater because they cannot mobilize and deploy in time. The Army also found that it would have very few active support forces available to send to the second MRC—only 12 percent of the total support forces needed. In addition, the Army did not authorize 19,200 positions that are needed to bring some existing units up to their full required strength. Finally, units totaling 58,400 positions were not authorized any personnel because the Army’s total wartime support requirement exceeds available personnel authorizations. The Army’s risk assessment depends largely on the assumptions and model inputs that were adopted for TAA 2003. Some of these assumptions were favorable in that they minimized risks to U.S. forces. For example, to be consistent with defense guidance, TAA assumed that U.S. forces had immediate access to ports and airfields in the theater of operations, faced limited chemical attacks, and were immediately available for redeployment if previously committed to OOTWs. Less optimistic assumptions would have led to higher support requirements. On the other hand, the Army did not consider all available resources to satisfy its unmet support force requirements, such as some support force capabilities that currently reside in the Army’s eight National Guard divisions and the TDA force, and support available from outside contractors and defense civilians. Also, while TAA is an analytically rigorous process, some aspects of its methodology could be improved. For example, TAA lacks mechanisms for adjusting to change during its 2-year cycle; some model inputs, such as consumption of fuel and water, were not sufficiently scrutinized; and sensitivity analyses were generally not used to measure the impact of alternative assumptions and resourcing decisions on risk. Changes to any of the key assumptions or other model inputs could produce significantly different force structure requirements than those determined in TAA 2003, and potentially different risk levels. Based on defense guidance, other Army guidance and inputs, wargaming assumptions, unit allocation rules, and logistical data, TAA determines the number and type of support units the Army needs to execute the national military strategy. TAA then allocates Army personnel authorizations, both active and reserve, among these support force requirements to minimize war-fighting risk. TAA is an advance planning tool that tries to anticipate potential war-fighting scenarios and personnel availability approximately 9 years in the future. TAA consists of a series of campaign simulation models and force structure conferences attended by representatives from key Army staff offices and commands, as well as the unified commands. A strategic mobility analysis is performed to determine the arrival times of Army forces in theater and identify shortfalls. This is followed by a theater campaign analysis to gauge force movement and unit strength over time, as well as personnel and equipment losses. Outputs from these models, along with approved unit allocation rules and logistics data, are input into the final Army model, Force Analysis Simulation of Theater Administration and Logistics Support. This model generates the required support forces by type and quantity, and specifies when they are needed in theater and what their supply requirements would be. The support forces identified by the model are then matched to actual Army support units. At this point, priorities are established among the competing requirements, and approaches are discussed to mitigate the risks of unmet requirements. One approach has been to authorize fewer personnel to some units than are required to meet their full wartime requirement. Additionally, the active/reserve force mix is examined on a branch by branch basis to assess whether sufficient active forces are available to meet early deployment requirements. The approved force structure is forwarded to the Army’s Chief of Staff for final approval as the base force for programming Army resources for the next Program Objective Memorandum. A more detailed description of the Army’s TAA process is provided in appendix I. The Army concluded that its authorized support forces, resulting from TAA 2003, were consistent with the moderate risk force delineated in the October 1993 BUR. This force, among other things, must be able to fight and win two MRCs that occur nearly simultaneously. To assess the risk level associated with its support forces, the Army employed four measures: late risk, second MRC risk, unmet requirements risk, and casualty risk. Each of the risks was quantified; however, their collective impact on the war fight was not modeled by the Army. Rather, the Army’s overall assessment of moderate risk is based on military judgment. TAA stipulates that support units needed in the first 30 days of the first MRC should be drawn from the active force because of the time needed to mobilize, train, and deploy reserve units. This is consistent with defense guidance. However, TAA 2003 found that about 79,000 of the more than 188,000 support force positions required in the first 30 days of the first MRC do not arrive on time because the Army lacks sufficient numbers of active support forces to meet these requirements and must rely on reserve forces instead. This represents 30 percent of the 260,000 total authorized Army force needed during this time period, and 42 percent of the Army support forces required. Branches with the most late arrivals include engineering, transportation, quartermaster, and medical—branches with high concentrations of reserve personnel. This risk is exacerbated when the Army relies on reserve forces during the first 7 days of the war fight. Almost one-quarter of the reserve support forces assigned to meet requirements during the first 30 days (19,200 positions) are needed in the first 7 days of the MRC. The 30-day time frame to mobilize and deploy reserve support forces is substantiated in classified studies by the RAND Corporation that examined the availability of reserve forces and by Army officials responsible for reserve mobilization activities. The Army estimates that mobilizing reserve forces, from unit recall to arrival at the port of embarkation, takes about 15 days for a small support unit and 31 days for a large unit. Personnel may be transported by air, but their equipment likely will be shipped by sea. Depending on whether the equipment sails from the east or west coast and to which theater, it will take an additional 12 to 30 days to arrive, unload, and assemble the equipment. Therefore, a small reserve unit will be available for the war fight no earlier than 27 days after call-up, and a large reserve unit will require at least 43 days. (See app. II for a listing of mobilization tasks and the time required to complete them.) OSD officials believe that if it were possible to reduce late risk by making more active forces available during the first 30 days, strategic lift constraints would limit the number of active support forces that could be moved to theater. Army officials noted that to the extent that any active support personnel are available to replace late reservists and could be moved, the Army’s risk of late arrivals would be lower. The availability of active support forces for the second MRC was another risk measure used in TAA 2003. Specifically, as the availability of active forces declined—and with it a corresponding increased reliance on reserve forces—risk was assumed to increase. The second MRC will have access to relatively small numbers of active support forces, most of them having deployed already in support of the first MRC. Consequently, the Army must rely on reserve component forces to meet most of its requirements in the second MRC. Only 12 percent of the support forces needed in the second MRC are active, compared with 47 percent in the first MRC. Branches with low representation of active forces in the second MRC include engineer, transportation, quartermaster, and artillery. High reliance on reserves for use in the second MRC may not entail greater risk assuming there is adequate warning time and mobilization has already occurred. The same risk of late arrival would apply if mobilization was delayed. An objective of TAA is to allocate resources among competing support force requirements. In the case of TAA 2003, the Army’s force structure requirements initially exceeded its authorized positions by 144,000 positions. At the conclusion of TAA, units totaling 58,400 positions were not allocated any positions and exist only on paper, and other existing active units were allocated 19,200 fewer positions than needed to meet mission requirements. Table 2.1 illustrates the Army’s approach to allocating its resources in TAA 2003. Drawing from its active, National Guard, and Reserve forces, the Army identified 528,000 authorized TOE positions that it could apply to its 672,000 Army requirement to fight two MRCs, leaving an initial imbalance of 144,000 positions. The Army’s total TOE force is actually higher than 528,000 positions (see table 2.1), but some resources are excluded from consideration in TAA, such as the eight National Guard divisions the Army considers as a strategic hedge, and forces needed to perform unique mission requirements. The Army then analyzed all of its support forces at Corps level and above to determine how it could reduce the risk associated with its shortfall. This resulted in the Army shifting about 66,000 active and reserve positions from support units excess to the war fight to higher priority support units. Units providing fire fighting, engineering, and medical support were among those selected for conversion. After these conversions, the Army was left with a shortfall of about 78,000 positions. This shortfall was allocated as follows. Some existing active support units were authorized fewer positions than are needed to meet their full wartime requirement. In TAA 2003, these amounted to about 19,200 positions. The expectation is that these understrength units would be brought up to full strength before being mobilized. These additional personnel would come from the Individual Ready Reserve or new recruits. The remaining shortfall of 58,400 positions represents units that are needed to meet a wartime requirement but have not been allocated any position authorizations, that is, units that exist only on paper. Table 2.2 shows how each of the Army’s major support branches will be affected by the conversions and where the remaining 58,400 positions in vacant units reside. Among the branches benefiting most were quartermaster and transportation, which accounted for more than half of the initial shortfall in totally vacant units. Two additional actions were taken by the Army to mitigate the risk associated with its remaining unmet requirements. The Army estimates that host nations will be able to provide the equivalent of over 14,000 positions to offset some requirements, leaving a shortfall of about 44,000 positions in vacant units. The Army also plans to implement an option developed by the Army National Guard Division Redesign Study to convert 42,700 Army National Guard combat