USSTRATCOM’s global missions provide a wide range of capabilities that are intended to respond to a dramatically changing security environment brought about by emerging global, transregional, and asymmetric threats to U.S. national security. Unlike the command’s nuclear deterrence and space operations missions, the command’s global strike; integrated ballistic missile defense; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; information operations; global command and control; and combating weapons of mass destruction missions had not been previously assigned to a unified command. These newer missions have been performed, mostly ad hoc, by multiple DOD organizations and the military services but did not have a primary joint sponsor and central focus within DOD. The command’s most recent reorganization, begun in late 2004, shifted the day-to-day planning and execution responsibility for most of its missions from its headquarters to several new subordinate organizations. USSTRATCOM intends that its latest organizational construct will provide greater focus, continuity, and performance for its missions and better accommodate the execution of the command’s global responsibilities by reducing organizational layers and enabling communication and information to flow more easily from the most senior levels of leadership to those producing the information. The command envisions that this new organizational construct will reduce the cycle time for reaching and implementing decisions for its missions, increase the effectiveness of the products and services it provides in support of the regional combatant commands, and provide improved access to all of the command’s capabilities. USSTRATCOM, for example, has recently established a joint space operations center, under its Joint Functional Component Command for Space and Global Strike, to more effectively respond to requests from regional combatant commands for space capabilities. As shown in figure 1, the current USSTRATCOM organization is comprised of a command headquarters, service component or supporting commands, joint functional component commands, centers, and task forces. Under the new organization, USSTRATCOM’s headquarters would focus primarily on overseeing tasks for command and control; strategic-level integration; and advocacy, including developing strategy and plans, managing command and control operations and support, and advocating for mission capabilities. It also has responsibility for designating objectives; assigning missions, tasks, forces, and resources; defining policy and concepts; and providing direction to the command’s subordinate organizations. Additionally, USSTRATCOM headquarters has responsibility for planning and deploying forces for the command’s nuclear mission. The reorganization created four new joint functional component commands for (1) space and global strike; (2) integrated missile defense; (3) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and (4) network warfare. These commands have day-to-day responsibilities for operational and tactical-level planning and execution and management of forces. The new organization also includes the USSTRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, Joint Information Operations Center, and Joint Task Force for Global Network Operations that work with the command, the unified commands, and mission partners to provide operational solutions to mission-related problems. The command has also geographically aligned many of its subordinate organizations with supporting military services and Defense agencies to leverage the expertise and resources in their respective mission areas. For example, the command has partnered and co-located its Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance with the Defense Intelligence Agency in the Washington, D.C., area to take advantage of the agency’s capabilities and improve access and coordination with DOD and national intelligence agencies. To further strengthen the partnership between the organizations, the commander of the component command is also the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. In response to intelligence information requests from the combatant commanders, the agency would globally prioritize intelligence collection requirements and the joint functional component command would then prioritize and task the appropriate intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets to best meet those requirements. Appendix IV provides additional information about the command’s key mission organizations. Additionally, the reorganization established new command relationships with the military services to better focus service support. USSTRATCOM accesses capabilities from each of the services through its three service component commands—the Army Forces Strategic Command, Air Force Forces Strategic Command, and Marine Corps Forces Strategic Command—and the Commander, U.S. Navy Fleet Forces Command. Unlike the other services, the Navy Fleet Forces Command is a supporting command rather than a designated service component command to USSTRATCOM. However, Fleet Forces Command’s overarching responsibilities in supporting USSTRATCOM are consistent with those of the other service components. Each service command acts as the primary focal point for its respective service capabilities and has responsibilities for ensuring that forces provided to USSTRATCOM are organized, trained, and equipped to support the command in carrying out its missions and providing the administrative chain of command and control for its respective service forces. Because of its expanded set of missions, USSTRATCOM’s budget has grown significantly from $276.8 million of total obligation authority in then-year dollars in fiscal year 2003 to $500.4 million in fiscal year 2006, excluding appropriations for military personnel and USSTRATCOM service component commands and other supporting agencies. The command’s annual budget is expected to increase to $551.4 million by fiscal year 2011. Table 1 details the command’s historic and projected budget by major appropriations account from fiscal years 2003 through 2011. The command’s budget is comprised mostly of operation and maintenance funding, with lesser amounts of research and development and procurement funding associated with programs for intelligence, information operations, network warfare, command and control, and planning systems. Appendix I provides more details about USSTRATCOM’s budget. Since its establishment, USSTRATCOM’s authorized number of military and civilian positions has increased by about 300. As of October 2005, the command’s overall authorized personnel level was composed of 2,947 military and civilian positions, of which 91 percent were filled. Of the 2,947 positions, military positions comprise about 72 percent of the positions (2,122), with the Air Force providing the largest number of positions (1,256). Civilian positions make up the remaining 28 percent (835). The command has begun to fill positions in its new mission organizations from within its existing authorized personnel levels by transferring positions from its headquarters to the new organizations over a 3-year period beginning with fiscal year 2005. The command’s authorized personnel levels are made up of a relatively few number of skills, although the mix of military skills has changed since 2002. Additional information about USSTRATCOM’s authorized personnel levels is in appendix II. USSTRATCOM has made progress in implementing its new missions and has taken a number of positive actions in each of its mission areas to prepare or update concepts of operations, plans, guidance, and policy; identify resources needed for mission planning and execution; and establish an organization to more effectively manage its responsibilities and provide the range of capabilities across its mission areas. Many of the command’s actions are consistent with the useful practices and lessons learned with high-performing organizations undergoing successful transformations that we have identified in our past work. However, further steps are needed to build on this progress in order to achieve the broad goals envisioned by the President and Secretary of Defense in creating the command. While the command has taken initial steps to include its new missions in its exercise program, USSTRATCOM has not yet fully developed a robust exercise program that integrates exercise support available from the U.S. Joint Forces Command, which can provide planning, training, and exercise tools. In addition, while USSTRATCOM’s leadership has provided general guidance to its mission organizations, it has not provided specific information or identified consistent requirements for achieving full operating capability and most of the command’s new mission organizations have not established clear criteria for determining when they have reached this milestone. Also, while the command has adopted some key management principles, the command has not yet developed strategic goals and outcome-oriented performance measures and criteria for assessing results across the command and in each of its mission areas. Since its establishment, USSTRATCOM has made progress in implementing its new missions and has taken a wide range of positive actions to integrate these missions into its organization, such as developing various plans, concepts, and guidance; establishing procedures and processes; identifying personnel and funding resources; developing new relationships; building communication networks; and providing education, training, and exercises. For example, the command has prepared concepts of operations for its missions and organization, such as operations for network warfare and global integrated missile defense, and has recently approved a concept of operations describing the processes it will use in integrating its diverse capabilities and providing warfighting options to regional combatant commands. Additionally, USSTRATCOM has taken other actions, including (1) establishing collaboration tools and processes to improve communication for planning, execution, and evaluation among its organizations and customers; (2) creating various processes and groups within the command to advocate for the capabilities necessary to accomplish its missions, such as advocating for modification of the Trident II missile to provide an improved near-term conventional global strike capability; and (3) upgrading and expanding its facilities, such as improvements to the command’s headquarters command center. The command has also taken actions to demonstrate the value added of its missions for other combatant commands and DOD organizations. For example, to implement its mission responsibilities for preventing and defending against intrusions into DOD’s critical information network systems, the command’s Joint Task Force for Global Network Operations has recently instituted stringent use controls and trained system users to improve security and reduce vulnerabilities for these systems. As its missions have matured, USSTRATCOM has also undertaken several reorganizations to more effectively manage its responsibilities and provide the range of capabilities across its mission areas. Many of the actions the command has taken to implement its latest reorganization are consistent with the useful practices and lessons learned with high-performing organizations undergoing successful transformations that we have identified in our prior work, including establishing a matrixed, horizontal organizational structure that provides a greater external focus for its customers, forms partnerships with key organizations, and openly shares information. As discussed earlier, its latest reorganization intends to leverage essential competencies of associated components and key supporting agencies and decentralize the responsibility of its headquarters for the day-to-day planning and execution of its primary mission areas to several interdependent mission organizations. While the command’s mission organizations differ in the extent of their maturity, USSTRATCOM has focused considerable attention over the past year on establishing their responsibilities, command and agency relationships, and operational competencies, and assigning personnel to these new organizations. Its senior leadership has also taken an active and visible role in supporting the organizational changes underway. USSTRATCOM has restructured its exercise program to better incorporate its missions and has conducted a few training exercises involving all of its missions and new organizations. While the command is taking steps to address the challenges in more fully including its missions in its exercises, it has not yet fully developed a robust exercise program that integrates exercise support available from the U.S. Joint Forces Command’s Joint Warfighting