The United Nations comprises (1) the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, and other governing bodies of member states that set the work requirements, or mandates, for U.N. programs and departments; (2) the Secretariat, headed by the Secretary General, which carries out a large part of the mandated work; and (3) the funds and programs, such as the U.N. Development Program, which are authorized by the General Assembly to conduct specific lines of work. Many funds and programs have their own governing bodies and budgets (mainly paid for by voluntary contributions from participating nations). The Secretary General’s reform initiatives do not apply to specialized agencies—such as the World Health Organization and the Food and Agricultural Organization—and programs that have their own governing bodies. Calls to reform the United Nations began soon after its creation in 1945. Despite cycles of reform, U.N. member states have had concerns about inefficient operations; problems of fragmentation, duplication, and poor coordination; and the proliferation of mandates. As one of the 191 member states, the United States played a significant role in promoting U.N. reform, calling for financial, administrative, and programmatic changes. The State Department and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations actively promoted these reforms such as establishing inspector general’s offices, many of which have been implemented. The State Department continues to promote further reforms and reports on the status of major reform initiatives to the U.S. Congress (see fig. 1). In July 1997, the Secretary General proposed a broad reform program to transform the United Nations into an efficient organization focused on achieving results as it carried out its mandates. Although the Secretary General does not have direct authority over specialized agencies and many funds and programs, the reforms at the Secretariat were intended to serve as a model for U.N.-wide reforms. In May 2000, we reported that the Secretariat had substantially restructured its leadership and operations and partly implemented a performance-oriented human capital management system. However, performance-oriented programming and budgeting proposals had not yet been adopted. In September 2002, the Secretary General released a second set of reform initiatives with 36 reform actions, some expanding on previous reform initiatives introduced in 1997 and others reflecting new priorities for the organization. The overall goal was to align U.N. activities with the priorities defined by the Millennium Declaration and the new security environment. As of December 2003, 60 percent of the 1997 reforms and 38 percent of the 2002 reforms were fully or substantially in place—or 51 percent overall (see app. II for the status of U.N. reforms). The Secretary General set a target date of 1999 for the implementation of reforms in the 1997 agenda, which consisted of initiatives that he could implement on his own authority and those that required member states’ approval. Of these reforms, the Secretary General implemented 70 percent of those reforms under his authority, while 44 percent of reforms requiring member states’ approval were in place. However, the outputs of many reforms, such as developing a written plan or establishing a new office, are only the first step in achieving the Secretary General’s overall reform goals. Although many of these reforms are in place, departments and offices in the Secretariat are still institutionalizing these new plans to improve U.N. operations in the long term. Since our May 2000 report, the United Nations continued to implement reforms from the Secretary General’s 1997 reform agenda and began to implement initiatives from the 2002 agenda (see fig. 2). We found that 60 percent of the 88 reform initiatives in the 1997 agenda were in place, compared with 38 percent of the 66 reform initiatives in the 2002 agenda. Overall, 51 percent of reforms from the 1997 and 2002 agendas were in place. We identified a total of 154 reform initiatives from the 1997 and 2002 reform agendas. This number differs from U.N. figures because many of the Secretary General’s reform action items had several components that we identified and counted as separate initiatives. To determine the implementation status of these reforms, we interviewed senior U.N. officials and reviewed relevant reports, bulletins, and resolutions. We then rated the reforms as in place or substantially so—that is, the reform had been approved and most key and minor elements were in place; partly in place—that is, the reform had been approved, and some key elements, as well as some or most minor elements, were in place; or not in place—that is, the reform had not been formally approved and minor elements could be in place, but no key elements were in place (see app. I for a more detailed description of our methodology). The implementation of reforms under the Secretary General’s authority advanced faster than those under the authority of the member states. We found that 70 percent of the 56 reform initiatives in the 1997 reform agenda under his authority are fully or substantially in place, compared with 44 percent of the 32 initiatives requiring member state approval (see fig. 3). The 2002 agenda did not differentiate between initiatives that the Secretary General could implement on his own authority and those that required member states’ approval. In particular, the Secretariat made the most progress on the 1997 reforms to restructure U.N. operations to provide more unified leadership and coordination across departments, programs, and offices; institute a new human capital management system that sets expectations and rates staff performance; and adopt results-based budgeting. However, the General Assembly did not adopt many reforms, such as those to further shorten the length and reduce the cost of its annual meetings; focus the assembly’s yearly debates on a few priority areas; and institute time limits, or sunset provisions, for all new U.N. programs. Delays in acquiring member state approval are due, in part, to the longer time needed for the General Assembly to reach agreement. To pass resolutions in favor of most specific reforms, the General Assembly generally requires a majority vote from the 191 member states. Although the Secretary General acknowledged that these reforms would take longer to implement, he set the end of 1999 as the target date to complete the 1997 reforms. However, we found that approximately 40 percent of these reforms are not fully in place. More than one-quarter of the Secretary General’s completed reforms, such as developing a written plan or establishing a new office, only represent the first steps in achieving longer-term and more important goals. The Secretariat’s departments and offices must then use these new plans and offices to improve U.N. operations for the long term. For example, the Secretary General directed the Secretariat to develop a plan to improve its information technology systems. We found that the Secretariat implemented a plan to upgrade software programs, enhance inter-office communication between headquarters and the field, and train staff in the use of these new systems. However, member states must continue to invest the necessary resources for the plan’s implementation to ensure that the technology does not become obsolete and to have an impact on U.N. operations in the long term. In addition, the Secretary General created several new offices as part of his reform initiatives. These include a strategic planning office in the Secretariat, an office to coordinate emergency humanitarian relief programs, and an office in Vienna to manage the U.N.’s interrelated programs to combat crime, drugs, and terrorism. Although the establishment of any new office can be counted as a completed reform, it is only the first step toward impacting the effectiveness of U.N. operations and achieving the Secretary General’s overall reform goals. GAO has previously reported that building an effective department that can meet overall objectives requires several components, including a staff, financial resources, and performance goals to measure progress toward objectives. We found that the U.N. has implemented many reforms in four key areas: (1) human capital management, (2) performance-oriented budgeting, (3) public information activities, and (4) the human rights program. Although numerous key initiatives are in place, other tasks are not yet complete, such as strengthening the U.N.’s monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to measure program impact and issuing additional guidelines on the new worldwide staff rotation, or mobility, policy. Therefore, the impact of these reforms on the effectiveness of U.N. operations is unclear. In response to human capital concerns raised by U.N. officials and outside observers, including the extensive time