The friendly fire casualties and equipment losses suffered during Operation Desert Storm reilluminated an old problem, fratricide, and underscored the need for more effective means of identifying friendly and hostile forces, and neutrals and noncombatants on the battlefield (i.e., combat identification). Studies and incidents subsequent to Operation Desert Storm, such as the friendly forces shootdown of two Blackhawk helicopters over Iraq during Operation Provide Comfort, have reiterated the need for improved combat identification. Combat identification has been defined as “the means to positively identify friendly, hostile and neutral platforms in order to reduce fratricide due to mis-identification and to maximize the effective use of weapon systems.” The services are pursuing a number of solutions to provide combat identification. They believe the solution will involve a “system of systems,” one component of which will be cooperative IFF Q&A systems. In March 1992, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council approved a mission need statement for combat identification. That mission need statement requires positive, timely, and reliable identification of hostiles, friendlies, and neutrals; classification of foes by platform, class/type, and nationality; interoperability between services; and interoperability with minimum civil air traffic control system requirements. It states that the primary constraint is affordability. A cooperative IFF Q&A identification is accomplished when a shooter/observer queries a target and the target answers with a reply identifying itself as a friend. A Defense Acquisition Board review conducted on August 14, 1992, and subsequent approval from the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, gave (1) the Army the lead in battlefield combat identification (BCI) efforts, including cooperative systems for ground-to-ground and air-to-ground identification, and (2) the Navy the lead for air-to-air and ground-to-air cooperative identification systems. The Navy was charged with coordinating these efforts. Figures 1 and 2 depict the current breakdown of responsibility for cooperative IFF Q&A systems development. To enhance force warfighting capability and minimize fratricide in the future, the Army has been pursuing a BCI program to improve situational awareness and provide immediate, positive target identification. In 1991, the Army started implementing a five-phased program to develop and field battlefield identification techniques through fiscal year 2000. The Army is actively into the third phase of the program, the near-term phase, whose objective is to integrate a battlefield combat identification system (BCIS) into selected ground vehicles and helicopters. A millimeter wave cooperative IFF Q&A system was selected for BCIS as the near-term technology. The near-term cooperative IFF Q&A system is currently in engineering and manufacturing development (EMD). The Army is acquiring 45 EMD models and is planning to acquire another 115 in fiscal year 1996 to be demonstrated during the fiscal year 1997 digitized brigade experiment known as Task Force XXI. The Army currently estimates the cost of providing the near-term BCIS to 6,400 selected platforms of Force Package I at between $250 million and $300 million. The ultimate cost of BCIS would be substantially higher if all Army divisions were to be equipped. The Army is just beginning the mid- and long-term phases of its BCI efforts with the development of a COEA to identify affordable and promising alternatives. The objectives of the mid- and long-term phases are to integrate situational awareness and target identification and to have an automated correlation and display of situational awareness and target identification information. The mid- and long-term cooperative IFF Q&A system may be different than the near-term technology. As the lead for cooperative aircraft identification development, the Navy has been working on its Cooperative Aircraft Identification (CAI) effort to address deficiencies in the currently used aircraft identification system, Mark XII. The CAI effort is to provide a system to replace or upgrade the Mark XII system for use in air-to-air and ground-to-air identification. Navy officials have estimated that a Mark XII follow-on system could cost more than $3.5 billion. In addition to providing reliable, secure identification of friends, any Mark XII follow-on system will have to ensure future civil aviation air traffic control compatibility. Mode S is a civil aviation air traffic control capability started by the United States and now planned for international use. Eurocontrol, the European aviation authority, has mandated Mode S usage by January 1, 1999. Mark XII transponders, however, do not currently incorporate Mode S. Without this capability, U.S. military aircraft may face delays in the use of civil airspace or may even be excluded from certain regions during peacetime. In June 1994, the Naval Research Laboratory completed and published a draft COEA for the CAI effort. That COEA was not approved because some Navy officials believe it did not consider subsequently proposed alternatives that should be considered. Additionally, the Navy provided only about half of the funding required for fiscal years 1996 and 1997 to accomplish a 1997 scheduled decision on whether to move the CAI effort forward to the next phase of the acquisition process—demonstration and validation. The services’ current management plan and structure for cooperative IFF Q&A systems, which reflect