As shore-based units located along the nation’s coasts and interior waterways, the Coast Guard’s 188 multimission stations conduct a wide range of operations, from rescuing mariners in distress to patrolling ports against acts of terrorism. The stations are involved in all Coast Guard programs, including search and rescue, port security, recreational and commercial fishing vessel safety, marine environmental response, and law enforcement (drug and migrant interdiction). Their involvement varies geographically from one Coast Guard district to the next, depending on differing conditions among regions. Some program operations also vary depending on the season—for example, search and rescue operations are greater in the summer when recreational boating is more active and lower in the winter. Because stations are traditionally associated with search and rescue operations, they can be compared to fire stations, in the sense that crew members remain at the station for extended periods, on duty, ready to respond to an emergency. Stations range in size from as few as 4 personnel at seasonal stations to as many as 60 personnel at larger stations. Individual stations are usually commanded by a command cadre consisting of an officer-in-charge—such as a senior chief petty officer—an executive petty officer, and an engineering petty officer. The command cadre is responsible for overseeing personnel, equipment, and mission-related issues. In support of operations, the stations also provide unit-level (on-the-job) training as well as equipment and minor boat maintenance. As shown in table 1, stations employ personnel in numerous occupations, but the principal staff usually consists of boatswain’s mates—those who operate the boats and carry out many station duties. In addition to performing essential station responsibilities, boatswains’ mates can undergo additional training for more advanced occupations, such as a coxswain (a boat driver) or a surfman (a coxswain who is qualified to operate boats in heavy weather and high surf conditions). Like the number of personnel, the number of boats at stations varies. Small, seasonal stations may have only one boat, while larger stations can have as many as nine. Table 2 describes the type of boats stations typically operate. (see app. II for pictures of selected boats). All station personnel are required to wear personal protection equipment (PPE), while operating or riding in a boat. Coast Guard personnel use PPE to protect against various dangers, such as inclement weather and cold water exposure. PPE includes items such as life vests, helmets, goggles, gloves, cold weather protection suits, thermal underwear, and electronic location devices. (See app. II for more information on the nature and use of PPE.) Following the events of September 11, the Coast Guard created a new program area for homeland security operations—the Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security (PWCS) program. The type and frequency of PWCS activities performed by stations varies depending on whether a station is located in a port area or in a nonport area. Stations located in or near a port tend to perform more PWCS tasks, such as patrolling, escorting vessels, and other duties. The responsibilities can vary by port, however, depending on several factors, including the availability of other Coast Guard units to share in operations, the strategic importance of the port, and the support of non-Coast Guard entities—such as state and local agencies—in both homeland and nonhomeland security activities. Although stations located in nonport areas also conduct PWCS operations, such as patrolling waterways, they tend to have fewer PWCS responsibilities. In general, stations located in nonport areas do not have the responsibility of maintaining the security of critical infrastructure, high-profile vessels, or shore operations as do stations located in port areas. As tactical units, stations do not determine the nature or frequency of their tasks; rather, they carry out the tasks assigned to them by operational units, which provide oversight as well as operational and administrative support to the stations. In 2001, studies by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) and a Coast Guard internal review team found that readiness conditions at multimission stations had been deteriorating for over 20 years. The studies, which had largely consistent findings, identified readiness concerns in the areas of staffing, training, and boats and presented recommendations for addressing these concerns. Table 3 presents selected findings from these studies, as well as congressional concerns regarding station readiness. In December 2002, in response to a recommendation from the OIG and at the direction of the Senate Appropriations Committee, the Coast Guard developed a draft strategic plan to maintain and improve essential capability of all its boat force units, including stations. The plan recognized that stations did not have sufficient resources to be fully capable of meeting all their workload requirements and that it would take both increases in resources as well as “more judicious tasking by operational commanders” to address the imbalance. In its 2003 report on station operations, the OIG criticized the plan for being too general in nature, specifically regarding how and when the Cost Guard will increase staffing, training, equipment, and experience levels at stations. Added security responsibilities after the September 11 attacks had a definite—but as yet unmeasured—impact on stations’ readiness needs. Stations have seen a substantial increase in their security workload, along with a shifting of activity levels in other missions. The effect of these changes on readiness needs is still largely undetermined, mainly because the Coast Guard has not yet translated the security-related mission responsibilities into specific staffing standards and other requirements. Until it does so, the impact of increased responsibilities on readiness cannot be determined nor can the Coast Guard or others measure progress made in meeting station needs. With the support of state and local entities, stations and other units appear to be meeting the majority of port security responsibilities identified in the Coast Guard’s interim guidelines. After September 11, the Coast Guard’s multimission stations experienced a substantial rise in overall activity levels. Following the attacks, the Coast Guard elevated the priority of the homeland security program to a level commensurate with search and rescue, and according to field and headquarters officials, stations were assigned the brunt of the Coast Guard’s port security responsibilities. These responsibilities led to considerable increases in the stations’ security workloads. One way to see this change is in the number of hours that station boats were operated before and after September 11. Station boat hours increased by 44 percent from a level of about 217,000 hours prior to the terrorist attacks to more than 300,000 hours by the end of fiscal year 2004 (see fig. 1). Coast Guard officials explained that increases in boat hours were due to increased homeland security responsibilities and the 160 additional boats and personnel stations received from fiscal years 2002 to 2004. While total boat hours for stations increased following September 11, the trend among specific programs varied greatly, with some programs experiencing substantial increases and others experiencing declines (see fig. 2). Most notably, boat hours for the PWCS program increased by almost 1,900 percent between pre-September 11 levels and fiscal year 2004. Coast Guard officials attributed the increases in PWCS hours to (1) stations’ expanded homeland security responsibilities, (2) several elevations in the Maritime Security Condition (MARSEC) after 2001, and (3) acquisition of new boats and additional personnel stations received in fiscal years 2002 through 2004. Conversely, during the same period, hours dedicated to nonhomeland security programs decreased. For example, boat hours expended for search and rescue decreased by 15 percent, while hours for living marine resources decreased by 61 percent. Similar trends emerge in the limited data available about how Coast Guard personnel spend their time at stations. While the Coast Guard does not formally track the number of work hours station personnel spend on each program (either when operating a boat or while at the station), it does administer a survey each year to personnel at selected stations, asking them to estimate how they spent their time over an average week or week period in August. Survey results indicated that the number of hours spent on PWCS activities increased for those responding by about 29 percent between calendar years 2002 and 2003, while the number of hours spent on search and rescue activities decreased by about 12 percent. Coast Guard officials told us that although the stations’ workload has increased since September 11, mission performance has not suffered. This does not mean that they believe stations’ readiness needs were not affected by the increase in operations, only that stations have been able to sustain expected performance despite increased workloads. Officials responsible for overseeing operations at the stations we contacted explained that stations have been able to sustain performance levels by achieving greater efficiencies in operations, specifically by (1) conducting multiple missions during port security operations and (2) coordinating their efforts with state and local organizations. They also noted that stations have received additional boats and personnel since September 11. It is likely that other factors also play a role in this issue. Our prior work on the Coast Guard’s overall use of resources suggests an additional possible factor, such as decreases in search and rescue responsibilities over time. This work also showed that even in those program areas in which the number of boat hours declined following September 11, the Coast Guard was generally able to meet performance goals. The Coast Guard has not yet determined the extent to which changes in post-September 11 mission priorities—specifically, increases in homeland security responsibilities—have affected station readiness needs. Coast Guard officials told us there are two reasons for this. First, the Coast Guard’s maritime homeland security requirements are being revised to better align with current resource levels. The Coast Guard is currently working under Operation Neptune Shield, an interim set of guidelines that establishes Coast Guard’s homeland security activity levels—taskings— under each MARSEC level. However, because the guidelines call for a level of operations that exceeds the Coast Guard’s current resource levels, the Coast Guard is in the process of revising the guidelines. Officials told us they expect the new, long-term, risk-based requirements to establish more realistic activity levels that better align with existing resources and take into account support from state and local organizations at strategic ports. Officials told us they expect to have new activity level standards finalized by February 2005. Under these new standards—requirements—it is possible that station workload levels may change. Officials also told us that although the new requirements, known as the Strategic Deployment Plan, will better align security operations with existing resources, the Coast Guard will need to monitor this balance in the future given the dynamic nature of homeland security issues. Second, because homeland security requirements have yet to be finalized, the Coast Guard has begun, but not yet completed, efforts to update station staffing standards and other requirements to reflect post- September 11 changes in mission priorities and station readiness needs. Officials told us that once homeland security requirements have been finalized under the Strategic Deployment Plan, they will revise station staffing standards and other requirements to better reflect readiness needs. Although station staffing levels have been increased in response to the new homeland security priorities and past reports of staffing readiness concerns, the staffing standards are still based upon pre-September 11 mission priorities (i.e., search and rescue operational levels). Until the Coast Guard can translate the impact of security-related activities into specific station requirements, the impact of the new homeland security responsibilities on station readiness needs cannot be determined. Furthermore, without specific requirements, neither the Coast Guard nor others can measure the progress made in meeting station readiness needs. While the impact of new responsibilities on overall readiness needs remains unknown, there is evidence that most stations have been able to meet the port security responsibilities—i.e., activity levels—expected of them given their available resources and, in some cases, all security responsibilities with the help of other entities. Since the level of security activities established under the interim guidelines exceeds available resources, the Coast Guard has communicated to stations and other units that they are expected to carry out security operations within the constraints of existing resources. The Coast Guard does not track station- specific performance regarding port security responsibilities, but in 2003 it developed an unofficial evaluation system that indicates that current security responsibilities for major ports—for which stations bear significant responsibility—are largely being met. This evaluation system— referred to as the Scorecard system—captures activity levels for selected PWCS standards at ports of high military and economic significance. However, it is important to note that the Scorecard results are not station- specific in that (1) they do not separate tasks handled by stations from those of other entities (either Coast Guard or other) that address port security needs and (2) stations that do not contribute to port security are not included. Nonetheless, the Scorecard results do provide some indication that at least some stations are for the most part able to meet their current port security responsibilities. Furthermore, of the 16 stations we reviewed, officials from all but 1 told us that PWCS responsibilities—as identified by the interim guidelines—were being met. In most instances, stations reported meeting PWCS responsibilities with the assistance of state and local entities, which were either directly performing PWCS tasks or performing other mission responsibilities—such as fisheries enforcement or search and rescue—that allowed station personnel to focus on PWCS responsibilities. There are also clear signs that partnerships with other agencies and other Coast Guard units play an essential role in the stations’ ability to meet assigned homeland security tasks. Most of the officials responsible for overseeing operations at the 16 stations we reviewed told us that their stations have been able to meet increased operational responsibilities only by sharing overall tasks—nonhomeland security-related as well as homeland security-related—with state and local partners as well as other Coast Guard entities. Officials explained that they have developed two main types of partnerships. First, they have established partnerships with local organizations such as police, fire, and marine patrol units to conduct port security operations as well as nonhomeland security activities. Officials at the majority of stations we contacted told us that they rely on assistance from marine patrol units to conduct patrols of key infrastructure, such as harbor docks; officials from several stations also indicated that these units assist with vessel escorts. Officials also told us that stations rely on partner organizations to conduct nonhomeland security activities, such as search and rescue, and that expanded partnership efforts have resulted in operational efficiencies. For example, officials representing one station located at a major port told us that a local partner increased its search and rescue operations following September 11, allowing the Coast Guard station to focus more of its efforts on homeland security operations. Second, stations have relied on varying levels of support from other Coast Guard components, namely, Marine Safety Offices (MSO) and Maritime Safety and Security Teams (MSSTs), to conduct port security operations. Station officials we interviewed told us that the level of support provided by both components varied. For example, MSST support varied by geographic location. One official told us that certain MSSTs located on the Pacific Coast each set aside 5,000 hours a year to perform port security operations, while those on the East Coast do not. Headquarters officials told us that because the Coast Guard is still considering the role MSSTs will play in port security operations, the amount of support they provide to stations will vary. One senior headquarters official told us that newly established MSSTs can generally provide only a limited amount of support because of initial training requirements. As the MSSTs mature, they are usually able to assume greater responsibilities for port security operations. While stations’ efforts to leverage external support are commendable, the extent to which they can continue to rely on that support is unclear. To better understand the potential for support levels to change, we contacted a number of state and local organizations that partner with the stations we interviewed. We asked them if they expected their level of support would change in the future. Of the 13 organizations we contacted, officials from 12 organizations told us that since the September 11 attacks, they have either directly increased port security operations or increased other operations—such as search and rescue—that enable Coast Guard stations to focus on port security and other missions. One of the organizations we contacted explained that they had plans to decrease resource levels allocated to port security in future years. In addition, another 6 organizations we contacted emphasized that while they did not have plans in place to reduce funding levels for port security, they were not confident that future funding would continue at current levels. The Coast Guard has made progress in addressing multimission station readiness concerns identified prior to September 11. The Coast Guard has increased station staffing levels by 25 percent, expanded formal training programs and increased training capacity, begun modernizing its small boat fleet, and as of fiscal year 2003 appeared to have provided station personnel with appropriate amounts of PPE. However, despite this progress, the Coast Guard has yet to meet existing readiness standards and goals in the areas of staffing and boats and does not have adequate processes in place to help ensure the future funding of station PPE, a shortcoming that could result in an insufficient supply of PPE at stations in future years. Since 2001, the Coast Guard has developed a variety of initiatives aimed at resolving long-standing staffing concerns at multimission stations. Table 4 presents a selection of the initiatives, either planned or under way, that we identified as noteworthy in addressing station staffing needs. (App. II contains a more detailed description of the initiatives.) In addition to increasing the number of personnel and positions allotted to stations by 25 and 12 percent, respectively, the Coast Guard has begun to reconfigure aspects of the station staffing program to provide more effective operations. For example, in an effort to provide a more appropriate mix of positions and skills at stations and to address concerns about insufficient numbers of senior personnel, the Coast Guard added 99 support officer positions in fiscal years 2002 through 2004, and 486 senior petty officer positions in fiscal years 2002 and 2003. According to one official, the additional support positions will allow station command cadre to spend less time on administrative work and more time on operations. Recognizing that in the past a significant number of positions had been initially filled with unqualified personnel, the Coast Guard plans to take steps to base assignments on position requirements and experience. Furthermore, once long-term homeland security responsibilities have been determined, the Coast Guard plans to complete steps it has already begun to reconfigure its station staffing standards, which define the number and type of positions at stations based on mission requirements. The reconfiguration is expected to better align staffing resources with mission activities. Despite this progress, the Coast Guard has yet to meet five key standards and goals related to staffing at the stations. Each is discussed below. Most notably, despite increases in station staffing levels over the past 2 years and other actions, average station workweek hours continue to exceed, by significant levels, the 68-hour standard established by the Coast Guard in 1988 to limit fatigue and stress among station personnel. According to the Coast Guard’s Boat Forces Strategic Plan, excessive workweek hours is symptomatic of “the adverse operational trends, identified lack of resources, and general reduction in …readiness” experienced by stations in recent years. Moreover, the plan also notes that the high number of stations working in excess of 68 hours shows that “staffing continues to be a significant problem at stations.” According to estimates from Coast Guard surveys of station personnel, although the average work week at stations decreased somewhat between 1998 and 2003, since 1994 it has not dropped below 81 hours per week. It should be noted that these survey data, although the best source of information available on station workweek hours, may have limitations. That is, the survey is administered every August—during both the peak search and rescue season and the Coast Guard’s period for rotating personnel—and it may be that a year-round average, which would include off-peak, winter hours, would be lower. In addition, although response rates for every year were not readily available, the 2003 response rate was relatively low, with only a little over half of the personnel surveyed responding. An explanation of how workweek hours are measured may be helpful in interpreting this workweek information. The way in which the workweek is measured at stations is similar to the way it is measured in professions such as firefighting, in that personnel are on duty for an extended amount of time—such as 24 hours—to respond to emergencies but may spend part of it in recreation, sleep, exercise, training, or other activities. Personnel can thus be on duty or off duty for consecutive periods of time during a week. Workweek hours are calculated by totaling the amount of hours spent on duty or at a station, over a 1-week period, or averaging the amount of time spent on duty over a 2-week period. The Coast Guard’s 2003 survey of stations indicated that slightly less than half of all respondents reported working either an average 77- or 84-hour workweek. Approximately 6 percent of respondents reported working a 68-hour workweek. (See app. II for more information regarding these results.) According to the Coast Guard, working excessively long hours leads to injury and illness. Officials told us that station personnel can exceed the 68-hour work week standard in one of two ways. First, they can be assigned to a work schedule that averages to more than 68 hours a week, such as an 84-hour schedule. The work schedule, which is determined by the officer-in-charge, defines the number of days personnel spend on duty and is therefore the primary driver of whether personnel will consistently work an average of 68 hours per week or some number above that amount. There are advantages and disadvantages associated with each of the many possible schedules stations can adopt—table 5 shows a comparison of the 68- and 84-hour work schedules. For example, a potential disadvantage to having personnel work the 68-hour schedule is that it requires stations to retain more qualified personnel for duty work than the 84-hour schedule, which could be one reason why officers-in- charge who are short of qualified personnel would use the higher hour schedule. The 84-hour schedule, in contrast, requires smaller numbers of qualified personnel, which could be of benefit to stations with high workloads and too few qualified personnel. It could also be preferred by some personnel because it provides for 3-day weekends. However, a significant disadvantage to the 84-hour schedule, as noted in the station operations and training manual, is that it puts personnel “at significant risk of exceeding fatigue standards,” which is why it is normally restricted to stations with low numbers of response-driven cases. In other words, personnel at stations that have a greater number of response operations— such as rescue cases—are at a higher risk of exceeding fatigue standards because they are underway (that is, operating a boat) more often. The Coast Guard’s 1991 staffing study found that long hours on duty resulted in lost time among personnel because of illness and injury, as well as increased attrition levels. According to officials, in the late 1990s the Coast Guard switched from an 84-hour standard—which it had adopted to better meet significant staffing shortages—to the present 68-hour standard because of concerns about crew fatigue and an increasing number of boat accidents. A second way personnel can exceed the 68-hour schedule is by working overtime, which, if significant, can also lead to lost time due to illness and injury. Overtime generally occurs when required operations exceed the number of qualified, available personnel. As with the 84-hour work schedule, significant amounts of overtime can increase the likelihood that personnel will exceed Coast Guard fatigue standards and can lead to lower retention levels for trained personnel. Field and headquarters officials told us that at most stations, the high number of hours worked is being driven by the following factors: an increase in homeland security responsibilities; an increase in the number of inexperienced personnel; the formation of MSSTs, which siphoned experienced and qualified crewmembers from stations; and a lack of sufficient support for training, building and equipment maintenance, and administrative duties. Of these factors, the primary one is the increased homeland security role. One senior official told us that although increased staffing levels may have been sufficient to meet pre-September 11 mission needs, the homeland security mission has greatly expanded the stations’ workload, and it is unknown whether current staffing levels will be sufficient to meet operational requirements as well as the 68-hour work week standard. According to senior Coast Guard officials, it may take 5 to 10 years before the 68-hour standard is attained at all stations because of the high levels of inexperienced personnel and other issues previously discussed. In fact, one senior official questioned whether stations will ever reach the goal given competing Coast Guard priorities. Officials told us that the Coast Guard will not be able to determine optimum station staffing levels until (1) long-term homeland security requirements have been identified, (2) inexperienced staff have grown into senior positions, and (3) all new staffing initiatives (such as increased administrative support) have taken effect. Until these issues have been addressed, officials said it is likely that stations with high workloads and resource constraints will continue to work longer work weeks. The Office of Boat Forces’ targeted goal for senior personnel, as a percentage of total station personnel, is 50 percent; as of March 2004, senior staff comprised about 37 percent of total staff. Officials told us that in recent years stations have received a significant number of relatively inexperienced personnel, which has skewed staffing proportions, and that it will take at least 3 years to increase the number of senior personnel to desired levels. The Coast Guard has yet to meet its goal of an average 48-month station assignment (tour of duty) for experienced personnel. According to Coast Guard data, the average tour of duty length for boatswain’s mates increased from 33 months in 1999 to 35 months in 2000, but has remained fairly constant between 35 and 36 months through 2003. Although assignment practices have been modified for some personnel to allow for longer tour lengths at stations, officials told us that meeting the 48-month goal will be a challenge given that stations draw upon a pool of personnel they share with other units—such as ships—that generally require shorter tours of duty. Thus, significant changes to station assignment policies will affect these other units. One senior official told us that although the stations may not meet the 48-month goal in the foreseeable future, given competing personnel needs from other units, even extending the average tour length to 36 months would be a significant improvement. Increasing the tour length lessens the training burden on senior station personnel (i.e., they end up training fewer new personnel) and allows a station to reap the benefits of the training it has already invested in junior personnel. Stations continue to experience a shortage of qualified surfmen. As of June 2004, approximately 42 percent of surfman positions were not filled with qualified personnel. According to training and program officials, in the past this shortage stemmed from difficulties in recruiting sufficient numbers of applicants, because of several factors: (1) a long training process of 3 to 6 years (deters potential applicants); (2) higher workloads (because of the shortage of qualified personnel); (3) remote assignment locations (surfman stations are largely located in remote areas of the Northwest); (4) obstacles to promotion (promotion to senior enlisted ranks requires a year of sea duty, which surfmen, who are needed at stations, have difficulty obtaining); and (5) program challenges (make it difficult to retain bonus pay benefits). To address these challenges, the Coast Guard has revised relevant personnel policies to facilitate career advancement and to clarify the process for becoming a surfman. The Coast Guard has also revamped the surfman training program by developing courses that that address training needs. Regarding the former, the Coast Guard has (1) eased requirements for advancement (waived the requirement for 1 year of sea duty for promotion to senior positions) and (2) allowed surfmen to retain special pay status after they transfer to a new station and are in the process of certifying for their new area of operation. Beginning in May 2005, surfmen will also receive additional points on their service-wide exams, the scores of which are used to determine promotions. Regarding training, the Coast Guard has concentrated on a two-pronged approach. First, to increase the number of trainees who actually qualify as surfmen, in 2004 the Coast Guard implemented a new 2-year intensive training program that will require trainees to reside at the surfman training center; this will allow trainees to concentrate more fully on the training process. Officials told us they would not know the impact of this new training initiative until 2006, when the first class of resident trainees graduates. Second, to improve formal training for personnel who are qualifying through on-the-job training at their stations, in November 2004, the Coast Guard implemented a new 2-week surfman course. Because the course was designed in part to relieve the training burden on stations (which are short of qualified surfmen who can serve as instructors), trainees will complete most of their qualification requirements during training. Officials expected 18 students to take the course during the winter of 2004. The Coast Guard has not met its goal of aligning the number of individuals assigned to stations with the number of designated positions, making it unclear whether station staffing levels (individuals assigned to stations), which are currently greater than designated positions, will remain at current levels or decrease, potentially affecting station workweek hours and other issues. At the end of fiscal year 2004, the estimated number of personnel assigned to stations exceeded the number of Coast Guard- designated positions by an estimated 1,019 (or about 17 percent of total estimated personnel assigned to stations). Because the 1,019 personnel are not assigned to permanent positions, and thus their assignment is potentially more temporary than that of other personnel, the Coast Guard could not assure us that the estimated fiscal year 2004 station staffing level of 5,925 personnel will be maintained in the future. In contrast, the number of designated positions—4,906 at the end of fiscal year 2004—is considered permanent. Officials told us that although the Coast Guard’s goal is to align personnel and position levels, it has been necessary to assign a greater number of less experienced staff to the stations, above designated staffing levels, to develop required numbers of senior staff (officials estimate it takes three junior personnel to produce one senior crew member). Attrition patterns, limited space on ships, and the need to expose junior personnel to on-the-job-training are driving factors in this decision. The Coast Guard does not plan to add either additional personnel or positions to stations in fiscal year 2005; rather, it will use this time to evaluate current station resource levels and give junior personnel time to gain experience and become fully trained. It is unclear how this decision may affect staffing levels—if staffing levels drop, the number of hours station personnel work might increase. On the other hand, if lower staffing levels are accompanied by higher levels of experienced personnel, then workweek hours might be unaffected or even decline. The impact will also depend in part on other factors, such as the implementation of remaining staffing initiatives—such as the station staffing standards—and the nature of future homeland security responsibilities. Since 2001, the Coast Guard has made progress in developing a more formalized training program and in expanding the number of training slots available for the majority of station occupations. As late as August 2003, when we began our work, the Coast Guard had yet to determine whether formal training delivered in a classroom environment was preferable to on-the-job training—administered by senior personnel at stations—or whether it should utilize a combination of both on a long-term basis. Subsequently, the Coast Guard identified formal training as its preferred training method because, according to officials, it provides greater accountability for consistent and uniform training across all occupations and stations. To date, the Coast Guard has taken steps to formalize or augment several aspects of station training, including boatswain’s mate and boat driver training. With respect to boatswain’s mate training, in fiscal year 2002 the Coast Guard instituted a formal training center with the capacity to train 120 trainees per year; during fiscal year 2003 it more than tripled the center’s capacity to 450 training slots. Training officials told us they plan to further expand the capacity of the center each year through 2006, when its annual capacity is expected to reach 1,000 slots, the estimated number of new boatswain’s mates needed each year. Furthermore, in conjunction with efforts to modernize its boat fleet, in fiscal year 2003 the Coast Guard increased the amount of formal training available to boat drivers who were learning to operate new response boats and nonstandard boats. Training officials told us that they employed a two-pronged approach to train operators on the new boats using on-site training teams, which conduct training at the stations, and a new 2-week national training center course. Table 6 provides additional information regarding the Coast Guard’s initiatives to address training needs. (See app. II for a more detailed discussion of the Coast Guard’s planned and ongoing initiatives regarding station training needs.) According to officials, the Coast Guard’s efforts to train boat drivers were developed to address missions with greatest priority as well as for training needs for new boats going into service. For example, in 2003 and 2004, training teams were deployed to all strategic ports to provide training in tactical operations, an emerging requirement following the attacks of September 11. In addition, to address safety concerns associated with the operation of nonstandard boats, officials told us that training efforts were targeted at stations that would retain nonstandard boats, while the Coast Guard completes its program to replace stations’ nonstandard boats. Since 2001, the Coast Guard has made progress in restructuring the stations’ boat fleet to address safety and operational concerns resulting from aging and nonstandard boats. The Coast Guard has focused a major part of its efforts on replacing an assorted variety of nonstandard small boats with new, standardized boats. Officials told us that although the Coast Guard had just started planning the acquisition of the new boats in 2001, following the attacks of September 11, it expedited the purchase of 100 of the new boats to meet stations’ increased homeland security responsibilities. Approximately 50 of these boats were distributed to stations located at strategic ports, to provide quick response capabilities for port security operations, and to stations in critical need of new boat replacement. The remaining 50 boats were distributed to MSSTs. In 2003, the Coast Guard developed a multiyear contract to replace the remainder of stations’ aging and nonstandard boats with an estimated 350 new boats. The Coast Guard has also initiated efforts to replace the aging 41-foot utility boat fleet, which will reach the end of its 25-year service life beginning in 2005, with a medium-size utility boat. Officials told us that as of August 2003 the Coast Guard was in the process of reviewing three medium boat prototypes and that they expect to select a manufacturer in 2005. In addition, in 2003, the Coast Guard completed the replacement of the 30-year old 44-foot motor lifeboat with a fleet of new 47-foot motor life boats. Table 7 describes the Coast Guard’s actions to address concerns regarding the stations’ boat fleet. (See app. II for a more detailed discussion of ongoing and planned efforts for addressing station boat needs.) Despite this progress, the Coast Guard has yet to meet mission readiness goals for medium-sized boats (utility and motor life boats), as indicated by internal inspection results. The Office of Boat Forces’ goal is for 80 percent of boats inspected to meet readiness standards at the initial inspection. Results from the Coast Guard’s fiscal year 2003 inspections indicate that only 16 percent of the motor lifeboats and utility boats inspected met mission readiness goals when initially inspected. After a 1- day opportunity to correct identified problems, approximately 81 percent had met readiness goals. It is important to note that the majority of the discrepancies cited were not of such severity that they would prevent the boats from being used in most mission operations. For example, the failure of navigation lights on a 41-foot utility boat could preclude the boat from being operated (i.e., disable it) until the lights were fixed or the operational commander issued a waiver outlining the conditions under which the boat could be operated. Boats that receive waivers are considered able to “perform some missions, but not all missions safely.” In this scenario, the boat’s failure to meet full readiness standards would not necessarily affect the station’s operational readiness. Officials also told us that in order to ensure that operational readiness is maintained at stations when a boat is disabled, all multimission stations have more than one boat. Officials attributed the inability of stations to meet full readiness standards for boats to the following: Junior engineers did not have the necessary experience to perform maintenance in compliance with operating manuals and configuration updates from the manufacturer. Engineers lacked sufficient time to perform maintenance because of increased operational hours (that is, the boats are being used more often, and the engineers assigned to perform maintenance are spending more time conducting boat operations). Station utility boats were reaching the end of their service life and had deteriorated to the point that they required more maintenance to meet mission readiness standards. New boats are more technologically advanced (e.g., satellite navigation systems) requiring specialized technical training in order to perform maintenance. Officials told us that they are taking various steps to respond to these issues. First, to compensate for the lack of experience among junior engineers, the Coast Guard intends to intensify the training that is provided to engineers for the motor lifeboat. In November 2004, the Coast Guard implemented a 2-week course focused specifically on motor lifeboat operations and maintenance. The Coast Guard does not have plans, however, to provide specialized training for utility boat maintenance, given that these boats are at the end of their life span and will be replaced within a few years with new medium response boats. Likewise, the replacement of the utility boats will address low scores related to their deteriorating condition. Regarding the lack of time engineers have to perform maintenance, officials told us that this issue will be examined after the Coast Guard has reassessed changes in station workloads following September 11. As of the end of fiscal year 2003, station personnel appeared to have sufficient PPE, but the Coast Guard does not have adequate processes and practices in place to help prevent funding shortfalls from recurring. The Coast Guard’s continued use of these processes and practices in fiscal year 2004 resulted in a $1.9 million shortfall in estimated PPE funding needs for that year. As we discussed in our previous report, following the expenditure of an additional $5.6 million on PPE in fiscal year 2003 to address perceived shortfalls, active and reserve station personnel appeared to possess sufficient PPE. However, the Coast Guard’s processes and practices for estimating station PPE needs and allocating funds have historically resulted in an underfunding of station PPE, despite congressional direction to provide adequate supplies of PPE. If these funding practices are not modified, funding shortfalls could continue to occur in the future. Moreover, such funding shortages would affect the Coast Guard’s ability to meet one of its strategic objectives for stations— namely, to ensure that station personnel are properly outfitted with mission-specific equipment, such as PPE. A shortfall in estimated PPE funding needs of $1.9 million occurred in fiscal year 2004, although the actual impact of the shortfall—in terms of PPE that was needed but not purchased—is not known, since the purchase of PPE is not tracked at the headquarters level. A shortfall of $1.9 million is projected for fiscal year 2005. Following a mishap in 2001 in which the improper use of PPE was found to have contributed to the death of two station personnel, the adequacy of PPE took on added importance. The Coast Guard has emphasized the importance of PPE, both through a Commandant directive and in its policy manual, stating that the proper supplies and use of PPE is one of the top priorities of Coast Guard management. Although these measures are important, several aspects of the Coast Guard’s processes for estimating and allocating station PPE funds raise concerns. Appendix II discusses these concerns in detail, but they are summarized as follows: The Coast Guard’s forecasting models do not recognize PPE funding needs for personnel assigned to stations over and above the number of designated positions. This is because the forecasting models are predicated on the number of positions designated for stations, rather than the number of personnel assigned (in fiscal year 2004 the estimated number of personnel assigned to stations exceeded positions by an estimated 1,019). According to program officials, historically the amount of funds allotted by the Coast Guard each fiscal year for station PPE has not been sufficient to fund the estimated needs of all assigned station personnel. For example, in 2003, the OIG reported that the Coast Guard had not provided PPE funding for 541 (69 percent) of the 789 personnel it had added to stations during fiscal year 2002. Even when funding is narrowed to just designated positions, the Coast Guard’s traditional practice has been to fund only about half of PPE station needs, according to program officials. For example, in fiscal year 2003, the Coast Guard initially allocated $1.8 million, or 