Although numerous U.S. agencies are engaged in U.S. efforts to provide assistance to foreign police forces, DOD and State are the major providers—providing police training around the world through a variety of authorities. DOD trains and equips foreign police forces to support its counterinsurgency operations. It also provides support for the counterdrug activities of foreign law enforcement agencies for purposes including counterdrug training of foreign law enforcement personnel. DOD provides such assistance around the world through a variety of authorities. For example, section 1004 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 1991, as amended, authorizes DOD to provide support for the counterdrug activities of foreign law-enforcement agencies for purposes including counterdrug training of foreign law-enforcement personnel, if requested by an appropriate official of a federal agency with counterdrug responsibilities. State trains and equips foreign police to support a variety of U.S. foreign policy objectives, including suppressing international narcotics trafficking, combating terrorism, and developing and implementing U.S. policies to curb the proliferation of all types of weapons of mass destruction. Different State bureaus carry out police assistance under different authorities. For example, according to State/INL officials, State/INL carries out its mission under authorities in Chapter 8 of the Foreign Assistance Act, as amended, which among other things, authorizes the provision of law-enforcement training. DOE provides training and equipment to overseas law enforcement, both at national borders and to police and security forces, as part of the mission of its National Nuclear Security Administration’s Second Line of Defense program to strengthen the capability of foreign governments to deter, detect and interdict illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials across international borders, through the global maritime shipping system, and by equipping teams to be deployed throughout their countries. USAID provides community-based police assistance as part of its role in promoting the rule of law through assistance to the justice sector. Treasury provides training as part of its mission to support the development of strong financial sectors and sound financial management overseas. DOJ and DHS implement foreign police assistance activities primarily funded by State. Treasury also receives some funds from State. Pub. Law No. 87-195, as amended. Investigation (FBI) Academy in Virginia, and at various DOD training facilities. Trainers provided by various U.S. agencies also travel overseas to provide instruction. Foreign law enforcement personnel are also trained at State-funded international law enforcement academies located in El Salvador, Thailand, Hungary, Botswana, and Peru. The training covers a variety of subject matter, including crime scene investigation, postblast investigations, forensics, and behavioral analysis. We estimate the U.S. government made available $13.9 billion for foreign police assistance during fiscal years 2009 through 2011. Most U.S. funding made available for foreign police assistance during fiscal years 2009 through 2011 provided training and equipment to Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Colombia, Mexico, and the Palestinian Territories. DOD and State funds constituted about 97 percent of the U.S. funds for police assistance in fiscal year 2009 and 98 percent of U.S. funds for police assistance in fiscal years 2010 and 2011. Four other agencies provided the remaining amount. On the basis of data provided by DOD, State, DOE, USAID, Treasury, and DOJ, we estimate that the U.S. government made available $3.5 billion in foreign police assistance in fiscal year 2009, $5.7 billion in fiscal year 2010, and $4.7 billion in fiscal year 2011 (see fig. 1).made available focused on sustaining the counternarcotics, counterterrorism, anticrime, and other civilian policing efforts of police forces around the world. GAO, Combating Terrorism: Pakistan Counterinsurgency Funds Disbursed, but Human Rights Vetting Process Can Be Enhanced, GAO-11-860SU (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 11, 2011). million in fiscal year 2011. State’s activities included support to the Colombian National Police’s aviation program and training on weapons and other equipment to rural police units. DOD support included training for a special unit of the Colombian National Police. In Mexico, DOD and State funds made available decreased from an estimated $167 million in fiscal year 2010 to $21 million in fiscal year 2011. Activities in Mexico included State’s Mérida Initiative, which provided training and equipment including aircraft and boats, inspection equipment, and canine units. DOD support to Mexico included training on aviation, communications equipment, maintenance, and information sharing. For the Palestinian Territories, State’s funds made available increased from an estimated $97 million in fiscal year 2010 to $142 million in fiscal year 2011. State provided battalion-level basic law enforcement and security training conducted at the Jordanian International Police Training Center located outside Amman, Jordan. Appendix IV contains additional information on activities in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Colombia, Mexico, and the Palestinian Territories. Four other agencies—DOE, USAID, Treasury, and DOJ—also made available about $83 million, or 2 percent of the estimated funds, for foreign police assistance in fiscal year 2011 (see table 1). DOE made available the majority of the funds ($52 million) for its nuclear security programs; USAID, Treasury, and DOJ made available the remaining amounts. DOD and State/INL have acknowledged limitations in their procedures to assess and evaluate their foreign police assistance activities and are taking steps to address them. DOD assesses the performance of the national police forces it has trained and equipped for counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan—countries that were the three largest recipients of DOD’s foreign police assistance funds during fiscal years 2009 through 2011. However, according to an October 2011 DOD report to Congress, the assessment process for Afghanistan does not provide data on civil policing operations such as referring cases to the justice system, a fact that hampers the department’s ability to fully assess the effectiveness of the training it provides to the ANP. DOD plans to begin collecting these data to assess civil policing effectiveness. As of April 2012, State/INL had conducted only one evaluation of a program that includes foreign police assistance activities. Recognizing the need to conduct such evaluations, State/INL is developing an evaluation plan that is consistent with State’s February 2012 Evaluation Policy and implementing its June 2010 guidelines that recommended including evaluation as a part of its budget and planning documents for programs in Iraq and Mexico. Other priority programs for evaluation include ones for Afghanistan, Colombia, the Palestinian Territories, and Pakistan. DOD assesses the performance of the national police forces it has trained and equipped for counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan—countries that were the three largest recipients of DOD’s foreign police assistance funds during fiscal years 2009 through 2011. For Afghanistan, DOD has assessed the Afghan National Security Forces, which consists of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and ANP, using its Commander’s Unit Assessment Tool. The assessment tool provides quantitative data for security