China became the 143rd member of the WTO on December 11, 2001, after almost 15 years of negotiations. These negotiations resulted in commitments to open and liberalize its economy and offer a more predictable environment for trade and foreign investment in accordance with WTO rules. The United States and other WTO members have stated that China’s membership in the WTO provides increased opportunities for foreign companies seeking access to China’s vast market. China is already a major destination of U.S. investment overseas, and China and the United States are already major trading partners. The results of China’s negotiations to join the WTO are described and documented in China’s final accession agreement, the Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, which includes the accompanying Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, the consolidated market access schedules for goods and services, and other annexes. China’s WTO commitments are complex and broad in scope. They range from the rules for how China’s trade regime will be reformed in accordance with WTO principles to specific market access commitments for goods and services. A number of commitments are to be phased in over 10 years. Commitments related to reforming China’s trade regime require a specific action from China, such as reporting particular information to the WTO, while others are more general in nature, such as those that affirm China’s adherence to WTO principles. Many commitments seek to improve the rule of law. Generally, China agreed to ensure that its legal measures would be consistent with its WTO obligations. These rule of law-related commitments include broad reforms to publish and translate trade-related laws and regulations and apply them uniformly at all levels of government and throughout China. China will have to adhere to internationally accepted norms to protect intellectual property rights and enforce relevant laws and regulations relating to patents, trademarks, copyrights, trade secrets, and integrated circuits. China also made a substantial number of other rule of law-related commitments regarding transparency, judicial review, and nondiscriminatory treatment of businesses. The accession agreement also includes market access commitments for goods, including commitments that will reduce tariffs on agricultural and industrial products from about 14 percent in 2001 to less than 10 percent in 2010, as well as commitments to reduce or eliminate many other trade barriers such as quotas or licensing requirements on some of these products. Further, China made commitments to allow greater market access in 9 of 12 general service sectors, including sectors that are important to U.S. companies such as banking, insurance, and telecommunications. However, some limitations, including those that require joint ventures with Chinese partners in some sectors or restrict the amount of foreign investment, will continue. It is important to note that, in addition to the commitments set forth in the accession agreement, WTO membership confers obligations and rights on China. For example, membership obligates China to adhere to more than 20 existing multilateral WTO agreements that cover various areas of international trade. China, like all other WTO members, must adhere to the WTO’s three main agreements governing key areas of international trade: (1) the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, (2) the General Agreement on Trade in Services, and (3) the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. Other specialized multilateral WTO agreements that apply to China include the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, the Agreement on Agriculture, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. Numerous sections of China’s protocol and working party report refer to or reiterate specific provisions of a number of these underlying WTO agreements. Membership also gives China various rights under WTO rules. For example, the Understanding on the Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes gives access to a formal mechanism for resolving disputes over WTO trade-related issues. Eventual implementation of China’s WTO commitments should result in greater freedom for American firms to invest and trade in China, according to the U.S. Department of Commerce. The United States was the second largest foreign investor in China in 2000. China was the ninth largest destination for U.S. exports in 2001. In 2001, U.S. companies exported about $18 billion of merchandise to China. The major exports included transport equipment, electrical machinery, office machines, general industrial machinery, oilseeds, and fruits. Figure 1 shows the increasing level of U.S. foreign direct investment in China. Figure 2 shows the increasing levels of U.S. trade with China. See appendix V for additional information regarding U.S.-China investment and trade. U.S. companies reported that many WTO-related commitment areas were important to them, according to our survey of U.S. companies with business activities in China. The 30 commitment areas included market access, investment measures, fundamental market, and rule of law-related reforms. Thirteen of the 30 commitment areas were important to a majority of the responding companies. Commitment areas related to enhancing the rule of law emerged as most important both for those who responded to our survey and for those who took part in our structured interviews. The relative importance of some other commitments varied among manufacturing and services firms but was consistent with the nature of their operations. In interviews, company representatives emphasized and explained the importance of key commitments. We found that survey respondents were particularly focused on reforms related to enhancing the rule of law. At least three quarters of respondents selected intellectual property rights; consistent application of laws, regulations, and practices; and transparency most frequently when asked to rate the importance of individual commitment areas to their companies (based on a list of 30 WTO-related commitment areas that we specified in the survey). These results did not materially change when we compared the survey results for small- and medium-sized companies and large companies. Other than those related to rule of law, respondents most frequently selected trading rights (the right to import or export); tariffs, fees, and charges; and scope of business restrictions as the commitment areas important to their companies. All 30 commitment areas were important to at least one quarter of our respondents. Table 1 shows the number of survey respondents that said each WTO-related commitment area was important to their company. The relative importance that companies assigned to rule of law-related commitment areas (compared to those related to other reforms) generally remained consistent for agricultural, manufacturing, and services firms. These three types of firms most frequently identified rule of law-related commitments as important. However, given the nature of their businesses, these firms differed in the areas that they identified next most frequently. Manufacturers assigned greater importance to tariffs, fees, and charges. Manufacturers as well as agricultural firms also assigned greater importance to trading rights (the ability to import and export) and customs procedures and inspection practices. This is consistent with the needs of manufacturers to move goods into and out of China. Services firms assigned greater importance to commitment areas related to the scope of business restrictions and market access for services, consistent with the historical limitations on their ability to operate in China and their need for approval from the Chinese government in order to do business there. Structured interviews with representatives of U.S. companies in China generally corroborated the survey results regarding important WTO-related commitment areas. Many survey respondents and company representatives we interviewed emphasized the importance of China’s rule of law-related reforms to the functioning of their operations in China and pointed to specific problems with current laws, regulations, and practices. For example, in order to explain the importance assigned to certain commitment areas, one company representative noted that because licensing procedures in China are notoriously opaque, transparency is a priority for his company. One survey respondent’s written comments emphasized the importance of equal treatment under the law, saying that “getting a level playing field for U.S. business versus Chinese competitors is critical.” Another representative of a large multinational company told us that rule of law-related reforms are important, because China’s application of product standards and other measures varies greatly between localities. Furthermore, this company representative said that Chinese officials often promulgate regulations and procedures without sufficient comment periods, the regulations themselves are often deliberately vague, and intellectual property rights (IPR) violations are still rampant. Another individual told us about the biggest problem his company had encountered in China, which involved the rule of law. Several years ago, his company won a court judgment against a client who had failed to pay on a contract. Despite winning the judgment, this U.S. company had been unable to collect the debt, and the court had failed to take steps to enforce the judgment. In addition to rule of law-related reforms, several company representatives also explained the importance to their companies of a number of other reforms, including (1) reductions in tariffs and nontariff barriers (market access) and (2) the liberalization of investment-related measures. First, several manufacturers discussed the importance of obtaining increased market access through tariff reductions. One representative of a food manufacturer explained that China’s implementation of its WTO commitments would make it easier and cheaper to import the ingredients used in his company’s products. Another representative of a manufacturing firm reported that high tariffs were one of the most important issues for his company. He noted that although tariffs have already come down on several imported products, his company still pays high tariffs on certain other products. Concerning nontariff barriers and reforms to China’s quota system, one company representative explained that his company sometimes encounters problems in selling products in China because quotas reserve a portion of the market for domestic manufacturers. This has caused problems because it lead to inventory overruns for his company. Second, several representatives of various U.S. companies in China also highlighted the importance of other reforms, such as commitments liberalizing investment-related measures. For example, one company explained that repatriating