The Flood Control Act of 1944 established a comprehensive plan for flood control and other purposes, such as hydroelectric power production, in the Missouri River Basin. The Pick-Sloan Plan—a joint water development program designed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) and the Department of the Interior’s (Interior) Bureau of Reclamation—included the construction of five dams on the Missouri River, including the Garrison Dam in North Dakota and the Oahe, Fort Randall, Big Bend, and Gavins Point Dams in South Dakota. The construction of the Fort Randall Dam, located 7 miles above the Nebraska line in south-central South Dakota, began in May 1946 and was officially dedicated in August 1956. The dam is 160 feet high, and the reservoir behind it, known as Lake Case, stretches 107 miles to the northwest. (See fig. 1.) In September 1959, the Corps began work on the Big Bend Dam, which is about 100 miles northwest of the Fort Randall Dam on land belonging to both the Crow Creek Sioux and Lower Brule Sioux tribes. The Big Bend Dam is 95 feet high and was completed in September 1966. The reservoir behind the dam, known as Lake Sharpe, is 20 miles long. (See fig. 2.) The Crow Creek Sioux and Lower Brule Sioux tribes reside on reservations located across the Missouri River from one another in central South Dakota. The Crow Creek reservation includes about 225,000 acres, 56 percent of which is owned by the tribe or individual Indians. According to the 2000 Census, the Crow Creek reservation has 2,199 residents, with the majority residing in the community of Fort Thompson. The Lower Brule reservation includes about 226,000 acres, 60 percent of which is owned by the tribe or individual Indians. According to the 2000 Census, the Lower Brule reservation has 1,355 residents, including several hundred who reside in the community of Lower Brule. Both reservations include some non- Indians, and both tribes have several hundred members who do not live on the reservations. The major economic activities for both the Crow Creek Sioux and Lower Brule Sioux tribes are cattle ranching and farming, and both tribes provide guided hunting for fowl and other game. Each tribe also operates a casino and a hotel. Both tribes are governed by a tribal council under their respective tribal constitutions, and each tribal council is led by a tribal chairman. The major employers on the reservations are the tribes, the casinos, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the Indian Health Service. In addition, the Lower Brule Sioux tribe provides employment through the Lower Brule Farm Corporation, which is the nation’s number one popcorn producer. See appendix II for a map of the Crow Creek and Lower Brule reservations and the locations of the previously mentioned dams and reservoirs. The construction of the Fort Randall Dam caused the flooding of more than 17,000 acres of Crow Creek and Lower Brule reservation land and the displacement of more than 100 tribal families. After these two tribes sustained major damage from this project, the construction of the Big Bend Dam inundated over 20,000 additional acres of their reservations. This flooding displaced more families, some of whom had moved earlier as a result of flooding from the Fort Randall Dam. (See table 1.) Flooding from the installation of both dams resulted in the loss of valuable timber and pasture and forced families to move to less desirable land, which affected their way of life. During the early 1950s, the Corps; Interior, through its Missouri River Basin Investigations Unit (MRBI); and the tribes—represented through tribal negotiating committees—developed their own estimates of the damages caused by the Fort Randall Dam. Discussions and informal negotiating conferences were held among the three parties in 1953 to try to arrive at acceptable compensation for damages. At that point, the Fort Randall Dam had been closed since July 1952 and portions of the reservations were underwater. The MRBI’s appraisal of damages was about $398,000 for Crow Creek and about $271,000 for Lower Brule, which was higher than the Corps’ proposal. Both the MRBI appraisal and the Corps’ proposal were substantially lower than the tribes’ settlement proposals, and the parties were unable to reach settlement. The Corps planned to take the land by condemnation, but in July 1954 decided against that action when the Congress authorized and directed the Corps and Interior to jointly negotiate separate settlements with the tribes. Meanwhile, the tribes arranged to have settlement bills introduced in July 1954. These bills requested $1.7 million for damages for the Crow Creek Sioux tribe and $2.5 million for damages for the Lower Brule Sioux tribe. Both of these bills also contained requests for about $2.5 million each for rehabilitation funds. The first formal negotiating conference was held among the parties in November 1954, and further discussions continued over several more years after the bills were introduced, but, again, the parties could not reach settlement. In 1955, with negotiations stalled, the Corps requested and obtained an official declaration of taking. The tribes—with their lands now flooded—received funds based on the earlier MRBI appraisal figures, with the understanding that negotiations for additional funds would continue. The tribes continued to insist on receiving substantially higher compensation amounts for damages, and additional funds for rehabilitation, as part of the settlement. The amounts the tribes requested for rehabilitation fluctuated in tribal settlement proposals between 1954 and 1957, but both the Corps