To address our objectives, we reviewed ongoing efforts within Defense to reduce Defense Transportation System (DTS) costs by eliminating redundancy in automated information systems and in the business processes they support. We examined governing regulations and directives, evaluated plans and actions to select transportation migration systems and improve transportation processes, and interviewed key Defense officials. We performed our audit from June 1995 through May 1996 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We worked principally at the offices of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics (Transportation Policy) in Washington, D.C.; the U.S. Transportation Command’s (USTRANSCOM) Joint Transportation CIM Center (JTCC) at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois; and at development sites for selected migration systems. Appendix I details our scope and methodology. Defense provided written comments on a draft of this report. These comments are reprinted in appendix II and are discussed in the agency comments and evaluation section of the report. Defense relies on transportation services and information systems to help ensure that cargo, supplies, and people are conveyed to designated locations as quickly as possible during peace and war. Information is needed to perform functions like deploying troops for wartime, packing and shipping cargo for transport, and drawing plans for ship loading. Because today’s defense strategies use fewer forward deployed troops and equipment, the transportation function and the information systems supporting it have become increasingly important. During fiscal year 1995, the total cost of common-user Defense transportation amounted to about $6 billion. For the same period, USTRANSCOM spent approximately $164.5 million on information technology to support transportation services. While transportation is crucial to achieving U.S. military objectives, Defense transportation business operations are very similar or identical, in some cases, to those of the commercial transportation industry. This commonality enables Defense to rely on the commercial transportation industry to meet about 85 percent of its peacetime and wartime transportation needs. Moreover, commercial transportation providers and port management authorities have developed or purchased their own automated information systems to perform many of the same functions as defense transportation performs, such as those for moving passengers, documenting and reporting on cargo, and operating sea and aerial ports. Defense itself recognizes the similarities between itself and the commercial transportation sector in its policies and procedures, which call for using commercial automated information systems when feasible. Over the years, various studies, commissions, and internal DOD reports have noted that military transportation processes are fragmented, outdated, inefficient, and costly. In addition, Defense has long recognized that timely, accurate, and comprehensive information on transportation activities would greatly increase its effectiveness. For example: In 1992, GAO reported serious problems with the services’ deployment data bases during Operation Desert Shield/Storm. Inaccurate and incomplete database information resulted in erroneous lift requirements, inefficient use of lift, and revisions to movement routing and scheduling. Defense was forced to rely on informal, personal communication and manual methods to obtain the correct amount of lift and to determine which units were ready to move. According to a Defense report on Operation Desert Shield/Storm logistics, military airport facilities became so overloaded with high-priority sustainment cargo that other cargo was hastily repacked into shipping containers with partial documentation or without any documentation and reshipped by surface transport. Because little or no documentation accompanied the cargo, over half of the 40,000 containers sent to Saudi Arabia had to be reopened to determine their contents. In 1993, GAO reported that Defense’s ability to effectively manage its transportation operations was limited, in part, because of redundancy and the lack of standardization among its automated information systems. Specifically, we noted, and Defense agreed, that the Continental United States Freight Management System (CFM) would duplicate functions which are similar or identical to transportation systems concurrently under development by the Air Force, Marine Corps, Army, and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). In a 1994 report, Reengineering the Defense Transportation System: The “Ought To Be” Defense Transportation System for the Year 2010, Defense recognized that change to transportation business processes is key to realizing large cost savings and performance improvements. Defense further maintained that nothing less than fundamental change would be required to achieve such gains in savings and productivity. In 1995, Defense reported that the lack of visibility over shipments and units entering a theater of operations has been a chronic problem experienced in every major U.S. deployment during the 20th century. The report asserted that acquisition of transportation automated information systems providing more timely, accurate, and complete information would help resolve the problem. In early 1996, GAO reported that Defense common-user transportation costs were two to three times higher than comparable