required to recruit and hire staff, the Secretariat developed a reform strategy to address the key elements of human capital management. The strategy included the implementation of a new recruitment and placement system that decentralized hiring authority and, according to U.N. officials, significantly reduced the average time to hire staff. Additional steps are needed, however, to fully implement reforms and address remaining challenges. For example, U.N. officials cited the need to develop a system to efficiently screen the increased number of applications received through the online hiring system. The Secretary General’s reform strategy called for changes to the Secretariat’s human capital management to create a results-oriented organizational culture supporting high performance, increased training, and more effective management. The United Nations’ human capital management had long been criticized by U.N. officials and external observers for the extensive time required for recruiting and hiring, the need for increased accountability for performance, and limited development and promotion opportunities. In his 1997 plan, the Secretary General stated that human capital management has been characterized by labor-intensive day-to-day staff administration and cumbersome rules and processes. He further stated that these rules and processes were seen as impeding program delivery and not maximizing staff contributions. The reform initiatives also attempted to bring human capital policies up to date with changes that had taken place within the organization, such as the move from being primarily headquarters-based to having an increasingly large field presence. In 2000, the Secretariat expanded the reforms by developing a broader human capital reform strategy. GAO has developed a human capital model that highlights the steps that organizations can take in managing human capital strategically. This model encompasses four human capital cornerstones that, when taken together, embody an approach to human capital management that is fact-based and focused on program results and mission accomplishment. We found that the Secretariat’s reform strategy includes actions in the areas of GAO’s four cornerstones of strategic human capital management—leadership; strategic human capital planning; acquiring, developing, and retaining talent; and results-oriented organizational cultures (see fig. 4). Leadership is defined as the demonstrated commitment of top leaders to continuously improve human capital management and support efforts to integrate human capital approaches with organizational goals. Soon after taking office, the Secretary General developed the 1997 reform plan for the Secretariat. He established a new leadership and management structure and began overhauling human capital policies to align the organization’s human capital capacity with its mission and structure. The Secretary General also established core organizational values and competencies to develop a results-oriented culture and has used this model to improve recruitment, staff development, and performance management processes. The Secretary General’s 2002 reform plan further emphasized the need for human capital improvements, including increased opportunities for staff mobility and expanded career prospects for support staff. The leadership cornerstone also emphasizes that human capital professionals have an expanded role, beyond paperwork processing, to become more integrated in the work of the organization. The Secretariat’s Office of Human Resources Management (OHRM) has begun to take on additional responsibilities, including developing human capital policies, monitoring compliance with these policies, and providing guidance on human capital issues. In addition, OHRM has begun to provide more automated services to employees. For example, the office has streamlined human capital rules and procedures and has made the Human Resources Handbook and personnel forms available online. U.N. employees reported in a survey that the streamlining of rules and procedures was the most successful human capital reform implemented since 2000. To improve strategic human capital planning, the second cornerstone, the Secretariat is developing its workforce planning activities through analysis of the demographic characteristics of Secretariat staff, while departmental staffing goals are being integrated with the organization’s broader human capital objectives. The Secretariat’s departments and offices also are preparing action plans, which incorporate human capital goals and indicators. OHRM holds planning sessions with the head of each department to develop measurable targets for achieving human capital goals, including targets for hiring staff from unrepresented or underrepresented countries. OHRM monitors the implementation of these action plans through semiannual reviews of the departments’ progress in meeting their goals. The Secretariat also is making increased use of information technology in implementing reforms. The electronic Human Resources Handbook, the online hiring system, and the electronic performance appraisal system are new technology tools that the Secretariat is using to manage human capital. Historically, the Secretariat had unique job profiles for most positions, but the new recruiting and placement system makes use of generic job descriptions in advertising job openings. U.N. officials stated that these generic job profiles have increased the accessibility and transparency of the application and hiring process and have facilitated staff’s ability to move to positions in other departments or offices. To acquire, develop, and retain talent, the third cornerstone, the Secretariat introduced a new recruitment and placement system in 2002 that entrusts program managers with the responsibility and accountability for hiring decisions. U.N. officials stated that the new hiring system has streamlined the hiring process, contributing to a significant reduction in the average time to hire an employee. In addition, an online tool allows individuals to submit their applications through the Internet. U.N. officials stated that this tool provides information on the status of applications and on management indicators, such as the gender balance and geographic distribution of applicants. The Secretariat also increased the emphasis on training and developing managers’ skills. Although U.N. officials acknowledged that more resources are needed for training, the organization is providing mandatory people management training for supervisory staff. The Secretariat also has implemented a career development policy based on the newly developed core competencies for managers and staff. Under this policy, managers must demonstrate support for their staff’s development and career progress. Finally, the Secretariat has implemented new initiatives to improve the work environment for staff. For example, employees now have more flexible work arrangements to address their personnel needs. The key to developing results-oriented organizational cultures, the fourth cornerstone, is to create a clear link between individual performance and organizational success. To do this, the Secretary General is holding senior managers accountable for accomplishing human capital goals through the use of annual performance agreements. On an annual basis, the Secretary General meets individually with department heads to discuss human capital priorities and goals for the upcoming year and to review indicators, such as the percentage of women in staff and management positions and the percentage of vacant positions. For these indicators, the managers’ departments are measured against the Secretariat’s overall average and their targets for the year. Program managers have been able to electronically track these and other indicators daily using a new tool developed by the Department of Management. The Secretary General also implemented a new electronic performance appraisal system, introduced in 2002. Rather than having performance management take place once a year, the new system emphasizes regular conversations and feedback between staff and supervisors related to staff performance. Under the system, staff also are assessed against newly developed organizationwide competencies. Examples of the Secretariat’s core staff competencies include communication, teamwork, commitment to continuous learning, and technological awareness. Managers also are assessed under additional competencies such as leadership, empowering others, and building trust. In addition, the new performance appraisal system links the individual’s performance to departmental or team goals and provides mechanisms for dealing with poor performers. Staff that have not met performance expectations under the appraisal system may have their salary increases withheld or could face the termination of their employment contracts. The Secretariat has made progress in implementing