Medicare FFS consists of Part A, hospital insurance, which covers inpatient stays, care in skilled nursing facilities, hospice care, and some home health care; and Part B, which covers certain physician visits, outpatient hospital treatments, and laboratory services, among other services. Most persons aged 65 and older, certain individuals with disabilities, and most individuals with end-stage renal disease are eligible to receive coverage for Part A services at no premium. Individuals eligible for Part A can also enroll in Part B, although they are charged a Part B premium. MA plans are required to provide benefits that are covered under the Medicare FFS program. Most Medicare beneficiaries who are eligible for Medicare FFS can choose to enroll in the MA program, operated through Medicare Part C, instead of Medicare FFS. All Medicare beneficiaries, regardless of their source of coverage, can choose to receive outpatient prescription drug coverage through Medicare Part D. Beneficiaries in both Medicare FFS and MA face cost-sharing requirements for medical services. In Medicare FFS, cost sharing includes a Part A and a Part B deductible, the amount beneficiaries must pay for services before Medicare FFS begins to pay. Medicare FFS cost sharing also includes coinsurance—a percentage payment for a given service that a beneficiary must pay, and copayments—a standard amount a beneficiary must pay for a medical service. Medicare allows MA plans to have cost-sharing requirements that are different from Medicare FFS’s cost-sharing requirements, although an MA plan cannot require overall projected average cost sharing that exceeds what beneficiaries would be expected to pay under Medicare FFS. MA plans are permitted to establish dollar limits on the amount a beneficiary spends on cost sharing in a year of coverage, although Medicare FFS has no total cost-sharing limit. MA plans can use both out-of-pocket maximums, limits that can apply to all services but can exclude certain service categories, and service-specific maximums, which are limits that apply to a single service category. These limits help provide financial protection to beneficiaries who might otherwise have high cost- sharing expenses. MA plans projected that, on average, they would allocate most of the rebates to beneficiaries as reduced cost sharing and reduced premiums for Part B services, Part D services, or both. In 2007, almost all MA plans in our study (1,874 of the 2,055 plans, or 91 percent) received a rebate payment from Medicare that averaged $87 PMPM. MA plans projected they would allocate 69 percent of the rebate ($61 PMPM) to reduced cost sharing and 20 percent ($17 PMPM) to reduced premiums. MA plans projected they would allocate relatively little of the rebates (11 percent or $10 PMPM) to additional benefits that are not covered under Medicare FFS. (See fig. 1.) On average, for plans that provided detailed cost estimates, the projected dollar amounts of the common additional benefits ranged from a low of $0.11 PMPM for international outpatient emergency services to $4 PMPM for dental services. Additional benefits commonly offered included dental services, health education services, and hearing services. About 41 percent of beneficiaries, or 2.3 million people, were enrolled in an MA plan that also charged additional premiums to pay for additional benefits, reduced cost sharing, or a combination of the two. The average additional premium charged was $58 PMPM. Based on plans’ projections, we estimated that about 77 percent of the additional benefits and reduction in beneficiary cost sharing was funded by rebates, with the remainder being funded by additional beneficiary premiums. For 2007, MA plans projected that MA beneficiary cost sharing, funded by both rebates and additional premiums, would be 42 percent of estimated cost sharing in Medicare FFS. Plans projected that their beneficiaries, on average, would pay $49 PMPM in cost sharing, and they estimated that the Medicare FFS equivalent cost sharing for their beneficiaries was $116 PMPM. Although plans projected that beneficiaries’ overall cost sharing was lower, on average, than Medicare FFS cost-sharing estimates, some MA plans projected that cost sharing for certain categories of services was higher than Medicare FFS cost-sharing estimates. This is because overall cost sharing in MA plans is required to be actuarially equivalent or lower compared to overall cost sharing in Medicare FFS, but may be higher or lower for specific categories of services. For example, 19 percent of MA beneficiaries were enrolled in plans that projected higher cost sharing for home health services, on average, than in Medicare FFS, which does not require any cost sharing for home health services. Similarly, 16 percent of MA beneficiaries were in plans with higher projected cost sharing for inpatient services relative to Medicare FFS. (See table 1.) Some MA beneficiaries who frequently used these services with higher cost sharing than Medicare FFS could have had overall cost sharing that was higher than what they would pay under Medicare FFS. Cost sharing for particular categories of services varied substantially among MA plans. For example, with regards to inpatient cost sharing, more than half a million beneficiaries were in MA plans that had no cost sharing at all. In contrast, a similar number of beneficiaries were in MA plans that required cost