Scientific research on and projections of the changes taking place in the Arctic vary, but there is a general consensus that the Arctic is warming and sea ice is diminishing. The U.S. National Snow and Ice Data Center reported that the annual Arctic minimum sea ice extent—which typically occurs in September each year—for 2015 was the fourth lowest in the satellite record, and 699,000 square miles less than the 1981 to 2010 average (see fig. 1). Further, it also reported that the 10 lowest September ice extents on satellite record have all occurred in the last 10 years. While much of the Arctic Ocean remains ice-covered for a majority of the year, most scientific estimates predict there will be an ice- diminished Arctic Ocean in the summer in the next 20 to 40 years. Roll over the year to view recorded ice extent. See appendix I for the printable,non-interactive version. (in millions of square kilometers) These Arctic environmental changes make maritime transit more feasible and are increasing the likelihood of further expansion of human activity including tourism, oil, gas, and mineral extraction, commercial shipping, and fishing. Melting ice could increase the use of three trans-Arctic routes—the Northern Sea Route, Northwest Passage, and Transpolar Route—saving several thousands of miles and several days of travel between major trading blocs. Increased trans-Arctic use of the Northern Sea Route could particularly affect the U.S. Arctic because vessels may pass through the Bering Strait, a body of water about 50 miles wide at its narrowest point between Russia and the United States. Vessel data show that transits through the Bering Strait increased from about 220 in 2008 to about 540 in 2015, and Coast Guard officials stated that they anticipate this number to increase annually. Significant oil, gas, and mineral deposits in the Arctic, including an estimated 13 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil, 30 percent of undiscovered gas, and some $1 trillion worth of minerals including gold, zinc, nickel, and platinum have also increased interest in exploration opportunities in the region. Cruise line interests in exploring the Arctic may also increase as evidenced by Crystal Cruise Lines’ planned 2016 Arctic voyage that is expected to be the largest cruise ship yet to traverse the Northwest Passage, a dynamic ice area with thick ice hazards usually present all summer. Various strategic guidance and policies govern U.S. operations in the Arctic region. These include overarching national policies as well as more specific maritime policies and authorities. A 2009 national security presidential directive reflects current U.S. Arctic policy and is key among U.S. policies. The Coast Guard’s role in the Arctic was implicated in this directive, which acknowledges the effects of climate change and increased human activity in the Arctic region; lays out specific policy objectives and federal partners; and addresses issues related to national security, international governance, international scientific cooperation, economic issues, environmental protection, and maritime transportation in the Arctic region. Additional White House national strategies and plans supplementing existing Arctic policy have been issued since the 2009 presidential directive on the Arctic region. Specifically, in May 2013, the White House issued the National Strategy for the Arctic Region that articulates the administration’s strategic priorities for the Arctic region and includes lines of effort related to (1) advancing U.S. security interests, (2) pursuing responsible Arctic region stewardship, and (3) strengthening international cooperation. The White House released an implementation plan for the National Strategy for the Arctic Region in January 2014 that sets forth the methodology, process, and approach for executing the strategy. This plan was superseded in March 2016 by the Implementation Framework for the National Strategy for the Arctic Region which incorporated new priorities, among other things. The Coast Guard and some other federal agencies have also issued their own strategies for the Arctic. For example, the Coast Guard issued its 10-year strategy in May 2013, which seeks to support national policy with three key objectives of improving awareness, modernizing governance, and broadening partnerships. The Coast Guard issued its implementation plan for this strategy in December 2015. While encompassing more than the Arctic region, the White House National Ocean Council issued the National Ocean Policy Implementation Plan in April 2013 which specifically identifies Arctic issues—such as the need for improvements to communications; navigation; and oil spill prevention, containment, and response to provide maritime safety and security in a changing Arctic. In an effort to coordinate the actions of federal entities involved in the Arctic, the White House established the Arctic Executive Steering Committee (AESC) in January 2015 and tasked it with shaping priorities, providing strategic direction, overseeing implementation of the National Strategy for the Arctic Region, and ensuring coordination of federal activities in the Arctic, among other things. In addition, since the Arctic region has significant maritime domain area, existing U.S. strategic guidance relating to maritime areas continues to apply, such as the Maritime Security Policy issued by the President in December 2004. Given the Arctic region’s extensive maritime domain, the Coast Guard plays a significant role in Arctic policy implementation and enforcement. The Coast Guard is a multimission, maritime military service that is responsible for maritime safety and security, environmental protection, and national defense, among other missions. The Coast Guard has these same mission responsibilities in the Arctic Ocean as it does in other oceans. Therefore, as more navigable ocean water has emerged in the Arctic and human activity increases, the Coast Guard has faced, and will continue to face, expanding responsibilities in the region. Other DHS components and federal agencies—such as the Departments of Defense, Interior, and Commerce, and the National Science Foundation—as well as interagency groups, such as the AESC, also have responsibilities in the Arctic, as detailed in Appendix II. State and local governments, Alaska Native tribal governments, Alaska Native corporations, and other Alaska Native entities, private industry, and nonprofit groups are also important Arctic stakeholders. State government is involved in, among other things, Arctic fishery enforcement, oil spill planning and response, emergency management, and economic development. Local governments, Alaska Native tribal governments, and Alaska Native entities are in some cases the closest stakeholders to activities taking place in the Arctic. Consequently, the responsibility for responding to Arctic incidents often falls to local governments. For example, the North Slope Borough, which encompasses about 89,000 square miles of northern Alaska, maintains its own search and rescue capabilities including fixed and rotary wing aircraft designed for shore-based response and a small boat for on the water response. Additionally, Alaska Native communities have inhabited the Arctic region for thousands of years and are particularly sensitive to changes in the environment due to a subsistence way of life and culture revolving around marine ecosystems. Finally, private sector and nonprofit groups are also important Arctic stakeholders, and they represent a wide spectrum of interests, including resource extraction companies, cruise lines, vessel tracking organizations, and conservation groups, among others. Presently, all of the Coast Guard’s permanent assets are based well below the Arctic Circle, so Coast Guard operations above the Arctic Circle are constrained by several factors, including the time required for surface vessels and aircraft to travel vast distances to reach the Arctic Circle and the scarcity of physical infrastructure to support operations. Figure 2 compares the state of Alaska to the lower 48 states to illustrate the large distances between, for example, Kodiak (the Coast Guard’s northernmost air station) and Point Barrow (the northernmost point of land in Alaska). Within the Coast Guard, District 17 and Sector Anchorage have primary responsibility for operations in the Arctic region. Since 2008, District 17 has conducted an annual operation in the Arctic (now known as Operation “Arctic Shield”). Coast Guard officials stated that Arctic Shield is a seasonal surge operation designed to help the Coast Guard learn how to operate in this increasingly active area of responsibility. Arctic Shield is intended to provide the Coast Guard with the opportunity to (a) perform Coast Guard missions and activities, (b) advance maritime domain awareness, (c) broaden partnerships in support of Coast Guard Arctic operations, and (d) enhance and improve preparedness, prevention, and response capabilities in the Arctic. It is also the primary operation through which the Coast Guard carries out activities in the Arctic region and includes the deployment of aircraft, cutters, and personnel to the Arctic region. It is generally conducted between June and October—although