its reform agenda, but it must address additional human capital challenges if it is to meet the Secretary General’s overall reform goals. Key challenges include (1) delegating increased authority and accountability for personnel actions to managers, (2) implementing the organization’s staff mobility policy, (3) developing a long-range workforce planning capacity, and (4) screening the significant increase in applications received through the new recruiting system. In addition, although the Secretariat has an overall reform strategy in place, this strategy does not include specific time frames to complete reform actions. Establishing time frames at the outset provides a baseline for assessing the Secretariat’s progress in implementing reforms and achieving its overall human capital reform goals. First, U.N. officials we met with stated that OHRM has not gone far enough in delegating authority for personnel decisions to program managers, a component of the leadership cornerstone. For example, U.N. officials stated that offices and programs working on humanitarian or development assistance often needed to hire staff quickly during crisis situations around the world. However, according to these officials, U.N. rules and procedures have been a barrier to the hiring process. These officials pointed out that the delegated hiring authority is only for employees under regular budget positions on longer-term contracts. Field-based programs and offices often hire staff under short-term contracts. U.N. officials stated that the authority to hire these staff has not been decentralized. In his 2002 reform plan, the Secretary General also acknowledged the need to further delegate responsibilities to managers. Second, one of the Secretary General’s major reform initiatives was the implementation of a staff mobility policy intended to facilitate the movement of staff within and between offices and duty stations. The policy establishes time limits of either 5 or 6 years for staff to occupy a position, depending on the staff’s grade level. Although the human capital office is developing incentives for staff to move to hardship duty stations, U.N. officials have identified key challenges that may impede the successful implementation of the mobility policy when the requirements go into effect in 2007. U.N. staff, for example, are employed under different types of contracts, some of which place restrictions on the duration of employment and the type of work an employee can undertake. U.N. officials stated that the differences in employment contracts would make it difficult to move staff to certain positions or locations. Another barrier to staff mobility is spousal employment. Some countries place visa and work permit restrictions on hiring U.N. employees’ spouses. The Secretary General has begun to negotiate with countries to ease the restrictions on the employment of U.N. spouses. A related challenge is the need for further improvements in strategic workforce planning, linked to strategic goals and objectives. Long-range workforce planning will enable the organization to remain aware of and be prepared for its current and future needs as an organization. The Secretary General has recognized the need for building this capacity, emphasizing the need for more systematic succession planning to account for the expected increase in retirement of U.N. staff. Ultimately, the success of an organization’s workforce planning process can be judged by its results— how well it helps the agency attain its mission and strategic goals. We have reported that other countries’ succession planning and management initiatives have addressed specific human capital challenges, such as retention and the identification of staff with critical skills. Finally, U.N. officials stated that the Secretariat’s new recruiting and placement system has made screening the increased number of incoming applications a challenge. These officials stated that the organization now receives an average of approximately 1,000 applications for each vacancy announcement, compared with a previous average of about 100 applications per opening. U.N. officials have recognized that it will be a challenge to develop an electronic mechanism to effectively and accurately screen the growing numbers of applications received. The United Nations has begun to adopt performance-oriented budgeting, but it lacks an adequate monitoring and evaluation system to measure program performance and results. GAO has reported that a performance- oriented budgeting framework includes three key elements: (1) a budget that reflects a results-based budgeting structure, linking budgeted activities to performance expectations; (2) a monitoring and evaluation system; and (3) procedures for shifting resources to meet program objectives. In December 2000, the United Nations adopted a results-based structure for its budgets. We found that this format at the United Nations has resulted in clearer linkages between program activities and expected results, but some performance indicators lack clear measures to assess results. We also found that existing U.N. monitoring and evaluation activities do not systematically measure program performance and impact. Consequently, the Secretariat has developed and is implementing a strategy to improve performance monitoring and evaluation. In December 2003, the General Assembly also adopted an initiative to strengthen the role of one of its oversight committees responsible for monitoring and evaluating programs, but the General Assembly does not evaluate the Secretariat’s program results to reallocate resources to new priorities. The Secretariat has implemented the first key element of the U.N.’s performance-oriented budgeting framework by adopting a budget that reflects a results-based budgeting format, which involves specifying program costs, objectives, expected results, and specific performance indicators to measure the results. GAO previously reported that linking funding to specific performance goals is a critical first step in supporting the transition to a more results-oriented and accountable organization. Expected results and performance indicators are intended to allow the Secretariat to track the progress its programs make to meet objectives. By approving the budget, the General Assembly can hold the Secretariat accountable for meeting expected results. The Office of Program Planning, Budget and Accounts, which prepares and reviews the Secretariat’s budget, issued guidelines and provided training sessions to assist program managers and other staff in preparing budget proposals in a results-based format. This office also created a Web site, which is updated regularly, to post information on best practices and lessons learned. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions noted an improvement in the clarity and detail of expected results and performance indicators between the 2002-2003 biennium budget, which was the first submitted in a results-based format, and the 2004-2005 budget. Figure 5 compares the 2002-2003 performance indicators for the deployment of peacekeeping police units with those developed for the 2004-2005 budget. For the first time, the 2004-2005 budget includes specific performance targets and baseline data for many performance indicators that can help measure performance over time and could allow program managers to compare actual achievements to expected results. For example, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations plans to use baseline data at the end of the budget period to determine whether it will be able to deploy police units for peacekeeping operations more quickly. However, oversight committees also reported that some programs still lack clear and concise expected outcomes and performance indicators. For example, the Secretariat established an indicator to measure increased coordination among U.N. agencies and programs, the Bretton Woods institutions, and the World Trade Organization, and called for “closer collaboration” to improve the delivery of economic assistance and development projects. The associated performance target consists of the estimated number of meetings among these institutions, but does not describe what these meetings are to accomplish or how they will improve coordination. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions reported that it cannot determine the impact of these activities, which would cost close to $10 million in the 2004-2005 budget period. It recommended that indicators, such as “closer collaboration” or “full utilization of resources,” should be replaced with more specific and concrete measurements. The vagueness of some of these indicators, however, stems from the fact that baseline information has not been collected or is missing due to inconsistent monitoring of program activities, according to officials from the Office of Program Planning, Budget and Accounts. The Secretariat does not systematically monitor and evaluate program impact or resultsthe second key element of performance-oriented budgeting. U.N. regulations require that programs should be regularly monitored and evaluated to determine their relevance, effectiveness, and impact in relation to their objectives. Program managers are responsible for monitoring and evaluating programs to assess their impact and to determine the extent to which changes are needed to meet expected results. However, in 2002, the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) found that program managers and department and office heads were not complying with U.N. regulations. For example, both OIOS and oversight committees reported in 2002 that nearly half of program managers were not regularly monitoring and evaluating program performance. In addition, program managers were not held directly accountable for meeting program objectives because U.N. regulations prevent linking program effectiveness and impact with program managers’ performance. U.N. officials told us that a more mature program monitoring and evaluation system is needed before program managers can be held responsible for program performance. We found that there were a variety of problems related to the Secretariat’s monitoring and evaluation of program results and impact. Most programs do not have comprehensive monitoring and evaluation plans and, in many cases, no systematic management review of evaluations. For example, department heads and program managers did not directly review the results of evaluation activities, consistent with U.N. guidance, in 13 out of 25 programs surveyed in 2001. OIOS reported that, overall, evaluation findings were not used to improve program performance. In some cases, such as with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, monitoring and evaluation responsibilities were assigned to low-level staff with minimal oversight from program managers. Further, adequate levels of staff time and other resources needed to conduct evaluations have never been assessed and programs were not regularly monitored and evaluated, according to the U.N.’s oversight office. For example, all U.N. programs supporting the economic and social development of Asia and the Pacific, which cost approximately $25 million for the biennium, were not evaluated in 2000 and 2001. Lastly, for the majority of programs, no resources have been specifically allocated for activities related to monitoring and evaluation. To address these weaknesses, the Secretary General tasked the Monitoring, Evaluation, and Consulting Division of OIOS to develop a strategy to systematically monitor and evaluate program results and to introduce information systems needed to implement results-based budgeting. The division began to implement its strategy in 2002 and expects to have a complete system by 2006. As part of its strategy, OIOS introduced an Internet-based system that allows program managers to prepare periodic assessments of program impact against stated objectives. Program managers are required to submit performance assessments after 12 and 18 months, and at the end of the budget period. OIOS officials stated that this would allow them to adjust the direction of their program to meet objectives before the end of the budget cycle. In addition, OIOS is updating its guidelines on monitoring and evaluation, which describe new data collection methods, such as online surveys, to monitor results and evaluation methods to report on results. We found that the final component of performance-oriented budgeting— procedures to review evaluation results, eliminate obsolete programs, and move resources to new priority programs—is not in place. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions reported in 2003 that it did not receive systematic information from the Secretariat on program impact and effectiveness to determine whether a program was meeting its expected results. The Secretariat’s strategy to improve program monitoring and evaluation is part of an effort to provide the General Assembly with better program assessments. However, in 2003, the Secretary General reported that the General Assembly’s oversight system was ill-suited to review the Secretariat’s evaluation results and to determine how best to distribute resources. In his 2002 reform agenda, the Secretary General proposed redefining the roles of U.N. oversight committees to focus on reviewing program results. In December 2003, the General Assembly passed a resolution changing the role of the Committee for Program and Coordination, the first step toward shifting the focus of oversight responsibility to assessing program impact. The committee now focuses exclusively on reviewing activities planned to meet program objectives and no longer reviews budgeting information. Although several committees review the U.N.’s planning and budgeting documents for the next biennium period, these committees do not systematically review programs to assess the impact of previous activities and determine the appropriate level of funding (see fig. 6). According to the Joint Inspection Unit, the planning and budgeting review process was duplicative and redundant. In addition, the costs of preparing and printing documents, servicing close to 300 meetings, and staff time for this review have exceeded $20 million a biennium, with little emphasis placed on evaluating program performance. To shift the focus to evaluating results, the General Assembly in December 2003 required the Committee for Program and Coordination to submit a proposal on ways to improve its ability to monitor and evaluate program impact. The Secretary General recommended that the committee assess the results achieved at the end of the budget period and establish priorities to guide the allocation of resources. This would support performance-oriented budgeting, according to Joint Inspection Unit officials. In August 2003, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions concluded that the General Assembly could not eliminate programs and shift resources until it received evaluations that addressed program impact. Performance information is necessary for decision- making bodies to determine whether programs are meeting their stated objectives. Program performance reports provided to member states focused on outputs (such as the number of staff recruited, reports issued, meetings held, or computers purchased), instead of measuring program impact. To address this concern, OIOS changed the format of the performance report, which now requires program managers to link resources to program activities and to use performance indicators to measure program impact. The program performance report for the 2002- 2003 biennium, which will be submitted by March 2004, will be the first prepared using the new format. In December 2003, the General Assembly approved the elimination of 912 outputs in the 2004-2005 program budget based on the Secretariat’s review of program activities and more than 50,000 outputs. In addition, as a result of this review, the General Assembly has shifted resources from these activities—deemed obsolete and inefficient by the Secretariat—to more immediate U.N. priorities. In 2003, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and the Committee for Program and Coordination recommended that program managers in the Secretariat continue to identify obsolete outputs in U.N. budgets in compliance with U.N. regulations. The committees also reported that many sections in the budget lacked justifications for continuing certain outputs. We found that the Secretariat had implemented some reforms related to U.N. public information activities, but most were still in the early phases. With a biennium budget of approximately $156 million, the Department of Public Information undertakes news coverage of U.N. events through radio, video, and the Internet in six official languages; manages the U.N. Web site; manages its overseas branch offices; and oversees the Dag Hammarskjold library and coordinates with depository libraries worldwide. Following a series of management reviews of U.N. public information activities, the Secretary General restructured the department to improve its ability to develop coherent, cost-effective communications strategies to promote the U.N.’s priorities. In addition, the Secretary General consolidated department branch offices in Western Europe into a regional branch office in Brussels, Belgium. However, we found that reforms of other public information activities are not yet in place. For example, reforms related to the Department of Public Information’s program monitoring and evaluation and library management, as well as the Secretariat’s publications oversight, are still in the early stages of implementation and have had a limited effect on the effectiveness of public information activities, according to U.N. officials. Since 1948, internal oversight bodies