Both the MS-13 and 18th Street gangs were formed in Los Angeles, California. MS-13 was founded by Salvadoran immigrants, many of whom came to the United States to escape the civil war in their native country in the 1980s. The 18th Street gang was founded primarily by Mexican immigrants in the 1960s, though it currently accepts members from other backgrounds. MS-13’s early membership is reported to have included former guerrillas and Salvadoran government soldiers whose combat experience during the Salvadoran civil war contributed to the growth of the gang’s notoriety as one of the more violent Los Angeles street gangs. The end of the Central American civil wars and changes in U.S. immigration laws helped to facilitate the removal of tens of thousands of Central Americans illegally in the United States to their native countries in the 1990s, including MS-13 and 18th Street gang members who subsequently spread their gang culture and operations to those countries. MS-13 and 18th Street gang members removed from the United States to Central American countries established gangs in those countries. Within the United States, NGIC has reported that MS-13 has between 8,000 and 10,000 members nationally. The FBI has reported that MS-13 operates in at least 42 states and the District of Columbia. Traditionally, in the United States, MS-13 has consisted of loosely affiliated groups; however, law enforcement officials have reported the coordination of criminal activity among MS-13 gang members operating in the Atlanta, Dallas, Los Angeles, New York, and Washington, D.C., metropolitan areas. In the 2009 National Gang Threat Assessment, the NGIC and NDIC indicated that MS- 13 members have been involved in a wide range of crimes within U.S. communities, including homicide, drive-by shootings, assault, robbery, weapons trafficking, the transportation and distribution of drugs, identity theft, and prostitution operations. The 18th Street gang is active in 28 states and has a membership estimated at between 30,000 and 50,000. According to the 2009 National Gang Threat Assessment, in California, for example, about 80 percent of 18th Street gang members are illegal aliens from Mexico and Central America. In the United States, 18th Street gang members have been involved in homicide, assault, robbery, street-level drug distribution, auto theft, and identification fraud. Although estimates vary, in the Central American countries of El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Guatemala, USAID has estimated that there are approximately 63,000 gang members, while the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) has estimated total gang membership in Central America to be approximately 70,000. According to USAID, the majority of these members belong to MS-13 and 18th Street. Within Central American countries, these gangs engage in a range of criminal and violent acts, including homicide, kidnapping, drug smuggling, and extortion, among other crimes. The NSC is the President’s principal forum for considering national security and foreign policy matters with his senior national security advisors and cabinet officials. The council also serves as the President’s principal arm for coordinating these policies among various government agencies. As such, under its IOCPCC, the NSC coordinated with other federal departments and agencies to develop a strategy to combat the threat of criminal gangs from Central America. Various other federal departments and agencies play key roles in U.S. federal government efforts to address transnational gangs. As shown in figure 1, these departments include DOJ, DHS, State, USAID, and DOD. Within DOJ, seven components have key roles in law enforcement efforts to combat transnational gangs—the Criminal Division; the 93 U.S. Attorneys in 94 judicial districts across the nation that operate with administrative and operational support from the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys (EOUSA); and four law enforcement agencies—the FBI; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF); Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); and U.S. National Central Bureau of Interpol. The Criminal Division, along with the U.S. Attorneys, is charged with enforcing most federal criminal laws and can prosecute a wide range of criminal matters, including those involving transnational gangs and gang members. The Criminal Division’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program and Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training have been involved in providing antigang training for law enforcement officials and prosecutors from Central America. Also part of the Criminal Division is the Gang Unit, a specialized group of prosecutors charged with developing and implementing strategies to address gangs. In addition to prosecuting gang cases, the Gang Unit prosecutors assist U.S. Attorneys on legal issues and multidistrict cases, as well as work with domestic and foreign law enforcement to coordinate enforcement strategies. The 93 U.S. Attorneys prosecute the majority of criminal cases as well as civil litigation handled by DOJ. EOUSA provides general executive assistance and guidance to U.S. Attorneys’ Offices (USAO) and has a national gang coordinator who acts as a liaison between the USAOs and other DOJ components involved in gang prosecution efforts. The FBI’s transnational gang efforts target violent crime and criminal enterprises associated with transnational gangs. ATF’s primary involvement with MS-13 and 18th Street is related to gang members’ illegal possession of, or trafficking in, firearms. DEA targets gangs in connection with specific drug sources or large-scale suppliers who distribute illicit drugs to the gangs. The U.S. National Central Bureau of Interpol is the point of contact for all International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) matters in the United States, including secure communications with police authorities in INTERPOL member countries. As such, among other things, the National Central Bureau receives and sends out notices to INTERPOL bureaus in other countries concerning information or the location of gang members or suspects involved in gang activities. Within DHS, ICE’s Office of Investigations has a National Gang Unit that manages and coordinates national efforts to combat the growth and proliferation of transnational criminal street gangs. Gang members who are involved in crimes with a nexus to the border, or are foreign-born and are in the United States illegally may be subject to ICE’s dual criminal and administrative authorities that are used to disrupt and dismantle transnational gang activities with criminal prosecutions and removal from the United States. In addition, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the DHS component that protects U.S. borders against terrorism, illegal immigration, and drug smuggling, among other threats, has a role in identifying gang members at the borders. Upon the arrest of a suspected gang member, CBP will contact ICE and determine if enforcement action is to be taken by CBP or ICE based upon whether the apprehension took place between the ports of entry or at a port of entry. CBP has developed an Anti-Gang Initiative to improve the agency’s awareness of gangs through increased partnerships with other federal agencies and to provide gang awareness training for its personnel. Two State bureaus, the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs and the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, are involved in efforts to address gang violence in Central America. The Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs is responsible for managing and promoting U.S. interests in the region and fostering cooperation on issues such as drug trafficking and crime. The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs advises the U.S. government on the development of policies and programs to combat narcotics and crime, and works with host nations to strengthen their capabilities so that they can bolster their own effectiveness in fighting drug trafficking and crime including transnational gangs. USAID provides economic, development, and humanitarian assistance to other countries and, with respect to transnational gangs, is the primary agency responsible for managing gang intervention and prevention efforts in Central America. These efforts are carried out principally through the agency’s Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean and missions in Central America, with technical assistance and support from the Democracy and Governance Office of the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance. The agency works with foreign governments and local communities in Central America to support and implement a broad range of programs focused on, among other things, creating employment opportunities and alternatives to participating in gangs. DOD, and specifically SOUTHCOM, has tracked the growth of the gangs in the Central American countries that are within its area of responsibility. Although SOUTHCOM does not have any specific programs in place in Central America to combat transnational gangs, it monitors information on gangs that either pose a threat to the sovereignty of governments in the region or are involved in drug trafficking. U.S.-sponsored antigang programs in Central America are being funded in part by the Mérida Initiative. This initiative was announced by the Bush Administration in October 2007 as a multinational effort to confront criminal organizations whose actions affect Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean countries of the Dominican Republic and Haiti, and spill over into the United States. Through this initiative, the U.S. federal government is providing equipment, training, and other assistance to help these countries address drug and arms trafficking, bulk cash smuggling, and other crime issues such as gangs and organized crime. For Central America, funding under the Mérida Initiative is administered by State and has been allocated to various areas and efforts, including to combat transnational gangs, improve Central American countries’ judicial systems, enhance airport and border security in the region, refurbish patrol boats used by Central American countries for intercepting drug traffickers in coastal waters, and a broad range of crime prevention programs, including programs directed at youth at-risk. In fiscal year 2008, the Supplemental Appropriations Act appropriated $60 million for the Central American portion of the Mérida Initiative. In fiscal year 2009, the 2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act appropriated $105 million for Mérida Initiative activities in Central America. Up to $83 million was appropriated for Mérida Initiative activities in Central America for fiscal year 2010 by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010. We recently completed work looking at the status of funds for the initiative and have work ongoing examining U.S. counternarcotics and anticrime assistance provided to Mexico under the initiative. We plan to issue a report on this work later this year. As of February 2010, federal agencies were developing a strategy for a regional security initiative in Central America, called the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). This new initiative is in accordance with direction in the conference report accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, which removed the Central American portion from the Mérida Initiative and placed funding for Central American programs into the new CARSI. Under this new initiative, Central American programs initially funded by the Mérida Initiative, including antigang programs under the Strategy, would be subsumed into CARSI. According to officials from State and USAID, the CARSI strategy is still under development and officials did not have an estimate as to when it would be completed. In addition to funding provided under the Mérida Initiative, federal agencies have used funding from their operating accounts to implement antigang programs in Central America and the United States. For example, in fiscal years 2007 and 2008 the FBI funded $200,000 and $965,000 from its operating account for establishment of the Transnational Anti-Gang (TAG) unit in El Salvador and the operations of the MS-13 National Gang Task Force, an FBI task force that coordinates FBI-led investigations of MS-13 and 18th Street gangs, respectively. Further, ICE uses funding to conduct transnational gang investigations in the United States and abroad. According to ICE officials, $20.4 million that Congress directed to be used for ICE’s antigang activities in fiscal year 2008 funded 119 positions to expand ICE’s efforts to combat transnational street gangs. Additionally, USAID officials reported starting their gang prevention programs before Mérida Initiative funding became available and have used non-initiative resources to promote antigang and rule-of-law programs in Central America. Various federal departments and agencies under the auspices of the NSC developed an interagency strategy for combating gangs with connections to Central America that defines the roles and responsibilities of federal agencies in carrying out the strategy, identifies the problems and risks associated with the gangs, defines its scope and purpose, and identifies specific activities to be taken to achieve results. However, it lacks other key characteristics, such as providing an approach or framework to include an entity for overseeing implementation, and goals and measures for assessing progress and performance in implementing the strategy. To respond to the threats criminal gangs such as MS-13 and 18th Street pose to the countries in which they operate, U.S. federal agencies developed the Strategy to Combat the Threat of Criminal Gangs from Central America and Mexico (the Strategy). Issued in July 2007, this interagency strategy was developed under the auspices of the NSC’s IOCPCC, comprised of representatives from various federal agencies, including State, DOJ, DHS, USAID, and DOD. The Strategy is designed to combat the threat posed by gangs with links to Central America and Mexico by adopting an approach that integrates law enforcement with youth crime prevention and interventions that provide alternatives to gangs. The Strategy is also designed to be regional in scope, with the United States working with the other countries affected by the gangs to avoid transferring the gang problem to neighboring countries. To implement this approach, the Strategy includes five broad categories under which federal agencies are to take actions to combat transnational gangs—diplomacy, repatriation, law enforcement, capacity enhancement, and prevention—and identifies the activities for agencies to implement under each of these categories. As shown in table 1, for each category, the Strategy identifies agencies that are to implement the individual activities and a lead agency to coordinate these activities. Specifically, the Strategy identifies State as the lead agency for the diplomacy category and, along with USAID, the lead agency for the capacity enhancement category; DHS as the lead agency for the repatriation category and, along with DOJ, the lead agency for the law enforcement category; and USAID as the lead agency for the prevention category. As part of our prior work on desirable characteristics of effective national strategies, we have reported that such strategies are the foundation for defining what agencies seek to accomplish. As such, we found that having characteristics like a description of agencies’ activities, roles, and responsibilities as part of a strategy helps to enhance the strategy’s effectiveness. Strategies that include characteristics such as these provide policymakers and implementing agencies with a planning tool that can better help ensure accountability and more effective results. In addition to defining activities, roles, and responsibilities of participating agencies, the Strategy also defines its scope and purpose and identifies the problems, risks, and threats associated with transnational gangs. In our prior work, we found that desirable characteristics of effective national strategies also include a discussion of purpose, scope, problems, risks, and threats. For example, in defining its purpose and scope, the Strategy notes that effectively addressing the problem of these transnational gangs requires close coordination and information sharing among the affected countries in Central America and Mexico and a comprehensive approach that includes law enforcement, prevention, intervention, rehabilitation, and reintegration for gang members, which the five categories of the Strategy are intended to address. In regards to identifying the problem, the Strategy states that gangs such as MS-13 and 18th Street threaten U.S. regional interests in fostering stable democracies and the U.S. domestic interest in protecting U.S. citizens from gang violence and crime. These characteristics help indicate why the Strategy was developed and identify the specific national issues and threats toward which the Strategy is directed. Even as the Strategy contains several characteristics of effective national strategies, it lacks other characteristics, such as providing an approach for overseeing implementation of programs and efforts across its different categories. Our prior work on effective national strategies found that they include an approach or framework for overseeing their implementation or describe the organizations that will provide oversight, which enhances the accountability of agencies and stakeholders to implement programs as planned. This is especially important for the U.S. antigang strategy given that (1) there are eight federal departments or agencies involved in implementing the Strategy; (2) these agencies have wide-ranging missions and programs—from USAID’s mission to implement gang prevention and youth intervention programs to ICE’s mission to remove foreign-born gang members from the United States; and (3) the Strategy specifies 35 different activities under the five categories that federal agencies are to implement. With regard to oversight, the Strategy itself does not identify an approach or framework for providing oversight across agencies’ implementation of the Strategy’s categories and activities and, according to DOJ, State, and USAID officials, one does not exist. Although the Strategy designates lead departments or agencies for each category, such as State leading the Diplomacy category and USAID leading the Prevention category, the Strategy does not designate an approach to provide oversight of the overall implementation of the Strategy across the Strategy’s various categories. Further, while members of an interagency antigang task force have discussed agencies’ efforts to implement the Strategy, this task force is not intended to provide this oversight. According to DOJ, State, and USAID officials, under the auspices of the NSC, the International Anti- Gang Task Force, which is chaired by DOJ’s Criminal Division and includes representatives from DOJ, DHS, State, and USAID, has responsibility for sharing information on the implementation of the Strategy. However, this task force is not intended to, nor does it, provide oversight for holding agencies accountable for implementation of their activities under the Strategy. Additionally, State’s regional gang advisor stated that no single department or entity has been identified as having oversight responsibility for the Strategy’s implementation. DOJ officials did not know why an oversight mechanism was not included in the Strategy, noting that, as a result, there is no enforcement mechanism to ensure that agencies are implementing their respective parts of the Strategy. USAID officials told us that after the Strategy was developed, the individual within the NSC who had been responsible for coordinating development of the Strategy stated that the council’s IOCPCC was to oversee the implementation of the Strategy; however this did not occur in part because the individual left the council. Additionally, although federal agencies are developing a strategy for the newly formed CARSI, participating agencies have not yet determined the oversight framework, if any, that is to be used for this broader initiative or whether the existing antigang Strategy will be incorporated into CARSI. Thus, it is too early to tell whether CARSI will provide an oversight approach for federal agencies’ antigang programs. Regardless of whether the antigang Strategy is incorporated into the new CARSI, or whether the NSC or some other agency or entity is responsible for oversight, establishing an approach or framework for oversight across the Strategy’s categories could help enhance the accountability of agencies to implement activities as laid out in the Strategy and provide visibility over the extent to which agencies’ individual efforts are achieving their intended results under the Strategy. Our prior work found that effective national strategies set clear goals and related performance measures for assessing progress made in achieving intended results. The Strategy, however, does not identify the goals that are to be achieved through its implementation and the associated measures to track the progress made in achieving those goals, which could be established and monitored through an oversight approach or framework. We have reported that performance measurement is important because decision makers can use performance information to identify problems or weaknesses in programs, identify factors causing problems, and modify processes to address the problems. USAID officials told us that after the Strategy was initially developed, the NSC intended to establish performance measures for implementation of the Strategy, but this did not occur in part because the individual within the NSC who had been responsible for coordinating development of the Strategy left the council. Although the Strategy itself lacks goals and measures to gauge results and assess progress across the Strategy’s categories and activities, State and USAID, for their parts of the Strategy, have begun to develop mechanisms to assess the results of their efforts being implemented under the Mérida Initiative, including the initiative’s antigang programs. For example, for its part, State has drafted four gang-specific performance measures within the broader set of measures it is developing for the Mérida Initiative: (1) number of arrests of suspected gang members completed by police units trained/equipped through Mérida Initiative funding in countergang strategies, (2) number of arrests and prosecutions of gang leaders in the region, (3) number of gang-related crime occurrences and homicides in the region, and (4) number of instances where gang-related information is passed from the TAG to U.S. law enforcement for review/action. State officials noted that the department is working with its embassies to determine if Central American countries will be capable of providing the department with the requisite data needed to determine results and outcomes for these measures, as these countries control much of the data, often in disparate data sets and across various ministries. As of November 2009, State officials also reported that they were in the process of reviewing bids from contractors to develop performance measures for the department’s Mérida Initiative programs, including its antigang programs, and to work directly with the host nations to obtain the necessary data to determine the results and outcomes of the efforts based on these measures. In addition to the measures State is developing to evaluate the results of Mérida Initiative-funded programs in Central America, USAID has developed a Mérida Initiative Central America Results Framework that includes an effect evaluation to be conducted by Vanderbilt University through a contractual arrangement with USAID. The agency intends for this evaluation to assess the long-term effect and measure the results of its programs in Central American communities that are the focus of USAID crime prevention efforts under the Mérida Initiative, including those related to gangs. The evaluation consists of five elements: (1) community surveys, (2) reviews of demographic data in the communities, (3) focus groups, (4) interviews with stakeholders such as community leaders, and (5) community observations such as physical infrastructure. Vanderbilt University officials are to conduct the evaluations every 18 months in communities where USAID-sponsored crime prevention activities have been implemented and communities where no activities have been implemented, with these latter communities serving as control groups in order to establish a baseline. Specifically with respect to the surveys, USAID plans to use the results to gauge the effect of its crime prevention programs through community and citizen perceptions on safety and security. To minimize any duplication and take advantage of survey efforts already underway, USAID officials stated that they plan to incorporate the survey questions on community and citizen perceptions on safety