During the 1990s, the demand for and supply of illegal drugs have persisted at very high levels and have continued to adversely affect American society in terms of social, economic, and health costs and drug-related violent crime. During the same period, funding for federal drug control efforts overall and for the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), which is dedicated to controlling the supply of illegal drugs, increased significantly. According to the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), drug use and its consequences threaten Americans of every socioeconomic background, geographic region, educational level, and ethnic or racial identity. Drug abuse and trafficking adversely affect families, businesses, and neighborhoods; impede education; and choke criminal justice, health, and social service systems. A report prepared for ONDCP showed that drug users in the United States spent an estimated $57 billion for illegal drugs in 1995. Other costs to society include lost jobs and productivity, health problems, and economic hardships to families. ONDCP, in its 1999 National Drug Control Strategy, noted that illegal drugs cost our society approximately $110 billion each year. On the basis of the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) estimated that in 1997 there were 13.9 million current users of illegal drugs in the United States aged 12 and older, representing 6.4 percent of the total population. As figure 1.1 shows, this number has fluctuated somewhat but has remained fairly constant overall since 1990, as have the numbers of current users of cocaine and marijuana, with 1.5 million cocaine users and 11.1 million marijuana users in 1997. As shown in figure 1.2, current drug use among youth rose significantly from 1992 to 1996. The trend then improved, with drug use declining for 8th and 10th graders in 1997 and 1998. Abuse of illegal drugs has serious consequences. For example, SAMHSA’s Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN) reported 9,310 drug-related deaths in 1996, an increase of 65 percent from the 5,628 deaths reported in 1990. The number of drug-related hospital emergency room visits reported to DAWN rose 42 percent from 1990 to 1997. There were 371,208 emergency room episodes in 1990 and 527,058 episodes in 1997. According to DEA and ONDCP, illegal drugs, including cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine, have inflicted serious damage and continued to threaten our nation during the 1990s. National and international drug trafficking organizations continued to bring these drugs into the United States, and certain illegal drugs are clandestinely produced in this country. Drug trafficking gangs and individuals dealing in drugs, as well as drug users, have caused violence in local communities. DEA considers cocaine to be the primary drug threat to the U.S. population. Cocaine use has remained at a relatively constant high level during the 1990s, as indicated by the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse. The National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee reported that the use of “crack,” a potent and highly addictive form of cocaine that first became widely available in the 1980s, also remained at a high level in the 1990s. ONDCP reported in the summer of 1998 that crack was failing to attract new users, although established users persisted in using it. Regarding cocaine trafficking trends, DEA intelligence information shows that Colombian trafficking organizations, although more fragmented than in the past, continue to control the worldwide supply of cocaine. However, Mexican organizations have played an increasing role in the U.S. cocaine trade in the 1990s. The Southwest Border is now the primary entry point for cocaine smuggled into the United States. Heroin is readily available in major cities in the United States, and its use is on the rise in many areas around the country, according to DEA. ONDCP has noted that the increasing availability of high-purity heroin has made snorting and smoking more common modes of ingestion than injection, thereby lowering inhibitions to heroin use. DEA intelligence information indicates that the heroin available in the United States comes from Southeast Asia (principally Burma); Southwest Asia/Middle East (Afghanistan, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Turkey); Mexico; and South America (Colombia). Although Southeast Asian heroin dominated the U.S. market in the 1980s and into the 1990s, Colombian heroin emerged as a significant problem in the mid-1990s. In 1997, 75 percent of the heroin seized and analyzed in the United States was Colombian. DEA reported that independent Colombian drug traffickers established themselves in the U.S. heroin market by distributing high- quality heroin (frequently above 90-percent pure), undercutting the price of their competition, and using long-standing drug distribution networks. According to DEA, marijuana is the most readily available and commonly used illegal drug in the country. Further, a resurgence of marijuana trafficking and use has taken place in urban centers across the United States. ONDCP noted that this market is driven by a high level of demand, with users from virtually all age groups, demographic groups, and income levels. According to DEA intelligence information, most of the foreign marijuana available here is smuggled into the country across the Southwest Border. Mexican drug trafficking organizations are responsible for supplying most of the foreign marijuana, whether grown in Mexico or shipped through Mexico from other locations such as Colombia. Marijuana is also grown domestically in remote outdoor locations in the United States, including on public lands, and indoors. In the 1990s, major outdoor marijuana growths have been found in California, Florida, Hawaii, Kentucky, New York, Tennessee, and Washington. DEA uses the term “dangerous drugs” to refer to a broad category of controlled substances other than cocaine, opiates such as heroin, and cannabis products such as marijuana. The list of dangerous drugs includes drugs that are illegally produced; drugs legally produced but diverted to illicit use (e.g., pharmacy thefts, forged prescriptions, and illegal sales); as well as legally produced drugs obtained from legitimate channels (e.g., legally and properly prescribed). Some of the dangerous drugs are methamphetamine; lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD); phencyclidine (PCP); diazepam (Valium); and flunitrazepam (Rohypnol), commonly called the “date rape” drug. DEA reports that methamphetamine use has increased in the 1990s, resulting in a devastating impact on many communities across the nation. A powerful stimulant, methamphetamine is the most prevalent synthetic controlled substance clandestinely manufactured in the United States. Historically, methamphetamine has more commonly been used in the western United States, but its use has been spreading to other areas of the country. According to DEA, methamphetamine suppliers have traditionally been motorcycle gangs and other independent groups. However, organized crime groups operating in California, some with ties to major Mexico- based trafficking organizations, now dominate wholesale-level methamphetamine production and distribution in the United States. Mexican trafficking organizations use their well-established cocaine, heroin, and marijuana distribution networks to smuggle methamphetamine throughout the country. Although large-scale production of methamphetamine is centered in California, it is increasingly being produced in Mexico and smuggled into the United States. Trafficking organizations have continued to supply domestic drug consumers despite short-term achievements by both federal and foreign law enforcement agencies in apprehending individuals and disrupting the flow of illegal drugs. When confronted with threats to their operations, drug trafficking organizations have become adept at quickly changing their modes of operation. For example, as we previously reported, when law enforcement agencies have successfully carried out efforts to intercept drugs being smuggled by aircraft, traffickers have increased their use of maritime and overland transportation routes. In another example, DEA reported that a 1989 drug enforcement operation, which involved the seizure of nearly 40 metric tons of cocaine, led to a new arrangement between Mexican transportation organizations and Colombian cocaine organizations. To reduce the complex logistics and vulnerabilities associated with large cash transactions, Mexican organizations started receiving part of the cocaine shipments they smuggled for the Colombians in exchange for their transportation services. By the mid-1990s, Mexican organizations were receiving up to one-half of a cocaine shipment as payment. This arrangement radically changed the role and sphere of influence of the Mexican organizations in the U.S. cocaine trade. By relinquishing part of each cocaine shipment, the Colombian organizations ceded a share of the U.S. cocaine market to the Mexican traffickers. In addition, although overall violent crime has steadily declined during the 1990s, many of the violent crimes committed are drug-related, according to ONDCP. There are no overall quantitative data on drug-related violent crime and the relationship between drug abuse or trafficking and violent crime, but ONDCP has identified several qualitative indicators linking drug abuse or trafficking and other crimes, including violent crimes. According to ONDCP, many crimes (e.g., murder, assault, and robbery) are committed under the influence of drugs or may be motivated by a need for money to buy drugs. In addition, drug trafficking and violence often go hand in hand. Competition and disputes among drug dealers can cause violence, as can the location of drug markets in disadvantaged areas where legal and social controls against violence tend to be ineffective. In this regard, DEA reported in 1996 that violent drug gangs, which were once largely confined to major cities, had migrated to and/or emerged in rural areas and small cities throughout the country. One example cited was Vidalia, GA, where a violent crack cocaine gang was linked to numerous homicides and drive-by shootings. Nevertheless, the Department of Justice (DOJ) reported that overall violent crime in the United States in 1997 had fallen more than 21 percent since 1993 and had reached its lowest level in at least 24 years. Similarly, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reported in its 1997 Uniform Crime Reports that the murder rate in 1997 had declined 28 percent since 1993. It also reported that the number of drug-related murders decreased by 7 percent between 1996 and 1997. According to ONDCP, from fiscal years 1990 through 1999 the federal government spent about $143.5 billion, in constant 1999 dollars, on four functional areas that can be divided between two categories—(1) those that are aimed at reducing the demand for illegal drugs and (2) those that are aimed at reducing the availability or supply of such drugs in the United States. As figure 1.3 indicates, about 33.8 percent of the total funds were used for drug demand reduction. About 66.2 percent of the total funds were used for the three functional areas intended to reduce the drug supply, with the largest share—49.5 percent—dedicated to domestic law enforcement programs, 3.8 percent to international programs, and 12.9 percent to interdiction programs. As figure 1.4 indicates, total funds for federal drug control activities increased, in constant 1999 dollars, by about 49 percent—from about $12 billion to almost $18 billion—between fiscal years 1990 and 1999. However, funding trends varied for the four functional areas. Although funds for the drug demand reduction functional area generally increased steadily overall by 50 percent from about $3.9 billion in 1990 to about $5.8 billion in 1999, funding trends for the three drug supply reduction functional areas were mixed. Funds for domestic law enforcement programs increased steadily overall by about 66 percent from about $5.4 billion in 1990 to almost $8.9 billion in 1999. Funds for interdiction programs fluctuated within the time period, increasing overall by about 9 percent from about $2.2 billion in 1990 to almost $2.4 billion in 1999. Funds for international programs increased by 23 percent from 1990 to 1992, to a peak of $759.1 million; they then decreased by 60 percent to a low of $303.5 million in 1996; they rose by 163 percent to about $796.9 million in 1999. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-690), as amended, established ONDCP to set federal priorities for drug control, implement a National Drug Control Strategy, and certify federal drug control budgets. The act specifies that the National Strategy must be comprehensive and research based; contain long-range goals and measurable objectives; and seek to reduce drug use (demand), availability (supply), and related consequences. ONDCP has produced annual strategic plans since 1989. These strategies recognized that no single approach could solve the nation’s drug problem; rather, drug prevention, education, and treatment must be complemented by drug supply reduction actions abroad, on our borders, and within the United States. Each strategy also shared a commitment to maintain and enforce antidrug laws. In 1998, ONDCP’s National Drug Control Strategy established performance targets to reduce illegal drug use and availability in the United States by 25 percent by the year 2002 and 50 percent by 2007. The strategy focuses on reducing the demand for drugs through treatment and prevention and attacking the supply of drugs through domestic law enforcement, interdiction efforts, and international cooperation. ONDCP’s 1999 National Strategy includes the performance targets and 5 goals along with 31 supporting objectives intended to serve as the basis for a coherent, long- term national effort. Goal 1: Educate and enable America’s youth to reject illegal drugs as well as tobacco and alcohol. Goal 2: Increase the safety of America’s citizens by substantially reducing drug-related crime and violence. Goal 3: Reduce the health and social costs to the public of illegal drug use. Goal 4: Shield America’s air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat. Goal 5: Break foreign and domestic sources of supply. As discussed in detail in chapter 3, strategic goals 2, 4, and 5 address drug supply reduction and involve drug law enforcement activities, including those for which DEA is responsible. Goal 2 seeks, among other things, to reduce the rate of drug-related crime and violence in the United States by 15 percent by the year 2002 and achieve a 30-percent reduction by the year 2007. Goal 4 seeks a 10-percent reduction in the rate at which illegal drugs successfully enter the United States by the year 2002 and a 20-percent reduction in this rate by 2007. Goal 5 seeks a 15-percent reduction in the flow of illegal drugs from source countries by the year 2002 and a 30- percent reduction by 2007. The goal also seeks a 20-percent reduction in domestic marijuana cultivation and methamphetamine production by 2002 and a 50-percent reduction by 2007. The mission of DEA, which is a component of DOJ, is to (1) enforce the drug laws and regulations of the United States and bring drug traffickersto justice and (2) recommend and support nonenforcement programs aimed at reducing the availability of illegal drugs in domestic and international markets. DEA is the lead agency responsible for federal drug law enforcement and for coordinating and pursuing drug investigations in foreign countries. According to DEA, its primary responsibilities for drug law enforcement include the following: investigating major drug traffickers operating at interstate and international levels and criminals and drug gangs who perpetrate violence in local communities; coordinating and cooperating with federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies on mutual drug enforcement efforts, including interstate and international investigations; managing a national drug intelligence system in cooperation with other federal, state, local, and foreign agencies to collect, analyze, and disseminate strategic and operational drug intelligence information; seizing and forfeiting drug traffickers’ assets; coordinating and cooperating with federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies and foreign governments on programs designed to reduce the availability of illegal drugs on the U.S. market through nonenforcement methods, such as crop eradication, crop substitution, and the training of foreign officials; and operating, under the policy guidance of the Secretary of State and U.S. Ambassadors, all programs associated with drug law enforcement counterparts in foreign countries. To carry out its mission and responsibilities, DEA, along with its headquarters office, had 21 domestic field divisions throughout the United States and its territories, including Puerto Rico, as of December 1998. Subordinate to these divisions, each of which was headed by a Special Agent in Charge (SAC), were a total of 30 district offices, 115 resident offices, and 46 posts of duty in the United States, with at least 1 office in every state. Overseas, DEA had 79 offices in 56 foreign countries. This included 56 country offices, each headed by a country attaché (CA), and 23 resident offices reporting to the country offices. (App. I contains profiles of the five field divisions and three country offices included in our review.) In addition, DEA manages a multiagency intelligence center in El Paso, TX; conducts training at Quantico, VA; and maintains seven drug analytical laboratories in various regions of the country and a special drug testing facility in McLean, VA. As shown in figure 1.5, DEA’s budget almost doubled, in constant 1999 dollars, from fiscal year 1990 to fiscal year 1999 and totaled about $11.3 billion during that period. Commensurate with its increased funding, as shown in figure 1.6, the size of DEA’s staff also increased during the 1990s by 40 percent—from 5,995 employees in 1990 to 8,387 employees in 1998. During this period, the number of intelligence specialists increased by about 116 percent, special agents by 40 percent, and other positions by 32 percent. As shown in figure 1.7, of the total on-board positions in fiscal year 1998, special agents made up about 51.4 percent, other positions about 41.8 percent, and intelligence specialists about 6.9 percent. The Chairmen of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control requested that we determine (1) what major enforcement strategies, programs, initiatives, and approaches DEA has implemented in the 1990s to carry out its mission, including its efforts to (a) target and investigate national and international drug traffickers and (b) help state and