A cyber incident can occur under many circumstances and for many reasons. It can be inadvertent, such as from the loss of an electronic device, or deliberate, such as from the theft of a device, or a cyber-based attack by a malicious individual or group, agency insiders, foreign nation, terrorist, or other adversary. Incidents have been reported at a wide range of public- and private-sector institutions, including federal, state, and local government agencies; educational institutions; hospitals and medical facilities; financial institutions; information resellers; retailers; and other types of businesses. Protecting federal systems and the information on them is essential because the loss or unauthorized disclosure or alteration of the information can lead to serious consequences and can result in substantial harm to individuals and the federal government. Specifically, ineffective protection of IT systems and information can result in threats to national security, economic well-being, and public health and safety; loss or theft of resources, including money and intellectual property; inappropriate access to and disclosure, modification, or destruction of sensitive information; use of computer resources for unauthorized purposes or to launch an attack on other computer systems; damage to networks and equipment; loss of public confidence; and high costs for remediation. While some cyber incidents can be resolved quickly and at minimal cost, others may go unresolved and incur exorbitant costs. Reported attacks and unintentional incidents involving federal systems such as those involving data loss or theft, computer intrusions, and privacy breaches underscore the importance of having strong security practices in place. In fiscal year 2013, US-CERT received notifications of 46,160 cyber incidents at all agencies and 43,931 incidents at the 24 major agencies. Cyber incidents reported by federal agencies increased in fiscal year 2013 significantly over the prior 3 years (see fig. 1), increasing almost 33 percent in the last 2 fiscal years. The following examples reported in 2013 illustrate that information and assets remain at risk. July 2013: Hackers stole a variety of personally identifiable information on more than 104,000 individuals from a Department of Energy system. Types of data stolen included Social Security numbers, birth dates and locations, bank account numbers, and security questions and answers. According to the department’s Inspector General, the combined costs of assisting affected individuals and lost productivity—due to federal employees being granted administrative leave to correct issues stemming from the breach—could be more than $3.7 million. June 2013: Edward Snowden, an employee of a contractor of the National Security Agency, disclosed classified documents through the media. In January 2014, the Director of National Intelligence testified, in his annual worldwide threat assessment, that insider threats will continue to pose a persistent challenge, as trusted insiders with the intent to do harm can exploit their access to compromise vast amounts of sensitive and classified information as part of a personal ideology or at the direction of a foreign government. June 2013: The Office of the Inspector General at the Department of Commerce reported that the department’s Economic Development Administration inaccurately identified a common malware infection as a sophisticated cyber attack by another country. To remedy the situation, according to the Office of Inspector General, the Economic Development Administration spent more than $2.7 million—more than half its fiscal year 2012 IT budget—on unnecessary incident response activities and destroyed more than $170,000 worth of IT components officials incorrectly thought to have been irrecoverably infected. The Office of Inspector General reported that a failure to adhere to the department’s incident handling procedures, a lack of experienced and qualified incident handlers, and a failure to coordinate incident handling activities all contributed to the mishandling of the incident. January 2013: A Romanian national was indicted in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York for allegedly running a “bulletproof hosting” service that enabled cyber criminals to distribute malicious software (malware) and conduct other sophisticated cybercrimes. Malware distributed by this hosting service had infected more than 1 million computers worldwide, including computers belonging to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), causing tens of millions of dollars in losses to the affected individuals, businesses, and government entities. NASA’s Office of Inspector General and the Federal Bureau of Investigation are investigating this incident. FISMA sets up a layered framework for managing cyber risks and assigns specific responsibilities to (1) OMB, including to develop and oversee the implementation of policies, principles, standards, and guidelines for information security; to report, at least annually, on agency compliance with the act; and to approve or disapprove agency information security programs; (2) agency heads, including to provide information security protections commensurate with the risk and magnitude of the harm resulting from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information collected or maintained by or on behalf of the agency; (3) agency heads and chief information officers, including to develop, document, and implement an agencywide information security program; (4) inspectors general, to conduct annual independent evaluations of agency efforts to effectively implement information security; and (5) NIST, to provide standards and guidance to agencies on information security. Organized, planned cyber incident response activities are essential in defending an information system and the information that resides on it from an accidental or malicious cyber incident. In addition, FISMA requires the establishment of a federal information security incident center to, among other things, provide timely technical assistance to agencies regarding cyber incidents. Each federal agency must also report annually to OMB, selected congressional committees, and the Comptroller General on the adequacy of its information security policies, procedures, practices, and compliance with requirements. In 2010, OMB transferred the operational aspects of its FISMA-mandated responsibilities for overseeing and assisting the cybersecurity efforts of federal agencies to DHS. Specifically, according to OMB, DHS activities are to include, but are not limited to: overseeing agencies’ cybersecurity operations and incident response and providing appropriate assistance; overseeing the governmentwide and agency-specific implementation of and reporting on cybersecurity policies and guidance; overseeing and assisting governmentwide and agency-specific efforts to provide adequate, risk-based, and cost-effective cybersecurity; overseeing agencies’ compliance with FISMA and developing analyses for OMB to assist in the development of the FISMA annual report; and annually reviewing agencies’ cybersecurity programs. Under presidential directive, DHS is also responsible for assisting public- and private-sector critical infrastructure owners and operators in preparing