As previously mentioned, multiple federal departments and components have responsibilities for combating the flow of illicit drugs into the United States. Figure 1 summarizes the missions and responsibilities of the federal departments and components primarily responsible for combating the trafficking of illicit drugs. In 1989, DOD created several joint task forces, which aimed to bridge the military’s counterdrug efforts with those of civilian, federal law enforcement agencies. These task forces have evolved since then and eventually developed into the present-day iterations of JIATF-South under the U.S. Southern Command and JIATF-West under the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. JIATF-South and JIATF-West both consist of representatives from DOD, DHS, and DOJ components, among others. Coast Guard admirals currently serve as the Directors of both of the JIATFs. Previously, DOD service components have led JIATF-South; however, while DOD is responsible for detection and monitoring of drug flow, it is precluded from taking law enforcement actions in counterdrug efforts. Task force officials stated that Coast Guard leadership encourages participation from both DOD and DHS because the Coast Guard is both a military and a law enforcement agency. The deputy and vice leadership positions at the JIATFs are held by officers and civilians from DOD, DHS, and DOJ components, which allow the task forces to leverage various experiences and authorities across these components, according to task force officials. In 2014, DHS established three new joint task forces — (1) JTF–East, (2) JTF–West, and (3) JTF–Investigations—as pilot programs to, among other things, address the smuggling of illicit drugs over the southern border and approaches to the United States. Additionally, according to the DHS Southern Border and Approaches Campaign Plan, the JTFs were created to strengthen the unity of effort within DHS toward common goals. The 2017 National Defense Authorization Act subsequently codified these task forces and established new JTF requirements, such as establishing outcome-based and other appropriate performance measures to evaluate the effectiveness of each JTF. In 2017, DHS also created a JTF Coordination Cell to develop JTF performance measures and enhance awareness among DHS components about the role of the JTFs, among other things. The DHS JTFs primarily consist of representatives from CBP, ICE, and the Coast Guard, and a representative from each of these components serves as the Director for each of the three JTFs. The deputy leadership positions of each JTF are held by officers from the other two components. For example, DHS JTF-West’s director is an officer from CBP, and the deputy directors are officers from the Coast Guard and ICE. According to a DHS memorandum, in establishing the JTFs, DHS wanted each JTF to be led and supported by the different DHS components in order to integrate their varied capabilities. For more information on the task forces’ leadership and compositions, see table 1. Each of the five task forces are similarly organized by functional areas and all include areas such as administration and personnel, intelligence, and operations. For example, JIATF-South, JIATF-West, and each of the DHS JTFs have Planning sections, which help guide the task forces’ overarching strategic plans and operations, with input from other sections. One task force—JIATF-West—further tailored its organizational structure to its missions and activities. Specifically, JIATF-West reorganized in January 2016, at the direction of the former U.S. Indo-Pacific Combatant Commander, to operationalize and combine its Intelligence and Operations functional areas into a Counternarcotics Operations Center. According to JIATF-West leadership, the Counternarcotics Operations Center better reflects the nature of its intelligence gathering and sharing activities with other federal law enforcement agencies and foreign countries. JIATF-West officials also stated the task force merged its section that provided support and training of foreign law enforcement agencies into its Planning and Engagement section since that section directs activities related to JIATF-West’s engagement with partner nations. As shown in figure 2, the two DOD task forces (JIATF-South and JIATF- West) and two of the three DHS task forces (JTF-East and JTF-West) have geographical areas of responsibility. In contrast, the third DHS task force (JTF-Investigations) is focused on coordinating investigations and information sharing to support DHS and the other two DHS JTFs. As a result, it does not have a geographical area of responsibility. Example of Joint Interagency Task Force– South (JIATF-South) Activity to Combat Illicit Drug Trafficking When JIATF-South receives information about a potential illicit drug smuggling event, it will use available air and maritime assets allocated to it to detect and monitor the suspect smuggling vessel. Once JIATF-South locates the suspect vessel and has assets in place, JIATF-South turns over control of the assets to the relevant law enforcement agencies (e.g., the Coast Guard, CBP, etc.) to interdict the smuggling vessel and any illicit drugs that may be on board. JIATF-South: Focuses its activities on detecting, monitoring, and supporting the interdiction of bulk cocaine movements being smuggled on noncommercial maritime vessels. According to JIATF- South officials, this focus is partly because the key coca-producing countries are within its area of responsibility, and partly because cocaine is a key source of profit for transnational criminal organizations. JIATF-South is also allocated assets, such as ships and surveillance aircraft, from DOD and DHS