some planning and outreach activities may take place before. The general area of operation for Arctic Shield each year is smaller than the Coast Guard’s District 17 area of operation, see figure 3. Under federal law, the Coast Guard has been responsible for carrying out the nation’s polar icebreaking needs since 1965—when it assumed primary responsibility for the nation’s polar icebreaking fleet. In addition, the Coast Guard cites a variety of statutes, strategic policies, and interagency agreements that drive the Coast Guard’s employment of polar icebreakers. A summary of some of these provisions can be found in Appendix III. The Coast Guard’s polar icebreaking fleet comprises three polar icebreakers—the Polar Star, Polar Sea, and Healy—of which, the Polar Star and Healy are currently active. See figure 4 for photographs of the Coast Guard’s active icebreakers. Commissioned in 1976 and 1978, respectively, the Polar Star and the Polar Sea are heavy polar icebreakers and the world’s most powerful non-nuclear icebreakers. The third icebreaker, the Healy, is a medium icebreaker that primarily supports Arctic research. Although the Healy is capable of carrying out a wide range of activities, it cannot operate independently in the ice conditions in the Antarctic or ensure timely access to some Arctic areas in the winter. Figure 5 details the history of the Coast Guard’s current icebreaking fleet, including commission dates, expected service life, and re-activation dates. The Coast Guard has reported making progress implementing its Arctic strategy and addressing tasks in its implementation plan. The Coast Guard’s May 2013 strategy aims to ensure safe, secure, and environmentally responsible maritime activity in the Arctic, while the related implementation plan, issued in December 2015, is intended to operationalize this strategy—within existing resources. The implementation plan also incorporates tasks assigned to the Coast Guard from the National Strategy for the Arctic Region, its implementation plan, and the National Ocean Policy (see App. IV and V for more on these strategies and plans). According to the Coast Guard, these national strategies and plans, as well as key presidential directives, executive orders, and other national strategies guided the development of its strategy. In addition, Coast Guard officials stated that they factored in findings and recommendations from other studies into their strategy, such as the Committee on the Marine Transportation System’s report on the Arctic Marine Transportation System. For example, the Coast Guard included tasks such as completing a study on the Bering Strait port access route in its Arctic Strategy, which was also included in the committee report. According to the Coast Guard’s implementation plan, the document is to be updated as new information is learned, and according to Coast Guard officials, expected timeframes for completion can be adjusted given funding and resources. The Coast Guard’s implementation plan includes 13 tasks (or initiatives) and identifies lead Coast Guard components for each initiative. Many of the tasks require the Coast Guard to research, coordinate, and evaluate Arctic issues—an indication that many of the Arctic efforts are planning- oriented and are to help agency officials better understand Arctic issues, and prepare the Coast Guard for increased Arctic operations. Coast Guard officials stated that the tasks in its strategy generally included actions that the Coast Guard was already planning to take in the Arctic, and new tasks were only agreed upon if resources permitted. The Coast Guard’s implementation plan also states that appropriate metrics are to be applied to each of the tasks and associated next steps to ensure that they are on schedule and properly tailored for the operational and resource environments faced by the Coast Guard and the nation. Specifically, the implementation plan states that Coast Guard component leads for each task are to specify the desired outcomes to define success for each task and develop supporting plans that specify the scope, timeline, and resources needed across the 10-year plan, and highlight significant challenges. However, this information was not included in the implementation plan and according to Coast Guard officials, it was not included because they anticipate that the plan will be updated annually, and as such, they wanted to keep the plan flexible to such change. Coast Guard officials stated that each lead component has drafted plans that specify the desired outcome for success, scope, timeline, and resources needed, and anticipate finalizing them in August 2016. Officials also stated that they wanted to wait for the White House to release its March 2016 revised implementation plan for the national strategy before finalizing these efforts. The revised national implementation plan incorporated new priorities, and Coast Guard officials stated that better prioritization will help the Coast Guard in making decisions about what it needs to achieve in the Arctic given its limited resources. Coast Guard officials stated that they have made some progress on the 13 tasks established in the Coast Guard’s implementation plan, as described in more detail in table 1. To track its progress on the 13 tasks, the Coast Guard is in the process of developing a web-based site for its components to enter and track the status of implementation plan tasks, as well as the status of its Arctic- related responsibilities under other national strategies, presidential directives, and service directives. Information on this site is to include the responsible component, milestones, status, and percentage toward completion for each task or responsibility. The Coast Guard expects that the web-based site will be updated continually as tasks are completed to ensure the most accurate reporting. Coast Guard officials stated that they delayed finalizing this tool until they saw the revised implementation plan for the national strategy. Officials also stated that they anticipate finalizing the tool by mid-year 2016, but that system integration and resource constraints could create delays. In addition to taking actions to implement its Arctic strategy, the Coast Guard assessed its capability to perform its missions in the Arctic and identified various capability gaps, primarily through two key studies. Specifically, a November 2011 Coast Guard study identified both the Coast Guard’s Arctic requirements and Arctic capability and capacity gaps. Another study, issued by the DOD–DHS Arctic Capabilities Assessment Working Group in March 2012, consolidated the needed capabilities identified in various federal agency studies on the Arctic, and is intended to guide both departments’ investment priorities. According to this study, the identified gaps lend themselves to further evaluation and investment consideration. The capability gaps identified in these two key reports include the following: Communications: including the lack of communications architecture. Harsh weather conditions, high latitude disturbances, and geomagnetic storms combine to make communications in the Arctic difficult. Arctic maritime domain awareness: including limited nautical charting, inadequate navigation systems, and insufficient surveillance. Extremely limited operational assets and support infrastructure in the Arctic, as well as the harsh operating environment make achieving maritime domain awareness a challenge. Infrastructure: including limited aircraft infrastructure on the North Slope and limited logistical support. Facilities located below the Arctic Circle, and even those within Alaska, provide limited capability to support Arctic missions due to the long transits to the Arctic region. No deepwater ports currently exist on the North Slope or near the Bering Strait that are capable of refueling and re-provisioning polar capable cutters. This forces polar capable cutters to expend significant time transiting long distances to and from replenishment ports. Development of infrastructure to support operations is challenging, in part, due to the high cost of transporting materials to the Arctic and short construction seasons. Icebreaking: including limited icebreaking capacity given the Coast Guard’s existing active inventory of one medium and one heavy polar icebreaker, as discussed later in this report. Training and exercise opportunities: including a limited pool of Arctic- trained and experienced Coast Guard personnel, and limited training, exercise, and educational opportunities to enhance Arctic skills among staff. According to Coast Guard officials, few opportunities exist to train in the Arctic, in part, because of limited Coast Guard icebreaking capacity. Coast Guard officials confirmed that the capability gaps identified in these reports remain relevant today, and are highlighted in the Coast Guard’s Arctic strategy. According to Coast Guard officials, some of the gaps are complex and more long-term than its 10-year Arctic strategy, and some are not the sole responsibility of the Coast Guard to mitigate or do not impact its operations. For example, rather than building permanent infrastructure, which its current Arctic strategy does not support given existing resources, the strategy