DOD has completed three additional statutory requirements of section 911 since our August 2019 report, but has not completed three remaining requirements, as shown in table 2. We previously reported that DOD had completed four of the statutory requirements, specifically awarding a contract for a study to determine how to best implement cross-functional teams, providing the results of the study to Congress, establishing any cross-functional teams to address critical department objectives and outputs, and reporting to Congress on the establishment of the cross- functional teams. Thus, in total, DOD has completed seven of the 10 statutory requirements. For more detail on all 10 statutory requirements, see appendix II. On October 29, 2019, the Secretary of Defense approved DOD’s organizational strategy. In preparing the strategy for review and approval, OCMO obtained input on the draft organizational strategy from other DOD and OSD components, consistent with a recommendation from our February 2018 report that OCMO obtain stakeholder input on the development of the organizational strategy. We found that the strategy addresses key requirements of section 911, including identifying critical objectives that would benefit from the use of cross-functional teams and providing for the appropriate use of these teams. As part of the organizational strategy, DOD also identified the actions it has taken to streamline the organizational structure and processes of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, another requirement of section 911. For example, the strategy states that DOD has delegated authority to approve certain global force management actions to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and delegated certain acquisition oversight functions to the military departments. Further, consistent with our recommendation from our February 2018 report that the CMO address how the department will promote and achieve a collaborative culture, the organizational strategy includes a short reference to our leading practices for mergers and organizational transformations. However, while the approved organizational strategy cites the leading practices, it does not include specific implementation steps that explain how DOD will follow these practices. Earlier drafts of the organizational strategy that we had reviewed included more specific implementation steps, but those steps were removed during the internal DOD review process. As we reported in August 2019, a January 2019 draft of the organizational strategy included practical implementation steps DOD planned to take to advance a collaborative culture, each of which were shown to align with our leading practices for mergers and organizational transformations. For example, consistent with the leading practice for establishing a coherent mission and integrated strategic goals to guide the transformation, the January 2019 draft proposed that the CMO develop an implementation plan with goals and milestones for its efforts to implement the organizational strategy, communicate those goals and milestones, and report periodically on the achievement of the goals. However, in place of these specific steps, the approved organizational strategy simply lists these leading practices and makes a broad statement that DOD is committed to further incorporating and institutionalizing these practices at every opportunity. An OCMO official told us these implementation steps were removed as the OCMO prepared the draft for department-wide coordination and submission to the Secretary of Defense for review and approval. According to that official, OCMO officials made this change because the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense were newly confirmed, and OCMO officials did not want to commit them to a specific course of action. That official also told us that DOD might use its senior leadership forums, such as the Deputy’s Management Action Group (DMAG), to monitor implementation of the organizational strategy and identify opportunities to improve collaboration, including implementation of our leading practices. However, the official acknowledged that any plan to use such forums for monitoring implementation has not been finalized. As we stated in making our February 2018 recommendation that the department address how it would promote and achieve a collaborative culture, section 911 identified several outcomes that DOD should achieve to advance such a culture. We also noted that DOD could use our leading practices for mergers and organizational transformations to address how the department will advance a culture that is collaborative, team-oriented, results-driven, and innovative. We further stated that DOD would be better positioned to transform and meet its mission if it incorporated these leading practices in its organizational strategy as a way to better articulate how the department will achieve the outcomes that advance a collaborative culture across DOD and address the requirements of section 911. Specific implementation steps like those included in earlier drafts of the organizational strategy offered the department a clear path forward for pursuing the goals of section 911 and promoting a collaborative culture. Absent these steps, such as developing an implementation plan with goals and milestones, it is less clear how DOD intends to implement the organizational strategy and assess progress toward its goals. Identifying and documenting specific implementation steps to advance a collaborative culture—such as those OCMO included in earlier drafts of the organizational strategy—is necessary to fully address the requirements of section 911. On December 12, 2019, the Secretary of Defense approved DOD’s guidance on cross-functional teams. We found that this two-page guidance addresses most, but not all, of the 911 requirements and leading practices for cross-functional teams. Specifically, it addresses in whole or in part six of the seven section 911 requirements and six of the eight leading practices. The Secretary-approved guidance also directs the CMO to develop more detailed implementing guidance. It will be important for the CMO to develop and issue this detailed implementing guidance to fully address section 911 requirements