force units, including personnel, equipment, and training, and qualitative assessments for functions such as training and education. In addition, the assessment tool reports on the operational performance of the ANA and ANP units using rating definition levels. Rating definition levels include (1) independent, (2) effective with advisers, (3) effective with assistance, (4) developing, (5) established, and (6) not assessed. As of August 2011, DOD reported 26 ANP units were rated as independent. We previously reported on U.S. efforts to train and equip the ANP in 2009 and more recently in 2012. For Iraq, DOD used a readiness assessment system to determine when units of the Iraqi security forces, including the Iraqi national police, could assume the lead for conducting security operations. This system’s classified assessments were prepared monthly by the unit’s coalition commander and Iraqi commander. According to multinational force guidance, the purpose of the assessment system was to provide commanders with a method to consistently evaluate units. It also helped to identify factors hindering unit progress, determine resource shortfalls, and make resource allocations. Units were evaluated in the areas of personnel, command and control, equipment, sustainment/logistics, training, leadership, operational effectiveness, and reliability, including how militia and sectarian influences affected the loyalty and reliability of Iraqi police and military forces. Further information on the results of these assessments is classified. For Pakistan, DOD reported that, since March 2009, the Strategic Implementation Plan has been the principal mechanism for monitoring and assessing the administration’s progress in attaining the core Pakistan- related objectives of the President’s Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy, which include developing the counterinsurgency capabilities of Pakistan’s Frontier Corps and army. Although details of these and supporting assessments are classified, DOD reported that a series of events beginning in late 2010 heightened bilateral tension between the United States and Pakistan. Pakistan’s military subsequently requested significant reductions in U.S. military personnel in Pakistan. According to the report, the reduced number of U.S. military personnel and trainers, along with continued delays in obtaining visas, hindered the United States’ provision of security-related assistance to Pakistan. As a result, the progress achieved since 2010 in training, advising, and equipping Pakistan security forces has eroded, particularly in the area of counterinsurgency effectiveness for tactical- and operational-level combat forces. Although DOD is assessing ANP’s operational performance, the department recently reported it lacked data to assess civil policing effectiveness. According to a DOD October 2011 report, DOD uses the same report template to assess ANA’s and ANP’s ability to meet their counterinsurgency mission, but it does not address civil policing and the other roles and responsibilities of ANP. In 2008, we reported that the deterioration of Afghanistan’s security situation since 2005 had led to increased ANP involvement in counterinsurgency operations, resulting in additional training in weapons and survival skills and counterinsurgency tactics. We also reported that ANP’s role is to enforce the rule of law, protect the rights of citizens, maintain civil order and public safety, control national borders, and reduce the level of domestic and international organized crime, among other activities. In its report, DOD acknowledged that transitioning ANP’s role from performing counterinsurgency operations to a community police force that interacts with the population will be challenging, especially in contested areas. DOD reported that it plans to create a separate ANP report template that will include data on law enforcement operations in 2012. According to the DOD report, the ANP report template will provide data on community policing and law enforcement operations (see table 2). For example, DOD plans to include questions in the ANP report template that will assess the extent to which ANP units are recording complaints from the public. In developing the new template, DOD is working with the International Police Coordination Board (IPCB), according to the department’s report. First established in the Afghanistan Compact at the London Conference in 2006, IPCB serves as the main coordination board for police reform in Afghanistan. Upon its establishment, IPCB had 13 member nations, including the United States. To increase DOD’s ability to assess civil policing effectiveness, IPCB has established a partnership with the International Security Assistance Force-Joint Command. According to the DOD report, IPCB is assisting DOD by having law enforcement professionals report data in its report template, and DOD is assisting IPCB by sharing current and historical ANP data. IPCB has also assisted DOD with drafting targeted questions that will be used within the ANP report template to provide data on the ANP units’ ability to conduct law enforcement operations, which we defined earlier. State/INL issued guidelines in June 2010 that recommended conducting evaluations. These guidelines were developed in response to the Secretary of State’s June 2009 directive for systematic evaluation and to promote a culture change among program offices that included support for conducting evaluations, according to State/INL officials. The bureau’s guidelines recommend that State/INL programs have  a defined strategy and written performance management plan that identifies performance measures, including indicators and targets, and establishes an approach for evaluation;  program implementation documents such as letters of agreement, interagency agreements, and contracts that specify State/INL, host country, and implementing partner responsibilities for conducting evaluations; and  budget proposals for programs that identify funding for evaluations as a separate item. State/INL guidelines for monitoring and evaluation also identify the types of evaluations that should be performed and the timing for them based on project length and budget. For example:  Projects shorter than 2 years may focus on output metrics such as the number of trained and equipped law enforcement personnel.  Projects longer than 2 years or greater than $25 million must evaluate outcomes and impacts.  Programs that have a life cycle longer than 5 years or exceed $5 million should conduct one or more midterm evaluations, as well as a final evaluation. Programs that exceed $25 million must conduct periodic midterm evaluations and a final evaluation. To leverage external expertise for programs exceeding $25 million, State/INL has recommended final evaluations be conducted by an independent party. As a key component of effective program management, evaluation assesses how well a program is working and helps managers make informed decisions about current and future programming. Evaluation provides an overall assessment of whether a program works and identifies adjustments that may improve its results. Types of evaluation include process (or implementation), outcome, impact, and cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses. First, process (or implementation) evaluation assesses the extent to which a program is operating as it was intended. Second, outcome evaluation assesses the extent to which program goals or targets are met. Third, impact evaluation is a form of outcome evaluation that assesses the net effect of a program by comparing program outcomes with an estimate of what would have happened in the absence of the program. Finally, cost-benefit and cost- effectiveness analyses compare a program’s outputs or outcomes with the costs to produce them. The bureau has conducted only one evaluation of a program that includes foreign police assistance activities because it lacked guidelines and a culture among program offices that supported evaluation, according to State/INL officials. For State/INL’s one outcome evaluation, State/INL reported that the U.S. Embassy, Beirut, hired a contractor to evaluate its training program for the Lebanese Internal Security Forces between November 2010 and May 2011. The purpose of the evaluation was to assess if the training had been successful, as well as to provide recommendations for its improvement. The final report was submitted to State/INL in June 2011. It identified what elements of the program worked and why the training failed to achieve its higher-order objectives. For example, the evaluators noted that the police training program had trained over 5,000 Lebanese Internal Security Forces personnel and that the training had been largely effective. However, the report concluded that the design of the training was not informed by a systematic assessment of training needs and engagement from the Lebanese Internal Security Forces during the planning process. In response to State’s February 2012 Evaluation Policy, State/INL is developing its annual evaluation plan, according to State/INL officials. The new policy requires that (1) all large programs, projects, and activities be evaluated at least once in their lifetime or every 5 years, whichever is less; (2) bureaus determine which programs, projects, or activities to evaluate; (3) bureaus evaluate two to four projects, programs, or activities over the 24-month period beginning with fiscal year 2012; and (4) program managers identify up to 3 to 5 percent of their resources for evaluation activities. State/INL officials said the bureau will assess its guidelines to ensure they are consistent with State’s policy and incorporate them into its annual evaluation plan. State/INL officials said that the bureau is implementing its monitoring and evaluation guidelines in phases beginning with its largest programs in Iraq and Mexico. Other priority programs for independent external evaluations include Afghanistan, Colombia, the Palestinian Territories, and Pakistan. For Iraq, State/INL officials said they have established a three-person monitoring and evaluation unit for the bureau’s Police Development Program. The unit recently used its civilian police advisers to conduct a baseline assessment of Iraqi law enforcement capabilities and is relying on advice from State/INL’s Office of Resource Management. For example, the office is assisting the unit with developing program objectives and performance measures to ensure they are specific, measurable, attainable, realistic, and timely. State/INL officials identified numerous goals, functions, objectives, tasks, and indicators for the bureau’s Police Development Program in Iraq. For example: Goal: Iraq’s Police Training Systems provide basic and advanced instruction to impart the skills required while promoting community policing, gender, and human rights. Function: Community Policing/Community Relations—Police specifically trained in establishing and maintaining positive relationships between the law enforcement agency and the public for the purpose of identifying and solving crimes, enhancing public service, and building community trust in the police. Objective: Ministry of Interior establishes Community Policing Training Task 1: Review existing curriculum for community policing training. Task 2: Assist General Directorate for Training Qualification as requested to ensure community policing curriculum adopts and integrates international human rights standards in terms of police service delivery. State/INL’s program office for Mexico has dedicated $3 million in fiscal year 2011 funds to conduct evaluations of its programs and is in the process of identifying contracting mechanisms to complete them, including institutions of higher education in Mexico. U.S. agencies have implemented various mechanisms to coordinate their foreign police assistance activities as part of wider foreign assistance activities. Such mechanisms include (1) interagency policy committees chaired by the National Security Council (NSC) that coordinate policies at a high level; (2) headquarters working groups established to coordinate specific issues, such as antiterrorism and nonproliferation; (3) various working groups at the overseas posts; and (4) special positions to coordinate foreign police assistance activities. However, we noted some areas for improvement, including lack of defined agency roles and responsibilities and inconsistent information sharing. Interagency groups at various levels coordinate policy, guidance, and activities related to assistance to foreign police. NSC coordinates policies at the highest level of government through interagency policy committees. For example, an NSC-led interagency policy committee on security sector assistance, which includes assistance to foreign police, is conducting a policy review of the security sector. This committee does not conduct coordination or oversight of the actual provision of assistance. One of the goals of the committee is to define the roles and missions of U.S. agencies providing such assistance. The committee is also attempting to establish interagency goals and guidelines to better shape, integrate, prioritize, and evaluate U.S. government efforts in this sector. The review of security sector assistance was proposed for a variety of reasons related to a desire to improve the integration, effectiveness, and responsiveness of security sector assistance, including a proposal by Secretary of Defense Gates, according to a U.S. Institute for Peace report. In addition, according to a State official, the committee was established as a result of NSC concerns about DOD’s increasing role in providing foreign assistance. According to officials of agencies participating in the committee, membership includes NSC, Office of Management and Budget, DOD, State, USAID, Treasury, DOJ, and DHS. The attendees are usually assistant secretaries or deputy assistant secretaries. Working-level officials participate in subgroups such as those on roles and responsibilities. The table below provides examples of various coordination mechanisms. In addition, for Iraq, from 2009 through the end of 2011, the key mechanism for managing the transfer of responsibilities from DOD to State was the Iraq Enduring Presence Working Group composed of individuals from offices in Baghdad and Washington, D.C. In addition to this working group, the embassy’s management section operated an interagency structure composed of 13 sub-working groups that covered all major areas of the transition—provincial affairs, police training, security, and administrative and support initiatives. According to State, DOD, DOJ, and DHS officials, the interagency policy committee on security sector assistance has met sporadically since its inception, which has contributed to delays in issuing a final report and associated recommendations that would address the roles and responsibilities of the various agencies and provide overall U.S. government policy guidance on security sector assistance. Agreeing on roles and responsibilities is a key practice that can enhance interagency collaboration. According to State, DOD, USAID, and DOJ officials, the committee began meeting sometime in 2009 but stopped in December 2010. A State/INL official said the committee reconvened in June 2011 and met or provided documents for review weekly through September. The committee met for a final session to review conclusions and policy recommendations in April 2012. State and DOD officials stated that they reviewed and commented on a draft policy directive on roles and responsibilities that was issued in 2011 and one that was issued in early 2012. Agencies reviewed proposed draft policy on roles and missions in April 2012 for final review. State officials attributed the lack of regular meetings to National Security Staff turnover and workload issues. While State and DOD had mechanisms to manage the transition from DOD to a State-led police development program in Iraq, they did not consistently share information. Establishing collaborative mechanisms to share information with partners is also a key practice for enhancing and sustaining interagency collaboration. Moreover, timely dissemination of information is critical for maintaining national security. The key mechanism for managing the transition was the Iraq Enduring Presence Working Group, composed of individuals from offices in Baghdad and Washington, D.C. In addition, the 2010 Joint Campaign Plan for Iraq—a strategic document composed and approved by top State and DOD officials in Iraq—included tasks State would need to consider as part of the transition. Despite these mechanisms, there was inconsistent and incomplete sharing of operational readiness assessments of the Iraqi police by DOD. Though State requested official copies of these assessments, DOD did not provide them. According to a former DOD civilian police adviser, DOD destroyed the database that contained the assessments of the Iraqi police forces during the transition, because it had completed its mission to train the Iraqi police. As a result, State developed a baseline assessment of Iraqi law enforcement capabilities without the benefit of DOD’s assessments. Moreover, overseas posts do not consistently document or share the results of their coordination efforts. In 2009, we reported that information is a crucial tool in national security and its timely dissemination is critical for maintaining national security. However, State/INL officials stated that overseas posts do not provide documentation of the results of their coordination efforts. In addition, several State Inspector General reports have discussed the need for agendas and minutes for interagency groups, including in Afghanistan, Colombia, and Mexico. For example, the Inspector General reported that although the working group at the U.S. embassy in Colombia concisely addressed law enforcement issues during these meetings, there was no published agenda or minutes of these proceedings. In another case, while the law enforcement working group at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad issues minutes to the embassy executive office, it does not necessarily share them with headquarters. The Deputy Chief of Mission for the U.S. Embassy in Bogotá, Colombia, acknowledged that the Homeland Security Group did not record the results of its coordination but stated that it will begin to issue an agenda and minutes for the meetings. The failure of overseas posts to document and disseminate their coordination efforts may hamper the agencies’ ability to have all the information they need to analyze the results of their foreign police assistance activities. Foreign partners’ counterinsurgency, counternarcotics, counterterrorism, and anticrime capabilities are critical to U.S. national security objectives. As such, interagency collaboration is essential to ensuring that U.S. agencies effectively and efficiently manage the resources they contribute to training and equipping foreign police forces. However, U.S. government agencies lack clearly defined roles and responsibilities for providing security sector assistance, including assistance to foreign police forces. While NSC has been tasked with leading efforts to define agencies’ roles and responsibilities, progress to date has stalled. U.S. agencies providing foreign police assistance need to define and agree on their roles and responsibilities to ensure that they make the most rational decisions about U.S. efforts to enhance foreign police forces’ capability. In addition, the lack of information sharing and documentation among agencies at some overseas posts providing foreign police assistance can inhibit the effectiveness of future U.S. assistance efforts. To better prioritize, evaluate, and avoid duplication of U.S. efforts to provide foreign police assistance, we recommend that NSC complete its efforts to define agency roles and responsibilities. To ensure that information is available for future U.S. foreign police assistance efforts, we recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and State establish mechanisms to better share and document information among various U.S. agencies. We provided a draft of this report to DOD, State, DOE, USAID, Treasury, DOJ, DHS, and NSC. State and DHS provided written comments which are reproduced in appendices VI and VII. DOD provided comments by e- mail. In addition, State, DOD, DOE, Treasury, DOJ, and NSC provided technical comments that were incorporated as appropriate. USAID noted that it had no comments. NSC did not comment on the report’s recommendations. DOD concurred with the report’s recommendation to establish mechanisms to better share and document information among various U.S. agencies. State partially concurred and described actions it was continuing to take to collaborate with other federal agencies. State noted that it will work with its interagency partners to identify ways to improve the sharing of best practices and lessons learned concerning U.S. foreign police assistance efforts. DHS noted that it remains committed to continuing its work with interagency partners such as the U.S. Department of Justice and other relevant agencies. This includes work to better define agency roles and responsibilities, as appropriate. As we agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30 days from the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretaries of Defense, State, Energy, Homeland Security; and the Treasury; the Attorney General; the Administrator of USAID; the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council; and interested congressional committees. The report will also is available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Public Affairs and Congressional Relations may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix IX. To identify U.S. agencies that trained and equipped foreign police forces during fiscal years 2009 through 2011, we reviewed past GAO reports, relevant legislation, and agency websites. To identify the amount of U.S. government funding made available for foreign police training and equipment activities, we examined past GAO reports; congressional budget submissions, including the Department of State’s (State) Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs’ (State/INL) program and budget guides for fiscal year 2011; the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund fiscal year 2012 congressional budget justification; and the Department of Defense (DOD) fiscal year 2012 congressional budget justification and other budget documents. To identify countries and police assistance activities, we reviewed funding amounts reported to GAO by agencies, the fiscal year 2012 budget appendix, congressional budget submissions, agency annual reports, interagency agreements, and other program documents. We also interviewed officials from the Departments of Defense, State, and Energy (DOE); the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID; and