commercial carrier costs. Higher costs were attributed, in part, to fragmented business processes and an inefficient organizational structure. The Congress also is concerned about continuing problems in defense transportation and has taken legislative action to reduce its costs. The House Committee on National Security, in its report on the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, estimated that approximately $100 million could be saved each year if commissaries and exchanges are allowed to contract directly, using the most cost-effective carriers to transport products overseas. Subsequently, the Congress approved a provision in the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 authorizing the commissaries and military exchanges to negotiate directly with private carriers for the most cost-effective transportation of commissary and exchange supplies by sea without relying on the Military Sealift Command or the Military Traffic Management Command. Although Defense has repeatedly attempted to correct its transportation problems over the years, many of its actions have been directed toward the acquisition of information technology to address problems rather than through a complete analysis of its business processes. Such an analysis would identify the root causes of Defense’s transportation problems. Identification of the root causes helps an organization focus on appropriate means for addressing the problem and serves to direct resources where needed to achieve quality improvements in operations. These process improvements, in turn, provide the basis for the acquisition of technology to support the newly improved processes. Defense’s CIM program was intended to institutionalize this type of approach to information systems management. In 1989, the Deputy Secretary of Defense established the CIM program to reduce the cost and improve the efficiency of operations. Defense anticipated that it would reduce costs significantly by streamlining its business practices, consolidating information systems into a core set of migration systems, and standardizing data. To carry out the CIM initiatives for Defense transportation, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics chartered JTCC, in August 1993, under the command authority of USTRANSCOM. JTCC’s primary objective is to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the DTS by using business process reengineering techniques, designating and implementing migration systems selections, and leading data standardization efforts. By migrating to 28 transportation systems, Defense estimated in February 1996 that it would save $240 million over a 6-year period, primarily through elimination of duplicate legacy systems. A description of Defense’s transportation business processes and the migration systems selections that support them are provided in appendix III. In an October 1993 CIM memorandum, after becoming dissatisfied with the pace of improvements, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed all functional business areas to accelerate efforts to select and implement migration systems by March 1997. In response, JTCC initiated a structured approach, in April 1994, to identify, select, and implement transportation migration systems by March 1997. The approach was systematic, communicated in a written plan, and agreed to by departmentwide transportation process owners and stakeholders. Further, the approach called for consideration of alternatives, including a review of commercial products, and required that cost-benefit analyses be prepared in support of migration systems selections. Defense has little assurance that its transportation system selections are cost-effective. To meet a March 1997 deadline imposed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, JTCC hurriedly implemented its migration system selection approach without adequately evaluating government and/or commercial sector alternatives in selecting 17 of the 28 migration systems, using complete and verified cost information in choosing 7 systems from among numerous legacy systems which could provide the same basic functionality, and assessing the impact that significant changes to transportation operations—made through reengineering and outsourcing—will have on its migration system selections. In some cases, Defense selected migration systems that will lose money if implemented as migration systems. Governmentwide and DOD regulations require that a range of feasible alternatives be considered before significant changes to business processes or information systems are made. These regulations call for aggressive examination of alternatives to ensure that innovative and improved ways of doing business are considered. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-94, General Services Administration’s (GSA) Federal Information Management Regulations, and DOD Instruction 7041.3 cite acquisition of new systems, sharing existing systems, contracting for services, using commercial off-the-shelf software, and maintaining the status quo as examples of alternatives that should be considered. In addition, in November 1993, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence issued criteria requiring that migration systems selection consider a reasonable range of alternatives. However, in selecting systems for migration, Defense did not adequately consider alternatives available in other parts of the government and/or the commercial sector. As a result, it has little assurance that the systems it chose are the most cost-effective and appropriate. The degree to which Defense considered alternatives to the systems chosen varies from system to system. However, in all cases, alternatives were not considered to the extent that Defense’s own guidance calls for. Specifically: For all system selections, Defense did not consider developing new systems or contracting for services as required by Office of Management and Budget, General Services Administration, and Defense directives. According to the Chair of Defense’s Transportation CIM Advisory Group, the March 1997 deadline provided insufficient time to fully evaluate alternatives. For 17 of the 28 transportation systems selected, Defense made its decisions based on the judgment of transportation experts who determined that these 17 systems support a transportation business function so unique that nothing else could be considered as a feasible alternative. However, JTCC officials could provide no documented analysis to support this conclusion. Seven migration systems were selected after considering a narrow range of alternatives. The remaining four systems were designated “interim” systems because Defense believes alternative solutions exist for these systems. According to JTCC officials, alternatives will be considered at a later, unspecified date. To its credit, Defense reviewed commercial off-the-shelf transportation software products for some transportation business areas while making its migration system selections. However, this review was inadequate because it did not analyze the degree to which unmodified software could meet unique Defense requirements, identify the expected cost to make necessary software modifications, determine the time required to make modifications, and provide for a hands-on view of the software in operation. While the study determined that about 700 commercially available software packages provided some degree of transportation functionality, 24 were selected for a final detailed review. Out of the 24 finalists, JTCC concluded that (1) none would fully support Defense’s transportation requirements without modified software and (2) required modifications could not be made before March 1997 at an acceptable cost. Although Defense asserts that required modifications would be costly, it could not provide documented analysis to support this conclusion. Further, Defense plans to make $13 million worth of software modifications to just five of its in-house selections. Also, despite Defense’s conclusion regarding the inability of commercially available software to fully support transportation requirements, a government contractor is making extensive use of one of the rejected products in its development of the Global Transportation Network. To meet the March 1997 deadline mandated in the Deputy Secretary’s October 1993 memorandum, Defense selected transportation migration systems based on incomplete, unverified cost data without comparing all the benefits of each system. Consequently, there is little assurance that these selected systems will help contain the cost of performing Defense’s transportation mission to any great extent or bring about the benefits envisioned by the migration strategy. Defense regulations stress the importance of considering system costs and benefits to ensure that correct, well-informed decisions are made about information systems. DOD Directive 8120.1 and DOD Instruction 7041.3 require preparation of a functional economic analysis to document all costs (both direct and indirect), all quantifiable benefits, and all significant nonquantifiable benefits. Also, the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Transportation Policy identifies conducting objective analyses that show favorable investment returns as the best way to ensure funding for migration systems. To be useful in making fully informed business decisions, such cost information should be complete and verified. Instead of preparing the required functional economic analyses and documenting investment returns, Defense selected its transportation migration systems based primarily on a system’s ability to meet current functional requirements. After the selections were made, JTCC continued to analyze savings projections associated with migration systems. This later analysis culminated in a January 1996 study discussed at the end of this section. Had Defense followed its own regulations and calculated investment returns, it would have found—based on data available when the migration systems were selected—that two of the selected systems would lose money if implemented as migration systems. The Air Loading Module (ALM) would lose $0.67 out of every dollar invested and the Cargo Movement Operations Systems (CMOS) would lose $0.04 out of every dollar invested. JTCC’s analyses also did not include all costs associated with its evaluation of in-house systems. At least $18 million in costs were excluded: $16 million for JTCC’s analysis of candidate migration systems and $2 million for maintaining migration system hardware. The magnitude of other exclusions remains unknown. For example, JTCC estimates that, collectively, training on migration systems will be required at nearly 300 sites. However, its analyses did not include estimates of the number of persons to be trained at each site or the cost of productivity losses associated with that training. JTCC also estimates that hardware and off-the-shelf software