profits made in China still involves a lengthy process. Representatives of another U.S. multinational company that we interviewed complained about the difficulties that China’s restrictive foreign exchange regime creates. This company maintains a separate holding company in order to move renminbi (China’s currency) from one joint venture to another within China. Finally, several companies that provide services in China pointed out that numerous commitment areas are important to them (indirectly) because they are important to their clients’ ability to do business in China (directly). Respondents to our survey expected China’s WTO accession and implementation of its commitments to improve their ability to do business in China and to increase their business with China. More than three quarters of the companies generally expected a positive impact on their business from China’s WTO commitments, and most expected to begin to see this impact relatively soon—though some company representatives indicated that the full impact would take time. Companies identified their current business goals for China, and most companies we interviewed said that their company’s goals had already changed to reflect China’s WTO membership. Furthermore, companies generally expected that their business activities in China would increase as a result of China’s implementation of its WTO commitments, including their volume of exports to China, market share in China, and distribution of products there. A majority of the companies participating in our survey and interviews expected a positive impact to eventually result from implementation of China’s WTO commitments. Some companies had already experienced an impact, and most companies expected to begin to experience an impact within the next few years. Companies provided a variety of explanations for their expectations regarding the eventual impact. When asked what impact they expected China’s WTO commitments would have on their companies, most survey respondents reported that they expected a positive or very positive impact. These positive expectations were generally consistent for firms in all sectors, but services firms had a somewhat higher percentage (93 percent) of positive and very positive expectations compared to manufacturing firms and agricultural firms (79 percent and 62 percent, respectively). Some respondents expected little or no impact on their business in China. A smaller group of respondents reported that they thought China’s WTO membership would have a negative impact on their business. Figure 3 shows the expected impact of implementation of China’s WTO commitments for respondents to both our mail survey and to the structured interviews in China. Most companies expected to begin to experience an overall business impact from China’s WTO commitments in the next few years, but this view was not unanimous. About one-fifth of survey respondents reported that they expected an immediate impact or had already experienced an impact. More than half of the survey respondents expected to begin to experience an overall business impact from China’s WTO commitments sometime from less than 1 year to 4 years. In contrast, a small fraction of respondents expected to begin to experience an impact in 5 to 10 years or never expected to experience an impact from China’s WTO commitments. About one-tenth of respondents did not know or had no basis to judge how soon their companies might begin to experience an impact. Table 2 summarizes these company responses. Company representatives that we interviewed in China made comments that lend support to the general expectation that change will be positive, but many believed that China’s implementation would be incremental and would be tempered by China’s desire to protect its workers. One representative said that his company planned to boost investments and build a national business in China. He explained that his company expected to obtain trading rights and national treatment in taxes as a result of WTO. Others explained that demand for services had already increased, that the trajectory of the reforms resulted in immediate benefits, and that the lowering of trade barriers had helped a great deal. One representative noted that some impact began before accession, but that the full impact from WTO implementation will be incomplete for some time to come. Similarly, another individual stated that all the commitments would eventually be implemented but that the time needed for implementing different commitments would vary considerably. A representative who agreed that it will take time for WTO concepts to take hold also said that the impact is dependent on how forceful the central government continues to be about WTO reform. Our survey of U.S. companies with a presence in China, which was conducted soon after China’s accession to the WTO, asked respondents to identify their current goals for doing business in China. The company goals that survey respondents most frequently identified were “establish a presence for the future,” “increase exports to China,” and “benefit from lower labor costs,” as shown in table 3. Identification of these three company goals follows logically from survey respondents’ identification of the commitment areas that their companies considered important. First, because many companies may want to establish a presence for the future, this may explain why rule of law reform is important. Second, many companies may want to increase exports to China. This may drive their interest in lower market access restrictions resulting from China’s WTO commitments. Third, some companies may want to take further advantage of China’s low wages once China implements some fundamental market reforms and liberalizes some investment measures. Even firms with a history of more than 10 years in China identified these goals as priorities for their companies. Manufacturing, agricultural, and services firms reported slightly different priorities in their companies’ most frequently identified goals. A larger percentage of manufacturers identified benefiting from lower labor costs (49 percent) and the cost or quality of raw materials (27 percent) in China as company goals compared to agricultural or services firms (38 and 18 percent, and 0 and 12 percent, respectively). Similarly, a larger percentage of manufacturers identified increasing exports to China (50 percent) as a company goal than either agricultural or services firms (38 percent and 27 percent, respectively). More than half of the companies that we interviewed in China reported that China’s official membership in the WTO had changed their company’s goals and expectations for future business opportunities in China to a moderate or great extent. Specifically, 16 company representatives said their goals had changed to a great extent while 12 reported their goals had changed to a moderate extent. When asked to describe the extent to which their company’s goals had changed, responses varied widely and focused on their companies’ operations. On one end of the spectrum were several companies whose operations had already changed as a result of China’s recent WTO membership. For example, one corporate representative in China noted that China’s WTO membership had resulted in big increases in demand for his company’s services and that his firm will also be allowed to provide a wider range of services to its clients in the future. In another example, a service provider looking forward to broader distribution rights speculated that if China had not gained WTO membership, his company would likely have withdrawn completely from China. At the other end of the spectrum were companies whose goals remained relatively unchanged. These companies focused on their ability to operate in China regardless of China’s WTO commitments. One company representative said, “We’re here, and we know how to operate.” This respondent emphasized that he hoped that China’s WTO membership would open new opportunities, but his company was not relying on that possibility. Other representatives said that, “WTO does not change our operations at all,” and that “we’ve been here a long time without WTO.” Another company representative explained that the future will be more open but that his company had already been planning for expansion for 5 to 10 years because China is a major focus of its Asia operations. Similarly, another company representative noted that “WTO will improve the market down the road, but the market exists with or without WTO.” Finally, representatives of several companies that we interviewed expressed uncertainty regarding how China’s WTO membership would affect their companies’ goals and operations in China. Several firms with agricultural interests or dependent on agricultural inputs for their manufacturing operations discussed their early concerns about China’s implementing rules and regulations, which indicated problems that could affect their goals. One firm cited China’s promulgation of agricultural regulations as well as recent prohibitions on investment in specific agricultural sectors. A representative of another agricultural firm noted that as a result of agricultural compliance issues that Chinese officials had raised since China’s WTO accession, his business had experienced greater difficulties doing business in China. A representative of a U.S. company operating a joint venture in China summarized his company’s uncertain expectations as follows: “Future goals depend on the whole dynamic of forcing the Chinese government to be more liberal and systematic as well as more fair in terms of legal protection.” In addition to expressing views on their companies’ goals in doing business with China, survey respondents also indicated how the implementation of China’s WTO commitments would affect their companies’ activities. About 85 percent of the respondents that completed this survey question expected their companies’ overall activities in China to greatly or somewhat increase. Almost 15 percent of the respondents expected their overall activities to stay the same, while only one respondent expected overall business activities to greatly decrease. Expectations for how the implementation of China’s WTO commitments would affect specific company activities are shown in figure 4. Corporate representatives whom we interviewed reiterated these expectations for an overall increase in company activities. Some companies told us that they hoped to increase their manufacturing base, their number of offices in China, and/or their investment in China in the next few years. Other companies predicted that implementation of China’s WTO commitments could create many additional business opportunities. One company representative noted that there is currently a “boom mentality” in China. For a few business activities, survey respondents reported mixed expectations regarding how they would be affected by the implementation of China’s WTO commitments, as shown