ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2023:6195, Rechtbank Amsterdam, 02-08-2023, C/13/737065 / KG ZA 23-667
Rechtbank Amsterdam — Uitspraak 
Datum: 2023-08-02 00:00:00.000000
Rechtsgebied: Civiel recht; Ondernemingsrecht

Samenvatting: Kort geding. Vordering de tenuitvoerlegging van het Arbitrale eindvonnis (gedeeltelijk) te schorsen totdat onherroepelijk is beslist in de aanhangige vernietigingsprocedure afgewezen.

vonnis
    RECHTBANK AMSTERDAM
    
    
      Afdeling privaatrecht, voorzieningenrechter civiel 
    
    
    
      zaaknummer / rolnummer: C/13/737065 / KG ZA 23-667 EAM/MvG
    
    
    
    
      
        Vonnis in kort geding van 2 augustus 2023
      
    
    
    
      in de zaak van
    
    
    1. de besloten vennootschap met beperkte aansprakelijkheid
    
      VCG B.V.,
    2. de besloten vennootschap met beperkte aansprakelijkheid
    
      SIEMPRE RICO II B.V.,
    3. de stichting
    
      
        STICHTING ADMINISTRATIEKANTOOR VAN CAEM KLERKS GROUP,
      alle statutair gevestigd te Amsterdam,
      eiseressen bij dagvaarding op verkorte termijn van 25 juli 2023,
      advocaten mr. N. Peters te Amsterdam en mr. M.A. Overman te Rotterdam,
    
    
    
      tegen
    
    
    
      de besloten vennootschap met beperkte aansprakelijkheid
      
        FIELD GOAL B.V.,
      gevestigd te Amsterdam,
      gedaagde,
      advocaten mr. D.J.J. Folgering en mr. N.J. Meuwese te Den Bosch.
    
    
    
    
      Eiseressen zullen hierna afzonderlijk VCG, SR II en STAK worden genoemd en gezamenlijk VCG c.s. Gedaagde wordt hierna FG genoemd.
    
    
    
  
  
    
      1De procedure
    
      1.1.
      Tijdens de mondelinge behandeling van dit kort geding op 28 juli 2023 hebben VCG c.s. de vorderingen zoals omschreven in de dagvaarding toegelicht. FG heeft verweer gevoerd, mede aan de hand van een tevoren ingediend schriftelijk verweer. Beide partijen hebben producties en een pleitnota in het geding gebracht. In verband met de spoedeisendheid van de zaak is op 2 augustus 2023 de beslissing gegeven, in de vorm van een ‘kopstaartvonnis’. Het hierna volgende is de uitwerking daarvan en is afgegeven op 16 augustus 2023.
      
        
      
    
    
      1.2.
      Bij de mondelinge behandeling waren aanwezig:
      - aan de zijde van VCG c.s.: [naam 1] , CEO van VCG, UBO van SR II en indirect bestuurder van VCG en STAK, [naam 2] , indirect bestuurder van VCG en STAK, met mr. Peters en mr. Overman; 
      - aan de zijde van FG: mr. Folgering en mr. Meuwese.
      
      
    
  
  
    
      2De feiten
    
      2.1.
      VCG is een houdstermaatschappij. Zij houdt (via tussenholdings) aandelen in het kapitaal van ongeveer 40 Nederlandse en buitenlandse (klein)dochtervennootschappen (de Van Caem Klerks Groep, hierna tezamen: Van Caem). Van Caem houdt zich bezig met de groothandel, import en export van originele merkwaren en is onderverdeeld in vier divisies: liquor, fragrances, luxury goods en fast moving consumer goods.
      
    
    
      2.2.
      
        [naam 1] (hierna: [naam 1] ) is de CEO van VCG. 
      
    
    
      2.3.
      SR II houdt 77,57% van de aandelen in VCG. De STAK houdt 2,43% van de aandelen in VCG.
      
    
    
      2.4.
      FG houdt 20% van de aandelen in VCG (hierna de VCG Aandelen). Enig aandeelhouder van FG is de Cypriotische vennootschap SG Yard Line ltd (hierna: Yard Line). Enig aandeelhouder van Yard Line is [naam 3] (hierna: [naam 3] ). [naam 3] is enig bestuurder van FG en Yard Line.
      
    
    
      2.5.
      
        [naam 3] is in 2009 in dienst getreden van Van Caem als salesmedewerker en is gedurende het dienstverband opgeklommen tot CEO van Van Caem. [naam 3] is via FG aandeelhouder van VCG (zie 2.4).
      