56 percent, of the estimated $3.2 million needed to provide PPE for personnel in designated station positions. Stations also receive general operating funds that may be used to purchase PPE, although these funds are also used for other purposes, such as boat maintenance. Assumptions used in PPE forecasting models have not been validated, according to officials. Without validated assumptions, the Coast Guard could be either underestimating or overestimating the life span and replacement cycle of the PPE. According to one official, the assumptions were based on input from station personnel. The Coast Guard does not require that PPE funds allocated to stations and oversight units actually be spent on PPE, according to program officials. Officials told us that in the interests of command flexibility units are allowed to spend allocated PPE funds on various operational expenses. Although such flexibility may be needed, the former PPE program manager told us that it was possible that oversight units have not been passing PPE funds on to stations as intended (i.e., the amount expended for PPE may be less than the amount allocated). To help address this possibility, the official said that in recent years he has disclosed to stations the total amount of PPE funding available to them, including funds held by oversight units. Officials told us the Coast Guard has no immediate plans to revise the traditional PPE funding allocation process because they believe it has been sufficiently reliable for the agency’s purposes. However, the process may change once long-term homeland security requirements have been identified. Given the historic shortages in PPE funding that have resulted from the Coast Guard’s allocation processes, as witnessed by the onetime increase in funding during fiscal year 2003, it seems likely that stations will experience shortfalls in the future if PPE allocation processes and practices are not adjusted. The Coast Guard Guard’s Boat Forces Strategic Plan, its 10-year plan for maintaining and improving readiness at stations and other boat units, lacks key components for achieving and assessing station readiness in the post-September 11 operating environment. The plan, although extensive, has not been updated to include the impact of post-September 11 homeland security requirements on station operations. The plan also does not identify the specific actions, milestones, and funding amounts needed to assure Congress and others that the Coast Guard is committed to achieving identified readiness levels. Moreover, the Coast Guard has yet to develop measurable annual goals for stations that would (1) allow it to track its progress in achieving long-term goals and objectives, (2) allow others to effectively monitor and measure progress, and (3) provide accountability. Without these key planning elements, the strategic plan’s effectiveness as a management tool, as well as the Coast Guard’s ability to ensure desired progress in meeting station readiness needs, is limited. The Boat Forces Strategic Plan identifies strategic goals in four areas: (1) leadership and management; (2) personnel and staffing; (3) training and expertise; and (4) equipment, support, and technology. These goals are supported by objectives and initiatives, the latter of which are prioritized, by fiscal year, in a summary implementation plan. Table 8 presents examples of goals, objectives, and initiatives, as well as the targeted time frames, pertaining to each of the four readiness categories (staffing, training, boats, and PPE). The initiatives contained in the plan are designed to address station readiness concerns identified in 2001. For example, to address the concern that stations’ have not received the appropriate number of positions or qualified personnel, the plan contains an initiative to revise station staffing standards as well as an initiative regarding the need to staff stations according to these revised standards. Although the strategic plan provides an indication of what overall measures may be needed to restore station readiness, the Coast Guard has not developed key planning elements in four areas—either pertaining to the strategic plan or related to it—that are essential to setting clear expectations about what will be achieved, and translating the expectations into specific funding needs. In four key areas, as discussed later, the Coast Guard does not follow practices that we and others have identified as necessary to effectively measure performance and hold agencies accountable for results. Plan not updated to reflect homeland security responsibilities: The plan has not been updated to reflect the impact of post-September 11 homeland security requirements on stations. Although it incorporates performance goals for other Coast Guard programs, the plan does not incorporate—because they have yet to be finalized—goals and requirements for the PWCS program, a major driver of station operations. Until those requirements have been developed, the capability and resources stations will need to address one of their most significant operational responsibilities, and hence overall readiness needs, cannot be fully determined. For example, the plan cites two important initiatives in the category of staffing—(1) revise station staffing standards (i.e., determine the optimal number and type of personnel needed at each station) and (2) staff stations according to those standards. According to the plan’s implementation summary, these standards were to be revised in fiscal year 2003 and station staffing completed by fiscal year 2007. As of January 2005, officials had yet to revise the standards because long-term homeland security responsibilities had not been finalized. Until the staffing standards have been revised, the bigger picture—when stations staffing needs will be met—cannot be determined. Plan contains insufficient details on specific planned actions and milestones: The plan does not identify, in sufficient detail, planned actions and milestones. Effective strategic plans should show an obvious link between objectives and the specific actions that will be needed to meet those objectives. These actions, in turn, should be clearly linked to milestones. Although the plan includes a summary implementation schedule, it does not clearly identify what steps will be taken to implement the initiatives and when they will be completed. For example, the plan does not identify what actions will be needed to ensure that station personnel are placed in positions that are appropriate for their experience, or to increase the actual length of time personnel are assigned to stations. Plan’s objectives not linked with budget: The plan lacks a clear link between objectives and required funding levels. Without a clear understanding of the funding needed each year, there is little assurance that initiatives will be implemented and long-term objectives realized. Clearly identifying funding needs would also help to ensure that projected goals and objectives are commensurate with available resource levels. Because the plan does not identify the funding needed to carry out key objectives and initiatives, even in the short term, it is unclear whether the Coast Guard will be able to fund initiatives according to proposed time frames. Lack of measurable annual goals: The Coast Guard has not established measurable annual goals linked to the long-term goals identified in the strategic plan. Without annual goals, Congress, the Coast Guard, and others cannot effectively and readily measure an agency’s progress in meeting its long-term goals. The above planning elements would help the Coast Guard and Congress use the strategic plan as a more effective tool for monitoring station readiness needs and identifying areas of continuing concern. As with any strategic plan, Coast Guard officials agree that it will also need to be revisited and revised to keep pace with changing events and, thus, the plan will be reviewed on an annual basis. The Coast Guard’s plan may be particularly susceptible to changing circumstances, given that it must deal with so many unpredictable events, ranging from natural disasters and accidents to the uncertainties of terrorist threats. A senior headquarters official told us that while the Coast Guard should more clearly identify expectations regarding annual goals, continually changing priorities often make it difficult for the agency to adhere to—and fund—long-term strategic plans and in some cases to even maintain program consistency. We acknowledge that these difficulties exist and must be considered in developing and using the plan, but even with these difficulties, incorporating the key elements discussed above would improve the plan’s effectiveness as a management tool. It has been 3 years since the September 11 terrorist attacks changed the mission priorities for multimission stations, and there is no doubt that station readiness requirements need to be updated to reflect this new reality. The Coast Guard’s decision to hold off updating these requirements until they can