The Convention is one of a number of cooperative efforts by the international community to improve nuclear safety worldwide and is meant to complement these other efforts. For example, as we previou sly reported, the United States and 20 other countries and internationa organizations contributed $1.9 billion to improve nuclear safety in countries operating Soviet-designed nuclear reactors. The United States alone has spent over $770 million since the Chernobyl accident on nuclear safety assistance to Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and several other countries through DOE and NRC programs. According to an agency official, DOE’s nuclear safety assistance programs have focused on physical safety enhancements to Soviet-designed reactors, while NRC has worked to increase the capacity and stature of recipient countries’ regulatory bodies to ensure the continuing operational safety of such reactors. In addition, a separate fund was established to help stabilize the damaged reactor at Chernobyl by constructing a new containment structure. As we reported, the estimated cost of this effort was $1.2 billion as of 2007, of which the United States pledged $203 million. Since 1991 the EU has spent over $1.9 billion on international nuclear safety assistance. See appendix II for more information about U.S. and EU expenditures to promote international nuclear safety. These expenditures are not used to support the implementation of the Convention. Matters pertaining to U.S. financial support to the Convention are contained on page 28 of this report. In addition to the Convention, other multilateral organizations—t Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), the Western European Nuclear Regulators’ Association (WENRA), the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG), and the EU—are making efforts to advance the safety of civilian nuclear power. All member or obse rver countries of the NEA, WENRA, ENSREG, and the EU are also partie the Convention. The NEA, for example, has created several specialized committees to facilitate exchanges of technical information and to organize joint research projects to improve national safety practices. WENRA works to develop common approaches to nuclear safety among the chief nuclear regulators in Europe. ENSREG, among other things, aims to maintain and continuously improve the safety of nuclear installations in the EU. In June 2009, the EU adopted a directive creating a framework f or (1) maintaining and promoting the continuous improvement of nuclear safety and its regulation and (2) ensuring that EU member states prov high level of nuclear safety to protect workers and the public against radiation from nuclear installations. This framework is based in par IAEA safety documents and the obligations of the Convention. EU members are required to incorporate legislation by June 2011. the directive into their national Other conventions have been established to advance international nuclear safety and are administered by IAEA’s Department of Safety and Security. Two “emergency conventions” obligate parties to provide early notification of a nuclear accident and to render assistance in the event of such an accident or a radiological emergency, and two other conventions waste and to obligate parties to safely manage spent fuel and radioactive take effective action to physically protect nuclear material. Nearly all parties responding to our survey reported that the Convention has been very useful or somewhat useful in helping to strengthen nuclear safety both in their country and worldwide. In all, these parties operate 404—or more than 92 percent—of the world’s 437 operating civilian nuclear power reactors. In addition, we also interviewed representatives from IAEA member states, nuclear regulatory organizations, and the EU (17 in all) who expressed similar views about the Convention. Survey respondents and parties we interviewed identified several Convention obligations as having helped strengthen the safety of civilian nuclear power programs. The obligations cited most frequently were (1) establishing an effective legislative and regulatory framework (laws and regulations) and a strong, effective, and independent nuclear regulatory body and (2) preparing a national report every 3 years that describes the measures the country has taken to achieve the Convention’s safety goals. In addition, some of the 17 parties we interviewed stated that the Convention has contributed to and promoted the independence and effectiveness of their country’s nuclear regulatory bodies. For example, an Austrian nuclear regulator told us he thought that this promotion of effective regulatory capacity is one of the Convention’s greatest contributions to international nuclear safety. Moreover, representatives of China and Pakistan told us that the Convention was influential in leading their countries to increase the independence and effectiveness of their nuclear regulators. NRC officials expressed a similar view, noting that parties to the Convention have taken many steps to develop more effective laws and regulations and increase the capacities and independence of their nuclear regulators. The requirement to prepare a national report describing the steps parties have taken to meet the Convention’s nuclear safety obligations also plays a large role in strengthening the safety of civilian nuclear power programs, according to survey respondents. Almost all survey respondents indicated that the presentation of national reports in country groups was a very or somewhat effective way for sharing best safety practices. Most survey respondents reported that preparing the national report has either greatly or somewhat improved opportunities to examine their country’s civilian nuclear power program. A number of parties we interviewed also said that this national report has been helpful in strengthening nuclear safety worldwide. NRC officials told us one effect of a national report is that nuclear regulators and plant operators are forced to think about even routine safety procedures and policies because the reports will be scrutinized by their peers. For example, as a result of questions raised by other parties on the national report prepared for the 2008 review meeting, the United States agreed to discuss with state governments and NRC licensees the benefits and costs of adopting stricter standards for protecting nuclear power plant workers and the public from exposure to radiation. In our survey, we also asked some additional questions about parties’ perceptions about how the peer review process affected the preparation of the 2008 reports. Specifically, among other things, we asked how likely parties thought reports were to include (1) comprehensive, detailed descriptions of measures taken to strengthen safety; (2) evidence that safety issues discussed in one review meeting were revisited in the next meeting and that the actions taken to address the issues were discussed in sufficient detail for parties to evaluate whether the safety concerns had been adequately addressed; and (3) sufficient technical detail to understand specific safety concerns. In each case, most survey respondents indicated that they thought reports were very or somewhat likely to include such information. We also asked how effectively the peer review process encouraged parties to provide detailed information in their 2008 national reports. Overall, most survey respondents indicated that the peer review process was very or somewhat likely to encourage parties to include detailed, comprehensive, and accurate information in their national reports. According to both survey respondents and parties we interviewed, the Convention has increased communication and encouraged the sharing of technical information to improve nuclear safety worldwide. There was wide agreement among the survey respondents