for, preventing, protecting against, mitigating from, responding to, and recovering from a cyber incident. NIST has responsibility for developing standards and guidelines for securing the information systems used or operated by a federal agency or contractor on behalf of an agency. NIST has issued three special publications (SP) that provide guidance to agencies for detecting and handling cyber incidents. NIST SP 800-61 specifies procedures for implementing FISMA incident handling requirements, and includes guidelines on establishing an effective incident response program and detecting, analyzing, prioritizing, and handling an incident. The specific steps outlined for a formal, focused, and coordinated response to a cyber incident include a plan that should be tailored to meet the unique requirements of the agency and lay out the necessary resources and management support. The incident response process that NIST outlines has four phases: preparation; detection and analysis; containment, eradication, and recovery; and post-incident activity. In preparing to respond to incidents, agencies should (1) develop and document policies, plans and procedures for appropriate incident handling guidance; (2) create and train an incident response team; (3) acquire the necessary tools and resources, such as those needed for analyzing incidents; and (4) periodically test their response capability to ensure it is working as intended. Upon detection of an incident, analysis is needed to determine the incident’s scope, such as affected systems, and potential impact to agency operations. These factors assist agencies in prioritizing response activities. In keeping with the severity of the incident, the agency can mitigate the impact of the incident by containing it and ultimately recovering from it. During this phase, activity often cycles back to detection and analysis—for example, to see if additional hosts have been infected by malware while eradicating a malware incident. After the incident has been managed, the agency may issue a report that details the cause and costs and the steps it should take to prevent a future incident. Policies, plans, procedures, as well as testing and training practices may require updates as lessons are learned throughout the various phases of response. In addition, NIST SP 800-53 identifies specific incident response control activities that parallel those in NIST SP 800-61 and that agencies should address in order to effectively respond to a cyber incident. These controls include, among others, (1) monitoring incident-handling activities (e.g., tracking and documenting incidents), (2) developing incident response policies and plans, (3) developing incident response procedures, (4) testing an agency’s incident response capability, and (5) training incident responders. NIST also provides guidelines on preventing malware agencies should respond to such an incident in an effective and efficient manner. Established in 2003, US-CERT is the federal information security incident center mandated by FISMA. US-CERT consults with agencies on cyber incidents, provides technical information about threats and incidents, compiles the information, and publishes it on its website, https://www.us-cert.gov/. Malware refers to a program that is inserted into a system, usually covertly, with the intent of compromising the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the victim’s data, applications, or operating system or of otherwise annoying or disrupting the victim’s system. In addition, US-CERT defines seven categories of incidents for federal agencies to use in reporting an incident. Agencies are required to report incidents to US-CERT within specified time frames, such as within an hour or weekly or monthly, depending on the category of the incident. The categories and their time frames for reporting are listed in table 1. Based on our statistical sample of cyber incidents reported in fiscal year 2012, we estimate that the 24 agencies did not effectively or consistently demonstrate actions taken in response to a detected incident in about 65 percent of reported incidents. Agencies frequently documented their incident response actions for containing and eradicating incidents, but did not consistently demonstrate how they had handled incident response activities for the analysis, recovery, and post-incident phases. Further, although the 6 selected agencies we reviewed had developed policies, plans, and procedures to guide their incident response activities, such efforts were not comprehensive or consistent with federal requirements. NIST specifies that agencies should document incident response activities, including analysis, containment, eradication, and recovery, as well as post-incident activities.documented some required actions, they did not effectively demonstrate others. NIST SP 800-61 specifies that an initial analysis be performed to determine the type, nature, and scope of an incident, such as which networks, systems, or applications have been affected; who or what originated the incident; and what is taking place regarding the incident (e.g., what tools or attack methods are being used, what vulnerabilities are being exploited). According to NIST SP 800-61, agencies are to consider impact for prioritizing incident response activities, such as the functional impact of the incident—the current and likely future negative impact to business functions. Resource limitations at agencies are one of the factors emphasizing the need for them to prioritize their incident response activities. Further, by prioritizing the handling of incidents, agencies could identify situations of greater severity that demand immediate attention. The initial analysis of an incident should identify enough information for the team to prioritize subsequent activities, such as containment of the incident and a deeper analysis of the effects of the incident. Agencies determined and documented the scope of an incident—a key part of the analysis—for about 91 percent of incidents governmentwide.ineffective scoping practices, such as: Examples below illustrate both effective and In a malware incident, the affected agency involved determined that after infecting a computer with malware, an attacker compromised the computer’s local administrator account and used those credentials to successfully access another agency computer, which incident handlers then contained and remediated. In another incident, an agency received a report from US-CERT indicating that login credentials at two of the agency’s components may have been compromised. When contacting the impacted components, agency incident handlers mistyped the potentially compromised credentials for one component and did not respond to an e-mail from the component requesting clarification, and failed to follow up with the second component when it did not respond to the initial alert. Despite these errors, the incident handlers closed the incident without taking further action. In addition, most agencies did not consistently consider potential impact of incidents. Although the variance in our statistical sample was too great for us to project a percentage, 2 of the 6 selected agencies demonstrated that they had considered impact; the other 4 did not. In addition, 11 of the 24 agencies responding to our survey reported