The U.S. government classifies information that it determines could damage the national security of the United States if disclosed publicly. Currently, all classified information falls under two authorities, one for national defense and foreign relations, the other for nuclear weapons and technology. Beginning in 1940, classified national defense and foreign relations information has been created, handled, and safeguarded in accordance with a series of executive orders. Executive Order 12958, Classified National Security Information, as amended, is the most recent. It establishes the basis for designating National Security Information (NSI). It demarcates different security classification levels, the unauthorized disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage (Top Secret), serious damage (Secret), or damage (Confidential). It also lists the types of information that can be classified and describes how to identify and mark classified information. In 2005, about one quarter of DOE classification decisions concerned NSI. The advent of nuclear weapons during World War II, led to a new category of classified information. In 1946, the Congress enacted the Atomic Energy Act, which established a system for governing how U.S. nuclear information is created, handled, and safeguarded. Nuclear information categorized as Restricted Data (RD) or Formerly Restricted Data (FRD) is not governed by Executive Order 12958. RD is defined as data concerning the design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons; production of special nuclear material; and use of special nuclear material in the production of energy. This includes information about nuclear reactors that produce plutonium and tritium, radioactive isotope separation techniques, and the quantities of nuclear materials involved in these processes. FRD relates primarily to data regarding the military use of nuclear weapons. Examples of FRD include weapons stockpile data, weapon yields, the locations of nuclear weapons, and data about weapons safety and storage. Like NSI, classified nuclear information also has three classification levels: Top Secret, Secret, or Confidential. Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information (NNPI) is an exceptional category, which may fall under either of the two classification authorities. NNPI is deemed by both DOE and the Department of Defense (DOD) to be sufficiently sensitive to merit special protections and may be classified under the Atomic Energy Act or Executive Order 12958, depending on its subject and details. Two categories of nuclear information can be withheld from the public without being classified: Unclassified NNPI and Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information (UCNI). Unclassified NNPI and UCNI are information the government considers sufficiently sensitive to withhold from public release, but not so sensitive as to warrant designation as RD, FRD, or NSI. UCNI is a category created under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act, which enables DOE officials to share information with state and local law enforcement and emergency services personnel who, while lacking security clearances, may have a legitimate need to know operational details about, for example, planned shipments of special nuclear materials. According to the current executive order, documents containing only NSI must be “portion marked,” for instance, classified paragraph-by-paragraph. For example, a document containing NSI may have paragraphs classified as Top Secret, Secret, or Confidential, along with others that are unclassified. However, documents containing any RD or FRD are classified in their entirety at the level of the most sensitive information in the document. Portion marking of documents containing RD and FRD is not required by the Atomic Energy Act and is discouraged by DOE policy. Executive Order 12958, as amended, states that NSI shall be declassified as soon as it no longer meets the standards for classification. The point at which information is to be declassified is set when the decision is made to classify it, and it is linked to an event, such as a completed mission, or to a period of time. Classified records that are older than 25 years and have permanent historical value are automatically declassified unless an exemption is granted because their contents still remain sensitive and their release could harm national security. Agencies have adopted processes to facilitate declassification in compliance with the executive order. Unlike documents containing NSI, documents containing RD or FRD are not reviewed automatically for possible declassification. The reason for this is that these two categories are mostly scientific and technical and may not become less sensitive with the passage of time. In fact, such data may be useful to nations and terrorist groups that are trying to build nuclear weapons. At a time of increased concern about nuclear proliferation, some of the oldest and simplest nuclear technology can be useful for making weapons of mass destruction. For this reason, documents about nuclear weapons and technologies from the 1940s and 1950s remain especially sensitive and worthy of protection. DOE implements the executive order and classification statutes by issuing departmental regulations, directives, and extensive use of classification guides. DOE’s directive, Identifying Classified Information, is the department’s comprehensive guide to classifying, declassifying, marking, and protecting information, documents, and material. The directive also establishes policies and procedures, such as departmentwide training and certification requirements for staff authorized to classify or declassify information, and for periodic self-assessments. Classification guides are manuals specifying precisely which DOE information must be classified, how it should be categorized (NSI, RD, or FRD), and at what level (Top Secret, Secret, or Confidential) it should be protected. DOE has a detailed and comprehensive set of classification guides that are integral to efficient functioning of the department’s classification activities. The