Table 1 lists the 37 research reactors operating in the United States. Of the 33 reactors that NRC licenses and regulates, 27 are located on university campuses. In contrast, all DOE research reactors are located in relatively isolated locations and at facilities where public access is restricted because weapons-usable nuclear materials associated with DOE’s nuclear weapons programs are also stored on site. Several factors may make research reactors a target for terrorists. For example, most U.S. research reactors are located on university campuses; while these research reactors have security systems in place, none are protected with the kind of security or armed security forces that protect nuclear power reactors. Furthermore, once inside the reactor building, terrorists may gain access to the reactor. Figure 1 shows the inside of a research reactor. In addition, while power reactors use LEU fuel, several research reactors still use HEU fuel in order to produce the appropriate conditions in the reactor for conducting a wide variety of research. HEU is attractive to terrorists looking to construct a crude nuclear weapon. NRC’s Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has oversight responsibility for all NRC-licensed research reactors. DOE’s Office of Nuclear Energy, Science, and Technology’s Radiological Facilities Management program is charged with maintaining DOE research reactors in a secure manner. To enforce safety, security, and emergency planning requirements, both DOE and NRC conduct routine inspections to ensure compliance with DOE orders, manuals, and directives and with NRC regulations. DOE’s Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance—which independently assesses the effectiveness of DOE policies and programs in safeguards and security and emergency management for DOE facilities— routinely inspects DOE facilities for compliance with DOE safeguards and security requirements. NRC-licensed research reactors are licensed and routinely inspected by inspectors representing NRC’s Research and Test Reactor Section. The requirements for the physical protection of NRC- licensed research reactors are set out in NRC regulations and primarily focus on preventing the theft and diversion of fuel. In addition to the specific requirements established in the regulations, NRC may require— depending on the individual facility and site conditions—any additional measures it deems necessary to protect against radiological sabotage at research reactors that it licenses to operate above 2 MW of power. Commensurate with the security requirements, security related inspection activity is based on a graded approach, where security measures are based on the type and quantity of nuclear material on site. For example, research reactors licensed to possess more than 5 kilograms of HEU are inspected at least annually, while reactors that are licensed to possess less than 1 kilogram of HEU are inspected at least triennially. NRC used its security assessment of NRC-licensed research reactors to determine whether additional security measures were warranted. NRC’s assessment considered an analysis of security at reactors, as well as the consequences of attacks. The security assessment also included site- specific assessments of NRC-licensed research reactors to determine the vulnerability of structures, security operations, and physical protection systems, as well as access control systems at research reactors. Using varying numbers of adversaries and capabilities, NRC assessed threat scenarios, which included theft of fuel for use in a nuclear weapon or dirty bomb and sabotage attacks designed to disperse radioactive material. NRC used the number of immediate fatalities caused by radiological release resulting from an attack at a research reactor as its criterion to measure consequences and assessed the adequacy of the security at NRC-licensed reactors. If NRC discovered that there was potential to affect public health, it was to identify countermeasures to mitigate or prevent the consequences, while considering the cost-effectiveness of these countermeasures. As a complement to DOE and NRC security efforts, NNSA’s Reactor Conversion Program has a goal of reducing or eliminating the use of HEU at research reactors. To support this goal, NRC promulgated a rule in 1986 requiring all NRC-licensed research reactors to convert to LEU if feasible and if DOE provided adequate funding. In addition, under the 2005 North American Security and Prosperity Partnership, the United States, Mexico, and Canada agreed to convert civil HEU reactors on the North American continent to LEU fuel, where such LEU fuel is available. Since 2004, NNSA has overseen the fuel conversion of U.S. research reactors. To achieve NNSA’s goal, in 2005, NNSA’s reactor conversion program partnered with the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy University Reactors Program to accelerate the conversion of U.S. research reactors by providing funding to enable research reactors where LEU is available to convert as rapidly as possible. INL is the technical lead for the reactor conversion program’s fuel development effort. To protect its four research reactors, DOE uses the security and emergency requirements developed from its DBT and counts on the security afforded by the reactors’ locations at certain national laboratories that require heightened security. Furthermore, DOE has concluded that consequences from an attack at some of its research reactors could be severe and has therefore established extensive plans and procedures for safety and security incidents. DOE’s research reactors benefit from the greater security required for the national laboratories where the research reactors are located. The laboratories are engaged in nuclear weapon activities or store special nuclear material and therefore are to meet the requirements for DOE’s 2003 DBT. This DBT was developed to support DOE policies for preventing unauthorized access, theft, or sabotage of nuclear weapons and all special nuclear material under DOE’s jurisdiction. More specifically, following the DBT, DOE requires its research reactors to be protected in a graded manner; that is, a reactor possessing more dangerous nuclear material must be safeguarded more securely than those that have less dangerous material. For example, SNL and INL–-the locations of DOE’s Annular Core Research Reactor and its Neutron Radiography Reactor, respectively—store weapons-usable nuclear materials and therefore have robust security features and specially dedicated, heavily armed guard forces. The other two DOE reactors—the Advanced Test Reactor and High Flux Isotope Reactor—located at INL and ORNL, respectively, have extensive security features, including perimeter barbed-wire fences and armed security guards at all times. In addition, DOE requires that all personnel with routine access to DOE reactors have a federal security clearance. Among other things, this requirement helps to reduce the possibility of an insider threat. We also found that DOE is engaged in efforts to improve security at the reactor sites. For example, at the SNL and INL sites the locations of the Annular Core