The Secret Service pursues two areas of responsibility simultaneously— protection and criminal investigations. The Secret Service’s Office of Protective Operations oversees the agency’s protective divisions, including the Presidential Protective, Vice Presidential Protective, and Uniformed Divisions. These divisions carry out permanent protective details and other protection-related assignments. Permanent protectees, such as the President and Vice President, have special agents permanently assigned to them from the Presidential Protective Division or Vice Presidential Protective Division. The Secret Service provides protection for the President, Vice President, and their families at all times. In fiscal year 2017, the Presidential and Vice Presidential Protective Divisions provided protection for 30 presidential and vice- presidential foreign trips in addition to providing protection for members of the President’s and Vice President’s families. The Uniformed Division protects certain facilities, including the White House and the Treasury Building, among others. Figure 1 illustrates an organizational chart of offices within the Secret Service. The Office of Investigations oversees the agency’s field activities, including investigations into crimes targeting the nation’s financial systems; surveys of locations a protectee may visit; investigations of threats to protected persons and facilities; and temporary support for protection. Figure 2 provides information about the components in the Office of Investigations. The Office of Investigations oversees the agency’s 21 international field offices and 141 domestic offices, consisting of 42 field offices, 60 resident offices, 13 resident agencies, and 26 domiciles. Special agents in these offices conduct investigations to identify, locate, and apprehend criminal organizations and individuals targeting the nation’s critical financial infrastructure and payment systems. Figure 3 shows the locations of Secret Service’s domestic field offices, resident offices, and resident agencies. Although the Secret Service was originally founded to investigate the counterfeiting of U.S. currency, the agency’s investigations now span a number of financial and computer-based crimes. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3056(b)(2), under the direction of the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secret Service is authorized to detect and arrest any person who violates any of the laws of the United States relating to coins, obligations, and securities of the United States, including the investigation of the counterfeiting of U.S. currency. In addition, the Secret Service is authorized to identify, locate, and apprehend criminal organizations and individuals that target the nation’s critical financial infrastructure and payment systems. Secret Service special agents investigate financial crimes such as access device fraud (including credit and debit-card fraud); identity crimes and theft; business email compromise; bank fraud; and illicit financing operations. In addition, the agency investigates cybercrimes, including network intrusions, ransomware, and cryptocurrency, among other criminal offenses. The Secret Service also provides forensic and investigative assistance in support of investigations involving missing and exploited children. Finally, Secret Service special agents may investigate and make arrests for any offense against the United States committed in their presence, or any felony cognizable under the laws of the United States if they have reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing such felony. For more information on the evolution of the Secret Service’s statutory authorities, see appendix III. The Secret Service has established three phases for a special agent’s career, in which the special agent contributes to both investigative and protective operations—Phase 1: Career Entry/Field Office Assignment; Phase 2: Protective Assignment; and Phase 3: Post-Protective Field, Protection, or Headquarters Assignment. During Phase 1, after being hired and receiving 7 months of training, the special agent is assigned to a field office for at least 3 years, where the special agent performs investigations and participates in temporary protective assignments locally and away from the special agent’s home office. In Phase 2, the special agent is assigned for up to 8 years to a permanent protective detail or to one of the Secret Service’s specialty divisions, such as the Office of Strategic Intelligence and Information. In Phase 3, the special agent may return to a field office, serve in headquarters-based specialized roles, or continue permanent protection duty. Figure 4 illustrates the Secret Service’s special agent career progression model. Secret Service special agents are paid in accordance with the Office of Personnel Management’s general schedule, which determines the pay structure for the majority of civilian white-collar Federal employees. In addition to standard pay under the general schedule, special agents are eligible for law enforcement availability pay (LEAP). The Law Enforcement Availability Pay Act of 1994, as amended, established a uniform compensation system for federal criminal investigators who, by the nature of their duties, are often required to work excessive and unusual hours. The purpose of LEAP is to provide premium pay to criminal investigators to ensure their availability for unscheduled work in excess of a 40-hour workweek based on the needs of the employing agency. The LEAP Act authorized a 25 percent increase in base salary (LEAP premium pay) as long as specific requirements of the LEAP Act are met. Among these requirements is a condition that criminal investigators maintain an annual average of 2 or more unscheduled duty hours per workday. Federal employees under the general schedule are subject to caps on pay equal to the highest pay level in the general schedule. In recent years, legislation has been enacted to raise this pay cap for Secret Service special agents who, due to the high number of hours they worked, were not otherwise compensated for all hours worked. In 2016, the Overtime Pay for Protective Services Act of 2016 authorized any officer, employee, or agent employed by the Secret Service who performs protective services for an individual or event protected by the Secret Service during 2016 to receive an exception to the limitation on certain premium pay within certain limits. The Secret Service Recruitment and Retention Act of 2018 extended the Secret Service-specific waiver of the pay cap for basic and premium overtime pay through 2018 and included agents within the Secret Service Uniformed Division. Subsequently, the Secret Service Overtime Pay Extension Act extended the Secret Service- specific waiver through 2020. The Secret Service’s Office of Investigations supports protective operations in a variety of ways. According to our analysis of Secret Service data, special agents assigned to the Office of Investigations expended 11.2 million hours supporting protective operations during fiscal years 2014 through 2018. These 11.2 million hours accounted for 41 percent of all protection hours recorded by Secret Service law enforcement personnel during that period. Figure 5 shows the number of hours Secret Service law enforcement personnel expended on protection, including the percentage expended by special agents in the Office of Investigations. The Office of Investigations conducts numerous tasks in support of protective operations, including temporary protective assignments, protective intelligence investigations, and critical systems protection. Temporary protective assignments. When a Secret Service protectee travels, special agents in the Office of Investigations carry out numerous tasks, on a temporary basis, to assist the agency’s protective operations. These special agents facilitate preparations for a protectee visit and safeguard locations. For example, special agents may review the vulnerabilities of a site, conduct motorcade route planning, and coordinate with special agents on the permanent protective detail and with state and local law enforcement. In addition, these special agents provide physical protection when the protectee arrives. Special agents assigned to the Office of Investigations also travel to provide temporary protection and assist during presidential campaigns and National Special Security Events. During presidential campaigns, these special agents may accompany certain presidential candidates and their family members to provide 24/7 protection, and may also work on advance teams that provide site security for campaign events. Protective intelligence investigations. The Office of Investigations assists with the agency’s protective intelligence efforts by investigating threats against protected