Since 2003, NRC has worked with agreement states and others to identify the radioactive materials that pose the greatest risk of being used to make an RDD, established additional security measures for these materials, and taken steps to ensure the increased security measures are effectively implemented. However, NRC has not successfully corrected the weaknesses in its radioactive materials licensing processes. Further, NRC has taken limited steps to determine how to effectively mitigate the potential psychological effects of an RDD. Finally, NRC has not yet decided whether certain radioactive sources need stronger licensing requirements. An NRC and DOE working group had established a tentative list of radioactive materials under NRC license and DOE control and the quantities at which they pose the greatest risk. However, according to agreement states representatives, the agreement states were not directly involved in creating this list prior to the release of our August 2003 report. Our report recommended that the Chairman of NRC collaborate with the agreement states on this list, which NRC did before the list was finalized in August 2005. Specifically, in July 2002, the chairman of the NRC and the Secretary of Energy established a working group to identify radioactive materials according to the relative risk they posed of being used by terrorists to make an RDD. The working group assessed the relative hazards of various radioactive isotopes, taking into consideration both the nature of the materials (their potential threat to human health) and their attractiveness for use in an RDD (their half-lives, the quantities in which such materials are typically found, the level of protection typically surrounding them, and the ease with which they might be dispersed). The working group completed its initial study in November 2002 and issued a final report in May 2003. During this period, NRC, DOE, and other U.S. government entities were also negotiating with other countries under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to create a single international threshold quantity at which nations adopting IAEA’s Code of Conduct would agree to take measures to more closely track and consider increased security measures to protect radionuclides of concern. NRC also consulted with agreement states on this issue. In the end, it was agreed in September 2003 that the threshold for increased concern—that is, the quantities at which various radionuclides become subject to more stringent security—should be category 2 quantities. After our August 2003 recommendation that NRC consult with the agreement states on this list, NRC officials formally provided it to agreement state officials for their review. The agreement states agreed with the list and the thresholds developed by the IAEA and participating countries (see table 1). NRC also implemented our recommendations to (1) determine how agreement state and nonagreement state officials could participate in the development and implementation of additional security measures for radionuclides of concern and (2) include performance criteria for assessing NRC’s and agreement states’ implementation of these additional security requirements in periodic evaluations of both NRC and agreement state effectiveness. First, NRC worked with agreement states to devise and implement several additional security measures—called “increased controls” —to protect category 2 or greater quantities of radionuclides of concern from theft, diversion, and other unauthorized access. In late 2003, NRC and state officials, some of whom were also officers of the Organization of Agreement States or Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors (an organization that includes both agreement and nonagreement states), established several working groups to facilitate the participation of state officials and their organizations in developing and implementing additional security measures for certain radioactive sources and materials. Several state officials, including a former chair of the Organization of Agreement States (OAS), told us that these working groups functioned in a highly collaborative and deliberative manner. Another OAS official told us that the fact that so many agreement state officials have been willing to volunteer to serve in working groups, and that NRC has been willing to provide some financial support for state officials’ involvement, is a testament to the importance that both NRC and agreement states placed on federal-state collaboration. NRC and agreement states officially issued requirements for the increased controls in December 2005. The purposes of the increased controls, according to NRC, are to reduce the risk of unauthorized use of radioactive materials and to aid the prompt detection and assessment of and response to any such attempt. Increased controls include such measures as 24-hour surveillance, multiple layers of physical security, and measures to ensure the immediate notification of local law enforcement agencies in the event of any actual or suspected breach in security. For example, increased controls on medical sources require some sources to be kept in heavily secured rooms with limited access (see fig. 1). According to NRC, all increased controls were to be fully implemented by June 2006. Some licensees with the highest-risk sources were inspected by June 2007, while all increased controls must be fully inspected by June 2009. NRC regional offices and agreement state regulators are also currently in the process of reaching out to licensees to help ensure they will be able to meet the June 2009 deadline and have already performed preliminary increased controls inspections on approximately 1,100 of the 1,700 licensees subject to the new controls (see table 2). Agreement state officials told us that they have already prevented at least one attempted theft of an industrial radiography source typically used to inspect metal parts and welds for defects. The would-be thieves broke in to an area protected by an alarm system that had been recently installed by the licensee to comply with the new requirement mandating the capacity to monitor, detect, and respond quickly with local law enforcement in the event of any unauthorized access. This new alarm system immediately notified local law enforcement authorities, who responded in time to prevent the criminals from obtaining an iridium-192 radiography source—a potent gamma emitter that could cause extensive radiation burns if handled improperly. NRC and agreement states have also collaborated in establishing criteria for assessing the implementation of increased controls and integrated these criteria into NRC’s existing oversight program, the Integrated Materials Performance Evaluation Program (IMPEP). In March 2006, NRC established performance criteria devised in working groups with agreement state officials for evaluating the implementation of increased controls. Under each of the existing performance categories—staffing and training, the technical quality of inspections, licensing actions, incident and allegation activities, and the overall status of the materials inspection program—NRC added additional performance criteria. For example, NRC regional and agreement