the division of responsibility between the Army and the Navy, lack needed cohesiveness. While the Army and the Navy have worked to coordinate their efforts, the separation of responsibility between the two services may result in the selection of suboptimal solutions, unnecessary program delays, and the acquisition of systems that may not be interoperable across the services. The services defined the management structure for their efforts to combat fratricide in a December 1992 memorandum of agreement on combat identification. In its capacity as lead for the services’ cooperative IFF Q&A systems development, the Navy led the development of the management section of DOD’s September 1993 Joint Master Plan for Cooperative Aircraft and Battlefield Combat Identification. The plan provides a management approach that is intended to coordinate cooperative identification requirements development and management mechanisms to ensure development, procurement, and integration of interoperable surface and air identification systems. As shown in figure 3, the management structure identified in the plan uses the organizations defined in the services’ memorandum of agreement on combat identification. The principal coordinating bodies identified in the plan are the General Officers’ Steering Committee for Combat Identification, the Joint Combat Identification Office, the Service Acquisition Executive Council, and the Senior Advisory Group. The General Officers’ Steering Committee for Combat Identification provides senior level review and coordination of all Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps combat identification requirements, development and procurement efforts, product improvements, and related technologies. The Joint Combat Identification Office provides action officer level coordination and functions as the primary information center for all combat identification issues, programs, requirements, and technologies. The Senior Acquisition Executive Council was established to provide the highest level of service coordination, while the Senior Advisory Group is to provide program manager level coordination. The separation of responsibility for the development of cooperative IFF Q&A systems between the Army and the Navy is not conducive to looking for and finding common technological solutions. For example, a DOD official informed us that a North Atlantic Treaty Organization ally has demonstrated a laser interrogation and D-band response system for ground-to-ground identification. Since the Mark XII system operates in the D-band, the adoption of a D-band ground-to-ground system, if feasible, could be a cost-effective solution providing interoperability among the services. The Army, however, has not considered that D-band system or one like it for ground-to-ground identification. Even absent the identification of a common technology, the current management plan and structure have allowed the services to pursue systems without fully considering how and if those systems can cost effectively be made interoperable. For example, the Navy’s COEA could not fully consider the equipment that would be needed to unify the Army’s mid- and long-term approach with the Navy’s CAI system because that approach has not been defined. Since a Mark XII follow-on wave form has not been identified for CAI, the Army will have similar difficulties. While the Army and the Navy have worked to coordinate their efforts, the current management structure and plan perpetuate the stovepipe development of cooperative IFF Q&A systems. In commenting on an earlier draft of the management plan, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition stated “. . . I am concerned that the ‘stovepipe’ management scheme shown . . . will not enable possible equipment interoperability and commonality to be realized between aircraft and battlefield systems.” A Navy official informed us that the plan’s developers added the Senior Acquisition Executive Council and Joint Senior Advisory Group to the plan’s organizational chart to address this criticism. However, these organizations were already defined in the draft plan because they were included in the services’ memorandum of agreement on combat identification. Furthermore, the delays in developing a new air-to-air and ground-to-air cooperative IFF Q&A system combined with the recent Army start of its mid- and long-term efforts provide an opportunity to address the Under Secretary’s concerns through joint management of the Army’s and Navy’s efforts. The current management structure also risks unnecessary delays in the development and fielding of a set of systems planned to help prevent future fratricide by allowing the services to prioritize their efforts differently. For example, while DOD has made development of combat identification systems a high priority, the Navy, through its funding process, did not make CAI a high priority. Given the high priority DOD places on combat identification, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (ASD/C3I) proposed an Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) funding line for the CAI effort to (1) pursue the planned course of development or (2) alternatively use an advanced concepts and technology demonstration (ACTD) to accelerate it. OSD decided not to proceed with the Program Objective Memorandum proposed strategy. Instead, OSD adopted the position that the existing Mark XII system satisfies the services’ current air-to-air and ground-to-air cooperative IFF Q&A system requirements. Its current strategy is an evolutionary upgrade