Congress passed the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) in 1990 to address issues related to workforce quality, to formally establish the acquisition workforce, and to increase its professionalism by directing DOD to create certification requirements for the acquisition workforce. In response, DOD defined its acquisition workforce, which evolved into the 16 career fields and paths that currently exist. According to DAU officials, this definition is still evolving. For each of the career fields and paths that DOD established, there are minimum requirements for education, experience, and training under DAWIA. The DAWIA workforce numbered 133,103 at the end of fiscal year 2009 and 150,566 at the end of March 2011. In 2010, DOD developed a Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Strategy to establish a comprehensive acquisition workforce analysis and decision-making capability that is still ongoing. The workforce analysis is focused on the DAWIA workforce and does not cover non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities despite recognition of the important roles they play in acquiring services in the federal government. The number of personnel and roles on services acquisitions can vary greatly. With the exception of DAWIA-certified contracting officers, who administer services acquisitions and are involved throughout the life cycle of a contract, other professionals do fall outside of DAWIA. A model of the services acquisition process is demonstrated in figure 1 below along with the roles of personnel who may be involved in the various stages throughout the life cycle of services acquisitions. Manage and assess contractor performance Requirements official(s) Source selection board member Contracting officer’s representative(s) Technical assistant(s) GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Tailored Approach Needed to Improve Service Acquisition Outcomes, GAO-07-20 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 9, 2006). complex investments that did not have well-defined requirements, a complete set of measurable performance standards, or both. The Office of Management and Budget’s Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) issued guidance in 2005 that built on previous efforts to improve the development of the acquisition workforce by defining the acquisition workforce more broadly than DOD’s definition under DAWIA. The OFPP policy applies to all executive agencies, except those subject to DAWIA. OFPP’s definition includes individuals who perform various acquisition functions to support accomplishing an agency’s mission. At a minimum, the acquisition workforce of a civilian agency includes contracting specialists, contracting officers regardless of general schedule series, contracting officers’ representatives or equivalent positions, program and project managers, positions in the purchasing series, and any significant acquisition positions identified by the agency. Members of the civilian acquisition workforce may also include: individuals substantially involved in defining, determining, and managing requirements; individuals involved in acquisition planning and strategy; individuals who participate in the contracting process (including soliciting, evaluating, and awarding of contracts); individuals who manage the process after the contract is awarded (including testing and evaluating; managing, monitoring, and evaluating performance on the contract; auditing; and administering the contract); individuals involved in property management; individuals who support the business processes of the above listed activities (e.g., General Counsel, finance, or other subject matter experts); and individuals who directly manage those involved in any of the above activities. Non-DAWIA personnel are assigned responsibilities in critical phases of the acquisition process, but no DOD organization has systematically identified these personnel and the acquisition-related competencies they require or been designated the responsibility of overseeing this group—as has been done for the personnel who are members of the DAWIA workforce. In our sample of 29 service contracts, we determined that the number of non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities was substantial. Identifying non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities is challenging, but DOD is working to identify a portion of this population—requirements personnel for major weapon systems—and provide specific training. DOD identified 218 of the 430 personnel (51 percent) reported to us as involved in the 29 contracts in our sample as outside the DAWIA workforce. While the absolute number is large, their acquisition-related responsibilities are generally part-time, according to DOD officials. Nonetheless, their roles and responsibilities touched all three phases of the services acquisition life cycle and included personnel with such titles as program managers, CORs, requirement officials, auditors, and legal advisors. DAU has acknowledged that non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities may also include technical experts, financial managers, and others whose duties may affect or be affected by the acquisition process. According to senior DOD officials, DOD policy does not require tracking or training for these non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities, but they are assigned responsibilities in critical phases of the acquisition process—acquisition planning, contract solicitation and award, and contract administration. Decisions about the number and type of personnel involved in each individual contract are made at the discretion of the organization responsible for the contract and may vary widely from contract to contract depending on the type of acquisition and the service or command. For 23 of the 29 contracts we reviewed, DOD officials identified non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities working on the contract. The number of non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities reported in our sample ranged from 61 on one Navy contract to none on two different DLA contracts. For two similar Air Force contracts involving aircraft maintenance, one reported 21 non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities involved in the contract, and the other reported 3. According to an Air Force contracting officer, the number of CORs associated with a contract can vary depending on the experience and skills needed to monitor the work being performed by the contractor. Additionally, variation among personnel identified on the contracts is also a result of personnel turnover, which may impact the