Neither industry data nor data collected by federal regulators document the extent to which banks have invested trust assets in proprietary mutual funds. However, we were able to gain some insight into this question by comparing several data sources. Some relevant statistical information was available from the reports on trust assets that banks must submit annually to federal regulators and from mutual fund data compiled by Lipper Analytical Services, a private firm. To understand the types of trust assets that might be converted into mutual funds, we talked to federal bank regulators at the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Reserve, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). We also interviewed trust department officials at 10 banks to understand the extent to which banks have invested trust assets in mutual funds. The banks had trust departments ranging from several billion to hundreds of billions of dollars in trust assets. These banks were chosen on a judgment basis and do not represent a statistically valid sample. To address questions about disclosure, consent, fees, and controls over banks acting in their self-interest when investing trust assets in proprietary mutual funds, we (1) reviewed relevant legislation, (2) talked to the federal bank regulators mentioned above, (3) reviewed 13 examination reports of trust departments, and (4) talked to officials at the Department of Labor and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The American Bankers Association (ABA) provided us with data from a 1993 survey on the status of state laws governing the investment of trust assets in proprietary mutual funds. We also received comments from the Federal Reserve, OCC, FDIC, and Labor, which we incorporated into the report where applicable. A more detailed discussion of the scope and methodology of our work is presented in appendix I. About 3,000 banks reported in 1992 that they provided fiduciary services to individuals, corporations, and charities (See app. II.) At year-end 1993, these services involved over 11 million accounts with total assets of about $10.6 trillion. Most trust assets were in custodial or other accounts for which the bank did not provide investment management service. About $2 trillion of the $10.6 trillion were in discretionary trust asset accounts (i.e., accounts for which banks provided investment management service). Most assets in these discretionary accounts were managed for employee benefit plans ($914 billion) and personal trusts ($556 billion). In 1993, $760 billion—representing approximately half of the funds contained in discretionary employee benefit plans and personal trusts—were invested in pooled trust investment funds. Discretionary trust assets that were not invested in pooled funds were invested in separate portfolios for each account. Pooled trust investment funds were generally used for relatively small accounts or to achieve diversification in areas that were too costly to achieve on an individual account basis. Pooled trust investment funds are similar to mutual funds in that the cash assets of many trust accounts are commingled in a single investment portfolio for the proportional benefit of all participating accounts. Pooled trust investment funds, like mutual funds, may serve different investment objectives and can be invested in such instruments as short-term treasuries, long-term bonds, growth stocks, and tax-free bonds. However, unlike mutual funds, pooled trust investment funds are not marketed to the general public. Pooled trust investment funds can be transferred to a bank proprietary mutual fund in a single transaction known as a conversion. Pooled trust investment funds for employee benefit accounts and personal trusts differ in some ways. The pooled funds are maintained separately for each type of account because employee benefit plans have different legal requirements. Pooled trust investment funds for personal trusts are called common trust funds. At the end of 1993, two-thirds of the discretionary employee benefit fund trust assets were placed in pooled trust investment funds, while less than one-third of the discretionary assets of personal trusts were placed in common trust funds. (See figs. 1 and 2.) Pooled trust investment funds ($608 billion) Pooled trust investment funds—common trusts ($152 billion) Individually managed funds ($404 billion) Unlike mutual funds, a bank’s operation of a pooled trust investment fund is specifically not covered by the Investment Company Act of 1940 or the Securities Act of 1933. Instead, banks acting as trustees are subject to a substantial body of federal, state, and common laws and regulations in addition to those governing the usual commercial banking activities. Employee benefit plans are governed by ERISA’s fiduciary responsibility provisions, which are administered by Labor. ERISA allows the investment of trust assets in proprietary mutual funds for employee benefit plans. State law as well as the trust agreement governs allowable investments for personal trusts. At least 39 states and the District of Columbia allow personal trust assets to be invested in proprietary mutual funds. We could not determine the status of the remaining 11 states from available information. Two common-law principles underlie the operation and regulation of trusts: the duty of loyalty and prudence. The duty of loyalty requires a fiduciary to act solely in the interests of its clients, excluding all self-interest. Banks are required to resolve any possible conflicts of interest in favor of the trust account and its beneficiaries, not the bank. In addition, the fiduciary is to avoid situations of potential conflict of interest that may prevent it from serving in the best interest of a client. Prudence requires banks that act as fiduciaries to be able to justify the suitability of trust investments for trust accounts. Federal trust regulatory authority stems in part from the fact that the bank regulators have the authority to grant or terminate the trust powers of banks and bank holding companies and their bank and trust subsidiaries. Under 12 U.S.C. 92a, OCC is authorized to grant permission for a national bank to act as a fiduciary and to promulgate regulations governing the proper exercise of fiduciary powers. OCC supervises the trust activities of national banks under regulation 12 C.F.R. part 9. State banks’ trust activities are supervised by the Federal Reserve or FDIC using regulations similar to OCC’s. The Federal Reserve also supervises the trust company subsidiaries of bank holding