Center, which can provide planning, training, and exercise tools. USSTRATCOM restructured its exercise program in 2003. It began incorporating its newer missions into its exercises beginning in November 2004 and brought together all of its missions in the same exercise in its two most recent exercises, Global Lightning in November 2005, and Global Thunder in April 2006. Global Lightning is an annual USSTRATCOM-sponsored command-post exercise, which involves the commander and his staff in testing and validating the communications within and between headquarters and simulated forces in deterring a military attack and employing forces as directed. The annual Global Thunder exercise is the command’s main nuclear deterrence field training exercise, which uses actual forces in training commanders, staff, and individual units at all levels of their warfare skills. Another command-post exercise, Global Storm, is designed to cover the command’s missions that are most relevant in the early stages of conflict, such as information operations and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The command plans to conduct this exercise annually depending on scheduling and resource considerations. The command faces challenges in effectively executing its exercise program across its missions and new organizations. However, the command is taking some actions to overcome these challenges, and some of these challenges should lessen over time as the command’s missions and organizations mature. First, many of the command’s operational concepts, directives, and instructions used in designing and executing exercises have not yet been approved, developed, or revised to reflect its new organization. For example, at the time of the November 2005 Global Lightning exercise, some USSTRATCOM mission organizations were executing their processes and procedures without the benefit of complete and approved doctrine because several key concepts of operations for its missions, such as the concept of operations for horizontally integrating its missions, were still in draft form. According to USSTRATCOM officials, the command has to prepare plans for an exercise many months in advance even if its doctrine continues to evolve. The officials said that USSTRATCOM incorporates any changes to doctrine and guidance as it develops its exercise plan, but these changes are more difficult to make as the plan becomes more complete and the exercise nears. A USSTRATCOM official told us that doctrine and guidance should become more stable and change less frequently as the command’s missions, organization, and processes mature. Second, several of the command’s new mission organizations are still being established, which has affected their ability to fully participate in the command’s recent exercises and identify exercise objectives. For example, at the time of the November 2005 Global Lightning exercise, the new joint functional component commands had existed for less than 1 year, and the Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction had been established for only 3 months. According to the Chief of Staff for the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance component, the component was not able to establish full connectivity during the exercise because it was still operating out of temporary facilities. Further, the new mission organizations were too immature, did not have staff in place, and lacked the established processes and procedures needed to plan their own objectives for the November 2005 exercise, according to USSTRATCOM officials. Instead, the new organizations’ exercise objectives for the November 2005 Global Lightning exercise were established by the command’s headquarters and linked to a broader set of critical tasks and responsibilities. Moreover, while the command’s Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction personnel participated extensively in the November 2005 Global Lightning exercise, no specific exercise objectives had been developed for the center’s mission area. To begin addressing the challenge of increasing involvement of its new organizations in exercise development, the command has advocated the establishment of an exercise or training group within each of its mission organizations and some groups have been created, such as in the space and global strike and integrated missile defense components. Additionally, in preparation for the next Global Lightning exercise in fall 2006, the mission organizations plan to be more involved in preparing exercise objectives for their mission areas and intend to send their personnel to training workshops conducted by the U.S. Joint Forces Command’s Joint Warfighting Center to learn how to develop these objectives. Third, the command has found it difficult to design an exercise that fully covers all of its responsibilities because its missions are so diverse and their relevancy to the exercise is dependent on the type and stage of a particular crisis. USSTRATCOM’s intent is to design its exercises so as to integrate the unique and interdependent capabilities of its global missions to provide a range of options throughout the various stages of a crisis and possible conflict. For example, the command has found that some of its missions, such as information operations, quickly become overlooked during its exercises as events move from crisis into actual conflict. Moreover, the command believes that its exercise program needs to place greater emphasis on the early stages of a crisis because much of USSTRATCOM’s daily operations are conducted before and just after a crisis has begun. To foster greater inclusion of its missions into its exercises, the command used a series of brief, scripted training events that preceded its first Global Lightning exercise in November 2004 to provide opportunities to incorporate some of its missions, particularly intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. During the November 2005 Global Lightning exercise, the command incorporated a timeline that extended from the early to the later stages of conflict to allow designers to prepare a scenario suitable for a more complete range of the command’s missions. The Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, also has directed that the annual Global Thunder exercise and other training events incorporate multiple missions to provide additional evaluation opportunities. Additionally, the command has designed its Global Storm exercises to specifically focus on those missions that are most pertinent before conflict begins. USSTRATCOM has not fully made use of the exercise support available from the U.S. Joint Forces Command. While USSTRATCOM has taken steps to obtain greater assistance from the Joint Forces Command’s Joint Warfighting Center to help the command address its challenges in executing a robust exercise program, the command and the center have not reached agreement on the extent of support the center will provide. Our past work has shown that robust exercise programs are important for assessing and improving mission capabilities, particularly when multiple organizations are involved in mission execution. Moreover, DOD’s recently issued Strategic Plan for Transforming DOD Training supports an increased training focus for many missions assigned to USSTRATCOM, including combating weapons of mass destruction, global strike, information operations, and ballistic missile defense. U.S. Joint Forces Command has lead responsibility for joint force training, and is responsible for helping combatant commanders to identify training requirements and methods, and for assisting them with executing exercises and other training events. As part of U.S. Joint Forces Command, the Joint Warfighting Center provides support to combatant commands in identifying requirements, objectives, methods, and tools for planning, implementing, and evaluating exercises. The center trains combatant command staff to better design exercise objectives that are clearly linked to the command’s essential tasks. It can also send independent observer teams to an exercise to assess the command’s performance and prepare after-action reports and related assessments. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness has overall responsibility for ensuring that DOD’s joint training programs and resources are sufficient to produce ready forces and overseeing the implementation of DOD’s training transformation strategy. USSTRATCOM has taken steps to obtain greater assistance from the Joint Warfighting Center in recent exercises. The command, for example, obtained limited support from the center during its April 2006 Global Thunder exercise, including teams to observe the participation and activities of its space and global strike component. However, USSTRATCOM’s requirements have not been typically identified far enough in advance for the center to assign staff and commit resources in providing the full range of requested support. For example, command officials told us that USSTRATCOM sought extensive Joint Warfighting Center support for the November 2005 Global Lightning exercise, but the center had already committed to supporting a U.S. Northern Command exercise that was scheduled over the same time period. The center was able to provide USSTRATCOM indirect support, such as providing simulated video news clippings to add context to the events in the exercise scenario, when the command linked its Global Lightning exercise to the U.S. Northern Command exercise. USSTRATCOM’s relationship with the Joint Warfighting Center is still developing. In the past, the center had a limited working relationship with USSTRATCOM and involvement in its exercises because the command’s exercises had been largely focused on its nuclear deterrence mission, which limited the involvement of other DOD organizations. As a result, the center had not included the level of support for USSTRATCOM’s program that it provided to other combatant commands in its past plans. However, to provide Joint Warfighting Center observers with access to more areas and aspects of its exercises, including activities involving the command’s nuclear deterrence mission, USSTRATCOM is changing its security procedures to grant center observers temporary clearances during the exercises. The Joint Warfighting Center’s recent support for USSTRATCOM’s exercise program has helped the command to better define its requirements for future support, but these requirements continue to evolve. USSTRATCOM officials told us that since requirements for future support from the center have traditionally been determined from prior support experience, the command’s limited relationship with the center in the past and the recent restructuring of the command’s exercise program have not yet provided a basis for determining the support needed from the center. The officials said that the specific requirements for the center’s assistance would be easier to determine as more exercises with the center’s involvement are completed. According to a USSTRATCOM official, a key exercise objective in its April 2006 Global Thunder exercise was to expose center personnel on a limited scale to the command’s exercise program. At the same time, the command would gain exposure to the services provided by the center. A center official told us that this type of interaction with the center would help USSTRATCOM to better define and identify its future requirements for center support. Over the long term, USSTRATCOM plans to seek much greater support from the center but has not yet fully defined its requirements. While the Joint Warfighting Center currently supports only one of USSTRATCOM’s exercises each fiscal year, USSTRATCOM officials told us that the center has committed to supporting both of its annual Global Lightning and Global Thunder exercises for fiscal year 2007, including the use of observation teams to help the command evaluate its performance. However, as of March 2006, center officials told us it was unclear how the center would adjust its current resources to support the November 2006 Global Lightning exercise because of the timing of that exercise and its linkage to a U.S. Pacific Command exercise, for which the center is already planning to provide support. In the long term, a center official told us that while the center plans to provide greater support to USSTRATCOM, the center can better plan and make resources available if it is provided with well-defined requirements 3 to 5 years in advance as other commands do. As a result, without fully providing the U.S. Joint Forces Command with well-defined requirements to plan the necessary resources to support USSTRATCOM’s program, USSTRATCOM may not be able to receive the supported needed to execute a robust exercise program to effectively implement its missions. USSTRATCOM had provided overall guidance to each of its subordinate