of Mark XII equipment to provide improved reliability and maintainability and greater upgradeability, while over the next couple of years defining, under a continued Navy-led effort, in coordination with our allies, what a Mark XII follow-on wave form might look like. The upgradeability of the new Mark XII system would allow for the addition of Mode S capability and implementation of the Mark XII follow-on wave form, should the services later decide that the current wave form no longer satisfies their requirements. If the Program Objective Memorandum proposal had been adopted, it would have alleviated any risk of delay in Mark XII efforts due to low prioritization. However, it would not have corrected the stovepipe nature of the management structure and plan. Even given OSD funding of the Mark XII effort, the continued division of development under the current management plan and structure would allow the Army’s and the Navy’s efforts to continue unsynchronized. The Navy’s initial time lead in development resulted in the Navy and Army programs being unsynchronized. The current delays in defining a Mark XII follow-on wave form, however, provides an opportunity for a jointly managed effort. The original Navy time lead is what led to (1) the Navy’s uncertainty about likely mid- and long-term ground identification systems and (2) the Navy’s inability to consider in its COEA the equipment necessary to obtain interoperability with those ground identification systems. Schedule changes in separate efforts could again result in difficulties obtaining full consideration of interoperability issues. Separate service efforts risk delays in the development and fielding of cooperative IFF Q&A systems due to time and resource expenditures to obtain “after-the-fact” interoperability, if required. Additionally, a dual management structure means dual funding of dual efforts when a single management structure and funding source could provide efficiencies resulting in not only monetary savings but also faster development and earlier fieldings. “. . . has been completed, and alternatives for improving the system and applying it to armor identification were to be considered at a CAI Milestone I review originally planned for the fall of 1993. However, the Services do not place a high priority on upgrading the Mark XII or on defining and demonstrating an integrated aircraft/armor identification system, and they have yet to schedule the review.” We believe ASD/C3I’s proposed action was a step in the right direction and that a single funding line for both the Navy’s CAI effort and the Army’s BCI program would help ensure coordinated aircraft and ground cooperative IFF Q&A systems development. While ASD/C3I’s proposed action would have alleviated some of the unnecessary risk currently associated with the services’ management structure and plan, it would not have corrected the stovepipe nature of that structure and plan. We believe, therefore, that, in addition to having a single funding line, those efforts should be managed under a structure similar to that recommended by DOD’s Acquisition Reform Process Action Team in its recent report on reengineering the acquisition process. “the creation of a Joint Acquisition Executive permits the DOD to directly address the long-standing problems encountered by joint programs. Issues of agreement on requirements, dictated marriages and shifting priorities are avoided by having the programs placed under a purple-suited decision maker who has fiscal resource management authority. No single Component will be able to optimize system performance at the expense of other users . . . .” The team stated that the advantages of such a management structure included reduction of program redundancy, promotion of commonality across the services, and stabilization of funding by removing funds from the vagaries of each service’s priorities. We believe that the adoption of the proposed management structure outlined by the team could help ensure the development of a cost-effective, integrated combat identification solution(s) while maintaining appropriate OSD oversight. The Army’s and the Navy’s development of separate COEAs for their respective BCI and CAI efforts risks the selection and development of systems that may not represent the most cost and operationally effective solution(s). The division of responsibility for cooperative IFF Q&A systems development between the Army and the Navy raises interoperability issues. Ground and air platforms that represent threats to each other and that are provided cooperative IFF Q&A systems based on different technologies will either have to field dual systems or systems that have been made interoperable or will remain at risk of fratricide from each other. COEAs that do not fully consider the desirability of interoperability, the way to obtain it, and its cost risk suboptimal solutions. In providing guidance on COEAs, DOD Instruction 5000.2 notes that “individual systems generally cannot be evaluated in isolation.” It goes on to state that “. . . the analysis must consider all relevant systems and the synergisms, such as interoperability, and potential difficulties they collectively represent on the battlefield.” The development of separate COEAs for IFF Q&A systems has not allowed and may not allow proper consideration of the interoperability issue and thus risks the selection of a suboptimal solution(s). A DOD official expressed concern about this risk when commenting on the plan to perform separate COEAs for the BCI and CAI efforts during the first