and the MRBI maintained that rehabilitation funding was not within the scope of the negotiations. In March 1958, each tribe’s negotiating committee submitted new proposals at compensation hearings for the Fort Randall Dam. The Crow Creek Sioux tribe proposed compensation of about $2.2 million for damages and administrative expenses related to the settlement, and the Lower Brule Sioux tribe proposed compensation of about $1.8 million for damages and administrative expenses. Neither proposal included funds for rehabilitation because both tribes agreed with the government’s request to wait to procure these funds in the Big Bend Dam compensation request. In May 1958, bills were introduced in the Congress with amounts that were less than the tribes had proposed through their negotiating committees, with the amount for direct damages from Fort Randall Dam construction being substantially reduced. According to House reports, both the tribes and the Corps agreed to the amounts proposed for damages. Later that summer, amendments to the bills reduced the amount for indirect damages for both tribes. In September 1958, the Congress authorized a payment of about $1.5 million to the Crow Creek Sioux tribe, and almost $1.1 million to the Lower Brule Sioux tribe. See table 2 for a summary of selected settlement proposals related to the Fort Randall Dam. In contrast to the Fort Randall negotiations, the compensation for the construction of the Big Bend Dam was granted quickly. In bills introduced in March 1961, the Crow Creek Sioux tribe requested over $1 million for damages and administrative expenses as a result of the Big Bend Dam construction. The Lower Brule Sioux tribe requested close to $2.4 million for damages, administrative expenses, and a new school. In addition, both tribes requested the rehabilitation funds that had not been included in the Fort Randall Dam settlement—that is, the Crow Creek Sioux tribe requested more than $4 million and the Lower Brule Sioux tribe requested about $2.7 million. In June 1961, the government and the tribes agreed to a reduction in direct damages, while the tribes requested an increase to the amount for indirect damages, bringing the total amount of compensation, including rehabilitation, requested by the Crow Creek Sioux and Lower Brule Sioux tribes to about $4.9 million for each tribe. In subsequent bills over the next year, however, the Congress lowered indirect damages considerably and dropped the amount requested for a new school for Lower Brule. The amounts requested for administrative expenses and rehabilitation were also reduced. In October 1962, the Congress authorized a payment of $4.4 million to the Crow Creek Sioux tribe and about $3.3 million to the Lower Brule Sioux tribe. See table 3 for a summary of selected settlement proposals related to the Big Bend Dam. See appendixes III and IV for a timeline summary of the settlement negotiations and compensation for the two dams for the Crow Creek Sioux and Lower Brule Sioux tribes, respectively. Tribes at five other reservations affected by flood control projects along the Missouri River incurred losses ranging from about 600 acres to over 150,000 acres. These tribes received some compensation, primarily during the 1950s, for the damages they sustained. However, beginning in the 1980s, some of these tribes began requesting additional compensation. The Congress responded to their requests by authorizing the establishment of development trust funds. (See table 4.) The tribes at the Fort Berthold, Standing Rock, and Cheyenne River reservations received compensation within the ranges we had suggested the Congress consider in our reviews of the tribes’ additional compensation claims. The ranges were based on the current value of the difference between each tribes’ final asking price and the amount that the Congress authorized. We were not asked to review the additional compensation claims for the Crow Creek Sioux and Lower Brule Sioux tribes in the 1990s or for the Santee Sioux and Yankton Sioux tribes in 2002. The Crow Creek Sioux and Lower Brule Sioux tribes’ consultant differed from the approach we used in our prior reports. The consultant used a variety of settlement proposals, instead of consistently using the tribes’ final asking prices, in calculating the difference between what the tribes asked for and what the Congress authorized. As a result, the consultant’s proposed compensation estimates are higher than if he had consistently used the tribes’ final asking prices. In addition, the consultant provided only the highest additional compensation value, rather than a range of possible additional compensation from which the Congress could choose. To arrive at an additional compensation estimate, the consultant did not consistently use the tribes’ final asking prices when calculating the difference between what the tribes asked for and what they finally received. In determining possible additional compensation for the tribes at the Fort Berthold and Standing Rock reservations in 1991, and the Cheyenne River reservation in 1998, we used the tribes’ final asking prices to calculate the difference between what the tribes asked for and what they received. In our prior reports, we used the tribes’ final position because we believed that it represented the most up-to-date and complete information, and that their final position was more realistic than their initial asking prices. In contrast, the consultant used figures from a variety of settlement proposals—several of which were not the tribes’ final asking prices—to estimate additional compensation for damages (including direct and