organizations for assessing two key milestones–initial operating capability and full operating capability–used to implement these organizations. However, this guidance does not fully establish clear and well-documented objectives, goals, or criteria to use in determining when these milestones have been achieved. Our prior work shows that it is important that organizations undergoing major transformations provide clear and complete guidance to subordinate organizations on the requirements and expectations for successful implementation of organizational changes. Each of the new subordinate mission organizations has already declared initial operating capability—the first milestone in implementing these organizations. However, without applying specific criteria, such as the extent to which mission organizations are staffed and trained and their mission tasks implemented, in determining when full operating capability– the second milestone–is achieved, the command may not have an accurate understanding of the extent to which its mission organizations are prepared to effectively carry out their missions. After its most recent reorganization, USSTRATCOM issued implementation directives that provide general guidance for establishing each of the five new subordinate organizations. The directives broadly describe the organizations’ responsibilities, authorities, tasks, personnel and resources requirements, and schedules for implementation. Additionally, the command prepared an implementation plan that summarizes the implementation directives and provides additional direction for establishing the new subordinate organizations, including timelines and implementation tasks. USSTRATCOM also created a reorganization management team working group comprised of representatives from headquarters and the new organizations to assist with and coordinate the reorganization activities. USSTRATCOM’s implementation guidance calls for each new organization to declare initial operating capability and full operating capability, which are key milestones used to indicate the organization’s progress in implementing plans, procedures, and structures and achieving the readiness required to perform its missions. In addition, the guidance provides some general criteria to follow before declaring initial operating capability or full operating capability. For example, the guidance requires that prior to the initial operating capability milestone, each new organization would develop a mission statement; a detailed concept of operations for the organization to manage and execute its assigned forces and missions, including personnel requirements; and a task hand-over plan for the transfer of functions from headquarters. The guidance also requires formal updates on the new organizations’ progress toward achieving the milestones during quarterly command conferences. Table 2 shows that each of the new organizations stated that it had achieved initial operating capability in 2005. The Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense achieved full operating capability in February 2006 and the other four organizations plan to reach this milestone between September 2006 and January 2007. While the implementation guidance provides general criteria for achieving initial and full operating capability, it lacks clarity and specificity for reaching these milestones. The Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, has delegated authority for establishing the new mission organizations and decisions for declaring initial and full operating capability to the senior leaders of these organizations. Headquarters representatives of the reorganization management team told us that a good deal of subjectivity is involved in deciding when each milestone has been achieved. In addition, we found that the commander or director of each new organization has interpreted the milestones differently when developing the organization’s approach and assessment criteria for achieving the milestones. For example, the criteria used by each organization to determine initial operating capability last year varied greatly among the organizations: The commander of the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance component declared reaching the milestone based on such factors as the component having its deputy commander in place, establishing the component’s online Web portal that facilitates external communication across various classified links, and beginning its intelligence campaign planning support for three regional combatant commands. The commander of the integrated missile defense component declared reaching the milestone based on completing preparation of several documents, for example, ballistic missile defense emergency activation plans and a supporting plan for one of the command’s contingency plans; undertaking the process of making operational several required functions, such as ballistic missile defense situational awareness and operational oversight of the ballistic missile defense command and control system; and assuming responsibility for performing most of its directed tasks. The acting deputy commander of the network warfare component told us the component declared initial operating capability on the basis that its mission responsibilities were already being performed by a predecessor organization that became the new component. Space and global strike component officials told us that the component based its initial operating capability decision largely on the results of its performance in events before and during USSTRATCOM’s November 2005 Global Lightning exercise. However, the component did not publish and make available the criteria that would be used to evaluate the component’s performance during the exercise, according to the component’s chief of staff. Similarly, the objectives, goals, and criteria that would be used for determining full operating capability vary among the organizations. According to network warfare component officials, the component plans to base its full operating capability decision on 8 to 10 items that were explained during a briefing to USSTRATCOM officials in early 2005, which include the component having adequate staffing and funding; its tactics, techniques, and procedures guidance approved; and its functions, tasks, and authorities clearly defined. The chief of staff for the space and global strike component told us that the component has considerable criteria for evaluating full operating capability. For example, several concepts of operations related to the component’s mission areas contain tasks that the component needs to perform. Other criteria include such goals as setting up a training program for new staff and developing a visual information panel in its command center. However, the official said that the component has not clearly assembled all of its criteria to make them readily accessible to those outside the component. The integrated missile defense component, which declared full operating capability in February 2006, used criteria that included the component’s assuming responsibilities and tasks delineated in the USSTRATCOM implementation directive, completing facility construction, getting staff trained and certified, developing approved joint mission essential tasks, and initiating reporting of operational readiness. The component considered its full participation in USSTRATCOM’s November 2005 Global Lightning exercise and the incorporation of the lessons learned from the exercise into its participation in a subsequent U.S. Pacific Command exercise as critical factors for declaring full operating capability. Additionally, although the target dates for declaring full operating capability are soon approaching, some of the new organizations have not fully developed the criteria that will be used to assess their milestone decisions. Although the USSTRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction plans to achieve the milestone in December 2006, center officials told us in February 2006 that the center is still deciding how to define full operating capability. Similarly, the deputy commander for the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance component told us in April 2006 that the component, which plans to reach the milestone in September 2006, has not fully decided on the criteria it would use because the selection of criteria has not been a high priority among the component’s implementation activities. However, the official told us that the component needs to have its criteria approved about 3 months before it decides to declare its milestone achieved. USSTRATCOM has adopted some key management practices, but the command has not yet fully developed a results-oriented management approach for continuously assessing and benchmarking its performance in achieving desired outcomes and for identifying actions to improve performance. Our prior work and the work of others show that organizations undertaking complex transformations can increase their likelihood of success by adopting a results-oriented management framework, which includes key management practices and results- oriented management tools to guide implementation efforts and progress toward achieving desired outcomes. These tools and practices include establishing long-term goals and objectives and performance measures and criteria for assessing results and value added; strong and inspirational leadership to set the direction, pace, and tone and provide a clear, consistent rationale for implementing the framework; and timelines to achieve results. While USSTRATCOM uses different techniques to review its progress in implementing its missions and responsibilities, these techniques do not provide the range of quantifiable metrics and criteria needed to fully assess the command’s progress toward achieving its goals and objectives and value added. The command’s senior leadership has taken an active role in articulating and supporting the command’s transformation, a factor that we have identified in prior work as critical to success. The Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, has addressed a variety of audiences to discuss the need for changing the way the command is organized in order to be more effective, and has described the needs and reasons for change in command concepts of operations and guidance. USSTRATCOM has also prepared guidance that assigns responsibility and describes the processes for implementing and integrating its missions. For example, to support its most recent reorganization, the command has prepared a draft integrating guidance document intended to provide a consolidated, objective framework describing how the command is organized, as well as its responsibilities, relationships, and processes. It also has issued a more detailed horizontal command-and-control integration concept of operations to identify how it brings together all of its missions and capabilities to support national objectives. Our prior work has shown that successfully transforming organizations have leaders who define and articulate a compelling reason for change; set the direction, pace, and tone for transformation; and assign accountability for results. The command has also created a collection of first principles to better align the command with national defense priorities, focus its efforts for integrating and synchronizing its missions, and provide advocacy for its missions as they mature. Table 3 provides USSTRATCOM’s nine principles, which include establishing a globally focused organization built to collaborate with all elements of national power; establishing operationally interdependent components; and embracing effects-based operations. The command also identified areas of emphasis that contain several key objectives for mission support, such as (1) for combating weapons of mass destruction, integrate and enable capabilities across the DOD enterprise; (2) in organizing for the global fight, embrace horizontal integration; and (3) for global force management, optimize the employment of low-density and high-demand intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems. However, USSTRATCOM has not yet developed clear, well-defined, outcome-based goals and measures to indicate how the command will measure success, track the progress it is making toward its goals, and give its leaders critical information on which to base decisions for improving the command’s implementation efforts. While the command’s first principles and areas of emphasis provide direction for better focusing its implementation efforts, these principles are process-oriented, tactical goals, rather than long-term, results-oriented strategic goals and objectives that can provide the basis for determining the command’s performance and progress. Our prior work has shown that long-term strategic goals and objectives are important for an