components (such as the Coast Guard and CBP Air and Marine Operations), as well as from foreign partners. JIATF-South uses these maritime and air assets, in conjunction with available intelligence, to detect and monitor the trafficking of illicit drugs, such as cocaine, being smuggled north across its area of responsibility. Once JIATF-South detects a smuggling event occurring, it passes this information and control of the assets to law enforcement authorities to interdict the smuggling event. For an example of how this occurs, see the sidebar. Example of Joint Interagency Task Force– West’s (JIATF-West) Capacity Building Efforts to Combat Illicit Drug Trafficking JIATF-West has helped countries in its area of responsibility—such as Vanuatu—build their financial investigative capacity by providing law enforcement training on topics such as bank records analysis, money laundering theory, and accounting. This training is intended to help foreign law enforcement agencies better detect transnational criminal organizations’ transactions, thus making it more difficult for such organizations to operate in their area of responsibility. JIATF-West: Focuses its missions and activities on four priorities: (1) detecting precursor chemicals that can be used to manufacture illicit drugs, such as synthetic opioids; (2) supporting allies and foreign partners in combating illicit drug trafficking in its area of responsibility; (3) monitoring drug flows moving to, from, and through Asia and other countries in the Indo-Pacific region; and (4) detecting the flow of fentanyl and other synthetic opioids, according to JIATF-West documents. According to JIATF-West officials, JIATF-West’s activities primarily consist of intelligence gathering and collaboration with law enforcement partners within foreign countries where precursor chemicals are manufactured or combined to manufacture illicit drugs. JIATF-West also engages in capacity building with law enforcement authorities in foreign countries in the Pacific region, such as the Philippines and Thailand. For an example of JIATF-West’s capacity building efforts, see the sidebar. Unlike JIATF-South, JIATF-West does not have assets, such as ships or aircraft. However, JIATF-West officials stated that even if JIATF- West had assets, it would not alter the focus of its missions and activities because of the threat transnational criminal organizations pose and the nature of the flow of illicit drugs and precursor chemicals in its expansive area of responsibility. For example, JIATF-West officials told us that precursor chemicals are typically shipped in commercial cargo containers. Notably, all precursor chemicals are legal to manufacture and sell for legitimate uses, such as the production of pharmaceutical drugs and pesticides, and it is difficult to determine when such chemicals have been diverted for illicit use. Officials stated that JIATF-West would face legal and logistical challenges if they were to directly disrupt precursor chemicals being diverted, such as if the vessel was state-owned or was in a foreign country’s territorial waters. Thus, even if JIATF-West had assets, JIATF-West officials noted that the legal and logistical challenges would not change how the task force approaches its missions and activities. DHS JTFs: Focus on coordinating with DHS components (e.g., CBP, ICE HSI, Coast Guard) to facilitate awareness about cross- component, cross-geographic homeland security issues. The JTFs have broader missions than countering the flow of illicit drugs. For example, the JTFs also have responsibilities for coordinating migrant interdiction and counter-terrorism activities. Further, given their areas of responsibility, JTF-East primarily focuses on threats along the southern maritime border of the United States and JTF-West primarily focuses on threats along the southwest land border. In contrast, JTF-Investigations focuses on supporting DHS-wide investigations and sharing information to support the other two task forces. Similar to JIATF-West, the JTFs do not have physical assets to support these activities. According to JTF officials, this is partly because the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act requires the JTFs to be cost neutral. Additionally, JTF officials stated the JTFs were not meant to serve a similar function as the DOD combatant commands and, instead, are meant to help with planning and coordinating missions and activities across joint operating areas. Task force officials reported that the task forces effectively coordinated counterdrug missions and activities to minimize duplication of efforts. The extent to which the task forces coordinate varied based on whether they have (1) shared purposes and (2) areas of responsibility with overlapping or shared geographical boundaries. In particular, those task forces that have shared purposes and those task forces that have overlapping areas of responsibility or shared boundaries tended to coordinate with one another more than with the other task forces. We also found that the task forces use a variety of mechanisms to coordinate counterdrug missions and activities, such as the use of working groups and liaison officers, that our prior work has identified as best practices. Officials we met with from each of the task forces stated that they are satisfied with the level of coordination that takes place with other task forces and that the coordination efforts have been effective. Our analysis of their responses found that of the five task forces, JTF-Investigations’ coordination activities were rated as the most effective by the other four task forces. JIATF-South was rated the second highest task force in terms of both the effectiveness of its