overall number of non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities identified on a particular contract. Based on our sample of 29 contracts, we identified 12 categories of personnel that have acquisition-related roles and responsibilities but are not part of the DAWIA workforce. Figure 2 shows the number of non- DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities in each of the 12 categories we identified based on DOD data, titles, and policy. See appendix II for a description of the 12 categories and acquisition-related responsibilities associated with them. In some cases, DOD reported personnel as serving in more than one role on the contract. For example, a COR was also reported as serving as a program manager—who is the principal technical expert usually most familiar with the requirements. In another example, a multifunctional team member—who plans and manages services acquisitions throughout the life of the requirement— was reported as also being the functional commander, who is the senior official of a requirements organization. Figure 2 below eliminates the multiple roles as we included the individual in a specific role identified in DOD’s guidebook, such as a COR, over a role within a group, such as a member of a multifunctional team. In addition, DOD identified personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities who had titles such as technical assistants, assistant CORs, and task managers who were not designated as the COR. This group along with CORs represented the vast majority of personnel on our 29 contracts. We were able to collect data on the non-DAWIA population from individual commands and contracting organizations on a contract-by- contract basis, but no organization within DOD is responsible for identifying, developing, and managing non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities—even though these personnel represented over half the people reported as working on the service contracts we reviewed. DOD is not required to identify non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities, and senior officials stated that DOD has not established criteria or a process to do so across the department or among organizations in DOD that have a role in helping to manage issues focused on services acquisitions. For the DAWIA population, however, organizations within DOD—including DAU, the Directors of Acquisition Career Management (DACMs), and the Functional Integrated Process Teams (FIPTs)—have integrated tracking responsibilities that allow DOD to strategically manage this population.8 DAU officials explained that in keeping with their mission and priority, they focus their resources on DAWIA professionals. According to DOD officials, the mission of each military service’s DACM is to track personnel covered under DAWIA and identify demand for training. FIPTs were established for 14 different acquisition career fields for the DAWIA workforce. The FIPT lead advises DOD on DAWIA career development policies and procedures, including education, training, and experience requirements for civilian and military personnel in the acquisition workforce. They also, in conjunction with the DACMs, identify demand for training. as the medical monitor to review the research proposal to help ensure the safety of the study participants. However, this official’s primary duty in the Air Force was an active duty flight surgeon. DOD officials stated that acquisition personnel may serve in both DAWIA and non-DAWIA positions at different points in their DOD careers, further complicating attempts to identify or track personnel. In the 29 contracts we reviewed, we found several examples of personnel serving in the same role with the same responsibilities—such as requirements definition, program management, and contractor oversight—some of whom were DAWIA personnel, while others were non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities. Figure 3 depicts our sample of DOD’s acquisition workforce and the roles that overlap between the DAWIA workforce and non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities. A group of organizations within DOD led by DAU officials has begun identifying non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities for developing requirements in major defense acquisition programs and is requiring specific training for them to perform their role.9 DOD’s focus is on personnel responsible for requirements for major weapon systems, and DOD has not undertaken a similar effort for all non-DAWIA personnel with roles and responsibilities on services acquisitions. As a part of the effort to identify the major weapon system personnel, DAU officials said DOD identified criteria to define the population—including non-DAWIA personnel—who would receive requirements management certification and training. We found that most non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities on our 29 contracts received some acquisition training, even though DOD does not require or track acquisition training for 11 of the 12 roles of non-DAWIA personnel—the exception being for CORs. The required training was limited and varied, and the current training and education programs for acquisitions do not address services acquisitions. This is different than for DAWIA-certified personnel who have minimum requirements for education, experience, and training. DAU data suggest that demand for training has increased, but DOD has limited metrics to gauge the current size and future demand for training of the population in the long term or the effectiveness of current training that is available. In the short term, however, DOD has taken interim steps to require training and provide resources for some non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition- related responsibilities. The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364 § 801 (2006). we did not assess the quality or effectiveness of any training as a component of our work. Included in the 218 non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities were 48 personnel who reported that they did not receive any acquisition training, such as:  7 officials who were responsible for developing requirements  3 functional commanders—senior requirements officials of an organization, such as the commanding officer for a missile range;10  1 COR; and  3 of 10 program managers.11 See figure 4 below to see the extent to which non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities on the 29 contracts we reviewed took training. For the majority of contracts in our sample, a functional commander was not included in the list of non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities reported to us by DOD. In some instances, there was more than one program manager reported per contract. In others, no program manager was reported on a contract. There is no requirement for a program manager on services contracts. Based on the number of courses completed, DAU faces growing demand for training by non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities, despite few requirements for training. For 11 selected courses, many of which are recommended by DOD to improve requirements development, non-DAWIA training participation increased from fiscal year 2008 to 2010, as shown in table 1 below. According to DAU officials, DAU does not collect information on why personnel are seeking training or what roles and responsibilities they have on contracts to determine whether the individuals are working on major weapon systems, services acquisitions, or other types of contracts. According to DAU records, two of the courses listed above—the Overview of Acquisition Ethics and the COR Mission with a Focus—accounted for over 75 percent of the increase in the number of Web-based acquisition- related training courses taken by non-DAWIA personnel from 2008-2010. The number of non-DAWIA personnel seeking acquisition training through DAU is expected to increase with the introduction of a contracting officer’s representative course in June 2009 and the Web-based equivalent in August 2010, which is listed above in table 1. Beyond the insight DAU course data provide, DOD has limited information on the demand for and the effectiveness of acquisition training for non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities. First, tracking acquisition training for non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities, if it is done at all, is typically conducted for COR training and auditors within organizations to which these personnel are assigned and is decentralized across the department. Second, DAU training participants' course evaluations through the middle of July 2011 rated COR courses positively in job impact and learning effectiveness, but according to a DAU official, these evaluations are completed before participants begin their COR duties, and DAU does not currently request feedback on the value of a course after the training participants have begun their acquisition duties as CORs. DAU officials acknowledged that DAU does not have information to assess the effectiveness of COR training. They explained that COR training is intended to be an introduction to acquisition-related duties and that because DAU’s mission is to focus on DAWIA professionals and its resources are limited, it does not collect more extensive feedback on COR courses for personnel that will not likely remain in the acquisition community because they are often involved in acquisitions as a secondary and not a primary duty. DOD has taken short-term actions to assist non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities to be successful in the role of COR for services acquisitions. However, DOD has not identified a plan to develop the skills or competencies necessary for other non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities in other roles. In 2006, 2008, and 2010 DOD recognized the importance of some non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities in several memoranda requiring that CORs be properly trained and appointed before contract performance begins on a services acquisition to address weaknesses in this key function that the DODIG and we identified. In 2010, DOD developed a COR certification standard that defines minimum COR competencies, experience, and training, based on the complexity of the requirement and contract performance risk. A DOD Instruction, currently in draft form and undergoing review, will give more specificity to the COR certification policy but has not been formally issued and published. Once this training is implemented across DOD, it may only require training for approximately one-fourth of the personnel identified as CORs for the contracts we examined. DOD and DAU officials stated that the training that is currently available through DAU is geared toward weapon systems acquisitions and that they do not have a curriculum developed for services acquisitions or for non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities, outside of CORs. Recently, DOD and DAU have undertaken initiatives to address training for requirements officials. For example, in 2009 DAU developed optional Service Acquisition Workshops to assist acquisition teams and guide them through the requirements writing process. According to DAU officials, key participants who should participate in the workshop include the program/project manager, contracting officer, and CORs. Both DAWIA and non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities from a specific services acquisition team participate in the workshop, writing the requirements together and building consensus on their vision and goals for the acquisition. To bridge the gaps in skills and abilities of non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities who do not have acquisition experience, several organizations across DOD have created a customer liaison capability to assist the requiring activity on services acquisitions in the absence of a program office to facilitate the interaction between the contracting organization and the requiring organization. For example, a Marine Corps contracting office official said they created a customer liaison group of four DAWIA personnel to assist non-DAWIA personnel with the acquisition process, including writing requirements. An Army command used the experience and skills of a former federal contracting officer to provide technical assistance to personnel developing requirements for services acquisitions, usually non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities. Within the Army Corp of Engineers, a project manager may be assigned to a contract to facilitate the relationship between the requirements and contracting organizations. DLA officials said that some organizations within DLA have an acquisition assistance office to assist in preparing the requirements package. DOD has two other ongoing initiatives to track and train a portion of the non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities. First, DOD is developing a system to identify and manage CORs that will provide a repository for COR training certificates and monthly contractor surveillance reports. It will also give contracting personnel and requiring activities the means to track and manage COR assignments. The system is anticipated to provide DOD with insight into the size of the