that the Convention has improved communication among nuclear regulators; nuclear power plant operators; and other national organizations involved in the civilian nuclear power industry, such as, in the case of the United States, the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO). More than half of the respondents to our survey indicated the Convention had “greatly” improved communication about safety issues affecting civilian nuclear power reactors. Most respondents to our survey agreed that the Convention had improved opportunities for sharing technical solutions to improve safety, such as reactor design improvements or fire safety enhancements. Russian and Ukrainian officials we spoke to provided examples of how the Convention has led to the sharing of nuclear safety information. Following are some examples: Russian nuclear regulatory officials told us that the Convention has played a useful role in promoting technical solutions to problems shared by countries operating similar types of reactors. Specifically, Russia and Finland have been developing a system to improve communication between their plant operators based on discussions that began with contacts made at Convention review meetings. A Ukrainian official told us his country’s participation in the Convention has increased other countries’ awareness of the safety problems confronting Ukraine’s aging Soviet-designed nuclear reactors. He further noted that the Convention is one of many forums that Ukraine participates in that supports the strengthening of nuclear safety. According to most parties we surveyed and interviewed, maintaining the confidentiality of information obtained during the Convention’s meetings is critical to the peer review process. Most party representatives we spoke with agree that confidentiality should be preserved. For example, when asked if the public should be allowed to directly observe review meetings—and thereby gain direct access to a party’s national report and any concerns or questions raised about it by other parties—approximately two-thirds of survey respondents said the public probably or definitely should not be given such access. Some parties we interviewed told us that, as a result of the confidentiality of the peer review process, their country’s national reports have become more comprehensive. Three-quarters of survey respondents indicated that the quality of national reports prepared for review meetings had improved in the past 10 years. While the parties’ perceptions of the value of the Convention are generally very positive, some concerns were raised about the lack of information provided to the general public about the Convention’s proceedings, some countries’ lack of resources to fully participate in the review meetings, and the absence of performance metrics. In addition, parties emphasize that without the participation of all countries with nuclear power programs in the Convention, the international community will have limited access and insight into countries’—such as Iran—civilian nuclear power programs. Notwithstanding the general agreement that preserving the confidentiality of the peer review process is important, most parties responding to our survey would like to see more public access to the results of review meetings. We have testified that, according to some experts familiar with international agreements that rely primarily on peer review, the public dissemination of information about parties’ progress in meeting the terms of the Convention can play a key role in influencing compliance with the Convention’s nuclear safety obligations. Currently, only summary information of the peer review meeting is released to the public. This summary provides a brief introduction containing background on the Convention, an overview of the review process, and a synopsis of what the parties agree were the most important points discussed at the meeting. For example, the public report on the fourth review meeting, which took place in 2008, briefly summarizes the discussions of the parties on many topics discussed at the meeting, including parties’ efforts to meet the challenges of maintaining adequate staffing and competence levels and ongoing concerns about the degree of independence of some parties’ regulatory bodies. Any further details about any party’s national report or questions and answers on the report remain confidential unless the party voluntarily releases it. French officials in particular have expressed an especially strong view regarding public access to information about the Convention’s proceedings. In July 2009, in written responses to our questions, French officials stated that parties to the Convention should consider making the opening and closing sessions of review meetings open to the media. Further, a Norwegian official we spoke with suggested that some nongovernmental organizations should be allowed to attend review meetings as observers. One way that some parties have attempted to increase public access to the Convention’s proceedings is by posting their national reports and answers to written questions received on their national reports to IAEA’s public Web site. While the number of parties to the Convention making their national reports available in this way has increased since the first review meeting was held in 1999, it has not increased significantly in several years and actually declined between the third review meeting in 2005 and the fourth review meeting in 2008. Specifically, 26 parties—about 43 percent of the 60 parties for whom the Convention had come into force by the due date for submitting the national report—posted their national report prepared for the 2008 review meeting. This was down from the 30 parties—or about 55 percent of parties to the Convention— posting reports prepared for the 2005 review meeting. In fact, eight countries that posted their national reports prepared for the 2005 review meeting— Argentina, Belgium, Bulgaria, Ireland, Japan, Latvia, the Slovak Republic, and South Korea—did not do so for the report prepared for the 2008 review meeting. However, three parties posted their national reports for the first time in 2008—Estonia and India, which had recently become parties to the Convention, and Pakistan, which became a party in the 1990s. Figure 1 shows the number of countries that posted their national reports to the IAEA public Web site for the four review meetings held thus far. Officials from NRC and State told us that the United States has always made its national report available on the Internet. However, the U.S. approach has been to lead by example rather than taking an active role in encouraging other parties to the Convention to post their national reports to the Internet. IAEA officials told us it was important for parties to make as much information about their civilian nuclear power programs accessible as possible, but that it was for each party to determine how much information should be made public and how much should remain confidential. In addition to its public Web site, IAEA also maintains a secure, members-only Web site where parties are encouraged to post their national reports. According to NRC officials, parties have improved their participation in posting their reports to this Web site. Parties posted 17, 22, 57, and 61 national reports in 1999, 2002, 2005, and 2008, respectively. The overwhelming majority of parties have never posted their answers to written questions about their nuclear power programs to the IAEA public Web site. The written questions and answers provide a great deal of information about each country’s nuclear power program. According to an IAEA official, over 4,000 questions were prepared for the 2008 review meeting, and almost all were answered. As figure 2 shows, 3 countries posted these questions and answers to the IAEA public Web site for the first review meeting in 1999. While 