CBP has divided geographic responsibility for the southwest border among nine Border Patrol sectors, as shown in figure 1 (see app. II for general information about Border Patrol sectors). Each sector has a varying number of stations, with agents responsible for patrolling within defined geographic areas. Within these areas, Border Patrol has reported that its primary mission is to prevent terrorists and weapons of terrorism from entering the United States and also to detect, interdict, and apprehend those who attempt to illegally enter or smuggle any person or contraband across the nation’s borders. Move mouse over the sector name to learn more about the sector. Each Border Patrol sector is further divided into stations. For example, the Tucson sector has divided geographic responsibility across eight stations, seven of which have responsibility for miles of land directly on the U.S.-Mexico border. Within the station areas Border Patrol refers to “border zones”—those having international border miles—and “interior zones”—those without international border miles. According to Border Patrol officials, zones allow sectors to more effectively analyze border conditions, including terrain, when planning how to deploy agents. Zone dimensions are largely determined by geography and topographical features, and zone size can vary significantly. See figure 2 for Tucson sector station and zone boundaries (see app. III for general information about the Tucson sector stations). Move mouse over the station name to learn more about the station. Border Patrol collects and analyzes various data on the number and types of entrants who illegally cross the southwest border between the land border POEs, including collecting estimates on the total number of identified—or “known”—illegal entries. Border Patrol collects these data composed of the total number of apprehensions, turn backs, and got aways as an indicator of the potential border threat across locations. Border Patrol reported that for nearly two-thirds of the remaining 1,120 southwest border miles, resources were in place to achieve a high probability to detect illegal activity, but the ability to respond may be compromised by insufficient resources or inaccessible terrain; while for the remaining border miles, insufficient resources or infrastructure inhibited detection or apprehension of illegal activity. its Fiscal Year 2010-2012 Annual Performance Report. DHS established an interim performance measure until a new border control goal and measure could be developed. Border Patrol issued its new 2012-2016 Strategic Plan in May 2012, stating that the buildup of its resource base and the operations conducted over the past two decades would enable the Border Patrol to focus on mitigating risk rather than increasing resources to secure the border. In contrast to the 2004 Strategy, which also recognized the importance of rapid mobility, the leveraging of partnerships, and accurate and useful intelligence, the new strategic plan places a greater emphasis on the integration of partner resources into operational planning and enforcement efforts, particularly partners external to DHS. (See app. IV for strategic goals and objectives presented in Border Patrol’s 2004 Strategy and 2012-2016 Strategic Plan.) Border Patrol apprehensions have decreased in the Tucson sector and across the southwest border, and DHS has reported data meeting its goal to secure the land border with a decrease in apprehensions. The decrease in apprehensions mirrored the decrease in estimated known illegal entries within each southwest border sector. Border Patrol officials attributed the decrease in apprehensions and estimated known illegal entries within southwest border sectors to multiple factors, including changes in the U.S. economy. While changes in apprehension levels provide useful insight on activity levels, other types of data may also inform changes in the status of border security, including changes in the percentage of estimated known illegal entries who are apprehended and who repeatedly cross the border illegally (recidivist rate), increases in seizures of drugs and other contraband, and increases in apprehensions of aliens from special interest countries (ASIC) that have been determined to be at a potential increased risk of sponsoring terrorism. Since fiscal year 2011, DHS has used changes in the number of apprehensions on the southwest border between POEs as an interim measure for border security as reported in its Annual Performance Report. In fiscal year 2011, DHS reported data meeting its goal to secure the land border with a decrease in apprehensions. These data show that Border Patrol apprehensions within each southwest Border Patrol sector decreased from fiscal years 2006 to 2011, generally mirroring the decrease in estimated known illegal entries within each sector. In the Tucson sector, our analysis of Border Patrol data showed that apprehensions decreased by 68 percent from fiscal years 2006 to 2011, compared with a 69 percent decrease in estimated known illegal entries, as shown in figure 3. (See app. V for additional information.) Border Patrol officials attributed the decrease in apprehensions and estimated known illegal entries within southwest border sectors to multiple factors, including changes in the U.S. economy and successful achievement of its strategic objectives. Border Patrol’s ability to address objectives laid out in the 2004 Strategy was strengthened by increases in personnel and technology, and infrastructure enhancements, according to Border Patrol officials. For example, Tucson sector Border Patrol officials said that the sector increased manpower over the past 5 years through an increase in Border Patrol agents that was augmented by National Guard personnel, and that CBP’s Secure Border Initiative (SBI) provided border fencing and other infrastructure, as well as technology enhancements. Border Patrol officials also attributed decreases in estimated known illegal entries and apprehensions to the deterrence effect of CBP consequence programs—programs intended to deter repeated illegal border crossings by ensuring the most efficient consequence or penalty for individuals who illegally enter the United States. One such multiagency initiative, Streamline, is a criminal prosecutions program targeting aliens who illegally enter the United States through designated geographic locations. Border Patrol collects other types of data that are used by sector management to help inform assessment of its efforts to secure the border against the threats of illegal migration, smuggling of drugs and other contraband, and terrorism. These data show changes in the (1) percentage of estimated known illegal entrants who are apprehended, (2) percentage of estimated known illegal entrants who are apprehended more than once (repeat offenders), (3) number of seizures of drugs and other contraband, and (4) number of apprehensions of persons from countries at an increased risk of sponsoring terrorism. In addition, apprehension and seizure data can be analyzed in terms of where they occurred relative to distance from the border as an indicator of progress in Border Patrol enforcement efforts. Border Patrol officials at sectors we visited, and our review of fiscal years 2010 and 2012 sector operational assessments, indicated that sectors have historically used these types of data to inform tactical deployment of personnel and technology to address cross-border threats; however, the agency has not analyzed these data at the national level to inform strategic decision making, according to Border Patrol headquarters officials. These officials stated that greater use of these data in assessing border security at the national level may occur as the agency transitions to the new strategic plan. The 2004 Strategy recognized that factors in addition to apprehensions can be used to assess changes in Border Patrol’s enforcement efforts to secure the border, including changes in the percentage of estimated known illegal entrants who are apprehended (apprehensions as a percentage of estimated known illegal entrants), and changes in the number and percentage of apprehensions made closer to the border. Border Patrol headquarters officials said that the percentage of estimated known illegal entrants who are apprehended is primarily used to determine the effectiveness of border security operations at the tactical— or zone—level but can also affect strategic