department limits the use of “source documents” for the purpose of making classification decisions. Source documents may be used to classify documents containing NSI, but only when there is no guidance available. For example, if a DOE classifier is evaluating a new document with the same information found in another document already classified as Secret, then this new document may also be classified as Secret. RD and FRD documents can never be used as source documents. DOE’s Office of Classification’s systematic training, comprehensive guidance, and rigorous oversight programs had a largely successful history of ensuring that information was classified and declassified according to established criteria. DOE’s training requirements and classification guidance are essential internal controls that provide a strong framework for minimizing the risk of misclassification. However, since responsibility for classification oversight was shifted from the Office of Classification to the Office of Security Evaluations in October 2005, the pace of oversight was interrupted—creating uncertainty about how oversight will be performed and whether it will continue to be effective. Systematic training requirements are an important element of DOE’s framework for maximizing the proper classification of documents. Only staff that have successfully completed training are authorized to classify or declassify documents. Staff must be recertified as classifiers and/or declassifiers every 3 years, in order to retain their authority. Staff are typically trained as “derivative classifiers” and, in some cases, as “derivative declassifiers” as well. They are limited in their authority to those areas in which they have special knowledge and expertise and are only authorized to classify (or declassify) documents “derivatively”—that is, only if the document in question contains information a DOE or other U.S. government agency classification guide specifically requires be classified or declassified. There are currently about 4,600 derivative classifiers in DOE, nearly all of whom do classification work only as a collateral duty. For example, most derivative classifiers in DOE are scientists, engineers, or other technically trained people who work in programs or areas involving classified information that need staff who can properly classify the documents these programs produce. Relatively few DOE staff (just 215 as of May 2006) are authorized to declassify documents. Because a declassified document may become publicly available, derivative declassifiers are among the most experienced derivative classifiers. Only original classifiers, of which there are currently 25 throughout the DOE complex, are authorized to classify previously unclassified information. All DOE original classifiers are either very senior, full-time classification professionals, such as the director and deputy director of the Office of Classification, or one of the department’s top-level political appointees, such as the Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration. DOE has developed an extensive collection of more than 300 classification guides, or manuals, specifying precisely which DOE information must be classified, how it should be categorized, and at what level (Top Secret, Secret, or Confidential) it should be protected. The Office of Classification oversees the regular updating of all classification guides used in DOE and must ultimately approve the use of every guide. DOE prohibits classification decisions based on source documents for documents containing RD and FRD and permits their use only when no guidance is available for documents containing NSI from other federal agencies. The Information Security Oversight Office considers the use of classification guides to be a best practice because they provide a singular, authoritative voice that is less open to individual interpretation or confusion than source documents and so using these guides are less likely to result in errors. According to the Information Security Oversight Office, DOE’s use of classification guides is among the most extensive in the federal government. Classification guides are integral to the efficient functioning of the department’s classification program. Some classification guides are more general in nature, such as those dealing with physical security, and are used widely throughout DOE. Others, known as “local guides,” are used at a few or even a single site because they provide guidance specific to a single DOE program or project. For example, a classification guide used by contractors working on a decontamination and clean-up project at a site in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, provides specific guidance on nuclear waste and storage unique to this site. DOE has also implemented an extensive and rigorous oversight program. From 2000 through 2005, the Office of Classification and its predecessor offices have conducted on-site inspections of classification activities at 34 DOE field offices, national laboratories, and weapons manufacturing facilities. In calendar years 2004 and 2005, the Office of Classification conducted an average of 10 oversight inspections a year. Classification activities were evaluated in depth in eight different functional areas, including site-provided classification training, self-assessment efforts, and overall senior management support for (and awareness of) classification activities. To this end, before a team of 3 to 10 Office of Classification inspectors arrived, it would send the site’s classification officer a “data call” requesting detailed and specific answers to dozens of questions about the procedures and practices of the site’s classification program. For example, to ascertain how effectively classification guidance was being used, requests were made for information about what guidance was in use at the site; the names of authorized classifiers who had guides; whether there were any local (site-specific) guides in use, and if so, when were they last validated by Office of Classification officials. Similarly detailed requests for information were requested about each of the other classification