relies on the seasonal use of mobile assets to support current demand. In addition, the Coast Guard does not have sole responsibility for addressing all of the gaps identified in the two reports. For example, although the Coast Guard’s Arctic strategy identifies nautical charting as a gap and one of the Coast Guard’s critical enablers for future success, NOAA has lead responsibility for charting U.S. coastal waters, including those in the Arctic. Further, Coast Guard officials stated that the capability gaps identified above do not completely impair or eliminate the ability to perform operations. For example, while communications can be a challenge in remote regions, the risk of lost communications can be mitigated by, for example, using multiple assets working together to mitigate risk if lost communications are anticipated. In addition, Coast Guard officials stated that lack of infrastructure and logistical and communications challenges have been mitigated through the use of offshore cutter-based command and control platforms, shore- based mobile command and control platforms, and seasonal air and communications capabilities through leased facilities and deployable assets. Coast Guard officials stated that, given its current activity levels, its Arctic presence being mobile and seasonal, and its ability to leverage partners’ resources, it has had sufficient resources to fulfill current Arctic responsibilities. Specifically, according to Coast Guard officials, partnerships are key to achieving agency goals in the Arctic. For example, the North Slope Borough provides the Coast Guard with additional search and rescue capabilities year round, and DOD counterparts have provided the use of a DOD base to extend Coast Guard aircraft ranges during Arctic operations. However, all 11 of the Arctic stakeholders we interviewed in Alaska—who represented state and local governments, Alaska Native Corporations, private industry, and non- profits—expressed concerns that the Coast Guard lacks resources in the Arctic. Specifically, three stakeholders stated concerns about the Coast Guard’s ability to respond to its usual missions elsewhere in Alaska when its assets were deployed for Arctic operations. Coast Guard officials stated they will reassess their approach as Arctic activity and resulting mission requirements change over time, but if Arctic activity continues to increase, as anticipated, they may have insufficient resources to meet expanded Arctic requirements with current funding levels. Coast Guard officials also stated that federal efforts are underway to better understand capabilities and these efforts often include tasking or decision making outside of the Coast Guard. For example, Coast Guard officials stated that until national priorities are better articulated by the AESC, the Coast Guard will not be able to identify all of its Arctic requirements. However, the Coast Guard’s Arctic strategy states that the agency is to continue to monitor evolving Arctic activities, and re-invest, where funding allows, to overcome potential gaps and shortfalls. The Coast Guard has worked with its Arctic partners—such as other federal agencies—to carry out actions to help mitigate Arctic capability gaps; however, it has not systematically assessed how its actions, across the agency, have helped to mitigate these gaps. According to Coast Guard officials, through the agency’s role in implementing the tasks from the various Arctic strategies and implementation plans, the Coast Guard has taken actions, along with its Arctic partners, that have helped to mitigate capability gaps. For example, the Coast Guard is the lead agency for implementing the strategies’ tasks related to enhancing Arctic maritime domain awareness—a capability gap identified in the previously noted reports. In another example, the National Ocean Policy directs the Coast Guard to work with other federal agencies to identify, analyze, rank, and implement the most cost-effective options to reduce communication gaps, and it has taken action that could affect these gaps. In addition, as discussed later in this report, the Coast Guard is also taking action to address the icebreaking capacity gap. In addition to the implementing tasks from the Arctic strategies that can help mitigate capability gaps, Coast Guard officials reported that they utilize Arctic Shield as the primary operational method to better understand agency capabilities and associated gaps in the Arctic and to take actions to help mitigate them. The Coast Guard Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Program has also helped to test Arctic capabilities, such as navigation systems—in part through Arctic Shield operations. The Coast Guard reported that upon the publication of the Coast Guard’s Arctic Strategy, it aligned its Arctic Shield operations with the strategy’s objectives. According to our review of the Coast Guard’s Arctic Shield operational planning documents and AARs, among other actions, the Coast Guard executed select Coast Guard missions; tested a variety of equipment, technologies, and processes; conducted internal training exercises; and improved maritime domain awareness by conducting operations, research, and outreach to partners. For example, during Arctic Shield 2015, the Coast Guard tested communications equipment belonging to DOD, extending communications capabilities further north than previously possible. During Arctic Shield 2014, the Coast Guard tested response equipment and communications systems to assess capabilities and refine Arctic resource requirements. According to Coast Guard officials, they will continue with mobile and seasonal operations, which will provide them with opportunities to continue assessing and testing operational capabilities. Although the Coast Guard has reported that these various actions have improved its Arctic capabilities, it has not systematically assessed the extent to which these actions have helped mitigate the identified capability gaps. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government provide that ongoing monitoring should occur in the course of normal operations and should help ensure that the findings of reviews, such as the capability gaps identified in the previously mentioned reports, are resolved. This monitoring should be built into the Coast Guard’s operations, performed continually, and be responsive to change. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government also calls for management to establish performance measures and indicators that help ensure that management’s directives are carried out. Coast Guard officials stated that they have not systematically assessed their progress in mitigating capability gaps, or developed measures for them, because the Coast Guard cannot unilaterally mitigate these gaps, not all of them are easily measurable, and because not enough is known about them. However, while taking actions to help mitigate these capability gaps requires joint efforts among Arctic partners, the Coast Guard has taken actions in the Arctic that are specific to its missions and therefore has responsibility for assessing the extent to which its actions have helped to mitigate its part of these capability gaps. Assessing relevant information on how its actions have helped to mitigate these gaps could also increase agency knowledge about capabilities. Coast Guard officials also stated that they track some of their Arctic activities through various mechanisms, but do not assess how these actions have helped to mitigate capability gaps. For example, the Coast Guard’s AARs for Arctic Shield document information on activities that the Coast Guard has conducted during each annual operation, as well as any lessons learned, key observations, best practices, challenges, and recommendations. In addition, the Coast Guard reported it has efforts underway to track its progress in implementing the national and Coast Guard Arctic strategies which will help it to more systematically track Arctic activities, as discussed previously. But, it does not plan to assess how the completion of these activities will affect capability gaps. While the Coast Guard’s various tracking efforts may inform the Coast Guard about its overall status in conducting Arctic activities, it does not provide a systematic assessment, across the agency, of how these actions have helped to mitigate the capability gaps—efforts which also help it determine resource needs. Systematically assessing the impact of its actions agency-wide—including using measures for gauging its progress, when feasible—is critical for the Coast Guard to be able to fully assess the status of its efforts to help mitigate the various Arctic capability gaps. By systematically assessing its own progress, the Coast Guard will better understand the status of the gaps and be better positioned to effectively plan its Arctic operations, including its allocation of resources and prioritization of activities to help mitigate them. Coast Guard officials stated several factors affect their Arctic Shield planning, including data limitations, uncertainty surrounding future Arctic activity, and limited resources. To carry out Arctic Shield, the Coast Guard manages a year-round process to plan, execute, and evaluate this annual