11 countries posted questions and their answers to the IAEA’s public Web site for the second review meeting, including the United States, 6 did so for the third review meeting, and 5 did so for the 2008 meeting. Only Slovenia and Switzerland—both nuclear power countries—have posted these questions and answers for all four meetings; the United Kingdom and Canada— the sixth and eighth largest nuclear power countries as measured by the number of operating reactors, respectively—have done so since 2002. The United States had not posted its answers to written questions received on its national report to IAEA’s public Web site since 2002, although NRC officials stated that they have always posted them to the NRC Web site. We also found that other nuclear power countries such as Finland, Germany, Japan, and Spain have not posted their answers to written questions to the IAEA’s public Web site since 2002, either. In 2008, Luxembourg became the first, and thus far only, nonnuclear party to post the answers to questions it received on its national report. Luxembourg’s responses focused primarily on how it would respond to a nuclear accident in a neighboring country. We met with NRC officials on March 15, 2010, to discuss an early draft of this report. At that time, we informed them that their answers to written questions on U.S. national reports were not available on IAEA’s public Web site. NRC officials acknowledged that these responses were not readily accessible and said they would take steps to post them. On March 17, 2010, NRC informed us of the availability of their responses, and we verified that they were now on IAEA’s public Web site. Some respondents to our survey reported the lack of resources to fully participate in the review meetings. Specifically, almost half of the survey respondents—ranging from parties with well-established civilian nuclear power programs to those with no nuclear power programs—report that a lack of resources has limited their country’s ability to develop their national report. As we noted in our March 1999 testimony, NRC officials anticipated this lack of staff resources and/or travel money could be a problem. We reported that NRC officials told us that, because of differences in parties’ nuclear safety programs and available resources, they anticipated unevenness in the quality and detail of some national reports. In addition, half of the parties responding to our survey reported that a lack of resources has limited their ability to attend review meetings, and more than three-quarters indicated that a lack of resources has inhibited their ability to send representatives to all of the country group meetings. According to NRC officials, this is important because the country groups meet simultaneously, and it is in these meetings where the national reports are presented and questions about them are addressed. Not being able to attend country group meetings reduces opportunities to learn from other parties’ nuclear safety experiences. In addition, NRC officials recently told us that since much of the peer review of national reports can occur in the 7 months before the review meeting, limited resources may reduce the ability of some parties to take full advantage of this opportunity. That is, according to NRC officials, some countries do not have the staff resources to devote to preparing for review meetings by reading national reports, formulating and submitting written questions, and reviewing the parties’ written responses to the written questions. The Convention does not include performance metrics to gauge its impact on improving safety. As a result, it provides no systematic way to measure where and how progress in improving safety in each country has been made. During the course of this review, we asked parties if the lack of performance metrics limited the usefulness of the Convention. Half the parties responding to our survey indicated that it did. Performance indicators and benchmarks are currently being used to track safety in civilian nuclear power plants that could be adapted to help countries enhance safety. For example, the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) publishes quantitative indicators of nuclear plant performance for 11 key areas, including industrial safety accidents and unplanned automatic shutdowns of nuclear power plants. Although the Convention itself lacks performance metrics, one-quarter of parties responding to our survey reported that they themselves measure progress toward Convention goals using performance metrics—specifically, in some cases, by comparing their activities with the results of IAEA safety review missions to countries that request them and actions taken in response to questions and comments from other parties at Convention review meetings. Neither State nor NRC has formally proposed the adoption of performance metrics. However, NRC officials told us that performance metrics could play a useful role in helping parties measure their progress toward meeting safety obligations and that they could be introduced through a modification to the rules and procedures governing the Convention. Specifically, Article 22 of the Convention provides for the preparation of guidelines by the parties regarding the form and structure of their national reports. The guidelines can be revised by consensus at review meetings. The guidelines provide only suggestions for drafting the reports; parties remain free to structure their reports as they see fit. However, the suggestions provided are very detailed and touch upon more than just form and structure. For example, the guidelines provide detailed suggestions on the content of the national reports. They also contain an appendix detailing voluntary practices that parties are encouraged to engage in regarding the public availability of their national reports. The Convention is designed to maximize the number of countries that will participate in order to achieve its goal of promoting the safe operation of civilian nuclear power reactors worldwide; however, it is voluntary in nature. By and large, this approach has worked. Since 2009, three countries that are considering developing civilian nuclear power programs—Libya, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates—have become parties to the Convention. Two others—Kazakhstan and Saudi Arabia— approved the Convention in 2010 and are expected to become parties to it later this year. An overwhelming majority of the parties we surveyed and interviewed said that all countries should be encouraged to join as soon as possible after making the decision to consider developing a nuclear power program. At present, all countries with such programs—except Iran—are parties to the Convention. Several parties we interviewed told us that Iran, which is on the verge of commissioning civilian nuclear power reactors, should ratify the Convention in order to benefit from the safety expertise that participation provides. In their view, without Iran’s participation in the Convention, the international community has limited or no insight on, or access to, how Iran is developing, operating, and maintaining its burgeoning civilian nuclear power program. Russian officials with whom we spoke agreed that greater international access to Iran’s civilian nuclear power program is needed and that the Convention could play a role in providing that access. Russia is helping Iran build the civilian nuclear power reactor at Bushehr, which is expected to be commissioned in the near future. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials told us that Russia’s continued assistance to Iran’s civilian nuclear program may be conditioned on Iran’s becoming a party to the Convention. The Convention does not require that unsafe reactors be closed down. As noted in our 1999 testimony, the Convention neither provides sanctions for noncompliance with any of its safety obligations nor does it require the closing of any unsafe nuclear reactors. However, more than 13 years after the Convention came into force, Russia continues to operate 11 Chernobyl-style RBMK reactors. These reactors pose the highest risk, according to Western safety experts, because of their inherent design deficiencies, including their lack of a containment structure. The containment structure, generally a steel-lined concrete dome, serves as the ultimate barrier to the release of radioactive material in the event of a severe accident. Russian nuclear regulators told us that adequate safety upgrades have been made to all 11 RBMK reactors and that they will continue to operate for the foreseeable future. We also discussed the matter of shutdown of Soviet-designed reactors with EU officials, who told us that the Convention was never intended to be a mechanism for closing unsafe Soviet-designed reactors. The European Union has used a different strategy to accomplish shutdown of the unsafe nuclear reactors in its member countries: making EU membership contingent upon the closure of these reactors. As a result, all eight RBMK and first-generation VVER 440 Model 230 reactors in Bulgaria, Lithuania, and Slovakia have been permanently shut down in order for these countries to obtain EU membership. According to NRC officials, as is the case in other international law on reactor safety, under the Convention each country is responsible for regulating the safety of its own reactors. In addition, NRC noted that the Convention relies on the peer review process, that it cannot obligate countries to comply with safety standards, and that it does not provide for sanctions such as the closing of any unsafe nuclear power plants. State expressed a similar view. State pointed out that the Convention was never meant to have the authority to require that unsafe reactors be shut down. According to State, it is the position of IAEA and its member states that each country operating nuclear power plants should have its own nuclear regulatory agency that would have the authority to shut down plants. The parties to the Convention generally agree that it would be difficult to amend the Convention. Consequently, several parties have taken the lead in making changes to the Convention’s rules and procedures. To date, some steps have been taken to improve the Convention’s peer review process, and parties are considering several additional proposals. Several parties have focused on improving the workings of the Convention’s peer review process. The most significant change they have made, in our view, is to allow the parties to more freely ask questions about each others’ national reports. NRC expressed concern in our January 1997 report about the rules governing how parties’ country group assignments affect the parties’ ability to discuss and seek clarification about other parties’ national reports at review meetings. According to NRC officials, in the past, parties assigned to a particular country group could ask questions about other parties’ nuclear programs that were assigned to that group during the question-and-answer session following the presentation of a national report. However, parties that were not assigned to that country group could not ask questions unless they submitted a written question several months in advance of the review meeting. This restrictive practice began to change during the 2005 review meeting, when at least one country group allowed parties that were not assigned to it to ask questions. At the next review meeting in 2008, according to NRC officials who attended both meetings, no restrictions were placed on any parties’ ability to ask questions about the national reports of any other parties. An NRC official told us that this change has made the process more open and accessible to all of the parties. Another notable change to the rules and procedures of the peer review process is the recent decision to move up the date for the organizational meeting and the selection of officers for the upcoming review meeting by almost a year and to advance by a few weeks the deadlines for submitting national reports and written questions for the peer review process. The purposes of the organizational meeting, among other things, are to elect the officers for the upcoming review meeting, adopt a provisional agenda for the meeting, assign parties to particular country groups, and identify which proposals for enhancing the peer review process should be considered at the upcoming meeting. Previously, organizational meetings were held about 7 months before the upcoming review meeting. However, the parties at the 2008 review meeting agreed to hold the organizational meeting for the 2011 review meeting in September 2009—19 months in advance. According to NRC officials, the purpose of the scheduling change was to put officers in place earlier to give them more time to plan for the next meeting and to promote greater continuity from one meeting to the next. Moving up the deadlines for submitting national reports and written questions for peer review is intended to give countries more time to both review the national reports of other parties and answer any written questions submitted. Additional proposals to improve the implementation of the Convention are currently under consideration by the parties. Specifically, these proposals include (1) allocating more country group meeting time to discuss, among other things, the national reports of countries with emerging nuclear programs; (2) expediting the process for calling a special meeting between review meetings to discuss urgent safety issues; and (3) changing the process for assigning parties to country groups. Some parties have suggested the peer review process might be more effective if more review meeting time were allocated to discussing the national reports of countries with emerging nuclear power programs or topics of general concern and less time presenting and discussing the national reports of parties with well-established nuclear programs. For example, according to NRC officials, the United Arab Emirates, which has only recently become a party to the Convention, is rapidly moving to establish its nuclear regulatory infrastructure and is soon to begin construction of several nuclear power reactors. Because its civilian nuclear power program is so new, the United Arab Emirates could benefit from more time to present its national report during the peer review process. NRC officials told us that the United States, in contrast, does not need as much time as it is allocated to present its national report. Similarly, according to a senior NRC official, the United States has proposed that more time at review meetings might also be allocated to discuss topics of general concern—such as the safety challenges of dealing with aging reactors or the challenges parties face in maintaining adequate staffing and competence levels in both the regulatory bodies and at nuclear power plants. Another proposal to be considered would create a more efficient process for calling a meeting to discuss topical or urgent nuclear safety issues that parties feel cannot wait until the next review meeting. Currently, in order to have such a meeting, a majority of parties are required to support the call for a meeting. One way of streamlining this process, according to an NRC official, would be to empower the officers elected for the most recent or upcoming review meeting to call a special meeting. An urgent issue might be, for example, a nuclear power plant accident. If such an accident occurred, parties might wish to convene a special meeting to discuss the causes of the accident and what might be done to avoid a similar accident. Finally, to promote greater variation in the composition of country groups from meeting to meeting, amending the method for assigning countries to the six country groups is being considered. Specifically, the experience of the first four review meetings has been that the country groups hav e remained relatively static—that is, there has been little variation in the membership of each group among the nuclear power countries. According to NRC officials, it would be useful if the composition of the groups were more varied from meeting to meeting. While each group would still be anchored by a country with a large number of operating civilian nuclear power reactors, the remainder of the group would consist of a more varied mix of countries. This type of mix would provide greater opportunities for more information sharing among a more diverse group of countries. An NRC official told us that many parties are generally in favor of some adjustment to the existing process but that there is not yet sufficient agreement on how to accomplish this change. IAEA has a long history of serving as a technical advisor to member states to promote the safe operation of nuclear power plants. Although this role predates the establishment of the Convention, and regulating nuclear safety is a national responsibility, the Convention complements the role the agency plays in these matters. IAEA promotes the Convention’s nuclear safety goals and objectives largely through its Technical Cooperation (TC) Program, safety standards, and peer review missions, which together help countries improve their nuclear regulatory bodies and the safety performance of their civilian nuclear power plants. Most survey respondents reported that they found IAEA effective in serving as a technical advisor. In addition, almost all parties responding to our survey consider IAEA to be effective in its role as secretariat to the Convention. IAEA provides assistance to its member states to promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy in several ways, including providing technical cooperation, establishing safety standards, and conducting advisory and peer review missions. The importance of its role in providing this type of assistance was corroborated by our survey results. A majority of survey respondents reported that IAEA was either very effective or somewhat effective in serving as a technical advisor to countries requesting assistance to improve civilian nuclear power safety. IAEA’s TC program supports, among other things, nuclear safety and the development of nuclear power. For the 2009-2011 activities under the TC program, nuclear safety remains one of the top three priorities for IAEA member states. IAEA currently conducts 551 TC projects in 115 countries and territories, and program activities are tailored to the needs of each region. Specific TC projects have included activities to extend the operating life of nuclear power plants and establishing safety culture in nuclear facilities. TC projects that support member states considering or developing nuclear power also include strengthening nuclear regulatory authorities and preparing an emergency plan for a nuclear power plant. In 2007, IAEA disbursed approximately $5.6 million to support the safety of civilian nuclear installations worldwide through the TC program. In addition to its TC program budget, IAEA plans to spend approximately $15.1 million in 2010 on other efforts to promote nuclear safety, such as strengthening countries’ abilities to respond to nuclear incidents and emergencies and to assess the safety of the siting and design of nuclear installations. The role and importance of IAEA in promoting nuclear safety will likely grow if the cost of fossil fuels and the threat of climate change spur a nuclear renaissance, as an independent commission assessing the role of IAEA to 2020 and beyond reported recently. According to this independent commission, this growing role may involve (1) leading an international effort to establish a global nuclear safety network, (2) helping countries with emerging nuclear power programs put in place the infrastructure needed to develop nuclear energy safely, and (3) ensuring that critical safety knowledge is widely shared among IAEA member states. In addition, IAEA has established safety standards that provide a framework for fundamental safety principles, requirements, and guidance for member states. The standards, which reflect international consensus, cover a wide range of topics, including nuclear power plant design and operation, site evaluation, and emergency preparedness and response. Committees of senior experts from IAEA member states use an open and transparent process to develop the standards and any subsequent revisions. The guidelines governing the drafting of national reports state that IAEA safety standards can give valuable guidance on how to meet the Convention’s safety obligations. IAEA also promotes nuclear safety through advisory and voluntary peer review missions—the most prominent are Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) missions and Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) missions. These missions evaluate the operations of a member state’s nuclear regulatory system and civilian nuclear power plant operational safety, respectively. IRRS missions assess the safety practices of the requesting country through an examination of its regulatory framework and organization and compare the country’s practices with IAEA safety standards. Since 1992, IAEA has conducted 44 IRRS missions in 26 countries, with 15 of these missions taking place in countries that have operated—and in some cases continue to operate—Soviet-designed reactors. Table 1 shows the number of IRRS missions that member countries had hosted through 2009. The United States has sent approximately 20 experts on IRRS missions and has agreed to host an IRRS mission in October 2010. Some parties that responded to our survey reported that they found IRRS and OSART missions effective at improving civilian nuclear power safety. In addition, according to the summary report of the Convention’s fourth meeting in 2008, many parties reported that they had positive experiences with IRRS and OSART missions, and parties who had not already hosted one of these missions were encouraged to do so. In February and March 2010, IAEA conducted an IRRS mission to Iran, which included a site visit to the nearly completed Bushehr nuclear power plant. IAEA recommended, among other things, that Iran join the Convention. According to a senior Swedish official who was involved in drafting the Convention, these missions are increasingly being used to measure the safety standards of parties to the Convention. Parties face peer pressure to submit to these voluntary missions, as they provide a way for a country to show its commitment to enhancing safety. For example, ENSREG has promoted the use of IRRS missions by EU countries. Describing the missions as “well established and well respected,” ENSREG has encouraged all EU member states to participate in one to obtain advice on improvements and to learn from the best practices of others. IAEA also manages the OSART missions through which teams of experts drawn from IAEA member countries—including the United States, which has sent over 100 experts on missions—review operational safety at specific nuclear power plants. IAEA has conducted over 150 OSART missions in 32 countries since 1983, and has 9 more scheduled through the end of 2011. Table 2 shows the number of OSART missions that member countries had hosted through 2009. As table 2 shows, the 2 countries that have hosted the most OSART missions are France and Ukraine, 21 and 14, respectively. Combined, those 2 countries have 73 reactors. China and the Czech Republic have hosted the second most missions, 10 and 8, respectively. These countries have a combined total of 17 operating reactors. Japan, which has 54 reactors, has hosted 5 OSART missions. Russia, which has 32 operating