totaling $10 million will be purchased between fiscal year 1996 and fiscal year 1999. However, JTCC’s estimates do not include the cost of labor necessary to purchase these items. If JTCC had included these costs in its systems selection analyses, it would have found that the overall return on investment would have decreased. For example, as stated above, $16 million in costs related to JTCC’s own work on migration systems was excluded from analysis. JTCC was unable to attribute a specific percentage of these costs to its work on selecting the seven systems for which in-house alternatives competed against one another. However, if just 6.3 percent of this $16 million were factored into the analysis, Defense would barely break even on its investment in those systems. Moreover, as figure 1 shows, Defense would actually lose money on its investment if more than 6.3 percent were included. Still, even if recommending migration systems were accomplished for free—the estimated reduced cost associated with the selected alternatives ($1.02 million) would be suspect since JTCC did not verify the system costs used in selecting the migration systems. Unlike the information obtained on each system’s functional and technical capabilities—which JTCC meticulously verified—system cost information was taken at face value. JTCC officials concede that the costs used for its analyses were very rough and resulted in inaccurate, low estimates of migration system costs. Further, since JTCC’s migration systems selection methodology emphasized the importance of meeting current functional requirements, JTCC’s analyses of in-house systems excluded the required quantification and comparison of new benefits. Although JTCC officials stated that the benefits of migration systems go beyond meeting current functional requirements, benefits such as operating more easily in remote locations and improving military readiness were not addressed in the migration system decision documents and remain unquantified. These decision documents instead focus on quantifying each system’s current functional and technical merits to the exclusion of new benefits a system may offer. Although the transportation migration systems were selected and approved prior to April 1995, Defense continued to prepare justification for its migration systems selections—culminating in a January 1996 study entitled A Business Case Study for Transportation Systems Migration. This case study documents additional projected cost savings and avoidances that were not considered during the migration systems selection process. However, these estimates of cost savings and avoidances are not reliable for a number of reasons. In its business case study, JTCC estimates that the transportation migration strategy will produce cost avoidances and savings of $4 billion. However, the validity of this figure is questionable. First, JTCC relied on cost estimates from 13 different sources using a variety of forecasting horizons (from 4 to 17 years) without consistently accounting for the timing of estimated costs and benefits. OMB Circular A-94 and DOD Instruction 7041.3 identify the timing of costs and benefits as an important consideration in deciding whether a government program can be justified on economic principles. These regulations further require that estimated gains and losses occurring in different time periods be converted to a standard unit of measurement that accounts for the time-value of money. Second, JTCC did not report estimated savings and avoidances in a constant base-year’s dollars. By mixing base-years, JTCC has failed to show the expected benefits and costs associated with the transportation migration systems in terms of meaningful, actual purchasing power. Third, Defense would be expected to realize $3.75 billion (93 percent) of the reported $4 billion in savings and avoidances whether or not the migration strategy was implemented. For example, JTCC estimates that Defense will avoid and/or save $92 million by implementing and operating the TC-AIMS II migration system over a 13-year period. However, the Air Force’s CMOS system, which is now a component of the TC-AIMS II migration system, predates the migration effort and was expected to save $57 million—without being implemented in any service but the Air Force. The remaining savings and avoidances that can be attributed directly to migration are comprised of estimates that rely on questionable assumptions. For example, JTCC assumed that each legacy system, if not terminated, would attempt to acquire all the functionality that a fielded migration system would have. Based on this assumption, JTCC calculated that Defense will avoid $101 million in costs for the legacy systems that competed as in-house alternatives. For example, JTCC estimated that by migrating to the TC-AIMS II system, Defense will avoid spending $17.4 million between fiscal year 1998 and fiscal year 2001 to upgrade the unit movement function of the CMOS system. CMOS program officials maintain that this estimate is grossly high—more than double the Air Force approved budget for the entire CMOS program during the same period. Similarly, JTCC estimated that Defense will avoid spending $18 million over the same period to upgrade the Transportation Coordinator - Automated Command and Control Information System (TC-ACCIS) unit movement functionality. This estimate increases by nearly 28 percent prior estimates for the entire TC-ACCIS program that already include system