program elements. Having such detailed information in hand prior to arrival at the site allowed inspection teams to undertake a comprehensive evaluation in just 2 to 5 days because they could focus more on validating the information provided in the data call than on undertaking the time-consuming task of gathering data themselves. The Office of Classification staff’s expertise in classification matters is augmented with subject area experts. For example, to ensure the inspection team had adequate expertise to make valid assessments of classification decisions about nuclear weapons design at Los Alamos National Laboratory, a staff member with nuclear weapons design experience was assigned to the team. Moreover, in many cases, members of the inspection team had more than 20 years of classification experience. As a result of the extensive information provided by the data call, and the level of experience of the inspection team, generally the team submitted a draft inspection report to the site’s classification officer before leaving. It is DOE policy that any findings requiring immediate correction resulted in the creation of a corrective action plan, which had to be completed within 60 days of the inspection. DOE officials told us progress on implementing corrective action plans was reported to the Office of Classification quarterly. In September 2005, the Information Security Oversight Office reviewed DOE’s classification program just prior to the shift in responsibility for classification oversight. Officials at the Information Security Oversight Office found DOE’s program to be much better than the average federal agency. They singled out DOE’s training program and extensive use of classification guidance as especially impressive. One official called DOE’s program for ensuring that all staff authorized to classify and declassify documents were recertified every 3 years “outstanding.” Another official called DOE’s extensive use of classification guides a “best practice.” Overall, Information Security Oversight Office officials were impressed with DOE’s classification program, noting that robust oversight is a very important part of an effective program for managing classified information. Since responsibility for classification oversight was shifted from the Office of Classification to the Office of Security Evaluations, the pace of oversight was interrupted—creating uncertainty about how oversight will be performed and whether it will continue to be effective. The Office of Security Evaluations is the DOE office responsible primarily for the oversight of physical security at DOE sites, with a special emphasis on Category 1 sites (sites containing special nuclear materials). Since October 2005, the Office of Security Evaluations has completed one inspection of two offices at the Pantex Site in Texas and another inspection of four offices at the Savannah River Site is under way. In April 2006, Office of Security Evaluations officials provided us plans for performing additional oversight inspections for the remainder of 2006. These plans included inspections evaluating classification activity at eight DOE offices at three additional sites. Classification oversight has been incorporated into larger oversight efforts on physical security at DOE sites. Classification oversight ceased from October 2005 until February 2006 when the Office of Security Evaluations began its inspection of two offices at the Pantex Plant, a nuclear weapons manufacturing facility in Texas. Before the shift in responsibility, DOE officials did not conduct any risk assessment of the likely effects on the classification oversight program of the shift for three reasons: (1) they did not consider the shift to be a significant organizational or management challenge because the upper- level management remained the same; (2) the Office of Security Evaluations would continue to draw on many of the same experienced Office of Classification staff who have been performing classification oversight for many years; and (3) responsibility for other key internal controls for managing classification activities, namely training and guidance, would remain with the Office of Classification. The director of the Office of Security Evaluations and the acting deputy director of the Office of Classification told us that the goal of shifting responsibility for classification oversight from one office to the other was to consolidate all oversight functions in one area. The idea arose in the course of a periodic reassessment of the organization of the Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance—the larger organization of which these and several other offices are part—and a judgment by senior DOE management that one group should do all the oversight. The Office of Security Evaluations seemed the most logical place to locate classification oversight, according to senior DOE management. DOE officials also told us that the Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance was not the only part of DOE affected by this drive to consolidate functions in single offices, and there was no intent to downgrade oversight. According to the Director of the Office of Security Evaluations, the procedures for conducting future oversight are still evolving—including the numbers of sites to be inspected and the depth of analysis to be performed. The office currently plans to evaluate classification activities at 14 offices within five DOE sites in calendar year 2006, integrating classification oversight into its regularly scheduled inspections of Category 1 sites with inspections at a few non-Category 1 sites. The director of the Office of Security Evaluations said the goal is to visit each of DOE’s 10 Category 1 sites every 2 years. However, this schedule has been recently delayed as the office has been tasked by senior DOE management to perform security reviews in other areas of DOE operations. Now that classification oversight is a component within the much larger oversight agenda of the Office of Security Evaluations—one focused on the physical security of DOE’s most sensitive sites—it raises uncertainty about whether classification