companies. Federal regulation of common trust funds has been strengthened by an Internal Revenue Code requirement that states banks must adhere to section 9.18 of OCC’s regulations to qualify for certain federal tax benefits. Federal bank regulators allow banks to invest trust assets in securities, including those of a proprietary mutual fund, only if the purchase is permitted by ERISA for employee benefit accounts, or by state law, the trust instrument, or court order for personal trust accounts. Without specific federal or state legislation authorizing the use of proprietary mutual funds in trust accounts, OCC officials said that such use is a breach of trust because of the unauthorized conflict of interest. Labor permits the investment of trust assets in proprietary mutual funds under a set of conditions stated in Prohibited Transactions Exemption (PTE) 77-4. According to the ABA survey, at least 39 states allow bank fiduciaries to invest trust assets in proprietary mutual funds. Regardless of state law, under its Regulation Y, the Federal Reserve prohibits bank fiduciaries from purchasing, in their sole discretion, proprietary mutual funds if the advisor to the fund is a subsidiary of the bank holding company. The Federal Reserve stated that banks that had been criticized under this provision have responded by either restructuring the investment advisor as a subsidiary of the bank, rather than of the bank holding company, or obtained co-trustees who have given consent or used outside counsel to petition the Federal Reserve to reexamine its interpretation of Regulation Y provisions. While it was not possible to quantify the exact extent to which assets in trust accounts had been invested in bank proprietary mutual funds, some inferences could be drawn from the information that was available. For example, while trust assets had been invested in proprietary mutual funds, most of the assets in proprietary mutual funds appeared to have come from other sources. Two, the level of funds contained in discretionary trust accounts far exceeded the amount of assets in proprietary mutual funds. Finally, industry and regulatory officials said that most of the trust assets that had been converted into proprietary mutual funds had come from employee benefit accounts. Bank proprietary mutual funds held about $202 billion in assets at the end of 1993, an increase of $187 billion since 1983. Data were not available to indicate what portion of that total came from each bank’s trust assets. However, even if all the assets in bank proprietary mutual funds came from the investment of trust assets, they would represent only 15 percent of the $1.5 trillion in discretionary employee benefit and personal trust assets. Because bank proprietary mutual funds provide a close alternative investment vehicle to a trust department’s pooled trust investment funds, we examined pooled trust investment funds to determine whether the volume of assets or the number of pooled trust investment funds had declined since the introduction of proprietary mutual funds. Such developments could be expected if pooled trust funds were being converted to proprietary mutual funds in substantial amounts. As figure 3 shows, pooled trust investment funds were still a more widely used investment vehicle for trusts as compared with proprietary mutual funds. From 1983 to 1993, the total of pooled trust investment funds, net of any decreases caused by conversions to proprietary mutual funds, grew from $150 billion to $760 billion. Moreover, at the end of 1993, 95 percent of the assets in pooled trust investment funds were in banks that also offered proprietary mutual funds. Most banks that offered pooled trust investment funds in 1986 continued to do so in 1993. While some banks discontinued pooled funds between 1986 and 1993, other banks increased the number of pooled trust investment funds they offered, and some banks offered pooled funds for the first time. Appendix IV discusses the status and trends in banks that offered both pooled trust investment funds and proprietary mutual funds. According to the annual data collected by federal bank regulators, the concentration of pooled trust investment funds in the largest banks has increased over the last several years. In 1993, the 10 largest banks held 75 percent of all pooled trust investment fund assets, compared with 55 percent of such assets in 1986. We do not know the reason for this change, although large bank and large corporate mergers could be contributing factors. We also do not know what effect this increased concentration has had or will have on the prospects for conversions to mutual funds. Evidence from press accounts and our discussions with bankers and bank regulators indicated that trust assets had been used to establish proprietary mutual funds. Lipper collected data from SEC registration filings of newly organized bank proprietary mutual funds to estimate the volume of trust assets used to start up proprietary mutual funds. Lipper reviewed these data and calculated that from 1985 through 1992, about $24 billion of trust assets were converted to proprietary mutual funds. (See table 1.) Lipper calculated this amount by assuming that newly registered bank proprietary mutual funds that reported a significant amount of assets at inception acquired those assets through the conversion of trust assets. The $24 billion represented about 15 percent of the $161 billion in total assets invested in proprietary mutual funds at the end of 1992. For 1985 to 1990, Lipper estimated that most of the trust asset conversions were into MMMFs. However, in 1991 and 1992 most were conversions into long-term debt and equity mutual funds. Lipper reported that MMMFs accounted for the majority of assets in bank proprietary mutual funds.Thus, conversions of trust assets represented a larger portion of the assets in proprietary long-term debt and equity mutual funds than in MMMFs. These data indicated only the volume of trust assets (which could be from pooled or nonpooled sources) assumed to have been placed in proprietary mutual funds at the start-up of a fund. Industry experts said that these numbers likely understated the amount of trust assets invested in proprietary mutual funds because they did not include the amount of trust assets that had been invested in or converted to mutual funds after the fund’s start-up. At the end of 1993, banks reported that $23 billion in discretionary employee benefit assets and $22 billion in discretionary personal trusts assets were invested in MMMFs. We do not know what portion