indirect damages), administrative expenses, and rehabilitation. As a result, the consultant’s estimate of the tribes’ asking prices in the late 1950s and early 1960s was about $7.7 million higher than it would have been if he had consistently used the tribes’ final asking prices. Choosing which settlement proposal to use to calculate the difference between what the tribe asked for and what it finally received is critically important, because a small numerical difference 50 years ago can result in a large difference today, once it is adjusted to reflect more current values. With respect to the Fort Randall Dam, the consultant used amounts from a variety of settlement proposals for damages and administrative expenses. To determine additional compensation, the consultant used a $2.2 million settlement proposal by the Crow Creek Sioux tribe and a $2.6 million settlement proposal by the Lower Brule Sioux tribe. (See table 5.) The Crow Creek proposal was from May 1957, and was the same as the tribe’s final asking price requested about 1 year later, in February 1958. However, the Lower Brule proposal was from the first compensation bill introduced in the Congress in July 1954, almost 4 years before the tribe’s final asking price of about $1.8 million in March 1958-—a difference of more than $850,000. For the Big Bend Dam, the consultant also used amounts from different settlement proposals for damages and administrative expenses. To determine additional compensation, the consultant used amounts from congressional bills introduced in March 1961 for direct damages, but used amounts from proposed amendments to the bills in June 1961 for indirect damages. The tribes’ asking prices from June 1961 can be considered their final asking prices because the proposed amendments are the last evidence of where the tribes requested specific compensation (indirect damages) or agreed to a compensation amount (direct damages). The consultant would have been more consistent had he used both the indirect and direct damage settlement figures in the proposed amendments from June 1961, rather than a mixture of these figures. As a result, the total amount for damages the consultant used to calculate the difference between what the tribes requested and what it finally received is about $427,000 (in 1961 dollars) higher than if the tribes’ final asking prices from June 1961 had been used consistently. (See table 6.) Lastly, the consultant did not use the tribes’ final asking prices for the rehabilitation component of the settlement payment. The consultant used a $6.7 million rehabilitation figure that the Crow Creek Sioux tribe’s negotiating committee proposed in May 1957 and a $6.3 million rehabilitation figure that was proposed in congressional bills in 1955 and 1957 for the Lower Brule Sioux tribe. (See table 7.) Both of these figures were developed during the negotiations for the Fort Randall Dam. However, the tribes agreed in their February and March 1958 proposals— their final asking prices for the Fort Randall Dam—to defer consideration of their rehabilitation proposals until after land acquisitions were made for the construction of the Big Bend Dam. The Big Bend Dam’s installation would once again result in the flooding of their lands. In our view, the consultant should have used the final rehabilitation figures proposed by the tribes in 1961—that is, $4 million for the Crow Creek Sioux tribe and $2.7 million for the Lower Brule Sioux tribe. While rehabilitation was the largest component of the tribes’ settlement proposals, we believe it should be considered separately from the comparison for damages because rehabilitation was not directly related to the damage caused by the dams. Funding for rehabilitation, which gained support in the late-1940s, was meant to improve the tribes’ social and economic development and prepare some of the tribes for the termination of federal supervision. Funding for these rehabilitation programs came from both the government and from the tribes themselves. From the late- 1940s through the early-1960s, the Congress considered several bills that would have provided individual tribes with rehabilitation funding. For example, between 1949 and 1950, the House passed seven bills for tribes totaling more than $47 million in authorizations for rehabilitation funding, and considered other bills, one of which would have provided $50 million to several Sioux tribes, including Crow Creek and Lower Brule. Owing to opposition from tribal groups, the termination policy began to lose support with the Congress in the late 1950s, and rehabilitation funding for individual tribes during this time was most often authorized by the Congress in association with compensation bills for dam projects on the Missouri River. However, the granting of rehabilitation funding for these tribes was inconsistent. Some tribes did not receive rehabilitation funding along with compensation for damages, while others did. (See table 8.) In our two prior reports, we suggested that, for the tribes of Fort Berthold, Standing Rock, and Cheyenne River, the Congress consider a range of possible compensation based on the current value of the difference between the final asking price of each tribe and the amount that it received. In calculating the current value, we used two different rates to establish a range of additional compensation. For the lower end of the range, we used the inflation rate to estimate the amount the tribes would need to equal the purchasing power of the difference. For the higher range, we used an interest rate to estimate the amount the tribes might have earned if they had