oversight will have a diminished priority than when it was solely an Office of Classification responsibility. However, if all of the visits planned for 2006 are completed, then the Office of Security Evaluations will be conducting oversight at a pace similar to what was done prior to October 2005. As classification oversight is now the responsibility of the Office of Security Evaluations—and will be reported as one component in a much larger report on the overall security of DOE sites—it is unclear if the new format will have the same depth of analysis or be as comprehensive, detailed, and useful as the format used by the Office of Classification. The Office of Security Evaluations reports are bigger and have a much higher profile with senior DOE management than reports by the Office of Classification. As such, they are written to convey information to a broader and less technically oriented audience. Each element of security is rated as “effective performance” (green), “needs improvement” (yellow), or “significant weakness” (red). To accommodate this shift, the format for reporting the results of inspections of classification activities has changed to fit into this larger, well-established Office of Security Evaluations reporting format. These reports have relatively brief executive summaries but are supplemented by several appendixes, one for each component of site security. The executive summary includes the highlights of the inspection, an overall evaluation of security at the site, the formal findings (that is, deficiencies uncovered), and a brief scope and methodology section (which includes a listing of the personnel participating in the inspection). It is uncertain if the results of the inspection of classification activities will be included in the executive summary, or if this depends on whether the results are particularly noteworthy. Not all aspects of an inspection will be mentioned in the summary section, and most of what is reported on classification and other topics will be in their respective appendixes. The Office of Security Evaluation’s full report will be classified because it will contain information on the vulnerabilities in site security. However, according to the Office’s director, the appendix on classification will likely be unclassified. Since the shift in responsibility, the Office of Security Evaluations has completed one classification inspection of two offices at the Pantex Site; and the new procedures for oversight are still evolving. It is uncertain whether the reporting on classification oversight will be as detailed, specific, and, ultimately, as useful as it was prior to the October 2005 shift in responsibility. While the overall reporting format for the Office of Security Evaluations reports is firmly in place, the director of the office told us that the details of how to assess the effectiveness of the classification program is still evolving. Initially, the Office of Security Evaluations plans to gather similarly detailed and comprehensive information from the sites it inspects using the same “data call” as the Office of Classification; the data call requests detailed and specific answers to dozens of questions about the procedures and practices of the site’s classification program. The director of the Office of Security Evaluations stressed—and the deputy director of the Office of Classification agreed—that they plan to have the information reported in the classification appendix written in language similar to that in Office of Classification reports, and findings and recommendations for improvement will be conveyed in language no less specific and “actionable” than in the previous reports. Nonetheless, until the Office of Security Evaluations performs several classification inspections and establishes its own record of accomplishment in overseeing DOE classification activities, it is not clear whether oversight will be as effective as it was before the shift in responsibility. Without continued effectiveness, DOE classification activities could become less reliable and more prone to misclassification. On the basis of reviews of over 12,000 classified documents totaling nearly a quarter million pages at 34 sites between 2000 and 2005, DOE officials have found that very few documents are misclassified. Office of Classification inspectors found 20 documents had been misclassified, an error rate of about one-sixth of 1 percent. At more than two-thirds of the sites (25 of 34) inspectors found no classification errors. The most misclassified documents that these inspectors found at any site were five, at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in May 2005. Four of these documents were classified, but not at the proper level or category. A fifth document containing nuclear weapons information should have been classified but was unclassified and found in the laboratory’s technical library. (See table 1.) Most misclassified documents remained classified, just not at the appropriate level or category. Of greater concern would be documents that should be classified but mistakenly are not. When mistakenly not classified, such documents may end up in libraries or on DOE Web sites where they could reveal sensitive RD and FRD to the public. When documents are not classified but should be, these errors can only be uncovered through some form of oversight, such as the document reviews that occurred in preparation for, and during, Office of Classification inspections. For example, during an inspection at the Sandia National Laboratories in March 2005, Office of Classification inspectors reviewed more than 170 unclassified documents in the laboratory’s holdings and found 2 documents that contained classified information. Without systematic oversight, these kinds of errors are unlikely to be discovered and corrected. While DOE’s extensive document reviews provided depth and rigor to its oversight inspections, two notable shortcomings in this process were (1) the inconsistent way that inspectors gained access to the many documents they would review and (2) the failure to adequately disclose these procedures in their reports. At the six DOE