The military services – Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps – have highly trained EOD personnel to eliminate explosive hazards in support of a variety of events and activities, ranging from major combat operations and contingency operations overseas to assisting the Secret Service in its protection of the President of the United States (see fig.1). EOD forces are dispersed worldwide to meet combatant commanders’ operational requirements related to these missions. Although the services’ EOD forces support combatant commanders, NORTHCOM’s Joint Force Headquarters-National Capital Region coordinates EOD force support of land-based homeland defense and DSCA missions. EOD forces conduct combat-related and DSCA missions that support national military objectives. EOD combat-related missions include preparations for combat such as training and exercises, and the wartime execution of EOD missions. EOD forces play a major role in all phases of combat operations. For example, these forces contribute to information gathering during operations and serve to enable the safe conduct of operations within an operational area. Additionally, EOD forces support freedom of maneuver and force protection. Further, they may directly support missions such as counterterrorism, deterring and defeating aggression, and countering weapons of mass destruction, among others across the spectrum of operations. Officials from each service stated that EOD forces prepare for these combat-related missions during predeployment in-garrison periods. EOD forces also conduct DSCA missions when they are not engaged in combat-related missions. DOD provides EOD forces when requested in advance by specific federal agencies and approved by the appropriate DOD official. Officials stated that generally, EOD forces undertake VIP support missions during in-garrison periods, just after returning from combat-related deployments or while preparing for the next deployment. The military services collectively have more than 6,300 EOD positions to fulfill combatant command missions, and demand for EOD manpower and expertise is high. Each service determines the number of EOD technicians it needs based on its respective requirements, which consider combatant commanders’ wartime missions and plans. According to a DOD official, the services take into account the long lead times—up to 3 years in one service—that can be necessary to produce qualified and experienced EOD specialists. In accordance with DOD policy, when considering EOD wartime requirements, service officials should make certain that national military objectives can be accomplished using a minimum of manpower that produces maximum combat power. DOD policy also states that a formal validated process is to be used to determine wartime manpower requirements. Generally, manpower requirements are the amount of personnel needed to accomplish a job, mission, or program. Joint doctrine outlines mission tasks associated with EOD units. Once a service determines the tasks required of a particular community (such as EOD), the service then sizes its forces (i.e., determines the manpower requirement) according to the demand for those tasks among the combatant commands. Risk is the effect of uncertainty on objectives with the potential for either a negative outcome or a positive outcome or opportunity. In the military, accurately appraising risk allows leaders and staffs to manage and communicate risk effectively to inform decisions across disparate processes. Joint doctrine describes a planning process that aligns resources and military activities, and enables leaders to examine risks, among other factors, to determine a preferred course of action to achieve an objective. Planning for EOD involves military manpower systems that accurately determine the required EOD forces and decision makers who decide how much risk is acceptable if or when there is a shortfall of EOD forces. According to DOD doctrine on joint planning, regardless of the efforts to mitigate it, some level of risk will remain and should be identified to senior leaders so there is a common understanding of the decisions required and the potential effects of those decisions. Commanders must include a discussion of risk in their interaction with DOD senior leaders and that discussion must be in concrete terms that enable and support decision- making. In the context of strategic and military risk evaluation during joint planning, combatant commanders and DOD’s senior leaders work together to reach a common understanding of risk, decide what risk is acceptable, and minimize the effects of accepted risk by establishing appropriate risk controls. The military services’ processes for determining EOD manpower levels are based on combat-related missions and, accordingly, do not fully consider DSCA missions. However, DOD provides EOD resources for various DSCA missions such as: aiding in the protection of the President of the United States and dignitaries through VIP support missions; providing assistance to law enforcement agencies and other civil authorities in the United States and its territories when necessary to save lives under DOD’s immediate response authority; and rendering safe military munitions when requested by civil authorities (see fig. 2). EOD and manpower officials from each of the military services explained that, in practice, their respective services focus on combat-related missions and do not consider DSCA missions in determining the number of EOD personnel needed. Specifically: According to Army officials, the Total Army Analysis process that is used to size Army forces considers core functions for combat operations and warfighting requirements. They explained that this process does not consider DSCA requirements in determining the number of EOD forces needed. In Army guidance, manpower is based on wartime missions and wartime requirements for sustained combat operations, among other types of information. Due in part to force structure adjustments and the drawdown of EOD forces, since 2014, according