operation. The Coast Guard also reported that this operation is to be scalable to match the level and type of threats and risks, opportunities, and mission responsibilities in the Arctic each year, and flexible to accommodate varying needs for Coast Guard services and the availability of resources. As part of its year-round planning process, Coast Guard officials hold a series of planning meetings with internal and external stakeholders, during which they finalize operational documents. According to the Coast Guard’s Arctic strategy implementation plan, outreach activities conducted during this planning process are to include regular engagement with tribal communities to ensure the operation does not interfere with tribal rights, interests, or subsistence activities. In addition, following each year’s Arctic Shield operation, Coast Guard officials assess the operation, develop lessons learned, and propose changes for the next year’s operation. The Coast Guard also produces an AAR each year, which describes the activities conducted during Arctic Shield that year and discusses challenges encountered and lessons learned. Coast Guard officials stated that when planning the size and scope of Arctic Shield operations they use information learned from prior operations, as well as review a wide variety of external sources that analyze present conditions and forecast future conditions. Specifically, these officials stated that they review commercial trends analyses, ice and weather forecasting, vessel tracking data, information on local fish stocks and subsistence hunting times, and law enforcement intelligence. Because commercial activity is the primary determinant of Arctic maritime activity levels, Coast Guard officials stated that they also review analyses that predict trends in oil and gas, mining, tourism, shipping, and other commercial sectors. Coast Guard officials reported that they discuss this information with various federal, state, industry, academic, and not- for-profit entities. Although Coast Guard officials reported using these data, they also stated that one factor affecting their planning for Arctic operations is the limited amount of data on regional activity, which they attributed to various factors. For example, because Arctic activity is limited, changes in year- to-year data do not always provide useful statistics. Further, the Coast Guard cannot always access some companies’ proprietary information on Arctic commercial trends, which also limits the robustness of the Coast Guard’s data sources. In addition, Coast Guard officials stated that recent commercial marine traffic in the Arctic has been variable rather than trending predictably, providing inconsistent data trends. As a result, Coast Guard officials stated that there are limited data to help them make planning decisions and as a result they are taking steps to improve their data collection on their own operations and as well as continuing to develop partnerships to collect external data. For example, during the course of our review, the Coast Guard began collecting data on its aircraft and cutter resource hours expended on 2015 Arctic Shield activities to improve its mission management and resource allocation. The Coast Guard also established an Arctic Information Fusion Center as part of its 2015 Arctic Shield operation, which helped to track the number of deployed Coast Guard personnel. Further, Coast Guard officials reported that they are working toward more systematically documenting AAR information—including lessons learned, best practices, and recommended improvements—to better track the Coast Guard’s Arctic activities. Specifically, Coast Guard officials stated that they are starting to accomplish this through their Contingency Preparedness System, the Coast Guard’s web-based data management tool that links, among other items, after action reporting and corrective actions. Although the Coast Guard designed the Contingency Preparedness System as a tracking tool for discrete exercises, not large operations like Arctic Shield which incorporate multiple exercises, Coast Guard officials stated that they are determining how to best use this system—and have begun to enter data—to better track Arctic Shield activities and increase their senior leadership’s awareness of Arctic challenges and opportunities. Coast Guard officials reported that they are also identifying ways to work with other agencies to better collect data. For example, Coast Guard officials stated they participate in conference calls with Arctic stakeholders that provide information on subsistence hunting activities to help with their planning. Coast Guard officials stated they continue to look for opportunities to gain better information on Arctic activities. The Coast Guard also faces inherent uncertainty surrounding drivers of future Arctic maritime activity and the potential corresponding increase in commercial activity in the region. These drivers of activity include the pace and effects of climate change in the Arctic and economic trends, and could affect the need for Coast Guard services. Many projections about future Arctic activity look forward only 2 to 3 years because of this uncertainty. According to Coast Guard officials, the uncertainty of these drivers of maritime activity render long-term planning beyond the 10-year time frame particularly difficult, and as a result, the Coast Guard must remain flexible to adjust its planning as conditions change. Limited resources is another factor that Coast Guard officials have reported affecting their Arctic planning process. Coast Guard officials stated that they must make tradeoffs on how to best deploy limited resources and among potential courses of action. Further, officials noted that funding uncertainty has also affected Coast Guard planning and operations for Arctic Shield. For example, the Coast Guard was not able to establish its forward operating base in the preferred location because funding for Arctic Shield 2015 had not been secured before a private entity leased that space. As a result, the Coast Guard stationed aircraft for monitoring Arctic activity at an alternate location farther from active oil rigs, which increased its travel time to sites being monitored. Coast Guard officials stated that despite these challenges, they have received support from Coast Guard leadership and were able to achieve Arctic Shield objectives. Various requirements drive the Coast Guard’s icebreaking mission responsibilities, and since 2010 the Coast Guard has been unable to fulfill some of these responsibilities. The Coast Guard’s icebreaking responsibilities are based in statute, presidential directive, strategies, and interagency agreements. Under statutory law, the Coast Guard has responsibility for operating the nation’s polar icebreaker fleet, which supports the Coast Guard in carrying out its missions. For example, the Coast Guard’s icebreaker fleet supports scientific research as part of its Ice Operations mission and promotes maritime security as part of its Defense Readiness mission, according to a 2013 Coast Guard report. In addition, the goals and activities set forth in the National Strategy for the Arctic Region and the 2009 presidential directive on the Arctic region drive the Coast Guard’s need to maintain the ability to project a sovereign presence in the Arctic—a standard which requires the use of a polar icebreaker at certain times when seasonal ice covers large portions of the Arctic region. The Coast Guard’s icebreaking responsibilities are also derived from interagency agreements that commit it to providing icebreaking services to other departments and agencies in support of various strategic and scientific missions, including national defense. For example, the Coast Guard assumed responsibility for the Navy’s icebreaker fleet in1965 and a memorandum of agreement first signed in 2008 identifies how the Coast Guard’s icebreakers would be used to support DOD. More recently, Coast Guard officials stated that the President’s September 2015 announcement about national priorities in the Arctic further emphasized the importance of the nation’s capability for year-round access to this region. Appendix III provides a selection of the laws and policies that are cited as sources for the Coast Guard’s need to maintain polar icebreaking capability. Coast Guard officials reported being able to minimally complete agency polar icebreaking responsibilities, that is, carrying out the annual McMurdo Station resupply in the Antarctic region and scientific research in the Arctic, with two functional icebreakers. However, when neither the Polar Sea nor the Polar Star was active in 2011 and 2012, the Coast Guard did not maintain assured, year-round access to both the Arctic and Antarctic, as the Healy cannot reach ice-covered areas with more than 4 ½ feet of ice. For these years, and in prior and subsequent years, the National Science Foundation chartered foreign icebreakers to support the resupply of the McMurdo Station, although National Science Foundation officials reported that this was challenging. Coast Guard officials stated that a short-term charter would not meet the Coast Guard’s needs in the Antarctic region because a sovereign U.S. presence can only be