invested the difference in Aaa corporate bonds as of the date of the settlement. The consultant did not follow this approach when he calculated the compensation estimates for the Crow Creek Sioux and Lower Brule Sioux tribes. Instead, he used the corporate bond rate to develop a single figure for each tribe, rather than a range. The consultant justified using only the corporate bond rate to calculate the compensation figures for the Crow Creek Sioux and Lower Brule Sioux tribes by pointing out that the Congress authorized additional compensation of $149.2 million for the tribes of Fort Berthold and $290.7 million for the Cheyenne River Sioux tribe in 1992 and 2000, respectively, by using our estimates of the high end of the range for these tribes. The consultant contended that if the Congress also uses the corporate bond rate for the Crow Creek Sioux and Lower Brule Sioux tribes to determine compensation, it would ensure parity with the amounts the tribes of Fort Berthold and the Cheyenne River Sioux received. However, the Congress has not always chosen to use the highest value in the ranges we estimated. For example, in the case of the Standing Rock Sioux tribe, the Congress chose to provide additional compensation of $90.6 million in 1992—an amount closer to the lower end of the range we estimated. Using the approach we followed in our prior reports, which was based on the tribes’ final asking prices, we found that the additional compensation the Crow Creek Sioux and Lower Brule Sioux tribes received in the 1990s was either at the high end or above the range of possible additional compensation. For both tribes, we calculated the difference between the final asking prices and the compensation authorized in 1958 and 1962. We then took the difference and adjusted it to account for the inflation rate and the Aaa corporate bond rate through either 1996 or 1997 to produce a possible range of additional compensation to compare it with the additional compensation the Congress authorized for the tribes in 1996 and 1997. For the Crow Creek Sioux tribe, we estimated that the difference adjusted to 1996 values for both dams would range from $6.5 million to $21.4 million (see table 9), compared with the $27.5 million the Congress authorized for the tribe in 1996. The $27.5 million in additional compensation already authorized for the Crow Creek Sioux tribe is therefore higher than the amount that we would have proposed in 1996 using our approach. For the Lower Brule Sioux tribe, we estimated that the difference adjusted to 1997 values for both dams would range from $12.2 million to $40.9 million (see table 10), compared with the $39.3 million the Congress authorized for the tribe in 1997. The $39.3 million falls toward the high end of the range that we would have proposed in 1997 using our approach. Our estimates of additional compensation for the two tribes vary significantly from the amounts calculated by the tribes’ consultant. Our estimated range for the two tribes combined is from about $18.7 million to $62.3 million. The consultant calculated an additional compensation figure for the two tribes of $292.3 million (in 2003 dollars)—that is, $105.9 for the Crow Creek Sioux tribe and $186.4 for the Lower Brule Sioux tribe—before subtracting the amounts received by the tribes in 1996 and 1997, respectively. There are two primary reasons for the difference between our additional compensation amounts and the consultant’s amounts. First, most of the difference is due to the different rehabilitation cost figures that were used. For the difference between the tribes’ asking prices for rehabilitation and the amounts they actually received, we used $901,450 and the consultant used about $7.3 million (in 1961 and 1957 dollars, respectively). Once the $901,450 is adjusted to account for inflation and interest earned through 1996 and 1997, it results in a range of additional compensation for rehabilitation for the two tribes combined of about $4.8 million to $15.1 million. If the consultant’s rehabilitation figure of about $7.3 million is adjusted through 1996 and 1997, his total for the two tribes is $120.9 million, or more than $105 million above our high estimate. Second, our dollar values were adjusted to account for inflation and interest earned only through 1996 and 1997 to compare them with what the two tribes received in additional compensation at that time. The consultant, however, adjusted for interest earned up through 2003. In addition, he then incorrectly adjusted for the additional compensation the tribes were authorized in the 1990s. Specifically, the consultant subtracted the $27.5 million and $39.3 million authorized for the Crow Creek Sioux and Lower Brule Sioux tribes in 1996 and 1997, respectively, from his additional compensation totals without first making the different estimates comparable. Since these amounts were in 1996 and 1997 dollar values, versus the 2003 dollar values for his current calculations, it was incorrect to subtract one from the other without any adjustment. In our view, the consultant should have adjusted his current calculations through 1996 and 1997, depending on the tribe, and then should have subtracted the additional compensation provided the tribes at that time. If there was any remaining compensation due the tribes, the final step then would have been to adjust it to reflect 2003 dollar values. Using this approach, the additional compensation provided to the tribes in the 1990s would have been subtracted from comparable dollar values. The additional compensation already authorized for the Crow Creek Sioux and Lower Brule Sioux tribes