As shown in figure 1, the CT Office has evolved over the last two decades. In December 2010, the QDDR recommended the creation of the CT Bureau to supersede the CT Office.numerous other offices, was attached to State’s Office of the Secretary, which provided management and administrative support to the CT Office. The CT Office relied on the Secretary of State’s Office of the Executive Secretariat for functions such as budgeting and human resources. According to a report by State’s Office of Inspector General in 2012, the The CT Office, along with CT Office’s needs for management support services, such as human resources, could not be met in a timely and efficient fashion because the Office of the Executive Secretariat had other responsibilities in addition to providing administrative support to the CT Office. According to State, one reason for elevating the CT Office to a bureau was that the office’s responsibilities for counterterrorism strategy, policy, operations, and programs had grown far beyond the original coordinating mission. The QDDR stated that the new CT Bureau, when established, would build on and expand the CT Office’s activities in three areas; it would (1) play a key role in State’s efforts to counter violent extremism, (2) strengthen State’s ability to assist foreign partners as they build their own counterterrorism capabilities, and (3) engage in multilateral and bilateral diplomacy to advance U.S. counterterrorism goals. In addition, the QDDR mentioned that the bureau status would allow for more effective coordination with other agencies, including the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, and Justice, and with the Intelligence Community. Figure 2 shows the organizational structure of the CT Office in 2011. As the new CT Bureau began organizing itself, State’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted an inspection of the CT Bureau in early 2012. The OIG recognized that the inspection took place as the bureau was implementing internal reorganization and reported that this process entailed creating an executive office, adding new staff to develop capabilities, and shifting staff around, among other things. In its report, the OIG stated that the CT Bureau’s intended goals included improving communications and coordination through measures such as integrating policy and program staff and creating more efficient and transparent flows of information, including through a new tasking and tracking system. The OIG made 13 formal recommendations addressing issues such as staffing, training, and reorganization; 10 of the recommendations had been closed as implemented as of June 2015, according to an OIG official. Since transitioning to a bureau in January 2012, the CT Bureau updated its mission statement to focus on partnerships and building the capacity of partner nations to counter terrorism. The current mission of the CT Bureau is to promote U.S. national security by taking a leading role in developing coordinated strategies and approaches to defeat terrorism abroad and securing the counterterrorism cooperation of international partners. The CT Bureau identified five principal areas of responsibility: (1) U.S. counterterrorism strategy and operations, (2) countering violent extremism, (3) homeland security coordination, (4) capacity building, and (5) counterterrorism diplomacy. According to CT Bureau officials, these responsibilities are reflected in the types of programming that the bureau carries out. Like its predecessor office, the CT Bureau manages a range of programs, initiatives, and activities to combat terrorism around the world. According to the CT Bureau, it manages and oversees six key programs: Antiterrorism Assistance: implemented by the Department of State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security, helps partner nations build capacity across a wide spectrum of counterterrorism law enforcement skills, offering training, equipment, mentoring, and technical assistance. Countering Violent Extremism (CVE): seeks to deny terrorism new recruits by reducing sympathy and support for violent extremism. The program supports targeted counter-recruitment interventions for at- risk communities in priority countries and aims to build resilience against violent extremist narratives. It also builds the capacity of partner nations and civil society organizations to counter violent extremism. Counterterrorism Engagement: builds the capacity of multilateral organizations and regional bodies, including the Global Counterterrorism Forum, to promote counterterrorism cooperation and best practices. Counterterrorism Finance (CTF): assists partner nations to build and strengthen effective legal frameworks and regulatory regimes, establish active and capable Financial Intelligence Units, strengthen the investigative skills of law enforcement entities, and bolster prosecutorial and judicial development. Regional Strategic Initiative: fosters regional cooperation and deepens partnerships to address top-priority terrorism challenges. Terrorist Interdiction Program: provides partner nations with biometrics technology and training to identify, disrupt, and deter terrorist travel at airports and other major ports of entry. In addition, the CT Bureau manages or is responsible for other counterterrorism-related efforts, which are described in appendix II. In the transition from CT Office to CT Bureau in 2012, some organizational changes occurred, such as a reduction from five to four Deputy Coordinators. The creation of the bureau elevated the role of strategic planning and metrics, and established a new policy and guidance unit to ensure that all CT programs and activities, to include counterterrorism programs implemented with foreign partners, conform to law and policy and reflect the counterterrorism priorities of the Secretary of State and the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. Additional changes to the CT Bureau’s organizational structure occurred starting in 2014, following the confirmation of an ambassador as the Coordinator of the bureau.Coordinator initiated a strategic review of the CT Bureau’s programs and what they were accomplishing to help form a clear picture of priorities, threats, and where the bureau’s efforts and funding should be directed. The strategic review led to several key changes in the bureau’s structure, and the CT Bureau’s overall programmatic focus shifted to a regional or geographic approach. The function of program monitoring, oversight, and evaluation was elevated, and a separate Office of Programs was created to monitor the day-to-day activities of counterterrorism programming at the program management level. Figure 3 depicts the new organizational chart of the CT Bureau as of June 2015. The CT Bureau is allocated funding for (1) foreign assistance programming that the bureau oversees as well as (2) the operations of the bureau. The foreign assistance allocations to the CT Bureau fund counterterrorism-related programs that the bureau oversees. As shown in figure 4, from fiscal years 2011 through 2014, the CT Bureau was allocated a cumulative total of $539.1 million for six counterterrorism- related programs: (1) Antiterrorism Assistance, (2) Countering Violent Extremism, (3) Counterterrorism Engagement, (4) Counterterrorism Finance, (5) Regional Strategic Initiative, and (6) Terrorist Interdiction Program. The CT Bureau requested $104.4 million in allocations for fiscal year 2015 for these programs. State officials were unable to provide actual allocations for fiscal year 2015 because they were working to finalize them, as of June 2015. For funding allocations