Our work has repeatedly shown that mission fragmentation and program overlap are widespread in the federal government. In 1998 and 1999, we found that this situation existed in 12 federal mission areas, ranging from agriculture to natural resources and environment. We also identified, in 1998 and 1999, 8 new areas of program overlap, including 50 programs for the homeless that were administered by eight federal agencies. These programs provided services for the homeless that appeared to be similar. For example, 23 programs operated by four agencies offered housing services, and 26 programs administered by 6 agencies offered food and nutrition services. Although our work indicates that the potential for inefficiency and waste exists, it also shows areas where the intentional participation by multiple agencies may be a reasonable response to a complex public problem. In either situation, implementation of federal crosscutting programs is often characterized by numerous individual agency efforts that are implemented with little apparent regard for the presence of efforts of related activities. In our past work, we have offered several possible approaches for better managing crosscutting programs—such as improved coordination, integration, and consolidation—to ensure that crosscutting goals are consistent; program efforts are mutually reinforcing; and, where appropriate, common or complementary performance measures are used as a basis for management. One of our oft-cited proposals is to consolidate the fragmented federal system to ensure the safety and quality of food. Perhaps most important, however, we have stated that the Results Act could provide the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), agencies, and Congress with a structured framework for addressing crosscutting program efforts. OMB, for example, could use the governmentwide performance plan, which is a key component of this framework, to integrate expected agency-level performance. It could also be used to more clearly relate and address the contributions of alternative federal strategies. Agencies, in turn, could use the annual performance planning cycle and subsequent annual performance reports to highlight crosscutting program efforts and to provide evidence of the coordination of those efforts. OMB guidance to agencies on the Results Act states that, at a minimum, an agency’s annual plan should identify those programs or activities that are being undertaken with other agencies to achieve a common purpose or objective, that is, interagency and crosscutting programs. This identification need cover only programs and activities that represent a significant agency effort. An agency should also review the fiscal year 2003 performance plans of other agencies participating with it in a crosscutting program or activity to ensure that related performance goals and indicators for a crosscutting program are consistent and harmonious. As appropriate, agencies should modify performance goals to bring about greater synergy and interagency support in achieving mutual goals. In April 2002, as part of its spring budget planning guidance to agencies for preparing the President’s fiscal year 2004 budget request, OMB stated that it is working to develop uniform evaluation metrics, or “common measures” for programs with similar goals. OMB asked agencies to work with OMB staff to develop evaluation metrics for several major crosscutting, governmentwide functions as part of their September budget submissions. According to OMB, such measures can help raise important questions and help inform decisions about how to direct funding and how to improve performance in specific programs. OMB’s common measures initiative initially focused on the following crosscutting program areas: low income housing assistance, job training and employment, health. We recently reported that one of the purposes of the Reports Consolidation Act of 2000 is to improve the quality of agency financial and performance data. We found that only 5 of the 24 Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act agencies’ fiscal year 2000 performance reports included assessments of the completeness and reliability of their performance data in their transmittal letters. The other 19 agencies discussed, at least to some degree, the quality of their performance data elsewhere in their performance reports. To address these objectives, we first defined the scope of each crosscutting program area as follows: Border control focuses on major federal security policies and operations that manage and govern the entry of people, animals, plants, and goods into the United States through air, land, or seaports of entry. Flood mitigation and insurance focuses on major federal efforts to proactively reduce the loss in lives and property due to floods and minimize the postflood costs of repair and construction. Wildland fire management focuses on major federal efforts to reduce accumulated hazardous fuels on public lands. Wetlands focuses on major federal efforts to protect and manage this resource, such as restoration, enhancement, and permitting activities. To identify the agencies involved in each area we relied on previous GAO work and confirmed the agencies involved by reviewing the fiscal year 2001 Results Act performance report and fiscal year 2003 Results Act performance plans for each agency identified as contributing to the crosscutting program area. One of the agencies we identified