and external groups have conducted at least seven periodic management reviews of public information policies and activities. However, these reviews resulted in few changes to the Department of Public Information’s operations. Member states continued to criticize the department, claiming that it did not adequately assess the impact of its activities. In his 2002 reform agenda, the Secretary General highlighted that fact that the department suffered from fragmented programs because of too many mandates and missions. To better align the Department of Public Information’s structure with its mandated activities, highlight priorities, and reduce fragmentation, the Secretary General reorganized the department into three divisions in November 2002: (1) the Outreach Division, which focuses on relationships with civil society, including outreach to educational institutions, and manages the Dag Hammarskjold Library in New York; (2) the News and Media Division, which aims to expand the United Nations’ access to media organizations worldwide; and (3) the Strategic Communications Division, which develops the U.N’s communications strategies in partnership with the Secretariat’s departments and manages the network of overseas branch offices. Within this third division, the department created focal points that work across the Secretariat’s departments in priority areas— including development, peace and security, Africa, human rights, Palestine, and decolonization—to identify communications strategies and reduce duplicative programs. In its spring 2003 session, delegates to the Committee on Information commented that the department’s new structure should help focus the department’s activities and maximize the use of its resources. To improve the cost efficiency of the department’s field operations, the Secretary General proposed changes to the structure of public information branch offices. Branch offices in developed countries—including the United States, Japan, Australia, and the European Union—accounted for 40 percent of all branch office expenditures, as of September 2002. Therefore, the Department of Public Information was devoting a large amount of funding to information activities in countries where available technology permitted greater online access to its services in the field. In 2003, internal auditors concluded that the department should evaluate these offices and consider options such as consolidation, regionalization, or closure. Based in part on these findings, the Secretary General created a regional branch office in Brussels in January 2004 and consolidated offices in nine European Union countries as part of his 2002 reform agenda. At its spring 2004 session, the Committee on Information will review a progress report on the implementation of the regionalization proposal to determine the feasibility of applying the initiative in other regions. The Secretariat has begun implementing additional reforms of other public information activities, but we found that these initiatives are only partly in place. The Secretary General stated that the department had historically devoted minimal attention to assessing the impact of its activities and that a comprehensive evaluation of the impact of its activities had never been conducted. Therefore, in 2003, the Department of Public Information and internal auditors began a 3-year joint process to evaluate the effectiveness and impact of the department’s activities through an annual review process. As part of its efforts to promote monitoring and evaluation, the department provides ongoing training for staff in results-based management within existing resources—a challenge, according to public information officials. Although these activities are still under way, an official from the Deputy Secretary General’s office stated that the department had taken positive steps to implement reforms to improve its monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. Reforms of U.N. libraries are also in the early phases. The United Nations has library collections in each of its headquarters offices and regional commissions, as well as libraries in many of the 62 branch offices and other depositories worldwide. The Secretary General reported in 2002 that the public information department needed to centralize library policy management and increase its use of technology in providing library services. In response, it established a steering committee in March 2003 to oversee the implementation of reforms, such as increasing the use of online archival systems for library collections and expanding information sharing among libraries to reduce duplication. The department plans to report to the Committee on Information in 2004 on its progress in implementing these reforms. Lastly, the implementation of reforms of publications activities is still under way. The Secretary General directed all departments to identify outdated or duplicative publications from more than 1,200 produced annually. We reported in 2000 that a review of U.N. publications in the economic and social affairs area found considerable redundancy and overlap. Publications activities are also extremely costly. For example, the U.N. Chronicle—a publication for teachers and students of world affairs—produced by the public information department—costs more than $1 million annually to publish. In his 2002 reform agenda, the Secretary General called for a review of the feasibility and cost of increasing online publications delivery, as opposed to printing certain publications. This review is not yet complete. To improve publications oversight, the relevant executive committees must approve all new publications proposed by the Secretariat pursuant to the 2002 reform plan. Overall, officials stated that the implementation of publications reform will depend on the willingness of Secretariat officials and the General Assembly to identify unneeded publications and discontinue duplicative mandates. On a positive note, in December 2003, the General Assembly approved the Secretary General’s 2004-2005 budget proposal calling for the discontinuation of 192 publications and reports. In recent years, management of the Secretariat’s human rights office has been complicated by several factors, such as weak financial and program management and a heavy reliance on voluntary funding to administer core activities. In addition to technical assistance, training, publications, and human rights advocacy, the office provides support to other parts of the human rights program outside the Secretariat, such as the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. We found that the office has implemented reforms to address its management deficiencies. In addition, we found that the human rights office has implemented reforms to improve its support to the actors outside the Secretariat, including requesting funding for additional staff. However, the Secretary General only has authority over the management of the Secretariat’s human rights office and cannot implement reforms across the entire U.N. human rights program, according to human rights officials. Several factors affect the management of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights—the Secretariat’s human rights office. For example, in 2002, OIOS concluded that the human rights office had poor financial controls and human capital management, as well as weak internal oversight procedures. According to a senior human rights official, for example, the office did not accurately track its unused voluntary funding in the past. According to the human rights office, this problem has been rectified and the office is tracking voluntary funding levels. In addition, the office relies heavily on voluntary funding to administer its core activities. Regular budget funding accounted for about 38 percent, or $24.2 million, of the office’s activities in 2002, whereas voluntary contributions accounted for about 62 percent, or $40 million (see fig. 6 for funding trends for the human rights office). Human rights officials stated that the heavy reliance on voluntary funding poses management challenges, including the resulting uncertainty of funding for future projects and low morale among staff unsure about job security. As shown in figure 8, the human rights office also provides administrative, technical, and substantive support to parts of the human rights program outside the Secretariat, including the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, which is a functional commission of the Economic and Social Council that meets annually to discuss human rights issues and standards and governments’ adherence to them; independent reporters and working groups, appointed by the commission to examine, monitor, and publicly report on human rights situations in specific countries or territories or on major human rights themes—there are reporters who focus on the right to education and on the situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; and independent committees, established by international human rights treaties, comprising independent experts that monitor governments’ compliance with treaty obligations. The workload generated by these independent groups affects the human rights office’s management. For example, the office provides administrative support, such as report processing, to the monitoring committees and national governments to ensure compliance with treaty reporting requirements. As the number of signatories increases, the Secretariat’s administrative burden increases. In addition, the Secretary General reported in 2002 that the more than 40 human rights reporters and working groups pose a management burden for the human rights office because they have grown in recent years in an ad hoc fashion and without clear rules for their responsibilities. The fragmentation and lack of clear working guidelines complicated the office’s support to these individuals and groups in the preparation of reports to the commission. As an independent body, the Commission on Human Rights appoints new human rights reporters. However, OIOS reported that the General Assembly has not provided commensurate additional regular budget funding to the human rights office for their support. As a result, the office has increasingly resorted to using voluntary funding to recruit additional staff to fulfill its responsibilities to the commission and monitoring committees. The Secretary General’s reform agendas called for the Secretariat’s human rights office to develop a strategy to strengthen its financial and human capital management and internal oversight procedures, among other things. We found that the office has developed and is implementing this strategy. For example, it established both the senior-level Management Board and Project Review Committee, in 1997 and 1998, respectively, to monitor the planning, budgeting, and implementation of the office’s programs and to identify outdated or nonpriority activities. The human rights office reported that it strengthened its program oversight and planning throughout 2003. Officials stated that the 2004 annual appeal, for example, presented a more strategic work plan than in prior years, which resulted in a 12 percent decline in voluntary funding requirements for the 2004 annual appeal, from $62.5 million in 2003 to $54.8 million in 2004. In addition, the office established the Advisory Panel on Personnel Issues in March 1999 to evaluate the office’s use of temporary staff and staff funded with voluntary resources and ensure the equitable geographic distribution of staff from member states. It also restructured its three main branches to reduce duplicative activities and leverage its personnel and financial resources. We found that the human rights office has also implemented reforms that indirectly address areas of the U.N. human rights program outside the Secretary General’s authority. For example, to help improve the quality of human rights reports, the office developed an induction kit for human rights reporters and working groups. The kit is updated regularly and used to brief new reporters on their rules and procedures. In addition, the office is working to keep them informed about the latest General Assembly resolutions that may affect reporting procedures, such as page limits and submission deadlines. In December 2003, the General Assembly also approved the Secretary General’s request for funding in the 2004-2005 budget for additional staff to improve the office’s ability to respond to increasing demands from the Commission on Human Rights and its human rights reporters and working groups. Nevertheless, the implementation of the Secretary General’s proposals is incomplete because he does not have authority over human rights activities outside the Secretariat’s human rights office. For example, because the majority of human rights reporters are selected by the chair of the Commission on Human Rights, the Secretariat’s human rights office could only recommend that the commission consider developing criteria for their selection. Moreover, only the commission can determine standard entrance criteria for its reporters and working groups. Thus, any reform related to the human rights reporters is dependent upon the support of commission members. In addition, in his September 2002 reform agenda, the Secretary General stated that governments should be allowed to submit a single report to the monitoring committees summarizing their adherence to human rights treaty obligations. Given his lack of authority over the monitoring committees, the Secretary General requested that the human rights office consult with the committees on methods of streamlining the governments’ various treaty-reporting requirements. The monitoring committees, however, resisted the concept of a single report, according to the human rights office. The proposal resulting from these consultations instead calls for an expanded core report containing standard information pertinent to all of the monitoring committees, with separate, more detailed reports going to individual committees. We identified several challenges that may impact the Secretariat’s ability to meet the overall reform goals: (1) the Secretariat does not conduct periodic, comprehensive assessments of the status and impact of reforms; (2) the Secretary General did not differentiate between short- and long- term goals in the 2002 reform plan; (3) resistance from managers and staff has slowed the implementation of reforms; and (4) potential financial and personnel resource implications are associated with some reforms. First, we found that the Secretariat does not conduct systematic, comprehensive assessments of the status and impact of the Secretary General’s reforms. Without such assessments, the Secretariat is not able to determine where further improvements are needed. In 1998 and 2003, the Secretary General issued reports on the status of the 1997 and 2002 reforms, respectively. These reports, however, did not include a comprehensive impact assessment. We found that individual departments and offices within the Secretariat oversee specific reforms within their area of work; for example, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights oversees the implementation of reforms of the U.N. human rights program. However, the Deputy Secretary General, who is responsible for overseeing the overall reform process, has only one full-time professional staff member dedicated to this effort. The Steering Committee on Reform and Management—comprising department heads within the Secretariat and chaired by the Deputy Secretary General—also tracks key reform issues and policy implementation. However, the Deputy Secretary General’s office neither systematically assesses departments’ performance in implementing reforms nor holds managers directly accountable. Furthermore, OIOS only monitors and evaluates the impact of select reforms and is not responsible for overseeing the implementation of the overall reform agendas. Second, the Secretary General has not differentiated between short- and long-term goals in his 2002 reform plan, and he has not consistently established time frames or milestones for their completion. GAO has identified the setting of implementation goals and a timeline to build momentum and show progress as key practices for organizations undertaking change management initiatives. We found that a few reforms required departments and offices to conduct evaluations and report their findings to the Secretary General by a certain date, but many reforms did not specify time frames for completing these actions. For example, the Secretary General called for the Department of Public Information and OIOS to complete an evaluation of the impact and cost effectiveness of the department’s activities within a three-year period (which started in 2003). However, when the Secretary General called for a review of the feasibility and cost of increasing the Secretariat’s delivery of online versus printed publications, he did not specify a deadline. Without prioritizing efforts and establishing deadlines, it is difficult to hold managers accountable for completing the reforms. Third, according to budget and human capital officials, some program managers and staff have resisted implementing certain reform initiatives. Human capital officials stated that program managers, for example, have raised concerns about the staff mobility policy because they fear losing expertise when staff rotate to new positions. In addition, OIOS reported that about half of program managers across the Secretariat have not complied with U.N. regulations to monitor and evaluate the performance of program activities. The Secretariat lacks clear rules and procedures for conducting regular monitoring and evaluation exercises, according to OIOS officials. Some managers also stated that they lacked resources to