Estimates of the numbers of North Koreans outside of North Korea have varied widely over the past decade, according to NGOs and scholars. Estimates have ranged from 6,000 to over 300,000, depending on the source of the data and the time period in which the data were collected. Scholars and NGOs said that a number of factors can contribute to the variance in the estimates, including the following: Some countries in the region limit access to the North Korean population, thereby preventing NGOs, international organizations, and scholars from collecting comprehensive data. The UNHCR, the UN agency dedicated to the protection of refugees, has little access to North Korean refugees, according to UNHCR officials. Methodological variances among NGOs and scholars in accounting for the numbers of North Korean refugees. In part because methodologies are not readily shared among those who collect data, estimates on the higher side could include North Koreans on the border who have been double- counted because of the two-way flow of migration across the border for economic purposes of finding work, according to scholars. Conversely, scholars also said that some estimates might not include those North Koreans who transit through the region fairly quickly on their way to third countries for resettlement (see fig. 1). Difficulty obtaining comprehensive information on the estimates. Scholars told us that because of the political sensitivities surrounding the North Korean population outside of North Korea, those collecting data on the population are hesitant to share their data for fear they will reveal their sources or compromise their operations in country. One scholar stated that it would be helpful if information on estimates of North Koreans in the region could be shared among those collecting the data so that methodological approaches could be critiqued. NGOs and scholars told us that, within the last couple of years, the flow of North Koreans out of North Korea has slowed due to the tightening of the border and stricter scrutiny of North Korean migrants. One recent estimate noted that the current number of North Koreans in the region might be between 6,000 and 16,000 at any given time. Despite the tightening of the borders, NGOs and scholars pointed out that North Koreans are still transiting through Asia to seek resettlement in other countries. According to NGOs and South Korean officials, the composition of North Koreans who have resettled in South Korea has changed over the past decade. While the ratio of male and female North Koreans arriving in South Korea in the early 2000s was closer to equal, South Korean data show that the number of female refugees has steadily increased, with 77 percent of the total number of refugees entering South Korea for resettlement being female in 2009. In addition, some of the more recent North Korean arrivals tend to be family members of those North Koreans who are already in South Korea. South Korean data indicate that 75 percent of North Koreans who arrived in South Korea recently range in age from 20 years to 40 years. The USRAP processes refugee applications for resettlement in the United States through an interagency effort involving a number of governmental and nongovernmental entities overseas and in the United States. Table 1 provides a description of these entities and their role in the USRAP process. USRAP’s steps for processing North Korean refugees who have arrived in the United States for U.S. resettlement are shown in figure 2. We provide further explanation of certain steps in the USRAP process below. Case creation. North Koreans generally request consideration as refugees from a U.S. embassy or from UNHCR. Under the USRAP, a U.S. embassy submits a P-1 referral to State/PRM in Washington, D.C., and the DHS/USCIS Refugee Affairs Division in Washington, D.C., and they must concur in the granting of the USRAP access to the refugee applicant. After this concurrence, State requests or authorizes the OPE to create the case in the State’s WRAPS database. At this point, the refugee applicant begins the process for consideration for admission to the USRAP. Security checks. Once the OPE prescreening interview is completed, the OPE requests that U.S. government agencies conduct the required security checks. DHS approval. After the prescreening interview and usually after the security checks have been cleared, DHS/USCIS officers interview the refugee applicants and make a recommendation of either “approve,” “hold,” or “deny” for the case. The USCIS District Director or Deputy District Director must then review and agree with all recommendations before the case decision can be finalized. DHS/USCIS will not finalize approval for a case until all security checks have cleared. Once required security checks and medical screening are complete, and DHS/USCIS has determined that the refugee applicant is eligible for resettlement to the United States, the OPE confirms the resettlement location. Exit permission. After the United States has approved the refugee for resettlement and after the individual is ready to travel, the U.S. embassy or UNHCR requests exit permission from the government of the country where the refugee is being processed. According to U.S. officials involved in the processing of these cases, the exit permission process often entails ongoing communications with that government and can take several months. Arrival in the United States. Upon arrival in the United States, U.S. resettlement agencies and HHS provide eligible refugees with services and assistance, as noted in table 1. The USRAP opened cases for 238 North Korean refugee applicants from fiscal years 2005 to 2010, as of March 29, 2010. During this time period, the U.S. government, particularly State, took actions to facilitate the processing of North Korean refugees. However, the policies of some host countries affect U.S. processing times for North Korean refugees. From fiscal years 2006 to 2008, the most current year for which complete data were available, U.S. processing times did not improve. In addition, while processing times for North Koreans were lower in fiscal year 2006 than those of some other refugee populations, processing times were generally comparable in fiscal year 2008. The USRAP processed a total of 238 North Korean refugee applicant cases from fiscal years 2005 to 2010, as of March 29, 2010. During this time period, 94 of these individuals arrived in the United States, 107 withdrew their applications, 18 were rejected or denied, and 5 individual cases were closed. In addition, 14 individuals were pending, including 9 that were on hold awaiting medical or other clearances. Figure 3 shows the status of North Korean refugee cases. According to State, many North Koreans withdrew their applications when they realized that (1) they would be found ineligible for consideration because they had already been firmly resettled in South Korea or (2) resettlement in South Korea was faster and entailed fewer requirements than U.S. resettlement. All of the pending cases were created in fiscal years 2009 or 2010. These include active cases, some of which are awaiting exit permission, as well