Consistent with provisions of the Homeland Security Act, as amended, the Chief Intelligence Officer (CINT) of the department—who also holds the position of DHS Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis and is the head of I&A—is to exercise leadership and authority over the enterprise and intelligence policy throughout the department. For example, the CINT is to provide strategic oversight to and support the missions and goals of members of the enterprise. The enterprise is composed of all DHS component intelligence programs. Specifically, it consists of I&A, the intelligence elements of six DHS operational components (CBP, USCIS, ICE, TSA, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the U.S. Secret Service), and three DHS headquarters elements supported by I&A (the National Protection and Plans Directorate, the Office of Operations Coordination and Planning, and the Office of the Chief Security Officer). However, as shown in figure 1, not all members of the enterprise perform intelligence analysis activities. I&A emerged from what the Homeland Security Act originally established as the Directorate for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection. Specifically, the Homeland Security Act established within DHS the directorate—led by the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection—to carry out DHS’s responsibilities in regard to, among other things, information analysis. In 2007, amendments to the Homeland Security Act included in the Implementing Recommendations of 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 reorganized the department by dividing the directorate into an Office of Intelligence and Analysis—headed by the Under Secretary for Information and Analysis—and an Office of Infrastructure Protection, headed by the Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection. As a result of the reorganization, responsibilities previously assigned to the Under Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection relating to intelligence analysis became attributed to the Secretary (as carried out through the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis) and remained largely unchanged. I&A is an element of the Intelligence Community. According to its February 2011 strategic plan, I&A’s mission is to equip the homeland security enterprise with the intelligence and information it needs to keep the homeland safe, secure, and resilient. To carry out its mission, I&A is to ensure that information related to homeland security threats is collected, analyzed, and disseminated to homeland security partners to keep the homeland safe, secure, and resilient. I&A prepares written, finished analytical products that it makes available to its customers. In addition to written analytical reports, I&A provides intelligence analysis to its customers through oral briefings (both classified and unclassified) and other analytic services, such as access to I&A analysts for review of the customers’ intelligence products, and advice and instruction on tradecraft standards.provides services to state, local, tribal, and territorial partners, as well as the private sector, through deployed personnel at fusion centers. Additionally, I&A’s deployed personnel are to assist fusion centers in obtaining needed information and analysis to aid in supporting their own customer bases. I&A is also to act as a conduit between the DHS component intelligence programs and the Intelligence Community. For example, I&A provides relevant information from the Intelligence Community to the components. In 2010, we were mandated to identify programs, agencies, offices, and initiatives with duplicative goals and activities within departments and government-wide and report annually to Congress. In March 2011, February 2012, April 2013, and April 2014 we issued our first four annual reports to Congress in response to this requirement.describe, in part, areas in which we found evidence of fragmentation, overlap, or duplication among federal programs. Using the framework we established in these reports, we used the following definitions for the purpose of assessing the analysis activities of the enterprise: Fragmentation occurs when more than one federal agency (or more than one organization within an agency) is involved in the same broad area of national need. Overlap occurs when multiple programs have similar goals, engage in similar activities or strategies to achieve those goals, or target similar beneficiaries. Duplication occurs when two or more agencies or programs are engaging in the same activities or providing the same services to the same beneficiaries. DHS has established mechanisms—including a governance board, intelligence framework, and analysis planning process—intended to better integrate analysis activities across the enterprise and help ensure that activities support strategic departmental intelligence priorities. However, the framework does not establish strategic departmental intelligence priorities or drive the analytic planning process across the enterprise, as intended. On the other hand, intelligence officials from I&A and all five components in our review reported that efforts to implement these mechanisms, particularly the analytic planning process, have allowed them to coordinate component activities and avoid unnecessary overlap or duplication of efforts. Likewise, we did not find unnecessary overlap or duplication in our review of border security products from I&A and two components. According to the DHS Intelligence Enterprise Strategic Plan, an integrated and collaborative Intelligence Enterprise is crucial to the department accomplishing its homeland security mission. Further, according to the plan, removing existing barriers to integration, while concurrently respecting and supporting DHS components’ unique missions—such as CBP’s mission to protect the borders—is necessary in order to fully integrate the DHS components that perform intelligence analysis. In 2005, DHS established a governance board—the Homeland Security Intelligence Council (the council)—to serve as the decision-making and implementation oversight body that supports the CINT in leading and managing the activities of the enterprise, and furthering a unified, coordinated, and integrated intelligence program for the department. The council’s Analysis Working Group—composed of subject matter experts from I&A’s analytic divisions and the intelligence elements of the components—is to coordinate analysis and production across the enterprise. Additionally, DHS has established two key mechanisms to help ensure that component intelligence analysis activities and resource investments align to support strategic departmental intelligence priorities—the Framework and the POA. According to the Framework, this is an annual document that is intended to present the department’s overall strategic intelligence priorities and to inform annual intelligence planning decisions related to collection, analysis, and resource management. In addition to the Framework, the POA is to be an annual document that DHS uses to plan and manage the more specific intelligence analysis activities of its enterprise. Specifically, according to DHS guidance, the POA is to identify a series of key intelligence questions that the enterprise will seek to address in the upcoming year. According to the 2011 I&A Strategic Plan and DHS guidance, the strategic priorities in the Framework should be used to drive analytic planning and production in the POA. However, neither mechanism is working as intended. Specifically, we identified two gaps in the implementation of these mechanisms that limit DHS’s assurance that component analytic activities support strategic departmental intelligence priorities: The Framework does not establish strategic departmental priorities: The Framework does not establish strategic departmental intelligence priorities that can be used to inform annual intelligence planning decisions—such as what analytic activities to pursue and what level of investment to make, as called for in DHS guidance. The Framework—developed by I&A’s Information Sharing and Intelligence Enterprise Management Division—was established in fiscal year 2011. However, the senior I&A official who assumed management of the Framework process in May 2013 stated that the Framework does not accomplish its intended purpose of informing annual intelligence planning decisions. According to this official, DHS took a bottom-up approach to developing the Framework in fiscal years 2011 through 2013. Specifically, DHS created a matrix that links the broad departmental missions outlined in the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review—such as preventing terrorist attacks and effectively controlling U.S. borders—to different intelligence categories that are relevant to these missions.points and asked the components to distribute these points across the QHSR missions and intelligence categories in accordance with the types of intelligence activities the component conducted. I&A then added up the total points assigned by the components for each intelligence category. These totals became a proxy for the intelligence priorities of the enterprise as a whole. Accordingly, the Framework presented the existing intelligence activities of the members of the enterprise, rather than outlining strategic departmental intelligence priorities. DHS allocated each component 100 According to officials responsible for the Framework, the goal of the fiscal years 2011 through 2013 Frameworks was to understand the diverse nature of intelligence priorities across the enterprise, not to establish overall departmental intelligence priorities. Accordingly, the officials acknowledged that the