active and inactive COR population within DOD. The system is anticipated to be fully implemented during fiscal year 2012. Second, within the non-DAWIA auditing community in DOD, DOD officials said that the DODIG has led a working group, including DAU, to find spaces in a specific DAU course through fiscal year 2011 so the non-DAWIA auditors can get the equivalent training they need for certification based on their current curriculum. In the long term, the working group is also meeting to establish an auditor-specific curriculum at DAU for the non-DAWIA auditors to receive acquisition training to address their specific needs. However, according to the DODIG lead for the working group, long-term plans and funding to support this training initiative for non-DAWIA auditors are uncertain. DOD has made some progress in implementing the outstanding recommendations from the Panel on Contacting Integrity, our previous reports, and other reports that raised issues related to training for non- DAWIA personnel. For the Panel on Contracting Integrity (Panel), the recommendations that were relevant to non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities focused on managing, training, and certifying CORs. Based on the Panel’s 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010 reports with recommendations related to CORs and follow-up action by the Panel, we determined that DOD has fully implemented 3, partially implemented 7, and has not implemented 1 of the 11 recommendations. Specifically, in response to the Panel’s recommendation that DOD develop a certification standard for CORs, DOD developed a certification program listing available training resources that meet the standard and defining a reasonable time-phased implementation plan for the standard. An example of one Panel recommendation that remains open is the recommendation to develop an implementation plan for the COR certification process. While DOD has issued a policy memorandum for the COR certification process, it has not yet issued the DOD Instruction that will implement the new certification standard policy. See appendix IV for more detailed information on the Panel recommendations and their implementation status. Our previous work has focused on the roles, responsibilities, and training of the professional DAWIA acquisition workforce and how DOD manages services acquisitions. This is our first report providing insight on non- DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities on services acquisitions. Recommendations from previous reports that are related to our population have focused primarily on the role of CORs, which we demonstrate are only a portion of a larger group of non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities. DOD has also made progress addressing recommendations we made from 2005 to 2009. DOD concurred with the four relevant recommendations, has fully implemented three, and has taken action on the other. In December 2005, DOD issued a memorandum to address our recommendation that surveillance personnel—CORs—are properly trained and appointed before contract award. In December 2006, DOD issued a policy memorandum requiring DOD components to ensure that the contribution of CORs in assisting in the monitoring or administration of contracts is addressed in their performance reviews to address our recommendation that DOD develop practices to help ensure accountability for personnel carrying out surveillance responsibilities. In October 2006, DOD issued an Acquisition Services Policy to address our recommendation that DOD’s service contract review process and associated data collection provide management more visibility over contract surveillance.  Our November 2009 recommendation that the military departments review their procedures to ensure that properly trained surveillance personnel have been assigned prior to and throughout a contract’s period of performance has not been implemented. Ongoing efforts to develop a certification system for all DOD CORs should address this recommendation. See appendix V for a list of our recommendations and additional details on the status of implementation. Finally, the House Armed Services Committee and the Defense Science Board recently issued reports including recommendations related to training for those who are responsible for requirements development for services acquisitions and non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities but the recommendations were made too recently for us to assess the status of implementation. For example, in March 2010, the House Armed Services Committee Panel on Defense Acquisition Reform Report reported that DOD was not ensuring that personnel with responsibilities for acquisition outcomes acquire the skills, training, and experience needed to properly write, award, and oversee performance of services acquisitions, which could pose a different set of challenges than those associated with the procurement of goods. The report recommended that the department reform the requirements process and establish a clear career path for civilians in the defense acquisition system. In March 2011, a Defense Science Board Task Force report advised that DOD should systematically improve training for personnel involved in services acquisitions and oversight. Non-DAWIA personnel carry responsibilities that are essential to getting good outcomes from DOD's services acquisitions. They are involved in defining requirements, shaping the acquisition decision-making process, and overseeing services acquisitions. While identifying these individuals is challenging, without a clear understanding of this population, DOD does not have sufficient oversight or assurance that the right people with the right skills are involved in the critical phases of services acquisitions to ensure successful outcomes. Challenges in identifying non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities exist, in part, because the personnel are dispersed throughout the department, come from a variety of career fields, and are often involved in acquisitions as a secondary duty. DOD’s efforts to identify and provide acquisition training to CORs, a portion of non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities, is a good foundation for building a strategic and sustainable approach to develop the skills and competencies of other non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities. This diverse population, because of its differences from DAWIA personnel, may require different ways to prepare its members for their unique roles and responsibilities in supporting the services acquisition process. Yet DOD does not have a deliberate approach to identifying