division positions to required support positions—eliminating most of the remaining vacant units. However, according to the study, these conversions will cost up to an additional $2.8 billion and could take many years to complete. The Army computes the number of casualties expected for each MRC as another measure of risk. Casualties are computed through a model that uses the Army’s full two-conflict requirement of 672,000, rather than the 528,000 authorized Army positions to meet that requirement. The number of casualties is a function of the population at risk, which is reflected in defense guidance; the wounded in action rate, which is calculated in the TAA modeling; and the disease, nonbattle injury rate, which is established by the Army Surgeon General. Campaign simulations generate the combatant battle casualties, which accounts for about 80 percent of all casualties. The remaining 20 percent are extended to support forces with algorithms. Variables that are considered in arriving at casualty estimates include the battlefield location (e.g., brigade area, division rear, and communications zone); intensity of the war fight (e.g., defend, attack, and delay); and the weapon systems involved. The Army uses a high-resolution model that pits individual weapon systems against one another to project equipment and personnel killed or injured for a multitude of platforms (e.g., 12 different types of tanks, light armored vehicles, and helicopters), according to their lethality under various conditions (e.g., moving, stationary, and exposed). Once the Army computes its casualties for each MRC, it does not increase its force requirements to provide casualty replacements. Otherwise, its personnel requirements would be much higher and shortfalls would be greater. The Army reasons that given the anticipated short duration of the MRCs, there will be little opportunity for significant replacements of individuals killed or otherwise unavailable for duty. However, if a need arose, individual replacements likely would be drawn from soldiers who had just completed their introductory training or by mobilizing the Individual Ready Reserve. Some of the assumptions and model inputs adopted for TAA 2003 lead to understated support force requirements. Without rerunning the theater campaign models with different assumptions and model inputs, the Army cannot determine the impact of changes in most of these assumptions, such as delaying the call-up of reserve forces on force requirements. However, some assumptions lend themselves to estimable force level equivalents, such as coalition support requirements. To the extent that less favorable assumptions would increase the Army’s support requirements, the risks associated with the current force may be higher than suggested by TAA 2003 results. During TAA, the Army used many key assumptions in modeling the two MRCs that were identical or similar to assumptions cited in the defense guidance then in effect. Some of these assumptions were favorable, that is, they tended to minimize risk to U.S. forces and objectives. These included: Immediate access to ports and airfields. TAA assumed that U.S. forces would have immediate, unobstructed access to ports and airfields in the theater of operation. An adverse case excursion was modeled in which immediate access to primary ports and airfields was denied in a one-MRC scenario. This excursion reflected a requirement for additional positions above that needed for two nearly simultaneous MRCs when it was assumed that immediate access would be available. Over 90 percent of this additional requirement was for transportation and quartermaster positions—positions already in short supply. However, in stating its requirements for TOE forces, the Army used the base case requirement of 672,000 positions. Timely decisions by the National Command Authorities. TAA assumed that the call-up of reserve forces coincided with the day U.S. forces deploy to the first MRC and that the activation of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, civilian aircraft that augment the military in wartime, occurs early. For the reserve call-up to occur on the same day as the first deployment of U.S. forces assumes that it occurs at the earliest feasible opportunity. Limited chemical use. TAA assumed limited use of chemical weapons by enemy forces in each of the MRCs. Because of the constrained amount of chemical weapons modeled, some TAA participants did not believe the scenario provided a realistic representation. A more intensive chemical attack was modeled in a single MRC adverse case excursion. Results of this excursion indicated a requirement for additional support forces, but this is not reflected in the overall TAA base case requirement of 672,000 spaces. For example, casualties resulting from chemical attacks were not modeled in TAA 2003 to identify the medical support requirement. Changes to any of these assumptions would have resulted in higher force requirements than those determined in TAA 2003. However, rather than present a range of requirements to reflect the results of less favorable assumptions, the Army focused solely on the base case in arriving at the results of TAA 2003. A list of the key assumptions used in TAA 2003 is provided in appendix IV. Support force requirements would also have been higher had the Army not taken steps to eliminate some workload requirements from consideration in TAA. For example, no requirements were added to support coalition partners, although historically the Army has provided such support. OSD officials estimate that support to coalition partners would result in an additional requirement of from 6,500 to 20,000 spaces. Also, support force requirements were determined based on a steady state demand rate, which does not account for above average periods of demand. This approach, called smoothing, disregards the cumulative effect of work backlogs. Smoothing can be problematic for units whose resources are based on the amount of workload to be performed, such as transportation, fuel supply, and ammunition supply units. For example, fuel off-loaded onto a pier will remain on the pier until transportation is available to move it. With smoothing, this backlog of fuel is forgotten; no resources are applied toward it because the Army model does not take into account workload that was not performed previously. Rather, the model considers each time period during the operation as a discrete, independent event. The effects of smoothing tend to diminish over time. However, for relatively short wars, such as those envisioned in illustrative planning scenarios contained in defense guidance, the impact can be significant. For TAA 2003, the effect of smoothing understated the support force requirement by more than 28,000 positions, according to Army officials. The branches most affected by smoothing were transportation (more than 18,400 positions) and quartermaster (more than 3,800 positions), the two branches with the highest number of unmet requirements, smoothing notwithstanding. Army officials told us that the requirement for cargo transfer and truck companies during the first 30 days of the first MRC is almost twice as great (183 percent) when the requirement is not smoothed, and three times as great over the entire conflict. Since TAA 2003 requirements are based on the two-MRC scenario, some officials have questioned whether the Army has given adequate attention to the role of OOTWs in the post-Cold War period and the demands these operations place on Army forces. In particular, some DOD officials, including CINCs, have concerns that the Army has not adequately considered delays or degradation in capability resulting from the extraction of forces from an OOTW to an MRC, or to the potential demands on supporting forces resulting from multiple OOTWs. Despite these concerns, the Army has no plans to change its approach to OOTWs in the currently ongoing TAA 2005. Defense guidance directed the Army to base TAA 2003 requirements on either two nearly simultaneous MRCs or on one MRC and one OOTW, whichever produced the greater requirement. To make this assessment, the Army modeled the force structure requirements of four individual OOTW excursions using defense illustrative planning scenarios and supporting intelligence and threat analysis information. These included requirements for a peace enforcement, humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, and a lesser regional contingency operation. Based on its modeling results, the Army concluded that requirements for one OOTW plus an MRC was less than the two-MRC war-fight requirement. In fact, the Army found that the aggregate support requirements of all four OOTWs were less than the support requirements for one MRC. Accordingly, the Army believes the needs of OOTWs can be satisfied by fulfilling the MRC requirements. The Army also observed that OOTWs could stress certain support specialties and used its excursion results to help “sharpen its assessment” of how Army resources should be allocated. For example, the Army conducted quick reaction analyses of the operational concept for employment and support of forces under the four defense planning OOTW scenarios. Among other results, these analyses identified a need for additional active Army support specialties, including transportation and quartermaster capability. The Army also found these specialties to be in short supply when it examined the impact of redeploying forces from an OOTW to an MRC. During OOTWs, the Army relies on active support forces and reserve volunteers, prior to a presidential call-up of reserve forces. To help mitigate this risk, Army officials told us they decided, to the extent possible, to redistribute resources during TAA to help overcome these key shortfalls. As shown on table 2.2, the Army shifted positions from other lower priority requirements to both the transportation and quartermaster branches in TAA 2003, although shortages remain and these branches are still heavily reliant on reserve forces. In the event the United States becomes involved in a major conflict, defense guidance assumes that the Army will withdraw its forces committed to OOTWs to respond to an MRC. Neither the Army nor the defense guidance acknowledges any potential for delays or degradation of mission capability of forces previously assigned to OOTWs in determining the Army’s support force requirements. However, both the Army’s own analyses and comments from the CINCs question this assumption. For example, as part of its risk assessment for TAA, the Army conducted an excursion to determine whether involvement in a significant OOTW would result in insufficient support force structure for the first 30 days of an MRC. The Army analysis found that about 15,000 active support forces participating in a sizable OOTW were required for this first MRC. The Army assumed it could extract these forces from the OOTW without delays or degradation in capability, but it provided no analysis to support this position. In contrast, TRADOC Analysis Center, in conducting a classified study on strategic risks, assumed as a given, that 20,000 Army active component