that they did not categorize the functional impact (e.g., low, moderate, and high) to their agency. Agencies risk ineffective and more costly incident response if they do not account for an incident’s impact. NIST SP 800-61 states that an agency can minimize the impact of an incident by containing it, and emphasizes the importance of containing an incident before it overwhelms resources or increases damages. Containment strategies vary according to the type of incident. For example, an incident involving a lost mobile device could involve sending the device commands that will delete its data and permanently disable it, and then cancelling its access to mobile phone networks. A malware incident could be contained by physically or logically quarantining infected computers, preventing the malware from spreading over the network or communicating with the attacker who initially placed the malware. Our sample indicates that agencies demonstrated that they had contained the majority of their cyber incidents. Specifically, our analysis shows that agencies had recorded actions to halt the spread of, or otherwise limit, the damage caused by an incident in about 75 percent of incidents governmentwide. However, agencies did not demonstrate such actions for about 25 percent of incidents governmentwide. For example: In an incident involving a lost iPhone, the device’s mobile service was disabled before a “kill” command could be sent to the device, meaning incident handlers were unable to remotely delete e-mails and other data in its memory, potentially leaving the data exposed to anyone who found the device. In a malware incident, sensors on an agency’s network recorded an agency computer contacting an external domain known to host malicious files, and downloading a suspicious file. Incident handlers closed the ticket without recording any actions taken to contain or otherwise remediate the potential malware infection. Although agencies demonstrated that they had contained most of the incidents, those that were not effectively contained could increase the risk of the incident spreading and causing greater damage to their operating environments. According to NIST SP 800-61, after an incident has been contained, eradication may be necessary to eliminate components of the incident, such as deleting malware and disabling breached user accounts, and identifying and mitigating all vulnerabilities that have been exploited. During eradication, it is important to identify all affected hosts within the agency so that they can be remediated. For some incidents, eradication is either not necessary or is performed during recovery. For example, after a lost mobile device has been remotely disabled and had its data deleted and network connectivity severed, incident handlers cannot take further actions regarding that mobile device. In the case of a minor malware incident, the malware could be removed from the system when the infected host has been removed from service or has had its hard drive wiped and its operating system and applications reinstalled. Our sample indicates that agencies demonstrated that they completed their eradication steps for the majority of cyber incidents. Specifically, our analysis shows that for about 77 percent of incidents governmentwide, the agencies had identified and eliminated the remaining elements of the incident. However, agencies did not demonstrate that they had effectively eradicated incidents in about 23 percent of incidents. For example: In a malware incident, incident handlers noted that they had requested the creation of network blocks to isolate the infected computer and the collection of its hard drive for analysis, but the ticket had not been updated to indicate whether the incident handlers had performed the requested actions or any subsequent actions. After an administrative password was exposed to one facility’s user population, incident handlers removed the password from the location where it had been posted, but did not indicate that they had changed the password to prevent users who had already seen it from using it. Although agencies demonstrated that they had eradicated most of the incidents, those that were not effectively eradicated could increase the risk that components of an incident might still remain in the operating environment and cause damage. According to NIST SP 800-61, in recovering from an incident, system administrators restore systems to normal operation, confirm that the systems are functioning normally, and (if applicable) remediate vulnerabilities to prevent a similar incident. Recovery may involve actions such as restoring systems from clean backups, rebuilding systems from scratch, and replacing compromised files with clean versions. NIST states that, during recovery, the agency should remediate vulnerabilities to prevent a similar incident from reoccurring (this could include, but is not limited to, installing patches, changing passwords, tightening network perimeter security, user education, adding or enhancing security controls, changing system configurations, etc.). Agencies generally demonstrated the steps they took in restoring systems to normal operations. Specifically, our analysis shows that agencies returned their systems to an operationally ready state for about 81 percent of incidents governmentwide. However, they had not consistently documented remedial actions on whether they had taken steps to prevent an incident from reoccurring. Specifically, agencies did not demonstrate that they had acted to prevent an incident from reoccurring in about 49 percent of incidents governmentwide. For example: In a malware incident, incident handlers determined that a laptop belonging to an agency employee on travel was infected with malware, and was targeting other agency employees. While incident handlers contained the incident by quarantining the machine and blocking the remote sites it was communicating with, they noted that further actions could not be taken until the user had returned from travel. Incident handlers did not document what, if any, action, they took when the employee returned. In an incident involving the leak of personally identifiable information, the information of seven agency employees was posted on a third- party website. The data included name, addresses, phone numbers, partial credit card information, mother’s name, e-mail addresses, and password. However, the agency did not document actions it took to determine how the leak had occurred, or how to prevent similar leaks from reoccurring. Incident handlers sent e-mails to the responsible component 31 times over a period exceeding 4 months, requesting status updates and confirmation that the component had taken remedial actions before the incident was eventually closed in the department’s tracking system. If incident recovery steps are not completed, agencies cannot be assured that they have taken all steps necessary to reduce the risk of similar incidents reoccurring and ensure that their systems will operate optimally. In its incident response guide, NIST states certain post-incident data can be used to improve the handling of future incidents. Lessons learned and reports from post-incident meetings can be used to update policies and procedures, such as when post-incident analysis reveals a missing step or