decision making. The data are also used to inform overall situational awareness at the border, which directly supports field planning and redeployment of resources. Our analysis of Border Patrol data for the Tucson sector showed little change in the percentage of estimated known illegal entrants who were apprehended by the Border Patrol over the past 5 fiscal years. Specifically, our analysis showed that of the total number of estimated known aliens who illegally crossed the Tucson sector border from Mexico each year, Border Patrol apprehended 62 percent in fiscal year 2006 compared with 64 percent in fiscal year 2011, an increase of about 2 percentage points. Results varied across other southwest border sectors, as shown in appendix V. Over the last fiscal year, however, Border Patrol apprehensions across the southwest border and in the Tucson sector have occurred closer to the border. In the Tucson sector, for example, the percentage of apprehensions occurring more than 20 miles from the border was smaller in fiscal year 2011 than in fiscal year 2010, while a greater percentage of apprehensions in fiscal year 2011 occurred more than 5 to 20 miles from the border, as shown in figure 4. There was little change in the percentage of apprehensions within 1 mile of the border. Similarly, apprehensions across the southwest border have also moved closer to the border over time, with the greatest percentage of apprehensions occurring more than 5 to 20 miles from the border in fiscal year 2011. (See app. VI for additional information.) Of the 13 ranchers we spoke or corresponded with in the Tucson sector, 6 said they would like to see Border Patrol enforce closer to the border to prevent illegal entry and trespass on their properties. Generally, these ranchers indicated that the level of illegal migrants coming across their properties had declined, but said the level of drug smuggling had remained constant. They were most concerned about safety, but cited considerable property damage and concerns that illegal trafficking had affected land values and driven up costs in the ranching industry. Border Patrol officials in the Tucson sector said that some factors precluding greater border presence included terrain that was inaccessible or created a tactical disadvantage, the distance from Border Patrol stations to the border, and access to ranches and lands that were federally protected and environmentally sensitive. Border Patrol officials also said they have taken steps to address factors that prevent closer access to the border, such as establishing forward operating bases—permanent facilities in remote locations near the border—and substations closer to the border, and working with ranchers and the federal government to ensure access to protected lands. The 2004 Strategy stated that changes in the percentage of persons apprehended who have repeatedly crossed the border illegally (referred to as the recidivism rate) is a factor that Border Patrol considers in assessing its ability to deter individuals from attempting to illegally cross the border. Our analysis of Border Patrol apprehension data showed that the recidivism rate has declined across the southwest border by about 6 percentage points from fiscal year 2008 to 2011 in regard to the number of apprehended aliens who had repeatedly crossed the border in the prior 3 years. Specifically, our analysis showed that the recidivism rate across the overall southwest border was about 42 percent in fiscal year 2008 compared with about 36 percent in fiscal year 2011. The Tucson sector had the third highest recidivism rate across the southwest border in fiscal year 2011, while the highest rate of recidivism occurred in El Centro sector, as shown in figure 5. According to Border Patrol headquarters officials, the agency has implemented various initiatives designed to address recidivism through increased prosecution of individuals apprehended for crossing the border illegally. The 2004 Strategy identifies the detection, apprehension, and deterrence of smugglers of drugs, humans, and other contraband as a primary objective. Border Patrol headquarters officials said that data regarding seizures of drugs and other contraband are good indicators of the effectiveness of targeted enforcement operations, and are used to identify trends in the smuggling threat and as indicators of overall cross-border illegal activity, in addition to potential gaps in border coverage, risk, and enforcement operations. However, these officials stated that these data are not used as a performance measure for overall border security because while the agency has a mission to secure the border against the smuggling threat, most smuggling is related to illegal drugs, and that drug smuggling is the primary responsibility of other federal agencies, such as the Drug Enforcement Administration and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Homeland Security Investigations. Our analysis of Border Patrol data indicated that across southwest border sectors, seizures of drugs and other contraband increased 83 percent over the past 5 fiscal years, with drug seizures accounting for the vast majority of all contraband seizures. Specifically, the number of drug and contraband seizures increased from 10,321 in fiscal year 2006 to 18,898 in fiscal year 2011. Most seizures of drugs and other contraband occurred in the Tucson sector, with about 28 percent, or 5,299, of the 18,898 southwest border seizures occurring in the sector in fiscal year 2011, as shown in figure 6. Further analysis of these data in the Tucson sector showed that the percentage of drugs and other contraband seized closer to the border— 5 miles or less—decreased slightly from fiscal year 2010 to fiscal year 2011. Specifically, the Tucson sector made 42 percent of drug and other contraband seizures within 5 miles of the border in fiscal year 2010, and 38 percent within 5 miles of the border in fiscal year 2011. Across other southwest border sectors, the distance from the border where seizures occurred varied, as shown in figure 7. For example, about 49 percent of the seizures in the El Centro sector occurred within 1 mile of the border in fiscal year 2011 compared with less than 7 percent of seizures within 1 mile of the border in the El Paso sector. Border Patrol headquarters officials stated that variances in data across sectors reflect geographical and structural differences among Border Patrol sectors—each sector is characterized by varying topography, unique ingress and egress routes, land access issues, and differing technology and infrastructure deployments, all of which affect how a sector operates and therefore the ability to make seizures at or near the border. The 2004 Strategy identified the detection and prevention of terrorists and their weapons from entering the United States between the ports of entry as a primary objective. ASICs are considered to pose a greater potential risk for terrorism than other aliens, and Border Patrol headquarters officials said that they collect data on the number of ASIC apprehensions in accordance with the reporting and documentation procedures outlined in policy and guidance. However, Border Patrol headquarters officials stated that they did not consider changes in the number of ASICs apprehended in their assessment of border security because until recently, they had been primarily focused on reducing the overall number of illegal entries, and that terrorism was addressed by multiple agencies besides the Border Patrol, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the Department of Justice. Our analysis of Border Patrol data showed that apprehensions of ASICs across the southwest border increased each fiscal year from 239 in fiscal 2006 to 399 in fiscal year 2010, but dropped to 253 in fiscal year 2011. The Rio Grande Valley sector had more than half of all ASIC apprehensions across the southwest border in both fiscal years 2010 and 2011, as shown in figure 8. Further analysis of these data showed differences in progress to apprehend ASICs closer to the border in support of Border Patrol’s overall intention to prevent potential terrorist threats from crossing U.S. borders. For example, Rio Grande Valley sector nearly doubled the percentage of ASICs apprehended within 1 mile of the border from the preceding fiscal year, from 26 percent in fiscal year 2010 to 48 percent in fiscal year 2011. In contrast, ASIC apprehensions within 1 mile of