resources would be committed to one or more OOTWs and would not be available to participate in the two-MRC war fight. Another TRADOC analysis has highlighted the reconstitution challenges encountered when moving support forces from an OOTW environment to an MRC, where personnel and equipment requirements frequently differ. During the planning phase of TAA 2003, the Forces Command commander recommended that the Army first determine the level of force structure it was willing to commit to OOTWs and then exclude this OOTW force from participating in the first MRC war fight. Both the TRADOC Analysis Center and the Forces Command commander were acknowledging that extraction from OOTWs could not be performed without consequences. CINCs also expressed concern regarding the Army’s handling of OOTWs in TAA 2003. For example, the CINC, U.S. Atlantic Command, stated that his major concern was in transitioning from an OOTW to an MRC, especially in the case of units with unique or highly specialized training and/or equipment. Similarly, the CINC, U.S. European Command asserted that some allowance must be developed in TAA to account for OOTW-type requirements, considering (1) their impact on a heavily committed resource base (i.e., active Army combat and support personnel) and (2) the time necessary to extract the troops from such missions if U.S. forces must be shifted to contend with an overwhelming threat to U.S. strategic interests. The CINC believes this is particularly important because U.S. commitments to these operations are significant and the trend to involve U.S. forces in such operations is on the rise. Our past review further supports the CINCs’ concerns. We reported that critical support and combat forces needed in the early stages of an MRC may be unable to redeploy quickly from peace operations because certain Army support forces are needed to facilitate the redeployment of other military forces. In addition, our follow-on peace operations study cited this deficiency as significant, because in the event of a short-warning attack, forces are needed to deploy rapidly to the theater and enter the battle as quickly as possible to halt the invasion. As part of its analysis of the four OOTW excursions, the Army developed troop lists and overall size estimates for each type of OOTW. These force size estimates suggest that multiple OOTWs could result in a major commitment of personnel resources—resources that have not been fully evaluated in the TAA process. This is the view of the current CINC, U.S. European Command, based on his expanded troop involvement in Bosnia, Macedonia, Turkey, and Africa. The CINC asserts that essential support personnel have been stretched to the limit for resourcing the above military operations in his area of geographic responsibility, including those associated with providing fuel supply and distribution capacity, heavy truck transportation, military police, fuel handling, and communications repair. By their nature, these operations tend to be manpower intensive. Thus, the CINC stated that the next TAA process should consider how to include specific operational scenarios of a lesser regional scale (i.e., OOTWs), in addition to the two MRCs. The Army lacks the quantitative data to assess how such potentially burdensome and repeated deployments of support troops in OOTW-like operations impact the Army. However, comments from both the CINCs and some Army officials suggest the need for improved force structure planning for such contingencies. Army officials responsible for TAA responded that the Army must assume that the forces needed for OOTW-type operations will come from the same pool of forces identified for use in the event of one or more MRCs, because this is a defense guidance requirement. As a result, the Army plans no future changes in how TAA approaches multiple OOTWs and their resourcing implications. This includes TAA 2005, which is now underway. In resourcing the Army’s support requirements for fighting two MRCs, the Army did not consider all available personnel at its disposal. By better matching available personnel with its requirements, we believe the Army could mitigate some of the risks disclosed in TAA 2003 results. Specifically, TAA did not consider support capabilities that currently exist in the National Guard’s eight divisions, civilian contractor personnel, TDA military personnel, or civilian defense personnel. Considering these personnel, most of which would be suitable to meet requirements for later deploying units, could enable the Army to somewhat reduce its shortfall of support personnel. However, it would not resolve the Army’s shortage of active support personnel to meet requirements in the first 30 days. TAA gave limited recognition to some host nation support to reduce the number of positions in unresourced units to 44,000, but is reluctant to place greater reliance on this resource until DOD resolves major issues as to when and how much support host nations will provide. In TAA 2003, the Army did not consider how to use the support capability that currently exists in the eight Army National Guard divisions that the Army does not envision using during a two-conflict scenario. Based on the Army’s analysis, some support capabilities in the National Guard divisions are similar or identical to support units in short supply. In our March 1995 report, we found that personnel in these divisions could be used to fill 100 percent of the vacant positions for 321 types of skills, including helicopter pilots, communications technicians, repair personnel, military police officers, intelligence analysts, and fuel and water specialists. In response, DOD formally concurred with our recommendation that the Army identify specific support requirements that could be met using National Guard divisional support units and develop a plan for accessing that support capability. This capability was not considered in TAA 2003 and we know of no plans to consider it in TAA 2005. Army officials advised us that while the National Guard units have specific personnel and equipment that could be used in wartime, the units do not clearly correlate with support units, and would likely deploy piecemeal rather than as full units, as the Army prefers. For this reason, Army officials advised us that there are no efforts underway to consider these personnel in TAA, as we recommended, even though in a wartime situation, the Army would, in fact, make use of these resources as a “fallback.” Since Army officials agreed that in some cases (for example, transportation), there may be potential for deployment to MRCs, planning how to access these forces in advance could reduce the number of unfilled positions in TAA. However, it would not reduce the Army’s late risk (i.e., the risk that forces might not arrive in the first 30 days of the first MRC), since these forces could not be mobilized, trained, and deployed in time. Contract personnel were also not considered in TAA 2003. The Army is already making greater use of contract personnel to provide many of the support services typically provided by its combat service support personnel. For example, through its Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, the Army has used contractor personnel to provide base camp construction and maintenance, laundry, food supply and service, water production, and transportation. In terms of timing, the Army’s current contract calls for logistical and construction support to be initiated within 15 days of the Army’s order. Among the most recent operations using contractor personnel are: Operation Restore Hope (Somalia); Operation Support Hope (Rwanda); Operation Uphold Democracy (Haiti); Operation Joint Endeavor (Bosnia); and Operation Deny Flight (Aviano, Italy). Civilian contractors were also used extensively in both the Korean and Vietnam wars to augment the logistical support provided to U.S. forces. However, the Army made no assessment in TAA 2003 to determine how much of its unresourced requirement could potentially be offset by contractor personnel. TAA 2003 also did not consider the potential use of TDA military personnel (with the exception of medical) and civilians, even though, in some instances, these personnel can and do deploy—sometimes on very short notice. Chapter 3 will discuss the need to unify the Army’s separate processes for allocating personnel to TOE and TDA, so that personnel who perform similar functions are considered together. Another potential resource pool the Army could consider to a greater extent is host nation support. To minimize war-fight risk, the Army does not use host nation support to offset requirements without a signed agreement from the host nation, and then only in cases where the joint war-fighting command is confident the support will be provided when and where needed. Host nation support that meets this test is only used to offset requirements for units that were not allocated any positions in TAA. In TAA 2003, host nation support offset over 14,000 of these positions. OSD officials who have reviewed TAA 2003 suggested that the Army place a greater reliance on host nation support by relaxing the requirement that the United States have formal agreements with the host nation to provide the support. OSD estimates that the Army could reduce its support force shortfall by as much as 42,000 if it were to count on likely host nation support even though formal agreements may not be in place. However, the Army’s current position is consistent with that of the Secretary of Defense, as reported in the Fiscal Year 1995 Annual Statement of Assurance to the President and Congress, under the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act. In that statement, the Secretary cites a material weakness in the Central Command’s program for validating quantities of wartime host nation support presumed to be available for use by U.S. forces, but not documented by formal agreements. The Central Command’s corrective action plan requires that lists of commodities and services required from the host nations be organized by location and time of availability and that the host nations’ political and military leaderships agree to these lists. We followed up with the Central Command to determine the status of their corrective action plan and were told that while efforts were underway to obtain such agreements, nothing was definite. Chapter 4 addresses further actions under way to respond to OSD’s analysis. While TAA is an analytically rigorous process, it is not an exact science. There are many assumptions and uncertainties involved in sizing Army support forces, and seemingly small changes can dramatically alter its final outcome. Among TAA’s strengths are that it bases many of its decisions on established Army doctrine, involves senior leadership throughout the process, and includes consensus building mechanisms among the branches. On the other hand, the Army may be able to improve some aspects of TAA’s methodology. For example, not all TAA model inputs were scrutinized to ensure they were free from error; the process does not easily accommodate changes that occur during its 2-year implementation