    
    
      2.6.
      SR II, STAK en FG hebben als aandeelhouders van VCG een shareholders agreement (hierna: SHA) gesloten. In artikel 7 van de SHA is een concurrentie- en relatiebeding opgenomen. Verder staat in dat artikel dat als een aandeelhouder het concurrentie- en relatiebeding schendt hij aan de andere aandeelhouder een boete verbeurt van € 150.000,00 voor iedere overtreding daarvan vermeerderd met € 5.000,00 voor iedere dag dat de overtreding voortduurt, tot een maximum van € 7,5 miljoen is bereikt. Partijen zijn NAI-arbitrage overeenkomen als wijze van beslechting van geschillen die voortvloeien uit de SHA.
      
    
    
      2.7.
      Op 3 september 2020 is [naam 3] op staande voet ontslagen als CEO van Van Caem. Van Caem heeft aan het ontslag onder meer ten grondslag gelegd dat [naam 3] ontoelaatbare uitingen heeft gedaan en zich schuldig heeft gemaakt aan verboden nevenactiviteiten.
      
    
    
      2.8.
      
        [naam 3] is daarop een procedure gestart bij de kantonrechter van deze rechtbank. In die procedure vorderde hij niet het ontslag op staande voet te vernietigen, maar betaling van verschillende vergoedingen, omdat hij naar zijn mening ten onrechte was ontslagen.
      
    
    
      2.9.
      De kantonrechter heeft geoordeeld dat Van Caem [naam 3] terecht op staande voet had ontslagen. Het gerechtshof Amsterdam heeft het vonnis van de kantonrechter vernietigd. De Hoge Raad heeft het arrest van het gerechtshof vernietigd en heeft de procedure doorverwezen naar het gerechtshof Den Haag, die de zaak nog in behandeling heeft. 
      
    
    
      2.10.
      Als gevolg van het ontslag op staande voet van [naam 3] heeft hij via FG de VCG Aandelen te koop aangeboden aan SR II, een en ander in lijn met de bepalingen daarover in de SHA. Omdat partijen het over de voorwaarden van de aandelentransactie niet eens konden worden, is FG een arbitrageprocedure gestart. VCG c.s. hebben in die procedure tegenvorderingen ingesteld.
      
    
    
      2.11.
      FG vorderde in de arbitrale procedure ten overstaan van drie arbiters (hierna: de Arbiters), voor zover van belang, SR II te veroordelen de aandelen van FG in VCG over te nemen voor een bedrag van USD 18.430.000,00 en VCG c.s. te veroordelen tot betaling van een boete van € 7.5 miljoen vanwege schending van artikel 7 SHA. VCG c.s. vorderde, voor zover van belang, de prijs van de VCG Aandelen na verrekening van verschillende posten te bepalen op USD 13.452,00 en FG te veroordelen tot betaling van een boete van € 7.5 miljoen vanwege schending van artikel 7 SHA.
      
    
    
      2.12.
      Op 18 november 2022 is in de arbitrageprocedure een (131 pagina’s tellend) tussenvonnis gewezen (hierna: het Arbitrale tussenvonnis). Daarin hebben de Arbiters geoordeeld, voor zover van belang, dat FG artikel 7 SHA niet heeft geschonden. Hieronder worden de standpunten van partijen in de arbitrageprocedure en het oordeel van de Arbiters weergegeven.
      
    
    
      15.32
      Respondents [VCG c.s., vzr] submit, in summary, the following.
      
    
    
      15.33
      In essence, Respondents take issue with trade between SG Yard Line and, notably, Panafrican Sea Ventures Limited (PSV), a Maltese Van Caem entity. They consider that such trade violates Article 7 SHA - which provision they interpret broadly.230 In addition, Respondents contest the notion, advanced by Claimant and captured below in paragraphs 15.43-15.49, that such trade has been permitted by Respondents and/or is otherwise compatible with Article 7 SHA.
      
