Human trafficking occurs worldwide and often involves transnational criminal organizations, violations of labor and immigration codes, and government corruption. Although their circumstances vary, fraud, force, or coercion typically distinguishes trafficking victims from people who are smuggled. Moreover, most trafficking cases follow the same pattern: people are abducted or recruited in the country of origin, transferred through transit regions, and then exploited in the destination country. People may also be trafficked internally, that is, within the borders of their own country. Trafficking victims include agricultural workers who are brought into the United States, held in crowded unsanitary conditions, threatened with violence if they attempt to leave, and kept under constant surveillance; child camel jockeys in Dubai who are starved to keep their weight down; Indonesian women who may be drawn to a domestic service job in another country, are not paid for their work and are without the resources to return home; child victims of commercial sexual exploitation in Thailand; and child soldiers in Uganda. During the 1990s, the U.S. government began drawing attention to the problem of human trafficking before various international forums and gatherings. In 1998, a presidential memorandum called on U.S. government agencies to combat the problem through prevention of trafficking, victim assistance and protection, and enforcement. This approach came to be known as “the three p’s”—prevention, protection, and prosecution. In 2000, Congress enacted TVPA and reauthorized and amended the act twice. The act defines victims of severe forms of trafficking as those persons subject to (1) sex trafficking in which a commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud, or coercion, or in which the person induced to perform such acts is under age 18 or (2) the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for labor or services, through the use of force, fraud, or coercion, for the purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery. The TVPA does not specify movement across international boundaries as a condition of trafficking; it does not require the transportation of victims from one locale to another. Under the TVPA, an alien, who is identified as a victim of a severe form of trafficking in the United States and meets additional conditions, is eligible for special benefits and services. The TVPA, as amended, provides a framework for current U.S. antitrafficking efforts. It addresses the prevention of trafficking, protection and assistance for victims of trafficking, and the prosecution and punishment of traffickers. The TVPA also laid out minimum standards for eliminating trafficking to be used in the Secretary of State’s annual assessment of foreign governments’ antitrafficking efforts. It authorized U.S. foreign assistance for efforts designed to meet these standards and established sanctions—withholding nonhumanitarian, nontrade-related assistance—that could be applied against governments of countries not in compliance with the standards and not making significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance. Responsibility for implementing U.S. government antitrafficking efforts domestically and abroad is shared by the Departments of State, Justice, Labor, Health and Human Services (HHS), Homeland Security (DHS), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Each agency addresses one or more of the three prongs of the U.S. antitrafficking approach. Some agencies have more responsibility for implementing international trafficking efforts than others. Figure 1 shows agencies and task forces with responsibilities for antitrafficking efforts. The government has also created several coordinating mechanisms for these antitrafficking efforts, as shown in figure 1. The TVPA directed the President to establish the Interagency Task Force to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, comprised of various agency heads and chaired by the Secretary of State, to coordinate the implementation of the act, among other activities. Furthermore, the TVPA authorized the Secretary of State to create the Department of State’s Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons (Trafficking Office) to provide assistance to the task force. Subsequently, TVPA 2003 established the Senior Policy Operating Group, which addresses interagency policy, program, and planning issues regarding TVPA implementation. The TVPA 2003 directed the Director of the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons to serve as chair of the group. In addition, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, passed in December 2004, established the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center to be jointly run by the Departments of State, Justice and DHS. This center houses several agency data systems to collect and disseminate information to build a comprehensive picture of certain transnational issues, including, among other things, human trafficking. Since 2001, the U.S. government has obligated approximately $375 million for international projects to combat trafficking in persons. For example, in fiscal year 2005, the U.S. government supported more than 265 international antitrafficking programs in about 100 countries. State, Labor, and USAID are the three largest providers of international assistance to target trafficking (see table 1). During an address to the U.N. General Assembly in September 2003, the President declared trafficking in persons a humanitarian crisis and announced that the U.S. government was committing $50 million to support organizations active in combating sex trafficking, sex tourism, and the rescue of women and children. In 2004, eight priority countries for the initiative were identified—Brazil, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Moldova, Sierra Leone, and Tanzania. The initiative was centered on developing the capacity of each country to rescue women and children, to provide emergency shelters, medical treatment, rehabilitation services, vocational training, and reintegration services, and to conduct law enforcement investigations and prosecutions. Existing estimates of the scale of trafficking at the global level are questionable, and improvements in data collection have not yet been implemented. The accuracy of the estimates is in doubt because of methodological weaknesses, gaps in data and numerical discrepancies. For example, the U.S. government’s estimate was developed by one person who did not document all of his work, so the estimate may not be replicable, casting doubt on its reliability. Moreover, country data are generally not available, reliable or comparable. There is also a considerable discrepancy between the numbers of observed and estimated victims of human trafficking. The U.S. government has not yet established an effective mechanism for estimating the number of victims or for conducting ongoing analysis of trafficking related data that resides within various government agencies. While trafficking data collection in the United States is fragmented, the database created by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) provides a useful systematic profile of victims and traffickers across countries. The U.S. government and three international organizations gather data on human trafficking, but methodological weaknesses affect the accuracy of their information. Efforts to develop accurate trafficking estimates are further frustrated by the lack of country level data. Finally, there is a considerable discrepancy between the numbers of observed and estimated victims of human trafficking. The U.S. government and three international organizations have gathered data on global human trafficking. However, these organizations face methodological weaknesses and institutional constraints that cast doubt on the accuracy of the collected data. The four organizations with databases on global trafficking in persons are the U.S. government, International Labor Organization (ILO), IOM, and UNODC. The U.S. government and ILO estimate the number of victims worldwide, IOM collects data on victims it assists in the countries where it has a presence, and UNODC traces the major international trafficking routes of the victims. The databases provide information on different aspects of human trafficking since each organization analyzes the problem based on its own mandate. For example, IOM looks at trafficking from a migration and rights point of view and ILO from the point of view of forced labor. Despite the fact that the databases use different methodologies for data collection and analysis and have various limitations, some common themes emerge. For example, the largest percentage of estimated victims is trafficked for sexual exploitation. In addition, women constitute the majority of estimated victims. However, the estimated percentage of victims that are children ranges from 13 to 50 percent. Table 2 describes the victim profiles that emerge from the data. Methodological weaknesses and limitations cast doubt on the U.S. estimate of global trafficking flows. We identified several important limitations: Estimate not entirely replicable. The U.S. government agency that prepares the trafficking estimate is part of the intelligence community, which makes its estimation methodology opaque and inaccessible. During a trafficking workshop in November 2005, the government agency provided a one-page overview of its methodology, which allowed for only a very limited peer review by the workshop participants. In addition, the U.S. government’s methodology involves interpreting, classifying, and analyzing data, which was performed by one person who did not document all of his work. Thus the estimate may not be replicable, which raises doubts about its reliability. Estimate based on unreliable estimates of others. The biggest methodological challenge in calculating an accurate number of global trafficking victims is how to transition from reported to unreported