sharing that could result in $2,000 or more for a 10-day hospital stay and $3,000 or more for three average-length hospital stays. In Medicare FFS in 2007, beneficiaries paid a $992 deductible for the first hospital stay in a benefit period, no deductible for subsequent hospital stays in the same benefit period, and a 20 percent coinsurance for physician services that averaged $73 per day for the first 4 days of a hospital stay and $58 per day for subsequent days in the stay. Figure 2 provides an illustrative example of an MA plan that could have exposed a beneficiary to higher inpatient costs than under Medicare FFS. While the plan in this illustrative example had lower cost sharing than Medicare FFS for initial hospital stays of 4 days or less as well as initial hospital stays of 30 days or more, for stays of other lengths the MA plan could have cost beneficiaries more than $1,000 above out-of-pocket costs under Medicare FFS. The disparity between out-of-pocket costs under the MA plan and costs under Medicare FFS was largest when comparing additional hospital visits in the same benefit period, since Medicare FFS does not charge a deductible if an admission occurs within 60 days of a previous admission. Some MA plans had out-of-pocket maximums, which help protect beneficiaries against high spending on cost sharing. As of August 2007, about 48 percent of beneficiaries were enrolled in plans that had an out-of- pocket maximum. However, some plans excluded certain services from the out-of-pocket maximum. Services that were typically excluded were Part B drugs obtained from a pharmacy, outpatient substance abuse and mental health services, home health services, and durable medical equipment. For 2007, MA plans projected that of their total revenues ($783 PMPM), they would spend approximately 87 percent ($683 PMPM) on medical expenses. Plans further projected they would spend approximately 9 percent of total revenue ($71 PMPM) on nonmedical expenses, such as administration expenses and marketing expenses, and approximately 4 percent ($30 PMPM) on the plans’ profits, on average. There was variation among individual plans in the percent of revenues projected to be spent on medical expenses. For example, about 30 percent of beneficiaries—1.7 million—were enrolled in plans that projected spending less than 85 percent on medical expenses. While there is no definitive standard for the percentage of revenues that should be spent on medical expenses, Congress adopted the 85 percent threshold to require minimum thresholds for MA plans in the Children’s Health and Medicare Protection Act of 2007. MA plans projected expenses separately for certain categories of nonmedical expenses, including marketing and sales. One type of MA plan—Private Fee-for-Service (PFFS)—allocated a larger percentage of revenue to marketing and sales than other plan types. On average, as a percentage of total revenue, marketing and sales expenses were 3.6 percent for PFFS plans compared to 2.4 percent for all MA plans. Medicare spends more per beneficiary in MA than it does for beneficiaries in Medicare FFS, at an estimated additional cost to Medicare of $54 billion from 2009 through 2012. In 2007, the average MA plan receives a Medicare rebate equal to approximately $87 PMPM, on average. MA plans projected they would allocate the vast majority of their rebates—approximately 89 percent—to beneficiaries to reduce premiums and to lower their cost- sharing for Medicare-covered services. Plans projected they would use a relatively small portion of their rebates—approximately 11 percent—to provide additional benefits that are not covered under Medicare FFS. Although the rebates generally have helped to make health care more affordable for many beneficiaries enrolled in MA plans, some beneficiaries may face higher expenses than they would in Medicare FFS. Further, because premiums paid by beneficiaries in Medicare FFS are tied to both Medicare FFS and MA costs, beneficiaries covered under Medicare FFS are subsidizing the additional benefits and lower costs that MA beneficiaries receive. Whether the value that MA beneficiaries receive in the form of reduced cost sharing, lower premiums, and extra benefits is worth the increased cost borne by beneficiaries in Medicare FFS is a decision for policymakers. However, if the policy objective is to subsidize health-care costs of low-income Medicare beneficiaries, it may be more efficient to directly target subsidies to a defined low-income population than to subsidize premiums and cost sharing for all MA beneficiaries, including those who are well off. As Congress considers the design and cost of the MA program, it will be important for policymakers to balance the needs of beneficiaries—including those in MA plans and those in Medicare FFS—with the necessity of addressing Medicare’s long-term financial health. Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared remarks. I would be happy to respond to any questions you or other Members of the Subcommittee may have at this time. For further information about this testimony, please contact James Cosgrove at (202) 512-7114 or cosgrovej@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Christine Brudevold, Assistant Director; Jennie Apter, Alexander Dworkowitz, Gregory Giusto, Drew Long, and Christina C. Serna made key contributions to this statement. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.