local law enforcement agencies combat drug offenders and drug-related violence in their communities; (2) whether DEA’s strategic goals and objectives, programs and initiatives, and performance measures are consistent with the National Drug Control Strategy; and (3) how DEA determined its fiscal year 1998 staffing needs and allocated the additional staff. We did our review at DEA headquarters, as well as at DEA offices in five domestic field divisions and three foreign countries. We also obtained information from officials representing DOJ, ONDCP, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the Department of State. Because the funding and other statistical data we collected from DEA and other agencies and used in this report were used primarily for background and descriptive purposes and were not directly related to our findings, conclusions, and recommendation, we did not independently validate or verify their accuracy and reliability. The five DEA domestic field division offices we visited are located in Los Angeles, CA; Miami, FL; New Orleans, LA; San Juan, Puerto Rico (the Caribbean Division); and Washington, D.C. We also visited one DEA district office located in Baltimore, MD, which is part of DEA’s Washington, D.C., Field Division. The three DEA foreign country offices we visited are located in La Paz, Bolivia; Bogota, Colombia; and Mexico City, Mexico. In Bolivia, we also visited resident offices in Santa Cruz and Trinidad and the Chimore base camp. (See app. I.) In Mexico, we also visited the Guadalajara Resident Office. These locations were judgmentally selected on the basis of geographic location, differences in the drug threat in these areas, and a variety of domestic and foreign drug enforcement operational characteristics. We also obtained information from the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices in Baltimore, Los Angeles, Miami, New Orleans, and Puerto Rico; from local police agencies in Baltimore; Los Angeles; South Miami, FL; Pine Bluff, AR; and Puerto Rico; and from State Department officials in Bolivia, Colombia, and Mexico. To determine what major enforcement strategies, programs, initiatives, and approaches DEA has implemented to carry out its mission in the 1990s, we collected and analyzed pertinent DEA, DOJ, and ONDCP documents. We also interviewed DEA headquarters officials, DEA officials in the selected domestic field offices and foreign country offices, and DOJ and ONDCP officials. We also collected ONDCP and DEA budget data for each fiscal year from 1990 to 1999, which we adjusted to constant 1999 dollars where appropriate. In addition, we obtained and analyzed DEA special agent work-hour statistics; case initiation data; statistical results (e.g., arrests, convictions, and seizures) of investigations; and other information relating to DEA’s enforcement programs. We did not evaluate the effectiveness of the individual strategies, programs, initiatives, and approaches discussed in chapter 2. To determine whether DEA’s strategic goals and objectives, programs and initiatives, and performance measures are consistent with the National Drug Control Strategy, we analyzed and compared DEA’s annual performance plans for fiscal years 1999 and 2000 with ONDCP’s 1998 and 1999 (1) National Drug Control Strategies, (2) National Drug Control Budget Summaries, and (3) Performance Measures of Effectiveness reports. We also reviewed DOJ’s (1) Strategic Plan for 1997-2002, (2) performance plans for fiscal years 1999 and 2000, and (3) Drug Control Strategic Plan. We interviewed DEA and ONDCP officials about their plans and how they interrelated. We used the Government Performance and Results Act as our basic criteria along with OMB, DOJ, and our guidance on the act, including OMB Circular A-11 and our guides for assessing agency annual performance plans and strategic plans. To determine how DEA’s fiscal year 1998 staffing estimates for its enforcement programs and initiatives were developed, we collected and analyzed information on the process, criteria DEA used, and staffing recommendations made during DEA’s budget formulation process. We interviewed DEA officials in headquarters and in the selected domestic field offices and foreign country offices, as well as DOJ, ONDCP, and OMB officials to obtain information on how staffing needs were determined and how the budget review process affected staffing estimates, requests, and allocations. We reviewed documents dealing with staffing recommendations and allocations; policies and procedures; DOJ, ONDCP, and OMB budget reviews; and congressional appropriations. We performed our work from December 1997 to May 1999 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. In June 1999, we provided a draft of this report to the Attorney General and the Director of ONDCP for comment. We also provided relevant sections of the report to OMB and State Department officials for a review of the facts that pertain to those agencies. We received written comments on June 23, 1999, from the Deputy Administrator, DEA, which are discussed in chapters 2 and 3 and reprinted in appendix II. In addition, DEA provided a number of technical changes and clarifications, which we have incorporated throughout the report where appropriate. On June 21, 1999, ONDCP’s Acting Deputy Director, Office of Legislative Affairs, orally informed us that ONDCP reviewed the report from a factual standpoint because the overall conclusions and recommendation are directed at DEA. He stated that the report was factually correct from ONDCP’s perspective and provided a few technical clarifications, which we incorporated where appropriate. On June 21, 1999, OMB officials responsible for examining DEA’s budget orally communicated a few technical comments, which we incorporated in chapter 4. The State Department’s liaison for GAO informed us on June 21, 1999, that the Department had no comments. Since its creation in 1973, DEA has focused its efforts primarily on investigating the highest levels of national and international illegal drug trafficking. In addition, DEA has supported state and local law enforcement efforts directed at the lower levels of drug trafficking. In the 1990s, however, DEA revised its strategy to focus its operations on what it refers to as the “seamless continuum” of drug trafficking, from international drug trafficking organizations residing outside the United States to local gangs and individuals illegally selling drugs on city streets. Consequently, during the 1990s, DEA gave a higher priority than in the past and increased resources to working with and assisting state and local law enforcement agencies, including starting a new program to help combat drug-related violent crime in local communities. Concurrently, in the 1990s, DEA made the following enhancements to its already high priority enforcement operations directed at national and international drug trafficking organizations. DEA established the Kingpin Strategy, which evolved into the Special Operations Division (SOD), placing greater emphasis on intercepting communications between top-level drug traffickers and their subordinates (i.e., attacking the “command and control” communications of major drug trafficking organizations) to dismantle their entire trafficking operations. DEA started participating in two interagency programs to target and investigate major drug trafficking organizations in Latin America and Asia. DEA helped establish, train, and fund special foreign police units to combat drug trafficking in certain key foreign countries, primarily in Latin America. Since its establishment, DEA has directed its resources primarily toward disrupting or dismantling major organizations involved in interstate and international drug trafficking. DEA has concentrated on investigating those traffickers functioning at the highest levels of these enterprises, often by developing conspiracy cases for U.S. Attorneys to prosecute and seizing the traffickers’ assets. Federal drug control policymakers considered this investigative approach to be the most effective for reducing the illegal drug supply in the United States. Consistent with this approach, DEA’s operational strategy in the early 1990s was to identify and exploit trafficker vulnerabilities and to disrupt or dismantle their organizations by conducting investigations leading to (1) the prosecution, conviction, and incarceration of leaders and key players in drug organizations and (2) the seizure and forfeiture of the assets of these organizations. DEA’s enforcement operations were to focus and apply pressure in four principal areas: source (production overseas and in the United States), transit (smuggling of drugs and essential chemicals), domestic distribution (sales of illegal drugs in the United States), and proceeds (money and assets derived from distribution). DEA operations were also to control the distribution of chemicals used to manufacture illegal drugs and prevent the diversion of legally produced controlled substances. In 1994, the DEA Administrator undertook a review of DEA’s policies and strategies to ensure that DEA was appropriately responding to the drug trafficking problem and related violent crime. The results of the review included recommendations by DEA SACs and senior managers that DEA refocus its investigative priorities by increasing its efforts against domestic drug trafficking, including violent drug organizations, street gangs, local impact issues, regional trafficking organizations, and domestically produced illegal drugs, while, at the same time, continuing to investigate major national and international trafficking organizations. As a result, in 1995, the DEA Administrator established the Mobile Enforcement Team (MET) Program, which focuses a small percentage of DEA’s resources on drug-related violent crime in local communities. Then, in a 1997 memorandum to DEA’s field offices, he indicated that over the next 5 years DEA was to focus its operations on the “seamless continuum” of the organized crime systems that direct drug trafficking, with agencywide programs and initiatives directed at major regional, national, and international cases; violent drug organizations, gangs, and local impact issues; and domestically cultivated and manufactured illegal drugs. According to DEA, the international aspects of drug trafficking cannot be separated from the domestic aspects because they are interdependent and intertwined. The operations of major trafficking organizations can involve the cultivation and production of drugs in foreign countries, transportation to the United States, and eventual distribution on city streets. Accordingly, the Administrator emphasized that DEA was to target the highest level drug traffickers and their organizations, as well as violent, street-level drug gangs operating in communities. To implement this strategy, DEA was to pursue a vigorous international enforcement program, while domestically using the MET Program and other enforcement approaches to combat the threat and impact of drugs in local communities. The Administrator cited cooperation with other agencies as a guiding principle for all aspects of DEA’s international operations and domestic operations, which included assisting state and local law enforcement agencies with their most serious drug and drug-related violence problems. Although DEA has always worked formally and informally with state and local law enforcement agencies, it increased its involvement in, and devoted more resources to, task forces and other multiagency operations with state and local law enforcement agencies in the 1990s. Major DEA programs for working with and assisting state and local police on multiagency operations are the State and Local Task Force Program, MET Program, and Domestic Cannabis Eradication/Suppression Program. Through its State and Local Task Force Program, which originated in 1970 with DEA’s predecessor agency, DEA coordinates with state and local law enforcement agencies, shares information, participates in joint investigations, and shares assets forfeited federally as a result of cases made against drug dealers. In addition, state and local officers often receive drug investigation training and enhanced drug enforcement authority. Throughout the 1990s, DEA substantially increased the number of its state and local task forces and the number of special agents assigned to them. DEA’s budget for state and local task forces also increased substantially during this period. Table 2.1 shows DEA’s budget for its state and local task forces and the number of task forces in fiscal years 1991 through 1999. As the table indicates, DEA spent $45.7 million, in constant 1999 dollars, on this program in fiscal year 1991 and budgeted $105.5 million for fiscal year 1999. The total number of DEA-sponsored state and local task forces increased by about 90 percent during these years. Similarly, as shown in table 2.2, the number of special agents assigned to DEA-sponsored state and local task forces increased by about 84 percent between fiscal years 1991 and 1998, while the number of assigned state and local law enforcement officers increased by about 34 percent during the same time period. About 22 percent of DEA’s 4,309 special agents in fiscal year 1998 were assigned to state and local task forces, compared to about 14 percent of the total 3,542 special agents at DEA in fiscal year 1991. The amount of time spent by DEA special agents overall on state and local task forces also increased steadily in the 1990s. DEA special agents spent about 19.5 percent of all domestic investigative work hours on these task forces in fiscal year 1998 compared to about 9.2 percent during fiscal year 1990. Table 2.3 shows the number of cases, arrests, convictions, asset seizures, and drug seizures that resulted from the state and local task forces in fiscal years 1991 through 1998. DEA categorizes each case as local, regional, domestic, foreign, or international, according to the geographic scope covered. As shown in table 2.4, a little over 50 percent of the task force cases initiated in fiscal years 1997 and 1998 were local and regional. They involved suspected drug violators operating in the geographic areas covered by the DEA offices conducting the investigations, and most of them were local violators. Less than 10 percent of the task force cases targeted people suspected of drug trafficking on an international scale. The following are examples of state and local task force investigations conducted by the Los Angeles; Miami; New Orleans; and Washington, D.C., field divisions, respectively, that DEA considered to be successful. DEA’s task force in Santa Ana, CA, targeted a Mexican methamphetamine manufacturing and distribution organization operating throughout southern California. The investigation employed wiretaps of nine telephones, along with extensive surveillance, use of informants, and other investigative techniques. Primarily on the basis of information from the wiretaps, the task force conducted 11 raids in 4 cities resulting in the arrest of 27 Mexican nationals on state drug charges and the seizure of 26 pounds of methamphetamine, 25 gallons of methamphetamine in solution form (estimated to be the equivalent of 50 to 100 pounds of methamphetamine), 100 pounds of ephidrine in powder form, an estimated 164 pounds of ephidrine in solution form, other chemicals used to manufacture methamphetamine, 3 ounces of cocaine, and about $93,000 in cash. Two methamphetamine laboratories and four ephidrine extraction laboratories were seized and dismantled. In Operation Emerald City, DEA, along with state and local law enforcement agencies and state regulatory agencies, targeted a drug trafficking organization that was selling drugs in a Riviera Beach, FL, bar in 1997. Some of the biggest known drug dealers in the greater West Palm Beach area had used the bar and its attached property for drug dealing since the 1960s; and numerous murders, stabbings, drive-by shootings, and robberies had occurred there over the years. Two leaders of one drug organization had been arrested, and another organization had taken control of the bar. DEA obtained a court order allowing surreptitious entry of the bar and installation of covert closed circuit television cameras to record drug transactions, identify traffickers, and afford undercover officers the ability to buy drugs while under constant camera surveillance. As a result, 38 people were arrested for violations of federal and state drug laws. In addition, the bar’s liquor license was revoked, and the business and surrounding property were forfeited to the government. DEA’s REDRUM (“murder” spelled backward) task force group, which focuses on drug and drug-related homicide cases, targeted a violent heroin trafficking organization operating in New Orleans, LA. DEA conducted the investigation jointly with the New Orleans Police Department Homicide Division and the FBI. As a result of the investigation, which included wiretaps, surveillance, and debriefings of informants, 13 individuals were indicted on a variety of federal drug, firearms, and murder charges. Ten defendants pled guilty prior to trial, and the head of the organization was found guilty of all charges and received a life sentence. In addition, five homicides in the city of New Orleans were solved, and 359 grams of heroin and $60,000 in drug-related assets were seized. According to DEA, the investigation had a significant local impact by reducing violent crime and disrupting the flow of heroin into New Orleans. DEA’s Richmond District Office City Strike Force in Virginia learned about a trafficking organization bringing Colombian heroin to the Richmond and Columbus, OH, areas from New York. Through the arrest and debriefing of drug couriers, the task force obtained evidence regarding the organization’s distribution of more than 100 pounds of Colombian heroin in the Richmond area over approximately 1 year’s time. The task force arrested the 2 heads of the organization and 24 co-conspirators. Three kilograms of Colombian heroin and $17,000 were seized. In February 1995, DEA established the MET Program to help state and local law enforcement agencies combat violent crime and drug trafficking in their communities, particularly crime committed by violent gangs. This was consistent with the Attorney General’s Anti-Violent Crime Initiative, which was initiated in 1994 to establish partnerships among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to address major violent crime problems, including gangs. The MET Program was also consistent with ONDCP’s 1995 National Drug Control Strategy, which cited the program as an example of how federal agencies would help state and local agencies address drug trafficking and associated violence. According to DEA officials, federal assistance through the MET Program was designed to help overcome two challenges facing state and local agencies in drug enforcement: State