persons, including the President, and protected facilities, such as protectee residences. According to a Senior Secret Service official, special agents in the Office of Investigations locate, interview, and monitor individuals that make threats to a protectee. In fiscal year 2018, the Secret Service opened 2,011 protective intelligence investigations. Critical systems protection. The Critical Systems Protection program identifies, assesses, and mitigates risk posed by information systems to persons and facilities protected by the Secret Service. The program is coordinated by special agents in the Office of Investigations, and according to a Senior Secret Service official, the program draws on the investigative experience that special agents have developed in the Office of Investigations. For example, the official told us that, through the Critical Systems Protection program, the agency may monitor electronic systems that could be compromised in a hotel where a protectee is staying. The Office of Investigations can provide other benefits to protective operations, such as providing support during periods of increased protection demand and, according to special agents we interviewed, developing relationships with local law enforcement that assist with protective operations. Below are examples of these potential benefits. Support during periods of increased protection demand. The Office of Investigations can shift the focus of its special agents from investigations to protection during periods of increased protection demand. For example, according to Secret Service officials, in fiscal year 2016, the Office of Investigations shifted special agents from criminal investigations to help meet the additional protection demands of the 2016 Presidential Campaign. As shown in figure 6, in fiscal year 2014 special agents assigned to the Office of Investigations spent 52 percent of their time on investigations and 39 percent on protection. These percentages shifted to 31 percent on investigations and 58 percent on protection in fiscal year 2016. Secret Service officials told us that the percentage of hours that special agents spent on protection remained elevated after fiscal year 2016 due to protection demands associated with the President and his family. Pre-established state and local relationships. Resources and support from local law enforcement are needed for the Secret Service to carry out its protective operations, according to senior Secret Service officials. In our interviews with 40 current and former special agents, 38 reported that Secret Service personnel develop relationships with state and local law enforcement while conducting investigations, and that these relationships can benefit protective operations. Twenty-two special agents noted that contacts with state and local law enforcement are pre-established as a result of the agency’s investigative operations. Twenty special agents reported that assets or resources are more readily provided by their state and local partners because of the relationships they have built. In addition, special agents said that relationships developed with state and local law enforcement are either necessary for (11 special agents) or improves (8 special agents) the Secret Service’s protective activities. This is consistent with our prior reporting on the topic. Specifically, in our February 2016 review of Secret Service field offices, we reported that special agents in each of the 12 domestic offices we interviewed emphasized that it would not be possible to protect visiting dignitaries without extensive assistance from state and local law enforcement partners. For example, state and local law enforcement partners may provide equipment such as helicopters, vehicles, and communication equipment during dignitary visits. Supports employee retention and work-life balance. Secret Service officials told us that special agents generally cannot work protective assignments for their entire career, and that investigations help support a more reasonable work-life balance for special agents. A senior Secret Service official described that protective assignments require a high level of readiness and threat consciousness, which can lead to significant psychological stress that cannot be sustained for a 25-year career. Another Secret Service official told us that some special agents can spend 100 or 200 nights away from home per year on protective assignments, and that some special agents do not want to work on protection full-time. Seventy-five percent (30 of 40) of the special agents we interviewed reported that their work-life balance is better while working on an investigation versus a protective assignment. For example, eighteen special agents reported that investigative operations have more normal working hours than protective operations. Special agents also reported that working protective operations requires that they spend more time away from home than investigations (12 special agents) and requires a work schedule dictated by someone else’s (i.e., the protectee’s) schedule (14 special agents). Most special agents we interviewed did not report any instances where they were unable to fulfill a protective assignment due to investigative demands. Of the 40 special agents we interviewed, 35 said there had never been an instance in which they were unable to fully execute a protection-related assignment as a result of their investigative responsibilities. The five special agents who said there were instances in which they could not personally serve in an assignment reported an issue related to staffing. For example, a special agent would have been assigned to a temporary protective activity, but they already had an investigative commitment (e.g., serving as a trial witness). According to Secret Service officials, in these instances special agents are replaced before the protective assignment begins, and thus, there is no negative effect on protective operations. During the course of our interviews, 23 special agents said that during the last two years they frequently or sometimes were required to work on investigations while they were assigned to temporary protective operations. Examples provided by these special agents included working on investigations during protective shifts, before and after protective shifts, and during breaks to pursue investigative leads and respond to U.S. Attorneys. Additional examples associated with this topic are sensitive and have been omitted from this report. These statements are consistent with those expressed in an August 2016 report assessing quality-of-life issues at the Secret Service. Senior Secret Service officials told us that investigations can help prepare Phase 1 special agents for the protective responsibilities required in Phase 2 of their career, which includes an assignment to a permanent protective detail or a specialty division (e.g., counter-assault team). However, the agency has not identified which types of investigations and related activities best prepare special agents for Phase 2, or established a framework to help ensure Phase 1 special agents work on such cases and activities to the extent possible. As described earlier, special agents typically start their careers as Phase 1 special agents in a field office, and work on criminal investigations. Twenty-six of the 40 current and former special agents we interviewed reported that investigations are important in developing the skills necessary for protective assignments. Special agents we interviewed offered examples of skills developed, such as communication, interviewing, and operational planning skills; greater attention to detail; and experience working with law enforcement partners. Special agents further stated that certain types of investigations can offer more skill development opportunities than other types of investigations. For example, 18 special agents we interviewed reported that working on protective intelligence cases can help prepare special agents for protective operations. A senior official in the Office of Protective Operations agreed, and told us that experience with protective intelligence investigations allows special agents to gain insight into both the protectees and the threats against them. In addition, six special agents identified cyber investigations as helping prepare special agents for protective operations. However, 15 special agents reported a type of Secret Service investigation that does not help them develop protection skills. For example, nine special agents said financial crime investigations (e.g., credit card fraud) are not helpful in preparing special agents for protection. As one special agent described, the skills developed from financial investigations do not translate to protection. Similarly, five special agents said that investigations into counterfeiting are not