Summary: Although private health plans were originally envisioned in the 1980s as a potential source of Medicare savings, such plans have generally increased program spending. In 2006, Medicare paid $59 billion to Medicare Advantage (MA) plans--an estimated $7.1 billion more than Medicare would have spent if MA beneficiaries had received care in Medicare fee-for-service (FFS). MA plans receive a per member per month (PMPM) payment to provide services covered under Medicare FFS. Almost all MA plans receive an additional Medicare payment, known as a rebate. Plans use rebates and sometimes additional beneficiary premiums to fund benefits not covered under Medicare fee-for-service; reduce premiums; or reduce beneficiary cost sharing. In 2007, MA plans received about $8.3 billion in rebate payments. This testimony is based on GAO's report, Medicare Advantage: Increased Spending Relative to Medicare Fee-for-Service May Not Always Reduce Beneficiary Out-of-Pocket Costs ( GAO-08-359 , February 2008). For this testimony, GAO examined MA plans' (1) projected allocation of rebates, (2) projected cost sharing, and (3) projected revenues and expenses. GAO used 2007 data on MA plans' projected revenues and covered benefits, accounting for 71 percent of beneficiaries in MA plans. GAO found that MA plans projected they would use their rebates primarily to reduce cost sharing, with relatively little of their rebates projected to be spent on additional benefits. Nearly all plans--91 percent of the 2,055 plans in the study--received a rebate. Of the average rebate payment of $87 PMPM, plans projected they would allocate about $78 PMPM (89 percent) to reduced cost sharing and reduced premiums and $10 PMPM (11 percent) to additional benefits. The average projected PMPM costs of specific additional benefits across all MA plans ranged from $0.11 PMPM for international outpatient emergency services to $4 PMPM for dental care. While MA plans projected that, on average, beneficiaries in their plans would have cost sharing that was 42 percent of Medicare FFS cost-sharing estimates, some beneficiaries could have higher cost sharing for certain service categories. For example, some plans projected that their beneficiaries would have higher cost sharing, on average, for home health services and inpatient stays, than in Medicare FFS. If beneficiaries frequently used these services that required higher cost sharing than Medicare FFS, it was possible that their overall cost sharing was higher than what they would have paid under Medicare FFS. Out of total revenues of $783 PMPM, on average, MA plans projected that they would allocate about 87 percent ($683 PMPM) to medical expenses. MA plans projected they would allocate, on average, about 9 percent of total revenue ($71 PMPM) to nonmedical expenses, including administration and marketing expenses; and about 4 percent ($30 PMPM) to the plans' profits. About 30 percent of beneficiaries were enrolled in plans that projected they would allocate less than 85 percent of their revenues to medical expenses. As GAO concluded in its report, whether the value that MA beneficiaries receive in the form of reduced cost sharing, lower premiums, and additional benefits is worth the additional cost to Medicare is a decision for policymakers. However, if the policy objective is to subsidize health care costs of low-income Medicare beneficiaries, it may be more efficient to directly target subsidies to a defined low-income population than to subsidize premiums and cost sharing for all MA beneficiaries, including those who are well off. As Congress considers the design and cost of MA, it will be important for policymakers to balance the needs of beneficiaries and the necessity of addressing Medicare's long-term financial health.