coordination activities and the number of other task forces with which it coordinated. Figure 3 provides a visual representation of the task force officials’ views on the extent to which the task forces coordinate with one another and the effectiveness of the coordination efforts. of coordination with the other task forces varies based on the extent to which the task forces have shared purposes. Of the five task forces, JTF-Investigations was the one task force that coordinated with all the other task forces, which is consistent with its purpose to enhance DHS investigations, coordinate priorities, and share information with the other joint task forces. As a part of its process in designating cases as a Homeland Criminal Organization Target (HOMECORT), JTF-Investigations conducts a Comprehensive Criminal Network Analysis that identifies links between multiple cases and criminal organizations that can cross geographical and task force boundaries (see sidebar for more information on the HOMECORT process). According to JTF-Investigations officials, this analysis helps identify cases that may be related and helps to coordinate cases across task force jurisdictions to prevent duplication of missions and activities. forces told us that they coordinated more with those task forces with which they had a shared border or joint operating area. For example, JIATF-South shares a joint operating area or a geographical boundary with both JTF-East and JIATF-West and, as a result, officials from these three task forces provided more robust examples of coordination. According to task force documentation, such as operational guidance, and our discussions with task force officials, JIATF-South, JIATF-West, and the DHS JTFs coordinated with each other on missions and activities where they have a shared interest, such as a common illicit drug threat. These coordination activities include information sharing and joint operations, as well as mechanisms, such as the use of working groups and liaison officers, which our prior work has identified as best practices for coordination. According to task force officials, this coordination is intended to enhance counterdrug efforts and avoid duplication of missions and activities. As described earlier, the task forces have different mission focuses that depend on their geographically defined areas of responsibility, which also help the task forces avoid duplication of missions and activities. However, as shown earlier in figure 2, there are some areas of land, sea, and air in which more than one task force may conduct missions and activities (e.g., between JIATF-South and JTF- East). These areas of overlap are called joint operating areas. According to our review of task force documents and discussions with task force officials, within these joint operating areas, the task forces share intelligence information, coordinate missions and activities with one another, and sometimes conduct joint operations. For example, in 2018, JTF-East led and coordinated with JIATF-South on an operation to increase intelligence and targeting capabilities to disrupt illicit drug trafficking organizations operating within their joint operating area in the Caribbean. JTF-East personnel deployed to JIATF-South’s headquarters to facilitate coordination and information sharing. As a result of this joint operation, the law enforcement agencies involved seized over 3,700 pounds of cocaine and apprehended 69 migrants, one smuggler, and the smuggling vessel, according to JTF-East documentation. Officials from the task forces we spoke with reported coordinating most frequently through meetings and working groups, and through liaison officers, as detailed in examples below. JIATFs: In 2018, JIATF-South and JIATF-West officials developed a collaborative process to track and target shipments with potential illicit drugs and precursor chemicals moving between their respective areas of responsibility. For example, JIATF-West analysts traveled to JIATF- South to initiate the process, and officials stated they continue to work with JIATF-South analysts remotely on an ongoing basis on such collaborative efforts. JTFs: The JTF Coordination Cell hosts quarterly “synchronization meetings” with the three DHS JTFs to discuss emerging drug and smuggling trends, ongoing coordination efforts, and investigations. All five task forces utilize liaison officers to enhance coordination with the other task forces and components. For example, in 2018, JIATF-West sent an analyst to JTF-Investigations to coordinate on a HOMECORT case related to drug threats in the Indo-Pacific region. Further, the five task forces coordinate with each other and their participating components through liaison officers that reside at the task forces. For example, JIATF- South officials told us that they coordinate with JTF-East through a Coast Guard liaison at JIATF-South. Liaison officers also provide direct access to their components’ information systems, which task force officials said further aids them in sharing information and coordinating missions and activities. In addition to meetings, working groups, and liaison officers, the task forces utilize other coordination mechanisms, such as memoranda of understanding and agreement, shared databases, and conferences, as detailed below. Memoranda of understanding or agreement: The two JIATFs have nine separate formal memoranda of understanding or agreement with various DHS and DOJ components, such as the Drug Enforcement Administration and ICE, that detail how the task forces and agencies will coordinate with one another and share resources. Shared databases: Each of the five task forces, along with other federal agencies, can submit information, sometimes known