meeting of the Combat Identification COEA Oversight Group that OSD established to periodically review the two COEA efforts. Additionally, Naval Research Laboratory officials who conducted the CAI COEA stated that because the Army’s selected near-term technology differed so dramatically from their expectations, the BCIS initially envisioned in their CAI COEA was made irrelevant by the Army selection. Without an approved Mark XII follow-on wave form identified, the Army will face the same difficulty addressing interoperability in its currently started BCI COEA effort. The performance of a joint COEA now, giving due consideration to the interoperability issue, will help assure the selection and development of the most cost and operationally effective solution(s). The recent delays in the Navy’s efforts combined with the Army’s recent start of its mid- and long-term BCI COEA provide an opportunity to develop a joint COEA for combat identification. A DOD official stated that an agreement with the allies on a Mark XII follow-on wave form should be accomplished within 2 years. The current Army schedule calls for the mid- and long-term COEA to be completed in fiscal year 1997, which provides time for a joint COEA effort to consider the new wave form being discussed with U.S. allies, expand the Navy’s COEA to consider subsequently proposed solutions, and merge the work with the Army’s COEA efforts. A joint COEA would ensure that DOD and the services have a joint analysis that will help to select systems representing the most cost and operationally effective integrated solution. The Army continues to invest in its near-term millimeter wave cooperative system when there is no discernible indication whether this system can or should be integrated into mid- and long-term solution(s). Without a completed COEA for BCI, there is no way to tell whether the near-term system should be or will be a part of the mid- and long-term solution(s). Furthermore, the Army may never choose to make large scale fieldings of the near-term system due to affordability. In our prior report on combat identification, we noted that the Army planned to begin procuring the near-term millimeter wave cooperative identification system without an analysis of whether the near-term system could be integrated into the mid- and long-term solution(s). At that time, we recommended that the Army not begin procurement of the systems until it had determined whether the near-term systems could be integrated into the mid- and long-term solution(s). DOD agreed that the integration of the near-term BCIS into the long-term approach is an important consideration in deciding on the production of the near-term system. Nevertheless, the Army now plans to acquire more near-term systems than are necessary to reach a production decision without the analysis we suggested. Our current evaluation showed that the Army plans to use $5 million in fiscal year 1995 funds and has requested about $18.4 million of fiscal year 1996 funds to acquire 115 additional near-term systems beyond the 45 in its current EMD contract. The Army intends to use these units, in combination with 25 refurbished EMD units, in the testing of the digitized battlefield concept. However, the Army did not develop a specific analysis to support the need to demonstrate 140 BCISs during the digitized brigade experiment. Rather, Army officials stated that the goal of the near-term BCIS demonstration was to sell individual soldiers on the system and provide higher level Army officials with an understanding of its operational effectiveness. They noted that the more soldiers supporting the acquisition of the system the better. This formed the basis for their “the more, the better” rationale. Given funding and time constraints, 115 systems are all “the more” that can be acquired. The Army has already awarded a contract option to obtain 45 of the additional 115 systems and expects to award a second option at a cost of about $15.2 million for the remaining systems in July 1995. When questioned about the impact of limiting the demonstration to 70 systems (i.e., those already on hand or on contract), Army program officials stated that they could accomplish their goals for the demonstration with 70 systems. There are concerns within DOD and the Army over the affordability and cost-effectiveness of the near-term system, and it may never be fielded for these reasons. The selection of a cooperative technology to pursue in the mid- and long-term will be determined in part by the Army’s mid- and long-term COEA, an effort that has just started. Until a mid- and long-term cooperative technology is selected, the continued acquisition of the near-term system risks wasting millions of dollars on a system that may not be able to be integrated into the mid- and long-term solution(s). Furthermore, acquiring more systems to demonstrate during the Task Force XXI exercise than is necessary to accomplish the goals of that demonstration also risks millions of dollars. We recommend that the Secretary of Defense (1) create a single OSD funding line for the Army’s BCI and Navy’s CAI efforts, (2) direct the Secretaries of the Army and the Navy to develop and institute a cohesive management structure and plan in line with the Process Action Team’s recommendation, and (3) direct the Secretaries of the Army and the Navy to develop a joint COEA for their BCI and CAI efforts giving due consideration to the problem and costs of obtaining systems’ interoperability. We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to (1) use the 70 near-term systems on hand or currently under contract for the Task Force XXI digitized brigade experiment and (2) not acquire more near-term systems than necessary until the Army determines the near-term technology is affordable and will be fielded and whether, if determined desirable, it can be integrated into the mid- and long-term combat identification and aircraft solution(s). In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD agreed that the requirements for aircraft and battlefield identification should not be addressed in isolation. It stated that this was one of the reasons they formed a Combat Identification Task Force in October 1994. DOD stated that the task force was created to consider the overall architectural framework for combat identification and within that architecture, the techniques and programmatic plans for battlefield identification and for the Mark XII identification system. DOD also stated that management actions are being taken that reflect the results of the task force, and that address the concerns described in our report. Specifically, DOD stated that a joint COEA on battlefield identification is being organized, and technology demonstrations that will be an important element of the evaluation will be guided and partially funded by OSD. DOD did not agree that Army’s plan to acquire 140 near-term systems for the Task Force XXI digitized brigade experiment risked wasting millions of dollars. In discussing Army officials’ comments made to us that they could accomplish their goals for the experiment with 70 near-term systems, DOD stated that the adequacy of 70 systems was judged in the context of a contingency plan, should 140 systems not be available. It also stated that the acquisition of more units would result not only in more operational experience and more data but also in a greater capability left with the forces. DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that the Army be directed to not acquire more near-term systems prior to a determination that the near-term system is affordable and will be fielded and whether it can be integrated into the mid- and long-term solution(s). DOD noted that although the integration of the near-term system into the long-term solution is an important consideration, it may be prudent to produce the near-term system even if it is not part of the long-term architecture and noted that it was concerned that, without a near-term system, U.S. forces may face a period of 10 years or more with no substantial improvement in their ability to identify combat vehicles. While DOD, in forming its Combat Identification Task Force, may have been motivated by many of the same concerns expressed in our report, it does not appear that the task force’s final product will address the issues identified in our report. Specifically, based on briefings we have received on the task force’s efforts, the task force’s final product will not (1) address needed management changes to provide cohesiveness in the services’ cooperative identification development efforts; (2) dictate a joint, single COEA for those efforts; and (3) address the Army’s plan to acquire more near-term systems than are required for the Army to reach a production decision. Furthermore, while the task force has developed an overall architectural framework for combat identification, it does not appear to provide the management structure and plans needed to assure a cohesive effort to obtain the goals of that architecture. The architecture provides direction to the services. However, in the past, DOD has provided direction to the services that was subsequently ignored. For example, as we noted earlier, while DOD has placed a high priority on combat identification efforts, the Navy did not place a high priority on its CAI effort and underfunded it. Regarding the Army’s plan to acquire more near-term systems than are necessary to accomplish the Army’s goals for the Task Force XXI experiment, the DOD’s comment indicates that 70 systems are adequate for conducting the experiment if 140 systems are not available. Since the Army has not yet made a procurement decision for the near-term BCIS, the expenditure of $15.2 million to acquire 70 systems beyond the 70 necessary to accomplish the goals for the demonstration risks millions of dollars on a system that may never be fielded. If the Army can accomplish its goals for the demonstration with 70 systems, as Army officials have repeatedly informed us, then only 70 systems are needed. Furthermore, the Army did not produce and does not have an analysis to support a requirement to demonstrate 140 BCIS units. There is no debating that more units will provide more operational experience and data. This, however, should not be the basis for acquiring more systems than are needed to accomplish the goals of the demonstration. DOD’s comment stating that it might be prudent to produce the near-term system even if it is not a part of the long-term architecture is not debated, and our recommendation would not prevent the Army from fielding any system for 10 years. We simply believe it would be prudent for the Army to make its production decision for the near-term system taking into consideration its decision for its mid- and long-term solution(s). Such a determination should be possible once the BCI COEA is completed. Since that COEA is currently scheduled to be completed in fiscal year 1997 and the BCIS production decision is currently scheduled to occur in late fiscal year 1997 or early fiscal year 1998, our recommendation would