victims. The U.S. government does not directly estimate the number of unreported victims but relies on the estimates of others, adjusting them through a complex statistical process. It essentially averages the various aggregate estimates of reported and unreported trafficking victims published by NGOs, governments, and international organizations, estimates that themselves are not reliable or comparable due to different definitions, methodologies, data sources, and data validation procedures. Moreover, the methodologies used to develop these estimates are generally not published and available for professional scrutiny. Internal trafficking data not included. The U.S. government does not collect data on internal trafficking, which could be a significant problem in countries such as India, where forced labor is reportedly widespread. According to the 2005 Trafficking in Persons Report, many nations may be overlooking internal trafficking or forms of labor trafficking in their national legislations. In particular, what is often absent is involuntary servitude, a form of severe trafficking. The report also noted that the TVPA specifically includes involuntary servitude in the U.S. definition of severe forms of trafficking. Nonetheless, the U.S. government estimate does not account for it, because it only collects data on offenses that cross national borders. Estimate not suitable for analysis over time. The U.S. government methodology provides an estimate of trafficking flows for a 1-year period and cannot be used to analyze trafficking over time to determine whether it is increasing, decreasing, or staying the same. Therefore, the estimate cannot help in targeting resources and evaluating program effectiveness. Methodological weaknesses also raise questions about the accuracy of trafficking information from international organizations. For example, UNODC’s methodology attempts to identify global trafficking flows across international borders. It tracks and totals the number of different source institutions that have reported a country having a trafficking incident. However, whether the trafficking incident involved 5 or 500 victims is irrelevant for UNODC’s methodology. In addition, by classifying countries in five categories based on the frequency of reporting, UNODC might rank a country very high as, say, a destination country, due to the country’s heightened public awareness, transparency and recognition of trafficking as a serious crime. Alternatively, ILO’s methodology provides a global estimate of trafficking victims. However, it attempts to overcome the gap between reported and unreported victims using an extrapolation that is based on assumptions and observations that have not been rigorously tested and validated. Moreover, global databases are based on data sources drawn from reports from a limited number of countries or restricted geographically to specific countries. For example, IOM’s data only come from countries where IOM has a presence, which are primarily countries of origin, and the organization is constrained by issues related to the confidentiality of victim assistance. Finally, although the three organizations are trying to collaborate in the area of data collection and research, they are having difficulty in mobilizing the necessary resources for their efforts. Therefore, this fragmentary approach prevents the development of a comprehensive and accurate view of global trafficking. (See app. II for additional information about the different methodologies, analytical assumptions, data validation, and data sources used by the international organizations and the U.S. government.) The quality of existing country level data varies due to limited availability, reliability, and comparability. Table 3 summarizes the main limitations of trafficking data, identified in our review of literature on human trafficking. The availability of data is limited by several factors. Trafficking victims are a hidden population because trafficking is a clandestine activity, similar to illegal migration and labor exploitation. This limits the amount of data available on victims and makes it difficult to estimate the number of unreported victims. Trafficking victims are often in a precarious position and may be unwilling or unable to report to, or seek help from, relevant authorities. Moreover, HHS reported that victims live daily with inhumane treatment, physical and mental abuse, and threats to themselves or their families back home. Victims of human trafficking may fear or distrust the government and police because they are afraid of being deported or because they come from countries where law enforcement is corrupt and feared. In such circumstances, reporting to the police or seeking help elsewhere requires courage and knowledge of local conditions, which the victims simply might not have. In addition, some governments give low priority to human trafficking violations and do not systematically collect data on victims. In most countries where trafficking data are gathered, women and children are seen as victims of trafficking, and men are predominantly seen as migrant workers, reflecting a gender bias in existing information. Men are also perceived as victims of labor exploitation that may not be seen as a crime but rather as an issue for trade unions and labor regulators. Thus, data collection and applied research often miss the broader dimensions of trafficking for labor exploitation. For example, the demand for cheap labor, domestic service, slavery, and child labor have not been sufficiently investigated as factors affecting the scale of human trafficking. The reliability of existing data is also questionable. In developing countries, which are usually countries of origin, capacity for data collection and analysis is often inadequate. In countries of destination, human trafficking convictions are often based on victim testimony. Moreover, estimates of trafficking are extrapolated from samples of reported cases, which are not random. Therefore, it is difficult to determine how representative those cases are of the general population of all human trafficking victims and what biases have been introduced. Data quality is further constrained by limited data comparability. Countries and organizations define trafficking differently. A practice that is considered trafficking in one country may be considered culturally and historically acceptable in another country. For example, in West African countries, people, in particular children, commonly move within and across borders in search of work and are placed in homes as domestic servants or on farms and plantations as laborers. Due to economic deprivation and an abundant supply of children from poor families, a child may be sold by his or her parents based on promises for job training and good education or may be placed with a creditor as reimbursement. The incompatibility of definitions for data collection is exacerbated by the intermingling of trafficking, smuggling, and illegal migration in official statistics. Countries have used different definitions regarding the scope and means of trafficking; the activities involved, such as recruitment, harboring, transportation and receipt of victims; the purpose; the need for movement across borders; and the consent of victims. For example, there are discrepancies in the collection of data on sex trafficking. Under the TVPA, participation of children under the age of 18 in commercial sex is a severe form of trafficking. However, some countries define children as people under the age of 16 and, according to U.S. government officials, this difference has implications for how countries collect data on children engaged in commercial sex. Finally, data are often program and institution specific and focus on the needs of individual agencies. Estimates may be developed for the purpose of advocacy. For example, some NGOs record all victims based on the first contact made with them regardless of whether they subsequently meet the criteria for receiving assistance such as legal counsel, shelter, financial support, or support during a trial, while others record only those who receive assistance. Data are also collected for operational purposes within criminal justice systems, and individual authorities use their own definitions and classifications. There is significant discrepancy between the number of estimated victims and the number of observed victims, which include officially reported, certified, registered and assisted victims. For example, the U.S. government estimated that the number of people trafficked into the United States ranged from 14,500 to 17,500 in 2003. Despite concerted U.S. government efforts to locate and protect victims, the government certified fewer than 900 victims in the United States during the 4 ½ years between March 2001 and September 2005. The June 2006 Attorney General's Annual Report to Congress on U.S. Government Activities to Combat Trafficking in Persons for Fiscal Year 2005 indicates that the 14,500 to 17,500 figure may be overstated because it was an early attempt to quantify a hidden problem. The number of certified victims may not reflect the total number of victims identified. For example, some alien victims need not seek certification because they can remain in the United States through family connections. The Justice Department indicates that further research is under way to determine a more accurate figure based on more advanced methodologies and a more complete understanding of the nature of trafficking. Similarly, the U.S. government estimated that a total of 600,000 to 800,000 people were trafficked across transnational borders worldwide annually. Yet, since 1999, fewer than 8,000 victims in 26 countries have received IOM assistance. Organizations may also publish estimates that incorrectly characterize the data reported by others. For example, in a 2001 report a Cambodian nongovernmental organization states that there were 80,000 to 100,000 trafficked women and children nationwide. However, this