sites we visited, the procedures that the Office of Classification inspection teams used to obtain documents varied widely. For example, at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, inspectors were granted unfettered access to any storage vault and library, and they themselves chose the documents for review. Once in the vault or library, inspectors used the document indexes or interviewed the librarians to decide which documents and topics were recently classified or declassified. The inspectors requested the documents of most interest, or they browsed in the collection and pulled files randomly from the shelves. By contrast, at the NNSA Service Center in Albuquerque, site officials selected documents from several different locations, and then inspectors chose from among them. By not being able to select their own samples, Office of Classification inspectors limited their independence—which could possibly undermine the credibility of their findings. Because DOE does not have a complete inventory of its classified documents, it cannot select a strictly random sample. Nonetheless, DOE officials acknowledged they could improve their selection procedures to make them more consistent and random. Furthermore, in the 34 inspection reports we analyzed, Office of Classification inspectors did not disclose to the reader key facts about how information was gathered, what limitations they agreed to, and how this affected their findings. According to Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, independent inspections should properly document and report on the processes they use in their evaluations. The Office of Classification’s reports provided no detail about how documents were chosen. Such detail would increase public confidence that DOE’s classification oversight is transparent and robust. Since the 1950s, the DOE’s Office of Classification and its predecessor organizations have developed strong systems of internal controls for managing classified information. At the core of these systems are (1) DOE’s requirement that staff authorized to classify documents must complete training and be periodically recertified, (2) its comprehensive guidance, and (3) its program of regular and rigorous oversight to ensure that DOE sites are following agency classification policies. These training, guidance, and oversight programs have provided a proven framework that has contributed to DOE’s success in managing classified information. However, the recent reduction in oversight activity following a shift in responsibilities raises questions about whether this framework will continue to be as strong. If the oversight inspections planned for the remainder of 2006 are effectively completed, it will demonstrate resumption in the pace of oversight conducted prior to October 2005. However, if these inspections are not completed, or are not as comprehensive, then the extent and depth of oversight will be diminished and may result in DOE classification activities becoming less reliable and more prone to misclassification. In addition, by implementing more random selection procedures for identifying classified documents to review—and by disclosing these procedures clearly in their reports—DOE has the opportunity to assure both itself and the public that its oversight is, indeed, effective. DOE is the agency most responsible for safeguarding the nation’s nuclear secrets, and its classification and declassification procedures are especially vital to national security. At a time when risks of nuclear proliferation are increasing, it is imperative that DOE build on its past successes in order to continue to be effective. To help ensure that DOE classification activities remain effective and result in documents that are classified and declassified according to established criteria, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy take the following three actions: ensure that the classified information oversight program provides oversight to a similar number of DOE sites, as it did before October 2005, and provides a similar depth of analysis; strengthen the review of classified documents by applying selection procedures that more randomly identify documents for review; and disclose the selection procedures used for documents for review in future classification inspection reports. In commenting on the draft of this report, DOE agreed with the findings and recommendations of the report. DOE was pleased that its classification program is being recognized as particularly effective in protecting information vital to national security. However, while DOE agreed with our recommendation that steps be taken to ensure that the classification oversight program provide oversight to a similar number of sites at a similar depth of analysis, it asserted that it is in fact already taking the needed actions and has, overall, “retained the effective framework previously established by the Office of Classification.” Although we are encouraged by DOE’s efforts, until the agency establishes a record of accomplishment under the new organizational structure, it will not be clear whether oversight will be as effective as it has been in the past. DOE also concurred with our recommendations to strengthen the review of classified documents by applying selection procedures that more randomly identify documents for review and disclose these procedures in future reports and outlined steps it will take to implement these two recommendations. Comments from DOE’s Director, Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance are reprinted in appendix II. DOE also provided technical comments, which we incorporated into the report as appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Energy; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and interested congressional committees. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff that made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix III. The Department of Energy (DOE) classifies and declassifies information under authorities granted by the Atomic Energy Act, first passed in 1946, and under presidential executive orders governing national security information. These authorities and corresponding implementing directives provide for three classification levels: Top Secret, Secret, and Confidential. DOE uses three categories to identify the different types of classified information: Restricted Data, Formerly Restricted Data, and National Security Information. In addition to classified information, certain types of unclassified information are sensitive and require control to prevent public release. The markings used and the controls in place depend on the statutory basis of the unclassified control system and vary in DOE, from Official Use Only information to Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information. At a practical level, unclassified information is controlled or not controlled, depending on its sensitivity, any overriding public interest requiring release, or operational considerations involving the benefit of control versus the cost of control (for example, it must be shared with uncleared state or local government officials). The information presented below is a summary of the various levels and categories used by DOE to classify and control information. All classified information and documents are classified at one of three levels, listed in descending order of sensitivity: Top Secret (TS), Secret (S), or Confidential (C). Classified under authority of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954, as amended. Defined in the AEA as all data concerning: the design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons; and the production of special nuclear material. Examples include: (1) Production reactors (2) Isotope separation (gaseous diffusion, gas centrifuge, laser isotope separation). The use of special nuclear materials in the production of energy. Examples include: (1) naval reactors, and (2) space power reactors. But not information declassified or removed from the RD category. Documents are not portion marked–an entire document is classified at the level of the most sensitive information contained in the document. Classified under authority of the AEA of 1954, as amended. Information that has been removed from the RD category because DOE and the Department of Defense have jointly determined that the information (1) now relates primarily to the military utilization of atomic weapons and (2) can be adequately safeguarded as defense information. Examples include: weapon stockpile quantities, weapons safety and storage, weapon yields, and weapon locations. Documents are not portion marked. Classified under the authority of Executive Order 12958, as amended. Information that pertains to the national defense or foreign relations of the United States and classified in accordance with the current executive order as Top Secret, Secret, or Confidential. NSI documents may be classified up to a 25 year limit unless containing information that has been approved for exemption from declassification under Executive Order 12958, as amended, and based on an approved declassification guide. For example, DOE treats certain nuclear-related information that is not RD or FRD, such as security measures for nuclear facilities, as exempt from declassification until such facilities are no longer in use. Many of these facilities have been in use for over 50 years. Documents are portion marked by paragraph. Confidential Foreign Government Information – Modified Handling Authorized (C/FGI-MOD) An agency must safeguard foreign government information under standards providing a degree of protection at least equivalent to that required by the government or international organization that furnished the information. If the FGI requires a level of protection lower than that for Confidential, the United States can, under Executive Order 12958 section 4.1(h), classify and protect it as C/FGI-MOD, which provides protection and handling instructions similar to that provided to United States Official Use Only. Before C/FGI-MOD was created, the only legal way for such information to be controlled was at the Confidential level, which resulted in over-protection, increased security cost, and operational complexity. Each classified document must be marked to show its classification level (and classification category if RD or FRD), who classified it, the basis for the classification, and the duration of classification (if NSI). Lack of a category marking indicates the classified document is NSI. A document containing only NSI must be portion marked. An RD document, for example, will be marked TSRD (Top Secret Restricted Data), showing the classification level and category. RD documents are similarly marked SRD (Secret Restricted Data), or CRD (Confidential Restricted Data). A document should never simply be marked “RD.” The same rules apply to FRD information (TSFRD, SFRD, and CFRD). A classified document that is not RD or FRD is an NSI document. NSI documents are marked as TSNSI (Top Secret National Security Information), SNSI (Secret National Security Information), or CNSI (Confidential National Security Information); or simply Top Secret, Secret, or Confidential. Controlled under authority of the AEA of 1954, as amended. the design of nuclear material production facilities or utilization facilities; security measures for protecting such facilities, nuclear material contained in such facilities, or nuclear material in transit; The design, manufacture, or utilization of any atomic weapon or component if it has been declassified or removed from the RD category. UCNI markings – A document containing UCNI must be marked at the top and bottom of each page with “Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information” or “UCNI” and include, on the front of the document, a marking that identifies the Reviewing Official making the determination, the date of the determination, and the guidance used. Unclassified information that may be exempt from public disclosure under provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) that is not otherwise subjected to a formally implemented control system. A decision to control information as OUO does not mean that such information is automatically exempt from disclosure if