inaccuracy in a procedure. Data such as the total hours of involvement and the cost may be used to justify additional funding of the incident response team. After handling an incident, an agency should also issue a report that details the cost of the incident, among other information. Agencies generally updated policies or procedures but did not consistently capture the costs of responding to an incident. Officials at 19 of the 24 agencies surveyed reported that their agency had amended policies or procedures as the result of a cyber incident. However, collection of cost data by agencies varied. Specifically, such information was recorded by only 1 of the selected 6 agencies we reviewed. In addition, 12 of 24 agencies surveyed reported that they had captured the costs of responding to an incident. Without this information, agencies may be unaware of the costs of responding to an incident and lack the information necessary for improving their response in a cost-effective manner. NIST states that, to facilitate effective and efficient incident response, agencies should develop corresponding policies, plans, procedures, and practices. However, selected agencies’ policies, plans, and procedures did not always include key information. NIST SP 800-61 states that policies are necessary for the effective implementation of a response to a cyber incident. Policies should identify the roles, responsibilities, and levels of authority for those implementing incident response activities. In addition, policies should address the prioritization of incidents, an activity that NIST deems to be a critical decision point in the process of handling an incident, and that handling should be prioritized based on factors such as the incident’s impact to the organization. Agencies’ policies should also address performance measures,response. which can help evaluate the effectiveness of the incident As shown in table 2, the six selected agencies’ policies did not always address each of three key elements defined by NIST. Roles, responsibilities, and levels of authority. Policies for two of the six selected agencies addressed roles, responsibilities, and levels of authority for incident response. Specifically, DOT’s cybersecurity policy tasked its Computer Security Incident Response Center with responsibility for implementing and monitoring incident handling for the agency and assigned roles for leading components’ incident response planning to individual coordinators. Similarly, NASA’s information security handbook specified the authorities of the incident response manager, who may, for example, decide to eradicate an incident without shutting down the system. Policies for DOE, DOJ, HUD, and VA partially defined the roles, responsibilities, and levels of authority for responding to cyber incidents. For example, while DOJ’s policy defines roles and responsibilities, the agency did not include information on who had authority to confiscate equipment and did not describe when an incident should be escalated. In addition, VA’s policies defined roles and responsibilities, but did not include authorities for the incident response team. HUD’s policy addressed roles, responsibilities, and levels of authority, but the policy was still in draft at the time of our review. If levels of authority are not clearly defined, agencies risk ineffective incident response, since personnel may be unsure of their responsibilities in responding to an incident. Prioritize severity ratings of incidents. Policies for two of the six selected agencies fully addressed the prioritization of incidents. For example, NASA’s handbook specified that, as part of prioritizing the handling of an incident, the following should be considered: the incident’s categorization, information sensitivity, the system’s categorization, and the impact to the system or mission. Conversely, policies for DOE, DOT, and HUD did not address the prioritizing of incidents and DOJ partially addressed it. For example, DOJ’s policy addressed the prioritizing of incidents affecting classified systems but not for unclassified systems. Agencies risk an ineffective response if they do not consider an incident’s impact, since incidents having the most effect on an agency or its mission may not be addressed in a timely manner. Establish performance measures. One of the six selected agencies addressed the establishment of performance measures. DOJ listed several objectives for measuring incident response, such as limiting an incident’s duration, minimizing impact to the department’s operations, and requiring annual tests of the department’s incident response capability. Policies for DOE, DOT, HUD, NASA, and VA did not address any measures of performance. Without such measures, agencies may lack the information needed to evaluate the effectiveness of their incident response. NIST SP 800-61 states that incident response plans should be developed to provide guidance for implementing incident response practices based on the agency’s policies. Further, NIST states the plan should be approved by senior management to indicate their support for the plan. The plan should also include and define metrics for measuring and evaluating the effectiveness of incident response. According to NIST, one such example would be “the total amount of labor spent working on the incident.” measuring and determining whether their incident response is effective. FISMA requires agencies to develop procedures for responding to an incident. NIST SP 800-61 also states that, in addition to being based on incident response policies, such procedures should provide detailed steps for responding to an incident and cover all phases of the incident response process. According to NIST, following standardized responses as listed in procedures should minimize errors resulting from “stressful” incident handling situations. NIST lists several types of incident response procedures that agencies should develop. These include procedures for containing an incident that detail how incident handlers should contain specific types of incidents in a manner that meets the agency’s definition of acceptable risk and procedures for prioritizing incident handling, which allow incident handlers to more quickly determine how best to apply their resources based on risk. As shown in table 4, selected agencies did not always develop procedures for responding to incidents, as NIST suggests. Procedures for containing incidents. Five of the six selected agencies developed procedures for containing incidents. For example, DOJ developed procedures for handling e-mails with malicious content and procedures for blocking potential malicious IP addresses. Similarly, DOT’s incident response group’s standard operating procedures identify procedures for handling key logging software, which can record keystrokes and capture sensitive information such as usernames and passwords. However, DOE procedures partially addressed the containing of incidents. For example, while the department had not developed procedures for containing incidents, two DOE components had developed such procedures. Without procedures for containing incidents, incident response personnel may not have instructions necessary to prevent incidents from negatively affecting other parts of their operating environment. Procedures for prioritizing