reactors, has hosted 6, and the United States, which has 104 operating reactors, has also hosted 6 missions. The only countries with operating civilian nuclear power programs that have not hosted OSART missions are Armenia and India, which operate 1 and 18 reactors, respectively. While recommendations that result from safety review services such as IRRS and OSART missions are not mandates, IAEA officials told us that the agency nevertheless sees a high rate of implementation of those recommendations. IAEA also makes available on its public Web site a compilation of best practices learned from recent OSART missions, as well as the mission reports as authorized by the member states. This compilation serves to help member states improve the operational safety of their power plants and includes emergency plans and preparedness, training, and maintenance. Finally, IAEA also promotes civilian nuclear safety through other means. For example, IAEA offers additional review services to member states by focusing on issues such as siting, seismic safety, research reactor safety, fuel cycle facilities’ safety, power plant accident management, and safety culture assessments. IAEA also promotes education and training in nuclear safety through Web-based courses, electronic textbooks, and workshops. This training covers topics such as basic safety concepts, regulatory control of nuclear power plants, and instruction on IAEA safety standards. Much of this information is available to the public to download from IAEA’s Web site. One survey respondent from Eastern Europe commented that the training courses and workshops had contributed significantly to the promotion of high safety standards and best practices. Moreover, IAEA regularly holds conferences and symposia on issues related to nuclear safety, with some event summaries available online. Recent topics have included promoting safety education and training for countries with new or expanding nuclear programs, ensuring safety for sustainable nuclear development, and managing nuclear power plant life. Almost all parties responding to our survey and parties we interviewed reported that IAEA effectively carries out its role as secretariat as outlined in the Convention. In this capacity, IAEA hosts the review meetings in Vienna, Austria; prepares documents; and provides translation and interpretation services. There was widespread agreement among the respondents that the agency is effective in convening, preparing, and servicing the meetings and at transmitting information received or prepared in accordance with the provisions of the Convention. Some survey respondents and parties we interviewed called for more IAEA support during the Convention’s review meetings in such areas as more translation services for all country group sessions and more administrative assistance for parties to the Convention. The Convention permits IAEA to provide other services in support of the review meetings, if the parties reach consensus. Finally, some survey respondents reported that IAEA should play a more active role in the following areas: helping prepare national reports, providing other assistance to help prepare for the next review meeting, providing other technical support to improve safety, and helping address concerns about a country’s civilian nuclear power program. IAEA estimates its costs to support the last review meeting in 2008 at nearly $118,000 and expects to spend approximately $130,000 for the fifth review meeting scheduled for April 2011. The costs associated with the review meetings are modest for the U.S. government as well. NRC and State spent approximately $725,000 preparing for and participating in the 2008 review meeting and estimate they will spend $825,000 for the next review meeting. The Convention plays an important role in strengthening nuclear safety and enjoys broad support among the parties we surveyed and interviewed. Support for the Convention continues to grow as evidenced by the increasing number of countries that have joined it, particularly those with emerging nuclear programs, such as the United Arab Emirates. Many parties to the Convention told us that all countries that are considering embarking on a nuclear power program—or currently operating civilian nuclear power reactors— should be encouraged to join the Convention, including Iran. We are encouraged that the parties have taken steps to improve the Convention’s peer review process. However, the Convention does not require parties to include performance metrics in their national reports, which makes it difficult to gauge its impact on improving nuclear safety. Without such metrics there is no systematic way to measure where and how progress has been made in improving safety in each country that operates civilian nuclear power reactors. In addition, more than half of the survey respondents reported that the lack of metrics hampers the Convention’s usefulness, and NRC has noted that it would be feasible to add performance metrics into the guidelines that implement that national report process called for by the Convention. There are already international organizations that use such indicators to track nuclear safety improvements and which could perhaps be incorporated into the guidelines as voluntary practices that parties are encouraged to implement. Further, public awareness about parties’ progress toward meeting the terms of the Convention can play a key role in influencing compliance with the Convention’s nuclear safety obligations. However, to date the public has had limited access to parties’ national reports and written answers to questions about their nuclear power programs. More than half of the national reports prepared for the 2008 review meeting are not posted to IAEA’s public Web site, and even fewer parties make their answers to written questions received on their national reports available on IAEA’s public Web site. Putting this information on the Web site could increase public awareness of the nuclear safety issues facing countries and how they are addressing them. To further enhance the usefulness of the Convention in promoting the safety of civilian nuclear power programs worldwide, we recommend that the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, work with other parties to the Convention to take the following three actions: Encourage parties to include performance metrics in national reports to better track safety in civilian nuclear power plants and help countries more systematically measure where and how they have made progress in improving safety. Expand efforts to increase the number of parties’ national reports made available to the public by posting them to IAEA’s public Web site. Promote greater public dissemination of parties’ written answers to questions about their nuclear power programs by posting this information to IAEA’s public Web site. We provided a draft of this report to NRC and State for comment. We also provided IAEA with a detailed summary of facts contained in the draft report. State and NRC provided written comments on the draft report, which are presented in appendixes IV and V, respectively. IAEA, State, and NRC also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. NRC generally agreed with our report but did not specifically agree or disagree with the report’s recommendations, and State generally agreed with the recommendations to (1) encourage parties to the Convention to include performance metrics in their national reports to better track safety in civilian nuclear power plants, (2) increase the number of parties’ national reports made available to the public by posting them to IAEA’s public Web site, and (3) promote greater public dissemination of parties’ written answers to questions about their nuclear power programs by posting this information to IAEA’s public Web site. In its written comments, however, State