in 1996 and 1997, respectively, is consistent with the additional compensation authorized for the other tribes on the Missouri River. Rather than bringing the Crow Creek Sioux and Lower Brule Sioux tribes into parity with the other tribes, the two bills under consideration in the 109th Congress—H.R. 109 and S. 374—would have the opposite effect. Providing a third round of compensation to the Crow Creek Sioux and Lower Brule Sioux tribes, in the amounts proposed in the bills, would catapult them ahead of the other tribes and set a precedent for the other tribes to seek a third round of compensation. Our analysis does not support the additional compensation amounts contained in H.R. 109 and S. 374. Notwithstanding the results of our analysis, the Congress will ultimately decide whether additional compensation should be provided and, if so, how much it should be. Our analysis will assist the Congress in this regard. Because the consultant’s analysis was the basis for the tribes’ additional compensation claims and the consultant had asserted that the additional compensation amounts were based on a methodology deemed appropriate by GAO, we chose to provide the tribes’ consultant with a draft of this report for review and comment. In commenting on the draft, the tribes’ consultant (1) acknowledged that he had made a calculation error in his analysis, (2) proposed a range of additional compensation based on four different alternatives, and (3) discussed the complex issues of “asking price” in the context of the particular set of facts for the Crow Creek Sioux and Lower Brule Sioux tribes. In addition, the consultant commented “…that there has been no uniform or consistent approach, method, formula, or criteria for providing additional compensation. . .” to the seven tribes affected by Pick-Sloan dam projects on the Missouri River. Specifically, the consultant pointed out that the Congress has provided additional compensation to four tribes based on a per-acre analysis, while only three tribes have received additional compensation within the ranges we calculated in our two prior reports. As a result, the consultant believes that there is a wide disparity in the total compensation that the seven tribes have received from the Congress. As discussed in detail below, we believe that our approach is reasonable, and we did not make any changes to the report based on the consultant’s comments. The tribes’ consultant provided written comments that are included in appendix V, along with our specific responses. To address the perceived disparity in the total compensation amounts provided by the Congress, the consultant proposed four different alternatives for calculating additional compensation for the Crow Creek Sioux and Lower Brule Sioux tribes: (1) on a per-acre basis compared with the Cheyenne River Sioux tribe, (2) the consultant’s original proposal (amended to correct for the calculation error), (3) on a per-acre basis compared with the Santee Sioux tribe, and (4) calculations based on using the tribes’ highest asking prices. We do not believe that the consultant’s amended original proposal nor the three new alternatives represent a sound approach for establishing the range of additional compensation. Our approach is to provide the Congress with a range of possible additional compensation based on the difference between the amount the tribes believed was warranted at the time of the taking and the final settlement amount. We then adjusted the differences using the inflation rate for the lower end of the range and the corporate bond rate for the higher end. The ranges of additional compensation we calculated in this report were calculated in exactly the same way we did in our 1991 and 1998 reports, and we believe our approach is reasonable. In our view, trying to compare the total compensation for the tribes on a per-acre basis—which are two of consultant’s proposed alternatives—does not take into account the differences of what each tribe lost. For example, even if the individual resources such as timber, wildlife, and wild products would have all been valued the same for all of the tribes, if one tribe lost more of one resource than another, then their per-acre compensation values would be different. Also, about half of the payments to four of the tribes were for rehabilitation, which had no direct correlation to the acreage flooded by the dams, and the consultant did not make the different dollar amounts comparable before performing his per-acre calculations. The tribes’ consultant disagreed with our assumption that the tribes’ final asking prices were based on the most up-to-date and complete information and that they were more realistic than their initial asking prices. Specifically, the consultant noted that the tribes’ final asking prices “were made under conditions of extreme duress.” We agree with the consultant that the tribes were not willing sellers of their land at the initial price that the government offered for their land. However, we disagree that this factor invalidates the use of the tribes’ final asking prices. The drawn out negotiations for the Fort Randall Dam and the amounts of the tribes’ final asking prices do not support the conclusion that the tribes simply capitulated and accepted whatever the government offered. For example, for 12 of the 15 compensation components shown in tables 5, 6, and 7 of our report, the tribes’ final asking prices were equal to, or higher than, their initial settlement proposals. We used a clearly defined and consistent approach, whereas, in his analysis, the consultant selected only certain numbers from a variety of