enhancements. Another $96 million in migration-related cost avoidances are associated with Defense’s data standardization, functional process improvement, electronic data interchange, and Defense Logistics Management System (DLMS) efforts. This estimate may overstate software maintenance costs by as much as $61.7 million, since it does not consider maintenance costs that legacy systems already planned to incur over the next 5 years. JTCC officials stated that preparing a cost analysis that takes into account what each program already planned to spend for software maintenance would require a level of visibility into each system that JTCC does not have. In May 1995, Defense launched an effort to reengineer the Department’s transportation processes, focusing first on transportation acquisition and financial payment/billing processes. According to the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Transportation Policy, this effort will examine transportation issues from a top-down perspective and will change Defense policies to affect the way work is done in the transportation acquisition and finance areas. Defense expects the reengineering of its remaining transportation processes to be completed within the next 6 years. In making its migration system selections, however, Defense did not assess the impact that these changes and other potential significant changes to transportation operations—such as outsourcing—would have on its system selections. Consequently, Defense may end up investing in systems that do not provide positive investment returns before such changes to transportation operations are made. For example, Defense plans to spend $63 million from fiscal year 1996 through fiscal year 2001 to implement a migration system that will automate and standardize the moving, storing, and managing of personal property for Defense personnel. At the same time, the Department is considering the outsourcing of major components of the personal property function. If outsourced, contractors will perform the management, administrative, and operational duties that Defense now performs for personal property movement and storage. As a result, further spending on the migration system may be questionable since the system may no longer be needed. Also, in following its migration strategy, Defense believes that the implementation of migration systems will resolve some of its process problems that may be more appropriately addressed through reengineering. For example, to alleviate water port loading dock congestion during full-scale deployment, Defense has selected a migration system to more quickly develop plans for loading ships. This system, the Integrated Computerized Deployment System (ICODES), is capable of dramatically reducing the time required to plan the load. However, without performing a thorough analysis of the nature of dock congestion, Defense cannot expect its load planning migration system to alleviate the congestion. In fact, according to an ICODES program official, port congestion is not caused by lengthy planning times. Rather, unit commanders load more equipment than necessary since they do not believe that all of it will arrive at the right location when needed. According to the official, this problem was so severe during Operation Desert Storm that unit commanders were typically bringing division-size loads to port. Defense’s initial approach to selecting and implementing transportation migration systems was systematic, communicated in a written plan, and agreed to by departmentwide transportation process owners and stakeholders. It was geared to ensuring that the Department chose systems that would meet its needs in the most cost-effective fashion. However, faced with the March 1997 deadline, Defense deviated from this approach and selected systems that may not provide much new savings or, in some cases, will actually lose money. We believe Defense’s management approach to implementing its transportation system migration strategy was shortsighted. By not considering alternatives, not relying on complete cost estimates, and by not assessing the potential impact of outsourcing and reengineering on its migration systems, Defense essentially gambled that systems migration would achieve anticipated savings and resolve problems with transportation business processes. As a result, these selections may turn out to be poor investments and preclude the use of better commercial alternatives. We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics to complete the following actions. To ensure that positive investment returns are achieved before reengineered or outsourced processes are implemented, immediately establish current cost, benefit, investment return, and schedule baselines for the seven migration systems that were selected from among in-house legacy systems. For these systems, terminate the migration of transportation systems for which migration is shown to be a poor investment. The Department of Defense provided written comments on a draft of this report. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics partially concurred with the report’s recommendations and stated that Defense would terminate systems that are shown to be poor investments. Defense’s response to this report is summarized below, along with our evaluation, and is presented in appendix II. In its response, Defense stated that its selection of migration systems was driven by the Deputy Secretary of Defense’s October 1993 memorandum which directed expedited selection and implementation of migration systems. Further, Defense stated that in accordance with DOD 8020.1, it selected transportation migration systems based primarily on their ability to improve support to the warfighter and enhance readiness. Defense added that cost effectiveness and economic factors were also considered when selecting migration systems. We recognize that the October 1993 memorandum was the primary basis for migration system selections. However, we believe that Defense erred in implementing the memorandum, because it did not follow its own regulations on systems development life cycle management. These regulations are designed to ensure that all essential ingredients to making sound business decisions are incorporated into all major technology investment decisions. In particular, DOD 8120.1-M directs that migration system selections be based on functional economic analyses (FEA) and that migration systems follow DOD life cycle management policies and procedures, to include making maximum use of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products. However, despite these requirements, Defense had just one up-to-date FEA available at the time it made its transportation migration selection decisions. Further, the analyses that Defense conducted in lieu of preparing the required FEAs did not (1) adequately consider alternatives (such as the use of COTS products), (2) rely on complete, verified cost and benefit data, and (3) consider the potential impact of change to transportation operations that reengineering would have on its system selections. We are sending copies of this report to the Ranking Minority Member of the Subcommittee on Military Readiness, House Committee on National Security; the Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members of the Senate and House Committees on Appropriations, the Senate Committee on Armed Services, the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, and the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight; the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Director of the Office of Management and Budget; the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Transportation Command; and other interested parties. Copies will be made available to others on request. If you have any questions about this report, please call me at (202)512-6240 or Franklin W. Deffer, Assistant Director, at (202)512-6226. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix V. CFM(HOST) CFM(FM) In addressing our objectives, we reviewed ongoing efforts within Defense to contain DTS costs by eliminating redundancy in automated information systems and in the business processes they support. We examined a number of governing criteria including GSA’s information resources management regulations; OMB policies and procedures for managing federal information resources; and Defense directives and instructions pertaining to acquisition of automated systems, defense information management, and life cycle management of automated information systems. We evaluated plans and actions to select migration systems and improve key transportation processes including USTRANSCOM’s Defense Transportation System 2010 Action Plan and 2015 Strategic Plan; the DOD Transportation Process Improvement, Systems Migration, and Data Standardization Plan; and 21 Integration Decision Papers justifying migration selection decisions. We analyzed Defense’s cost containment strategy including comparing investment costs among competing systems and identifying costs associated with systems not selected for retention. In performing our investment analysis, we used cost data published in the Integration Decision Papers, which the JTCC had not validated but considered the best data available. We worked primarily with officials at USTRANSCOM’s JTCC, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, to determine the regulating criteria, methodology, and status of Defense’s cost containment and streamlining efforts. We also interviewed the Deputy Director for Command, Control, Communications, and Computers at the Military Sealift Command, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.; the Program Manager for the Global Transportation Network; the Assistant for Travel and Transportation Management to the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary for Transportation Policy-Logistics; staff at Air Force Transportation (AF/LGT), Deputy Chief of Staff (Logistics); and the former Transportation Management Division Chief, Directorate of Transportation Energy and Troop Support, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Department of the Army. To see migration projects firsthand, we interviewed representative officials and received demonstrations of CMOS at Gunter Air Force Base, Montgomery, Alabama; Navy Material Transportation Office Operations and Management Information System under development at Norfolk Naval Base, Norfolk, Virginia; Consolidated Aerial Port System II and Passenger Reservation and Manifest System systems at Charleston Air Force Base in Charleston, South Carolina; and Worldwide Port System in operation at the Military Traffic Management Command’s Major Port Command in Charleston, South Carolina. To better understand overall transportation issues, we interviewed the Chairman, Information Technology Committee, American Association of Port Authorities; and the manager of the Systems and Programming Information Services, South Carolina State Ports Authority. We interviewed the Vice President for Technology at Boeing Information Services regarding private industry system migration efforts. We also provided status briefings to the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Logistics (Transportation Policy) at the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia. Our audit was performed from June 1995 through May 1996 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Defense’s letter dated August 7, 1996. 