and our leading practices for effective cross- functional teams, consistent with a recommendation in our February 2018 report. According to an OCMO official, OCMO plans to use previously drafted terms of reference as the basis for the CMO’s more detailed implementing guidance. Based on our review, when the Secretary of Defense approved guidance is considered along with the draft terms of reference expected to serve as detailed implementing guidance, both documents will fully address all section 911 requirements and leading practices for effective cross-functional teams. We will monitor the department’s progress in issuing this guidance as part of our normal process of assessing DOD’s efforts to implement our recommendations. DOD has not approved its curriculum for training for cross-functional team members and their supervisors. In February 2018, we reported that DOD’s draft curriculum for cross-functional team members and their supervisors addressed the section 911 requirements for that training. We reported in August 2019 that DOD had provided required training using its draft curriculum to members of the EMSO team—DOD’s only established section 911 team at the time—but had not provided training to their supervisors. According to DOD’s comments on our August 2019 report, DOD expected the draft curricula for training for cross-functional team members and their supervisors to have been approved simultaneously with the issuance of the Secretary’s guidance on cross-functional teams. According to OCMO officials, however, DOD has contracted for the delivery of the required training for cross-functional team members and their supervisors. One of those officials also told us OCMO now expects that training to be completed in 2020. Another OCMO official told us that the OCMO has been further refining the draft curriculum based on feedback from the members of the EMSO team and external experts before submitting the curriculum for review and approval. DOD has not provided required training on cross-functional teams and related subjects to presidential appointees and the curriculum has not been approved. Section 911 required presidentially appointed, Senate- confirmed officials to receive training on leadership, modern organizational practice, collaboration, and the operation of cross- functional teams within 3 months of their appointment or to receive a waiver from the President of the United States. As of October 2019, 23 of 36 such positions had been filled and the officials had been in their positions for more than 3 months; none had received the statutorily mandated training. According to DOD’s comments on our August 2019 report, DOD expected the draft training curricula for presidential appointees to have been approved simultaneously with the issuance of the Secretary’s guidance on cross-functional teams. According to OCMO officials, however, DOD has contracted for the delivery of the required training for presidential appointees. One of those officials also told us they now expect that training to be provided in 2020. An OCMO official told us that OCMO has been further refining the draft curriculum and discussing possible venues for providing this training for presidential appointees, including one of the weekly meetings that the Deputy Secretary of Defense has with all Office of the Secretary of Defense presidential appointees. DOD has not completed the required analysis of the successes and failures of its cross-functional teams. Section 911 requires DOD’s analysis to be completed with support from external experts in organizational and management sciences within 18 months of the establishment of the first cross-functional team under section 911. Because the first cross-functional team was established in August 2017, this analysis was due in February 2019. According to OCMO officials, DOD has contracted with an organization to help develop the analysis. One of the officials also told us DOD expects the analysis to be completed in 2020. Another OCMO official told us in December 2019 that work on the assessment, including a survey and structured interviews, was underway, and that an initial draft report was expected by the end of December 2019. DOD’s EMSO team is continuing to work toward its mission to develop requirements and specific plans to improve EMSO capabilities across the department and to achieve operational superiority. The team is developing 13 initiatives in four areas—governance, organization, capabilities and gaps, and training and readiness. In addition, the team issued a report required by section 1053 of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, which included the mandated assessments of the electronic warfare capabilities of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China in consultation with the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Section 1053 also required the team to, among other things, update the department’s Electronic Warfare Strategy in coordination with the Electronic Warfare Executive Committee. According to an EMSO official, the team is developing a new strategy, which is scheduled for completion in June 2020. The EMSO team is continuing to demonstrate leading practices for effective cross-functional teams, similar to what we reported in August 2019. Specifically, at that time, we reported that the EMSO team was demonstrating leading practices for effective cross-functional teams, such as a well-defined team structure and well-defined team goals. Based on the results of our recent survey of individual team members, most team members believe the team is demonstrating open and regular communication, an inclusive team environment, has an empowered cross-functional team leader, and has well-defined team goals. However, our survey results show that team members responded less favorably to questions about senior management support than to questions about the other leading practices. Specifically, less than half of the respondents agreed with the statements that DOD’s senior leadership provides the team with sufficient resources for its work, supported the team as a priority, and supported the team’s goals and objectives. In their survey responses and during interviews, team members expressed their concerns about the lack of