On the day of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, the President’s declaration of a major disaster under the Stafford Act activated the Federal Response Plan (superseded by and incorporated into the National Response Plan). The Federal Response Plan established the process and structure for the federal government to provide assistance to state and local governments when responding to major disasters and emergencies declared under the Stafford Act. Under the Federal Response Plan, FEMA coordinated this assistance through mission assignments and interagency agreements, which assigned specific tasks to federal agencies with the expertise necessary to complete them. The Congress authorized $20 billion to respond to the attacks, of which $8.8 billion was provided through FEMA, for the New York City area. Under the Federal Response Plan (and the National Response Plan today), EPA served as coordinator during large-scale disasters for 1 of 15 emergency support functions (ESF)—ESF 10, which addresses oil and hazardous material releases. ESF 10 encompasses various phases of hazardous material response, including assessment and cleanup. In the first 6 months after the WTC disaster, EPA responded to FEMA mission assignments to assist with the response efforts and, among other tasks, provided wash stations for responders and disposed of waste from the WTC site. There are an estimated 330 office buildings in Lower Manhattan below Canal Street and roughly 900 residential buildings with approximately 20,000 apartments. In 2002, after initial efforts by the city of New York to advise New York residents how to clean the World Trade Center dust in their homes, FEMA and EPA entered into an interagency agreement to address indoor spaces affected by the disaster. While EPA has responded to hazardous material releases for decades, the WTC disaster was the first large-scale emergency for which EPA provided testing and cleanup in indoor spaces. WTC dust is a fine mixture of materials that resulted from the collapse and subsequent burning of the twin towers and includes pulverized concrete, asbestos, and glass fibers. WTC dust entered homes and offices through open windows, was tracked in, or was picked up by air-conditioning system intakes. Figures 1 and 2 show the dust generated by the WTC disaster. The amount of dust in indoor spaces in and around Lower Manhattan varied due to a variety of factors, including distance from the WTC site; weather conditions, such as wind; and damage to individual buildings. In the years since the disaster, the level of WTC dust in indoor spaces has varied, depending upon the cleaning performed by residents and other groups, including EPA and professional cleaning companies. In May 2002, EPA, New York City, and FEMA officials announced a program, to be overseen by EPA, offering a cleanup of residences in Lower Manhattan. Between September 2002 and May 2003, residences were cleaned and tested, or tested only, for airborne asbestos. EPA analyzed samples from 4,167 apartments in 453 buildings and 793 common areas in 144 buildings. This program cost $37.9 million—$30.4 million for indoor cleaning and testing by the New York City Department of Environmental Protection and $7.5 million for EPA oversight and sample analysis. Figure 3 shows the area in Lower Manhattan eligible for participation in EPA’s program. Residents could choose either an aggressive or modified aggressive testing method for providing samples of indoor air to EPA. For the modified aggressive method, the contractor ran a 20-inch fan for the duration of testing. For the aggressive method, a leaf blower was used, in addition to the 20-inch fan, to direct a jet of air toward corners, walls, fabric surfaces, and the ceiling to dislodge and resuspend dust. The contractors HEPA vacuumed and wet-wiped hard surfaces, including floors, ceilings, ledges, trims, furnishings, appliances, and equipment; and they HEPA vacuumed soft surfaces, such as curtains, two times. In addition, in cases where there were still significant amounts of WTC dust and debris, contractors used asbestos abatement procedures such as the use of personal protective equipment, including respirators and a properly enclosed decontamination system; posting of warning signs; isolation barriers to seal off openings; and disposal of all waste generated during the cleaning in accordance with applicable rules and regulations for asbestos-containing waste. The New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) collected samples from in and around 30 buildings in Lower Manhattan from November though December 2001. In September 2002, these agencies released their assessment of the public’s exposure to contaminants in air and dust, recommended additional monitoring of residential spaces in Lower Manhattan, and referred residents to EPA’s program. Before EPA finalized its second indoor program plan, several assessments related to indoor contamination were conducted: an August 2003 EPA Inspector General report; an expert technical review panel that EPA conducted from March 2004 through December 2005; and three EPA studies. The studies identified background levels of contamination in New York City (“background study”); the WTC-related contaminants of potential concern, and associated cleanup benchmarks (“COPC study”); and the efficacy of various cleaning methods in eliminating WTC-related contaminants of concern (“cleaning study”). During the time EPA met with the WTC Expert Technical Review Panel, some expert panel members encouraged EPA to develop a method for differentiating between contaminants found in the New York City urban environment and those found in WTC dust. This method would have served as the basis for determining the extent of WTC-related contamination, and EPA officials believed it would have enabled the agency to limit its focus to contamination specific to the WTC disaster. Early in the panel process, EPA formed a subpanel of these experts to assist EPA’s Office of Research and Development in developing such a methodology. In August 2005, EPA released its final report describing its methodology, which was peer reviewed. In their October 2005 final report, the peer reviewers criticized the reliability of EPA’s method and provided suggestions on improving EPA’s approach. In a November 2005 letter, EPA officials told expert panel members that in the absence of a valid method, EPA could not definitively distinguish between WTC contaminants in dust and levels of the same contaminants found in an urban environment. At the same time, 2 weeks before the final panel meeting, the EPA chairman informed the panel that it would be disbanded as of the final meeting and that EPA would not be implementing a plan that included determining the extent of WTC contamination. Experts that were a part of the subpanel addressing this method reported that the peer-review comments could be addressed and that EPA should perform additional sampling. Nonetheless, EPA ultimately decided not to pursue developing this methodology. Figure 4 shows the chronology of events preceding the second program. In January 2006, EPA formally requested funds from FEMA. EPA and FEMA signed an interagency agreement to conduct EPA’s second program in July 2006, and EPA announced the agency’s second program to test indoor spaces in Lower Manhattan in December 2006. Appendix III provides information regarding EPA’s first and second indoor programs. In response to recommendations and additional input from the Inspector General and expert panel members, EPA’s second program incorporates some additional testing elements. However, EPA’s second program does not incorporate other items. Figure 5 shows the key recommendations and additional input the EPA Inspector General and expert panel members provided to EPA. While EPA tested solely for airborne asbestos in order to trigger cleanup in the first program, it agreed to test for three additional contaminants in its second program—man-made vitreous fibers, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, and lead. These contaminants, as well as two additional ones—dioxin and silica, were identified as WTC contaminants of potential concern in a May 2003 report issued by EPA and other federal, New York City, and New York state agencies. EPA did not include dioxin and silica in the second program for several reasons. Regarding dioxin, EPA noted that concentrations were elevated in the weeks following the disaster when fires were still burning, but concentrations returned to predisaster levels by December 2001. Furthermore, because “only eight” of 1,500 dioxin samples exceeded cleanup benchmarks during tests in 2002 and 2003, EPA decided not to sample for this contaminant in its second program. Regarding silica, EPA noted that in 2002 an ATSDR/New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene report stated that short- term exposure to silica is unlikely to cause adverse health effects and that adverse health effects from chronic exposure are possible but unlikely if recommended cleaning is conducted. EPA also explained that levels of silica are likely to have been reduced by cleaning activities over the past 3 years. EPA also agreed to test for contaminants in dust. To do so, EPA developed site-specific cleanup benchmarks for asbestos and man-made vitreous fibers in dust over the course of nearly a year. In its second program plan, EPA explains that these benchmarks are not risk based but rather are based on, among other things, work by experts in the field as to what constitutes contamination and how it compares with site-specific background levels, and the benchmarks employed for cleanup at a Superfund site with asbestos-contaminated residences. Though EPA expanded the number of contaminants tested for in its second program, it did not adopt recommendations and additional input from the EPA Inspector General or the expert panel that addressed the following issues: Evaluating risks in geographic areas north of Canal Street and in Brooklyn. EPA did not expand the scope of testing north of Canal Street, or to Brooklyn, as advisory groups had advised. EPA reported it did not expand the scope of testing because it could not differentiate between normal urban dust and WTC