and local police agencies did not have sufficient resources to effectively enforce drug laws. Local law enforcement personnel were known to local drug users and sellers, making undercover drug buys and penetration of local distribution rings difficult and dangerous. Unlike DEA’s traditional State and Local Task Force Program, previously discussed, in the MET Program, upon request from local officials, DEA deploys teams of special agents (referred to as METs) directly to communities affected by drug-related violence. The METs are based in DEA field divisions throughout the country. The METs are to work cooperatively with the requesting local law enforcement agency—sharing intelligence, coordinating activities, and sometimes combining staff and other resources—to target drug gangs and individuals responsible for violent crime. Since its creation in fiscal year 1995, funds for the MET Program have totaled about $173 million in constant 1999 dollars. Table 2.5 shows the MET budget, the number of active METs, and the number of agents authorized for those METs from the inception through fiscal year 1999. A typical MET is made up of 8 to 12 DEA special agents. Each MET operation starts with a request to the local DEA field office from a police chief, sheriff, or district attorney for assistance in dealing with drug-related violence. DEA then evaluates the scope of the problem and the capability of local law enforcement to address it. Each assessment is supposed to give particular attention to the violent crime rate in the requesting community and the impact of the identified drug group on the violence occurring there. Once DEA decides to deploy a MET, an action plan is to be developed, including identification of the suspects to be targeted. Following this initial planning, the MET is to conduct the deployment outfitted with the necessary surveillance and technical equipment. During a deployment, the MET is to work with the local law enforcement officials to investigate and arrest targeted violent drug offenders. According to DEA officials, the MET generally collects intelligence, initiates investigations, participates in undercover operations, makes arrests, seizes assets, and provides support to local or federal prosecutors. Evidence developed in MET investigations may also be used to prosecute the same individuals for related crimes, including murder, assault, or other acts of violence. According to DEA, each MET deployment plan establishes a time frame of between 90 and 120 days for completing the deployment. At the time of our review, DEA had 24 METs in 20 of its 21 domestic field divisions (with the Caribbean Division being the only exception). Table 2.6 shows the number of MET deployments and their results from the program’s inception in fiscal year 1995 through fiscal year 1998. The DEA offices in Los Angeles, Miami, New Orleans, and Washington, D.C., had completed 33 MET deployments at the time we made our visits during 1998. In conducting our work at these offices, we spoke with local police officials in selected cities—Baltimore, MD; Los Angeles, CA; Pine Bluff, AR; and South Miami, FL—who had requested MET deployments. The officials said they were pleased with the results of the MET deployments and that the accomplishments met their expectations. Following are summaries of the MET deployments in these four cities. A MET deployment conducted for about 2-1/2 months during 1996 in the Rampart area of Los Angeles targeted six violent street gangs: 18th Street, Mara Salvatruches, Orphans, Playboys, Crazy Riders, and Diamonds. In addition to the MET, the Los Angeles Police Department, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, and the California Department of Corrections participated. The operation resulted in 421 arrests, including 144 by DEA’s MET, and seizures of 1,200 grams of heroin, 630 grams of cocaine, 104 pounds of marijuana, 28 weapons, and $70,000 in currency. According to a Los Angeles Police Department official, crime statistics (e.g., homicides and aggravated assaults) in the Rampart area fell immediately after the MET deployment was completed. However, DEA’s post-deployment assessment of violent crimes in the area, comparing the 6 months after the deployment ended to the 6 months prior to the deployment, showed that homicides increased from 42 to 47, aggravated assaults increased from 738 to 1,008, robberies increased from 1,091 to 1,275, and sex crimes increased from 130 to 207. In addition, the assessment indicated that drug sales appeared to increase shortly after the deployment was completed, approaching levels observed before the deployment started. It further indicated that a significant number of drug dealers reportedly changed the location of their distribution activities while remaining in the Rampart area. The South Miami Police Department requested DEA support in going after crack cocaine dealers. Initially, the police collected intelligence, purchased drugs, and arrested 17 street-level drug dealers. DEA’s MET then became involved. The MET bought crack cocaine from drug dealers who came out to sell the drugs after the initial arrests had been made. The MET, which deployed for about 3 months in 1998, made 13 arrests (7 for federal prosecution and 6 for state prosecution) and seized 386.7 grams of crack cocaine. South Miami police officials said some of those arrested had committed weapons violations and some violence (e.g., assaults, batteries, and armed robberies) in the past. According to DEA’s post-deployment assessment of violent crimes in the area, comparing the 6 months after the deployment ended to the 6 months prior to the deployment, homicides decreased from 1 to 0, assaults decreased from 11 to 4, aggravated batteries decreased from 9 to 3, and robberies decreased from 14 to 5. The assessment noted that illegal drug activity in the South Miami area had been greatly reduced. The assessment further noted that the availability of crack cocaine in the area had been reduced, as well as drug distribution in surrounding areas. A MET deployment conducted for 6 months during 1997 in Pine Bluff targeted violent organizations dealing in crack cocaine and methamphetamine. A total of 46 people were arrested, including 15 who were indicted by a federal grand jury. Four people were suspects in four different homicides. Six ounces of crack cocaine were seized, along with 15 vehicles and $118,026. The Pine Bluff Police Chief told us that the MET deployment had successfully helped reduce both the city’s homicide rate and its crack cocaine problem. However, DEA’s post-deployment assessment of violent crimes in the area, comparing the 6 months after the deployment ended to the 6 months prior to the deployment, showed that homicides increased from 4 to 7, assaults increased from 677 to 1,098, rapes increased from 44 to 51, and robberies increased from 168 to 190. A MET deployed in eastern Baltimore for 5 months during 1997 successfully targeted a drug organization—the M&J Gang—in a housing project. This case resulted in 81 arrests, many of which were already “in the works” before the MET deployment, according to Baltimore police officials we contacted. The officials said the MET deployment also reduced violent crime in that area. DEA’s post-deployment assessment showed fewer major crimes overall in the area during the 6-month period starting about 1 month before the deployment ended compared to the 6 months prior to the deployment. Shootings decreased from 527 to 389, aggravated assaults decreased from 3,273 to 2,950, robberies decreased from 4,888 to 3,889, burglaries decreased from 5,775 to 5,684, larcenies decreased from 16,475 to 15,976, and stolen automobiles decreased from 4,851 to 3,213. However, murders increased from 143 to 156, and rapes increased from 175 to 202. DEA’s assessment also reported that narcotic activity in two areas covered by the deployment was significantly reduced, and gang- related criminal activity had decreased in the sections of Baltimore controlled by the M&J Gang and another drug gang. DEA officials we met with in the four field division offices told us that although MET deployments typically focused on local violent drug offenders, they sometimes led to investigations of higher level drug traffickers. In response to our request for quantitative data on this, a DEA headquarters official responded that it is difficult for DEA to provide statistics on the exact number of deployments that have led to investigations of higher level drug traffickers through MET operations because this information was not systematically maintained in an automated database. However, DEA did provide us with some examples of MET deployments that led to higher level drug traffickers. For example, DEA reported that a MET deployed from DEA’s Phoenix office identified connections in Mexico to MET targets in Lake Havasu City, AZ, and family members in southern California. The resulting intelligence revealed that this Mexican-based organization was responsible for smuggling precursor chemicals from Mexico to clandestine laboratory sites in southern California, where methamphetamine was produced. Multiple-pound quantities of methamphetamine were transported to Lake Havasu City. According to DEA, the organization was also transporting large shipments of methamphetamine to Oregon, Washington, Colorado, and New Mexico. As shown in table 2.7, the MET deployments conducted in fiscal years 1995 through 1998 resulted in mostly local and regional drug cases. Local and regional cases involve suspected drug violators operating in the geographic areas covered by the DEA offices conducting the investigations. As expected, given the MET program’s purpose, local cases were the single largest category, making up about 47 percent of the total during that period. About 6 percent of the MET cases involved criminals trafficking in drugs on an international scale. After completing a MET deployment, DEA may carry out efforts to help a community maintain a lower level of drug trafficking and violent crime. For example, DEA offers follow-up training to those communities carrying out drug demand reduction activities. In addition, if feasible, DEA may respond to a request for the re-deployment of a MET to prevent drug- related violent crimes from resurging to the level that existed prior to the initial deployment. In a June 1998 memorandum to all SACs of domestic field offices, DEA headquarters directed that the field divisions proactively promote the MET Program to increase the number of requests for deployments. The memorandum stated that despite the MET Program’s success, much more could and should be done to stimulate interest in the program on the part of state and local law enforcement agencies. The DEA offices were instructed to collect crime statistics in specific areas within their geographic boundaries to determine the existence of drug trafficking problems related to violent crime. After making such determinations, the DEA SAC or a designated assistant was to contact the local police chief or sheriff in those areas to explain the benefits of a MET deployment in their jurisdictions and inform them of the availability of MET resources. The memorandum noted that each SAC or assistant was expected to visit local police officials each month. The memorandum further noted that each office’s proactive MET Program activities would be a significant factor in the SACs’ annual performance appraisals. According to DEA, the proactive contacts have generated numerous additional requests for MET assistance, and the majority of recent deployments have been the result of such proactive contacts. With regard to the results of the MET Program, DEA officials reported decreases in the number of murders, robberies, and aggravated assaults in local areas covered by the program based on an analysis of local crime statistics gathered from the targeted geographic locations before and after 133 deployments that had been completed as of April 20, 1999. According to DEA, its post-deployment assessments cumulatively showed a 12- percent decline in murders, 14-percent decline in robberies, and 6-percent decline in aggravated assaults in the 133 deployment areas during the 6 months after the deployments ended when compared to the 6 months prior to the deployments. Further, DEA’s analysis showed that 28 of the 133 deployment areas had decreases in all 3 major violent crime categories (i.e., murder, robbery, and aggravated assault) during the 6 months after the deployments ended, while only 5 of the areas had increases in all 3 crime categories. (These five deployments included two of the examples summarized above). In commenting on these results, DEA noted that the effectiveness of MET deployments in removing a specific, targeted violent drug gang, for example, cannot by itself eliminate a community’s drug trafficking problems because DEA cannot continue to control the deployment areas to prevent other drug dealers from filling the void that a MET deployment might have created. DEA started assisting state and local law enforcement agencies in their efforts to control domestically grown marijuana in 1979, when it helped agencies in California and Hawaii. DEA’s Domestic Cannabis Eradication/Suppression Program was established in 1982 to more formally help the states eradicate domestic marijuana while building cases leading to the arrest and prosecution of growers. The program became active in all 50 states in 1985. To implement the program, DEA provides funds to state and local law enforcement agencies. The funds are to be used by these agencies for program expenses, such as aircraft rentals and fuel, vehicles, equipment, supplies, and overtime payments for state and local officers working on eradication operations. As table 2.8 indicates, funds provided by DEA for the program increased about 177 percent, in constant 1999 dollars, from fiscal year 1990 to fiscal year 1999. DEA encourages state and local agencies to assume the major responsibility for eradicating domestic marijuana. In coordinating the program in each state, DEA is to assist efforts to detect and eradicate marijuana plants (including coordinating the support of other agencies, arranging for needed equipment, and helping with surveillance); exchange intelligence; investigate marijuana trafficking organizations; and provide training. Table 2.9 shows the statistical results of DEA’s Domestic Cannabis Eradication/Suppression Program for 1990 through 1998. In addition to its State and Local Task Force, MET, and Domestic Cannabis Eradication/Suppression Programs, DEA also participates in other multiagency task force operations involving state and local law enforcement agencies. These include the following: The Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) Program is coordinated by U.S. Attorneys. This program is designed to promote coordination and cooperation among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies involved in drug enforcement in each task force region. The goal of the OCDETF Program is to identify, investigate, and prosecute members of high-level drug trafficking organizations and related enterprises. In fiscal year 1998, DEA sponsored 847, or 62 percent, and participated in 1,096, or 81 percent, of the 1,356 OCDETF investigations that were initiated. DOJ reimburses DEA for its expenditures on OCDETF investigations. For fiscal year 1998, DEA was reimbursed $94.4 million for the OCDETF Program. The High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) Program is administered by ONDCP. The mission of the HIDTA Program is to coordinate drug control efforts among federal, state, and local agencies in designated areas in order to reduce drug trafficking in critical regions of the United States. At the time of our work in September 1998, ONDCP had designated 20 areas as HIDTAs. According to ONDCP, a HIDTA organization typically consists of a major task force led by federal agencies, drug and money laundering task forces led by state or local agencies, a joint intelligence center and information-sharing network, and other supporting initiatives. DEA receives funds from ONDCP based upon its participation in the HIDTA Program. For fiscal year 1998, DEA received $14.8 million in direct HIDTA funding. Since it was established, DEA’s highest priority has been to investigate major drug trafficking organizations, both domestic and foreign, responsible for supplying illegal drugs consumed in the United States. Over the years, DEA has adopted various techniques for focusing its efforts on such investigations. In 1992, DEA started using an investigative approach designed to identify and target drug kingpins and their supporting infrastructures, primarily through the use of wiretaps and other types of electronic surveillance within the United States and the use of intelligence information. DEA called this approach the Kingpin Strategy. This approach, which has led to the dismantling or disruption of major trafficking organizations, was later adopted by SOD when it was established in 1995. More recently, DEA has established the Regional Enforcement Team (RET) initiative to address regional, national, and international drug trafficking in small towns and rural areas within the United States. Developed in 1992, the Kingpin Strategy targeted major Colombian cocaine and Southeast and Southwest Asian heroin trafficking organizations. This strategy was DEA’s top priority and its primary enforcement approach for addressing the national priority of reducing the availability of illegal drugs in the United States. The Kingpin Strategy primarily targeted cocaine trafficking organizations operating out of Medellin and Cali, Colombia, with most of its focus on one organization referred to as the Cali cartel. According to DEA, the heads of the Colombian organizations tightly controlled all aspects of their operations and telephoned subordinates to give directions. DEA concluded that this was a weakness in the operations of these organizations. DEA decided to exploit this weakness by monitoring their communications and analyzing telephone numbers called to identify the kingpins and their key subordinates for U.S. and/or foreign investigation, arrest, and prosecution and for seizure of their domestic assets. The Office of Major Investigations at DEA headquarters was responsible for implementing the Kingpin Strategy. Various intelligence, financial, and operational functions were consolidated within this office to facilitate focusing DEA’s investigative resources and capabilities on targeted kingpin organizations (TKO). The office disseminated tips and leads, collected from intelligence sources worldwide, to help agents in the field carry out investigations and enforcement activities. The office centrally directed, coordinated, oversaw, and funded investigations that were being carried out in multiple U.S. cities and foreign countries in cooperation with state, local, and foreign police. DEA’s