statement is based on a report which discusses 80,000 to 100,000 sex workers in the country, who may or may not be trafficking victims. Moreover, the latter report uses two other sources that did not corroborate this estimate. Several factors could explain the differences between the numbers of observed and estimated victims, but it is unclear the extent to which any single factor accounts for the differences. For example, the 2005 Trafficking in Persons Report cited cases in which victims reported by law enforcement were deported before they reached an assistance agency. In addition, agencies may not make sufficient efforts in identifying and helping victims or may have constraints imposed by certain assistance requirements. Victims assisted by IOM missions are those willing to go back to their country of origin. However, if there are other opportunities available in the country of destination, such as receiving a residence permit, victims may not be willing to accept IOM assistance. In the United States, one requirement of receiving official certification is that victims of human trafficking must be willing to assist with the investigation and prosecution of trafficking cases. According to an HHS official, this requirement may work to limit the number of recorded victims. Given the weaknesses in data and methods, it also cannot be dismissed that the estimates may overstate the magnitude of human trafficking. The U.S. government has not yet established an effective mechanism for estimating the number of victims or for conducting ongoing analysis of trafficking related data that resides within various government agencies. The TVPA 2005, passed in January 2006, called on the President, through various agencies, to conduct research into the development of an effective mechanism for quantifying the number of victims of trafficking on a national, regional, and international basis. Since 2005, the U.S. government has funded a project to develop a transparent methodology for estimating the number of men, women, and children trafficked into the United States for purposes of sex or labor trafficking. To date, the modeling has been limited to 10 countries of origin—Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Mexico, Haiti, and Cuba—and one arrival point in the United States—the southwest border. The firm developing this methodology is in the early stages of this effort and plans to continue to refine and test its methodology. Thus, it is too early to assess this methodology. The U.S. government also recently funded an outside contractor to improve future global trafficking estimates. To date, the U.S. government has funded few projects to improve estimates of trafficking on a regional or international basis. In addition, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 established the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center to serve, among other responsibilities, as a clearinghouse for all relevant information and to convert it into tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence to combat trafficking in persons. The Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center collects trafficking information from U.S government agencies and sends this information to other agencies that have an interest in it for law enforcement purposes. Center officials stated that they receive and collate trafficking information from federal government agencies. However, officials stated that they do not systematically analyze the trafficking information they receive and lack the human and financial resources to do so. In addition, we identified eight entities within the federal government that possess some information related to domestic and international trafficking. The Justice Department alone has four different offices that possess domestic trafficking information. None of the federal agencies systematically shares their international data with the others, and no agency analyzes the existing data to help inform international program and resource allocation decisions. (See app. III for information on the type of trafficking data available within agencies.) Furthermore, based upon our analysis of agency data sets, we found that federal agencies do not have data collection programs that could share information or include common data fields. As a result, it is difficult to use existing agency trafficking data to compile a profile of trafficking victims. In previous work, we have reported that it is good practice for agencies to establish compatible policies, procedures, standards, and data systems to enable them to operate across agency boundaries. Although some information exists, agencies were unable to provide an account of the age, gender, type of exploitation suffered, and origin and destination of trafficking victims into the United States. Moreover, some agencies with law enforcement missions were generally unwilling to share demographic trafficking data with us and would release statistics for law enforcement purposes only. The U.S. National Central Bureau was able to extract limited profile information from its case management system. While the information on trafficking victims collected by U.S. agencies is fragmented, the database created by IOM allows for the development of a useful, in-depth profile of traffickers and their victims across 26 countries. Although IOM’s data are limited to countries where IOM provides direct assistance to trafficking victims, has a short history of about 7 years, and may not be easily generalizable, it is the only one of the four databases that contains data directly obtained from victims. Drawing from more than 7,000 cases, it includes information about the victims’ socioeconomic profile, movement, exploitation, abuse, and duration of trafficking. Moreover, the database tracks victims from the time they first requested IOM assistance, through their receipt of assistance, to their subsequent return home. Importantly, it also tracks whether victims were subsequently retrafficked. These factors provide information that could assist U.S. efforts to compile better data on trafficking victims. As shown in figure 2, the victims IOM assisted often were enticed by traffickers’ promise of a job, most believed they would be working in various legitimate professions, and were subjected to physical violence. In addition, based on cases with available data on the duration of the trafficking episode, the average duration of stay in the destination country before seeking help from IOM is more than 2 years. Most of the sexual exploitation victims worked 7 days a week and retained a small fraction of their earnings. Moreover, about 54 percent of the victims paid a debt to the recruiter, transporter and/or other exploiters, and about 52 percent knew they were sold to other traffickers at some stage of the trafficking process. The database also contains information about the recruiters’ and traffickers’ networks, nationality, and relationship to victims. It thus provides insights into the traffickers and the mechanisms traffickers used to identify and manipulate their victims. For example, in 77 percent of the cases, contact with the recruiter was initiated based on a personal relationship. Moreover, the correlation between the nationality of the recruiter and that of the victim was very high (0.92). Trafficking networks may have a complex organization, with the recruiter being only one part of the whole system. The organization may involve investors, transporters, corrupt public officials, informers, guides, debt collectors, and money launderers. The extent of information on victims and traffickers in the database improves the overall understanding of the broader dimensions of trafficking. While federal agencies have undertaken activities to combat trafficking in persons, the U.S. government has not developed a coordinated strategy to combat human trafficking abroad, as called for in a presidential directive. The U.S. government has established an interagency task force and working group on human trafficking, which have focused on complying with U.S. policy on prostitution and avoiding duplication of effort, but they have not focused on developing and implementing a systematic way for agencies to clearly delineate roles and responsibilities in relation to each other, and identify targets of greatest need and leverage overseas activities to achieve greater results. In addition, governmentwide task forces have not developed measurable goals and associated indicators to evaluate the overall effectiveness of efforts to combat trafficking abroad or outlined an evaluation plan to gauge results, making the U.S. government unable to determine the effectiveness of its efforts abroad or to adjust its assistance to better meet needs. Despite the mandate to evaluate progress, the Interagency Task Force has not developed a plan to evaluate overall U.S. government efforts to combat trafficking abroad. In TVPA 2000, Congress called upon the Interagency Task Force to measure and evaluate the progress of the United States and other countries in preventing trafficking, protecting and providing assistance to victims, and prosecuting traffickers. However, the Task Force has not developed an evaluation plan or established governmentwide performance measures against which the U.S. government can evaluate the overall impact of its international antitrafficking efforts. In previous work, we have reported that monitoring and evaluating efforts can help key decision makers within agencies, as well as clients and stakeholders, identify areas for improvement. Further, in its 2005 annual assessment of U.S. government activities to combat human trafficking, the Department of Justice recommended that the U.S. government begin measuring the impact of its antitrafficking activities. Although the project-level documentation that we reviewed from agencies, such as USAID and the Department of Labor, included measures to track activities on specific projects, officials stated that USAID’s agency-level aggregate