as a “critical movement alert” to shared databases, to alert JIATF-South about a potential drug event in its area of responsibility. According to JIATF-South officials we spoke with and our observations, JIATF- South uses these critical movement alerts, along with other intelligence that may exist, to determine whether it will dedicate assets to target a smuggling event, in conjunction with other, relevant law enforcement agencies. Conferences: Each of the five task forces participates in periodic in- person, telephone, or video conferences to coordinate with one another and share information on key issues. For example, JIATF- South officials stated they have ongoing discussions once a quarter via video conference with JIATF-West officials and other federal agencies and task forces to coordinate on illicit drug threats. JIATF-South uses both output-based and outcome-based performance measures to gauge the effectiveness of its counterdrug missions and activities, and it reports the results to the DOD Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and Global Threats in JIATF- South’s annual Performance Summary Reports. JIATF-South consistently assesses four key performance measures, called interdiction continuum measures, using data from the Consolidated Counterdrug Database to determine the effectiveness of its missions and activities. Specifically, JIATF-South measures (1) total maritime smuggling events, (2) targeted smuggling events, (3) detected smuggling events, and (4) seized or disrupted smuggling events. According to JIATF-South officials, data on these events allow JIATF-South to develop its primary measure to determine the effectiveness of its counterdrug missions and activities: the percentage of smuggling events JIATF-South detected that it handed off to law enforcement agencies that resulted in disrupted or seized illicit drugs. These measures and the results for fiscal years 2014 through 2018 are shown in table 2. From fiscal years 2014 through 2018, the rate at which JIATF-South successfully detected and handed off smuggling events for interdiction was generally 70 percent or higher. While JIATF-South officials acknowledged they have not met the target set by DOD, they noted there are many factors that influence the effectiveness of JIATF-South’s counterdrug missions and activities in any given year that are outside of its span of control. For example, drug trafficking organizations may adapt their tactics in response to JIATF-South’s activities to make it more difficult for the task force to target and detect their movements. This could include changing their trafficking routes or altering the size or type of smuggling conveyances the drug trafficking organizations use to transport the illicit drugs. In September 2014, JIATF-West set up an Assessments Branch to provide an annual assessment of the task force’s counterdrug efforts that was intended to inform leadership about whether the task force was undertaking the best activities to achieve its mission and implementing them effectively. According to JIATF-West officials, the nature of JIATF- West’s missions and activities make it inherently more difficult to assess and quantify the effectiveness of its efforts relative to other task forces. For example, unlike JIATF-South, which is annually allocated assets to support its missions and activities and can measure results—such as tons of cocaine seized—JIATF-West’s initiatives and activities are primarily focused on information sharing and helping partner nations improve their counterdrug capabilities, activities for which results may be more difficult to quantify. To develop its annual assessment report, JIATF-West’s Assessments Branch evaluates and assigns scores for each of the approximately 20 counterdrug initiatives and more than 100 corresponding activities it conducts each year. (For an example of a JIATF-West initiative and a corresponding activity and a description of how they were assessed, see the sidebar.) In particular, JIATF-West evaluates its initiatives to determine the progress made toward achieving objectives defined in JIATF-West’s strategic documents, such as its Theater Counternarcotics Campaign Plan. Further, JIATF-West evaluates its activities to determine whether they were executed as planned, including considerations of whether the activities were done with the intended organizations, at the specified locations and times, and whether they met stated objectives. Nevertheless, we identified ways JIATF-West measures its performance that inhibit its ability to demonstrate its overall effectiveness of countering the flow of illicit drugs. Specifically, we found that JIATF-West (1) lacks a vital few performance measures that summarize its overall effectiveness that can be consistently assessed over time and (2) that it does not have established targets for assessing the effectiveness of its numerous missions and activities. JIATF-West has focused its performance measures on assessing its numerous initiatives and activities; however, it has not developed a vital few, comprehensive performance measures that summarize the overall effectiveness of its numerous initiatives and activities in a manner that would convey essential information on its counterdrug activities to decision makers at the DOD command level and above. Such information could help these decision makers better understand the overall effectiveness of JIATF-West’s counterdrug missions and activities in relation to broader U.S. counterdrug efforts. For example, JIATF-West could develop a performance measure that calculates the percentage of leads it provides to foreign partners that result in seizures or apprehensions. Such a measure could demonstrate