Each service academy operates its own preparatory school. The U.S. Air Force Academy Preparatory School is co-located with the U.S. Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs, Colorado. The U.S. Military Academy Preparatory School is located at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, and the U.S. Naval Academy Preparatory School is located in Newport, Rhode Island. (See fig 1.) During World War I, the Secretaries of the Army and the Navy nominated enlisted personnel to their respective service academies. Many of the first enlisted personnel did poorly on service academy entrance examinations, and many of the slots that were created for them went unfilled. To coach enlisted nominees for service academy entrance examinations, Army and Navy officials formally established the Military Academy and Naval Academy preparatory schools in 1946 and 1920, respectively. (The U.S. Air Force Academy was created in 1954, and its preparatory school in 1961.) The preparatory schools have evolved over the years and become more diverse. Today, the student bodies of these schools consist of enlisted personnel, minorities, recruited athletes, and women (see table 1). To be admitted to a preparatory school, an applicant must meet basic eligibility requirements. Because applicants to the academies must (1) be unmarried, (2) be a U.S. citizen, (3) be at least 17 years of age and must not have passed their twenty-third birthday on July 1 of the year they enter an academy, (4) have no dependents, and (5) be of good moral character, the preparatory schools apply the same requirements. The preparatory schools do not charge for tuition. The enlisted personnel who are selected to attend the preparatory schools are reassigned to the preparatory schools as their duty stations, and these enlisted personnel continue to be paid at the grades they earned before enrolling. Civilians who are selected to attend the preparatory schools enlist in the reserves and are paid about $700 per month. Enlisted personnel must complete their military obligations if they do not complete the programs or go on to one of the academies. Civilian students do not incur any financial or further military obligation if they do not complete the programs or go on to one of the academies. However, they also do not accrue any transferable college credits while attending the preparatory schools. The preparatory schools offer a 10-month course of instruction that combines academic instruction, physical conditioning, and an orientation to military life. The daily schedule includes several hours of classroom instruction, mandatory study time, and extra instruction; time for athletics or physical training; and some instruction in military customs and practices. Emphasis is placed on giving each candidate as much tutorial assistance as is necessary to maximize the individual’s potential for success. The student body at each school is organized into a military unit with a student chain of command that is advised by commissioned and noncommissioned officers. This structure is intended to provide the students with exposure to military discipline and order. In fiscal year 2002, DOD reported that the total cost to operate all three preparatory schools was about $22 million (see table 2). We did not independently verify or evaluate these costs. OUSD/P&R, the service headquarters, and the service academies have established clear roles and responsibilities for oversight of the preparatory schools. According to DOD Directive 1322.22 (Service Academies), the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness has responsibility to assess the operations and establish policy and guidance for uniform oversight and management of the service academies and their preparatory schools. The service headquarters perform their oversight over their respective academies and preparatory schools in accordance with the directive. The superintendent of each academy reports directly to the uniformed head of his respective service (the Chiefs of Staff for the Army and the Air Force and the Chief of Naval Operations for the Navy), in accordance with the chain of command for each service. The academies perform the primary DOD oversight function for their respective preparatory schools. The commanding officers at the Air Force and Army preparatory schools hold the rank of colonel, and the head of the Navy’s preparatory school holds the equivalent rank of captain. They report directly to the superintendent of their respective service academies, in accordance with the chain of command for each service. Appendix II provides general information about the three service academy preparatory schools. The three preparatory schools’ current mission statements do not clearly define the purpose for which the schools are being used by their respective service academies. Mission statements should define an organization’s purpose in language that states desired outcomes. Mission statements also bring the organization’s vision into focus, explain why it exists, and tell what it does. Without a clear mission statement, the organization cannot establish goals that fully reflect the organization’s intended purpose. Although the preparatory schools exist to help the service academies meet their diversity needs, the schools’ mission statements simply refer to preparing “selected personnel who meet special needs,” “selected candidates,” or “candidates” for admission to and success at the service academies. These mission statements are not clearly aligned with DOD guidance, which states that primary consideration for enrollment shall be accorded to nominees to fill officer objectives for three target groups: (1) enlisted personnel, (2) minorities, and (3) women. Senior academy officials told us