as cases that were put on hold. Cases may be on hold because they are awaiting medical clearance or clearance for other required security checks. According to U.S. and IOM officials, some North Korean applicants were required to complete medical treatment for tuberculosis, for which the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention requires 6 to 9 months of treatment before the U.S. government grants medical clearance and permission to travel to the United States. The U.S. government, particularly State, has taken actions to facilitate the U.S. resettlement process for North Korean refugees by placing a high priority on North Korean cases and providing additional resources to process these cases. In response to the NKHRA, the U.S. government places a high priority on the overseas processing of North Korean refugee cases, specifically the processing stages involving OPE prescreening, security checks, DHS/USCIS interviews, and U.S. resettlement agencies. OPE prescreening. State has directed the OPE to prioritize the prescreening interviews of all North Korean cases at the start of the process. To do so, the OPE schedules and conducts the prescreening interview for North Korean cases before all other refugee cases on its list, according to OPE officials. Security checks. State has prioritized the security checks for some North Korean cases. State/PRM told us they usually expedite the security checks for some North Korean cases that have been pending for more than 2 or 3 months. Conducting and clearing security checks involve a number of federal agencies, and this stage in USRAP can create delays in U.S. processing times, according to U.S. officials. DHS/USCIS interviews. State and DHS/USCIS prioritize North Korean cases by scheduling USCIS adjudication interviews with them before other refugee cases. According to DHS/USCIS officials, doing so can save a month or more in overall processing time. In addition, to expedite some North Korean cases that are urgent or of humanitarian concern, DHS/USCIS may conduct interviews before the security checks are cleared, whereas the standard protocol for most refugee populations is to conduct the USCIS interview afterwards. U.S. resettlement agencies’ assurance. A final part of the process that State has prioritized is finding and confirming the resettlement location and resettlement agency support for North Korean refugees who will soon arrive in the United States. For North Korean cases, State/PRM requests that U.S. resettlement agencies confirm the location and support upon arrival within 1 week, whereas this confirmation can take up to 4 weeks for other refugee populations, according to State/PRM. The U.S. government provides additional resources to process North Korean refugee applicant cases. A State/PRM official told us that, overall, each North Korean case usually requires more of State’s time and resources than a comparable refugee case from another country. According to another State/PRM official, North Korean cases at one point comprised 1 percent of State/PRM’s caseload in the region but 20 percent of PRM’s time. Since UNHCR is not permitted to access North Koreans in some of the countries in the region, State and DHS take over the refugee referral role. U.S. officials are also more involved in obtaining exit permission for North Koreans in some countries than they are for other refugee populations for which UNHCR or IOM typically assists with this step of the process. Because North Korean refugee cases are more labor intensive than other refugee cases, State/PRM and OPE officials said that in 2006, State created and funded a Korean-speaking special caseworker at the regional OPE to focus specifically on North Korean cases. According to officials at the regional OPE, North Koreans are the only population to which this OPE dedicates a special caseworker. The special caseworker facilitates processing by often serving as an interpreter during the prescreening and DHS/USCIS interviews or interactions with U.S. staff. In addition, the special caseworker sends a biweekly status report to State/PRM and DHS/USCIS and, as of early 2010, was in the process of establishing monthly meetings with the North Koreans to update them on the status of their case. As a result, processing of these cases is now more efficient, according to U.S. and OPE officials. Additionally, officials from U.S. and international organizations must spend time traveling to different locations in the region to process some North Korean refugee applicants, since North Koreans are often housed in shelters or immigration detention centers located throughout the region rather than a few refugee camps concentrated in one country. According to U.S. officials and international organizations, these trips can also lengthen the processing times for these cases. Some host countries’ policies affect the processing of North Korean refugee cases, according to officials from the U.S. government and international organizations. For example: Some host countries delay granting exit permission for North Korean refugees, which can add months to overall processing times, according to U.S. officials. These officials also told us that some host countries often delay granting exit permission because they do not want to become “magnets” for more North Koreans and do not want to facilitate the movement of North Korean refugees from the host country to the United States. In addition, State officials told us that some host countries grant exit permission to North Koreans seeking resettlement in South Korea faster than those seeking U.S. resettlement, thus leading to faster processing times for the South Korean-bound North Koreans. Some host countries consider North Korean refugee issues to be sensitive and prefer that these issues be handled discreetly, according to U.S. officials. Due to these sensitivities, U.S. officials have told us that processing North Korean cases often requires a high level of U.S. involvement. For example, State officials described North Korean refugee cases in which the U.S. government and host countries communicated intensively over extended periods of time before the U.S. government received permission to process these cases or received exit permission in these countries. According to U.S. officials, one reason for these countries’ reluctance to assist in the U.S. processing of North Korean cases is concern about creating tensions with the North Korean government. Some host countries do not recognize any North Koreans as “refugees” and limit access to them. Some host governments consider North Koreans to be illegal or economic migrants, and thus do not offer them protection as refugees. Some of these countries are also not parties to the UN Protocol and Convention on Refugees and do not allow UNHCR access to North Korean refugees, according to UNHCR officials. In some of these countries, UNHCR does not assist the United States during the processing of North Korean refugee applicant cases. U.S. and OPE officials told us that some countries can also limit U.S. government and international organizations’ access to North Korean refugee applicants by requiring them to