not delay the fielding of the near-term system. DOD’s comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix I, along with our evaluation. During this review, we interviewed officials and reviewed documents in Washington, D.C., at the offices of the ASD/C3I; the DOD Joint Combat Identification Office; the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition; the U.S. Navy, Air Traffic Control and Landing Systems Office; the U.S. Navy, Office of the Director of Navy Space Systems Division; the Naval Research Laboratory; and the Defense Intelligence Agency. We also reviewed documentation issued from the offices of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, the Congressional Research Service, and the Office of Technology Assessment. We visited, received, and analyzed information from the U.S. Army Communications and Electronics Command, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey; the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia; the U.S. Army Armor Center and School, Fort Knox, Kentucky; the U.S. Army Aviation Center, Fort Rucker, Alabama; and the Headquarters of the U.S. Marines Corps’ Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia. In addition, we visited and received briefings on the Air Force’s Combat Identification Integration Management Team from Air Force personnel at the Directorate of Special Projects, Electronic Systems Center, Hanscom Air Force Base, Massachusetts. We also visited and received briefings on the OSD sponsored Joint Air Defense Operation/Joint Engagement Zone exercises from service personnel at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. We conducted this review from August 1994 to July 1995 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We are sending copies of this report to other appropriate congressional committees; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, and the Navy. We will also make copies available to other interested parties upon request. Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any questions concerning this report. Major contributors to this report were William L. Wright, Bruce H. Thomas, and Peris Cassorla. The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Defense’s (DOD) letter dated July 6, 1995. 1. We appreciate that DOD shares our concern that the requirements for aircraft and battlefield identification should not be addressed in isolation. While this was one of the reasons the Combat Identification Task Force was formed, and we believe the task force’s efforts were a step in the right direction, we do not believe the task force adequately addressed our concerns regarding the cohesiveness of the structures and plans created to manage the services’ aircraft and battlefield cooperative identification efforts. 2. The management actions discussed represent a continuation of the stovepipe management of the ground and air identification efforts discussed in our report. The Army-led development of a cost and operational effectiveness analysis (COEA) for battlefield identification separate from the Navy-led similar analyses planned to help define what a new air identification wave form might look like perpetuates the stovepipe development scheme identified in our report. 3. As explained in our report, we focussed our evaluation on the services’ cooperative identification of friend or foe (IFF) question and answer (Q&A) system efforts because the services are approaching major decision points in the acquisition process for those systems. To address DOD’s concern, we have added information to the body of our report indicating that the services’ cooperative IFF Q&A system development efforts are a part of a much broader array of efforts that should help minimize friendly fire incidents. 4. At the time our draft report was written, we were aware of the task force’s efforts. We determined that while those efforts may have been motivated by many of the same concerns expressed in our report, it did not appear that the task force was going to address the issues related to our findings. Based on more recent briefings on the task force’s outcome, it still does not appear that those issues were addressed. Specifically, based on the information we have received in briefings on the task force’s efforts, the task force’s final product will not (1) address needed management changes to provide needed cohesiveness in the services’ cooperative identification development efforts; (2) dictate a joint, single COEA for those efforts; and (3) address the Army’s plan to acquire more near-term systems than are needed to reach a production decision. 5. While the task force has developed an overall architectural framework for combat identification, it does not appear to provide the management structure needed to assure a cohesive effort to attain the architecture’s goals. The architecture provides direction to the services. However, in the past, DOD has provided direction that was subsequently ignored. For example, as noted in our report, while DOD has placed a high priority on combat identification efforts, the Navy did not place a high priority on the Cooperative Aircraft Identification (CAI) effort and underfunded it. 6. The management and funding arrangements being established do not adequately address our concerns. The joint advanced concepts technology demonstration and advanced technology demonstrations planned are to demonstrate candidate battlefield identification systems, that is, ground-to-ground and air-to-ground solutions. The planned demonstrations are to focus on battlefield identification solutions, not on battlefield and aircraft identification solutions and their interoperability. Furthermore, the planned demonstrations will not address the underlying management structure’s division of responsibility between the Navy and the Army and the risks that are associated with that division. The continued use of the current management plan and structure with its division of responsibility between the Army and the Navy still risks the selection of suboptimal solutions, unnecessary program delays, and the acquisition of systems that may not be interoperable across the services. 