state programs are now evaluated on whether they have established a system to readily identify new licensees that should be subject to increased controls and to determine whether sensitive licensee information is being securely maintained. Although not all NRC regional and agreement states’ radioactive materials programs have been evaluated on their implementation of the increased controls, 22 of the 35 agreement states and one of the three NRC regional offices with responsibilities for regulating such materials have to date had aspects of their implementation of increased controls at least partially assessed in this manner. Moreover, agreement state officials familiar with this revised performance evaluation process told us that the new criteria were effective and valid measures of the implementation of the increased controls. To increase the security of radioactive materials and sealed sources and better ensure that they are used as intended, we recommended in 2003 that NRC modify its process for issuing specific licenses to ensure that such sources cannot be purchased before NRC has verified, through inspection or other means, that the materials and sources will be used as intended. In December 2006, NRC issued new prelicensing guidance to help NRC and agreement state licensing officials to make a risk-based determination of whether an applicant for a license to possess an amount of radioactive material or source sufficient to require a specific (rather than a general) license should have to undergo some sort of verification before being granted a license. This guidance asked two screening questions: (1) whether “the applicant is an entity or a licensee transferring control to an entity that has never had a license or is unknown” and (2) whether the applicant is seeking category 2 or greater quantities of one or more of the 16 radionuclides of concern and has not already been licensed to possess materials subject to a security order or additional requirements for increased controls. If the applicant answers yes to either question, according to the guidance, the license examiner should consider whether it is necessary to take any of the steps on a 12-item checklist. For example, one checklist item suggests doing an Internet search on the name of the applicant; another suggests conducting a site visit to the stated place of business. In spring 2007, however, our investigators, posed as first-time radioactive materials license applicants for devices containing sources large enough to require specific licenses, and therefore subject to the extra scrutiny from the 12-item checklist, they were able to obtain a materials license from NRC, even though an Internet search or a prelicensing site visit would have revealed the application to be based on false claims. After being notified of the results of our undercover investigation in June, NRC stopped issuing specific licenses for radioactive materials and sources until it could develop and issue “supplemental interim prelicensing guidance.” This supplemental guidance, issued 12 days after NRC stopped issuing specific licenses, requires a first-time licensee to pass a site visit inspection at the applicant’s place of business or appear at an NRC regional office for a face-to-face meeting with a license application reviewer and satisfy this official that the radioactive materials will be used as intended. Applicants would not be subject to these requirements if they already have an established regulatory relationship with NRC or an agreement state and meet other specific criteria. In September 2007, NRC announced in a public briefing that it had developed a comprehensive plan for resolving all the vulnerabilities in its radioactive materials licensing processes. NRC announced plans to do several things to help make its program more secure, including the following. Establish a panel of independent external reviewers to study NRC’s materials licensing program vulnerabilities, with particular scrutiny of its “good faith assumptions” about applicants. This panel presented a number of observations and recommendations to NRC in March 2008. Reconstitute the NRC and agreement state prelicensing working group to develop solutions to vulnerabilities associated with verification, counterfeiting, and general licenses. Establish a new materials program working group that would review the results of an independent external review and comprehensively assess the entire materials licensing program, including NRC’s evaluation of state programs. Leverage the capabilities of new databases currently under development— the National Source Tracking System and Web-based licensing. To assure themselves that other radioactive materials licenses had not been issued to fraudulent individuals, NRC also undertook a retrospective review of a sampling of licenses to verify their legitimacy. NRC officials stated that these reviews uncovered no other incidences of fraud. We think all of these actions are useful steps toward closing the long-standing vulnerabilities in NRC materials licensing processes, but it is too early to evaluate whether these steps will be successful. In addition to recommending that NRC work with agreement states and others to identify and better secure the radioactive sources that pose the greatest risk of being used to make an RDD, we also recommended that NRC determine how to effectively mitigate the potential psychological effects of malicious use of radioactive materials. Since we issued our 2003 report, DHS issued the National Response Plan in December of 2004 to establish a comprehensive all-hazards approach to domestic incident management. The National Response Plan, revised and reissued as the National Response Framework in January 2008, details how federal agencies and others should coordinate to ensure an efficient and effective nationwide response to a broad spectrum of domestic incidents, including those involving the malicious use of radioactive materials. Under the National Response Framework, where a radiological incident involves facilities or materials licensed by the NRC or agreement states, NRC either coordinates federal response activities or assists DHS in doing so, depending on the scope of the incident. In our view, such coordination should include taking actions to determine how to effectively mitigate all the effects of such an RDD—including psychological effects. However, NRC has not implemented this recommendation because, according to NRC officials, NRC has only a very limited role to play in mitigating the psychological effects that may occur in the aftermath of an RDD event unless the amount of radioactive materials released is sufficient to cause “prompt fatalities”—that is, fatalities directly caused by exposure to radioactive materials. Accordingly, NRC has identified and taken limited steps that it sees as consistent with its prescribed role. Specifically, NRC points to its participation in the interagency Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force Public Education Working Group with DHS, DOE, agreement and nonagreement states, and others to design a coordinated public education campaign to, among other things, reduce public fears of radioactivity and diminish the impact of