helpful in preparing special agents for protection. The Secret Service’s December 2017 Office of Investigations Priorities and Roadmap states that the office must continually look to identify areas where the expertise it has developed for investigative purposes can be leveraged to advance the Secret Service’s ability to perform its protective responsibilities. In addition, consistent with Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, effective management of the Secret Service’s workforce is essential to achieving results, as is continually assessing knowledge, skill, and ability needs of the organization, and establishing training aimed at developing and retaining employee knowledge, skills, and abilities to meet changing organizational needs. Further, according to leading management practices related to training and development efforts, adequate planning allows agencies to establish priorities and determine the best ways to leverage investments to improve performance. However, Secret Service officials told us the agency has not identified which of its current types of criminal investigations and related activities best prepare special agents for protective responsibilities, nor has it established a framework to help ensure that Phase 1 special agents gain experience in those areas to the extent possible. According to Secret Service officials, a list of investigative experiences beneficial to protective assignments existed in the past; however, the list is no longer used in practice and a copy of the list no longer exists. Special agents we interviewed reported that certain types of investigations (e.g., protective intelligence investigations) are more helpful than others in preparing them for protective assignments. Secret Service officials agreed that identifying the types of investigations and activities that best prepare special agents for protective responsibilities, as well as developing a framework to help ensure Phase 1 special agents have the opportunity to work on such cases to the extent possible, could help better prepare their special agents for the protective responsibilities required in Phase 2 of their careers. In addition, a framework could better support the Secret Service’s protective operations by focusing Phase 1 training on building skills needed for successfully executing protective responsibilities. It could also help make Phase 1 special agents more readily available to assist the agency when faced with a surge in protective responsibilities. Types of financial crimes most often prosecuted by U.S. Attorneys based on Secret Service referrals during fiscal years 2014 through 2018 were similarly investigated by four additional federal law enforcement agencies, including the FBI, Homeland Security Investigation, IRS Criminal Investigation, and the U.S. Postal Inspections Service. As shown in figure 7 below, the selected agencies served as lead investigators in a total of 14,669 prosecuted cases across six financial crimes offense types during fiscal years 2014 through 2018, with Secret Service serving as the lead on 31 percent (4,620) of the cases. The Secret Service served as the lead investigating agency on more counterfeiting and forgery, identity theft, and aggravated identity theft cases prosecuted by U.S. Attorneys than any of the other selected law enforcement agencies during fiscal years 2014 through 2018. For example, the Secret Service served as the lead investigative agency on 1,368 counterfeiting and forgery cases that were prosecuted during this time period, while the FBI led 66 cases and IRS Criminal Investigations led six cases that were prosecuted (see figure 7). Although Secret Service was the lead investigative agency on the vast majority of counterfeiting and forgery prosecutions compared to the selected agencies, some types of cases were more evenly divided among the selected agencies. For example, between 2014 and 2018, U.S. Attorney’s Offices prosecuted 608 aggravated identity theft cases for which the Secret Service was the lead investigating agency, while the FBI led 484 prosecuted cases, U.S. Postal Inspections Service led 454 prosecuted cases, and IRS Criminal Investigations led 383 prosecuted cases. All 12 of the federal prosecutors we interviewed told us that the benefits of the Secret Service and selected agencies investigating similar crimes outweigh the drawbacks. These prosecutors highlighted the following three benefits: (1) additional staff resources; (2) agency-specific expertise; and (3) value added by having agencies work together on cases. For instance, three federal prosecutors we interviewed said that the occurrence of financial and cybercrimes in their district was pervasive, and that the number of criminal complaints they received far exceeded the number of federal agents available to investigate. With regard to agency-specific expertise, one federal prosecutor noted that although multiple agencies may conduct counterfeiting investigations, the Secret Service has expertise in this area that is appreciated by local businesses, such as casinos. Finally, agency collaboration can benefit criminal investigations, as in a June 2018 case in which the Department of Justice announced a coordinated effort to disrupt schemes designed to intercept and hijack wire transfers from businesses and individuals. The effort included an investigation by Secret Service and the FBI in which 23 individuals were charged in the Southern District of Florida with laundering at least $10 million. In addition, although the Secret Service and selected federal agencies can investigate similar crimes, federal prosecutors told us that federal agencies prioritize different types of crimes or cases. For example, eleven federal prosecutors told us that the Secret Service was the only agency that referred counterfeiting cases to their district, and 6 federal prosecutors said the Secret Service was the only agency that referred protective intelligence or threat cases. Further, according to senior FBI officials, they generally investigate large-scale financial crimes. On the other hand, the Secret Service may be willing to investigate financial crimes with smaller losses than the FBI, according to senior FBI officials and two federal prosecutors we spoke with. Table 1 below includes the mission and investigative priorities of the Secret Service and selected federal agencies. Although nine of 12 federal prosecutors we interviewed stated that there are no drawbacks to the Secret Service investigating crimes similar to those investigated by selected federal agencies, two of 12 federal prosecutors and one federal agency official identified drawbacks related to deconfliction and case assignment. Specifically, one prosecutor told us that, in the past, there was a greater need for deconfliction between the Secret Service and the FBI, but that deconfliction had not been an issue in the last 18 months. In addition, FBI officials in one field office told us that although the Secret Service and the FBI generally coordinated and worked well together, sometimes there were instances in which they could have deconflicted earlier in an investigation. Another federal prosecutor told us that it may be difficult to know what federal law enforcement agency would be best to assign an investigation since in the early stages of an investigation, the federal prosecutor’s office may lack adequate case information to know what law enforcement agency would be best positioned to conduct an investigation. In December 2017, the Secret Service released the Office of Investigations Priorities and Roadmap (Roadmap). The Roadmap states that fiscal constraints require that the agency prioritize its efforts and take steps to ensure that resources are aligned with its criminal investigative priorities. It further states that the Secret Service will align enterprise-wide investigative activities from independent or uncoordinated cases into a systematic, well-prioritized, and targeted operation to counter the networks of transnational criminals that present risks to financial and payment systems. Towards this effort, the Roadmap states that the Office of Investigations will “counter the most significant criminal threats to the financial and payment systems of the United States through criminal investigations,” and that these investigations will focus on three priority criminal threats: Criminal activity with significant economic and financial impacts to the United States. Criminal activity, such as cybersecurity threats, that operate at scale and present emergent or systemic risks to financial and payments systems. Transnational criminal activity involving corruption, illicit finance, fraud, money laundering, and other financial crimes. To implement the Roadmap, the Office of Investigations was to identify investigative targets, such as specific