SOD and its investigative approach evolved out of the Office of Major Investigations and the Kingpin Strategy. According to DEA, the Kingpin Strategy was enhanced by the creation of SOD as a separate division. SOD was established at DEA headquarters in August 1995 and given its own budget and additional staff.As with the Kingpin Strategy, SOD’s approach focuses on the command and control communications of major drug trafficking organizations. However, a major difference is that its scope was expanded beyond Colombian cocaine and Southeast and Southwest Asian heroin trafficking organizations to coordinate and support investigations of major organizations trafficking in methamphetamine and Colombian heroin, as well as organizations trafficking illegal drugs along the Southwest Border. SOD’s primary emphasis currently is Colombian and Mexican organizations responsible for smuggling illegal drugs into the United States. Another major difference from the Kingpin Strategy is that representatives from other law enforcement agencies, including the FBI and U.S. Customs Service, are detailed to SOD. The FBI has had agents detailed to SOD since 1995, and the Deputy SAC of SOD is an FBI agent. Similarly, the Customs Service has detailed agents to SOD since 1996. Most of SOD’s workload supports cases being conducted by DEA field offices. However, the SOD SAC told us that the workload was increasingly supporting FBI and Customs Service cases. The intelligence agencies and the Department of Defense (DOD) also participate by providing drug intelligence to SOD. In addition, DOJ’s Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Section participates by providing legal advice to SOD on investigations. Like the Kingpin Strategy, SOD’s investigative approach and initiatives are to support domestic and foreign investigations of major drug traffickers and trafficking organizations in two principal ways. First, SOD is to disseminate tips and leads collected from intelligence sources worldwide to help agents in the field carry out investigations and enforcement activities. Second, SOD is to assist agents in building and coordinating multijurisdictional drug conspiracy cases that are based primarily on the use of wiretaps. Multijurisdictional efforts, such as Operation Reciprocity (described later) with 35 wiretaps in 10 U.S. cities, can involve many different individual investigations across the country. In May 1999, the SOD SAC estimated that SOD was supporting and coordinating about 240 cases throughout the United States. He said that SOD typically had approximately six to eight ongoing major operations at any one time, each having multiple related cases. Similar to the Kingpin Strategy, SOD does not control the cases that it supports; rather, decisionmaking on cases is left to field supervisors and agents. According to DEA officials, if SOD determines that field offices in different parts of the country are conducting investigations related to the same major drug trafficking organization, it attempts to bring the responsible agents together to develop the best cases for prosecution. In so doing, it is to coordinate and guide the agents’ efforts, including their intelligence and electronic surveillance operations, and assist with intelligence collection and analysis. SOD essentially funds the same types of investigative activities as the Office of Major Investigations funded under the Kingpin Strategy. According to the SOD SAC, SOD provides funds to DEA field offices primarily for conducting electronic surveillance in support of investigations. It also funds payments for informants and drug purchases if doing so is essential to an investigation. However, he said it does so only when an electronic surveillance is being conducted or planned and only in connection with an ongoing case with which SOD is involved. (For example, in the course of an investigation, an agent may acquire a phone number that is determined to be connected with a current SOD-funded investigation.) SOD does not fund individual FBI and Customs drug investigations, but it does support some of those investigations through its various activities. SOD is responsible for the oversight of and guidance for DEA’s Title III (electronic surveillance) program. In Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Congress set forth the circumstances under which the interception of wire and oral communications may be authorized (P.L. 90-351,18 USC 2510, et seq.). SOD is to help special agents in the field focus their intercept operations on the best available targets, choose the best telephone numbers for intercept, correctly conduct the intercepts, make the best use of collected information, and make the most efficient use of transcribers and translators. SOD also is to send teams to the field to assist special agents with their wire intercept operations. According to DEA officials and data, since the Kingpin Strategy and SOD initiatives have been in operation, DEA has greatly increased the number of wiretaps and other electronic surveillances it conducts. The number of electronic surveillance court orders requested and conducted by DEA, as shown in table 2.10, increased by 183 percent; and the number of facilities (e.g., telephone, pager, and fax machine) covered by the orders increased by 158 percent, from fiscal year 1990 to fiscal year 1998. Most noteworthy is that the number of orders increased by 30 percent between fiscal years 1991 and 1992 after the Kingpin Strategy was initiated, and they increased by 65 percent between fiscal years 1995 and 1996 after SOD was established. DEA’s Special Intelligence Division is to support SOD’s operations by collecting, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence and other information from a variety of sources. For example, the unit is to analyze and disseminate information from telephone records and access and disseminate information from DEA, FBI, and Customs computerized drug intelligence systems. The unit has expanded both in size and computer and other technological capability. There were 186 staff in October 1998, including DEA, FBI, Customs, DOD, and contractor personnel. According to the SOD SAC, although DEA did not systematically compile results data on all of the Kingpin and SOD operations, cases supported, and leads disseminated, DEA has used both initiatives to successfully dismantle or disrupt drug trafficking organizations responsible for large amounts of illegal drugs brought into the United States. For example, according to DEA, the Kingpin Strategy contributed to dismantling the Cali cartel, which DEA considered the most powerful criminal organization that law enforcement has ever faced. Since 1995, all of the top Cali cartel leaders have been captured by or surrendered to the Colombian National Police (CNP), with the exception of one who was killed in a shoot-out with CNP at the time of his arrest. According to DEA, evidence gathered through years of investigations by DEA and other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies and CNP led to the identification, indictment, arrest, conviction, and incarceration of the cartel leaders and some of their subordinates on drug charges in Colombia and the United States. According to DEA, a number of other successful operations have resulted from the Kingpin Strategy and SOD initiatives. These include the following: Operation Tiger Trap was a joint operation carried out by DEA and the Royal Thai Police in 1994. Tiger Trap produced U.S. indictments against members of the 20,000-man Shan United Army, a heroin TKO that operated the principal trafficking network in the Golden Triangle area of Thailand, Burma, and Laos for decades. Zorro I and Zorro II were multijurisdictional operations involving DEA, the FBI, Customs Service, and numerous state and local law enforcement agencies. Zorro I targeted Colombian drug traffickers based in Cali, Colombia, and their key subordinates operating in Los Angeles, New York, and Miami. Zorro I operated from 1992 to 1994 and included 10 DEA domestic field divisions. Zorro II targeted Mexican transportation groups used by the Colombians, as well as Colombian distribution cells located throughout the United States. It operated from 1995 to 1996 and included 14 DEA field divisions. The two operations relied heavily on the use of wiretaps. There were 117 wiretaps conducted, generating leads that identified Colombian distribution cells, Mexican traffickers’ command and control networks, money laundering routes, cocaine cache sites, and other important information. According to DEA, these operations disrupted both Colombian and Mexican organizations. Specifically, Zorro I resulted in 209 arrests, 6.5 tons of cocaine seized, and $13.5 million seized. Zorro II resulted in 182 arrests, 5.7 tons of cocaine and 1,018 pounds of marijuana seized, $18.3 million seized, and $2.5 million in assets seized. Operation Limelight was a multijurisdictional operation involving DEA, Customs, and numerous state and local law enforcement agencies. The operation targeted a Mexican drug transportation and distribution organization, which intelligence indicated was responsible for importing over 1-½ tons of cocaine monthly into the United States. The operation, which ran from 1996 to 1997, included the use of 37 wiretaps and other electronically generated intelligence, which helped identify groups in Houston and McAllen, TX; Los Angeles, San Diego, and San Francisco, CA; New York, NY; and Chicago, IL. The operation resulted in 48 arrests, 4 tons of cocaine seized, 10,846 pounds of marijuana seized, and $7.1 million seized. Operation Reciprocity was a multijurisdictional investigation involving DEA, the FBI, Customs Service, and numerous state and local agencies. In this operation, DEA combined several independent, but related, investigations being simultaneously conducted by federal, state, and local agencies into one investigation and helped other offices start investigations of other subjects by providing leads. The operation focused on two independent group heads based in the Juarez, Mexico, area who were responsible for importing, transporting, and distributing more than 30 tons of cocaine from Mexico to Chicago and New York. The operation involved 35 wiretaps and other electronically generated intelligence information in 10 cities. The operation, which ran from 1996 to 1997, resulted in 53 arrests, 7.4 tons of cocaine seized, 2,800 pounds of marijuana seized, and $11.2 million seized. According to DEA, information from some of the above SOD operations and other intelligence sources indicates that some major drug trafficking organizations are adapting to drug law enforcement efforts in large U.S. cities by shifting their operations to small towns and rural areas within the United States. DEA investigations and other information have provided evidence that these trafficking organizations have established command and control centers, warehouses, and drug transshipment points in many small communities. Consequently, according to DEA, these communities have become major distribution centers, as well as production centers in some cases, for illegal drugs, such as cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, and marijuana. To respond to this threat, DEA established the RET initiative in fiscal year 1999, for which Congress provided $13 million and authorized 56 positions. The RETs are designed to be proactive, highly mobile regional investigative teams whose mission is to (1) target drug organizations operating or establishing themselves in small towns and rural areas where there is a lack of sufficient drug law enforcement resources and (2) better develop and exploit drug intelligence developed by SOD and other sources. The RET initiative’s objective is to identify and dismantle these drug organizations before they become entrenched in the communities. The RETs are similar to METs, previously discussed, only in that they are mobile teams. The RET initiative differs significantly from the MET Program in that the RETs are to only target major drug violators operating at the regional, national, or international level; while the METs, upon request from local authorities, are to assist urban and rural communities in investigating and eliminating drug-related violence. DEA is implementing two RETs, which are to become operational in September 1999, one in Charlotte, NC, and one in Des Moines, IA. According to DEA, each RET will consist of 22 personnel, including 15 special agents. In addition, the RETs are to be provided with the investigative equipment and vehicles needed to ensure a high degree of mobility and capability to support the performance of even the most complex investigations. According to DEA, international drug trafficking organizations have become the most dangerous organized crime forces in the world, and Colombian and Mexican organizations are the most threatening to the United States. DEA documents state that such international trafficking organizations are often headquartered in foreign countries where there is little or no potential for extradition to the United States. Because of the international nature of drug trafficking, DEA had 79 offices in 56 foreign countries as of December 1998. DEA opened 16 offices in 15 foreign countries, and closed 4 offices in 4 countries, from fiscal years 1990 through 1998. Each foreign DEA office is part of the U.S. Embassy’s country team. As a country team member, how DEA operates in a foreign country must be consistent with the embassy’s Mission Program Plan, which is a strategic plan required by the State Department for U.S. government activities within each country where there is a U.S. Embassy. Mission Program Plans discuss the embassies’ human rights, democratic, economic, law enforcement, and other goals, strategies, and objectives, including efforts to combat drug trafficking. The plan for each country is to be reviewed and approved by DEA and other agencies represented on the country team. DEA cannot operate in foreign countries as it does in the United States because of various limitations. For example, DEA said its agents cannot make arrests or conduct electronic surveillances in any foreign country, nor can they be present during foreign police enforcement operations without a waiver from the Ambassador. DEA’s primary goal in the countries where it operates is, through bilateral law enforcement cooperation, to disrupt and/or dismantle the leadership, command, control, and infrastructure of drug trafficking organizations that threaten the United States. To accomplish this goal, DEA engages in cooperative investigations and exchanges intelligence with its host nation counterparts. In addition, DEA provides training, advice, and assistance to host nation law enforcement agencies to improve their effectiveness and make them self-sufficient in investigating major drug traffickers and combating the production, transportation, and distribution of illegal drugs. In addition to SOD operations, DEA has been a participant in two interagency investigative programs that were established during the 1990s to address drug trafficking in certain foreign countries where major trafficking organizations were based. They are the Linear and Linkage Approach Programs. This program was established in 1991 as a U.S. interagency forum to disrupt and dismantle the key organizations in Latin America responsible for producing and shipping illegal drugs to the United States. The program’s foundation rests on three basic tenets: focus law enforcement and intelligence community resources on key targets, foster community collaboration, and enhance host nation capabilities. The Washington Linear Committee, which comprises 15 organizations and is cochaired by DEA, was designed to help better coordinate the counterdrug efforts of U.S. Embassy country teams, field-based regional intelligence centers, and U.S. Military Commands. The Linear Approach Program initially focused on Colombian and Mexican cocaine organizations. It has since been expanded to include other Latin American trafficking organizations that are primary recipients of significant amounts of drugs directly from the source countries of Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru. Some of these organizations may traffic in heroin and/or methamphetamine, in addition to cocaine. DEA reported that, for the period of 1994 through 1998, 21 main targets of the Linear Program and 22 associates had been arrested. All of the Cali cartel leaders who were arrested as part of the previously discussed Kingpin Strategy were also primary targets of the Linear Approach Program. This program was established in 1992 and has been DEA’s principal international strategy to address the heroin threat from Asia. The program is cochaired by DEA. It focuses law enforcement and intelligence community resources on efforts to disrupt and dismantle major Asian trafficking organizations producing heroin for distribution to the United States. Linkage Approach Program targets are to have a significant role in one of the Southeast or Southwest Asian heroin trafficking organizations and be subject to extradition to, and arrest and prosecution in, the United States. According to DEA, prior to this program, which was designed to make use of U.S. drug conspiracy laws, major Southeast and Southwest Asian traffickers exploited the lack of conspiracy laws in their own countries by insulating themselves from the actual drugs. The Linkage Program uses a multinational and multiagency approach to gather evidence for use in the U.S. judicial system, securing indictments in federal courts, and pursuing the extradition of the targeted traffickers to the United States for prosecution. DEA reported that through 1998, 33 Linkage Approach Program targets had been arrested, 10 defendants had been extradited to the United States, and 1 defendant was incarcerated pending extradition. In 1996, DEA initiated its Vetted Unit Program, under which foreign police participate in special host country investigative and intelligence collection units in selected foreign countries. According to DEA officials, the foreign police participants are screened and then trained by DEA with the intention of enhancing their professionalism and creating an atmosphere of increased trust and confidence between participating foreign police and DEA agents working with the vetted units. DEA believes that these units will (1) enhance the safety of DEA agents in those participating countries and (2) increase the sharing of sensitive information between DEA and foreign police. All foreign police participating in the DEA program must be successfully “vetted,” that is, pass a computerized criminal background investigation, a security questionnaire and background interview, medical and psychological screening, polygraph testing, and urinalysis testing. They then attend a 4- to 5-week DEA investigative training course in Leesburg, VA. After