by program, fiscal year, and funding account, see appendix IV. When the CT Bureau became operational, in early 2012, its operations were no longer part of the executive management of the Office of the Secretary of State. The CT Bureau and the Office of the Secretary of State worked with State’s Bureau of Budgeting and Planning to determine the size of the budget that was needed to support the new CT Bureau, according to CT Bureau officials. The bureau’s allocated resources include funding for the operations of the bureau. The CT Bureau receives funds from two sources to fund its core operations: the Diplomatic and Consular Programs and the Worldwide Security Programs accounts. Figure 5 shows the bureau’s total allocations for its overall management and operations since fiscal year 2012. These allocations increased from $11.7 million in fiscal year 2012 to $14.7 million in fiscal year 2013, as the bureau was being established. The allocations then decreased to $13.1 million in fiscal year 2014. Appendix V provides information on the CT Bureau’s total obligations for its overall operations since fiscal year 2012. The CT Bureau’s number of authorized full-time equivalent (FTE) staff positions has grown annually since fiscal year 2011, and the bureau has recently undertaken efforts to reduce a persistent staffing gap. The bureau’s number of authorized FTEs grew from 66 in fiscal year 2011 to 96 in fiscal year 2015, which is an increase of more than 45 percent. Figure 6 shows the number of authorized FTEs within the bureau for fiscal years 2011 to 2015, along with the number of FTE positions that were filled. While the bureau’s current authorized level of FTEs for fiscal year 2015 is 96 positions, it had 22 vacancies as of October 31, 2014. The percentage of vacancies in the bureau has ranged from 17 percent to 23 percent in fiscal years 2011 to 2015. According to the CT Bureau, these vacancies have included both staff-level and management positions. For example, recent vacancies have included a management position in the Office of Homeland Security and program analyst positions in the Office of Programs. Since the staffing snapshot reflected in figure 6, the bureau has reported it has made efforts to fill vacancies. The Principal Deputy Coordinator for Counterterrorism testified before Congress on June 2, 2015 that the CT Bureau had reduced its FTE vacancies to 11 positions. However, we have been unable to verify that 4 of the reportedly filled positions have been filled because State has not provided sufficient documentation. In addition to the authorized FTEs, the CT Bureau also has non-FTE positions, which include contractors; interns; fellows; detailees; and “When Actually Employed,” the designation applied to retired State employees rehired under temporary part-time appointments. For fiscal years 2013, 2014, and 2015, respectively, the CT Bureau had 92, 78, and 69 such positions, in addition to its authorized FTEs, according to the CT Bureau. According to State, to meet the personnel requirements associated with standing up the CT Bureau, the bureau received an authorized increase According of 31 positions covering fiscal year 2012 to fiscal year 2014. to the CT Bureau, about 7 of these positions were initially filled within the first 6 months after the bureau was established. Filling many of the remaining positions was postponed until the current Coordinator for Counterterrorism had time to assess the bureau’s needs and priorities, according to the CT Bureau. CT Bureau officials stated that since fiscal year 2012, the authorized positions have been reallocated each year and moved around within the CT Bureau based on the bureau’s needs. When the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, following the strategic review, deemed that more staff might be needed in newly created units, some of the authorized positions were used for that purpose. For example, 1 position was used to fill a management-level position in the CT Bureau’s Office of Strategy, Plans, and Initiatives and another to fill a senior-level position in the Foreign Terrorist Fighters Unit, according to CT Bureau officials. For additional information regarding the CT Bureau’s workforce planning efforts, see appendix VI. The CT Bureau utilized various means to assess its performance, including performance assessments and program evaluations. Specifically, in fiscal years 2012 and 2013, the CT Bureau established indicators and targets for its foreign assistance–related goals identified in the bureau’s first multiyear strategic plan. The bureau also reported results achieved toward each established indicator. In addition, since being elevated to a bureau in fiscal year 2012, the CT Bureau has completed four evaluations of counterterrorism-related programs it oversees, but none have focused on CVE programming—a priority for the bureau. The completed evaluations resulted in 60 recommendations, and the CT Bureau reported having implemented about half of the recommendations as of June 2015. A standard practice in program management is to complete actions in response to recommendations from evaluations within established time frames. However, the CT Bureau has not established time frames for addressing the remaining recommendations. Without specific time frames for completing actions in response to recommendations from evaluations, it will be difficult for the bureau to ensure that needed programmatic improvements are made in a timely manner or to hold its implementing partners accountable for doing so. The CT Bureau assessed its progress toward achieving its foreign assistance–related goals in fiscal years 2012 and 2013, as required by State policy. That policy requires bureaus to respond to an annual department-wide data call for foreign assistance–related performance information. Specifically, bureaus must identify indicators and targets for their foreign assistance–related goals, as defined in their multiyear strategic plans, and report results achieved toward each indicator for the prior fiscal year.foreign assistance–related goals in its first multiyear strategic plan and As shown in figure 7, the CT Bureau identified four established quantitative indicators and corresponding targets for each of those goals. It also reported results achieved for each indicator. According to these results, the CT Bureau generally met or exceeded its targets or the baseline when no target existed. Since being elevated to a bureau in fiscal year 2012, the CT Bureau has completed four evaluations of counterterrorism-related programs it funds and oversees. The number of completed program evaluations meets the number of evaluations required by State’s February 2012 evaluation policy.during fiscal years 2013 and 2014 and focused primarily on evaluating programs providing training courses to law enforcement officials of partner nations, such as the Antiterrorism Assistance program in Morocco and Bangladesh. Standard practices in program management include, among other things, establishing specific time frames for addressing recommendations from program evaluations. For example, internal control standards for the federal government state that management should (1) promptly assess the findings and recommendations from evaluations, (2) determine and complete actions in response to the findings and recommendations from evaluations within established time frames, and (3) record actions taken on recommendations in a timely and accurate manner. State’s January 2015 evaluation guidance, which provides specific criteria and guidelines for evaluating State programs, also recognizes the need for bureaus to track