in figure 4. Specifically, an almost equal percentage (about 50 percent each) of the respondents reported that the geographic diversity of their companies’ investments in China would either increase or stay about the same. With regard to investment in existing facilities in China, 50 percent of the respondents expected their companies’ activities to increase, while 47 percent expected their companies’ activities to stay about the same. Fifty-four percent of the respondents indicated that their investment in new facilities in China would increase, while 44 percent indicated that their investments would stay about the same. At least 5 percent of the companies responding expected two activities to decrease. First, ventures with Chinese partners will reportedly decrease for 16 percent of the respondents. Implementation of China’s WTO commitments will allow foreign-invested enterprises in some sectors to operate wholly owned foreign enterprises rather than being restricted to joint ventures. For example, a services firm that we interviewed reported that it has been restricted by requirements that it have Chinese partners but hopes to transition to a wholly owned foreign enterprise in 3 to 5 years. Second, competition from foreign or Chinese firms located in China will reportedly decrease for 9 percent of the respondents. One respondent addressed his company’s hopes that WTO will “level the playing field” for U.S. companies in China. For example, leveling the playing field for U.S. companies could include encountering decreased competition from China’s state-owned enterprises as market forces lead to the further closure of inefficient and unprofitable companies and as foreign-invested (joint venture) enterprises lose the benefit of discriminatory practices once China’s WTO-related reforms are implemented. U.S. companies with business activities in China expected a number of impediments to implementation of China’s WTO reforms. Views varied concerning the expected ease or difficulty of implementing specific commitment areas, but we were able to identify some common themes from our survey and structured interviews. Companies generally expected many of China’s WTO commitment areas to be relatively difficult for Chinese officials to implement, especially many of those they considered important. Large numbers of respondents expected reforms to be generally difficult or did not know what to expect in terms of WTO implementation throughout specific locations in China and/or in terms of China’s various levels of government. Companies also described numerous challenges that China faces as it continues to reform its economy and implement its WTO commitments. Companies with a presence in China had different expectations regarding Chinese officials’ implementation of particular WTO commitments. Our analysis of survey responses showed that 7 of the 30 commitment areas listed in the survey ranked “High” in difficulty, 13 commitment areas ranked “Medium” in difficulty, and 10 of the commitment areas ranked “Low” in expected difficulty for the Chinese government to implement. Furthermore, when asked whether each WTO commitment area would be easy or difficult for the Chinese government to implement, respondents expected that two-thirds of the commitment areas listed in the survey would be relatively difficult to implement. However, large numbers of respondents (sometimes as many as 50 respondents) did not know what to expect concerning the ease or difficulty of specific commitment areas or said some were not applicable to their business. Companies most frequently identified five commitment areas related to rule of law reform as the WTO commitments that they expected to be relatively difficult to implement. Respondents also expected some non rule-of-law-related commitment areas to be relatively difficult for Chinese officials to implement. These included reforms to the operation of state- owned enterprises, which are related to fundamental market reforms; and standards, certification, registration, and testing requirements, which are related to market access reforms. On the other hand, most of the commitment areas that are related to reforming China’s foreign investment measures were considered relatively less difficult for China to implement. Table 4 shows the company responses indicating the commitment areas deemed difficult for the Chinese to implement (in terms of the number of “difficult” responses each commitment area received). Our interviews with representatives of U.S. companies in China generally supported these findings. In general, the commitment areas expected to be the most difficult to implement were those that survey respondents also identified as most important. Specifically, our analysis identified rule of law-related commitment areas as the commitment areas of greatest importance to respondents’ companies and also showed that respondents expected these reforms to be the most difficult for China to implement, as shown in table 5. Reforms to China’s state-owned enterprises (SOE) were also expected to be difficult for China’s government officials to implement but were relatively less important to survey respondents. Companies we interviewed explained that reforming SOEs creates a huge challenge for the Chinese and will take a number of years, but that other reforms will have a more immediate impact on their companies’ ability to do business in China and are consequently more important to them. Our analysis identified another group of commitments respondents expected to be both moderately important and moderately difficult for the Chinese to implement. This group is comprised of 37 percent of the commitment areas and includes a range of fundamental market, market access, and investment measure-related reforms. Some commitment areas related to these three types of reforms may appear easier for Chinese officials to implement, because, in some cases, the reforms require specific regulatory or legal changes rather than more systemic legal changes associated with rule of law. Finally, our analysis showed that various other commitment areas were expected to be relatively less difficult for the Chinese to implement. However, while tariffs, fees, and charges and trading rights were expected to be less difficult for Chinese officials to implement, these commitment areas were still rated “High” in importance. It is important to note that all the commitment areas that emerged as low in both importance and difficulty were still important to at least 20 percent of survey respondents. Companies we surveyed also expressed mixed views regarding the ease or difficulty expected for implementation in various locations and for different levels of government in China. For example, almost as many respondents expected reforms to be very or somewhat easy for the national/central level of government as those who expected reforms to be very or somewhat difficult. Similarly, an almost equal number of respondents expected officials in China’s major cities to have an easy or difficult time making reforms. Nevertheless, survey respondents expected China’s local and provincial governments and autonomous regions to have the most difficulties implementing reforms. Table 6 provides a summary of these responses. Company representatives whom we interviewed provided a number of explanations for these expectations by level of government. For example, one company representative compared China to Europe, in that each Chinese region is like a different country and they each have different rules and regulations. Another company official explained how differences within China play out at the local level. He believed that the local officials have a different mind-set, because existing approval processes are their livelihood (he cited import inspections as an example). In his view, local officials want to protect the domestic market and local suppliers from losing jobs. A specific example provides further context for understanding how these differences relate to specific business operations. As one company representative explained, he believed that there is no unified customs system and therefore, customs procedures will be slow to change. In his view, state directives often do not get to local customs authorities and authorities may interpret the directives differently. Another reason that might help explain the varied expectations by level of government is that many respondents’ knowledge about different parts of China is limited. Specifically, more respondents selected “Don’t know” than “Yes” or “No” for 24 of the 26 locations listed in the survey when asked whether they expected that reforms would be relatively difficult for the Chinese to implement. Beijing and Shanghai were the only locations where more respondents expected reforms to be relatively easy to implement (compared to the number of respondents who did not know whether reforms would be difficult and the number of respondents who expected reforms to be difficult to implement). With regard to Beijing, 43 percent of the respondents expected reforms would be relatively easy to implement, while 22 percent of the respondents expected reforms to be difficult to implement. In Shanghai, 54 percent of the respondents expected that reforms would be relatively easy to implement, while 15 percent of the respondents expected reforms to be difficult to implement. Respondents also expected reforms to be more difficult to implement in locations where fewer U.S. companies have a presence in China. These locations included the western provinces (Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang, and Tibet), Guizhou and Yunnan, Sichuan, Heilongjiang, and Inner Mongolia. Companies’ overall positive expectations for their future in China were tempered by their views regarding the domestic challenges China faces as it implements WTO-related reforms. Company representatives described the numerous challenges China faces during implementation of its WTO commitments. Their comments covered a spectrum of opinions ranging from the broad view that, overall, China’s accession would be great for China and the United States, to less enthusiastic expectations based on their companies’ experiences in China. One representative said that WTO has huge potential for his company and implementation of China’s commitments could radically improve his company’s ability to operate. Another representative explained how expectations were somewhat mixed within his own company: “It should be positive, but our immediate expectations are not very high. The intentions are good, and the Chinese have made radical reforms. The desire is there on the part of the Chinese.” Other U.S. companies noted a somewhat neutral reaction to China’s early months of WTO membership. A representative of one U.S. multinational that has invested in China since the 1980s said that WTO has not improved matters much for his company. A service provider said his company has held off