dust; differentiating between the two would have enabled EPA to determine the geographic extent of WTC contamination. Some expert panel members had suggested that EPA investigate whether it was feasible to develop a method for distinguishing between normal urban dust and WTC dust. EPA initially agreed to do so. Beginning in 2004—almost 3 years after the disaster—EPA conducted this investigation into developing a WTC dust signature. However, EPA officials told us that because so much time had passed since the terrorist attack, it was difficult to distinguish between WTC dust and urban dust. EPA ultimately abandoned this effort because peer reviewers questioned its methodology; EPA decided not to explore alternative methods that some of the peer reviewers had proposed. Instead, EPA will test only in an area where visible contamination has been confirmed by aerial photography conducted soon after the WTC attack, although aerial photography does not reveal indoor contamination. Furthermore, EPA officials told us that some WTC dust was found immediately after the terrorist attacks in areas, including Brooklyn, that are outside the area eligible for its first and second program. Testing in HVACs and inaccessible areas. In its November 2005 draft plan for the second program, EPA had proposed collecting samples from a number of locations in HVACs. In some buildings, HVACs are shared; in others, each residence has its own system. In either case, contaminants in the HVAC could recontaminate the residence unless the system is also professionally cleaned. However, EPA’s second program will not provide for testing in HVACs under any circumstances but will offer cleaning in HVACs if tests in common areas reveal that cleanup benchmarks for any of four contaminants have been exceeded. EPA officials told us that EPA will sample near HVAC outlets in common areas and will obtain dust samples in proximity to these locations. EPA explained in the second plan that it will not sample within HVACs because it is no longer assessing the extent of contamination resulting from the WTC disaster and because it is attempting to devote the maximum resources to testing requests. Similarly, EPA had proposed sampling for contaminants in “inaccessible” locations, such as behind dishwashers and rarely moved furniture within apartments and common areas. Again, because it was unable to differentiate between normal urban dust and WTC dust, EPA stated that it would not test in inaccessible locations in order to devote its resources to as many requests as possible. EPA told us that 272 residents and 25 building owners had enrolled in the second program, compared with 4,167 residents and 144 building owners that participated in the first program. Evaluating risks to workers/workplaces. According to EPA, its second program plan is “the result of ongoing efforts to respond to concerns of residents and workers.” Workers were concerned that workplaces in Lower Manhattan experienced the same contamination as residences. In its second program, EPA will test and clean common areas in commercial buildings, but only if an individual owner or manager of the property requests the service. EPA stated that employees who believe their working conditions are unsafe as a result of WTC dust may file a complaint with OSHA or request an evaluation by HHS’s National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). Concerns remain, however, because these other agencies do not have authority to conduct cleanup in response to contaminant levels that exceed cleanup benchmarks. In addition, OSHA’s benchmarks are designed primarily to address airborne contamination, while EPA’s test and clean program is designed to address contamination in building spaces, whether the contamination is airborne or in settled dust. OSHA requires individual employers to adopt work practices to reduce employee exposure to airborne contaminants, whereas EPA’s test and clean program is designed to remove contaminants from affected spaces. Addressing whole buildings. Between March 2004 and December 2005, when EPA met with expert panel members, officials discussed sampling a representative number of each buildings’ apartments in order to “characterize the building,” which would have allowed EPA to characterize areas in Lower Manhattan. This information would have been used to inform decision-making regarding the extent of indoor contamination. According to EPA officials, all residents from each building would need to volunteer their individual apartments, and EPA would select the units it then tested. The approach that EPA developed entailed cleaning a building, including all units, common areas and HVACs, if there was a high degree of certainty that the average concentration of at least one contaminant, across all apartments tested, exceeded the benchmark, and dust could be associated with the WTC. While this method addressed the Inspector General recommendation that buildings be treated as a system so that potentially contaminated apartments did not contaminate previously cleaned apartments, EPA did not ultimately include this particular methodology in its second program plan due to the lack of a method to identify WTC dust. Instead, EPA will clean whole common areas, such as lobbies, and HVACs in buildings. It will clean common areas when at least one contaminant is found to exceed the cleanup benchmark in that area. It will clean HVACs and common areas when there is a high degree of certainty that the mean contaminant level for accessible areas, infrequently accessed areas, or air samples in common areas exceeds one contaminant benchmark. The expert panel’s ability to meet its goals was limited by two factors: (1) EPA officials’ belief that some panel goals were more appropriately addressed by other agencies and (2) EPA’s approach to managing the panel process. Furthermore, the majority of expert panel members do not believe the panel successfully met any of its goals. All of the panel members who responded to our follow-up inquiry regarding EPA’s second program (10 out of 10 members) told us the program is not responsive to the concerns of residents and workers affected by the collapse of the WTC towers. Appendix IV provides the full range of responses from structured interviews with expert panel members about EPA’s management of the panel process. According to EPA officials, some panel goals were more appropriately addressed by other agencies. We believe this view limited the panel’s ability to address these issues. In particular, one panel goal, as stated by CEQ, was to advance the identification of unmet public health needs. However, EPA officials believed that other federal agencies, such as HHS, were better equipped to address the issue of public health. Therefore, rather than having the expert panel members discuss and identify actions to address this issue, EPA allowed time during panel meetings for public health presentations. EPA officials believe that the panel met CEQ’s charge by including health experts on the panel and by including health presentations during panel meetings. While the panel was provided with these presentations, the majority of expert panel members (16 out of 18) told us the panel did not successfully identify unmet public health needs. Outside of the panel, a multiagency effort established a WTC health registry to assess the health impact of the WTC collapse. The EPA panel chairman noted that panel member recommendations to maintain the WTC health registry for more than 20 years and to link the results of subsequent indoor testing to the registry had been provided to the appropriate agencies. In addition, EPA officials believed that, despite the panel’s broader goal, which was to help guide EPA in its ongoing efforts to “monitor the situation for New York residents and workers impacted by the collapse of the WTC towers,” OSHA should address the issue of workplace safety because that is OSHA’s mission. Consequently, as noted earlier, the second program does not address workers’ concerns, and employers and workers are not eligible to request testing or cleaning. EPA stated that employees who believe their working conditions are unsafe as a result of WTC dust may file a complaint with OSHA or request an evaluation by HHS’s National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). EPA’s management of the panel process limited the panel’s ability to successfully meet its goals. According to 9 or more of the 18 expert panel members we interviewed, problematic aspects of EPA’s management included (1) the lack of a consensus approach, (2) inadequate time for technical discussion, and (3) no fully transparent decision-making process. In addition, a number of expert panel members told us that failure to document recommendations created other concerns. Lack of a consensus approach. EPA did not allow the panel to reach consensus on key issues and prepare a final report; instead it obtained recommendations from each member of the expert panel. The majority of expert panel members (13 out of 18) told us that EPA’s approach was not appropriate, and one panel member noted that the lack of a consensus approach prevented the resolution of key issues. The EPA chairman told the panel that the panel would not be asked to reach consensus because this approach might limit the contribution of individual panel members. EPA officials also noted that it would have been difficult to reach consensus with such a diverse panel of experts and the technical nature of the discussion. Inadequate time for technical discussion. The majority of expert panel members (14 out of 18) told us there was not adequate time on the agenda for the panel to discuss issues. According to several panel members, EPA dedicated half or less of each daylong panel meeting to technical discussions, devoting the remainder of each day to public comment. Lack of a fully transparent decision-making process. EPA’s reasons for accepting or rejecting expert panel members’ recommendations were not at all transparent, according to half of the panel members (9 out of 18). Furthermore, six panelists said that EPA did not respond to their recommendations or provide any explanation for rejecting recommendations. In contrast, the two EPA panel chairmen we