JIATF-West’s overall effectiveness in supporting allies and foreign partners in combating illicit drug trafficking in its area of responsibility, in keeping with one of its operational priorities. Guidance on performance measures from the DOD Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and Global Threats states that agencies should develop a vital few measures, no more than two or three, which convey essential information on counterdrug activities to decision makers. JIATF-West used to assess and report such measures as recently as fiscal year 2015. For example, it reported scores on the effectiveness of its mission and broader lines of effort, such as countering illicit drug and precursor chemical flows in its area of responsibility. However, JIATF-West officials told us they stopped reporting on these performance measures in fiscal year 2015 because, from the task force’s perspective, the measures did not provide meaningful insights into the effectiveness of the task force’s operations. However, such performance measures could provide meaningful information on the effectiveness of JIATF-West’s counterdrug activities to decision makers at the DOD command level and above, even if such summary information might not affect the effectiveness of operations at the task force level. We have previously reported on the importance of developing performance measures that demonstrate broader effectiveness and have also reported it is worthwhile for agencies to develop them to better determine and understand the overall effectiveness of their missions and activities. Further, JIATF-West is also unable to assess the effectiveness of its initiatives and activities over time because it has annually changed the way it measures the effectiveness of more than 100 counterdrug initiatives and activities. Specifically, JIATF-West has adjusted how it assesses the initiatives and activities each year since 2014—for example, by changing the weight scale for scoring its initiatives and activities to give more emphasis to some over others. These changes to the methodology make it difficult to compare results and assess the effectiveness of its activities over time. DOD guidance states that agencies should have measures that are consistent over time to capture trend results. In discussing these issues with JIATF-West officials, they stated that assessing the initiatives and activities provides valuable information on the effectiveness of the task force’s efforts for internal, task force management. They acknowledged that JIATF-West’s performance measures could be improved to allow for assessments of the effectiveness of the task force’s activities over time, but they added that they plan to use the same methodology to calculate the task force’s initiatives and activities scores in the future because this information is still needed internally. Given that JIATF-West’s individual initiatives and activities change year to year, however, it will be difficult for JIATF-West to assess trends in the effectiveness of its initiatives and activities over time. By also establishing a vital few, comprehensive performance measures that can be assessed consistently over time, as appropriate, JIATF-West will be able to better convey trends in the overall effectiveness of its counterdrug missions and activities over time. JIATF-West has not developed specific performance targets (i.e., established acceptable levels of performance or outcomes) for its initiatives and activities as part of its documented assessment methodology, and no such targets appear in any of the task force’s annual assessment reports. When assessing its initiatives and activities, JIATF-West officials told us it aims to achieve the best possible outcome—or the highest possible score—for each of the initiatives and activities it undertakes and assesses. DOD guidance states that targets should be set for each performance measure to establish a minimum level of performance to be accomplished within a given time frame. Additionally, establishing specific performance measure targets that set a minimum level of performance to achieve could better encourage the task force to meet the targets and identify ways to improve, as needed. The DHS JTFs were fully operational in fiscal year 2016 and began assessing their performance and producing performance reports in fiscal year 2017. Since they began reporting on their performance, the measures the JTFs reported changed in fiscal year 2018 and, according to JTF officials, will change again in fiscal year 2019. Specifically, in the fiscal year 2017 performance report, the JTFs reported on activities, such as the amounts of drugs seized, arrests made, and currency seized. However, according to task force officials, the 2017 report’s performance measures did not accurately reflect the strategic-level coordination the JTFs performed. For example, the measures the JTFs reported in fiscal year 2017 focused on drug seizures and arrests made by the DHS components. While the drug seizures and arrests made by the DHS components may have been made possible because of coordination activities of the DHS JTFs, using data on drug seizures and arrests as JTF performance measures resulted in double-counting because the components reported on the same seizures and arrests for their respective counterdrug programs. To address these issues for fiscal year 2018, the JTFs and the DHS Coordination Cell developed a new set of performance measures that were intended to better reflect the JTFs’ coordination activities and contributions. For example, a new JTF performance measure developed for fiscal year 2018 included the number of leads that the JTFs provided to a partner law enforcement agency, DHS