CBP is the lead federal agency charged with interdicting terrorists, criminals, and inadmissible travelers at ports of entry while facilitating the flow of legitimate travel and commerce at the nation’s borders. In March 2003, inspectors from the three legacy agencies—the Department of Justice’s U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Department of the Treasury’s U.S. Customs Service and the Department of Agriculture’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service—were merged to form CBP. As part of the merger, CBP cross-trained CBP officers to simultaneously perform immigration and customs inspection functions as well as identify and refer possible agricultural violations for further inspection. DHS stated that the ability to use inspectors interchangeably for immigration and customs inspection functions would allow the agency to more effectively use its personnel and accelerate the processing of legitimate travelers, thereby enabling CBP to more effectively enhance efforts to secure the border. OFO—one of the CBP component offices—manages and deploys CBP officers who operate within 20 field offices, and 329 ports of entry composed of airports, seaports, and designated land ports of entry throughout the United States plus selected locations overseas. As of July 2011, nearly 20,000 CBP officers operated at U.S. ports of entry and other locations overseas. The total number of onboard CBP officers peaked in fiscal year 2009 at 21,339 but declined in fiscal years 2010 and 2011 to 20,431. According to OFO, the decline in the onboard number of CBP officers is due, in part, to a decline in traveler volume resulting in a decline in collected user fees that fund CBP officers located at airports and seaports. At the end of fiscal year 2004, there were about 18,000 CBP officers, the majority of whom were legacy officers from the Department of Treasury’s U.S. Customs Service, followed by legacy officers from the Department of Justice’s U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Department of Agriculture’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. Since fiscal year 2007, the total number of legacy officers has declined. As of July 2011, 45 percent of the CBP officer workforce was comprised of legacy officers. Since fiscal year 2007, the annual attrition rate of legacy officers has declined from 6.5 percent to 2.4 percent in fiscal year 2010. Figure 1 illustrates the percentage of legacy CBP officers compared to the total CBP officer workforce over time. CBP officer responsibilities for passenger inspection are primarily focused at the primary and secondary inspection areas at ports of entry. In the primary inspection area, CBP officers are expected to rapidly analyze passenger admissibility by sufficiently questioning the passenger, examining the passenger’s travel documents, and using appropriate technology to identify those passengers that can be immediately admitted into the United States or need to be referred to a secondary inspection area for a more thorough inspection, if necessary. Specifically, CBP officers in the primary inspection area are expected to first examine travel documents by comparing the document to the passenger and then ask questions to confirm the identity of the traveler. They also may inspect travelers’ luggage. CBP officers who serve in the secondary inspection area conduct closer inspection of travel documents and possessions and can use multiple law enforcement databases to verify the traveler’s identity, background, and purpose for entering the country. CBP officers may also serve in specialized teams to support the inspection functions at the ports of entry. For example, CBP established the Passenger Analysis Unit team, which is responsible for cross-checking passenger data in automated systems to identify high-risk passengers before they enter the country. Appendix I provides more detail on CBP officer staffing policy and OFO specialized teams. OFO is to coordinate with OTD to ensure that component training complies with OTD training standards. In the case of CBP officers, OFO and OTD share responsibility for ensuring that newly hired and incumbent CBP officers are sufficiently trained. OTD is responsible for designing, developing, delivering, and evaluating CBP-wide training courses and establishing training standards and policies for the program, while OFO is responsible for identifying the training requirements of CBP officers, providing subject-matter experts to assist in the development and instruction of some training courses, and reviewing training that is developed. OFO established a training branch in 2003 to serve as a liaison between OTD and OFO. OFO also established FDAU in 2005, which performs analyses of fraudulent documents that have been seized to identify global patterns and trends. FDAU is to provide training and training materials to enhance CBP officers’ abilities to detect fraudulent documents and thereby increase the number of interceptions through the sharing of information within CBP and DHS and with other U.S. and foreign government agencies. OTD is also responsible for overseeing and managing the CBP training budget, known as the National Training Plan (NTP), and prioritizing training development and delivery via the Training Advisory Board (TAB). Also, OTD developed and manages the Virtual Learning Center (VLC) where CBP officers can take self-paced courses on a variety of topics. Further, OTD operates and manages basic and advanced training schools for CBP officers. Specifically, OTD operates the Field Operations Academy, which trains and prepares newly hired CBP Officers for deployment to U.S. ports of entry. OTD is responsible for managing and overseeing CBP’s official training records system, Training Records and Enrollment Network (TRAEN), and the Academy Course Management System, a training scheduling and tracking system that OFO uses to monitor newly hired CBP officers’ successful completion of basic training. Each year, OTD is to request that the CBP offices provide a list of specific training courses and the approximate number of participants they would like to send to training. OTD is to compile these requests and present them to TAB, which is to review and prioritize the courses to be delivered that year. In addition, TAB approves the total NTP budget amount for each fiscal year. On the basis of the Board’s priorities, OTD is to develop the NTP budget for the fiscal year and is also responsible