the border in Tucson sector decreased from 26 percent in fiscal 2010 to 8 percent in fiscal year 2011. Across the southwest border, the greatest percentage of ASICs was apprehended more than 20 miles from the border in fiscal year 2011, as shown in figure 9. Border Patrol headquarters officials said they are transitioning to a new methodology to identify the potential terrorist risk in fiscal year 2013. This new methodology will replace the use of a country- specific list with a range of other factors to identify persons posing an increased risk for terrorism when processing deportable aliens. The Tucson sector scheduled a higher percentage of agent workdays to enforcement activities related to patrolling the border than other southwest border sectors in fiscal year 2011. However, until recently sectors have differed in how they collect and report data that Border Patrol used to assess its overall effectiveness in using resources to secure the border, precluding comparison across sectors. In September 2012, Border Patrol issued new guidance on standardizing data collection and reporting practices that could increase data reliability and allow comparison across locations. Border Patrol’s 2004 Strategy provided for increasing resources and deploying these resources using an approach that provided for several layers of Border Patrol agents at the immediate border and in other areas 100 miles or more away from the border (referred to as defense in depth). According to CBP officials, as resources increased, Border Patrol sought to move enforcement closer to the border over time to better position the agency to ensure the arrest of those trying to enter the country illegally. Headquarters and field officials said station supervisors determine (1) whether to deploy agents in border zones or interior zones, and (2) the types of enforcement or nonenforcement activities agents are to perform. Border Patrol officials from the five sectors we visited stated that they used similar factors in making deployment decisions, such as intelligence showing the presence of threat across locations, the nature of the threat, and environmental factors including terrain and weather. Our analysis of Border Patrol data showed differences across sectors in the percentage of agent workdays scheduled for border zones and interior zones in fiscal year 2011. Specifically, our analysis showed that while Tucson sector scheduled 43 percent of agent workdays to border zones in fiscal year 2011, agent workdays scheduled for border zones by other southwest border sectors ranged from 26 percent in the Yuma sector to 53 percent in the El Centro sector, as shown in figure 10. Border Patrol officials attributed the variation in border zone deployment to differences in geographical factors among the southwest border sectors—such as varying topography, ingress and egress routes, and land access issues, and structural factors such as technology and infrastructure deployments—and stated that these factors affect how sectors operate and may preclude closer deployment to the border. Additionally, many southwest border sectors have interior stations that are responsible for operations at some distance from the border, such as at interior checkpoints generally located 25 miles or more from the border, which could also affect their percentage of agent workdays scheduled for border zones. Southwest border sectors scheduled most agent workdays for enforcement activities during fiscal years 2006 to 2011 and the activity related to patrolling the border accounted for a greater proportion of enforcement activity workdays than any of the other activities. Sectors schedule agent workdays across various activities categorized as enforcement or nonenforcement. Across enforcement activities, our analysis of Border Patrol data showed that all sectors scheduled more agent workdays for “patrolling the border”—activities defined to occur within 25 miles of the border—than any other enforcement activity, as shown in figure 11. Border Patrol duties under this activity include patrolling by vehicle, horse, and bike; patrolling with canines; performing sign cutting; and performing special activities such as mobile search and rescue. Other enforcement activities to which Border Patrol scheduled agent workdays included conducting checkpoint duties, developing intelligence, and performing aircraft operations. (See app. VII for a listing of nonenforcement activities.) Border Patrol sectors and stations track changes in their overall effectiveness as a tool to determine if the appropriate mix and placement of personnel and assets are being deployed and used effectively and efficiently, according to officials from Border Patrol headquarters. Border Patrol calculates an overall effectiveness rate using a formula in which it adds the number of apprehensions and turn backs in a specific sector and divides this total by the total estimated known illegal entries— determined by adding the number of apprehensions, turn backs, and got aways for the sector. Border Patrol sectors and stations report this overall effectiveness rate to headquarters. Border Patrol views its border security efforts as increasing in effectiveness if the number of turn backs as a percentage of estimated known illegal entries has increased and the number of got aways as a percentage of estimated known illegal entries has decreased. Our analysis of Tucson sector apprehension, turn back, and got away data from fiscal years 2006 through 2011 showed that while Tucson sector apprehensions remained fairly constant at about 60 percent of estimated known illegal entries, the percentage of reported turn backs increased from about 5 percent to about 23 percent, while the percentage of reported got aways decreased from about 33 percent to about 13 percent, as shown in figure 12. As a result of these changes in the mix of turn backs and got aways, Border Patrol data showed that enforcement effort, or the overall effectiveness rate for Tucson sector, improved 20 percentage points from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year 2011, from 67 percent to 87 percent. (See app. VIII for additional information.) Border Patrol data showed that the effectiveness rate for eight of the nine sectors on the southwest border improved from fiscal years 2006 through 2011. The exception was the Big Bend sector, which showed a decrease in the overall effectiveness rate, from 86 percent to 68 percent, during this time period. Border Patrol headquarters officials said that differences in how sectors define, collect, and report turn back and got away data used to calculate the overall effectiveness rate preclude comparing performance results across sectors. Border Patrol headquarters officials stated that until recently, each Border Patrol sector decided how it would collect and report turn back and got away data, and as a result, practices for collecting and reporting the data varied across sectors and stations based on differences in agent experience and judgment, resources, and terrain. In terms of defining and reporting turn back data, for example, Border Patrol headquarters officials said that a turn back was to be recorded only if it is perceived to be an “intended entry”—that is, the reporting agent believed the entrant intended to stay in the United States, but Border Patrol activities caused the individual to return to Mexico. According to Border Patrol officials, it can be difficult to tell if an illegal crossing should be recorded as a turn back, and sectors have different procedures for reporting and classifying incidents. In terms of collecting data, Border Patrol officials reported that sectors rely on a different mix of cameras, sign cutting, credible sources, and visual observation to identify and report the number of turn backs and got aways.additional information.) (See app. IX for According to Border Patrol officials, the ability to obtain accurate or consistent data using these identification sources depends on various factors, such as terrain and weather. For example, data on turn backs and got aways may be understated in areas with rugged mountains and steep canyons that can hinder detection of illegal entries. In other cases, data may be overstated—for example, in cases where the same turn back identified by a camera is also identified by sign cutting. Double counting may also occur when agents in one zone record as a got away an individual who is apprehended and