1. We have clarified our recommendation to specify the systems requiring cost, benefit, investment return, and schedule baselines. 2. According to Defense, the total number of migration systems is 23, while the report states the number as 28. The 28 figure cited in our report is based upon the signed July 1995 memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence which identifies 26 of the 28 migration systems listed in appendixes III and IV. The additional systems not listed in the memo, the Analysis of Mobility Platform (AMP) and Joint Flow and Analysis System for Transportation (JFAST) are identified in JTCC’s Integration Decision Papers (IDP) as the two systems supporting the future operations component of the Global Transportation Network (GTN). The IDP for the transportation planning and execution functional area specifically recommends that Defense select AMP and JFAST as the migration system for the future operations subfunctional area. Further, while Defense does not identify in its response which one of the four interim migration selections is incorrect, our report identifies the four systems as interim migration selections based upon information in the January 1996 A Business Case Study for Transportation Systems Migration. 3. According to a February 1995 Air Force paper, CMOS provides cost and operational benefits and a positive return on investment. However, these benefits and returns are relevant to the CMOS system only when it is deployed within the Air Force—but not to any other military service as a migration system. The figures cited in the February 1995 paper are based on a CMOS Functional Economic Analysis that is nearly 4 years old and that predated the migration effort. And although the February 1995 paper included some cost avoidances that were not considered in the CMOS FEA, it did not include an analysis of costs and benefits associated with migrating CMOS to the other military services. We modified our report to reflect that implementing CMOS as a migration system is a losing proposition. — Transportation Coordinator’s Automated Information Management System II (TC-AIMS II) Installation Transportation Office/Traffic Management Office (ITO/TMO) - receive movement requirements; plan, monitor, and conclude movements; screen potential carriers; order conveyances; reserve space on scheduled carriers; and produce documentation for billing and statistical purposes — Cargo Movement Operations System (CMOS) — CONUS Freight Management (CFM) — Canadian Transportation Automated Control System (CanTRACS) — Passenger Reservation and Manifest System (PRAMS) — Groups Operational Passenger System (GOPAX) — Transportation Operational Personal Property System (TOPS) Load Planning - planning to fit cargo, vehicles, and equipment onto specific aircraft, ships, and rail cars — Air Loading Module (ALM) — Integrated Computerized Deployment System (ICODES) Port Management - planning for arriving passengers and cargo; preparing shipments for transport; supervising terminal operations — In-transit Visibility-Modernization (ITV-MOD) Consolidated Aerial Port System II (CAPS II) — Worldwide Port System (WPS) Mode Clearance - actions taken to hand off cargo, passengers, and equipment from one transportation mode to another — Navy Material Transportation Office Operations and Management Information System (NAOMIS) — Integrated Booking System(IBS) — Mobilization Movement Control (MOBCON) Theater Transportation Operations - includes all business processes described above with the primary difference being a more extensive use of service and host country organizations — Command and Control Information Processing System (C2IPS) — Department of the Army Movement Management System-Redesign (DAMMS-R) High-Level Transportation Planning and Execution - actions performed at the Commander-in-Chief (CINC) and CINC Component levels to plan and perform deployment, operational level movement, sustainment, and redeployment — Airlift Deployment Analysis System (ADANS) — Global Decision Support System (GDSS) — ITV-MOD Headquarters On-Line System for Transportation (ITV-MOD HOST) — Global Transportation Network (GTN) — Analysis of Mobility Platform (AMP) — Joint Flow and Analysis System for Transportation (JFAST) — TRANSCOM Regulating and Command and Control Evacuation System (TRAC2ES) — Enhanced Logistics Intra-Theater Support Tool (ELIST) — Asset Management System (AMS) — Integrated Command, Control, and Communications (IC3) Project — Joint Air Logistics Information System (JALIS) — Defense Transportation Tracking System (DTTS) Plans and schedules transportation airlift missions for commercial aircraft and for the C-17, C-5, and C-141. The system also plans and schedules aerial refueling for the KC-10 and KC-135. Performs military and civilian aircraft load planning. Performs rapid time-phased force deployment data modeling for all transportation modes and deployment phases. Manages movement tracking, repair, modification, compliance