a terrorist attack using radioactive materials. This working group issued a draft public education action plan in December 2007 and provided an update on its efforts on May 15, 2008. NRC is also a member of and has provided input to a Health Physics Society working group that is putting together a program to educate the public about radiation and help counteract unfounded or irrational fears. Despite these activities, in our view, NRC’s response to our recommendation is inadequate. Over 4 years after we made our recommendation, NRC has not yet determined how to effectively mitigate the potential psychological effects of the malicious use of radioactive materials. Moreover, according to existing EPA protective action guidelines, the amount of radioactive material needed to cause “prompt fatalities”—the threshold at which NRC accepts having a significant role— is significantly greater than would be necessary to cause contaminated areas to be evacuated, a threshold at which psychological effects could reasonably be expected to occur. According to NRC officials, unless the prompt fatalities threshold is met, NRC believes its job is to provide the public with prompt, complete information about the effects of any release of radiation involving material the agency regulates and, to the extent it is relevant, to inform the public about the NRC regulations or guidance that may be relevant as a result. Beyond participating in an interagency task force working group, providing any additional information that may be needed is, according to NRC, the responsibility of others (federal, state, or local officials, etc.). This approach is consistent with NRC’s view that its primary responsibility is to regulate “inside the fence, inside licensee- controlled areas.” “Outside the fence,” NRC views its role as assisting those federal agencies that have primary responsibility, namely DHS, DOE, and others and making sure that its licensees comply with these agencies’ legitimate concerns. In light of growing concerns about the potential malicious use of radioactive sealed sources, and to better secure generally licensed devices containing such sources, we recommended that NRC, in consultation with agreement states, re-examine whether certain radioactive sources should be regulated through specific licenses rather than general licenses. According to NRC, by November 2007 it had gathered the necessary information about generally licensed devices containing relatively larger radioactive sources (the largest category 4 sources or higher) to decide whether changes should be made. NRC and agreement state officials are currently analyzing the data and conferring in working groups and, according to NRC officials, initiated a rulemaking process in September 2007. Given the complexity and range of the issue and the solutions to be considered, NRC officials estimate the formal rulemaking process will take approximately 2 years, depending on what form a new rule takes. Rules that require states to make statutory changes typically take longer to implement. NRC officials stressed that it is impossible to predict what form a final rule would take. The various options—for example, a lower activity cap for general licenses; specific licensing requirements for particular radionuclides regardless of activity; or the development of a new, more streamlined specific license—will continue to be a subject of discussion among federal and state radioactive materials regulators until a decision has been reached. If a revised rule is finalized by September 2009, agreement states could have up to an additional 3 years to fully implement any changes—meaning that any rule change may not be fully implemented until the fall of 2012. NRC has developed an interim database that can monitor and track the more dangerous, category 1 and 2 radioactive sealed sources. However, two additional systems—one to track radioactive sealed sources and one to track licenses—have been repeatedly delayed. A third system under development will draw on information in both of these systems to provide regulators and vendors with the ability to verify that those seeking to purchase radioactive sources are licensed to do so. NRC established the interim database in October 2003 to provide NRC and agreement states a stop-gap means of more closely monitoring the potentially more dangerous sources until the new National Source Tracking System (NSTS) could be completed. This database is called “interim” because it is intended to be a temporary measure for implementing a quick, practical response to the recommendation in the May 2003 DOE–NRC report on RDDs that the U.S. government develop a database of sources at greatest risk of being used to make an RDD. The interim database currently records information about category 1 and 2 radioactive sealed sources licensed by both NRC and agreement states. For a given source, the interim database records the radionuclide; the quantity (activity); the licensee address; and the make, model, and serial number (where available) of the registered source. Although participation is voluntary, NRC successfully persuaded agreement states to provide data on their licensees for inclusion in the interim database, and as a result, the database includes information from 99 percent of all licensees. Originally, the database was intended to be a one-time snapshot of what radioactive materials existed in the United States during fiscal year 2004. However, NRC began to update the database annually as it became apparent that the development and launch of the NSTS would take longer than expected. The result is an annual snapshot of information about radioactive sources as they were at one point during a given year, not a system that tracks the current location of sources. The information for any given source in the database is, at any given time, 0 to 12 months old. It is important to note that the licensee address listed in the interim database may simply be the address for the licensee’s administrative offices—that is, the place where the company officials responsible for dealing with NRC or state regulators have offices—and not necessarily the address of the physical location of the material. A licensee may be allowed to store radioactive materials in several locations throughout one or more states but still provide only a single administrative address for reporting purposes in the interim database. NRC and agreement states check the completeness and accuracy of this inventory of source locations during routine inspections of licensees. The completion and implementation of the major new systems NRC is developing to help it better track, and ultimately help secure, radioactive sealed sources have been delayed repeatedly. The impetus for the creation of the NSTS was a recommendation in the May 2003 DOE-NRC report on RDDs that radionuclides identified as being at greatest risk of use by terrorists to make an RDD be nationally tracked. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 required the establishment of a mandatory tracking system. The NSTS is also consistent with the United States’ endorsement of the IAEA Code of Conduct, which recommends that nations establish a national source registry to include, at a minimum, category 1 and 2 sources of radionuclides of concern. The NSTS will initially track category 1 and 2 sources of the 20 radionuclides that NRC has determined are sufficiently attractive for use in an RDD or for other malicious purposes that warrant national tracking. The 20 radionuclides include the 16 radionuclides of concern plus four additional radionuclides: actinium-227, polonium-210, and thorium-228 and -229. In April 2008, NRC proposed a rule to expand the NSTS to include all category 3 sources and the largest category 4 sources (at or about one- tenth of the activity threshold for category 3). Although the NSTS was originally supposed to be operational in mid-2007, difficulties in developing the system have led NRC to postpone the launch of the NSTS multiple times. NRC’s current estimate for the launch of the NSTS (tracking category 1 and 2 sources) is January 31, 2009. NRC estimates the expansion of the NSTS will be implemented by March 2010. According to NRC, the NSTS will initially be populated by the data from the interim database. However, unlike the interim database, the NSTS will not be an annual snapshot of source inventories. The NSTS will be a transaction-based system that will track each major step that each tracked radioactive source takes within the United States, from “cradle to grave.” That is, licensees will be responsible for recording the manufacture, shipment, arrival, and disposal of all licensed and tracked category 1 and 2 radioactive sources. More specifically, the NSTS will include the radionuclide, quantity (activity), manufacturer, manufacture date, model number, serial number, and site address. The licensee will have until the close of the next business day after a transaction takes place to enter it into the system. As a result, the location of all such sources will be accounted for and more closely tracked than in the interim database. While some sources may be moved temporarily to different sites, any time that the source changes its “home base,” the transaction must be registered through the NSTS. In this way, the data in the system should be kept up-to-date. For security reasons, access to the information in the NSTS will be on a need-to-know basis. Licensees will have access to information about their sources, agreement state officials will have access to information about licensees and sources in their state, and only selected NRC officials will have access to the entire system. While the NSTS is designed to track larger and potentially more dangerous radioactive sealed sources, NRC’s Web-based licensing system is being developed to provide quick access to up-to-date information on all NRC specific licenses for radioactive materials and sources in all five IAEA categories. In its technical comments on a draft of this report, NRC told us that it is developing a third system—a license verification system—which, once operational, will draw on the information in NSTS and the Web-based licensing system which will provide regulators and vendors of radioactive sources with an easily accessible ability to verify that those seeking to purchase nationally tracked sources are licensed to do so. Taken together, these systems will include detailed information about what licensees are allowed to possess and, importantly, whether a prospective licensee seeking to purchase additional sealed sources is authorized to possess the additional types and quantities. For example, an individual from a construction company wanting to purchase a piece of equipment containing a radioactive sealed source must demonstrate to the vendor that the company is licensed to possess such a source. Once all three systems are operational, the vendor could easily verify that the company is legitimately licensed to purchase a given piece of equipment containing the particular sealed source. Although the Web-based licensing system was originally supposed to be deployed in 2005, it is now estimated be completed no earlier than the late summer of 2010. Moreover, the Web- based licensing system may not initially include any information on radioactive materials licenses issued by agreement states—which represent over 80 percent of all U.S. licenses for these materials. NRC officials told us that they are currently working with agreement states to determine the most efficient means of including agreement state data in the Web-based licensing system. Finally, NRC has only recently begun developing its new license verification system and has not yet established firm completion dates. However, NRC officials told us that they expect it to be complete by the time that the Web-based licensing is launched. The delays in the development of both the NSTS and the Web-based licensing system are especially consequential because NRC officials, both commissioners and staff, have identified the deployment of these systems as key to improving the control and accountability of radioactive materials in the United States. More specifically, in NRC’s September 2007 public hearing addressing the weaknesses that we uncovered in NRC’s materials licensing program, the commissioners said that an expanded NSTS including category 3 and perhaps the largest category 4 sources, a Web- based licensing system including agreement state data, and some means for making relevant information in both of these systems available to vendors and officials at ports of entry, would be a secure and effective means of verifying that those seeking to obtain radioactive materials, or enter the United States with licensable quantities of radioactive materials or sources, were doing so for legitimate purposes. CBP has a comprehensive, layered system for detecting and identifying radioactive materials as they enter the United States at land ports of entry—whether they are in the form of industrial sources, raw materials, trace amounts of radiation found in such common products as ceramics or bananas, or radionuclides left in the human body in the aftermath of medical procedures. However, some equipment that is used to protect CBP officers is in short supply. According to CBP, over 90 percent of the personally owned vehicles entering the United States at land ports of entry pass through radiation portal monitors. Portal monitors are very sensitive and can detect even the very small amounts of radiation. All vehicles must pass through the monitors at every port of entry that deploys them. Any vehicle triggering a portal monitor alarm is referred to a secondary screening area, where it is sent through a second portal monitor to confirm (or disconfirm) the original alarm. Whether the second portal monitor confirms the alarm or not, the vehicle, the driver, any passengers, and any cargo are scanned by a CBP officer with a hand-held radiation isotope identification device (RIID). The RIID can detect very small amounts of radiation and also identify many of the most commonly used radionuclides by name and activity level. CBP keeps detailed records on the cause of each alarm and its resolution and sends them to a central location for archiving. All portal monitor alarms must be resolved—that is, CBP officers must investigate each alarm until they are convinced that the vehicle, occupants, and any cargo pose no