7. The Office of the Secretary of Defense’s (OSD) role as the top level manager of these demonstrations and the funding of these demonstrations under an OSD line do not adequately address our concerns regarding the cohesiveness of the Army’s and the Navy’s efforts and the need for truly joint management. Under the current DOD plan, that is, the joint demonstrations, the Army and the Navy will continue to manage and fund separate developmental efforts for their respective areas of responsibility. Continued use of separate funding lines for those efforts will continue to pose interoperability risks and risks to the timely accomplishment of the most cost and operationally effective solutions. 8. While the evolutionary nature of the upgrade process and the reliance on commercial technology may or may not make centralized funding desirable, the DOD’s adopted strategy includes working with U.S. allies to define what a new wave form might look like. The services’ new wave form definition efforts will be a joint effort under a Navy lead, just as the Navy’s original CAI effort was. We maintain our position that funding the services’ new aircraft wave form definition and ground identification efforts under a single funding line would help ensure coordinated aircraft and ground cooperative IFF Q&A systems’ development. 9. As we indicated in our report, while the Army and the Navy have worked to coordinate their efforts, the current management structure and plan perpetuate the stovepipe development of cooperative IFF Q&A systems. As noted in our report, in commenting on an earlier draft of the management plan for the cooperative IFF Q&A development efforts, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition stated “. . . I am concerned that the ’stovepipe’ management scheme shown . . . will not enable possible equipment interoperability and commonality to be realized between aircraft and battlefield systems.” The General Officers’ Steering Committee on Combat Identification, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, and the Joint Combat Identification Office were all defined in the draft and final management plans. Despite these coordinating bodies, we agree with the Under Secretary’s assessment and believe the current management structure continues to perpetuate that stovepipe management scheme. 10. We have added information on the role of the General Officers’ Steering Committee on Combat Identification to our report. 11. A prioritized list of identification initiatives with service funding commitments did not prevent the Navy from placing a lower priority on its CAI effort than DOD placed. As we note in our report, while DOD has made development of combat identification systems a high priority, the Navy, through its funding process did not make the CAI effort a high priority. Again, a single OSD funding line for both the Navy’s new wave form and the Army’s battlefield combat identification system (BCIS) efforts would help ensure coordinated aircraft and ground cooperative IFF Q&A systems development efforts and appropriate funding given DOD’s prioritization of those efforts. 12. While DOD’s adopted Mark XII upgrade strategy has superseded the Navy-led COEA, the continued research and development of air and ground systems without performing a joint COEA still risks the selection and development of systems that may not represent the most cost and operationally effective solutions. DOD’s adopted strategy for upgrading the Mark XII includes working with U.S. allies to define what a follow-on Mark XII wave form might look like. In providing oral comments on a draft of this report, agency officials indicated that the new wave form air identification effort would include cost and operational effectiveness type analyses. Those analyses should be done as a part of a joint aircraft and ground identification COEA to ensure that the most cost and operationally effective ground and air solutions are selected giving due consideration to the interoperability issue. We recognize that commonality between air and ground identification systems may or may not be attainable or desirable from a cost and operational effectiveness standpoint. In fact, a joint COEA may support the use of different technologies for air and ground systems. The performance of a joint COEA, however, will not only help ensure the consideration of technological commonality between air and ground solutions but also the cost and operational effectiveness of solutions to provide interoperability between differing air and ground solutions. Because the Navy-led joint service new wave form air identification effort is to develop cost and operational effectiveness type analyses and the Army-led joint service ground identification effort is developing a formal COEA, it appears that minimal adjustment would be required to combine the two efforts to obtain a joint COEA ensuring due consideration of the interoperability issue. In addition, the final product of a joint COEA would present a service-wide, unified vision of the air and ground solution(s) to be pursued and the means, if determined attainable and desirable, by which air and ground interoperability will be obtained. 