as being involved in the areas of flood mitigation and wetlands was the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps). Although we identify the Corps, we do not comment on the agency because, as noted above, the Department of Defense did not submit a fiscal year 2001 performance report or fiscal year 2003 performance plan and was not included in our review. To address the remaining objectives, we reviewed the fiscal year 2001 performance reports and fiscal year 2003 performance plans and used criteria contained in the Reports Consolidation Act of 2000 and OMB guidance. The act requires that an agency’s performance report include a transmittal letter from the agency head containing, in addition to any other content, an assessment of the completeness and reliability of the performance and financial data used in the report. It also requires that the assessment describe any material inadequacies in the completeness and reliability of the data and the actions the agency can take and is taking to resolve such inadequacies. OMB guidance states that an agency’s annual plan should include a description of how the agency intends to verify and validate the measured values of actual performance. The means used should be sufficiently credible and specific to support the general accuracy and reliability of the performance information that is recorded, collected, and reported. We did not include any changes or modifications the agencies may have made to the reports or plans after they were issued, except in cases in which agency comments provided information from a published update to a report or plan. Furthermore, because of the scope and timing of this review, information on the progress agencies may have made on addressing their management challenges during fiscal year 2002 was not yet available. We did not independently verify or assess the information we obtained from agency performance reports and plans. Also, that an agency chose not to discuss its efforts to coordinate in these crosscutting areas in its performance reports or plans does not necessarily mean that the agency is not coordinating with the appropriate agencies. We conducted our review from September through November 2002, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. As shown in table 1, multiple agencies are involved in each of the crosscutting program areas we reviewed. The discussion of the crosscutting areas below summarizes detailed information contained in the tables that appear in appendix I through IV. Hostile nations, terrorist groups, transnational criminals, and even individuals may target American people, institutions, and infrastructure with weapons of mass destruction and outbreaks of infectious disease. Given these threats, successful control of our borders relies on the ability of all levels of government and the private sector to communicate and cooperate effectively with one another. Activities that are hampered by organizational fragmentation, technological impediments, or ineffective collaboration blunt the nation’s collective efforts to secure America’s borders. Each of the five agencies we reviewed in the area of border control— Agriculture, Justice, State, Transportation, and Treasury—discussed in their performance reports and/or plans the agencies they coordinated with on border control issues, although the specific areas of coordination and level of detail provided varied. For example, Agriculture, which focuses on reducing pest and disease outbreaks and foodborne illnesses related to meat, poultry, and egg products in the United States, discusses coordination with a different set of agencies than the other four agencies, which share a focus on border control issues related to travel, trade, and immigration. Agriculture stated that it is a key member of the National Invasive Species Council, which works with other nations to deal with the many pathways by which exotic pests and diseases could enter the United States. Agriculture also stated that it coordinates with the Department of Health and Human Services and EPA on food safety issues. Although Agriculture states it is responsible for inspecting imported products at ports of entry, it does not specifically describe any coordination with the Customs Service within Treasury or the Border Patrol within Justice. In its combined performance report and plan, Transportation provided general statements that the Coast Guard regularly coordinates with a variety of agencies on immigration issues and potential international agreements to ensure security in ports and waterways. However, Transportation provided a more extensive discussion of the coordination and roles played by bureaus within the agency. For example, for its goal to ensure that sea-borne foreign and domestic trade routes and seaports remain available for the movement of passengers and cargo, Transportation states that the Transportation Security Administration, the Maritime Administration (MARAD), and the Coast Guard will coordinate with the international community and federal and state agencies to improve coordination of container identification, tracking, and inspection. As an example of the roles described, Transportation states that the Coast Guard and MARAD will test deployment plans through port security readiness exercises. In its performance report, State listed the partners it coordinates with for each performance goal, but did not always provide details about the coordination