resources, such as funding and sufficient office space to perform their work. According to team officials, they are continuing to work with the OCMO to resolve the team’s resource issues. In our August 2019 report, we stated that the team’s progress was negatively affected by funding delays resulting from disagreements among senior leadership over the responsibility for funding the team. The disagreement had been resolved for fiscal year 2019, but had not yet been resolved for future fiscal years. We recommended, and DOD concurred, that the CMO and EMSO cross- functional team clarify roles and responsibilities for providing administrative support and funding for the team beyond fiscal year 2019 in accordance with the memorandum establishing the team. According to EMSO team officials, however, funding for future years has not been identified. The team has discussed its funding needs with the OCMO and staff from the Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, but there is still no clarity regarding responsibility for funding the team. The team’s budget submission as part of DOD’s fiscal year 2021 budget process was withdrawn because the amount requested was smaller than the amounts typically reviewed in the process. According to an EMSO team official, the OCMO is providing funding for the team incrementally on a quarterly basis, and is facing challenges with funding the team’s request for a contract due to the department operating under a continuing resolution. According to another EMSO team official, the team is maintaining the status quo with its current funding and is not considering any additional initiatives. We also reported in our August 2019 report that, according to a team official, while the team had its own office space, the space did not have the level of security required to allow the team to work on a third of its initiatives. Team officials have since told us the team plans to move to an appropriately secure space in early 2020. We will continue to monitor DOD’s progress to secure resources and office space for the team as part of our normal process of assessing DOD’s efforts to implement our recommendations. In its approved organizational strategy, DOD identified two existing task forces to expand the number of cross-functional teams. First, the Secretary of Defense established the Close Combat Lethality Task Force in February 2018 to develop, evaluate, recommend, and implement improvements to U.S. squad-level infantry combat formations and strengthen the combat, lethality, survivability, resiliency, and readiness of infantry squads. Second, the Secretary of Defense established the Protecting Critical Technology Task Force in October 2018 to address concerns over the security of the department’s critical technology and the loss of classified information and controlled unclassified information that puts DOD’s investments at risk and erodes the lethality and survivability of U.S. forces. According to an OCMO official, the OCMO updated the organizational strategy and designated these two task forces as cross- functional teams as a result of input from DOD senior leadership during their review of the draft organizational strategy. Based on our review of the documents used to establish the two task forces, we found that they would meet only some of the requirements we reviewed for cross-functional teams as mandated by section 911. For example, we found that the documentation for the Close Combat Lethality Task Force, as it was established, shows that the task force has a clearly established objective; is directed to develop recommendations such as policy changes and investment decisions; and is directed to make decisions on cross-functional issues—some of the key section 911 requirements. Similarly, we found that the documentation for the Protecting Critical Technology Task Force, as established, shows that the director of the task force has the authority to select the membership from across the department, another key requirement. However, based on the documents we reviewed, we found that the teams would not meet other requirements. For example, we found that the documentation for both teams did not ensure that those team members and leaders who are supervisors receive training in elements of successful cross-functional teams. According to an OCMO official, the OCMO will ensure that these task forces identified as cross-functional teams meet the requirements of section 911. For example, the OCMO will provide the required training. DOD’s newly issued guidance on cross-functional teams could help ensure that existing and any new cross-functional teams meet section 911 requirements. In addition, it could help provide these existing and any new teams with the information, direction, and authority they need to comply with mandated requirements for cross-functional teams. For example, section 911 permits the Secretary to delegate to cross- functional teams any decision-making authority that the Secretary considers appropriate to achieve the objectives of the teams; DOD’s guidance delineates the decision-making authority of cross-functional teams. More than 3 years after the passage of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, DOD has begun to take key steps to address the requirements of section 911 and to promote a more collaborative culture in the department, including issuing its organizational strategy and making greater use of cross-functional teams under the act. Even as it has taken these steps, challenges for the departments’ ongoing implementation of section 911 remain. The department has still not addressed key requirements to help promote a collaborative culture and, according to officials, still has not identified responsibility for funding one of its cross-functional teams established under section 911. Further, specific implementation steps that would have offered the department a clear path forward for pursuing the goals of section 911 and promoting a collaborative culture at DOD were removed from DOD’s approved organizational strategy—a disappointing development. Identifying and documenting specific implementation steps to encourage a collaborative culture is necessary to fully address the requirements of section 911 and encourage such