threat and, if radioactive materials are found, that the vehicle occupants appear to have a legitimate reason to possess and transport them—before the vehicle, driver, and any passengers can be allowed to enter the United States. The vast majority of portal monitor alarms are resolved by CBP officers at the border using the information available to them directly from portal monitor and RIID scans, documents provided by shippers and passengers, and the explanations of the travelers (commercial and passenger vehicle drivers and passengers) for why they are carrying radioactive materials, whatever the amount or form. When CBP officers cannot resolve the radiation alarm with information available to them at the border, they are required to contact technical experts at CBP’s National Targeting Center for assistance. These experts offer scientific expertise to help CBP officers interpret and use the portal monitor and RIID data and will also verify whether any radioactive sources have been properly licensed by checking NRC and agreement state licensing data. Figures 2 and 3 show vehicles lining up and passing through portal monitors at ports of entry. Figure 4 shows an inspection area and a truck-sized portal monitor on the southern border. Most of the CBP officers we spoke with at the ports of entry we visited told us they had never or rarely felt it necessary to contact the National Targeting Center for assistance, but they all stated that they would not hesitate to do so if they encountered anything out of the ordinary or if they thought something might pose any threat to national security. Those CBP officers who told us they had contacted the center for assistance were very pleased with the timely and practical help they received. Finally, we found that personal radiation detectors—an important component of the suite of radiation detection equipment at the borders— are in short supply. Unlike portal monitors and RIIDs, personal radiation detectors are not designed to be used as screening tools for radioactive materials. Instead, they are designed to alert the individual wearer when he or she is being exposed to unusually high levels of radiation, permitting CBP officers to take protective measures if needed. While most CBP officers dealing with the public in frontline positions are equipped with personal radiation detectors, some are not. According to CBP officials, the agency lacks sufficient resources to purchase the approximately 1,500 personal radiation detectors it needs to provide one for each officer at the border who currently needs one. In fact, during our visit to one port of entry, we found that some officers in frontline positions at the border did not have a personal radiation detector. Moreover, CBP has no money currently in the budget to acquire the approximately 2,000 additional personal radiation detectors it would require to equip the new officers it plans to hire—leaving a shortfall of about 3,500 personal radiation detectors. CBP headquarters officials are aware of the shortage of personal radiation detectors and they hope to procure enough of them for each officer who needs one. However, they acknowledged that, in doing so, they have to consider competing priorities at the border, and also whether emerging technologies may provide a more effective solution. In December 2003, CBP issued a radiation detection program directive that contained, among other things, the requirement that CBP officers at the border contact the National Targeting Center for assistance under certain circumstances when radiation is detected. Under the directive, even large shipments of radioactive materials can be admitted without a CBP officer contacting the National Targeting Center to verify whether the materials are legitimately licensed. The radiation detection program directive was scheduled for review in December 2006, but CBP officials told us that this review was delayed pending the resolution of unrelated matters regarding the CBP’s right to search property for radioactive materials between ports of entry. In response to our March 2006 reports assessing the progress DHS has made deploying radiation detection equipment at U.S. ports of entry and detailing how our investigators used fake documents to bring licensable quantities of industrial radioactive sources into the United States respectively, CBP revised its policy. Specifically, in May 2006, CBP issued a memorandum that officials told us tightened security by requiring CBP officers to contact the center to verify the legitimacy of a license or obtain technical assistance whenever they detect more than incidental, trace amounts of radiation, such as that found in ceramics and bananas or in people who have recently undergone a medical treatment using radionuclides. This memorandum, according to headquarters officials, was intended to communicate to officers at the border that they should verify the legitimacy of radioactive materials because CBP officers at a port of entry cannot determine whether a licensee or shipper is authentic without the assistance of the National Targeting Center. This updated guidance, however, was not effectively communicated to officers at the border. Specifically, we asked border officials at the several ports of entry we visited and the four others we interviewed on the telephone about the current guidance they use for regulating the flow of radioactive materials across borders. All either provided us copies of the 2003 radiation detection program directive or confirmed it was current and operative, and some gave us versions of the directive that were port- specific, and therefore, more detailed. Only one port of entry provided us with guidance reflecting the May 2006 memorandum and its requirement that CBP officers contact the National Targeting Center to verify the legitimacy of all licensable quantities of radioactive materials crossing the border. Moreover, officials at all these ports of entry told us that they contact the National Targeting Center for technical assistance when they need it; officials at only one port of entry told us they would call solely to verify whether radioactive materials are appropriately licensed. Officials representing a few other ports of entry told us they had never called the National Targeting Center to verify the legitimacy of a license and that all of their inquiries had been made solely to seek technical assistance. In addition, the officers we spoke to had minimal knowledge of the general regulatory structure established by NRC and agreement states. While we found officers generally were aware that radioactive materials and sources must be licensed, they typically did not take steps to verify licenses, as required by the May 2006 guidance. At the ports of entry we visited, we observed CBP officers working to ensure that when radioactive materials triggered an alarm, the people carrying (or contaminated with) these materials had a good explanation and that the readings from the portal monitors and RIIDs were in accord with what travelers said and what their documents attested to. In short, the officers were focused on resolving the alarm according to the rules established in the 2003 radiation detection program directive and on