provided some clarifications concerning the recommendations. First, State noted that it might be difficult to achieve metrics that would be meaningful across so many countries’ nuclear power programs and to agree on the specific metrics to be used. Second, State noted that initiatives to increase public access to information would run counter to strong concerns regarding confidentiality of information on civilian nuclear power plants held by many parties. In addition, State asserted that the report somewhat mischaracterizes the Convention by noting that the Convention does not require that unsafe reactors be shut down. State noted that the Convention was never meant to have that authority, which would be contrary to IAEA practice and policy. It is the position of IAEA and member states that each country operating nuclear power plants should have its own national regulatory agency that would have the authority to shut down plants. Regarding the first point, while it might be challenging to establish a common set of performance metrics, we believe there are already examples of standard metrics being used, such as those published by WANO. We believe that WANO’s metrics, for instance, could be used as a benchmark for parties to follow in measuring safety progress when developing their national reports. With regard to encouraging public dissemination of information about the Convention, we agree that maintaining confidentiality of sensitive information about what is discussed among the parties during the peer review process should be maintained. However, we also believe that increasing public awareness of the Convention’s proceedings—even on an incremental basis—through the posting of national reports to IAEA’s public Web site is a worthwhile goal and should be encouraged to the extent practicable. Finally, with respect to the issue of unsafe reactors, we have not mischaracterized the Convention. Rather, we pointed out in the report—as we have previously reported—that the Convention does not require the closing of any unsafe nuclear reactors. We also noted in this report that nuclear safety is a national responsibility and have not suggested or implied that the Convention is flawed because it does not require unsafe reactors to be closed. The fact remains, however, that Russia, which has ratified the Convention, continues to operate numerous nuclear power plants that pose a safety risk according to Western safety experts. However, based on State’s comments, we have clarified the text regarding this issue. As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of State, the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and other interested parties. The report also will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI. Appendix I: Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety 11 November 2009 437 , 2010. By the terms of the Convention, it will enter into force for Saudi Arabia 90 days after the date of deposit of the instrument of accession. Table 3 reflects the cumulative amount of nuclear reactor safety assistance funds provided by the Department of Energy (DOE) from the inception of these programs. Table 4 reflects the cumulative amount of nuclear reactor safety assistance funds provided by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) from the inception of these programs. Table 5 reflects nuclear safety expenditures from the European Union’s Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States program. The objectives of our review were to evaluate the extent to which the Convention on Nuclear Safety is achieving its primary goal: promoting the safe operation of civilian nuclear power reactors worldwide. Specifically, we assessed (1) parties’ views on the perceived benefits and limitations of the Convention; (2) efforts to improve the implementation of the Convention; and (3) how International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) programs complement the Convention’s safety goals and objectives. In addition, we are providing information in appendix II about funding provided by the United States and the EU to promote international nuclear safety since the early 1990s. To assess parties’ views of the perceived benefits and limitations of the Convention and efforts to improve implementation, we (1) interviewed representatives of 17 nuclear and nonnuclear parties to the Convention as well as officials from NRC and State responsible for representing the United States at the Convention; (2) analyzed various Convention-related documents from NRC, State, IAEA, and EU; and (3) conducted a Web- based survey of 64 parties to the Convention. To encourage honest and open responses to our survey, we pledged member countries confidentiality in their responses and indicated that we would report only aggregate information or examples that would not identify a particular party. The survey included questions about the usefulness of the Convention, the effectiveness of Convention activities, and the role of IAEA in the Convention. To develop the survey questions, we analyzed the text of the Convention itself, as well as related rules and procedures. We also interviewed parties to the Convention and other experts to identify issues related to the Convention. Finally, we reviewed previous GAO reports to identify past issues and concerns related to the Convention and developed survey questions to gauge whether these issues were still relevant. The survey was pretested to ensure that (1) the questions were clear and unambiguous, especially to nonnative English-speaking respondents; (2) the terms we used were precise; (3) the survey did not place an undue burden on the officials completing it; and (4) the survey was independent and unbiased. In addition, the survey was reviewed by an independent, internal survey expert and by NRC. The survey was conducted using self-administered electronic questionnaires posted on the World Wide Web. We sent e-mail notifications to 64 parties to the Convention to alert them that we were conducting the survey and would be sending them log-in information in a separate e-mail. We also e-mailed each potential respondent a unique password and username to ensure that only members of the target population could participate in the survey. To encourage respondents to complete the survey, we sent an e-mail reminder to each nonrespondent about 2 weeks after our initial e-mail message. We also sent an additional e-mail reminder that extended the deadline to complete the survey. In addition to these e-mails, we also conducted extensive telephone and personalized e-mail follow-up to encourage those parties who contacted us with questions about the survey and to encourage the nonrespondents from the 17 parties whose representatives we interviewed to complete the survey. The survey data were collected from October 2009 through December 2009. Half (32) of the 64 parties to the Convention responded to the survey. To assess the potential for nonresponse bias in our survey results, we compared selected characteristics of nonresponding countries, such as (1) length of time as a party to the Convention, (2) nuclear power status and number of nuclear power plants, (3) region, (4) former Soviet bloc alignment, and (5) EU membership, to those of the responding parties. The distribution of these characteristics among responding and nonresponding parties was well-balanced. For example, 3 of the 32 respondents have been parties to the Convention for 2 years or less, 2 respondents for 3 to 9 years, and 27 respondents for 10 or more years. In addition, we also received responses from 13 nonnuclear countries and 19 nuclear countries and 17 EU-member countries and 15 nonmember countries. To eliminate data-processing errors, we independently verified the computer program that generated the survey results. This report does not contain all the results from the survey; the survey and a more complete tabulation of the results are provided in an electronic supplement to this report (this supplement can be viewed online at GAO-10-550SP). To assess how IAEA programs complement the Convention’s safety goals and objectives, we analyzed budget and other relevant documents from the Convention, such as meeting minutes and rules of procedure. We also interviewed IAEA officials; U.S. officials at the U.S. Missions in Vienna and Brussels; and the representatives of 17 parties to the Convention in Vienna, Brussels, Moscow, and Washington, D.C. To determine the amount of money the United States has spent promoting nuclear safety from the early 1990s through September 30, 2009, we obtained expenditure information from DOE and NRC. To assess the reliability of the information provided, we interviewed knowledgeable officials from each agency to understand (1) how they had developed the estimates and (2) what supporting documentation had been used to develop them; we determined the information provided was sufficiently reliable for our purposes. To determine the amount of money the EU has spent promoting nuclear safety from 1991 through 2006, and the amount they have budgeted to spend from 2007 to 2013, we obtained budget information from EU officials. However, the reliability of these EU estimates is undetermined because we did not receive responses to our data reliability questions. Given these limitations, we characterize these costs as estimates, and we use them only as background. Because the EU budget information was provided in euros, we converted the original values to dollars. In all instances, when converting euros to dollars, we used nominal and purchasing power parity average annual exchange rates from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. When converting euro values for future projections into dollars, we used the latest available annual exchange rate. In addition, to determine the amount of money IAEA has budgeted for nuclear safety in 2010, we obtained information from the agency’s Programme and Budget for 2010-11. These IAEA budget figures—which we converted to dollars from euros—are also of undetermined reliability because we were unable to obtain sufficient detail about how they developed the estimates or the data sources that supported them. To determine the cost to the United States to participate in the Convention, and IAEA’s costs to support the Convention for one 3-year cycle, we obtained expenditure information from NRC, State, and IAEA. To assess the reliability of this information, we also interviewed knowledgeable officials from each agency to understand (1) how they had developed the estimates and (2) what supporting documentation had been used to develop them. We determined the information provided by NRC was sufficiently reliable for our purposes. However, the reliability of the State and IAEA information is undetermined. The reliability of State estimates are unknown because staff typically combined work and travel related to the Convention with other work duties, so it is not possible to accurately determine the amount of money spent exclusively on Convention participation. IAEA estimates—which we converted to dollars from euros—are of undetermined reliability because they do not formally track costs to run the review meetings. We conducted this performance audit from February 2009 to April 2010, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. In addition to the individual named above, Glen Levis, Assistant Director; Dr. Timothy Persons, Chief Scientist; Antoinette Capaccio; Frederick Childers; Nancy Crothers; Bridget Grimes; Kirsten Lauber; Rebecca Shea; and Kevin Tarmann made key contributions to this report.

Summary: Currently, 437 civilian nuclear power reactors are operating in 29 countries, and 56 more are under construction. After the Chernobyl accident, representatives of over 50 nations, including the United States, participated in the development of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, a treaty that seeks to promote the safety of civilian nuclear power reactors. The Convention has been in force since 1996. GAO was asked to assess (1) parties' views on the benefits and limitations of the Convention, (2) efforts to improve implementation of the Convention, and (3) how International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) programs complement the Convention's safety goals. GAO surveyed the 64 parties to the Convention for which it was in force at the time of GAO's review and analyzed the responses of the 32 that completed it, analyzed relevant documents, and interviewed U.S. and foreign officials. The Convention on Nuclear Safety plays a useful role in strengthening the safety of civilian nuclear power reactors worldwide, according to most parties to the Convention that responded to GAO's survey and representatives of parties GAO interviewed. In particular, parties indicated that the Convention's obligations to (1) establish effective legislative and regulatory frameworks and strong, independent nuclear regulatory bodies and (2) prepare a national report every 3 years that describes the measures the country has taken to achieve the Convention's nuclear safety goals, are among its most useful contributions. The countries present their national reports at review meetings, address questions that may arise about the reports, and assess and ask questions about the reports of other parties. This is known as the peer review process. Some concerns were raised about limited public access to Convention proceedings, some countries' lack of resources to fully participate in the review meetings, and the absence of performance metrics in the national reports to gauge progress toward meeting safety goals and objectives. Half of the parties responding to GAO's survey stated that the lack of performance metrics limited the usefulness of the Convention. Neither the Department of State nor the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has formally proposed the adoption of performance metrics. However, NRC officials told GAO that performance metrics could be useful. In addition, the number of parties posting their national reports to IAEA's public Web site has declined since 2005. NRC and Department of State officials told GAO that the United States has always made its national report available on the Internet. However, the U.S. approach has been to lead by example rather than taking an active role in encouraging other parties to post their reports. Further, universal participation would advance achievement of the Convention's goals. Several representatives from countries who are parties to the Convention told GAO that Iran should ratify the Convention. In their view, without Iran's participation, the international community has limited or no insight on, or access to, Iran's civilian nuclear power program. Russia, which is helping Iran build the nuclear reactor at Bushehr, may condition continued assistance on Iran becoming a party to the Convention, according to Russian officials. The parties have taken some actions to improve the Convention's implementation, and more proposals are being considered. Steps have been taken to make the process for asking questions during peer review meetings more open and to increase the amount of time available for preparing for the review meetings. IAEA nuclear safety programs, which predate the Convention, complement the Convention's safety goals through the Technical Cooperation program, safety standards, and peer review missions. The Technical Cooperation program supports, among other things, the development of nuclear power. IAEA has established nuclear safety standards and also promotes nuclear safety through peer review missions that evaluate the operations of a member state's nuclear regulatory system and nuclear power plant operational safety