then reported as an apprehension in another zone. As a result of these data limitations, Border Patrol headquarters officials said that while they consider turn back and got away data sufficiently reliable to assess each sector’s progress toward border security and to inform sector decisions regarding resource deployment, they do not consider the data sufficiently reliable to compare—or externally report—results across sectors. Border Patrol headquarters officials issued guidance in September 2012 to provide a more consistent, standardized approach for the collection and reporting of turn back and got away data by Border Patrol sectors. Each sector is to be individually responsible for monitoring adherence to the guidance. According to Border Patrol officials, it is expected that once the guidance is implemented, data reliability will improve. This new guidance may allow for comparison of sector performance and inform decisions regarding resource deployment for securing the southwest border. Border Patrol does not yet have performance goals and measures in place necessary to define border security and determine the resources necessary to achieve it. Border Patrol officials said that they had planned to establish such goals and measures by fiscal year 2012, but these efforts have been delayed, and are contingent on developing and implementing key elements of its strategic plan. Further, Border Patrol is in the process of developing a plan for implementing key elements of the 2012-2016 Strategic Plan that may be used to inform resource needs across locations, and expects to begin developing a process for assessing resource needs and informing deployment decisions across the southwest border once key elements of its strategic plan have been implemented in fiscal years 2013 and 2014. Border Patrol officials stated that the agency is in the process of developing performance goals and measures for assessing the progress of its efforts to secure the border between POEs and for informing the identification and allocation of resources needed to secure the border, but has not identified milestones and time frames for developing and implementing them. Since fiscal year 2011, DHS has used the number of apprehensions on the southwest border between POEs as an interim performance goal and measure for border security as reported in its Annual Performance Report. In February 2011, we testified that DHS intended to use this indicator as an interim performance goal and measure until it completed development of new border control performance goals and measures, which DHS officials expected to be in place by fiscal year 2012. However, as of September 2012, DHS had not yet issued new performance goals and measures for assessing border security or identified revised milestones and time frames for developing and implementing them. We previously testified that the interim goal and measure of number of apprehensions on the southwest border between POEs provides information on activity levels, but it does not inform program results or resource identification and allocation decisions, and therefore until new goals and measures are developed, DHS and Congress could experience reduced oversight and DHS accountability. Further, studies commissioned by CBP have documented that the number of apprehensions bears little relationship to effectiveness because agency officials do not compare these numbers with the amount of cross-border illegal activity. Border Patrol officials stated that DHS and Border Patrol have established a performance goal—linked to relevant measures—addressing border security that, as of October 2012, was being used as an internal management indicator. However, a DHS official said it has not been decided whether this goal and the associated measures will be publicly reported or used as an overall performance goal and measures for border security. to ensure results are achieved.project planning—such as identifying time frames—to be performed in the early phases of a program and recognize that plans may need to be adjusted along the way in response to unexpected circumstances. Time frames for implementing key elements of the 2012-2016 Strategic Plan can change; however, milestones and time frames for the development of performance goals and measures could help ensure that goals and measures are completed in a timely manner. Moreover, milestones and time frames could better position CBP to monitor progress in developing and implementing goals and measures, which would provide DHS and Congress with information on the results of CBP efforts to secure the border between POEs and the extent to which existing resources and capabilities are appropriate and sufficient. Border Patrol headquarters officials stated that they were in the process of developing a plan for implementing key elements of the 2012-2016 Strategic Plan that may be used to inform resource needs across locations, and expect to begin developing a process for assessing resource needs and informing deployment decisions across the southwest border once those key elements have been implemented. Border Patrol officials said that they planned to develop and implement key elements of the new strategic plan in fiscal years 2013 and 2014. According to Border Patrol officials, the Border Patrol 2012-2016 Strategic Plan identifies several key elements that are to inform agency resource needs and deployment decisions. Border Patrol officials reported in September 2012 that they were in the process of developing an implementation plan that is to lay out how key elements of the new strategic plan are to be implemented. Border Patrol officials reported that, in general, key elements of the strategic plan are to be developed and implemented during fiscal years 2013 and 2014. According to agency officials, key strategic plan elements to be addressed by the implementation plan that are to inform agency resource needs and deployment decisions include (1) a process for identifying risk that is to inform resource decisions, (2) the enhancement of mobile response capabilities to redeploy resources to address the shifts in threat, and (3) an approach to integrate partner resources and contributions to enhance Border Patrol capabilities (“whole-of-government” approach). Border Patrol officials told us that these elements are interdependent and must be developed, refined, and disseminated to the field to strengthen the effectiveness of the new strategic plan. According to these officials, delays in the development of one element would likely affect the development of others. For example, delays in implementing the new risk assessment tools could affect sectors’ ability to identify appropriate responses to changing levels of risk. Risk assessment tools. In September 2012, Border Patrol officials said they were in the process of developing two tools that are to be used in the field to identify and manage risk under the agency’s new risk management approach. The first tool for assessing risk is the Operational Implementation Plan (OIP), a qualitative process that prioritizes sector evaluations of border security threats and identifies potential responses. Border Patrol is developing a second tool—a quantitative model called the Integrated Mission Analysis Tool (IMAT)—that is to, among other things, assess risk and capability by predicting and identifying the need for various courses of action, such as the rapid response of resources to the highest risks. Actions are to be assessed based on a comparison of agency capability with risk. In contrast to the OIP, the IMAT is to be completed at the zone level by stations; consolidated station outputs may then be used by sectors to inform the OIP process. The IMAT is to use data from various sources to develop a “Border Assessment of Threat” of known or potential threats by zone and compare that assessment with a point-in-time operational assessment of each sector’s capability to determine to what extent current capability—including resources—matches the perceived risk. On the basis of the outcome, the station can then choose from various predetermined courses of action to address the perceived level of risk, such as reallocating resources or leveraging external—law enforcement partner—resources. Once the IMAT is fully implemented, Border Patrol plans for the resulting outputs to be used to reassess and inform OIP decision making; information from both systems is to be used to inform resource needs