that was undertaken. Both Justice and Treasury discuss expanded cooperation through BCI, which includes Agriculture; Customs; Coast Guard; the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and other federal, state, local, and international agencies. According to Customs, BCI efforts toward increased cooperation among partner agencies included cross training, improved sharing of intelligence, community and importer outreach, improved communication among agencies using radio technology, and cooperative operational and tactical planning. Of the five agencies we reviewed, only Justice reported meeting all of its fiscal year 2001 performance goals related to securing America’s borders. Transportation reported not meeting either of its two goals related to border control, but provided explanations and strategies for meeting the goals in the future that appeared reasonable. For example, Transportation said it did not meet its target for the percentage of undocumented migrants interdicted and/or deterred via maritime routes because socioeconomic conditions here and abroad and political and economic conditions caused variations in illegal migration patterns. To meet the target in the future, the Coast Guard plans to operate along maritime routes and establish agreements with source countries to reduce migrant flow. For its two performance goals related to border control, State reported progress in meeting its goal of reducing the risk of illegitimate entry of aliens hostile to the nation’s interest, but not meeting the immigrant visa targets. State explained that it failed to meet this goal due to extremely high demand for visa numbers from INS to adjust the status of large numbers of aliens already in the United States, but did not provide any specific strategies for meeting this goal in the future. Treasury reported meeting its targets for all but two of its seven measures related to its strategic goal of protecting the nation’s borders and major international terminals from traffickers and smugglers. Treasury did not provide reasonable explanations for either shortfall, and did not discuss strategies for achieving those targets in the future. Agriculture reported meeting all but one of its performance targets for its three goals. The unmet performance target for significantly reducing the prevalence of salmonella on broiler chickens fell under Agriculture’s goal of creating a coordinated national and international food safety risk management system. Agriculture provides a reasonable explanation, but it is not clear if from the discussion if it is a domestic or international issue. According to their performance plans, the five agencies generally aimed to achieve the same goals as those reported on in fiscal year 2001, with targets adjusted to reflect higher performance levels. Transportation reported that it established a new performance goal and related measure in fiscal year 2002 that would also be included in the fiscal year 2003 plan. The new goal is to ensure that sea-borne foreign and domestic trade routes and seaports remain available for the movement of passengers and cargo. The new measure is the percentage of high-interest vessels screened, with a target of 100 percent for fiscal year 2003. Three of the five agencies—Agriculture, Justice, and Transportation— discussed strategies that appeared to be reasonably linked to achieving their fiscal year 2003 goals. For example, Transportation discusses strategies for each of its goals. For its new goal Transportation describes strategies, such as increasing intelligence efforts in ports; improving advanced information on passengers, crew, and cargo; and establishing or improving information and intelligence fusion centers in Washington and on both coasts. It also identified more specific efforts, such as increasing boarding and escort operations to protect vessels carrying large numbers of passengers and vessels with dangerous cargo, such as liquefied natural gas or other volatile products, from becoming targets. In contrast, Customs discussed a more limited “strategic context” for each of its goal areas and other information in sections pertaining to specific Customs activities, both of which varied in the level of detail. For example, for its goal of contributing to a safer America by reducing civil and criminal activities associated with the enforcement of Customs laws, Customs defined challenges and constraints to achieving the goal and mentions that it is playing a major role in the interdiction and detection of weapons of mass destruction entering or leaving the United States, including increased vessel, passenger, and cargo examinations. For the most part, State provided only general statements of how it plans to achieve its fiscal year 2003 goals. For example, regarding its visa issuance goal, State said it has committed itself to improving its visa procedures and coordination with other agencies and departments. Regarding the completeness, reliability, and credibility of their reported performance data, Agriculture, Justice, Transportation, and Treasury provided general statements about the quality of their performance data and provided some information about the quality of specific performance data. For example, Transportation provided extensive information on its measures and data sources that allow for an assessment of data quality. The information includes (1) a description of the measure, (2) scope, (3) source, (4) limitations, (5) statistical