with industry and regulatory requirements, receipt and disposal of equipment, and auditing of revenues and expenses for the Defense Freight Railway Interchange Fleet and the Army’s railroad container fleet. Routes and ranks cargo shipments originating in Canada and maintains all Canadian commercial transportation tenders and contracts. Accepts aircraft mission schedule information from GDSS and then distributes the schedule data to wing activities involved in aircraft launch, loading, and recovery. CFM(HOST) supports procurement of commercial freight and cargo transportation services. CFM(FM) is a field module which allows transportation officers to obtain routing and rating information via the Defense Information System Network or a commercial telephone line. CFM(HOST) and CFM(FM) together constitute CFM. Supports the collection, processing, and transmission of information concerning the movement of cargo entering aerial ports located outside the continental United States. CMOS supports both peacetime and contingency operations. Supports the management of joint-use theater land transportation. Provides near real-time satellite tracking of any sensitive cargo transported by commercial carriers and of classified arms, ammunition, and explosives. Compares the planned theater arrival schedule against a theater’s transportation assets, cargo handling equipment, facilities, and routes in order to produce a detailed plan of the daily flow of theater transportation including delays and constrictions. Worldwide command control system for strategic airlift and air refueling. Performs functions associated with arranging commercial transportation for groups of 21 or more passengers by air or surface transport. Transportation command and control system providing intransit visibility of units, passengers, and cargo during both peace and war. It also tracks patient movement and performs planning activities. GTN is the transportation command and control module of the Global Command and Control System. Standardizes booking procedures for unit and nonunit ocean-eligible cargo. This project consolidates four sealift transportation planning and execution systems onto one hardware platform. Facilitates ship loading by integrating digitized ship drawings and cargo data from multiple information sources. Performs command and control operations, passenger operations, and cargo movement operations at Air Mobility Command (AMC) aerial ports. Provides for a centrally located record of on-hand cargo and cargo movements to AMC aerial ports and operating sites around the world. Maintains airlift cargo data, manifest data, and air shipment information. Schedules all the Services’ fixed-wing and rotary-wing support airlift for nontactical passengers and cargo. Provides strategic transportation feasibility estimates. Plans and supports unit deployments. Also builds and maintains a database of force and equipment data on support assets and requirements. Plans the routes and obtains permission to use state highways for truck convoys. Provides shipment information on clearing or challenging air-eligible cargo, supports asset visibility, and performs cargo manifesting and transportation billing processes. Performs passenger reservation services for AMC, including flight and reservation processing and passenger processing. Manages DOD personal property movement and storage information. Provides in-transit visibility of patients, monitors patient medical equipment pools, and plans transportation for patients. Performs water port terminal management functions. Denice M. Millett, Evaluator-In-Charge Michael W. Buell, Staff Evaluator David R. Solenberger, Senior Evaluator The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free. Additional copies are $2 each. Orders should be sent to the following address, accompanied by a check or money order made out to the Superintendent of Documents, when necessary. VISA and MasterCard credit cards are accepted, also. Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. U.S. General Accounting Office P.O. Box 6015 Gaithersburg, MD 20884-6015 Room 1100 700 4th St. NW (corner of 4th and G Sts. NW) U.S. General Accounting Office Washington, DC Orders may also be placed by calling (202) 512-6000 or by using fax number (301) 258-4066, or TDD (301) 413-0006. 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Summary: Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defenses' (DOD) transportation migration systems. GAO found that DOD: (1) has little assurance that its transportation migration systems are cost-effective; (2) selected its transportation migration systems without fully evaluating government or commercial alternatives; (3) relied on incomplete and unverified cost data in making its selections; (4) selected migration systems that will lose money if implemented; (5) did not consider developing new systems or contracting for services; (6) made some of its selection decisions based on the judgement of transportation experts; (7) reviewed commercial off-the-shelf transportation software products while making migration system selections; (8) did not analyze the extent to which unmodified software could meet its requirements, identify software modification costs, or provide a hands-on view of the software in operation; (9) did not assess how changes to its transportation operations would affect the migration systems; and (10) did not ensure that the new migration system would yield savings.