cycle; TAA’s transportation model is not rerun with the required force; and the Army does not prioritize deficiencies that remain and develop action plans to mitigate risk. Participants’ exposure to TAA modeling was limited and focused on the results of the war gaming, not its methodology and detailed assumptions. Nonetheless, in TAA 2003, participants detected errors in model inputs late in the process, after the models had been run and requirements had been identified. While allocating positions, participants began to question whether fuel and water consumption rates had been understated. Since the TAA process had already been delayed as the Army considered how to account for OSD’s planned 20,000 reduction in end strength, the Army had an opportunity to convene a supplemental conference to allow time to rerun the models with revised inputs. The result was an additional support requirement of 48,000 positions. This experience caused some participants to question the degree to which the Army had scrutinized its planning data and assumptions. It also provides an illustration of how changes in the model inputs can dramatically alter the final results of TAA. In another example, the Army was able to reduce its medical-related support requirements in TAA 2003 by reducing the medical evacuation time from 30 to 15 days. Previously, the policy was 15 days within the first 30 days of the conflict and 30 days thereafter. This one change, which was supported by the Army’s medical branch, reduced the need for hospital beds in theater by 35 percent. This change led to reductions in branches like engineer and quartermaster, and in some types of medical units. Both OSD and Army officials agree that key model inputs, such as those for fuel, ammunition, and medical, need to be reviewed and validated because they can have such a significant impact on TAA results. The Army is responsible for providing certain logistics support to the other services during the two MRCs. TAA acknowledged the need for Army personnel to support the Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine Corps forces, and the Army solicited their wartime requirements through the war-fighting CINCs. For example, in TAA 2003, the Army’s assistance consisted primarily of providing overland transport of bulk fuel and ammunition. Based on CINC inputs, the Army added about 24,000 support positions to assist the other services in these areas, meeting 79 percent of their requirements. According to a Forces Command official, during a war, the war-fighting CINCs determine where to allocate these personnel. Additionally, some Army officials believe that some of the logistical support requirements such as those for transportation may be understated because the Army typically receives a poor response from the CINCs concerning the other services’ requirements. The Army acknowledges it needs more accurate estimates of the other services’ needs. Because of the time needed to complete a full TAA cycle, almost 2 years, the Army may find that key assumptions or data inputs, while valid at the time, have essentially been overtaken by events. TAA has a limited ability to accommodate changes in strategy or key assumptions that occur beyond its initial planning phase. This inability to accommodate change undercuts the Army’s case that TAA is focused on the future, that is, Army force structure required 9-years out. The following examples in TAA 2003 illustrate this point. First, soon after TAA 2003 was completed, the Secretary of Defense issued new guidance reflecting a significant change in scenarios. TAA 2003 assumed that the MRCs would be sequenced differently, consistent with earlier guidance. A subsequent analysis by the Army showed that if the more current guidance had been used, an additional 40,000 warfight support positions would have been required. TAA 2005 could also be impacted by changes in defense strategy since the Army plans to run its models based on the existing two-conflict strategy. The ongoing Quadrennial Defense Review could change this strategy and lessen the usefulness of the Army’s TAA results. Second, in the middle of the TAA 2003 process, OSD issued a directive for the Army to reduce its active end strength by 20,000 toward a goal of 475,000 as early as practical, but no later than 1999. Army officials told us that TAA could not accommodate this change since it could not anticipate what parts of its force would be affected by the mandated cut, and any changes to its combat forces would affect how the Army fights. This, in turn, would result in changes to various inputs to the war fight model itself. The TAA process could be enhanced if additional analyses were conducted to reveal the impact of force size on the movement of forces to fight two major conflicts. The Army could have refined its mobility assessment by running the TAA 2003 required force through its transportation model, rather than exclusively relying on the earlier TAA 2001 required force. TAA models were run in the early stages of the process using a prior TAA (i.e., TAA 2001) generated force structure to establish a baseline for flowing forces into theater and to fight the war. At the conclusion of this phase of TAA, the Army determines its total war-fighting requirement. However, the Army does not rerun its models with this “required” TAA 2003 force to assess the impact of this larger force on moving forces to theater. Army officials agreed that rerunning its transportation model using the required force would improve TAA, and the Army is currently considering how to use its iterative modeling capability to its best advantage in TAA 2005. The Army does not prioritize force deficiencies that remain after TAA is completed and all force structure decisions are made, nor does it indicate what is being done to mitigate war-fighting risks. Examples of risk reduction measures include: use of new technology to overcome personnel shortages; new training initiatives (e.g., cross training personnel to perform more than one function); changing doctrine where appropriate; or drawing on other resource pools not addressed in TAA (e.g., civilians, reserves, and contractors). Although not formally documented in the TAA 2003 process, the Director of Army Force Programs told us that he is identifying actions to further mitigate the risks identified in TAA 2003. The Director cited studies on the feasibility of home station deployment and having unequipped reservists falling in on prepositioned equipment located in counterpart active Army units (e.g., the Army’s truck fleet could handle a greater workload if it had more drivers to take more shifts). In a period of declining resources, actions such as these could help the Army use its available resources more efficiently. While the Army believes it can support two MRCs, given existing force levels, and 10 fully active divisions, it has accepted some risks—most notably the lack of sufficient active support forces during the first 30 days of an MRC. TAA results indicate that 42 percent of all required support forces needed in the first 30 days of the first conflict will arrive late—about 79,000 soldiers. These late arrivers are tasked to provide essential services such as medical, engineering, transportation, and quartermaster support. The Army is also counting on the arrival of about 15,000 predominantly support personnel previously deployed to OOTWs during the first 30 days, even though CINC and Army officials question their availability and readiness during this time frame. Further, because the Army discounts peaks in demand in establishing its requirements through a technique called “smoothing,” actual workload for some types of units during the first 30 days is actually much higher than TAA 2003 requirements reflect—almost twice as high for some transportation units. Finally, TAA results reveal that the Army will have few active support forces—about 12 percent of total support forces required—available to support the second MRC and that 19,200 required active support positions in existing units are not authorized to be filled. Moreover, units totaling 58,400 positions are not authorized any personnel at all because the Army’s total wartime support requirement exceeds available personnel authorizations. The Army plans to mitigate this risk by relying on host nation personnel and converting some Army National Guard combat forces to support forces. These conversions are not yet funded and could take many years to be accomplished. Our examination of TAA assumptions and model inputs found that the Army used many favorable assumptions that may have understated risks to U.S. forces, such as limited chemical use by the enemy, assured port availability, and no delays in the call-up of reserves forces. In particular, the Army does not appear to have adequately considered delays or degradation in capability resulting from the extraction of forces from an OOTW to a major conflict, or to the potential demands on support forces resulting from multiple OOTWs. War-fighting commanders believe that such multiple OOTWs will add to the Army’s war-fighting risk. Since the Army does not conduct sensitivity analyses to assess the impact of less favorable assumptions, it does not know the extent to which changes in these underlying assumptions would increase Army support requirements and related risks. On the other hand, the Army could mitigate some risks by expanding its resource pool to include support capabilities that currently exist in the National Guard and TDA forces, as well as contract services—resources that, with the exception of medical, are presently excluded from TAA. While TAA is an analytically rigorous process with extensive modeling and wide participation by key Army personnel, some aspects of its methodology could be improved. Some participants questioned whether the Army had sufficiently scrutinized key model inputs, such as consumption factors for fuel and water. In addition, by not rerunning the campaign models with its required force, the Army missed an opportunity to fully assess how mobility limitations affected risk. To improve TAA’s ability to accurately project war-fighting requirements and allocate the Army’s personnel resources, we recommend that the Secretary of the Army reexamine key model inputs to ensure they are accurate and consistent perform analysis to determine how multiple OOTW support force requirements might differ from support force requirements based on two MRCs and bring any variances to the attention of the Secretary of Defense so that he can consider them in developing defense guidance; perform sensitivity analyses on significant model inputs, assumptions, and resourcing decisions to determine their impacts on war-fighting risk. For example, although the Army used assumptions established by defense guidance, determining the implications of less favorable conditions, such as delayed call-up of reserves, would provide the Army with additional information on which to base its assessment of risk; rerun TAA models with the required force to assess the impact of force size on mobility requirements; and determine how support units