issues, and (6) verification and validation. Other explanatory information is provided in a comment section of Transportation’s combined performance plan and report. State did not provide consistent or adequate information for the border-control- related data sources to make judgments about data reliability, completeness, and credibility. For the most part, State provided only a few words on the data source, data storage, and frequency of the data. Floods have inflicted more economic losses upon the United States than any other natural disaster. Since its inception 34 years ago, the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) has combined flood hazard mitigation efforts and insurance to protect homeowners against losses from floods. The program, which is administered by FEMA, provides an incentive for communities to adopt floodplain management ordinances to mitigate the effects of flooding upon new or existing structures. It offers property owners in participating communities a mechanism—federal flood insurance—to cover flood losses without increasing the burden on the federal government to provide disaster relief payments. Virtually all communities in the country with flood-prone areas now participate in NFIP, and over 4 million U.S. households have flood insurance. The two agencies we reviewed—Agriculture and FEMA—generally address coordination efforts regarding the issue of flood mitigation. Agriculture states in its report and plan that it works with other agencies, such as FEMA and the Corps, to obtain data regarding its goal related to flood mitigation. However, Agriculture does not further specify coordination activities. FEMA’s fiscal year 2001 performance report does not state which agencies it collaborates with to achieve goals related to flood mitigation and insurance. FEMA’s plan provides an appendix that outlines the crosscutting activities and partner agencies associated with its flood mitigation and preparedness activities. For example, FEMA states it is the chair of the President’s Long-Term Recovery Task Force, which helps state and local governments to identify their needs related to the long-term impact of a major, complex disaster. Agencies FEMA coordinates on this effort with include the departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Education, Energy, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban Development, the Interior, Labor, and Transportation, among other organizations. Agriculture reported that it did not meet its only fiscal year 2001 goal related to flood mitigation—providing benefits to property and safety through flood damage reduction by completing 81 watershed protection structures. Agriculture explained that it did not meet the goal because (1) complex engineering can result in watershed protection structures taking several years to complete, (2) multiple funding sources, including federal, state, and local funds, may alter the schedule for completing the structures, and (3) external factors such as weather and delays in obtaining land rights and permits caused delays in construction. Agriculture states that many of the structures that were not completed in time for the fiscal year 2001 report will be complete in the next few months. FEMA reported meeting all but one of its fiscal year 2001 goals and indicators related to flood mitigation and insurance. FEMA’s five goals were (1) prevent loss of lives and property from all hazards, (2) collect and validate building and flood loss data, confirm that the reduction in estimated losses from NFIP activities exceeds $1 billion, and continue systematic assessment of the impact and effectiveness of NFIP, (3) increase the number of NFIP policies in force by 5 percent over the end of the fiscal year 2000 count, (4) improve the program’s underwriting ratio, and (5) implement NFIP business process improvements. FEMA reported that it did not meet the third goal, explaining that, although the end of year policy count for fiscal year 2001 increased, the retention rates for existing policies were not maintained. FEMA outlined three strategies that appeared reasonably linked to achieving the unmet goal in the future: (1) placing two new fiscal year 2002 television commercials that emphasize the importance of buying and keeping National Flood Insurance, (2) establishing retention goals for “Write Your Own” companies, private insurance companies that write flood insurance under a special arrangement with the federal government, and (3) targeting its marketing strategies toward those properties no longer on the books. Because it revised its strategic plan, FEMA reorganized the layout of its fiscal year 2003 performance plan. Nevertheless, FEMA’s fiscal year 2003 performance goals and measures are similar to those that appear in its fiscal year 2001 performance plan. FEMA merged its goal of implementation of NFIP business process improvements into its fiscal year 2003 goal of improving NFIP’s “bottom line,” an income-to-expense ratio, by 1 percent. In addition, FEMA merged two other goals: (1) prevent loss of lives and property from all hazards and (2) collect and validate building and flood loss data, confirm that the reduction in estimated losses from NFIP activities exceeds $1 billion, and continue the systematic assessment of the impact and effectiveness of NFIP. FEMA adopted one new goal in its fiscal year 2003 plan related to modernizing its floodplain mapping. Agriculture