organization to explain the results it expects, what it intends to accomplish, and how these goals would be assessed. Outcome- based performance measures should be objective and results oriented with specific target levels to meet performance goals. Measuring performance allows organizations to track progress toward goals and provides crucial information on which to base organizational and management decisions. The command has adopted some processes and metrics to monitor its performance and provide information on its progress in implementing its missions; however, these processes and metrics are largely subjective and do not provide the command with the full range of both quantitative and qualitative outcome-based performance measures it needs to fully assess progress in achieving its goals. Organizations use evaluation and corrective action plans to examine the success of a program and to improve performance by identifying appropriate strategies to meet those goals that were not met. In contrast, USSTRATCOM’s current processes result in largely subjective assessments and are intended to support more limited purposes. For example, according to an official responsible for coordinating the command’s readiness reporting, the command has adapted its readiness reporting process to include inputs from each of the command’s mission organizations and service components. The official said that this process gives the USSTRATCOM commander access to a broad perspective on the command’s overall readiness. However, the readiness reports resulting from the process discuss the commander’s subjective assessment of USSTRATCOM’s ability to execute its missions, based on short-term internal and external factors affecting the command’s operations. Similarly, the command’s annual training assessments are subjective evaluations, based on observations of prior training, exercises, real-world operations, and other factors, which are used to set priorities for future training priorities. USSTRATCOM senior officials told us that the command has not yet established strategic goals and outcome-based performance metrics to fully assess the command’s progress because the command is still sorting out the implementation of its new organizational construct. Although command officials stated they believe such metrics are needed and the command should begin to develop them, they have not yet developed a process or assigned responsibility for developing metrics. While the development of such metrics will present a significant challenge due to the complex nature of the command’s missions, such an effort is needed so that the command can assess its progress and identify areas that need further improvement. For example USSTRATCOM officials believe they can and should develop metrics to assess the extent to which they are efficiently allocating intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems to optimize the use of high-demand aircraft. Without developing strategic goals and the full range of outcome-based performance measures, the command will lack a process to evaluate its performance, identify areas that may need improvement, and take corrective actions. USSTRATCOM has not clarified the roles and responsibilities of its service component organizations and lacks a commandwide outreach strategy for enhancing its relations with other DOD organizations. Since its most recent reorganization, USSTRATCOM has provided some guidance to its service component commands. However, the command’s guidance is not always specific and service officials believe that additional guidance from USSTRATCOM would help to more clearly define their responsibilities, expectations, and relationships with the command, particularly with its new mission organizations. In addition, USSTRATCOM lacks a commandwide strategy to effectively manage and coordinate its external outreach activities with the large number of commands and organizations it interacts with in executing its diverse missions. Without clear service component guidance and a comprehensive communications strategy, USSTRATCOM’s service components will not have complete information on the command’s expectations for their support and the command may not have the most effective approach for building relationships, promoting its capabilities, and providing the most effective level of support to other combatant commands and organizations. While USSTRATCOM has provided broad guidance to its service components, Army, Navy, and Air Force component officials told us they lack specific guidance that clarifies and provides more detailed information on their responsibilities, requirements, expectations, and relationships with the command and, particularly, its newer mission organizations. Our prior work has shown that it is important for organizations undergoing significant change to provide clear and complete guidance to their subordinate organizations. Without clearly defined, specific guidance, it can be difficult for the service components to effectively organize, plan, and identify resources to provide the expected support. Moreover, the lack of this guidance can also limit the understanding that USSTRATCOM’s headquarters and its organizations have about the components’ organizations, organizational relationships, and range of support they provide. USSTRATCOM has provided guidance to its service components in its concepts of operations, orders, plans, and other documents and through meetings and other activities between command and service component staffs, such as conferences, videoconferences, and command exercises. Guidance and expectations have also been provided during routine and crisis-oriented collaborative planning activities among the command’s organizations and service components. However, USSTRATCOM Army component officials told us that much of the command’s overall guidance, such as USSTRATCOM’s standing operational order for its global strike mission and its overarching concept of operations, is too general and often does not provide enough specific information for the service components to fully understand the command’s requirements and expectations. Our review of USSTRATCOM guidance found that key guidance lists the overarching responsibilities for the command’s service components, such as providing support for the command’s operations and planning and advocacy activities. Some mission-specific guidance, such as the concept of operations for the space and global strike missions, provides additional responsibilities for each of the components that relate to a specific mission area or organization. In particular, this concept of operations assigns the Air Force service component responsibility for establishing an operations center for global strike planning and execution, and for performing day-to-day command and control of space forces assigned to the command. In contrast, much of the remaining guidance we reviewed provided few specific details on what is expected or required to carry out the components’ responsibilities, such as the type of military personnel skills, planning systems, or secure communications lines that are needed to effectively support the command. Additionally, several guidance documents we reviewed that contain references to the services are still in draft, such as the command’s integrating guidance, or need revision as a result of the command’s recent reorganization. For example, in 2004 the command drafted a concept for integrating its missions that included detailed annexes describing the how the command’s service components were to monitor global events affecting U.S. interests; analyze, evaluate, and communicate information; predict likely consequences of military operations on U.S. and adversary forces; and plan and execute operations in support of each of the command’s mission areas. However, according to a USSTRATCOM official the command leadership decided not to include specific expectations for its service components following the decision to reorganize the command and establish the joint functional component commands in late 2004. As a result, the command’s most recently drafted guidance does not yet completely reflect service responsibilities and expectations and unique support that may be required to support USSTRATCOM’s new organization. According to USSTRATCOM officials, the command does not plan to provide additional formal guidance to its service component organizations at this time. The relationships between the command’s service components and new subordinate mission organizations are still evolving. Army component officials told us that USSTRATCOM’s new mission organizations have not yet developed a full understanding of the Army service component’s responsibilities, and as a result, USSTRATCOM’s expectations may not be consistent with the support that can be provided by the Army. For example, the acting chief of staff for USSTRATCOM’s Army service component told us that according to the Joint Staff’s Unified Action Armed Forces policy publication, which clarifies all command relationships and other authorities, the Army’s service component has responsibility for providing Army personnel with training in service- related tasks. The official told us the USSTRATCOM command assumed that training in the use of joint systems, such as secure communications lines operated by the USSTRATCOM command for integrated missile defense, would be done by the service component. However, the respective USSTRATCOM command is responsible for providing any joint training to service personnel. The official said the Army could provide this training if USSTRATCOM defined this requirement in its guidance. Army component officials also told us that the Army can better respond to USSTRATCOM requirements when expectations are more clearly described in guidance and related documents. For example, USSTRATCOM cited a requirement in its draft concept of operations for a small Army detachment to be assigned to USSTRATCOM’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance command. The Army provided this type of detachment based on that requirement. Similarly, the head of the Eighth Air Force’s air operations center, which is part of the USSTRATCOM Air Force service component, told us that the component has clear guidance about its responsibilities to provide direct support to USSTRATCOM’s space and global strike command, and therefore, has a clear understanding of what is required to support the component. The space and global strike command has provided information on the direct support expected from the Air Force in its concept of operations. However, the official said the requirements and expectations for supporting other USSTRATCOM mission organizations, such as the Joint Functional Component Commands for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance and Network Warfare, are not as clearly known because USSTRATCOM has not yet provided guidance on the required Air Force support for those organizations. According to Navy Fleet Forces Command officials, USSTRATCOM has not provided clear and specific guidance on the command’s responsibilities and expectations, despite its unique relationship to USSTRATCOM. Officials of the Navy Fleet Forces Command told us that the Fleet Forces Command has a unique relationship to USSTRATCOM because it is a supporting command and not a traditional service component. The officials said their command is not formally assigned to and under USSTRATCOM’s operational chain of command, but rather their command provides advice to USSSTRATCOM on the best use of Navy forces and capabilities in support of its missions. The officials said that clear and specific guidance is necessary to provide an understanding of their command’s unique relationship to USSTRATCOM headquarters and organizations. In March 2006, USSTRATCOM, in consultation with the Fleet Forces Command, did issue a command instruction that clarifies the Fleet Forces Command’s relationship with USSTRATCOM and its responsibilities, which include taking part in the command’s collaborative planning processes, participating in its exercise program, and helping USSTRATCOM prepare its readiness review reports. However, while this document helps to clarify the Navy component’s support responsibilities, it neither sets priorities for the Fleet Forces Command nor includes mission-specific requirements. According to service officials, USSTRATCOM’s unique organization, complex planning processes, and global focus are very different than more traditionally organized combatant commands that have clearly defined geographic areas of responsibility. In contrast to more traditional regional combatant commands, USSTRATCOM has constructed a collaborative planning process, which is globally focused, and involves a much broader range of military capabilities. As this planning process continues to