resident within the eight National Guard divisions, TDA military personnel, contractor personnel, and DOD civilians can be used to fill some support force requirements. In written comments on a draft of this report DOD fully concurred with four of our recommendations and partially concurred with one (see app. V). DOD noted that the Army has already planned some actions to resolve issues we identified. For example, DOD stated the Army is closely scrutinizing its model inputs for TAA 2005, beginning with a rigorous review of all 3,000 allocation rules, and major studies to review fuel consumption factors and casualty rates. The Army also plans to analyze the impact of multiple OOTWs on support requirements and agreed that the current assumption that all units involved in OOTWs will be immediately available for the war fight is flawed and overly optimistic. The Army also plans to conduct other sensitivity analyses and excursions in TAA 2005, beyond those required by defense guidance. Further, the Army will rerun TAA models with the required force to provide the force flow data needed to improve its analysis of risk. However, DOD only partially concurred with our recommendation to consider other personnel resources in filling its support force requirements. The Army plans to consider some types of Army National Guard Division assets to fill support force shortfalls where the capabilities are nearly a match, such as aviation assets. The Army also plans to further analyze how to use its TDA structure to meet both OOTW and war-fighting requirements. In the future, deployable TDA forces will be considered part of the Army’s operating force. However, DOD differs with us on recognizing civilian contractor personnel in TAA. The Army believes that while contractor personnel enhance the Army’s capabilities, they should not be considered an available resource in TAA since contractor personnel are not funded in the outyears of the Program Objective Memorandum. The Army also expressed concern about its ability to provide security to contractors in an MRC environment. Because contractor personnel have historically been used by the Army to provide support in many different types of overseas environments, both OOTWs and MRCs, we believe that, as a minimum, the Army could treat contractor personnel in the same way it treats host nation support—as an offset to unmet requirements. The Army can make assumptions concerning the funding of the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, just as it makes assumptions about such issues as the availability of host nation support, the size of the active Army force, or the level of modernization of the force in future years. Despite numerous Army initiatives to improve its TDA requirements determination process since the late 1970s, the Army cannot allocate its TDA personnel based on the workload required to complete TDA missions. As a result, the Army does not have a tool to prioritize TDA functions and has made across-the-board cuts in TDA that are not analytically based. Ongoing command and Army-wide initiatives to manage TDA based on workload, to include analyzing what work needs to be done and assessing how processes can be improved, will require senior Army leadership support for successful implementation. The Army has reviewed some TDA functions and identified a potential to reduce its TDA by up to 4,000 military positions as a result of its initial streamlining efforts. However, the Army’s end strength will not be reduced; rather, the positions will be used to offset shortfalls in TOE support forces. Plans for some of these initiatives, however, have not been finalized and it is difficult to definitively quantify some savings. Army TDA streamlining will continue through 2007. The Army is evaluating several options to consolidate its major commands, which could further reduce TDA requirements for active military personnel and introduce more efficient business practices. However, such a reorganization could be hampered without workload-based requirements. The Army’s potential for streamlining TDA will also be limited by several laws and regulations, such as civilian downsizing and TDA positions that are protected from Army force reduction initiatives. Finally, some personnel in TOE and TDA units perform similar functions which calls into question the need for separate resourcing processes. Some features of the Army’s process for using TDA medical personnel to fill positions in TOE medical units may provide a model for other functions with both TOE and TDA missions. Weaknesses in the Army’s ability to fully define force requirements for the institutional Army in terms of workload are long standing and have been reported by us and the Army since the late 1970s. Workload-based management is designed to help managers determine the resources needed to complete a job and logically respond to resource cuts. For example, using workload-based management, a manager could determine how many trainers would be required to train a certain number of students in a specified period of time. Weaknesses in its program leave the Army unable to analytically support its TDA requirements or define the risks of reducing this portion of the Army forces. Further, a weak requirements process prevents the Army leadership from making informed choices as to possible trade-offs among TDA functions and commands based on highest priority needs. According to Army regulation and policy, force requirements are to be logically developed from specific workload requirements derived from mission directives. Responsibility for allocating personnel resources to fulfill TDA missions belongs to the major commands. For fiscal year 1998, the Army projects its TDA force at over 123,000 military positions and over 247,000 civilian positions. Although TDA functions are carried out by military and civilian personnel depending on the type of mission, our focus was on the active military Army. Table 3.1 shows the distribution of active military TDA positions for fiscal year 1998. In response to our 1979 report criticizing the Army for its lack of workload-based information on which to determine personnel requirements, the Army developed a workload-based personnel allocation system, known as the Manpower Staffing Standards System. This system was intended to determine minimum essential requirements to accomplish TDA workload and identify operational improvements to increase efficiency and effectiveness. However, command officials told us that this process was time consuming and labor intensive, taking as long as 3 years to analyze a single function, and that the standards generated by it were often obsolete by the time they were issued. In 1994, the Army Audit Agency found that, as a result of these problems and lack of management tools to collect workload data, managers were not able to effectively determine or manage their TDA workloads and thus could not be assured that limited personnel resources were being distributed to the highest priority functions. During our review, Army headquarters officials acknowledged that the Army cannot articulate its TDA force structure in terms of workload, and we found varying levels of compliance with the Army’s workload-based management regulation at the major commands we contacted. The Intelligence and Security Command, with a 1998 TDA active end strength authorization of over 6,000, does not have a formal manpower study program due to downsizing and changes in workload. Allocation of TDA resources is done based on command guidance with functional staff’s input. An official at Forces Command, which has a 1998 active component TDA of about 13,000, told us that workload-based manpower management had not been a high priority in recent years because of turmoil in the workforce caused by downsizing and reallocation of workload due to base realignments and closures. Forces Command has a plan to conduct a comprehensive manpower assessment at each of its installations by the year 2000. This assessment will include validating work requirements, developing manning levels based on workload, and using cross-installation comparisons of functions to establish a model for future manpower requirements determination. TRADOC, the Medical Command, and the Army Materiel Command had more extensive workload-based management processes. Both the Medical Command and TRADOC employ workload-based standards for about 60 percent of their TDA positions and have processes to review workloads and resource allocations according to established requirements. The Army Materiel Command, which has a largely civilian workforce, began a review of all of its functions in March 1995 and completed this review of over 60,000 authorized military and civilian positions in January 1997. The review includes validating units’ requirements, analyzing and projecting workload, and applying available resources to that workload. Having visibility over the workload and the resources needed to complete it gives commanders greater control over their resources and enables them to identify inefficiencies. For example, at the Medical Command, the Surgeon General holds “bankruptcy hearings” for units that exceed established workload benchmarks. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs has developed a new methodology for workload-based management that is intended to address concerns that the Army does not know how big its institutional force needs to be to satisfy its requirements. The Army’s methodology includes an analysis of (1) the work that needs to be done based on organizational mission, (2) how to improve processes through better methods, benchmarking, capital investment, automation and improved facilities, and (3) the most appropriate technique for linking people to work. In addition, the Army is pilot testing an automated system for collecting and analyzing workload information and monitoring efficiency based on time spent completing functions. Army officials told us that the system could provide managers at all levels significant visibility over TDA resources and could ultimately be used to make trade-offs among TDA functions Army-wide. The Assistant Secretary’s office is also increasing its review of major commands’ requirements determination processes. Differing management philosophies on the use of workload-based requirements could challenge the Army-wide adoption of workload-based management. For example, one resource management official told us that he preferred across-the-board percentage cuts rather than cuts weighted according to workload, because this allows the commanders more autonomy in how they allocate their resources. In October 1996, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs stated that a challenge to adopting workload-based management will be changing the perspective of resourcing officials from a philosophy of managing personnel resources based on budget to managing personnel resources based on workload. Although managing to budget allows commanders to allocate resources based on available budgets, we believe that using it as the sole-allocation process does not provide the commander a vision of what