request permission for meetings with these refugees during processing, which can cause delays. Overall, average processing times did not improve for the 85 cases created in fiscal years 2006 to 2008 that arrived in the United States. Average processing times increased from 133 days in fiscal year 2006 to 314 days in fiscal year 2008 (see fig. 4). State officials said that one host country limited U.S. government access to North Koreans in fiscal years 2007 and 2008, which resulted in longer average processing times for cases created in those years. Furthermore, for those stages in the overseas process that are primarily handled by the U.S. government—the stages between case creation and DHS approval—we found that average processing times did not improve from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year 2009. Average processing times in fiscal year 2009 (147 days) were faster than in fiscal years 2007 (284 days) and 2008 (192 days), but slower than in fiscal year 2006 (65 days) (see fig. 5). The time period from case creation to DHS approval includes all of the pending cases that were created in fiscal year 2009 that were excluded from figure 4. We have complete data through fiscal year 2009 for the processing times of North Korean cases that pertain to the stages between case creation and DHS approval. According to State data from fiscal years 2006 to 2008, processing times for North Koreans in fiscal year 2008 were generally comparable to those of some other refugee populations that require similar security checks, as well as to those of some other refugee populations in the region. (See figs. 6 and 7.) When compared to two other refugee populations that require similar security checks—Iraqi and Sudanese refugees—there were greater disparities in average processing times in fiscal year 2006 compared to fiscal years 2007 and 2008; however disparities have lessened over time. For example, in fiscal year 2006, average processing times for North Koreans were 287 days faster than average processing times for Iraqis, but were 74 days slower than these times for Iraqis in fiscal year 2008. Processing times for North Koreans in fiscal year 2008 were also generally comparable to those of three other refugee populations who are processed in the region, namely Burmese, Chinese, and Vietnamese refugees. While there were disparities in average processing times for North Korean refugees compared to these populations in fiscal year 2006, these disparities lessened over time. For example, in fiscal year 2006, average processing times for North Koreans were 424 days faster than average processing times for Burmese, but only 23 days faster in fiscal year 2008. There are substantially fewer North Korean refugee cases than Iraqi, Sudanese, Burmese, or Vietnamese refugee cases, as described in the notes to figures 6 and 7. A number of factors can affect processing times for all refugee populations, including North Koreans as described earlier. While we discussed factors that affect processing times of North Korean cases, the factors affecting other populations were outside the scope of our review. In the United States, North Koreans have applied for asylum protection through two processes—the affirmative and the defensive. DHS/USCIS identified 33 North Koreans who have applied for asylum in the United States from October 2004 through March 2010, but the actual number is likely higher. North Koreans have sought asylum status in the United States through either the affirmative or defensive process. The asylum process for North Koreans is generally similar to that of individuals of other nationalities, except that DHS/USCIS conducts an additional review of North Korean cases. In the affirmative asylum process, individuals, including North Koreans, who are physically in the United States—regardless of how they arrived or their current immigration status—may present an asylum application to DHS/USCIS. Following the initiation of background checks, a DHS/USCIS asylum officer conducts a non-adversarial interview with the applicant to verify the applicant’s identity, determine whether the applicant is eligible for asylum, and evaluate the credibility of the applicant’s asylum claim. If the asylum officer finds the applicant is eligible for asylum, the officer issues an approval and the applicant can remain in the United States. If the asylum officer finds the applicant is ineligible for asylum but the applicant is otherwise in lawful immigration status, the asylum officer denies the claim and the applicant can remain in the United States under the terms of his or her lawful status. However, if the applicant is determined to be ineligible for asylum and does not otherwise have a lawful immigration status, then the applicant is placed in removal proceedings and the case is referred to an EOIR Immigration Judge for a hearing. Through the defensive asylum process, applicants, including North Koreans, request asylum as a defense against removal from the United States and can be held in detention while their case is processed. According to DHS/USCIS officials, individuals generally enter the defensive asylum process in one of three ways: (1) as a referral to an EOIR Immigration Judge following a finding of ineligibility in an affirmative asylum application; (2) by asserting a claim of asylum after they are apprehended in the United States and placed into removal proceedings because they are in violation of their immigration status or do not have proper documentation; or (3) after being detained at a port of entry without proper documentation or apprehended near a port of entry within 14 days of their illegal entry, being placed in expedited removal proceedings, and asserting a fear of return or intention to apply for asylum and after a DHS/USCIS asylum officer finds that they have a credible fear of persecution or torture. Adjudication of asylum claims in immigration court is “adversarial” in that the EOIR Immigration Judge receives the applicant’s claim and then hears arguments about the applicant’s eligibility for asylum from the applicant and the U.S. government, which is represented by a DHS/Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) attorney. The EOIR Immigration Judge then makes an eligibility determination, which can be appealed by either the applicant or the U.S. government. Immigration Judges can grant asylum to applicants, allowing them to stay in the United States, or deny asylum and order them to be removed from the United States unless they qualify for another form of relief. DHS/ICE enforces alien detention and removal. Appendix VI provides more information about the affirmative and defensive asylum processes. North Koreans and North Koreans with South Korean citizenship claiming asylum through the affirmative process or who claim a credible fear of persecution or torture during expedited removal proceedings receive an additional level of review at USCIS Asylum Division headquarters. DHS/USCIS officials stated that, because North Korean asylum seekers may attract national media attention or a high-level U.S. government interest, USCIS headquarters must review North Korean asylum cases before