and security as part of a broader survey Vanderbilt University will be conducting in the region in 2010. Although State and USAID have begun to develop mechanisms to help assess the outcomes of antigang programs implemented under the Mérida Initiative, these mechanisms do not encompass all of the Strategy’s categories and activities, nor do they include the antigang programs of other federal agencies, such as those of DOJ and DHS. For example, while the measures State is developing, such as the numbers of arrests of gang members and leaders in the region, relate to the law enforcement, capacity enhancement, and prevention categories of the Strategy, these measures do not encompass the diplomacy or repatriation categories of the Strategy. According to State and USAID officials as well as officials from the FBI and ICE, State and USAID have not consulted or worked with DOJ and DHS agencies such as FBI and ICE in developing these performance measures because State’s and USAID’s measures are intended to encompass only their own programs and efforts. According to State, USAID, DOJ, and DHS officials, each agency focuses on developing performance-related goals and measures for its own programs as opposed to other agencies’ antigang programs for which it is not responsible, and, therefore, less familiar. As a result, the performance measures State and USAID are developing cannot serve as overall indicators of the federal government’s progress in implementing the Strategy as they do not take into account all of the federal agencies’ antigang programs to be implemented under the Strategy’s five categories, including those programs led by DOJ and DHS. In the absence of goals and performance measures or other mechanisms for monitoring and assessing the progress and performance of agencies’ antigang programs across the categories of the Strategy, it will be difficult for the federal government to determine if the overall interagency antigang effort is achieving the intended results and to hold agencies accountable for implementing the Strategy. Federal agencies have implemented a variety of programs to carry out the Strategy and combat transnational gangs with connections to Central America. To coordinate their implementation of antigang programs, agencies use a variety of mechanisms such as interagency committees and task forces. However, for the antigang unit in El Salvador, coordination among the FBI, ICE, and Salvadoran law enforcement in sharing investigative information on gangs could be enhanced by reaching agreement on ICE’s participation in the unit. Further, although agencies have taken steps to develop performance measures and obtain data on those measures to track the results of programs, agencies are just starting to collect performance data due to the early stage of implementation of most of these programs. Additionally, federal agencies have identified various factors that are largely outside their control and that can affect their implementation of programs, such as challenges facing Central American countries in sustaining antigang programs. To carry out the Strategy and combat transnational gangs with connections to Central American countries, federal agencies have developed and implemented a variety of programs in the United States and in host countries in the region, such as El Salvador and Guatemala. This variety of programs reflects the different categories of the strategy and includes diplomatic efforts to establish a coordinated approach to the gang problem; efforts to facilitate the repatriation of gang members who are in the United States illegally; mechanisms to facilitate the sharing of investigative information between U.S. law enforcement agencies and foreign law enforcement agencies; programs to provide training to Central American law enforcement officials; and programs to provide recreational and vocational opportunities for at-risk youth, among others. Additional details on federal agencies’ antigang programs under each category of the Strategy are as follows: Diplomacy: State has led efforts to engage diplomatically with Central American countries to discuss gang issues. The department has led discussions with member countries of the Central American Integration System. Under this initiative, the United States and Central American countries first held discussions regarding regional gang threats in July 2007, at which time the United States announced the Strategy. The countries held a second, and the most recent, dialogue in December 2008, which focused on discussing practical measures to combat the threats of criminal gangs, narcotics trafficking, and illicit trafficking of firearms in Central America. At the conclusion, all participating countries signed a communiqué pledging their continued support in the fight against transnational threats, including gangs. Repatriation: ICE has implemented the Electronic Travel Document system to facilitate the issuance of travel documents for the removal of illegal aliens, including gang members, to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Under this program, ICE electronically sends travel document applications to the consular officials of these countries; these officials can then electronically sign and certify the documents stating that the countries will receive the illegal aliens to be removed. These documents are available to ICE electronically through the Electronic Travel Document system. This program eliminates the need for consular officials to visit in person the individual awaiting removal from the United States before issuing documents, helping to reduce the amount of time it takes for ICE to receive travel documents from foreign countries and ultimately remove illegal aliens. According to ICE officials, the program can eliminate approximately 5 to 7 days that an alien would spend in detention, thus decreasing the cost incurred by the government. Law Enforcement: In 2005, ICE implemented Operation Community Shield—a nationwide initiative to arrest and remove criminal alien gang members from the United States. ICE began the operation to target violent transnational street gangs through the use of ICE’s broad law enforcement powers to identify, prosecute, and ultimately remove gang members from the United States. Although initially focused on MS-13, ICE expanded Operation Community Shield to target all transnational criminal street gangs, prison gangs, and outlaw motorcycle gangs. For its part, the FBI has implemented various programs to facilitate the exchange of information, such as criminal histories of suspected gang members, between law enforcement agencies in the United States and Central American countries. For example, in 2007, the FBI established a joint U.S.- Salvadoran Transnational Anti-Gang unit in El Salvador—called TAG—to exchange information on gangs and gang members between the Salvadoran national police and U.S.-based law enforcement agencies for use in criminal investigations and gang-member prosecutions in both countries. The unit includes investigators and analysts from the Salvadoran national police, prosecutors from El Salvador’s Attorney General’s Office, and two FBI agents. The TAG unit’s exchange of information on gang members has aided U.S. gang investigations in locations such as Charlotte, North Carolina; Omaha, Nebraska; and Los Angeles, California. The FBI plans to establish units like this in Guatemala and Honduras. Further, in 2006, the FBI began the Central American Fingerprint Exploitation program to collect and store existing criminal fingerprint records and other biometric information from the countries of Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, Belize, and Honduras in FBI databases and make them available to all U.S. local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies. These records are searched in the FBI’s Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System, with resulting matches shared with the contributing country for investigative purposes. The FBI has deployed the system in El Salvador, conducted assessments to determine how to deploy the system to Belize and Panama, and plans to conduct more assessments for deploying the system to Guatemala and Honduras. In addition, beginning in 2008, the FBI, with funding from State, has implemented the Central American Law Enforcement Exchange program wherein law enforcement personnel from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras have visited locations in the United States to receive antigang training and share investigative practices with U.S. law enforcement personnel. In exchange, law enforcement personnel from the United States have visited El Salvador to provide antigang training and share practices with Central American police. Also related to law enforcement, ICE, in conjunction with State, established an international gang task force in Honduras in January 2010. Comprised of four Honduran police officers and one ICE agent, the task force is charged with developing intelligence to initiate and support gang investigations in the United States and Honduras. Capacity Enhancement: To help enhance the capacity of Central American governments to address gangs, beginning in 2006, State, DOJ, DHS, and other agencies have provided antigang training courses to Central American law enforcement officials through the International Law Enforcement Academy in El Salvador. The academy provides law enforcement training to officials from countries in Central and South America and the Caribbean. The training courses have focused on various aspects of gang enforcement efforts, such as police investigative techniques, prosecution, witness protection, and prison gang management, and participants have included police, prosecutors, judges, prison staff, border agents, and prevention and rehabilitation officials from El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, and Belize. As another example of capacity enhancement, USAID has provided technical assistance and training to police, prosecutors, and judges, among others, to reform justice-sector institutions in El Salvador to help improve the investigation, prosecution, and prevention of crimes including those committed by gangs. Prevention: USAID has implemented gang prevention, intervention, and rehabilitation programs in Central American countries to provide youth with alternatives to joining gangs and assist former gang members’ reentry into society. For example, through partnerships with faith-based and nongovernmental organizations and local governments in Central America, USAID has started youth centers in specific communities to provide a safe environment for recreational and vocational opportunities for young people. Figure 2 shows individuals participating in activities at these youth centers in El Salvador. Additionally, USAID has sponsored a community-based policing program in Guatemala to improve the relationship between the police and local citizens by establishing collaborative partnerships between law enforcement and the communities they serve to solve problems and increase trust. According to USAID, the agency plans to expand the community policing program to five new communities in Guatemala as well as five communities each in El Salvador and Panama. Federal agencies have taken action to coordinate their antigang programs and share information with each other through various interagency and coordinating groups. For example, DOJ has established several entities to coordinate and share information on gang enforcement efforts, including transnational gangs, among DOJ and DHS component agencies. These entities include the Anti-Gang Coordination Committee that is comprised of representatives from a variety of DOJ components and agencies, as well as representatives from DHS’s ICE, and meets at least quarterly each year to report on the status of antigang efforts and disseminate information for coordination. Another entity used to coordinate, share information and intelligence on gangs, and serve as a deconfliction center for gang operations is the National Gang Targeting, Enforcement, and Coordination Center (GangTECC). GangTECC is comprised of participants from the FBI, ATF, DEA, and ICE, among other DOJ and DHS components, and has responsibility for coordinating multijurisdictional investigations of all gangs except FBI-led investigations involving the MS-13 and 18th Street gangs. In addition, the FBI’s MS-13 National Gang Task Force has only FBI participants and is responsible for coordinating FBI’s multijurisdictional investigations involving MS-13 and 18th Street gangs. Further, within Central American