Framework does not fulfill its stated purpose of informing annual intelligence planning decisions. To begin addressing this problem, the officials stated that I&A plans to make some changes to the fiscal year 2014 Framework. However, the planned changes relate primarily to the methodology used to tally the current intelligence activities of the components. Specifically, the officials said that rather than giving all components equal weighting, the fiscal year 2014 Framework will give greater weight to the priorities of components that have a large intelligence portfolio. However, the official stated that the fiscal year 2014 Framework will look similar to the fiscal year 2013 Framework. planned changes to the fiscal year 2014 Framework will not result in the establishment of strategic departmental intelligence priorities that can be used to inform annual intelligence planning and resource decisions, as called for in DHS guidance. As of March 2014, the fiscal year 2014 Framework had not been finalized. The Framework does not drive analytic planning and production: The Framework was not used to drive analytic planning and production in the POA. The POA, established in fiscal year 2011, is overseen by the Homeland Security Intelligence Council’s Analysis Working Group. As with the Framework, DHS took a bottom-up approach to developing the POA for fiscal years 2012 and 2013. Specifically, each component independently developed a set of key intelligence questions that it would address in the upcoming year. Officials from each of the five components we contacted said that they developed these questions in order to be responsive to their unique missions and customer needs. DHS then aggregated these individual component responses to generate the POA. For the 2013 POA, this resulted in a catalogue of more than 80 questions to be addressed. DHS modified the process for the fiscal year 2014 POA in order to focus analytic planning efforts on a smaller, more strategic set of priority questions of common interest to the enterprise as a whole. As a result, the number of key intelligence questions decreased to 15. Also, rather than having each component individually generate key intelligence questions for inclusion in the POA, subject matter experts from participating DHS components brainstormed to collectively develop the 2014 key intelligence questions, determine which DHS components would contribute analysis to each question, and identify what specific intelligence products each would generate to address the questions. According to the I&A official responsible for the POA, the brainstorming was informed by the subject matter experts’ daily engagement with DHS leadership, knowledge of operational and policy priorities and missions, the current threat environment, customer-specific requirements, and Intelligence Community and law enforcement engagement and collaboration. However, given the Framework limitations described above, and because of the new focus of the fiscal year 2014 POA, the official stated that the 2014 process was not informed or influenced by the Framework. Because of the gaps we identified in the Framework and POA processes, DHS cannot provide reasonable assurance that component intelligence analysis activities and resource investments throughout the enterprise are aligned to support both strategic departmental intelligence priorities as well as component-specific priorities driven by their unique operational missions. According to I&A officials, it can be challenging for components to focus on both overall strategic departmental intelligence priorities and their more tactical intelligence priorities that support their specific operations and component customers. As articulated in the DHS Intelligence Enterprise Strategic Plan, the CINT recognizes the importance of respecting and supporting these unique component intelligence missions. However, to achieve its strategic goal of establishing an integrated intelligence enterprise, it will be important for DHS to clearly define its departmental intelligence priorities and ensure that annual enterprise intelligence planning activities are aligned to support these priorities. Establishing strategic departmental intelligence priorities in the Framework, and using these priorities to inform the planned analytic activities of the enterprise, as articulated in the POA, would better assure DHS of this alignment. DHS’s efforts to implement mechanisms—particularly the POA—have helped to minimize unnecessary overlap and duplication across component intelligence analysis activities. The intelligence analysis activities within DHS are inherently fragmented, as multiple DHS components conduct intelligence analysis in support of the same broad intelligence topics. For example, I&A, CBP, ICE, TSA, and the U.S. Coast Guard all contributed intelligence analysis to the DHS goal of Securing and Managing Our Borders in fiscal year 2012, as articulated in that year’s POA. However, intelligence officials at I&A and all five operational components with whom we met stated that the mechanisms DHS instituted to integrate analysis throughout the enterprise—particularly the POA—helped to avoid unnecessary overlap and duplication. Specifically, senior intelligence officials in all five components said the POA helped them gain a better understanding of the work of other components or prevent duplication in the intelligence analysis activities of the components. For example, U.S. Coast Guard intelligence officials stated that through the POA process, they gained an understanding of what other DHS components were doing in the intelligence realm to meet their mission requirements and learned that they may have some areas of commonality with CBP. This understanding allowed U.S. Coast Guard analysts to reach out to CBP analysts to determine which component would lead analysis work on different topics, thereby preventing duplication. Specifically, the U.S. Coast Guard agreed to lead maritime border analysis work and CBP agreed to lead land border analysis work. Intelligence officials from another component stated that because of the POA, departmental components have developed a relationship such that two components conducting similar analysis will work together to determine which component is better suited to do the analysis. Officials from four of the five DHS components we met with also reported that the revised POA process used in fiscal year 2014 was an improvement over the process used in prior years for various reasons. The reasons most often mentioned were improved coordination and reduced redundancy, and the ability of the components to display their contributions and inject the components’ internal needs into the broader priorities included in the POA. Additionally, DHS is considering additional ways to enhance coordination across its enterprise, according to I&A officials. For example, officials said that DHS is exploring ways to have the Homeland Security Intelligence Council’s Analysis Working Group— the group currently responsible for developing the POA—play a more active role in sharing information on planned analytic production throughout the enterprise and in monitoring joint production across the components. In addition, we did not find evidence of any duplication among the intelligence analysis products that we reviewed as part of our case study in the area of border security. We did identify one instance of overlap where two DHS components provided similar information to similar customers in different products, but the information was packaged differently such that the products were not duplicative. This result is consistent with our determination based on our case study review, which senior intelligence officials at I&A and the components confirmed, that I&A products tend to be more strategic and written to a broader customer base than are component intelligence products, which tend to be more tactical and written to component operators. We also found that I&A products tend to be based on multiple sources of information, including DHS component data and information from the Intelligence Community, whereas component products tend to be sourced primarily from internal component data. In this way, I&A products aggregate information from across the department and the Intelligence Community to present a national picture, whereas component products use component information to discuss the implications on component operations. For example, a component intelligence product may provide analysis of a specific law enforcement incident, such as a drug seizure in a specific jurisdiction, whereas an I&A product may provide a strategic look at drug activity across the country using data from CBP, ICE, and international law enforcement sources. Results from customer feedback surveys that are attached to I&A intelligence products indicate general satisfaction with these products, but the results have limitations that prevent I&A from drawing readership-wide conclusions. Our discussions with representatives of I&A’s five customer groups indicate that customers in two groups—DHS leadership and state and local officials at fusion centers—found I&A’s products to be useful, while customers in the other three groups—DHS components, the Intelligence Community, and private critical infrastructure sectors— generally did not. Customers in four of the five groups reported that they found other types of I&A analytic support to be useful, such as briefings from I&A analysts. I&A is taking steps to identify the analytic products and services that best meet its customers’ needs. I&A assesses the accuracy and usefulness of its intelligence analysis products through voluntary customer feedback surveys that are attached to products. Survey results indicate general satisfaction, but the results have limitations that prevent I&A from drawing statistically significant conclusions about all the readers of its products. Specifically, during fiscal year 2013, 73 percent of I&A customers that responded to the feedback surveys were very satisfied with the products’ usefulness, and 68 percent were very satisfied with the products’ timeliness. During this period, I&A issued a total of 830 intelligence products, of which 467 included a customer feedback survey. I&A received survey responses for 104 (22 percent) of the 467 products, with a total of 4,162 responses. According to ODNI officials, I&A’s level of effort directed at obtaining feedback from its customers, along with the number of responses received, were above the norm for the Intelligence Community. While generally positive, I&A survey results have limitations due in part to a bias in those who respond to the surveys. This bias exists because the results reflect the views of I&A customers who chose to respond to the feedback form and do not reflect the views of those who did not respond, a fact that prevents I&A from drawing statistically significant conclusions about the usefulness of its products since the results are not representative of all customers. Also, certain products concerning particularly notable topics can also account for a disproportionate number of survey responses received, which can bias the overall results since the responses do not reflect the full range of issued products. For example, in September 2012, I&A data show that three intelligence products accounted for 513 (88 percent) of the 586 total survey responses received during the month. The remaining 73 responses (12 percent) I&A received during the month covered a total of 18 products. Further, because I&A’s products are distributed through broad information-sharing networks and generally not sent directly to individual recipients, I&A cannot determine the full extent of its customer base. I&A officials agree that this distribution method limits its ability to form readership-wide conclusions based on the survey results; however, I&A officials stated that I&A uses these networks to further its goal for a wide distribution of its products. Additionally, because of the broad distribution through information sharing networks, I&A cannot track the number of individuals who ultimately open and read its products in order to obtain more complete feedback. All of these factors limit I&A’s ability to draw any readership-wide conclusions about its products. Despite these limitations, I&A officials view the survey results as a useful tool for generally understanding how their products are being received by the customer base. The surveys also allow customers to submit product and service improvement recommendations that help to inform I&A in making adjustments to products to better serve customers’ needs. Officials from I&A’s Production Management Division said they provide the survey results to the I&A analytic division responsible for the product in order for the division to consider and make improvements in future products. In addition, I&A formed the Analytic Production Improvement Council in fiscal year 2012 to implement product quality improvement initiatives. For example, one product improvement effort the council implemented was to change product titles to better inform prospective customers of the topic of interest in those products. I&A has established portals on web-based distribution networks to facilitate customers’ access to its intelligence products, such as the Homeland Security Information Network for unclassified products and the Homeland Secure Data Network for classified reporting. According to I&A’s strategic plan, because of resource constraints and other factors, I&A gives priority in its intelligence analysis efforts to the needs of DHS leadership and state and local customers. I&A officials added that the priority order of customer groups is (1) departmental leadership; (2) state, local, tribal, and territorial partners; (3) DHS operational components; (4) Intelligence Community members; and (5) private critical infrastructure sectors. Our work indicates that I&A’s finished intelligence products are useful and relevant to DHS leadership and state, local, tribal, and territorial customers, but generally not to customers in the other three groups. Officials from four of the five customer groups (state, local, tribal, territorial partners; DHS components; the intelligence community; and the private sector) said they found other types of I&A analytic support to be useful, including briefings on emerging threats, tradecraft review of the customers’ own products, assistance with developing intelligence analysis, training, and the general exchange of information. I&A’s first priority is to provide finished intelligence products and other analytic services to DHS leadership—which consists of the Secretary of Homeland Security, Deputy Secretary, and DHS component heads—to support decision making. According to I&A officials who brief the Secretary, I&A’s products and services are useful and relevant to meeting leadership needs. For example, I&A’s daily intelligence report and related threat briefing to the Secretary include actions DHS components plan to take in response to threats, which helps the Secretary ensure that the department is taking actions to mitigate these threats. I&A has given priority to providing intelligence reports and other support to state, local, tribal, and territorial entities, consistent with provisions of the Homeland Security Act, as amended, and subsequently enacted laws.that I&A products were useful for providing an overall, strategic-level perspective and situational awareness regarding emerging threats. The Officials from five of the seven fusion centers we contacted said officials also said they incorporate threat analysis from I&A products into their own reporting to state and local customers. They specifically cited I&A’s Joint Intelligence Bulletins and Roll Call Releases as products that were useful. Officials at the two fusion centers that generally did not find I&A analytic products to be useful said the products rarely addressed concerns that were unique to their geographic area, such as domestic terrorist groups that operate in their regions. In addition, officials from all seven fusion centers said that they valued access to I&A personnel, including analysts, for assistance with fusion center needs related to intelligence analysis. This assistance included training on proper methods for developing analytic products, reviewing fusion center products, and providing other analytic services, such as oral briefings on emerging threats that may be relevant to the center. I&A has deployed analysts to fusion centers on a limited basis. Specifically, I&A initially deployed one analyst to the Los Angeles and San Diego fusion centers. According to I&A officials responsible for FAST, the purpose of these embedded analysts is to work with fusion centers to do detailed analytic work in accordance with the tradecraft standards that I&A follows.officials noted that these analysts provide an avenue for improving the tradecraft skills of fusion center analysts, which could help reduce delays in the issuance of I&A’s joint products with centers. I&A has recently taken steps to deploy additional analysts to fusion centers. According to the I&A Deputy Research Director, I&A deployed an additional four analysts to fusion centers and plans to deploy a fifth analyst in June. Intelligence officials from all five DHS components we contacted generally stated that they did not consider themselves customers of I&A with regard to finished intelligence products. The officials recognized the overall high- level perspectives and situational awareness that I&A products can provide, but noted that their operational elements generally have a more critical need for tactical information and analysis to support operations and investigations—such as details on specific individuals or groups— which their own intelligence groups typically provide. Officials from all five components noted the value of I&A’s other analytic support, such as providing access to the Intelligence Community and training. Managers of the intelligence elements of two components (the U.S. Coast Guard and USCIS) cited a desire to have I&A analysts placed in the components’ intelligence offices to allow for better exchanges of information, analysis, and subject matter expertise. For example, according to U.S. Coast Guard officials, colocating I&A analysts within components would allow I&A to better serve the Secretary by facilitating the identification of relevant information and analysis. In January 2014, I&A officials said that they were in the process of developing and considering several plans to deploy analysts to jointly work on high-priority issues of mutual interest to I&A and components. ODNI officials said that they generally do not perceive the members of the Intelligence Community to be customers of I&A’s finished intelligence products because the products are not targeted to the Intelligence Community elements, and these agencies rely on other sources for analysis. The officials noted that Intelligence Community elements also tend to have an international focus, while I&A focuses on the homeland. ODNI officials said that they appreciated that I&A serves state and local customers since they are not traditional Intelligence Community customers. The officials also noted that I&A frequently writes its products at an unclassified level, which hinders their usefulness to the Intelligence Community. According to ODNI officials, the daily interaction between their personnel and I&A analysts embedded at ODNI’s National Counterterrorism Center provides expertise and perspective on DHS data sets—such as data on individuals crossing the borders—that are valuable to the Intelligence Community. The officials noted that they value being able to integrate information from these data sets into their own analyses. Representatives from all nine private critical infrastructure sectors and subsectors we contacted said that I&A generally does not generate products that are either useful or relevant to them, except for I&A’s analytic efforts related to cyber security, for which all of the officials generally had positive views. The officials said that I&A’s finished intelligence products are usually more strategic than they require, and I&A does not fully understand the intelligence needs of their industries. The officials added that they are interested in developing a relationship with I&A. For example, officials from all nine sectors noted that having I&A analysts detailed to the private sector on a limited and temporary basis would better position I&A to understand their industries and related threats and provide intelligence analysis, including written reports, oral briefings, and other direct assistance. In January 2014, I&A officials said they are not considering long-term deployments (90 days or longer) in part because of staffing constraints, but are considering shorter-term deployments to interested private sector companies. According to I&A officials, I&A has historically given the private sector lower priority with respect to intelligence analysis than its other customer groups because of resource considerations. However, the officials stated that I&A is continuing efforts going forward to perform outreach to the private sector to better determine private sector’s analytic needs and how to satisfy them. For example, I&A is participating in the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Infragard program for sharing information and analysis with the private sector. Further, I&A’s Strategic Plan calls for enabling the National Network of Fusion Centers to serve as a conduit for disseminating products to private sector partners. I&A has not identified the types and mix of analytic products and services that best meet the needs of its various customers, but has recently taken steps that could support doing so. Specifically, the surveys I&A attaches to individual products help obtain customer feedback on various aspects of the products, but are not intended to obtain customer views on the full range of analytic products or services that I&A provides. However, in fiscal year 2012, I&A’s Production Management Division initiated a Core Customer Study to ascertain, among other things, its core customers’ organizations, the functions they perform, and their intelligence-related mission needs. The study is using a combination of interviews and surveys with members of I&A’s five customer groups. I&A characterized the Core Customer Study as a long-term effort to define, identify, and profile its core customers as a step to better identify their overall intelligence needs. Production Management Division officials said they expect to complete the study by the end of June 2014. In addition, in January 2014, I&A initiated the Customer Satisfaction Assessment to obtain views on I&A products and services that were provided to customers during 2013 and forecast how I&A can better meet customer needs in the future. To support this assessment, and in response to our September 2012 report, I&A initiated a survey in March 2014 to gain a better understanding of its customers’ satisfaction with and use of I&A intelligence products and services.survey covers the types of I&A products the customers read in 2013, including finished intelligence and current intelligence (e.g., alerts and Among other things, the warnings); the extent to which the products were useful in informing actions and decisions, such as in making resource investments; and satisfaction with I&A services, such as threat briefings and tradecraft assistance. According to I&A officials, they sent the survey to customers who were likely recipients of I&A intelligence products and services in 2013. Specifically, I&A sent the survey to customers who maintained an active account to a portal where I&A products are posted (e.g., the Homeland Security Information Network), were members of a homeland security information-sharing network that regularly distributes I&A products (e.g., terrorism liaison officer network), or were individually referred by their local fusion center or the I&A private sector outreach program. According to I&A officials, the results of this survey will be analyzed and provided directly to I&A intelligence analysts, managers, and senior leadership to help them better understand how their customers use I&A intelligence and determine how to tailor and improve products and services in the future. I&A officials said that as part of the Customer Satisfaction Assessment they also plan to conduct detailed interviews with a smaller group of customers in order to obtain a more in-depth understanding of ways to increase the usefulness of I&A’s analytic products and services that will guide its improvement efforts. According to I&A officials, the assessment will also help I&A understand its customers’ desired mix of products and analytic services. I&A plans to complete the first draft of a report on the results of the assessment by the end of April 2014. Once completed, the Core Customer Study and Customer Satisfaction Assessment could provide I&A with information to help it more clearly define how it plans to support each customer group, the types of analytic products and services it will provide, and related levels of investment. The results could also assist I&A in determining how best to use its available analytic resources, including deciding whether additional deployments of I&A intelligence analysts to DHS components, fusion centers, and private sector entities would allow for better exchanges of information and analysis in support of national counterterrorism efforts. I&A has faced human capital challenges in recruiting and hiring the skilled workforce it needs and providing training and professional development opportunities that keep morale high and attrition low. Specifically, according to I&A’s recruitment strategy, I&A’s hiring authority under competitive service put it at a disadvantage compared with other organizations that were able to process hiring actions more quickly and For offer career advantages associated with excepted service status. example, according to officials, under competitive service status, it could take anywhere from several months to a year between the initial hiring offer and completion of the hiring process, a time lag that they said led many applicants to seek employment elsewhere. The officials added that when they engaged in Intelligence Community career fairs, many individuals were looking for offers on the spot that other Intelligence Community elements could provide but that I&A could not, a fact that affected their ability to compete for top talent. In addition, according officials, the perception of I&A as a less than prestigious intelligence agency than the others in the Intelligence Community also affects its ability to recruit top talent. To some extent, such hiring challenges contributed to I&A’s historical reliance on contractors to fill the gaps in Intelligence Community experience. For example, a 2009 Homeland Security Institute study concluded that burdensome recruitment and hiring processes resulted in I&A’s heavy reliance on contract labor to staff key positions. I&A officials stated that the use of contractors was the primary method outside of federal hiring to acquire the needed tradecraft skills. They added that budgetary limitations on the number of authorized full-time equivalent (FTE) positions, the desire for operational flexibility to deal with uncertainty, and the need for “surge capability” also made contractors a viable alternative. As of November 2013, I&A’s Office of Analysis had the smallest percentage of contractors compared with the rest of I&A, but the office still relied on contractors to support analytical instruction, such as reviews of the Program of Analysis. I&A has also faced challenges in providing professional development opportunities for its workforce, and experienced low morale scores and high rates of attrition, particularly among its lower-level analysts. Regarding professional development, I&A historically did not institutionalize a commitment to investing in its workforce, according to I&A officials. For example, they said that some managers sent their employees to training, assigned mentors, and provided rotational opportunities, while others did not. Furthermore, I&A’s training program did not always focus on mission-specific requirements that its workforce needed, according to officials. The 2009 Homeland Security Institute report also concluded that I&A lacked a robust training program. According to officials, these challenges contributed to I&A’s low morale and high rates of attrition. For example, I&A employee responses to the 2012 Intelligence Community Climate Survey show that 36 percent of employees responded positively when asked if they would recommend I&A as a good place to work, as shown in figure 2. Also, in September 2012, we reported that I&A had one of the lowest morale scores within DHS in OPM’s Federal Viewpoints Survey—a tool that measures employees’ perceptions of whether and to what extent conditions characterizing successful organizations are present in their agencies. According to I&A officials, attrition among I&A intelligence analysts has led to a loss in valuable technical expertise and organizational knowledge. I&A data show that attrition has been the highest for lower- level analysts, with attrition for GS-9 positions fluctuating from a high of 80 percent in fiscal year 2009 to 21 percent in fiscal year 2013. According to exit interviews, I&A officials attributed the attrition to a number of factors, including low morale and limited promotion opportunities for lower-level analysts. The officials added that exit interviews indicate that analysts leave for positions with other Intelligence Community agencies, which are often perceived as higher-profile agencies. To help address these challenges, I&A has taken the following steps: To help address recruitment and hiring challenges, in November 2012, DHS requested excepted service status on behalf of I&A from ODNI and OPM to align itself with the rest of the Intelligence Community and better compete for top talent. In June 2013, I&A received excepted service status. According to I&A officials, this will allow them to process hiring actions quicker and offer career advantages associated with excepted service positions, which will in turn help them recruit and hire the right applicants. In addition, I&A human capital officials stated that they started working with DHS human capital officials in 2013 to improve intelligence analyst position descriptions by, for example, targeting specific skill requirements, to help ensure that I&A recruits the right people. To address low morale and attrition among its intelligence analysts and enhance professional development opportunities, I&A restructured its organizational grade structure to provide more career advancement and promotion opportunities. In 2012, I&A awarded a contract to the MITRE Corporation to review its workforce structure. MITRE concluded that I&A had more staff at the higher grade levels and that this was out of line with the rest of the Intelligence Community. As a result, in November 2012, I&A released a memorandum that noted the grade structure changes. Specifically, I&A increased the number of GS-7 through GS-12 analyst positions and decreased the number of GS-13 through GS-15 positions. According to the directors of the four Office of Analysis analytic divisions, this change is intended to help I&A grow its workforce through junior analysts and increase promotion opportunities that were previously not available. In fiscal years 2012 and 2013, I&A provided over 20 courses related to analytic tradecraft for its analytic workforce. According to I&A officials, these courses were developed in accordance with ODNI standards. were detailed to other Intelligence Community elements or DHS components. According to I&A officials, this program helps I&A analysts better understand the operations and needs of other Intelligence Community elements and DHS components and helps them develop their analytic tradecraft. In May 2013, I&A began to strategically assess whether its workforce has the right skills—such as written communications, program knowledge, and decision making—through a competency gap assessment. According to officials, this gap assessment will also to serve as an opportunity for I&A to determine whether its current practice of recruiting and hiring individuals that have strong analytical skills as opposed to subject matter expertise, and then training them to specialize in areas that According to support DHS’s unique operational missions, is appropriate.officials, the gap assessment will include a survey of the knowledge, skills, and capabilities of intelligence analysts across the enterprise. The survey will cover critical skills and competencies that I&A developed in conjunction with other DHS components. According to I&A officials, the results of the assessment are to be released in fiscal year 2014. I&A officials said that they intend to use the results of the assessment to help fill skill gaps within the current workforce through training and analyst performance management activities. I&A officials acknowledged the importance and the need to use the results of the competency gap assessment given the absence of other mechanisms or documents that can help guide its overall workforce planning efforts. While the competency gap assessment is an important step in strategic workforce planning, I&A has not assessed the effects of its recently completed workforce efforts. In the past 3 years, I&A has implemented changes that are intended to strengthen its workforce, however; I&A currently has no established mechanisms in place to monitor and evaluate the effect of these efforts and use the results to make any needed changes. Specifically, we identified three areas where I&A could strengthen the monitoring and evaluation of its human capital efforts. First, I&A officials stated that they use ODNI and DHS-OPM surveys and survey forms from analysts regarding training to review changes in morale; however, I&A does not have a systematic way of monitoring these activities and using the results to make changes. Second, the results I&A receives from the ODNI and DHS-OPM morale surveys reflect all of I&A, which makes it difficult for I&A to determine whether its workforce activities are having any results on the intelligence analysts within the Office of Analysis. Third, I&A does not have any mechanisms in place to monitor and assess the effects of its excepted service status and grade restructuring. According to I&A officials, these mechanisms are not in place because I&A leadership was focused on other priorities. However, these officials agreed that such mechanisms could help ensure that its efforts are helping to address the challenges of its analytic intelligence workforce. According to DHS workforce planning guidance, workforce planners must monitor and assess the progress of their strategies, evaluate the outcomes, and use the results from the evaluation to revise the strategies, if needed. Consistent with this guidance, establishing mechanisms to monitor and evaluate workforce efforts, such as changes to I&A’s hiring authority and grade levels restructuring, could help the Office of Analysis determine if the efforts are achieving their intended results. In addition, using the results from these evaluations to determine any need for changes will help ensure that I&A is making sound workforce decisions. The organizations within the DHS Intelligence Enterprise play critical roles in uncovering and analyzing threats to the United States. DHS has made efforts, such as developing the Framework and POA, to integrate the analysis activities of its enterprise in support of common departmental intelligence priorities. These efforts, however, are not functioning as intended and as a result, DHS has not yet reached its goal of having an intelligence enterprise that responds to an integrated set of strategic departmental priorities that in turn drive analytical plans and resource decisions. Because of challenges I&A experienced in recruiting and hiring a skilled workforce, it has also taken actions intended to make it easier to attract, develop, and maintain skilled analysts, and many of these actions have been recently completed. By not monitoring and evaluating the effect of these actions, I&A cannot be confident that it is making progress in improving its ability to build and maintain the workforce it needs to effectively and efficiently analyze possible threats to the homeland. Furthermore, I&A lacks the information essential to know whether additional changes are needed to its workforce improvement activities and the strategies that underlie those activities. To help ensure that the intelligence analysis activities and resources throughout the enterprise align to an integrated set of strategic departmental intelligence priorities, we recommend that the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, Homeland Security take the following two actions: establish strategic departmental intelligence priorities in the Homeland Security Intelligence Priorities Framework that can be used to guide annual enterprise planning efforts, including intelligence analysis and resource management and ensure that once strategic departmental intelligence priorities are established, the Framework is used to inform the planned analytic activities of the DHS Intelligence Enterprise, as articulated in the Program of Analysis. To help ensure that I&A maintains critical skills and competencies, when planning for and implementing current and future workforce actions, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security establish mechanisms to monitor and evaluate workforce initiatives and use results to determine any needed changes. We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. In its written comments, reprinted in appendix V and summarized below, DHS concurred with the three recommendations and described actions underway and planned to address them. In addition, DHS provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. With regard to the first recommendation, that I&A establish strategic departmental intelligence priorities in the Framework that can be used to guide annual enterprise planning efforts, DHS concurred and stated that, based in part on GAO’s work, I&A has revised its approach to developing strategic departmental intelligence priorities. Further, DHS stated that the 2014 Framework was approved on April 9, 2014, and I&A will coordinate future refinements to the methodology with the Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise prior to the beginning of the 2015 priorities process. We will determine if I&A’s revised approach and the resulting 2014 Framework address the intent of our recommendation as part of our recommendation follow-up process. With regard to the second recommendation, that I&A ensure that once strategic departmental intelligence priorities are established the Framework is used to inform the planned analytic activities of the DHS Intelligence Enterprise, DHS concurred, and stated that the priorities established in the 2014 Framework will inform the development of the 2015 POA. Additionally, DHS stated in its letter that the 2015 POA will be informed by updated Intelligence Community-wide guidance from the Director of National Intelligence pertaining to both the development of the POA and key intelligence questions, and lessons learned from last year’s development process. If fully implemented, these planned actions should address the intent of the recommendation. With regard to the third recommendation, that I&A establish mechanisms to monitor and evaluate workforce initiatives and use results to determine any needed changes, DHS concurred and stated that I&A is developing specific performance indicators to monitor and evaluate workforce initiatives and plans to develop a complete set of measures by the end of fiscal year 2014. If fully implemented, these planned actions should address the intent of the recommendation. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Undersecretary for Intelligence and Analysis, and interested congressional committees as appropriate. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or larencee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI. The Intelligence Community consists of 17 U.S. intelligence agencies whose mission is to collect and convey essential information that the President and members of the policymaking, law enforcement, and military communities require to execute their appointed duties. See 50 U.S.C. § 3003(4).The agencies include the following: Department of Energy, Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) Appendix II: Description of Key Finished Intelligence Products from the Six DHS Intelligence Entities in Our Review Finished Intelligence Product Homeland Intelligence Today DHS’s daily product that provides the Secretary, DHS operational component leadership, and other federal partners with timely homeland- relevant analysis and reporting. Provides strategic analysis on a variety of topics that impact homeland security; can range from covering a single issue to an in-depth multi- themed analysis. Produced jointly with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and focused on emergent or recent terrorism-related threats or events that are pertinent to the Homeland. Produced for frontline law enforcement officers to highlight emergent terrorist or criminal techniques or tactics they may encounter in the field. A sister product to Roll Call Release that is geared toward fire, rescue, and emergency management personnel to aid in planning, response, and mitigation. Provides an informational overview on an issue, development, key figure, or lasting trend. Provides a comprehensive analysis of threats and hazards that impact CBP operations. Provides analysis, trends, and patterns that directly relate to CBP efforts. Provides research, primarily associated with travel and imports, to other law enforcement agencies and the Intelligence Community. Provides DHS and other members of the Intelligence Community with CBP analysis of terrorism and other criminal activities that affect border security. Homeland Security Assessment (HSA) Provides a comprehensive analysis of a complex intelligence topic or target related to specific events or trends. HSA’s typically include a threat analysis; a discussion or potential threat actors and tactics, techniques, and procedures; and an outlook or review of potential mitigation strategies, counter-measures, or vulnerabilities. Provides in-depth analysis of a single intelligence development, discovery, finding, or issue. Covers new intelligence and summarize developments on an issue or topic area of interest to ICE customers. Provides information and analysis on a single threat or situation involving transportation security. Provides analyses of threats to transportation’s critical modal sectors, such as aviation and mass transit. Posters focus on a single topic of concern, such as concealment techniques. Analyzes how violent extremists, typically overseas, attack transportation modes in order to discern impacts on the homeland transportation environment. Product Description Provides information on individual subjects such as their immigration history, current immigration status/expiration, previous and pending immigration benefits, and a list of immigration systems checked. Contains the information in an individual’s Immigration Systems History, as well as additional information on the evolution of the subject’s immigration history. Provides in-depth analysis and judgments of an event or development previously addressed in a previous product. Provides immediate maritime intelligence and law enforcement situational awareness. An Analytic product providing judgments and prognosis regarding a specific intelligence issue. Provides an overview and summary judgments on an intelligence issue based on all-source intelligence information. This report addresses the following questions: To what extent are the intelligence analysis activities of the enterprise integrated to support departmental strategic intelligence priorities, and to what extent are enterprise analysis activities unnecessarily overlapping or duplicative? To what extent do I&A’s customers report that they find I&A products and other analytic services to be useful? What challenges does I&A face in maintaining a skilled analytic workforce and what steps has it taken to address these challenges? To address the first objective, we analyzed documents produced by DHS and I&A related to setting intelligence priorities to determine how priorities are established and how the priorities are to be followed by the enterprise. Specifically, we reviewed the Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years 2012-2016, the 2006 and 2008 versions of DHS Intelligence Enterprise Strategic Plan; Office of Intelligence and Analysis Strategic Plan Fiscal Year 2011–Fiscal Year 2018; Delegation to the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis/Chief Intelligence Officer, August 10, 2012; DHS Management Directive 8110, Intelligence Integration and Management, January 30, 2006; Department of Homeland Security Directive 264-01, Intelligence Integration and Management, June 12, 2013; DHS Instruction Number: 264-01-001 DHS Intelligence Enterprise June 28, 2013; the 2005 and 2009 versions of the Homeland Security Intelligence Council Charter; I&A memos including the fiscal year 2013 and the fiscal year 2014 DHS Enterprise Programmatic Guidance; DHS Intelligence Enterprise Programs of Analysis (POA) for fiscal years 2011 through 2014; and the Homeland Security Intelligence Priorities Framework for fiscal years 2012 and 2013 to determine the roles and responsibilities of DHS in managing its enterprise and the analytic efforts of the enterprise, and how DHS was carrying out these responsibilities. Additionally, we analyzed documents from DHS components for which intelligence analysis is a core function in supporting their unique missions and operations—the U.S. Coast Guard, Transportation Security Administration (TSA), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)—to help determine the roles and responsibilities of component agency intelligence programs and how they respond to the coordination and prioritization efforts of I&A. These included U.S. Department of Homeland Security Annual Performance Report, Fiscal Years 2011–2013, Appendix A: Measure Descriptions and Data Collection Methodologies; National Infrastructure Advisory Council, Intelligence Information Sharing, Final Report and Recommendations, January 10, 2012; Transportation Security Administration Office of Intelligence and Analysis Mission and Functional Statement; ICE Strategic Plan, FY 2010-2014; U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Homeland Security Investigations, Office of Intelligence, Analysis Division, Fact Sheet; Secure Borders, Safe Travel, Legal Trade, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Fiscal Year 2009-2014 Strategic Plan; United States Citizenship and Immigration Services Intelligence and Information Products Fact Sheet; and U.S. Coast Guard Publication 2-0, Intelligence, May 2010; among others. We compared these efforts against requirements listed in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended, that call on the DHS Chief Intelligence Officer (CINT) to establish the intelligence analysis priorities for the intelligence components of the department, consistent with any directions from the President and, as applicable, the Director of National Intelligence. According to DHS guidance, the appropriate vehicle for establishing enterprise-wide intelligence priorities is the Homeland Security Intelligence Priorities Framework. We met with the I&A Research Director and members of his staff, and the Director of the Information Sharing and Enterprise Management Division and his staff who are responsible for developing and implementing the management coordination mechanisms for the enterprise. We also met with representatives from the intelligence programs of USCIS, the U.S. Coast Guard, CBP, ICE, and TSA to discuss the coordination mechanisms established by DHS. Additionally, to address in the first objective whether overlap or duplication exists in the analytic activities of the DHS Intelligence Enterprise, we analyzed all 21 products written by I&A, CBP, and ICE where these three organizations shared responsibility to answer questions in the 2012 POA in support of DHS’s border security mission. We selected the 2012 POA because it was the most recent available when we began this analysis. We selected this mission area for our analysis because this departmental mission contained contributions from the largest number of DHS intelligence components, and chose I&A, CBP, and ICE products to review because these three entities had the greatest number of key intelligence questions assigned to them within the border security mission area. By reviewing only one mission area, we cannot determine if there was duplication in other areas, but our findings support statements from intelligence officials in both I&A and the operational components that the content of their products differs because of their unique missions and primary customer sets and, therefore the products are not duplicative, even when they cover the same broad topical area. Within the DHS mission area of securing the border, we requested an inventory of finished intelligence products for fiscal year 2012 from I&A, CBP, and ICE—the three entities with the greatest number of key intelligence questions assigned to them in this topic area. Products written in 2012 were chosen because this was the most recent complete available to us at the time of this analysis. According to an analysis of these product inventories, we identified six key intelligence questions in which I&A and either ICE or CBP both generated finished intelligence products. In support of these six key intelligence questions, I&A, ICE, and CBP generated a total of 21 finished intelligence products—15 authored by I&A, 4 by ICE, and 2 by CBP. We analyzed these 21 products to determine the extent to which duplication existed by comparing the topics, sources, and customers of these products. To address the second objective, we met with I&A staff from the Production Management Division to determine how I&A develops, administers, and analyzes feedback surveys included with all I&A finished intelligence products, as well as to discuss the efforts I&A had in place through February 2014 to improve customer satisfaction. We then analyzed the results of the feedback surveys that were included with all fiscal year 2012 I&A finished analytic products to determine what readers of these products thought about the quality and usefulness of them. We also met with representatives from four of the five I&A customer groups: DHS components; the Intelligence Community; state, local, tribal, and territorial governments; and the private sector. While we did not meet with representatives from DHS leadership, we did meet with representatives of the I&A unit that briefs leadership. Specifically, we met with representatives from the intelligence programs of the DHS components for which intelligence analysis is a core function in supporting their missions and operations—USCIS, the U.S. Coast Guard, CBP, ICE, and TSA—to discuss the extent to which these organizations find I&A analysis relevant and useful. We met with staff from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence—the office that administers the overall efforts of the Intelligence Community—to discuss their review of the quality of I&A analytic products, as well as the usefulness of these products to the Intelligence Community. We met with DHS and state and local government agency staff members working at 7 of 78 state and major urban area fusion centers—centers that serve as primary focal points within the state and local environments for the receipt, analysis, gathering, and sharing of threat-related information among federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial homeland security partners. The fusion centers we met with were (1) the Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center, (2) El Paso (Texas) Fusion Center (no DHS staff were located in the El Paso Fusion Center at the time of our discussion), (3) Montana All Threat Intelligence Center, (4) New York State Intelligence Center, (5) San Diego (California) Law Enforcement Coordination Center, (6) Texas Fusion Center in Austin, and (7) the Washington State Fusion Center. These fusion centers comprised 4 of the 6 centers we considered southwest border fusion centers and 3 of the 11 northern border fusion centers. We selected each center to provide access to a range of state-level users of I&A analytic products with an emphasis on border issues because of our examination of potential overlap or duplication related to DHS components’ intelligence analysis reporting on border issues. While information we obtained at these locations cannot be generalized across all fusion centers because we selected these locations based on the diversity of participation in the POA and geographic locations along the southwest and northern border, the units we visited provided us with an overview of users’ perspectives on the usefulness and relevance of I&A analytic products. We also met with representatives of the Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Security (PCIS), the National Council of Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISAC), and individual representatives from the Transportation and Commercial Facilities critical infrastructure sectors to determine how the private sector views the analytic services provided by I&A. We compared I&A’s efforts against criteria in the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government that note the importance for management to communicate to, and obtain information from, both internal and external stakeholders that may have a significant impact on the organization’s ability to achieve its goals and utilize resources effectively and efficiently. For objective two, we also reviewed the standards by which I&A’s products are judged. To do so we reviewed I&A Policy Directive 900.2- Producing Finished Intelligence (July 15, 2011), I&A Policy Directive 900.4-I&A Joint Production with State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers (August 31, 2011), I&A Policy Instruction IA-901 DHS Intelligence and Analysis Review and Clearance of Analytic Products Disseminated Outside the Federal Government, I&A memos including Fiscal Year 2013 and Fiscal Year 2014 DHS Intelligence Enterprise Programmatic Guidance; and ODNI Intelligence Community Directive 203, Analytic Standards (June 21, 2007). To obtain a general view of the quality of these products, we reviewed the 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012 DHS Report to Congress on Voluntary Feedback from State, Local, Tribal, and Private Sector Consumers; I&A’s fiscal year 2011 Customer Feedback Report and the September 2012 Production Performance Report that includes monthly production and feedback information. For the third objective, we reviewed the U.S. Office of Personnel Management Position Classification Standard Flysheet for Intelligence Series GS-0132 June 1960, the classification standard in effect as of December 2013, and the I&A Human Capital Standard Operating Procedures to obtain basic information about personnel standards and operations at I&A. To determine the challenges I&A experienced maintaining a skilled workforce, we reviewed correspondence between I&A and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence related to obtaining excepted service hiring (November 2012-June 2013) and I&A- reported data on personnel attrition. To obtain information on intelligence analyst hiring needs and practices, we reviewed the I&A memo on career ladder decision and hiring standards (November 2012), the DHS Competency Assessment Pilot frequently asked questions and presentation, and the I&A Recruitment Strategy (January 2010). To determine I&A training and development practices and needs we reviewed the Fiscal Year 2013 Intelligence Training Academy Catalog, DHS Intelligence Learning Roadmap for Analysts (September 2012), and the Analysis 101/BITAC Study Report comparing two alternative introductory courses for intelligence analysts prepared for I&A by Booz Allen and SAIC (November 2008). We also reviewed the DHS Human Resources, Performance Management Program (December 2008), and I&A performance competencies to determine I&A’s performance management practices. We then compared I&A’s work force planning activities with those enumerated in DHS’s Workforce Planning Guide (November 2012), the DHS document that outlines the process for workforce planning at DHS. We also met with representatives from I&A’s human capital office, training branch, mission support office, and the acting Chief of Staff to discuss human capital recruitment, hiring, training, and evaluation practices and procedures. We conducted this performance audit from August 2012 to May 2014 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix IV provides additional information about our analysis of fragmentation, overlap, and duplication in DHS components’ intelligence analysis activities. The intelligence analysis activities within DHS are inherently fragmented, as multiple DHS components conduct intelligence analysis in support of the same broad intelligence topics. However, on the basis of our case study in the area of border security, we did not find evidence of unnecessary overlap or duplication among the activities. DHS intelligence entities said that implementing the mechanisms to date has helped them to minimize such overlap and duplication. The intelligence analysis activities of the enterprise are inherently fragmented, as multiple DHS components conduct intelligence analysis in support of shared departmental goals. As articulated in the fiscal year 2012 DHS Intelligence Enterprise Program of Analysis, three to five DHS intelligence components planned to provide intelligence analysis products in support of each departmental goal in fiscal year 2012. For example, as shown in table 1, five components planned to support the departmental goal of Securing and Managing Our Borders through their fiscal year 2012 intelligence analysis activities. Although this creates fragmentation, each entity is providing distinct perspectives because of its unique missions and primary customer sets. As shown in table 2, I&A focuses on threats to the homeland in general, whereas the operational components—such as CBP, ICE, and TSA— each focus more narrowly on supporting their unique operational missions through intelligence analysis. Further, DHS intelligence officials report that the primary customers of I&A are DHS leadership and state and local partners, whereas the primary customers of the operational components are generally internal component customers. Despite distinct missions and primary customer sets, some overlap does exist in the secondary customers that the six DHS intelligence entities serve. For example, as shown in table 2, all six entities reported serving the Intelligence Community, and three entities reported serving state and local partners as part of their secondary customer sets. In some cases, it may be appropriate for multiple entities to be involved in the same programmatic or policy area because of the nature or magnitude of the federal efforts. For example, having multiple DHS entities contributing intelligence analysis to shared departmental goals and serving overlapping customers can be beneficial, as it provides a mechanism to share and validate information and to facilitate complementary analysis. However, fragmentation and overlap may create inefficiencies if customers are burdened with too much information or if entities are inefficiently using resources to develop duplicate products. We did not find evidence to suggest that DHS customers were being burdened with too much information or that DHS resources were being used to develop products that unnecessarily overlapped or were duplicative. Specifically, senior intelligence officials from all seven fusion centers we contacted said that they had not experienced any instances of unnecessary overlap or duplication in the border security–related intelligence products they received from various DHS components. Further, we did not find any duplicative products among those we reviewed in the area of border security that were generated by different components. We did identify one instance of overlap where two DHS components provided similar information to similar customers in different products, but the information was packaged differently such that the products were not duplicative. Specifically, we identified one instance where I&A and ICE each wrote an intelligence product on a similar topic—human smuggling—and for similar customers—DHS leadership and the Intelligence Community. Both products discussed the relationship between permissive visa policies and the potential for exploitation by human-smuggling networks. Further, both products specifically identified one particular country as susceptible to exploitation from human smugglers due at least in part because of its permissive visa policies. However, we determined that the overlapping information was presented in a different context in each product. Specifically, the I&A product provided a summary graphic depicting the visa permissiveness level of each country within a particular region of the world. This provided its customers with a snapshot of countries with permissive visa policies and a warning that these countries may be more susceptible to exploitation from human smugglers than others. This graphic was presented as part of I&A’s Border Security Monitor—a quarterly compilation of relevant border security intelligence analysis from throughout the enterprise. Alternatively, the ICE product was a broader assessment of the factors that make certain locations vulnerable to exploitation from human smuggling networks. Accordingly, the ICE product provided an analysis of the reasons that the specifically identified country may be vulnerable to human smuggling, identifying its visa permissiveness policy as just one contributing factor. While our results cannot be generalized beyond the border security mission area, our findings support statements from intelligence officials in both I&A and the operational components that the content of their products differs because of their unique missions and primary customer sets and, therefore, are not duplicative, even when the products cover the same broad topical area. Eileen R. Larence, (202) 512-8777 or larencee@gao.gov. In addition to the contact named above, Eric Erdman (Assistant Director), Jonathan Bachman, Katherine Davis, Michele Fejfar, Michael Harmond, Eric Hauswirth, Katherine Lee, Thomas Lombardi, Bintou Njie, and Anthony Pordes made significant contributions to this report.

Summary: DHS plays a vital role in securing the nation, and its intelligence analysis capabilities are a key part of this effort. Within DHS, I&A has a lead role for intelligence analysis, but other operational components also perform their own analysis activities. GAO was asked to review the management of departmental analysis efforts. This report addresses the extent to which (1) DHS intelligence analysis activities are integrated to support departmental intelligence priorities, (2) I&A customers find analytic products and services useful, and (3) I&A has addressed challenges in maintaining a skilled analytic workforce. GAO examined mechanisms DHS used to coordinate analysis across components, I&A reports and feedback surveys, and human capital plans. GAO also interviewed officials from I&A, the five DHS components with intelligence analysis as a core function, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence who represent the Intelligence Community, 7 of 78 fusion centers (focal points within states that analyze and share information), and the private sector. The fusion center and sector interviews, chosen based on geographic location and other factors, are not generalizable, but provided insight on progress. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has established mechanisms—including an intelligence framework and an analytic planning process—to better integrate analysis activities throughout the department, but the mechanisms are not functioning as intended. For example, the framework does not establish strategic departmental intelligence priorities that can be used to inform annual planning decisions, such as what analytic activities to pursue and the level of investment to make, as called for in DHS guidance. According to officials from DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), it can be challenging for DHS components to focus on developing both strategic priorities and more tactical priorities that support their specific operations. Absent strategic priorities, DHS used component subject matter experts and other information to develop key questions of common interest they would address through analysis. As a result, DHS does not have reasonable assurance that component analytic activities and resource investments are aligned to support departmental priorities. The mechanisms to integrate analysis, however, gave components insight into one another's work and helped them avoid unnecessary overlap and duplication. I&A customers had mixed views on the extent to which its analytic products and services are useful. GAO's interviews with representatives of I&A's five customer groups indicate that two groups—DHS leadership and state, local, tribal, and territorial partners—found products to be useful, while three groups—DHS components, the Intelligence Community, and the private sector—generally did not. Representatives of four of the five groups said that they found other types of services, such as briefings, to be useful. Results from surveys that are attached to I&A products indicate that most customers were very satisfied with the products' usefulness, but the results are not generalizable because they reflect only the views of customers who chose to respond. To address this issue, I&A is conducting more comprehensive surveys and interviews with customers to evaluate the products and services that best meet their needs. I&A expects to complete this effort by the end of June 2014. I&A has taken steps to address challenges it faced in maintaining a skilled workforce, but has not assessed whether its efforts are resolving the challenges. For example: I&A faced challenges in recruiting and hiring analysts, in part because of its hiring authority, which put it at a disadvantage compared with other agencies that were able to process hiring actions more quickly. I&A's hiring authority was changed in 2013, a fact that could help ease these challenges. I&A experienced low morale and high rates of attrition, particularly among its lower-level analysts. To help address these issues, I&A restructured its grade levels in 2012 to provide additional career advancement opportunities. However, I&A has not established mechanisms to evaluate its efforts and use the results to make any needed changes because I&A leadership has focused on other priorities. Such mechanisms will help I&A evaluate if efforts are achieving their intended results of improving recruiting and hiring, bolstering morale, and reducing attrition. In addition, using the evaluation results to determine any needed changes will help ensure that I&A is making sound workforce decisions. GAO recommends, among other things, that DHS (1) establish strategic intelligence priorities and use them to inform analytic activities and (2) establish mechanisms to evaluate workforce initiatives and use results to determine any needed changes. DHS concurred with our recommendations.