evolve, the role and involvement of the service components will change. For example, the director of the Army component’s planning and exercise group told us that USSTRATCOM’s new mission organizations have not always provided well-documented requirements for certain Army capabilities, which has delayed the Army component’s ability to provide the needed capabilities to these organizations. The official told us that in the summer of 2005 the Army component had difficulty in both staffing its office and initially providing information operations capabilities to support command missions because USSTRATCOM had not documented the Army requirements for these capabilities. The Army official said that although the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, has been satisfied with the Army’s support for this mission area, greater clarity about USSTRATCOM’s expectations would have helped the Army component to better identify its authorized personnel requirements and ensure that the required Army capabilities were more quickly available. Unlike the other service components, however, the Marine Corps Forces component is satisfied with the guidance that has been provided, according to a Marine Corps component official. The official said the component does not need additional guidance at this time because the component has a more limited role and fewer responsibilities than the other services in supporting USSTRATCOM and its organizations. The official said that the Marine Corps’ component of about 20 people largely serves as a conduit to USSTRATCOM to ensure Marine Corps representation and provide inputs, when needed, on command issues. While USSTRATCOM routinely conducts outreach with other combatant commands and organizations, it lacks a common approach across the command because it has not developed a comprehensive, commandwide outreach strategy to effectively manage these activities. Without an outreach strategy, the command and its organizations do not have a consistent, coordinated approach to use in developing and expanding relationships, educating other organizations on the command’s capabilities, and providing the most effective level of support to other commands and organizations. In our prior work in identifying key practices adopted by organizations undergoing successful transformations, we found that it is essential for organizations to adopt a comprehensive communication strategy that reaches out to customers and stakeholders and seeks to genuinely engage them in the organization’s transformation. In particular, successfully transformed organizations have found that by communicating information early and often, organizations are able to build trust and increase understanding among their stakeholders about the purpose of planned changes. Organizations use these communication strategies to provide a common framework for conducting consistent and coordinated outreach throughout their organizations by clearly presenting the organization’s rationale, specific objectives, and desired outcomes of outreach efforts. These strategies also cover the range of integrated information activities to be implemented and clearly articulate how all the various components of the strategy will be coordinated and managed in order to achieve the objectives most efficiently and effectively. Additionally, outreach strategies provide measurable criteria against which to evaluate the outcomes of organizations’ outreach efforts and determine whether any adjustments are necessary. Because USSTRATCOM supports or is supported by a large number of commands and organizations in executing its diverse set of global missions, the command considers its external outreach efforts essential to (1) develop effective relationships and communications, (2) promote and educate others about the value of its missions and capabilities, and (3) obtain information on how the command can best support other organizations. USSTRATCOM and its organizations regularly use a wide range of methods and activities to promote its missions and capabilities to combatant commands, military services, and DOD and other government organizations. These methods and activities include conferences and symposia, exercises and training events, senior leadership visits, exchange of liaison staff, routine meetings, and voice and electronic communication. The command has also established a strategic knowledge integration Web site, which is called SKIWeb, on DOD’s classified computer network to provide information about the command and the status of its activities and allow open exchange among its staff and other individuals with access to the network. While USSTRATCOM officials told us that USSTRATCOM has developed good working relationships with other combatant commands and organizations across DOD since its establishment in 2002, they believe that the command’s missions, capabilities, and authorities are not yet fully understood by others. The USSTRATCOM commander’s summary report for its November 2005 Global Lightning exercise states that while the command has expended a great amount of effort in developing processes and strategies to integrate the command’s missions, the organizations it supports, particularly other combatant commands, have a vague understanding of the “value added” by USSTRATCOM capabilities. The report states that USSTRATCOM’s ability to provide capabilities and influence global events are not clearly understood, nor do some other commands’ headquarters completely understand how to access that capability. For example, in observing the Global Lightning exercise, U.S. Central Command and other participants told us that they were unsure of value added by USSTRATCOM in planning for global strike operations in their theater. However, USSTRATCOM officials said USSTRATCOM brings the full range of capability options into global strike planning, particularly nonkinetic capability options such as computer network operations; other commands are just beginning to see the potential value of these options. Additionally, USSTRATCOM has also had to change the perceptions held by other organizations that the command is responsible only for nuclear deterrence, which was the case with the previous U.S. Strategic Command, but has other essential missions that are global in scope and span all levels of military operations. While some missions, such as nuclear deterrence and military space, are well practiced and have established histories and interactions with outside organizations, others, such as its combating weapons of mass destruction and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions, are less mature and still evolving. Further, many of USSTRATCOM authorities, responsibilities, and capabilities are still being refined, clarified, and demonstrated to other organizations in exercises and training events and in real-time military activities. For example, the deputy commander of USSTRATCOM’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance command told us that USSTRATCOM’s evolving role in providing support for decisions on allocating intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets is not yet clear to all of the regional combatant commands. The official said that some combatant commands have concerns about how USSTRATCOM responsibilities could affect their ability to exercise operational and tactical control over any assets assigned to their commands. According to the official, these commands do not yet understand that USSTRATCOM’s role is to provide overall management for these assets rather than control their operational use. Moreover, DOD commands and organizations are still getting acquainted with USSTRATCOM’s new organizational construct, particularly the new subordinate organizations that are responsible for the day-to-day management of several command missions. The command’s new organization does not follow the headquarters-centric model, in which information flows vertically, that is used by other combatant commands. According to the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, horizontal flows of information and command and control run counter to traditional military thinking, which prefers a vertical chain of command. While the new organizational structure has the potential to greatly expand the command’s opportunities to conduct external outreach, relationships and communication links are still being developed or reestablished with other organizations. Each of the command’s organizations conduct numerous outreach activities daily, but these efforts are often not well coordinated and consistently conducted to achieve the most optimal benefit for the command. We also found that USSTRATCOM does not have an approach for comprehensively collecting information on the needs and priorities of the combatant commands and other stakeholders who use its capabilities, information which USSTRATCOM could then use to determine how it can provide the most effective level of support. USSTRATCOM has recognized the need to develop a comprehensive outreach strategy to increase understanding among other combatant commands about the specific capabilities and contributions that the command can provide to their operations. Both of the command’s summary reports for its October 2004 and November 2005 Global Lightning exercises recommended development of an outreach strategy for identifying USSTRATCOM capabilities for the benefit of combatant commands and stakeholders. The November 2005 report recommended that the strategy provide an integrated methodology for conducting effective outreach and education of the command’s capabilities. The report also recommended (1) improving the command’s SKIWeb Web site to allow outside users to more easily identify capabilities, (2) providing briefings and seminar support to the Defense and interagency community, and (3) developing outreach products to provide key information about the command. The report states that much of the understanding and credibility of the command can be achieved though an effective outreach plan that is focused at other commands, at the interagency level, and with the services to demonstrate and provide understanding about its global support capabilities. USSTRATCOM headquarters officials told us that the command does not have any current plans to develop an outreach strategy as recommended in each of the two exercise reports. To provide the most effective level of support to other combatant commands, U.S. Joint Forces Command recently developed an approach that could serve as a best practice in identifying the priorities of the commands it supports for inclusion in an external outreach strategy. Under U.S. Joint Forces Command’s approach, the command asks each of the other combatant commands to provide a list of its top priorities for the type and level of support needed from the command in the coming year. These lists are incorporated into the command’s annual plans and are used to make adjustments in its activities and resources to best meet the needs of its customers. During the year, the command schedules periodic updates with staffs of the other commands to determine to what extent the command is addressing these priorities or whether the priorities have changed. A USSTRATCOM headquarters official responsible for coordinating the command’s priorities with the U.S. Joint Forces Command told us that approach has been helpful for USSTRATCOM in communicating the command’s priorities for support. The official said that USSTRATCOM added to the effectiveness of the approach by preparing a detailed matrix that identified and ranked the command’s priorities and provided contact information for command staff. USSTRATCOM has been assigned a new role in providing the President and the Secretary of Defense with an expanded set of military options to more effectively respond to emerging global, transregional, and asymmetric threats to U.S. national security, including those involving weapons of mass destruction. While the command has made progress in implementing its global missions, its ability to strengthen implementation efforts and ensure that its leadership has critical information on the effectiveness of its missions and organizations will continue to be limited until it identifies long-term support requirements for its exercise program; establishes clear, consistent criteria for assessing the establishment of its newest mission organizations; and fully implements a results-oriented approach for evaluating its progress. The U.S. Joint Forces Command offers a range of capabilities and resources for supporting command exercises. Until it clearly identifies the long-term support it requires from the U.S. Joint Forces Command, and the Joint Forces Command incorporates these requirements into its plans, USSTRATCOM will continue to lack a robust exercise program, which is essential for