and deployment decisions after the 2012-2016 Strategic Plan has been implemented. According to Border Patrol officials, both the OIP and the IMAT are to identify risk and potential responses at the sector level. However, these tools will not allow Border Patrol to assess and prioritize risks and response options across sectors. Moreover, agency officials said that when the IMAT is fully deployed, in fiscal year 2014, it will not have the capacity to differentiate among threats related to terrorists and their weapons, drugs and other illegal contraband, and illegal migration (such as recidivism, in which individuals repeatedly cross the border illegally). Border Patrol officials said the agency plans to explore mechanisms for developing these capabilities— assessing risk across sectors and differentiating threat—once OIP and IMAT have been developed and implemented in fiscal year 2014. According to Border Patrol headquarters officials, as of August 2012, the agency was in the process of pilot testing the OIP and the IMAT in the field and expected to begin to initially implement the OIP and populate the IMAT through a web-based program that will record baseline data on threat and operational conditions throughout fiscal year 2013. Rapid deployment of resources. A second key element of the 2012- 2016 Strategic Plan is to increase mobility and rapid deployment of personnel and resources to quickly counter and interdict threats based on shifts in smuggling routes and tactical intelligence. As we testified in May 2012, CBP reported expanding the training and response capabilities of the Border Patrol’s specialized response teams to support domestic and international intelligence-driven and antiterrorism efforts as well as other special operations. Additionally, Border Patrol officials stated that in fiscal year 2011, Border Patrol allocated 500 agent positions to provide a national group of organized, trained, and equipped Border Patrol agents who are capable of rapid movement to regional and national incidents in support of high-priority CBP missions. However, we testified in May 2012 that Border Patrol officials had not fully assessed to what extent the redeployment of existing resources would be sufficient to meet security needs, or when additional resources would need to be requested. In September 2012, Border Patrol officials said they had not yet developed a process for assessing the need for, or implementation of, rapid deployment of existing resources to mitigate changing risk levels along the border, but expected to do so after programs and processes—key elements—identified in the strategic plan have been more fully developed. In the interim, deployment decisions—such as the redeployment of agents and mobile technology to border areas identified as having greater, or unacceptable, levels of risk—are to be made at the sector level. Integrated partner resources. A third key element of the 2012-2016 Strategic Plan is the capability of Border Patrol and federal, state, local, and international partners working together to quickly and appropriately respond to changing threats through the timely and effective use of personnel and other resources. According to the new strategic plan, this “whole of government” approach will be achieved through various efforts, including the expansion of operational integration (the combining of best practices, capabilities and strategies among partners) and jointly planned targeted operations (the leveraging of combined partner assets to address risks), the development and fusion of intelligence, and the creation of integrated partnerships (the sharing of resources, plans, and operations among partners). In December 2010, we recommended that CBP develop policy and guidance necessary to identify, assess, and integrate available partner resources in its operational assessments and resource planning documents. CBP concurred with this recommendation, but as of June 2012, Border Patrol had not yet required partner resources to be incorporated into operational assessments or into documents that inform the resource planning process. Border Patrol headquarters officials said that the agency has yet to finalize interim milestones for integrating partner resources into Border Patrol operational assessments and resource planning documents because it is still in the process of determining how partner resources are to be integrated; however, Border Patrol plans to have a process in place for that purpose in fiscal year 2014. According to Border Patrol officials, since the beginning of fiscal year 2011, as the agency began transitioning from the 2004 resource-based strategy to the 2012-2016 risk-based strategic plan, the Border Patrol has been using an interim process for assessing the need for additional personnel, infrastructure, and technology in agency sectors. Border Patrol officials said that resource needs using this interim process are intended to maintain the current status of border security, and will be used until key elements of the strategic plan—such as the OIP and the IMAT—that are necessary to develop a new process have been implemented in fiscal years 2013 and 2014. Under this interim process, Border Patrol has maintained, with some exceptions, personnel and resource levels established in fiscal year 2010, the last year in which operational control was used as a performance goal and measure for border security. According to Border Patrol officials, under the new risk management approach, the need for additional resources will be determined in terms of unacceptable levels of risk caused by illegal activity across border locations. Moreover, in considering ways to mitigate elevated risk levels, Border Patrol will look to mechanisms other than resource enhancement for expanding capacity, such as the rapid redeployment of resources from locations with lower risk levels and the leveraging of partner resources (i.e., a “whole of government” approach). Border Patrol officials said that use of the new risk assessment tools—the OIP and the IMAT—in making decisions for resource requests will be made at the sector level. Until a new process for identifying resource needs has been developed, sectors will continue to use annual operational assessments to reflect specific objectives and measures for accomplishing annual sector priorities, as well as identifying minimum budgetary requirements necessary to maintain the current status of border security in each sector. Border Patrol headquarters officials said that the resource levels established at the end of fiscal year 2012 are to serve as a baseline against which future needs are assessed, and that the personnel and infrastructure in place across the southwest border by the end of fiscal year 2012 should be sufficient to support the agency’s transition to a risk- based strategy for securing the border. Key elements—such as the OIP and the IMAT—of the strategic plan are necessary to evaluate the need for resources; until these elements are in place, Border Patrol sectors are to continue to request resources they have identified as necessary to maintain the current status of border security. However, our review of Border Patrol’s fiscal year 2012 operational assessments showed that sectors have continued to show concerns about resource availability. For example, all nine southwest border sectors reported a need for new or replacement technology to detect and track illegal activity, six southwest border sectors reported a need for additional infrastructure (such as all- weather roads), and eight southwest border sectors reported a need for additional agents to maintain or attain an acceptable level of border security. Border Patrol officials stated that at the time these operational assessments were developed—in fiscal year 2011—the agency had yet to transition to the new risk-management approach under the 2012-2016 Strategic Plan and sectors were continuing to assess resource needs according to the 2004 resource-based model. According to these officials, Border Patrol has determined that for fiscal year 2013 resource levels for most of the southwest border will remain constant, with the exception of the Tucson and Rio Grande Valley sectors, because of budget constraints. Border Patrol officials stated that the agency recognizes the need to develop a new process for assessing resource needs under the new risk management focus of the 2012-2016 Strategic Plan and that this process will be different from the prior system, which focused on increasing resources and activities at the border rather than using existing resources to manage risk. As Border Patrol is in the initial stages of developing and implementing the key elements of its 2012-2016 Strategic Plan, it is too early to assess how Border Patrol will identify the level of resources needed to secure the border under the new plan. Securing the nation’s borders against the evolving threat of terrorism and transnational crime is essential to the protection of the nation. Recognizing the importance of establishing secure national borders, DHS has dramatically increased resources and activities at the southwest border over the past several years to deter illegal border crossings and secure the border. With increased levels of resources and activities now in place, Border Patrol intends to transition from a resource-based approach to securing the nation’s borders to a risk management approach that seeks to leverage existing resources to manage risk. Given the nation’s ongoing need to identify and balance competing demands for limited resources, linking necessary resource levels to desired outcomes is critical to informed decision making. Accordingly, milestones and time frames— established as soon as possible—for the development of performance goals that define the levels of security—or risk—to be achieved at the border could help ensure that goals are developed in a timely manner. The establishment of such goals could help guide future border investment and resources decisions. Similarly, milestones and time frames for developing and implementing performance measures under the new strategic plan that are linked to the Border Patrol’s goal for securing the border could better ensure accountability and oversight of the agency’s programs by better positioning it to show progress in completing its efforts. Once established, border security performance goals and measures would also support Border Patrol’s efforts to assess whether the key elements—programs and processes—of its new strategic plan have brought the agency closer to its strategic goal of securing the border. To support the implementation of Border Patrol’s 2012-2016 Strategic Plan and identify the resources needed to achieve the nation’s strategic goal for securing the border, we recommend that the Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection ensure that the Chief of the Office of Border Patrol establish milestones and time frames for developing a performance goal, or goals, for border security between the POEs that defines how border security is to be measured and a performance measure, or measures—linked to a performance goal or goals—for assessing progress made in securing the border between POEs and informing resource identification and allocation efforts. We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. DHS provided written comments, which are reproduced in full in appendix X, and technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. DHS concurred with our recommendations for the agency to establish milestones and time frames for developing performance goals and measures for border security between the POEs, and stated that it plans to establish such milestones and time frames by November 30, 2013. Establishing these milestones and time frames would meet the intent of our recommendations, but doing so as soon as possible, as we reported, would better position CBP to monitor progress in developing and implementing goals and measures, which would provide DHS and Congress with information on the results of CBP efforts to secure the border between POEs and the extent to which existing resources and capabilities are appropriate and sufficient. Further, DHS indicated that Border Patrol cannot unilaterally develop a performance goal for border security and define how it is to be measured, but can develop performance goals that will likely become key components of an overarching goal for border security. Since our recommendations were directed at Border Patrol establishing milestones and time frames for developing such goals and measures focused on border security between the POEs, we believe that DHS’s proposed actions for Border Patrol in this area would meet the intent of our recommendations, as Border Patrol has primary responsibility for securing the border between POEs. Such actions would help provide oversight and accountability for border security between the POEs, support the implementation of Border Patrol’s 2012-2016 Strategic Plan, and help identify the resources needed to achieve the goal for securing the border. As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after its issue date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland Security and interested congressional committees, as appropriate. The report will also be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix XI. The report addresses the following three questions: What do data show about apprehensions across the southwest border, and in the Tucson sector in particular, and what other types of data, if any, does Border Patrol collect that inform changes in the status of border security? How does the Tucson sector schedule agent deployment compared with deployment in other southwest border sectors and to what extent do the data show these deployments have been effective in securing the border? To what extent has Border Patrol developed mechanisms to identify resources needed to secure the border under its new strategic plan? In conducting our work, we gathered information and interviewed officials from the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Office of Border Patrol. Specifically, we analyzed agency data related to Border Patrol performance and cross- border threats; policy, planning, and budget documents; sector operational assessments; border security reports; operations manuals; and strategic plans provided by Border Patrol. We interviewed Border Patrol headquarters officials regarding data collection and analysis procedures, strategic planning, operational assessments, and border security programs and activities. We obtained relevant data from DHS and Border Patrol databases for fiscal years 2006 through 2011. We chose this time period because fiscal year 2006 was the first full year for which data were available following Border Patrol’s implementation of its 2004 National Border Patrol Strategy (2004 Strategy). To assess the reliability of these data, we spoke with Border Patrol headquarters officials who oversee the maintenance and analyses of the data and with select sector and station officials regarding guidance and processes for collecting and reporting data in regard to apprehensions of illegal entrants, seizures of drugs and other contraband, and scheduling the deployment of agents tracked in a Border Patrol database. We determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We conducted visits to five of the nine Border Patrol sectors on the southwest border—San Diego sector, California; Yuma sector, Arizona; Tucson sector, Arizona; El Paso sector, Texas; and Rio Grande Valley sector, Texas. We selected these sectors based on differences in (1) the level of threat as defined by Border Patrol data, (2) agency priorities for resource deployment, (3) the level of operational control achieved in fiscal year 2010, (4) the use of enforcement strategies deemed successful by the Border Patrol in reducing cross-border illegal activity, and (5) varied terrain. Within these sectors we selected 21 Border Patrol stations to visit based on factors such as the level of cross-border illegal activity as defined by Border Patrol data and unique characteristics such as terrain and topography. We visited both “border stations”—those having international border miles—and “interior stations”—those without international border miles. Because Border Patrol officials identified the Tucson sector as the highest-priority sector for resource deployment in fiscal year 2011 and it had the highest level of cross-border illegal activity, we conducted site visits to each of the eight stations. (See table 1 for the Border Patrol sectors and stations we visited and the location of each station relative to the border.) While we cannot generalize the conditions we found at these Border Patrol sectors and stations to all southwest border locations, they provided us with an overall understanding of the range of operating conditions