that their expectations of the preparatory schools are consistent with DOD guidance on enrollment objectives and that they also rely on the preparatory schools to meet their needs for a fourth group— recruited athletes—adding that the service academies would not be able to meet their diversity needs if the preparatory schools did not exist. However, neither DOD nor the service academies have required the preparatory schools to align their mission statements to reflect DOD’s guidance and the service academies’ expectations. As a result, none of the mission statements are explicit about the preparatory schools’ intended purpose. Table 3 presents more detailed information on the preparatory schools’ mission statements. Even though the mission statements are not explicit about the schools’ intended purpose, data on the number of students belonging to target groups who enter the preparatory schools and then enter the service academies indicate that, in practice, the schools are giving primary consideration for enrollment to those target groups identified by the DOD directive and the service academies—namely, enlisted personnel, minorities, recruited athletes, and women—and are primarily preparing those student groups for admission to the service academies. Preparatory school and service academy admissions data over a 10-year period indicate that the preparatory schools are a source for the academies of target groups—enlisted personnel, minorities, recruited athletes, and women—identified by DOD guidance and service academy officials. Average admissions data on the representation of targeted groups in the preparatory schools for preparatory school academic years 1993 through 2002 are shown in figure 2. (Appendix III contains detailed enrollment figures, by target group, for each of the preparatory schools.) Figure 3 shows the average percentage of each targeted group enrolled at the service academies that came from the preparatory schools for the same time period. We first identified this lack of clarity in mission statements in our 1992 report on the preparatory schools. In the 1992 report, we concluded that the preparatory schools’ missions were not clearly defined and that the preparatory schools appeared to be pursuing somewhat differing goals for the target groups of enlisted personnel, minorities, recruited athletes, and women—the primary groups the schools served at that time. We recommended that the Secretary of Defense determine what role the preparatory schools should play among the services’ officer production programs and direct the services to clarify their school missions accordingly. To address this lack of clarity, DOD indicated that it planned to work with the services to develop a consistent mission statement for these schools that would be approved by May 1992. As discussed previously, however, the preparatory schools’ current mission statements still do not clearly define the purpose for which the schools are being used by their respective service academies. It is difficult to evaluate how effective the preparatory schools have been in accomplishing their missions because the service academies have not established performance goals for their preparatory schools. The service academies rely on the preparatory schools to meet their targeted needs for enlisted personnel, minorities, recruited athletes, and women. The preparatory schools collect a substantial amount of performance data for these targeted groups. However, without mission-linked performance goals and measures, the service academies cannot objectively and formally assess these data to determine mission effectiveness. Without specific performance goals, there is no objective yardstick against which to gauge preparatory school effectiveness, as would be consistent with the principle of best practices for ensuring optimal return on investment. With performance goals against which to compare actual performance, an organization can gauge how effectively it is meeting its mission. To assess effectiveness in achieving its mission, an organization should establish performance goals to define the level of performance to be achieved by a program; express such goals in an objective, quantifiable, and measurable form; provide a basis to compare actual program results with performance goals; and report assessment results, including actions needed to achieve unmet goals or make programs minimally effective. The preparatory schools collect performance data, such as the number of students admitted to the schools, the types of students (enlisted personnel, minorities, recruited athletes, and women) admitted, and the number who entered and graduated from the academies. These descriptive data show, among other things, that during the past 10 years, an average of 76 percent of students enrolled at the preparatory schools graduated from them. Data for this same 10-year period show that a smaller percentage of all students admitted to the preparatory schools graduated from or are still attending the academies. For example, 51 percent of students who were admitted to the Air Force Academy preparatory school, 56 percent of students admitted to the Military Academy preparatory school, and 59 percent of students admitted to the Naval Academy preparatory school graduated from or are still attending their respective academies. Senior officials at the preparatory schools and academies stated that they are satisfied with these results. Figure 4 shows the average number of students who entered the preparatory schools, graduated from the preparatory schools, entered the academies, and graduated from or are still attending the academies for preparatory school academic years 1993 through 2002. Appendix IV provides more detailed information, for class totals