attending to the many other tasks they have in monitoring what flows through U.S. land ports of entry. In fact, the approach to resolving radiation alarms according to the procedures prescribed in the 2003 radiation detection directive has been so ingrained in day-to-day practice at one port of entry that CBP field office managers had discovered only in the week before our visit that officers had been allowing large neutron radiation-emitting shipments to enter the United States without contacting the National Targeting Center for technical support and to verify their legitimacy. While this situation has since been corrected, this is of particular concern because (1) some neutron radiation-emitting materials can be used to produce nuclear weapons and (2) it is in direct conflict with CBP’s 2003 directive and 2006 supplemental guidance. A senior CBP headquarters official told us that the 2003 radiation detection program directive, as supplemented by the additional criteria established by the May 2006 memorandum on when CBP officers must call to verify the legitimacy of radioactive materials, reflected current policy. He told us that the May 2006 memorandum was always envisioned as only an interim solution, pending a revision of the directive. According to this official, CBP was still working on a revision to the directive that would fully incorporate the heightened security of the memorandum—but he could not give a firm date when an updated directive would be issued. In our view, until CBP effectively communicates the guidance in the 2006 memorandum to its border locations, CBP officers at the border will not know when they should contact the National Targeting Center to verify that radioactive materials being brought into the United States are legitimately licensed. NRC has taken a number of important actions to implement several of our recommendations from our 2003 report that will enhance the accountability and control of radioactive sources and materials and its ability to help protect the nation from nuclear smuggling. Still, its actions in three key areas remain incomplete. In our view, the reasons behind our recommendations 4 years ago are still valid today. Accordingly, to further enhance public protection from the threats posed by potentially dangerous quantities of radioactive sealed sources and materials, we continue to believe that NRC should implement the recommendations from our 2003 report. Specifically, NRC should correct the vulnerabilities uncovered in NRC’s materials licensing process and implement the steps needed to ensure that radioactive materials can only be purchased by those with a legitimate reason to possess them, and determine whether certain radioactive sources should be regulated through specific licenses rather than general licenses and move quickly to implement whatever changes are deemed necessary. In addition, we continue to believe that a plan of how to effectively mitigate the potential psychological effects of an RDD event needs to be developed. For potential incidents involving radiological facilities or materials licensed by NRC or agreement states, for which NRC has coordinating responsibilities, NRC should work with DHS, other federal agencies, and agreement states, respecting the roles described in the National Response Framework, to take action to determine how to effectively mitigate the potential psychological effects of such an event. Also, the causes of the delays in the development and implementation of NRC’s more comprehensive systems for securing, monitoring, and tracking radioactive materials need to be confronted and addressed. Specifically, NRC’s National Source Tracking System and Web-based licensing system have missed numerous milestones and are not expected to be complete as currently envisioned until at least 2010. Past delays in implementing these systems give reason to wonder whether these dates will again be extended and whether NRC is firmly committed to delivering these systems. The recent decision to develop a third new system has added to these concerns. In our view, given the potential consequences of the use of these materials in an RDD and the potential for these systems to greatly improve the security of both NRC’s and agreement states’ materials licensing processes, it is time for NRC to make meaningful progress in successfully completing these important initiatives. While CBP has a comprehensive system in place to detect radiation at ports of entry on the northern and southern borders, CBP’s task of preventing the smuggling of radioactive materials is made more difficult by the fact that guidance on when officers should verify whether radioactive materials being brought into the United States are legitimately licensed has not been effectively communicated. The result of this communication gap is that resources that are available to CBP officers at the border to ensure that those possessing radioactive materials are doing so legitimately are underutilized. Given the repeated delays in implementing improvements to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s ability to monitor and track radioactive sealed sources, we recommend that the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission take steps, consistent with sound systems development practices, to ensure that priority attention is given to meeting the current January 2009 and summer 2010 target dates for launching the National Source Tracking System, Web-based licensing system, and the new license verification system, respectively. In addition, because some quantities of radioactive materials are potentially dangerous to human health if not properly handled, we recommend that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission complete the steps needed to include all potentially dangerous radioactive sources (category 3 and the larger category 4 sources, as well as categories 1 and 2) in the National Source Tracking System as quickly as is reasonably possible. Finally, to improve the likelihood of preventing radioactive sources and materials from being smuggled into the United States, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection to effectively communicate current Customs and Border Protection guidance to officers at ports of entry regarding when they are required to contact the National Targeting Center to verify that radioactive materials are legitimately licensed, and take measures to ensure that this guidance is being followed. We provided the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Energy, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Chair of the Organization of Agreement States with draft copies of our report for their review and comment. In commenting on the draft of this report, NRC neither agreed nor disagreed with our findings and recommendations. Instead, NRC described its current efforts to implement the recommendations from our 2003 report. On this point, NRC outlined the steps it is taking to modify and strengthen its processes and procedures for licensing radioactive materials. NRC also provided an update on the status of the efforts of the Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force’s subgroup on public education—a subgroup led by DHS of which NRC is a