criminal networks or activities, and develop campaign plans for each investigative target. As described in the Roadmap, the campaign plans were to synchronize the efforts of the Secret Service to counter the targets. They were also to identify government and non-government partners for countering investigative targets. In addition, the campaign plans to counter the most significant criminal threats to the financial and payment systems of the United States were to be reviewed, updated, discontinued, or newly developed on an annual basis. The Secret Service has not, however, employed the practices as identified in the Roadmap because, according to Office of Investigations officials, the approach outlined in the Roadmap is not beneficial given the dynamic nature of the crimes they investigate. Instead, rather than identifying investigative targets based on the most significant threats on a yearly basis and developing campaign plans for each target as originally planned, Secret Service officials report that their Global Investigations Operations Center helps identify individual cases with national significance and coordinate resources necessary to investigate these cases throughout the year. In addition, every two weeks Office of Investigations leadership meets with field office management to discuss their significant cases, including discussions about resource demands for these cases. However, available documentation of efforts taken does not consistently demonstrate synchronized efforts across the agency to counter investigative targets, as envisioned in the Roadmap. This is in part because the process for identifying cases with national significance and coordinating related resources is not documented. The Office of Investigations provided us with campaign plans it developed since the Roadmap was released, and based on our review, there were inconsistencies in the type of information provided. For example, one campaign plan identified gas station pumps that may have been compromised by skimming devices—that is, devices that steal credit card related information. The plan also identified field offices responsible for executing investigations of the gas pumps, timeframes for the investigations, and potential partners. A different campaign plan was an informational alert regarding business email compromises, including details about how the attacks are executed and examples of information the attacker is attempting to steal. However, this plan did not identify offices responsible for combatting the attacks, timeframes, or potential partners. The plan also does not specify what resources would be necessary to combat the identified threat. The Roadmap states that fiscal constraints require the Secret Service to prioritize its efforts and take steps to ensure that resources are aligned with its priorities. This is consistent with the recommendation of an independent panel established by the Secretary of Homeland Security to assess the Secret Service’s operations, which in 2014 recommended that the Secret Service “clearly communicate agency priorities, give effect to those priorities through its actions, and align its operations with its priorities.” Further, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government require that management should implement control activities through policies and define objectives clearly. This involves clearly defining what is to be achieved, who is to achieve it, how it will be achieved, and the time frames for realizing the achievement. Documenting a process to ensure the Office of Investigations dedicates resources to priority criminal threats can assist the Secret Service in combatting these threats and ensuring that resources align with its priorities. In addition, the documented process can help ensure that plans for addressing priority criminal threats consistently include key information, such as offices responsible for combatting specific priority criminal threats, timeframes for actions to be taken, potential partners, and resources necessary to combat the identified threat. The Roadmap identifies three priority criminal threats to the U.S. financial and payment systems. However, according to Secret Service officials, the agency does not have a process for identifying cases that address priority criminal threats. In addition, the agency does not collect data on the related expended resources, according to Secret Service officials. Secret Service officials told us they maintain a significant case database, which holds information about individual cases that field office management determine to be significant. However, Secret Service officials told us the significant case database does not currently have the capability to identify whether a case addresses one of the three priority criminal threats, and acknowledged that the criteria of a significant case differ from the criteria of a priority threat outlined in the Roadmap. For example, as stated in the significant case database guidance, “significant cases are those that represent a significant economic or community impact, as well as those that involve multi-jurisdictional districts or schemes that employ emerging technologies.” However, as described earlier in this report, the Roadmap identifies three priority criminal threats, one of which is described as “criminal activity, such as cybersecurity threats, that operate at scale and present emergent or systemic risks to financial and payments systems.” Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that relevant, reliable, and timely information is needed throughout an agency in order to achieve its objectives. However, the Secret Service does not have a systematic process for identifying cases that address priority criminal threats or the related expended resources, according to agency officials. As a result, Office of Investigations management and senior Secret Service officials lack complete information on the number of criminal investigations and amount of resources expended agencywide to investigate the agency’s priority criminal threats. Until the agency identifies investigations that address each priority criminal threat and the related resources, Office of Investigations management and senior-level Secret Service officials will not know the extent to which its operations are aligned with the stated priorities. Capturing and analyzing this data could help inform future decisions on how to allocate resources for addressing priority criminal threats. Since 2017, the Office of Investigations has employed a staffing model to determine how many special agents are necessary to sustain protective and investigative operations in its field offices. The staffing model takes into account the number of hours special agents are expected to work under LEAP and standard overtime, but does not consider annual caps on federal employee salaries. According to the Secret Service’s Human Capital Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2018 through 2025, the special agent staffing model is used to analyze the protective workload of the field offices. In addition, the plan stated that the model is used to determine the appropriate levels of investigative and intelligence output while keeping travel and overtime at “tolerable levels.” To fulfill the requirements to qualify for LEAP, Secret Service special agents regularly work a 10-hour day, inclusive of 2 hours of LEAP premium pay, for an annual total of 520 hours beyond the standard work year of 2,080 hours. The Office of Investigations staffing model also assumes special agents will work an estimated standard overtime of 200 hours, among other hours. As a result, the staffing model assumes that each special agent will work an estimated 2,600 hours per year. See Figure 8. However, if certain special agents work the hours projected under the staffing model, they may not be compensated for all of their work time because they may exceed the annual caps on federal employee salaries. For example, in calendar year 2018, using the Secret Service’s pay scale for the Washington, D.C. metro area, the standard pay cap was $164,200. Special agents at pay grade GS 13 Step 9 would have lost compensation if, in addition to their regular hours, they worked 520 hours of LEAP and 200 hours of standard overtime (see table 2). Special agents at pay grade GS 14 Step 6 would have lost compensation if, in addition to their regular hours, they worked 520 hours of LEAP alone. Although legislation was enacted in recent years to address compensation for Secret Service special agents by temporarily raising the pay cap, special agents at higher pay levels may still exceed the temporary pay cap under the current staffing model. For instance, under the temporary cap implemented for fiscal years 2017 and 2018, special agents at the GS 15 Step 5 pay grade would have been uncompensated for some hours if they worked the hours projected under the staffing model. See table 2 for additional details. According to data received from the Secret Service, some special agents did work time that was uncompensated despite the pay cap waivers. In calendar years 2016 through 2018, between 8 and 80 special agents assigned to the Office of Investigations worked some hours without being compensated for their time each year. This resulted in more than $1 million in lost wages (see table 4). Without the pay cap waiver, between 426 and 819 special agents would have worked some hours without being compensated for their time, which would have resulted in a total of $15.4 million in lost wages. See Table 3 for more details. Due to the limits on special agent compensation, the Office of Investigation’s special agent staffing model currently plans for individuals to work hours for which they cannot be compensated. Without adjusting its staffing model to ensure compensation limits are accounted for when estimating staffing needs, certain Secret Service special agents will continue to be under-compensated for their work. Additionally, the Secret Service-specific waiver does not apply after 2020, at which point special agents in the Office of Investigations may further exceed the pay caps and work some hours without compensation. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that management should design control activities to achieve objectives and respond to risks, such as those related to the management of human capital and the entity’s workforce. Internal control standards also call for the consideration of excessive pressures, noting that excessive pressure can result in personnel “cutting corners” to meet the established goals, and that management can adjust excessive pressures using tools such as rebalancing workloads. The standards further state that management should recruit, develop, and retain competent personnel to achieve the entity’s objectives. Retention can be pursued by, among other things, providing incentives to motivate and reinforce expected levels of performance and desired conduct among staff. Working long hours without being fully compensated may cause special agents to be less focused when providing protection or to seek employment elsewhere. Because the Secret Service’s staffing model does not consider maximum pay cap allowances, the Secret Service will continue to overestimate the number of hours each special agent should work and underestimate the number of staff needed to meet its workload demands. In addition, maximum pay cap allowances are subject to change if legislation does not continue to increase them on an annual basis. As a result, absent developing an updated staffing model that accounts for compensation limits and using that model to estimate staffing needs, the Secret Service risks special agents continuing to work some hours without compensation, and continuing to underestimate staffing needs. The Secret Service plays a critical role in safeguarding both the leadership of the United States and its financial resources. The Secret Service’s Office of Investigations provides valuable support to its protective operations, such as by conducting protective intelligence investigations, building special agents’ protection skills, and allowing the agency the flexibility to shift special agents from investigations to protection in campaign years and other protection-heavy periods. However, the Secret Service could better leverage its investigative responsibilities for supporting protective operations by identifying the types of investigative activities that best prepare special agents for protection, and developing a framework to help ensure special agents participate in those activities to the extent possible. In addition, selected federal prosecutors reported that the Secret Service’s financial investigations are helpful to the law enforcement community as a whole, bringing specialized expertise to investigations and complementing investigations performed by other federal law enforcement agencies. However, although the Secret Service has identified priority criminal threats in its Roadmap, it has not employed the actions identified in its Roadmap to pursue these threats. Rather, the agency relies on its Global Investigations Operations Center to identify individual cases with national significance and coordinate resources because, according to current Office of Investigations officials, the approach outlined in the Roadmap is not beneficial given the dynamic nature of the crimes they investigate. Documenting the process of identifying priority criminal threats and developing campaign plans would help the agency better direct investigative resources towards priority criminal threats. In addition, until the Secret Service identifies cases that address priority criminal threats and captures data on resources used, agency management will not be able to determine the extent to which resources and operations are aligned with priority criminal threats. Finally, special agents can work long hours in carrying out their investigative and protective duties. Unless the Secret Service updates its staffing model to account for compensation limits, the agency risks continuing to underestimate staffing needs and having special agents work some hours without compensation. This could affect retention, potentially weakening the agency’s ability to provide the highest level of quality protection. We are making the following six recommendations to the Secret Service: The Director of the Secret Service should identify which types of investigations and activities best prepare special agents for protective responsibilities. (Recommendation 1) The Director of the Secret Service should develop a framework to help ensure special agents have an opportunity to work, to the extent possible, investigations and activities that best prepare them for protection. (Recommendation 2) The Director of the Secret Service should establish a documented process to ensure that Office of Investigations resources are aligned with priority criminal threats. The process should outline key information to be included in plans for addressing priority threats. (Recommendation 3) The Director of the Secret Service should identify investigations that address priority criminal threats agencywide and collect data on the resources expended to investigate the threats. (Recommendation 4) The Director of the Secret Service should revise its special agent staffing model to ensure compensation limits are accounted for when estimating staffing needs. (Recommendation 5) The Director of the Secret Service should, after revising the special agent staffing model, use the revised model to recalculate and estimate staffing needs. (Recommendation 6) We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. DHS provided written comments, which are reprinted in appendix IV, and technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. In its comments, Secret Service, through DHS, concurred with the six recommendations. In addition, in its written comments the Secret Service outlined steps to address the recommendations. With regard to identifying which types of investigations and activities best prepare special agents for protective responsibilities and establishing a framework to help ensure they have an opportunity to work on them, the Secret Service has established a pilot program to revise guidance on preparing special agents for protection. Upon completion of the pilot program in March 2020, the agency plans to revise a directive to give field office supervisors a framework for identifying key training and experiences to prepare special agents for protection. The agency anticipates the new directive being implemented by June 2020. The stated actions are an appropriate response to our recommendation that the Secret Service develop and implement a framework for preparing special agents for protective responsibilities. These actions, if implemented effectively, should address the intent of our first two recommendations. Regarding the establishment of a documented process to ensure that Office of Investigations resources are aligned with priority criminal threats, the Secret Service plans to replace its current guidance, the INV Priorities and Roadmap, with a new strategic document with the goal of better aligning resources to address priority threats by March 2020. Developing an effective strategic plan that sets goals and objectives and outlines effective and efficient operations necessary to fulfill those objectives is consistent with best practices. Likewise, making clear what information should be included in investigative plans for addressing these priority criminal threats will help the Secret Service ensure that its resources use will be aligned with the criminal threats the agency has identified as priorities. We will continue to monitor the Secret Service’s efforts in this area. To identify investigations that address priority criminal threats across the agency, the Office of Investigations intends to revise its internal policy to further define the role of the Global Investigative Operations Center (GIOC), including how the GIOC will identify and track investigations into priority criminal threats. The agency anticipates that these revisions will be published by March 2020. To collect data on the resources expended to address priority criminal threats, the Office of Investigations plans to consider new and additional data collection methodologies. The agency intends to have developed an analysis of the validity of its revised data aggregation methodology by September 2020. Finally, the Office of Investigations plans to address our recommendations related to its staffing model by working with the Office of Strategic Planning and Policy and the Office of Human Resources to revise the staffing model to ensure compensation limits are accounted for when estimating staffing needs. The Office of Investigations then intends to work with these offices and the Chief Financial Officer to use the revised model to recalculate staffing needs. As the Secret Service notes, this recalculation is likely to result in an increase to the number of special agents required for the agency to maintain its current level of investigative engagement. The agency intends to complete the revision of the staffing model by March 2020 and update staffing estimates by June 2020. We also provided the report to the Department of Justice (DOJ). The Executive Office of U.S. Attorneys (EOUSA), a component of the Department of Justice, provided written comments, which are reprinted in appendix IV. In its response, EOUSA, noted that it agreed with our statements that Secret Service is a valuable law enforcement partner in criminal investigations, particularly those related to counterfeit currency, cyber fraud, and identity theft. EOUSA further emphasized that Secret Service’s investigative mission is intrinsically valuable to federal law enforcement efforts. DOJ also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Finally, we provided the report to the Internal Revenue Service, which did not provide comments on the report. The U.S. Postal Service declined to review the public version of the report. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney General of the United States, the Postmaster General of the United States, and the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service, as well as other interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or GoodwinG@gao.gov. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V. This report addresses the following objectives: (1) how, if at all, do the U.S. Secret Service’s (Secret Service) investigative operations support or negatively affect its protective operations; (2) to what extent do the Secret Service and selected federal entities investigate similar financial crimes, and to what extent do selected federal prosecutors find this to be beneficial; (3) to what extent has the Secret Service developed a plan to combat its priority criminal threats; and (4) to what extent does the Office of Investigations’ staffing model ensures compensation limits are accounted for when estimating staffing needs. This is a public version of a sensitive GAO report that we issued in September 2019. Secret Service deemed some of the information in our September report as sensitive, which must be protected from public disclosure. Therefore, this report omits sensitive information on whether Secret Service’s investigative operations negatively affect its protective operations. Although the information provided in this report is more limited, the report addresses the same objectives as the sensitive report and uses the same methodology. To determine how the Secret Service’s investigative operations potentially support or negatively affect protective operations, we reviewed Secret Service policies and guidance, including those related to Office of Investigations roles and responsibilities, time and attendance, and training. For example, we reviewed the Secret Service’s December 2017 Office of Investigations Priorities and Roadmap (Roadmap) to assess whether the agency is leveraging the expertise it has developed for investigative purposes to advance special agents’ ability to perform protective responsibilities. We also analyzed Secret Service data for fiscal years 2014 through 2018. For example, we analyzed Secret Service time and attendance data to determine the number of hours special agents spent on investigation and protection activities. We focused on special agents in the Office of Investigations, as these personnel are responsible for conducting criminal investigations and temporary protective assignments. Further, the data we analyzed focused on special agents in a field location (e.g., field office or resident office), and thus did not include special agents at headquarters. We focused on field staff because that is how the agency captures and reports the hour-related data in its annual reporting. In addition, we analyzed data on the number of investigative cases opened and closed. We focused on fiscal years 2014 through 2018 as it was the most recent data available at the time of our review; included a fiscal year in which the Secret Service experienced the operational tempo of a presidential campaign (i.e., fiscal year 2016); and included data from two administrations. To assess the reliability of the data, we discussed with Secret Service officials how the data are entered and maintained in their Manhours Reporting System, which tracks special agent workload and tasks, and their Field Investigative Reporting System, which maintains data on field office staffing and investigations. In addition, we compared the data to recent Secret Service annual reports and congressional budget justifications, and inquired about any differences. We also reviewed the data for any obvious errors and anomalies. Based on our review of the data and related controls, we determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of reporting the number of hours that special agents in the Office of Investigations expended on different activities and the number of cases opened and closed during fiscal years 2014 through 2018. We also interviewed Secret Service officials at headquarters and selected field offices. We selected office locations using the following criteria: highest number of criminal investigation and protection hours, diversity in types of offices, geographic diversity, and presence of other federal law enforcement agencies. In addition, we conducted semi-structured interviews with 40 current and former Secret Service special agents. Specifically, we randomly selected and interviewed 10 special agents from each of the Secret Service’s three career phases (30 special agents in total). We also interviewed 10 former special agents, including those that retired from the Secret Service and others that left the agency for other reasons. To select these 10 special agents, we asked special agents that we interviewed to recommend former special agents to participate in our study (i.e., snowball sampling) and contacted an association for former Secret Service personnel to help identify recently retired special agents. The information obtained from our interviews cannot be generalized across all current and former special agents; however, the information provided examples and perspectives on how investigative operations can support and negatively affect protective operations. To determine the extent to which the Secret Service and selected federal agencies conduct similar investigations, we analyzed federal prosecutor data from the Legal Information Office Network System (LIONS)—a system maintained by the Department of Justice’s Executive Office for United States Attorneys. We analyzed the data to determine the number and types of cases referred by the Secret Service during fiscal years 2013 through 2017, the latest years for which data was available when making the determination. Specifically, based on our data analyses, we identified the six LIONS categories wherein Secret Service (1) was identified as the lead investigative agency by the US Attorney’s Office and (2) referred the highest number of financial crime cases to federal prosecutors during fiscal years 2013 through 2017. The categories were counterfeiting and forgery, other white collar crime/fraud, financial institution fraud, identity theft, aggravated identity theft, and other fraud against businesses. Next, we identified federal law enforcement agencies that referred the highest number of cases in these categories. Based