support this work and were concerned that these evaluation requirements would detract time and money from their regular work responsibilities. Consequently, the Secretariat is providing training to all departments to assist managers and staff in conducting self-monitoring and evaluation exercises to comply with performance-oriented budgeting and overcome resistance. Managers’ support is critical for the institutionalization of reforms in the long term. Fourth, U.N. officials stated that they have encountered delays in implementing reforms due to a lack of available regular budget resources. For example, public information officials stated that their department did not have a specific budget for new monitoring and evaluation activities—a key aspect of public information reform. In addition, human capital officials stated that they developed the online recruiting and hiring system after receiving resources from another department in the Secretariat. The Secretary General stated that departments would need to implement reforms within existing resources because additional funding would not be available in the regular budget. He also stated that program managers should streamline operations and eliminate obsolete activities to make resources available to implement reforms. According to U.N. officials, the Secretariat did not complete a comprehensive assessment of the personnel and budgetary implications during the development of his 2002 reform agenda. Rather, departments have conducted resource assessments for individual reforms on a case-by-case basis as a part of the budget process. In 1997 and 2002, the Secretary General proposed sweeping reforms of the United Nations in response to recurring calls to improve its efficiency and effectiveness in spending member states’ contributions. Many reforms have been completed since our 2000 report, including key measures to improve human capital management, focus the United Nations on results- based management, and strengthen the management of the human rights program. However, the United Nations faces many challenges to completing reforms, including potential resource constraints. Moreover, the Office of the Deputy Secretary General does not periodically and comprehensively assess the impact of reforms on the effectiveness of U.N. operations. Given that the Secretary General does not provide regular, comprehensive reports on the overall status and impact of reforms, it is difficult to hold staff accountable for implementing these reforms and their impact is unclear. In addition, the 2002 reform agenda did not specify short- and long-term goals or establish expected time frames for their completion—practices that increase the transparency and accountability of the reform process. Adopting key practices in management, oversight, and accountability for reforms, such as systematic monitoring and evaluation, could facilitate the achievement of the Secretary General’s overall reform goals. As the U.N.’s largest financial contributor and a proponent of reform, the United States would also benefit from the adoption of these practices. To promote full implementation and accountability of the Secretary General’s overall reform actions, we recommend that the Secretary of State and the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations work with other member states to encourage the Secretary General to report regularly through an existing U.N. reporting mechanism on the status and impact of the 1997 and 2002 reforms and other reforms that may follow; differentiate between short- and long-term reform goals and establish time frames for completion for those reforms that are not in place; and conduct assessments of the financial and personnel implications needed to implement the reforms. The Department of State and the United Nations provided written comments on a draft of this report (see apps. III and IV). State agreed with our recommendations, stating that it will continue to encourage the full implementation of all reform initiatives at the United Nations. In particular, State noted several efforts it is pursuing through the General Assembly, including further reforms related to human capital management and the Department of Public Information, among others. Moreover, State agreed with our conclusion that many reforms from the 1997 and 2002 agendas are first steps in achieving the Secretary General’s overall reform goals. State also said that the report provides a comprehensive analysis of the status of U.N. reforms and the challenges affecting their implementation. State noted that our report did not contain an in-depth analysis of reforms of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations—a point that we acknowledge in our scope and methodology (see app. I). In addition, State provided technical comments on our draft report, which were incorporated into the text, where appropriate. The United Nations also provided written comments on a draft of this report. Although we did not make recommendations directly to the United Nations, it generally agreed with the report’s findings. In particular, the United Nations acknowledged that the implementation of certain reforms is proceeding more slowly than others. The United Nations also provided observations regarding its efforts to implement its ambitious reform agenda. In addition, the United Nations provided technical comments, which were incorporated into the text where appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to other interested Members of Congress. We are also providing copies of this report to the Secretary of State, the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations, and the United Nations. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov, or Phyllis Anderson at (202) 512- 7364 or andersonp@gao.gov. In addition to the persons named above, Jeremy Latimer, Leland Cogliani, Lynn Cothern, Martin de Alteriis, Kathryn Hartsburg, and Monica Wolford made key contributions to this report. At the request of the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and Committee member Michael Enzi, we examined the status of U.N. reform activities to follow up on GAO’s 2000 report. Specifically, we assessed (1) the overall status of U.N. reforms proposed in 1997 and 2002 by the Secretary General; (2) the Secretariat’s efforts to implement reforms in four key areas: human capital management, performance- oriented budgeting, public information activities, and the human rights program; and (3) the challenges facing the implementation of U.N. reforms. We focused our work on the Secretary General’s 1997 and 2002 reform agendas. These reforms applied to the Secretariat and member state governing bodies, including the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, and the Security Council. We did not include U.N. specialized agencies or funds and programs in our review. We did, however, meet with officials and collect information from the International Labour Organization, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and the World Health Organization to discuss their progress and challenges in implementing management reforms similar to those that the Secretary General is undertaking. Overall, we identified 88 reform initiatives in the 1997 reform agenda and 66 in the 2002 agenda, for a total of 154 reform initiatives. This number differs from U.N. figures because many of the Secretary General’s reform action items had several components that we identified and counted as separate initiatives. For example, one of the Secretary General’s action items called for improving the information technology systems of the United Nations, which involved upgrading the U.N.’s Web site; modernizing internal systems that produce, store and disseminate documents; and adopting an information technology strategy for New York headquarters and field offices. We counted each one of those actions as separate initiatives, while the Secretariat grouped them into one action item. To determine the overall status of the reforms, we developed a methodology to code them as (1) substantially or completely in place, (2) partly in place, or (3) not in place (see table 1 for our definitions). We discussed our methodology with U.N. officials, and they agreed to its utility for assessing the status of U.N. reforms. We defined a key element as one that is critical or central to the reform. We considered that reforms could not be implemented or institutionalized without these key elements (e.g., staff or budget). All other elements were considered as minor. We considered a reform to be in place if it had moved from the planning stage to implementation. Implementation should have been well under way, though it may not have been completed and the reform may not have been institutionalized. For reforms with more than one key element, we considered the following factors to determine whether some or most key elements were in place: (1) the number