rendering a final decision. DHS/USCIS asylum field offices send the USCIS Asylum Division headquarters a packet containing the asylum application or credible fear worksheet, a draft assessment of the case, and other supporting documents. Asylum officers at USCIS headquarters review the case to ensure that proper procedures were followed and the decision on the case is legally sufficient. According to DHS/USCIS officials, North Korean asylum cases follow the same process as affirmative asylum cases of other nationalities apart from this case review. Since some North Koreans seeking asylum have citizenship in both North Korea and South Korea, according to USCIS and EOIR officials, U.S. asylum decisions for North Koreans can be affected by the issues of dual citizenship. Under U.S. law, North Koreans holding South Korean citizenship must establish a fear of persecution or torture in South Korea, as well as North Korea, to obtain asylum in the United States. Historically, UNHCR and the international community, including the United States, viewed South Korea as the third-country resettlement of choice. The constitution of the Republic of Korea, known as South Korea, states that the territory of South Korea shall consist of the Korean Peninsula and its adjacent islands. According to South Korean officials, since the South Korean constitution considers all Koreans on the Korean Peninsula, including North Koreans, to be citizens of South Korea, North Koreans generally are entitled to South Korean citizenship, with some exceptions. However, the 2004 NKHRA sought to clarify that North Koreans are not barred from eligibility for refugee or asylum consideration in the United States on account of any legal right to citizenship that they may enjoy under the South Korean constitution. Accordingly, USCIS and EOIR officials told us that North Korean citizens applying for asylum who have not availed themselves of South Korean citizenship only need to establish a fear of persecution or torture in North Korea, while those North Koreans who have availed themselves of South Korean citizenship must establish a fear of persecution or torture in both countries. USCIS and EOIR make a determination regarding the North Korean applicant’s citizenship before determining eligibility for U.S. asylum. DHS/USCIS officials stated that at least one North Korean with South Korean citizenship was placed in the defensive asylum process after the individual was found to have a credible fear of persecution or torture in both North and South Korea. According to EOIR data, the North Korean was granted asylum. DHS/USCIS identified 33 North Koreans—including their dependents (some of whom may not be North Korean)—who have sought asylum in the United States since fiscal year 2005 through either the affirmative asylum or credible fear process. Of the 33 North Korean asylum seekers, 9 have been granted asylum, 15 are pending, as of March 2, 2010, and 9 individual cases were closed or resolved for other reasons (“other decisions”). A North Korean applicant receives a grant of asylum if USCIS or the EOIR Immigration Judge determines that the applicant is eligible for asylum. The asylee can remain in the United States indefinit unless asylum is terminated. The 33 North Korean asylum seekers comprise a total of 25 asylum cases, of which 7 cases were grante asylum. Furthermore, 24 North Koreans originally sought asylum thro he the affirmative asylum process. Nine North Koreans were placed in t credible fear process, and when found eligible, applied for asylum with EOIR in the defensive asylum process. Table 2 provides a summary of the outcomes for North Korean asylum seekers since fiscal year 2005. We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State, Homeland Security, Justice, and Health and Human Services. State, DHS, and DOJ provided technical comments, which have been incorporated throughout the report, as appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional committees and to the Secretaries of State, Homeland Security, Justice, and Health and Human Services. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-9601 or melitot@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix VII. In this report, we (1) assess the U.S. government’s efforts to facilitate the processing of North Korean refugees overseas for resettlement in the United States, and (2) determine the number of North Koreans who have sought asylum to remain in the United States and the process by which they may do so. Because Congress passed the North Korean Human Rights Act (NKHRA) in 2004, we focused our data collection efforts on fiscal years 2005 through 2010. To assess how the U.S. government processes North Korean refugees, we reviewed documents from the Departments of State (State) and Homeland Security (DHS) related to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP). We also interviewed officials from State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM); State’s Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs; State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; State’s Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons; State’s Office of the Special Representative for North Korea Policy; DHS Security Advisory Opinion Review Board; and DHS/U.S. Citizenship and Immigrations Services (USCIS). Additionally, in Asia we interviewed representatives from the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the regional Overseas Processing Entity (OPE) to understand the various steps in overseas and domestic refugee processing. We spoke with both U.S.- and South Korean- based nongovernmental organizations (NGO), academics, think tanks, and resettled North Koreans living in the United States to learn about the characteristics of the North Korean refugee population; the challenges that North Korean refugees face in their journeys from North Korea to gain access to refugee admissions processing in Asia; and factors that North Koreans consider when deciding in which country to resettle. We also analyzed aggregate and country-specific data from State’s Worldwide Refugee Admissions Processing System (WRAPS) to determine the processing times for North Korean refugees from fiscal years 2005 to 2010. We asked State to provide us WRAPS data on an individual level because some cases in WRAPS include more than one individual. To determine the reliability of WRAPS data on North Korean refugees, we interviewed State/PRM and OPE officials who input, monitor, and use these data about procedures for collecting data and ensuring their accuracy. We also reviewed the data at various stages of the refugee resettlement process and analyzed the WRAPS Privacy Impact Assessment. We determined that these data were sufficiently reliable to calculate the processing times for North Korean cases created (1) between fiscal years 2006 and 2008 for the total number of days between case creation and arrival in the United States, and (2) between fiscal years 2006 and 2009 for the total number of days between case creation and DHS approval of the case. We made this determination because decisions on DHS approval had been made for all pending cases