and address recommendations from evaluations. The four program evaluations the CT Bureau completed during fiscal years 2013 and 2014 resulted in 60 recommendations. In response to questions during the course of our review, CT Bureau officials developed action plans to describe the status of efforts to address the 60 recommendations. On the basis of our review of these action plans, the CT Bureau reported having implemented about half of the recommendations (28 of 60) as of June 2015. The bureau had put on hold or decided not to implement 4 recommendations. The remaining 28 recommendations were still being considered or were in the process of being implemented, or the bureau had made a commitment to implement them. CT Bureau officials said that program officers are assigned responsibility for following up on recommendations that affect their portfolio but that the bureau does not have any policy or other guidance outlining the timing for addressing recommendations from evaluations. Further, according to bureau officials, the bureau does not have a system for assigning time frames for the implementation of recommendations. While the action plans are a positive first step to help the bureau monitor and track its progress in implementing recommendations, they do not address the need for the bureau to establish time frames for addressing recommendations from evaluations. Without specific time frames for completing actions in response to recommendations from evaluations, it will be difficult for the bureau to ensure that needed programmatic improvements are made in a timely manner or to hold its implementing partners accountable for doing so. We found that activities between the CT Bureau and other bureaus within State as well as with other U.S. government agencies on counterterrorism programs, specifically the CVE and CTF programs, were generally in line with six of the seven key practices that GAO has identified for interagency collaboration in the areas of (1) outcomes and accountability, (2) bridging organizational cultures, (3) leadership, (4) clarity of roles and responsibilities, (5) resources, and (6) written guidance and We did not review one additional key collaboration agreements.practice, which covers participants, because doing so would have required taking a comprehensive look across all the State bureaus and other U.S. government agencies to ensure that all the relevant participants in counterterrorism efforts were included and would have required an evaluation of their relevant resources, skills, and abilities to contribute, which was outside the scope of this review. Outcomes and accountability. GAO-12-1022. Having defined outcomes and mechanisms to track progress can help shape a collaborative vision and goals. defined intended outcomes generally as collaborating on policy and programming decisions, sharing information, and ensuring that there is no duplication of existing or planned initiatives. When working with other U.S. government agencies, the CT Bureau generally has laid out the intended outcomes of coordination efforts in interagency agreements. We found that within State, the goals of coordination may be articulated by the CT Bureau through specific requests across regional or functional bureaus or messages defining and assigning specific tasks. For example, some State officials in regional bureaus mentioned that the CT Bureau has asked for input on CVE programming, specifically on reviewing CVE grant proposals from posts and nongovernmental organizations for respective regions to ensure that the programming was feasible and did not conflict with other initiatives. Further, some State officials said that the CT Bureau reached out to them to request their expertise on identifying regional stakeholders that could provide input for the State portion of the February 2015 White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism. With regard to coordination on CTF, we found that the interagency Terrorist Financing Working Group previously had provided a mechanism for the CT Bureau and other U.S. government agencies to hold regular meetings to discuss and reach consensus on CTF programming outcomes and goals. According to agency officials, interagency coordination on CTF programs occurred in the past mostly through the Terrorist Financing Working Group, which developed an annual list of priority countries based on an analysis by participating agencies, including various intelligence agencies. The working group was co-chaired by the former CTF unit within the CT Bureau and provided a mechanism for agency stakeholders to share information on CTF activities and find ways to avoid potential conflict between any initiatives. According to officials at other agencies, the Terrorist Financing Working Group has not met recently, and the CT Bureau is in the process of developing new interagency collaboration mechanisms for CTF programming, after the CTF unit within the bureau was disbanded during the recent reorganization of the bureau. Department of the Treasury officials stated that in the interim there is sufficient coordination between the bureau and stakeholders on CTF programming; however, they stated that if the Terrorist Financing Working Group remains on hiatus for some time, and no replacement mechanism for regular formal collaboration is initiated, stakeholders’ awareness of what other agencies are doing to counter terrorism financing could be hindered. We identified accountability mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results or outcomes of counterterrorism programming, especially when there is an interagency agreement between the CT Bureau and other U.S. government agencies on programming such as CVE. For example, an interagency agreement between the CT Bureau and United States Institute of Peace stipulates that reporting on the outcome of the programming is to include quarterly performance reports, interim reports, and final reports no later than 60 days after the termination of the agreement. In addition, some agency officials said that there are monitoring and evaluation mechanisms in place when implementing CT Bureau–funded programming. For example, Department of the Treasury officials stated that they are responsible for providing after-action reports to the CT Bureau on their program efforts related to activities with foreign governments aimed at strengthening anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism regimes for CT Bureau-funded programming. Bridging organizational cultures. We found that while terminology may differ when discussing CVE, within State, some regional and functional bureau officials we spoke with stated that they use a common definition for CVE and apply the CVE strategy and policy that the CT Bureau has developed for CVE programming. Similarly, some officials in other U.S. government agencies we spoke with said they agree on common terms and outcomes of counterterrorism programming as ideas are discussed between the CT Bureau and the implementing agency, if the bureau funds a program or grant. For example, USAID officials said that while their agency’s definition of CVE differs from the CT Bureau’s, they have implemented programs on the ground in the Maghreb and the Sahel region on CVE capacity building using an agreed-upon common CVE definition. We also found that collaborating agencies reported frequent communication related to CVE programs. Specifically, we found that frequency of communication between the CT Bureau and other State bureaus as well as other U.S. government agencies varied depending on the project or activity and ranged from daily to monthly interactions. For example, on one of the CT Bureau–funded CVE projects implemented by the United States Institute of Peace, the implementing program specialist estimated that he has been in touch with his counterpart at State once every 2 days on average over the life of the program, which focuses on developing training for an international institution for CVE-related training in the United Arab Emirates. Leadership. For CVE and to some extent CTF, we found that officials at State and at other U.S. government agencies were generally aware of the agency or individual with leadership responsibility for the particular counterterrorism program. In addition, at the time of our review, officials said that they receive relevant and timely information on CVE-related programming from the bureau. Officials in State’s regional bureaus stated that they are generally aware of when the CT Bureau would have the lead on counterterrorism issues versus the regional bureaus. For example, some of these officials said that if a given issue involved policy and cross-cutting counterterrorism areas, the CT Bureau would take the lead on meetings and assigning tasks, whereas if the issue was more regional in nature, the regional bureaus would take the lead with support from the CT Bureau. We found that while the leadership for the CTF program was generally clear in the past, at the time of our review there was some uncertainty among officials as to whom they should be working with on CTF programming, because of the recent reorganization of the CT Bureau. For example, some U.S. government officials said that there had been a dedicated CTF unit within the bureau that dealt with CTF programming and also coordinated the interagency Terrorist Financing Working Group. However, with the elimination of the stand- alone CTF unit within the CT Bureau, it was not as clear to these officials who was the point of contact for CTF issues. At the time of our review, a few U.S. government agency officials said that it would be beneficial if the CT Bureau shared new contact information resulting from the recent reorganization; however, in the interim, the officials would still reach out to the point of contact that had been previously established for CTF issues. Clarity of roles and responsibilities. We found that there was general clarity on the roles and responsibilities of the participants collaborating on CVE and CTF counterterrorism programs with the CT Bureau. For example, several State officials said that for questions related to programs, such as CVE, they knew who their point of contact in the CT Bureau was and also what that person’s portfolio encompassed. We also found that the roles and responsibilities of participants are generally clarified in writing in cases where there is an interagency agreement between the bureau and implementing U.S. government agency partners on a particular program. For example, such agreements outline the roles and responsibilities of the requesting agency and the servicing agency. When referring to assessing the performance of counterterrorism programming, officials from both within State and other U.S. government agencies said that they were clear on whose responsibility it was to monitor and evaluate CVE and CTF programming activities. State and other agency officials understood that the CT Bureau would be responsible for ensuring evaluations of counterterrorism programs are conducted; however, the monitoring and reporting of the outcomes of CT Bureau–funded programs would be the responsibility of the implementing U.S. government agency partner of that program, or the recipient of the funding. Resources. According to information provided by the CT Bureau, it had provided funding for CVE or CTF programming activities to most of the agencies with which we spoke. The program funding for these activities came from the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs and Economic Support Fund funding accounts. According to information from the CT Bureau, from fiscal year 2011 to fiscal year 2014, it obligated over $11 million to agencies we spoke with for CVE programming and over $43 million to agencies we spoke with for CTF programming using interagency agreements or transfers. We found that, in cases where the CT Bureau funded U.S. government agencies on CVE or CTF programming, the funding mechanism was clear and laid out in the interagency agreements. Some agency officials told us that these agreements provide the vehicle whereby funding can be obligated from the CT Bureau to their agencies using a standard process. For example, Department of Homeland Security officials said that they have worked with the CT Bureau when receiving funding for cross-border financial training to be carried out in various countries and that the funding mechanism was clear. USAID officials stated that while USAID does not have interagency agreements with the CT Bureau, funding from the bureau for the CVE programs and activities that USAID administers comes through standard interagency transfers. Written guidance and agreements. We found that many of the U.S. government agencies we spoke with had formal interagency agreements with the CT Bureau on CVE- and CTF-related programming or activities. The interagency agreements described, among other things, the service to be provided, roles and responsibilities of each party, method and frequency of performance reporting, and accounting information for funding of the service provided. The interagency agreements we reviewed covered a multiyear agreement period. For example, the CT Bureau has an agreement with the Department of Justice Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training on funding a Resident Legal Advisor in Panama who works with the host country government to enhance the capacity of criminal justice actors and institutions to handle financial crimes involving money laundering and terrorist finance. The interagency agreement in place covers funding for the period of 2014 through 2019. According to CT Bureau officials, as the scope or activities of the CT Bureau–funded programming changes, the interagency agreements can be modified. In addition, the CT Bureau and the Department of Justice have an interagency agreement on development of community police training in Bangladesh. We found that many of the State bureaus we spoke with that coordinate with the CT Bureau on CVE and CTF programs did not have any written agreements, such as memorandums of understanding or written guidance laying out the terms of the collaboration. However, several State officials indicated that formalized agreements were not necessary, as the collaboration between bureaus within State is routine and the CT Bureau has been effective in sharing information pertaining to the CVE programs. Given the critical importance of preventing terrorist attacks on the United States and its interests around the world, State elevated the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism to the Bureau of Counterterrorism in fiscal year 2012 to lead the department’s effort to counter terrorism abroad and to secure the United States against terrorist threats and violent extremism. The CT Bureau recently has undertaken steps to address long-standing staffing gaps and it has placed a priority on efforts to counter violent extremism, among other things, since being elevated to a bureau in fiscal year 2012. Although the bureau has completed some program evaluations, it has yet to evaluate its past or current CVE efforts, an action that could help it make more informed decisions about programmatic efforts to counter violent extremism abroad. Also, while the CT Bureau has completed four program evaluations, resulting in 60 recommendations to improve its programs, it has implemented only about half of those recommendations and has not established time frames for addressing the remaining recommendations. Without specific time frames for completing actions in response to evaluation recommendations, it will be difficult for the bureau to ensure the timely implementation of programmatic improvements that would benefit both the country-specific efforts evaluated as well as the broader global program. Given that countering violent extremism is a priority for the U.S. government in general and State’s CT Bureau, we recommend that the Secretary of State take steps to ensure that CVE program efforts abroad are evaluated. To improve State’s CT Bureau’s program management efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of State take steps to ensure the CT Bureau establishes specific time frames for addressing recommendations from program evaluations. We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, Homeland Security, and the Treasury, and to USAID, the United States Institute of Peace, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence for their review and comment. We received written comments from State, which are reprinted in appendix VII. State and Treasury provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. State concurred with our recommendation to conduct an evaluation of its overseas Countering Violent Extremism program efforts. Specifically, State indicated that it was currently assessing which programs would most benefit from third-party evaluation during the upcoming fiscal year and expected CVE to be included in its final determination. State also concurred with our recommendation to establish specific time frames for addressing recommendations from its program evaluations. State indicated that it will commit to setting a timetable for reviewing each recommendation by a third-party evaluator and implementing those actions that are deemed both implementable and worthwhile. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretaries of State, Defense, Homeland Security, and the Treasury, the Attorney General of the United States, the USAID Administrator, the Director of National Intelligence, and the President, United States Institute of Peace. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix VIII. In addition to presenting information on the evolution of the Department of State’s (State) Bureau of Counterterrorism (CT Bureau) and changes in funding, the objectives of this review were to examine (1) how the CT Bureau’s staffing resources have changed since 2011, (2) the extent to which the bureau has assessed its performance since 2011, and (3) the extent to which the bureau’s coordination with U.S. government entities on selected programs is in line with key collaboration practices. To determine the extent to which the CT Bureau’s staffing resources have changed since 2011, we reviewed staffing allocation data from fiscal years 2011 to 2015. We received data on the total authorized full-time equivalent (FTE) positions, total established positions, and the total on- board positions for those fiscal years. State’s Office of the Executive Secretariat provided the FTE staffing data for fiscal years 2011 and 2012, and the CT Bureau, specifically the Executive Office, provided the FTE and other staffing data for fiscal years 2013 to 2015. To assess the reliability of the staffing data, we compared and corroborated information provided by State with staffing information in the Congressional Budget Justifications for the fiscal years as well as spoke to State officials regarding the processes they use to collect and verify the staffing data. On the basis of the checks we performed, we determined these data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. To determine how the CT Bureau’s mission, organizational structure, and funding resources may have changed since 2011, we reviewed and analyzed State and CT Bureau documents pertaining to the mission, organization of the bureau, staffing, funding, and foreign assistance program allocations. We also interviewed State officials from the CT Bureau; Office of Inspector General; Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources; and the Bureaus of Human Resources, Comptroller and Global Financial Services, Budgeting and Planning, and Administration. Specifically, for the mission statement, we reviewed the CT Bureau’s mission statement from 2011 and also from 2015, both reflected in bureau documents and on the bureau’s website, to ascertain what changes, if any, there have been to the bureau’s mission. We discussed with CT Bureau officials any changes to the bureau’s mission over time. To determine changes in the CT Bureau’s organizational structure, we reviewed the organizational chart of the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (CT Office) from 2011 as well as organizational charts of the CT Bureau covering 2012 through 2015. We also spoke to officials representing every directorate and most offices that had been established within the CT Bureau to understand their roles and responsibilities and any impact that the bureau’s strategic review and reorganization has had on their portfolios. To depict changes in resources, we reviewed data on the CT Bureau’s operations allocations and obligations from 2011 to 2015 as well as foreign assistance allocations that the bureau has received over the same time period. The allocations and obligations for the bureau’s operations were provided by the CT Bureau, while the allocations for the foreign assistance programs were provided by State’s Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources. We depicted the allocated funding information based on the funding accounts as well as the foreign assistance programs they cover. To assess the reliability of the funding and allocations data, we spoke to State officials regarding the processes they use to collect and verify the data. On the basis of the checks we performed, we determined these data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. To examine the extent to which the CT Bureau has assessed its performance since 2011, we reviewed bureau strategic plans, performance reports, program evaluation reports, and action plans for evaluation recommendations, as well as State policy and guidance documents outlining performance reporting and evaluation requirements for bureaus. Specifically, to examine the CT Bureau’s performance reporting efforts, we reviewed the bureau’s multiyear strategic plans and performance reports to determine whether the bureau had established performance measures for its foreign assistance–related goals and used established performance measures to assess the bureau’s progress toward achieving its goals, as required by State policy. While we reviewed documentation on the CT Bureau’s performance measures, and discussed the CT Bureau’s performance reporting efforts with cognizant State officials, we did not fully assess the reliability of these measures because our goal was to determine whether the bureau had established performance measures rather than describe the bureau’s actual performance. We are publishing the performance results the CT Bureau reported to provide context and additional support for our finding that the bureau has assessed its performance. To examine the CT Bureau’s program evaluation efforts, we reviewed evaluation reports and compared the number of evaluations the bureau completed against the number of evaluations required by State’s February 2012 evaluation policy. We also compared the bureau’s efforts to track and address recommendations from evaluations against internal control standards for the federal government and State’s January 2015 evaluation guidance, which provides specific criteria and guidelines for evaluating State programs. In addition, we interviewed or obtained written responses from officials from State’s Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources and Bureau of Budget and Planning to clarify State’s performance reporting and evaluation requirements for bureaus and whether the CT Bureau had met the requirements. We also interviewed CT Bureau officials responsible for strategic planning and program monitoring and evaluation to obtain additional or clarifying information related to past or currently planned bureau efforts on performance reporting and evaluations. To examine the extent to which the CT Bureau’s coordination within State and other U.S. government entities on selected programs is in line with key collaboration practices and collaboration features, we reviewed agency documents and interviewed officials from various State regional and functional bureaus and other U.S. government agencies. Specifically, we spoke with officials representing regional bureaus—African Affairs, East Asian and Pacific Affairs, European and Eurasian Affairs, Near Eastern Affairs, South and Central Asian Affairs, and Western Hemisphere Affairs—and officials representing functional bureaus or offices—Center for Strategic Communications; Conflict and Stabilization Operations; Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; Economic and Business Affairs; Educational and Cultural Affairs; International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs; and International Organization Affairs. We also spoke with officials from the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, and the Treasury; United States Agency for International Development; the National Counterterrorism Center; and the United States Institute of Peace in Washington, D.C. We focused on coordination on the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) and Counterterrorism Finance (CTF) programs because these programs involve coordination with large numbers of agencies and State entities and also represent strategic priorities for the CT Bureau. We used GAO’s leading practices for implementing interagency collaborative mechanisms to better understand the extent and nature of collaboration between the CT Bureau and other bureaus within State and other U.S. government agencies on CT Bureau programs and compared CT Bureau’s coordination efforts against these key collaboration practices. We devised a standard set of questions that incorporated questions provided in GAO’s collaboration practices to ask State regional and functional bureaus and U.S. government agencies. We focused on six of the key collaboration practices: outcomes and accountability, bridging organizational cultures, leadership, clarity of roles and responsibilities, resources, and written guidance and agreements. We analyzed the information provided by State and agency officials against these practices to determine whether the collaboration between these entities and the CT Bureau on CVE and CTF were generally consistent with these practices. We conducted this performance audit from July 2014 to July 2015 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. In addition to its key programs and activities, the Bureau of Counterterrorism manages or is responsible for a number of other counterterrorism-related efforts, including the following: Issuing Country Reports on Terrorism, which are annual, mandated reports to Congress that provide, among other things, an assessment of each country in which acts of international terror of major significance occurred and an assessment of each country whose territory is being used as a sanctuary for terrorist or terrorist organizations. Co-chairing the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG), which enhances the counterterrorism technology and equipment capabilities of U.S. government agencies and elements involved in counterterrorism and antiterrorism activities. The TSWG implements five bilateral research and development agreements with international partners. The cooperative programs with Israel, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Singapore allow the United States to leverage foreign experience, expertise, resources, and infrastructure to address commonly-held technical priorities for combating terrorism. Leading the Counterterrorism Preparedness Program, a series of international exercises designed to strengthen the U.S. and partner nations’ capacity to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, especially those involving weapons of mass destruction. Leading the Foreign Emergency Support Team, which is the U.S. government’s only interagency, on-call team poised to support embassies in responding to terrorist incidents worldwide. Preparing public designations of foreign terrorist organizations, designations that have legal consequences. The Department of State’s (State) Bureau of Counterterrorism (CT Bureau) is led by a Coordinator for Counterterrorism and is currently organized with four directorates and numerous offices and units that cover counterterrorism policy, strategy, planning, programming, and operations. According to the CT Bureau, the bureau’s final structure is pending until it has been approved by State’s management and incorporated into the department’s Foreign Affairs Manual. Pending incorporation into the Foreign Affairs Manual, the CT Bureau provided the following description of its directorates and offices. The Principal Deputy Coordinator for Counterterrorism serves as the senior deputy and advisor to the Coordinator for Counterterrorism and has the authority to act on the Coordinator’s behalf in his or her absence. The Principal Deputy Coordinator is responsible for overall management of the bureau and, in consultation with the Coordinator, plans and supervises the substantive work of the bureau, including public affairs outreach strategies. The Principal Deputy Coordinator represents the bureau in department and interagency groups as well as supervises subordinate offices, as directed by the Coordinator. The directorate is led by a Deputy Coordinator and is made up of two offices with a regional focus and one focused on multilateral affairs, according to the CT Bureau. The two regional offices—Office of Africa, Europe, and the Americas, and Office of South and Central Asia and the Near East—are engaged in day-to-day policy tasks and interactions that are managed by interagency working groups. This includes writing policy papers, providing policy guidance, and participating in interagency and within-State meetings to work on counterterrorism-related issues. The offices work very closely with State regional bureaus, focusing on terrorism-related issues, such as designation of terrorist groups or updates on terrorist threats or activities in a region or country. The Office of Multilateral Affairs handles multilateral engagements of the CT Bureau and works with multiple partners including the United Nations. The office tracks the work of the multilateral organizations, sets the agenda on U.S. counterterrorism issues at multilateral meetings, and develops multilateral counterterrorism programs to cover capacity- building goals as well as other counterterrorism strategic priorities of the CT Bureau and the rest of the U.S. government. One example of multilateral engagement is through the Global Counterterrorism Forum, which is an informal, multilateral counterterrorism platform that focuses on identifying critical civilian counterterrorism needs, mobilizing the necessary expertise and resources to address such needs, and generally enhancing global cooperation. The directorate is led by a Deputy Coordinator and covers three offices— Office of Homeland Security, Office of Terrorist Screening and Interdiction, and Office of Terrorist Designations and Sanctions, according to the CT Bureau. The Office of Homeland Security leads State’s efforts to deliver and implement core cross-cutting homeland security policies and programs that intersect with U.S. foreign policy development on counterterrorism issues and coordinates with other State bureaus and U.S. government agencies on homeland security issues such as border security, transportation security, and critical infrastructure protection. The Office of Terrorist Screening and Interdiction leads State’s policy development, interagency coordination, international engagement, and negotiations for the exchange of biographic terrorism screening information. It also coordinates programs to constrain terrorist mobility globally by helping countries at risk of terrorist activity or transit to enhance their border security capabilities. The Office of Terrorist Designations and Sanctions identifies and designates targets for listing as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and leads the mandated review of State’s designations under Foreign Terrorist Organization authorities. It also leads State’s coordination of policy on countering terrorism finance worldwide. The directorate is led by a Deputy Coordinator and covers one office, the Office of Operations, and three units—the Technical Programs Unit, the Policy Unit, and the Coordination Unit, according to the CT Bureau. The directorate coordinates State’s interagency efforts to plan and conduct sensitive counterterrorism operations worldwide. It also coordinates interagency and military counterterrorism activities and leads the Foreign Emergency Support Team, which is the U.S. government’s interagency team poised to respond quickly to terrorist incidents worldwide. The Office of the Executive Director provides executive management and direction for the CT Bureau in areas related to budget and finance, human resources, information technology, and communications. The office keeps track of CT Bureau reporting requirements such as quarterly reports and congressional notifications in order to execute the foreign assistance budget. The office also liaises with other government agencies on counterterrorism programmatic and management issues such as budget and financial management, training, and continuity of operations. The Office of Strategy, Plans, and Initiatives identifies, sets, coordinates, monitors, and adjusts CT Bureau counterterrorism priorities at the strategic level. The priorities are based on the current threat environment, partnership priorities, and monitoring priorities. The office also manages the bureau’s congressional affairs portfolio and provides broad guidance on counterterrorism policy and strategy to program implementers in State and other government agencies. The Office of Programs covers counterterrorism programming and implementation from a regional perspective focused on Countering Violent Extremism, Counterterrorism Finance, Antiterrorism Assistance, and Regional Strategic Initiative–funded programs and other counterterrorism-related programs. The office monitors the day-to-day activities at the program management level and makes sure that program implementers follow implementation agreements. The office also leads the monitoring and evaluation of programs to ensure that the programs follow statements of work with indicators. The Public Affairs Unit covers several functions, among other things, that involve writing press guidance, speeches, public remarks, and congressional testimony for senior CT Bureau personnel. The unit reviews and clears reports from other offices within the CT Bureau and also clears press releases and guidance related to counterterrorism issues. The unit also promotes the CT Bureau’s mission and events via social media. The unit is also involved in the tasking, coordinating, and drafting of State’s annual Country Reports on Terrorism. The Foreign Terrorist Fighters Unit, led by an ambassador-level Senior Advisor, leads State’s and interagency efforts in engaging with foreign partners to prevent and interdict foreign extremist travel to Syria and Iraq. The unit coordinates bureau and interagency strategy and initiatives on the foreign fighter issue to advise principals on the latest developments surrounding this problem set. The unit screens cables, intelligence reports, and academic research, and briefs the Senior Advisor and other principals as necessary. The unit also meets with foreign partners to exchange information, coordinate actions, and assist in the development of press guidance on these issues. The Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Unit was created to elevate and advance the CT Bureau’s policy work on countering and preventing violent extremism. To accomplish this goal, the CVE policy unit helps formulate and develops department, interagency, diplomatic, and multilateral efforts and initiatives to identify and address the drivers of violent extremism. The unit also engages with and supports other CVE- specific and relevant elements within State and with other agencies. Foreign assistance allocations to the Department of State’s Bureau of Counterterrorism (CT Bureau) fund counterterrorism-related programs that the bureau oversees. These allocations increased from fiscal years 2011 to 2012 as the CT Bureau transitioned from an office to a bureau. These allocations decreased thereafter from $154 million in fiscal year 2012 to $110 million in fiscal year 2014, as shown in figure 8. The majority of these allocations are from the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs account, which funds all six counterterrorism-related programs listed in the figure. These programs support a variety of activities including antiterrorism training and equipment, building foreign partner capacity to counter violent extremism, counterterrorism engagement with foreign partners, and anti-money laundering and counterterrorism finance training. Allocations from the Economic Support Fund support those Countering Violent Extremism and Counterterrorism Engagement program activities that do not involve law enforcement entities. For fiscal year 2015, the CT Bureau requested $104.4 million in allocations to fund the six programs. The Bureau of Counterterrorism receives funds from two sources to support its core operations: the Diplomatic and Consular Programs and the Worldwide Security Programs accounts. The base operations of the bureau cover all travel, the majority of contracts, supplies, staffing costs, telephone, information technology, and printing and equipment. Figure 9 shows the bureau’s total obligations for its overall operations since fiscal year 2012. These obligations increased from fiscal year 2012 to 2013 as the bureau was being established. The base operations obligations then decreased from about $7.7 million in fiscal year 2013 to about $4.8 million in fiscal year 2014. The Bureau of Counterterrorism’s overall budget is made up of the following components: (1) Base Operations covers all travel, the majority of contracts, supplies, staffing costs, telephone, information technology, and printing and equipment for the bureau; (2) Regional Security Initiative covers the travel for the bureau’s six field coordinators based at U.S. embassies as well as two to four regional conferences per year that bring together personnel from the embassies from various regions to discuss counterterrorism policy and strategy for that region; (3) Foreign Emergency Support Team supports the Operations Directorate’s activities, including its travel, equipment, and post support costs; (4) Technical Support Working Group supports the Operations Directorate’s activities, including its travel and contribution to the Department of Defense; and (5) the Worldwide Security Program account covers the costs of the contracts related to staff and other direct costs supporting the Counterterrorism Preparedness Program. According to the Department of State’s (State) Bureau of Counterterrorism (CT Bureau), it has used a number of ways to assess its resource and workforce planning needs. CT Bureau officials reported that it uses State’s Domestic Staffing Model to establish human resource demand for its workforce and to also make staffing decisions across the bureau. According to the Office of Resource Management and Analysis in State’s Bureau of Human Resources, bureau managers can use the data in the model to make various decisions on current levels of work and the personnel resources performing the work. For example, the baseline could provide insight into the level of effort being expended on each function and managers could assess whether their practices are consistent with bureau priorities. The Domestic Staffing Model contains grade and skill level information for personnel performing functions in each bureau, which allows the model to predict what type of personnel resources would be required to support the expected workload increases. Moreover, this in turn could provide valuable information for recruitment, succession planning, and training purposes. However, the most recent data collection for the Domestic Staffing Model was conducted in spring 2011, when the CT Bureau was the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism and thus the model does not reflect the current CT Bureau’s organizational structure. According to State officials, the information for the CT Bureau will be updated in the Domestic Staffing Model by the end of 2015. CT Bureau officials also reported that the bureau looks at its resource needs during the annual planning and budgeting process that entails CT Bureau directors analyzing or assessing the workload of the staff in their respective areas and providing detailed justification for each full-time equivalent staff position requested. All requests and justifications for additional full-time equivalent staff positions are vetted with the Principal Deputy Coordinator for Counterterrorism and if approved, presented to the Coordinator for Counterterrorism for approval as part of the overall bureau budget request, according to the CT Bureau. Once updated, the Domestic Staffing Model, along with the annual planning and budgeting process, would be a reasonable approach at looking at workforce planning and consistent with best practices. Best practices for effective strategic workforce planning should, among other things, address the following key principles: determine the critical skills and competencies that will be needed to achieve current and future programmatic results; develop strategies that are tailored to address gaps in number, deployment, and alignment of human capital approaches for enabling and sustaining the contributions of all critical skills and competencies; and monitor and evaluate the progress toward its human capital goals. In addition to the contact named above, Jason Bair (Assistant Director), Andrea Riba Miller (Analyst-in-Charge), Esther Toledo, Ashley Alley, David Dayton, Martin de Alteriis, and Laurani Singh made key contributions to this report. Tina Cheng, Steven Lozano, and Sarah Veale provided technical assistance.

Summary: Terrorism and violent extremism continue to pose a global threat, and combating them remains a top priority for the U.S. government. State leads and coordinates U.S. efforts to counter terrorism abroad. State's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism was elevated to bureau status in 2012 with the aim of enhancing State's ability to counter violent extremism, build partner counterterrorism capacity, and improve coordination. GAO was asked to review the effects of this change and the new bureau's efforts. This report examines (1) how the bureau's staffing resources have changed since 2011, (2) the extent to which the bureau has assessed its performance since 2011, and (3) the extent to which the bureau's coordination with U.S. government entities on selected programs is in line with key collaboration practices. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed and analyzed State and other U.S. government agency information and interviewed U.S. government officials in Washington, D.C. The Department of State's (State) Bureau of Counterterrorism has had an annual increase in authorized full-time equivalent (FTE) positions since fiscal year 2011 and has recently undertaken efforts to reduce a persistent staffing gap. The bureau's authorized FTEs increased from 66 in fiscal year 2011 to 96 in fiscal year 2015, and over the same period, FTE vacancies ranged from 17 to 23 percent. The vacancies included both staff and management positions. Bureau officials said they postponed filling some positions until the Coordinator for Counterterrorism had sufficient time to assess the bureau's needs and priorities. A senior Bureau of Counterterrorism official testified before Congress in June 2015 that the bureau was making progress and that it had 11 vacancies. However, we have not been able to verify that 4 of the reportedly filled positions have been filled because State did not provide sufficient documentation. While the bureau has undertaken efforts to assess its progress, it has not yet evaluated its priority Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) program and has not established time frames for addressing recommendations from program evaluations. Specifically, the bureau established indicators and targets for its foreign assistance–related goals and reported results achieved toward each indicator. The bureau has also completed four evaluations covering three of its six programs that resulted in 60 recommendations. The bureau reported having implemented about half of the recommendations (28 of 60) as of June 2015 but has not established time frames for addressing the remaining recommendations. Without specific time frames, it will be difficult for the bureau to ensure timely implementation of programmatic improvements. In addition, despite identifying its CVE program as a priority and acknowledging the benefit of evaluating it, the bureau has postponed evaluating it each fiscal year since 2012. The bureau's coordination on two programs GAO reviewed, CVE and Counterterrorism Finance, generally reflects key practices for effective collaboration. For example, GAO identified efforts to define outcomes and accountability, bridge organizational cultures, and establish written guidance and agreements—all key practices of effective collaboration. GAO recommends that the Secretary of State take steps to (1) ensure that CVE program efforts abroad are evaluated and (2) establish time frames for addressing recommendations from program evaluations. State concurred with both of GAO's recommendations. State indicated that it was currently assessing which programs would benefit from a third-party evaluation and that it would commit to setting a timetable for reviewing each recommendation by a third-party evaluator.