non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities or ensuring they have the skill sets, resources, and tools they need. Apart from the new training for one of the non-DAWIA roles—the CORs—training for non-DAWIA personnel is limited. DOD does not have a way of knowing whether the training these people take is targeted to critical skills and competencies related to carrying out their acquisition responsibilities. Without a departmentwide focus and an organization within DOD with designated responsibility for the population of non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities—as the professional DAWIA workforce has to provide leadership on training, identification, and development of personnel—it is unclear whether these personnel have the training they need to help ensure that DOD obtains its desired acquisition outcomes. In the area of weapon systems, DOD has taken steps to assure that non- DAWIA personnel are getting needed acquisition training. Specifically, DOD has identified some requirements positions involved in major weapon systems that should receive additional training and built a curriculum designed for this group to obtain certification. This is one of perhaps several approaches to managing an amorphous and transient population within DOD. To help ensure that training and development efforts for non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities are deliberate and contribute to successful services acquisitions—meaning DOD buys the right thing, the right way, while getting the desired outcomes—we recommend the Secretary of Defense take the following three actions:  establish criteria and a time frame for identifying non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities, including requirements officials;  assess what critical skills non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition- related responsibilities might require to perform their role in the acquisition process and improve acquisition outcomes; and  designate an organization that has the responsibility to track DOD’s progress in identifying, developing, and overseeing non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities to help ensure they have the skills necessary to perform their acquisition function. We provided a draft of this report to DOD for comment. In written comments, DOD agreed with our recommendations. DOD provided technical comments, which we incorporated into the report as appropriate. DOD’s comments are reprinted in appendix VI. We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional committees, the Secretary of Defense, and other interested parties. The report is also available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or martinb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Staff acknowledgements are listed in appendix VII. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 included a provision requiring that GAO report on the Department of Defense’s (DOD) training for its acquisition and audit workforce.1 Our October 2010 report addressed training provided by the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) to the DAWIA workforce.2 In addition to that report, we agreed to review training provided to non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities in a noncontingency environment. To accomplish this, we assessed the extent to which (1) DOD knows the composition of the population of non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities, (2) non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities are taking acquisition training, and (3) selected recommendations related to non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition- related responsibilities from previous reviews have been implemented. Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 1108 (b)(2) (2009). GAO, Defense Acquisition Workforce: DOD's Training Program Demonstrates Many Attributes of Effectiveness, but Improvement Is Needed, GAO-11-22 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 28, 2010). We initially selected 33 contracts during the design phase of our work to understand the differences between how goods and services were acquired by DOD. Once we narrowed our scope to focus on service contracts in a noncontingency environment, we removed 3 contracts for goods and a fourth contract that was contingency-related. and personnel involved in the contracts to verify the specific service being provided and to enhance specific details not provided in FPDS-NG such as where work was being conducted. Through these steps, we found FPDS-NG to be reliable for the purposes of this report. For this sample of contracts, we asked DOD contracting and program officials associated with each contract to identify the personnel with roles and responsibilities related to that acquisition, including pre- and postaward responsibilities. We relied on DOD officials to specify whether the personnel involved in each of the selected contracts were DAWIA- certified, and thus a member of the DAWIA workforce, or were non- DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities. To gather more specific information from each organization responsible for the contracts in our selected sample, we also interviewed DOD officials, DAWIA contracting personnel, requirements officials, and other personnel who performed specific roles on the contracts from each of the services and DLA. We obtained information about the involvement of non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities in the selected contracts, the organizations’ training policies when the contracts were awarded, and how the individual organizations each tracked training for CORs and other non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities. To help determine the roles and responsibilities of acquisition personnel, we reviewed guidance to executive branch agencies that defines the acquisition workforce, including those that may be outside of DOD’s DAWIA definition. However, we did not review executive agencies’ efforts to identify, develop, and train its acquisition workforce. To understand DOD’s ability to define, identify, and track non- DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities, we interviewed officials from the Defense Acquisition University (DAU), Defense Procurement Acquisition Policy (DPAP), each of the services’ Director of Acquisition Career Management (DACM) offices, the Air Force Program Executive Office for Combat and Mission Support (AFPEO/CM), the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Services, the Director for Services Acquisition for the Navy, the Functional Integrated Process Team for Program Management, the Department