interviewed told us they believed the decision-making process was completely transparent. Failure to document recommendations. Although EPA stated in its operating principles that it would keep detailed minutes of each panel meeting, including all individual recommendations, whether oral or written, EPA did not maintain a list of recommendations. Instead, EPA provided “summaries” of each meeting that included an overview of issues raised, and, starting with the fifth meeting, EPA provided audio recordings of six of the remaining panel meetings. The majority of expert panel members (10 out of 18) said that having written transcripts of the meetings available would have been somewhat or very helpful. Some expert panel members told us the lack of transcripts presented a problem because they had no record of EPA agreement with several recommendations that were later not adopted. The majority of expert panel members told us that the panel was unable to meet its goals as outlined by EPA. As figure 6 shows, these included guiding EPA in: (1) developing the second program, (2) identifying unmet public health needs, (3) identifying any remaining risks using exposure and health surveillance information, and (4) determining steps to further minimize risks. According to all expert panel members who responded to our follow-up inquiry regarding EPA’s second program (10 out of 10 members), this program does not respond to the concerns of residents and workers affected by the collapse of the WTC towers. At the final panel meeting, some expert panel members said publicly that they would discourage participation in EPA’s program and several expert panel members said that the data yielded by the test and clean program will not be useful and the program is unlikely to adequately identify or clean up contaminants. In addition, the Community-Labor Coalition distributed information that also discouraged participation, citing lack of expert panel member support. EPA did not provide complete information in its second plan to allow the public to make informed choices about their participation in its voluntary program. While EPA stated that the number of samples in its first program exceeding risk levels for airborne asbestos was “very small,” EPA did not provide the following additional information to help inform residents’ decisions regarding participation in the second program: Voluntary program participation. Participation in the first program came from about 20 percent of the residences eligible for participation. In addition, participation was voluntary, which may suggest that the sample of apartments was not representative of all residences eligible for the program. Only asbestos tested. EPA’s conclusions were based only on tests for asbestos, rather than other contaminants, and the conclusions focused on airborne contamination rather than contamination in dust inside residences. Sampling protocols varied. EPA did not explain that over 80 percent of the samples were taken after professional cleaning was completed as a part of EPA’s program. In addition, EPA did not identify the portion of the samples that were collected following aggressive, as opposed to modified aggressive, techniques. In the first case, the air inside apartments was more actively circulated before sampling occurred. In these instances, about 6 percent of apartments tested were found to exceed EPA’s asbestos level, compared with roughly 1 percent that used the modified aggressive technique. Out of 4,167 apartments sampled, 276 were sampled using the aggressive method. Discarded sample results. EPA also did not explain in its second program plan that its first program’s test results may have been affected by sample results that were discarded because they were “not cleared”—that is, they could not be analyzed because the filter had too many dust particles to be analyzed under a microscope. However, EPA’s final report on its first program stated that residences with more than one inconclusive result, such as filter overload, were encouraged to have their residences recleaned and retested. Without complete explanations of EPA’s sampling data, residents who could have elected to participate might have decided not to do so. The number of participants declined from roughly 4,200 residents and 144 building owners in the first program to 272 residents and 25 building owners in the second program. In addition, community leaders on the panel believed that allowing participants to choose between two sampling techniques, coupled with the voluntary nature of the program, had the effect of making the overall program appear unnecessary. EPA did not take steps to ensure that it would have adequate resources to effectively implement the second program. Instead, EPA is implementing this program with the approximately $7 million in Stafford Act funds remaining after its first program. Although this program increases the number and type of contaminants being sampled, the funds available are less than 20 percent of those used in the first program. EPA is implementing its second program with the funding remaining after completion of its first program—approximately $7 million—but EPA did not determine whether this amount would support the effective implementation of its second program. According to EPA officials, they could not estimate the cost of the second program without information on the number of program participants and the size of residences, which vary widely throughout Lower Manhattan. Nevertheless, the interagency agreement between FEMA and EPA for the first program included estimated costs, although EPA faced the same challenges. This first estimate of $19.6 million was based on projections for the number of eligible residents participating in the program—specifically, 10,000 residences requesting cleaning and 3,000 residences requesting testing only—and included, among other things, detailed estimates for sample analysis, equipment and supplies, and EPA salary and travel costs. In the first program, EPA spent $7.5 million—of $19.6 million obligated by FEMA to EPA—on program oversight and analysis of air samples, while New York City spent approximately $30.4 million to collect air samples and clean residences. EPA returned $12.1 million in unspent funds to FEMA. According to FEMA officials, when the agency learned about the establishment of the expert panel, FEMA retained $7 million for additional EPA activities. EPA officials told us that in discussions with FEMA about whether the amount was appropriate, FEMA responded that only $7 million was available. In July 2006, an interagency agreement was signed by EPA and FEMA for the second program that describes EPA’s role as developing and implementing a program to test and clean in the specified area. After EPA entered into this agreement, EPA officials told us that if the number of registrants for the program exceeded the number that could be covered by the $7 million, they were unsure where additional funds could be obtained. EPA did not provide information to FEMA in the agreement about how many residents and building owners could potentially be served under the program. Thirteen of the 18 expert panel members told us they did not believe the $7 million for the sampling and cleanup was sufficient. According to one of the expert panel’s chairmen, the $7 million was sufficient for initial sampling in the second program but not for sampling and cleanup. In its final plan, EPA noted that requests for participation from eligible residents and building owners would be prioritized based on proximity to the WTC site. Although EPA’s second program increases the number and type of contaminants being sampled, the $7 million available is less than 20 percent of the $37.9 million spent on the first program. While only 1 percent of roughly 20,000 eligible residences are participating in the second program, compared with 20 percent who participated in the first program, it is not clear whether funding for the second program will be adequate without a cost estimate. EPA has acted upon lessons learned from the WTC disaster to prepare for future disasters, such as clarifying internal roles and responsibilities and improving health-related cleanup benchmarks. Nevertheless, we are uncertain about how completely these activities address EPA’s ability to respond to contamination in indoor environments in the face of future disasters. For example, EPA has not yet addressed certain methodological challenges raised by expert panel members regarding the WTC disaster, such as how it will determine the extent of contamination, which we believe are important for addressing future disasters. Without addressing this and other challenges, it is uncertain whether people in affected areas will be protected adequately from risks posed by indoor contamination stemming from future disasters. Since the WTC disaster, EPA has taken actions to improve its ability to respond to future disasters. However, EPA’s approach to emergency response does not differentiate between indoor and outdoor contamination, and therefore it is difficult to determine how EPA’s preparedness actions have improved EPA’s readiness to respond specifically to indoor contamination. EPA’s actions are consistent with several Inspector General recommendations, as the following examples of EPA’s preparedness actions illustrate: Clarified roles and responsibilities. EPA has completed response policies, established various specialized response teams, and conducted training. Though not specific to indoor contamination, EPA’s June 2003 National Approach to Response policy outlines EPA roles and responsibilities in the event of future large-scale disasters. Its October 2004 Homeland Security Strategy also notes that in the event of a national incident, EPA has the lead responsibility for decontaminating affected buildings and neighborhoods and for advising and assisting public health authorities on when it is safe to return to these areas and on what the safest disposal options for contaminants are. EPA’s National Decontamination Team provides general scientific support and technical expertise for identifying technologies and methods for decontaminating buildings and other infrastructure. EPA also expanded the capabilities