and by target groups, on the percentage of students who entered the preparatory schools and graduated from or are still attending the academies between preparatory school academic years 1993 and 2002. Appendix V provides more detailed information, for class totals and target groups, on the percentage of students who graduated from the preparatory schools for that same time period. Appendix VI provides more detailed information, for class totals and by target groups, on the percentage of preparatory school graduates who accepted appointments to the academies. The service academies have not established quantified performance goals for their preparatory schools. However, they do have implicit expectations. Senior officials at both the preparatory schools and the academies told us that the preparatory schools are expected to enable preparatory school students to (1) meet the service academies’ academic standards and (2) graduate from the service academies at rates comparable to the rates of students who received direct appointments to the service academies. A 2.0 grade point average is the minimum level of academic performance accepted at the academies. Our analysis of academy data for the graduating class of 2002 shows that preparatory school graduates, as a group, exceeded the 2.0 grade point average but had slightly lower cumulative grade point averages than did the student body as a whole. Figure 5 shows the cumulative grade point averages for preparatory school graduates and service academy student bodies as a whole for the class of 2002. For preparatory school academic years 1993 through 1998, an average of 73 percent of preparatory school graduates who accepted appointments to the academies graduated from the service academies, while the average rate was 78 percent of students directly admitted to the academies for the same years. Thus, graduation rates for preparatory school graduates were slightly lower than the rates for students directly admitted to the service academies. The academies, however, do not have a performance target for graduation rates for preparatory school graduates, and therefore these rates do not necessarily represent the achievement of a desired outcome. Figure 6 shows the average percentage of preparatory school students who graduated from the academies and the average percentage of directly appointed students who graduated from the academies for preparatory school academic years 1993 through 1998. Appendix VII provides more detailed information for comparative graduation rates for preparatory school academic years 1993 through 1998 for each preparatory school. We first found that DOD had not established specific performance goals for the preparatory schools in our 1992 review on the service academy preparatory schools. In that report, we concluded that without such goals, DOD lacked the tools it needed to determine whether the schools were effective. DOD still has not required the academies to establish quantified performance goals that are clearly linked with the mission of the schools. The effectiveness of DOD, military service, and service academy oversight is limited because the existing oversight framework for assessing preparatory school performance does not include, among other things, performance goals and mission statements—as discussed in previous sections of this report—and objective measures against which to assess performance. An effective oversight framework includes tracking achievements in comparison with plans, goals, and objectives and analyzing the differences between actual performance and planned results. The interrelationship of these elements is essential for accountability and proper stewardship of government resources, and for achieving effective and efficient program results. Without formal goals and measures that are, moreover, linked to mission statements, oversight bodies do not have sufficient focus for their activities and cannot systematically assess an organization’s strengths and weaknesses or identify appropriate remedies to achieve the best value for the investment in the organization. OUSD/P&R, the services, and the service academies have established mechanisms to conduct oversight of the preparatory schools through DOD guidance established in 1994. OUSD/P&R is required to assess and monitor the preparatory schools’ operations based on the information provided in the annual reports it requires from the service secretaries. The service headquarters are responsible for oversight for their respective academies and preparatory schools, and they oversee the schools’ operations through the annual preparatory school reports that they submit to OUSD/P&R. These reports contain data on various aspects of preparatory school performance, such as student demographic trends, admissions trends, and attrition. The service academies exercise direct oversight of their respective preparatory schools and monitor the schools’ performance through ongoing collection of data required by OUSD/P&R. For example, each of the service academies collects preparatory school data such as the number of students admitted to the schools, the types of students (enlisted personnel, minorities, recruited athletes, and women) admitted, and the number who entered and graduated from the academies. DOD, the service headquarters, and the service academies, through these annual assessment reports, are able to compare aspects of preparatory school performance against prior period results. For example, service academy data show that over the past 10 years, 51 percent of students who were admitted to the Air Force Preparatory School, 56 percent of students admitted to the Military Academy Preparatory School, and 59 percent of students admitted to the Naval Academy Preparatory School