to information provided by the Army, the Army has reduced more than 800 EOD positions, the equivalent of two EOD battalions and 13 EOD companies. According to Navy officials, the Navy makes manpower decisions with a focus on wartime requirements by analyzing required operational capabilities against the projected operational environment. In Navy manpower guidance, this analysis is critical to developing fleet manpower requirements for units such as EOD forces. Navy officials explained that the process does not consider the DSCA mission in determining EOD manpower. The Air Force’s EOD manpower standard, which has been updated through 2013, is based on in-garrison needs and wartime requirements. In Air Force manpower guidance, manpower is described as a critical resource that enables combat capability; the guidance further notes that manpower requirements are identified and resources are subsequently allocated for peacetime and wartime missions. However, Air Force officials stated that the process focuses on results for combat-related missions and does not specifically include DSCA requirements. According to Marine Corps officials, the Marine Corps’ EOD forces are sized to support Marine Expeditionary Forces for deployment for overseas combat operations. The Marine Corps’ manpower guidance describes a force structure process designed to identify and provide the capabilities, including personnel and equipment, necessary to accomplish mission essential tasks. Marine Corps officials stated that the service does not receive additional EOD manpower specifically for DSCA missions. Although service manpower calculations do not reflect DSCA missions, one of the DSCA missions—VIP support—is manpower intensive and occurs frequently. Specifically, the workload for VIP support can be substantial and has increased from about 248,000 man-hours in fiscal year 2007 to over 690,000 man-hours in fiscal year 2017. According to a NORTHCOM official, this rise is due to an increase in the different types and complexity of threats requiring more EOD personnel to sufficiently support civil authorities. Figure 3 below illustrates the increase in the amount of time the EOD forces have spent on VIP support missions. The military services have a long-standing practice of providing support to civil authorities, including EOD support. DOD support to civil authorities is grounded or reflected in statute and DOD guidance. For example, the Presidential Protection Assistance Act of 1976 requires executive agencies, including DOD, to assist the Secret Service on a temporary basis in protecting the President, the Vice President and other persons— such as visiting foreign dignitaries (see fig.4). In addition, the National Military Strategy and current homeland defense strategy prioritize defending the homeland and providing support to civil authorities. Moreover, DOD guidance addresses DSCA generally as well as specific support to the Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, and law enforcement. Further, the Secretary of Defense approved a Joint Staff standing execute order (EXORD) which is used to execute routine VIP support missions related to the protection of dignitaries on short notice. This order authorizes NORTHCOM to provide EOD support to the Secret Service and U.S. Department of State within the NORTHCOM area of operations, and to coordinate that support at locations worldwide. Joint doctrine for EOD also lists DSCA as one of nine military missions that EOD forces may directly support, and states that the majority of EOD DSCA missions will be in support of law enforcement or emergency support agencies. Finally, the military services’ Inter-Service Responsibilities for Explosive Ordnance Disposal lists several common responsibilities of the military services’ EOD assets that include providing support to civilian agencies such as the Secret Service. While the DSCA mission is emphasized in departmental guidance and support of civil authorities has placed increasing and significant demands on EOD forces, the military services do not fully consider these factors in determining the appropriate number of EOD forces. According to EOD officials, this is because the primary mission of EOD forces is to conduct combat missions in support of combatant commanders and meet operational plans. Service officials stated that DSCA missions are not priority missions when it comes to sizing their respective forces, and that they do not routinely increase EOD manpower in order to provide support to other federal agencies. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that management should design control activities to achieve objectives and respond to risks. Specifically, management should ensure policies and procedures are relevant and effective in achieving an entity’s objectives. In addition, the standards state that management should use quality information to make informed decisions and evaluate the entity’s performance in achieving key objectives. Quality information is information that is appropriate, current, complete, accurate, accessible, and provided on a timely basis. DOD manpower policy states that manpower management shall be flexible, adaptive to program changes, and responsive to new management strategies, and that existing policies, procedures, and structures shall be periodically evaluated to ensure efficient and effective use of manpower resources. However, the military services’ current processes for determining the appropriate amount of EOD manpower do not fully account for the increase in DSCA missions requiring EOD support. While it is understandable that the services prioritize combat missions when determining EOD requirements, they are not considering all available information in their decision-making process. This lack of consideration limits their ability to efficiently and effectively achieve their objectives and manage risks. Accounting for the increase in EOD manpower demand may not necessarily result in an increase in manpower; however, the services will be better prepared to understand the demand on existing EOD forces and evaluate any resulting risks. Ultimately, unless the military services update appropriate guidance to ensure that they consider the total EOD force required to support combat-related and DSCA missions, decision makers cannot accurately assess the sufficiency of EOD forces to meet both missions and the associated risks. DOD cannot evaluate the effects of VIP support missions on military preparedness because current VIP support mission guidance does not require the military services to notify the Joint Staff and appropriate combatant commands when military preparedness is negatively affected by these missions. According to officials from the military services, the execution of VIP support missions introduces risk that threatens the services’ abilities to execute combat-related missions. Specifically, military preparedness is degraded when the services’ EOD forces are unable to concurrently complete predeployment tasks, such as training for combat, because the forces are called upon to execute routine VIP support missions. Officials told us that EOD forces can only conduct these VIP support missions during the time period when EOD forces are scheduled to conduct predeployment tasks and accomplish training. As a result, according to officials, VIP support missions can deleteriously affect military preparedness for EOD forces. In multiple instances, missions supporting civil authorities have stressed the Army’s EOD capabilities, resulting in missed training and the inability to participate in exercises and activities supporting combat-related missions, according to statements and data provided by the Army. Furthermore, fulfilling VIP support missions can be particularly difficult because short-notice demand for EOD teams often exceeds the planned VIP support demand that can be supported. As a result, Army EOD teams are sometimes dispatched at the expense of military preparedness for combat-related missions in support of combatant commands, according to Army officials. Specific details of the effect recent VIP support missions have had on the Army’s EOD capabilities are included in our July 2019 restricted report. Officials from other services also acknowledged that undertaking routine VIP support missions comes at the expense of training for combat-related missions because of the high demand for and limited number of EOD forces. According to a senior Navy official, that service has sometimes refused mission requests to protect dignitaries because of its inability to meet operational demands, such as deployments and training for its EOD forces and support missions to protect dignitaries simultaneously. When this occurs, however, NORTHCOM will ask another service to accept the mission, thereby putting increased demand on that other service’s EOD forces that, in turn, may conflict with their scheduled training and preparations for combat missions, according to military service officials. Because NORTHCOM has few permanently assigned forces to conduct VIP support missions, it must instead rely on EOD forces from each of the military services that are in-garrison and preparing for but not currently deployed to a combat-related mission. According to DOD guidance, DOD’s ability to grant Secret Service requests for support is to be evaluated based on a number of factors, one of which is the effect on military preparedness. For example, DOD Directive 3025.18, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), specifies that requests from civil authorities for assistance shall be evaluated for several factors, including the impact on DOD’s ability to perform its other primary missions. The guidance also provides that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible for advising the Secretary of Defense on the effects of requests for civil support on national security and military readiness. According to joint doctrine, a commander’s tasks associated with the function of command and control include managing risk—such as that arising from EOD support for other agencies protecting dignitaries—as well as communicating and ensuring the flow of information across the staff and joint force, and to higher authorities. Additionally, in the context of evaluating strategic and military risk during joint planning, combatant commanders and senior DOD leaders work together to reach a common understanding of risk, decide what risk is acceptable, and minimize the effects of accepted risk. The Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government also addresses the importance of an entity using quality information to achieve its objectives. Specifically, management should use quality information to make informed decisions and evaluate the entity’s performance in achieving key objectives and addressing risks. As previously mentioned, the Joint Staff has issued a Secretary of Defense-approved EXORD that provides guidance for the military to provide EOD support to the Secret Service and Department of State for routine VIP support missions. However, this EXORD does not specify a requirement for the services to notify DOD stakeholders regarding the effect on military preparedness for combat missions. As a result, the military services are not advising the Joint Staff or NORTHCOM when these VIP support missions are adversely affecting EOD military preparedness for combat-related missions. Regarding military preparedness, the absence of a notification requirement precludes decision makers from understanding the risk to EOD forces’ ability to perform their primary mission. Decision makers need this information to carry out their responsibilities and assess risk to ensure efficient and effective accomplishment of both VIP support missions and preparation for combat-related missions for combatant commands. The military services’ EOD forces provide the combatant commanders necessary capabilities for combat and combat-related missions. They also provide capabilities through their DSCA missions that are important to supporting U.S. law enforcement agencies and other federal, state, and local civil authorities. DOD has manpower processes that result in careful consideration of the requirements of the combatant commander for combat-related missions. However, those manpower processes do not fully consider DSCA missions, such as the VIP support mission and its accompanying substantial workload. Until DOD processes begin to consider the demand for EOD support for both types of missions, decision makers cannot know the complete manpower requirement for EOD. Consequently, the extent to which the services’ EOD forces are sufficient or insufficient to meet national military objectives cannot be fully known. Furthermore, DOD lacks a requirement in guidance specific to the VIP support mission to notify stakeholders regarding the effects of such missions on military preparedness for combat-related missions. As a result, DOD may not be fully considering risks associated with the use of EOD forces for VIP support on the preparation and training of those forces for combat-related missions. We are making the following four recommendations to DOD. The Secretary of the Army should update Army manpower guidance, or other guidance as appropriate, to ensure that all missions conducted by EOD forces, including DSCA missions, are considered in determining the required number of EOD forces. (Recommendation 1) The Secretary of the Air Force should update Air Force manpower guidance, or other guidance as appropriate, to ensure that all missions conducted by EOD forces, including DSCA missions, are considered in determining the required number of EOD forces. (Recommendation 2) The Secretary of the Navy should update Navy and Marine Corps manpower guidance, or other guidance as appropriate, to ensure that all missions conducted by EOD forces, including DSCA missions, are considered in determining the required number of EOD forces. (Recommendation 3) The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in collaboration with the combatant commands, incorporate into the appropriate guidance a requirement that the military services notify the Joint Staff and the affected combatant commands when the execution of VIP support missions negatively affects the preparedness of EOD units for combat-related missions. (Recommendation 4) We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. DOD did not provide comments. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-5431 or russellc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix I. In addition to the contact named above, Guy LoFaro, (Assistant Director), Ben Atwood, Naba Barkakati, Christopher Gezon, Amie Lesser, Dennis Mayo, Paulina Reaves, Michael Silver, Michael Shaughnessy, Stephen Woods, and Lillian Yob made contributions to this report.

Summary: EOD forces are a high demand, critical asset that support DOD's ability to execute military operations. DOD increased the number of EOD forces by more than 70 percent from 2002 to 2012 because of increased demand. When not deployed, EOD forces provide support to civil authorities. One of these missions is protecting U.S. and foreign dignitaries—also referred to as VIP support missions. House Report 115-200 included a provision for GAO to review matters related to EOD capabilities and requirements. This report assesses the extent to which (1) the military services consider all combatant command EOD requirements, including DSCA, in determining the number of EOD personnel needed, and (2) DOD evaluates the effect of VIP support missions on the military preparedness of EOD forces. GAO reviewed relevant guidance, analyzed EOD data, and interviewed EOD and manpower officials. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in July 2019. Information that DOD deemed sensitive has been omitted. The military services' processes for determining the necessary number of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel are based on combat-related missions. However, these processes do not fully consider some defense support of civil authority (DSCA) missions that EOD forces conduct. Demand for EOD forces for DSCA missions can be manpower-intensive and frequent. For example, EOD forces' workload for protecting U.S. and foreign dignitaries—also referred to as Very Important Person (VIP) support missions—increased from about 248,000 to over 690,000 man-hours in fiscal years 2007 to 2017 (figure). However, according to officials, the services do not consider DSCA missions in determining the number of EOD personnel needed, instead focusing on combat-related missions. Unless the Department of Defense (DOD) ensures that the services update guidance to consider the total EOD force required to support both missions, decision makers cannot accurately assess the EOD forces' sufficiency. DOD guidance specific to VIP support missions does not include a requirement for the services to report on the effect of VIP support missions on military preparedness. According to officials, military preparedness is degraded when the services' EOD forces are unable to concurrently complete predeployment tasks such as training for combat. Per DOD guidance, Secret Service support requests are to be evaluated based on their effects on military preparedness. Without this information, decision makers are precluded from understanding the risk to EOD forces' military preparedness resulting from the routine VIP support missions. Decision makers need this information to ensure efficient and effective accomplishment of both VIP support missions and preparation for combat-related missions for affected combatant commands. GAO is making four recommendations including that DOD (1) update the appropriate service guidance to ensure that all EOD missions, including DSCA missions, are considered in determining the required number of EOD forces, and (2) incorporate into appropriate guidance a requirement for the military services to notify the Joint Staff and combatant commands when VIP support missions negatively affect the military preparedness of EOD units. DOD did not provide comments on the draft of this report.