on our data analyses, we selected the following four law enforcement agencies: the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the U.S. Postal Inspection Service (USPIS), Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), and Internal Revenue Service – Criminal Investigation (IRS-CI). In the course of our investigation, data from fiscal year 2018 became available, and we analyzed data from fiscal years 2014 through 2018 to determine the extent to which our selected federal law enforcement agencies referred similar types of cases to U.S. Attorney’s Offices as those referred by Secret Service. The information obtained from selected federal agencies cannot be generalized across all federal agencies. However, the information provides examples of how federal law enforcement agencies can conduct similar types of investigations. In addition, the data may not account for all financial crimes cases each agency contributed investigative resources to. This is because the data only includes cases referred by each investigative agency wherein the agency was identified as the lead investigative agency as determined by the U.S. Attorneys who entered the data into LIONS. To assess the reliability of the LIONS data, we discussed with Department of Justice officials how the data are entered and maintained in the system. We also reviewed the data for any obvious errors and anomalies. Based on our reviews and discussions, we determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of describing the extent that selected federal law enforcement agencies referred financial crimes cases to federal prosecutors similar to those referred by the Secret Service during fiscal years 2014 through 2018. To help identify potential benefits and drawbacks of the Secret Service and selected federal agencies conducting similar types of investigations, we conducted interviews with officials from the selected federal agencies. Specifically, we interviewed officials at the headquarters and the Miami and New York field office locations for each selected agency in conjunction with site visits to Secret Service field offices in those areas. In addition, we conducted semi-structured interviews with one representative with a high-level understanding of the office’s activities (e.g., criminal chief) at 12 U.S. Attorney Offices (USAO). To select U.S. attorney districts, we established the following criteria to help ensure that we gathered a range of perspectives and interviewed USAOs that were likely to have experience working with Secret Service: highest number of ongoing cases of the types Secret Service investigates the most during fiscal years 2013 through 2017, size of USAO district (as designated by the Department of Justice), geographic diversity, and USAOs located in a state with a Secret Service field office. The information obtained from selected USAOs cannot be generalized across all federal prosecutors; however, the information provided examples of the benefits and drawbacks of selected federal agencies and the Secret Service conducting similar types of investigations. To determine the extent to which the Secret Service has developed a plan to combat its priority criminal threats, we reviewed Office of Investigations policies and guidance. For example, we reviewed the December 2017 Roadmap and guidance related to the Secret Service’s Significant Case Database. In addition, as discussed earlier, we interviewed officials from the Office of Investigations at Secret Service’s headquarters and selected field offices. We held discussions with agency officials to better understand whether the agency had a plan to address priority criminal threats and whether it maintained data on the number of cases that addressed priority criminal threats in fiscal years 2014 through 2018. We also reviewed Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government to assess whether the Secret Service has the necessary control activities and information to combat its priority criminal threats and carry out its responsibilities. Finally, to understand how the Office of Investigations develops and uses its staffing model, we reviewed agency guidance documents including guidance governing personnel utilization; the Secret Service human resources manual; and the fiscal years 2018-2025 human capital strategic plan. We also received a briefing on the development and use of the Office of Investigations staffing model and the assumptions and statistical methods used in the staffing model from officials in the Office of Investigations. To describe the ways in which federal law affects special agent pay, we reviewed federal laws, such as the Law Enforcement Availability Pay Act of 1994, the Overtime Pay for Protective Services Act of 2016, and the Secret Service Recruitment and Retention Act of 2018. Finally, we reviewed data provided by the Office of Human Resources to determine the number of special agents assigned to the Office of Investigations in calendar years 2016 through 2018 that were not compensated for all the time worked in each calendar year and the total sum unpaid. We determined the data were reliable for the purposes of this report through interviews with officials and evaluations of the system from which the data was pulled. We also reviewed Standards for Internal Controls and previous GAO products to assess the potential effects of some special agents working without compensation. We conducted this performance audit from November 2017 to September 2019 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We subsequently worked with Secret Service from October 2019 to January 2020 to prepare this version of the original sensitive report for public release. This public version was also prepared in accordance with these standards. From fiscal years 2014 through 2018, the U.S. Secret Service (Secret Service) expended $9.2 billion, with an average of $1.8 billion per fiscal year. Secret Service officials told us that in fiscal years 2017 and 2018, the Secret Service changed the way it collected and reported expenditure data. Specifically, Department of Homeland Security management directed all agency components to use the Common Appropriations Structure (CAS). As a result, the Secret Service implemented CAS in fiscal year 2017. In addition, the officials told us the Secret Service updated its accounting software in fiscal year 2018, resulting in additional changes to the accounting structure. Secret Service officials told us that because of these changes, it is not possible to accurately compare expenditure data across fiscal years 2014 through 2018. However, Secret Service officials noted that in the future they will be able compare year- over-year fiscal data starting with fiscal year 2018 and beyond using a tool within the new accounting system. A description of the expenditure data for fiscal years 2014 through 2018 is provided below. Secret Service officials told us that in fiscal years 2014 through 2016, expenditure data was collected and reported according to the task being performed. For example, a special agent’s salary was reported under the investigation category if the special agent was performing investigation- related tasks, and it was reported under the protection category if the special agent was performing protection-related tasks. See table 4. According to Secret Service officials, in fiscal year 2017, the agency implemented CAS and began to collect and report expenditure data according to location. For example, a special agent’s salary was reported under the investigation category if the special agent was assigned to an Office of Investigations field office even if the special agent was performing a protection-related task. See table 5. In fiscal year 2018, Secret Service transferred its financial reporting to the Oracle R12 system, which tracks data according to both location and task. In addition, officials noted that other accounting structure changes were made in 2018, such as changes to what activities were classified as protection. As a result, expenditures data from fiscal year 2018 is not comparable to fiscal years 2014 through 2017. See table 6. In 1865, the Secret Service was established by the Secretary of the Treasury for the purpose of investigating the counterfeiting of U.S. currency. Over the course of the next 50 years, the Secret Service’s role within the department continued to evolve as additional duties, such as Presidential protection, were assigned to it. During this time, the authorities exercised by the Secret Service were those delegated to it within the Department of the Treasury and, on occasion, authorities enacted through annual appropriations, which expired at the end of the applicable fiscal year. In 1916, the Secret Service received its first grant of authority enacted by permanent legislation— the Federal Farm