graduated from or are still attending their respective academies. Other data reported by the preparatory schools show that the percentage of students in the target groups admitted to the schools has varied over the past 10 years. However, as mentioned in previous sections of this report, the preparatory schools lack quantified performance goals that are linked to clear mission statements. Without goals linked to clear mission statements, DOD, the service headquarters, and the service academies do not have an objective basis by which to judge the effectiveness of the preparatory schools’ performance of their missions. Although the service academy preparatory schools receive oversight from a number of organizations, they lack clear mission statements and quantified performance goals and measures. Thus, there is no objective yardstick against which to gauge preparatory school performance, consistent with the principle of best practices for ensuring optimal return on investment. This conclusion reiterates our 1992 report’s finding that the preparatory schools lacked clear mission statements and that DOD lacked the tools necessary to determine whether the schools were effective. We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in concert with the service headquarters and service academies, to clarify the preparatory schools’ mission statements by aligning these statements with the department’s guidance and the academies’ expectations, which target student groups for primary enrollment consideration; establish quantified performance goals and measures, linked with the schools’ mission statements; and enhance the existing oversight framework by using quantified performance goals and measures to objectively evaluate the performance of the preparatory schools. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our recommendations and indicated that the mission statements of the preparatory schools will be aligned with DOD guidance and service expectations and that quantitative goals will be established to create effective measures and appropriate standards for success. DOD added that the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness will review and analyze these statistics over time to ensure the successful performance of the preparatory schools. DOD’s comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix VIII. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees; the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. Please contact me on (202) 512-5559 if you or your staff have any questions concerning this report. Key contributors are listed in appendix IX. To assess the adequacy of the mission statements of the preparatory schools, we interviewed officials at the following locations: the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Washington, D.C.; the U.S. Air Force Academy, Washington Liaison Office, Washington, D.C.; Headquarters, Department of the Army, Personnel, Washington, D.C.; Headquarters, Department of the Navy, Office of Plans and Policy, Washington, D.C.; the U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colorado; the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New York.; the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland; the U.S. Air Force Academy Preparatory School, Colorado Springs, Colorado; the U.S. Military Academy Preparatory School, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey; and the U.S. Naval Academy Preparatory School, Newport, Rhode Island. We obtained and reviewed Department of Defense (DOD), service, service academy, and academy preparatory school guidance, service academy strategic plans and instructions, and preparatory school annual reports on operations and performance. Using data provided to us by the preparatory schools, we analyzed aggregate data for preparatory school academic years 1993 through 2002, by class totals and by four groups of students—enlisted personnel, minorities, recruited athletes, and women—to ascertain the extent to which these four groups of students were being admitted to the preparatory schools; at what rates these four groups of students graduated from the preparatory schools and accepted appointments to the academies; and how well these four groups fared at the academies in comparison with their nonpreparatory school peers. We also reviewed relevant studies on the preparatory schools conducted by internal and external sources. To evaluate the effectiveness of the preparatory schools in accomplishing their missions, we held discussions with senior service academy and preparatory school officials to determine what results they expected the preparatory schools to achieve, and we obtained their assessments of the schools’ effectiveness. We reviewed and analyzed aggregate preparatory school performance data for preparatory school academic years 1993 through 2002. We reviewed and analyzed the preparatory schools’ annual assessment reports, as well as other relevant data gathered from the academies and the preparatory schools. For class totals and for the four target groups of students at each of the preparatory schools, we analyzed the number and percentage of preparatory school students who entered and graduated from a preparatory school; the number and percentage of preparatory school graduates who accepted an appointment to an academy; the number and percentage of preparatory school graduates who accepted an appointment to an academy and then graduated from or are still attending an academy; and the number and percentage of the original preparatory school students who graduated from or are still attending an academy. We did not independently assess data reliability, but we obtained assurances about data completeness, accuracy, and reliability from academy officials responsible