of its existing Environmental Response Team (ERT), which is responsible for technological support and training through the establishment of an additional ERT office in Las Vegas, Nevada. Along with the Radiological Emergency Response Team and the National Decontamination Team, these teams provide support during emergencies. In addition, EPA officials noted that they have developed and delivered a training course on the Incident Command System, to be used under the National Response Plan, to 2,000 staff as well as senior managers in all regions to provide additional guidance on roles and responsibilities. Finally, in its newly developed Crisis Communication Plan, EPA outlines the responsibilities of agency staff in providing the public with information during disasters. EPA officials told us they have added 50 on-scene coordinators to their emergency response staff to improve preparedness and response capabilities. Shared information on likely targets and threats and developed approaches to address them. EPA’s Office of Research and Development (ORD) has several efforts to develop approaches to address future threats, including research on building decontamination, and EPA’s Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response has begun to establish a network of environmental laboratories. In 2003, EPA created the National Homeland Security Research Center (NHSRC), part of ORD, to develop expertise and products to prevent, prepare for, and recover from public health and environmental emergencies arising from terrorist threats and incidents. Its research focuses on five areas: threat assessment, decontamination, water infrastructure protection, response capability, and technology evaluation. In November 2004, NHSRC reported on several threat scenarios for buildings and water systems; these threat scenarios guide NHSRC’s research, which is focused heavily on chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) agents. EPA also participates on a number of interagency workgroups, including policy coordination committees formed by the White House Homeland Security Council; DHS work groups addressing sampling and other issues; and FEMA work groups that address various aspects of the National Response Plan. Although an interagency team, including EPA, has developed tabletop exercises to respond to nationally significant incidents, these exercises have not yet included residential contamination. EPA has also developed standardized analytical methods that environmental laboratories can use to analyze biological and chemical samples during disasters caused by terrorist attacks, and the agency has begun to establish a network of environmental laboratories capable of analyzing CBR agents, which would benefit from these methods. Improved health-related benchmarks for assessing health risks in emergencies. According to EPA officials, EPA’s Office of Prevention, Pesticides and Toxic Substances is leading the agency’s participation in developing acute exposure guideline levels (AEGL), an international effort aimed at describing the risk resulting from rare exposure to airborne chemicals. The AEGLs focus on exposures of 10 minutes, 30 minutes, 1 hour, 4 hours, and 8 hours. To date, AEGLs have not been developed under emergency situations; however, EPA officials told us the availability of methodologies such as those used to derive AEGLs make it possible to develop emergency benchmarks quickly, if necessary. EPA is also developing subchronic exposure guidance—provisional advisory levels (PAL)—to bridge the gap between acute exposure durations addressed by AEGLs and the chronic lifetime exposure guidance. EPA officials told us that NHSRC is developing this guidance for contaminants in air and water, and it will focus on exposure periods of 1 day, 30 days, and 2 years. EPA officials noted that, to date, it has developed PALs for over 20 chemical agents. In addition, EPA officials told us that the agency has completed a method to assess risk from exposure to contaminated building surfaces and that it is also completing guidance on how to address future incidents involving asbestos. Additional monitoring capabilities. The Deputy Director of EPA’s Office of Emergency Management told us the agency has five total suspended particulate (TSP) monitors in each region; however, these are not real- time monitors. For real-time data monitoring, each region has portable air monitors—Data-Rams—to provide approximate measures of ambient particulate matter concentrations. EPA officials told us they also have mobile monitoring labs, as well as specialized vans and aircraft, that can be deployed during disasters to conduct monitoring. EPA officials said they are evaluating other monitors—electronic beta attenuation monitors (EBAM)—that have the capability to work with higher dust loads. The Deputy Director of EPA’s Office of Emergency Management also told us that fixed near real-time radiation monitors, part of the environmental radiation ambient monitoring system (ERAMS), are currently being deployed at a rate of five per month at cities across the United States. While EPA has taken actions since the WTC disaster to prepare for future incidents, it has not demonstrated how it will overcome several methodological challenges that expert panel members identified. These challenges include determining the extent of contamination; developing appropriate cleanup benchmarks; and testing for contaminants that cause acute or short-term health effects. In addition, some expert panel members questioned EPA’s reliance on visual evidence, rather than sample data, as the primary basis for its actions, as well as its use of the modified aggressive sampling technique. Assessing extent of contamination. Some expert panel members recommended that EPA reconsider its decision to abandon its efforts to develop a method for differentiating between normal, urban dust, and WTC dust, which would have allowed EPA to determine the extent of WTC contamination. Several panel members encouraged EPA to continue to refine the method and collect applicable sample data, saying that collecting data now could provide critical information for future responses. EPA was unable to develop a WTC dust signature that would have allowed it to determine the extent of WTC contamination, in part, because of the limited number of dust samples taken immediately after the disaster, and the length of time that elapsed between the event and development of the signature. EPA officials told us they would need to identify contamination signatures in responding to future disasters. Developing cleanup benchmarks. Some expert panel members also expressed concerns regarding the cleanup benchmarks that EPA developed in response to the WTC disaster. Some expert panel members agreed with the concept of dividing sampled spaces into categories, such as accessible and inaccessible areas, with associated cleanup benchmarks; however, these panel members disagreed with how EPA defined the categories. For example, an expert panel member noted that children access areas under beds, which were not considered “accessible” by EPA’s definitions, and workers such as telecommunications technicians and housing inspectors access areas defined by EPA as “inaccessible” on a daily basis. In addition, expert panel members disagreed with some cleanup benchmarks that EPA developed for the various categories. For example, two panel members asserted that EPA’s proposed cleanup benchmark for man-made vitreous fibers was not stringent enough. While EPA then changed the benchmark for man-made vitreous fibers in inaccessible areas from 100,000 fibers/cm to 50,000 fibers/cm Using the modified aggressive sampling technique. Some expert panel members questioned EPA’s use of the modified aggressive sampling technique. The number of samples exceeding cleanup benchmarks was greater when the aggressive sampling technique was used. EPA’s rationale for departing from the technique specified by the Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act (AHERA) is that the aggressive technique does not appropriately represent conditions of human exposure in a residence. EPA has not identified in its protocols how these methodological concerns can be overcome, such as how and when data collection will occur, in order to facilitate determining the extent of contamination. Without clarifying actions that are appropriate for EPA and other federal agencies in these scenarios, important determinations about risk from disaster- related contamination may not be promptly addressed. Shortcomings in EPA’s second program to test and clean residences for WTC contamination raise questions about the agency’s preparedness for addressing indoor contamination resulting from future disasters. With respect to communication, the public relies on EPA to provide accurate and complete information about environmental hazards that may affect them. However, in announcing its plan for the second program, EPA did not fully disclose the limitations of its earlier test results. Consequently, some eligible residents of Lower Manhattan may have concluded that they were not at risk from contaminated dust and therefore elected not to participate in the second program. EPA did not develop a cost estimate to support its use of available Stafford Act funds for its second program. Without this information, EPA and other decision makers could not know how many residents and building owners could potentially be served by the program. Given limited federal disaster response funds and competing priorities, the federal government must carefully consider how best to allocate these monies to be sure that these funds are used most cost effectively. In the future, unless officials justify the Stafford Act funds necessary for achieving program objectives prior to implementation, EPA will not have a sound basis for securing needed funds and, as a result, may be forced to scale back its programs in ways that limit their effectiveness. Moreover, EPA has reported that it faced several challenges in addressing WTC indoor contamination, including limited indoor sampling protocols, health benchmarks, and background data for urban areas. In addition, since the National Response Plan does not explicitly address indoor contamination, it is unclear how EPA, in concert with other agencies— including the Departments of Homeland Security, Health and Human Services, and Labor—will address these challenges. Unless these agencies establish an approach for responding to indoor contamination, the nation may face the same challenges after future disasters. To enhance EPA’s ability to provide environmental health risk information to the public that is complete and readily understandable, we recommend that the Administrator of EPA facilitate the implementation of the recently issued Crisis Communication Plan by issuing guidance that, among other things, ensures the presentation of environmental data in an appropriate context, with appropriate technical caveats noted in plain language. To provide decision makers with a sound basis for the Stafford Act funds needed for future disaster response programs, we recommend that the Administrator of EPA establish guidelines for developing program cost estimates. These cost estimates should support the programs’ objectives and promote the efficient and effective use of government resources. To ensure that EPA is better prepared for future disasters that involve indoor contamination and that it captures important information that could guide future cleanup decisions, we recommend that the Administrator of EPA, in concert with the Departments of Homeland Security, Health and Human Services, and Labor, and other appropriate federal agencies, develop protocols or memorandums of understanding under the National Response Plan that specifically address indoor contamination. These protocols should define when the extent of contamination is to be determined, as well as how and when indoor cleanups are to be conducted. EPA should seek additional statutory authority if it determines that such additional authority is necessary. In commenting on a draft of this report, EPA’s Assistant Administrator for Research and Development and Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste and Emergency Response identified actions that EPA has begun taking that are responsive to these recommendations. EPA also provided comments on aspects of the report it considered misleading or inaccurate, such as our characterization of the Expert Technical Review Panel process, including the panel’s goals. Though EPA preferred that we present the charges identified by CEQ, we reported the goals that EPA provided directly to the expert panel at its first meeting, and we believe this accurately characterizes the priorities that EPA established for the panel. In addition, EPA asserted that the report creates a misleading impression that EPA did not fully disclose the limitations of test results from its first program. EPA refers to an appendix in its second plan, which includes a discussion of EPA’s methodology; raw data, such as the total number of samples taken; and the results of sampling efforts, but does not include a discussion of the factors that may have influenced these results. We continue to believe that EPA did not include appropriate caveats that clearly articulated the limitations in the results in its discussion, such as that 20 percent of eligible residents participated and, therefore, the results may not have been representative of all residences. We believe that the report offers a balanced portrayal of EPA’s development of its second program, the expert panel process, and EPA’s actions to better prepare for future disasters. EPA also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. EPA’s letter and our detailed response to it appear in appendix V. We are sending copies of this report to the Administrator, EPA; appropriate congressional committees; and other interested parties. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you have any questions about this report or need additional information, please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or stephensonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and of Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix VI. Since the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was given the authority to classify information in May 2002, it has classified information in three documents. However, none of these documents address the World Trade Center (WTC) or the environmental impact of its destruction. In May 2002, through Executive Order 12958, the President gave the EPA Administrator the authority to classify information as “Secret.” Section 1.4 of the executive order, as amended, prescribes a uniform system for classifying, safeguarding, and declassifying national security information, including information relating to defense against transnational terrorism. It also identifies the types of information that should be considered for classification: military plans, weapon systems, and operations; foreign government information; intelligence activities, sources, and methods, and cryptology; scientific, technological, and economic matters relating to the national security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism; U.S. programs for safeguarding nuclear materials and facilities; vulnerabilities and capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, and protection services relating to the national security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism; and weapons of mass destruction. The executive order also describes several different classification types and levels. Original classification refers to the classification of information that has not already been classified by another authority. Derivative classification refers to the classification of a document that uses information that has already been classified. The levels of classification— “Top Secret,” “Secret,” or “Confidential”—refer to the severity of national security damage that disclosure of the information would result in. Since it received its classification authority in May 2002, EPA has originally classified information in three documents, according to EPA’s review of classified information, and identified 51 documents with derivative classification. This assessment concurs with our review of National Archives program data, as table 2 shows. In information that EPA submitted to the National Archives, it explained that, although EPA did not originally classify information in any documents in fiscal year 2006, the three documents containing originally classified information significantly increased the number of derivative classification decisions made by EPA because subsequent documents included the originally classified information. EPA has not classified any WTC information, including environmental information, according to our review of the three documents that EPA has classified. According to nonclassified portions of these three documents, they discuss threat scenarios for buildings, water systems and drinking water infrastructure, and water decontamination. We were asked to determine (1) the extent to which the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) incorporated recommendations and additional input from the expert panel and its Inspector General in its second program; (2) what factors, if any, limited the expert panel’s ability to meet its goals; (3) the completeness of information EPA provided to the public in its second plan; (4) the way EPA estimated the resources needed to conduct the second program; and (5) the extent to which EPA has acted upon lessons learned to better prepare for indoor contamination that could result from future large-scale disasters. In addition, owing to concerns raised in the media about EPA’s use of classification authority, we were asked to determine the extent to which EPA has classified information, and, if so, whether any classified information discusses the environmental impact of the towers’ collapse. To examine EPA’s actions to incorporate recommendations and additional input from the expert panel and its Inspector General, we reviewed four Inspector General recommendations on EPA’s test and clean program; all 13 WTC Expert Technical Review Panel meeting summaries, which included input from the WTC Community-Labor Coalition representatives to the panel and other panel members; and EPA’s 2002-2003 indoor test and clean program plan and all drafts leading to the 2006 program plan. We analyzed the December 2006 Final Test and Clean Plan to determine whether EPA had incorporated individual panel member and Inspector General input. We relied upon EPA’s summaries of the panel meetings to obtain information on individual panel member input because EPA did not have a comprehensive list of panel recommendations. We also conducted interviews with EPA officials from headquarters (Washington, D.C.) and Region 2 (New York City) to identify actions EPA took to incorporate the expert panel and Inspector General input into the test and clean program plan. Finally, we conducted structured interviews with all 18 expert panel members, as well as the two chairs of the WTC Expert Technical Review Panel. The expert panel members included community representatives, local and federal government officials from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Department of Labor’s Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the New York City’s Department of Environmental Protection and Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, and nongovernment members. To determine the factors that affected the expert panel’s ability to meet its goals, we conducted structured interviews with all 18 WTC expert panel members, as well as the two former EPA Assistant Administrators for the Office of Research and Development who chaired the panel. We analyzed expert panel member and panel chair responses to both qualitative and quantitative questions in order to describe the panel process and obtain information on EPA’s management of the process. In follow-up correspondence, we asked panel members whether EPA’s second program was responsive to the concerns of residents and workers; we were only able to obtain 10 panel member responses. We also reviewed all 13 panel meeting summaries and reviewed selected video or audio recordings of meetings. To evaluate the completeness of information EPA provided to the public in its second plan, we reviewed EPA’s 2002-2003 program plan and all drafts leading to the December 2006 program plan, information on testing data included on EPA’s Web site, the 2003 EPA Inspector General report, and all 13 summaries of EPA’s Expert Technical Review Panel meetings. To examine EPA efforts to estimate the resources needed to conduct the second program, we obtained and analyzed funding documentation, including interagency agreements between FEMA and EPA, as well as documentation related to funding and expenditure data for the WTC indoor test and clean program. We found discrepancies in the data EPA and FEMA provided. We assessed the reliability of expenditure data received from EPA but were unable to assess the reliability of expenditure data provided by FEMA. We assessed the reliability of the EPA expenditure data by interviewing officials knowledgeable about the data and reviewing existing information about the data and the system that produced them. We determined that EPA’s funding data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our review. We also interviewed agency officials to gather information on EPA’s expenditures, its plans to spend funding, and whether EPA plans to seek additional funds. To examine the extent to which EPA has acted upon lessons learned for addressing indoor contamination resulting from future large-scale disasters, we interviewed officials from EPA headquarters, including the Office of Research and Development and the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response; from Region 2, which is responsible for New York City; and from EPA’s National Homeland Security Research Center, among others. We compared EPA’s activities with the Inspector General’s recommendations on preparedness and with recommendations in EPA’s Lessons Learned in the Aftermath of September 11, 2001. We also attended a National Institute of Standards and Technology technical seminar on WTC materials and observed the disaster area with a FEMA official. To determine the extent to which EPA has classified information, and, if so, whether any classified information discusses the environmental impact of the towers’ collapse, we requested a statement from EPA on (1) whether any EPA officials, including former EPA Administrators, authorized by Executive Order 12958 to classify information as secret have done so since the executive order was promulgated; and (2) whether any of the classified information pertains to the environmental impact of the WTC collapse, including the indoor test and clean program, contaminants of potential concern, or geographic boundaries, that are relevant to EPA’s approach to addressing indoor contamination. After EPA responded, we requested access to and we reviewed all classified information to determine whether it was related to the WTC disaster. In addition, we obtained and reviewed data from the National Archives to determine the number of documents EPA has classified since receiving authority to do so. Appendix I provides the results of our analysis of EPA’s classification of information under this authority. We performed our work between June 2006 and September 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Lower Manhattan indoor dust test and clean program (December 2006) In general, a cleanup will be offered if a benchmark for any contaminant is exceeded in any unit or building common area tested. EPA will conduct surveys to determine if contamination levels exceeding benchmarks may be attributed to sources within or adjacent to the place of business or residence. This information will be considered with information on building cleaning history to determine whether additional sampling or further cleaning will be offered. Streets based on the EPIC visual residents: owners or renters residents: owners or renters residential buildings: common areas, as well as buildings: residential or commercial building employees and employers not eligible Air samples were also analyzed for total fibers, including MMVF; however, this did not affect cleanup decisions. In a subset of residences, pre- and post-cleanup dust wipe samples were collected and analyzed for dioxin, mercury, lead, and 21 other metals. This included over 1,500 samples from 263 residences and 157 buildings. The body of this report generally identifies expert responses to our questions about EPA’s management of the panel process. The following tables include the full range of experts (out of 18) who responded to these questions. The tables also indicate the number of experts who provided no response. Question: Was EPA’s decision to obtain individual recommendations rather than have the panel arrive at consensus appropriate? Question: Did expert panel members have adequate agenda time for panel discussion of issues? Question: How transparent was EPA’s decision-making process behind changes in the test and clean plan versions? Question: How helpful would it have been to have written transcripts of the meetings available? Question: How successful do you think the panel was in meeting each of the following panel goals? Follow-up question: Is the Lower Manhattan Indoor Dust Test and Clean Program Plan responsive to the concerns of residents and workers impacted by the collapse of the World Trade Center towers? The following are GAO’s comments on the Environmental Protection Agency’s letter dated August 21, 2007. 1. We believe that the report offers a balanced portrayal of EPA’s development of its second program, the WTC Expert Technical Review Panel process, and EPA’s actions to better prepare for future disasters. In several cases we have clarified the language in the draft report to address EPA concerns. 2. In regard to EPA’s comments about the transparency of the WTC Expert Technical Review Panel process, we reported on the factors that limited the panel’s ability to meet its goals and not on the overall transparency of the process. We stated that two factors limited the panel’s ability to meet its goals: (1) EPA officials’ assertion that other agencies were better equipped to address public health and (2) EPA’s approach for managing the panel process. Regarding EPA’s management of the panel process, however, expert panel members told us that EPA did not have a transparent process for adopting or rejecting their recommendations, as we stated in the draft report. 3. Regarding panel members’ views on the responsiveness of EPA’s second program to concerns of residents and workers, we clarified our report to note that the source of the views included all of the expert panel members who responded to a follow-up inquiry regarding this question. 4. We disagree that the draft report provided panel member views in a misleading manner. However, we clarified the report language to indicate that 9 of 18 panel members reported that the decision-making process behind EPA’s changes to its plan were not at all transparent. In doing so, we reported the category with the largest number of responses and, as indicated in the draft report, the full range of responses can be found in appendix IV. As stated in the draft report, in order to determine the factors that affected the expert panel’s ability to meet its goals, we conducted structured interviews with all 18 expert panel members. We analyzed these responses in order to describe the panel process, including EPA’s management of the panel process. We reported the views that panel members provided to us during structured interviews and included the full range of responses to these questions in an appendix, as stated above. Regarding comments supporting inadequate time for decision making, panel members requested at the final panel meeting that EPA allow time for additional discussion. According to the December 2005 meeting summary, the panel co-chair “summarized that the overall sense of the panel members is that there is a need for additional discussion.” 5. We acknowledge that EPA would have preferred for us to include more detailed information in our discussion of the agency’s second WTC program, the WTC Expert Technical Review Panel process, and its programs for responding to disasters. However, the purpose of our report was not to reiterate the technical details of EPA’s efforts but to summarize specific findings related to our key objectives. 6. EPA asserts that it conducted extensive monitoring and modeling after September 11, 2001, in order to determine the extent of contamination. We acknowledge that appendix I in EPA’s December 2006 plan states, “the plumes resulting from the collapse of the towers and subsequent fires were modeled by EPA” and that “EPA and many other agencies collected and analyzed environmental samples after the September 11, 2001, attack on the WTC,” and we incorporated these facts in the report. However, when we asked EPA to identify which samples were taken indoors, EPA officials told us they did not have this information. Furthermore, in the body of EPA’s December 2006 program plan, EPA acknowledges that it is no longer attempting to assess the extent of WTC contamination. We maintain that the challenge of identifying the extent of WTC contamination in indoor spaces remains. 7. We agree that neither EPA nor panel members suggested testing in inaccessible areas as a means of determining the adequacy of its cleanups. However, our statement was intended to convey our belief that if EPA had information about these areas, a more complete picture of both the extent of contamination and the adequacy of overall efforts directed toward cleaning and testing could be assessed. 8. EPA takes issue with our assertion that EPA did not estimate the resources needed to carry out its second program. We believe that EPA did not conduct a cost estimate that identified the resources needed to effectively implement the second program. As EPA stated in comments, it provided information for potential contract costs for the second program; however, we continue to believe that the information was limited as it related to only one program component—sampling— and it was unclear how the sampling costs related to an overall cost estimate. In EPA’s comments, it states that cost data provided in its interagency agreement constituted a cost estimate; however, information on key assumptions such as estimated participation rates as well as key program elements, including the cost of sampling, were not included. Further, the information provided in the interagency agreement was not the basis for determining whether $7 million in funding would be adequate for implementing the second program—as this amount had already been established as the remaining funds FEMA set aside for EPA’s use. In contrast, for its first program, EPA provided information in the interagency agreement with FEMA that included details associated with individual cost elements, such as sample analysis, equipment and supplies, and salary and travel costs. For example, EPA provided detailed estimates for analytical services based on key assumptions related to participation, samples per unit, and the testing for specific contaminants. EPA did not provide this information in the second interagency agreement to support its identification of resources needed for analytical activities. We note that the interagency agreement for EPA’s first program identified over $9 million for sampling and analysis of asbestos. While the second program is addressing three additional contaminants, the interagency agreement has limited detail on the associated sampling and analysis costs or how these relate to the total funding of $7 million. 9. EPA asserts that table 1 in the draft report (figure 5 in the final report) does not accurately characterize the IG recommendations and the relationship between them and the CEQ charges. As the draft report stated, table 1 in the draft report (figure 5 in the final report) showed key recommendations and additional input that the IG and panel members provided to EPA. We believe that the figure accurately presents both recommendations such as those found in Chapter 6 of the IG report, as well as input the IG provided in other sections of the report that supports these specific recommendations. The figure also presents input provided by panel members, which we believe is not documented comprehensively in other locations. 10. In EPA’s comments, it notes that panel members were free to refocus issues, and our draft report acknowledged that EPA adopted panel members’ input to address contamination, rather than recontamination, of spaces. On page 8 of its comments, EPA took issue with our description of the panel’s goals. EPA provided the charges identified by CEQ in its October 27, 2003, letter to the agency. In our report, rather than present these charges, we instead reported goals that EPA directly provided to the expert panel at its first meeting on March 31, 2004. We believe this is an accurate characterization of the priorities EPA established for the panel. 11. In its comments, EPA states that the agency decided to implement a voluntary program to test and clean residences and whole buildings. In fact, when requested by building owners, the December 2006 program plan offers testing and cleaning in residential and commercial buildings’ common areas, but does not use the term “whole buildings.” 12. EPA takes issue with our assessment that EPA failed to disclose the limitations in testing results. EPA refers to appendix I of its second plan and notes that it contains an “extensive discussion” of the results of the first program. The appendix includes a discussion of EPA’s methodology, raw data such as the total number of samples taken, and the results of sampling efforts but does not include a discussion of the limitations that may have influenced these results. EPA also notes that discussion of its first program’s test results were available in panel meeting summaries and on EPA’s WTC Web site; however, these sources summarized presentations made to the panel and responses to panel member comments but lacked the same discussion of limitations as EPA’s second program plan. We continue to believe that EPA did not include appropriate caveats that clearly articulated the limitations in the results in its discussion, such as that 20 percent of eligible residents participated and, therefore, the results may not have been representative of all spaces. Finally, GAO did not conclude that EPA withheld data, as EPA suggested in its comments. 13. In EPA’s comments, EPA disagrees with our assessment that EPA has not demonstrated how it will overcome certain challenges identified by expert panel members. We acknowledge EPA’s analytical capabilities and the acute exposure guideline levels and other benchmarks that are available to EPA. We continue to believe that expert panel members raised valid issues regarding EPA’s second program following the WTC disaster, including what cleanup benchmarks EPA used, what contaminants EPA tested for, and EPA’s reliance on visual evidence. We believe these issues point to the need for protocols or interagency agreements that clarify how EPA, along with other agencies, is to address indoor contamination in the future. Further, after reviewing the summary that EPA provided on pages 24 and 25 of its comments of the HVAC system evaluation process it employed, we continue to believe that this process is primarily a visual assessment and that we accurately portrayed panel member concerns with EPA’s reliance on visual evidence rather than sample data for HVAC evaluations. 14. We encourage EPA to complete and implement its Crisis Communication Plan’s companion resource guide, described in its comments, in a timely fashion. The public relies on EPA to provide accurate and complete information about environmental hazards that may affect them. Assuring that environmental data are presented in language that is easily understood and in easily accessible formats will improve the public’s ability to make informed decisions. 15. We note that EPA’s comments indicated that since the WTC disaster, EPA has developed more detailed cost estimates to help plan the agency’s Stafford Act activities and that the agency is working to establish more specific reporting requirements. In order to more fully inform planning and to allow for the efficient allocation of disaster funds, we encourage the agency to continue these efforts. 16. We recognized in our recommendation the role that DHS and other federal agencies would play in developing protocols and memorandums of understanding under the National Response Plan that specifically address indoor contamination. We acknowledge that EPA plays a critical role under Emergency Support Function 10 for addressing oil and hazardous waste releases. It is encouraging that EPA is pursuing a number of efforts related to chemical, biological, and radiological incidents, including the development of protocols that specifically address indoor contamination involving these types of agents. In addition to these areas, we believe that protocols specific to indoor contamination, which define when the extent of contamination is to be determined, as well as how and when indoor cleanups are to be conducted, should be priorities. 17. We edited the sentence as suggested, but we note that the May 3, 2002, letter from Christopher Ward, New York City Department of Environmental Protection, to Brad Gair, FEMA, refers specifically to asbestos. It states, “The City of New York believes that it is in the public’s interest to remove this material from buildings in the vicinity of the WTC site. Samples collected during the inspections indicate that asbestos may be present in some of the debris. The removal of this material will assure that it will not become re-entrained in the air in the future, thereby protecting against any adverse affects on air quality or public health and safety.” 18. We edited the sentence on residential sampling as suggested. 19. EPA is concerned that we provided additional detail beyond the specific statement of IG recommendation 6-3. We believe our statement accurately characterizes the recommendation by taking into consideration other information in the IG report. Specifically, preceding this recommendation, the IG provides details that support this recommendation. The IG states on page 51 of its August 2003 report that “in the case of centralized HVAC systems, selective cleaning does not ensure that cleaned apartments will not be recontaminated by uncleaned apartments through the HVAC system. Consequently, the cleaning of contaminated buildings should proceed by treating the building as a system.” 20. We included this information in our final report. 21. EPA asserts that our discussions of EPA’s efforts to develop a WTC dust screening method are incorrect. We recognize that additional development would have been necessary to improve the precision and accuracy of the method and, in doing so, render the method usable as a WTC dust screening tool. Our draft report described the subpanel’s work to help EPA develop such a methodology and provided information about the peer review of the methodology. As indicated on page 18 of its comments, EPA suggested that its method was never intended to distinguish “WTC contaminants in dust.” Our draft report asserted that EPA was unable to develop a method for differentiating between normal background dust and WTC dust and therefore EPA was unable to determine the extent of WTC contamination. We believe the phrase “WTC contaminants in dust” is synonymous with dust contaminated with “WTC residue.” 22. We included this information in our final report. 23. EPA disagrees with our statement that EPA did not begin examining methods for differentiating between normal urban dust and WTC dust until May 2004. While multiagency workgroup and task force activities were related, EPA initiated its specific effort to develop a method for identifying a WTC dust signature after individual expert panel members recommended that it do so at its May 12, 2004, meeting. This decision is documented in a September 8, 2006, letter from the EPA Region 2 Administrator to a Member of Congress that states, “As a result of these discussions, EPA decided to explore whether a WTC signature exists in dust.” We continue to believe that our statement is accurate. 24. We disagree that our statement regarding workplaces is misleading. Despite OSHA and NIOSH presentations made at panel meetings, we continue to have concerns because these agencies do not have authority to conduct cleanup in response to contaminant levels that exceed EPA’s site-specific cleanup benchmarks. Furthermore, our draft report stated that OSHA’s standards are designed primarily to address airborne contamination, while EPA’s test and clean program is designed to address contamination in building spaces, whether it is airborne or in settled dust. 25. We disagree with EPA’s assertion that this statement creates the impression that other agencies were not addressing health-related issues. Our comments were limited to the panel’s ability to meet its goals, one of which was to identify unmet public health needs. While EPA’s facilitation of public health presentations may have provided information about health issues, all but two expert panel members told us that the panel did not successfully identify unmet public health needs. We did not address the quality of the WTC Health Registry or other agencies’ public health activities. 26. The source of the office and residential building data is the May 12, 2004, panel meeting summary posted on EPA’s Web site. The summary identifies a New York City Department of Buildings database from which EPA drew this information. 27. The draft report provided basic facts and background information about EPA’s first program that were derived from EPA’s December 2006 program plan and other EPA reports in order to provide context for the development of the second program. 28. EPA takes issue with our draft regarding our characterization of the availability of sample results from the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene and the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry’s study. In fact, our draft report provided a footnote pointing out the results of the study were made available to EPA in February 2002. 29. EPA said the dates we provided in a timeline of events did not accurately portray when the results of agency studies were available for its use. We provided publication dates for three EPA studies in our timeline to illustrate the range of activities that EPA engaged in prior to its second program. EPA also asserted that there was no single date for reoccupation of residences. In fact, our timeline specifically includes the date, 9/17/2001, that New York City residents began to reoccupy homes and Wall Street was reopened. 30. As suggested, we replaced the term “cleanup standards” with “cleanup benchmarks” and we expanded our discussion of how these benchmarks were developed. 31. EPA asserts that our statement is incorrect because it omits discussion of cleaning in common areas. We acknowledge that EPA will clean in common areas under certain circumstances; however, the context of this discussion was the panel members’ recommendations that EPA clean in HVACs. 32. We believe that the draft report correctly presents the IG recommendation, what EPA considered, and the agency’s rationale for not electing to pursue a sampling approach that would have addressed whole buildings; however, we clarified the report’s language to include more detail regarding EPA’s proposed approach. The July 26, 2004, panel meeting summary supports our description of how EPA considered various approaches. While EPA said that its intent was not to characterize buildings but rather to use the information from buildings “to characterize areas,” the meeting summary includes a presentation by an EPA official on a sampling approach that involved “…conducting air and dust sampling in several units within the building to characterize the building.” Further, we disagree with EPA’s explanation of why its proposal to do so was rejected by panel members and the public. Panel members rejected the aspect of the plan that would have limited the sampling to the same residences that participated in EPA’s first program, as panel members wanted the plan to allow for sampling in residences that had not participated previously. Thus, EPA’s assertion in its comments that the panel members rejected EPA’s approach because it was addressing whole buildings is not accurate. 33. We clarified this statement in the report, noting that EPA did not maintain a list of recommendations; however, we continue to believe that the meeting summaries maintained by EPA did not constitute comprehensive documentation of recommendations made by expert panel members. 34. We disagree that our discussion of overloaded samples is incorrect; however, we clarified report language to indicate that sample results, rather than samples, were discarded and that dust particles, rather than fibers, obscured analysis. In EPA’s final report from its first program, the agency states, “there were a number of outcomes that resulted in inconclusive results. Filter overload was the most common. Filter overload occurs when too many dust particles are captured on the filter. The filter becomes obscured so technicians examining it under a microscope cannot separate out individual fibers. This causes an inconclusive result, which is discarded.” In its second program plan, EPA does not present this information in its description of its first program’s test results. We continue to believe that this information would have provided additional context to the public. 35. EPA disagrees with our assessment that EPA guidance has not yet addressed how the agency will determine the extent of contamination resulting from disasters. We acknowledge that EPA has built its capacity to address contamination since the WTC disaster and that it continues to work to develop additional sampling methods. In fact, the draft report provided examples of research EPA is conducting, benchmarks EPA is developing, and other preparedness activities that EPA has undertaken. However, we do not believe that existing guidance or protocols have provided additional assurances that EPA has addressed the challenges it faced from 2004 to 2005 when working to develop a reliable screening method for WTC dust. 36. As suggested, we edited the sentence regarding the Environmental Response Team. 37. As suggested, we edited the sentence regarding environmental laboratory networks. 38. As suggested, we edited the sentence regarding acute exposure guideline levels. 39. EPA noted matters for correction in an appendix that provides background information on EPA’s first and second programs. We edited the statement regarding EPA’s role in the first program, as suggested. However, we note that in its final report on its first program EPA states, “contractors cleaned and tested homes, under the direction of the EPA.” In addition, our draft report included a table note referring to the subset of 263 residences that EPA tested for additional contaminants, and we have added detail regarding total fibers. For common areas, the draft report included the number of samples taken from common areas, and it also notes that 144 buildings had common areas cleaned. We clarified the appendix III language regarding geographic extent to note that the appendix provides program boundaries. In addition to the contact named above, Diane B. Raynes, Assistant Director; Janice Ceperich; Michele Fejfar; Brandon H. Haller; Katheryn Summers Hubbell; Karen Keegan; Omari Norman; Carol Herrnstadt Shulman; and Sandra Tasic made major contributions to this report. Additional assistance was provided by Katherine M. Raheb.

Summary: The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and World Trade Center (WTC) collapse blanketed Lower Manhattan in dust from building debris. In response, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) conducted an indoor clean and test program from 2002 to 2003. In 2003, EPA's Inspector General (IG) recommended improvements to the program and identified lessons learned for EPA's preparedness for future disasters. In 2004, EPA formed an expert panel to, among other goals, guide EPA in developing a second voluntary program; EPA announced this program in 2006. As requested, GAO's report primarily addresses EPA's second program, including the (1) extent to which EPA incorporated IG and expert panel member recommendations and input; (2) factors, if any, limiting the expert panel's ability to meet its goals; (3) completeness of information EPA provided to the public; (4) way EPA estimated resources for the program; and (5) extent to which EPA has acted upon lessons learned regarding indoor contamination from disasters. EPA has incorporated some recommendations and input from the IG and expert panel members into its second program, but its decision not to include other items may limit the overall effectiveness of this program. For example, while EPA agreed to test for more contaminants, it did not agree to evaluate risks in areas north of Canal Street and in Brooklyn. EPA reported that it does not have a basis for expanding the boundaries of its program because it cannot distinguish between normal urban, or background, dust and WTC dust. The expert panel's ability to meet its goals was limited by two factors: (1) EPA officials' belief that some panel goals were more appropriately addressed by other agencies, and (2) EPA's approach to managing the panel process. Furthermore, the majority of expert panel members believe the panel did not meet any of its goals, and that EPA's second program does not respond to the concerns of residents and workers affected by the disaster. EPA's second plan does not fully inform the public about the results of its first program. EPA concluded that a "very small" number of samples from its first program exceeded risk levels for airborne asbestos. However, EPA did not provide information such as how representative the samples were of the affected area. Residents who could have participated in this voluntary second program might have opted not to do so because of EPA's conclusion about its first program. EPA did not develop a comprehensive cost estimate to determine the resources needed to carry out its second program. EPA is implementing this program with $7 million remaining from its first program. While EPA has acted upon lessons learned following this disaster, some concerns remain about its preparedness to respond to indoor contamination following future disasters. Specifically, EPA has not developed protocols on how and when to collect data to determine the extent of indoor contamination, one of the concerns raised by panel members.