    
    
      15.34
      Respondents assert that on the side of Claimant [FG, vzr], an Affiliate (as defined in the SHA), includes both Mr [naam 3] and SG Yard Line.231
      
    
    
      15.35
      	During the Hearing, Respondents presented a table in which they sought to outline various breaches of the non-compete provisions in the SHA, in so far as trade in liquor and fragrances is concemed.232 Respondents assert that Mr [naam 3] commenced a "competing" / "side business" as early as the beginning of 2018.233 In their presentation, Respondents further intended to differentiate between transactions that went "via PSV'' or, put in pleadings also in different words, "through PSV'' and those that did not.234 Where transactions went through PSV, the Respondents indicated that as such.235
      
    
    
      15.36
      Respondents assert that transactions through PSV are also in breach of the non­ compete if, as Claimant asserts in response to Respondents' position, they have generated profits for PSV.236 With respect to the relevance of whether or not profits were made by SG Yard Line in connection with alleged breaches of the non-compete provisions in the SHA, Respondents' position is that this is not relevant per se.237 Respondents referred notably to the relevance of the building of a commercial network in the relevant market.238
      
    
    
      15.37
      In addition, Respondents contend that Mr [naam 3] , as the CEO of the Company, instructed PSV to execute these transactions.239 And, furthermore, that:"[... ]  even acted as if SG Yard Line was not even his own company. He acted as if SG Yard Line was a third party. This shows that [naam 3] was not at all transparent in this regard.240
      
    
    
      15.38
      Respondents further assert that the judgment of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal of 15 February 2022 does not have a hearing on its ability to assert claims, including for penalties and for breaches of the non-compete clauses in the SHA.241
      
    
    
      15.39
      	Respondents, have submitted a witness statement by Mr [naam 2] (CFO of the Group and director of VCG) of 26 July 2021 (RWS-2). Mr [naam 2] 's witness statement contains, inter alia, multiple remarks on non-compliance of Mr [naam 3] with formal and administrative matters (in regard of SG Yard Line). Mr [naam 2] also stated "When I saw the invoice and the name of the company SG Yard Line, I recognized it as Field Goal's parent company owned by [naam 3] ." (underscore added, Tribunal).
      
    
    
      15.40
      In addition, Respondents state that Mr [naam 2] "has ...denied'' to have had knowledge of trading involving SG Yard Line.243
      
    
    
      15.41
      	Respondents also take the position that the preparation by the Group's Legal department and posting in the Group's offices of a corporate chart of the Group, on which SG Yard Line appears (Exhibit C-010), does not evidence knowledge of SG Yard Line.244
      
    
    
      15.42
      Finally, Respondents argue, by reference to (the relevant parts of) the judgment of the Amsterdam District Court245, which Respondents hold to maintain intact despite an adverse decision by the Amsterdam Court of Appeal, that Mr [naam 3] has violated the non-compete provisions in the SHA.246 This decision is subject to review by the Dutch Supreme Court - on the relevance of which Respondents refer to cassation advice taken from Prof. Sagel.247 In addition, Respondents argue that the Amsterdam Court of Appeal did not rule on a breach of the provisions of the employment agreement or on the merits of the allegations which, are therefore still open for discussion in any proceedings under the relevant employment agreement.248
      
      
        
          (ii)	Claimant’s Position
        
      
      
    
    
      15.43
      Claimant's position in response to these allegations by Respondents is based on two key premises and may be summarized as follows.
      
    
    
      15.44
      First, Claimant argues that it did not conduct business competing with the Group. Second, Claimant submits that the Amsterdam Court of Appeal has ruled that Mr [naam 3] 's dismissal was not lawful.249 These two arguments are now further summarised.
      
    
    
      15.45
      On the first point, Claimant rejects the notion that any activity in SG Yard Line amounts to evidence of competing business within the sense of the SHA.
      
    
    
      15.46
      In this regard, Claimant submits that SG Yard Line was involved in trades: where
      
      
        a) a company that was part of the Group was unable to effectuate payments250;
      
      
      
        b) products involved in such trades, in considerable instances, did not concern business the Group was engaged in251;
      
      
      
        c) no profits were made by SG Yard Line on such trades (whereas the Group itself did)252;
      
      
      
        d) the Group's financial system showed253, and persons financially responsible within the Group knew, of the trades with SG Yard Line and Mr. [naam 2] agreed thereto.254 In this respect, Claimant emphasises that Messrs [naam 1] and [naam 2] were well aware of the fact that Mr [naam 3] was the UBO of SG Yard Line, also by reference to payments made to SG Yard Line.255
      
      
      
        e) Claimant further asserts that trading by SG Yard Line was done further to consultation with, and in the eye of, Mr [naam 2] . This has been a consistent theme in Claimant's response.256
      
      
      
        f) the Group could not do this business without the involvement of SG Yard Line and the local funds of Mr [naam 3] ;257 and
      
      
      
        g) Lack of motive: Claimant made the point that Mr [naam 3] could have routed the transactions at issue in a manner that would place them outside the view of the Group and that he did not do so.258
      
      
    
    
      15.47
      
        According to Claimant, the actual motives for these transactions involving SG Yard Line were (a) convenience / enabling transactions were the Group itself could not; and
        (b) a need for Mr [naam 3] to clear Lebanese personal funds - which he did not consider to be at odds with the non-compete provisions in the SHA and was done with the knowledge and approval of Mr [naam 2] .259 The clearing of funds aspect is also reflected in a contemporaneous reaction by Mr [naam 3] to allegations made against him in August 2020.260 
      
      
    
    
      15.48
      Furthermore, Claimant notes that Respondents have access to all of Claimant's data and that nevertheless, they have not been able to submit evidence of unlawful trading by SG Yard Line.261 Claimant contrasts this with its own limited access to information. 262
      
    
    
      15.49
      On the second point, Claimant disputes that it has been established in separate court proceedings that Mr [naam 3] violated his non-compete obligations. Claimant asserts that the Court of Appeal in Amsterdam overturned the earlier decision by District Court. Claimant highlights the finding of the Court of Appeal that the investigation conducted into the actions of Mr [naam 3] was inadequate and that Mr [naam 3] did not breach the non-compete clause in his employment agreement.263 In addition, Claimant argues that irrespective of these court proceedings, the Tribunal should make its own assessment in this arbitration on whether or not the non-compete provisions of the SHA are violated.
      
      
        
          (iii) The Tribunal's Analysis
        
      
      
    
    
      15.50
      The Tribunal notes that its findings with respect to the interpretation, and application of Article 7.2 SHA (in the prevailing circumstances and relationship between the Parties) as made above in relation to Claimant's claims for violation of the non­ competition provisions by Respondents, apply mutatis mutandis with respect to Respondents' argument on potential breaches thereof by Claimant. This holds, in particular, for the Tribunals findings on consent for behaviour that would potentially qualify as a violation of the SHA's provisions on non-competition.
      
    
    
      15.51
      In relation to Respondents' argument on potential breaches of the non-competition provisions in the SHA by Claimant, the Tribunal is convinced that Messrs [naam 1] and [naam 2] had knowledge of SG Yard Line's existence, role and place in relation to the Group's activities to such a degree that this serves to defeat Respondents' claims in this regard.264 The following considerations are determinative for this finding.
      
    
    
      15.52
      First, the Tribunal is persuaded by the argument presented, and addressed at the Hearing, on the knowledge of the Group's financial (Mr [naam 2] ) and legal staff (Mr [naam 4] ) of SG Yard Line's activities and position. The knowledge of the Group's legal department became apparent, clearly, at the Hearing.265
      
    
    
      15.53
      Second, the Tribunal is not convinced that Mr [naam 2] did not approve the business transactions with SG Yard Line. Mr [naam 2] held the central CFO position within the Group266 and had a role that was much closer to the operation of the Group's business than Mr [naam 1] ' role at the time. Even if Mr [naam 1] was not aware of SG Yard Line's link to Mr [naam 3] , of which the Tribunal is not convinced, also in light of what Mr [naam 1] said at the Hearing,267 that comes for Respondents' own account. Hence, the information was widely and openly available within the Group. The same applies if there was a lack of such knowledge at the people who were doing the administration for PSV.
      
    
    
      15.54
      The Tribunal finds that express rebuttal statements could, and should, have been offered by Mr [naam 2] , if indeed he had no such knowledge and had not discussed and approved SG Yard Line's business, in his witness statement and/or in a supplementary witness statement to deal with Claimant's assertions. Although Respondents state that "Mr [naam 2] has also denied it" they have not substantiated this with evidence.268 The fact that this has not been done is a relevant point in the Tribunal's considerations. Such evidence was called for, notably, given Claimant's position on Mr [naam 2] 's knowledge as set out in paragraph 80 and following of the Statement of Claim. It is also not in dispute that Mr [naam 2] knew of funds held by Mr [naam 3] in Lebanon.269
      
    
    
      15.55
      The Tribunal does not accept Respondents' implied proposition that it is sufficient for Respondents to deny Claimant's allegations that the activities of SG Yard Line were discussed with Mr [naam 2] and that he had not objected to this, as Claimant has the burden of proof for this.270 In this case, Claimant did provide evidence (through witness evidence of Mr [naam 3] ) that Mr [naam 2] knew of and consented to these activities. In addition, the Tribunal notes that it is in not in dispute that Claimant has limited access to documentary records (such as email accounts) while Respondents have full access. Under these circumstances, the Tribunal finds that Respondents had the duty to further substantiate their denial of Claimant's allegations, in particular as Mr [naam 2] falls within Respondents' evidentiary sphere of control and already provided a witness statement in which this denial cannot be found. The absence of a substantiation of Respondents' denial thus weighs against Respondents.
      