the Departments of the Treasury, Justice (DOJ), and Homeland Security (DHS). We collected data for fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2011 to update foreign police assistance funding information provided in our prior report. We used the same definition of police assistance that we used in the previous report. We defined police training and equipment activities (which we referred to as “police assistance”) as all training—regardless of its content—and equipment provided to law enforcement units or personnel with arrest, investigative, or interdiction authority. Officials from the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and Global Threats (DASD-CN>) updated information on DOD police assistance from fiscal year 2009 for fiscal years 2010 and 2011 using the definition we developed with State. DASD-CN> has oversight of program funding through a web-based database. However, specific funds for police assistance are managed at the combatant command level. The data DASD-CN> compiled included allotments for fiscal years 2010 and 2011 that were provided by combatant commands for training and equipping activities. Using our definition, DOD’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency provided funding data based on allotments from DOD’s defensewide operations and maintenance account. We also obtained total amounts made available after reprogramming for Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan from the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, Iraq Security Forces Fund, and Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund from the Comptroller’s Office in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. We reviewed these figures along with congressional budget justifications and DOD’s fourth quarter, fiscal year 2011 report to Congress on the Iraqi, Afghan, and Pakistan Security Forces, as required by Section 9009 of DOD’s Appropriation Act for fiscal year 2011. We combined data from all funding sources to derive the DOD total. We included funding for equipment and transportation, training, and sustainment. We excluded any infrastructure costs because such costs are not typical of most police assistance activities. We compared the DOD data for reasonableness of the reported information and questioned DOD officials about their methodology and the reliability of the data. Some of the data may have included both military and civilian police personnel, which might result in overestimating DOD funding. However, for fiscal years 2010 and 2011, the majority of DOD funds (over 90 percent) were provided through the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, Iraq Security Forces Fund, and Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund, which separate funds provided to military and civilian personnel. To identify any discrepancies in the funding data, we compared the data from fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2011 with that provided for fiscal year 2009. We reconciled discrepancies with the agencies and determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. State/INL analyzed data reported in its annual program and budget guides to provide allocations for police-assistance activities that fit our definition. The funding data covered all country programs funded through the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account directed to law enforcement, stabilization operations, counternarcotics, border control, and transnational crime. State also used the definition to identify police assistance funded through other foreign assistance accounts. State analyzed appropriations and obligations funding data from the Foreign Assistance Coordination and Tracking System database, which tracks data on U.S. foreign assistance programs. Allotments or allocations were provided for the Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia account and the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs account. State also provided obligations for the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund, which received funds transferred from DOD’s Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund, and allotments from funding transferred from DOD to State under Section 1207 authority of the fiscal year 2006 National Defense Authorization Act. We compared State’s data for fiscal year 2009 with data for fiscal years 2010 and 2011 for reasonableness. We also questioned State officials about their methodology, reviewed the program and budget guides, reviewed other GAO reports that used the same data sources, and discussed data reliability with agency officials. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We combined the data from the various funding accounts to derive the State total. The State data included funding provided to Treasury, DOJ, and DHS. It excluded funding provided to State from other agencies, with the exception of Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund and 1207 funds transferred from DOD. We excluded any infrastructure costs because such costs are not typical of most police assistance activities. DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration provided allotments and obligations funding data for police assistance for fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2011 in response to our request for funding data based on our definition. DOE’s funds were made available from its Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation account. USAID reviewed the Foreign Assistance Coordination and Tracking System database by program element to identify programs that might have a civilian policing component. USAID then consulted with its geographic bureaus and its overseas missions to obtain detailed data not available at headquarters. USAID provided us with funding data based on allotments for activities that included civilian police training. We reviewed the data for reasonableness and discussed their reliability with agency officials. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We excluded programs that did not meet our definition, such as judicial exchanges. Treasury provided appropriations funding for police assistance from its Economic Crimes division for fiscal years 2010 and 2011 in response to our request for funding data based on our definition. Funds were made available from the Treasury International Affairs Technical Assistance account and included supplemental funding provided during fiscal year 2010. For DOJ, we used funding data provided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). The FBI explained that the primary purpose of its foreign police training is not to provide ‘foreign assistance. Rather, the primary purpose of such training is to further the FBI’s statutorily authorized mission to detect, investigate, and prosecute crimes against the United States, which include federal crimes of terrorism and other crimes that the FBI is authorized to investigate extraterritorially. FBI provided funding data using its definition of police assistance: any activity, including the provision of equipment in association therewith, that is intended to develop or enhance foreign law enforcement capabilities to prevent, deter, detect, investigate, or respond to criminal or terrorist acts or support public safety and security. Such training occurs both in the United States and abroad. FBI officials explained that our definition would exclude some types of law enforcement personnel, such as crime lab technicians, who do not have arrest authority, and that they could not isolate such individuals from their submission. FBI provided data on obligations that were also disbursed based