countries, federal agencies have mechanisms for coordinating and sharing information on antigang programs. For example, in El Salvador at the U.S. embassy, U.S. government agency officials who are involved in implementing antigang programs, such as officials from DOJ, DHS, State, USAID, and DOD, hold regular meetings to discuss antigang activities and coordinate their implementation efforts. Appendix IV provides additional information on the roles and responsibilities of these and other headquarters-level coordinating entities as well as task forces that coordinate antigang efforts at the field level within the United States. In July 2009, we reported on the benefits and challenges associated with some of these various coordinating mechanisms. Specifically, we reported that entities such as the Anti-Gang Coordination Committee, GangTECC, and the MS-13 National Gang Task Force provide DOJ and DHS with a means to operate across agency boundaries and facilitate communication among participating agencies at the headquarters level. However, we also reported that while some overlaps in mission may be appropriate, the entities had not clearly identified their roles and responsibilities, resulting in possible gaps or unnecessary overlaps in agencies’ coordination and sharing of information on gang enforcement efforts, including those involving transnational gangs. Specifically, we reported that GangTECC and the MS-13 National Gang Task Force had overlapping missions and responsibilities for coordination and deconfliction of multijurisdictional investigations involving the MS-13 and 18th Street gangs. The two entities had these overlaps in part because the MS-13 National Gang Task Force already existed when GangTECC was established in 2006 and was not dismantled or folded into GangTECC at that time. We reported that both entities risked unnecessary federal resource expenditures to fund two entities when a single group could be more efficient. We recommended that DOJ, in consultation with DHS, articulate and differentiate roles, responsibilities, and missions of headquarters-level entities, which would strengthen headquarters-level coordination efforts to help ensure that they are not expended on overlapping missions. DOJ agreed with our recommendation and as of February 2010, DHS and DOJ officials reported that they are discussing ways to streamline processes, modify policies, and establish cross-cutting performance measures for federal gang programs. At the field level, FBI and ICE could strengthen their coordination and sharing of information on gang members and investigations specifically in El Salvador by reaching agreement on ICE’s participation in the TAG. In El Salvador, both ICE and FBI contact the Salvadoran national police to request information and intelligence on gangs to assist in the agencies’ gang investigations. The FBI makes its requests directly through its agents assigned to the TAG, while ICE’s requests for Salvadoran national police information on gangs or gang members are sent through ICE’s country attaché in El Salvador who forwards them to the FBI agents at the TAG. The FBI agents then pass the requests to Salvadoran national police officials if the FBI agents do not have the information needed to fulfill ICE’s requests. FBI and ICE officials stated that this process for coordinating information requests for the Salvadoran national police through the TAG has worked well, but that the process could be further strengthened by ICE’s participation in the TAG unit. Our work on effective interagency coordination has shown that collaborating agencies should organize joint and individual efforts and facilitate information sharing. Collaborating agencies also look for opportunities to leverage each others’ resources, thus obtaining additional benefits that would not be available if they were working separately. Coordinating in this way could yield benefits in terms of leveraging efforts already underway and minimizing any potential unnecessary duplication in federal agencies’ requests for information on gang members or gang investigations. Various U.S. and Salvadoran officials have cited potential benefits that could be gained from ICE and FBI both participating in the TAG. The director of El Salvador’s national police stated that he would like to see federal law enforcement agencies other than the FBI involved in the TAG unit, particularly ICE, because of ICE’s role in managing the removal of gang members from the United States to El Salvador. The unit chief of FBI’s MS- 13 National Gang Task Force stated that the FBI would also benefit from ICE participating in the TAG to assist in deconflicting enforcement operations between the FBI and ICE in El Salvador. ICE’s El Salvador country attaché stated that having an ICE agent at the TAG would streamline the current process since an ICE agent would be working directly at the TAG and be able to better identify possible connections between FBI and ICE gang cases and requests for information, thereby expediting information sharing. The FBI and ICE have discussed signing a joint memorandum of understanding to provide parameters for ICE’s participation in the TAG. According to the unit chief of the FBI’s MS-13 National Gang Task Force, in 2008 the FBI presented ICE with a memorandum of understanding for ICE to participate in the TAG unit in which the FBI legal attaché would manage the TAG and coordinate TAG gang investigations with ICE. The FBI memorandum required ICE to coordinate all of its activities related to the TAG with the FBI legal attaché. However, according to the head of ICE’s National Gang Unit, ICE would like to participate in the TAG more as an equal partner as opposed to being subordinate to the FBI. ICE officials stated that clarification is needed in regards to the administrative details on placing an ICE agent at the TAG such as housing and the location of the ICE agent’s office, as well as agreement on the extent to which an ICE agent assigned to the TAG could focus on work for ICE- specific investigations as needed. To help obtain this clarification and try to reach consensus on ICE participation in TAG, ICE officials stated that as of February 2010 they have not yet completed the process of drafting language to clarify their points of concern in the memorandum of understanding and plan to provide this draft language, once completed, to the FBI for its consideration. Further, the FBI and ICE have initiated discussions to conduct an assessment of ICE’s possible participation in TAG by having an ICE agent who would conduct the assessment assigned to the unit on a temporary basis. However, as of February 2010, ICE and FBI have not yet reached agreement on this temporary assignment and ICE’s plans to conduct the assessment because the two agencies disagree about the type and scope of the work that the agent would conduct for the assessment. The FBI and ICE could strengthen their coordination on gang investigations and enhance the efficiency of their existing process for exchanging information through the TAG by reaching consensus on ICE’s participation in the unit. By reaching agreement on ICE’s role, which the FBI and ICE have been considering since 2008, the two agencies would be in a better position to leverage their existing resources and information- sharing processes for gang investigations with a nexus to El Salvador. Earlier in this report, we discussed federal government efforts to measure the results achieved with the overall Strategy. Separately, federal agencies have established performance measures, such as numbers of arrests of gang members, for assessing their own individual antigang efforts. However, as most of these programs are in the early stages of implementation, agencies’ data on their programs’ performance cannot yet be used to assess the level of activity or program results across time. For example, USAID officials said that because most of the Mérida Initiative funding for its Central American programs was not released to USAID field missions until July and August 2009, programs funded by the Mérida Initiative have yet to have any appreciable results to measure. In addition, several antigang programs in Central America have yet to be fully implemented. For example, ICE and the FBI are seeking to establish the Criminal History Information Program in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras pending the hiring of needed analysts and completion of interagency agreements—expected to occur by the summer of 2010. Although federal agencies’ performance data do not yet indicate the level of progress or results achieved over time, federal agencies have begun to report data on their levels of activity to date. For example, State has established measures for the antigang training courses offered through the International Law Enforcement Academy in El Salvador, including tracking data on the number of gang classes offered and the number of participants successfully completing them. According to State, the academy has offered 10 gang-related training courses since 2006 with a total of 416 participants from various countries including El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Mexico. In addition to these measures, State asks participants to complete course evaluations and uses these evaluations to make modifications to the antigang training courses, such as changes in curriculum. USAID has also established measures for its own antigang programs, as shown in table 2. For example, USAID has established measures for its community policing program, such as the number of communities that have implemented community policing programs. USAID also requires program contractors to develop performance indexes for their respective programs. For example, the private contractor conducting USAID’s Community-based Crime and Violence Prevention Project plans to review local government records to measure the crime rate in project-targeted communities. For other efforts related to youth outreach centers, performance indicators tracked by program contractors include measures such as the number of youth who have received a job through the support of the outreach center or because of the skills acquired through the center. With regard to its gang enforcement efforts, ICE reports on the number of gang-related criminal and administrative arrests, among other measures. As shown in figure 3, the number of criminal and administrative gang- related arrests made by ICE has generally increased since fiscal year 2006, the first full year that it compiled this information. As shown in table 3, the FBI has also established various measures for each of its primary programs to combat transnational gangs. Among others, these measures include the number of gang cases worked and the number of countries and officials participating in the Central American Law Enforcement Exchange Program. In addition to these measures, the FBI has prepared after-action reports for the Central American Law Enforcement Exchange Program that summarize the results of the exchanges, including feedback from program participants, and has used these reports to modify the program. For example, according to the FBI, future exchange classes will include more practical and operational experiences (such as ride-alongs with local police officers and observation of police operations). Moreover, future classes will include more allowances for travel time and representation from more U.S. and foreign police departments. For the TAG, the FBI did not start to collect data for the unit’s measures, such as the number of requests for assistance the unit receives, until April 2008, about 6 months after the unit was established. According to FBI officials, no systematic log or other mechanism was used to track and record data on the TAG’s activities from September 2007 through April 2008, because, at the start-up of the unit, agents were assigned on a temporary basis and were primarily focused on establishing and initiating the operations of the unit. Thus, the FBI lacks information about the unit’s activity levels for its first 6 months of operation. Since FBI agents have been stationed at the TAG for 2-year, long-term rotations, these agents have developed and maintained a log to track the unit’s activities and assistance provided to FBI offices and other law enforcement agencies. This data maintained by the TAG is used by FBI, particularly the MS-13 National Gang Task Force, to identify trends in where transnational gang members are located and traveling to and proactively target specific geographic areas for gang education or enforcement activities. Even as agencies have worked to implement antigang programs in Central America, various factors in the region largely outside of the control of U.S. agencies pose challenges to the implementation of the programs. These factors include: the ability of host countries to sustain programs after U.S. support ends; Central American law enforcement personnel issues; and legal restrictions in Central American countries, such as El Salvador, that diminish the benefits of efforts. Sustainability of programs by host countries: Federal agencies have identified challenges facing Central American countries in sustaining antigang programs currently being initiated and implemented in the region. Specifically, State officials identified several factors outside the control of U.S. agencies that contribute to the uncertainty as to whether Central American countries will be able to sustain antigang programs over the long term. These officials reported that the ability of partner countries to take responsibility for managing and supporting U.S.