of these investments were in proprietary MMMFs, but if all of the assets were invested in proprietary mutual funds they would have accounted for only one-third of the assets in proprietary MMMFs. Data on the amount of trust assets invested in long-term debt and equity mutual funds were not separately reported. Bank regulators stated that pooled trust investment funds are a likely source of trust funds for conversion into proprietary mutual funds. We do not know how much of proprietary mutual funds has come from pooled trust investment funds. Because capital gains taxes are deferred on funds invested in employee benefit plans, most trust assets that have been converted into mutual funds—including those in the banks we interviewed—have likely come from pooled employee benefit funds. A few banks have converted common trust funds into proprietary mutual funds, but none of the bankers we spoke with had done so. However, these bankers said they believed many more conversions of common trust funds would occur if tax laws were changed to clearly allow a tax-deferred transfer of common trust fund assets to mutual funds. Congress passed clarifying legislation that would have allowed tax-deferred conversions as part of other legislation in 1992, but the President vetoed the bill. Bankers told us that many trust customers prefer to have their accounts invested in a mutual fund rather than a pooled trust investment fund. These bankers said that mutual funds, unlike pooled funds, have become widely accepted by the general public as an investment vehicle. Also, they said that the services routinely offered by mutual funds are in some respect superior to pooled trust investment funds. For example, mutual funds are priced at market daily, rather than monthly or quarterly, and the funds’ performance can be followed in the daily press; money can be invested or withdrawn daily, rather than monthly or distributions can, if desired by the customer, be paid out in shares of the mutual fund, rather than only in cash. These bankers said that mutual funds may also provide a wider range of investment choices than pooled trust investment funds. For example, a proprietary mutual fund might attract enough trust and nontrust investors to justify specialized funds in such areas as small companies or foreign investments. However, the trust customers alone may not provide a large enough base to support the overhead and transactions costs of running these funds. Federal laws and some state laws have established various requirements relating to the disclosure of and consent for investment of trust assets in proprietary mutual funds. Under conditions set out in PTE 77-4, Labor requires disclosure of the investment of employee benefit assets in proprietary mutual funds to a second, independent fiduciary as well as the consent to such an investment by the independent fiduciary. PTE 77-4 does not require that Labor or the bank regulators be notified or provide advance approval. Instead, PTE 77-4 establishes bank procedures regarding (1) what must be disclosed and to whom, (2) fees, and (3) conflicts of interest. Provision of the mutual fund prospectus, disclosure of fees paid by the employee benefit plan, and an explanation of why the investment is appropriate must be made to a second fiduciary, who is to be chosen by the plan and independent of the bank. The second fiduciary must give consent before the conversion. Labor specifies that consent may be limited to fees to be charged. Of those banks we visited that had converted employee benefit plan assets into proprietary mutual funds, all had relied on PTE 77-4. These banks sent disclosure letters and consent forms to the independent fiduciaries of the plans. A sample of the letters revealed that these banks discussed the benefits of investing in the proprietary mutual funds and disclosed their relationship to the funds and the fees that would be charged. Several letters also discussed how funds in the accounts would be handled if the fiduciaries did not agree to the conversion. In only one case did a bank fail to obtain positive consent before the conversion took place. In an examination report, federal regulators cited the bank for failure to obtain positive consent in a timely manner. For investing the assets of personal trust accounts in a proprietary mutual fund, the issue of disclosure concerns whether beneficiaries are notified about the fees charged for such investments. According to the ABA survey, disclosure requirements vary, with about half of the 39 respondent states saying they required fee disclosure to trust customers. In implementing the conversion of a common trust fund into a proprietary mutual fund, some of the bankers we interviewed said they would send disclosure notices to current income beneficiaries even if the law or trust agreement did not require it. We do not know whether these policies are representative of the industry. For personal trusts, the ABA survey reported that beneficiary consent is not required in almost all of the 39 states that responded. Federal bank regulators said that requiring consent could be a problem in some personal trusts where some future beneficiaries may not even be born. New trust agreements are often written to allow investment of trust assets in proprietary mutual funds. Trust departments normally charge a fee for managing investments in a trust account, including a fee for providing investment advice. Similarly, the investment advisor to a mutual fund, including bank proprietary funds, normally charges a fee for investment advice, which is paid out of the assets of the fund. Thus, by investing trust assets in proprietary mutual funds, a bank creates a possibility of collecting two fees for investment advice (i.e., collecting both trust fees and mutual fund fees on the same trust assets). This practice is generally referred to as charging double fees. Besides paying the fee for investment advice, mutual funds may also pay fees for distribution, custody, and other services. For a trust customer, total fees could be greater for trust assets invested in proprietary mutual funds than if the trust assets were otherwise invested. However, banks’ practices in charging fees when investing trust assets in proprietary mutual funds are governed by federal and some state laws, and other factors also influence those practices. The laws governing fees charged for investment advice differ for employee benefit plans and personal trust accounts. For employee benefit plans, PTE 77-4 prohibits paying double fees for investment advice. For