evaluating its capabilities and identifying areas in need of improvement. Additionally, absent clear, consistent guidance from the command, four new mission organizations that have not yet achieved full operating capability are establishing their own criteria for this milestone, which results in different understandings of what it means to reach this milestone and how it would be evaluated. Without establishing clear, consistent criteria at major points in implementation, the command cannot create a foundation on which to assess and measure the success of these organizations even after full operating capability has been declared. Further, while the command has adopted some elements of a results- oriented management approach, without a process that includes criteria and benchmarks for measuring the progress toward mission goals at all levels of its organization, the command will be limited in its ability to adjust to the many uncertainties surrounding its mission areas, measure the success of its efforts, and target shortfalls and gaps and suggest corrective actions, including any needed adjustments to future goals and milestones. Similarly, without complete and clearly articulated expectations and requirements, the service components will not have the information needed to fully determine the personnel, resources, and capabilities required to support the command and respond to its requests and tasks in a timely way. In addition, in the absence of a commandwide communications strategy to conduct consistent, coordinated outreach to other commands and organizations, USSTRATCOM cannot effectively develop and expand relationships, foster education about its capabilities, and provide the most effective level of support to other commands and organizations. Lastly, without incorporating into its external outreach strategy a systematic tool to help identify the priorities of the combatant commands and organization it supports—similar to one used by the U.S. Joint Forces Command—USSTRATCOM is limited in its ability to fully address the priorities for support of the other commands and organizations, improve feedback, and identify resources needed to respond to these priorities. To better determine and obtain the assistance that can be provided by the U.S. Joint Forces Command’s Joint Warfighting Center in supporting USSTRATCOM’s exercise program, we recommend the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, to fully identify and request in a timely manner the long-term services and resources required from the U.S. Joint Forces Command’s Joint Warfighting Center to support the command’s program and to reach agreement with the U.S. Joint Forces Command on the support to be provided. We further recommend that the Secretary direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, (1) in the near term, to make any possible adjustments among the Joint Warfighting Center’s current resources to more fully support USSTRATCOM’s exercise program; and (2) in the long term, incorporate USSTRATCOM requirements for support in the center’s plans to provide the full range of assistance necessary to help USSTRATCOM execute a robust exercise program. To strengthen USSTRATCOM’s efforts to implement its missions and provide greater visibility of its progress, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, to take the following four actions: Provide clear and complete guidance to the Joint Functional Component Commands for Space and Global Strike, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, and Network Warfare, and the USSTRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction that clearly defines full operating capability and provides specific, common criteria for determining what is required and how it will be assessed. This guidance should be developed, in consultation with these organizations, before each organization declares full operating capability. Develop a comprehensive, results-oriented management process for continuously assessing and benchmarking the command’s overall progress in achieving desired outcomes and for identifying corrective actions to enhance the command’s efforts to implement and integrate its missions. Develop or refine performance measures that clearly demonstrate performance results and ensure that those measures cascade down through the command; assign clear leadership with accountability and authority to implement and sustain the process; and develop and ensure that goals and objectives are clear and achievable and timelines are established. Set a specific time frame for completing development of this process. Provide additional guidance to the command’s service components that clearly defines and provides more specific information about their responsibilities, requirements, relationships, and expectations for supporting the command’s headquarters and subordinate mission organizations. Set a specific time frame for approval of this guidance. Develop and implement a commandwide communications strategy to guide and coordinate USSTRATCOM’s efforts to conduct outreach with other combatant commands and Defense and other organizations to develop effective relationships and communications, promote and educate others about the value of its mission and capabilities, and obtain information on how the command can best support other commands and organizations. This strategy should include the command’s rationale, specific objectives, desired outcomes, and strategies for conducting outreach with other commands and organizations, and criteria against which the command can evaluate the success of its efforts. Given the importance of the new role assigned to USSTRATCOM by the President and the Secretary of Defense to provide an expanded set of military options to more effectively respond to emerging threats to U.S. national security, Congress should consider requiring the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, to develop a longer-term, comprehensive and transparent, results-oriented management process for continuously assessing and benchmarking the command’s overall progress in achieving desired outcomes and for identifying corrective actions to enhance the command’s efforts to effectively carry out its missions, as outlined in our recommendation to DOD. In developing this process, the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, should develop and ensure that long-term goals and objectives are clear and achievable and milestones and timelines for achieving desired outcomes are established; develop or refine performance measures that clearly demonstrate performance results and ensure that those measures cascade down through the command; and assign clear leadership with accountability and authority to implement and sustain the process. The Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, should set a specific time frame for developing and implementing this process. Additionally, the Commander should periodically report to Congress on the command’s progress in achieving desired outcomes. DOD’s Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy provided written comments on a draft of this report. DOD generally agreed with our three recommendations regarding U.S. Joint Forces Command’s support of USSTRATCOM’s exercise program. DOD did not agree with our other four recommendations that USSTRATCOM provide clear and complete guidance to its joint functional component commands on achieving full operating capability; develop a comprehensive results- oriented management process to assess and benchmark the command’s overall progress; provide additional guidance to its service components; and develop and implement a commandwide communications strategy. In regard to these four recommendations, DOD commented that measures are already in place that address the issues raised by the report. We disagree that the actions taken by USSTRATCOM to date fulfill the intent of our recommendations and are complete. While USSTRATCOM has taken some positive actions on these issues, we do not believe that the command’s actions go far enough, are specific enough, or are sufficiently transparent in improving evaluation of the command’s progress in implementing its mission areas, providing more complete guidance to its mission and service component organizations, and strengthening its external communications with other organizations and commands. Therefore, we believe our recommendations are still warranted and we have added a matter for congressional consideration for Congress to direct the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, to develop and implement a longer-term results-oriented management process for assessing the command’s overall progress and periodically reporting to Congress its progress in achieving desired outcomes. DOD’s comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix V and more specific information on DOD’s comments on our recommendations and our assessment of these comments follows below. DOD generally agreed with our recommendations regarding USSTRATCOM’s exercise program. Specifically, DOD agreed with our recommendation that USSTRATCOM should identify and request, in a timely manner, the long-term services and resources required from the U.S. Joint Forces Command’s Joint Warfighting Center to support USSTRATCOM’s exercise program. In its comments, DOD said that while the center had provided limited exercise planning, execution, and assessment support to USSTRATCOM, the command and the center have steadily built a relationship over the past year to support USSTRATCOM’s seven mission areas and are jointly solving problems that hindered the center’s support in previous USSTRATCOM exercises. The department partially agreed with our recommendation that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, in the near term make any possible adjustments among the Joint Warfighting Center’s current resources to more fully support USSTRATCOM’s program. DOD commented that the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is currently conducting an in-depth review of the joint training programs to determine how it can provide better flexibility and synergism through joint training investments. DOD agreed with our recommendation that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, in the long term, incorporate USSTRATCOM’s requirements for support into the Joint Warfighting Center’s plans. DOD commented that its current review of joint training programs intends to match, to the greatest extent possible, joint training requirements and resources, including the training support provided by the U.S. Joint Forces Command. DOD also said while USSTRATCOM’s requirements must compete with other training priorities for joint training funding, the center can better plan and make resources available if USSTRATCOM provides the center with well-defined requirements 3 to 5 years in advance. DOD did not agree with our recommendation that the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, provide additional guidance to its joint functional component commands that clearly defines full operating capability and provides specific, common criteria for determining what is required and how it will be assessed. DOD commented that the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, has provided specific guidance in the form of a tailored implementation directive that assigns specific duties, responsibilities, tasks, and authorities to the components. DOD also said that the Commander is continuing to work closely with the component commanders to develop, implement, and assess the measures of progress by which full operating capability will be declared and will report to the Secretary of Defense when the milestone is achieved for each mission area. We believe that the command’s tailored implementation directives do not go far enough in providing clear and specific criteria for assessing whether specific duties, responsibilities, tasks, and authorities assigned to each organization have been met. For example, during our review we found that the components had different interpretations as to what criteria might apply for declaring full operating capability. We believe that it is important for USSTRATCOM and its organizations to have a clear definition of full operating capability and the criteria, or measures of progress, in place as early as possible, by which the achievement of the milestone will be assessed for each of the new mission organizations. These criteria should be complete and readily accessible so the command and its mission organizations will have confidence in the extent that planned capabilities will be achieved at full operating capability. After declaring full operating capability, each of the new organizations will require further actions to more completely implement and enhance their mission capabilities and responsibilities. Establishing