The Parole Commission and Reorganization Act of 1976 established USPC as an independent agency within DOJ. In particular, the act required USPC to develop rules and regulations establishing guidelines for (1) granting or denying an application or recommendation to parole any eligible prisoner, (2) imposing reasonable conditions on an order granting parole, and (3) modifying or revoking an order paroling any eligible prisoner. In addition, the act required USPC to enact other rules and regulations as necessary to carry out a national parole policy. Certain functions of USPC changed after the federal and D.C. governments abolished parole and enacted a new sentencing structure for certain offenses that included a new form of post-incarceration supervision, called supervised release, as discussed below. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 abolished parole for federal offenders convicted of crimes committed on or after November 1, 1987, and, under a new sentencing structure for certain offenses, introduced supervised release for these offenders. Generally, federal offenders convicted of crimes committed before November 1, 1987, are eligible for parole and USPC has jurisdiction to determine whether to grant or deny parole for these offenders. Federal offenders convicted on or after November 1, 1987, now receive determinate sentences—a definite term of imprisonment, followed in most cases by a period of supervised release, which may continue for a number of years. Additionally, under the Sentencing Reform Act, a federal court, in imposing a sentence to a term of imprisonment for a felony or a misdemeanor, may include as part of the sentence a requirement that the offender be placed on a term of supervised release after imprisonment, as well as modify, terminate, extend, or revoke a term of supervised release.have jurisdiction for supervision and revocation decisions for these federal offenders subject to terms of supervised release under the new determinate sentencing structure. With the abolition of parole for federal offenders, it was expected that the existing functions of USPC—granting parole, determining and modifying parole conditions, and revoking parole—would apply to a limited and diminishing class of federal Thus, USPC does not offenders sentenced under the old sentencing law who were on or otherwise eligible for parole. Thus, the act provided for the eventual abolition of USPC. The expectation that USPC would only carry residual functions that eventually would disappear, or readily could be assigned elsewhere, changed with the enactment of the National Capital Revitalization and Self-Government Improvement Act of 1997 (Revitalization Act). The Revitalization Act, along with related D.C. legislation, instituted reforms in the sentencing and supervision structure for D.C. offenders, which in many respects were similar to those that the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 had established for federal offenders. Revitalization Act required the District of Columbia to move to a determinate sentencing structure for certain offenses and abolished parole. Also, it provided for terms of supervised release to follow the determinate sentences to be imposed. Further, it provided USPC with ongoing jurisdiction for supervision and revocation decisions for D.C. Code offenders subject to terms of supervised release under the new determinate sentencing structure. In August 2000, the District of Columbia enacted a determinate sentencing system and abolished parole for D.C. offenders convicted of crimes committed on or after August 5, 2000. These offenders now receive determinate sentences, followed in most cases by a period of supervised release. According to DOJ, during the period of supervised release, the offenders’ behavior is to be closely monitored under conditions that USPC determines are in order to protect public safety and maximize the likelihood of successful reentry into society. D.C. offenders convicted of crimes committed before August 5, 2000, are under the jurisdiction of USPC and are on or are eligible for parole. USPC was last reauthorized in 2013, since it still has offenders under its jurisdiction, including federal and D.C. offenders on or eligible for parole and D.C. offenders on supervised release or serving a prison sentence that includes supervised release. This reauthorization expires on November 1, 2018. Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 712 (1997). Offenders under USPC’s jurisdiction currently include the following: federal offenders on or eligible for parole; other federal offenders, including transfer treaty offenders, military offenders, and certain Federal Witness Protection Program offenders; D.C. offenders on or eligible for parole; and D.C. offenders on supervised release or serving a prison sentence that includes supervised release. Regarding the above offenders, USPC currently has the responsibility for: holding hearings regarding release decisions for federal, transfer treaty, military, and D.C. offenders; making determinations regarding the initial conditions of supervised release for D.C. offenders, managing these offenders’ risk in the community, modifying the conditions of supervision for changed circumstances, discharging offenders from supervision early, and issuing warrants or summons for violation of the conditions; and revoking the release of federal, military, witness protection, and D.C. offenders on parole and D.C. offenders on supervised release. As figure 1 shows that, from fiscal years 2002 through 2014, the total