Loan Act—which authorized the Secret Service to investigate counterfeiting, embezzlement, fraud, and certain other offenses in the federal farm loan system. Ten years later, the Secret Service received another grant of authority to investigate the counterfeiting of government requests for transportation by common carrier. Later, the Banking Act of 1933 and its 1935 amendments charged the Secret Service with investigating offenses similar to those under the Federal Farm Loan Act, but as applied to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). In 1948, the Secret Service’s investigative authorities under the above statutes were consolidated into a single provision of law, 18 U.S.C. § 3056 (“the Secret Service Statute”). However, the 1948 codification effort did not account for the investigative or protective activities that the Secret Service was authorized to perform under a delegation of authority or annual appropriations acts. The authorizing legislation for these activities came three year later, with the 1951 revision of the Secret Service Statute. As originally enacted, the Secret Service’s protective duties extended to the President and his immediate family, the President- elect, and, upon request, the Vice President. On the investigative side, the 1951 statute authorized the Secret Service to investigate any federal offense related to U.S. or foreign coins, obligations and securities, thereby expanding its jurisdiction beyond the enumerated offenses enacted in 1948. Over the next three decades, a series of amendments to the Secret Service Statute added new investigative and protective duties. In 1984, a revised version of the Secret Service Statute was enacted, which incorporated all prior amendments while adding a new investigative responsibility. Although there has not been another wholesale revision of the Secret Service Statute since 1984, subsequent amendments have further increased the Secret Service’s protective and investigative responsibilities. Under the current codification of its primary protective authorities, 18 U.S.C. § 3056(a), the Secret Service protects the President, the Vice President, the President-elect, and the Vice President-elect. The Secret Service may also provide protection, unless declined, to the immediate families of the President, the Vice President, the President-elect, and the Vice President-elect; former Presidents and their spouses for their lifetimes (unless the spouse remarries); children of a former President who are under 16 years of age; visiting heads of foreign states or foreign governments; other distinguished foreign visitors to the United States and official representatives of the United States performing special missions abroad when the President directs that such protection be provided; major Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates and, within 120 days of the general Presidential election, the spouses of such candidates; and, finally, former Vice Presidents, their spouses, and their children who are under 16 years of age, for a period of not more than six months after the date the former Vice President leaves office. Under the current codification of its primary investigative authorities, 18 U.S.C. § 3056(b), the Secret Service conducts criminal investigations in areas such as financial crimes, identity theft, counterfeiting of U.S. currency, computer fraud, computer-based attacks on banking, financial, and telecommunications infrastructure, and a wide range of financial and cybercrimes. In addition to investigating financial and electronic crimes, special agents conduct protective intelligence—investigating threats against protected persons, including the President, and protected facilities, such as protected residences. Table 7 provides a chronology of key statutes enacting protective and investigative authorities under the Secret Service Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3056. Table 8 provides a cross-reference to enumerated offenses within the Secret Service’s investigative jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3056(b)(1) of the Secret Service Statute. “the Secret Service is authorized to detect and arrest any person who violates . . . section 508, 509, 510, 871, or 879 of this title or, with respect to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal land banks, and Federal land bank associations, section 213, 216, 433, 493, 657, 709, 1006, 1007, 1011, 1013, 1014, 1907, or 1909 of this title.” The enumerated offenses generally involve fraud, counterfeiting, embezzlement, and certain other misconduct in connection with government transportation requests, federal farm loans, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Table 8 provides a brief description of each of the cited offenses. In addition to the contact named above, Joseph P. Cruz (Assistant Director), Jeffrey Fiore, Miriam Hill, Lerone Reid, and Leslie Stubbs made key contributions to this report. Also contributing to this report were Willie Commons III, Christine Davis, Eric Hauswirth, Susan Hsu, Grant Mallie, Claire Peachey, Farrah Stone, Eric Warren, and Sonya Vartivarian.

Summary: Commonly known for protecting the President, the Secret Service also investigates financial and electronic crimes (e.g., counterfeit currency and identity theft). In recent years, Congress and a panel of experts established by the Secretary of Homeland Security have raised concerns that the Secret Service's investigative operations may negatively affect its protective operations. GAO was asked to review the Secret Service's investigative operations. This report examines, among other things, the extent to which the Secret Service's (1) investigative operations support or negatively affect its protective operations; (2) Office of Investigations has developed a plan to combat its priority criminal threats; and (3) staffing model accounts for federal employee compensation limits. GAO analyzed Secret Service data related to investigation and protection activities from 2014 through 2018; conducted semi-structured interviews with current and former special agents and federal prosecutors; and reviewed Secret Service policies and guidance. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in September 2019. Information that the Secret Service deemed sensitive has been omitted. The operations of the U.S. Secret Service (Secret Service) Office of Investigations, which conducts criminal investigations into financial and electronic crimes, generally support Secret Service protective operations in a variety of ways. For example, special agents in the Office of Investigations perform temporary protective assignments, such as during presidential campaigns or augment protective operations by securing a site in advance of a visit by a protectee. GAO found that personnel in the Office of Investigations spent 11.2 million hours supporting protective operations from fiscal years 2014 through 2018. Most of the 40 current and former special agents GAO interviewed said that their investigative duties did not negatively affect protection. However, over half identified that they were frequently or sometimes required to work on investigations while assigned to temporary protective operations. Details associated with this topic are sensitive and have been omitted from this report. In December 2017, the Secret Service developed a plan to align its resources to combat what it identified as priority criminal threats (e.g., criminal activity with significant economic and financial impacts). However, available documentation of efforts taken does not consistently demonstrate synchronized efforts across the agency to counter the priority criminal threats, as envisioned in the plan. Further, the Secret Service does not have a systematic approach for identifying cases that address priority criminal threats. Absent a documented process for aligning resources and identifying cases, Secret Service will continue to lack assurance that its resources are aligned to combat its priority threats. The Office of Investigations employs a staffing model to determine how many special agents are needed in its field offices. The staffing model takes into account the number of law enforcement premium pay and standard overtime hours special agents are expected to work. However, it does not consider annual caps on federal employee salaries. As a result, the agency may be underestimating the number of staff needed to meet its workload demands. GAO is making six recommendations, including that the Secret Service establish a documented process to ensure that resources are dedicated to priority criminal threats, identify investigations that address these threats, and ensure compensation limits are accounted for when estimating staffing needs. The Department of Homeland Security concurred with each of GAO's recommendations.