be aligned with homeland security responsibilities Coast Guard-wide is sensible. The readiness of multimission stations is but one of the many competing demands the Coast Guard must balance as it attempts to meet increased homeland security responsibilities while continuing to support other missions. Nonetheless, the Coast Guard still needs to have the necessary plans, processes, and safeguards in place to help ensure that it can continue the impressive progress made thus far in addressing 20 years of operational deterioration at stations. In particular, indications of high workweek hours for many personnel and inadequate processes and practices used to estimate and fund needs for personal protection equipment may limit the stations’ readiness. Historic shortages in station PPE funding allocations, which continued in fiscal years 2004 and are estimated for 2005, indicate that stations will continue to experience funding shortfalls in the future unless PPE allocation processes and practices are adjusted. Perhaps more significantly, it remains unclear where station readiness falls in the Coast Guard’s list of priorities, as evidenced by a lack of measurable annual goals related to stations and the lack of detail—in terms of both specific actions as well as necessary funding—in the Boat Forces Strategic Plan, the Coast Guard’s strategy for addressing station readiness issues. The lack of specificity on the Coast Guard’s part thus far is perhaps understandable given the challenges it has faced in the wake of September 11. However, continuing in this way will make it difficult to know what the Coast Guard intends as a readiness baseline, how close or far away it is from achieving this level, and what it thinks will be needed to get there. To help ensure that the Coast Guard and Congress have the information necessary to effectively assess station readiness needs and track progress in meeting those needs, and that multimission station personnel receive sufficient personal protection equipment to perform essential and hazardous missions as specified by Congress, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consideration of any revised homeland security requirements, direct the Commandant of the Coast Guard to take the following three actions: Revise the Boat Forces Strategic Plan to (1) reflect the impact of homeland security requirements on station needs and (2) identify specific actions, milestones, and funding needs for meeting those needs. Develop measurable annual goals for stations. Revise the processes and practices for estimating and allocating station PPE funds to reliably identify annual funding needs and use this information in making future funding decisions. We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Homeland Security and the Coast Guard for their review and comment. The Department of Homeland Security and the Coast Guard generally concurred with our findings and recommendations and did not provide formal comments for inclusion in the final report. The Coast Guard, however, provided technical clarifications as well as suggested contextual adjustments, which we incorporated to ensure the accuracy of the report. We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional committees and subcommittees. We will also make copies available to others on request. If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact me at (415) 904-2200 or Steven N. Calvo at (206) 287-4839. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix III. This report will also be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. To examine the extent to which multimission station readiness needs changed as a result of post-September 11 changes in mission priorities, we reviewed relevant Coast Guard documents, including Operation Neptune Shield, the agency’s interim guidelines for implementing homeland security operations; the Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security; and mission planning guidance used to establish fiscal year 2004 mission priorities. We also reviewed our previous work on the Coast Guard’s efforts to balance its homeland security and nonhomeland security missions. In addition, we interviewed headquarters officials regarding trends in station operations and the agency’s plans for addressing the homeland security mission. To better understand how station performance was affected by changes in mission priorities, we reviewed data from the Coast Guard’s Scorecard System, its unofficial process for monitoring security operations at strategic ports. We interviewed officials responsible for analyzing and compiling these data at the field and headquarters levels and determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report, given the parameters of the system. We also reviewed boat hour data from the Coast Guard’s Abstract of Operations database to determine trends in the number of hours station boats were operated, by program, both before and after September 11. Boat hour data, reported by station crews, represent the number of hours that boats were operated by station personnel. To develop a more representative estimate of pre- September 11 boat hours and to normalize for fluctuations in hours that might occur in a single year, we averaged the number of boat hours expended during fiscal years 1999 and 2000 to create a pre-September 11 baseline. The Coast Guard agreed with our use of this 2-year average as an appropriate baseline of pre-September 11 boat hours. To determine the reliability of the data, we used assessments from our previous report, which consisted of (1) a review of existing documentation regarding the data and the systems that produced them and (2) interviews with knowledgeable agency officials. On the basis of these assessments, we determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We visited 8 multimission stations on the Pacific and Atlantic coasts, as well as the four groups and activities responsible for overseeing their operations, to better understand how stations’ readiness needs changed following September 11. These stations were selected on the basis of geographic location, proximity to a strategic port, and the number of boat hours expended in fiscal year 2003 on homeland security, search and rescue, and law enforcement operations. To further explore how increased homeland security operations had affected stations, we conducted telephone interviews with field officials responsible for overseeing operations at 8 additional stations located at strategic ports. We selected these additional 8 stations based on the number of station resource hours expended on port security operations. To assess the levels of support provided to stations by state and local organizations, we contacted 13 organizations identified as key partners for 8 of the stations we reviewed. To address multimission station readiness concerns identified prior to September 11, we reviewed the Department of Transportation’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) reports on station readiness, the Coast Guard’s internal review of station operations, and various congressional reports. We also spoke with Coast Guard headquarters officials from the Offices of Boat Forces; Budget and Programs; and Workforce Performance, Training, and Development. To identify actions the Coast Guard has taken or is planning to take regarding station readiness concerns, we reviewed available Coast Guard data regarding station staffing, training, boats, and personal protection equipment (PPE). In the areas of staffing and PPE, we used data from our May 2004 report—such as the number of staff and positions added to stations in fiscal year 2003 and the estimated amount of funds expended on station PPE in fiscal year 2003—which we had determined were sufficiently reliable for reporting purposes. To assess the reliability of training and boat data, we (1) reviewed existing documentation regarding the data and how they were developed and (2) interviewed knowledgeable agency officials. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. Furthermore, we interviewed officials responsible for overseeing operations at the 16 stations we reviewed, as well as at relevant oversight units. To review the Coast Guard’s training programs and identify progress made in expanding formal training opportunities for station personnel, we visited the following Coast Guard training centers: the Motor Life Boat School; the Boatswain’s Mate School, the Boat Forces Center, the Boat Engineering School; and the Maritime Law Enforcement Center. In addition, we interviewed officials from the Coast Guard’s internal inspection teams to discuss biennial inspections of station operations and reviewed station inspection results for fiscal years 2002 and 2003. To obtain a better understanding of personnel workloads and how those workloads may be changing, we also reviewed fiscal years 2002 and 2003 survey results from the Coast Guard’s annual survey of station personnel activities. With some exceptions, the Coast Guard has conducted an annual survey of station workweek hours since 1991. The Coast Guard uses the survey results to gauge changes in the average number of hours personnel work each week, and thus have not validated the survey. Personnel are asked to report the number of hours spent among 49 predefined activities during an average workweek in August. In 2003, personnel at 77 of the 188 stations were surveyed, with personnel from 64 stations responding, for a total response rate of 54 percent of all personnel surveyed. (Response rate data were not readily available for other survey years.) One possible reason for this low response rate may be that nonrespondents did not have time to complete the survey, which could mean that workweek hours were under-reported. However, it is also possible that personnel who were working longer hours per week were more inclined to report that condition, leading to an over-reporting of workweek hours. To assess the reliability of the data, we interviewed the headquarters officials who oversee the survey as well as available documentation. Recognizing the limitations of the data—such as the low response rate—we determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. That is, as an indicator of average station workweek hours, and general trends in those hours over time, the survey results are sufficiently reliable. To assess the extent to which Coast Guard’s plans address station readiness needs, we reviewed the Coast Guard’s Boat Forces Strategic Plan, the agency’s strategy for maintaining and improving essential operations capabilities for all boat units, including multimission stations. We also reviewed the Department of Transportation OIG’s assessment of the draft plan. To identify practices for effectively measuring program performance, we reviewed the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993, our prior work on results-oriented management, and Office of Management and Budget circulars. We conducted our work between September 2003 and December 2004 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. This appendix presents additional information regarding the four categories of multimission station operations we reviewed—staffing, training, boats, and PPE. The appendix also contains additional information regarding the initiatives the Coast Guard has either started or plans to develop to address concerns in each of these categories. The Coast Guard has initiated multiple efforts to address staffing concerns at multimission stations. This section provides additional information regarding Coast Guard (1) station survey results regarding workweek hours and (2) initiatives to address staffing concerns. Approximately 44 percent of the individuals who responded to the Coast Guard’s 2003 station staffing survey indicated that they worked an average workweek that was in excess of the 68-hour standard (see table 9). Approximately 6 percent of those questioned indicated they worked a standard 68-hour work week. Table 10 presents additional information on initiatives the Coast Guard has under way or plans to develop with regard to station staffing needs. Since 2001, the Coast Guard has taken steps to increase training capacity at national training centers. Two efforts to expand formal training slots have been the reinstituting of the boatswain’s mate training center and the implementation of response boat training courses. Additional information regarding training efforts are summarized in table 11. The Coast Guard has also taken steps to improve the way it evaluates job performance for station personnel. To monitor knowledge levels and provide insight on areas of training that may need improvement, every 2 years station personnel are tested on requisite areas of job performance. In an effort to improve how the examinations measure station personnel knowledge levels, the Coast Guard employed professional test writers in 2004 to revise the examinations. Over the past few years test scores for station personnel have shown mixed trends. For example, between fiscal years 2002 and 2003 assessment results for boat drivers and motor lifeboat engineers improved somewhat, while results for crew members (boat personnel other than the boat driver or engineer) and for utility boat engineers decreased slightly. Coast Guard officials told us that they are exploring the reasons for these results, but in general, increases in test results can be attributed to improvements made in on-the-job training. Conversely, decreases can be attributed to a continued lack of experience on the part of junior personnel, the number of which have increased in the past few years, and to high levels of personnel turnover at stations. Multimission station personnel use a variety of boats to support operations. Figures 3 and 4 illustrate three of the primary boats used by station personnel. The Coast Guard has made progress in replacing nonstandard and aging boats to support station operations. Table 12 presents additional information regarding the Coast Guard’s initiatives to modernize stations’ boat fleet. As we previously reported, anecdotal and quantitative data indicate that as of fiscal year 2003 active and reserve station personnel possessed sufficient levels of PPE. During fiscal year 2003, the Coast Guard spent $7.5 million to address PPE shortfalls for station personnel, of which $5.6 million came from specially designated funds. In fiscal year 2003, the cost of a total basic PPE outfit was $1,296. The cost of a cold weather PPE outfit, which is used by personnel working at stations where the outdoor temperature falls below 50 degrees Fahrenheit, was $1,431. (Fig. 5 shows a station crew member in cold weather PPE.) According to the Coast Guard, personnel at 135 (72 percent) of the 188 multimission stations require cold weather PPE in addition to basic PPE. Despite indications that the Coast Guard had met its goal in fiscal year 2003 of providing sufficient amounts of PPE to all active duty and reserve station personnel, concerns remain as to whether the Coast Guard will provide sufficient funding for station PPE in the future. The Coast Guard’s processes for estimating station PPE needs and allocating funds have historically resulted in an under funding of station PPE. See table 13 for concerns regarding the Coast Guard’s processes and practices for allocating funds for station PPE. In addition to those named above, Randy B. Williamson, Barbara A. Guffy, Joel Aldape, Marisela Perez, Stan G. Stenersen, Dorian R. Dunbar, Ben Atwater, Michele C. Fejfar, Elizabeth H. Curda, and Ann H. Finley made key contributions to this report.

Summary: For years, the Coast Guard has conducted search and rescue operations from its network of stations along the nation's coasts and waterways. In 2001, reviews of station operations found that station readiness--the ability to execute mission requirements in keeping with standards--was in decline. The Coast Guard began addressing these issues, only to see its efforts complicated by expanded post-September 11, 2001, homeland security responsibilities at many stations. GAO reviewed the impact of changing missions on station needs, the progress made in addressing station readiness needs, and the extent to which plans are in place for addressing any remaining needs. The Coast Guard does not yet know the extent to which station readiness needs have been affected by post-September 11 changes in mission priorities, although increases in homeland security operations have clearly affected activities and presumably affected readiness needs as well. Following the attacks, stations in and near ports received the bulk of port security duties, creating substantial increases in workloads. The Coast Guard is still in the process of defining long-term activity levels for homeland security and has yet to convert the homeland security mission into specific station readiness requirements. Until it does so, the impact of these new duties on readiness needs cannot be determined. The Coast Guard says it will revise readiness requirements after security activity levels have been finalized. Increased staffing, more training, new boats, more personal protection equipment (such as life vests), and other changes have helped mitigate many long-standing station readiness concerns. However, stations have been unable to meet current Coast Guard standards and goals in the areas of staffing and boats, an indication that stations are still significantly short of desired readiness levels in these areas. Also, because Coast Guard funding practices for personal protection equipment have not changed, stations may have insufficient funding for such equipment in the future. The Coast Guard does not have an adequate plan in place for addressing remaining readiness needs. The Coast Guard's strategic plan for these stations has not been updated to reflect increased security responsibilities, and the agency lacks specific planned actions and milestones. Moreover, the Coast Guard has yet to develop measurable annual goals that would allow the agency and others to track stations' progress.