created in fiscal year 2009 and prior years, but not all of the pending cases that were created in fiscal year 2009 had arrived in the United States, and therefore we did not have complete data on arrivals for that year. However, although we worked to identify delays in U.S. processing through interviews and an examination of the aggregate data, we did not have access to individual-level data on the factors that might influence processing times. Consequently, we were not able to probe these factors using statistical modeling techniques, and cannot comment on the extent to which changes in processing times might be attributable to factors such as State Department or Asian countries’ actions. To determine the number of North Koreans who have sought asylum to remain in the United States and the process by which they may do so, we reviewed relevant statutes as well as documentation and data from USCIS and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) within DHS and from the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) within the Department of Justice (DOJ). We also interviewed officials from these agencies. We analyzed data from USCIS’s Refugees, Asylum, and Parole System (RAPS) to determine the number of North Korean affirmative asylum applicants processed from fiscal years 2005 to 2010. To determine the reliability of RAPS data on North Korean asylum applicants, we interviewed DHS/USCIS officials about their procedures for collecting affirmative asylum application data and ensuring their accuracy. In addition, we asked about data limitations and analyzed the RAPS Privacy Impact Assessment and System of Records. We also obtained data from USCIS’s Asylum Prescreening System (APSS) to determine the number of North Korean credible fear applicants processed between fiscal years 2005 and 2010. To determine the reliability of APSS data on North Korean asylum applicants, we interviewed DHS/USCIS officials about their procedures for collecting the credible fear data and ensuring their accuracy. USCIS databases contain data on all citizens of North Korea in both affirmative and credible fear cases, according to USCIS. We requested data on North Korean asylum cases in the defensive process from EOIR. However, EOIR was not able to provide comprehensive data on its North Korean asylum cases without a manual review of individual cases. According to EOIR officials, asylum applicants with North Korea as their country of birth may have been categorized as South Koreans in EOIR databases because, in accordance with eligibility requirements in the INA, the database only tracks country of nationality and not birth, making a manual review necessary to provide accurate data. EOIR officials also stated that they did not have resources necessary to perform a manual review. We determined that the RAPS and APSS data were sufficiently reliable to report on the North Korean affirmative asylum cases and credible fear cases from fiscal years 2005 to 2010. However, these data may not represent all North Korean asylum cases filed during this time period because EOIR was not able to provide data on North Koreans who first claimed asylum defensively in front of an EOIR Immigration Judge. To describe the resettlement benefits offered to North Korean refugees both in the United States and in South Korea and to describe the resettlement experiences of North Koreans, which are discussed in appendixes II and III of this report, we reviewed relevant laws, regulations, and policies regarding government-funded refugee resettlement programs in both countries. We obtained documentation and spoke with officials at State/PRM and the Department of Health and Human Service’s (HHS) Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR). Through field work in South Korea, we met with South Korean officials from the Ministry of Unification to discuss the assistance and social services that the South Korean government provides to North Koreans. Information on South Korea’s resettlement program to North Koreans was provided by the South Korean Ministry of National Unification and was not independently verified. We also visited the Hanawon Social Adaptation Education facility, a South Korean government-run facility, to observe the social adaptation training provided to North Koreans and the Hangyeore Middle and High School to see how North Korean students receive special educational courses to prepare them for entrance into the South Korean school system. In addition, we spoke with six resettlement agencies that have resettled North Koreans in the United States: Episcopal Migration Ministries, International Rescue Committee, Church World Service, Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, and World Relief. We met with NGOs in both the United States and South Korea who provide services to resettled North Koreans to discuss the challenges that they have faced in serving this population. We also interviewed several North Korean refugees who have resettled in the United States about their experiences. Their views or experiences may not be representative of all North Korean refugees. German, British, Japanese, and Canadian foreign officials and embassies provided us with data on North Koreans who have sought humanitarian protection in countries other than the United States. We did not conduct a data reliability assessment on this information because we are providing these data for background purposes only. We conducted this performance audit from August 2009 to June 2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on audit objectives. Both the United States and South Korea offer resettlement benefits to North Koreans that cover immediate needs assistance, cash and medical assistance, social and employment services, and other needs. By law, U.S. resettlement assistance and services are provided to refugees without regard to race, religion, nationality, sex, or political opinion. North Koreans receive the same benefits and access to federal programs as all other refugee populations. The United States, which resettles more refugees than any other country, resettled refugees from 69 countries in fiscal year 2008, according to State. The 99 North Koreans who have resettled in the United States represent a very small portion of the approximately 260,000 refugees resettled in the United States since fiscal year 2006. Almost all of the refugees in South Korea are North Korean, and South Korea’s resettlement program was specifically created to provide benefits and services for North Koreans. Approximately 18,000 North Koreans have resettled in South Korea since the 1950s, while only 268 individuals who were not from North Korea have been granted refugee or humanitarian status in South Korea since 1994, according to South Korean government officials. The South Korean Ministry of Unification manages the resettlement program, and almost 50 percent of the Ministry’s budget is allocated for the resettlement of North Koreans, according to Ministry reports. According to South Korean officials, the government has tailored its resettlement program to specifically reflect the changing needs of resettled North Koreans over time. Both