they are screened and trained, the vetted foreign police are to receive ongoing training as well as random polygraph and urinalysis testing. The Vetted Unit Program initially began in Mexico in May 1996. After the Government of Mexico approved the concept, 21 Mexican police were screened and then trained by DEA. The vetting process was completed in November 1996, and the Mexico National Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU) became operational in January 1997. DEA then expanded the program to other countries. For fiscal year 1997, Congress appropriated $20 million to support vetted units in Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. In March 1997, the DEA Administrator authorized immediate implementation of vetting in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru. He also authorized programs in Brazil and Thailand for 1998. The $20 million appropriation for vetted units in fiscal year 1997 is now part of DEA’s budget base and has recurred each subsequent fiscal year. According to DEA, as of October 1998, vetted units, which were designed to engage in intelligence collection, investigations of drug traffickers, or both, were operational in Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. Program start-up costs in fiscal years 1997 and 1998 amounted to a total of $7.4 million for Bolivia, $5.3 million for Colombia, $4.6 million for Mexico, and $4.4 million for Peru. According to a DEA official, it took an average of about 6 months to complete the screening and training of the foreign police from the time they were identified to DEA as candidates selected by the host governments for the program, although the actual length of time varied because of factors such as limited availability of polygraphers. As shown in table 2.11, the number of vetted officers varied by country. Each vetted unit had one or two DEA agents assigned for assistance, liaison, and case support. The following summarizes the status and accomplishments of the existing vetted units under the program as of September 30, 1998, according to DEA. Bolivia had four SIUs with vetted personnel. Three SIUs each had 25 Bolivian National Police, and a fourth unit had 97 personnel. The SIUs were located in La Paz, Santa Cruz, and Cochabamba. Two of the SIUs collect intelligence, conduct investigations, and arrest targeted drug traffickers, while the other two SIUs concentrate primarily on collecting intelligence. DEA reported that the Bolivian SIUs’ efforts through fiscal year 1998 resulted in 1,206 arrests and seizures of 3,201 kilograms of cocaine hydrochloride (HCL), 5,392 kilograms of cocaine base, and $15.8 million in assets. Colombia had 4 vetted units consisting of 112 members. The Major Investigations Unit in Bogota had 39 personnel, including both investigators and prosecutors. This unit focused on drug trafficking in the major cities of Colombia, such as Cali, Medellin, and Barranquilla. The Financial Investigation Unit had 14 investigators who focused on money laundering in financial institutions in Colombia’s major cities. The Intelligence Group consisted of 39 personnel headquartered in Bogota and operating in the major drug producing regions. This unit collected intelligence to support investigations of Colombian drug trafficking organizations by other CNP units. The fourth vetted unit, consisting of 20 members, monitors the diversion of precursor substances from legitimate manufacturers for the production of illegal drugs. DEA reported that the Colombian vetted units’ efforts through fiscal year 1998 resulted in 63 arrests and seizures of 6,398 kilograms of cocaine HCL and cocaine base, 6 kilograms of heroin, and $250,000 in U.S. currency. Mexico had 3 vetted units made up of 232 vetted and trained personnel. The Mexico National SIU, operating out of Mexico City, had 14 Mexican Federal Narcotics Investigators assigned to collect intelligence on Mexican drug traffickers. The Border Task Forces had 106 Mexican Federal Narcotics Investigators. The task forces operated out of regional headquarters in Tijuana, Ciudad Juarez, and Monterrey—all along the U.S.- Mexico Border—and Guadalajara. The task forces had a mission similar to the SIU, but the task force investigators were also responsible for executing warrants and making arrests. The narcotics section of the Organized Crime Unit was made up of 112 Mexican federal attorney- investigators and narcotics investigators. This unit’s mission was to use information from court-ordered electronic intelligence collection to investigate high-level drug trafficking groups, as well as drug-related money laundering groups, throughout Mexico. The unit’s headquarters was in Mexico City, but the assigned personnel were often located in other cities. DEA did not report the number of arrests or seizures for the Mexican vetted units, but noted there had been arrests made in three major organizations, including one of the largest drug cartels in Mexico. Peru had 2 vetted units, with a total of 135 personnel. One unit, an intelligence group, consisted of 52 vetted personnel and specialized in collecting intelligence and targeting drug traffickers to support the second unit, the investigation group with 83 vetted police. Both units were headquartered in Lima and operated throughout the cocaine production regions of Peru. DEA reported that the Peruvian vetted units’ efforts through fiscal year 1998 resulted in 199 arrests and seizures of 819 kilograms of cocaine HCL, 2,297 kilograms of cocaine base, 4,350 gallons of precursor chemicals, and numerous weapons and ammunition. In commenting on a draft of our report, DEA officials informed us that as of April 1999, 2 vetted units with 25 and 75 vetted personnel, respectively, were fully operational in Thailand; 1 vetted unit with a total of 16 vetted personnel was operational in Brazil; and vetted antinarcotics police were expected to be operational in Pakistan in early fiscal year 2000. The officials also noted that assessments were scheduled for Ecuador and Nigeria in May and June, respectively, to examine the future suitability of vetted units in those countries. DEA expanded its enforcement strategy in the 1990s to focus its operations on what it refers to as the seamless continuum of drug trafficking. It placed emphasis on investigating gangs, drug dealers, and drug-related violence in local communities while continuing to target higher level drug traffickers involved in major national and international drug trafficking organizations. DEA’s programs and initiatives discussed in this chapter—for example, its state and local task forces, its MET Program, SOD’s initiatives, and its foreign operations—are consistent with DEA’s mission and responsibilities to enforce the nation’s drug laws and bring drug traffickers to justice, as described in chapter 1. In carrying out its strategy, DEA’s domestic enforcement efforts placed more emphasis on, and devoted more resources to, assisting and working with local law enforcement agencies than in the past. Consequently, funds and staff devoted to DEA’s State and Local Task Force Program increased in the 1990s. Also, although not in substantial numbers in comparison to DEA’s total dollar and staff resources, DEA began and continued to fund and dedicate agents to the MET Program during the 1990s. These programs targeted drug traffickers operating primarily at the local and regional levels. DEA provided examples of what it considered to be successful program operations at these levels and reported various program results, including federal and state arrests and convictions and seizures of drugs and assets. To improve the effectiveness of its domestic and international efforts directed at national and international drug trafficking organizations in the 1990s, DEA established and invested increased resources in SOD to continue and enhance the investigative approach initiated under its former Kingpin Strategy. SOD, like the Kingpin Strategy, emphasizes targeting the command and control communications of major traffickers. Consequently, the number of DEA electronic surveillances rose significantly in the 1990s. DEA documented the results of some Kingpin and SOD operations that it considered to be successful in disrupting and dismantling major national and international trafficking organizations. However, DEA did not compile results data on all Kingpin and SOD operations, cases they supported, or leads they disseminated. DEA also made changes to improve its foreign efforts directed at international drug trafficking organizations. In this regard, it has participated in two major interagency programs established in the 1990s to target major organizations in Latin America and Asia. The programs have led to the arrests of some high-level drug traffickers. In addition, the specially trained vetted units of foreign police initiated in recent years by DEA may help increase the sharing of information and the trust level between DEA and foreign police participating in those units. This, in turn, may help DEA and its foreign counterparts in targeting major traffickers and disrupting and dismantling trafficking organizations based in the participating foreign countries, as indicated by the initial results reported by DEA. In its written comments on a draft of this report, DEA stated that, overall, the report provides a detailed and factual background of DEA strategies and special operations. DEA also provided a number of technical comments and clarifications, which we incorporated in this chapter and other sections of this report. DEA’s strategic goals and objectives, along with its enhanced programs and initiatives in the 1990s discussed in chapter 2, are consistent with the strategic goals of ONDCP’s National Drug Control Strategy. Both the National Strategy and DEA hope to reduce illegal drug supply and drug- related crime and violence by disrupting or dismantling drug trafficking organizations. The National Strategy contains mid- and long-term measurable performance targets for 2002 and 2007 that identify the extent to which the National Strategy seeks to disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking organizations. However, DEA has not yet established comparable measurable performance targets for its operations. Throughout this chapter, we use footnotes to explain various planning and performance measurement terms as defined by OMB, ONDCP, and DOJ. We also include a glossary at the end of this report, which provides an alphabetical listing of the various planning and performance measurement terms used in this report and their definitions. DEA’s strategic goals and objectives, and enhanced programs and initiatives in the 1990s for carrying out its mission are consistent with the National Strategy’s strategic goals and objectives defining a 10-year commitment to reduce drug abuse. DEA’s mission, as described in chapter 1, is an important element of the National Strategy and DEA, through the implementation of its programs and initiatives as discussed in chapter 2, is a major participant in the National Strategy. As discussed below, we reviewed the National Strategy’s strategic goals and objectives, and compared them with DEA’s strategic goals and objectives and its programs for consistency. ONDCP has produced National Strategies annually since 1989. Since 1996, the National Strategy has included five strategic goals (listed in ch. 1) and related strategic objectives. These goals and objectives are the basis for a long-term national antidrug effort aimed at reducing the supply of and demand for illicit drugs and the consequences of drug abuse and trafficking. The goals define the major directives of the strategy. The objectives, which are more narrowly focused, stipulate the specific ways in which goals are to be obtained. The 1998 strategy provided a 10-year plan to reduce illegal drug use and availability by 50 percent by the year 2007. The 1999 National Strategy also continued the goals but eliminated 1 objective, reducing the total number of objectives to 31. The National Strategy is intended to guide the approximately 50 federal agencies with drug control responsibilities. DEA has significant responsibilities for helping to achieve the following three National Strategy goals. Strategy goal 2: Increase the safety of American citizens by substantially reducing drug-related crime and violence. Strategy goal 4: Shield America’s air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat. Strategy goal 5: Break foreign and domestic drug sources of supply. For these 3 strategy goals, the National Strategy has 15 supporting objectives, at least 10 of which relate to DEA. Table 3.1 identifies the strategy goals and objectives for which DEA has responsibilities. Recently, as part of its reauthorization legislation, ONDCP became responsible for monitoring the consistency between the drug-related goals and objectives of drug control agencies to ensure that their goals and budgets support and are fully consistent with the National Strategy. In its National Drug Control Budget Summary for 1999, ONDCP reported that DEA has various programs and initiatives that support strategy goals 1, 2, 4, and 5. DEA’s most recent planning document is its performance plan for fiscal year 2000,which it issued in February 1999, in response to the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993(the Results Act).That plan contains information on DEA’s vision, mission, strategic goals, strategic objectives, and performance indicators. DEA listed three strategic goals and nine strategic objectives for carrying out its mission: DEA strategic goal 1—disrupt/dismantle the leadership, command, control, and infrastructure of drug syndicates, gangs, and traffickers of illicit drugs; DEA strategic goal 2—reduce the impact of crime and violence that is the result of drug trafficking activity by providing federal investigative resources to assist local communities; and DEA strategic goal 3—facilitate drug law enforcement efforts directed against major drug trafficking organizations by cooperating and coordinating with federal, state, local, and foreign law enforcement and intelligence counterparts. Along with its strategic goals, DEA listed the following nine strategic objectives: DEA strategic objective 1—-attack the command and control of international and domestic drug trafficking organizations through the arrest, prosecution, conviction, and incarceration of their criminal leaders and surrogates; DEA strategic objective 2—concentrate enforcement efforts along the Southwest Border to disrupt, dismantle, and immobilize organized criminal groups operating from Mexico; DEA strategic objective 3—direct enforcement efforts at the escalating threat posed by heroin; DEA strategic objective 4—address the dual threats presented by methamphetamine and resurgence in marijuana trafficking; DEA strategic objective 5—assist local law enforcement by deploying METs into communities where drug trafficking and related violent crime are rampant; DEA strategic objective 6—prevent the diversion of controlled substances and control the distribution of chemicals used to manufacture illicit drugs; DEA strategic objective 7—enhance intelligence programs to facilitate information sharing and develop new methods to structure and define drug trafficking organizations; DEA strategic objective 8—support interdiction efforts to target drug transshipments destined for the United States; and DEA strategic objective 9—-seize and forfeit assets and proceeds derived from drug trafficking. DEA did not align each of its objectives with any particular goals. Because DEA is the nation’s lead drug enforcement agency, its strategic goals and objectives and its programs should be consistent with the National Strategy. Table 3.2 shows DEA’s strategic goals compared to National Strategy goals for drug supply reduction. DEA’s first strategic goal aimed at dismantling and disrupting drug trafficking organizations is consistent with National Strategy goal 4, which calls for shielding America’s air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat, as well as with goal 5, which calls for breaking foreign and domestic sources of drug supply. DEA’s goal for dismantling and disrupting trafficking organizations applies to all drug trafficking organizations regardless of where they operate—in the United States, in drug transshipment areas, at U.S. border areas, and in foreign countries. Similarly, DEA’s strategic goal 2, which calls for providing federal investigative resources to local communities for reducing drug-related crime and violence, is consistent with National Strategy goal 2, which also calls for reducing drug-related crime and violence. DEA’s strategic goal 3, which calls for DEA to cooperate and coordinate with federal, state, local, and foreign law enforcement and intelligence counterparts, is consistent with National Strategy goals 2, 4, and 5. By coordinating and cooperating with other law enforcement and intelligence groups, DEA’s coordinated efforts reach out in support of the National Strategy’s three supply reduction goals. As with its goals, DEA’s strategic objectives are also consistent with the objectives of the National Strategy. For example, as can be seen in table 3.3, various DEA strategic objectives for dismantling and disrupting domestic and international drug trafficking organizations, providing assistance to local communities to reduce drug-related violence, and supporting drug interdiction efforts align with National Strategy objectives. In addition, as with its strategic goals and objectives, DEA’s programs and initiatives in the 1990s as discussed in chapter 2 are also consistent with the goals of the National Strategy. During the1990s, DEA has enhanced or changed important aspects of its operations, that is, its strategies, programs, initiatives, and approaches. DEA gave a higher priority than in the past to and increased resources for working with and assisting state and local law enforcement agencies through its State and Local Task Force Program and started the MET Program to help combat drug–related violent crime in local communities. DEA established the Kingpin Strategy, which evolved into SOD, placing greater emphasis on intercepting communications between top-level drug traffickers and their subordinates (i.e., attacking the “command and control” communications of major drug trafficking organizations) to dismantle their entire trafficking operations. DEA started participating in two interagency programs—Linear Approach and Linkage Approach—to target and investigate major drug trafficking organizations in Latin America and Asia. DEA helped establish, train, and fund special foreign police units to combat drug trafficking in certain key foreign counties, primarily in Latin America. These and other drug law enforcement programs and initiatives discussed in detail in chapter 2 are consistent with National Strategy goals 2, 4, and 5 previously discussed