incidents. Two of the six selected agencies developed and documented procedures for prioritizing the handling of incidents. NASA listed eight factors for determining the priority of handling an incident. Each of the factors is to be assigned a rating, after which the ratings for each factor would be added together to determine a number that would then be mapped to a priority ranging from low to critical. In addition, VA developed procedures for prioritizing incidents where a matrix would be used to map the type of incident to a predefined priority, such as critical, high, medium, and low, for handling the incident. Procedures for HUD and DOE partially addressed this activity since their procedures did not specify whether risk or impact would determine incident handling priorities. The remaining two of the six agencies (i.e., DOJ and DOT) had not developed and documented procedures for prioritizing incidents. As a result, these agencies may not be addressing incidents affecting the agency in the most risk-effective manner. NIST SP 800-53 states that agencies are to test their incident response capability, at an agency-defined frequency, for their information systems to determine the effectiveness of procedures for responding to cyber incidents. Agencies should also train personnel in their incident response roles and responsibilities. According to NIST, the lack of a well-trained and capable staff could result in inefficient incident detection and analysis and costly mistakes. As shown in table 5, agencies did not test their incident response capabilities or consistently train staff responsible for responding to incidents. Tested incident response capability. Four of the six agencies had not tested their incident response capability and two—DOE and DOJ —partially tested their incident response capabilities. For example, DOE did not demonstrate that the department had conducted an entitywide test of its incident response capability and only provided information concerning a review of a key component’s incident response activities. In addition, components at DOJ are responsible for testing their own incident response capability, with 10 of the 13 agency components completing testing of their capabilities. If an agency’s incident response capability has not been tested, the agency will have limited assurance its controls have been effectively implemented. Trained incident response personnel. Three of the six agencies trained their incident response personnel. For example, both DOJ and HUD maintained a list of personnel who were responsible for responding to their department’s incidents. These lists included the dates staff received training and the type of training received. DOT also trained their incident response personnel. However, VA did not demonstrate that their incident response personnel had received training, and DOE and NASA partially addressed this activity. For example, NASA provided a detailed listing of incident response personnel and the types of training they had taken, but did not define what qualified as acceptable training. If staff do not receive training on their incident response roles, they may not have the knowledge or skills to ensure they are prepared to effectively respond to cyber incidents affecting their agency. Inconsistencies in agencies’ performance of incident response activities and development of policies, plans, and procedures indicate that further oversight, such as that provided by OMB’s and DHS’s CyberStat review process, may be warranted. CyberStat reviews are in-depth sessions with National Security Staff, OMB, DHS, and an agency to discuss that agency’s cybersecurity posture and discuss opportunities for collaboration. According to OMB, these reviews were face-to-face, evidence-based meetings to ensure agencies were accountable for their cybersecurity posture and to assist them in developing focused strategies for improving their information security posture in areas where they faced challenges. According to DHS, the goal for fiscal year 2013 was for all 24 major agencies to be reviewed. However, this goal was not met. DHS officials stated that the reviews were conducted with 7 federal agencies, and that interviews were conducted with chief information officers from the other 17 agencies. In addition, the current CyberStat reviews have not generally covered agencies’ cyber incident response practices, such as considering impact to aid in prioritizing incident response activities, recording key steps in responding to an incident, and documenting the costs for responding to an incident. DHS officials told us that, regarding incident response, the reviews discussed the status of agencies’ closing of incidents and trends surrounding incident reporting; however, the reviews did not address evaluating the incident response practices of the agencies. Without addressing response practices in these reviews, OMB and DHS may be missing opportunities to help agencies improve their information security posture and more effectively respond to cyber incidents. While DHS provides various services to agencies to assist them in addressing cyber incidents, opportunities exist to improve the usefulness of these services, according to the 24 agencies we surveyed. DHS components, including US-CERT, offer services that assist agencies in preparing to handle incidents, maintain awareness of the current threat environment, and deal with ongoing incidents. Based on responses to our survey, officials at 24 major agencies were generally satisfied with DHS’s service offerings, although they identified improvements they believe would make certain services more useful, such as improving reporting requirements. For its part, US-CERT does not evaluate the effectiveness of its incident services. US-CERT serves as the central federal information security incident center mandated by FISMA. By law, the center is required to provide timely technical assistance to operators of agency information systems regarding security incidents, compile and analyze information about incidents that threaten information security, inform operators of agency information systems about current and potential information security threats and vulnerabilities, and consult with NIST and agencies operating national security systems regarding security incidents. More broadly, OMB has transferred responsibility to DHS for the operational aspects of federal cybersecurity, including overseeing and assisting federal agencies’ cybersecurity operations and incident response. Table 6 lists DHS cyber incident assistance services. The results of our survey indicate that agency officials were generally satisfied with the services provided to them by DHS, and they offered various opinions about DHS services or noted dissatisfaction with incident reporting requirements. Of the agency officials that used services provided to them by DHS, as illustrated in figure 2, the majority were generally satisfied, finding the service to be very or moderately useful. In addition, officials from 16 of the 24 agencies reported that they were generally satisfied with DHS’s outreach efforts to inform them of cyber incident services and assistance, while 4 of the 24 officials reported that they were generally dissatisfied. However, surveyed officials at 11 of the 24 agencies noted