expects to continue making progress on its goal of providing benefits to property and safety through flood damage reduction, but has adopted a new approach to achieving the goal. Agriculture appears to have dropped its target for completing new watershed protection structures and instead plans to implement a new program of rehabilitating aging dams. Overall, the strategies Agriculture and FEMA plan to use appear to be reasonably linked to achieving their fiscal year 2003 goals. For example, to support its fiscal year 2003 performance goals, FEMA outlines several strategies, such as increasing the number of Emergency Action Plans in communities located below significant and potentially high-hazard dams. In its fiscal year 2001 Annual Performance and Accountability Report, FEMA states “the performance measurement criteria and information systems are thought to be generally effective and reliable.” FEMA does not individually identify data quality assessment methods for any of its performance indicators. However, it acknowledges a data limitation for one of its goals relating to business process improvement. FEMA explained that it relied on trend data to assess its performance in customer service for fiscal year 2001 because of a delay in obtaining OMB approval for distributing its customer surveys that year. FEMA states that it plans to conduct the surveys in fiscal year 2002 to obtain more accurate information. Agriculture addresses this issue at the beginning of its report by stating, “performance information supporting these performance goals is of sufficient quality and reliability except where otherwise noted in this document.” Agriculture also states that the data reported by state offices for fiscal year 2001 are accurate. According to estimates by FWS, more than half of the 221 million acres of wetlands that existed during colonial times in what is now the contiguous United States have been lost. These areas, once considered worthless, are now recognized for the variety of important functions that they perform, such as providing wildlife habitats, maintaining water quality, and aiding in flood control. Despite the passage of numerous laws and the issuance of two presidential orders for protecting wetlands, no specific or consistent goal for the nation’s wetlands-related activities existed until 1989. Recognizing the value of wetlands, in 1989, President George Bush established the national goal of no net loss of wetlands. However, the issue of wetlands protection and the various federal programs that have evolved piecemeal over the years to protect and manage this resource have been subjects of continued debate. We previously reported that for the six major agencies involved in and responsible for implementing wetlands-related activities—the Corps, Agriculture’s Farm Service Agency (FSA) and Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS), Interior’s FWS, Commerce’s NOAA, and EPA—the consistency and reliability of wetlands acreage data reported by these federal agencies were questionable. Moreover, we reported that the agencies’ reporting practices did not permit the actual accomplishments of the agencies—that is, the number of acres restored, enhanced, or otherwise improved—to be determined. These reporting practices included inconsistencies in the use of terms to describe and report wetlands-related activities and the resulting accomplishments, the inclusion of nonwetlands acreage in wetlands project totals, and the double counting of accomplishments. We recommended that these agencies develop and implement a strategy for ensuring that all actions contained in the Clean Water Action Plan related to wetlands data are adopted governmentwide. Such actions included, in addition to the ongoing effort to develop a single set of accurate, reliable figures on the status and trends of the nation’s wetlands, the development of consistent, understandable definitions and reporting standards that are used by all federal agencies in reporting their wetlands-related activities and the changes to wetlands that result from such activities. The agencies we reviewed generally discussed the need to coordinate with other agencies in their performance plans, but provided little detail on the level of coordination or specific coordination strategies. Agriculture’s annual performance plan includes a strategy to work with other federal agencies and partners to identify priority wetlands that could benefit from conservation practices in the surrounding landscape. Neither of the bureaus within Agriculture—FSA or NRCS—specifically discussed coordination on wetlands issues in their performance reports or plans. Interior’s annual performance report and plan indicate that it will work with Agriculture, EPA, the Corps, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), and the states on wetlands issues. EPA discusses cooperation with the Corps, NOAA’s National Marine Fisheries Service within Commerce, FEMA, FWS within Interior, and NRCS within Agriculture, but provides no specifics. Both Commerce and NOAA indicate that they work with other federal agencies to address crosscutting issues. Although NOAA mentions that it works closely with other agencies on a number of crosscutting issues to address critical challenges facing coastal areas, its plan does not specifically mention coordination with other agencies on wetlands issues. Each of the agencies we reviewed had goals related to wetlands that it reported