on optimistic expectations, because the results of implementation could be positive or negative depending on available opportunities to provide services in China and regulations forthcoming from the Chinese government. Another respondent expressed his company’s skepticism as follows: “ very concerned that China will do as they see fit, without regard to the WTO agreement.” Other respondents referred to the uncertainty of doing business in China through observations that implementation would only extend as far as necessary in order to satisfy policies on paper often differ from actual practice, particular government agencies will make implementation difficult in China despite seeming to comply , and the pace of change and degree of compliance will likely be irregular. Company representatives’ open-ended comments regarding the challenges ahead generally focused on three common explanations for these anticipated challenges: China’s ability to implement rule of law-related reforms, China’s need to protect its domestic interests, and China’s culture and its emphasis on relationships. Several company representatives explained why they believe that China will experience the greatest challenges in implementing its rule of law- related WTO commitments. One respondent to our survey characterized China’s current “standard” approach to legislation as follows, “Pass a gray law, see how it goes, modify interpretation accordingly.” Another respondent noted that “for rule of law issues, there isn’t a structure in place and a structure won’t be in place for a long time.” Several other company representatives whom we interviewed provided numerous examples to illustrate the difficulties anticipated with other rule of law-related reforms. Other explanations focused on the inherent barriers to transparency such as China’s history and culture; the evolutionary nature of the issue (for example, several respondents said that transparency is not a common concept in China); and a tendency to draft regulations and procedures that are deliberately vague. One company representative reported that Chinese agencies are likely to provide conflicting answers to business inquiries. In addition, several companies also cited consistent application of laws as a potential difficulty. At the central government level, China is committed to implementing WTO, but all cities and provinces understand WTO differently, in the view of one U.S. corporate representative. According to another interview respondent, China is so big that even if there is a central government policy, the policy may still vary throughout the country at different levels of government. Other company representatives cited reforms to enforcement of laws and regulations relating to intellectual property rights (IPR) as another area fraught with difficulty. Respondents noted that Chinese officials have enacted reforms resulting in overall improvements to IPR protection, but that challenges continue. One company provided a specific example of a current problem that is expected to continue: “Local companies copy our product and packaging, even though these companies are operated by the local governments. Trademark registration takes at least 6 to 8 months. Even if a company wins a copyright case, you can’t get the government to enforce the copyright violation, so it’s not worth the time and money expended on filing a case.” IPR violations were also described by one company representative as a game embedded in China’s culture. Several respondents predicted that IPR would remain a problem in the years to come, because the government will not risk destabilizing the labor force by enforcing IPR laws and regulations. Company representatives also described the domestic challenges China faces in protecting its domestic interests while implementing WTO commitments. Company representatives told us that they expected WTO reforms to be part of a long-term process, but they believed that the Chinese leadership is dedicated to living up to their WTO commitments. One individual noted that any change must be considered within the broader context of China’s political and economic environment. In his words, “The final test will be how such change affects or impacts on domestic interests including the domestic economy and political interests and pressures.” Several respondents referred to the balancing act that China faces as it implements reform and dismantles state-owned enterprises while still needing to protect the labor force and maintain economic stability. One company assessed the likely result by saying that while China may comply with the letter of its commitments, the process of reforming sectors populated by state-owned enterprises will be slow in order to protect those industries and to avoid displacing large numbers of workers. One individual said that China will not forgo domestic stability to meet WTO requirements and therefore, domestic firms will continue to be favored. A number of companies noted the need to remain attentive to cultural differences in doing business with China and their expectations that implementation will be a lengthy and gradual undertaking. Several corporate representatives mentioned the continued importance of personal relationships, known as “guanxi” in China. For example, one respondent noted that in China relationships are more important than policy and policy is more important than the rule of law. Another respondent echoed this theme and encouraged patience with the Chinese and their culture. Specifically, with reference to China’s WTO commitments, he said, “Patience and understanding will reap rewards. China bashing will not.” Another company representative advised that although it might be necessary to apply pressure to ensure that Chinese officials adhere to WTO rules, it is important to do so in a manner that does not cause officials to lose face. If implemented, China’s commitments will open China’s economy and reform its trading activities, thereby expanding U.S. companies’ opportunities for investing in China and for exporting goods, agricultural products, and services to China. Understanding U.S. companies’ expectations is fundamental for policymakers to judge the degree to which the benefits of China’s WTO membership are being realized. As you have requested, over the next several years we will continue to gather the views of the business community regarding China’s implementation of its WTO commitments and report the results to you. We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional committees. We will make copies available to others on request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4128. Other GAO contacts and staff acknowledgments are listed in appendix VII. The Chairman and the Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Finance Committee and the Chairman and the Ranking Minority Member of the House Committee on Ways and Means asked us to undertake a long-term body of work relating to China’s membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the monitoring and enforcement of China’s commitments. This work includes examining through annual surveys, the experience of U.S. firms doing business in China. The 2002 GAO Survey of U.S. Companies on China-WTO Issues and related interviews discussed in this report provided an opportunity for us to assess business views and expectations for their work in China while also exploring methods for soliciting business views on an annual basis in the future. Our objectives for this initial preparatory survey were to assess U.S. businesses’ (1) views about the importance of WTO-related commitments to their business operations in China, (2) views about the anticipated effects of China’s WTO-related reforms on their businesses, and (3) opinions regarding China’s prospects for implementing these reforms. To respond to our objectives, we mailed surveys to 551 selected chief executive officers (CEO) or presidents of U.S. companies with a presence in China; conducted structured interviews in China with representatives of 48 U.S. companies, two foreign-owned companies with operations in the United States and China, and representatives of two U.S. trade associations with representative offices in China; met with representatives of other U.S. business associations in China and the United States; and considered other surveys of U.S. businesses in China. We reviewed relevant documents related to China’s WTO accession and implementation to understand the context for questions included in our survey. These documents included China’s accession agreement, referred to as the Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China. This is a set of legal documents totaling more than 800 pages that describes China’s WTO commitments. It includes the protocol itself and the accompanying Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China. These documents describe how China will adhere to WTO principles and technical guidelines. Additionally, the agreement includes schedules for how and when China will grant market access to foreign goods and services, and several other annexes. We also consulted with high-level officials from several public and private sector agencies, organizations, and firms to obtain input on question development, survey administration, and prior surveys on related issues. Specifically, we refined our survey based on consultations with U.S. government agencies and offices including the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, the Department of State, the Department of Commerce (International Trade Administration and Bureau of Economic Analysis), the Department of Agriculture, and the Congressional Research Service to discuss draft survey questions and methods of survey administration. In addition, we circulated the draft survey instrument among and sought comments from the following organizations: the American Chambers of Commerce in the People’s Republic of China, the American Farm Bureau, the Coalition of Service Industries, the Emergency Committee for American Trade, the National Association of Manufacturers, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and the U.S.-China Business Council. Finally, we participated in a feedback session with representatives of three private sector firms with a presence in China prior to pretesting our draft survey instrument. We conducted telephone pretests with representatives of five U.S. firms with a presence in China, which resulted in additional refinements to the survey instrument. In the survey, we asked U.S. businesses to identify their business activities in China based on 25 agriculture/manufacturing categories and 18 services categories. For both agriculture/manufacturing and services, businesses could also choose an “other” category that allowed them to write in a description of their business activities in China. The agriculture/manufacturing categories were based on the Department of Commerce’s North American Industry Classification System. The services categories were based on the WTO’s services classifications and the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis’s services classifications used in its reports on services trade. The categories are shown in table 9 in appendix IV. Preparation of the sample for the survey on China-WTO issues required multiple steps. Our target population was the population of U.S. companies with a presence in China. However, consultation with the agencies, organizations, and firms previously mentioned confirmed that a comprehensive list of U.S. companies with investments in China did not exist. Consequently, we collected membership directories from the American Chambers of Commerce in the People’s Republic of China (Beijing; Chengdu, Sichuan; Guangdong; and Shanghai) and contact lists of American companies in China from the Department of Commerce’s U.S. & Foreign Commercial Service’s (FCS) offices in Beijing, Chengdu, Guangzhou, Shanghai, and Shenyang. We selected the names of all U.S.- incorporated companies from these lists and entered them into a database. In cases where the nationality of incorporation was not identified, we obtained this information to the extent possible through searches of publicly available information and contacts with individual companies in the United States and China. We combined company names from these directories into a single list. A total of 3,139 company names was included in the database after we combined the names of U.S.-incorporated companies from these sources. We excluded companies located in the United States, but whose ultimate parents were incorporated outside the United States (for example, we excluded companies incorporated in the British Virgin Islands). A total of 1,945 company names remained in the database after completion of various automated steps to identify duplicate listings such as listings of multiple subsidiaries of the same parent company. Additional manual searching of the company names in the database and various business directories identified subsequent duplicate entries and further reduced the list to 1,695 company names. This list of 1,695 company names represented known U.S. companies registered with one of the five FCS offices and/or a member of one of the four American Chambers of Commerce in China with publicly available membership lists. We then selected a random sample of 1,000 company names from the combined list of 1,695 companies. We chose to select a sample of 1,000 companies based on the expectation that an unknown number of the 1,000 companies would be identified as subsidiaries of other parent companies in the sample, or subsidiaries of companies not incorporated in the United States, and/or would not have contact information that could be located using publicly available information and individual contacts with the companies. We searched a variety of sources, including the Leadership Directories’ Yellow Book, Nexis, and Internet search engines, in order to locate each company’s parent company name in the United States and/or to confirm the nationality of incorporation, locate corporate headquarters’ mailing addresses in the United States, identify the CEO or other most senior company officer’s name, and locate telephone numbers for reminder telephone calls. We also searched corporate Web sites, called companies, and looked at other business directories to locate mailing addresses, contact names, and telephone numbers. This process resulted in a final mailing list of 551 active U.S. companies with a presence in China and parent companies incorporated in the United States. The disposition of the random sample of 1,000 U.S. company names (after completion of our search for corporate contact information) is outlined in table 7. 2002, we mailed a second copy of the survey to all companies from which we had not received a survey response. Telephone reminder calls to nonrespondents began on April 17, 2002, and continued through May 24, 2002. We mailed questionnaires to company CEOs and presidents at their headquarters offices in the United States, but a range of company officials in the United States and China, including managing directors, directors of international trade, and vice presidents, among others, completed the questionnaires. Of the sample of 551 U.S. companies with a presence in China that we surveyed, responses indicated that 505 were eligible for inclusion in the sample. We received 191 usable questionnaires from eligible companies, for an overall response rate of 38 percent (191 usable responses/505 eligible sampled elements=38 percent). Because of this low response rate, we restricted our analysis to the subset of firms that participated in our survey, and we did not make estimates about the larger population of all U.S. businesses with a presence in China. The low response rate to the survey would threaten the validity of estimates made using these data, particularly if those not providing data were materially different from those who did provide data. As a result, the representativeness of weighted estimates for the population might be subject to significant bias. Because the survey results represent only responses received and are not projected to the population of U.S. companies with a presence in China, sampling errors have not been calculated. Therefore, we present survey results in this report in unweighted form, representing only those firms that participated in our study and that provided answers to the individual questions analyzed. Other potential sources of errors associated with the questionnaires, such as question misinterpretation and question nonresponse, may be present. We included steps in the development of the questionnaire, the data collection, and data analysis to reduce possible nonsampling errors. Specifically, as previously discussed, we solicited feedback on a draft of the survey from numerous internal and external parties. We pretested the questionnaire with eligible representatives of U.S. companies with a presence in China to help ensure that our questions were interpreted correctly and that the respondents were willing to provide the information required. All nonrespondents received a follow-up copy of the survey and a follow-up telephone call. All data were double-keyed during entry. We performed computer analyses to identify inconsistencies or other indications of errors and had all computer analyses reviewed by a second independent analyst. The final disposition of the 551 surveys is presented in table 8. We conducted structured interviews with representatives of 48 U.S. firms in Beijing, Guangzhou, Shanghai, and Shenzhen, China. These structured interviews gave us an opportunity to discuss survey responses in greater detail as well as to gain an understanding for the context of these responses, to determine whether responses to these questions varied between interview respondents in China and survey respondents based in the United States, to discuss the questions and survey administration issues with survey nonrespondents, and to obtain information from firms not included in the survey sample (including firms that did not appear in our random sample). Consequently, the firms that we interviewed included survey respondents and nonrespondents as well as companies not included in the mail survey sample. In addition to these criteria, our invitation list for the interview sessions also represented a broad cross section of the business sectors invested in China. We also interviewed representatives from two U.S. trade associations with offices in China in order to gain further insight into the possible range of business views. We discussed topics during the interviews that included the anticipated effects of China’s WTO membership, WTO compliance issues, and background issues to help us with our future work. Tabulations of the interview responses were independently verified. All firms that we interviewed or surveyed were assured that their responses would remain confidential. In spite of this, due to the sensitive and/or proprietary nature of the topics discussed, it is possible that the data presented in this report reflect the views of respondents only to the extent to which they felt comfortable sharing them with an independent agency of the U.S. Congress. In addition, respondents had varied knowledge of China’s WTO commitments and their application to their line of business. We did our work in Washington, D.C., and in Beijing, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and Shanghai, China. We performed our work from July 2001 to September 2002 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. The United States General Accounting Office on your company’s experience in conducting (GAO), an independent agency of Congress, business with China. The questionnaire has been asked by Congress to study China’s should take about 20 minutes to complete. World Trade Organization (WTO) Please designate one person to have overall commitments. As part of this work, we are responsibility for completing and returning surveying U.S. companies with business this questionnaire for your company and interests in China. In particular, this survey provide the following information so we can seeks to obtain U.S. business views on (1) call or e-mail that person if additional reforms in China associated with information is necessary. implementing WTO commitments, (2) expectations for China’s implementation of WTO commitments, and (3) anticipated changes to business opportunities resulting from China’s WTO membership. Your responses will allow us to present meaningful information to Congress. This survey will serve as a foundation for future GAO efforts to advise Congress about the status of China’s compliance in implementing its WTO commitments. If you would like to return the questionnaire information that could identify individual by fax, please fax to: (202)-512-2550. If you respondents. Most of the questions in the survey can be chinasurvey@gao.gov. Thank you very much for your cooperation comments you would like to add to your and assistance. QUESTIONNAIRE TO GAO) 1. Less than 100 2. What types of business relationships does 2. From 100 to 249 your company currently have with China? Enterprise (WOFE) 8. Limited Liability Company 2. Less than 50 9. Company Limited by Shares 3. From 50 to 99 10. Other (Please describe.) 4. From 100 to 249 5. From 250 to 499 11. None of the aboveGo to Question 4 6. From 500 to 1,000 7. More than 1,000 3. How long has your company engaged in a business relationship with China? (Check 8. How soon does your company expect to make a profit in China? (Check one.) N=186 1. Less than 2 years 2. From 2 to 5 years 2. Within 3 years 3. From 6 to 9 years 3. Within 4 to 5 years 4. From 10 to 20 years 4. Within 6 to 10 years 5. More than 20 years 5. Within 10 years 6. 10 years or more 4. Does your company import from China, 8. Other (Please describe.) export to China, both import from and export to China, or neither import from nor export to China? (Check one.) N=189 1. Only import from China 2. Only export to China 3. Both import from and export to 4. Neither import from nor export to ChinaGo to Question 6 9. Which of the following categories describe your business activities with China? (Check all that apply.) 1. Agriculture, forestry, fish, & hunting 27. Banking & all other financial services 3. Beverages & tobacco 29. Professional services (legal, accounting, medical, etc.) 6. Petroleum & coal 30. Computer, database, & related services 7. Chemicals including pesticides, 8. Plastic, rubber, clay, & related products 9. Wood & paper products 34. Retail / Franchises 10. Furniture & related products 35. Wholesale / Distribution 11. Textiles, apparel, accessories, & leather 37. Construction & related services 12. Machinery (except electronic) 13. Computer & peripheral 15. Audio & video equipment 40. Health-related & social services 16. Semiconductor & other electronic 41. Recreational, cultural, & sporting 17. Navigational, measuring, medical, & 42. Tourism and travel-related services 18. Manufacturing & reproducing magnetic 43. Other (Please specify.) China’s economic reforms during the past 5 any? (Check one.) N=190 years have improved the climate for U.S. businesses in China? (Check one.) N=191 1. Very positive impact 1. To a very great extent 3. Little or no impact 2. To a great extent 3. To a moderate extent 5. Very negative impact 4. To some extent 5. To little or no extent 6. Don’t know/No basis to judge ………………………………………. 6. Don’t know/No basis to judge 12. How soon do you expect you will begin to experience an overall business impact on your 14. Currently, what are your company’s goals in company, if any, from China’s WTO doing business with China? (Check all that commitments? (Check one.) N=168 1. Immediately/ Has already occurred 1. Establish a presence for the future 2. Less than one year 3. From 1 to 2 years 2. Benefit from lower labor costs in 4. From 3 to 4 years 5. From 5 to 6 years 3. Benefit from foreign investment 6. From 7 to 10 years 7. More than 10 years 4. Benefit from the cost or quality of 8. Never, no effects expected 5. Establish a regional base in China 9. Don’t know/No basis to judge 6. Expand a regional base in China 7. Establish a distribution network in 8. Expand a distribution network in 9. Increase exports to China 10. Other (Please specify.) _______________________________ 15. For each of he items listed below, how will your company’s activities be affected by the implementation of China’s WTO commitments (increase or decrease in investments, exports, etc.)? (Check one box for each item.) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 10. Number of agents or 11. Market share in China N=174 12. Competition from foreign or Chinese firms located in China 13. Other (Please describe and rate 14. Overall business activities in China N=178 Please answer the following two questions for each of the Chinese locations listed in the grid below. 19. Does your company have a facility or other presence in this location? (Check one box for each item.) 20. Do you expect that reforms will be relatively difficult for the Chinese to implement in this location? (Check one box for each item.) Do you anticipate that reforms will be relatively difficult for the Chinese to implement in this location? location? (1) (2) (1) (2) (3) 1. Beijing Q19, N=169; Q20, N=162 2. Tianjin Q19, N=136; Q20, N=120 3. Hebei Q19, N=115; Q20, N=102 4. Shanxi Q19, N=115; Q20, N=103 5. Inner Mongolia Q19, N=114; Q20, N=104 6. Liaoning (except Shenyang) Q19, N=114; Q20, N=102 7. Jilin Q19, N=114; Q20, N=102 8. Heilongjiang Q19, N=112; Q20, N=100 9. Shenyang Q19, N=119; Q20, N=105 10. Shanghai Q19, N=169; Q20, N=157 11. Jiangsu Q19, N=118; Q20, N=108 12. Fujian Q19, N=120; Q20, N=107 13. Zhejiang Q19, N=113; Q20, N=103 14. Shandong Q19, N=120; Q20, N=107 15. Jiangxi Q19, N=113; Q20, N=101 16. Anhui Q19, N=113; Q20, N=101 17. Guangdong Q19, N=147; Q20, N=131 18. Guangxi Q19, N=116; Q20, N=101 19. Hainan Q19, N=112; Q20, N=100 20. Henan Q19, N=109; Q20, N=97 21. Hubei Q19, N=116; Q20, N=102 22. Hunan Q19, N=112; Q20, N=97 23. Sichuan Q19, N=119; Q20, N=104 24. Chongqing Q19, N=117; Q20, N=104 25. Guizhou & Yunnan Q19, N=115; Q20, N=102 26. Any Western province (Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang, & Tibet) Q19, N=116; Q20, N=98 21. Some reforms will have to be made by different levels of government. Based on your company’s experience, how difficult or easy do you believe it will be to make the reforms at each of the levels of government listed below? (Check one box for each item.) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 22. How likely is your company to contact the following groups or individuals if your company encounters difficulties related to China’s implementation of its WTO commitments? (Check one box for each item.) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) agencies or officials (Please specify.): N=165 4. Chinese consultants N=178 5. U.S. trade associations representing your company’s 6. U.S. Embassy or Consulate in 7. U.S. Trade Representative N=178 8. U.S. Department of Agriculture 9. U.S. Department of Commerce 10. U.S. Department of State N=178 11. U.S. Congress N=175 12. Other (Please specify): N=23 23. Is your company providing or planning to provide assistance or training in the following areas to Chinese officials or businesses? (Check one box for each item.) (1) (2) (3) 2. General training in China’s WTO commitments N=178 3. Protection of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) N=179 4. Customs facilitation N=177 5. Revising laws & regulations to comply with WTO 6. Enforcement of contracts & judgments N=180 7. Ways to increase transparency N=182 8. Quota administration N=179 9. Testing certification N=180 10. Distribution rights N=180 11. Other (Please specify.) N=26 24. If your company has provided or is planning to provide assistance or training to Chinese officials or businesses, please describe the training in the space below and/or attach additional sheets describing the training. 25. Is there anything else you would like to tell us regarding China’s accession to the WTO, including any problems or concerns that China’s WTO commitments do not address? (Please attach additional sheets if necessary.) Thank you for your participation! U.S. General Accounting Office Structured Interview of U.S. Companies in China about China-WTO Issues Q1) Currently, what are your company’s operations in China? (Skip if company responded to survey.) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Wholly-Owned Foreign Enterprise (WOFE) 8. Limited Liability Company 9. Company Limited by Shares 10. Other (Please describe.) The effects of China’s WTO membership Q2) To what extent, if any, has China’s official membership in the WTO changed your company’s goals and expectations for future business opportunities in China? 5. No basis to judge Please describe: Q3) From your company’s perspective, what are China’s most important WTO commitments? (Prompt from list.) Why? Q4) From your company’s perspective, are there particular WTO commitments that you expect to be relatively difficult to implement? (Prompt from list.) Why? Q5) What impact do you expect that China’s WTO commitments will have on your business, if any? 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Don’t know/No basis to judge Q6) How soon do you expect you will begin to experience an overall business impact on your company, if any, from China’s WTO commitments? 1. 2. 3. From 1 to 2 years 4. From 3 to 4 years 5. From 5 to 6 years 6. From 7 to 10 years 7. 8. Never, no effects expected 9. Don’t know/No basis to judge Q7) To what extent, if any, is your company’s business strategy in China dependent on China’s compliance with its WTO commitments? 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. WTO implementation and compliance issues Q8) From your company’s perspective, in what areas have the Chinese successfully complied with their WTO commitments? Q9) From your company’s perspective, in what areas have the Chinese not complied with their WTO commitments? Q10) Is your company involved in efforts to assist the Chinese in implementation of their WTO commitments (Prompt: formal and informal training by your company, U.S. or other governments, associations, non-profit organizations, etc.)? 1. 2. If yes, please describe: Q11) How, if at all, does your business track China’s implementation of its WTO commitments (legislative and regulatory changes, practices, etc.)? 1. Day-to-day experience of doing business in China 2. 3. 4. Contacts with Chinese government officials 5. Contacts with U.S. government officials 6. GAO’s future compliance surveys Q12) Do you feel that most U.S. businesses in China have a sufficient understanding of China’s WTO commitments, as they relate to their own industries, to identify all potential compliance problems? Q13) Who is the most knowledgeable respondent in your company for questions related to China’s compliance with its WTO commitments? 1. Self or other corporate representative in China 2. Company’s government affairs representative 3. 4. Respondent varies depending on question 5. 6. Other (please describe) Q14) From your company’s perspective, how concerned are you that reporting compliance problems with WTO commitments to the U.S. government might result in retaliatory action by Chinese government entities against your company? Q15) Are there any tactics you would recommend to GAO to ensure that we receive candid responses from businesses in future surveys and interviews? Q16) Do you have any suggestions to GAO for monitoring China’s compliance with its WTO commitments? Q17) For future compliance surveys, what is the most convenient format for you and others in your company? Q18) Is there anything else you would like to tell us regarding China’s accession to the WTO, including any problems or concerns that China’s WTO commitments do not address? Thank you very much for your cooperation and assistance. Categorization of commitment areas for questions 3 & 4: Tariff & nontariff trade restrictions (increased market access) 1. Tariffs, fees, & charges 3. Other quantitative import restrictions (licensing & tendering requirements) 4. Standards, certification, registration, & testing requirements (product safety, animal, plant, & health standards, etc.) 5. Customs procedures & inspection practices 7. Market access for services Investment-related measures (liberalized foreign investment) 8. Government requirements stipulating minimum amount of production that must be exported 9. Foreign exchange restrictions (including balancing & repatriation of profits) 10. Technology transfer requirements 11. Local content requirements 12. Scope of business restrictions (types you can provide, customers you can do business with, number of transactions you can conduct, & where you