dissatisfaction with incident reporting requirements. Agency officials made the following comments: Time frames are difficult to meet. The incident categories are no longer practical. Attributes that contribute to classification are not unique between the categories and it allows for too much discretion and interpretation. The categories are long overdue for updates. A category that separates data loss from unauthorized access would be beneficial. A category specific to phishing and advanced persistent threats would be helpful. Add a category for non-incident. Additionally, each category should have sub-categories to further identify the incident and how it happened. These comments are consistent with the results of a review we conducted in 2013.revise reporting requirements to DHS for personally identifiable information-related data breaches, including time frames that would better reflect the needs of individual agencies and the government as a whole. DHS officials provided information about actions the agency plans to take to help address our recommendations and stated that it has interacted with OMB regarding requirements specific to these recommendations and is preparing new incident reporting guidance for agencies. We and othersmeasures that demonstrate results. Such measures support an agency’s efforts to plan, reinforce accountability, and advance the agency’s mission. have noted the value of having clear performance However, US-CERT has not established measures to evaluate the effectiveness of the cyber incident assistance it provides to agencies. US- CERT gathers usage statistics and feedback on its public website and portal and uses those data to identify opportunities for improving those services, but it only performs these reviews on an ad-hoc basis. For its other activities, a US-CERT official stated that the agency gathers monthly statistics on activities such as the number of on-site or remote technical assistance engagements it performs each month, or the number of pieces of malware analyzed by staff. The official noted, however, that these numbers are driven by factors outside of US-CERT’s control, and as such, indicate activity levels rather than performance measures and that the agency is still trying to identify meaningful performance measures. However, without results-oriented performance measures, US-CERT will face challenges in ensuring it is effectively assisting federal agencies with preparing for and responding to cyber incidents. With federal agencies facing increasing and more threatening cyber incidents, it is essential for them to be able to effectively manage their response activities. However, agencies did not consistently demonstrate that they responded to cyber incidents in an effective manner. Although agencies often demonstrated that they carried out various aspects of incident response activities, documenting all of the steps taken to analyze, contain, eradicate, and recover from incidents are important actions for agencies to take to ensure that incidents are being appropriately addressed. Having comprehensive policies, plans, and procedures that include measures of performance and guidance on impact assessment provide key elements necessary for agencies to effectively respond to cyber incidents. Testing the incident response program and ensuring employees are appropriately trained increases the assurance that controls are in place to prevent, detect, or respond to incidents. Further, capturing related costs could help agencies more efficiently manage their incident response activities. OMB and DHS have established CyberStat reviews to improve information security at federal agencies, but the reviews have not focused on agencies’ incident response practices. Although DHS and US-CERT offer numerous services to agencies to assist with cyber incidents, US-CERT does not have a process in place to evaluate the effectiveness of the assistance that it provides agencies. Without results-oriented performance measures, US-CERT will face challenges in ensuring that it is effectively assisting federal agencies with preparing for and responding to cyber incidents. To improve the effectiveness of governmentwide cyber incident response activities, we recommend that the Director of OMB and Secretary of Homeland Security address agency incident response practices governmentwide, in particular through CyberStat meetings, such as emphasizing the recording of key steps in responding to an incident. To improve the effectiveness of cyber incident response activities, we are making 25 recommendations to six selected agencies to improve their cyber incident response programs. We recommend that the Secretary of Energy: revise policies for incident response to include requirements for defining the incident response team’s level of authority, prioritizing the severity ratings of incidents based on impact and establishing measures of performance; revise the department’s incident response plan to include metrics for measuring the incident response capability and its effectiveness; develop incident response procedures that provide instructions for establish clear requirements to ensure the department’s incident containing incidents and revise procedures for incident response to prioritize the handling of incidents by impact; fully test the department’s incident response capability; and response personnel are trained. We recommend that the Attorney General of the United States: revise policies for incident response by including requirements for defining the incident response team’s level of authority, and prioritizing the severity ratings of incidents for unclassified systems, based on impact; revise the department’s incident response plan to include quantifiable metrics for measuring the incident response capability and its effectiveness; develop incident response procedures that provide instructions for prioritizing the handling of incidents by impact; and ensure that all components test their incident response capability. We recommend that the Secretary of Transportation: revise policies for incident response by including requirements for prioritizing the severity ratings of incidents based on impact and establishing measures of performance; revise the department’s incident response plan to include senior management’s approval, and metrics for measuring the incident response capability and its effectiveness; develop incident response procedures that provide instructions for prioritizing the handling of incidents by impact; and test the department’s incident response capability. We recommend that the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development: finalize policies for incident response and include in those policies requirements for prioritizing the severity ratings of incidents and establishing measures of performance; develop a departmentwide incident response plan that includes, among other elements, senior management’s approval, and metrics for measuring the incident response capability and its effectiveness; revise procedures for incident response to prioritize the handling of incidents by impact; and test the department’s incident response capability. We recommend that Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration: revise policies for incident response by including requirements for establishing