    
    
      15.56
      Third, in respect of SG Yard Line's activities, the Parties have drawn the Tribunal's attention to multiple documents and given their views thereon. Claimant, notably, has discussed- at its final opportunity to do so271 - such documentary exhibits in its Post­ Hearing Brief of 16 June 2022. This discussion is, ultimately, an extension of Claimant's argument that the making of profits or existence of a "benefit" is the factor that determines whether or not a breach of obligations set out in Articles 7.1 and 7.2 SHA occurs.
      
    
    
      15.57
      The Tribunal is furthermore persuaded by the merit of Claimant's argument on non­ realisation of profits and intent to act in the interest of the Group in connection with SG Yard Line's trades. Had this been different, Claimant would have structured his dealings in another form to realise such profits.272 The Tribunal finds it therefore that the above qualifies as consent for SG Yard Line's trading for the purpose of Article 7 SHA.
      
    
    
      15.58
      Finally, with respect to the decision by the Court of Appeal (Exhibit C-474), the Tribunal notes that this decision concerns a different legal relationship in a different context than the one presently at issue. In any event, this decision and argument presented thereon is not determinative for the Tribunal's findings, in light of the above.
      
    
    
      15.59
      In light of the above, the Tribunal concludes that the Claimant has not violated Articles 7 and 9 SHA and rejects all claims made by Respondents in this regard.
      
    
    
      2.13.
      VCG c.s. hebben bij het gerechtshof Amsterdam gevorderd dat het gerechtshof het Arbitrale tussenvonnis zal vernietigen. 
      
    
    
      2.14.
      Tijdens de laatste zitting van 2 mei 2023 in de arbitrale procedure hebben VCG c.s. de Arbiters verzocht de arbitrageprocedure aan te houden totdat het gerechtshof Amsterdam in de aanhangige vernietigingsprocedure heeft beslist. VCG c.s. heeft haar verzoek onderbouwd met de stelling dat FG fraude/bedrog heeft gepleegd tijdens de arbitrale procedure, omdat [naam 3] (en dus FG) ook na zijn ontslag op staande voet op 3 september 2020 artikel 7 SHA heeft geschonden. Op 5 mei 2023 hebben de Arbiters beslist dat de arbitrageprocedure niet wordt aangehouden. De motivering daarvoor wordt hieronder in 2.16 weergegeven.
      
    
    
      2.15.
      Bij e-mail van 9 mei 2023 hebben VCG c.s. tegen deze beslissing van de Arbiters bezwaar gemaakt. Verder hebben VCG c.s. bij die e-mail een getuigenverklaring in het geding gebracht en een factuur van 31 oktober 2021 van Yard Line. Bij e-mail van 10 mei 2023 heeft FG aan de Arbiters bericht dat die factuur een vervalsing was. Vervolgens is FG door de Arbiters in de gelegenheid gesteld nader te reageren. Dit heeft FG bij e-mail van 11 mei 2023 gedaan, waarbij zij nieuwe producties in het geding heeft gebracht. Op 12 mei 2023 hebben de Arbiters aan VCG c.s. bericht dat zij tot 16 mei 2023 de gelegenheid krijgen op die producties te reageren en dat zij geen nieuwe bewijsstukken meer in het geding mogen brengen. VCG c.s. hebben nog diezelfde dag de Arbiters verzocht om uitstel, welk verzoek op 13 mei 2023 werd afgewezen. Bij brief van 14 mei 2023 hebben VCG c.s. hiertegen bezwaar gemaakt.
      