for maintaining data for each preparatory school. To assess the effectiveness of DOD oversight of the preparatory schools, we reviewed DOD guidance on oversight roles, responsibilities, and reporting requirements, as well as academy regulations and instructions, and discussed oversight activities with DOD, service, and service academy officials. Additionally, we reviewed criteria on the principles of effective management, such as those found in Internal Control Standards: Internal Control Management and Evaluation Tool. We conducted our review from February 2003 through July 2003 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Colorado Springs, Colorado (co- located with the U.S. Air Force Academy) Figure 7 shows the composition of each class of Air Force Academy Preparatory School enrollees over the past 10 years. Minorities are the largest target group at the school, averaging 48 percent of enrollment. The percentage of recruited athletes decreased from 1993 through 1996, and it has remained relatively constant since then at about 40 percent of enrollment. Enlisted personnel experienced the greatest change, constituting 12 percent of the student body in 1993, and peaking to 28 percent in 1996. Enlisted personnel averaged 18 percent of the enrolled class from 1993 through 2002. Since 1996 the percentage of enlisted personnel enrolled at the Military Academy Preparatory School has generally declined from a high of 54 percent in 1996 to a low of 25 percent in 2002. Concurrently, the enrollment of minorities has fluctuated between 29 and 49 percent. (See fig. 8.) The composition of each class of Naval Academy Preparatory School enrollees over the past 10 years is shown in figure 9. Minorities constituted the largest target group, averaging 44 percent from 1993 through 2002. Enlisted personnel made up, on average, 29 percent of the enrolled class, and recruited athletes made up, on average, 31 percent of the class. Figure 10 shows the percentage of all Air Force Academy Preparatory School students who graduated from or are still attending the Air Force Academy. From 1993 through 1998, academy graduation rates of Air Force Preparatory School students ranged from 43 percent to 53 percent. Figure 11 shows the same data for each of the four target groups. Figure 12 shows the percentage of all Army Preparatory School students who graduated from or are still attending the Military Academy. From 1993 through 1998, academy graduation rates of Army Preparatory School students ranged from 46 percent to 59 percent. Figure 13 shows the same data for each of the four target groups. Figure 14 shows the percentage of all Naval Academy Preparatory School students who graduated from or are still attending the Naval Academy. From 1993 through 1998, academy graduation rates of Naval Academy Preparatory School students ranged from 50 percent to 63 percent. Figure 15 shows the same data for each of the four target groups. Figure 16 shows the graduation rates for the Air Force Academy Preparatory School. In 2002, 79 percent of the students enrolled in the U.S. Air Force Preparatory School graduated from the preparatory school. The graduation rate remained relatively constant, averaging 78 percent from 1993 through 2002. Air Force preparatory school graduation rates by target group are shown in figure 17. Recruited athletes had the lowest graduation rates, averaging 67 percent over 10 years. Women and minorities had similar graduation rates over 10 years, both averaging 83 percent. Enlisted personnel had the highest graduation rate, averaging 85 percent over the past 10 years. Figure 18 shows the trend in Army preparatory school graduation rates over the past 10 years. In 2002, 77 percent of students in the U.S. Military Academy Preparatory School graduated from the school. The graduation rate increased during the past 10 years, from a low of 59 percent in 1993 to a high of 82 percent in 2000, before declining slightly in both 2001 and 2002. Figure 19 shows the Army preparatory school graduation rates, by target group, over the past 10 years. The rate for women increased—in fact doubled—from a low of 42 percent in 1993 to a high of 84 percent in 2001. On average, minorities graduated at a higher rate—73 percent—than did the other target groups from 1993 through 2002. Enlisted personnel had the lowest graduation rate among the four target groups, averaging 67 percent over 10 years. Figure 20 shows the trend in overall graduation rates at the Navy preparatory school for the past 10 years. Graduation rates at the school generally declined until 2000, reaching a low of 68 percent in that year. The graduation rate increased in the last 2 years, reaching 73 percent in 2002. Graduation rates averaged 75 percent over the 10 years. Figure 21 shows historical trends in Navy preparatory school graduation rates for target groups. Enlisted personnel had an average graduation rate of 83 percent, the highest among the target groups. Women and recruited athletes had lower graduation rates, both averaging 69 percent over 10 years. Graduation rates for minorities generally declined after peaking at 90 percent in 1994 and averaged 73 percent from 1993 to 2002. Figure 22 shows the percentage of Air Force preparatory school graduates who accepted appointments at the Air Force Academy. This percentage has remained relatively constant over the past 10 years. On average, 91 percent of the graduates accepted appointments to attend the Air Force Academy. Figure 23 shows the percentage of Air Force preparatory school students in the four target groups–enlisted personnel, minorities, recruited athletes, and women–who accepted an appointment to the Air Force Academy. All four groups had similar acceptance rates of appointments for admission. For