component, or foreign government partner for interdiction or investigative action. Table 3 shows the evolution of the JTF performance measures from fiscal year 2017 to fiscal year 2018. The 2017 National Defense Authorization Act requires the Secretary of DHS to establish outcome-based and other appropriate performance measures to evaluate the effectiveness of each joint task force. Although the DHS JTF Coordination Cell and the JTFs developed performance measures in fiscal year 2018 that better reflect the specific missions and activities of the three task forces, these measures are focused on outputs—such as the number of operations conducted in combating transnational criminal organizations—and not outcomes, such as the number or percentage of leads that resulted in seizures of illicit drugs. According to JTF Coordination Cell officials, the fiscal year 2018 JTF performance measures are not outcome-based because it is difficult to quantify and capture the contributions of the JTFs through their roles as coordinators and facilitators of missions and activities that are conducted by DHS components. Table 4 illustrates each of the DHS JTF performance results for fiscal year 2018 under the revised measures. In addition to the changes to the performance measures made from fiscal years 2017 to 2018, JTF Coordination Cell officials told us in October 2018 they plan to further revise their performance measures for fiscal year 2019, as they believe their measures could continue to improve to better reflect the value added by the JTFs and their coordination and information-sharing activities. JTF Coordination Cell officials further stated that they had considered linking the fiscal year 2018 performance measures to relevant strategic-level outcomes in DHS plans. However, they noted that such outcomes—including the number of drug seizures and apprehensions—are already reported by the individual DHS components and they are trying to avoid the double-counting that occurred in the fiscal year 2017 performance report. We acknowledge that the types of coordination activities that the JTFs perform are inherently more difficult to measure, but developing and implementing outcome-based performance measures that reflect the value the JTFs add would better position the JTFs to demonstrate the effectiveness of their coordination efforts. For example, a performance measure that calculates the percentage of leads provided to components, partner law enforcement agencies, or foreign government partners that result in a successful seizure or arrest could help demonstrate the JTFs’ contributions to DHS counterdrug efforts. Further, in designing its outcome-based performance measures that are reflective of their coordination and information sharing activities, establishing a consistent set of performance measures across years, as appropriate, will allow the JTFs to better assess and convey their progress over time. In 2017, 70,237 Americans died from an overdose involving synthetic opioids, heroin, cocaine, and other drugs. The number of annual overdose deaths has nearly doubled over the past decade. Combating the trafficking and availability of illicit drugs in the United States is a government-wide priority that requires a coordinated effort by federal departments and agencies with counterdrug responsibilities. JIATF- South, JIATF-West, and the three DHS JTFs are five task forces that are focused on strengthening interagency counterdrug efforts. While these task forces have worked together to coordinate and avoid duplicative activities, improvements to the performance measures used by four of the five task forces could enable them to better determine the effectiveness of their counterdrug missions and activities. In particular, by developing a vital few, comprehensive measures that are consistent from one year to the next, and establishing specific targets against which it can measure its missions and activities, JIATF-West will be better able to determine the effectiveness of its missions and activities and assess performance trends across years. In addition, by developing outcome-based performance measures that are consistent, the JTFs would be better positioned to demonstrate the effectiveness of their counterdrug efforts over time. We are making a total of three recommendations: two for JIATF-West and one for DHS. The Director of JIATF-West should establish a vital few performance measures that are consistently measured over time. (Recommendation 1) The Director of JIATF-West should establish specific targets that set a minimal level of performance. (Recommendation 2) The Secretary of Homeland Security should develop outcome-based performance measures for the DHS JTFs that are consistent. (Recommendation 3) In May 2019, we provided a copy of this report to DOD, DHS, DOJ, and the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) for review and comment. In written comments, which are included in appendix II, DOD stated that it concurred with the two recommendations directed to JIATF- West and noted that JIATF-West plans to conduct an internal evaluation to establish a vital few performance measures to allow it to measure performance over time. Additionally, JIATF-West has identified several areas where it can establish specific targets that set a minimal level of performance to support DOD priorities. In its written comments, which are included in appendix III, DHS stated that it concurred with its recommendation and plans to implement new performance measures in a phased approach. DHS also provided technical comments, which we have incorporated into the report, as appropriate. Additionally, ONDCP provided technical comments, which we have incorporated into the report, as appropriate. DOJ did not have any comments on the draft report. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, the Acting Secretary of Defense, and other interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at www.gao.gov. If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3841or AndersonN@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV. This appendix provides further details regarding the performance measures and performance targets for the Department of Homeland Security Joint Task Forces. In addition to the contact named above, Christopher Conrad (Assistant Director), Kelsey Hawley (Analyst-in-Charge), and Julia Vieweg made key contributions to this report. Also contributing to the report were Billy Commons, Pamela Davidson, David Dornisch, Eric Hauswirth, and Susan Hsu. Drug Control: DOD Should Improve Its Oversight of the National Guard Counterdrug Program. GAO-19-27. Washington, D.C.: January 17, 2019. Colombia: U.S. Counternarcotics Assistance Achieved Some Positive Results, but State Needs to Review the Overall U.S. Approach. GAO-19-106. Washington, D.C.: December 12, 2018. Illicit Opioids: Office of National Drug Control Policy and Other Agencies Need to Better Assess Strategic Efforts. GAO-18-569T. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2018. Illicit Opioids: While Greater Attention Given to Combating Synthetic Opioids, Agencies Need to Better Assess their Efforts. GAO-18-205. Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2018. Counternarcotics: Overview of U.S. Efforts in the Western Hemisphere. GAO-18-10. Washington, D.C.: October 13, 2017. Border Security: Additional Actions Could Strengthen DHS Efforts to Address Subterranean, Aerial, and Maritime Smuggling. GAO-17-474. Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2017. Coast Guard: Resources Provided for Drug Interdiction Operations in the Transit Zone, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. GAO-14-527. Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2014. Combatting Illicit Drugs: DEA and ICE Interagency Agreement Has Helped to Ensure Better Coordination of Drug Investigations. GAO-11-763. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2011.

Summary: The U.S. government has identified illicit drugs, as well as the criminal organizations that traffic them, as significant threats to the United States. In 2017, over 70,000 people died from drug overdoses, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. DOD and DHS created joint task forces to help facilitate and strengthen interagency efforts in combating the flow of illicit drugs, particularly in the maritime domain. GAO was asked to review the structure of these task forces and their ability to coordinate and conduct missions effectively. Among other objectives, this report (1) assesses the extent to which the task forces coordinate effectively to minimize duplication, and (2) examines how the task forces measure the effectiveness of their missions and activities. GAO reviewed and assessed documentation on the task forces' missions, coordination efforts, and performance assessments and compared them to best practices from prior work, departmental guidance, and federal internal control standards. GAO also met with task force officials to discuss and observe planning and coordination activities. Many federal agencies are involved in efforts to reduce the availability of illicit drugs by countering the flow of such drugs into the United States. Among them are the Department of Defense (DOD), which has lead responsibility for detecting and monitoring illicit drug trafficking into the country, and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which is responsible for securing U.S. borders to prevent illegal activity. DOD and DHS lead and operate task forces—Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF)-South, JIATF-West, and three DHS Joint Task Forces (JTF)—to coordinate and conduct counterdrug missions and activities. Task force officials reported that the task forces coordinated effectively with each other when they had shared purposes and overlapping or shared geographical boundaries (see map). The task forces also used coordination mechanisms that align with best practices, such as working groups and liaison officers, to minimize duplication of their missions and activities. Note: DHS also has JTF-Investigations, which is a functional task force with no geographic area of responsibility. Each of the five task forces GAO reviewed has performance measures, but only JIATF-South uses output (e.g., number of detected smuggling events) and outcome-based measures to assess the effectiveness of its activities. Specifically, JIATF-South developed an outcome-based measure of its overall effectiveness: the percentage of smuggling events it detected and provided to law enforcement that resulted in disrupted or seized illicit drugs. JIATF-West evaluates its numerous initiatives and activities, for instance, by determining if they were executed as planned, but has not established a vital few performance measures that consistently convey the overall effectiveness of its activities. Lastly, the DHS JTFs' performance measures are not outcome-based and do not fully assess the effectiveness of the task forces' activities. Enhancing their measures would better position JIATF-West and the JTFs to demonstrate contributions and convey trends in the overall effectiveness of their activities. GAO is making three recommendations, including that JIATF-West establish a vital few, consistent performance measures for its overall performance; and that DHS develop outcome-based performance measures for the JTFs' activities. DOD and DHS concurred with the three recommendations.