number of offenders under USPC’s jurisdiction declined 26 percent from about 23,000 to about 17,100. Specifically, the number of federal and D.C. offenders on or eligible for parole declined; however, the number of D.C. offenders on supervised release or serving a prison sentence that includes supervised release generally increased. Table 1 in appendix I provides data on the annual variation in these numbers during this period, and the subsections below elaborate on the trends. As figure 2 illustrates, from fiscal years 2002 through 2014, the overall number of federal offenders either on or eligible for parole declined 67 percent, from just about 7,200 to about 2,400 following the abolition of federal parole in 1987. In particular, over the period shown in the figure, the number of federal offenders on parole declined 68 percent from about 4,000 to about 1,300. Similarly, the number of federal offenders eligible for parole declined 66 percent from about 3,200 to about 1,100. Table 2 in appendix I provides the annual variation in these numbers from fiscal years 2002 through 2014 for this population. Figure 3 provides information on the number and composition of federal offenders under USPC’s jurisdiction for 5 of the most recent fiscal years. As the figure illustrates, the overall number of federal offenders under USPC’s jurisdiction declined 27 percent from fiscal years 2010 through 2014 mainly because of the decline in the number of federal offenders on parole. Table 3 in appendix I provides data on the annual variation in these numbers from fiscal years 2002 through 2014. As figure 4 illustrates, from fiscal years 2002 through 2014, the number of D.C. offenders on or eligible for parole declined 74 percent, from about 14,100 to about 3,700 following the abolition of parole for D.C. offenders in 2000. In particular, over the period shown in the figure, the number of D.C. offenders on parole declined 70 percent from about 7,400 to about 2,200. Similarly, the number of D.C. offenders eligible for parole declined 78 percent from about 6,700 to 1,500. Table 4 in appendix I provides the annual variation in these numbers from fiscal years 2002 to 2014. Figure 5 illustrates that, from fiscal years 2002 through 2014, following the introduction of supervised release in 2000, the total number of D.C. offenders on supervised release or serving a prison sentence that includes supervised release increased 606 percent, from about 1,700 to about 12,000 in fiscal year 2011, and then slightly declined but remained above 11,000 through fiscal year 2014. In particular, over the period shown in the figure, the number of D.C. offenders on supervised release increased 600 percent from about 900 to about 6,300 in fiscal year 2011 and then slightly declined but remained above 5,700 through 2014. Similarly, the number of D.C. offenders serving a prison sentence that includes supervised release increased 613 percent from about 800 to about 5,700 in fiscal year 2011 and then slightly declined to above 5,300 through 2014. Table 5 in appendix I provides the annual variation in these numbers from fiscal years 2002 to 2014. According to officials from USPC and criminal justice partner organizations we interviewed, any organization accepting the transfer of USPC’s jurisdiction over D.C. offenders would need to have three key organizational characteristics in place for such a transfer to be feasible. Because no existing entity currently possesses these characteristics, a transfer of USPC’s jurisdiction to another entity is not feasible without altering the characteristics of an existing entity or establishing a new organization. Doing so would pose challenges related to estimating costs and assessing impacts on decision making. According to officials we interviewed from USPC and CSOSA, in order for another entity to feasibly assume USPC’s jurisdiction for D.C. offenders, this entity would need to have the following key organizational characteristics in place: (1) relevant statutory authority; (2) specialized processes, procedures, and personnel; and (3) formal agreements with other organizations concerning decisions for parole and supervised release cases. We found that none of the other 17 criminal justice entities currently involved with D.C. offenders possesses any of the three: Relevant statutory authority. The Revitalization Act specifies different organizations’ responsibilities over D.C. offenders, including USPC’s jurisdiction for parole and supervised release decisions regarding these offenders. None of the other 17 entities we assessed have similar authority. Further, USPC derives its powers from existing statute to subpoena witnesses for parole and supervised release revocation hearings. Thus, any organization assuming USPC’s functions would likewise need relevant statutory authority to do so. Specialized processes, procedures, and personnel. USPC has mechanisms in place, as well as the appropriate expertise, for handling and hearing parole and supervised release cases. No other organization that could potentially assume USPC’s jurisdiction has these same mechanisms in place already. For example, USPC’s standard operating procedures describe the hearing processes and the specific steps hearing officials are required to take before making recommendations to the Parole Commissioners for parole and supervised release cases. Additionally, according to USPC officials, because USPC is the only organization in the federal government that makes parole and supervised release decisions based on federal and D.C. statutes, its personnel have developed the necessary expertise to carry out its responsibilities over time. Formal agreements with other organizations concerning parole and supervised release decisions. USPC has formal agreements concerning its decisions for parole and supervised release cases with other criminal justice partners. Thus, an entity absorbing USPC’s jurisdiction would need to establish these formal agreements anew and stipulate roles. For example, according to USPC officials, USPC conducts many decision hearings for D.C. offenders who have been released outside of the D.C. metro area. In order to conduct those hearings, USPC leverages its formal agreement with U.S. Probation and Pretrial Services, to ensure that it has access to offenders and information on these offenders. Further, according to CSOSA officials, their agency’s understanding with USPC is formalized in an interagency agreement. They noted that any transfer of jurisdiction would require a new, formalized agreement with any new entity accepting USPC’s jurisdiction to ensure ongoing and successful D.C. offender management. Further, according to USPC officials, formal agreements are reinforced with statutory authorities. Thus any entity assuming USPC functions would need authority to enter into formal agreements with partner agencies for the management of D.C. offenders. Given that no entity currently involved in the criminal justice system has the structure in place to absorb USPC’s jurisdiction for D.C. offenders, the transfer of jurisdiction is not feasible without altering the characteristics of an existing entity or establishing a new organization. Altering or establishing a new entity poses challenges estimating costs and assessing impacts on decision making. Altering the characteristics of an existing entity or establishing a new organization with the structure to assume USPC’s jurisdiction could involve an initial outlay of expenditures in order to begin operations. For example, start-up costs could include, among others, costs related to hiring and training personnel; renting or building work space; and establishing processes, procedures, and an infrastructure of technology. Such initial costs could possibly be neutralized by longer term savings attributable to reductions in USPC operations. However, because it is difficult to estimate both the specific start up costs involved and any projected efficiencies resulting from a modification to USPC’s jurisdiction, a net cost effect is difficult to estimate as well. Estimating the dollar amount of start-up costs is challenging on several fronts. We spoke with representatives from the D.C. Office of the Deputy Mayor for Public Safety and Justice, which has oversight of D.C.’s criminal justice agencies and thus could have responsibility for supervising a new entity if the entity were to be housed in the D.C. government. According to these officials, they are not well positioned to generate a cost estimate for creating a new entity for three reasons. First, D.C. has not recently established an entirely new organization and thus these officials had no example upon which to base an estimate. Second, they noted that D.C. had recently consolidated several agencies, and that this process resulted in increased costs. Finally, they explained that estimates of this type are often required to be made years in advance in order to secure the necessary statutory and funding changes from their city council and Congress. Estimating projected efficiencies resulting from a modification to USPC’s jurisdiction is also difficult. This is mainly because USPC would still incur operating costs related to its authorities over federal offenders even after its jurisdiction over D.C. offenders was transferred. In addition, USPC’s operations with respect to D.C. offenders would still need to operate for some amount of time before a new or altered entity would be ready to assume its responsibilities. Thus, there would be some overlap of expenses before funding shifted. It is also important to note that D.C. government organizations that could oversee a new or altered entity already rely on federal funding. For example, the Superior Court of the District of Columbia received about $115 million in funding from the federal government in fiscal year 2014. Additionally, the Public Defender Service for District of Columbia’s Parole Division, which provides representation to D.C. offenders facing revocation before USPC, among other things, received about $40 million in fiscal year 2014 from the federal government to do so. Thus, withdrawing funding from USPC to provide additional federal funds to another organization that already receives federal funding would likely just shift the federal burden. On the other hand, if the new or altered entity could perform USPC’s functions related to D.C. offenders more efficiently and at a lower cost than USPC, then federal savings might be realized. Assessing USPC’s current operational expenses and analyzing where efficiencies could be achieved would require a thorough evaluation. Such an evaluation, and the implementation of any changes resulting from it, could require upfront costs. Thus, it is difficult to estimate whether or not any longer term savings could be achieved after the initial investments to alter an existing entity or establish a new organization. Altering the characteristics of an existing entity or establishing a new organization with the structure to assume USPC’s jurisdiction could initially result in delays in decision-making but the longer term impact is also challenging to assess. For example, the altered or newly created organization would need time to start up and establish formal agreements with its criminal justice partners such as CSOSA. According to USPC and CSOSA officials, this could result in the other entity experiencing potential delays in making parole or supervised release decisions. These officials further stated that such delays could result in increased incarceration and supervision costs, risks of litigation, and threats to public safety. Specifically, according to USPC and CSOSA officials, because offenders cannot be released until the organization processes decisions, delays in decision-making by the other entity could result in, for example, offenders staying incarcerated longer and having higher housing-related costs. These officials also stated that if offenders are under supervision and a decision to revoke their status is delayed, then this could result in more supervision-related expenses. Further, according to USPC and CSOSA officials, when decisions are made outside the statutory timeframes because of delays, offenders could be positioned to file lawsuits, which could result in additional costs related to, for example, defending the organization’s actions. Finally, according to USPC officials, if courts were to rule in favor of those offenders, they could potentially offer early release or reduced sentences to them, which could result in public safety threats. We requested comments on a draft of this report from DOJ, CSOSA, and the D.C. government. They did not provide written comments. USPC and CSOSA provided technical comments, which we incorporated into the draft as appropriate. If you or your staff have any questions about our work, please contact me at (202) 512-9627 or MaurerD@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix III. Table 6 describes the federal and local agencies involved with District of Columbia offenders. We identified these entities by reviewing our prior work on the District’s criminal justice system and other information on the key responsibilities of these federal and District criminal justice organizations. David C. Maurer, (202) 512-9627 or MaurerD@gao.gov. In addition to the contact named above, Joy Booth (Assistant Director); David Alexander; Pedro Almoguera; Willie Commons, III; Emily Gunn; Eric Hauswirth; Susan Hsu; Katherine Lee; and Juan Tapia-Videla made key contributions to this report.

Summary: USPC was established in 1976, in part to carry out a national parole policy that would govern the release of offenders to community supervision prior to completing their full custody sentences. USPC's budget is just over $13 million for fiscal year 2015. Over time, changes in laws have abolished parole and introduced supervised release—a new form of postincarceration supervision. As a result, USPC has been reauthorized and has authority to grant and revoke parole for eligible federal and D.C. offenders and to revoke supervised release for D.C. offenders violating the terms of their release. USPC's current authorization is set to expire in 2018. This report addresses (1) changes in the number of offenders under USPC's jurisdiction from fiscal years 2002 through 2014 and (2) the organizational characteristics needed for an entity to feasibly assume jurisdiction of D.C. offenders from USPC, and the feasibility and implications of such a transfer. GAO analyzed USPC data on federal and D.C. offenders from fiscal years 2002-2014—the most recent years for which reliable data were available—as well as DOJ reports on USPC and USPC policies, and determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. GAO also discussed with USPC and some of its criminal justice partners the feasibility of transferring USPC's jurisdiction for D.C. offenders and any related challenges. From fiscal years 2002 through 2014, the total number of offenders under the Department of Justice's (DOJ) U.S. Parole Commission's (USPC) jurisdiction declined 26 percent from about 23,000 to about 17,000. Specifically, following the abolition of parole, the number of offenders on or eligible for parole declined 67 percent among federal offenders, and 74 percent among D.C. offenders. However, following the introduction of supervised release, the number of D.C. offenders on supervised release or serving a prison sentence that includes supervised release increased 606 percent from fiscal year 2002 to fiscal year 2011, and then slightly declined through fiscal year 2014. Transferring USPC's jurisdiction for D.C. offenders would require that an entity has three key organizational characteristics to assume this jurisdiction, and altering or establishing a new entity poses challenges. Based on our discussions with officials from USPC and other organizations, including those from the D.C. government, these three key organizational characteristics are: statutory authority for asserting jurisdiction over D.C. offenders; processes, procedures and personnel in place for handling parole and supervised release cases; and formal agreements with other criminal justice organizations for making parole and supervised release decisions. We identified 17 criminal justice entities with the potential to assume USPC's jurisdiction for D.C. offenders; however none currently possesses the three key organizational characteristics. Thus, transferring jurisdiction is not feasible without altering an existing or establishing a new entity, and would pose challenges related to estimating costs and assessing impacts on decision making. GAO is not making any recommendations.