tribal settlement proposals without providing any justification. While the tribes’ consultant chose to use the Crow Creek Sioux tribes’ offer from May 1957, he did not use the Lower Brule Sioux tribes’ offer from the same time. Instead, the consultant chose to use the Lower Brule Sioux tribes’ initial offer from 3 years earlier—July 1954— without any explanation. Furthermore, rather than consistently using the Lower Brule Sioux tribes’ July 1954 offer, the consultant used the tribes’ rehabilitation offer from April 1957, again without any explanation. The tribes’ consultant correctly points out that only three of the seven tribes have received additional compensation consistent with the ranges calculated in our two prior reports. Until this report, the Congress had only asked us to review these three tribes’ additional compensation requests, and, each time, the Congress provided additional compensation within the ranges we calculated. Furthermore, our two prior reports dealt with the three highest tribal claims for additional compensation—all over $90 million—whereas, the four tribes that obtained additional compensation based on a per-acre calculation were all less than $40 million, and we were not asked to review those requests. As noted in this report, although the additional compensation already provided to the tribes in 1996 and 1997 was calculated on a per-acre basis, by coincidence, for the Lower Brule Sioux tribe it was within the range we would have proposed and for the Crow Creek Sioux tribe it was above our range. As such, should the Congress rely on our analysis in this report and not provide these two tribes a third round of compensation, then the additional compensation provided to five of the seven tribes would generally be within the ranges we have calculated, leaving only two tribes that would have had their additional compensation calculated based on a per-acre analysis and not analyzed by GAO. Accordingly, we believe our approach would provide more consistency among the tribes. It is important to note that both the consultant’s analysis and the two bills pending in the 109th Congress state that the additional compensation amounts for the Crow Creek Sioux and Lower Brule Sioux tribes are based on a methodology deemed appropriate by GAO. We do not believe our analysis supports the additional compensation claims. We recognize that compensation issues can be a sensitive, complex, and controversial. Ultimately, it is up to the Congress to make a policy determination as to whether additional compensation should be provided and, if so, how much it should be. We amended our observations to reflect this reality. We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional committees, the Secretary of the Interior, the tribes’ consultant, the Crow Creek Sioux and Lower Brule Sioux tribes, and other interested parties. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or nazzaror@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI. To assess the consultant’s methods and analysis for determining additional compensation for the Crow Creek Sioux and Lower Brule Sioux tribes as a result of the flooding of 38,000 acres of their land and resources by the installation of the Fort Randall and Big Bend Dams, we used standard economic principles and the analysis we conducted in our two prior reports on additional compensation. We met with the tribes’ consultant to determine how he used the method that we suggested the Congress adopt as the basis for granting additional compensation to other tribes and reviewed additional information he provided on how he arrived at his proposed compensation amounts. In order to ensure that we obtained and reviewed all relevant data, we conducted a literature search for congressional, agency, and tribal documents at the National Archives and the Department of the Interior’s (Interior) library. We used original documents to learn about the negotiation process and to identify the appraised land prices and various proposed settlement amounts. As a result, we determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for purposes of this report. Specifically, from the National Archives, we reviewed legislative files containing proposed House and Senate bills, public laws enacted, House and Senate reports, and hearings held on compensation for the tribes. In addition, from Interior’s library, we obtained Missouri River Basin Investigations Unit documents to review information on early damage estimates as a result of installation of the Fort Randall Dam and on details regarding both informal and formal negotiations between the federal government and the two tribes. We also met with representatives of the two tribes on their reservations in South Dakota to (1) discuss the analysis, the actions taken with the compensation previously obtained, and plans for the additional compensation amounts requested and (2) review any records they might have on earlier compensation negotiations. The tribes, however, did not have any documentation on tribal discussions or decisions regarding either compensation negotiations or offers that took place in the 1950s and 1960s. We performed our work from October 2005 to April 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. January 4, February 14 Tribal Prity Act reintrodced as H.R. 109 nd S. January 4, February 14 Tribal Prity Act reintrodced as H.R. 109 nd S. The following are our comments on the Crow Creek Sioux and Lower Brule Sioux tribes’ consultant’s letter dated April 27, 2006. 