across the southwest border, as well as differences in how sectors and stations assess border security and deploy resources. In each location we observed conditions, including the use of personnel, technology, and infrastructure, and conducted semistructured interviews with Border Patrol sector and station officials. To assess trends in apprehensions, seizures, and other types of data Border Patrol uses to inform changes in the status of border security across the southwest border and in the Tucson sector, we obtained Border Patrol data for fiscal years 2006 through 2011 from DHS and Border Patrol databases—apprehensions and seizure data from the Enforcement Integrated Database (EID) and estimated cross-border illegal activity data from the Border Patrol Enforcement Tracking System (BPETS). Because of the complexity and amount of the data sets we requested, Border Patrol queried apprehension and seizure data in two groups, with different run dates. We analyzed Border Patrol apprehension and seizure data by sector for each fiscal year to obtain an overall view of cross-border illegal activity over time and the types of threats in each sector. In addition, we analyzed apprehension data to identify the number of repeat offenders (recidivism rate) and aliens from special interest countries (ASIC) apprehended across years by sector, as indicators of the extent to which deportable aliens with increased levels of associated risk were apprehended. For fiscal years 2010 and 2011, we also analyzed data showing the location of apprehensions, seizures, and apprehensions of ASICs relative to their distance from the border. We also analyzed data Border Patrol uses to assess estimated known Although illegal entries (cross-border illegal activity) within each sector. estimated known illegal entry data can be compared within a sector over time, these data cannot be compared or combined across sectors as discussed in this report. Because of the complexity and amount of data we requested, Border Patrol provided these data in two queries, with different run dates. We also interviewed relevant Border Patrol headquarters and field officials regarding the maintenance of these data, and how the agency analyzes the data to inform the status of border security. In addition, we spoke or corresponded with 13 ranchers who operated in the Tucson sector at the time of our review to discuss border security issues. We selected these ranchers based on input from various entities, including Border Patrol and select organizations that are knowledgeable about border security issues. Because this selection of ranchers was a nonprobability sample, the results from our discussions cannot be generalized to other ranchers; however, what we learned from the ranchers we contacted provided a useful perspective on the issues addressed in this report. To determine how the Tucson sector scheduled agent deployment compared with other southwest border sectors and to what extent the data showed these deployments had been effective in securing the border, we analyzed Border Patrol BPETS data regarding the scheduled deployment of agents, by sector, from fiscal years 2006 through 2011. We also analyzed to what extent agents were scheduled for deployment in “border zones”—those having international border miles—and “interior zones”— those without international border miles. Because of the complexity and amount of the data sets we requested, Border Patrol queried deployment data in two groups, with different run dates. We also interviewed Border Patrol headquarters officials in the Planning, Analysis, and Enforcement Systems Branches regarding agency guidance and practices for allocating and deploying resources—personnel, technology, and infrastructure. In addition, we conducted semistructured interviews with Border Patrol sector and station officials regarding the processes used and factors considered when determining the deployment and redeployment of resources. Further, we analyzed data from fiscal years 2006 through 2011 that Border Patrol uses to calculate overall effectiveness within sectors and to determine if the appropriate mix of assets is being deployed and used effectively and efficiently.interviewed Border Patrol headquarters and station officials regarding agency practices for collecting and recording these data and how those practices may vary across sectors. As previously discussed, because of potential inconsistencies in how the data are collected, these data cannot be compared across sectors but can be compared within a sector over time as discussed in more detail in this report. In addition, we reviewed Border Patrol guidance issued in September 2012 regarding the collection and reporting of effectiveness data. To assess to what extent Border Patrol has identified mechanisms for assessing resource needs under the 2012-2016 Border Patrol Strategic Plan (2012-2016 Strategic Plan), we analyzed key elements of the strategic plan defined by Border Patrol. To gain a better understanding of Border Patrol’s plans for developing and implementing key elements of the 2012-2016 Strategic Plan, including processes for identifying resource needs and the extent to which officials have identified interim milestones and time frames, we interviewed Border Patrol headquarters officials from the Planning and Analysis Branches, and analyzed relevant documents, such as Border Patrol planning and policy documents. We also reviewed standard practices in program management for documenting the scope of a project, including milestones or time frames for project completion and implementation. stations had identified the need for additional resources, we interviewed sector and station officials and analyzed southwest border sector operational assessments for fiscal years 2010 and 2012. We analyzed operational assessments for fiscal year 2010 because that was the last fiscal year in which DHS used operational control as a performance goal and measure, and for fiscal year 2012 because it was the most current fiscal year available at the time we conducted our analysis. For example, The Project Management Institute, The Standard for Program Management© (Newtown Square, Penn., 2006). We conducted this performance audit from June 2011 to December 2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Information in this appendix is also presented in figure 1. Table 2 describes, for each of the nine sectors on the southwest border, the (1) number of border miles and size, in square miles; (2) type of terrain; and (3) number and type (border or interior) of stations. Figures 13 through 16 illustrate the types of terrain that can be found in four of the nine sectors. Information in this appendix is also presented in figure 2. Table 3 describes, for each of the eight stations in the Tucson sector, the (1) number of border miles and size, in square miles; (2) type of terrain; and (3) number and type (border or interior) of zones, and their distance from the border. Figures 17 through 23 illustrate the types of terrain that can be found in seven of the eight stations in the Tucson sector. Border Patrol collects and analyzes various data on the number and types of entrants who illegally cross the southwest border between the land border ports of entry, including estimates on the total number of identified—or “known”—illegal entries. Border Patrol’s estimate of known illegal entries includes the number of illegal entrants who were apprehended as well as estimates of the number of entrants who illegally crossed the border but were not apprehended (individuals who either crossed back to Mexico—turn backs—or continued traveling to the U.S. interior and who Border Patrol ceased pursuing—got aways). These data are collectively referred to as known illegal entries because Border Patrol officials have what they deem to be a reasonable indication that the cross-border activity occurred. Border Patrol uses the estimated known illegal entry data to inform tactical decision making within each of the nine southwest border sectors. Border Patrol apprehensions and estimated known illegal entries decreased significantly across all nine southwest border sectors from fiscal years 2006 through 2011, as shown in figures 24 through 32. Apprehensions decreased by 46 percent or more across all the southwest border sectors. Over this same time period, the number of estimated known illegal entries also decreased by 28 percent or more across all southwest border