governments’ resettlement benefits cover immediate needs (fig. 8), cash and medical assistance (fig. 9), social and employment services (fig.10), and other benefits (fig. 11). Reception irport. Trporttion to reettlement detintion. $1,100 to provide for initil food, housing, necessary clothing; referr to medicl, trining, nd other ociervice progr. (from date of Hanawon graduation, in years) 12-week government-rn trining coe tht cover topic such as initiettlement support; mentability nd helth edtion; creer gidnce nd basic voctionl trining; nd introdction to Sth Koreociety nd overcoming ocio-cltl difference. -week coe focusing on locervice nd assnce nd pting to ociety. Issuance of permnent reidence nd reident regitrtion crd. Leased rtment nd $11,456 for ecrity depoit. Two assnt offer intenive reettlement support fter fmily move into commnity. Both the United States and South Korea provide benefits to address the immediate needs of resettled North Koreans (see fig. 8). Refugees are eligible for State/PRM-funded basic needs support and services when they arrive in the United States. As of January 1, 2010, State/PRM provided the resettlement agencies with $1,800 per refugee to cover the direct and administrative costs of these services, of which at least $1,100 must be designated for the direct support of the refugee’s short-term living expenses. To facilitate North Koreans’ resettlement, the South Korean government established the Hanawon Social Adaptation Education facility in 1999 to provide North Koreans with a 12-week training course before they resettle in local communities. The Hanawon curriculum is divided into four categories: mental stability and health education, career guidance and basic vocational training, introduction to South Korean society and overcoming socio-cultural differences, and initial settlement support. Following graduation from Hanawon and resettlement in a South Korean community, North Koreans may continue their education through local Hana Centers that provide an additional 3 weeks of job and employment training. South Korea helps North Koreans find rental units and provides the security deposit as well as the resettlement assistants who offer additional support after a family moves into a South Korean community. Time-limited casassnce nd other support ervice for qualifying low-income individua with dependent children. 200 TANF level te rnged from $170 to $92 per month for ingle-prent fmily of three. Casassnce to low-income individua who re ged, lind, or disabled. Progrimilr to TANF for refgee who do not qualify for TANF. Helth cre coverge for qualifying low-income individua. Progrimilr to Medicid for refgee who do not qualify for Medicid. (from date of Hanawon graduation, in years) One-time pyment of $2,644 t gruation from Hwon, with dditionl $2,644 in quarterly inllment. Pyment of $1,571 over 5-yer period for eligile North Kore with disabilitie. Pyment of $6,45 over 5-yer period for individua over 60 ye of ge t gruation from Hwon. Casassnce of $ month for qualifying low-income fmilie. Free medicervice Sth Koren hopit for qualifying low-income fmilie. Both the United States and South Korea provide resettled North Koreans with cash and medical assistance (see fig. 9). North Korean refugees may be eligible for a number of longer-term U.S. federal public benefit programs—including TANF, Medicaid and CHIP, and SSI for up to 7 years generally, depending on the program and the state. Refugees who are not eligible for TANF, SSI, Medicaid, or CHIP may be eligible for ORR funded Refugee Cash Assistance and Refugee Medical Assistance for up to 8 months, according to HHS. In South Korea, resettled North Koreans receive a one-time financial benefit, or endowment, valued at approximately $5,000 upon their entry into South Korean society. Qualified low-income families also receive free medical care indefinitely at South Korean hospitals as well as minimum living support of $353 per month indefinitely. Emphas on ecring erly employment for refgee, inclding employment preption nd jo plcement nd retention ervice. (from date of Hanawon graduation, in years) Finncil incentive for mintining able employment for t least 6 month; mximm of $19,740 in comintion with jo trining incentive. Finncil incentive for ndergoing t least 500 ho of jo trining, inclding quiring technicl licen; p to $19,740 in comintion with employment incentive. Service inclding pychologicl coeling, jo trining, nd employment assnce. Compnie hiring North Koren employee receive subsidy equivlent to hlf of the employee'ge. Provide assnce with ecring government-issued docment nd ccessing finncind medicassnce. Up to 8 month Provide assnce on ccessing voctionl trining nd finding jobs. ORR social service benefits are not subject to financial eligibility criteria. ORR social services include citizenship and naturalization preparation services as well as referral and interpretation services, which may be offered beyond 5 years. The employment and job training incentives are provided per individual. Both the United States and South Korea provide social and employment services for resettled North Koreans (see fig. 10). In the United States, ORR social services emphasize the preparation of refugees for job placement and retention. In addition, ORR’s program offers a wide range of services that include employability services, such as English language instruction, vocational training, and on-the-job training. North Koreans in South Korea may also access social and employment services. For example, North Koreans may receive financial payments as incentives for maintaining stable employment or undergoing job training, including acquiring technical licenses. The combined maximum value of these incentives is about $20,000. The Hana Centers also provide psychological counseling to North Koreans for up to 1 year following their resettlement. The South Korean government also pays companies half of the wages of their North Korean employees for up to 3 years. ears. Food assnce for qualifying low-income individua. (from date of Hanawon graduation, in years) Subsidy of p to $2,291 for reettling oide of the cpitl city, Seol. Locl police officer provide protection. Fll tition t public middle chool, high chool, nd niverity; hlf tition t privte niverity. Bording chool for North Koredent to prepre them for the trition to the Sth Korechool tem. North Korean refugees in the United States and South Korea may receive additional benefits (see fig. 11). For example, eligible refugees in the United States can qualify for food assistance under SNAP. Aside from the major federal benefit programs available to eligible refugees, there are additional programs such as school lunch programs for children of eligible refugees. The South Korean government provides North Koreans with a personal safety counselor for protection indefinitely as well as a subsidy to resettle outside of the capital city, Seoul. In addition, the South Korean government may provide long-term tuition assistance for those North Koreans attending higher education institutions. Notably, the South Korean government has established a system to support the education and integration of North Korean