-funded antigang programs is hampered by the fact that these countries often do not have the financial resources to sustain the programs in the absence of U.S. funds. State officials said that the ability of foreign countries to sustain antigang programs is hindered by other factors as well, such as corruption throughout the countries’ police and judiciary structures; a lack of investment in police training to make the countries’ police forces more professional and accountable; the countries’ inability to provide police forces with equipment such as communications gear and transportation assets; and the ability of the gangs to quickly adapt to law enforcement strategies. To help address these issues, federal agencies have taken steps prior to implementing these programs to plan for how the programs will be sustained, particularly after U.S. federal funding ends. For example, State officials said that when the department first developed and implemented these programs, it took into account the ability of foreign countries to take over and manage antigang programs initially funded and managed by the United States. Specifically, the officials noted that they worked directly with host country officials to gain an understanding of what programs or efforts the countries needed and what the countries might be able to support, both in terms of resources available and a supportive political climate, and then used that as a starting point to identify and shape the efforts that would receive U.S. support. According to USAID officials, USAID also took similar steps to work with host country officials to identify antigang efforts the countries had planned or were already underway for which USAID could provide additional support. Officials stated that they chose this approach because they sought to support local initiatives and programs whenever possible, as programs already planned or implemented by the host countries are more likely to be sustained by the countries themselves. Rather than setting up similar programs that would compete for resources, providing support for the host countries’ programs helped to broaden the reach of the programs into additional areas that the host countries may not have had resources for otherwise. Further, USAID officials reported that they coordinated with the host countries and other donors to ensure that the host countries would assume responsibility for the activities when USAID funding expires. In regard to FBI-led efforts such as the TAG, FBI officials stated that they also considered the ability of the foreign government to support these efforts during negotiations between the foreign governments, such as El Salvador, and the FBI to establish the units. To help prepare for sustaining antigang programs over the long term, federal agencies have also taken action after these programs have been implemented. For example, at the country level, USAID officials work directly with host government partners and with other donors through regular donor coordination groups and meetings to identify best practices for sustaining efforts and incorporating those practices into programs. Further, FBI officials have discussed with the Salvadoran government ways for the government to provide the resources and commitment needed to help sustain the TAG unit over the long term. According to the unit chief of the MS-13 National Gang Task Force who manages the TAG, other than what the FBI pays for in the salaries and living expenses of the FBI agents based at the TAG, the Salvadoran government provides the other resources necessary to sustain the TAG’s operations. Screening process for law enforcement personnel and transfer of personnel: Finding a sufficient number of Central American law enforcement personnel who can pass the screening process required to participate in U.S. investigative and information-sharing programs can complicate the implementation of those programs. For example, in order to become part of the FBI’s TAG unit, police officers must receive a background screening before initially joining the unit and undergo a polygraph every 6 months thereafter. Under the rules of the TAG, if officers fail the polygraph, they must leave the unit. FBI officials stated that, as was the case in El Salvador when they set up the TAG in that country, they expect to face challenges in identifying and successfully screening a sufficient number of Guatemalan and Honduran police officers to participate in the units planned for those countries. To address this challenge, the FBI is planning to establish smaller TAG units in Guatemala and Honduras (10 officers each instead of the 20 stationed at the Salvadoran TAG) and set aside more time and resources for screening Guatemalan and Honduran police officers for the units. FBI officials also stated that one disadvantage of the first officer exchange with El Salvador was that of the four participating Salvadoran police officers, only two officers continued to work on gang investigations in El Salvador after the exchange was completed with the other two being transferred to different areas within the Salvadoran police force. Although the FBI has an agreement with participating countries that requires exchange participants to be involved in gang investigations for at least 2 years after the exchange has concluded so they can put into practice the training they received and share it with their colleagues, FBI officials noted that there is little they can do to ensure participating countries abide by this requirement. Legal restrictions: According to officials we interviewed from the FBI and DOJ’s Criminal Division, Central American countries’ laws can also pose challenges for conducting gang investigations in the region, or for federal agencies that may seek the extradition of individuals to face trial for crimes committed in the United States. According to an FBI official with the MS-13 National Gang Task Force, legal restrictions in countries such as El Salvador do not permit law enforcement to conduct electronic surveillance or wiretaps as part of their investigations. According to this official, while this restriction has not hindered the ability of the Salvadoran national police to conduct investigations, it takes more time and effort to develop and corroborate the evidence through the use of other investigative methods. According to an official from DOJ’s Criminal Division, a recent amendment to the Salvadoran constitution now allows the use of electronic surveillance as a tool in criminal investigations and the Salvadoran National Assembly is currently considering implementing legislation. In regard to the extradition of gang members wanted in the United States, FBI officials noted that countries such as El Salvador have laws that prohibit the extradition of individuals to other countries where they could face a more severe punishment than would be given in El Salvador for the same crime. As an example, the unit chief of the MS-13 National Gang Task Force stated that the FBI had requested the extradition of a gang leader imprisoned in El Salvador for prosecution in Baltimore, Maryland, where the individual would have likely faced a longer prison sentence for the crime. However, the FBI’s request for extradition was denied, preventing the gang leader from facing the charges against him in the United States. Nevertheless, DOJ’s Criminal Division reported that on December 22, 2009, the Supreme Court of El Salvador voted to permit the first extradition of a Salvadoran national pursuant to the extradition treaty between the United States and El Salvador. Officials explained that future extraditions may still be limited by the penalties applicable to extradited individuals, such as the death penalty and life imprisonment. To help address these challenges, DOJ’s Criminal Division continues to work with El Salvador under the existing treaty to facilitate extradition between the United States and El Salvador. Despite these challenges, officials from the agencies we interviewed stated that they continue to work to address or mitigate the effect of these challenges and to ensure their antigang programs are both sustainable and effective. Given the rapid growth of transnational gangs, their propensity for violence, and the public safety threats they pose, the response to these gangs requires a comprehensive and collaborative approach on the part of federal agencies that have different responsibilities and missions for combating transnational gangs. The Strategy to Combat the Threat of Criminal Gangs from Central America and Mexico (the Strategy) provides a roadmap for federal departments and agencies to follow in designing and implementing efforts to combat the gangs. However, while individual federal agencies may be familiar with the implementation of their own antigang programs, or those in the Strategy for which they are responsible, they do not necessarily have the visibility across the Strategy’s categories to determine the extent to which the broader strategy is being implemented. Regardless as to whether it remains a separate effort or is incorporated into the broader CARSI being developed, incorporating an approach for overseeing the interagency effort to combat transnational gangs would help provide visibility by designating an agency or entity to ensure that the Strategy is being implemented as planned. In addition, as the Strategy and related antigang efforts are implemented, it will be important to be able to track the effect the Strategy as a whole is having against the transnational gang problem. By establishing performance goals and measures or other mechanisms to evaluate the progress made in implementing the Strategy, federal agencies, Congress, and other stakeholders could have more specific information relating to agencies’ performance under the Strategy, thereby enabling them to make more informed decisions as to what adjustments to the Strategy might be necessary, if any, to achieve its desired effect. Relatedly, while federal agencies have taken various actions to collaborate on their transnational antigang efforts, agencies such as the FBI and ICE can take steps to further resolve their roles and participation in the TAG unit in El Salvador, especially given that the FBI and ICE have been discussing this participation since 2008. By reaching agreement on ICE’s participation in the unit, both agencies could realize additional information-sharing benefits not only with each other, but with foreign counterparts, and help ensure that resources to combat gangs in El Salvador are used efficiently and effectively. To strengthen oversight and accountability for implementation of the Strategy to Combat the Threat of Criminal Gangs from Central America and Mexico (the Strategy), we recommend that the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, in conjunction with DOJ, DHS, State, USAID, and DOD, revise the Strategy to include, or include in the CARSI if the Strategy is incorporated into that initiative an approach or framework for overseeing implementation of the Strategy and antigang efforts in Central America, and performance goals and measures to assess progress made in achieving intended results under the Strategy. To strengthen federal agencies’ coordination of antigang efforts and maximize use of federal law enforcement resources in El Salvador, we recommend that the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security reach agreement on ICE’s role and participation in the TAG unit. We provided a draft of this report for review to the Departments of Defense (DOD), Homeland Security (DHS), Justice (DOJ), and State (State); the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); and the National Security Council (NSC). DHS, DOJ, and USAID provided written comments on the draft report. DOD, State, and the NSC did not provide comments. In their written comments, DHS and DOJ concurred with our recommendation that the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security reach agreement on ICE’s role and participation in the TAG unit in El Salvador, and outlined steps they have begun to take to address this recommendation. For example, DHS commented that ICE officials have reviewed the FBI’s memorandum on the TAG to clarify the roles and responsibilities of ICE and the FBI within the unit in El Salvador. DOJ also commented that any agreement on DHS’s participation in the TAG unit in El Salvador should also address DHS’s participation in future TAG units that the FBI expects to create in Guatemala and Honduras. In its written comments, USAID commented that it acknowledges the importance of increased interagency coordination to help bolster U.S. government efforts to address the threat of criminal gangs in Central America and the United States. DHS’s, DOJ’s, and USAID’s written comments are contained in appendixes VI, VII, and VIII, respectively. We also incorporated technical comments provided by DHS, DOJ, and USAID as appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the Attorney General; the Secretaries of Homeland Security, State, and Defense; the Administrator of USAID; selected congressional committees; and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. Please contact Eileen Larence at (202) 512-8777 if you or your staff have any questions concerning this report. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix IX. Federal agencies have specifically identified two primary gangs with connections to Central America—Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and 18th Street—as posing the most significant public safety threats to the United States and Central American countries among transnational gangs. This appendix summarizes information federal agencies have on the leadership structure and transnational criminal activities of these two gangs. Federal agencies have reported that these gangs generally do not have a centralized leadership structure. Rather, most gang cliques—or local gang groups—tend to operate in specific areas or communities in the United States and Central America and have autonomy to function independently without reporting to a central authority or leadership. However, law enforcement officials have reported that in some gang cliques activities are directed by gang leaders incarcerated in Salvadoran prisons. These leaders communicate by cell phones or coded written messages that are smuggled in and out of the prisons. Of the five U.S. locations we visited to discuss gang investigations with federal, state, and local law enforcement, three reported instances in which gang leaders incarcerated in El Salvador directed gang members to organize new cliques, coordinate with cliques in other parts of the country, and carry out criminal activities, including murder. For example, an investigation in Charlotte, North Carolina, found that MS-13 clique leaders were sent to establish cliques at the behest of leaders in El Salvador. Further, according to the FBI, cliques convene periodically with gang leadership to determine future criminal activities and punishments for individual delinquent gang members. Transnational gangs engage in criminal activities that not only affect local communities in the United States and Central American countries, but that also stretch beyond U.S. and Central American borders. For example, in its 2006 Central America and Mexico Gang Assessment, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) reported that gang activity has transcended the borders of Central America, Mexico, and the United States and evolved into a transnational concern. USAID reported that while gang activity used to be territorially confined to local neighborhoods, globalization, sophisticated communications technologies, and travel patterns have facilitated the expansion of gang activity across neighborhoods, cities, and countries. Further, the 2009 National Gang Threat Assessment indicated that U.S. street gangs are expanding their influence in most regions and broadening their presence outside the United States to develop associations with criminal organizations in Mexico and Central America. According to federal agencies, major cross- border criminal activities in which transnational gangs engage include drug trafficking and distribution, human smuggling, and extortion, among others. With regard to drug trafficking and distribution, assessments conducted by the National Gang Intelligence Center, the National Drug Intelligence Center, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) indicate that connections exist between drug trafficking organizations and MS-13 and 18th Street gangs and these connections may be expanding. Several agencies also suggested that both gangs’ connections with prison gangs such as the Mexican Mafia may provide a link to drug trafficking organizations, as one of the prison gangs’ main sources of income is extorting money from drug distributors outside prison and distributing various narcotics within and outside the prison system. Further, the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) has reported that drug trafficking organizations have worked with MS-13 and 18th Street gangs to distribute their narcotics in Central America and the United States. MS-13 and 18th Street gangs have also been identified as engaging in retail street distribution of narcotics in the United States, for example. Although connections between gangs and drug trafficking organizations exist and may be growing, these connections may not yet reflect large-scale, organized cooperation between gangs and drug- trafficking organizations. For example, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) officials stated that while individual gangs and gang members might work with drug trafficking organizations for their own personal gain, DEA has not observed or obtained evidence of high-level, organized cooperation between gangs and drug trafficking organizations. Likewise, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime has reported that because the Central American drug market is too small for gangs to develop into major distributors, the gangs lack the maritime capabilities required for the transport of drugs from Central America, and gangs have limited involvement in the U.S. narcotics market, the link between Central American gangs and drug trafficking organizations may not yet be well- developed. In addition to their involvement in drug trafficking and distribution, transnational gangs have also been involved in other cross-border crime, including alien smuggling and extortion. For example, the 2009 National Gang Threat Assessment indicated that U.S.-based gang members are increasingly involved in cross-border criminal activity that includes smuggling illegal aliens from Mexico into the United States. Moreover, U.S. Customs and Border Protection and the FBI reported that MS-13 is known to smuggle persons from Central America into the United States from Mexico. The FBI has also reported that 18th Street may be involved in human trafficking and alien smuggling. However, the FBI stated that it is difficult to determine gang members’ roles—whether they are organizing the border crossings, smuggling other aliens into the country, or being smuggled themselves. In addition, federal agencies have reported that extortion and retail drug distribution provide financial support for both MS-13 and 18th Street. Cliques have been reported to extort those who conduct illicit activities themselves, such as prostitution or drug distribution entities, within the gangs’ territory. In the United States, transnational gang members are known also to extort money from businesses that operate within gang territory in exchange for not inflicting harm on the businesses or those businesses’ owners, family members, or workers. Both MS-13 and 18th Street gangs also conduct extortion across international borders. For example, gang members in the United States may extort immigrants with threats that they will retaliate against family members in Central America if law enforcement is notified. In some instances, the gangs have coupled extortion with kidnapping. The FBI has reported that MS-13 has kidnapped illegal immigrants and then extorted money from their families for the immigrants’ safe return. Finally, with regard to links to terrorists, federal agencies have found no indication that U.S. gangs with transnational ties have routine relationships. According to the National Gang Intelligence Center (NGIC), three basic types of gangs have been identified by gang investigators: street gangs, prison gangs, and outlaw motorcycle gangs. The focus of this report has been on gangs with ties to Central America, such as Mara Salvatrucha (MS- 13) and 18th Street, which belong to the “street gang” category. However, all three categories contain gangs with members who are either present or criminally active (or both) in more than one country. This appendix provides examples of other gangs in these categories, including descriptions of their transnational activities. Most of the information presented in this appendix is from the April 2008 Attorney General’s Report to Congress on the Growth of Violent Street Gangs in Suburban Areas and supplemented by information obtained from interviews with agency officials. According to federal law enforcement, street gangs are typically associated with a particular neighborhood, town, or city, which they may incorporate into the name of their gang. However, law enforcement officials report that several street gangs have attained regional or national status and operate in a number of states throughout the country. Two examples of these street gangs that also have transnational connections include the following: Florencia 13: Florencia 13 originated in Los Angeles in the early 1960s. Gang membership is estimated to be more than 3,000. This gang operates primarily in California, but is expanding to other states. Drug trafficking is a primary source of income for the gang whose members smuggle cocaine and methamphetamine from Mexico into the United States for distribution. Florencia members are also involved in other criminal activities including assault, drive-by shooting, and homicide. Latin Kings: Latin Kings is a collection of over 160 structured gangs, referred to as chapters, operating in 158 cities in 34 states in the United States. The gang’s membership is estimated to be 20,000 to 35,000. Most members are Mexican-American or Puerto Rican males whose main source of income is street-level drug sales. The gang obtains drugs primarily from Mexican drug trafficking organizations that operate along the U.S.