for monitoring the delivery of the training and managing the NTP budget during the year. The NTP budget funds the delivery of training for all CBP offices—including training for OFO—for a single fiscal year. In fiscal year 2009, CBP training expenditures peaked due, in part, to receipt of supplemental funding to hire and train CBP officers and Border Patrol agents. Since fiscal year 2009, CBP’s NTP budget expenditures have declined due to increasing budget constraints. Figure 2 displays CBP’s actual NTP budget expenditures from fiscal years 2008 through 2010 and its projected end-of-year expenditures for fiscal year 2011. OFO has also funded the development and delivery of its own training courses for CBP officers when they have not received funding from the NTP. IA has oversight authority for all aspects of CBP operations, personnel, and facilities. IA is responsible for ensuring compliance with all CBP-wide programs and policies and operates a covert test program to ensure compliance. Following the issuance of the results of our covert tests of border security in May 2008, CBP initiated covert tests to evaluate CBP’s capabilities to detect document fraud. Specifically, CBP focused its tests on evaluating CBP’s detection of impostors, or individuals who attempt to enter the United States fraudulently by using a genuine, unaltered travel document that belongs to another person. CBP also continued covert tests to detect cargo containing illicit radioactive material, among others.potential training needs. OFO uses these ongoing test results to identify All newly hired CBP officers are required to complete a basic training program and demonstrate proficiency in CBP officer duties. Incumbent CBP officers are required to take mandatory courses such as information technology security, occupational safety, and human trafficking awareness, among others. CBP provides most mandatory courses on a one-time or annual basis via the VLC. OFO has mandatory course requirements, such as fraudulent document detection, and has also developed specialized courses for incumbent officers assigned to specialized teams. However, CBP does not require that all CBP officers assigned to specialized teams complete the specialized training developed for that team. According to OFO, management must balance the operational needs of the port with the availability of the training. Appendix II lists examples of mandatory and specialized courses for CBP officers for fiscal year 2011. As we previously reported, in 2003, CBP initiated a multiyear cross- training program to equip new and legacy officers with the tools necessary to perform primary immigration and customs inspections, and sufficient knowledge to identify agricultural inspections in need of further examination.courses—covering immigration fundamentals, immigration law, and agriculture fundamentals—regardless of where they were assigned. All legacy immigration officers were required to complete three courses— customs fundamentals, customs law, and agriculture fundamentals— regardless of where they were assigned. Further, based on their assignment, legacy officers were required to complete additional courses specific to their assignment and port environment. In June 2011, CBP officially retired the cross-training courses and replaced them with revised modules. OFO instructed managers, supervisors, and training officers to use these new materials as refresher training for officers who transfer to a CBP required all legacy customs officers complete three new assignment or environment or who return to inspection duties after an extended absence. CBP has prepared training development standards for all CBP training programs and courses to ensure that training delivered to CBP employees meets established quality standards of instruction and evaluation. OTD standards are based, in part, on federal laws and regulations, which require agencies to establish training programs that support their mission and meet specified standards, including identifying training needs, prioritizing these needs, and evaluating the results of training programs and plans. Also, CBP develops and revises its basic training for new CBP officers to meet Federal Law Enforcement Training Accreditation (FLETA) standards, which provide law enforcement agencies with an opportunity to voluntarily demonstrate that they meet an established set of professional standards and receive appropriate recognition. Finally, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government provide criteria for the management and oversight of agency operations, including training programs. In 2009, CBP revised its training program for new officers in accordance with its training development standards. These standards are based on legal standards that guide the development of training in the federal government and standards that guide federal law enforcement training. OTD standards also contain specific guidance related to the following phases: (1) planning, (2) analysis, (3) design, (4) development, (5) evaluation, and (6) delivery of the course curriculum, which CBP adhered to in revising its training program. Table 1 provides an overview of the OTD training development phases and related standards and our assessment of how CBP efforts met these standards in revising its training for newly hired officers. OTD standards state that the training curriculum should be current, valid, and updated once every 3 to 5 years. CBP began the process of revising its training for new officers in 2009 after the initial launch of the CBP Officer curriculum in 2004, consistent with OTD standards for updating the training curriculum every 5 years. OTD, as well as other federal law enforcement training standards, state that programs should first identify the critical tasks that the individual is expected to perform in order to determine what training is needed. Consistent with these standards, OTD convened a team of subject matter experts (SMEs) to identify and rank the tasks that new CBP officers are expected to perform. The team identified a total of 138 critical tasks that newly hired CBP officers are expected to perform within the first 2 years of employment. These included conducting thorough and accurate research to support inspections and investigations, and preparing thorough and accurate reports covering significant incidents and intelligence. Once the tasks were identified, the panel of SMEs compared the identified tasks to the tasks addressed