personal trust accounts, the states that allow investment of trust assets in proprietary mutual funds differ regarding permissible fees. Of the states that responded to the ABA survey, 8 prohibited charging both a trust and a mutual fund investment advisory fee, 27 permitted both fees to be charged, and 4 were silent about whether both fees may be charged. We did not have data on the remaining 11 states. Data were not available to determine whether banks were more likely to invest trust assets in proprietary mutual funds when double fees were permitted by state law. Moreover, even if data had been available, we do not know if we could have isolated other factors—such as the performance of the fund and its suitability for the investment goals of the beneficiaries of the trust accounts—that influenced the decision of whether to invest trust assets in proprietary mutual funds. Factors other than federal and state laws also influence banks’ fees when investing trust assets in proprietary mutual funds. According to bankers we interviewed, competitive forces often keep bank fees lower than the amount that could be charged under law for trust assets invested in proprietary mutual funds. They said this is especially true with employee benefit accounts and revocable personal trusts, since customers may move accounts elsewhere if fees are not competitive. Regulatory examinations of bank trust departments may also influence banks’ practices in charging fees because investments in proprietary mutual funds and the fees associated with them are susceptible to regulatory criticism and action based on common law. Bank regulatory officials told us that fees collected by banks for investing trust assets in proprietary mutual funds are a matter of concern. OCC stated that even if the investment of trust assets in a proprietary mutual fund is authorized by state law, the terms of the trust instrument, or the consent of all beneficiaries, regulators still require banks to meet common law standards of prudence and loyalty and the regulation 12 C.F.R. part 9 requirement that fees be reasonable. Thus, investments in proprietary mutual funds and the fees associated with them become susceptible to regulatory criticism and action. Beneficiary lawsuits regarding poor investment performance or fee abuse are another factor that may influence banks’ practices regarding fee charges. Bankers we interviewed said that their banks do not charge, nor would they charge, two investment advisory fees on trust assets invested in proprietary mutual funds. We were not able to determine whether or to what extent total fees would be higher on such investments than if they were otherwise invested. Most of the bankers we interviewed said they preferred that their proprietary mutual funds charge the same fees to trust and other investors. These banks arranged for their trust departments to refund mutual fund advisory and sometimes other mutual fund fees to trust accounts. One bank, however, created a separate class of mutual fund shares so that it could waive its mutual fund fees directly. Among the banks we visited that adjusted fees through their trust departments, some bankers said they itemized their trust fees into various categories of service while others charged a single comprehensive trust fee, usually based on average asset values in the account. For those banks that have broken down their trust fees, most of the bankers said they waived either the trust or the mutual fund investment advisory fee but continued to charge a trust fee for nonadvisory services. Of the banks we visited that charged a single trust fee, one banker said the bank planned to waive its entire trust fee on those assets invested in mutual funds. Other bankers said that their banks rebated portions of the mutual fund fees, which might have included other fees besides the investment advisory fee that their bank or affiliates received from the mutual fund. As we pointed out earlier in this report, regulations and laws governing trusts generally prohibit banks acting as fiduciaries from serving in their own interest when that interest conflicts with the interest of a trust. A conflict of interest arises for a banking organization when it invests trust assets in its proprietary mutual fund. As we have noted, the bank regulators address this conflict through regulation. For example, section 9.12 of OCC’s regulation 12 C.F.R. part 9 establishes local law as the applicable standard of permissibility for investments involving a conflict of interest. In addition, their examination of a bank’s trust activities is intended, among other things, to identify and resolve this type of conflict on a case-by-case basis. A description of federal oversight authority and trust examination programs is provided in appendix V. The federal bank regulators maintain examination manuals to test for compliance with trust laws and regulations. These manuals provide guidance to test for conflicts of interest, including conflicts involving the investment of trust assets in proprietary mutual funds. However, our review of these manuals indicated that the criteria for evaluating investments in proprietary mutual funds are rather general in nature. For example, the Federal Reserve manual, in its section on conflicts of interest, does not specifically address this issue. Also, OCC has drafted, but not yet adopted, a special set of examination procedures to cover trust investments in proprietary mutual funds. We reviewed trust examination reports on selected banks, some of which had converted trust assets into proprietary mutual funds. The reports contained limited information regarding recent conversions. Given the limited number of examinations we reviewed and the general nature of the trust examination manuals, we have no basis for judging the effectiveness of trust examinations in detecting and controlling unresolved conflicts of interest when investing trust assets in proprietary mutual funds. In addition, most proprietary mutual funds are new, particularly the long-term debt and equity funds. Because it takes several years for a fund to develop a meaningful performance record, it is probably too soon to evaluate the choice of these funds as an investment vehicle for trust assets. In our limited review, we noted that Regulators have recognized that the investment of trust assets in proprietary mutual funds poses important regulatory issues for trusts. Examiners are to direct attention to such issues as double fees in trust examinations. These issues could become more significant if such investments continue. Little documentation of the review of trust asset conversions existed in the trust examination reports we reviewed. To gain some appreciation of how the general guidelines are applied in examinations, we reviewed examination reports for 13 trust departments. About half of these departments had converted trust assets to proprietary mutual funds. In one case, OCC found that the bank had failed to get appropriate authorizations from independent fiduciaries for the conversions. OCC indicated that corrective action had been taken. In another case, FDIC questioned the fees that trust customers were being charged on investments in proprietary mutual funds. FDIC indicated that a conflict of interest existed, which management should address in writing. For each of the banks that had trust conversions, there was little documentation of detailed examiner review of the transactions. A federal regulator may not be aware of a conversion until long after the conversion has occurred. Banks are not required to provide regulators with advance notification of trust conversions to proprietary mutual funds. Because trust examinations can be 2 or more years apart, a federal regulator may not be aware of a conversion until long after the fact. The conversion of pooled trust assets typically has been reviewed after the fact as part of the regulator’s periodic trust examination. In the period 1991 to 1993, one violation relating to a conversion of employee benefit funds was referred to Labor. Regulators are to refer matters of noncompliance relating to employee benefit accounts to Labor. For the years 1991 to 1993, bank regulators stated that they had noted few problems with the investment of trust assets in proprietary mutual funds. Only one violation relating to a conversion of employee benefit funds had been referred to Labor, where action is pending. We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Federal Reserve, OCC, FDIC, and Labor. OCC, FDIC, and Labor provided written comments, which appear in appendixes VI through VIII, respectively. The Federal Reserve declined to provide written comments. Each of the agencies also provided us with technical comments, which have been incorporated where appropriate. OCC and FDIC indicated that they generally concur with the report’s observations. FDIC noted, however, that the benefits of investing in a mutual fund as opposed to a pooled trust investment fund (as appears on p. 22) should be clarified. It noted that these benefits could be provided by pooled trust investment funds as well as mutual funds. Labor had no specific comments but provided us with an update, which we incorporated, on the referral mentioned on p. 34 of the report. Labor also said that a referral that was being considered by the Federal Reserve has since been determined not to be a violation. We are sending copies of this report to the Comptroller of the Currency, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Chairman of the FDIC, the Secretary of Labor, and other interested parties. We will also make copies available to others upon request. This report was prepared under the direction of Thomas J. McCool, Associate Director, and Stephen C. Swaim, Assistant Director, Financial Institutions and Markets Issues. Other major contributors are listed in appendix IX. If you have any questions, please call me on (202) 512-8678. To determine the extent to which trust assets had been invested in proprietary mutual funds, we reviewed editions of Trust Assets of Financial Institutions. This report is issued annually by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, and it contains the most detailed data available regarding the investment of trust assets by banking institutions. We also reviewed statistical data on bank proprietary mutual funds provided to us by Lipper Analytical Services. Although the data on trust assets and the mutual funds data did not document the extent to which banks have invested trust assets in proprietary mutual funds, we were able to gain some insight into this question by comparing these data sources. However, there are some problems with these data, which we have noted below. Because of the format used to collect data in Trust Assets of Financial Institutions, we could not precisely determine the extent to which trust assets were invested in mutual funds, either proprietary or nonproprietary. In addition, we encountered other problems with the data. For example, trust assets may have been double counted whenever the trust department managed a proprietary mutual fund. Also, regulators and bankers told us that the instructions for completing the report, which are complex, may result in inconsistent reporting by the banks. Finally, the 1993 data provided to us were preliminary. The Lipper data provided information regarding the growth of proprietary mutual funds, but the source of these assets (i.e., whether from pooled trust investment funds, other trusts, or nontrust sources) was not tracked. However, Lipper provided an estimate of the amount of all types of trust assets that were invested at the start-up of a proprietary mutual fund, which Lipper identified from SEC registration filings. We determined that, for purposes of this report, only those trust assets for which banks provided some degree of investment advice were relevant. Furthermore, from our discussions with bankers and federal bank regulators, we determined that the most likely source of trust assets for conversion into proprietary mutual funds were those that were invested in pooled trust investment funds (since these funds are very similar to mutual funds and would provide a relatively large asset base). Therefore, we narrowed our focus further to those assets in pooled trust investment funds. To determine disclosure and consent requirements and whether double fees are permitted, we reviewed the federal laws and regulations that are generally relevant to the investment of trust assets and in particular to the investment of such assets in proprietary mutual funds. We interviewed officials of the federal bank regulators—the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Reserve Board, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)—who oversee bank trust departments. We also interviewed officials at the Department of Labor who regulate the operation of employee benefit plans in accordance with the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) and related Labor regulations. Such plans are significant sources of trust assets. Labor oversight includes the investment of employee benefit plan assets in mutual funds. We interviewed Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) officials to determine the nature of their oversight of mutual funds in connection with trust assets. OCC, Federal Reserve, and FDIC officials provided the manuals used in trust department examinations and described how their examination programs test for compliance with the applicable laws and regulations. They also provided their views regarding potential fiduciary conflicts of interest, fees, disclosure, and customer consent when trust assets are invested in proprietary mutual funds. We reviewed the trust examination reports for 13 banks that were identified as operating proprietary mutual funds; about half of them had converted trust assets into proprietary mutual funds. We obtained additional information from other sources. The American Bankers Association (ABA) provided us a survey regarding the status, as of November 1993, of the laws they identified as pertaining to the investment of trust assets in proprietary mutual funds in 39 states. We interviewed officials of 10 banks where trust departments managed pooled trust investment funds and had either converted such investments into proprietary mutual funds or had contemplated doing so. We selected these banks on a judgment basis to reflect a variety of trust activity and because each was familiar with the issues involved in the conversion of trust assets into proprietary mutual funds. The trust assets in these banks ranged from several billion to hundreds of billions of dollars. In 1993, three of these banks were among the 20 largest managers of pooled trust investment funds. One bank had proprietary mutual funds that were among the 10 largest such proprietary funds offered by banks. We were interested in each bank’s policies and experience, and also in their officers’ views about the prospects for the investment of trust assets in proprietary mutual funds. Specifically, we asked them why mutual funds were becoming a more commonly used investment choice and how they had dealt with issues of disclosure, consent, and fees charged in connection with trust asset investment in proprietary mutual funds. Data that would fully describe these activities were not available, and we did not independently verify the information we obtained. Because we interviewed only a limited number of banks, we do not know if the practices described in this report reflect those of the industry as a whole, and our results are not statistically valid. Our work was done in Washington, D.C., between December 1993 and April 1994 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We obtained written comments on a draft of this report from OCC, FDIC, and Labor. These comments are discussed on pp. 20 and 21 and reproduced in appendixes VI through VIII. At the end of 1993, available data show that banks held $10.6 trillion of assets in trust. Of this total, $2 trillion were classified as discretionary trust assets. For these assets, banks are to provide investment management services. Such services can range from the bank simply giving advice to an outside party that has sole authority to make investment decisions to the bank itself having sole authority to direct investments. The remaining assets, $8.6 trillion, were classified as nondiscretionary. For these assets, banks simply provide a variety of investment support services, such as custody of securities, dividend collections and distributions, and record keeping. The focus of this report is on the discretionary trust assets because banks are to provide investment management services for them. Discretionary trust assets may be divided into three categories: (1) employee benefit accounts, (2) personal trust accounts, and (3) other accounts. In 1993, almost half of the discretionary trust assets, $914 billion, were held in employee benefit accounts; another quarter, $556 billion, were held in personal trusts; the remaining $577 billion were held in other accounts, which may include the assets of proprietary mutual funds. Figure II.1 summarizes the types of trust assets held by banks as of December 1993. Pooled trust investment funds are similar in concept to mutual funds, but unlike mutual funds, which may be offered to the general public, pooled trust investment funds are not marketed to the general public. Of the $2 trillion in discretionary trust assets in 1993, $760 billion were invested in pooled trust investment funds composed of pooled employee benefit accounts and pooled personal trust accounts. Separate pools are maintained for these accounts because employee benefit plans have deferred tax status whereas personal trusts generally do not. Pooled personal trust accounts are generally referred to as common trust funds. (See fig. II.1.) Discretionary trust assets are separated into three groups, and for two of these groups—employee benefit plans and personal trusts—the assets are further divided into pooled trust investment funds and individually managed employee benefit plans and personal trust accounts. Industry officials and regulators we spoke with said that pooled trust investment funds are a likely source of trust assets for conversion into proprietary mutual funds because they are very similar to mutual funds. Accounts that are not invested in pooled trust funds are referred to as individually managed trust accounts. Some of the bankers we interviewed said that individually managed accounts are less likely to be converted into mutual fund investments because of customer preference. Of the $914 billion in employee benefit accounts in 1993, $608 billion, or 67 percent, were invested in pooled funds. By contrast, only $152 billion of the $556 billion in personal trust accounts, or 27 percent, were invested in pooled funds (i.e., common trusts). The concentration of pooled employee benefit funds in a few large banks was also greater than that of common trust funds. The five banks with the largest amount of pooled employee benefit funds controlled $460 billion, or 76 percent, of the total assets in these pools. The five banks with the largest amount of common trust funds held $46 billion, or only 30 percent of the total assets in these pools. The significance of this concentration is that the scale of future conversions of trust assets into proprietary mutual funds may depend to a great extent on decisions made by a small number of banks. Pooled trust investment funds provide a large potential source of assets for future conversion to proprietary mutual funds. The number of banks offering one or both types of pooled trust investment funds, however, declined from 895 in 1983 to 533 at the end of 1992. It is possible that bank mergers account for a significant part of this decline. In other cases, banks could have either converted their pooled trust investment funds to proprietary mutual funds or liquidated their pooled funds and invested the proceeds elsewhere. Table III.1 shows the status of pooled trust investment funds and proprietary mutual funds for 1983, 1988, and 1993. On the basis of data presented in this table, we noted the following changes: The assets in employee benefit and common trust funds grew by about 400 percent from 1983 to 1993, to $760 billion, with employee benefit funds growing faster than common trusts. The number of separate pooled trust investment funds declined from more than 4,000 in 1983 to about 3,500 in 1993. Assets in the pooled trust investment funds in 1993 were nearly four times as large as assets in proprietary mutual funds, notwithstanding the fact that the banks’ proprietary mutual funds grew from relative insignificance to more than $200 billion in just 10 years. Pooled trust investment funds increased by $610 billion while proprietary mutual funds increased by $187 billion. We do not know how much pooled trust investment funds would have grown if proprietary mutual funds had not been available. At the end of 1993, about five times as many banks maintained pooled trust investment funds as offered proprietary mutual funds. Data on the number of institutions offering proprietary mutual funds in 1983 were not available. Table III.1 indicates that pooled trust investment funds have remained an important investment vehicle, despite the smaller number of banks offering them and the start-up of many new proprietary mutual funds. Although customer preference and the relative performance of pooled trust investment funds compared with mutual funds will be important factors in determining whether there are additional conversions of pooled trust investment funds to proprietary mutual funds, several other factors may have an impact on this process. These factors include (1) the profitability of continuing to offer both pooled trust investment funds and proprietary mutual funds, especially since proprietary mutual funds can be offered to a wider range of customers; (2) changes in federal tax laws to allow capital gains accrued in common trusts to be deferred in a conversion; and (3) changes in federal regulation, such as that which has been proposed by OCC for a number of years to allow banks to advertise the performance of their pooled trust investment funds. Out of the more than 3,000 banks active in the trust business, about 500 offered pooled trust investment funds at year-end 1992. At the end of 1993, 91 of the banks offering pooled trust investment funds offered proprietary mutual funds as well. As table IV.1 shows, these 91 banks, which we will call dual providers, dominated both markets. They held 95 percent, $719 billion, of all reported pooled trust investment fund assets and 94 percent, $191 billion, of all reported proprietary mutual fund assets. Table IV.1 also shows that the number of separate pooled trust investment funds offered by dual providers had declined since 1988 while asset growth had been substantial. In about half of these banks, the number of separate pooled trust investment funds decreased, although fewer than one-fourth of the 91 banks reported a decline in the assets of pooled funds over that period. Such declines could reflect different events, such as conversions of trust assets into proprietary or other mutual funds, bank mergers, or trouble at the bank. The decline in the number of pooled trust investment funds compared to the increase in the number of proprietary mutual funds offered by the dual providers is an interesting development. However, the extent of the shift toward proprietary mutual funds needs to be kept in perspective. Most pooled trust investment funds have not been converted, and in fact their assets are continuing to grow. One indication of the continuing importance of pooled funds is that only 17 of the banks that offered proprietary mutual funds in 1993 had actually discontinued either their common trust funds or their pooled employee benefit funds since 1986, and only 5 had discontinued both. While a huge potential for future conversions may exist, particularly for employee benefit funds, we have no basis for predicting the extent of future conversions. In reviewing banks that had pooled trust investment funds, we noted a high and increasing concentration of pooled trust assets. At the end of 1993, the 10 largest banks, measured by their pooled trust investment funds, held 75 percent of all pooled trust investment fund assets. In 1986, the 10 largest banks had only 55 percent of this market. Since 1986, assets in pooled trust investment funds in these banks have grown almost eight times faster than pooled trust assets in smaller banks. The increase in concentration of these funds among the 10 largest banks indicated that despite the large volume of pooled trust assets managed by banks, many banks are unlikely to reach the scale of assets needed to make a mutual fund viable simply by converting trust assets into a proprietary mutual fund. The average size of pooled trust investment funds has also grown. This increase in size may make it easier for pooled funds to realize any available economies of scale and may lessen the possibility that pooled trust investment funds would be converted into proprietary mutual funds. The laws and regulations relating to trusts are enforced by OCC, the Federal Reserve, and FDIC. Their oversight authority stems in part from the fact that they are authorized to grant or terminate the trust powers of banks and bank holding companies and their bank and trust subsidiaries. The regulators say that they have the tools necessary to ensure that banks are meeting their trust-related fiduciary responsibilities. Each agency maintains a trust examination manual for the guidance of examiners. We reviewed these manuals and found that they reflected the regulations issued by each agency. Bank examiners must determine if the bank has resolved any conflicts of interests in favor of the trust account and its beneficiaries. They are also to determine if the bank can justify all trust investments by documented analysis of their historic performance and suitability for the trust involved. Regulatory guidelines and policies require examiners making these determinations to exercise a great deal of judgment in analyzing