having met or exceeded in fiscal year 2001. For example, FWS within Interior reported that it restored or enhanced 144,729 acres of wetlands habitat on non-FWS lands, exceeding its goal of 77,581 acres. However, FWS did not report on the number of acres of wetlands restored or enhanced on FWS lands and did not distinguish between the number of acres restored and the number enhanced. Furthermore, several of the agencies included nonwetlands acreage when reporting their accomplishments, and NOAA changed its performance measure from acres of coastal wetlands restored to acres benefited. Consequently, the contributions made by these agencies toward achieving the national goal of no net loss of the nation’s remaining wetlands cannot be determined from their reports. Each of the agencies we reviewed had plans to create, restore, enhance, and/or benefit additional wetlands acreage in fiscal year 2003, although the targets were in some cases lower than the targets for fiscal year 2001. Of the agencies we reviewed, only NRCS indicated in its plan that its progress would contribute to the national goal of no net loss of wetlands. The strategies the agencies planned to use appeared to be reasonably linked to achieving their fiscal year 2003 goals. For example, FSA planned to use the same strategy it has successfully used in past years to achieve its goals— working with producers to enroll land in the Conservation Reserve Program. Regarding the completeness, reliability, and credibility of the performance data reported, agency discussions varied in the specifics they provided. NOAA and FWS had overall discussions of the sources of their performance data and the verification procedures they followed in their performance reports. Within Agriculture, while FSA reported on the sources and processes used to develop the data reported for the number of wetlands acres restored, NRCS discussed its requirement that each state conservationist verify and validate the state’s performance data. NRCS also acknowledged that some discrepancies were noted when the performance data were analyzed, but indicated that there was no compelling reason to discount the performance data reported. Two agencies—FWS and EPA—acknowledged shortcomings in the data, including the possibility of double counting performance data. EPA also indicated that the measure might not reflect actual improvements in the health of the habitat. While FWS does not discuss any steps to resolve or minimize the shortcomings in its data, EPA described improvements it made to make data reported more consistent. FSA indicated some limitations to its data for the Conservation Reserve Program, which it attributed to lags between the date a contract is signed with a producer and when the data are entered, the continual updating of the contract data, and the periodic changes in contract data, but did not discuss any steps to resolve the limitation. We recently testified that the most extensive and serious problem related to the health of forested lands—particularly in the interior West—is the overaccumulation of vegetation, which is causing an increasing number of large, intense, uncontrollable, and destructive wildfires. In 1999, Agriculture’s Forest Service estimated that 39 million acres of national forested lands in the interior West were at high risk of catastrophic wildfire. This figure later grew to over 125 million acres as Interior agencies and states identified additional land that they considered to be high risk. To a large degree, these forest health problems contributed to the wildfires in the year 2000—which were some of the worst in the last 50 years. The policy response to these problems was the development of the National Fire Plan—a long-term, multibillion-dollar effort to address the wildland fire threats we are now facing. Our work on wildland fire has stressed the need for three things: (1) a cohesive strategy to address growing threats to national forest resources and nearby communities from catastrophic wildfires, (2) clearly defined and effective leadership to carry out that strategy in a coordinated manner, and (3) accountability to ensure that progress is being made toward accomplishing the goals of the National Fire Plan. Two years ago, the Forest Service and Interior began developing strategies to address these problems, and recently established a leadership entity—the Wildland Fire Leadership Council—that is intended to respond to the need for greater interagency coordination. Whether the strategy and the council will serve as the framework and mechanism to effectively deal with the threat of catastrophic wildland fire remains to be seen and will depend upon how well the National Fire Plan is implemented. To determine the effectiveness of this implementation effort, we continue to believe that a sound performance accountability framework is needed, one that provides for specific performance measures and data that can be used to assess implementation progress and problems. Both Interior and the Forest Service indicate in their performance plans their participation in developing the 2000 National Fire Plan and a 10-year Comprehensive Strategy under the plan. Furthermore, both agencies discuss current efforts under way to develop a joint Implementation Plan for the Comprehensive Strategy. Consistent with our recommendations, the implementation plan is reported to include cooperatively developed, long-term goals and performance measures for