in the existing curriculum to identify any skill gaps. OTD then developed specific courses with appropriate lessons and topics to ensure that these tasks were addressed in the new curriculum. For example, new modules on evidence preservation and secondary report writing were incorporated in the revised curriculum to address identified officer skill gaps in handling evidence and writing. Consistent with the OTD standard that requires a test run of a complete and approved course in a controlled environment by selected individuals representing the course’s learning audience, the new CBP officer curriculum was piloted to test its content and delivery prior to its launch in February 2011. As a result, the new officer training program course was expanded from about 15 to 18 weeks and approximately 30 to 35 percent of the new officer curriculum is new or updated and expanded. Thus, the new officer training program complies with OTD’s standards that state the training curriculum should be current and valid. OTD internal training standards also state that the training should be aligned with the current agency mission and current threats. According to OFO and OTD officials, the previous CBP officer curriculum focused primarily on preparing the officer to serve in the primary inspection function at a port. The SME panel recommended that the new officer curriculum be revised to produce a law enforcement officer capable of supporting CBP’s expanding antiterror mission. As a result, the new curriculum is designed to produce a professional law enforcement officer capable of protecting the homeland from terrorist, criminal, biological, and agricultural threats. Specifically, the new curriculum states that the CBP officer is expected, among other tasks, to draw appropriate conclusions and take appropriate action to identify behavioral indicators displayed by criminals and terrorists, effectively interview and analyze travelers to identify potential threats, expertly identify altered and counterfeit documents and impostors, and use technology in support of the inspection process.officer is expected to be able to perform the primary inspection function, as well as some aspects of the secondary inspection function. Upon completion of training, the newly hired CBP OTD standards also state that is important to identify the appropriate delivery method and location. In accordance with these standards, CBP determined that the training for new CBP officers would be divided into three components as shown in figure 3. Pre-academy—According to OFO officials, the pre-academy component helps educate incoming CBP officers of job responsibilities before the agency commits the funds to send them to the Field Operations Academy in Glynco, Georgia, for basic training. OFO officials also stated that the pre-academy curriculum is structured because it recommends that a fixed curriculum be completed in a specific amount of time. Also, it contains a mix of classroom instruction and web-based courses to familiarize incoming CBP officers with the specific requirements of the law enforcement and inspections job, thereby helping to ensure that the pre- academy training is consistent throughout the nation. Basic academy—The SME panel recommended that the curriculum include intensified training to enhance officer vigilance and awareness though interview training, behavior analysis training to discern passenger behavior, report writing training, and training to detect fraudulent documents, among others. In addition, CBP increased the amount of time devoted to practical exercises in response to comments made by newly hired officers during pilot testing. For example, exercises in the passenger processing module increased from 11 hours in the old curriculum to 33 hours in the revised curriculum. The revised curriculum was designed to enhance an officer’s ability to effectively interview and analyze travelers to identify potential threats; expertly identify altered and counterfeit documents and impostors; identify behavioral indicators displayed by terrorists and criminals; use technology (including computers and other resources) in support of the inspection process. Postacademy—In 2007, we reported that although CBP had issued guidance for on-the-job training of new CBP officers, CBP had difficulty in providing the training in accordance with the guidance. We recommended that CBP incorporate the following into its on-the-job training program: (1) specific tasks that CBP officers must experience during on-the-job training and (2) requirements for measuring officer proficiency in performing those tasks. In response to our recommendations, CBP revised its postacademy training program by identifying specific tasks and developing a plan for measuring officer proficiency in those tasks. The revised postacademy training program combines classroom and on-the-job training and incorporates ongoing testing and evaluation of officer proficiency. The evaluations are tied to the critical tasks and competencies that a new officer must perform. In accordance with the new postacademy training program, prior to being able to perform primary inspections independently, a training officer must certify that the officer is proficient to perform the task. The revised postacademy training began in June 2011. Consistent with OTD training standards that call for measuring the effectiveness of training, CBP plans to ask new officers to evaluate their basic academy and postacademy training. In addition, CBP plans to survey both new officers and their supervisors several months after a new officer completes on-the-job training to determine the effectiveness of the training. Consistent with OTD standards that its training meets federal law enforcement standards, OTD officials stated that the curriculum received its federal law enforcement training accreditation in November 2011. CBP has taken steps to identify the training needs of its incumbent officers, by for example, conducting covert tests to assess vulnerabilities and systemic weaknesses at ports of entry and identifying possible officer training needs, but could do more to analyze the tests’ results. In response to its covert tests, CBP has delivered two required training courses for incumbent officers, but it has not evaluated the effectiveness of these courses. Also, OFO officials stated that supervisors identify CBP officer training needs. However, CBP faces challenges in establishing policies and procedures to guide