on its definition. This definition did not materially affect the total amount of U.S. funding. We reviewed the data for reasonableness and determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. DEA provided data on obligations that were also disbursed in response to our request for data based on our definition. DEA provided funding data by country for Afghanistan, Colombia, and Mexico, but neither DEA nor FBI provided total funding data by country. We combined the funding data provided by DOD, State, DOE, USAID, Treasury, and DOJ to obtain total U.S. government funds made available. The amounts are estimates because, according to agency officials, agencies do not generally track funding by a category specifically for activities to train and equip foreign police. In addition, to estimate funding for all elements of police training, the agencies relied on project code reports, manual estimates, and data calls to overseas posts. On the basis of our review of the data and discussions with agency officials, we determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for a broad estimate of U.S. government funding. To assess the extent to which DOD and State/INL report on the results of their police assistance activities for countries with their largest programs, we reviewed GAO reports, including those that examined the capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces and Afghan National Security Forces, including the Iraqi national police and Afghan National Police (ANP). We also reviewed DOD’s October 2011 Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan. Within DOD, we spoke with officials from U.S. Central Command and the Afghan National Security Forces Desk. Within State, we spoke with officials from relevant components about State/INL’s monitoring and evaluation guidelines, including the Office of Resource Management, Office of Program Assistance and Evaluation, Office of Iraq Programs, and the Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan. To identify reporting requirements, we reviewed letters of agreement and interagency agreements provided by State/INL. Further, we reviewed relevant documents including State/INL guidelines for program monitoring and evaluation and one evaluation completed by State/INL for its police assistance activities. To examine the mechanisms U.S. agencies use to coordinate their police assistance activities, we reviewed GAO reports, including those describing practices for enhanced interagency collaboration; State Office of Inspector General reports; and other reports, legislation, and documents describing NSC’s interagency policy committees. We also interviewed State, DOD, DOJ, DHS, Treasury, and USAID officials, including officials who participated on the NSC Security Sector Assistance Interagency Policy Committee. We also interviewed State and U.S. law enforcement officials at the U.S. embassies in Bogotá, Colombia, and Lima, Peru. On the basis of the document review and the testimonial evidence, we identified mechanisms for coordinating foreign police assistance and areas for improvement. We did not assess the overall effectiveness of the coordinating mechanisms. We conducted this performance audit from April 2011 through May 2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our work objectives. This appendix provides information on DOD and State funds made available for police assistance activities during fiscal years 2010 and 2011, by region and country. DOD and State funds constituted about 98 percent of U.S. funds for these purposes. We did not include funds made available from other agencies because they provided only 2 percent of U.S. funds and not all agencies provided information by individual countries. These graphs also do not include regional funds, which totaled $182 million for DOD and State in fiscal year 2010 and $186 million for DOD and State in fiscal year 2011. Our analysis of DOD and State data shows that both DOD and State made available funds for police assistance activities in 8 of 12 recipient countries in the South and Central Asia region for fiscal years 2010 and 2011 (see fig. 5). For Afghanistan, agencies made available more than $3 billion each year, and for Pakistan, agencies made available between $176 million and $299 million each year. Agencies made available less than $10 million per country each year for 8 of the remaining 10 countries. As shown in figure 6, both DOD and State made funds available for police assistance activities in 3 of the 13 recipients in the Near East for fiscal year 2010 and 4 of the 13 recipients in the Near East for fiscal year 2011. State alone made assistance available for 10 recipients in fiscal year 2010 and 9 recipients in fiscal year 2011. State and DOD made available more than $972 million for Iraq in fiscal year 2010 to train and equip the Iraqi security forces, including the provision of equipment, supplies, services, training, facility and infrastructure repair, and renovation. State alone made available $97 million and $142 million to the Palestinian Territories in fiscal years 2010 and 2011, respectively. Agencies made available less than $10 million per country in each fiscal year for 9 of the remaining 11 countries. Figure 7 shows that both DOD and State made funds available for police assistance activities in 7 of 20 countries in fiscal year 2010 and in 6 of 18 countries in fiscal year 2011 in the Western Hemisphere. DOD alone made funds available for assistance in 7 countries each fiscal year, while State alone made funds available in 6 countries in fiscal year 2010 and 5 countries in fiscal year 2011. In fiscal year 2010, Colombia, Mexico, and Haiti each had more than $100 million made available for police assistance activities, while in fiscal year 2011, only Colombia had more than $100 million made available. In fiscal year 2010, agencies made less than $10 million available in police assistance for 14 countries, and in fiscal year 2011, agencies made less than $10 million available in police assistance for 13 countries. Figure 8 shows that both DOD and State made available police assistance in 11 of 21 countries in fiscal year 2010 and 10 of 20 countries in fiscal year 2011 in Europe and Eurasia. DOD alone made assistance available to 7 countries in fiscal year 2010 and 5 countries in fiscal year 2011, while State alone made assistance available to 3 countries in fiscal year 2010 and 5 countries in fiscal year 2011. In fiscal year 2010, agencies made available between $1 million and $22 million in police assistance to each of 11 countries, while agencies made available less than $1 million to each of 10 countries. In fiscal year 2011, agencies made available between $1 million and $8 million in police assistance to 12 countries, while agencies made available less than $1 million to each of 8 countries. As shown in figure 9, both DOD and State made police assistance available in the Africa region in 12 of 29 countries in fiscal year 2010 and 12 of 35 countries in fiscal year 2011. DOD alone made assistance available in 6 countries in fiscal year 2010 and 16 countries in fiscal year 2011. State alone made assistance available in 11 countries in fiscal year 2010 and 7 countries in fiscal year 2011. DOD and State made available between $1 million and $14 million to each of 16 countries in fiscal year 2010, and from $1 million to $11 million to each of 13 countries in fiscal year 2011. Agencies made less than $1 million available to each of 13 countries in fiscal year 2010 and less than $1 million to 22 countries in this region in fiscal year 2011. Figure 10 shows that both DOD and State made funds available for police assistance in 6 