established by a vessel that is available year-round, able to fly the U.S. flag, and perform Antarctic treaty inspections. Further, the Coast Guard has set a target of meeting 100 percent of its internal and interagency requests for polar icebreaking, and it annually calculates its success rate in meeting this target. In the last 6 years of available data (fiscal years 2010 through 2015), the Coast Guard reported that it failed to attain this target for 3 years—primarily when neither heavy icebreaker was operational. Specifically, the Coast Guard was unable to complete 5 out of 26 requests for polar icebreaking, including 4 out of 11 requests in 2011 and 2012 when both heavy icebreakers were unavailable. These unfulfilled requests included support for the resupply of McMurdo Station, Arctic Shield activities, and an Arctic science deployment, some of which would have required weeks or months of icebreaker use. See Table 2 below for specific results. The Coast Guard reported in acquisition documentation that the addition of one heavy icebreaker would allow it to maintain current icebreaking capacity by replacing the Polar Star after its useful service life ends in 4 to 7 years. However, the Coast Guard reported that increased heavy icebreaking capacity is needed to fully meet requirements in the Arctic and Antarctic regions. Although record lows for recent summer and early autumn sea ice extent have made seasonal maritime navigation more feasible in the Arctic, the Coast Guard reported that polar icebreakers can still be necessary during these seasons to conduct research or to assist other vessels. Winter sea travel is also still severely limited due to extensive ice coverage across the Arctic region, necessitating heavy icebreaker assistance. Furthermore, although slightly decreased in 2015, the maximum ice extent in the Antarctic has expanded in recent years. The Coast Guard reported that a medium icebreaker, like the Healy, can complete many of the Coast Guard’s Arctic missions, but cannot operate independently in the presence of thick ice. Even with melting Arctic ice, Coast Guard officials noted that it would be risky to assume that a medium icebreaker would be sufficient to provide year-round access to the Arctic. In addition, Coast Guard officials anticipate that heavy icebreaking capability may continue to be necessary in an operating environment with much less ice overall because ice sometimes piles up, creating thicker ice. Because only heavy polar icebreakers can provide assured, year-round access to both polar regions, the Coast Guard maintains that it must have heavy icebreaking capability to fully meet its responsibilities as outlined above and in Appendix III. A 2010 Coast Guard-commissioned study found an even greater need for icebreakers, if the Coast Guard were to fully accomplish all of its polar icebreaking responsibilities. Specifically, this study determined that at least six icebreakers—three heavy and three medium—would be required to carry out the Coast Guard’s statutory missions. To carry out its statutory missions as well as fulfill all interagency responsibilities for defense readiness, the report states that the Coast Guard would need four to six heavy and two to four medium icebreakers depending on various operational factors, such as whether the Coast Guard employs multiple crewing models and where the Coast Guard homeports the icebreakers. Recognizing the fiscal challenges posed by such a request, Coast Guard officials have stated that obtaining a minimum of two heavy icebreakers is needed to at least maintain the fleet’s self-rescue capability in the event one vessel became beset in ice—a capability the Coast Guard does not currently have. In addition, without two or more heavy icebreakers, the Coast Guard reports that it may not be able to: (1) complete its polar icebreaking missions if one vessel suffered a disabling casualty, (2) conduct the McMurdo Station resupply and also ensure the continued ability to operate in the Arctic, or (3) conduct the McMurdo Station resupply if the mission required more than one icebreaker as it did in prior years. To maintain polar icebreaking capability after the Polar Star’s projected service life ends between 2020 and 2023, the Coast Guard initiated a program in 2013 to acquire a new heavy icebreaker and is currently working to determine the optimal acquisition strategy. From fiscal years 2013 to 2016, Congress directed that $16 million of appropriated funds were for the Coast Guard to conduct early acquisition activities, and the President’s budget has since requested $150 million to continue pre- acquisition and design activities over multiple years starting in fiscal year 2017. As of May 2016, the acquisition program was in the Analyze/Select phase, during which the Coast Guard was establishing asset requirements, evaluating the feasibility of alternatives, and developing a cost estimate for the preferred acquisition strategy. As part of this phase, the Coast Guard reports that it will identify the optimal acquisition strategy and will consider several options including new construction, parent craft, and parent craft design, as well as leasing arrangements. The President’s fiscal year 2017 budget request outlined plans to accelerate the acquisition process, so that production activities commence by 2020. The Coast Guard expects a new heavy icebreaker to cost approximately $1.09 billion, according to a 2013 preliminary estimate, which included development, procurement, and Coast Guard facilities improvements for one vessel. Although they have yet to complete a more detailed cost estimate, Coast Guard officials stated that they believe the primary construction cost drivers are likely to be the icebreaker’s size, weight, and horsepower. While the Coast Guard’s icebreaker fleet supports other federal agencies and departments, Coast Guard officials—as well as other federal officials—stated that these other agencies and departments do not require specific operational capabilities that would significantly increase the overall acquisition cost of an icebreaker. Coast Guard officials also noted that it would be unreasonable to build an icebreaker that could operate in the Arctic but not the Antarctic because that would limit the type of operations it could conduct. To move forward with the acquisition process, the Coast Guard would need to receive funding and ensure that a U.S.-based commercial shipyard would be able to build the vessel. However, the Coast Guard’s annual acquisition budget—which averaged $1.5 billion from fiscal year 2012 to fiscal year 2016—has primarily been allocated to other projects, such as the National Security and Fast Response cutters. The Coast Guard’s fiscal year 2016 acquisition budget was $1.945 billion— approximately 60 percent higher than the prior year, largely due to the addition of a ninth National Security Cutter for which the Coast Guard had not planned. We previously found when reviewing the Coast Guard’s acquisition portfolio in 2014 that the Coast Guard was further from fielding its planned fleet in 2014 than it was in 2009, in terms of the funding needed to complete these programs. The Coast Guard reported that it believes that the U.S. shipbuilding industry—which must be used to build all Coast Guard vessels unless the President has authorized a national security exception—is capable of building a heavy icebreaker. Specifically, the Coast Guard reported that several U.S. shipyards responded to a March 2013 market survey and indicated that they have the ability or could make necessary infrastructure upgrades to build a vessel similar to the Polar Star. Coast Guard officials told us that the selected shipyard or shipyards would likely need to upgrade their facilities because of the size, weight, and complexity of an icebreaker and that facility upgrades represent a calculated risk on the part of the shipyard, particularly if the Coast Guard only orders one vessel. The Coast Guard met with industry representatives in March 2016 to learn about industry capabilities. Prior GAO work on Navy and Coast Guard shipbuilding indicates that new icebreaker construction is likely to be an expensive and lengthy process because of cost growth associated with lead ships—that is, the first ship constructed in a class of ships, which the Coast Guard icebreaker would be. In September 2014, we identified cost growth that totaled over 150 percent for the first two lead ships of the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship. We also reported in May 2009 that lead ships often experience schedule delays, such as the Navy’s first San Antonio-class ship which was delivered 52 months late, and in June 2008 we reported that the lead ship of the Coast Guard’s National Security Cutter was delayed by approximately 2 years. Thus, the potential for costly delays on lead ships has some precedent. The Coast Guard reported in 2015 that it will begin to plan for the acquisition of additional heavy icebreakers in line with the President’s September 2015 announcement. Various factors limit the options available to the Coast Guard to maintain, or increase, its icebreaker capacity, and the Coast Guard has reported that the long-term lease of a polar icebreaker is unlikely to result in cost savings when compared with a purchase. Specifically, as figure 6 depicts, two key factors limiting the Coast Guard’s options are the lack of an available icebreaker for lease that meets agency and legal requirements, and the total cost associated with leasing. Availability. The Coast Guard reported in October 2015 that no existing icebreakers were available to lease or purchase that met both its legal and operational requirements. First, with respect to legal requirements, the Coast Guard would need to either purchase or demise charter an icebreaker, as legal requirements associated with several Coast Guard missions prohibit a short-term lease. Specifically, under federal law, to be capable of conducting all of its statutory missions, the Coast Guard must use a public vessel, which federal law defines as one that the United States owns or demise charters. For example, federal law states that the Coast Guard’s Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security Mission may be carried out with public vessels or private vessels tendered gratuitously for that purpose. Similarly, for the Coast Guard to employ its law enforcement authorities in the conduct of certain missions, the icebreaker would need to operate as a warship, and warships are necessarily sovereign immune, public vessels, according to Coast Guard officials. In addition, federal law also provides that no Coast Guard vessel may be constructed in a foreign shipyard. According to the Coast Guard, besides the Polar Star and the Polar Sea, the only existing icebreakers that are powerful enough to meet the Coast Guard’s operational requirements were built in and are owned by Russia, and, thus, would not comply with this legal requirement. As a result of these constraints, that is, the lack of a U.S.-built icebreaker available to purchase or demise charter with sufficient horsepower to conduct all of the Coast Guard’s missions, the Coast Guard’s only procurement options are for a U.S.- based shipyard to agree to build a new icebreaker for the Coast Guard to lease or purchase outright. However, the Coast Guard has also reported that the long-term lease of a polar icebreaker built expressly for the Coast Guard is likely to be more costly than purchasing an icebreaker for several reasons. Budgeting and Total Cost. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidelines require federal agencies to acquire assets in the manner least costly overall to the government. For a large acquisition like a heavy icebreaker, OMB Circular A-94 requires the Coast Guard to conduct a lease-purchase analysis based on total lifecycle costs. To then proceed with a lease, the Coast Guard would need to show that leasing is preferable to direct government purchase and ownership. The purpose of this requirement is to promote efficient resource allocation through well- informed decision-making by the federal government. Budget scorekeepers—specifically, OMB, the Congressional Budget Office, and the House and Senate Budget Committees—score purchases and capital leases at the outset of the acquisition. Based on scoring rules, the long- term lease of a polar icebreaker would not qualify as an operating lease, which is intended for short-term needs and would allow the costs to be recognized over time. As a result, whether the Coast Guard purchased or leased an icebreaker, it would need full funding up front to enter into a legal obligation with a shipbuilder, unless the Coast Guard uses incremental funding, as was authorized in the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2015. With incremental funding authority, the Coast Guard would be able to proceed with the acquisition with only part of the estimated costs of a capital acquisition. However, we have previously discouraged the use of incremental funding, except in cases with especially high research and development costs, because incremental funding erodes future fiscal flexibility and limits cost transparency. The Coast Guard has also reported that the total cost of a long term lease is likely to exceed the total cost of a purchase. A 2011 preliminary cost analysis prepared for the Coast Guard indicated that the lease option would be more costly to the federal government over an icebreaker’s expected 30-year service life. According to this analysis, the prospective ship owner’s profit rate would increase the overall expense as this profit rate is priced into the lease, such that government ownership would be less costly in the long run. Moreover, because a demise charter requires the lessee to operate and maintain the vessel, the Coast Guard would not be able to outsource crewing or maintenance activities, actions which we previously reported could reduce ongoing operating costs. According to a subsequent 2012 report prepared for the Coast Guard, legal and operational requirements render additional cost-benefit analysis of leasing unnecessary. Nevertheless, Coast Guard officials stated that they will consider leasing as a possible acquisition strategy in a forthcoming report, as directed by language in committee reports accompanying the fiscal year 2014 DHS appropriations bill. Previous GAO work on the question of leasing versus buying an icebreaker identified important assumptions in comparing the costs to the federal government and suggests that outright purchase could be a less costly alternative than a long-term vessel lease. Assuming that the cost of building and operating the vessel was the same under both the buy and the lease scenarios, the cost advantage to government purchase over leasing in our previous work was based on two factors. First, the costs of private sector financing under a lease arrangement—which were higher than the government’s borrowing costs—could be expected to be passed on to the federal government in lease payments, thereby increasing the vessel’s financing costs over what they would be under outright government purchase. Second, under a lease arrangement, an additional profit would accrue to the lessor for services related to its retained ownership of the vessel. Separately, in multiple other reports we found that when other agencies sought to enter into long-term lease arrangements, they did so for reasons unrelated to cost, such as acquiring already-built aircraft sooner, and these explanations are not pertinent in this case. Anticipating a likely gap in heavy icebreaker capability between the end of the Polar Star’s service life and the deployment of a new icebreaker, the Coast Guard is developing a bridging strategy, as required by law, to determine how to address this expected gap. Based on current projections, if the Coast Guard’s icebreaker acquisition proceeds on schedule, the Coast Guard will likely lack heavy icebreaker capability for several years. Currently, the Coast Guard estimates that the Polar Star’s service life will likely extend until 2020 to 2023, while the Coast Guard’s 2016 timeline for a new icebreaker indicates that it would not achieve its operational requirements until fiscal year 2026, leaving a potential gap in heavy icebreaking capability of 3 to 6 years. See Figure 7. The Coast Guard has not determined the cost-effectiveness of reactivating the Polar Sea, and reported that it was conducting a Bridging Strategy Alternatives Analysis that will assess and make recommendations on whether to reactivate the Polar Sea and whether to further extend the service life of the Polar Star. Coast Guard officials said that they have not established a completion date for this report, but do not anticipate a final decision on the Polar Sea before fiscal year 2017, after which they will evaluate the cost-effectiveness of extending the Polar Star’s life, if necessary. Given the heightened interest in the Arctic, the Coast Guard has taken actions to implement its Arctic strategy, and conduct Arctic operations— both of which may help the Coast Guard better understand and mitigate identified Arctic capability gaps. In addition, the Coast Guard is tracking, or has plans to track, its various activities in the Arctic. For example, the Coast Guard reports on activities it conducts during its annual Arctic Shield operation in an AAR each year, and is in the process of the developing a system that will track its Arctic actions taken to implement the various strategies and directives. However, the Coast Guard has not systematically assessed how its actions have helped to mitigate Arctic capability gaps. Such an assessment—which includes developing measures for gauging its progress, when feasible—is critical for the Coast Guard to be fully informed about its own progress in helping to mitigate these gaps. By systematically assessing and measuring how its actions have helped to mitigate capability gaps, the Coast Guard will better understand the status of these gaps and be better positioned to effectively plan its Arctic operations, including its allocation of resources and prioritization of activities to target the gaps. To better position the Coast Guard to effectively plan its Arctic operations, we recommend that the Commandant of the Coast Guard take the following two actions: develop measures, as appropriate, for gauging how the agency’s actions have helped to mitigate the Arctic capability gaps; and design and implement a process to systematically assess the extent to which actions taken agency-wide have helped mitigate the Arctic capability gaps for which it has responsibility. We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Homeland Security, Commerce, Defense, and Interior and the National Science Foundation for comment. DHS provided written comments, which are summarized below and reproduced in full in appendix VI. In addition, components within the Departments of Commerce and Interior provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. In its written comments, DHS concurred with and described actions it has planned to address our recommendation that the Coast Guard develop measures and design and implement a process for systematically assessing the extent to which its actions have helped to mitigate Arctic capability gaps. Specifically, DHS stated that the Coast Guard plans to develop specific measures for some of its Arctic activities which will be tracked on the web-based site that it has under development. DHS further stated that these measures will be used as part of the Coast Guard’s annual review of its implementation plan for its Arctic strategy. Through this annual review, the Coast Guard plans to systematically assess how its actions have helped to mitigate the capability gaps for which the Coast Guard is the lead agency, per the Implementation Framework for the National Strategy for the Artic Region. According to DHS, this review will begin in December 2016 and continue throughout calendar year 2017. We believe that these actions will help the Coast Guard better understand the status of these capability gaps and better position it to effectively plan its Arctic operations. However, we continue to believe that it is important for the Coast Guard to also systematically assess how its actions affect Arctic capability gaps for which it is not the lead as well. Although the Coast Guard may not be the lead for these gaps, its Arctic missions can still be affected by them, and thus, it remains important for the Coast Guard to be aware of its own progress in helping to mitigate its part of these gaps. As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate committees and federal agencies. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-7141 or groverj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix VII. Appendix II: Selected Federal Stakeholders and Interagency Groups with Arctic Responsibilities Examples of Arctic responsibilities The U.S. Coast Guard is a multimission, maritime military service within the Department of Homeland Security that has responsibilities including maritime safety, security, environmental protection, and national defense, among other missions. Other departmental components also have Arctic responsibilities. For example, the National Protection and Programs Directorate protects critical infrastructure, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency has responsibility for disaster assistance that could increase with climate change. The Department of Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration provides information on Arctic oceanic and atmospheric conditions, issues warnings for hazardous weather, issues weather and ice forecasts, provides fisheries management and enforcement, develops and maintains nautical charts, provides scientific support in the event of oil or other hazardous material spills, and operates the Search and Rescue Satellite Aided Tracking System, among other responsibilities. The National Telecommunications and Information Administration under the Department of Commerce is responsible for the telecommunication infrastructure in the Arctic. The Department of Defense is responsible in the Arctic and elsewhere for securing the United States from direct attack; securing strategic access and retaining global freedom of action; strengthening existing and emerging alliances and partnerships; and establishing favorable security conditions. The Department of the Interior is responsible for management and regulation of resource development in the U.S. Arctic region and coordinates with the Coast Guard on safety compliance inspections of offshore energy facilities and in the event of a major oil spill. Specifically, within the Department, the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management is responsible for managing development of offshore resources, and the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement enforces safety and environmental regulations. The Department of State is responsible for formulating and implementing U.S. policy on international issues concerning the Arctic and Antarctic, leading the domestic interagency Arctic Policy Group, and leading U.S. participation in the Arctic Council. The department has also established a senior-level representative for the Arctic region to support efforts on increasing engagement with international partners. The Department of Transportation and its component agency, the Maritime Administration, is involved in marine transportation and shipping issues in the Arctic and elsewhere, among other things. The National Science Foundation is responsible for funding U.S. Arctic research— including research on the causes and effects of climate change––and providing associated logistics and infrastructure support to conduct this research. The National Science Foundation and Coast Guard also coordinate on the use of the Coast Guard’s icebreakers for scientific research. Other federal departments and agencies also have a role in U.S. Government efforts in the Arctic, but were not discussed in this report. They include the Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Energy, Department of Health and Human Services, Federal Communications Commission, and National Aeronautics and Space Administration, among others. Examples of Arctic responsibilities The Arctic Executive Steering Committee provides guidance to federal departments and agencies and coordinates implementation of national Arctic policies and plans, such as the National Strategy for the Arctic Region and its implementation plan. The steering committee is chaired by the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy and consists of representatives from over 20 federal departments, agencies, and offices. The Arctic Policy Group is an informal interagency group led by the Department of State that shares Arctic-related information and oversees implementation of U.S. Arctic policy. The group consists of officials from numerous federal agencies and the state of Alaska Governor’s and Lieutenant Governor’s offices. The Committee on the Marine Transportation System is a federal interagency coordinating committee that assesses the adequacy of the marine transportation system and coordinates and makes recommendations on federal policies that affect the marine transportation system. The Coast Guard and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration co-chair the Committee’s Arctic Integrated Action Team with the Maritime Administration. The Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee helps set priorities for future Arctic research, works with the Arctic Research Commission to develop and establish national Arctic research policy, and promotes federal interagency coordination on Arctic research activities, among other things. The committee is chaired by the National Science Foundation and consists of representatives from over 15 departments, agencies, and offices, including the Department of Defense. The Interagency Coordinating Committee on Oil Pollution Research coordinates federal oil pollution research activities and establishes oil pollution research priorities. The Committee is chaired by the Coast Guard with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, and the Environmental Protection Agency serving as rotating Vice Chairs. The Interagency Working Group on Coordination of Domestic Energy Development and Permitting in Alaska, led by the Department of the Interior, coordinates federal oversight of the development of energy resources and associated infrastructure in Alaska. The National Ocean Council consists of representatives from 27 federal agencies, departments, and offices and is responsible for implementation of the National Ocean Policy. The U.S. Arctic Research Commission is responsible for, among other things, developing and establishing an integrated national Arctic research policy that guides federal agencies in developing and implementing their Arctic research programs. The commission consists of representatives from the National Science Foundation, academic and research institutions, private industry, and indigenous residents of the U.S. Arctic. The Extended Continental Shelf Task Force, led by the Department of State, coordinates the collection and analysis of relevant data and prepares the necessary documentation to establish the limits of the U.S. continental shelf in accordance with international law. Table 3 identifies selected laws and policies that cite polar icebreaking capability. . The May 2013 National Strategy for the Arctic Region seeks to integrate the work of federal departments and agencies with the activities already underway in Alaska and at the international level. The Coast Guard is the lead for 7 of the 36 total tasks (or objectives) in the January 2014 implementation plan, and DHS and the Coast Guard support another 19. Each task also has various, actionable next steps. According to Coast Guard officials, the agency is responsible for coordinating the completion of tasks for which it has been identified as the lead agency, as funding and resources allow. To complete its tasks, the Coast Guard must coordinate with other agencies. As described in the implementation plan, federal departments and agencies are to report on their progress on the tasks, and the plan is to be revisited after 5 years to ensure that it still meets the intent and priorities of the nation. The implementation plan includes timeframes for some, but not all, next steps, and Coast Guard officials stated that tasks are being completed as resources permit. According to a March 2016 White House report describing federal agencies’ progress on Arctic strategy tasks, the Coast Guard, along with supporting agencies, has taken action toward implementing all the strategy tasks for which the Coast Guard is assigned as the lead, as detailed in table 4. In March 2016, the White House issued the Implementation Framework for the National Strategy for the Arctic Region which is to supersede its 2014 implementation plan. The AESC led the efforts to develop the revised framework, which updates the 2014 implementation plan by (1) incorporating the Administration’s new priorities into the existing lines of efforts, particularly placing greater importance on community sustainability and resilience; (2) removing actions listed in the 2014 implementation plan that have been completed, or are no longer considered an actionable priority; (3) including factors to improve efficiency by reducing redundancies and closing interagency coordination gaps; and (4) increasing the importance of science by incorporating the entire Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee Arctic Research Plan by reference into the Pursuing Responsible Arctic Region Stewardship line of effort. In addition, the revised framework assigned an overall coordination lead for each line of effort from the national strategy. The 2016 framework includes 28 tasks that encompass various next steps and, unlike the 2014 plan, assigned a lead agency to each next step rather than to the overarching task. The Coast Guard was assigned to lead next steps that fall within 8 of the 28 tasks—7 of which it was also assigned as the lead in the 2014 plan. For the additional 2016 task, the Coast Guard has the lead for one of the next steps, which involves the analysis and monitoring of illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the Arctic. The 2016 framework is to be revisited in 5 years; however, the framework states that because the Arctic is undergoing changes, the AESC may make adjustments before then. According to Coast Guard officials, the AESC’s efforts to update the implementation plan’s priorities are important because the tasks in the national strategy need to be balanced with new priorities announced by the President—some of which may be difficult to accomplish because they are evolving and may be planned further into the future than the 10-year national strategy. Further, Coast Guard officials stated that better prioritization of the national efforts will help the Coast Guard in making decisions about what it needs to achieve in the Arctic given its limited resources. The April 2013 National Ocean Policy Implementation Plan and its appendix—developed by the National Ocean Council—identify the Arctic as one of nine key objectives and include tasks for federal agencies consistent with their existing missions and activities. Although the plan does not assign designated leads for each task, the Coast Guard is charged with helping to implement three Arctic-specific tasks—which include various next steps. The National Ocean Council developed and maintains a U.S. government-authorized, web-based site for federal agencies to report the status of the tasks under the National Ocean Policy. The Coast Guard, along with supporting agencies, has taken steps toward implementing all three of its assigned tasks, as detailed in table 5. For example, the National Ocean Council reported that the Coast Guard and its partners completed one task in its entirety, and that the two other tasks and related next steps were from 55 to 95 percent complete, as of December 2015. All of the Coast Guard’s tasks were to have been completed in either 2013 or 2014, but the Coast Guard reported to the National Ocean Council that funding and resource constraints challenged their ability to complete the tasks in their entirety. In addition to the contact named above, Dawn Hoff (Assistant Director), Tracey Cross (Analyst-in-Charge), Jillian Schofield, Linda Collins, Eric Warren, Susan Hsu, Tracey King, Chuck Bausell, Jan Montgomery, Michele Fejfar, Eric Hauswirth, Katherine Trimble, Laurier Fish, Carol Henn, and John Crawford made key contributions to this work.

Summary: The retreat of polar sea ice in the Arctic, as reported by the U.S. National Snow and Ice Data Center, combined with an expected increase in human activity, has heightened U.S. interests in the Arctic region. To supplement U.S. Arctic policy, the White House and federal agencies have issued Arctic strategies and plans. Since the Arctic region has a substantial maritime domain, the Coast Guard plays a significant role in Arctic policy implementation and enforcement. GAO was asked to examine the Coast Guard's responsibilities, capabilities, and plans for the Arctic. This report discusses, among other things, the extent to which the Coast Guard has (1) reported progress in implementing its Arctic strategy, (2) assessed its Arctic capabilities and taken actions to mitigate any identified gaps, and (3) reported being able to carry out polar icebreaking operations. GAO reviewed relevant laws and policies and Coast Guard documents that detail its Arctic plans. GAO conducted a site visit to Alaska and interviewed officials from the Coast Guard, state and local government entities, native village corporations, and private or nonprofit organizations. These observations are not generalizable, but provided insights on Coast Guard activities. The U.S. Coast Guard, within the Department of Homeland Security, reported making progress implementing its Arctic strategy . For example, the Coast Guard reported conducting exercises related to Arctic oil spill response and search and rescue, and facilitating the formation of a safety committee in the Arctic, among other tasks in its strategy. To track the status of these efforts, the Coast Guard is developing a web-based tool and anticipates finalizing the tool in mid-2016. The Coast Guard assessed its capability to perform its Arctic missions and identified various capability gaps—including communications, infrastructure, and icebreaking, and has worked to mitigate these gaps with its Arctic partners, such as other federal agencies. Specifically, Coast Guard officials stated that the agency's actions to implement the various Arctic strategies and carry out annual Arctic operations have helped to mitigate Arctic capability gaps. However, the Coast Guard has not systematically assessed the extent to which its actions agency-wide have helped to mitigate these gaps. Coast Guard officials attributed this, in part, to not being able to unilaterally close the gaps. While mitigating these gaps requires joint efforts among Arctic partners, the Coast Guard has taken actions in the Arctic that are specific to its missions and therefore has responsibility for assessing the extent to which these actions have helped to mitigate capability gaps. By systematically assessing and measuring its progress, the Coast Guard will better understand the status of these gaps and be better positioned to effectively plan its Arctic operations. The Coast Guard has been unable to fulfill some of its polar icebreaking responsibilities with its aging icebreaker fleet, which currently includes two active polar icebreakers. In 2011 and 2012, the Coast Guard was unable to maintain assured, year-round access to the Arctic and did not meet 4 of 11 requests for polar icebreaking services. With its one active heavy icebreaker—which has greater icebreaking capability—nearing the end of its service life, the Coast Guard initiated a program in 2013 to acquire a new one and is working to determine the optimal acquisition strategy. However, the Coast Guard's efforts to acquire an icebreaker, whether by lease or purchase, will be limited by legal and operational requirements. In addition, current projections show that the Coast Guard is likely to have a 3- to 6-year gap in its heavy icebreaking capability before a new icebreaker becomes operational, as shown below. The Coast Guard is developing a strategy to determine how to best address this expected gap. Coast Guard's Heavy Icebreaker Availability and Expected Capability Gaps, Present until 2030 GAO recommends that the Coast Guard develop measures for assessing how its actions have helped to mitigate Arctic capability gaps, and design and implement a process to systematically assess its progress on this. DHS concurred with our recommendations.