requested under the FOIA. That determination is made by a FOIA Authorizing Official only when the document is requested. The OUO marking merely serves as a warning that the document reviewer considers the information to be sensitive and indicates why by including on the document the FOIA exemption that the document reviewer thinks applies. OUO markings – Documents determined to contain OUO information are and when they do, they state which FOIA exemption applies. This classification guide is then cited on the OUO stamp.) NNPI concerns all classified and controlled unclassified information related to the naval nuclear propulsion program. This marking supplements existing classification and control systems and is not a separate category outside of the authorities provided under the AEA or Executive Order 12958 for, as an example, classified NNPI. The use of “NNPI” is an additional marking applied to some of the previously defined categories of information to indicate additional controls for protection or access. Classified under the authority of the AEA of 1954, as amended, or Executive Order 12958, as amended. All classified information concerning the design, arrangement, development, manufacture, testing, operation, administration, training, maintenance, and repair of propulsion plants of naval nuclear powered ships and prototypes, including associated shipboard and shore-based nuclear support facilities. Markings can be RD or NSI. C-NNPI documents containing RD information are marked TSRD, SRD, or CRD. C-NNPI NSI documents are typically marked Secret NOFORN (“not Documents containing information classified under the authority of the AEA are not portion marked. Controlled in accordance with Naval Sea Systems Command Instruction C5511.32B and protected pursuant to export control requirements and statutes. All unclassified but controlled information concerning the design, arrangement, development, manufacture, testing, operation, administration, training, maintenance, and repair of propulsion plants of naval nuclear powered ships and prototypes, including associated shipboard and shore-based nuclear support facilities. U-NNPI documents will be marked and controlled as NOFORN (not releasable to foreign nationals). In addition, Nancy Crothers, Robin Eddington, Doreen Feldman, William Lanouette, Greg Marchand, Terry Richardson, Kevin Tarmann, and Ned Woodward made significant contributions to this report.

Summary: In recent years, the Congress has become increasingly concerned that federal agencies are misclassifying information. Classified information is material containing national defense or foreign policy information determined by the U.S. government to require protection for reasons of national security. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which (1) DOE's training, guidance, and oversight ensure that information is classified and declassified according to established criteria and (2) DOE has found documents to be misclassified. DOE's Office of Classification's systematic training, comprehensive guidance, and rigorous oversight programs had a largely successful history of ensuring that information was classified and declassified according to established criteria. However, an October 2005 shift in responsibility for classification oversight to the Office of Security Evaluations has created uncertainty about whether a high level of performance in oversight will be sustained. Specifically, prior to this shift, the Office of Classification had performed 34 inspections of classification programs at DOE sites since 2000. These inspections reviewed whether DOE sites complied with agency classification policies and procedures. After the October 2005 shift, however, the pace of this oversight was interrupted as classification oversight activities ceased until February 2006. So far in 2006, one classification oversight report has been completed for two offices at DOE's Pantex Site in Texas, and work on a second report is under way at four offices at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina. More oversight inspections evaluating classification activity at eight DOE offices are planned for the remainder of 2006. In addition, according to the Director of the Office of Security Evaluations, the procedures for conducting future oversight are still evolving--including the numbers of sites to be inspected and the depth of analysis to be performed. If the oversight inspections planned for the remainder of 2006 are completed, it will demonstrate resumption in the pace of oversight conducted prior to October 2005. However, if these inspections are not completed, or are not as comprehensive as in the past, the extent and depth of oversight will be diminished and may result in DOE classification activities becoming less reliable and more prone to misclassification. On the basis of reviews of classified documents performed during its 34 oversight inspections, the Office of Classification believes that very few of DOE's documents had been misclassified. The department's review of more than 12,000 documents between 2000 and 2005 uncovered 20 documents that had been misclassified--less than one-sixth of 1 percent. DOE officials believe that its misclassification rate is reasonable given the large volume of documents processed. Most misclassified documents remained classified, just not at the appropriate level or category. Of greater concern are the several documents that should have been classified but mistakenly were not. When mistakenly not classified, such documents may end up in libraries or on DOE Web sites where they could reveal classified information to the public. The only notable shortcomings we identified in these inspections were the inconsistent way the Office of Classification teams selected the classified documents for review and a failure to adequately disclose these procedures in their reports. Inspection teams had unfettered access when selecting documents to review at some sites, but at others they only reviewed documents from collections preselected by site officials. Office of Classification reports do not disclose how documents were selected for review.