1. The tribes’ consultant did not calculate a range of additional compensation as we suggested in our report. Our approach is to provide the Congress with a range of possible additional compensation based on the difference between the amounts the tribes believed was warranted at the time of the taking and the final settlement amount. We then adjusted the differences using the inflation rate for the lower end of the range and the corporate bond rate for the higher end. In deciding not to calculate a low-end value using the inflation rate, the consultant stated that “…there is no precedent for Congress using the inflation rate as a basis for any additional compensation it has awarded to the seven Tribes since 1992.” While the consultant is correct in stating that the Congress has not provided any tribe with additional compensation at the lowest value in the ranges we have calculated, there is a precedent for the Congress providing an amount less than the highest value. In 1992, the Congress authorized $90.6 million in additional compensation for the Standing Rock Sioux tribe, which was toward the low end of the possible compensation range we calculated of $64.5 million to $170 million. Although the Congress did not select the lowest value, having a lower value provided the Congress with a range from which to select. We did not suggest that the consultant should propose a range of additional compensation using four different approaches. 2. Determining whether additional compensation is warranted is a policy decision for the Congress to decide. Nonetheless, if the Congress relies on our analysis in this report and does not provide a third round of compensation to the Crow Creek Sioux and Lower Brule Sioux tribes, the additional compensation provided to five of the seven tribes—the Cheyenne River Sioux tribe, the Crow Creek Sioux tribe, the Lower Brule Sioux tribe, the Standing Rock Sioux tribe, and the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation—would generally fall within the ranges we calculated using our approach, thereby leaving only two tribes—the Santee Sioux tribe and the Yankton Sioux tribe— that would have had their additional compensation calculated on a per- acre basis and not reviewed by GAO. As a result, we believe using our approach, which is based on the amounts that the tribes believed were warranted at the time of the taking, would provide more consistency among the tribes, rather than less. 3. The tribes’ consultant did not make the amounts from different years comparable before making his per-acre calculations. The consultant did not adjust the original compensation amounts from 1947 through 1962 before adding them with the additional compensation amounts from 1992 through 2002. As a result, any comparisons made between the compensation amounts of the Crow Creek Sioux and Lower Brule Sioux tribes and other tribes, such as the Cheyenne River Sioux tribe or the Santee Sioux tribe, would be inaccurate. For example, for the Lower Brule Sioux tribe, the consultant added three amounts from 1958, 1962, and 1997 for a total of $43.6 million, without first adjusting the individual amounts to constant dollars. More importantly, we do not believe that an aggregate per-acre comparison among the tribes is appropriate. We agree with the tribes’ consultant that the tribes all suffered similar damages, but similar does not mean exactly the same. Damages would have to be exactly the same among all tribes for there to be equal total compensation on a per-acre basis, and this was not the case. Products, such as buildings, timber, and wildlife, were valued differently depending on type and some tribes lost more of one resource than other tribes. As a result, their per-acre compensation values would be different. Also, about half of the payments to four of the tribes were for rehabilitation that was not directly linked to the acreage flooded by the dams. 4. We disagree that the additional compensation authorized for the Cheyenne River Sioux tribe in 2000 had a “skewing” effect on the additional compensation provided to the four other tribes prior to that time. The additional compensation authorized for the Cheyenne River Sioux tribe fell within the range we calculated, as did the additional compensation authorized for the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation and the Standing Rock Sioux tribe. Our range was based on the amount the Cheyenne Rive Sioux tribe believed was warranted at the time of the taking. Furthermore, as our analysis in this report demonstrates, although the Crow Creek Sioux and Lower Brule Sioux tribes were provided with additional compensation in 1996 and 1997 based on a per-acre analysis, the amounts were consistent with, or higher, than the ranges we calculated in this report. 5. As the tribes’ consultant noted in his comments, he did not use the tribes’ highest offers in every case in his original analysis because he believed that some of those offers, such as the $16 million rehabilitation figure requested by the Lower Brule Sioux tribe, were skewed by special circumstances. However, the consultant uses these same highest asking prices in his fourth alternative, even though he believed them to be too unreasonable to include in his original analysis. 