can conduct business geographically) 13. Restrictions on partnerships & joint ventures (choice of partner & equity limits) 14. Establishment & employment requirements (capital, deposit, years in practice, threshold sales, forced investment, & nationality/residency requirements) 15. Trading rights (ability to import & export) 16. Number of products subject to state/designated trading 18. Subsidies for Chinese firms 20. Operation of state-owned enterprises 21. Price controls including dual and discriminatory pricing 22. Equal treatment in taxation 23. Equal treatment for access to funding (loans & equity issues), supplies, & human resources 24. Consistent application of laws, regulations, & practices (within & among national, provincial & local levels) 25. Transparency of laws, regulations, & practices (publishing and making publicly available) 26. Enforcement of contracts & judgments/Settlement of disputes in Chinese court system 27. Independence of judicial bodies 28. Equal treatment between Chinese & foreign entities under Chinese laws, regulations, & 29. Intellectual Property Rights 30. China’s application of safeguards against U.S. exports (antidumping duties and other legal actions against surges in imports) This appendix summarizes key items of interest from the survey and structured interview results in order to present a profile of the companies providing the data discussed in this report. We asked survey and structured interview respondents a series of questions to describe their business operations in China. Detailed results are also included in the reprinted survey and structured interview guide found in appendixes II and III. The 191 respondents to our mail survey included companies from a wide range of industries, locations, and types of operations in China. For example, respondents included companies with business activities in all of the agriculture, manufacturing, and services categories listed in our survey. About 69 percent of respondents identified manufacturing as their primary business activity with China, while 25 percent of respondents identified services as their primary business activity with China. Only eight respondents (about six percent) identified agriculture as their primary business activity with China. Almost 60 percent of respondents were relatively specialized and identified only one category to describe their business activities with China. Conversely, about 20 percent of respondents selected two categories to describe their business activities in China, and another 18 percent of respondents selected three or more categories to describe their company’s activities there. Table 9 displays the number of respondents included in individual categories to describe their business activities with China. Respondents reported that they carry out these business activities in facilities and offices across all of China. Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangdong were the most frequent responses to the question of where companies had a facility or other presence among all of the Chinese locations listed in our survey (listed in order of frequency of responses). In fact, only a few respondents (less than five) did not have a facility or other presence in Beijing, Guangdong, or Shanghai. About 46 percent of respondents had a facility or other presence in one or more of these three locations, while another 45 percent were located in Beijing, Shanghai, and/or Guangdong plus one or more other locations. Figure 5 shows the number of companies that reported having a facility or other presence in each location in China listed in our survey. Survey and structured interview respondents reported that they engage in a range of business relationships in their many locations throughout China. More than 50 percent of the respondents had one type of business relationship, about 25 percent had two types of business relationships, and more than 10 percent of the respondents reported three or more types of business relationships there. Representative offices, joint ventures, wholly owned foreign enterprises, and agents/distributors were the most frequently reported types of business relationships, respectively. Table 10 provides a description of each type of business relationship. Figure 6 displays the number of survey and structured interview respondents that reported each type of business relationship. More than 40 percent of the survey respondents reported that their companies both imported from and exported to China as part of these business relationships. More than one quarter of the respondents reported that they only exported to China. Almost one quarter of the respondents reported that they neither import from nor export to China. Companies that neither import from nor export to China include businesses operating representative offices and service providers, among others. Survey respondents also varied with respect to the number of employees in the United States, the number of employees in China, and the length of time that their companies had engaged in business relationships with China. Large companies, those with 500 or more employees in the United States, accounted for about 60 percent of the respondents. In contrast, only 20 percent of the respondents reported having more than 500 employees (including joint venture employees) in China. Respondents to our survey had a strong base of experience to draw on as they answered our questionnaire. Respondents reported business relationships with China ranging from less than 2 years to more than 20 years, with 6 to 9 years and 10 to 20 years as the most frequent responses. Most of the respondents had engaged in a business relationship with China for more than 5 years. In fact, more than half of large company respondents had been in China more than 10 years. Smaller companies that responded to our survey had generally maintained a presence in China for fewer years than large companies. Figure 7 shows the length of time that survey respondents had engaged in a business relationship with China. Companies with a longer history in China and agriculture/manufacturing firms reported that they were already profitable more frequently than companies with a shorter history in China or firms whose primary business activity in China focused on services. Specifically, for companies engaged in a business relationship with China for 6 to more than 20 years, about 72 percent of them reported that they were already profitable. Among companies engaged in a business relationship with China for 5 years or less, only about 43 percent of them reported that they were already profitable. Overall, about 66 percent of respondents engaged in agriculture/manufacturing reported that they were already profitable compared to less than 50 percent of the respondents only engaged in services activities. U.S. investment and trade with China have grown significantly over the past decade. U.S. companies have increased their presence in China through manufacturing and service operations, and both exports and imports of goods and services have risen dramatically, including those of small- and medium-sized companies. In addition, many U.S. companies have integrated operations in which trade occurs with their affiliates in China. Total U.S. direct investment in China reached nearly $10 billion in 2000, according to the U.S. Department of Commerce (on a historical-cost basis), making the United States the second largest source of foreign direct investment in China. This amount represents nearly 27 times the amount of U.S. foreign direct investment in China in 1990. U.S. investment in China followed a different pattern from overall U.S. investment worldwide. Figures 8 and 9 show the percentages of foreign investment worldwide and U.S. foreign direct investment by industry sector in China in 2000. The largest portion of worldwide U.S. direct investment abroad went to finance, insurance, and real estate, which accounted for 40 percent of total U.S. investment abroad. However, in China, finance, insurance, and real estate accounted for less than 10 percent of U.S. investment in 2000. In China, the largest portion of U.S. foreign direct investment went to manufacturing, which accounted for almost 60 percent of investment. Globally, manufacturing accounted for less than 30 percent of U.S. investment in 2000. This difference reflects China’s foreign direct investment policy, which aimed at guiding direct investment into targeted industries in accordance with China’s economic and industrial development strategy. The targeted economic sectors include infrastructure (such as roads) and high-technology industries. U.S. exports of goods and services have also grown significantly over the past decade. In terms of trade in goods, U.S. exports totaled almost $18 billion in 2001, making China the ninth largest market for U.S. goods. The United States was also the top export destination for China in 2001, as $102 billion in goods from China were imported here. As a result of this difference between exports and imports, the United States has had a trade deficit in goods with China since 1983. In terms of exports, U.S. small- and medium-sized companies accounted for a growing share of companies that export to China. In 1999, about 83 percent of companies that exported to China were small- and medium-sized firms compared to about 77 percent in 1992, according to the U.S. Department of Commerce. In addition, the value of these exports to China rose 85 percent from 1992 to 1999. Nonetheless, large firms still accounted for more than 70 percent of total U.S. exports to China in 1999. U.S. exports to China include products such as transport equipment, electrical machinery, office machines, oilseeds, and fruits. Figure 10 shows the distribution of U.S. exports to China in 2001 by broad industrial groupings. This distribution of U.S. exports to China is very similar to the distribution of U.S. exports to the world overall. For example, machinery, electronics, and high-tech apparatus; auto vehicles, other vehicles, and parts; and chemicals, plastics, and minerals were the three major exporting sectors, both worldwide and to China in 2001. U.S. private services exports to China have also grown over the past decade, rising from $1.6 billion in 1992 to $4.6 billion in 2000, according to the U.S. Department of Commerce. The United States maintains a services trade surplus with China, importing about $2.8 billion in services from China in 2000. China is currently a relatively small market for U.S. services exports, making up less than 2 percent of total U.S. services exports in 2000. For some multinational companies, investment and trade with China are integrated. Companies may establish a presence in China through foreign direct investment in order to supply goods and services to the Chinese market or to produce products in China for export. In 1999, the most recent year available for such data, U.S. businesses exported about $3 