the wildland fire management program. In its performance report, the Forest Service detailed additional specific actions it collaborated on with Interior and other agencies related to wildland fire management, such as conducting an interagency review of the fire plan system. Regarding progress in achieving its fiscal year 2001 goals, Interior reported meeting only about half of its planned target of using fire and other treatments to restore natural ecological processes to 1.4 million acres. Although Interior’s report provided reasonable explanations for the unmet goals—difficulty in obtaining permits to carry out the treatments and shifting of resources from restoration to suppression of active fires—it did not discuss any specific strategies for overcoming these challenges in the future. The Forest Service reported meeting its goal of treating wildlands with high fire risks in national forests and grasslands. However, the Forest Service did not meet any of the individual indicators related to this goal. For example, the Forest Service treated only 1.4 million acres of its targeted 1.8 million hazardous fuel acres. The Forest Service provided explanations that appeared reasonable for some of its unmet targets. For example, unusual drought conditions combined with the added complexities and restrictions of treating hazardous fuels in the wildland urban interface contributed to the unmet hazardous fuels goal. The Forest Service did not provide any strategies for meeting the unmet targets in the future. In fiscal year 2003, Interior expects to treat 1.1 million acres to reduce hazards and restore ecosystem health compared to its goal of 1.4 million acres in 2001. In addition, Interior has added goals for wildland fire containment, providing assistance to rural fire departments, treating high- priority fuels projects, and bringing fire facilities up to approved standards. Interior’s strategies for achieving these goals are very broad and general and lack a clear link or rationale for how the strategies will contribute to improved performance. The Forest Service expects to treat 1.6 million acres to reduce hazardous fuels, slightly less than its 2001 target of 1.8 million acres, and assist over 7,000 communities and fire departments. The Forest Service did not include one of its targets for 2001—maximizing fire fighting production capability. The Forest Services strategies for achieving its goals, although fairly general, appear to be reasonably linked to achieving each of the performance targets. The performance data reported by Interior and the Forest Service for wildfire management generally appear to be complete, reliable, and credible. The Forest Service reported that it will use the Budget Formulation and Execution System to report on performance. However, we have found that this system is more of a planning tool for ranking fuel reduction work at the local unit level and that another system, the National Fire Plan Operations and Reporting System, is being implemented by both the Forest Service and Interior to track outputs and measure accomplishments. Interior acknowledges that its bureaus may interpret the data they collect differently and that a common set of performance measures is still being developed between Interior and the Forest Service as they implement the National Fire Plan. We have recommended that the agencies develop a common set of outcome-based performance goals to better gauge whether agencies are achieving the objective of restoring ecosystem health. The Forest Service acknowledges possible data limitations and reported that it is currently taking steps, such as conducting field reviews, to ensure effective internal controls over the reporting of performance data. We have previously stated that the Results Act could provide OMB, agencies, and Congress with a structured framework for addressing crosscutting program efforts. OMB in its guidance clearly encourages agencies to use their performance plans as a tool to communicate and coordinate with other agencies on programs being undertaken for common purposes to ensure that related performance goals and indicators are consistent and harmonious. We have also stated that the Results Act could also be used as a vehicle to more clearly relate and address the contributions of alternative federal strategies. The President’s common measures initiative, by developing metrics that can be used to compare the performance of different agencies contributing to common objectives, appears to be a step in this direction. Some of the agencies we reviewed appear to be using their performance reports and plans as a vehicle to assist in collaborating and coordinating crosscutting program areas. Those that provided more detailed information on the nature of their coordination provided greater confidence that they are working in concert with other agencies to achieve common objectives. Other agencies do not appear to be using their plans and reports to the extent they could to describe their coordination efforts to Congress, citizens, and other agencies. Furthermore, the quality of the performance information reported—how agencies explain unmet goals and discuss strategies for achieving performance goals in the future, and overall descriptions of the completeness, reliability, and credibility of the performance information reported—varied considerably. Although we found a number of agencies that provided detailed information about how they verify