clear, documented criteria for assessing and measuring success for declaring full operating capability can provide a baseline and a sound foundation for assessing the future progress of the organization in carrying out its mission responsibilities. DOD also disagreed with our recommendation that USSTRATCOM develop a comprehensive results-oriented management process for continually assessing and benchmarking the command’s overall progress in achieving desired outcomes and for identifying corrective actions to enhance the command’s efforts to implement and integrate its missions. In its comments, DOD stated that a variety of directives, including concepts of operations, articulate the command’s goals and objectives. The department also stated that the command conducts periodic exercises, external inspections, and in-progress reviews to help assess the command’s effectiveness in making operational the assigned mission areas and achieving stated objectives. While these actions by USSTRATCOM may be helpful to the command’s leadership, they do not represent a comprehensive and transparent plan for assessing progress in achieving desired outcomes. Moreover, DOD interpreted our recommendation as being directed at the metrics to be used by the command’s organizations in declaring full operating capability for its missions, which are scheduled to occur by early 2007. However, our recommendation calls for creation of a longer-term, comprehensive, results-oriented management process that would provide the command with a framework for continuously assessing its future progress in achieving desired outcomes in each of its mission areas and the command’s overall goals and objectives. Because of the importance of the command’s new role in providing expanded military options for addressing emerging threats, we continue to believe that creation of a results-oriented management process that establishes long-term goals and objectives, milestones and timelines for achieving desired outcomes, performance measures that clearly demonstrate performance results, and clear leadership to implement and sustain the process is needed. Therefore, we have included a matter for congressional consideration to require the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, to develop such a process that would improve transparency and accountability of the extent to which the command is achieving desired outcomes in each of its mission areas. DOD also did not agree with our recommendation that the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, provide additional guidance to the command’s service components that clearly defines and provides more specific information about their responsibilities, requirements, relationships, and expectations for supporting the command’s headquarters and subordinate mission organizations. In its comments, DOD said that the duties and responsibilities of USSTRATCOM and its service components are documented in Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces. The department also stated that day-to-day liaison activities between the command and the services are provided by on-site service component representatives. While broad guidance is provided in the Joint Staff’s Unified Action Armed Forces publication on the relationships and authorities of the military services in supporting combatant commanders and by USSTRATCOM in various documents, we continue to believe that additional guidance from the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, to the command’s service components is needed to provide clear and specific information about their responsibilities, requirements, relationships, and expectations for supporting the command’s headquarters and subordinate mission organizations, particularly since the components have expressed a desire for further guidance from the command. As USSTRATCOM continues to implement its new organization and develop capabilities in each of its mission areas, this additional guidance can strengthen relationships with the services by (1) providing better information for the components in effectively organizing, planning, and identifying resources to support the command; and (2) increasing understanding among the command’s headquarters and its organizations about the components’ organizations, organizational relationships, and the range of support they provide. Lastly, DOD disagreed with our recommendation that USSTRATCOM develop and implement a commandwide communications strategy to guide and coordinate the command’s efforts to conduct outreach with other combatant commands and Defense and other organizations. DOD commented that USSTRATCOM provides and promotes insight to all its activities through its classified Web site; maintains a senior officer representative at each of the combatant commands and with the Joint Staff; and, as a supporting command, conducts continuous liaison activities with other combatant commands. DOD also stated that Web- based mission area training for USSTRATCOM missions is available on the U.S. Joint Forces Command’s Web site. However, as discussed in our report, we found that while USSTRATCOM organizations routinely conduct outreach activities to promote its missions and capabilities, these activities are often not well coordinated and consistently conducted to achieve the most optimal benefit for the command. Both of USSTRATCOM commander’s summary reports prepared after its two most recent Global Lightning exercises in 2004 and 2005 recommended that the command develop a comprehensive outreach strategy to increase understanding among other combatant commands about the specific capabilities and contributions that the command can provide to their operations. The November 2005 Global Lightning report also recommended that the strategy provide an integrated methodology for conducting effective outreach and education of the command’s capabilities. Therefore, we continue to believe that USSTRATCOM needs a commandwide communications strategy to provide a framework to effectively manage these activities and a common approach for conducting consistent and coordinated outreach across the command. We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional committees; the Secretary of Defense; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command; and the Commander, U. S. Joint Forces Command. We will make copies available to others upon request. In addition the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions, please contact me at (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Staff members who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI. This appendix provides information on trends and changes we identified in the United States Strategic Command’s (USSTRATCOM) historic and projected budget, from fiscal years 2003 through 2011. To perform our analysis, we identified trends and changes in USSTRATCOM’s budget since its establishment in October 2002 by obtaining and analyzing the command’s historic, current, and projected funding for fiscal years 2003 through 2011. We used data prepared to support the President’s fiscal year 2006 budget request, which were the most current official data available when we conducted and completed our work. We also discussed with USSTRATCOM officials anticipated changes to the budget resulting from the fiscal year 2007 President’s budget request, and efforts taken by the command to identify how its funding is allocated by mission responsibility and subordinate organization. We took steps to assess the reliability of the data used in this analysis, including (1) performing electronic testing of required data elements, (2) comparing the data to another independently prepared data source, and (3) interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about the data. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. This appendix provides information on trends and changes we identified in the United States Strategic Command’s (USSTRATCOM) military and civilian authorized personnel levels since its establishment in October 2002. Our analysis shows that USSTRATCOM’s overall authorized personnel level has remained relatively stable since 2002, and that the percentage of filled military and civilian positions has increased. The command is transferring positions to its new mission organizations from its headquarters organization, rather than increasing its overall commandwide authorized personnel level. Although the command has expanded the number of professional military skills of its authorized personnel, the majority of its military positions encompass relatively few types of skilled positions. We also determined that while Air Force and Navy military positions continue to make up most of USSTRATCOM’s authorized personnel, the proportion of civilian positions is increasing. To determine how USSTRATCOM’s authorized personnel level has changed since its establishment in 2002, we obtained and reviewed USSTRATCOM projections and historic data that identify (1) the number of authorized civilian and military positions assigned to USSTRATCOM, (2) the number of authorized positions filled by individuals assigned to the command, and (3) the professional military skills associated with the command’s military positions. The data we obtained include USSTRATCOM positions assigned to the command’s headquarters near Omaha, Nebraska, its mission organizations, and to various other locations and assignments. We also obtained the command’s projections for authorized personnel levels for the new mission organizations, and discussed these projections with officials responsible for managing the command’s authorized personnel. In our analysis, we did not consider staff positions from organizations that are supporting several of USSTRATCOM’s mission organizations, such as the Air Force Space Command, Eighth Air Force, Army Space and Missile Defense Command, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and Defense Information Systems Agency. The data also do not include part-time reservists or contractors. We took steps to assess the reliability of the data used in this analysis, including (1) performing electronic testing of required data elements, (2) comparing the data to another independently prepared data source, and (3) interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about the data. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. To address the extent to which the United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) has made progress in implementing its new missions and assessing mission results, we reviewed a wide range of Department of Defense (DOD) and command documentation including USSTRATCOM guidance, plans, directives, speeches and testimony statements, and reports; implementation plans and directives for creating its new mission organizations; and documentation related to DOD’s implementation of its New Triad concept to transform U.S. strategic capabilities. We also spoke with various officials involved in the command’s implementation efforts about their roles, related plans, and actions. When possible, we met with the command and other organizations’ senior leadership to discuss and obtain their views on various command issues, including: Commander, U.S. Strategic Command; Commander, Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance/Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; Commander, Joint Functional Component Command for Network Warfare/Director, National Security Agency; Commander, Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense/Commander, Army Space and Missile Defense Command; Commander, Joint Task Force for Global Network Operations/Director, Defense Information Systems Agency; Director, USSTRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction/Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency; Commander, Air Force Space Command; and Chief of Staff, U.S. Joint Forces Command. To determine the extent to which USSTRATCOM has a robust exercise program for demonstrating its capabilities, we reviewed the command’s annual training plan, which describes the command’s individual exercises, establishes an exercise schedule, and sets expectations for the participation of the command’s mission organizations. For the November 2005 Global Lightning exercise, we reviewed the exercise plan, collection management plan, after-action report, and final exercise report. We also observed that exercise and discussed the exercise results with the participants. We also reviewed the collection management plan and the after-action report prepared for the April 2006 Global Thunder exercise, and after-action reports prepared for the April 2005 Global Thunder, October 2004 Global Lightning, and October 2003 Global Guardian exercises. We obtained guidance from the Joint Staff that describe the roles and responsibilities of U.S. Joint