of Defense Inspector General (DODIG), the Naval Audit Service, the Army Audit Agency, and the Air Force Audit Agency. To identify the extent to which non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition- related responsibilities are taking acquisition training, we asked each service and DLA to report any acquisition training that non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities associated with our sample had taken and specific training auditors had taken from each respective audit agency noted above. We also asked each audit agency for aggregate counts of the number of their non-DAWIA auditors who worked on contracting and acquisition who had received DAWIA- equivalent certification. In order to confirm training taken by the non- DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities for the contracts in our sample we requested DAU training records, training certificates, and locally maintained training records. To identify the demand for DAU acquisition training by non-DAWIA personnel over time, we requested data on 15 classroom and Web-based courses from DAU for fiscal years 2008 through 2010 that were identified from DOD policy documents as training for requirements officials or CORs. We made an effort to only include designated non-DAWIA personnel to establish the amount of training taken and additionally calculated the number of unique individuals by removing duplicate names to provide a more accurate number to the demand for training. However, we were not able to determine whether individuals worked on major weapon systems, services acquisitions, another type of contract, or did not work in acquisition at all. To identify the individual courses that non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities took and the sources for training on the 29 contracts, we compiled the training identified by DOD officials and cross-referenced individuals listed with DAU’s training database. However, these data sources did not provide us enough information to completely verify the training individuals identified as non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition- related responsibilities have taken. We did not assess the content or the effectiveness of the required or available training. Despite some of the limitations noted above, we found the data to be reliable for the purposes of this report. To understand DOD’s ability to strategically plan for the training or development of non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities we interviewed officials from DAU, DPAP, and the services’ DACMs. We also interviewed contracting and requirement officials with the Air Force, Army, Navy, and DLA to obtain acquisition training and evidence of completed training. We reviewed relevant legislation, acquisition policy, and service and agency-specific policies and guidance, such as the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, the Federal Acquisition Regulation, and the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement in order to understand any training requirement for non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities. To identify the extent to which recommendations addressing non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities from previous reviews have been implemented, such as the Panel on Contracting Integrity (Panel), we reviewed 2007-2010 annual updates prepared by DOD to address the Panel’s recommendations. Specifically, we compared the recommended actions from the previous reports with each additional report and conducted a comparative analysis of the Panel’s status of each recommendation with our own assessment. We provided our analysis to DPAP officials to review and provide additional information that we considered in making our final determination. We also reviewed past GAO reports that made recommendations on non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities from 2005-2009 and provided an update on the status of DOD’s implementation or current work to implement past recommendations. We also reviewed more recently issued reports by the House Armed Services Committee Panel and the Defense Science Board that addressed issues impacting non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities and services acquisitions. We conducted this performance audit from June 2010 to September 2011, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Based on the guidance and policies issued by DOD and the Air Force as well as from information collected on personnel reported in our sample, DOD’s non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities are a substantial group of DOD civilians and military personnel who perform acquisition duties in their current positions or assignments and are not members of the DAWIA workforce. Following is a list of categories of roles, titles, and a description of the acquisition responsibilities for non- DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities. 1. Alternate/assistant contracting officer’s representative (ACOR)/technical assistant/task manager: Serves as support to the COR in the administration of the contract but does not have the authority to provide any technical direction or clarification to the contractor. 2. Contracting officer’s representative (COR): Serves as the onsite technical subject matter expert assessing contractor performance against contract performance standards and recording and reporting this information, including inspecting and accepting supplies and services. The COR represents and is nominated by the requiring organization and designated by the contracting officer. The personnel responsible for developing the requirements may or may not be assigned as the COR on services acquisitions. Regardless, DOD guidance states that the COR should be identified early in the acquisition cycle and included in preaward activities, such as requirements definition/acquisition planning and contract formation processes. In our selected contracts, CORs were sometimes DAWIA personnel, but the majority of them were not. In 17 of 29 contracts, there was more than one COR assigned. 3. Requirements official: Represents an organization with a need for a particular product or service. Requirements officials are responsible for technical requirements, for prescribing contract quality requirements, and for defining the requirement. According to agency officials, acquisition planning activities generally begin when the program office, along with requirements officials, identifies a need. The program office is primarily responsible for conducting market research, defining requirements in a document such as a statement of work, developing cost estimates, and developing a written acquisition plan, if required. In the 29 contracts we reviewed, there were non- DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities identified as requirements officials. 