6. The tribes’ consultant is correct in pointing out that we did not use the exact phrase “final asking price” in our two prior reports. However, the ranges we calculated in our 1991 and 1998 reports were based on the final asking price of the tribes and their final settlements. We used the phrase “at the time of the taking” as a general phrase to denote the time period when the tribes’ were negotiating with the government for compensation for the damages caused by the dams. It is not intended to refer to a specific date. 7. We disagree with the tribes’ consultant that tribal members were forced to relocate without funds for moving expenses. The tribes did receive initial funds based on the Missouri River Basin Investigations Unit appraisals to help cover relocation expenses 3 years before they made what we refer to as their final asking prices in March 1958. In March 1955, the Crow Creek Sioux tribe received $399,313 and the Lower Brule Sioux tribe received $270,611 from the court, with the understanding that negotiations between the tribes, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and Interior would continue until settlements were achieved. Tribal committees were formed to plan relocation activities with these funds. 8. We disagree with the tribes’ consultant regarding his characterization of the rehabilitation portion of the payment the tribes received. We state in this report that it should be considered separately from the comparison of the dams because it was not directly related to the damage caused by the dams. The tribes’ consultant states that “…the Congress has consistently demonstrated the understanding that funds for rehabilitation were directly linked to the damages caused by the dams.” We agree that funding for rehabilitation became intertwined with compensation for the dams, and we included rehabilitation in our analysis in this report, as shown in tables 9 and 10, as we did for the Cheyenne River Sioux tribe and the Standing Rock Sioux tribe. However, we disagree that rehabilitation is directly linked to the damages caused by the dams for the following three reasons. First, other tribes not affected by dam projects were also provided with rehabilitation funding. Second, rehabilitation funding was to improve the economic and social conditions of all tribal members, it was not limited to only those members directly affected by the dams. Third, it was clear during the negotiations that the government did not consider rehabilitation funding to be compensation for the damages caused by the dams. In addition, in this report, as in our 1998 report, we show the breakout of each component in our analysis to provide the Congress with the most complete information. In addition to the individual named above, Jeffery D. Malcolm, Assistant Director; Greg Carroll; Timothy J. Guinane; Susanna Kuebler; and Carol Herrnstadt Shulman made key contributions to this report. Also contributing to the report were Omari Norman, Kim Raheb, and Jena Y. Sinkfield.

Summary: From 1946 to 1966, the government constructed the Fort Randall and Big Bend Dams as flood control projects on the Missouri River in South Dakota. The reservoirs created behind the dams flooded about 38,000 acres of the Crow Creek and Lower Brule Indian reservations. The tribes received compensation when the dams were built and additional compensation in the 1990s. The tribes are seeking a third round of compensation based on a consultant's analysis. The Congress provided additional compensation to other tribes after two prior GAO reports. For those reports, GAO found that one recommended approach to providing additional compensation would be to calculate the difference between the tribe's final asking price and the amount that was appropriated by the Congress, and then to adjust it using the inflation rate and an interest rate to reflect a range of current values. GAO was asked to assess whether the tribes' consultant followed the approach used in GAO's prior reports. The additional compensation amounts calculated by the tribes' consultant are contained in H.R. 109 and S. 374. The tribes' consultant differed from the approach used in prior GAO reports by (1) not using the tribes' final asking prices as the starting point of the analysis and (2) not providing a range of additional compensation. First, in calculating additional compensation amounts, GAO used the tribes' final asking prices, recognizing that their final settlement position should be the most complete and realistic. In contrast, the consultant used selected figures from a variety of tribal settlement proposals. For example, for the rehabilitation component of the tribes' settlement proposals, the consultant used $13.1 million from proposals in 1957, rather than $6.7 million from the tribes' final rehabilitation proposals in 1961. Second, the tribes' consultant calculated only the highest additional compensation dollar value rather than providing the Congress with a range of possible additional compensation based on different adjustment factors, as in the earlier GAO reports. Based on calculations using the tribes' final asking prices, GAO's estimated range of additional compensation is generally comparable with what the tribes were authorized in the 1990s. By contrast, the consultant estimated about $106 million and $186 million for Crow Creek and Lower Brule, respectively (in 2003 dollars). There are two primary reasons for this difference. First, GAO used the tribes' final rehabilitation proposals from 1961, rather than the 1957 proposals used by the consultant. Second, GAO's dollar amounts were adjusted only through 1996 and 1997 to compare them directly with what the tribes received at that time. The consultant, however, adjusted for interest earned through 2003, before comparing it with the payments authorized in the 1990s. The additional compensation already authorized for the tribes in the 1990s is consistent with the additional compensation authorized for other tribes on the Missouri River. GAO's analysis does not support the additional compensation amounts contained in H.R. 109 and S. 374.