billion in goods to their affiliates in China, according to the U.S. Department of Commerce. This accounted for nearly one quarter of total U.S. exports to China in that year. In addition, U.S. parent companies sold nearly $500 million in services to their affiliated companies in China, accounting for about 10 percent of total U.S. cross-border sales of services to China in 2000. In order to supply services abroad, companies can either provide the service from the United States (cross-border trade) or establish affiliates in foreign countries to supply the foreign markets directly. In the case of China, U.S. businesses provided about $1.7 billion in services through local affiliates in 1999. This is more than double the amount provided in 1998 ($800 million) and has grown annually since 1993, the first year for which these figures were available. We identified and reviewed similar surveys that other organizations had conducted of U.S. companies in China to help us develop our own questionnaire and to increase our understanding of issues of interest to companies doing business in China. These surveys, administered between 1998 and 2001, were sponsored by U.S. government agencies, professional associations, and consulting firms and had response rates ranging from just under 5 percent to just under 30 percent. Table 12 summarizes the surveys we reviewed in terms of their sponsors, populations, response rates, key survey topics, WTO-related findings, and other relevant factors. These surveys cannot be directly compared to our survey, because they were administered at different points in time to different populations and asked different questions. All of the surveys discussed here addressed issues that overlapped with the items considered in our survey. However, some of them had very different purposes than our survey. In addition, all of the other surveys had low response rates, which raises major questions about generalizing their results to the full populations from which the samples were drawn. Nevertheless, we found that, at a very broad level -- such as basic expectations about WTO -- there were some similarities between the responses to the other surveys and the responses to our survey. Furthermore, the results of these surveys can sometimes provide further insights into the results that we obtained. For example, we asked a question about profitability, as did several of the other surveys. Our question asked how soon firms expected to be profitable. Other surveys asked about the profitability of investments and improvements in operating margins. While all of these questions probed the same issue, the way in which the questions were asked and the response options all differed; therefore, reporting on the other surveys’ results allows for some additional insights and perspectives. The sections that follow describe some of the main findings from these surveys in order to provide some context for our survey. Respondents to the other surveys were generally positive about the effects of China’s WTO entry. For example, more than three quarters of the respondents to the 2001 American Chamber of Commerce annual membership survey expected China’s WTO entry to have a positive impact on their companies. Respondents viewed the major positive impacts as increased transparency (85 percent), increased business scope (81 percent), and increased investment options (66 percent). Almost 90 percent of the China-based respondents to the 2001 Deloitte-Touche Tomatsu survey reported that the importance of the Chinese market will likely increase in the 3 years after China’s WTO entry. Almost two-thirds of these respondents expected their companies to expand existing product or enterprise lines in China. There are many difficulties with doing business in China, according to respondents to the other surveys. For example, almost two-thirds of the respondents to the 1998 U.S. Embassy Survey reported that problems with transparency were worse or much worse than they had expected. More than half of the respondents to this survey also reported that the cost of doing business, the problems with customs procedures, and the risks encountered in dealing with foreign exchange rates were worse than they had expected. Almost half of the respondents reported that protectionism, the enforcement of regulations, and intellectual property rights (IPR) protection were worse than expected. Similarly, at least two-thirds of the respondents to the 2001 American Chamber of Commerce annual membership survey indicated that transparency, bureaucracy, weak enforcement of laws, business scope restrictions, and protectionism negatively affected their companies. The other surveys also listed a number of potential compliance problems. More than two-thirds of the respondents to the May 2000 Department of Commerce survey foresaw difficulties with China’s ability to develop a WTO-compliant legal framework and enforce the obligations consistently throughout the country. About half of these respondents expected difficulties with or due to corruption, local/provincial implementation, IPR, transparency in practices, and/or transparency in regulations. More than three quarters of the respondents to the 2001 American Chamber of Commerce annual membership survey were concerned or very concerned that China’s WTO agreement will be ignored, that new regulations will be enacted to counter WTO commitments, and that there will be increased protectionism by the Chinese government. China’s implementation of its WTO commitments was a concern for most respondents (about 90 percent) to the 2001 Deloitte-Touche Tomatsu survey. The 2000 Department of Commerce survey asked a question on concerns about potential retaliation for reporting compliance problems to the U.S. government. About half of the survey respondents reported that they feared retaliation if they reported WTO compliance problems to U.S. government officials. Questions about profitability generally yielded results similar to those obtained in response to our survey. Almost 60 percent of the respondents to the 1998 U.S. Embassy Survey reported that they were already profitable. Slightly more than 50 percent indicated that they had attained a return on their investment. About 50 percent of the respondents to the 2001 American Chamber of Commerce annual membership survey reported that their operating margins had improved either “substantially” or “somewhat” from 2000 to 2001, while about 25 percent of respondents reported that their operating margins had deteriorated either “substantially” or “somewhat” over the same time period. About 50 percent of the respondents to the 2001 Deloitte-Touche Tomatsu survey expected their investments to be profitable in less than 3 years, while slightly less than 33 percent expected investments to be profitable in about 3 to 4 years. Two of the other surveys asked questions about respondents’ familiarity with China’s WTO commitments. Almost 66 percent of respondents to the 2000 Department of Commerce survey reported that at the time they did not understand the WTO obligations for their sector. Only about 10 percent of respondents to the 2001 Deloitte-Touche Tomatsu survey that were located in China reported that they were familiar with China’s commitments to a “great extent.” Sixty-four percent reported that they were familiar to a certain extent, while 25 percent reported that they had very little familiarity. The area in which respondents already in China most wanted to increase their familiarity was in taxation and customs commitments (74 percent), followed by marketing and distribution (59 percent), IPR and financial services (38 percent), technology transfer (33 percent), labor and benefits (31 percent), and venture capital investment (28 percent). In addition to those named above, Carolyn Black-Bagdoyan, Ming Chen, Martin De Alteriis, Matthew Helm, Simin Ho, Stanley Kostyla, Janeyu Li, Rona Mendelsohn, Suen-Yi Meng, Beverly Ross, Richard Seldin, and Timothy Wedding made key contributions to this report. The General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability of the federal government for the American people. 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Summary: China's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) on December 11, 2001, brought the world's seventh largest economy under global trade liberalizing rules. If implemented, China's commitments will open China's economy and reform its trading activities, thereby expanding U.S. companies' opportunities for investing in China and for exporting goods, agricultural products, and services to China. Understanding U.S. companies' expectations is fundamental for policymakers to judge the degree to which the benefits of China's WTO membership are being realized. GAO analyzed U.S. companies' views about (1) the importance of, (2) the anticipated effects of, and (3) prospects for China implementing its WTO commitments. GAO surveyed a random sample of 551 U.S. companies and interviewed 48 judgmentally selected companies in four cities in China. Survey results reflect responses from 191 companies--a response rate of 38 percent--and may not reflect the views of all U.S. companies with activities in China. U.S. companies that responded to the GAO survey reported that most of China's WTO commitments are important to them. These companies, which already have a presence in China, identified rule of law--related reforms as more important than other reforms to increase market access, to liberalize foreign investment measures, and to make fundamental changes to continue China's transition to a market economy. Specifically, WTO commitments in the areas of intellectual property rights; consistent application of laws, regulations, and practices; and transparency of laws, regulations, and practices emerged as the most important areas in which China made commitments. Most companies responding to GAO's survey expected that China's WTO commitments would have a positive impact on their business operations, that the impact has already begun or would begin within 2 years and that it would lead to an increase in their volume of exports to China, market share in China, and distribution of products there. However, some company representatives whom GAO interviewed in China believed that China's implementation would be incremental. Survey respondents expected that most of the WTO--related commitment areas listed in GAO's survey would be difficult for Chinese officials to implement. Companies expected the important rule of law--related commitment areas to be the most difficult commitments to carry out and had mixed expectations about implementation for different government levels and geographic areas across China. Besides rule of law--related reforms, company representatives described how they expect that China's need to protect its domestic interests and China's culture with regards to business relationships might create impediments to implementation.