in this chapter and described in table 3.1. For example, DEA’s MET Program, started in 1995, is consistent with National Strategy goal 2, which calls for increasing the safety of American citizens by substantially reducing drug-related crime and violence. The 1999 National Strategy established performance targets calling for specific increases in the percentage of drug trafficking organizations disrupted and dismantled. These targets are measurable and can be used to assess the collective performance of drug control agencies responsible for achieving them. However, although DEA is the lead drug enforcement agency, it has not established similar measurable performance targets for its own operations. To measure the effectiveness and performance of the National Strategy, ONDCP established 5 and 10 year performance targets and performance measures.These performance targets and measures are intended, in part, to enable policymakers, program managers, and the public to determine efforts that are contributing to the strategic goals and objectives of the National Strategy. To track and measure progress in achieving the strategic goals and strategic objectives of the National Strategy, ONDCP issued its Performance Measures of Effectiveness (PME) system in February 1998.This system is a 10-year plan that identifies performance targets and related performance measures as the means for assessing the progress of the National Strategy in achieving its strategic goals and objectives. The PME system contains 97 performance targets. Although originally undertaken as a policy decision to bring more accountability to drug policy, the PME system is now grounded in legislation. The Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 1998 requires ONDCP to submit an annual report to Congress on the PME system. ONDCP issued its first annual status report in February 1999. Beginning in 1996, interagency working groups involving federal agencies, including DEA, along with outside experts developed the PME performance targets through a consensual process. The performance targets were incorporated into the PME plan issued in February 1998. After the initial PME plan was issued, interagency working groups, including those involving DEA, continued developing, refining, and implementing the PME system during 1998. The working groups, among other things, focused on developing specific action plans identifying the responsibilities of each agency in working towards the PME performance targets and identifying annual targets that correspond to the achievement of the 5 and 10 year performance targets. For each performance target, the PME system identifies a “reporting agency” (or “agencies” when there is shared responsibility) and “supporting agencies.” A reporting agency(s) is required to report to ONDCP on progress in achieving the performance target. However, the reporting agency is not necessarily the only agency responsible for achieving the target. Supporting agencies are to assist with data collection and assessment or have programs that contribute to achieving the target. The initial 1998 PME system document identified performance targets relating to disrupting and dismantling drug trafficking organizations and arresting drug traffickers. These performance targets called for specific percentage increases in the number of domestic and international drug trafficking organizations disrupted or dismantled and the number of drug traffickers arrested by 2002 and 2007. DEA was designated as the sole reporting agency for performance targets aimed at decreasing the capabilities of domestic and international drug trafficking organizations and traffickers. DEA shared reporting-agency responsibilities with HIDTAs for the performance target aimed at drug trafficking organizations identified in HIDTA threat assessments. As a result of the PME implementation process in 1998, changes were made to performance targets for drug trafficking organizations and drug traffickers. These changes were reported in the 1999 PME report. The performance target for domestic drug traffickers was deleted. The target for international drug traffickers was combined with the target for international drug trafficking organizations to focus on one manageable target. In addition, DEA was deleted as a reporting agency for the performance target aimed at drug trafficking organizations identified in HIDTA threat assessments. Tables 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 show the performance targets and related performance measures for disrupting and dismantling drug trafficking organizations, along with the current status of achieving the targets as reported by ONDCP in its 1999 PME report. As can be seen in the tables, the National Strategy performance targets and measures are quantifiable and outcome oriented and can be readily used to assess performance following collection of proposed baseline data on lists of drug trafficking organizations. DEA, with assistance from supporting agencies such as the FBI, is to report progress by the drug law enforcement community in dismantling or disrupting a percentage of identified domestic and international drug trafficking organizations. However, ONDCP, in reporting on the current status of the performance targets for which DEA is the reporting agency, noted that data on drug trafficking organizations needed to assess performance had not been identified nor had annual performance targets been established. Further, according to ONDCP and DEA, neither the domestic nor international designated target lists referred to in tables 3.4 and 3.5 have been developed. According to ONDCP officials, DEA and various supporting agencies are working toward developing lists of domestic and foreign drug trafficking organizations for use in pursuing the performance targets. ONDCP officials said that the time frames for reporting on performance targets for dismantling and disrupting drug trafficking organizations and their leaders are (1) 1999 for defining organizations and developing trafficker lists, (2) 2000 for collecting data, and (3) 2001 for reporting on data and gauging performance. According to ONDCP’s 1999 report, its PME system tracks the performance of the numerous programs that support each strategy goal and objective. The accomplishment of National Strategy goals and objectives generally require the contributions of many agency programs. The PME system does not track an individual agency’s performance nor is it designed to do so. According to ONDCP, agencies such as DEA are required to track their own performance through their Results Act plans, and these plans should be consistent with the National Strategy and the PME system. Over the years, DEA has used arrest and seizure data (drugs and assets) along with examples of significant enforcement accomplishments, such as descriptions of successful operations, to demonstrate its effectiveness in carrying out its enforcement programs and initiatives. However, these data are not useful indicators for reporting on results because arrest and seizure data relate to outputs (activities) and not to outcomes (results). These arrest and seizure data do not present a picture of overall performance or of DEA’s level of success in achieving its goals. Further, the use of arrest data as a performance indicator can be misleading without information on the significance of the arrests and the extent to which they lead to prosecutions and convictions. In addition, using arrest data as a performance target can lead to undesirable consequences when law enforcement agencies place undue emphasis on increasing the numbers of arrests at the expense of developing quality investigations. More recently, with passage of the Results Act, DEA has been attempting to go beyond reporting outputs to reporting outcomes. In response to the Results Act, DEA prepared annual performance plans for fiscal years 1999 and 2000 that contain information on its strategic goals and objectives and its performance indicators. In its fiscal year 1999 performance plan issued in January 1998, DEA described its strategic goals, strategies for achieving those goals, annual goals, and performance indicators. DEA associated these goals, strategies, and performance indicators with its various programs and initiatives. “… disrupt/dismantle the leadership, command, control, and infrastructure of drug syndicates, gangs, and traffickers, of licit and illicit drugs that threaten Americans and American interests.” “… implement drug law enforcement strategies that target and attack the leadership and infrastructure of major drug syndicates, gangs, and traffickers of licit and illicit drugs that threaten America.” “DEA will continue its investigative efforts, including the application of forfeiture laws, especially along the Southwest border. This will produce an increase in the number of arrests, removals, and seizures. The primary outcome will be a reduction in the trafficking capability of drug organizations, particularly those associated with the Mexican Federation, that use the southwest border in transshipment.” To assess the extent to which it was accomplishing its strategic and annual goals to reduce trafficking capability, DEA’s plan listed performance indicators that were not results oriented. DEA planned to measure performance, using data on total numbers of arrests and total number of major criminal enterprises and other drug trafficking organizations disrupted or dismantled. However, DEA did not identify performance targets for its goals, such as the proportion of identified drug trafficking organizations to be disrupted and dismantled, against which its performance could be assessed. DEA’s fiscal year 1999 plan had no annual, mid- or long-range performance targets for disrupting and dismantling drug trafficking organizations. DEA noted in its performance plan for fiscal year 1999 that data on the number of drug trafficking organizations had not been previously collected and reported and would be available by March 1, 1998. But it never reported these data in its subsequent performance plan for fiscal year 2000. DEA also pointed out that although several of its performance indicators were in the developmental stage, their establishment would help to provide the framework for future evaluations of DEA’s efforts. DEA organized its fiscal year 2000 performance plan—issued in February 1999—differently from its 1999 plan to align it with its three major budget activities—enforcement, investigative support, and program direction. DEA organized its fiscal year 2000 plan around what it identified as its three core business systems: (1) enforcement of federal laws and investigations, (2) investigative support, and (3) program direction. Along with information on its 3 core business systems and 15 subsystems, the plan, as previously described, listed DEA’s strategic goals and objectives. However, unlike its 1999 performance plan, the fiscal year 2000 plan did not have clearly identifiable annual goals. “Through effective enforcement effort, DEA will disrupt/dismantle the command & control, and infrastructure of drug syndicates, gangs, and traffickers of licit and illicit drugs that threaten Americans and American interests, including providing enforcement assistance to American Communities to fight drug-related crime and violence.” Related to its core business system for enforcement, DEA’s fiscal year 2000 performance plan listed a strategic goal and objectives for disrupting drug trafficking organizations. DEA’s description of its core business system and its strategic goal and objective are similar. However, as with its fiscal year 1999 plan, DEA’s fiscal year 2000 plan does not include annual, mid- or long-range measurable performance targets for disrupting or dismantling drug trafficking organizations. Although DEA does not have a performance target for dismantling international drug trafficking organizations, it does have a performance indicator that may lead to a performance target that is consistent with the target in the National Strategy. DEA’s fiscal year 2000 performance plan contains a performance indicator specifying that DEA plans to use data on the number of targeted organizations disrupted or dismantled as a result of DEA involvement in foreign investigations compared to the total number of targeted organizations as a basis for measuring performance. The plan notes, however, that DEA is currently not collecting data for this performance indicator but expects to do so during fiscal year 1999. For domestic drug trafficking organizations, DEA’s plan does not include a performance indicator that is quantifiable and results oriented similar to the one it specified for international drug organizations. DEA has no performance indicator specifying that it will measure performance on the basis of the number of targeted domestic organizations disrupted and dismantled compared to the total number of targeted organizations. Further, DEA’s fiscal year 2000 performance plan does not indicate that DEA plans to collect data on domestic drug trafficking organizations for development of a performance target that is consistent with the target in the National Strategy. It is unclear whether DEA plans to develop a performance target for its program aimed at disrupting and dismantling domestic drug trafficking that would be consistent with the performance target and the national effort called for in the National Strategy. DEA’s fiscal year 2000 performance plan indicates that DEA will be reporting on prior year arrests resulting in prosecutions and convictions as a performance indicator for measuring its enforcement efforts. As required by DOJ policy, to avoid perceptions of “bounty hunting” DEA and other DOJ component organizations cannot specify performance targets for arrests. However, DOJ’s policy would not preclude DEA from developing a performance target and performance indicator for domestic drug trafficking organizations consistent with those in the National Strategy. The National Strategy performance targets do not involve projecting increased numbers of arrests; rather, they call for increasing the percentage of targeted drug trafficking organizations dismantled or disrupted. In addition to the lack of result-oriented performance indicators and performance targets for its programs aimed at domestic drug trafficking organizations, DEA’s plan lacks performance targets and related performance indicators for other mission-critical programs. For example, DEA’s core business system for enforcement and one of its strategic goals call for assistance to local communities to reduce drug-related crime and violence. However, DEA has not established a performance target and performance indicator that could be used to measure the results of its assistance to local communities. In this regard, DEA has a strategic objective calling for assistance to local law enforcement by deploying METs, discussed in chapter 2, into communities where drug trafficking and related crime are rampant. However, DEA has not identified a performance target and performance indicator to measure the results of its MET Program even though, as discussed in chapter 2, resources dedicated to METs and other forms of assistance to local law enforcement have continued to grow in the 1990s. Thus, it is unclear how DEA will measure the results of its strategic objective calling for MET deployments. In the program accomplishment and highlight section of its performance plan for fiscal year 2000, DEA states that “he effect of METs in reducing violent crime has been clearly established in 1998.” The plan further points out that a comparison of violent crime statistics before and after MET deployments indicated reductions in violent crime in areas where MET deployments occurred. Using this type of results-oriented data, DEA should be able to specify a performance indicator that, when tied to a measurable performance target, could be used to assess the results of the MET Program in terms of actual versus expected performance. In August 1998, DEA’s Chief for Executive Policy and Strategic Planning, told us that DEA had not yet identified the performance goals and indicators it will ultimately use. She told us that at the direction of the Administrator, DEA was planning to bring its field representatives together with headquarters officials to obtain their views and input on DEA’s goals, strategies, and performance indicators. In April 1999, she told us that the meeting with field representatives, which was initially planned for the fall of 1998 but was delayed pending hiring of a contractor, was expected to be held by the summer of 1999. However, with the recent resignation of DEA’s Administrator, these plans were placed on hold and not addressed in DEA comments on a draft of this report. In addition, in April 1999, DEA’s Chief for Executive Policy and Strategic Planning told us that DEA would have to work with DOJ in developing performance goals and indicators. In this regard, she said that DEA would be following the direction provided by DOJ in its departmentwide drug strategy. She also pointed out that ONDCP had not yet established a baseline (agreed-upon target list) for its National Strategy performance targets aimed at disrupting and dismantling drug trafficking organizations. In commenting on a draft of this report in June 1999, DEA pointed out that DEA (1) has developed preliminary performance targets that were included in DEA’s fiscal year 2001 budget submission to DOJ; (2) had established a working group consisting of representatives from its operations, strategic planning and executive policy, and resource management staffs to further refine its performance targets; and (3) is working with other DOJ components to develop performance targets and measurements that will be consistent with the targets in the National Strategy. Measuring and evaluating the impact of drug law enforcement efforts is difficult for several reasons. First, antidrug efforts are often conducted by many agencies and are mutually supportive. It is difficult to isolate the contributions of a single agency or program, such as DEA’s domestic enforcement program aimed at disrupting and dismantling major drug traffickers, from activities of other law enforcement agencies. Other factors that DEA has little control over, such as drug demand reduction efforts, may also affect drug trafficking operations. Second, the clandestine nature of drug production, trafficking, and use limits the quality and quantity of data that can be collected to measure program performance. History has shown that drug trafficking organizations continually change their methods, patterns, and operations as law enforcement concentrates its resources and efforts on a specific region or method. Drug law enforcement agencies must continuously deal with unknown and imprecise data, such as the number of drug trafficking organizations and the amount of illegal drugs