of 12 countries for fiscal year 2010 and 6 of 14 countries for fiscal year 2011 in the East Asia and Pacific region. DOD alone made assistance available in 3 countries in fiscal year 2010 and 5 countries in fiscal year 2011, while State alone made funds available in 3 countries each fiscal year. DOD and State made between $1 million to $16 million available to each of 6 countries in this region in fiscal year 2010 and 5 countries in fiscal year 2011. Agencies made less than $1 million available in police assistance to 6 countries in fiscal year 2010 and 9 countries in fiscal year 2011. This appendix provides information on DOD and State amounts made available for police assistance activities by account during fiscal years 2010 and 2011 (see tables 4 and 5). For a description of accounts, see table 4. For the amounts made available from each account, see table 5. Profiles on Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Colombia, Mexico, and the Palestinian Territories can be found on the following pages. Related GAO Work In GAO-09-280, we reported that the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan had begun retraining Afghan National Police units through its Focused District Development program. However, a lack of military personnel constrained the command’s plans to expand the program. We also reported in GAO-10-291 that U.S. agencies reported progress within counternarcotics program areas, but we were unable to fully assess the extent of progress because of a lack of performance measures and interim performance targets to measure Afghan capacity. GAO Recommendations In GAO-09-280, we recommended that the Secretaries of Defense (DOD) and State provide dedicated personnel to support creation of additional police mentor teams to expand and complete the Focused District Development program. In September 2010, we closed this recommendation as implemented because DOD and State took actions to increase trainers and mentors for the Afghan police. centers in Kunduz and Heart Provided antiterrorism assistance to build capacity in protection of national leadership and explosives incident countermeasures Provided introductory and advanced training to members of the Sensitive Investigation Unit of the Counternarcotics National Police. This training focused on investigative methods for apprehending drug traffickers. Related GAO Work During April and May 2012, we provided briefings to staff on selected committees regarding U.S security assistance to Iraq. The Sensitive But Unclassified briefings covered the transition of lead responsibility from DOD to State for U.S. assistance to Iraq’s military and police.  Assumed full responsibility for the U.S. presence in Iraq in fiscal  Funding for 2010 supported U.S. personnel hired to position State to assume responsibility for the police development mission in Iraq. Activities included developing plans and requirements for transitioning police development from DOD to State, training curricula, statements of work, position descriptions, comprehensive work plans, and oversight and administrative processes. GAO Recommendations Not applicable. Related GAO Work GAO-11-860SU is sensitive but unclassified Provided aviation support through flight and maintenance training to civilian Pakistani law enforcement agencies Provided training, technical assistance, and equipment to law enforcement entities, including train-the-trainer and instructor development courses Provided training and equipment to Pakistani law enforcement Provided antiterrorism assistance to build capacity in protection of national leadership, critical incident management, and protection of digital infrastructure Provided equipment, including protective equipment such as helmets and night vision devices to the Frontier Corps Provided counternarcotics training and equipment Provided radiation detection equipment to the Port of Qasim. The program included refresher training for Pakistani officials on radiation detection equipment. Related GAO Work In GAO-09-71, we found that U.S.- funded helicopters provided the air mobility needed to rapidly move Colombian counternarcotics and counterinsurgency forces. U.S. advisers, training, equipment, and intelligence assistance helped professionalize Colombia's military and police forces. We also reported that State and the other U.S. departments and agencies had accelerated their nationalization efforts, with State focusing on Colombian military and National Police aviation programs. GAO Recommendations We recommended that State, in conjunction with the other departments, USAID, and Colombia, develop an integrated nationalization plan that defines U.S. and Colombian roles and responsibilities, future funding requirements, and timelines. State agreed and noted that its annual multiyear strategy report offers the most useful format to address our recommendation. However, we did not believe this report sufficiently addressed our recommendation. In September 2011, State/INL officials in Colombia reported it reached agreement with the government of Colombia to nationalize aircraft, contractor personnel, facility maintenance, and other programs. For example, State/INL officials in Colombia told us they plan to nationalize 103 aircraft by 2014, which would represent an annual cost savings of $83 million. Related GAO Work In GA0-10-837, we reported on the Mérida Initiative, which provides training and equipment to law enforcement in Mexico and Central American countries. We found that deliveries of equipment and training had been delayed by challenges associated with an insufficient number of staff to administer the program, negotiations on interagency and bilateral agreements, procurement processes, changes in government, and funding availability. We also found that while State had developed some of the key elements of an implementation strategy, its strategic documents lacked certain key elements that would facilitate accountability and management. In addition, State had not developed a comprehensive set of timelines for all expected deliveries, though it plans to provide additional equipment and training in both Mexico and Central America. Provided training and equipment under the Mérida Initiative to help address the problem of increasing crime and violence in Mexico and Central America. Equipment included aircraft and boats. Provided antiterrorism assistance to build capacity in protection of Provided counternarcotics support including pilot and maintenance training, surveillance aircraft, information sharing, technical advice, and related support SLD provided radiation detection equipment for cargo scanning at five Mexican ports. This includes fixed and handheld equipment, maintenance and in-country training to officials in the ports of Altamira, Lazaro, Cardenas, Manzanillo, and Veracruz. Additional technical assistance was provided to Mexican Customs officials at a national level. GAO Recommendations We recommended that the Secretary of State incorporate into the strategy for the Mérida Initiative outcome performance measures that indicate progress toward strategic goals and develop more comprehensive timelines for future program deliveries. State agreed and is working to develop better metrics and more comprehensive timelines. As of April 2012, State is revising its performance measures, according to State officials. GAO will examine the extent to which these efforts address the recommendation in a separate engagement. GAO Summary In GAO-10-505, we reported that although U.S. and international officials said that U.S. security assistance programs for the Palestinian Authority had helped improve security conditions in some West Bank