Research Reactor and Neutron Radiography Reactor, respectively, DOE recently made several security upgrades, including installing new surveillance systems with thermal imaging cameras; these cameras enable surveillance of the surrounding territory for up to several miles, regardless of light and weather conditions. Despite extensive security features at DOE research reactors, we did find a security weakness and some research reactor vulnerabilities. Specifically, we discovered that the Web site for one DOE research reactor contained information about its refueling schedule. According to security experts, reactors are more vulnerable during refueling because large doors that are normally tightly secured must be opened to deliver fuel. After we brought this weakness to DOE’s attention, the department removed the information. Concerning vulnerabilities, at two DOE research reactors, we discovered key features at the reactor facilities that were vulnerable to attack, as DOE officials acknowledged. In both cases, the reactor operators store large amounts of spent reactor fuel in pools that are easily accessible to anyone inside the reactor facility. According to national laboratory officials at both of these facilities, this fuel is dangerous because if it is damaged during a terrorist attack, it could cause a large radiological release into the area surrounding the research reactor. During visits to both facilities, the reactor operators said that an attack on their spent fuel concerned them just as much as an attack on the actual reactor because of the potential for release of radiological material into the atmosphere. These operators said that the spent fuel needs to be removed for disposal; DOE plans to remove most of this spent fuel by 2012. DOE has concluded that the consequences of an attack at some of its research reactors could be severe, possibly causing radiation to be dispersed over many square miles and requiring the evacuation of nearby areas. As a result, all facilities where DOE reactors are located have established extensive plans and procedures for responding to reactor emergencies, as DOE policies require. For example, ORNL—the location of the High Flux Isotope Reactor—has a laboratory shift superintendent on duty at all times to classify potential events and coordinate preplanned responses geared to the nature of the event. According to ORNL officials, emergencies can lead to the mobilization of significant numbers of security personnel trained to respond to emergencies at the reactor. This mobilization could include the activation of the mutual assistance agreement between ORNL and the neighboring Y-12 National Security Complex to deploy Y-12’s off-duty security forces to ORNL in the event of a terrorist attack. DOE policies also require DOE research reactor operators, with DOE and laboratory officials, to assess the worst-case consequences of accidents or terrorist attacks at their research reactors and develop emergency response plans that call for evacuating areas up to 300-square miles surrounding the reactor in the event of a potentially hazardous radiological release into the atmosphere. Decisions to evacuate are made based on the amount of radiation to which people could be exposed, as determined by their proximity to the reactor and the amount of radioactivity released. Furthermore, in worst-case scenarios, DOE reactor facility emergency plans include multijurisdictional plans outlining the immediate coordination of regional and federal emergency response assets. NRC decided to largely retain the security and emergency response regulations it had in place before September 11, 2001. NRC decided to retain these requirements after conducting a security assessment between 2003 and 2006 and determining that these requirements were sufficient. However, we found that NRC’s security assessment used questionable analysis and assumptions that may not fully reflect the consequences of a terrorist sabotage attack. According to experts at INL and DHS, the consequences of a terrorist attack on a research reactor could be more than what NRC estimates. Consequently, even though a number of NRC- licensed research reactors have recently improved security, NRC’s security and emergency response requirements may need immediate strengthening to protect against the consequences of an attack. Between 2003 and 2006, NRC conducted a security assessment of NRC- licensed research reactors to determine whether existing security and emergency response requirements were sufficient to protect against an attack. NRC first conducted a screening analysis to assess the significance of the consequences of a sabotage attack at each of the 33 NRC-licensed research reactors and established a minimum radiological dose that an attack would have to produce before further assessment was warranted. Eventually, NRC concluded that the potential effects of terrorists sabotaging these 33 reactors were minimal and that the security and emergency response regulations for research reactor licensees did not need strengthening. In conducting this assessment, NRC established a minimum radiological dosage as the criterion to determine if a full security assessment was necessary. During its initial phase of this assessment, NRC determined that most of the reactors would experience minimal consequences from sabotage and therefore present a low radiological risk to public health and safety. For the remaining reactors, NRC conducted a further detailed security assessment. NRC concluded that the potential effects of an attack at these reactors were also minimal and that the security and emergency response regulations for research reactors did not need strengthening. NRC’s security assessment also included SNL’s evaluation of the security of NRC-licensed research reactors; however, NRC disagreed with several of SNL’s findings. NRC contracted with SNL to help perform its security assessment, and as part of this work, SNL estimated the probabilities that terrorists could successfully carry out an attack on NRC-licensed reactors. SNL found that some NRC-licensed research reactors may not be prepared for certain types of terrorist attacks. For example, SNL’s analysis of several reactors found that under certain scenarios involving a small group of well-trained terrorists, an attack on a reactor could be successful. NRC, however, believed that SNL’s assumptions about terrorists’ capabilities were excessive and that SNL did not give enough credit to the capabilities of first responders. Ultimately, NRC disagreed with SNL about the security of research reactors. In its final analysis, NRC concluded that, because the radiological consequences of an attack would be minimal, no changes in the security and emergency response regulations for NRC-licensed research reactors were necessary. However, NRC’s security assessment may contain important shortcomings. As a result, NRC may not have a sound basis for determining the adequacy of security and emergency response requirements for its licensed research reactors. Based on our analysis and an analysis conducted by an INL reactor vulnerability expert at our request, we concluded that NRC’s security