-Mexico border. Members also engage in other criminal activity such as assault, burglary, homicide, identity theft, and money laundering. According to federal law enforcement officials, prison gangs are criminal organizations that operate within federal and state prison systems as self- perpetuating criminal entities. These gangs also operate outside of prisons typically through the activities of members who have been released from prison into communities. Examples of prison gangs with transnational connections include the following: Barrio Azteca: Barrio Azteca is one of the most violent prison gangs in the United States. The gang is highly structured and has an estimated membership of 2,000. Most members are either Mexican national or Mexican American males. Barrio Azteca is most active in the southwestern United States, primarily in federal, state, and local corrections facilities in Texas and outside of prison in southwestern Texas and southeastern New Mexico. The gang’s main source of income is derived from smuggling illegal drugs from Mexico into the United States for distribution both inside and outside prisons. Gang members often transport illicit drugs across the border for drug trafficking organizations. Gang members are also involved in other crimes including alien smuggling, arson, assault, extortion, kidnapping, and weapons violations. Hermanos de Pistoleros Latinos: This is a Hispanic prison gang formed in Texas in the late 1980s. It operates in most prisons in the state and on the streets in many communities in Texas, particularly Laredo. The gang is also active in several cities in Mexico, and its largest contingent in that country is located in Nuevo Laredo. The gang is structured and is estimated to have 1,000 members. These members maintain close ties to several Mexican drug trafficking organizations and are involved in the trafficking of large quantities of illegal drugs from Mexico into the United States for distribution. Mexican Mafia: This gang was formed in the late 1950s within the California prison system. It is loosely structured and has strict rules that must be followed by the estimated 350 to 400 members. Most of these members are Mexican American males who previously belonged to a Southern California street gang. Mexican Mafia is active in 13 states, but California remains the power base. The gang’s main source of income is extorting drug distributors outside prison and distributing illegal drugs within the prison system and on the streets. Some members have direct links to Mexican drug trafficking organizations. Other criminal activities include controlling gambling and homosexual prostitution in prison. Mexikanemi: The Mexikanemi prison gang was formed in the early 1980s within the Texas prison system. The gang is highly structured and estimated to have 2,000 members, most of whom are Mexican national or Mexican American males who were living in Texas at the time of their incarceration. This gang poses a significant drug trafficking threat to communities in the southwest region of the United States, particularly Texas. Gang members reportedly traffic illegal drugs from Mexico into the United States for distribution inside and outside of prison. Gang members obtain these drugs from Mexican drug trafficking organizations. Surenos: As some individual Hispanic street gang members enter the prison systems, they put aside rivalries with other Hispanic gangs and unite under the name Surenos. The original Mexican Mafia members, most of whom were from Southern California, considered Mexicans from the rural, agricultural areas of Northern California as weak and viewed them with contempt. To distinguish themselves from these northern agricultural workers, members of Mexican Mafia began to refer to the Hispanic gang members that worked for them as Surenos (Southerners). Surenos gang members’ main source of income is retail-level distribution of illegal drugs both within prison systems and in the community, as well as the extortion of drug distributors on the streets. Some members have direct links to Mexican drug trafficking organizations and broker deals for Mexican Mafia as well as their own gang. Other criminal activities of Surenos members include assault, car jacking, home invasion, homicide, and robbery. Texas Syndicate: Texas Syndicate is one of the largest and most violent prison gangs. It is active on both sides of the U.S.-Mexico border and poses a significant drug trafficking threat to communities in the southwest region. The gang is highly structured and is estimated to have 1,300 members, most of whom are Mexican American males between 20 and 40 years of age. Gang members smuggle illegal drugs from Mexico into the United States for distribution inside and outside of prison. Gang members have direct working relationships with drug trafficking organizations. According to federal law enforcement, outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMG) have been in the United States longer than many other gangs and are most numerous in the United States. According to the Department of Justice (DOJ) Gang Unit, there are more than 300 active OMGs in the United States, ranging in size from single chapters with five or six members to hundreds of chapters with thousands of members worldwide. DOJ considers OMGs to be transnational criminal organizations because they typically maintain chapters in more than one country and engage in illicit cross-border activities. OMG chapters are found on every continent. OMGs are highly organized with well-defined hierarchies, defined rules in the form of either bylaws or constitutions, and clear recruitment, acceptance, and promotion processes for members. OMGs have a distinct chain of command, much like a corporation with positions such as president, vice-president, treasurer, sergeant-at-arms, and road captain at the chapter level. Generally, OMG organizational structure consists of individual chapters grouped by geographic region all being headed by a national president. While national and international presidents may exist, each regional chapter is run by its own president. The gang leadership requires loyalty and obedience from members. OMG members may be governed by a code of ethics, a constitution, or a strict set of bylaws. Descriptions of major OMGs present in the U.S. follows—including details on the gangs’ transnational connections. Hells Angels Motorcycle Club: According to U.S. law enforcement officials, the Hells Angels are the largest and the most criminally prominent of the “Big Five” OMGs. The gang includes 2,000 to 2,500 members belonging to over 230 chapters in the United States and 26 foreign countries. In the United States, law enforcement officials estimate that Hells Angels has more than 92 chapters in 27 states with over 800 members. Gang members produce, transport, and distribute marijuana and methamphetamine and transport and distribute cocaine, hashish, heroin, and other drugs. Other crimes perpetrated by Hells Angels members include assault, extortion, homicide, money laundering, and motorcycle theft. Bandidos: U.S. law enforcement authorities consider the Bandidos and Hells Angels to be the two largest OMGs in the United States. This gang has approximately 900 members belonging to over 93 chapters in the United States, with a total of 2,000 to 2,500 members when the membership in 13 other countries is added to U.S. membership. Bandidos is involved in transporting and distributing cocaine and marijuana and producing, transporting, and distributing methamphetamine. The gang is most active in the Pacific, southeast, southwest, and west central regions of the United States and is expanding in these regions by forming new chapters and allowing members of support clubs to form or join Bandidos chapters. Mongols Motorcycle Club: According to law enforcement officials, the Mongols Motorcycle Club is an extremely violent OMG that poses a serious criminal threat to the Pacific and southwest regions of the United States. Mongols members transport and distribute cocaine, marijuana, and methamphetamine and frequently commit violent crimes including assault, intimidation, and murder to defend Mongols territory and uphold its reputation. Most of the club’s 300 members are Hispanic males who live in the Los Angeles area, and many are former street gang members with a long history of using violence to settle grievances. The club also maintains ties to Hispanic street gangs in Los Angeles. In the 1980s, the Mongols OMG seized control of southern California’s OMG activity from the Hells Angels and today is allied with the Bandidos, Outlaws, and Pagan’s OMGs against the Hells Angels. Outlaws: Outlaws has more than 1,700 members belonging to 176 chapters in the United States and 12 foreign countries. U.S. law enforcement officials estimate that Outlaws has more than 86 chapters in 21 states with over 700 members in the United States. Outlaws are the dominant OMG in the Great Lakes Region of the United States. Gang members produce, transport, and distribute methamphetamine and transport and distribute cocaine and marijuana. Other criminal activities engaged in by Outlaws include arson, assault, explosives operations, extortion, fraud, homicide, intimidation, kidnapping, money laundering, prostitution, robbery, theft, and weapons violations. Outlaws compete with the Hells Angels for membership and territory. Vagos Motorcycle Club: The Vagos OMG has hundreds of members in the United States and Mexico and poses a serious criminal threat to those areas in which chapters are located. Law enforcement reports that Vagos has approximately 300 members among 24 chapters in California, Hawaii, Nevada, Oregon, and three chapters in Mexico. Club members produce, transport, and distribute methamphetamine and distribute marijuana. Vagos members also have been implicated in other criminal activities including assault, extortion, insurance fraud, money laundering, murder, vehicle theft, weapons violations, and witness intimidation. Black Pistons: This OMG is the official support club of the Outlaws Motorcycle Club. Established in 2002 with the backing of the Outlaws, Black Pistons has expanded rapidly throughout the United States and into Canada and Europe. The club has an estimated 70 domestic chapters in 20 states and an unknown number of foreign chapters in Belgium, Canada, Germany, Great Britain, Norway, and Poland. The exact number is unknown but is estimated to be more than 200 in the United States. The Outlaws OMG uses Black Pistons chapters as sources of prospective new members. The Outlaws also uses Black Pistons chapters to conduct criminal activity, especially transporting and distributing drugs. Black Piston members also engage in assault, extortion, fraud, intimidation, and theft. Federal agencies have developed and implemented a wide range of programs to combat transnational gangs in the United States that have links to Central America. As shown in table 4, some of these efforts directly combat the gangs while others seek to improve criminal justice systems to increase the ability of Central American countries to apprehend and prosecute criminals including gang members (such as Community Policing and Justice Sector Reform). As also shown in table 4, other efforts are aimed at improving educational and employment opportunities of youth to reduce the motivation for joining gangs (such as Youth Centers). Federal agencies have coordinated their programs to combat transnational gangs through working groups at the interagency level, coordinating groups within Central American countries, and federally led antigang task forces at the local level. For example, at the headquarters level, through the National Gang Intelligence Center (NGIC), representatives of the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF); and Bureau of Prisons (BOP), among other components, and the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) coordinate and share information on gangs that are a threat to U.S. communities. Table 5 provides additional information about headquarters-level entities’ coordination of antigang efforts. These coordinating entities have different roles and responsibilities, but in general, they serve as mechanisms for deconflicting cases; providing law enforcement agencies with information on gangs and gang activities, including transnational gangs; and coordinating participating agencies’ strategies and task forces. In localities we contacted, law enforcement agencies obtained assistance from the antigang coordinating entities to support their investigations of MS-13 and 18th Street gangs and gang members. For example, in one location we visited, the National Gang Intelligence Center provided an analyst to an FBI antigang task force to help that task force analyze MS-13 gang data for an ongoing investigation. At another location, the FBI antigang task force obtained assistance from the TAG unit in El Salvador to help identify two MS-13 gang members who were in a Salvadoran prison and communicated with MS-13 gang members in the United States to direct the gang members’ criminal activities. Additionally, DOJ’s Gang Unit has assisted with the prosecution of MS-13 and 18th Street gang cases in the United States. For example, in one location we contacted, the Gang Unit assisted the local U.S. Attorney’s Office with the prosecution of a gang case under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. The Gang Unit provided this assistance because, according to the U.S. Attorney’s Office, the office did not have enough experienced attorneys who were familiar with using the Act to prosecute gang members. At the field level, federal law enforcement agencies utilize task forces to coordinate their gang enforcement efforts. For example, the FBI’s Violent Gang Safe Streets Task Forces coordinate with federal, state, and local law enforcement to investigate all active gang threats, but have conducted investigations on MS-13 and 18th Street gangs across the country. In locations we contacted, including Omaha, Nebraska; Los Angeles, California; and Charlotte, North Carolina, FBI task forces investigated MS- 13 gangs and determined that gang members in those locations were communicating with gang members in