cannot be done as a result of declining budgets and may discourage commands from identifying efficiencies if they know they will be receiving a cut regardless. In addition, managing to budget does not provide an analytical basis on which to make trade-offs among TDA workload priorities. For example, during deliberations for TAA 2001, which was completed in 1993, an attempt by major command representatives to allocate a cut in TDA positions among their commands ended in gridlock, in part due to the lack of an analytical basis on which to divide the resources. The result was that each command’s TDA military positions were cut by 7.5 percent, regardless of its individual missions or requirements. Such a cut impacts some commands more than others. For example, Intelligence and Security Command officials told us that 75 percent of its officers were controlled by other agencies; therefore, it could not eliminate any of these positions. As a result, an across-the-board 7.5 percent reduction applied to Intelligence and Security Command officers fell disproportionately on the remaining 25 percent of its officers that the command had authority over. Efforts to allocate resources based on workload will require the support of the Army leadership to be successful. The long-standing weaknesses with the Army’s process, despite numerous efforts to improve it, suggest that a higher level of reporting and oversight may be warranted. However, the Army has not reported its historic lack of compliance with its workload-based allocation policy as a material weakness under the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act (P.L. 97-255). Policy implementing the act requires agencies to establish internal controls to provide reasonable assurance that programs are efficiently and effectively carried out in accordance with applicable law and policy. One criterion for determining whether an internal control weakness is material is if it significantly weakens safeguards against waste. If lack of workload analysis, which does not comply with Army policy and does not safeguard against waste, was reported to the Secretary of Defense as a material weakness, the Secretary of the Army would be required to develop a corrective action plan with milestones for completion. As required by OSD guidance, responsible OSD officials would then need to assess whether this problem is a DOD-wide systemic weakness and whether it is a weakness of sufficient magnitude to be reported in OSD’s annual statement of assurance to the President and Congress. Despite the lack of workload data to define specific requirements of the TDA force, the Army is re-engineering its processes and redesigning the overall TDA organization through a series of streamlining initiatives. Although these efforts have some aspects that are similar to workload analysis, these are one-time, Army-wide assessments intended to provide a forum for re-engineering many Army functions. The Army defines re-engineering as a “fundamental rethinking and radical redesign of business processes to achieve dramatic improvements in critical, contemporary measures of performance.” In contrast, workload management is a tool for conducting more micro-levels of analysis on a unit-by-unit basis. The streamlining and re-engineering effort, known as the Force XXI Institutional Army Redesign, is one component of the overall Force XXI redesign. The other two components are the redesign of the combat forces and an effort to incorporate information age technology into the battlefield. The institutional redesign will take place in three phases to correspond with presidential budget cycles. Phase I, completed in March 1996, resulted in modifications to the 1998-2003 Army Program Objective Memorandum. Phases II and III will be completed in time to update the 2000-2005 and the 2002-2007 budgets, respectively. As a result of the phase I reviews of TDA missions, to include acquisition, training, mobilization, recruiting, personnel management and redesign of the Department of Army Headquarters, the Army eliminated 13 headquarters offices, realigned a major command, and identified almost 4,000 active military positions that will be cut from TDA and transferred to the TOE end strength between 1998 and 2003. Before the TDA cuts were identified, TAA 2003 applied 2,000 TDA positions to unmet support force requirements in anticipation of the streamlining results. Officials told us that the remaining 2,000 positions will also be transferred to the deployable portion of the force to fill shortages in units that are at less than full strength, although they could not specify the units. Furthermore, many of the 4,000 positions that are being shifted are based on initiatives that have not been fully tested or approved. Thus, the expected savings are not assured. The largest single planned transfer of 2,100 positions is the result of an Army proposal to replace active TDA military assigned to the Senior Reserve Officer Training Corps with reserve component, noncommissioned and retired officers. This proposal is being studied by TRADOC and would require a change in legislation to authorize the use of retired and additional reserve personnel, according to the Army. If pilot testing shows the concept is infeasible, or if the legislative enabler the Army is proposing is not passed, the Army would need to find a means to accomplish this function since it has already taken these TDA reductions. In another example, the Army anticipates reducing attrition, thereby freeing up 750 TDA positions associated with training and recruiting. The Army’s plan to reduce attrition is based primarily on establishing an advisory council to provide commanders with attrition statistics and review policies that impact attrition. As a result, the Army cannot be certain that the anticipated TDA transfers can be realistically accomplished. The Army’s efforts to streamline its institutional force are linked to a conceptual model delineated in a draft Department of the Army Pamphlet, 100xx entitled “Force XXI Institutional Force Redesign.” The model identifies the core competency of the TDA force, divides this competency into 4 core capabilities, and divides the 4 capabilities into 14 core processes, as shown in table 3.2. The Army plans to align its organizations around the core capabilities and core processes, so that there would be one office with lead responsibility for each process. For example, under the current structure, several commands, including TRADOC, the Intelligence and Security Command, and U.S. Army, Europe, have responsibility to develop Army doctrine. Under the streamlined model, TRADOC would have the lead responsibility for doctrine writing. The Army will use this framework to align the TDA organization with core processes. The Army has developed three organizational models that would reduce the number of major commands and are intended to eliminate duplication, establish clearer lines of authority, streamline resource management, and could further reduce TDA military personnel. For example, one model would reduce the Army from its current structure of 14 major commands to a total of 10 commands, with 3 major commands and 7 Army service component commands to support the CINCs. The three major commands would be aligned to the “Develop the Force,” “Generate and Project the Force,” and the “Sustain the Force” core capabilities with the Department of the Army Headquarters assuming responsibility for the “Direct and Resource” capabilities. However, these models are illustrative and were presented as a starting point for further discussion and do not directly address shortfalls in defining requirements based on workload. As such, officials said they could not provide a specific date on which any of these models would be in place or estimate how many positions might be saved through streamlining. Additional streamlining of the Army’s TDA force must accommodate limitations from legislative, regulatory, and budgetary guidance. These actions can influence the size and composition of the institutional Army force, but are outside the Army’s span of control. For example, DOD’s ongoing civilian drawdown limits the Army’s ability to convert military positions to generally less expensive civilian positions. In 1994 and 1996, we reported that there were opportunities for the Army to convert certain enlisted and officer support positions from military to civilian status, but to overcome impediments to conversion, the Secretary of Defense would need to slow the civilian drawdown, or the Congress would need to reprogram funding. Further, officials in the commands we visited pointed to budgetary challenges to converting military positions to civilians. First, the commands are reluctant to convert military positions to civilian positions because they cannot be assured that operations and maintenance money, which funds civilian pay, will be available to hire a new civilian. Officials told us that the transfer of a military position to a civilian position is authorized years before the civilian is hired and sometimes by the year of execution, inadequate operations and maintenance funding prevent the command from hiring a new civilian. Second, local commanders have a disincentive to civilianize because civilian positions are paid in full from the installation’s budget while military personnel are paid out of the Army’s centralized military personnel budget. Also, some active military TDA positions are required by law or controlled by other agencies. As a percentage of the active component TDA force, these positions, sometimes referred to as “fenced” positions, will have increased from 29 percent in 1991 to a projected 37 percent in 2001. For example, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 restricts the Secretary of Defense from reducing medical personnel without providing certification to Congress that the number reduced is in excess of that required and that the reduction would not cause an increase in costs to those covered under the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services. Positions controlled by other agencies include those assigned to the National Foreign Intelligence Program. Under executive order, these positions are required and budgeted by the Director of Central Intelligence and cannot be reallocated without his permission. Table 3.3 summarizes the major categories of fenced positions and the change from 1991 to 2001. Although fencing ensures that selected high-priority missions are adequately staffed, to the extent positions are fenced, the Army must disproportionately reduce other non-fenced TDA categories to absorb across-the-board reductions. The distinction of a deployable TOE force and a nondeployable TDA force is becoming less clear and calls into question the necessity of maintaining separate processes to allocate personnel resources. The draft Army Pamphlet 100xx acknowledges a blurred distinction between operational and institutional forces because institutional forces are increasingly being called on to perform tactical support functions in areas such as intelligence, communications, transportation, logistics, engineering, and medical support. For example, an Intelligence and Security Command official told us that all of its TDA military personnel along with almost 600 civilians at the command are considered deployable. At Forces Command, we were told that TDA personnel assigned to directly support a TOE unit are expected to deploy with that unit. Another example is military police. In recognition of historical deployments of TDA military police to support law and order operations in theater, the Army plans to convert 1,850 TDA military police positions to TOE. The initiative would establish modular military police organizations that would be designed to provide capabilities in peace, conflict, and war. However, with the exception of medical, TDA specialties with potential use in a deployment are not considered available to be distributed among requirements in the TAA process. TAA does not model the relative risks of reducing TDA units compared to reducing below-the-line support TOE units. Nor does it consider trade-offs between below-the-line support units and support units embedded in combat divisions. Thus, the Army could overstate the risk of shortages in a below-the-line TOE branch, when in practice, TOE support units in combat divisions or TDA personnel are capable of performing similar functions. A unified resourcing process would give the Army visibility over all capabilities available to complete its missions, regardless of their classification as TOE or TDA. The Army’s process for handling medical requirements may provide a model for functions that are resident and required in both TOE and TDA forces. During peacetime, some deployable hospitals are maintained by a small cadre of personnel. During deployments, these hospitals are filled in with designated TDA medical personnel whose peacetime TDA mission is to staff Army medical treatment facilities. Medical reservists are in turn called up to back fill the medical treatment facilities. In TAA 2003, about 5,000 requirements were filled with predesignated TDA medical positions. While it may not be feasible to back fill certain specialties with reservists, two features of the medical model could be reviewed for broader application. First, the medical model formally recognizes and quantifies the dual duties of personnel assigned to TDA functions in peacetime but expected to deploy in operations. Second, it gives visibility to all medical assets, regardless of their classification as TOE or TDA forces. Army initiatives to analytically define and allocate TDA resources according to workload have not been effective. Although ongoing initiatives show some promise, they will require significant support by the Army leadership. If implemented, workload-based management could identify opportunities to streamline TDA functions and ensure that active military positions are allocated most efficiently. Of the potential 4,000 required positions for transfer to TOE by the Force XXI institutional redesign, many are contingent on Army plans that have either not been finalized or that are difficult to quantify. As a result, the anticipated reallocation should be viewed with caution. There is potential for further savings as the Army streamlines its TDA by aligning the organization with TDA core processes; however, streamlining may be limited by legislative, regulatory, and budgetary guidance. The reliance of TOE units on TDA personnel to complete missions calls into question the need for separate resourcing processes. A more unified process would permit the Army to consider how it can best meet requirements from a wider range of personnel at its disposal. In addition, it would allow for better management of personnel resources—one of the Army’s most expensive budget items. To improve the management and allocation of personnel resources to the institutional Army, we recommend that the Secretary of the Army report to the Secretary of Defense the Army’s long-standing problem with implementing workload-based analysis as a material weakness under the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act to maintain visibility of the issue and ensure action is taken and closely monitor the military positions the Army plans to save as the result of Force XXI initiatives and have a contingency plan in place in the event that these savings do not materialize. DOD’s comments on these recommendations appear in appendix V. DOD agreed that the Secretary of the Army should report its long-standing problems in managing its institutional personnel as a material weakness under the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act and develop a sound basis for allocating resources to these functions. As part of this effort, the Army intends to assess the potential benefit to the Army of new workload-based management tools being pilot tested by an office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army. DOD also concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of the Army closely monitor the military positions saved under Force XXI. The Army’s intent is to apply any such savings to authorization shortfalls in existing support units. However, the Army acknowledges that it is too soon to speculate on the size of any future savings. Reducing active Army support forces does not appear feasible now based on TAA 2003 results, which show that the Army cannot meet its early deployment needs. But a smaller combat and TDA force may be possible in the future, based on ongoing Army initiatives and efforts under way to review U.S. defense strategy and forces. Nevertheless, OSD’s current position on active Army end strength was not supported by detailed analysis. OSD cited potential end strength savings from the Army’s Force XXI streamlining initiatives as a basis to reduce the Army’s end strength to 475,000. However, while Force XXI’s emphasis on digitization and more efficient logistics practices may achieve end strength savings in the long term, these savings do not appear likely to occur by 1999, the time frame OSD established to achieve the 20,000 position drawdown. Following its decision to reduce the Army by 20,000 positions, OSD reviewed TAA 2003 results. OSD’s study questioned the Army’s determination of its support requirements but did not examine downsizing of the active Army. OSD’s assessment of the appropriate size of the active Army could change as a result of the congressionally mandated Quadrennial Defense Review. DOD is expected to assess a wide range of issues, including the defense strategy of the United States, the optimum force structure to implement the strategy, and the roles and missions of reserve forces. The number of divisions required or the mix of heavy and light divisions may change if a new strategy is adopted. Also, options may exist for restructuring the Army’s active divisions by integrating some reserve forces. Options to expand the role of the reserves would have the effect of reducing requirements for active combat forces. In April 1995, to free resources for modernization programs, OSD directed the Army to reduce its end strength by 20,000 no later than 1999. This guidance was reflected in DOD’s 1997 FYDP, which reduced the Army’s active force by 10,000 positions in both 1998 and 1999, along with related military personnel funding. However, in March 1996, the Army Chief of Staff testified that the active Army should not get any smaller. Instead, the Army planned to identify savings within its own budget sufficient to avoid the 20,000 position reduction. A memorandum from the Secretary of Defense cited the Army’s Force XXI initiative as the means by which the Army would identify efficiencies to reduce the force. However, according to Army documentation, Force XXI’s primary focus is to increase capability by leveraging technology, not to attain specific end strength reductions. The Army is experimenting with ways to streamline its TOE forces through its Force XXI redesign of its combat divisions, known as Joint Venture. For example, Joint Venture’s focus on increasing situational awareness by digitizing the battlefield and better managing logistics could reduce the size of Army divisions. However, the division redesign is not yet finalized and will not be fully implemented until 2010. The Army’s streamlining of its TDA force under Force XXI has identified about 4,000 excess active military spaces, but the Army plans to reallocate those spaces to fill unmet requirements in active TOE support forces. The Army’s efforts to streamline TDA under Force XXI, and additional streamlining initiatives and policy changes proposed by Army leadership, enabled the Army to increase its military personnel account throughout its fiscal year’s 1998-2003 Program Objective Memorandum to pay for the 20,000 spaces eliminated in DOD’s 1997 FYDP. Based on Army projections, we estimate that from 1998 to 2003, the Army will need about $3 billion in savings to pay for the 20,000 positions. The Army has identified almost $9 billion in savings over that same period, but considers only about $2 billion of those savings as finalized; the remaining $7 billion will require coordination and oversight among several Army organizations to be realized. For example, recommendations to reduce logistics costs, including reductions in acquisition lead time and spare parts inventories, account for over $2 billion in savings and will result in overhead cuts to the logistics community. The benefit of the overhead cuts will be realized by the commands through lower logistics costs. An Army official told us that such a disconnect between the entity doing the cutting and the entity receiving reductions in cost could make some of the initiatives difficult to manage. Further, some of the savings are based on across-the-board cuts to headquarters overhead that are not analytically based. As discussed in chapter 3, the Army has identified a potential to reduce its TDA force by 4,000 active military positions as a result of its initial Force XXI streamlining initiatives. Ongoing streamlining initiatives could further reduce TDA requirements for active military personnel. As a separate initiative, OSD reviewed TAA 2003’s methodology and results, but did not examine the issue of active Army end strength. OSD questioned whether the Army’s 672,000 TOE requirement was high based on its analysis of selected TAA assumptions and model inputs, and its comparison of Army support requirements based on TAA to those used in a 1995 DOD war game known as Nimble Dancer. OSD’s assessment was limited to an analysis of TOE forces, both active and reserve, and did not consider the question of availability of reserve forces during the first 30 days of a conflict, as did the Army’s TAA analysis. Nor did OSD assess another risk factor the Army deemed important, availability of active forces for the second MRC. The OSD study did not recommend a smaller Army, but did ask it to study some issues that affect the size of its TOE force. The Army did not agree that its support force requirements were high. However, at the direction of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Army did agree to review model inputs and