indicators are intended as a way of communicating agency outputs, not as a means of evaluating the effectiveness of programs. In addition, according to the 2005 State Department Inspector General report, State’s Trafficking Office needs to better identify relevant, objective, and clear performance indicators to compare progress in combating trafficking from year to year. Officials from State’s Trafficking Office recognized the need to establish mechanisms to evaluate grant effectiveness. However, officials stated that the office lacks the personnel to monitor and evaluate programs in the field and that it relies on U.S. embassy personnel to assist in project monitoring. In early 2006, the Trafficking Office adopted a monitoring and evaluation tool to assist embassy personnel in monitoring its antitrafficking programs, but it is too soon to assess its impact. Our review of the Department of State documentation and discussions with agency officials found little evidence of the impact of various antitrafficking efforts. For example, the 2005 Trafficking in Persons Report asserts that legalized or tolerated prostitution nearly always increases the number of women and children trafficked into commercial sex slavery, but does not cite any supporting evidence. However, apart from a 2005 European Parliament sponsored study on the link between national legislation on prostitution and the trafficking of women and children, we found few studies that comprehensively addressed this issue. In addition, the State Inspector General report noted that some embassies and academics questioned the credentials of the organizations and findings of the research that the Trafficking Office funded. The Inspector General recommended that the Trafficking Office submit research proposals and reports to a rigorous peer review to improve oversight of research efforts. In addition, according to agency officials in Washington, D.C. and in the field, there is little or no evidence to indicate the extent to which different types of efforts—such as prosecuting traffickers, abolishing prostitution, increasing viable economic opportunities, or sheltering and reintegrating victims—impact the level of trafficking or the extent to which rescued victims are being retrafficked. As required by the TVPA, the Department of State issues an annual report that analyzes and ranks foreign governments’ compliance with minimum standards to eliminate trafficking in persons. This report has increased global awareness about trafficking in persons, encouraged action by some governments who failed to comply with the minimum standards, and raised the threat of sanctions against governments who did not make significant efforts to comply with these standards. The Department of State includes explanations of the rankings in the report, though they are not required under the TVPA. However, the report’s explanations for these ranking decisions are incomplete, and agencies do not consistently use the report to influence antitrafficking programs. Information about whether a country has a significant number of trafficking victims may be unavailable or unreliable, making the justification for some countries’ inclusion in the report debatable. Moreover, in justifying the tier rankings for these countries, State does not comprehensively describe foreign governments’ compliance with the standards, many of which are subjective. This lessens the report’s credibility and hampers its usefulness as a diplomatic tool. In addition, incomplete country narratives reduce the report’s utility as a guide to help focus U.S. government resources on antitrafficking programming priorities. Each year since 2001, State has published the congressionally mandated Trafficking in Persons Report, ranking countries into a category, or tier, based on the Secretary of State’s assessment of foreign governments’ compliance with four minimum standards for eliminating human trafficking, as established in the TVPA. These standards reflect the U.S. government’s antitrafficking strategy of prosecuting traffickers, protecting victims, and preventing trafficking. The first three standards deal with countries’ efforts to prohibit severe forms of trafficking and prescribe penalties for trafficking crimes, while the fourth standard relates to government efforts to eliminate trafficking. The TVPA instructed the Secretary of State to place countries that are origin, transit, or destination countries for a significant number of victims of severe forms of trafficking in one of three tiers. In 2003, State added a fourth category, the tier 2 watch list, consisting of tier 2 countries that require special scrutiny in the coming year (see fig. 3). Governments of countries placed in tier 3 may be subject to sanctions by the United States. In addition to the rankings, each Trafficking in Persons Report contains country narratives intended to provide the basis for each country’s tier placement. Although the narratives are not required by the TVPA, they state the scope and nature of the trafficking problem, explain the reasons for the country’s inclusion in the report, and describe the government’s efforts to combat trafficking and comply with the minimum standards contained in U.S. legislation. For countries placed in the lowest two tiers, State develops country action plans to help guide governments in improving their antitrafficking efforts. The Trafficking in Persons Report has raised global awareness about human trafficking and spurred some governments that had failed to comply with the minimum standards to adopt antitrafficking measures. According to U.S. government and international organization officials and representatives of trafficking victim advocacy groups, this is due to the combination of a public assessment of foreign governments’ antitrafficking efforts and potential economic consequences for those that fail to meet minimum standards and do not make an effort to do so. U.S. government officials cited a number of cases in which foreign governments improved their antitrafficking efforts in response to their tier placements. For example, State and USAID officials cited the case of Jamaica, a source country for child trafficking into the sex trade, which was placed on tier 3 in the 2005 report. The country narrative noted deficiencies in Jamaica’s antitrafficking measures and reported that the government was not making significant efforts to comply with the minimum standards. Jamaica failed to investigate, prosecute, or convict any traffickers during the previous year, despite the passage of a law to protect minors. In response, the Jamaican government created an antitrafficking unit within its police force and conducted raids that led to nine trafficking-related arrests. In addition, the 2004 report placed Japan on the tier 2 watch list, and the country narrative noted that Japan is a destination country for large numbers of foreign women and children who are trafficked for sexual exploitation. It highlighted weaknesses in Japan’s law enforcement efforts. For example, the lack of scrutiny of Japan’s entertainer visas reportedly allowed traffickers to use them to bring victims into the country. The country narrative also mentioned Japan’s failure to comply with minimum standards for protecting victims, deporting foreign trafficking victims as undocumented aliens who had committed a crime by entering the country illegally. According to State officials and the 2005 report, the Japanese government responded to the report’s criticisms by tightening the issuance of entertainer visas and ceasing the criminal treatment of trafficking victims. Governments of countries placed on tier 3 that do not implement the recommendations in the country action plan may be subject to sanctions or other penalties. The United States, for example, may oppose assistance for the country from international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund. Since 2003, full or partial sanctions have been applied to eight countries, most of which were already under sanctions from the United States. According to the presidential directive and the 2005 Trafficking in Persons Report, the annual report is intended as a tool to help the United States engage foreign governments in fighting human trafficking. According to U.S. government officials, the report’s effectiveness as a diplomatic tool for discussing human trafficking with foreign governments depends on its credibility. The country narratives used as the basis for ranking decisions should provide clear and comprehensive assessments of foreign governments’ antitrafficking efforts and demonstrate consistent application of the standards. Our analysis of the 2005 report found limitations in the country narratives, and State officials in the Regional Bureaus expressed concerns that these limitations detract from the report’s credibility and usefulness. These include some countries’ inclusion in the report based on unreliable data, incomplete explanations of compliance with the minimum standards by some of the highest-ranked countries, and country narratives that did not clearly indicate how governments complied with certain standards and criteria. We also found criticisms of the process for resolving disputes about country inclusion and tier rankings. The TVPA requires State to rank the antitrafficking efforts of governments of countries that are sources, transit points, or destinations for a “significant number” of victims of severe forms of trafficking. Since 2001, State has used a threshold of 100 victims to determine whether or not to include a country in the Trafficking in Persons Report. However, as discussed earlier in this report, reliable estimates of the number of trafficking victims are generally not available. For example, according to State officials, one country was included in the report because a junior political officer stated that at least 300 trafficking victims were in the country and that the government’s efforts to combat trafficking should be assessed. According to these officials, this statement was based on the political officer’s informal survey of brothels in that country. Since then, other embassy officials, including the ambassador, have argued that the country does not have a significant number of victims, but it continues to appear in the report. In addition, State officials cited Estonia as a country that was included in the report based on an IOM official’s informal estimate of more than 100 victims. State officials said that a subsequent embassy-funded study of trafficking in Estonia found that the country had around 100 confirmed victims in a 4-year period, but internal discussions have not led to the removal of Estonia from the Trafficking in Persons Report. However, the country narrative for Estonia in the 2005 report was modified from previous years to state that Estonia is a source and transit country for a “small number” of trafficking victims. Our review of country narratives in the 2005 report revealed some cases in which it was not clear how the situations used to justify the country’s inclusion in the report constituted severe forms of trafficking under U.S. law. For example, the country narratives for Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and Singapore described cases in which human smugglers abandoned people, domestic workers were abused by their employers, and foreign women engaged in prostitution. The narratives either did not clearly establish whether the situation involved victims of severe forms of trafficking or failed to provide enough information about the magnitude of the problem to convey the sense that the number of victims had reached 100 people. According to State officials, inclusion of human rights abuses or labor issues in the description of foreign countries’ human trafficking problem can damage the report’s credibility with foreign governments. Some State officials have suggested abandoning the threshold of 100 victims and including all countries in the report. Our analysis of the 2005 report found that many narratives did not clearly state whether and how the government met the minimum standard regarding stringency of punishment for severe forms of trafficking (see app. I for a description of the methodology used to analyze the 2005 report). This standard requires that prescribed penalties for severe forms of trafficking be sufficiently stringent to deter such trafficking and that they reflect the heinous nature of the offense. The Trafficking Office has not defined a threshold for what constitutes “sufficiently stringent” punishment. Our analysis showed that in over one-third of cases, the 2005 report’s country narratives did not characterize the prescribed penalties as sufficiently stringent. Moreover, in many cases the narratives do not state whether or not the government met this minimum standard. State officials agreed that this subjectivity makes it difficult for reports staff and foreign governments to know what constitutes compliance, negatively affecting the report’s credibility and utility as a diplomatic tool. Our analysis of the 2005 report found that many country narratives do not provide a comprehensive assessment of foreign governments’ compliance with the minimum standards, resulting in incomplete explanations for tier placements. Although the 2005 report discusses the importance of imposing strict penalties on traffickers, we found that only 2 of the 24 tier 1 country narratives clearly explained compliance with the second minimum standard established in the TVPA, which, among other things, calls for governments to prescribe punishment for sex trafficking that is commensurate with that for grave crimes such as forcible sexual assault. The narratives for 17 (71 percent) of the tier 1 countries provided information on penalties for sex trafficking but did not compare these with the governments’ penalties for other grave crimes. Five (21 percent) tier 1 countries did not mention whether the governments complied with this standard at all. Our analysis of the tier 1 country narratives in the 2005 report also showed that, while most explained how these governments fully met the core criteria for the fourth minimum standard, related to government efforts to eliminate severe forms of trafficking, some did not. A senior official at the Trafficking Office confirmed this finding. We found that country narratives for 11 (46 percent) of the 24 tier 1 countries raised concerns about the governments’ compliance with key parts of core criteria used to determine if the government is making a serious and sustained effort to eliminate severe forms of trafficking. However, the narratives failed to explain whether and how the governments’ success in meeting the other core criteria outweighed these deficiencies and justified their placement in tier 1. For example, the 2005 report described France, a tier 1 country, as a destination for thousands of trafficked women and children. Although the report states that the French government fully complied with the minimum standards, our analysis of the narrative found that the first three standards were not mentioned. Furthermore, the narrative also discussed the French government’s failure to comply with the criterion on protecting trafficking victims, one of the key objectives of U.S. antitrafficking legislation. The narrative discusses a French law, which harmed trafficking victims by arresting, jailing, and fining them. Senior officials at the Trafficking Office are concerned about France’s lack of compliance with the victim protection criterion. The narrative, however, did not balance the discussion of these deficiencies by explaining how the government’s compliance with the other core criteria allowed it to meet the fourth minimum standard and thus be placed in tier 1. Similarly, the country narratives for two tier 1 countries stated that the governments were not taking steps to combat official corruption, which the 2004 report highlights as a major impediment to antitrafficking efforts. For example, the narrative for Nepal, a source country for women and children trafficked to India and the Middle East, states that the government fully complied with the minimum standards. However, the narrative noted that the government has not taken action against immigration officials, police and judges suspected of benefiting from trafficking-related graft and corruption, and it did not explain how the deficiency in this core criteria was outweighed by Nepal’s efforts with other core criteria. According to State officials, there are a considerable number of disagreements within State about the initial tier placements proposed by the Trafficking Office. These disagreements are not surprising, given that the Trafficking Office focuses exclusively on antitrafficking efforts while the Regional Bureaus manage bilateral relations, which comprise a wide range of issues. However, it is important that the process for resolving these conflicts be credible. Some disagreements on tier rankings are resolved in meetings between the Trafficking Office and the Deputy Assistant Secretaries of the Regional Bureaus, but most are elevated to the undersecretary level. A few disagreements are even referred to the Secretary of State for resolution. According to State officials, some disputes are worked out by clarifying misunderstandings or providing additional information. Although Trafficking Office staff said that these discussions are constructive, staff in State’s Regional Bureaus said that many disagreements over tier rankings are resolved by a process of “horsetrading,” whereby the Trafficking Office agrees to raise some countries’ tier rankings in exchange for lowering others. In these cases, political considerations may take precedence over a neutral assessment of foreign governments’ compliance with minimum standards to combat trafficking. Senior officials at the Trafficking Office acknowledged that political considerations sometimes come into play when making the tier ranking decisions. The Trafficking Office’s implementation plan and the 2005 Trafficking in Persons Report states that the report should be used as a guide to target resources to prosecution, protection, and prevention programs. However, we found that U.S. government agencies do not systematically link the programs they fund to combat trafficking overseas with the tier rankings or the deficiencies that are identified in the report’s country narratives. For example, U.S. agencies did not use the report when they selected high-priority countries to participate in the 2-year $50 million Presidential Initiative to Combat Trafficking in Persons. Moreover, we found that many of the country narratives describing deficiencies in foreign governments’ antitrafficking efforts were incomplete, making it difficult to use them to guide programming. Officials from State’s Trafficking Office acknowledged that the management processes and staff responsible for producing the report are not linked with those managing overseas assistance programs. State’s Inspector General reported in November 2005 that the lack of synchronization between the Trafficking Office’s grants cycle (January and February) and reporting cycle (June) makes it difficult to address the shortcomings identified in the report and the countries’ programming needs. In addition, most of the State requests for grant proposals that we reviewed were generic in scope and were not tailored to address a specific problem or priority. For example, one request for proposal was directed broadly at prevention and protection programs in Africa, the Caribbean, and Latin America. In addition, officials from State’s regional bureaus said that most of their requests for grant proposals are sent to all the embassies in their region and are not targeted to those countries on lower tiers. However, officials from one regional bureau stated that they sent a request for grant proposals dealing with law enforcement issues only to those countries on the tier 2 watch list to ensure the programs were targeted where they were