assessment used questionable assumptions and analyses about research reactor security and the potential consequences of an attack on NRC-licensed research reactors. Specifically, NRC made the following assumptions that we have reason to question: NRC assumed that terrorists would use certain weapons and tactics in attacking a reactor but did not fully consider alternative attack scenarios which could be more damaging if carried out successfully. According to an SNL expert, attacking a research reactor using this alternative approach would be a difficult and sophisticated task, which would likely require specific knowledge of reactors and sabotage techniques. Nonetheless, this expert stated that such an attack was possible and identified detailed information for carrying it out. Moreover, the attack scenarios that NRC did not fully consider could lead to more significant consequences than NRC estimates, according to an INL reactor vulnerability expert. NRC assumed that only a small portion of a research reactor could be damaged in a terrorist attack, resulting in the release of only a small amount of radioactivity into the atmosphere. However, according to experts at INL and DHS, it is possible that a larger portion of a research reactor could be damaged in a terrorist attack. If this occurred, these experts also noted that an attack could result in a release of a larger amount of radioactivity into the atmosphere over neighboring communities. NRC assumed that insiders with access to the reactor would only participate to a limited degree. However, in similar security assessments for DOE facilities, DOE assumes that insiders would fully participate in an attack, and it has designed its defenses on the assumption of full participation. Fully participating insiders could both provide information, such as details of the facility layout and operating schedule, as well as participate in an attack by performing key functions, such as opening doors or disabling alarm systems. NRC officials acknowledge that if its assessment had assumed fully participating insiders, then the results of its assessment may have turned out differently. “It is clear that an event as described in this report could have significant consequences. The consequences of a successful sabotage attack in addition to the direct dose could be significant radioactive material release and subsequent contamination of areas that have high socio-economic impact. It is important that the risk from these reactors be well characterized and the emergency preparedness for such an event be included the planning process.” Because most NRC-licensed research reactors are located on college campuses or in urban areas, the release of large amounts of radiation could affect a substantial portion of the population. We discussed the INL reactor vulnerability expert’s analysis with INL’s Deputy Associate Laboratory Director for National and Homeland Security Directorate, who stated that the analysis was technically accurate and that their reactor vulnerability expert had done good work in preparing it. However, he cautioned us that the analysis represented the efforts of only one of INL’s reactor vulnerability experts. In his view, a more comprehensive analysis of the vulnerability and the consequences of a terrorist attack on a research reactor is warranted. Such a study should include experts from a variety of technical areas, including national intelligence sources, and involve more than one laboratory. These experts would determine the most appropriate assumptions that should be used in the analysis. For example, according to the Deputy Associate Laboratory Director, one important part of such an analysis would be examining the physical nature of damaging a research reactor. This could be done through modeling and actual experiments. Once this is determined, it would inform other aspects of a reactor vulnerability analysis and result in a more comprehensive understanding of the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. We shared the results of INL’s reactor vulnerability expert’s analysis with NRC, who disagreed with several of the basic assumptions and findings concerning the consequences of an attack on a research reactor. NRC’s reasons for its disagreement, and our analysis of these reasons, are discussed in detail in the classified version of this report. NRC maintains an active oversight program of all research reactor licensees, which includes routine safety and security inspections. Between 2001 and 2006, NRC worked with its licensees to make immediate security improvements to research reactors where needed. As a result of continuing oversight activities, when NRC found additional security measures were necessary to ensure public health and safety, NRC requested that licensees implement additional security measures. NRC verified improved security through inspections and issued letters formally binding the licensees to maintain security enhancements. During our visits to NRC-licensed research reactors, we found the following improvements to security: improved access controls to key areas inside reactor facilities, augmented surveillance of activities within controlled access areas, and improved alarm and communication systems. For example, one NRC research reactor licensee installed antitruck bomb barriers, including concrete and steel reinforced poles and a steel cable gate, which are not required for the category of reactor at this particular facility. In fact, we discovered that several of NRC’s research reactor licensees have made security improvements that exceed NRC’s security requirements. Similarly, to address the potential truck bomb threat, several other NRC research reactor licensees have placed jersey barriers near exterior parts of reactor buildings. Figure 2 shows a research reactor building surrounded with jersey barriers. Some NRC-licensed research reactors have added jersey barriers, installed new steel-hardened doors, and improved camera surveillance systems. Still another licensee installed a new alarm system that is hardwired to the closest police station, which monitors reactor alarms at all times. Despite such improvements, we identified potential shortcomings with current security and emergency response requirements and measures. These requirements and measures may require immediate attention if NRC’s assessment of the consequences of an attack on its licensed reactors is deficient. For example: At two research reactors we visited, we found features of the reactor that if damaged during an attack could make the reactor more at risk for radiological releases. According to an SNL security analysis of NRC-licensed research reactors, a number of reactors could be attacked and sabotaged by well-trained terrorists. If an NRC-licensed research reactor were attacked, the local police would have to assess the threat and determine the appropriate response before the attackers have completed the tasks needed to sabotage the reactor. At still another research reactor, we found an unlocked and unalarmed access leading directly into the reactor room. In this case, the licensee is relying on another security measure that