measures of performance; revise the agency’s incident response plan to include metrics for measuring the incident response capability and its effectiveness; test the agency’s incident response capability; and establish clear requirements for training the agency’s incident response personnel. We recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs: revise policies for incident response by including requirements for defining the incident response team’s level of authority, and establishing measures of performance; revise the department’s incident response plan to include metrics for measuring the incident response capability and its effectiveness; test the department’s incident response capability; and train the department’s incident response personnel per the agency’s requirements. To improve the cyber incident response assistance provided to federal agencies, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security: establish measures to evaluate the effectiveness of the cyber incident assistance it provides to agencies. We sent draft copies of this report to the six agencies selected for our sample, as well as to DHS and OMB. We received written responses from DOE, DHS, HUD, NASA and VA. These comments are reprinted in appendices II through VI. The audit liaisons for DOJ and DOT responded via e-mail. However, OMB did not provide comments to our draft report. Six of the eight agencies generally concurred with our recommendations. Five agencies (DOE, DHS, DOJ, HUD, and VA) concurred with all of our recommendations. NASA agreed with three of four draft recommendations and partially agreed with the fourth recommendation. DOT responded that the department had no comments. In cases where these agencies also provided technical comments, we have addressed them in the final report as appropriate. DOE, DHS, NASA, and VA also provided information regarding specific actions they have taken or plan on taking that address portions of our recommendations. Further, DHS, NASA, and VA provided estimated timelines for completion of actions that would address our recommendations. NASA agreed with our three recommendations to revise its incident response policy, revise its incident response plan, and test the agency’s incident response capability. In addition, it partially concurred with our recommendation that the agency establish clear requirements for training its incident response personnel. The Chief Information Officer stated that agency personnel were being trained in their response roles and responsibilities. He added that his office would define what qualified as acceptable training for incident response personnel and that his office would then update policy to reflect the need for focused incident response training. We believe these actions, if effectively implemented, will satisfy our recommendation. As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the Departments of Energy, Homeland Security, Housing and Urban Development, Justice, Transportation, and Veterans Affairs, as well as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Office of Management and Budget. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you have any questions regarding this report, please contact Gregory C. Wilshusen at (202) 512-6244. I can also be reached by e-mail at wilshuseng@gao.gov. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix VII. Our objectives were to evaluate the extent to which (1) federal agencies are effectively responding to cyber incidents and (2) the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) provides cyber incident assistance to agencies. To address our first objective, we reviewed the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA), National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-53 Revision 3, Special Publication 800-61 Revision 2, Office of Management and Budget (OMB) OMB-06-19, and United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) guidance to determine the key steps agencies should address when responding to a cyber incident. We then used a two-stage cluster sample to identify a generalizable sample of incidents to review for compliance with key steps. First, we selected 6 agencies from the population of 24 major agencies covered by the Chief Financial Officers Act, using probability proportionate to the number of cyber incidents those agencies had reported to US-CERT in fiscal year 2012, divided by 32,442—the total number of cyber incidents reported to US-CERT in fiscal year 2012—sampling without replacement. The 6 agencies selected were the Departments of Energy (DOE), Justice (DOJ), Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Transportation (DOT), Veterans Affairs (VA), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). After selecting the 6 agencies in the first stage of sampling, we then obtained for each agency the list of individual cyber incidents for fiscal year 2012. From those lists, we then randomly selected 40 cyber incidents within each agency, for a total sample size of 240 cyber incidents. This statistical sample allowed us to project the results, with 95 percent confidence, to the 24 major agencies. Table 7 lists the number of incidents in our sample in each of the six US-CERT-defined incident categories. Because we followed a probability procedure based on random selections, our sample is only one of a large number of samples that we might have drawn. Since each sample could have provided different estimates, we express our confidence in the precision of our particular sample’s results as a 95 percent confidence interval (e.g., plus or minus 7 percentage points). This is the interval that would contain the actual population value for 95 percent of the samples we could have drawn. To determine the reliability and accuracy of the data we used to develop our sample, we interviewed knowledgeable agency officials and reviewed related documentation on internal controls for US-CERT’s database of incident tickets and reviewed the data for duplicates and outliers. For the incident data in our sample, we interviewed officials at the six agencies in our sample, reviewed each agency’s incident management system to gain an understanding of the data, reviewed related documentation on internal controls for each agency’s incident management system, and traced a random sample of records back to source agency documents and tested the fields for accuracy. Our sample results capture estimates for the extent of duplicate records, false positives, and inaccurately recorded data fields. Based on this assessment, we determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our work. To address the effectiveness with which agencies responded to a cyber incident, we reviewed documents (extracted from agencies’ incident tracking systems) covering the incidents in our sample to determine the extent to which the agencies had performed analysis, containment, eradication, recovery, reporting, and post-incident procedures in accordance with federal requirements and guidance and their own policies and procedures. In addition, we reviewed and analyzed the six selected agencies’ cyber incident response policies, plans, procedures, and practices and compared them to key elements in NIST guidance; and interviewed agency officials to discuss their incident response practices. We