being trafficked. Third, some of the data that are currently collected are not very useful in assessing the performance of individual programs and agency efforts. As previously mentioned, data collected on arrests, drug seizures, and assets forfeited generally measure enforcement outputs but not outcomes. Further, data collected on drug availability and consumption are generally not designed to measure the performance of a single program or agency, and such data are influenced by other factors in addition to enforcement efforts. DEA’s strategic goals and objectives as well as its programs and initiatives are consistent with the National Drug Control Strategy. However, DEA has not developed performance targets for its programs and initiatives aimed at disrupting or dismantling drug trafficking organizations and arresting their leaders. We recognize the complexity and difficulty of measuring outcomes and impact for drug law enforcement agencies operating in a clandestine drug trafficking environment. Nevertheless, without measurable performance targets and related performance indicators for its mission-critical programs, it is difficult for program managers, policymakers, and others to quantitatively assess DEA’s overall effectiveness and the extent to which DEA’s programs are contributing to its strategic goals and objectives and those of the National Strategy. ONDCP has set specific measurable performance targets in the National Strategy for achieving strategic goals that it shares with DEA. DEA has worked with ONDCP and other federal drug control agencies to develop performance targets for the National Strategy and for measuring the progress of federal efforts toward those targets. However, although DEA is the lead federal drug enforcement agency and reporting agency for several National Strategy performance targets, it has not established similar measurable performance targets for its own operations. In this regard, DEA has not established similar measurable performance targets for its operations in either its fiscal years 1999 or 2000 annual performance plans although, as discussed below, it stated in its comments on a draft of this report that it has developed preliminary targets for inclusion in its fiscal year 2001 performance plan. Measurable DEA performance targets, once finalized, coupled with continued refinement of the National Strategy performance targets on the basis of DEA input and leadership, along with DOJ guidance, should bring DEA and ONDCP closer in pursuing their shared goals and objectives for disrupting and dismantling drug trafficking organizations. Such performance targets also should provide DEA with a better basis for measuring its own progress in achieving its mission and for making decisions regarding its resource needs and priorities as discussed in the next chapter. We recommend that the Attorney General direct the DEA Administrator to work closely with DOJ and ONDCP to develop measurable DEA performance targets for disrupting and dismantling drug trafficking organizations consistent with the performance targets in the National Drug Control Strategy. In its written comments on a draft of this report, although not directly agreeing with our recommendation, DEA agreed with our principal finding regarding measurable performance targets. However, it disagreed with our draft conclusion relating to the finding, pointed out actions it was taking relating to our recommendation, and requested guidance on bringing closure to the recommendation. DEA agreed with our principal finding that it had not included measurable performance targets for disrupting or dismantling drug trafficking organizations in its fiscal years 1999 and 2000 performance plans. However, it disagreed with our draft conclusion that “In the absence of such targets, little can said about DEA’s effectiveness in achieving its strategic goals.” DEA indicated that this statement and supporting information in this chapter gave the impression that DEA had not attempted to develop performance targets. DEA said that it has developed “preliminary performance targets” that have been included in its fiscal year 2001 budget submission to DOJ and that are to be refined for inclusion in subsequent budgets. To further refine its performance targets, DEA said that it had established a working group consisting of representatives from its operations, strategic planning and executive policy, and resource management staffs. DEA also noted that it is working with other DOJ components to develop performance targets and measurements that will be consistent with the targets in the National Drug Control Strategy. To recognize these actions, we added them to the pertinent section of this chapter as an update to information previously provided by DEA. We also modified our draft conclusion that little can be said about DEA’s effectiveness without performance targets to clarify our intent that it is difficult to quantitatively assess DEA’s overall effectiveness without such targets. DEA’s stated actions are consistent with the intent of our recommendation. However, because DEA performance targets are preliminary and under review within the executive branch, they are subject to change until February 2000 when DEA issues its annual budget submission and performance plan, as part of DOJ’s submission, to Congress. Further, DEA indicated that it cannot finalize its performance targets and measures until a designated targeted list of international drug trafficking organizations, as called for in the National Strategy, is completed. Therefore, we are retaining our recommendation until DEA’s preliminary performance targets are finalized for inclusion in its annual performance plan and can be compared for consistency with those in the National Strategy. DEA and ONDCP also provided technical comments, which we incorporated in this chapter where appropriate. In order to carry out its mission and operations during the 1990s, including the programs and initiatives discussed in chapter 2 and the strategies discussed in chapter 3, DEA received funds to staff its operations through several sources. These included its annual appropriations salaries and expenses budget; DOJ’s Violent Crime Reduction Program (VCRP); and other reimbursable programs, such as OCDETF. This chapter focuses on the process used to determine and allocate additional DEA positions provided through its salaries and expenses budget. Specifically, it discusses the process used in fiscal year 1998, which was, according to DEA and DOJ officials, generally typical of the approach DEA has used in other years. The process used to determine the need for and to allocate additional DEA staff is linked to the federal budget formulation and execution process and reflects federal laws and budget guidelines promulgated by OMB. In fiscal year 1998, the DEA process considered field input, changes in drug abuse and drug trafficking patterns, and the Administrator’s priorities to prepare its staffing enhancement estimates for its budget submission to DOJ. DEA’s submission to DOJ estimated the need for 989 new total positions, including 399 special agent positions. As a result of reviews by DOJ, OMB, and ONDCP and consideration of the resources provided in DEA’s fiscal year 1997 appropriation,the President’s fiscal year 1998 budget, which was submitted to Congress in February 1997, requested a total of 345 new positions for DEA, including 168 special agent positions. Congress provided 531 additional positions, of which 240 were special agent positions, with guidance as to how the positions were to be allocated. DEA senior management then determined the allocation of additional staff, considering congressional guidance and such other factors as field office prior requests. The process used to determine the staffing resources necessary to carry out DEA’s mission is generally typical of the federal budget processes and procedures that federal agencies are expected to follow. These processes and procedures are established in federal law and budget guidelines promulgated by OMB. Each legislative session, the president is required by law to submit a budget to Congress. The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, as amended, provides the legal basis for the president’s budget, prescribes much of its content, and defines the roles of the president and the agencies in the process. During budget formulation, the president establishes general budget and fiscal policy guidelines. Policy guidance is given to agencies for the upcoming budget year and later to provide initial guidelines for preparation of agency budget requests. OMB Circular A-11 provides instructions on the preparation of agency submissions required for OMB and presidential review of budget estimates and for formulation of the president’s budget. The budget formulation process begins at the lowest organizational levels of a federal agency and moves to the higher levels. A consolidated agencywide budget is prepared for submission to OMB. This approach is typical of federal agencies, although some have elaborate planning processes that allow for objectives established at the top to guide budget preparation. OMB reviews agency requests according to a process that includes several stages—(1) staff review, (2) director’s review, (3) passback, (4) appeals, and (5) final decisions. The final budget is prepared and printed by OMB for submission to Congress no later than the first Monday in February of each year, as required by law. According to DEA and DOJ officials, the DEA fiscal year 1998 staffing needs determination process began in the summer of 1995 and was typical of DEA’s staffing determination process. Prior to the commencement of the official budget formulation process, DEA domestic and foreign field offices provided estimates of their staffing needs to DEA headquarters program staff. Program and budget staff reviewed and considered these estimates in the development of DEA’s budget submission with staffing estimates, which were sent to DOJ in June 1996. In accordance with the federal budget process, DOJ and OMB reviewed DEA’s budget submission and staffing estimates, which resulted in some changes in the estimates. ONDCP reviewed DOJ’s budget submission to OMB as part of the national drug budget certification process, which is distinct from, but occurs simultaneously with, the budget formulation process and may also affect DEA’s staffing estimates. Figure 4.1 depicts DEA’s fiscal year 1998 staffing determination process. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. DEA: Aug.-Oct. Domestic and foreign field offices prepared and submitted staffing estimates to DEA headquarters. DEA: May Administrator approved the budget submission/ staffing estimates. DEA: Dec.-Apr. DEA headquarters program and budget staff reviewed field office submissions and began development of staffing estimates. DEA: Apr.-May In accordance with the budget formulation process, DEA headquarters program and budget staff prepared and revised, on the basis of the Administrator's comments, DEA's FY 98 initiative-based submission and staffing estimates. Budget submission/ staffing estimates were sent to DOJ. 6 DOJ: June-Aug. DOJ budget staff received, reviewed, and analyzed DEA submission/staffing estimates and sent them back to DEA. OMB: Sept.-Dec. OMB budget staff reviewed and analyzed DEA's budget submission/ staffing estimates. DOJ: Dec. DOJ budget staff reviewed OMB's passback and sent DOJ's interpretation of the passback to DEA. OMB: Dec.-Jan. OMB prepared final budget submission with assistance from and review by DEA and DOJ. OMB staff sent their results to the OMB Director. 11 DEA: Dec. 15 OMB: Feb. OMB Director reviewed examiners' recommendations. DEA prepared its appeal to the OMB passback and sent it to DOJ. OMB transmitted budget submission to President for submission to Congress on Feb. 6th. OMB Director generally discusses the overall federal budget with the President at this time. 12 DOJ: Dec. OMB prepared DEA/DOJ passback. 13 OMB: Dec. OMB reviewed DEA/DOJ's passback appeal, including staffing estimates. DOJ and OMB agreed on an overall spending level for the department, and DOJ distributed the appeal amounts. DEA’s fiscal year 1998 staffing process began in the summer of 1995. Each DEA domestic field division submitted a field management plan (FMP), and foreign offices followed a less structured and more informal staffing request process. In an August 1995 memorandum to its domestic field divisions, DEA headquarters provided direction and guidelines for preparation of the fiscal year 1996-1997 FMPs. DEA requested detailed, specific, and realistic enhancements for fiscal year 1998 for use in the formulation of DEA’s fiscal year 1998 budget/staffing submission. According to DEA officials, an FMP is supposed to be based on the Administrator’s vision statement, which is provided to the field divisions; the local SAC’s vision statement, which has previously been reviewed and approved by DEA headquarters; and the drug threat that the division expects to confront. The 1995 memorandum directed each field division to indicate the resources it would need. Through the FMPs, which were due in October 1995, DEA’s domestic field divisions requested a total of 591 positions, including 369 special agent positions. According to DEA officials, recommendations and requests for DEA foreign office staffing enhancements and new foreign offices for fiscal year 1998 came from a variety of sources, including DEA country attachés (CA)and the foreign country through the U.S. Ambassador. Each of the four foreign sections (Central America and the Caribbean, Europe and the Middle East, Far East, and South America) within the Office of International Operations at DEA headquarters was tasked with identifying the issues, including staffing needs, within specific countries. In March 1996, according to a DEA official, the International Operations staff, including the Chief, Deputy Chief, and section heads of International Operations, met to discuss recommendations from the four sections. The official said that to assess and justify staffing requests for their respective regions, DEA foreign section staff used regional and individual DEA country plans, as well as foreign situation and quarterly trends in trafficking reports, which provided context and background. Foreign operational needs were discussed in terms of DEA’s goals and objectives and prioritized. DEA officials told us that International Operations communicated the results of this meeting (as a discussion document) to DEA’s budget section. In accordance with the federal budget formulation process, DEA budget staff prepared the agency’s spring budget submission to DOJ, including staffing estimates. After review and approval by its executive staff and the Administrator, DEA sent DOJ its budget submission, which included 6 initiatives with identified additional staffing needs of 989 total positions; 399 were special agent positions, and 590 were support positions. For preparing DEA’s budget submission to DOJ, DOJ budget officials said DOJ provides instructions and usually guidance; and, according to DEA officials, the DEA Administrator also usually provides guidance. Although the documents sent to the agencies varied each year, DOJ provides written planning guidance and instructions in April, about 17 months prior to the beginning of the budget year. However, officials said that informal guidance was usually available earlier. The DEA Administrator may also issue a budget call memorandum to all program managers listing his priorities. According to DEA and DOJ budget officials, for its fiscal year 1998 guidance, DOJ used an amended version of its fiscal year 1997 guidance. In addition, DEA budget officials said that the DEA Administrator sent out a budget call memorandum in February 1996 indicating his priorities. However, DEA budget officials said that they actually began to develop DEA’s fiscal year 1998 budget submission/staffing estimates in December 1995, prior to the guidance, and continued to work through May 1996. As part of this process, officials said that DEA budget staff considered the needs of field and headquarters offices, analyzed information on emerging drug trends, and held discussions with DEA program managers. Budget staff said that after canvassing the program managers, they presented the proposed budget submission and staffing request to the Administrator in March 1996. According to these staff, on the basis of the Administrator’s comments, they then prepared DEA’s final fiscal year 1998 budget submission/staffing request to DOJ, which DEA’s Executive Staff and the Administrator reviewed and approved in May. In June 1996, DEA sent its fiscal year 1998 budget request with estimates of additional staffing needs to DOJ. In its submission, DEA estimated a need for 989 additional positions, including 399 special agent positions and 590 support positions (e.g., diversion investigators, chemists, intelligence analysts, and professional and clerical staff). DEA identified, prioritized, and requested funding, including staffing enhancements, for six specific initiatives. Countering violent crime: This included staffing estimates (193 total/98 special agents) for the MET Program and for converting 8 provisional state and local task forces to program-funded status. Methamphetamine strategy: This initiative included estimated staffing enhancements (279 total/127 special agents), including positions to convert 7 provisional state and local task forces to program-funded status, to fund a comprehensive approach for attacking methamphetamine abuse. Southwest Border project: This included estimated staffing enhancements (212 total/96 special agents) to continue DOJ’s interagency strategy against drug trafficking on the Southwest Border. Domestic heroin enforcement: This initiative included estimated staffing enhancements (104 total/53 special agents) to continue implementation of DEA’s 5-year heroin strategy. International crime: This included estimated staffing enhancements (76 total/25 special agents) to (1) open DEA country offices in Tashkent, Uzbekistan; Vientiane, Laos; Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates; Lisbon, Portugal; and Managua, Nicaragua; (2) provide additional support to DEA offices in Mexico City, Panama City, New Delhi, Bangkok, and Hong Kong; and (3) establish an International Chemical Control Center in order to address the growing international aspects of drug production, transshipment, and trafficking. Investigative shortfalls: This initiative included estimates of resources and staffing enhancements (125 total) needed to replace lost asset forfeiture revenues, provide support staff for domestic field offices, and provide additional basic and refresher training for special agents and DEA support staff. The submission included justifications for each initiative and reflected DEA’s internal budget/staffing determination process. For example, on the basis of changing trends and input from the field, DEA’s fiscal year 1998 budget submission proposed a methamphetamine initiative, including domestic and international staff enhancements, to fund a comprehensive approach for attacking methamphetamine abuse. To justify its fiscal year 1998 estimates, DEA provided (1) DAWN data that indicated a steady increase in the number of methamphetamine-related emergency room episodes and deaths and (2) statistics indicating an increased use of and trafficking in methamphetamine and the proliferation of clandestine drug laboratories in both traditional and new locations. In accordance with the budget formulation process, DEA’s fiscal year 1998 budget submission was reviewed by DOJ Justice Management Division (JMD) budget staff and the Attorney General between June and August, 1996. According to DOJ budget staff, as in other years, to assess DEA’s fiscal year 1998 enhancements and the corresponding justifications, the budget staff considered the (1) overall illegal drug situation at the time, including drug trends and patterns; (2) link between the specific request and ONDCP, DOJ, and DEA goals, strategies, and indicators; (3) facts and arguments used by DEA to justify the request; and (4) level of resources requested relative to the justified need, including prior year appropriations. As a result of their analysis of DEA’s fiscal year 1998 budget submission, DOJ budget staff estimated that DEA would need 771 additional positions, including 311 special agents, to support the 6 initiatives. This was 218 fewer total positions, including 88 special agent positions, than DEA estimated. Over half of the difference between DEA’s and DOJ’s estimates can be accounted for by DOJ’s not having included positions to convert certain state and local task forces to permanent funding status under the violent crime and methamphetamine initiatives. DOJ argued that (1) local entities must continue to contribute to these efforts to maintain the integrity of the intergovernmental relationship; (2) additional resources were available to these entities through other DOJ state and local grant programs; and (3) in the case of the methamphetamine initiative, further assessment was needed before conversions were made. DOJ budget staff recommended fewer positions than DEA for five of the DEA initiatives but concurred with DEA’s staffing estimates for the investigative shortfall initiative. These recommended changes in staffing estimates, including the justifications provided, are summarized below. Violent crime: In addition to not including positions to convert state and local task forces to permanent status, as previously discussed, budget staff recommended fewer additional agent positions for the MET Program. DOJ staff concluded that four new MET teams for deployment to areas with higher numbers of outstanding requests were sufficient to keep the waiting time for a MET deployment to acceptable limits. Methamphetamine: Most of the difference between DEA’s and DOJ’s staffing estimates for this initiative can be attributed to DOJ’s not including positions for state and local task force conversion. DOJ also did not recommend additional chemists, concluding that DEA had sufficient chemist resources; or an additional agent for demand reduction to increase public awareness of methamphetamine, given DEA’s other critical needs. Budget staff recommended 2 DEA clandestine lab regional training teams to teach 26 classes annually, rather than 4 teams to teach 40 classes annually. Southwest Border: DOJ budget staff did not recommend 5 additional chemists and 14 additional support staff, which were included in DEA’s submission. DOJ concluded that DEA had sufficient resources to meet these needs. Domestic heroin: Asserting that DEA had sufficient chemists to meet its desired staffing ratio, DOJ budget staff did not recommend the five chemists and two clerical support positions included in DEA’s estimates for this initiative. International: DOJ budget staff recommended 22 fewer total positions, including 6 fewer special agent positions, than DEA estimated for this initiative. More than half of these 22 positions (2 chemists, 4 foreign diversion investigators, and 6 support staff) were to establish an International Chemical Control Center. DOJ argued that DEA could use chemists from other places to meet these needs and use diversion investigators from key locations in other parts of the world to provide intelligence to the Center. DOJ also did not recommend opening new DEA offices in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, or Lisbon, Portugal, contending that DEA lacked “substantive rationale” for offices in these locations. DOJ’s estimates also included no staffing enhancements for Bangkok, Thailand, asserting that DEA had sufficient staffing resources to assist Thai police in collecting intelligence about the emerging methamphetamine problem and no additional special agent for Panama, concluding that DEA had not provided “substantive reasons” for that agent. The DOJ budget staff review was followed on August 2, 1996, by the Attorney General’s hearingon DEA’s fiscal year 1998 budget submission. Three working days before the hearing, DOJ budget officials provided their analysis to DEA. According to DOJ budget officials, during the hearing DEA had the opportunity to appeal DOJ’s proposed changes in DEA’s submission and to provide additional information to justify its budget initiatives and enhancements before the Attorney General’s final decision. On August 12, 1996, the Administrator submitted an appeal to the Attorney General in which he requested reconsideration of some of the DOJ budget staff’s recommended changes. The appeal asserted DEA’s need for staff positions to convert certain state and local task forces, associated with its violent crime reduction and methamphetamine efforts, from provisional to program-funded status. It also addressed DEA’s need for resources for its clandestine laboratory cleanup efforts; items previously funded partially by asset forfeiture funds, including awards to informants and marijuana eradication efforts; and in-service training. Nevertheless, for fiscal year 1998, the estimates for additional staffing for DEA included in DOJ’s OMB submission were the same as those recommended by DOJ budget staff and previously discussed. Table 4.1 shows the differences between DEA’s estimates for additional staffing and those proposed to OMB by DOJ. DEA’s fiscal year 1998 budget submission was sent to OMB for review in September 1996 as part of DOJ’s budget request. According to OMB officials, an OMB budget examiner initially reviewed the DOJ budget submission, and the results were presented to and reviewed by the OMB policy officials. Generally, a complete set of budget proposals is presented to the president by early December for his approval. Subsequently, OMB staff prepares the agency passbacks. An OMB official described OMB’s approach to DOJ’s fiscal year 1998 budget submission as “flexible.” That is, as in other years, OMB made suggestions regarding specific DOJ activities, providing DOJ with an overall dollar level and specifying minimum funding for certain funding floors. OMB officials said that OMB did not make account-level recommendations, leaving those decisions to the Attorney General to ensure that the budget reflected DOJ’s priorities. By early December 1996, OMB sent DOJ’s fiscal year 1998 passback in which it recommended an overall DOJ budget lower than DOJ’s submission. For DEA, the passback specified minimum funding for the methamphetamine strategy, the Southwest Border project, and the domestic heroin strategy, but it did not discuss specific staffing estimates or foreign enhancements. Prior to the passback, DEA had received its fiscal year 1997 appropriation, but we were unable to ascertain how it affected the passback. According to DOJ budget officials, DOJ reviewed OMB’s fiscal year 1998 DOJ passback to determine what could be funded according to the Attorney General’s priorities. They said that as a result of OMB’s specifying funding levels for DEA’s methamphetamine, Southwest Border, and heroin initiatives, no funds for the enhancements in other initiatives were available within the DEA budget submission. The DOJ budget officials said that they then sent DOJ’s interpretation—which was based on the Attorney General’s priorities—of the OMB passback to DEA. According to DOJ budget section officials, DEA developed its appeal to the OMB passback and then presented it to OMB, through DOJ, in early December 1996. DEA’s specific staffing-related appeals and outcomes were as follows: Methamphetamine initiative: DEA requested additional resources, including 131 positions. DOJ and OMB agreed to a slight increase in the funded amount to cover 74 positions. Southwest Border initiative: DEA sought 131 additional positions, including 90 special agents. DOJ and OMB agreed to increase the funded amount to cover the additional agents. OMB and DOJ officials reported that the method used to settle appeals varied from year to year. In fiscal year 1998, OMB and DOJ agreed on an overall spending level on appeal and DOJ’s spread of the increase, which provided DEA with funding to cover additional positions for both the methamphetamine and Southwest Border initiatives described above. Concurrent with departmental and OMB reviews of budget submissions, each agency with a drug mission is required by the drug budget certification process to submit a drug control budget to ONDCP. However, in 1996, due to the appointment of a new ONDCP Director and the reformulation and consequent late release of ONDCP’s drug strategy, the national drug budget certification process did not follow ONDCP’s established procedures and schedule. Specifically, ONDCP requested only one fiscal year 1998 budget submission in September 1996, coincident with the OMB deadline. On November 8, 1996, while OMB was reviewing DOJ’s budget submission, DOJ sent its budget request to ONDCP. On November 18, 1996, for consideration before finalizing DOJ’s fiscal year 1998 budget request, the ONDCP Director advised the Attorney General of two DEA program initiatives that did not appear to have been included in DOJ’s submission. The initiatives in question were (1) the continued expansion of vetted law enforcement units in key source and transit countries and (2) a request for additional resources for DEA’s Domestic Cannabis Eradication/Suppression Program. The Director’s letter did not specifically discuss staffing related to the initiatives. Final ONDCP budget certification was withheld until ONDCP reviewed DOJ’s final budget submission. According to DOJ and ONDCP officials, DEA received sufficient resources in its fiscal year 1997 appropriation to address the ONDCP Director’s concerns. Therefore, on the basis of ONDCP’s final review, the Director notified the Attorney General on February 7, 1997—1 day after the President submitted the fiscal year 1998 budget request—that the resources requested by DOJ were certified as adequate to implement the goals and objectives of the National Drug Control Strategy. The President submitted his fiscal year 1998 budget to Congress on February 6, 1997. As a result of the iterative process between DEA/DOJ and OMB over DEA staffing estimates and after consideration of the resources provided in DEA’s fiscal year 1997 appropriation, the President’s budget requested 345 new positions, including 168 special agents, for DEA domestic offices. As shown in table 4.2, the number of total positions requested was approximately one-half the number DOJ initially estimated in its OMB submission. The number of special agents requested was approximately 50 percent of the original DOJ estimates. Some of the differences between the DOJ estimates and the DEA staffing request in the President’s budget submission reflected changes recommended by DOJ or OMB, which were previously discussed. However, other revisions took into account DEA’s fiscal year 1997 appropriation. For example, according to DOJ officials, although DEA’s international crime initiative was not included in the President’s budget submission for fiscal year 1998, DEA was able to staff the Vientiane and Managua offices, included in that initiative, with fiscal year 1997 funds from the Source Country Initiative. In addition, because Congress provided almost twice the funds for the MET Program requested by DEA in fiscal year 1997, the program was fully funded (130 agents were provided) as of that year. Additional funds for the MET Program, which had been included in the fiscal year 1998 violent crime initiative, were no longer necessary. As shown in table 4.3, the conference committee recommended 531 additional positions, of which 240 were special agent positions. On the basis of the recommendations of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, the conference committee also provided guidance as to how those positions were to be allocated, including a new Caribbean initiative. During the fiscal year 1998 appropriations process, the House Appropriations Committee recommended, and Congress approved as part of the conference committee’s report on DEA’s appropriation, a new Caribbean initiative, which was not included in the President’s budget. According to the House Appropriations Committee report, this initiative was proposed to address the increase in drug trafficking throughout the Caribbean. The initiative provided 60 additional DEA special agents for Puerto Rico, the Northern Caribbean, and south Florida. In addition, the conference committee recommended additional positions, above the President’s request, for the heroin and investigative shortfall initiatives. On the basis of the Senate Appropriations Committee’s recommendation, the Conference Committee’s report included 120 new positions, 24 of which were special agents (twice the number of total and special agent positions in the President’s budget request), to continue efforts to reduce heroin trafficking within the United States. The Conference Committee also identified the need for 85 additional intelligence analysts for the investigative shortfall initiative. The President signed DEA/DOJ’s fiscal year 1998 appropriation into law on November 26, 1996. After receipt of its annual appropriation, DEA is responsible for budget execution and the allocation of new staff. In addition to the guidance provided by Congress, DEA officials said they consider factors, such as recently changing drug trends, to determine that allocation. For fiscal year 1998, according to a DEA official involved in the allocation process that year, DEA’s Executive Policy and Strategic Planning, Operations Division, Financial Management Division, and Office of Resource Management staff prepared a draft allocation for the additional resources provided in DEA’s appropriation. The official indicated that among the factors considered in determining the allocation of additional staff were congressional direction; the number of agents added by Congress, broken out by mission and team; FMPs and any other written requests from the field divisions; DEA and DOJ strategies, initiatives, and priorities, including the Southwest Border and methamphetamine plans; actual hours worked by agents on particular types of cases; and drug trends that had emerged since the original fiscal year 1998 budget submission. The recommendations were sent to the DEA Administrator for review and final approval. DEA allocated 531 new positions, including 240 special agent positions, for the 5 initiatives included in its appropriation. As shown in table 4.4, DEA’s fiscal year 1998 staffing allocation followed Congress’ appropriations guidance. The process used for determining DEA’s staffing needs, as carried out in fiscal year 1998, was systematically linked to its budget formulation process. The DEA process was typical of and consistent with the processes and procedures that federal agencies are expected to follow, according to federal laws and regulations and procedures promulgated by OMB. Moreover, the DEA process considered factors related to DEA’s ability to carry out its mission, including emerging drug trafficking trends, staffing requests from the field, the Administrator’s vision statement, and the SAC’s vision statement from each field office. Once Congress approved DEA’s fiscal year 1998 appropriation, DEA senior management systematically determined the allocation of the additional staff to headquarters and field offices, taking into consideration congressional guidance and such factors as field office requests.

Summary: Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the strategies and operations of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in the 1990s, focusing on: (1) what major enforcement strategies, programs, initiatives, and approaches DEA has implemented in the 1990s to carry out its mission, including its efforts to: (a) target and investigate national and international drug traffickers; and (b) help state and local law enforcement agencies combat drug offenders and drug-related violence in their communities; (2) whether DEA's goals and objectives, programs and initiatives, and performance measures are consistent with the National Drug Control Strategy; and (3) how DEA determined its fiscal year 1998 staffing needs and allocated the additional staff. GAO noted that: (1) during the 1990s, DEA has enhanced or changed important aspects of its operations; (2) DEA expanded its domestic enforcement operations to work more with state and local law enforcement agencies and help combat drug-related violent crime in local communities; (3) DEA implemented an investigative approach domestically and internationally, focusing on intercepting the communications of major drug trafficking organizations to target the leaders and dismantle their operations; (4) DEA started participating in two interagency programs to target and investigate major drug trafficking organizations in Latin America and Asia; (5) DEA changed its foreign operations by screening and training special foreign police units to combat drug trafficking in certain key foreign countries; (6) DEA has significant responsibilities for the drug supply reduction portion of the Office of National Drug Control Policy's (ONDCP) National Drug Control Strategy; (7) DEA's strategic goals and objectives, and its enhanced programs and initiatives, in the 1990s have been consistent with the National Drug Control Strategy; (8) however, DEA has not developed measurable performance targets for its programs and initiatives that are consistent with those adopted for the National Strategy; and (9) as a result, it is difficult for DEA, the Department of Justice (DOJ), Congress, and the public to assess how effective DEA has been in achieving its strategic goals and the effect its programs and initiatives in the 1990s have had on reducing the illegal drug supply.