of elements, (2) the relative importance of the elements, (3) the relative difficulty of implementation, and (4) the degree of implementation of each of the elements. To assess the status of the reforms, we reviewed the Secretary General’s 1997 and 2002 reform plans and obtained and reviewed official reports of the Secretariat and the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), budget documents, General Assembly resolutions, Secretary General bulletins, Web sites, and statements from U.N. officials. We interviewed senior officials from U.N. departments in New York City and Geneva. Specifically, we met with the Deputy Secretary General and her staff, and officials from the Department of Management, the Office of Human Resources Management (OHRM), the Office of Program Planning, Budget, and Accounts (OPPBA), the Department of Public Information (DPI), and the Acting High Commissioner for Human Rights. We also met with officials from OIOS and the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU). During the course of our review, we also discussed the status of U.N. reforms with U.S. Department of State officials in Washington, D.C.; New York; and Geneva. We selected reforms in the areas of human capital management, the performance-oriented budgeting system, public information activities, and the human rights program to assess in more detail. In our discussions with U.N. and U.S. officials, and in our review of U.N. documents, we determined that these were key areas of the Secretary General’s 1997 and 2002 reform plans. A detailed assessment of the reforms for peacekeeping and improving the coordination among U.N. departments and offices and between the U.N. and civil society was beyond the scope of this review. To assess the status of human capital management reforms, we compared the Secretariat’s human capital reform strategy with criteria from GAO’s model of strategic human capital management. This model provides a framework for examining an organization’s human capital practices and is based upon the actions that are characteristic of high-performing organizations. To collect information on the Secretariat’s progress in implementing its reform strategy, we reviewed internal and public human resources documents detailing the new recruitment and hiring system, the performance appraisal system, human resources action plans, and a survey of U.N. staff views on human capital reforms. We discussed human capital management reforms with OHRM officials who are planning and implementing the office’s reform initiatives. We also met with the chief personnel officer for the U.N. Geneva Office, as well as personnel officers at the Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, and the Internal Labour Organization, to discuss the status and problems of human capital reforms in their organizations. We did not evaluate the effectiveness of implemented human capital reforms. To assess the implementation of budgeting and monitoring and evaluation reforms, we analyzed the last three U.N. biennium budget documents (2000-2001, 2002-2003, and 2004-2005) to determine changes in the budget’s format after the adoption of a results-based budgeting format. We also examined budget-related documents prepared by the Committee for Program and Coordination and the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. In addition, we examined Secretariat documents on program monitoring and evaluation activities to determine the U.N.’s ability to report on and assess program results and impact, as well as strategies the Secretariat developed to strengthen the monitoring and evaluation system. We discussed performance-oriented budgeting reforms with OPPBA, JIU, and OIOS officials from the Monitoring, Evaluation, and Consulting Division. We also met with budget officers at the International Labour Organization and the World Health Organization to discuss the status and lessons learned from implementing performance-oriented budgeting at their organizations. To determine the status of reforms of U.N. public information activities, including DPI’s reorganization, the restructuring of the department’s branch offices, library management, and publications, we reviewed reports from OIOS, the General Assembly’s Committee on Information, and the Secretary General. We also spoke with DPI officials, including the Under Secretary General, the department’s senior managers, and senior library officials in New York. In addition, we interviewed officials from DPI’s branch office and U.N. library in Geneva to determine the extent to which operations in the field have been affected by these reforms. To determine the status of efforts to reform the U.N. human rights program, we reviewed official reports from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)— including annual appeals and reports—detailing the steps the office is taking to implement these reforms. We also reviewed internal audit reports and external reviews by independent contractors highlighting the key management challenges facing OHCHR and its efforts to improve in these areas. In addition, we interviewed human rights officials in Secretariat offices in Geneva and New York. To assess the Secretariat’s efforts to improve the management of the human rights program, we spoke with the Acting High Commissioner for Human Rights and senior management officials responsible for implementing the Secretary General’s reforms. To determine the status of reforms related to the monitoring committees and human rights reporters and working groups, we analyzed relevant Secretary General, General Assembly, and Commission on Human Rights reports, resolutions, and other official documentation, and we spoke with OHCHR officials. We did not review the work or membership of the Commission on Human Rights or the performance of individual human rights reporters. To determine the challenges facing the implementation of U.N. reforms, we reviewed reports and documentation of the Secretariat, General Assembly, OIOS, and JIU. We also reviewed reports from outside observers of the U.N. system, including nongovernmental organizations and members of academia. In addition, we spoke with U.N. officials in New York and Geneva. These included officials from the Office of the Deputy Secretary General, the Department of Management, OHRM, OPPBA, DPI, OHCHR, OIOS, and JIU. We also spoke with U.S. officials in Washington, New York, and Geneva. We conducted our work from June 2003 through January 2004, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Summary: The U.N. Secretary General launched two reform agendas, in 1997 and 2002, to address the U.N.'s core management challenges--poor leadership of the Secretariat, duplication among its many offices and programs, and the lack of accountability for staff performance. In 2000, GAO reported that the Secretary General had reorganized the Secretariat's leadership and structure, but that the reforms were not yet complete. As the largest financial contributor to the United Nations, the United States has a strong interest in the completion of these reforms. GAO was asked to assess the (1) overall status of the 1997 and 2002 reforms, (2) implementation of reforms in four key areas, and (3) potential challenges to reform. As of December 2003, 60 percent of the 88 reform initiatives in the 1997 agenda and 38 percent of the 66 initiatives in the 2002 agenda were in place. In general, reforms under the Secretary General's authority were progressing more quickly than those requiring member states' approval. Since 1997, the Secretariat has implemented reforms to provide more unified leadership and coordination across departments and offices. However, the Secretariat has implemented other reforms, such as developing a written plan or establishing a new office, that are only the first step in achieving the Secretary General's overall goals. Reforms in four key areas of U.N. operations are in various stages. First, the Secretariat has taken positive steps to strengthen its human capital management, but reforms in this area are ongoing and additional challenges remain. Second, the U.N. has begun to adopt results-oriented budgeting, but its monitoring and evaluation system does not measure program impact. Third, although the Secretariat reorganized its public information department, reforms of library management and publications are not fully in place. Fourth, the Secretariat's human rights office implemented the majority of its management reforms but does not have the authority to implement reforms outside the Secretariat. U.N. reform faces several challenges. For example, the Secretariat does not conduct comprehensive assessments of the status and impact of U.N. reforms. In addition, the reform agendas lack clearly stated priorities, interim goals, and target dates for overall completion. Other challenges include resistance to change from program managers and possible resource constraints.