We found that BSEE leadership has started several initiatives to improve its safety and environmental oversight capabilities, but its limited efforts to obtain and incorporate input from within the bureau have hindered its progress. Since 2012, BSEE has sought to augment its annual inspection program with a risk-based inspection program, but limited efforts to obtain and incorporate input from experienced regional personnel have hindered BSEE’s ability to develop and implement the risk-based program. In 2012, BSEE began an initiative to develop an approach for conducting inspections of offshore facilities based on the level of risks they posed. However, to date, BSEE has not successfully implemented this supplemental risk-based inspection capability. BSEE leadership led the development of the risk-based program; however, according to officials, leadership developed the program with little input from regional personnel. Officials in the Gulf of Mexico region with knowledge and experience conducting previous risk-based inspection efforts told us that they were not apprised of key program products (e.g., a risk model developed by Argonne National Laboratory) until the products were well under development and that they were given little opportunity to provide comment on them. As a result, BSEE first identified deficiencies with its risk-based program during pilot testing in 2015, rather than working closely with experienced regional personnel earlier in the process to obtain their input to identify potential deficiencies and remediate them during program development. In turn, BSEE leadership’s limited efforts to obtain and incorporate input from regional staff and management during development of the program led to poor pilot results. In response, BSEE has changed the focus of the program and reduced expectations for its initial approach to risk-based inspections. In 2016, BSEE conducted an environmental stewardship initiative comprised of two simultaneous environmental risk reduction efforts, but we found that these efforts were overlapping, fragmented, and uncoordinated, which reduced the effectiveness of the initiative and hindered the implementation of identified improvements. These efforts were led and coordinated by BSEE leadership in the Environmental Compliance Division at headquarters, which BSEE created in 2015 to establish national strategic goals and procedures for the bureau’s environmental compliance activities. However, the efforts were overlapping because BSEE leadership tasked both with the same five objectives. The two efforts were also fragmented because BSEE leadership did not effectively coordinate their execution, which hindered information sharing between them that could have enhanced their value. Moreover, because the efforts were uncoordinated, they resulted in the inefficient use of resources. In our report being released today, we recommended that the Secretary of the Interior direct the Assistant Secretary for Land and Minerals Management, who oversees BSEE, to establish a mechanism for BSEE management to obtain and incorporate input from bureau personnel and any external parties, such as Argonne National Laboratory, that can affect the bureau’s ability to achieve its objectives. In its written response to our report, Interior neither agreed nor disagreed with our recommendation. Interior stated that the recommendation reflects an ongoing BSEE commitment and that BSEE and Interior agree with the concept laid out therein. However, Interior’s comments do not discuss any specific actions taken or under way to do so. Without higher-level oversight within Interior establishing a mechanism for BSEE management to obtain and incorporate input from personnel within the bureau and any external parties that can affect the bureau’s ability to achieve its objectives, BSEE’s risk-based inspection program and Environmental Stewardship efforts are likely to experience continued implementation and efficacy problems. We found that since 2013, BSEE has begun four strategic initiatives to improve its internal management—two to improve its decision-making capabilities and two to enhance communication and transparency—but their successful implementation has been hindered by limited leadership commitment and not addressing factors contributing to trust concerns. In 2013, BSEE began an initiative to develop an Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) framework but has not fully implemented it as a management tool. BSEE has made some progress over the past 3 years in implementing an ERM framework but has not completed the actions necessary to fully implement it. In conjunction with a contracted ERM support consultant, BSEE developed an iterative ERM cycle that includes six steps. In 2014, BSEE identified and prioritized 12 strategic risks that cover the lifecycle of BSEE operations. BSEE planned to verify the prioritization of its top several strategic risk treatments by July 2016 but did not do so. BSEE officials told us that the bureau halted ERM implementation while it acquired automated ERM software. The officials said BSEE planned to finalize a plan for its prioritized risk treatments by August 2016 but did not do so because of the temporary halt to ERM implementation. Likewise, they said BSEE intended to promulgate a monitoring plan by October 2016 but did not do so because of the aforementioned temporary halt to ERM implementation. However, in November 2016, BSEE determined that it would reinitiate ERM implementation simultaneous to the implementation of software. In 2014, BSEE began an initiative to develop performance measures for its programs but has not implemented any measures. BSEE’s October 2012 Strategic Plan-Fiscal Years 2012-2015 stated that the bureau must develop performance measures to assess the results of its programmatic efforts as well as its ability to reduce the risks of environmental damage and accidents. BSEE’s initiative to develop performance measures has been comprised of three sequential efforts, in 2014, 2015, and 2016. For the first two efforts, the bureau contracted with a consultant. BSEE terminated the first effort, and although the consultant delivered a report identifying 12 performance measures during the second effort, BSEE officials said they were not implementing them due to a variety of factors, including data availability limitations. For its third effort to develop performance measures in 2016, BSEE headquarters officials told us that this initiative, which is being conducted internally by BSEE personnel, represents the beginning of a multi-year effort to implement a performance management system. BSEE initially planned to finalize its internally developed list of performance measures in February 2016 but did not meet this deadline. In December 2016, BSEE completed a report that discusses 17 performance measures and the bureau’s plans for future iterations of their development. We have previously reported on BSEE’s struggles to effectively implement internal management initiatives. Specifically, in February 2016, we found that since its inception in 2011, BSEE had made limited progress in enhancing the bureau’s investigative, environmental compliance, and enforcement capabilities. Likewise, with regard to its ongoing strategic initiatives to improve its decision-making capabilities, more than 3 years have passed since BSEE initiated the development of its ERM framework, more than 2 years have passed since the bureau prioritized the strategic risks it faces, and more than 4 years have passed since it identified the development and implementation of performance measures as an organizational need. In that time, BSEE initiated several efforts to develop and implement such measures, and although BSEE has developed measures, it has yet to fully implement any. One of our five criteria for assessing whether an area can be removed from our high-risk list is leadership commitment—that is, demonstrated strong commitment and top leadership support. An example of leadership commitment is continuing oversight and accountability, which BSEE leadership has not demonstrated for implementing internal management initiatives, as evidenced by its limited progress in implementing key strategic initiatives as well as its inability to address long-standing oversight deficiencies. In our report being released today, we recommended that the Secretary of the Interior direct the Assistant Secretary for Land and Minerals Management, who oversees BSEE, to address leadership commitment deficiencies within BSEE, including by implementing internal management initiatives and ongoing strategic initiatives (e.g., ERM and performance measure initiatives) in a timely manner. Interior neither agreed nor disagreed with our recommendation. Interior stated that the recommendation reflects an ongoing BSEE commitment and that BSEE and Interior agree with the concept laid out therein. However, Interior’s comments did not discuss specific actions taken or planned to meet the intent of our recommendation. Without higher-level oversight within Interior addressing BSEE’s leadership commitment deficiencies— including by implementing internal management initiatives and ongoing strategic initiatives—in a timely manner, the bureau is unlikely to succeed in implementing such initiatives. In February 2016, BSEE announced an initiative to assess internal communications and develop an employee engagement strategy. BSEE employee engagement initiative documentation identifies the need to enhance communication vertically and horizontally across the bureau. BSEE leadership’s safety and environmental stewardship initiatives have had limited success, largely due to poor communication and coordination between headquarters and the regions. BSEE officials from across the bureau told us that the poor communication between headquarters and the regions led to a deficit of trust vertically throughout the bureau. They also told us that because BSEE headquarters was newly established as part of the reorganization of MMS in 2010 following the Deepwater Horizon incident, not many existing relationships between headquarters and regional personnel existed. The data collection plan for this employee engagement initiative focused on conducting outreach across the bureau to identify the means by which BSEE personnel prefer to receive information—for example, town hall meetings, BSEE’s website, or e-mail. BSEE conducted this outreach but as of November 2016 had not developed an employee engagement strategy—although its original target completion date was April 2016— and it is unclear when it will do so. In September 2016, BSEE decided to conduct a second round of outreach across the organization by spring 2017 to review feedback from the initial outreach, discuss next steps, and provide guidance on existing communications resources. To address trust concerns that exist between headquarters and the field, we recommended in our report being released today that the Secretary of the Interior direct the BSEE Director to expand the scope of its employee engagement strategy to incorporate the need to communicate quality information throughout the bureau consistent with federal standards for internal control. Interior neither agreed nor disagreed with our recommendation. Interior asserted that, since receiving our draft report for review, BSEE has completed the assessment and analysis of employee feedback and developed an engagement plan, but Interior did not provide documentary evidence of this plan or what it entails. Without providing evidence of BSEE’s activities, we could not confirm that any action had been taken and continue to believe that BSEE should expand the scope of its employee engagement strategy. In addition, the bureau’s Integrity and Professional Responsibility Advisor (IPRA) is responsible for promptly and credibly responding to allegations or evidence of misconduct and unethical behavior by BSEE employees and coordinating its activities with other entities, such as Interior’s Office of Inspector General (OIG). Senior BSEE officials from across the bureau stated that the IPRA function is critical to bolstering trust within the bureau because personnel need to have a functioning mechanism to which they can report potential misconduct by other employees. To increase transparency and consistency in how IPRA cases are handled following the completion of an investigation report, BSEE conducted a pilot initiative in 2016 to assess the types of allegations of misconduct being reported to the IPRA as well as the frequency with which the IPRA referred such allegations to other entities. In August 2016, BSEE determined that the majority of incoming allegations were being directed to the appropriate office for action. However, BSEE’s pilot initiative did not address unclear and conflicting guidance that could undermine organizational trust in how the IPRA addresses allegations of misconduct. Specifically, we found that the Interior Department Manual and IPRA guidance do not specify criteria for the severity thresholds for allegations that are to be referred to the OIG. As a result, the boundaries of IPRA responsibility are unclear. Additionally, BSEE’s pilot initiative did not address IPRA guidance that conflicts with the reporting chain established by the Interior Department Manual and BSEE’s organization chart. Some BSEE regional officials told us that the uncertainty about how the IPRA reports allegations to the OIG as well as its reporting structure led them to question the independence of IPRA activities, and they expressed concern that the IPRA could be used to retaliate against employees, which has undermined organizational trust in its activities. Under the federal standards of internal control, management should design control activities to achieve objectives and respond to risks, such as by clearly documenting internal controls. While BSEE has documented its policies, they are not clear. In our report being released today, we recommended that the Secretary of the Interior direct the BSEE Director to assess and amend IPRA guidance to clarify (1) severity threshold criteria for referring allegations of misconduct to the OIG and (2) its reporting chain. Interior neither agreed nor disagreed with our recommendation but stated that contrary to our draft report, the Interior Department Manual includes severity threshold criteria for referring allegations of misconduct to the OIG. We believe that the language in the Interior Department Manual does not provide the specificity needed to adequately define the boundaries of IPRA responsibility. Additionally, Interior stated that the IPRA reports to the BSEE Director, consistent with the reporting chain established in the bureau’s organizational chart and the Interior Department Manual. However, the BSEE Director told us that, in practice, the IPRA often reports to the BSEE Deputy Director rather than the Director. Moreover, our work found that the decision-making process of the IPRA Board—whereby the Board determines how to respond to an investigation without consulting the Director—does not align with the IPRA’s prescribed reporting chain. Without assessing and amending its IPRA guidance to clarify (1) the severity threshold criteria for referring allegations and (2) the IPRA reporting chain, BSEE risks further eroding organizational trust in the IPRA to carry out its mission to promptly and credibly respond to allegations or evidence of misconduct by BSEE employees. Chairman Farenthold, Ranking Member Plaskett, and Members of the Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you may have at this time. If you or your staff have any questions about this testimony, please contact Frank Rusco, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, at (202) 512-3841 or ruscof@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. GAO staff who made key contributions to this testimony are Richard Burkard, Cindy Gilbert, Matthew D. Tabbert, Kiki Theodoropoulos, and Daniel R. Will. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.

Summary: This testimony summarizes the information contained in GAO's March 2017 report, entitled Oil and Gas Management: Stronger Leadership Commitment Needed at Interior to Improve Offshore Oversight and Internal Management ( GAO-17-293 ). The Department of the Interior's (Interior) Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) leadership has started several key strategic initiatives to improve its offshore safety and environmental oversight, but its limited efforts to obtain and incorporate input from within the bureau have hindered its progress. For example, to supplement its mandatory annual regulatory compliance inspections, in 2012, BSEE leadership began developing a risk-based inspection initiative to identify high-risk production facilities and assess their safety systems and management controls. During pilot testing in 2016, several deficiencies--including the usefulness of its facility risk-assessment model and unclear inspection protocols--caused BSEE to halt the pilot. According to bureau officials, during the development of the initiative, BSEE headquarters did not effectively obtain and incorporate input from regional personnel with long-standing experience in previous risk-based inspection efforts, who could have identified deficiencies earlier in the process. GAO previously found that when implementing large-scale management initiatives a key practice is involving employees to obtain their ideas by incorporating their feedback into new policies and procedures. Instead, BSEE leadership appears to have excluded the input of regional personnel by, for example, not incorporating input beyond the risk-assessment tool when selecting the first pilot facility, even though it was prescribed to do so in the bureau's inspection planning methodology. This undercut the pilot effort, raising questions about whether the bureau's leadership has the commitment necessary to successfully implement its risk-based program. Without higher level leadership within Interior establishing a mechanism for BSEE to obtain and incorporate input from personnel within the bureau, BSEE's risk-based inspection initiative could face continued delays. Similarly, since 2013, BSEE leadership has started several key strategic initiatives to improve its internal management, but none have been successfully implemented, in part, because of limited leadership commitment. For example, BSEE's leadership identified the importance of developing performance measures in its 2012-2015 strategic plan. BSEE began one of three attempts to develop performance measures in July 2014 by hiring a contractor to develop measures, but the bureau terminated this contract in January 2015 after determining a need to complete its internal reorganization before developing such measures. A second effort to develop performance measures started in December 2015, using the same consultant, and yielded 12 performance measures in March 2016, but BSEE did not implement them, in part, because data did not exist to use the measures. By the time BSEE received this consultant's report, it had already begun a third effort to internally develop performance measures; as of November 2016 had identified 17 draft performance measures, but BSEE leadership missed repeated deadlines to review them. BSEE officials told GAO that after leadership approval, the bureau plans to pilot these measures and develop others. BSEE leadership has not demonstrated continuing oversight and accountability for implementing internal management initiatives, as evidenced by its limited progress implementing key strategic initiatives. Without higher-level oversight within Interior addressing leadership commitment deficiencies within BSEE, the bureau is unlikely to succeed in implementing internal management initiatives.