children. For example, the government- funded Hangyeore Middle and High School, established in 2006, was specifically designed to address the needs of North Korean students and serve as a transition school until the students are ready to enter regular South Korean schools. Children at Hangyeore stay at the boarding school for 6 months to 2 years depending on their individual performance. According to the school’s principal, the school’s mission is to (1) match the age group of the students with their abilities in school, (2) enhance students’ learning capabilities, (3) help students to overcome cultural differences, and (4) help students to heal psychologically. North Koreans who have resettled in the United States and in South Korea come from an isolated society with limited or no exposure to capitalism and can therefore face economic difficulties. According to some of the North Korean refugees we spoke with in the United States, they have encountered difficulties finding jobs and affording basic living expenses. South Korean and U.S. officials also noted that North Koreans in South Korea have high rates of unemployment. In addition, North Koreans also have difficulties learning basic day-to-day skills, such as using supermarkets, credit cards, and public transportation. According to NGOs and government officials, North Koreans face linguistic, cultural, and social challenges in both the United States and South Korea. For example, North Koreans who are now resettled in the United States told us about their struggles adjusting to a new language and culture. Even in South Korea, North Koreans face difficulties with the Korean language due to the differences in dialects. In addition, North Koreans in South Korea face social problems and have higher school drop- out, crime, and alcoholism rates, according to South Korean and U.S. government officials. Obtaining medical care has also been a challenge for some North Koreans. Since some North Koreans arrive in the United States in poor health and have suffered traumatic and stressful experiences, obtaining and affording medical care has been important, according to resettled North Korean refugees and NGOs. State/PRM, OPE, and IOM officials have told us that some North Koreans face mental health issues and psycho-social problems, in addition to physical problems. Some North Koreans who have resettled in the United States and South Korea have overcome some of the challenges of assimilating into a new culture and society and have achieved accomplishments such as obtaining higher educational degrees. According to an NGO, some North Koreans who have resettled in the United States have passed their General Educational Development Test or are attending community college. Moreover, during our fieldwork in South Korea we heard of 10 North Korean students who attended medical school in South Korea after finishing high school. In addition, some resettled North Koreans have become business owners, according to NGO and South Korean government sources. Finally, some resettled North Koreans have established or work for NGOs in South Korea that assist other resettled North Koreans. For example, Dr. Lee Ae-Ran, the first female North Korean defector to receive a doctoral degree in South Korea, has established a number of organizations to assist other North Koreans in South Korea. She was awarded the 2010 U.S. State Department International Women of Courage award for her accomplishments. As illustrated in figure 12, approximately 18,000 North Koreans have resettled in South Korea since the end of the Korean War, according to South Korean government data. The number of North Koreans resettling in South Korea has increased since 2000 with some years, namely calendar years 2004 and 2006, seeing an annual increase of 46 percent or more. The number of North Korean refugees arriving in South Korea increased 5 percent from calendar years 2008 to 2009. According to data from the South Korean government, 81 percent of the resettled North Koreans in South Korea are from the Hamgyeong Province in the northeast area of North Korea. In recent years, the percentage of North Korean refugees who are women has increased from about 50 percent in 2001 to about 77 percent in 2009, according to South Korean data. This appendix provides data on North Korean applicants for humanitarian protection status in the United Kingdom, Germany, Canada, and Japan. Humanitarian protection status includes refugee status, asylum status, and other immigration statuses governments extend on humanitarian grounds. Each country has different definitions of refugee or asylum seeker; thus, countries’ data are not directly comparable. The United Kingdom, Germany, Canada, and Japan have provided North Koreans with a humanitarian protection status to allow them to remain in their countries. As shown in table 3, from calendar year 2006 to September 30, 2009, the United Kingdom received a total of 665 applications filed by North Koreans for a humanitarian protection status. According to the British Embassy, the United Kingdom granted 350 North Korean cases humanitarian protection status during this time period. From calendar years 2000 through 2009, 329 North Korean individuals applied for a humanitarian protection status in Germany, as shown in table 4. German Embassy officials informed us that Germany granted a humanitarian protection status to 189 North Korean individuals from calendar years 2000 through 2003. Since calendar year 2003, two North Koreans have been granted a humanitarian protection status in Germany. As shown in table 5, from calendar years 2000 through 2009, 217 North Korean individuals applied for humanitarian protection status in Canada. According to a Canadian official, the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board had granted 76 of these North Koreans humanitarian protection status, with 66 granted in calendar year 2009. Japanese officials informed us that over 100 North Koreans have entered Japan on humanitarian grounds. They did not provide us with additional information. Individuals can acquire asylum status in the United States through either the affirmative process or the defensive process. Figure 13 outlines the steps involved in both the affirmative and defensive asylum processes. In the affirmative asylum process, individuals who are physically in the United States, regardless of how they arrived or their current immigration status, may present an asylum application to DHS/USCIS. Following the initiation of background checks, a DHS/USCIS asylum officer conducts a non-adversarial interview with the applicant to verify the applicant’s identity, determine whether the applicant is eligible for asylum, and evaluate the credibility of the applicant’s asylum claim. DHS/USCIS asylum officers can also request a comment letter from State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) on a particular case. These comment letters help inform the asylum officers’ decisions on cases by providing information on general country conditions and information specific to an individual applicant’s situation that may not be accessible from other sources. In the case of dual citizenship, the