13. DOD’s comment indicates that 70 systems are adequate for conducting the demonstration if 140 systems are not available. Since the Army has yet to determine whether it will procure the near-term BCIS, the expenditure of $15.2 million to acquire 70 systems beyond the 70 systems necessary to accomplish the goals for the demonstration risks millions of dollars on a system that may never be fielded. 14. At issue here is not whether the demonstration of more systems will have value, but rather the value of what is gained against the cost and the risk that the Army may never procure and field the BCIS. The Army did not produce and does not have an analysis to support a requirement to demonstrate 140 BCIS units. If the Army can accomplish its goals for the demonstration with 70 systems, as Army officials have repeatedly informed us, then only 70 systems are needed. There is no debating that more units will provide more operational experience and data. This, however, should not be the basis for acquiring more systems than are needed to accomplish the goals of the demonstration. “Believe it is imperative that during Force XXI we not only evaluate how well BCIS works but the total impact BCIS has on the way we operate. Platforms are currently prioritized to give us the ability to look at this total impact even if we don’t get the entire 140 systems we are currently planning for.” 19. We have clarified our recommendation in view of DOD’s comments. We believe that the acquisition of near-term systems should be limited to the minimum quantity required to complete any testing needed to make a production decision. Furthermore, the Army should not be allowed to acquire more near-term systems than that limit until a COEA based determination has been made that the near-term system, if deemed desirable, can be integrated, that is, made interoperable, with the mid- and long-term combat identification and aircraft solutions. 20. We recognize that commonality between air and ground identification systems may or may not be attainable or desirable from a cost and operational effectiveness standpoint, just as interoperability of differing air and ground systems may not be determined attainable or desirable. Nothing in our report dictates commonality. It does, however, argue that a joint COEA should be completed to assess this issue before moving forward. 21. As we pointed out in our response to DOD in our prior report, our recommendation will not prevent the Army’s acquisition of the near-term system and will not require the Army to wait until long-term systems are fielded. As stated in our prior report, we believe it would be prudent for the Army to make its production decision for the near-term system taking into consideration its decision for its mid- and long-term solution(s). Such a determination should be possible once the BCI COEA is completed. Since that COEA is currently scheduled to be completed in fiscal year 1997 and the BCIS production decision is not scheduled to occur until late fiscal year 1997 or early fiscal year 1998, our recommendation would not delay the fielding of the near-term system. Our current recommendation extends the recommendation in our prior report to include a determination on interoperability with the new air identification wave form being defined. The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free. Additional copies are $2 each. Orders should be sent to the following address, accompanied by a check or money order made out to the Superintendent of Documents, when necessary. Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. U.S. General Accounting Office P.O. Box 6015 Gaithersburg, MD 20884-6015 Room 1100 700 4th St. NW (corner of 4th and G Sts. 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Summary: GAO reviewed the Army's and Navy's development of combat identification systems to reduce the occurrences of friendly fire incidents, focusing on the services' management plans and structures for the systems' development and integration. GAO found that: (1) the Army and Navy do not have a cohesive management plan and structure for the development of their cooperative combat identification systems; (2) the lack of cohesiveness reflects the division in the services' responsibilities for developing systems for different combat modes; (3) the two services have based their system development plans on different technologies and have not fully addressed how and at what cost these systems will be integrated; (4) the lack of a cohesive management structure could lead to development and deployment delays by allowing the services to prioritize their efforts differently; (5) the Navy has developed a cost and operational effectiveness analysis (COEA) for its system, but the Army is just beginning to develop its COEA; (6) the development of separate COEA risks wasting resources because of duplication and delays in system development and deployment and does not address the need for interoperability; (7) the DOD proposal for a single funding line for system development would help ensure better cooperative systems development; and (8) the Army plans to procure more near-term identification systems than it needs for its planned field demonstration and without knowing if the systems are affordable and can be integrated into long-term solutions.