might be overcome. However, this measure could be compromised. In our view, it is both sensible and inexpensive to put a lock and an alarm trigger on this access to the reactor room, rather than depend on having one element of the security system function flawlessly. In response to the Energy Policy Act of 2005, NRC has begun to address a potential security weakness we identified during our review. Specifically, we found that NRC did not require research reactor licensees to conduct extensive background checks on their staff with access to reactors. However, starting in 2006, NRC began requiring research reactor licensees to fingerprint staff with access to sensitive security information and subject them to a criminal history background check by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Furthermore, in May 2007, NRC ordered research reactor licensees to subject all staff with unescorted access to reactors to this check. All of the NRC-licensed research reactors that we visited have detailed and coordinated emergency plans for responding to terrorist attacks, including the deployment of police, Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT), fire, ambulance, and hazardous material personnel to the reactor facility. In addition, most NRC-licensed research reactors licensees we visited have agreements with local law enforcement and other first responders for responses to emergencies. For example, the research reactor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology has memorandums of understanding with the city of Cambridge Police Department, Fire Department, Emergency Management Department, and Massachusetts General Hospital outlining cooperation in case of emergencies. However, we found weaknesses in two key areas of NRC emergency response plan requirements—evacuation planning and first response: Few Reactors Have Evacuation Planning. Evacuation planning is important because most NRC-licensed reactors are located in highly populated areas, with other buildings located near the reactor facility. For example, one NRC-licensed research reactor is located within 100 yards of a day-care facility, 300 yards of a university dormitory, and one-half mile of a stadium that holds more than 90,000 fans on game days during football season. NRC regulations for emergency plans require licensees to establish plans for coping with emergencies, but NRC does not require that these plans include evacuation plans for areas surrounding its licensed reactors. Instead, these requirements only require licensees to establish limited emergency planning zones, which vary in size depending on the size of the reactor. The acceptable emergency planning zone for reactors that NRC licenses to operate at 2 MW or less—that is, 30 of the 33 NRC-licensed research reactors—is limited to the grounds of the reactor facility; there are no evacuation plans for the areas surrounding the reactor. Two other NRC-licensed research reactors—at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the University of Missouri, Columbia—must establish an emergency planning zone with possible evacuation of 100 meters surrounding the research reactor; the 20 MW National Institute of Standards and Technology reactor must establish an emergency planning zone of 400 meters. Some First Responders Are Not Armed. NRC regulations on emergency response require that licensees ensure that a watchman or off- site response force will respond to unauthorized entrance or activity at research reactors, but regulations do not require first responders for emergencies at research reactors to be armed. At most NRC-licensed reactors we visited, the designated first responders are armed. At a few reactors, however, unarmed campus police—not local law enforcement agencies—would be the first responders when alarms are set off. Such plans are likely to delay an armed police response. According to SNL security experts, the lack of a timely armed response increases the risk that a terrorist attack will be successful. NNSA has converted 8 currently operating U.S. research reactors from HEU to LEU fuel and has plans to convert 10 remaining reactors by 2014. However, NNSA will confront challenges in converting 5 of these 10 remaining research reactors because they cannot be converted with fuel that is currently available. According to NNSA and national laboratory officials, the schedule for fuel development is optimistic and further technical setbacks in fuel development would likely delay their research reactor conversion plans. Since 1978, when the reactor conversion program started, DOE has converted a total of 8 currently operating U.S. research reactors from HEU to LEU fuel. In 2004, we reported on the progress of the reactor conversion program and recommended, among other things, that NNSA place a higher priority on converting these reactors. In response to our recommendation, in 2006, NNSA converted 2 more operating U.S. research reactors from HEU to LEU fuel. NNSA plans to convert an additional 10 U.S. research reactors by 2014, including 5 that can convert with currently available fuel and 5 that cannot convert with currently available fuel. The 2 NRC-licensed research reactors that converted in 2006 were reactors at the University of Florida and Texas A&M University, which were converted at a cost of about $3 million and $7 million, respectively. These recent conversions represent the first U.S. conversions since 2000 and are part of NNSA’s expanded effort to convert research reactors worldwide. NNSA plans to convert the remaining 5 U.S. research reactors that can convert with currently available fuel by September 2009 at an estimated cost of $37 million (see table 2). NNSA has set a target date of 2014 for converting the five remaining HEU research reactors that cannot convert with currently available fuel. NNSA is now developing a new fuel that will allow the remaining five reactors to convert; according to an NNSA official, this new fuel must be developed by 2011 if NNSA is to meet its 2014 conversion schedule goal. We believe that the conversion schedule may be optimistic because developing this fuel has been problematic. For example, early efforts to develop the fuel experienced failures during testing that caused NNSA to push back anticipated completion dates from 2008 to 2010, and NNSA has since delayed the completion of the fuel until 2011. Argonne National Laboratory officials working on the fuel development effort at that time characterized the failures during testing as the worst they had ever experienced. According to NNSA officials and INL fuel development scientists, more recent attempts to develop new LEU fuel appear promising. In addition, a series of recent successful tests of the new fuel, including fuel fabrication and testing at the Advanced Test Reactor are indicative of the potential to successfully develop the new LEU fuel. However, NNSA and national laboratory officials acknowledged that the fuel development schedule is optimistic and that further technical setback would likely delay DOE’s research reactor conversion plans. NNSA estimates that an additional $46 million will be needed to actually convert reactors once