assumptions that OSD questioned and to determine the impact of any changes on the size of the Army’s support forces. The Army also responded that it would make adjustments to TAA 2003 results if any errors were identified. Among OSD’s principle concerns were the following: Casualty estimates. OSD questioned whether the TAA models produced valid casualty estimates because of variances between Army casualty estimates and actual casualties experienced in battles dating back to World War II. Army casualty estimates are not used to size the Army medical force, but do influence support requirements in the theater of operations such as for quartermaster and engineer branches. Fuel consumption. OSD questioned whether Army fuel consumption rates were high based on a review of actual fuel issued to units during the Gulf War. Host nation support. OSD believed the Army could reduce its active support requirements by placing greater reliance on support from host nations. Currently, the Army reduces its unmet requirements by the amount of host nation support it expects to receive, based on signed agreements. (See chapter 2 for a discussion of material weaknesses in DOD’s host nation support program.) The Army has arranged for an independent analysis of its casualty estimation methodology and has asked the Director of the Joint Staff to query the CINCs concerning the availability of additional host nation support. The Army is conducting its own detailed analysis of its fuel consumption rates. OSD used the 1995 DOD war game Nimble Dancer to evaluate the reasonableness of the Army TOE requirements. By comparing the Nimble Dancer Army force level requirement of 457,000 TOE spaces to the TAA 2003 Army-generated war fight requirement of 672,000 TOE spaces (195,000 combat and 477,000 support forces), OSD identified a potential overstatement of 215,000 spaces. After adjusting for different assumptions used in TAA 2003 and Nimble Dancer, OSD concluded that the Army TAA 2003 requirements were high. While there may be insights to be gained by analyzing some aspects of the Nimble Dancer war game, we believe comparing the Army’s TAA 2003 force requirements against the Nimble Dancer force is problematic. In Nimble Dancer, DOD identified the availability of sufficient support forces as critical to the outcome of the conflict and determined that shortages could delay the start of the counterattack in the second MRC. However, as we noted in our June 1996 report on Nimble Dancer, DOD did not model or analyze in detail the sufficiency of support forces during the war game. For purposes of its baseline modeling, DOD assumed that support forces would accompany combat units when they deployed. Game participants held discussions concerning the impact of support force shortfalls, but deferred further analysis to the Army’s TAA 2003. The 457,000 spaces OSD used as a baseline for comparison to TAA 2003 was a notional Army force based on TAA 2001 and its purpose was to assess mobility, not end strength, requirements. Only the combat forces were played in the war game itself. Given the limited consideration given to support forces in Nimble Dancer, we do not believe comparisons with Army TAA 2003 are meaningful. Although OSD asserts that Army support requirements are high, it endorsed the concept of converting reserve positions from combat to support to fill the Army’s unmet requirements. These conversions were recommended by us in past reports, the Commission on Roles and Missions and most recently in a National Guard Division Redesign Study. In addition to the studies previously mentioned, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed OSD analysts to assess whether DOD has sufficient mobility assets to move (1) the Army’s full TOE requirement of 672,000, and (2) the force actually planned in the Army’s fiscal year’s 1998-2003 Program Objective Memorandum. In particular, the Deputy Secretary is interested in how scenario timelines would be affected if mobility assets are constrained to those actually planned. During TAA 2003, the Army relied on the Mobility Requirements Study Bottom-Up Review Update to establish available lift to move forces to theater. This was consistent with Secretary of Defense guidance. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 requires DOD to conduct a Quadrennial Defense Review by May 15, 1997. An independent panel of defense experts will submit a comprehensive assessment of DOD’s report and conduct an assessment of alternative force structures by December 1, 1997. In conducting its review, DOD must assess a wide range of issues, including the defense strategy of the United States, the force structure best suited to implement the strategy, the roles and mission of reserve forces, the appropriate ratio of combat forces to support forces, and the effect of OOTWs on force structure. The number of Army divisions or the mix of heavy and light divisions may change as a result of this study, particularly if a new strategy is adopted. For example, a strategy that places more emphasis on OOTWs might result in an active Army that has fewer heavy divisions and assigns a higher percentage of its active forces to support units. The review will also provide an opportunity to reassess the role of the Army’s reserve forces. For example, as a result of the BUR and the Army’s experience in the Persian Gulf War, the Army discontinued its reliance on reserve component “round-up” and “round-out” brigades to bring the active divisions to full combat strength during wartime. However, options may exist to adopt some variant of this concept, such as integrating reserve forces at the battalion level or assigning reserve forces a role in later deploying active divisions. Options to expand the role of the reserves would have the effect of reducing requirements for active combat forces. OSD did not support its plan to reduce the Army’s active end strength with detailed analysis. OSD’s assessment of TAA 2003 identified issues worthy of further analysis, but did not draw conclusions about the size of the active Army. Future active Army end strength will likely be affected by several ongoing Army streamlining initiatives, and potential changes to military strategy and the role of reserve forces resulting from the upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review. TDA streamlining may identify additional opportunities to reduce active TDA personnel by reducing the number of major commands and adopting broader use of workload analysis. Force XXI’s emphasis on digital technology and just in time logistics may result in smaller combat divisions in the future. Other options for restructuring combat forces include reassessing the mix of heavy and light divisions and assigning reserve forces a role in later deploying active divisions. However, given the risks the Army has accepted in its active support forces, we do not believe it is feasible for the Army to reduce its active support forces at this time. In addition to DOD’s official agency comments (see app. V), the Army provided technical comments on a draft of this report concerning the role of reserve forces in any new strategy proposed by the Quadrennial Defense Review. The Army believes that the use of round-up/round-out brigades is a Cold War concept not viable for an early response power projection force. However, the Army says it is currently studying options to employ “multi-component” units, that is, combining an active unit with an associated reserve unit that is organized with fully trained personnel and minimal equipment. Upon mobilization, associate units would deploy and augment the active component unit, or earlier deploying reserve component units, increasing their capability by adding qualified personnel. Our report does not recommend a return to the round-up and round-out concept used in the past. Rather, our intention was to suggest that there may be a variant of this concept that would allow the Army to make greater use of its reserve forces. The Quadrennial Defense Review provides an opportunity for such new concepts to be considered. We have not reviewed the multi-component concept currently being analyzed by the Army, but agree that new approaches that better integrate the Army’s active and reserve forces and optimize the use of available equipment should be explored.

Summary: Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed how the Army determines its support force requirements, and the results of its most recent process for allocating support forces, known as Total Army Analysis (TAA) 2003. GAO found that: (1) it does not appear feasible to have a smaller active Army support force at this time, but a smaller active combat force and institutional force may be possible in the future; (2) a smaller active support force today would certainly increase the Army's risk of carrying out current defense policy; (3) current initiatives being explored by the Army regarding its institutional force could lead to greater efficiencies and thus a smaller active force; (4) improvements in the requirements determination process for both support forces and institutional forces could provide greater assurance that the size and composition of the Army is appropriate to meet war-fighting needs; (5) on the basis of TAA 2003 results, the Army believes it can deploy sufficient support forces to meet the requirements of two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRC) with moderate risk; (6) because it lacks adequate active support forces and must rely on reserve forces that take more time to be readied to deploy, an estimated 79,000 support forces needed in the first 30 days would arrive late; (7) support forces needed for the second conflict would consist of only 12 percent active forces; (8) high reliance on reserves for use in the second MRC may entail risk if the second MRC occurs without warning, or if mobilization is delayed; (9) existing active support units are short another 19,200 required positions and some required support units exist only on paper; (10) TAA 2003 had some limitations and the Army's risk assessment depends largely on the assumptions and model inputs that were adopted for TAA 2003; (11) the Army used many favorable assumptions that, although consistent with defense guidance, understated risk; (12) the Army's recent efforts to streamline the institutional active Army by identifying better ways to organize and adopt more efficient business practices have identified up to 4,000 military positions that the Army plans to use to offset active support shortfalls; (13) the Army may reduce the number of major commands, which could result in some additional force savings in the future; (14) however, the Army's efforts to make its institutional force more efficient and potentially smaller are hampered by long-standing weaknesses in its process to determine institutional force requirements; (15) GAO's analysis indicates that the Department of Defense (DOD) has not supported its proposal to reduce the active Army to 475,000 by 1999 with sound analysis; and (16) DOD has an opportunity to explore these and other alternatives during its Quadrennial Defense Review.