4. Source selection board member: Evaluates contract proposals against requirements and recommends contractors for award. 5. Program/project manager: Serves as the principal technical expert and is usually the most familiar with the requirement and best able to identify potential technical trade-offs and determine whether the requirement can be met by a commercial solution. In the absence of a program office or program/project manager, requirements officials from the customer organization serve in a similar role as the program/project manager. In contrast to major weapon programs, for services acquisitions, a program office is not usually established, so the contracting organization works directly with the requirements organization—which typically consists of non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities in our selected contracts. In our selected contracts, DOD does not require a program/project manager to be appointed for services acquisitions, and there is no requirement for those that are serving in this role for services acquisitions to be DAWIA personnel. Of the contracts in our sample, 13 reported having program/project managers and 16 did not. Some contracts had more than one person serving in a role similar to that of a program/project manager. 6. Legal advisor: Ensures that terms and conditions contemplated are consistent with the government’s legal rights, duties, and responsibilities. Reviews contracting documents and request for proposals for legal sufficiency and advises on acquisition strategies and contracts. 7. Multifunctional team member: Plans and manages services acquisitions throughout the life of the requirement. The functional experts on the team maintain knowledge and provide continuity and stability. The duties, expertise, and contributions of each team member are important to the success of a services acquisition. Of the 29 contracts we reviewed, 24 used multifunctional teams or the equivalent, and 5 did not. 8. Functional commander: Directs or commands the requirements organization responsible for the actual performance of a given service. Identifies mission-essential services and develops, implements, and assists in the execution of services acquisitions. Some responsibilities may include developing acquisition strategy and overseeing performance and monitoring the service throughout the life of the acquisition, including reviewing contractor performance documentation on a regular basis to ensure performance is compatible with the contract and mission objectives. They are also responsible for assigning primary and alternate CORs and assigning functional experts to the multifunctional team. DOD officials in this role are generally non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities. 9. Auditor: Conducts acquisition and contract-related audits at any phase in the services acquisition life cycle. Non-DAWIA auditors include those in the Army Audit Agency, the Naval Audit Service, the Air Force Audit Agency, and the DOD Inspector General. In our selected contracts, non-DAWIA audit personnel do not have and are not required to receive DAWIA certification. 10. Financial/budget officer: Serves as an advisor for fiscal and budgetary issues. 11. Price analyst: Analyzes and evaluates financial and cost-based data for reasonableness, completeness, accuracy, and affordability at initiation or contract award phases of services acquisitions. 12. Small Business Administration advisor: Serves as the principal advisor and advocate for small business issues. To determine the extent to which training recommendations from the Panel on Contracting Integrity (Panel) have been implemented, we examined whether DOD had implemented the Panel’s recommendations in 2007, 2008, and 2009 by reviewing the 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010 reports. To assess the implementation of the 2010 recommendations, DPAP provided information on the status of the recommendations. Specifically, we compared the recommended actions from the 2007 report with the reported action in the 2008 report. The same comparative analysis was conducted using the recommended actions from 2008, 2009, and 2010 reports. We differentiated between recommendations that specifically mention training from those that did not, as well as recommendations in which training was involved in the implementation of the recommendation. We analyzed the supporting documents to assess the status, and, based on our review, we assigned one of the following four status assessments to each of the recommendations: 1. Fully Implemented. The entire wording of the action item has been fulfilled. 2. Partially Implemented. Only a portion of the action has been implemented. When the wording of the action item had multiple parts, if one part or a portion of a part had been implemented (but not all parts), we categorized the action item as “partially implemented.” 3. Not Implemented-Action Taken. No part of the action item has been implemented, but steps have been taken toward the completion of the action item. For example, if legislation had been introduced to address the action but had not been enacted into law, we categorized the action item as “not implemented-action taken.” 4. Not Implemented-No Action. No part of the action item has been completed, and no action has been taken to address the action item. For example, if the action item called for changes in legislation but no legislation has even been proposed, we categorized the action item as “not implemented-no action.” We identified previous recommendations involving CORs—identified as surveillance personnel in table 5 below—in reports from 2005-2009 as being relevant to the training or management of non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities. To determine the status of their implementation by DOD, we obtained and analyzed documentation from agency officials and assigned one of the following four status assessments to each of the recommendations: 1. Fully Implemented. The entire wording of the action item has been fulfilled. 2. Partially Implemented. Only a portion of the action has been implemented. When the wording of the action item had multiple parts, if one part or a portion of a part had been implemented (but not all parts), we categorized the action item as “partially implemented.” 