investment decisions and other aspects of trust activities. Each of the federal regulatory agencies has a relatively small number of bank examiners specializing in trust activities, although each of these agencies expects all bank examiners to review trust activities, if any, in the banks they examine. The Federal Reserve had 65 trust specialists out of a field force of approximately 1,600 examiners; OCC had 79 out of about 3,220; and FDIC had 21 out of 3,259. OCC stated that it usually examines trust activities as part of its compliance program although the examinations are usually conducted separately from other compliance examinations. FDIC and the Federal Reserve conduct separate trust examinations. The frequency of trust examinations depends variously on the size of a bank’s trust department and its earlier rating, as shown in Table V.1. OCC, the Federal Reserve, and FDIC use the Uniform Interagency Trust Rating System in their trust examinations. The system was designed to measure performance and identify problems that warrant correction. Banks are rated on six separate components: (1) supervision and organization; (2) operations, controls, and audits; (3) asset administration; (4) account administration; (5) conflicts of interest and self-dealing; and (6) earnings, volume, trends, and future prospects. A type of pooled trust investment fund maintained by a bank for the collective investment of money held as trustee, executor, administrator, guardian or custodian under a state Uniform Gifts to Minors Act. This principle requires a fiduciary to act solely in the interests of his clients, excluding all self-interest. ERISA defines employee pension benefit plans as those which provide retirement income to employees or result in deferred employee income for a period extending to the termination of covered employment or beyond. A federal statute administered by the Department of Labor, Internal Revenue Service, and Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. ERISA regulates the conduct of those charged with administering and investing the assets of privately sponsored employee benefit plans. A person acting alone or jointly with others primarily for the benefit of another. The principal function of a fiduciary is the management of property for others. An organization that advises others as to the value of or advisability of investing in securities. A mutual fund employs an investment advisor to give professional advice on its investments and the management of its assets. A company that issues redeemable securities and is engaged primarily in the business of investing or trading in securities. Mutual funds enable investors to pool their money to obtain professional management and diversification of their investments. A mutual fund must stand ready to buy back its shares at their current net asset value. The value of the shares depends on the market value of the fund’s portfolio of securities at a given time. In an agency relationship, a customer retains legal ownership of the managed property and receives the beneficial interest in the property. Agency relationships terminate upon the death of the customer. In a trust relationship, ownership of and beneficial interest in the trust property are separated. The trustee takes title to the trust property to manage it for the benefit of others. Similar in concept to a mutual fund, except these funds are only available to trust customers as allowed by law or regulation. The term is used in this report to refer to both common trusts and the pooled funds of employee benefit plans. Funds advised by the bank, its subsidiary, or an affiliate. This principle requires a fiduciary to invest assets in a manner similar to that which would be selected by a prudent person of discretion and intelligence who is seeking a reasonable income and preservation of assets. It is a rule of conduct, not of performance. An individual or institution holding title to and managing trust property on behalf of others. The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free. Additional copies are $2 each. Orders should be sent to the following address, accompanied by a check or money order made out to the Superintendent of Documents, when necessary. Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. U.S. General Accounting Office P.O. Box 6015 Gaithersburg, MD 20884-6015 Room 1100 700 4th St. NW (corner of 4th and G Sts. NW) U.S. General Accounting Office Washington, DC Orders may also be placed by calling (202) 512-6000 or by using fax number (301) 258-4066, or TDD (301) 413-0006. 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Summary: Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the extent to which banks have invested trust assets into proprietary mutual funds, focusing on: (1) the disclosure and consent requirements that apply when trust assets are invested into these funds; (2) whether double fees on invested trust assets are legal; and (3) the regulatory controls that prevent banks from acting in their own self-interest. GAO found that: (1) most banks have not invested trust assets in proprietary mutual funds; (2) the majority of funds invested in bank proprietary mutual funds are from non-trust assets; (3) by the end of 1992, about $24 billion in trust assets had been used to start up proprietary mutual funds which represented about 15 percent of the total assets in these funds; (4) the bank industry believed the trust asset investments were understated because the estimates did not take into account conversions and new trust investments; (5) in 1993, about $45 billion in employee benefit and personal trust assets were invested in short-term money market mutual funds; (6) industry and regulatory officials believe that trust investments are becoming more attractive to investors for tax reasons; (7) investment disclosure requirements vary by state and most states that allow proprietary mutual fund investments do not require beneficiary consent; (8) although 8 states are in compliance with the double fee prohibitions on employee accounts, 27 states allow double fees to be charged; (9) most banks lack incentives to charge double fees because of competition and the possibility of federal penalties and beneficiary lawsuits; (10) when investing trust assets, banks are prohibited from acting in their own self-interest, must justify their investments, and are subject to federal review; and (11) the effectiveness of trust examinations could not be determined, since the number of examinations are limited and use of proprietary mutual funds in trusts is new.