its component offices’ efforts to implement and oversee training, and ensuring that it has reliable training data. Moreover, CBP has not conducted an analysis of possible skill gaps that may exist between identified critical skills all incumbent officers should possess and incumbent officers’ current skills. To identify vulnerabilities and weaknesses at U.S. ports of entry, CBP IA conducts covert tests in which undercover inspectors attempt to enter the United States with genuine documents used fraudulently. The tests are designed to provide a snapshot of the level of a port’s performance related to the testing objectives on a particular day. We examined CBP’s results of covert tests conducted over more than 2 years and found significant weaknesses in the CBP inspection process at the ports of entry that were tested.all ports, OFO officials stated that the tests are useful to identify possible Although the results are not fully generalizable to weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Following each covert test, IA prepared a written post-test summary of the tests and outcomes, debriefed with senior port management and headquarters officials, and provided data to OFO on the test outcomes. In some of the summaries, IA inspectors identified what they observed to be the key factors that contributed to successful outcomes, as well as potential vulnerabilities. In response to initial test results, OFO developed and mandated an updated annual fraudulent document course in August 2009. Also, in March 2010, OFO developed and mandated a “Back to Basics” course that emphasized the basic inspection duties that all CBP officers are required to perform during a primary inspection. In July 2011, OFO began implementing a follow-on course which includes more specific instruction. CBP administers postcourse evaluations to CBP officer trainees to obtain their feedback on the “Back to Basics” course but does not have plans to fully evaluate the effectiveness of this course by checking the extent to which the officers have retained the information over time. OTD officials stated that they conduct these types of evaluations for the newly hired CBP officer basic training but do not do so for this one for incumbent officers, due to time and cost constraints. However, we have previously reported that agencies should assess the extent to which training and development efforts contribute to improved performance and results to help ensure that the agency is not devoting resources to training that may An evaluation of the impact of these training courses on be ineffective.CBP officer performance could help CBP know the extent to which such training is a sufficient response to the covert test results or whether adjustments to the training or other management actions are needed. CBP has not conducted an analysis of all the possible causes or systemic issues that may be contributing to the test results. The protocols for covert tests state that IA will provide a comprehensive report at the conclusion of all cover tests that will summarize test results and identify systemic issues. As of August 2011, neither IA nor OFO have conducted such an analysis due to staffing and time constraints, according to IA and OFO officials. However, this type of analysis would help CBP identify any patterns or trends that indicate the extent to which CBP officer training, performance, or other systemic issues may contribute to the issues identified in the covert tests. Without a comprehensive assessment, it is difficult for CBP to identify the systemic issues underlying the test results. In December 2008, CBP issued a directive assigning general roles and responsibilities for training to OTD and other CBP offices, such as identifying OTD as the centralized leader for all CBP training. However, CBP has not established policies or procedures to guide component offices’ efforts to implement and oversee training. Figure 4 illustrates the key offices and positions that OFO identified as responsible for incumbent CBP officer training. OFO does not have a policy that specifies the roles and responsibilities of each of these offices and positions for training implementation and oversight. Federal regulations require that agencies establish policies governing employee training, including a statement of the alignment of employee training and development with agency strategic plans, the assignment of responsibility to ensure the training goals are achieved, and the delegation of training approval authority to the lowest appropriate level. In addition, internal control standards state, in a good control environment, areas of authority and responsibility are clearly defined and appropriate lines of reporting are established. Internal control standards also require that responsibilities be communicated within an organization. According to OFO, the OFO Programs and Policy branch is responsible for overseeing and coordinating the development of policy to govern incumbent officer training, including policy that assigns roles and responsibilities. According to the OFO officials, a policy would be useful because it helps clearly define the responsibilities of all offices involved in incumbent CBP officer training. Specifically, a policy outlining the roles and responsibilities of offices and positions for training would help clarify which offices and positions are responsible for ensuring incumbent officer training needs are identified and addressed. However, the acting branch chief of the OFO Programs and Policy branch stated staffing constraints have limited the branch’s ability to initiate the process of developing a policy that clearly assigns responsibility for all offices involved in CBP officer training. According to OFO officials, supervisors are responsible for identifying officer training needs and requesting training to meet these needs. For example, in June 2011, CBP instructed supervisors to identify training needs and use the post academy modules to address those needs. However, OFO could not provide a policy document outlining how supervisors would identify training needs and coordinate training. Also, according to the OFO officials, port management and field office directors are responsible for ensuring that CBP officers complete mandatory and other training related to their job duties. However, OFO officials in headquarters and at the ports stated that no policy exists that assigns these responsibilities to port management or field offices. In addition, senior CBP officials stated that Field Training Officers help ensure that CBP officers are receiving the training they need to perform their assigned duties, and that internal measures are in place to assess training needs and accomplishments nationwide. However, officials from the OFO Training branch stated that Field Training Officers are assigned to help deliver training to the ports but are not required to oversee the completion of required training by CBP officers at their respective ports. Further, OFO could not provide documentation confirming the roles and responsibilities of the Field Training Officer. A policy outlining the roles and responsibilities of offices and positions for training could help eliminate such confusion and clarify which offices and positions are responsible for identifying and addressing training needs and for holding these offices and individuals accountable for their responsibilities. CBP currently lacks reliable training completion records to ensure CBP officers received required training or other training relevant to their assigned duties. According to OTD and OFO officials, the training completion records maintained in TRAEN, CBP’s official record of training, are incomplete or contain inaccurate information, such as the dates of training completion. As a result, officials from OTD’s Office of Operations, which plans and manages the annual National Training Plan (NTP) budget, stated they developed their own records of training completions that consist of TRAEN records supplemented with data they gather from e-mail archives. Also, officials from two of the three ports we visited stated they rely on locally developed databases or data sources other than TRAEN to track CBP officers’ training records. We found, based on our analysis of TRAEN records, more than 4,000 onboard legacy customs officers have not completed the immigration fundamentals, immigration law, and agricultural fundamentals courses although they were required to complete them during the cross-training program. According to OFO officials, the training completion records maintained in TRAEN are incomplete, and it is unlikely that legacy officers did not complete required cross-training. Nevertheless, without reliable training records, CBP cannot provide reasonable assurance that all legacy customs officers completed required cross-training courses. OTD stated that CBP offices are responsible for recording their employees’ training records in TRAEN. However, CBP does not have a policy that assigns the responsibility for entering records to its offices or that assigns oversight responsibility to port management to ensure that their staff enter data into TRAEN completely and accurately. CBP is currently in the process of transferring the TRAEN system to the VLC and training CBP officials on how to properly enter training records in the new system. However, OFO and OTD officials stated that even trained employees sometimes do not enter training records completely or in a timely manner. Internal control standards state control activities—such as policies, procedures and management supervision—help to ensure that all transactions are completely and accurately recorded. Further, having reliable data could enable agency managers to compare actual performance to planned or expected results throughout the organization and analyze differences. Moreover, having reliable data to measure the degree to which CBP officers have completed required or recommended training for their assigned positions would put CBP in a better position to gauge the results of its cross-training program and other CBP officer training and measure its progress towards achieving CBP officer training goals. CBP has taken steps to identify training needs among incumbent CBP officers but has not conducted a comprehensive training needs assessment to identify and address potential gaps in incumbent officers’ current skills and competencies. Under executive order and federal regulations, agencies are to review, not less than annually, programs to identify training needs, establish priorities for training, and allocate resources in accordance with those priorities.development standards state that a training needs assessment is needed to identify knowledge or skill gaps and suggest material for new or follow- on training. Specifically, the analysis stage of training development includes conducting a training needs assessment to identify skill or knowledge gaps, conducting a job task analysis to identify critical competencies required for the target audience, and analyzing the target audience to develop appropriate training, among other steps. CBP has taken some steps to identify and analyze incumbent officer training needs. In 2008, CBP initiated the first job task analysis for the CBP officer position since 2003 by identifying nearly 300 job tasks and about 100 competencies that all incumbent CBP officers are expected to perform regardless of their currently assigned duties or port environment. In 2011, CBP also completed a curriculum gap analysis, which compared the newly revised basic academy curriculum with the previous basic academy training to identify new skills or material that incumbent CBP officers may not have learned in their basic academy training. For example, the previous curriculum trained CBP officers to perform 75 critical tasks while the newly revised curriculum trains newly hired officers to perform 138 critical tasks. According to OTD officials, the curriculum gap analysis identified a shift in the training philosophy and delivery methods and some changes in course content. For example, the revised training for newly hired officers aims to instill a law enforcement mindset by adding new courses in weapons training, evidence preservation, and courtroom testimony, among others, and by expanding courses that are designed to increase situational awareness and anti-terrorism vigilance among the CBP officers. It also increases physical conditioning and the number of hours of practical exercises related to conducting primary inspections and examining documents as well as course content to reflect new laws related to immigration processing and operating new equipment. The revised curriculum also adds more training in skills that CBP officers need to perform in secondary processing, including using appropriate computer systems and following procedures to verify passenger admittance. However, CBP has not conducted a training needs assessment or analyzed the target audience to determine what training is needed. For example, it has not evaluated potential gaps between the skills and competencies of current incumbent officers to identify appropriate training needs and possible gaps between (1) the nearly 300 job tasks and 100 competencies that all incumbent officers are expected to perform and (2) any additional skills and knowledge that are currently taught in the revised basic academy curriculum. In addition, CBP has not reviewed incumbent CBP officers’ previous training and experience, including cross-training or any on-the-job training, to identify what training they may have completed. OTD training standards state that it is important to review the previous experience and training to better identify the training needs for particular audiences. In 2007, we recommended that CBP develop data on cross-training programs to determine whether officers received required training so the agency may measure progress toward achieving its training goals. As of September 2011, CBP has not developed these data or measured the extent to which officers completed required cross-training. In June 2011, CBP retired the cross-training courses and replaced the courses with new postacademy modules that contain updated content. However, CBP could review the previous training records of its legacy and other incumbent officers to help identify what training they have completed and to identify which postacademy modules or other training they may need to take to perform their assigned duties. Conducting a comprehensive training needs assessment could help CBP analyze and identify potential skill gaps and training needs for incumbent officers—including legacy officers—and better position it to develop training to meet these needs, thus ensuring its officers are equipped to meet the operational demands at the border. OTD criteria state that CBP training managers may use a variety of techniques during a training needs assessment to gather and analyze information about the necessary training content for proposed training, including: interviews with SMEs; focus groups (moderated group interviews) involving SMEs and representatives of the learning audience; observation of and interviews with those performing a particular job or task in the field; review of course critiques, test results, and performance evaluations; instructional review, course audit, or content review of existing training; and review of field incident reports, critical factors identified, and lessons learned. OFO officials stated that a training needs assessment would be useful, but they have been unable to conduct one due to budget constraints and may not be able to undertake a comprehensive training needs assessment until fiscal year 2013, at the earliest. However, CBP could begin the initial steps of planning for a training needs assessment for incumbent officers in fiscal year 2012. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) guidance states that a training needs assessment should include a plan that sets goals or objectives for the training needs assessment; evaluates the agency readiness and identifies key roles; evaluates prior or other relevant needs assessments; prepares a project plan; and clarifies success measures and program milestones. This plan could be similar to the preparation of a project plan. Specifically, elements of a project plan include (1) establishing clear and achievable training goals; (2) balancing the competing demands for quality, scope, time, and cost; (3) adapting the specifications, plans, and approach to the different concerns and expectations of the various stakeholders involved in the project; and (4) developing milestone dates to identify points throughout the project to reassess efforts under way to determine whether project changes are necessary. OFO officials stated that such a plan could be helpful in initiating the process for conducting a training needs assessment. Project management standards also call for assigning responsibility and accountability for ensuring the results of program activities are carried out. Developing a project plan could also help CBP ensure that it is well-positioned to conduct a comprehensive training needs assessment in 2013 for its incumbent officers—while allowing for monitoring and oversight of the staff efforts through the completion of interim milestones to ensure progress in being made as intended. CBP has designed its training program for newly-hired CBP officers to comply with its standards. Such compliance can contribute to ensuring that newly-hired officers are prepared to accomplish CBP’s mission of securing the border and simultaneously facilitating the cross-border movement of millions of legitimate travelers and billions of dollars in international trade. However, CBP faces challenges in ensuring that the training needs of its nearly 20,000 incumbent CBP officers are properly identified and addressed. The results of its covert tests are not generalizable to the entire CBP officer population. However, they reveal a consistent pattern of weaknesses among the officers tested in their ability to perform basic tasks and these weaknesses have not been corrected. CBP has no plans for assessing the effectiveness of its “Back to Basics” course and subsequent follow-on training developed in response to the covert tests. Assessing the effectiveness in improving incumbent officer performance could help CBP management know if the training is a sufficient response to the weaknesses identified by the covert tests or if additional adjustments are needed. In addition, CBP has not established policies and procedures to guide OFO’s implementation and oversight of incumbent officer training, including entry of complete and accurate data into TRAEN. Having policies and procedures to ensure that managers are fulfilling their oversight responsibilities, including maintaining accurate and complete training records, could help improve CBP’s knowledge of whether incumbent CBP officers have been properly trained. Given CBP’s commitment to reinforcing the law enforcement mindset among all CBP officers, evaluating the training needs of the current CBP officers so that they can be addressed in a timely and cost-efficient manner is important. In addition, given budget constraints on training resources throughout the government, planning accordingly to ensure that skill needs of the incumbent CBP officers are assessed could help ensure that a road map is in place for conducting such an assessment thereby ensuring that CBP’s officer workforce is equipped to meet the operational demands at the border. To improve CBP training efforts, we recommend that the CBP Commissioner take the following four actions: (1) Conduct an evaluation of the effectiveness of the “Back to Basics” and subsequent follow-on training, (2) Conduct a comprehensive assessment of its covert test results to identify the causes of and systemic issues underlying the results, (3) Establish a policy that specifies roles and responsibilities for CBP officer training implementation and related oversight, including oversight responsibilities to ensure that training records are entered in TRAEN completely and accurately and (4) Develop a plan for conducting a training needs assessment to address any skill gaps for incumbent CBP officers and then implement that plan. We provided a draft of the sensitive version of this report to DHS for comment. DHS provided written comments which are reprinted in appendix III. In commenting on the sensitive version of this report, DHS, including CBP, agreed with the recommendations. Specifically, DHS stated that CBP is taking action or has taken action to address each recommendation. DHS agreed with the first recommendation that CBP conduct an evaluation of the effectiveness of the training course and subsequent follow-on training, and stated that the Office of Field Operations and the Office of Training and Development will work in partnership to determine if the Back to Basics and follow-on training had an effect on overall CBP officer performance by conducting a study and obtaining the results of any further covert tests by March 30, 2012. Regarding the second recommendation that CBP conduct a comprehensive assessment of its covert test results, DHS agreed and stated that the Office of Internal Affairs plans to conduct a comprehensive assessment of its covert test results for fiscal year 2011 by December 30, 2011. DHS agreed with the third recommendation that CBP establish a policy that specifies roles and responsibilities for CBP officer training implementation and related oversight, and stated that a policy will be developed by March 30, 2012, to clarify the training roles and responsibilities at all national and local levels to include the responsibility for maintaining accurate training records. Regarding the fourth recommendation that CBP develop a plan for conducting a training needs assessment to address any skill gaps for incumbent CBP officers and then implement that plan, DHS stated that OFO is coordinating with OTD to evaluate current training to identify any existing training gaps, and plan to address any identified needs through formal training by December 31, 2012. If effectively implemented, these actions should address the intent of the recommendations. DHS raised an issue regarding the report’s characterization of the DHS covert test results. Specifically, DHS stated that the covert tests were deliberately designed to test only a specific aspect of the overall primary inspection process within the wide range of inspectional duties that CBP officers perform and are not a valid measure of overall officers’ performance and capabilities or reliability of the entire admissibility process. The report noted that the test results are not generalizable to all ports of entry. However, OFO officials emphasized that the tests are informative in that they can help management identify possible weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the inspection process and in the CBP officer ability to perform basic tasks. Specifically, the tests are designed to provide a snapshot of the level of a port’s performance related to the testing objectives. Further, according to the protocols, the tests are designed to test and challenge CBP officers on their abilities, adherence to policies and procedures, and use of technologies to detect and prevent individuals attempting to enter the United States through the use of document fraud. OFO also developed and mandated an annual fraudulent document course based on the initial response to the covert test results. Nevertheless, we incorporated language throughout the report to clarify the objectives and the scope of the covert tests. We believe that this report presents a valid characterization of the covert test results and their potential uses. DHS also provided technical comments, which we incorporated into the report as appropriate. We will send copies of this report to the Department of Homeland Security, the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the appropriate congressional committees and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge at GAO’s website https://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8816 or stanar@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Other GAO contacts and staff acknowledgments are listed in appendix IV. In February 2009, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) management and the union that represents CBP officers reached an agreement to allow CBP officers the opportunity to bid and rotate to a new work unit, specialized team, or port location every 1 or 2 years. This bid-and- rotation system for CBP officers is based on seniority and is designed to increase officer morale and retain CBP officers. The system also provides port management the ability to assign CBP officers to units based on immediate, changing workload demands. The following list includes specialized teams that operate at all U.S. air, land, and sea ports of entry. Ports may have additional CBP officer specialized teams depending on their size, environment, and mission demands. These are the passenger work units charged with the interdiction of high- risk passengers attempting to facilitate surreptitious entry of contraband or who may be associated with terrorist activities. These are the work units charged with the use of automated systems to target high-risk passengers, conduct threat analysis, or using after-action reports to identify threats. This work unit is charged with processing violations to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) which may result in adverse actions, such as determination of inadmissibility to the United States. This work unit is charged with targeting and examining outbound commercial cargo for violations of law, rules or regulations. This work unit is charged with the use of automated systems to target high-risk commercial shipments, conduct analysis, or use after-action reports to identify threats. This work unit is charged with the inbound and/or outbound interdiction of narcotics and other contraband, including currency, arms and ammunition, as well as terrorist related materials in the cargo and/or passenger environments. This work unit is charged with providing nationally mandated and locally designed training including, but not limited to pre-academy, postacademy, virtual learning center, and unification training. This work unit is charged with the scheduling of all regular day and overtime assignments, as well as the administration of the Customs Officers Pay Reform Act, including, but not limited to, overtime cap compliance and annuity integrity. This work unit is charged with developing and conducting local firearms programs, including but not limited to, conducting required firearms qualifications and use of force training, maintaining quantities of firearms- related supplies and equipment, and conducting annual firearms inventory. The following mandatory courses are required either on a one-time basis or annually for all nonsupervisory Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers. The specialized courses were developed to enhance incumbent nonsupervisory CBP officer skills in specific areas and are not mandatory. In addition to the contact named above, Michael Dino, Assistant Director, Kathryn Bernet, Assistant Director, and Nanette J. Barton, Analyst-in- Charge, managed this assignment. Jennifer Bryant and Edith Sohna made significant contributions to the work. Stanley Kostyla assisted with design and methodology. Frances Cook provided legal support. Katherine Davis provided assistance in report preparation.

Summary: Recent incidents involving potential terrorists attempting to enter the country highlight the need for a vigilant and well-trained workforce at the border. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), within the Department of Homeland Security, is the lead federal agency in charge of inspecting travelers and goods for admission into the United States. About 20,000 CBP officers play a central role in ensuring that CBP accomplishes its mission of securing the border while also facilitating the movement of millions of legitimate travelers and billions of dollars in international trade. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which CBP has (1) revised its training program for newly hired CBP officers in accordance with training standards and (2) identified and addressed the training needs of incumbent CBP officers. GAO analyzed data and documentation related to the agencys training efforts, such as its covert test program and its training records. GAO also interviewed CBP officials and CBP officers. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in October 2011. Information CBP deemed sensitive has been redacted. CBP revised its training program for newly hired CBP officers in accordance with its own training development standards. Consistent with these standards, CBP convened a team of subject-matter experts to identify and rank the tasks that new CBP officers are expected to perform. As a result, the new curriculum was designed to produce a professional law enforcement officer capable of protecting the homeland from terrorist, criminal, biological and agricultural threats. In addition, the curriculum stated that the CBP officer is to draw conclusions and take appropriate action to identify behavioral indicators displayed by criminals, effectively interview travelers to identify potential threats, identify fraudulent documents, and use technology in support of the inspection process. CBP has taken some steps to identify and address the training needs of its incumbent CBP officers, but could do more to ensure that these officers are fully trained. GAO examined CBPs results of covert tests conducted over more than 2 years and found significant weaknesses in the CBP inspection process at the ports of entry that were tested. In response to these tests, CBP developed a Back to Basics course in March 2010 for incumbent officers but has no plans to evaluate the effectiveness of the training. Moreover, CBP has not conducted an analysis of all the possible causes or systemic issues that may be contributing to the test results. Further evaluation of the training and causes underlying covert test results could help inform CBP about whether the training is sufficient to address the weaknesses identified by the covert tests or if adjustments are needed. In addition, CBP offices are responsible for recording their employees training records; however, CBP does not have a policy that assigns responsibility to port management to ensure that their staff enter data into its training records system completely and accurately. A policy outlining the roles and responsibilities of offices and positions for training could help clarify which offices and positions are responsible for identifying and addressing training needs and for holding these offices accountable for their responsibilities. Moreover, CBP currently does not have reliable training completion records to ensure CBP officers received required training or other training relevant to their assigned duties. Based on GAOs analysis of training records, more than 4,000 customs officers have not completed the immigration fundamentals, immigration law, and agricultural fundamentals courses, although they were required to complete them during a cross-training program. According to CBP, the training completion records are incomplete, and it is unlikely that the officers did not complete the required cross-training. Nevertheless, without reliable training records; CBP cannot provide reasonable assurance that all customs officers completed the required cross-training. Further, CBP has not conducted a needs assessment that would identify any gaps between identified critical skills and incumbent officers current skills and competencies. A needs assessment could enhance CBPs ability to ensure its workforce is training to meet its mission. To improve CBP training efforts, GAO recommends that the CBP Commissioner evaluate the Back to Basics training course; analyze covert test results; establish a policy for training responsibilities, including oversight of training records; and, conduct a training needs assessment. CBP concurred with the recommendations and is taking steps to address them.