most needed. The presidential directive stated that agencies are to develop a consensus on the highest priority countries to receive antitrafficking assistance through interagency consultation and in consultation with U.S. missions overseas. The Trafficking Office’s implementation plan called for using the annual Trafficking in Persons Report as a guide to target assistance, with priority to countries ranked in the lowest tiers and assistance to only those tier 1 and 2 countries with limited resources and whose governments showed a clear commitment to combat trafficking. In fiscal year 2005, the U.S. government obligated about $96 million to support more than 265 international antitrafficking programs in about 100 countries. Only one-fourth of this money went to countries ranked in the lowest two tiers (see fig. 4). Through the Senior Policy Operating Group, in January 2004 agencies selected eight countries to target their efforts for the presidential initiative to combat trafficking in persons; however, documentation of the decision-making process does not mention use of the Trafficking in Persons Report’s tier rankings or country narratives to affect this selection. Officials from the Trafficking Office and the documents we reviewed stated that the Group selected countries based on several factors, including anticipated host government commitment and the ability to start implementation in a short time frame. The eight countries selected were ranked in tier 2 in the 2003 Trafficking in Persons Report, suggesting that their governments showed some commitment to combating trafficking by making efforts to comply with the minimum standards and criteria outlined in the TVPA. However, it was not clear how the Group applied the criteria in selecting the countries. For example, host government commitment to combat trafficking did not necessarily translate into a willingness to receive U.S. assistance. The Department of State cables indicate that the governments in Brazil and India did not support U.S. efforts to fund antitrafficking programs under the presidential initiative. In addition, despite an emphasis on selecting countries in which the United States could start implementation in a short time frame, agreements necessary to conduct law enforcement projects were not in place in Brazil and Mexico, causing these initiatives to be delayed. Also, according to an agency official and documents we reviewed, Tanzania was included because a senior official had just traveled there and thought trafficking might be a problem. The country narratives’ incomplete assessments of deficiencies in foreign governments’ efforts to combat trafficking diminish the Trafficking in Persons Report’s utility as a programming guide. Our analysis of the 2005 report found that many country narratives failed to include information on the governments’ compliance with some standards and core criteria, making it difficult for U.S. government officials to use the report as a programming guide. For example, all narratives for countries in the lowest two tiers contained some discussion of government efforts to protect trafficking victims. However, we found that 80 percent failed to mention key aspects of the victim protection criterion, including whether victims were encouraged to cooperate with law enforcement, whether the government provided legal alternatives to deportation, and whether victims were protected from inappropriate treatment as criminals (see fig. 5). In addition, 92 percent of country narratives for tier 2 countries, which receive the largest share of U.S. government antitrafficking funds, did not mention compliance with certain standards and criteria. The United States has placed trafficking on the international agenda and has spurred governments and organizations into action through its funding of international programs and the publication of the annual Trafficking in Persons Report. Additionally, the development of a victim-centered approach based upon prevention, protection, and prosecution programs has provided an operational framework for both governments and practitioners in the field. However, more than 5 years since the passage of the TVPA, the U.S. government lacks fundamental information on the nature and extent of the global trafficking problem and an overall strategy for agencies to target their programs and resources abroad. As the United States and other countries work to identify victims of trafficking, the scope of the global trafficking problem remains unknown in terms of overall numbers within countries of origin; victims’ gender, age, and type of exploitation suffered; and the profile and methods of the perpetrators. The United States has provided about $375 million in antitrafficking assistance since 2001 for projects in about 100 countries. However, the lack of an overall government strategy which ties together and leverages the program expertise and resources of agencies with the knowledge of victims’ identity and location, raises questions about whether antitrafficking activities are targeted where they are most needed. Furthermore, little evaluation research has been conducted to determine which international antitrafficking activities are working or how best to tailor them to meet specific needs. The fight against human trafficking will almost certainly require years of effort and the continued monitoring of governments’ actions. To enhance its usefulness as a diplomatic tool, the narratives and country rankings in the annual Trafficking in Persons Report must be viewed as credible by governments and informed human rights and country observers. However, the report does not comprehensively or clearly describe how decisions about tier rankings were reached. Moreover, problems identified in the report provide the means to better identify program needs and allocate resources, but agencies have not linked their activities to identified deficiencies. To improve efforts to combat trafficking in persons abroad, we recommend that the Secretary of State, in her capacity as Chair of the Interagency Task Force to Monitor and Combat Trafficking, consider the following actions: 1. Work closely with relevant agencies as they implement U.S. law calling for research into the creation of an effective mechanism to develop a global estimate of trafficking. This could include assigning a trafficking data and research unit to serve as an interagency focal point charged with developing an overall research strategy, collecting and analyzing data, and directing research. 2. In conjunction with relevant agencies, develop and implement a strategic approach that would delineate agency roles and responsibilities in relation to each other, strengthen mechanisms for integrating activities, and determine priorities, measurable goals, time frames, performance measures, and a methodology to gauge results. 3. To improve the credibility of State’s annual report on trafficking in persons, we recommend that the Secretary of State ensure that the report clearly documents the rationale and support for tier rankings and improve the report’s usefulness for programming by making the narratives more comprehensive. We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Secretaries of State, Justice, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, and Labor; the Administrator of USAID; the U.S. government agency that prepares the trafficking estimate; and cognizant officials at the ILO, IOM, and UNODC, or their designees. We received written comments from State, which are reprinted in appendix V along with our responses to specific points. State generally agreed with our recommendations. State agreed with our first recommendation to work closely with relevant agencies as they implement U.S. law calling for research into the creation of an effective mechanism to develop a global estimate of trafficking and provided detailed suggestions for areas of future research that are consistent with our findings. Regarding our second recommendation that the Secretary of State develop and implement a strategic approach, State recognized the need for better performance measures and enhanced interagency coordination while also stating that roles and responsibilities have been established. In response, we clarified our recommendation to state that agencies’ roles and responsibilities should be delineated in relation to each other, consistent with our report findings. In response to our third recommendation, State said that while its annual Trafficking in Persons Report can improve, it has become a much richer, more useful product since first published in 2001. State also said our report includes some useful recommendations that the department will explore integrating with ongoing efforts in light of available resources. In addition, State commented that its 2006 Trafficking in Persons Report offers a greater and more consistent examination of the minimum standards as they apply to each country. We conducted a selective review of 26 tier 1 country narratives in the 2006 report and found that many of the concerns we cited in our report remain. For example, none of the tier 1 country narratives clearly explained whether or not the government complied with the second minimum standard established in the TVPA, which, among other things, calls for governments to prescribe punishment for sex trafficking that is commensurate with that for grave crimes such as forcible sexual assault. In oral comments, the U.S. government agency that prepares the trafficking estimate fundamentally concurs with our characterization of the U.S. global estimate of trafficking flows. The agency stated that it has sought to improve upon the 2004 estimate’s accuracy and utility through working with an outside contractor with the intention of thoroughly documenting and vetting a methodology, as well as preparing detailed recommendations for improving future estimates. According to the agency, many of this contractor’s initial recommendations have been in-line with those delineated in our report. Despite these efforts and the inherent difficulty of preparing estimates of hidden populations, the agency agreed with our overall findings—particularly with the idea that housing the estimate in the intelligence community makes it opaque and inaccessible. The agency stated that it believes that other U.S. government agencies are best positioned to produce the global trafficking estimate in the future, because they have access to the same unclassified data, would be better able to vet the methodology, and could provide additional information to allow for a closer link between international and domestic human trafficking flow estimates. State, Justice, Labor, USAID, the U.S. government agency that prepared the trafficking estimate, and the ILO, IOM, and UNODC submitted technical comments which we have incorporated into this report as appropriate. As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Secretaries of State, Justice, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, and Labor; the Administrator of USAID; the U.S. government agency that prepares the trafficking estimate; ILO; IOM; and UNODC; and interested congressional committees. Copies of this report will also be made available to other interested parties on request. In addition, this report will be made available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-9601. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI. Our objectives were to examine (1) estimates of the extent of global trafficking in persons, (2) the U.S. government’s strategy to combat trafficking in persons abroad, and (3) the Department of State’s (State) process for evaluating foreign governments’ antitrafficking efforts. To examine estimates of the extent of global human trafficking, we conducted an analysis of the global trafficking databases developed and maintained by the U.S. government, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the International Labor Organization (ILO), and the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). We met with officials from each organization, determined the reliability of their global trafficking data, reviewed documents and assessed their methodologies for collecting and analyzing human trafficking data, and analyzed the data collected by IOM. We examined ILO, UNODC, and IOM reports. We also reviewed the existing relevant literature on data and methodologies used in global human trafficking research. We collected reports, journal articles, conference presentations, U.S. government sponsored studies, and books that discuss human trafficking. We read and analyzed these documents and used them to identify issues that affect the quality of data on trafficking. We grouped these issues into three major categories: availability, reliability, and comparability. To examine the U.S. government’s strategy for combating human trafficking abroad, we reviewed U.S. laws and presidential directives describing actions that various U.S. government entities were to undertake in combating trafficking. These include the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) of 2000 and its reauthorizations in 2003 and 2005, Executive Order 13257, and National Security Presidential Directive 22. We also analyzed documents and interviewed officials from the Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS), Homeland Security (DHS), Justice, Labor, State, and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Documents we reviewed include each agency’s plan to implement the presidential directive, agency and project-level monitoring and evaluation documents, project proposals, interagency coordination guidance, the Bureau Performance Plan from State’s Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, USAID’s strategy to combat trafficking in persons, as well as regional and country-level strategic framework documents. To examine State’s process for evaluating foreign governments’ antitrafficking efforts, we reviewed 122 country narratives in the 2005 Trafficking in Persons Report. We examined the narratives for all 66 countries in tier 1, tier 2 watch list, and tier 3. For the 77 narratives in tier 2, we reviewed all of the narratives for the 35 countries whose tiers had changed from the previous year’s report. For the remaining 42 country narratives, we drew a random probability sample of 21 countries. With this probability sample, each narrative in the 2005 report had a nonzero probability of being included and that probability could be computed for any member. Each sample element was subsequently weighted in the analysis to account statistically for all the narratives in the 2005 report, including those not selected. Because we followed a probability procedure based on a random selection of tier 2 countries, our sample is only one of a large number of samples that we might have drawn. Since each sample could have provided different estimates, we express our confidence in the precision of our particular sample’s results as a 95 percent confidence interval (e.g., plus or minus 5 percentage points). This is the interval that would contain the actual population value for 95 percent of the samples we could have drawn. As a result, we are 95 percent confident that each of the intervals in this report will include the true values in the study population. All percentage estimates from the narrative review have margins of error of plus or minus 7 percentage points or less, unless otherwise noted. In addition, we systematically compared the country narratives describing these governments’ antitrafficking efforts with the minimum standards and five core criteria in the legislation and determined whether or not the country narrative mentioned each standard or criteria. If the country narrative did not mention a standard or criteria, we coded that as “not mentioned.” If the country narrative did mention a standard or criteria, we determined whether the narrative showed that the government complied or did not comply with the standard or criteria. If we determined that the narrative showed that the government complied with the standard or criteria, we coded that as “yes.” If we determined that the narrative showed that the government did not comply with the standard or criteria, we coded that as “no.” In some cases, the narrative mentioned a standard or criteria, but we could not determine conclusively whether or not the narrative demonstrated the government’s compliance. We coded those cases as “not clear.” Finally, elements of some criteria were not applicable to certain countries. For example, if the report described a country as a source of trafficking victims rather than as a destination for victims, the criterion regarding provision of victims with legal alternatives to deportation would not apply. We coded these cases as “not applicable.” We then tallied the number of responses in each category. Finally, to ensure analytical validity and reliability, our analysis involved multiple phases of checking and review of analytical procedures, categories, and results. Two GAO analysts reviewed a selection of country narratives, independently coded them, and agreed on the basis for the coding decisions. Next, one GAO analyst performed the coding for the remaining country narratives. A second GAO analyst reviewed a number of these coding decisions and both analysts discussed them. Finally, a third GAO analyst performed a review of all coding decisions and tabulations. In addition, to ensure the reliability of the funding data used, we reviewed the information collected by the State Department on each agency’s funding obligations. We then checked with each individual agency to verify that the amounts State reported were correct. We conducted our review from September 2005 to May 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. This appendix describes the data sources, data validation, methodology, and key assumptions used by the U.S. government, ILO, UNODC, and IOM to collect data on and/or estimate the extent of human trafficking as well as the limitations of these databases. (See tables 4 and 5.) This appendix describes the data on human trafficking maintained by eight U.S. government entities. (See table 6.) The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of State’s letter, dated June 30, 2006. 1. State agreed that more research would help in the fight against human trafficking. State said that its Trafficking in Persons office (G/TIP) continues to pursue better estimates of the scope of trafficking; that the Senior Policy Operating Group (the Group) has established a subcommittee on trafficking research to, among other things, ensure regular interagency communication on research and close the most important data gaps; that G/TIP plans to set aside a substantial portion of its program budget for trafficking research; and that G/TIP funds IOM’s database. We recognize two ongoing projects to develop better estimates of trafficking and note that it is too early to assess the results of these projects. The Group subcommittee began meeting within the past year and, at the time of our review, had not established research priorities. During our review, G/TIP staff expressed concern about the limited amount of funding available for research, including continued funding for IOM’s database, which G/TIP partially funds. 