sectors. Apprehensions as a percentage of estimated known illegal entries increased for six sectors over this time period. Border Patrol’s 2004 Strategy recognized that both apprehensions and apprehending individuals closer to the border affect border security. Our analysis of Border Patrol data showed that apprehensions across the southwest border decreased by 69 percent from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year 2011. Across the southwest border, from fiscal year 2010 to 2011, apprehensions within 5 miles of the border increased slightly, from 54 percent to 55 percent of total apprehensions. Apprehensions that occurred more than 20 miles from the border decreased slightly from fiscal year 2010 to 2011, from 28 percent to 26 percent across the southwest border. See figures 33 and 34 for apprehensions by southwest Border Patrol sector and distances from the border, for fiscal years 2010 and 2011. Border Patrol schedules the deployment of agents to various activities, which are categorized as either enforcement or nonenforcement. In fiscal year 2011 the percentage of agent workdays scheduled for nonenforcement activities varied by southwest border sector, from 19 percent for the Big Bend sector to 34 percent for the Yuma sector. The percentage of nonenforcement agent workdays scheduled to individual activities in fiscal year 2011 varied across sectors, as shown in figure 35, with “administration” accounting for a greater proportion of agent workdays than any other nonenforcement activities across all southwest border sectors. Border Patrol officials stated that examples of administrative activities include remote-video surveillance, public and congressional affairs duties, asset forfeiture duties, and employee support duties. Agent workdays scheduled to administration ranged from about 39 percent of all nonenforcement agent workdays in the Rio Grande Valley sector to almost 65 percent in the Laredo sector. Within the Tucson sector–our focus sector–training, intelligence support, and agent nonenforcement duties (defined to include duties such as brush removal; facility, fence, and vehicle maintenance; and video surveillance system operations) each accounted for a greater proportion of agent workdays than any other nonenforcement activity after administration. The percentage of agent workdays scheduled to these activities in other sectors varied, as shown in figure 35. “Other nonenforcement activities” includes duties such as litigation, camera operations, and public relations. Figures 36 through 44 show the number of apprehensions, turn backs, and got aways as percentages of total estimated known illegal entries for each southwest border sector, from fiscal years 2006 through 2011. Border Patrol sectors rely on a different mix of cameras, sign cutting, credible source, and visual observation to identify and report the number of turn backs and got aways used to determine the number of estimated known illegal entries across locations. Figure 45 shows the breakdown by source of data that sectors used to estimate got aways and turn backs in fiscal year 2011. In addition to the contact named above, Lacinda Ayers (Assistant Director); Joshua S. Akery; Frances A. Cook; Barbara A. Guffy; Eric D. Hauswirth; Stanley J. Kostyla; Brian J. Lipman; John W. Mingus, Jr.; Jessica S. Orr; Susan A. Sachs; and Jerome T. Sandau made key contributions to this report.

Summary: Within DHS, U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) Border Patrol has primary responsibility for securing the border between ports of entry, and reported that with its 18,500 agents it apprehended over 327,000 illegal entrants at the southwest border in fiscal year 2011. Across Border Patrol's nine southwest border sectors, most apprehensions occurred in the Tucson sector in Arizona. GAO was asked to review how Border Patrol manages resources at the southwest border. This report examines (1) apprehension and other data Border Patrol collects to inform changes in border security for the southwest border and the Tucson sector, in particular; (2) how the Tucson sector compares with other sectors in scheduling agent deployment and to what extent data show that deployments have been effective; and (3) the extent to which Border Patrol has identified mechanisms to assess resource needs under its new strategic plan. GAO analyzed DHS documents and data from fiscal years 2006 to 2011, and interviewed officials in headquarters and five southwest border sectors selected based on cross-border illegal activity, among other things. Results cannot be generalized across the southwest border, but provided insights into Border Patrol operations. In fiscal year 2011, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) reported data meeting its goal to secure the land border with a decrease in apprehensions; our data analysis showed that apprehensions decreased within each southwest border sector and by 68 percent in the Tucson sector from fiscal years 2006 to 2011, due in part to changes in the U.S. economy and achievement of Border Patrol strategic objectives. These data generally mirrored the decrease in estimated known illegal entries across locations. Other data are used by Border Patrol sector management to assess efforts in securing the border against the threat of illegal migration, drug smuggling, and terrorism; and Border Patrol may use these data to assess border security at the national level as the agency transitions to a new strategic plan. Our analysis of these data indicated that in the Tucson sector, there was little change in the percentage of estimated known illegal entrants apprehended by Border Patrol over the past 5 fiscal years, and the percentage of individuals apprehended who repeatedly crossed the border illegally declined across the southwest border by 6 percent from fiscal years 2008 to 2011. Additionally, the number of drug seizures increased from 10,321 in fiscal year 2006 to 18,898 in fiscal year 2011, and apprehensions of aliens from countries determined to be at an increased risk of sponsoring terrorism increased from 239 in fiscal year 2006 to 309 in fiscal year 2010, but decreased to 253 in fiscal year 2011. The Tucson sector scheduled more agent workdays in fiscal year 2011 for enforcement activities related to patrolling the border than other sectors; however, data limitations preclude comparison of overall effectiveness in how each sector has deployed resources to secure the border. In fiscal year 2011 the Tucson sector scheduled 73 percent of agent workdays for enforcement activities, and of these activities, 71 percent were scheduled for patrolling within 25 miles of the border. Other sectors scheduled from 44 to 70 percent of agent enforcement workdays for patrolling the border. Border Patrol sectors assess how effectively they use resources to secure the border, but differences in how sectors collect and report the data preclude comparing results. Border Patrol issued guidance in September 2012 to improve the consistency of sector data collection and reporting, which may allow future comparison of performance. Border Patrol is developing key elements of its 2012-2016 Strategic Plan needed to define border security and the resources necessary to achieve it, but has not identified milestones and time frames for developing and implementing performance goals and measures in accordance with standard practices in program management. Border Patrol officials stated that performance goals and measures are in development for assessing the progress of agency efforts to secure the border between the ports of entry, and since fiscal year 2011, DHS has used the number of apprehensions on the southwest border as an interim goal and measure. However, as GAO previously testified, this interim measure does not inform program results and therefore limits DHS and congressional oversight and accountability. Milestones and time frames could assist Border Patrol in monitoring progress in developing goals and measures necessary to assess the status of border security and the extent to which existing resources and capabilities are appropriate and sufficient. Border Patrol expects to implement other key elements of its strategic plan over the next 2 fiscal years. GAO recommends that CBP ensure Border Patrol develops milestones and time frames for developing border security goals and measures to assess progress made and resource needs. DHS concurred with these recommendations.