and validate individual measures, only 5 of the 10 agencies we reviewed for all the crosscutting areas commented on the overall quality and reliability of the data in their performance reports consistent with the requirements of the Reports Consolidation Act. Without such statements, performance information lacks the credibility needed to provide transparency in government operations so that Congress, program managers, and other decision makers can use the information. We sent drafts of this report to the respective agencies for comments. We received comments from EPA, FEMA, Commerce, and State. The agencies generally agreed with the accuracy of the information in the report. The comments we received were mostly technical and we have incorporated them where appropriate. Regarding flood mitigation and insurance, FEMA commented that performance reports and plans are static documents that are over a year old and therefore may not reflect the progress FEMA has made since then. FEMA also stated that, although not reflected in it performance reports and plans, it coordinates its flood mitigation and insurance activities extensively and maintains and employs a number of interagency agreements related to the implementation of its programs. We acknowledge these limitations to our analysis in the scope and methodology section of this report. Regarding border control, State commented that, as summary documents, performance reports and plans provide a limited opportunity to fully describe their coordination and data validity and verification efforts. State indicated that it plans to include more appropriate measures of performance and performance data that are complete, reliable, and credible in its upcoming performance reports and plans. Regarding its unmet goal for the number of visas processed, State explained that this is not an accurate measure of program performance because it depends on the demand for visas, which is beyond the agency’s control. State plans to revise this measure to one that will more appropriately reflect program effectiveness. Regarding wetlands, EPA commented on a number of initiatives it has undertaken along with other federal agencies to address the accuracy and availability of data on the extent and health of wetlands. For example, EPA states that its Region V office (Chicago) is working with other federal and state agencies to develop an integrated, comprehensive, geographic information system-based wetlands mapping system for the Minnesota River Basin. Once completed, this new wetland inventory would provide a reliable estimate of total wetland acreage for the Minnesota River Basin, provide a test to update the older National Wetland Inventory data, and serve as a pilot project for identifying wetlands throughout the country using an innovative technology. We are sending copies of this report to the President, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the congressional leadership, other Members of Congress, and the heads of major departments and agencies. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you have any questions about this report, please contact me or Elizabeth Curda on (202) 512-6806 or daltonp@gao.gov. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix V. In addition to the individual named above, the following individuals made significant contributions to this report: Steven J. Berke, Paul Bollea, Lisa M. Brown, Sharon L. Caudle, Amy M. 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Summary: GAO's work has repeatedly shown that mission fragmentation and program overlap are widespread in the federal government. Implementation of federal crosscutting programs is often characterized by numerous individual agency efforts that are implemented with little apparent regard for the presence and efforts of related activities. GAO has in the past offered possible approaches for managing crosscutting programs, and has stated that the Government Performance and Results Act could provide a framework for addressing crosscutting efforts. GAO was asked to examine the actions and plans agencies reported in addressing the crosscutting issues of border control, flood mitigation and insurance, wetlands, and wildland fire management. GAO reviewed the fiscal year 2001 performance reports and fiscal year 2003 performance plans for the major agencies involved in these issues. GAO did not independently verify or assess the information it obtained from agency performance reports and plans. On the basis of the reports and plans, GAO found that most agencies involved in the crosscutting issues discussed coordination with other agencies in their performance reports and plans, although the extent of coordination and level of detail provided varied considerably. The progress agencies reported in meeting their fiscal year 2001 performance goals also varied considerably. For example, wetlands was the only area in which all of the agencies GAO reviewed met or exceeded fiscal year 2001 goals. Some of the agencies that did not meet their goals provided reasonable explanations and/or strategies that appeared reasonably linked to meeting the goals in the future. The agencies GAO reviewed generally planned to pursue goals in fiscal year 2003 similar to those in 2001, although some agencies added new goals, dropped existing goals, or dropped goals altogether. Many agencies discussed strategies that appeared to be reasonably linked to achieving their fiscal year 2003 goals.