the fuel is available. This estimate is uncertain. If any further technical difficulties are experienced in the process of developing the new fuel, additional funding will be required for further fuel improvements, and the estimated conversion date will not be met. Table 3 outlines the schedule for converting the five research reactors that cannot convert with currently available fuel. The NRC-licensed nuclear research reactors located throughout the United States play an important role in education and basic scientific research. However, because most of these reactors are located on university campuses, they face unique challenges in both remaining accessible for educational purposes and providing enough security to protect neighboring communities from the potentially significant impacts of a terrorist attack. Understanding the consequences of a terrorist attack on these research reactors is critical to determining the level of security needed to protect them. To understand the consequences of an attack, NRC conducted a security assessment of its licensed reactors and concluded that the consequences would be minimal—having almost no effect on nearby areas. However, NRC’s security assessment may underestimate the potential consequences of an attack because it used assumptions and analyses about reactor security and terrorist capabilities that we believe are questionable. Additionally, NRC’s conclusions are not supported by the findings of SNL, an INL reactor vulnerability expert, and a DHS expert. SNL found that a group of well-trained terrorists could gain access to a number of NRC-licensed research reactors. Moreover, INL and DHS experts believe that it is possible that a meaningful portion of a research reactor could be damaged in an attack. Such an attack could result in a radioactive release that is greater than NRC estimates in their assessment. Without an analysis that better reflects the full range of expert opinion on the security of reactors and the capabilities of potential terrorist forces, NRC will not have fully considered the risks posed by research reactors. NRC will also lack assurance that it has established security and emergency response plan requirements commensurate with the risks posed by attacks on its licensed research reactors. To better understand and prepare for the potential consequences of a terrorist attack on NRC-licensed research reactors, we recommended in our October 2007 classified report that the Chairman of NRC reassess the consequences of terrorist attacks on NRC-licensed research reactors using assumptions that better reflect a fuller range of outside expert opinion on the security of reactors and the capabilities of potential terrorist forces. If NRC finds that the consequences of an attack on a research reactor are more severe than previously estimated, we recommended that the Chairman of NRC take the following three actions: ensure that the security requirements for research reactors are commensurate with the consequences of attacks, reexamine emergency response requirements to address whether evacuation plans should be included, and require that first responders to alarms at research reactors be armed. We provided DOE, NNSA, and NRC with draft copies of our classified report for their review and comment. As discussed in our classified report, NNSA, whose comments also reflected DOE’s views, generally agreed with the report and provided minor technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate in this unclassified report as well. NRC did not agree with the report and stated that the report provides an unbalanced assessment of its effort to enhance security at research reactors since September 11, 2001. NRC summarized its views in a separate unclassified letter which we have included in appendix I, along with our comments. NRC criticized our report in four areas. First, NRC stated that the draft report misrepresented the effort it has made following September 11, 2001, to assess and enhance the security of research reactors; it also asserted that we compared security requirements for NRC-licensed research reactors with DOE operated reactors and that the comparison is incomplete and inaccurate. Second, NRC stated that we misrepresented its use of the SNL security assessment and that we incorrectly stated that NRC had dismissed the findings in SNL’s assessment. Third, NRC asserted that our report misrepresented or excluded key facts. Finally, NRC believes that our assumptions concerning terrorist attack scenarios lack a sound technical basis. First, we disagree with NRC’s assertion that our report misrepresents the Commission’s efforts since September 11, 2001, to assess and enhance the security of research reactors. We accurately describe NRC’s active oversight actions, including routine inspections for safety and security. Furthermore, we give NRC credit for working with research reactor licensees to make, and to verify, many security improvements that NRC identified as necessary. We also discuss the many security features and improvements at NRC-licensed research reactors that we visited and note that several of the licensees have made security improvements that exceed NRC’s security requirements. Furthermore, contrary to NRC’s comments, our report does not compare security requirements for NRC-licensed and DOE operated research reactors or actual security conditions at the reactors. Rather, our report discusses our findings on security requirements and their implementation at NRC-licensed and DOE operated research reactors. Second, we disagree with NRC’s assertion that our report misrepresents NRC’s use of the SNL security assessment and that NRC dismissed SNL’s security assessment. Our report did not state that NRC “dismissed” the security assessment; instead, it accurately states that NRC “disagreed” with SNL about the security of research reactors. Furthermore, NRC itself has reiterated this disagreement with the SNL analysis in writing on several occasions. Specifically, when NRC provided us with copies of SNL’s security assessment, it also provided a disclaimer stating that NRC “does not support many of the assumptions and/or information contained in these reports and…the reports cannot be used independently to develop any conclusions regarding the security or protective measures for the facilities contained in the reports.” In addition, a 2005 statement by an NRC Commissioner concerning SNL’s work further supports our point that NRC disagreed with the SNL analysis. This Commissioner states, “because the Sandia security assessment reports contain scenarios and assumptions that are not supported by the Commission, the reports should not be released to anyone outside the agency nor should they be shared with licensees or stakeholders.” Continuing, this Commissioner states that SNL’s security reports “if taken out of context, could prove to be an enormous burden on NRC and our licensees and could result in a tremendous amount of time spent explaining why we think the Sandia analyses are deeply flawed.” Third, we disagree with NRC’s assertion that our report misrepresents or excludes key facts. In particular, NRC states that INL and SNL