member—to proactively educate the general public about radiation with the goal of reducing public anxiety and mitigating the adverse psychological effects in the event of an RDD attack. Finally, NRC described its proposed rule, expected to be issued in the fall of 2009, to limit the quantity of radioactive material allowed in a generally licensed device. Although we are encouraged by NRC’s efforts to finish implementing the recommendations from our 2003 report, we remain concerned that nearly 5 years after we issued our report these recommendations have yet to be fully implemented. Furthermore, NRC stated that it is taking the steps necessary to launch the National Source Tracking System (NSTS) and Web-based licensing and to complete the needed steps to include all potentially dangerous radioactive sources in the NSTS as quickly as is reasonably possible. In addition, NRC assures that it intends to place the highest priority on the completion and deployment of the NSTS and Web- based licensing system. However, we are concerned that NRC has once again postponed its estimated completion dates for these systems—by at least 9 months in the case of expanding NSTS to include the smaller but still potentially dangerous radioactive sources and estimates a similar delay in the deployment of the Web-based licensing system. Finally, in its technical comments, NRC informed us that it is developing a new, third system which will draw information from both the NSTS and the Web- based licensing system to provide an improved capability for vendors and regulators to verify licensing information. While we hope this new, third system provides the intended additional capabilities, we are concerned that after so many delays with NSTS and the Web-based licensing system, adding a third system may further delay the ultimate security benefits that these systems are expected to provide. NRC also provided additional technical comments, which we incorporated into the report as appropriate. The other federal agencies that were offered the opportunity to comment on our report either agreed with our recommendations and outlined the steps to be taken to implement them, or chose not comment on the final draft. Specifically, according to DHS’s written comments, CBP concurred with our recommendations and specified the steps it will take to effectively communicate current Customs and Border Protection guidance to officers at ports of entry regarding when they are required to contact the National Targeting Center to verify that radioactive materials are legitimately licensed, and the measures it will take to ensure this guidance is being followed. In fact, CBP has already updated its current guidance to CBP officers at the border by issuing a memorandum to the field directors restating and clarifying when officers must contact the National Targeting Center to verify that radioactive materials are legitimately licensed and requiring them to incorporate this guidance into ports of entry standard operating procedures. Finally, DOE and EPA reviewed and provided comments on earlier versions of our draft report and, after reviewing our final draft, had no further comments. The Organization of Agreement States neither agreed nor disagreed with our findings and recommendations, but offered two comments which we incorporated into the report. Specifically, state officials thought it was important to recognize the quality of agreement state regulatory programs by highlighting the fact that while GAO investigators succeeded in obtaining an NRC radioactive materials license using fictitious documents, GAO withdrew its application to obtain a materials license from the agreement state when that state informed GAO investigators that it would take steps that would have revealed the application not to be authentic. State officials also wanted to stress what they view as the high level of collaboration they enjoy with NRC, as evidenced by the number of state officials involved in security-related working groups with NRC officials and the financial support that NRC provides to states to enable this level of state participation. As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report, we plan no further distribution until 24 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Energy, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Chair of the Organization of Agreement States, and interested congressional committees. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff that made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V. A radiological dispersal device (RDD) is any type of device that is intended to disperse radioactive materials, through conventional explosives or other means. Among the federal agencies, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has lead responsibility for providing radiological emergency planning guidance, known as Protective Action Guides (PAG), to protect the public from exposure to radiation. In addition, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued PAGs for responses to RDD and improvised nuclear devices (IND) for interim use and comment. Both EPA’s and DHS’s PAGs can be used by other federal agencies or state governments to develop their own guidance or regulations to protect public health. According to EPA officials, the general public’s fear of radiation, coupled with most law enforcement officers’ relative inexperience dealing with radioactive material, would likely cause any emergency incident that triggers first responders’ radiation detectors to be treated as an RDD. Until the type and specific quantity of radioactive material could be determined, the situation would initiate a federal response, whether or not specific, federal thresholds for safety have been reached. Even very small amounts of radioactive material are sufficient to set off the radiation detectors of first responders. For purposes of illustration (see table 3), we calculated how large an area might be sufficiently contaminated using International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) category 1, 2, and 3 quantities of cesium-137—assuming the material could be evenly distributed—to (1) trigger the EPA PAG recommending relocation of the public until the site is cleaned up and (2) reach the threshold at which potential direct health effects, such as radiation sickness, might occur. We used category 2 and 3 amounts of cesium-137 (one of the 16 radionuclides of concern) because, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency categorization scheme, the threshold category 3 quantity is the amount at which a radionuclide becomes potentially dangerous to human health if not handled appropriately. A category 2 quantity of a radioactive material is at least 10 times more dangerous than the category 3 threshold quantity and is also the level at which NRC requires licensees to take additional security measures to protect the material from unauthorized access or use. We calculated how large an area might be contaminated with a category 1 quantity of cesium-137 because such quantities can be found in medical devices and irradiators throughout the United States. Specifically, when the potential additional exposure to radiation for a person remaining in a given