the past 10 years, of those who graduated, an average of 91 percent of enlisted personnel, 92 percent of minorities, 93 percent of recruited athletes, and 90 percent of women accepted an appointment to attend the Air Force Academy. Figure 24 shows the rate at which U.S. Military Preparatory School students accepted appointments to attend the U.S. Military Academy. From 1993 through 2002, 97 percent of U.S. Military Academy Preparatory School graduates accepted appointments to attend the U.S. Military Academy. Figure 25 shows the rate at which Army preparatory school students in the target groups accepted appointments to attend the Military Academy. On average, almost all students in three target groups—minorities, recruited athletes, and women—accepted appointments into the U.S. Military Academy from 1993 through 2002. The acceptance rate for enlisted personnel decreased to 85 percent in 1999; however, it increased to 128 percent in 2002. Figure 26 shows the acceptance rate, by Navy preparatory school graduates, of appointments into the Naval Academy. Rates remained relatively constant over 10 years, falling to a low of 87 percent in 1998 and increasing to 100 percent in 1999. On average, 97 percent of the graduates accepted appointments to attend the U.S. Naval Academy. Figure 27 shows the rate at which Navy preparatory school students in the target groups accepted appointments to attend the Naval Academy. Women had the highest average acceptance rate among the four target groups, averaging 100 percent over 10 years. Although acceptance rates for enlisted personnel remained at or above 100 percent from 1999 through 2002, they had the lowest average acceptance rate, averaging 90 percent, over 10 years. On average, 99 percent of minorities and 95 percent of recruited athletes accepted nominations to attend the U.S. Naval Academy. Figure 28 shows a comparison between the Air Force Academy graduation rates of preparatory school graduates and those of students who accepted direct appointments to the academy. Academy graduation rates of Air Force Academy Preparatory School graduates from 1993 through 1998 were, on average, lower than those of direct appointees. Only in 1993 was the difference in graduation rates between preparatory school graduates and direct appointees greater than 10 percent. Figure 29 shows a comparison between the Military Academy graduation rates of preparatory school graduates and those of students who accepted direct appointments to the academy. Academy graduation rates of Military Academy Preparatory School graduates from 1993 through 1998 were, on average, lower than those of direct appointees. Figure 30 shows a comparison between the Naval Academy graduation rates of preparatory school graduates and those of students who accepted direct appointments to the academy. Academy graduation rates of Naval Academy Preparatory School graduates from 1993 through 1998 were, on average, lower than those of direct appointees. In addition to the name above, Daniel J. Byrne, Leslie M. Gregor, David F. Keefer, Tina M. Morgan, David E. Moser, Cheryl A. Weissman, and Susan K. Woodward made key contributions to this report.

Summary: Each year, the U.S. Air Force Academy, the U.S. Military Academy, and the U.S. Naval Academy combined spend tens of millions of dollars to operate preparatory schools that provide an alternative avenue for about 700 students annually to gain admission to the service academies. Service academy officials screen all applicants to identify those who they believe could succeed at the academies but who would benefit from more preparation. The Department of Defense (DOD) pays the full cost of providing this preparation. GAO was asked to review the three service academy preparatory schools, and this report specifically assesses (1) the adequacy of their current mission statements, (2) the effectiveness of these schools in accomplishing their missions, and (3) the effectiveness of DOD oversight of these schools. The three service academy preparatory schools' current mission statements do not clearly articulate the purpose for which the schools are being used by their respective service academies. In accordance with DOD guidance and the service academies' expectations, the preparatory schools give primary consideration for enrollment to enlisted personnel, minorities, women, and recruited athletes. However, the preparatory school mission statements are not clearly aligned with DOD guidance and the academies' expectations. This is a continuing problem, which GAO first reported in 1992. Without clear mission statements, the service academies and their respective preparatory schools cannot establish goals that fully reflect the preparatory schools' intended purpose. It is difficult to evaluate how effective the preparatory schools have been in accomplishing their missions because the service academies have not established performance goals for the preparatory schools. Without specific performance goals, there is no objective yardstick against which to gauge preparatory school effectiveness, as would be consistent with the principle of best practices for ensuring optimal return on investment. The effectiveness of DOD, military service, and service academy oversight is limited because the existing oversight framework for assessing preparatory school performance does not include performance goals and measures against which to objectively assess performance. DOD and the services receive annual reports from the academies on preparatory school performance. Without stated performance goals and measures, however, the reports do not offer DOD, the services, or the service academies as good an insight into the preparatory schools' performance and their return on investment as they could.