refute our characterization of key facts gathered from INL, federal agencies, and SNL to support our recommendations. With regard to INL, we did receive a letter from INL in June 2007 requesting that we not include or refer in any fashion to any INL technical judgments contained in the INL report. Later that month, we spoke with INL management about the reason for this request. As we state in our report, according to INL’s Deputy Associate Laboratory Director for National and Homeland Security Directorate, INL believes that a more comprehensive analysis of the vulnerability and consequences of attacks on research reactors is warranted. Nonetheless, this official stated that the INL analysis was technically accurate and INL’s vulnerability expert had done good work in preparing it. As a result of this discussion, we deleted from the report much of the specific details of this analysis, such as the specific estimates of radiological consequences, and instead provided only a short summary of the key findings of the analysis. Our report includes a statement from the INL analysis stating that a terrorist attack could produce “significant consequences” and have “high socio-economic impact” because INL officials emphasized this point during communications with us after we received INL’s June 2007 letter. Furthermore, in its comments, NRC states that INL requested that we exclude from our report references to information we obtained from verbal communications with INL experts. INL never asked us to exclude discussions we had during our visit to INL and subsequent discussions with INL officials. INL would have no basis to make such a request because representatives of INL management arranged our meetings with INL experts to gather the information and data needed to complete our work. With respect to SNL, in neither of two sets of written comments did SNL dispute our primary conclusion regarding its work for NRC—that some NRC-licensed research reactors may not be prepared for certain types of terrorist attacks—nor did SNL disagree with our main report recommendation. We received initial comments from SNL in July 2007 on an early version of our classified draft report. At that time, we revised our draft to acknowledge one of SNL’s key points—namely, that damaging a research reactor is a difficult and sophisticated task. However, we did not include further details of these initial comments because they were inconsistent with the information SNL had provided during extensive discussions over 2 days in November 2006. For example, in its July 2007 written comments, SNL provided information that demonstrated why this task is so difficult. However, during discussions with SNL’s expert, he noted that damaging a reactor was possible and provided us with very detailed steps of how to do so. These steps addressed many of the very limitations discussed in the July 2007 comments from SNL. Furthermore, a key finding of our report is that NRC disagreed with the SNL finding that some NRC-licensed research reactors may not be prepared for certain types of terrorist attacks. In its July 2007 comments, SNL did not address our characterization of the work it did for NRC. Finally, in subsequent comments provided in September 2007 as part of DOE’s technical comments, SNL expanded upon its earlier comments regarding the difficulty of sabotaging a research reactor which we had already acknowledged in the report. In discussing this point, SNL stated that further study was needed on the extent to which terrorists could damage a research reactor. Regardless of the details of the work performed by INL and SNL, which we believe raise key concerns, one thing remains clear: there is need for further study to better understand the risks and consequences of an attack on a research reactor by well trained terrorists. Finally, NRC asserted that our assumptions regarding terrorist attack scenarios lack a sound technical basis. We disagree. Specifically, we note the following: The findings in our report do not rely on assumptions but, instead, are based on the evidence we collected from experts at NRC, DOE, INL, SNL, DHS, and other sources. This evidence demonstrates that there is uncertainty about some aspects of NRC’s security assessment. However, NRC’s comments suggest that no such uncertainty exists, even though in some cases NRC used assumptions in its security assessment that it had difficulty defending. For example, NRC officials did not fully consider an alternative attack scenario that could be more damaging if carried out successfully because, according to NRC officials, the supervisor of the staff doing the assessment was an engineer who instructed the staff that such scenarios were unlikely, if not impossible. During discussions on this point, an NRC official acknowledged that if the alternative attack scenario had been fully assessed, NRC’s security assessment might have demonstrated more significant consequences. NRC states that we incorrectly assumed that terrorists could use certain tactics in attacking research reactors since there is a lack of intelligence information that terrorists have demonstrated these capabilities. We disagree. The events of September 11, 2001, and the threats faced by our armed forces in Iraq demonstrate that terrorists are capable of innovating how they conduct attacks. Consequently, we believe that, in conducting its security assessment, NRC should have considered a fuller range of threats, including both the threats that have occurred and the possibility of emerging threats. NRC also disagreed with our characterization of (1) what portion of a reactor could be damaged in a terrorist attack and (2) the extent of the radiation released from such an attack. However, experts at INL and DHS provided our evidence on these points. As previously discussed, according to an INL vulnerability expert, a well-executed terrorist attack could damage a significant portion of a research reactor and release a larger amount of radioactivity into the neighboring communities than NRC estimates. On this point, INL’s Deputy Associate Laboratory Director for National and Homeland Security Directorate told us that additional analysis and study is warranted in order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of both how much of a reactor could be damaged in an attack and what the resulting radiological consequences would be. As agreed with your office, unless you publicly release the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will then send copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees; the Secretary of Energy; the Administrator of NNSA; the Chairman of NRC; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix II. The following are GAO comments on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) letter dated December 17, 2007. 1. We disagree. We accurately describe NRC’s oversight actions taken since September 2001, including its process of performing routine inspections for safety and security. Furthermore, we give NRC credit for working with research reactor licensees to make, and to verify, many security improvements that NRC identified as necessary. We also discuss the many security features and improvements at NRC-licensed research reactors that we visited including security improvements that exceed NRC’s security requirements. 