area for 1 year reaches 2 rem, EPA considers the area sufficiently dangerous to recommend that people be relocated until the site can be decontaminated. When the potential exposure to radiation over the course of 1 year reaches 100 rem, the International Commission on Radiological Protection—an organization of radiation scientists from around the world who provide recommendations regarding radiation exposure—concludes that readily observable health effects, such as radiation sickness, are possible with extended exposure. Only a category 1 quantity would be likely to produce health effects due to acute radiation doses. This level, however, is still substantially below the level at which prompt fatalities could occur. (Prompt fatalities from untreated radiation exposure may only result from acute radiation doses—that is, doses delivered in their entirety in a matter of hours or days—of at least hundreds of rem from a predominately beta-gamma emitting radionuclide like cesium-137.) EPA guidance is based on protecting human health and calculating the odds that radiation exposure will lead to cancer, the most common of radiation’s long term side effects. In the event of an RDD, federal RDD PAGs, such as those issued by DHS in 2006, would be used to manage the response to the incident. PAGs are operative during the emergency, and their chief goal is to protect the public by providing standards to guide the response in the early and intermediate phases of an incident. However, any PAG guidance is only a series of recommendations and is not legally enforceable or binding. Furthermore, a PAG does not establish cleanup levels. In fact, guidance for specific cleanup levels after an RDD has been deliberately left ad hoc, and is to be established after an evaluation occurs using an “optimization” process for long-term site cleanup and restoration. The level to which a contaminated site would be cleaned up for the long term would be agreed upon after the emergency has passed and would depend on the uses of the site. A cleanup standard would factor in the lifetime exposure that the contamination creates for the people using the site—generally, the long- term increased risk of developing cancer. For example, a site that is used for business purposes, where the typical person would spend only working hours, would not have to be cleaned up to the same level as a site where people live, where some people could reasonably be exposed to the post- cleanup radiation levels 24 hours a day. Public involvement in the decision would play a significant role in determining what risk levels are acceptable. While EPA provides guidelines, state and local authorities make the ultimate decisions under most scenarios. In addition to the contact named above, Ned Woodward, Nabajyoti Barkakati, Kevin Bray, Ryan Coles, Nancy Crothers, Walker Fullerton, Cindy Gilbert, Richard Hung, Carol Kolarik, Keith Rhodes, and Kevin Tarmann made significant contributions to this report.

Summary: Concerns have grown that terrorists could use radioactive materials and sealed sources (materials sealed in a capsule) to build a "dirty bomb"-- a device using conventional explosives to disperse radioactive material. In 2003, GAO found weaknesses in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) radioactive materials licensing process and made recommendations for improvement. For this report, GAO assesses (1) the progress NRC has made in implementing the 2003 recommendations, (2) other steps NRC has taken to improve its ability to track radioactive materials, (3) Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) ability to detect radioactive materials at land ports of entry, and (4) CBP's ability to verify that such materials are appropriately licensed prior to entering the United States. To perform this work, GAO assessed documents and interviewed NRC and CBP officials in headquarters and in several field locations. NRC has implemented three of the six recommendations in GAO's 2003 report on the security of radioactive sources. It has worked with the 35 states to which it ceded primary authority to regulate radioactive materials and sources and others to (1) identify sealed sources of greatest concern, (2) enhance requirements to secure radioactive sources, and (3) ensure security requirements are implemented. In contrast, NRC has made limited progress toward implementing recommendations to (1) modify its process for issuing licenses to ensure that radioactive materials cannot be purchased by those with no legitimate need for them, (2) determine how to effectively mitigate the potential psychological effects of malicious use of such materials, and (3) examine whether certain radioactive sources should be subject to more stringent regulations. Beyond acting on GAO's recommendations, NRC has also taken four steps to improve its ability to monitor and track radioactive materials. First, NRC created an interim national database to monitor the licensed sealed sources containing materials that pose the greatest risk of being used in a dirty bomb. Second, NRC is developing a National Source Tracking System to replace the interim database and provide more comprehensive, frequently updated information on potentially dangerous sources. However, this system has been delayed by 18 months and is not expected to be fully operational until January 2009. Third, NRC is also developing a Web-based licensing system that will include more comprehensive information on all sources and materials that require NRC or state approval to possess. Finally, NRC is developing a license verification system that will draw information from the other new systems to enable officials and vendors to verify that those seeking to bring these radioactive materials into the country or purchase them are licensed to do so. However, these systems are more than 3 years behind schedule and may not include the licensing information, initially at least, on radioactive materials regulated by agreement states--which represent over 80 percent of all U.S. licenses for such materials. The delays in the deployment and full development of these systems are especially consequential because NRC has identified their deployment as key to improving the control and accountability of radioactive materials. While CBP has a comprehensive system in place to detect radioactive materials entering the United States at land borders, some equipment that is used to protect CBP officers is in short supply. Specifically, vehicles, cargo, and people entering the United States at most ports of entry along the Canadian and Mexican borders are scanned for radioactive materials with radiation detection equipment capable of detecting very small amounts of radiation. However we found that personal radiation detectors are not available to all officers who need them. Moreover, while CBP has systems in place to verify the legitimacy of radioactive materials licenses, it has not effectively communicated to officers at the borders when they must contact officials to verify the license for a given sealed source. Consequently, some CPB officers are not following current guidance, and some potentially dangerous radioactive materials have entered the country without license verification.