a culture. The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Chief Management Officer identify and document specific implementation steps to advance a collaborative culture, consistent with our leading practices for mergers and organizational transformations. We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. In its written comments, which are reproduced in Appendix IV, DOD concurred with our recommendation. DOD also provided additional information on the steps that DOD has taken or plans to take to advance a collaborative culture, such as the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense’s use of DOD’s senior governance forums to encourage collaboration across the department. DOD also stated that it plans to incorporate policies based on best practices for cultivating a collaborative organizational climate into the CMO’s guidance on the implementation of cross-functional teams as well as future National Defense Strategies and National Defense Business Operations Plans. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees and to the Secretary of Defense and Chief Management Officer. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-2775 or fielde1@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this are listed in appendix V. Section 911 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017 included a provision for us—every 6 months after the date of enactment on December 23, 2016, through December 31, 2019—to submit to the congressional defense committees a report. Each report is to set forth a comprehensive assessment of the actions that DOD has taken pursuant to section 911 during each 6-month period and cumulatively since the NDAA’s enactment. Table 3 identifies our five prior reports on DOD’s implementation of section 911 and the status of the 11 recommendations from those reports. Section 911 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 requires the Secretary of Defense to take several actions. Table 4 summarizes these requirements, the due date, and the date completed, if applicable, as of December 2019. In February 2018, we reported on eight leading practices for implementing effective cross-functional teams. Table 5 identifies these leading practices and their related key characteristics. In addition to the contact named above, Margaret Best (Assistant Director), Daniel Ramsey (Analyst-in-Charge), Sierra Hicks, Alexa Kelly, Richard Powelson, and Paulina Reaves made key contributions to this report. Other contributors included Tracy Barnes, Arkelga Braxton, Michael Holland, Ned Malone, Judy McCloskey, Jeremy Rogers, Ron Schwenn, and Sarah Veale.

Summary: DOD has had longstanding organizational and management challenges that hinder collaboration. Section 911 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017 directed the Secretary of Defense to, among other things, issue an organizational strategy that identifies critical objectives that span multiple functional boundaries, establish cross-functional teams to support this strategy, and provide related guidance and training. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017 also included a provision for GAO periodically to assess DOD's actions in response to section 911. GAO has issued a series of reports since June 2017 and made a number of recommendations to DOD. This report assesses the extent to which DOD has made progress in (1) implementing the requirements of section 911 and (2) establishing cross-functional teams. GAO reviewed documentation, interviewed cross-functional team members and other DOD officials, and compared DOD's actions to section 911 requirements and leading practices for cross-functional teams. Since GAO's August 2019 report, the Department of Defense (DOD) has taken actions to complete three additional statutory requirements of section 911 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2017, but has not completed three remaining requirements. These requirements are intended to support cross-functional teams and to promote department-wide collaboration (see table). Cross-functional teams rely on individuals with different types of expertise to work toward a common, well-defined goal, and are thought to deliver better and faster solutions to complex and fast-moving problems. DOD's approved organizational strategy addresses key requirements of section 911, including identifying critical objectives that would benefit from the use of cross-functional teams and providing for the appropriate use of these teams. However, the strategy did not include practical, specific implementation steps to guide DOD's efforts to advance a collaborative culture, which had been included in earlier draft versions of the strategy. These steps had aligned with GAO's leading practices for mergers and organizational transformations. Specific implementation steps like those included in earlier drafts of the organizational strategy offered DOD a clear path forward for pursuing the goals of section 911 and for promoting a collaborative culture. Absent identifying and documenting specific implementation steps, it is less clear how DOD intends to implement the organizational strategy and assess progress toward its goals. DOD's existing cross-functional team charged with improving electromagnetic spectrum operations and defending its communication systems from attacks is continuing its work by issuing a statutorily mandated report, among other efforts, but DOD has not clarified responsibility for funding the team. GAO will continue to monitor DOD's progress toward providing such support to the team as GAO recommended in August 2019. In addition, DOD has designated the Close Combat Lethality Task Force and the Protecting Critical Technology Task Force as new cross-functional teams, although they meet only some of the section 911 requirements. DOD officials said they will ensure that the newly designated teams meet these requirements, including providing required training. In this report, GAO recommends that DOD identify and document specific implementation steps to advance a collaborative culture, consistent with GAO's leading practices. GAO also reiterates the importance of addressing its prior recommendations. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendation.