The military services preposition stocks ashore and afloat to provide DOD the ability to respond to multiple scenarios by providing assets to support U.S. forces during the initial phases of an operation until the supply chain has been established (see figure). Each military service maintains its own configurations and types of equipment and stocks to support its own prepositioned stock program. The Army stores sets of combat brigade equipment, supporting supplies, and other stocks at land sites in several countries and aboard ships. The Marine Corps stores equipment and supplies for its forces aboard ships stationed around the world and at land sites in Norway. The Navy’s prepositioned stock program provides construction support, equipment for off-loading and transferring cargo from ships to shore, and expeditionary medical facilities to support the Marine Corps. In the Air Force, the prepositioned stock program includes assets such as direct mission support equipment for fighter and strategic aircraft as well as base operating support equipment to provide force, infrastructure, and aircraft support during wartime and contingency operations. Figure: High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles in a Prepositioned Storage Facility (left) and Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles Being Loaded for Prepositioning (right) In June 2008, DOD issued an instruction directing the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to develop and coordinate guidance that identifies an overall war reserve materiel strategy that includes starter stocks, which DOD defines as war reserve materiel that is prepositioned in or near a theater of operations and is designed to last until resupply at wartime rates is established. Also, the instruction states that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is responsible for establishing and coordinating force development guidance that identifies an overall strategy to achieve desired capabilities and responsiveness in support of the National Defense Strategy. Further, it states that the Global Prepositioned Materiel Capabilities Working Group, including representatives from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the Joint Staff, has responsibility for, among other things, addressing joint issues concerning prepositioned stocks. On March 7, 2017, DOD issued its strategic policy for managing its prepositioned stocks in DOD Directive 3110.07, Pre-positioned War Reserve Materiel (PWRM) Strategic Policy, and included information that addresses one of the six reporting elements enumerated in section 321 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2014. The table below presents our assessment of DOD’s strategic policy. Table: GAO’s Assessment of DOD’s Strategic Policy Compared to the Six Reporting Elements Required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 GAO Assessment of DOD’s Strategic Policy Addressed (1) Overarching strategic guidance concerning planning and resource priorities that link the Department of Defense’s current and future needs for prepositioning stocks, such as desired responsiveness, to evolving national defense objectives. DOD’s strategic policy requires the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to develop and coordinate planning and resource requirements – such as those found in the Guidance for Employment of the Force and the Defense Planning Guidance – so that war materiel and prepositioned war reserve materiel is appropriately linked to desired capabilities in support of the national defense strategy. In addition, the strategic policy requires the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the DOD Component heads to maintain guidance that includes component-specific requirements for planning and resourcing priorities to address current and future requirements for maintaining prepositioned stocks optimally. GAO Assessment of DOD’s Strategic Policy Not Addressed (2) A description of the department’s vision for prepositioning programs and the desired end state. DOD’s strategic policy does not include information describing the department’s vision for prepositioning programs and the desired end state. Rather, the strategic policy assigns the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the DOD Component heads with the responsibility of maintaining guidance that includes a description of the component’s vision and desired end state. (3) Specific interim goals demonstrating how the vision and end state will be achieved. DOD’s strategic policy does not include information on specific interim goals describing how the department’s vision and end state will be achieved. Rather, the strategic policy assigns the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the DOD Component heads with the responsibility of maintaining guidance that includes specific interim goals demonstrating how the component’s vision and end state will be achieved. (4) A description of the strategic environment, requirements for, and challenges associated with prepositioning. DOD’s strategic policy does not include a description of the strategic environment, requirements for, and challenges associated with, prepositioning stocks. Rather, the strategic policy assigns the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and the DOD Component heads the responsibility for providing guidance on the strategic environment, requirements for, and challenges associated with prepositioning stocks. (5) Metrics for how the Department will evaluate the extent to which prepositioned assets are achieving defense objectives. The strategic policy does not include metrics to evaluate whether prepositioned assets are achieving defense objectives. Rather, the strategic policy assigns the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the responsibility for developing metrics regarding DOD’s prepositioned stock programs. (6) A framework for joint departmental oversight that reviews and synchronizes the military services’ prepositioned strategies to minimize potentially duplicative efforts and maximize efficiencies in prepositioned stocks across the Department of Defense. The strategic policy does not include a framework for joint departmental oversight. Rather, the strategic policy assigns the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the responsibility for developing such a framework for synchronizing the services’ prepositioning stock programs. As the table shows, DOD addressed the first element in section 321 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2014 by describing strategic planning and resource guidance. However, we assessed the remaining elements as not addressed because DOD did not provide the required information in its strategic policy. Officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy stated that the strategic policy does not include this information because it is intended to serve as a directive for developing policies and assigning key responsibilities, which can be used as a mechanism for addressing required elements at a later time. However, the NDAA for fiscal year 2014 required that these elements be included in the strategic policy. Specifically: Element 2 (Description of the Department’s Vision and Desired End State) and Element 3 (Specific Interim Goals): DOD’s strategic policy does not include a description of the department’s vision and the desired end state for its prepositioning programs, as required by element 2, or specific interim goals for achieving the department’s vision and desired end state, as required by element 3. Rather, the strategic policy assigns the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the DOD Component heads the responsibility for providing guidance that includes a description of the component’s vision and desired end stats as well as specific interim goals for achieving the component’s vision and desired end state. DOD officials from the offices of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Joint Staff acknowledged that the strategic policy does not include a department-wide vision, desired end state, and specific interim goals. However, the NDAA for fiscal year 2014 requires a department vision, not a component vision. Moreover, for the past 6 years in our annual reports on duplication, overlap, and fragmentation and in our related reports, we have identified the potential for duplication in the services’ prepositioned stock programs due to the absence of a department-wide strategic policy and joint oversight. Such joint oversight is necessary to articulate a single, department-wide vision and interim goals. By not including the department’s vision or interim goals in its strategic policy, and instead, directing the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the DOD Component heads to provide guidance on the component’s vision, DOD is continuing its fragmented approach to managing its prepositioned stock programs by further emphasizing individual visions rather than a joint, department-wide view. Unless DOD revises its policy or includes in other guidance a department-wide vision, desired end state, and goals for its prepositioned stock programs, DOD risks being unable to recognize potential efficiencies that could be gained by synchronizing the services’ prepositioning programs with each other. Element 4 (Description of the Strategic Environment and Challenges): DOD’s strategic policy does not include a description of the strategic environment, or the requirements for and challenges associated with prepositioned stocks as required by element 4. Rather, it directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and the DOD Component heads to provide guidance on this element. We believe that if the Under Secretaries issue such guidance as directed, DOD and the services will be able to have a shared understanding of the strategic environment, requirements, and challenges of managing their prepositioned stocks, which could promote joint oversight and efficiencies across the department. Element 5 (Metrics): DOD’s strategic policy does not include metrics for evaluating the extent to which DOD prepositioned stocks are achieving defense objectives as required by element 5. Rather, the policy assigns the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the responsibility for developing metrics. We believe that if the Chairman develops such metrics as directed, DOD and the services will have common criteria with which to measure their programs. However, DOD will not be able to create informed metrics before first addressing other elements such as developing a department vision, goals, and articulating the strategic environment. Element 6 (Framework for Joint Departmental Oversight): DOD’s strategic policy does not include a framework for joint departmental oversight that reviews and synchronizes the military services’ prepositioned strategies to minimize potentially duplicative efforts and maximize efficiencies in prepositioned stocks across DOD, as required by element 6. Rather, the policy assigns the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the responsibility for establishing the framework. We have reported for years that DOD lacks joint oversight of its prepositioned programs. We believe that if the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff develops such a framework, as directed by the policy, DOD and the services will be better able to integrate and align at a department-wide level its prepositioning programs in order to achieve efficiencies and avoid duplication. Further, DOD has not yet issued an implementation plan for managing its prepositioned stock programs, which was also required by Section 321 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2014. The NDAA required DOD to complete the plan by April 24, 2014. In May 2017, DOD officials stated that they were reviewing information on the military services’ prepositioning strategies for consolidation into a department-wide implementation plan. They anticipated that a plan would be finalized by September 30, 2017. It will be important for DOD to address the elements that were omitted from its strategic policy as it creates the implementation plan to ensure that the plan is linked to a complete strategy on prepositioned stocks for the department. Prepositioned stocks play a pivotal role during the initial phases of an operation. We have reported for the past 6 years on the importance of DOD having a department-wide strategic policy and joint oversight of the services’ prepositioned stock programs, and Congress has required DOD to take action in this area. While it is encouraging that DOD has recently issued a strategic policy, the policy does not address most of the required elements enumerated in section 321 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2014. In the cases of a description of the strategic environment and challenges, metrics, and a framework for joint departmental oversight, DOD’s policy appropriately assigns responsibility for the development of such information, and therefore we are not making recommendations related to those elements because the department has already directed their implementation. However, for the description of the department’s vision and desired end state and specific interim goals, DOD’s strategic policy does not include the required information and instead directs the development of the component’s vision, end state, and goals, which reinforces a fragmented and potentially duplicative approach to managing prepositioned stocks across the services. Without either revising its strategic policy or including in other guidance the department’s vision, end state, and goals for its prepositioned stock programs, DOD will continue to be ill positioned to recognize potential duplication, achieve efficiencies, and fully synchronize the services’ prepositioned stock programs across the department. To improve DOD’s management of its prepositioned stocks and reduce potential duplication among the services’ programs, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to revise DOD’s strategic policy or include in other department-wide guidance: a description of the department’s vision and the desired end state for its prepositioned stock programs, and specific interim goals for achieving that vision and desired end state. We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. DOD provided written comments on the draft, which are reprinted in appendix II. DOD concurred with our recommendations and noted it is taking steps to implement them. We also received technical comments from DOD, which we incorporated throughout our report as appropriate. We are providing copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition, this report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-5431 or russellc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III. Section 321 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2014 required that the Department of Defense (DOD) establish an implementation plan for its programs of prepositioned stocks. The implementation plan for the prepositioning strategic policy shall include the following elements: A. Detailed guidance for how the Department of Defense will achieve the vision, end state, and goals outlined in the strategic policy. B. A comprehensive list of the Department’s prepositioned stock programs. C. A detailed description of how the plan will be implemented. D. A schedule with milestones for the implementation of the plan. E. An assignment of roles and responsibilities for the implementation of the plan. F. A description of the resources required to implement the plan. G. A description of how the plan will be reviewed and assessed to monitor progress. In addition to the contact named above, individuals who made key contributions to this report include Alissa H. Czyz, Assistant Director; Vincent M. Buquicchio, Tracy W. Burney, Lionel C. Cooper, Richard Powelson, Courtney R. Bond, and Michael D. Silver.

Summary: DOD positions billions of dollars worth of assets–including combat vehicles, rations, medical supplies, and repair parts—at strategic locations around the world to use during early phases of operations. Each of the military services maintains its own prepositioned stock program. For the past 6 years, GAO has reported on the risk of duplication and inefficiencies in the services' programs due to the absence of a department-wide strategic policy and joint oversight. Section 321 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2014 required DOD to maintain a strategic policy and develop an implementation plan to manage its prepositioned stocks. The NDAA for fiscal year 2014 also included a provision for GAO to review DOD's strategic policy and implementation plan. This report assessed the extent to which DOD's strategic policy addresses mandated reporting elements and describes the status of DOD's implementation plan. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed DOD's strategic policy against the elements required in the NDAA and discussed the status of the implementation plan with DOD officials. The Department of Defense's (DOD) strategic policy on its prepositioned stock programs, issued in March 2017, addressed one of the six mandated reporting elements (see table). Specifically, DOD's policy describes strategic planning and resource guidance (element 1), as required. GAO assessed the remaining five reporting elements as not addressed because DOD did not provide the required information in its policy. For three of the five elements that were not addressed—a description of the strategic environment and challenges (element 4), metrics (element 5), and a framework for joint oversight (element 6)—DOD's policy assigns responsibility for the development of such information, and therefore GAO is not making recommendations related to those elements because DOD has already directed their implementation. However, for two of the five elements that were not addressed—a description of the department's vision and desired end state (element 2) and specific interim goals (element 3)—DOD's strategic policy does not include the required information and instead directs the development of component's (rather than the department's) vision, end state, and goals. DOD officials stated that the strategic policy does not include required information such as a department-wide vision, end state, and interim goals because it is intended to serve as a directive for assigning responsibilities. Without revising its strategic policy or including required information in other department-wide guidance, DOD will not be positioned to fully synchronize the services' prepositioned stock programs to avoid unnecessary duplication and achieve efficiencies. DOD has not yet issued an implementation plan for managing its prepositioned stock programs, which the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) required by April 24, 2014. DOD officials anticipated that a plan would be finalized by September 30, 2017. It will be important for DOD to address the elements that were omitted from its strategic policy as it creates the implementation plan to ensure that the plan is linked to a complete strategy on prepositioned stock programs for the department. GAO recommends that DOD revise its prepositioned stocks strategic policy or include in other department-wide guidance (1) a description of the department's vision and the desired end state, and (2) specific interim goals for achieving this vision and end state. DOD concurred with the recommendations, noting that it is taking steps to implement them.