also conducted a web-based survey of officials responsible for cyber incident response at the 24 major federal agencies. After we drafted the questionnaire, we asked for comments from independent GAO survey professionals, and we conducted two in-person pretests to check that (1) the questions were clear and unambiguous, (2) terminology was used correctly, (3) the questionnaire did not place an undue burden on agency officials, (4) the information could be obtained, and (5) the survey was comprehensive and unbiased. We chose the pretest participants to include one member of our survey population, and one official from a federal agency not in our population, but who had a similar role and responsibilities with regard to incident response. We made changes to the content and format of the questionnaire after the review and both pretests, based on the feedback we received. We received completed questionnaires from all 24 agencies surveyed. Because this was not a sample survey, it has no sampling errors. However, the practical difficulties of conducting any survey may introduce errors, commonly referred to as nonsampling errors. For example, difficulties in interpreting a particular question, sources of information available to respondents, or entering data into a database or analyzing them can introduce unwanted variability into the survey results. We took steps in developing the questionnaire, collecting the data, and analyzing them to minimize such nonsampling errors. For example, social science survey specialists designed the questionnaire in collaboration with GAO staff who had subject matter expertise. Then, we pretested the draft questionnaire with a number of officials to ensure that the questions were relevant, clearly stated, and easy to understand. When we analyzed the data, an independent analyst checked all computer programs. Since this was a web-based survey, respondents entered their answers directly into the electronic questionnaire, eliminating the need to key data into a database. To address our second objective, we reviewed DHS documents, reviewed US-CERT’s public-facing website and limited-access portal, and interviewed officials at DHS about the services it offers to agencies to support their incident response capabilities and activities. In addition, as part of our web-based survey, we asked officials at the agencies what incident response-related services or assistance they had sought from DHS, and their opinion of those services and the utility of US-CERT’s public website and limited-access portal. In addition, we interviewed agency officials from the six agencies selected as part of our random sample regarding their interactions with DHS in receiving cyber incident assistance. We compared the assistance provided by DHS, including US- CERT, to the requirements specified in FISMA. Further, we met with officials to determine whether the department had measures—such as those described by us and others—to evaluate the effectiveness of the assistance they provided to agencies. We conducted this performance audit from February 2013 to April 2014 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. In addition to the contact named above, Jeffrey Knott (assistant director), Carl Barden, Larry Crosland, Kristi Dorsey, Nancy Glover, Wilfred Holloway, Kendrick Johnson, Stuart Kaufman, Tyler Mountjoy, Justin Palk, and Minette Richardson made key contributions to this report.

Summary: The number of cyber incidents reported by federal agencies increased in fiscal year 2013 significantly over the prior 3 years (see figure). An effective response to a cyber incident is essential to minimize any damage that might be caused. DHS and US-CERT have a role in helping agencies detect, report, and respond to cyber incidents. GAO was asked to review federal agencies' ability to respond to cyber incidents. To do this, GAO reviewed the extent to which (1) federal agencies are effectively responding to cyber incidents and (2) DHS is providing cybersecurity incident assistance to agencies. To do this, GAO used a statistical sample of cyber incidents reported in fiscal year 2012 to project whether 24 major federal agencies demonstrated effective response activities. In addition, GAO evaluated incident response policies, plans, and procedures at 6 randomly-selected federal agencies to determine adherence to federal guidance. GAO also examined DHS and US-CERT policies, procedures, and practices, and surveyed officials from the 24 federal agencies on their experience receiving incident assistance from DHS. Twenty-four major federal agencies did not consistently demonstrate that they are effectively responding to cyber incidents (a security breach of a computerized system and information). Based on a statistical sample of cyber incidents reported in fiscal year 2012, GAO projects that these agencies did not completely document actions taken in response to detected incidents in about 65 percent of cases (with 95 percent confidence that the estimate falls between 58 and 72 percent). For example, agencies identified the scope of an incident in the majority of cases, but frequently did not demonstrate that they had determined the impact of an incident. In addition, agencies did not consistently demonstrate how they had handled other key activities, such as whether preventive actions to prevent the reoccurrence of an incident were taken. Although all 6 selected agencies that GAO reviewed in depth had developed parts of policies, plans, and procedures to guide their incident response activities, their efforts were not comprehensive or fully consistent with federal requirements. In addition, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) conduct CyberStat reviews, which are intended to help federal agencies improve their information security posture, but the reviews have not addressed agencies' cyber incident response practices. Without complete policies, plans, and procedures, along with appropriate oversight of response activities, agencies face reduced assurance that they can effectively respond to cyber incidents. DHS and a component, the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT), offer services that assist agencies in preparing to handle cyber incidents, maintain awareness of the current threat environment, and deal with ongoing incidents. Officials from the 24 agencies GAO surveyed said that they were generally satisfied with the assistance provided, and made suggestions to make the services more useful, such as improving reporting requirements. Although US-CERT receives feedback from agencies to improve its services, it has not yet developed performance measures for evaluating the effectiveness of the assistance it provides to agencies. Without results-oriented performance measures, US-CERT will face challenges in ensuring it is effectively assisting federal agencies with preparing for and responding to cyber incidents. GAO is making recommendations to OMB and DHS to address incident response practices governmentwide, particularly in CyberStat meetings with agencies; to the heads of six agencies to strengthen their incident response policies, plans, and procedures; and to DHS to establish measures of effectiveness for the assistance US-CERT provides to agencies. The agencies generally concurred with GAO's recommendations.