Forces Command for supporting combatant command exercises. In addition we held discussions with command officials from the exercise and training branch and with other exercise observers to obtain their views on USSTRATCOM efforts to plan and schedule its exercises. We also met with officials from the new joint functional component commands as well as the Joint Task Force for Global Network Operations and the USSTRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons Of Mass Destruction to identify challenges to more fully including their missions in the commands exercises and assist in our understanding of the extent to which the command’s mission organizations were able to participate in the command’s exercises. Command officials also briefed us on the evolution of the command’s exercise program since its establishment, and plans for the future. Finally, we met with officials from the U.S. Joint Forces Command’s Joint Warfighting Center to determine the extent to which they have been involved in identifying requirements, objectives, methods, and tools for planning, implementing, and evaluating USSTRATCOM exercises to strengthen the design and execution of the command’s exercises, such as participant training and independent observer team support and evaluation. To determine the extent to which USSTRATCOM and its mission organizations had developed criteria for assessing their progress toward achieving full operating capability, we reviewed documents from the command and each of the new mission organizations. These documents included the command’s implementation directives for each new mission organization and the overarching command reorganization implementation plan for the current reorganization. We also reviewed briefings from each of the mission organizations that gave status information on the organizations’ efforts towards achieving full operating capability. We held discussions with USSTRATCOM officials who were part of the command’s reorganization management team and with the senior leadership, when possible, to determine their roles and management approach in assisting the mission organizations’ efforts to reach full operating capability and to obtain an understanding of what reaching full operating capability means as a milestone in developing the new USSTRATCOM organization. We met and held discussions with the senior staff of each mission organization on their criteria for measuring the organization’s progress toward full operating capability. To determine the extent to which USSTRATCOM has developed a results- oriented management approach to establish goals, continually track its progress, achieve better synergy among its missions, and gauge the results of its efforts, we reviewed key documentation and interviewed officials to determine what steps, if any, the command has taken to develop and follow this approach. We reviewed relevant GAO reports that identified and reviewed management approaches of other government and private sector organizations. We used the practices and implementation steps identified in these approaches as criteria for reviewing USSTRATCOM documents and for discussions with command officials about their approach to transforming the USSTRATCOM organization. We then compared USSTRATCOM’s approach against these examples of success that we had identified in other organizations to determine the extent to which USSTRATCOM had these elements in place. We reviewed key USSTRATCOM documents, including its first principles (i.e., its long-term goals) related to reporting on the command’s performance and those from its biannual readiness reporting and its annual training assessments. We reviewed the command’s implementation plan and related directives for establishing USSTRATCOM’s joint functional component commands. We compared these documents to implementation plans used by other organizations, including the U.S. Atlantic Command and U.S. Northern Command, and reorganization plans, such as the Report to Congress on the Plan for Organizing the National Nuclear Security Agency and the Department of Homeland Security Reorganization Plan, to determine any differences in the elements and details for implementation that were considered in these plans and the extent to which they had developed, used, or planned to use outcome-based performance goals and measures. To assess the extent to which USSTRATCOM has made progress defining organizational responsibilities and establishing relationships with other DOD commands and organizations, we obtained and reviewed relevant documents and spoke with various officials involved in implementing and advocating for the command’s new missions about its roles and related plans and actions. To determine the extent to which the command has clarified the roles and expectations of its service component organizations, we reviewed command documentation including draft integrating guidance, concepts of operations, orders, plans, and other documents. We met with officials from each of the command’s service component/supporting commands and discussed the extent to which they believed the command’s guidance and expectations was sufficiently clear about their supporting roles. We also discussed with command officials the extent to which guidance was provided to the service components through meetings and other activities. To determine the extent to which USSTRATCOM has developed a common approach and comprehensive strategy to enhance its outreach to numerous DOD organizations on which its success depends, we met with the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, and with officials in the command’s directorate responsible for advocacy. We also met with senior leadership in all of the subordinate mission organizations to understand the extent to which a clear, coordinated, and unified outreach strategy is in place and to identify the range of methods and activities the command and its subordinate mission organizations use to engage and promote its missions and capabilities with combatant commands, military services, and DOD and other government organizations. We met with officials at the U.S. Joint Forces Command and U.S. Northern Command and discussed command relationships, the ways that USSTRATCOM officials performed outreach with these organizations, sought their viewpoint on lessons that should be learned in communicating the command’s missions and responsibilities, and their perspectives on USSTRATCOM progress. During USSTRATCOM’s Global Lightning exercise in November 2005, we also obtained insights from participants on the command’s effectiveness at performing its outreach activities. We also reviewed several GAO reports that addressed key practices organizations should implement during a significant reorganization or transformation. We used the reports to identify successful communication and outreach practices employed by other U.S. and foreign government organizations. We reviewed the USSTRATCOM commander’s summary report for its November 2005 Global Lightning exercise to identify any lessons learned, from participating in the exercise with two other combatant commands, on the success of the command’s outreach efforts. During our review, we obtained and analyzed USSTRATCOM budget and authorized personnel data to identify trends in acquiring the resources, personnel levels, and skills needed to implement the command’s missions. We took steps to assess the reliability of the data used in these analyses, including (1) performing electronic testing of required data elements, (2) comparing the data to other independently prepared data sources, and (3) interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about the data. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. For additional methodological details about how we performed our analyses, see appendixes I and II. We performed our work from May 2005 through June 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. In conducting our work, we contacted officials at the command’s headquarters, service, and functional components; think-tank organizations; and other relevant stakeholders. Table 6 provides information on the organizations and offices contacted during our review. The United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) organization is comprised of a command headquarters, joint functional component commands, task forces, and centers, which are located around one of four metropolitan areas: Omaha, Nebraska; Colorado Springs, Colorado; San Antonio, Texas; and Washington, D.C. Each of the command’s organizations is supported by a primary Defense agency or service partner organization. Table 7 shows the primary responsibilities and related information for key USSTRATCOM organizations. In addition to the individual named above, Gwendolyn R. Jaffe, Assistant Director; Alissa H. Czyz; David G. Hubbell; Amanda M. Leissoo; Kevin L. O’Neill; Roderick W. Rodgers; and Mark J. Wielgoszynski, Analyst- in-Charge, made key contributions to this report.

Summary: In 2002, the President and Secretary of Defense called for the creation of the United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) to anticipate and counter global threats. Currently, USSTRATCOM has responsibility for seven mission areas including nuclear deterrence and integrated missile defense. GAO was asked to determine the extent to which USSTRATCOM has made progress in (1) implementing its new missions and assessing mission results and (2) defining organizational responsibilities and establishing relationships with other Department of Defense (DOD) commands and organizations. To assess progress, GAO compared USSTRATCOM's efforts with lessons learned in implementing successful organizational transformations. Since its establishment in 2002, USSTRATCOM has made progress in implementing its new missions by taking a wide range of actions such as developing concepts of operations for its new missions, establishing processes and procedures, and identifying and obtaining personnel and resources needed to begin operations. However, further steps are needed to build on this progress in order to achieve the broad goals envisioned by the President and Secretary of Defense in creating the command. While the command's leadership recognizes the need to build on progress to date and has some additional actions underway to expand and enhance capabilities in its seven mission areas, GAO identified several areas in which more specific actions are needed to help the command achieve its vision. Specifically, the command has taken initial steps to include its new missions in its exercise program but has not yet fully developed a robust exercise program that integrates exercise support available from the U.S. Joint Forces Command, which can provide USSTRATCOM with several planning, training, and evaluation tools. In addition, most of USSTRATCOM's new mission organizations have not established clear criteria for determining when they will reach full operating capability. Furthermore, USSTRATCOM has not developed performance measures and criteria for assessing results across the command and in each of its mission areas. GAO's prior work examining organizational change and defense transformation shows that each of these tools is important for transforming organizations to increase their likelihood of success, particularly when multiple organizations are involved in mission execution. Developing plans in each of these areas should help the command demonstrate it can provide added value to the combatant commanders and give the President an expanded set of military options for responding to future threats--two key DOD goals. USSTRATCOM has also made progress in establishing an overall organizational framework and identifying subordinate mission organizations that have responsibility for the daily management of operations. However, it has not fully clarified roles and expectations of its service component organizations and had not developed a commandwide approach for enhancing outreach to other DOD organizations. While USSTRATCOM has provided some guidance to its service component organizations, because this guidance has not been specific or well documented, the Army, Navy, and Air Force do not fully understand their expectations in providing support to the command. In addition, while USSTRATCOM conducts some outreach with other combatant commands and organizations, it lacks a commandwide approach to effectively manage outreach activities. GAO has previously found that it is essential for organizations to develop a comprehensive communication strategy that seeks to engage customers and stakeholders. Providing additional guidance and developing a communications strategy should help USSTRATCOM's service component organizations to better understand their roles and enable the command to build effective relationships with other commands.