2. Our report does not misrepresent NRC’s use of Sandia National Laboratories’ (SNL) security assessment and did not state that NRC “dismissed” the security assessment. Instead, our report accurately states that NRC “disagreed” with SNL about the security of research reactors. On this point, NRC has reiterated its disagreement with the SNL analysis in writing several times. Specifically, when NRC provided us with copies of SNL’s security assessment, it also provided a disclaimer stating that NRC “does not support many of the assumptions and/or information contained in these reports and…the reports cannot be used independently to develop any conclusions regarding the security or protective measures for the facilities contained in the reports.” Furthermore, a 2005 statement from an NRC Commissioner concerning SNL’s work further supports our point that NRC disagreed with the SNL analysis. According to this Commissioner, “because the Sandia security assessment reports contain scenarios and assumptions that are not supported by the Commission, the reports should not be released to anyone outside the agency nor should they be shared with licensees or stakeholders.” He further states that SNL’s security reports “if taken out of context, could prove to be an enormous burden on NRC and our licensees and could result in a tremendous amount of time spent explaining why we think the Sandia analyses are deeply flawed.” 3. Contrary to NRC’s comments, our report does not compare security requirements for NRC-licensed and Department of Energy (DOE) operated research reactors or actual security conditions at the reactors. In fact, we reported on DOE and NRC security issues in separate sections of the report. We did, however, compare one assumption regarding how each agency considered the role of insiders who may provide assistance to an attacking force. In our view, this was an important comparison to make because, in its assessment, NRC assumed that insiders with access to the reactor would only participate to a limited degree in an attack on a reactor. However, in similar security assessments for DOE facilities, DOE assumed that insiders would fully participate in an attack, and it has designed its defenses on the assumption of full participation. In discussing this point with NRC officials, they acknowledged that if NRC’s assessment had assumed fully participating insiders, then the results of its assessment may have turned out differently. 4. Our report did not misrepresent or exclude key facts provided to us by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and SNL. With regard to INL, we did receive a letter from INL in June 2007 requesting that we not include or refer in any fashion to any INL technical judgments contained in the INL report, and we subsequently spoke with INL management about the reason for this request. As our report states, according to INL’s Deputy Associate Laboratory Director for National and Homeland Security Directorate, INL believes that a more comprehensive analysis of the vulnerability and consequences of attacks on research reactors is warranted. Nonetheless, this official stated that the INL analysis was technically accurate and INL’s vulnerability expert had done good work in preparing it. As a result of this discussion, we deleted from the report many of the specific details of this analysis, such as the specific estimates of radiological consequences, and instead provided only a short summary of the key findings in the analysis. As we pointed out in our report, the INL analysis stated that a terrorist attack could produce “significant consequences” and have “high socio-economic impact.” We retained this statement because INL officials emphasized this point during communications with us after we received INL’s June 2007 letter. Furthermore, although NRC states that INL asked us to exclude references to information we obtained from verbal communications with INL experts, INL never made such a request to us. INL would have no basis to make such a request because representatives of INL management arranged our meetings with INL experts to gather the information and data needed to complete our work. With respect to SNL, in neither of two sets of written comments did SNL dispute our primary conclusion regarding its work for NRC—that some NRC-licensed research reactors may not be prepared for certain types of terrorist attacks—nor did SNL disagree with our main report recommendation. We received initial comments from SNL in July 2007 on an early version of our classified draft report and revised our draft to acknowledge one of SNL’s key points—namely, that damaging a research reactor is a difficult and sophisticated task. However, we did not include further details of the SNL comments because they were inconsistent with the information we received during extensive discussions with SNL experts during 2 days in November 2006. For example, in its July 2007 written comments, SNL provided information that demonstrated why this task is so difficult. However, during discussions with SNL’s expert, he noted that damaging a reactor was possible and provided us with very detailed steps of how to do so. These steps addressed many of the very limitations discussed in the July 2007 comments from SNL. Furthermore, as we also reported, NRC disagreed with the SNL finding that some NRC-licensed research reactors may not be prepared for certain types of terrorist attacks. In its July 2007 comments, SNL did not address our characterization of the work it did for NRC. Finally, in subsequent comments provided in September 2007 as part of DOE’s technical comments, SNL provided more detailed information on the difficultly of sabotaging a research reactor. Our report includes SNL’s view that attacking a research reactor would be a difficult task that would likely require specific knowledge of reactors and sabotage techniques. Nonetheless, SNL’s comments also acknowledge the need for further study on the extent to which terrorists could damage a research reactor. Regardless of the details of the work performed by INL and SNL, which we believe raise key concerns, one thing remains clear: there is need for further study to better understand the risks and consequences of an attack on a research reactor by well trained terrorists. 