2. State said that a better global estimate of the number of trafficking victims should not be the primary focus of additional research initiatives. State said a more valuable approach would be information on the comparative severity of trafficking in particular regions, countries, or localities; on the methods used by traffickers; and the effectiveness of antitrafficking programs. We believe our recommendation is consistent with State’s comments. We agree that additional research on these areas is valuable as discussed in the report. We report that reliable and comparable country data do not exist. We also report that U.S. agencies collect information on traffickers and their victims but do not share their information or analyze the information to identify trends and compile a profile of victims. We also describe the value of IOM’s database in providing information on traffickers’ routes and nationalities and the mechanisms they use to identify and manipulate their victims. We also agree that more information on the effectiveness of antitrafficking programs is needed, and we note that little or no evidence is currently available to indicate the extent to which different types of efforts impact the level of trafficking. Our recommendation calls upon the Secretary of State, in her capacity as Chair of the Interagency Task Force to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, to consider assigning a trafficking data and research unit but does not call for setting up a new unit as State’s comments suggest. 3. State agreed with the need for better performance measures, said that the Group is looking at how to reconcile the different agency grants processes so as to achieve an earlier exchange of information, and said that State will address enhanced interagency coordination in its upcoming G/TIP office strategy. State said that roles and responsibilities of government agencies in combating trafficking in persons have been established. We have clarified our recommendation to state that agencies’ roles and responsibilities should be delineated in relation to each other, consistent with our report findings. State also said that the Group creates an active forum where interagency representatives work together to identify strengths and weaknesses of of the Group’s the U.S. approach to combat trafficking in real time. State also said that the Attorney General’s annual report and several of the Group’s subcommittees focus on improving efforts to combat trafficking in persons. We reported findings from the Attorney General’s report. We also reported that the Group, through the work of its various subcommittees, served as a forum for agency officials to discuss trafficking policy and programs. However, based on information from the other Group members, we believe that our report remains accurate in also stating that the Group has not developed or implemented a systematic way for agencies to identify priorities and target efforts abroad to complement each others’ activities to achieve greater results than if the agencies were acting alone. 4. The Department of State agrees with our finding that its annual Trafficking in Persons Report could provide more comprehensive and clearer explanations for the tier ranking decisions. The Department of State said that the 2006 report offers a greater and more consistent examination of the minimum standards as they apply to each country. We conducted a selective review of 26 tier 1 country narratives in the 2006 report and found that many of the concerns we cited in our report remain. For example, none of the tier 1 country narratives clearly explained how the government complied with the second minimum standard established in the TVPA, which, among other things, calls for governments to prescribe punishment for sex trafficking involving force, fraud, or coercion that is commensurate with that for grave crimes such as forcible sexual assault. Also, as in the 2005 report, our review found that some tier 1 country narratives in the 2006 report described governments’ failure to comply with certain core criteria, but the narratives did not explain how the governments’ success in meeting the other core criteria outweighed these deficiencies and justified their placement in tier 1. We acknowledge in our report that the Department of State is not legislatively mandated to include country narratives in the annual Trafficking in Persons Report. However, the 2006 Trafficking in Persons Report and reports from previous years characterize the country narratives as “an assessment of the government’s compliance with the minimum standards … as laid out in the TVPA of 2000, as amended.” According to the report, the narratives are also intended to explain the basis for the tier ranking decisions. 5. State said that under G/TIP’s current guidelines to keep narratives short, readable, and focused on deficiencies, the Trafficking in Persons Report does not provide (and the law does not require) an exhaustive examination of compliance with all of the minimum standards’ criteria. According to State, such an approach would create lengthy country narratives that would lose their readability, effectiveness, and policy relevance and would significantly increase the size of the report. As described in our report, we did not assess whether the 2005 report’s country narratives considered all 10 criteria for the fourth minimum standard, and we do not criticize the Department of State for failing to provide an exhaustive examination of governments’ compliance with all 10 of these criteria. Instead, our analysis focused on the four minimum standards required by the TVPA; and for the fourth standard, we looked only at whether the narratives explained governments’ compliance with the five core criteria identified by the Trafficking Office. We believe these issues can be discussed while maintaining a concise reporting format. 6. State said the TVPA requires the Trafficking in Persons Report to include countries with a “significant number of victims of severe forms of trafficking.” As a matter of policy the minimum “significant number of victims” has been defined as 100. As discussed in our report, our interviews with State officials as well as our review of the 2005 report’s country narratives indicated that some countries’ inclusion in the report was questionable. State acknowledges that many countries have not analyzed their crime statistics through the prism of trafficking in persons, making the available data unreliable. 7. State said the law does not clearly define what constitutes a sufficient sentence to deter, or that adequately reflects the heinous nature of the offense. The department has defined “sufficiently stringent” punishment to mean time in jail, preferably at least several years in jail. We recognize the subjectivity of the third minimum standard in our report. Even though some narratives indicate that countries prescribe jail time, State’s report does not explicitly state the department’s definition that sufficiently stringent means some jail time nor did some of the narratives state that the punishment was sufficiently stringent. Thus, it is unclear how the government complied with this minimum standard. Cheryl Goodman, Assistant Director; Suzanne Dove; Christina Werth; Gergana Danailova-Trainor; Bruce Kutnick; Barbara Stolz; and Patrick Dickriede made key contributions to this report. In addition, Lynn Cothern, Martin de Alteriis, Etana Finkler, and Mary Moutsos provided technical or legal assistance.

Summary: Human trafficking is a worldwide form of exploitation in which men, women, and children are bought, sold, and held against their will in involuntary servitude. In addition to the tremendous personal damage suffered by individual trafficking victims, this global crime has broad societal repercussions, such as fueling criminal networks and imposing public health costs. In 2000, Congress enacted the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) to combat trafficking and reauthorized this act twice. This report reviews U.S. international antitrafficking efforts by examining (1) estimates of the extent of global trafficking, (2) the U.S. government's strategy for combating the problem abroad, and (3) the Department of State's process for evaluating foreign governments' antitrafficking efforts. The U.S. government estimates that 600,000 to 800,000 persons are trafficked across international borders annually. However, such estimates of global human trafficking are questionable. The accuracy of the estimates is in doubt because of methodological weaknesses, gaps in data, and numerical discrepancies. For example, the U.S. government's estimate was developed by one person who did not document all his work, so the estimate may not be replicable, casting doubt on its reliability. Moreover, country data are not available, reliable, or comparable. There is also a considerable discrepancy between the numbers of observed and estimated victims of human trafficking. The U.S. government has not yet established an effective mechanism for estimating the number of victims or for conducting ongoing analysis of trafficking related data that resides within government entities. While federal agencies have undertaken antitrafficking activities, the U.S. government has not developed a coordinated strategy for combating trafficking abroad or developed a way to gauge results and target its overall assistance. The U.S. government has established coordination mechanisms, but they do not include a systematic way for agencies to clearly delineate roles and responsibilities in relation to each other, identify needs, or leverage activities to achieve greater results. Further, the U.S. government has not established performance measures or conducted evaluations to gauge the overall impact of antitrafficking programs abroad, thus preventing the U.S. government from determining the effectiveness of its efforts or adjusting its assistance to better meet needs. The Department of State assesses foreign governments' compliance with minimum standards to eliminate trafficking in persons; but the explanations for ranking decisions in its annual Trafficking in Persons Report are incomplete, and the report is not used consistently to develop antitrafficking programs. It has increased global awareness, encouraged government action, and raised the risk of sanctions against governments who did not make significant efforts to comply with the standards. However, State does not comprehensively describe compliance with the standards, lessening the report's credibility and usefulness as a diplomatic tool. Further, incomplete country narratives reduce the report's utility as a guide to help focus U.S. government resources on antitrafficking programming priorities.