El Salvador. Similar to the FBI’s Violent Gang Safe Street Task Forces, ATF’s Violent Crime Impact Teams, which partner ATF with federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to reduce firearms-related violent crime including gang crime, may investigate gangs with transnational connections in specific locations. For example, in 2007 ATF led an investigation in Baltimore, Maryland, involving MS-13 gang members who committed murder and robbery. Through its task force, ATF coordinated this investigation with other agencies including FBI, ICE, the United States Attorneys’ Office, local police agencies, and the Salvadoran national police to investigate and prosecute these gang members. In addition, through Operation Community Shield, ICE works primarily with state and local law enforcement agencies to investigate gangs whose members are foreign- born or in the United States illegally, or both, or have been involved in crimes with a nexus to the U.S. borders. To determine to what extent the U.S. federal government has developed a strategy to combat transnational gangs with connections to Central America, we examined the interagency strategy, called the Strategy to Combat the Threat of Criminal Gangs from Central America and Mexico (the Strategy), and compared the contents of the Strategy to select criteria in our prior work on desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy, including (1) clear purpose, scope, and methodology; (2) discussion of problems, risks, and threats; (3) desired goals, objectives, activities, and performance measures; and (4) delineation of roles and responsibilities. In regard to the National Security Council (NSC), we discussed its role in developing and implementing the Strategy with a mix of the departments and agencies that participated in the NSC’s International Organized Crime Policy Coordinating Committee (IOCPCC) such as the Department of State (State), the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). We also examined the roles and activities of the various federal agencies under the Strategy including DOJ, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), State, the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of the Treasury (Treasury), and USAID and their component agencies. To do this we reviewed antigang program documents and interviewed officials from DOJ, DHS, State, DOD, Treasury, and USAID in headquarters as well as component agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) within DOJ and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) within DHS to obtain their views about the framework, including the different categories, of the Strategy. To determine how U.S. federal agencies have implemented programs to carry out the Strategy and combat transnational gangs, coordinated these programs, and assessed their results, we examined a mix of DOJ’s, DHS’s, State’s, USAID’s, and their component agencies’ plans, performance data, reports, and assessments for fiscal years 2006 through 2009. We compared federal agencies’ efforts to coordinate and share information on their transnational antigang programs to criteria in our prior work on effective interagency collaboration and results-oriented government. To assess the reliability of statistical information we obtained, such as data on program performance and outcomes, we discussed the sources of the data with agency officials and reviewed documentation regarding the compilation of data. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. In addition, we examined federal agencies’ funding allocated to transnational antigang programs. In particular, we reviewed agencies’ budget requests for fiscal years 2008 through 2010; appropriations acts for DOJ, DHS, State, and USAID for those fiscal years; and expenditure and other plans for the Mérida Initiative. To obtain information on federal efforts to combat the gangs as well as the extent to which the agencies coordinated their efforts with other agencies, we interviewed a mix of federal, state, and local law enforcement officials in seven U.S. locations—Baltimore, Maryland; Charlotte, North Carolina; Laredo and McAllen, Texas; Los Angeles, California; Nashville, Tennessee; and Omaha, Nebraska—and U.S. federal, foreign, and three nongovernmental agencies’ officials in El Salvador and Guatemala. To understand the process of how ICE handles and removes gang members who are in the United States illegally, we visited ICE’s South Texas Detention Facility in Pearsall, Texas, and interviewed officials with ICE’s Office of Detention and Removal Operations. We selected the U.S. locations and El Salvador and Guatemala based on a mix of criteria that included locations (1) along the U.S. borders, (2) where U.S. federal agencies have implemented antigang programs, and (3) where federal law enforcement agencies have conducted operations involving gangs with connections to Central America. For our site visits to foreign locations, we consulted with officials of federal agencies to identify in which foreign locations their agencies had efforts underway. Of the countries in the region, agency officials suggested we visit El Salvador and Guatemala because more antigang initiatives were underway and further along as compared to efforts in other countries. Given this, we selected these countries to obtain more information on these efforts and evaluate the effect they have had on the gang problem. We selected the South Texas Detention Facility because it was the facility identified by ICE officials for handling the most gang members awaiting removal. More specifically, in the U.S. locations we interviewed officials from some of the following federal agencies: the FBI; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF); Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); U.S. Attorneys’ Office; ICE; and in Laredo, Texas, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). We also interviewed a mix of state and local law enforcement officials in Charlotte, North Carolina; Los Angeles, California; Nashville, Tennessee; and Omaha, Nebraska. In Guatemala and El Salvador, we interviewed a mix of officials from the following federal agencies: DOJ’s Office of International Affairs, FBI, DEA; ICE; State; USAID; the State-sponsored International Law Enforcement Academy; and DOD. We also interviewed a mix of officials from Salvadoran and Guatemalan government agencies, including the countries’ national police and the Salvadoran prosecutors’ office. We also observed some of the activities related to USAID-sponsored prevention efforts in El Salvador and Guatemala such as the youth centers and interviewed participants, local government officials involved in the efforts, and members of the community about their views and the effect of the programs. Additionally, we interviewed officials from intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations such as the Organization of American States, Washington Office on Latin America, the Central American Coalition for Prevention of Youth Violence, the Centro de Formacion y Orientacion, and the Instituto Universitario de Opinion Publica to obtain their perspectives on the gang problem in Central America. We also interviewed officials from contractors and companies such as Creative Associates International, Inc., and Pepsi Co. that have partnered with USAID or participated in USAID efforts to establish gang prevention programs and provide employment opportunities for ex-gang members in countries such as El Salvador and Guatemala. The information we obtained from interviewing officials in the U.S. and Central American locations cannot be generalized across all locations in the United States or Central America. However, because we selected these locations based on a variety of factors, they provided us with an overview of the agencies’ antigang programs, examples of coordination and measurements to assess results, and any challenges with implementation of the programs. We conducted this performance audit from April 2008 through April 2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. In addition to the contact named above, Rebecca Gambler, Assistant Director; Heather Dowey; Sally Gilley; Mike Harmond; Chris Hatscher; Michael Lenington; Amanda Miller; Janet Temko; and Adam Vogt made significant contributions to this report.

Summary: Thousands of gang members in the United States belong to gangs such as MS-13 and 18th Street that are also active in Central American countries. Federal entities with responsibilities for addressing Central American gangs include the National Security Council (NSC); the Departments of Homeland Security (DHS), Justice (DOJ), and State; and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). GAO was asked to review federal efforts to combat transnational gangs. This report addresses (1) the extent to which the federal government has developed a strategy to combat these gangs, and (2) how federal agencies have implemented the strategy and other programs to combat these gangs, coordinated their actions, and assessed their results. GAO examined federal agencies' antigang plans, resources, and measures; interviewed federal, state, and local officials in seven localities representing varying population sizes and geographic regions; and interviewed U.S. and foreign officials in El Salvador and Guatemala where U.S. agencies have implemented antigang programs. The results of these interviews are not generalizable. The NSC, in conjunction with State, DOJ, DHS, and USAID, developed a strategy to combat gangs with connections to Central America; however, the strategy lacks an approach or framework to oversee implementation and performance goals and measures to assess progress. GAO previously reported that characteristics such as defining the problem to be addressed as well as the scope and methodology of the strategy; describing agencies' activities, roles, and responsibilities; providing an approach to oversee implementation; and establishing performance measures, among other characteristics, can enhance a strategy's effectiveness. While the antigang strategy contains some of these characteristics, such as identifying the problems and risks associated with the gangs, describing the scope and purpose of the strategy, and defining roles and responsibilities of federal agencies as well as specific implementation activities, it lacks other characteristics such as an approach for overseeing implementation and goals and measures for assessing progress. For example, although agencies coordinate the strategy's implementation through an interagency task force, agency officials reported that this task force does not oversee the strategy's implementation and that no entity exercises oversight responsibility for the strategy's implementation. Similarly, while State and USAID are developing measures to assess the outcomes of their antigang programs, these measures do not encompass all programs under the strategy or track results of the strategy as a whole. Incorporating these characteristics could enhance the accountability of agencies to implement the strategy and provide a means for assessing progress. To carry out the strategy and combat transnational gangs, federal agencies have implemented programs and taken steps to coordinate their actions and develop performance measures to assess results of individual programs; but, coordination could be strengthened in an antigang unit in El Salvador by reaching agreement on Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) role in the unit, the only such unit currently in Central America. Agencies use various interagency groups to coordinate with each other, such as DOJ's Anti-gang Coordination Committee. However, improved coordination at the FBI-initiated antigang unit in El Salvador could enhance information sharing. While the FBI requests information directly from Salvadoran police, ICE requests go to its country attache, then to FBI agents at the unit who pass it on to Salvadoran police, as ICE does not have an agent at the unit. Prior GAO work has shown that agencies should facilitate information sharing and look for opportunities to leverage resources. Although FBI and ICE officials agree that the process could be improved by posting an ICE agent at the unit and have been discussing the possibility since 2008, they have not yet reached agreement on ICE's role. By reaching agreement, the FBI and ICE could strengthen coordination and information sharing. While agencies have established measures to assess programs, as some of the programs are just starting, data collection for many measures is in the early stages.