areas, State and the Office of the United States Security Coordinator (USSC) had not established clear and measurable outcome-based performance indicators to assess progress. State and USSC officials noted that they planned to incorporate performance indicators in a USSC campaign plan to be released in mid-2010. Open GAO Recommendation We recommended that, as State developed the USSC campaign plan for providing security assistance to the Palestinian Authority, the Secretary of State should define specific objectives and establish outcome-based indicators enabling it to assess progress. State partially concurred with this recommendation. It agreed with the need for more performance-based indicators but noted that factors outside its control influence progress. GAO continues to monitor this development. As a part of its assessment process in Afghanistan, DOD uses criteria— called capability milestones—to assess the professionalism and capacity of departments under the Afghan Ministry of Interior, including components of the ANP. Departments are assessed against four capability milestones that range from 1 to 4. A department rated at 1 is fully capable of conducting its primary operational mission but may require coalition oversight. By contrast, a department rated at 4 has been established but cannot accomplish its mission. DOD’s basic assessment system in Iraq contained capabilities ratings in the areas of personnel, command and control, equipment, sustainment/logistics, training, and leadership. Commanders used the assessment results and their professional judgment to determine a unit’s overall readiness level. The assessment reports also included the commanders’ estimates of the number of months needed before a unit could assume the lead for counterinsurgency operations. DOD also reported readiness assessments for headquarters service companies, such as engineering and signal units that support combat units. The assessment reports included the coalition commander’s narrative assessments of the Iraqi unit’s overall readiness level, known as the Performance Capability Assessment, which was designed to clarify the overall assessment. The narrative assessed the Iraqi unit’s leadership capabilities, combat experience, and ability to execute intelligence-based operations, and described any life support issues affecting the Iraqi unit’s capabilities. Commanders also explained and addressed any regression in the unit’s overall assessment level and listed the top three issues preventing the unit from assuming the lead for counterinsurgency operations or advancing to the next level. Remarks were intended to provide information and details that would help resolve the problems that degrade the unit’s status. Details on DOD’s assessments of the Pakistan Security Forces are classified. The table below provides definition of the capability milestones, as identified in DOD’s October 2011 Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan. According to DOD’s October 2011 report, advisers from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission–Afghanistan and Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan used capability milestones to assess individual offices and cross-functional activities on a quarterly basis against specific end-state objectives, quarterly milestones, and skill- building requirements. For example, DOD reported in October 2011 that the Afghan National Civil Order Police advanced from requiring some coalition assistance to requiring minimal coalition assistance. In addition to the individual named above, Judy McCloskey (Assistant Director), Lynn Cothern, Brian Egger, Mark Needham, and La Verne Tharpes made key contributions to this report. Robert Alarapon, Martin De Alteriis, Etana Finkler, Mary Moutsos, and Anthony Pordes provided technical support.

Summary: In April 2011, we reported that the United States provided an estimated $3.5 billion for foreign police assistance to 107 countries during fiscal year 2009. We agreed to follow up that report with a review of the extent to which U.S. agencies evaluated and coordinated their foreign police assistance activities. As such, this report (1) updates our analysis of the funding U.S. agencies provided for foreign police assistance during fiscal years 2009 through 2011, (2) examines the extent to which DOD and State/INL assess or evaluate their activities for countries with the largest programs, and (3) examines the mechanisms U.S. agencies use to coordinate foreign police assistance activities. GAO focused on DOD and State because they have the largest foreign police assistance programs. GAO analyzed program and budget documents and interviewed officials from DOD, State, Energy, the U.S. Agency for International Development, Justice, the Treasury, and Homeland Security. The United States provided an estimated $13.9 billion for foreign police assistance during fiscal years 2009 through 2011. Funds provided by U.S. agencies rose and then fell between fiscal years 2009 and 2011. During fiscal years 2009 through 2011, the United States provided the greatest amount of its foreign police assistance to Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Colombia, Mexico, and the Palestinian Territories. Department of Defense (DOD) and State (State) funds constituted about 97 percent of U.S. funds for police assistance in fiscal year 2009 and 98 percent in fiscal years 2010 and 2011. DOD and States Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (State/INL) have acknowledged limitations in their procedures to assess and evaluate their foreign police assistance activities and are taking steps to address them. DOD assesses the performance of the police forces it trains and equips in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan. However, the assessment process for Afghanistan does not provide data on civil policing effectiveness. DOD plans to expand its assessments to obtain data to assess the ability of these forces to conduct civil policing operations. In addition, recognizing that it had conducted only one evaluation of its foreign police assistance activities because it lacked guidelines, State/INL is developing an evaluation plan that is consistent with States February 2012 Evaluation Policy. This evaluation plan includes conducting evaluations for its largest programs in Iraq and Mexico. U.S. agencies have implemented various mechanisms to coordinate their foreign police assistance activities as part of wider foreign assistance activities, such as the National Security Councils (NSC)-led interagency policy committees that coordinate policies at a high level and various working groups at the overseas posts. However, GAO noted some areas for improvement. Specifically, NSC has not defined agencies roles and responsibilities for assisting foreign police. Further, DOD and State do not consistently share and document information. For example, DOD did not provide copies of its capability assessments of the Iraqi police to State, which is now responsible for police development in Iraq, because it destroyed the database containing the assessments at the end of its mission to train the police. Further, some U.S. embassies, including the one in Bogotá, Colombia, do not publish agendas or minutes of their proceedings. GAO recommends that (1) NSC complete its efforts to define agency roles and responsibilities, and (2) the Secretaries of Defense and State establish mechanisms to better share and document information among various U.S. agencies. NSC provided technical comments, but did not comment on our recommendation. DOD concurred and State partially concurred, noting the importance of interagency collaboration.