3. Not Implemented-Action Taken. No part of the action item has been implemented, but steps have been taken toward the completion of the action item. For example, if legislation had been introduced to address the action but had not been enacted into law, we categorized the action item as “not implemented-action taken.” 4. Not Implemented-No Action. No part of the action item has been completed, and no action has been taken to address the action item. For example, if the action item called for changes in legislation but no legislation has even been proposed, we categorized the action item as “not implemented-no action.” GAO Draft Report Dated SEPTEMBER, 2011 GAO-11-892 (GAO CODE 120930) “DEFENSE ACQUISITION WORKFORCE: BETTER IDENTIFICATION, DEVELOPMENT AND OVERSIGHT NEEDED FOR PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN ACQUIRING SERVICES” RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense establish criteria and a timeframe for identifying non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities, including requirements officials. (See page /GAO Draft Report.) DoD RESPONSE: Concur. RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense assess what critical skills non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities might require to perform their role in the acquisition process and improve acquisition outcomes (See page 17/GAO Draft Report.) DoD RESPONSE: Concur. RECOMMENDATION : The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense designate an organization that has the responsibility to track DOD's progress in identifying, developing, and overseeing non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities to help ensure they have the skills necessary to perform their acquisition function (See page 17/GAO Draft Report.) DoD RESPONSE: Concur. In addition to the contact above, Penny Berrier, Assistant Director; Patrick Breiding; Heather Miller; John K. Needham; Keo Vongvanith; Morgan Delaney Ramaker; Roxanna Sun; Julia Kennon; and John Krump made key contributions to this report.

Summary: In fiscal year 2010, more than half of the $367 billion dollars the Department of Defense (DOD) spent on contracts was spent on services. Buying services is fundamentally different than buying weapon systems, yet most acquisition regulations, policies, processes, and training remain structured for acquiring weapon systems. Over the last decade, reports from GAO, DOD, and Congress have raised issues about services acquisitions and have also highlighted the importance of acquisition training. GAO previously reported on the training provided to the acquisition workforce as defined by the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA). This report addresses personnel working on services acquisitions who were outside the DAWIA acquisition workforce--termed non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities--and the extent to which (1) DOD knows the composition of this population, (2) this population is taking acquisition training, and (3) DOD has implemented past recommendations related to this population. To complete this work, GAO reviewed a nongeneralizable sample of 29 service contracts, relevant policies, and recommendations from previous reports and met with key DOD officials. Non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities represented more than half of the 430 personnel involved in the 29 services acquisition contracts in this review. Several organizations have been tracking and managing the DAWIA workforce, but no DOD organization has systematically identified non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities, the competencies they need to conduct their acquisition duties, or been designated responsibility for overseeing this group. DOD is not required to identify these personnel and has not established a process to do so. Identifying this population is challenging, partly because, as DOD officials noted, it is a transient one that is dispersed across many DOD organizations. Additionally, these people come from a variety of career fields and are often involved in acquisitions as a secondary duty. DOD has taken action to identify part of this population and provide them training--requirements personnel for major weapon systems--but has not done this for all non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities. Most non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities in GAO's sample received some acquisition training. The required training was varied and limited and applied largely to contracting officer's representatives (CORs) and not to other non-DAWIA personnel such as requirements officials, technical assistants, or multifunctional team members. For example, the Air Force required two Air Force-specific phases of training, while the Navy and Marine Corps policy did not specify what training was required. Demand for acquisition training courses by non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities has been increasing in the past few years at the Defense Acquisition University, but DOD has limited information to gauge the current and future demand for training this population in the long term or the effectiveness of the current training that is available. DOD has taken short-term actions to require training and provide resources for some non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities. For example, DOD recognized the importance of CORs in several memoranda requiring that they be properly trained and appointed before contract performance begins on services acquisitions. DOD has made some progress in implementing the recommendations of reports from the Panel on Contracting Integrity and GAO that related to management and training of the COR--a portion of non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities. For example, for the four relevant GAO recommendations--which are related to training, assignment, and oversight of the CORs--DOD fully concurred with all of them, has fully implemented three, and is implementing a COR tracking system to address the remaining recommendation. The House Armed Services Committee and the Defense Science Board issued reports since 2009 that made recommendations that were relevant to this population but were made too recently for GAO to assess their implementation. For example, the House Armed Services Committee Panel on Defense Acquisition Reform report recommended DOD reform the services requirements process in order to address the different set of challenges services acquisitions pose compared to the procurement of goods. Among other things, GAO recommends that DOD establish criteria for identifying non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities and assess the critical skills needed to perform their role in the acquisition process. DOD concurred with the recommendations.