5. We disagree with NRC’s assertion that our assumptions regarding terrorist attack scenarios lack a sound technical basis. Specifically, we note the following: The findings in our report do not rely on assumptions but instead are based on the evidence we collected from experts at NRC, DOE, INL, SNL, DHS, and other sources. This evidence demonstrates uncertainty about some aspects of NRC’s security assessment. In contrast, NRC’s comments suggest that no such uncertainty exists, even though in some cases NRC used assumptions in its security assessment that it had difficulty defending. For example, NRC officials did not fully consider an alternative attack scenario that could be more damaging if carried out successfully because, according to NRC officials, the supervisor of the staff doing the assessment instructed the staff that such scenarios were unlikely, if not impossible. An NRC official acknowledged that if the alternative attack scenario had been fully assessed, NRC’s security assessment might have demonstrated more significant consequences. We disagree with NRC’s statement that we incorrectly assumed that terrorists could use certain tactics in attacking research reactors, since there is a lack of intelligence information that terrorists have demonstrated these capabilities. NRC’s security assessment did not address certain tactics that were raised as a concern in its own intelligence documents. Furthermore, as the events of September 11, 2001, and the threats faced by our armed forces in Iraq have shown, terrorists are capable of innovating how they conduct attacks. Consequently, we believe that, in conducting its security assessment, NRC should have considered a fuller range of threats, including both the threats that have occurred and the possibility of emerging threats. We stand by the evidence provided by INL and DHS experts regarding the portion of a reactor that could be damaged in a terrorist attack and the extent of the radiation that could be released from such an attack. As previously discussed, according to an INL vulnerability expert, a well-executed terrorist attack could damage a significant portion of a research reactor and lead to the release of a larger amount of radioactivity into the neighboring communities than NRC estimates. On this point, INL’s Deputy Associate Laboratory Director for National and Homeland Security Directorate told us that more analysis and study is warranted to gain a more comprehensive understanding of both how much of a reactor could be damaged in an attack and what the resulting radiological consequences would be. 6. This comment refers to a classified report Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) issued in 1989. That report discussed the potential and limitations to a certain type of terrorist attack on research reactors that is discussed more fully in our classified report. The scenario addressed in the LANL report was similar to the type of attack identified in the INL analysis. (The LANL report was discussed in our classified report. Because the LANL report is classified, we are not including the details of the LANL report in this report.) However, we note that the LANL report was completed more than 15 years ago at a time when the United States faced different and less severe potential threats. In our view, the LANL study, when combined with the views of INL and DHS experts, demonstrates that there is some uncertainty within the community of reactor experts on the consequences of certain types of attacks on research reactors. This uncertainty provides the basis for our recommendation that NRC reconsider its security assessment. In addition to the contact named above, John Delicath, Doreen S. Feldman, Eugene Gray, Keith Rhodes, Ray Rodriguez, Peter Ruedel, Rebecca Shea, Carol Herrnstadt Shulman, Ned Woodward, and Franklyn Yao made key contributions to this report.

Summary: There are 37 research reactors in the United States, mostly located on college campuses. Of these, 33 reactors are licensed and regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Four are operated by the Department of Energy (DOE) and are located at three national laboratories. Although less powerful than commercial nuclear power reactors, research reactors may still be attractive targets for terrorists. As requested, GAO examined the (1) basis on which DOE and NRC established the security and emergency response requirements for DOE and NRC-licensed research reactors and (2) progress that the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has made in converting U.S. research reactors that use highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. This report summarizes the findings of GAO's classified report on the security of research reactors (GAO-08-156C). DOE developed the security and emergency response requirements for its research reactors using its Design Basis Threat--a process that establishes a baseline threat for which minimum security measures should be developed. These research reactors benefit from the greater security required for the national laboratories where they are located, which store weapons-usable nuclear materials. DOE also has concluded that the consequences of an attack at some of its research reactors could be severe, causing radioactivity to be dispersed over many square miles and requiring the evacuation of nearby areas. As a result, all facilities where DOE reactors are located have extensive plans and procedures for responding to security incidents. NRC based its security and emergency response requirements largely on the regulations it had in place before September 2001. NRC decided that the security assessment it conducted between 2003 and 2006 showed that these requirements were sufficient. While it was conducting this assessment, NRC worked with licensees to improve security when weaknesses were detected. However, GAO found that NRC's assessment contains questionable assumptions that create uncertainty about whether the assessment reflects the full range of security risks and potential consequences of attacks on research reactors. For example, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL)--a contractor NRC used to assist in performing its assessment-- found that some NRC-licensed research reactors may not be prepared for certain types of attacks. However, NRC disagreed with SNL's finding. In 2006, NRC concluded that the consequences of attacks would result in minimal radiological exposure to the public. In addition, NRC assumed that terrorists would use certain tactics in attacking a reactor but did not fully consider alternative attack scenarios that could be more damaging. Finally, NRC assumed that a small part of a reactor could be damaged in an attack, resulting in the release of only a small amount of radioactivity. However, according to experts at Idaho National Laboratories and the Department of Homeland Security, it is possible that a larger part of a reactor could be damaged, which could result in the release of larger amounts of radioactivity. NNSA has made progress in changing from HEU to LEU fuel in U.S. research reactors but may face difficulty in converting some of the remaining research reactors. Since 1978, NNSA has converted eight currently operating U.S. research reactors, including two in 2006. In addition, NNSA plans to convert 10 more U.S. research reactors by September 2014--five of which are scheduled for conversion by 2009. However, NNSA faces difficulties in converting the remaining five reactors because these reactors cannot operate with the currently available LEU fuel. NNSA is now developing a new LEU fuel that will allow the remaining five reactors to operate. However, according to NNSA, developing this fuel has been problematic, as early efforts experienced failures during testing. NNSA officials acknowledged that further setbacks are likely to delay plans to convert these research reactors.