DRL comment letter could include information on both countries. If the DHS/USCIS asylum officer finds the applicant is eligible for asylum, the officer issues an approval and the applicant can remain in the United States. If the DHS/USCIS asylum officer finds the applicant is ineligible for asylum but the applicant is otherwise in lawful immigration status, the asylum officer issues a Notice of Intent to Deny to the applicant, who then has 16 days to provide a rebuttal. The DHS/USCIS asylum officer considers the rebuttal, if any, prior to issuing a final denial or grant of asylum. If the DHS/USCIS asylum officer issues a final denial of asylum status, the applicant can remain in the United States under the terms of his or her lawful status. However, if the applicant is determined to be ineligible for asylum and does not otherwise have a lawful immigration status, then the applicant is placed in removal proceedings and the case is referred to an Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) Immigration Judge for a hearing. Through the defensive asylum process, applicants request asylum as a defense against removal from the United States and can be held in detention while their case is processed. According to DHS/USCIS officials, individuals are generally placed in the defensive asylum process in one of three ways. DHS/USCIS can refer them to an EOIR Immigration Judge after a finding of ineligibility in an affirmative asylum application. They can assert a claim of asylum after they are apprehended in the United States and placed into removal proceedings because they are in violation of their immigration status or do not have proper documentation. DHS can place them in the defensive asylum process if they are detained at a port of entry without proper documentation or are apprehended near a port of entry within 14 days of their illegal entry, they are being placed in expedited removal proceedings they assert a fear of return or intention to apply for asylum, and after a DHS/USCIS asylum officer finds that they have a credible fear of persecution or torture (“the credible fear process”). Adjudication of asylum claims in immigration court is “adversarial” in that the EOIR Immigration Judge receives the applicant’s claim and then hears arguments about the applicant’s eligibility for asylum from the applicant and the U.S. government, which is represented by a DHS/ICE attorney. The Immigration Judge then makes an eligibility determination, which can be appealed by either the applicant or the U.S. government. Immigration Judges can grant asylum to applicants, allowing them to stay in the United States, or deny asylum and order them to be removed from the United States unless they qualify for another form of relief. DHS/ICE enforces removal orders by coordinating alien deportation and repatriation. In addition to the persons named above, Cheryl Goodman, Assistant Director; Andrea Miller; Teresa Abruzzo; Georgina Scarlata; Debbie Chung; Martin de Alteriis; and Mary Moutsos made key contributions to this report. Technical assistance was provided by Muriel Brown, Etana Finkler, Mike Maslowski, Chhandasi Pandya, and Jena Sinkfield.

Summary: Famine killed hundreds of thousands of North Koreans in the 1990s and compelled a large number of others to leave in search of food, economic opportunities, and escape from a repressive regime. This migration continues. Some North Koreans seek resettlement in other countries, such as South Korea and the United States. To promote a more durable humanitarian solution to the plight of North Korean refugees, Congress passed the North Korean Human Rights Act in 2004. In reauthorizing the Act in 2008, Congress found that delays in processing North Korean refugees have led refugees to abandon their quest for U.S. resettlement. GAO was asked to (1) assess the U.S. government's efforts to facilitate the processing of North Korean refugees who request resettlement in the United States from overseas, and (2) determine the number of North Koreans who have sought asylum to remain in the United States and the process by which they may do so. GAO is issuing a separate classified annex to this report. GAO analyzed data on North Korean refugees and asylees, interviewed agency officials, and conducted fieldwork in Asia. This report does not contain recommendations. The Departments of State (State), Homeland Security, and Justice provided technical comments and GAO incorporated these comments, as appropriate. The U.S. government has taken actions to facilitate the U.S. resettlement of North Korean refugees from overseas, but processing times did not improve from fiscal years 2006 to 2008 due in part to some host countries' policies. The United States opened cases for 238 North Korean refugee applicants from October 2004 through March 2010, and 94 of these North Koreans arrived in the United States. As part of its recent actions to facilitate the processing of North Korean refugees, State has placed a high priority on these cases and provided additional staff time and resources to process these cases. However, according to U.S. officials, some U.S. requirements, such as conducting and clearing security checks, can delay U.S. processing. According to officials from the U.S. government and international organizations, the policies of some host countries also can affect U.S. processing of North Korean refugees. For example, some host countries delay granting North Korean refugees permission to leave their countries. Average processing times for North Koreans did not improve from fiscal years 2006 to 2008, the most recent year for which complete data were available. State officials said that one host country limited U.S. government access to North Koreans in fiscal years 2007 and 2008, resulting in longer average processing times for cases created in those years. While processing times for North Koreans were lower in fiscal year 2006 than those of some other refugee populations, the processing times were generally comparable in fiscal year 2008. From October 1, 2004, through March 2, 2010, at least 33 North Koreans have sought asylum protection to remain in the United States, but the actual number is likely higher. Of the 33 North Koreans, 9 individuals have been granted asylum, 15 are still pending, and 9 are categorized as "other decisions," meaning their cases have been denied, dismissed, or withdrawn, according to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) data. The actual number of individuals is likely higher for several reasons including agencies' difficulties in compiling information. North Koreans can seek asylum protection through two processes--the affirmative or the defensive. In the affirmative process, individuals who are physically in the United States may present an asylum application to USCIS and undergo a non-adversarial interview to determine their eligibility for asylum. In the defensive process, applicants request that the Department of Justice grant them asylum as a defense against removal from the United States. USCIS data do not include information on North Koreans who first claimed asylum before an Immigration Judge in the defensive process.