    
    
      2.16.
      Op 21 juli 2023 is in de arbitrageprocedure eindvonnis (hierna: het Arbitrale eindvonnis) gewezen. Het Arbitrale eindvonnis verplicht SR II op straffe van dwangsommen aan FG het bedrag van USD 16.589.460,00 min € 2.042.709,47 te betalen tegenover de levering door FG aan SR II van de VCG Aandelen. Verder zijn VCG c.s. hoofdelijk veroordeeld tot betaling van € 150.000,00 aan FG vanwege schending van artikel 7 SHA. Tot slot zijn VCG c.s. veroordeeld in de proceskosten, begroot op € 1.874.460,13. In het Arbitrale eindvonnis hebben de Arbiters over de door VCG c.s. gestelde fraude door FG tijdens de arbitrale procedure, het daarmee samenhangende aanhoudingsverzoek door VCG c.s. (zie 2.14) en het schenden van [naam 3] (en daarmee FG) van artikel 7 SHA na zijn ontslag op staande voet het volgende overwogen. 
    
  
  
    
      4RESPONDENTS' FRAUD ALLEGATIONS
    
  
  
    
      4The Parties' Positions
    
    
      4.1
      Respondents [VCG c.s., vzr] argue that Claimant [FG, vzr] committed fraud during this arbitration as Mr [naam 3] and/or SG Yard Line traded in liquor and other products since Mr [naam 3] 's dismissal on 3 September 2020, as a result of which Field Goal violated the non-compete provision of Article 7 SHA. According to Respondents, they obtained evidence for these violations after the date of the Partial Final Award. Respondents rely, inter alia, on affidavits from Ms [naam 5] , a farmer employee of SG Yard Line. Consequently, Respondents argue that this arbitration should be stayed until the Amsterdam Court of Appeal decides on Respondents' claim that the Partial Final Award should be set aside (the Setting Aside Procedure), or, alternatively, that the fraud allegations should be further investigated and/or the Tribunal should reverse its decisions in the Partial Final Award that Claimant did not violate the non-compete provisions in the SHA.
      
    
    
      4.2
      Claimant denies the fraud allegations and argues that none of the evidence submitted by Respondents support their position. In particular, Claimant argues that Ms [naam 5] has been coerced to provide affidavits and that Respondents forged evidence. Claimant concludes that there is no reason to reverse any decisions taker the Partial Final Award, and that the Tribunal should render its final award.
      
      
        
          B. The Tribunal's Analysis
        
      
      
    
    
      4.3
      In Procedural Order No. 16, the Tribunal rejected Respondents' request for a stay this arbitration pending the Setting Aside Procedure and decided that Responder fraud allegations would and could be decided within the framework of this arbitration:
    
    
      3.3
      
        The Tribunal rejects Respondents' arguments for a stay. In essence, Respondents request that this arbitration is stayed so that the Court of Appeal can first decide on Respondents' setting aside grounds, including the fraud allegations in respect of this arbitration (the allegation being that Mr [naam 3] lied about his and/or Yard Line's continuous trading). The Tribunal disagrees. First, the Tribunal will pursue this arbitration on the basis that the Partial Final Award is valid and enforceable and will not be set aside by the Court of Appeal. This is also in line with the general principle that a setting aside procedure does not suspend the enforceability of the challenged award. As such, the setting aside procedure cannot on its own justify a stay of this arbitration and thus prevent the Tribunal from ruling on the issues remaining after the Partial Final Award before the Court of Appeal would render its decision on the setting aside. With respect to Respondents' fraud allegations raised in this arbitration, the Tribunal does not agree that those should cause a stay of the arbitration until the Court of Appeal would render its decision on Respondents' fraud allegation in the setting aside procedure. To the contrary, this arbitration must continue and the Tribunal will assess, within the framework of this arbitration, whether Respondents' fraud allegations (as articulated on 28 April 2023) ought to lead to the reversal of one or more decisions in the Partial Final Award. In doing so, the Parties agree that the Tribunal shall apply the (Dutch regular procedural law) doctrine of (binding) final decisions ('leerstuk van (bindende) eindbeslissingen'). That the Tribunal shall rule on the fraud allegations raised by Respondents in this arbitration, is also in line with the Supreme Court's decision in Waterschappen/Milieutech which Respondents relied upon.2 In that case, the Supreme Court stated that arbitrators must allow a party to present its position in respect of fraud if that party had complied with its substantiation obligation, and that arbitrators would then have to assess the arguments. If the arbitrators conclude that a party has committed fraud and this fraud was relevant for the decisions in its interim award, such decisions must be reversed.3 This Supreme Court decision thus confirms that this Tribunal would have to assess Respondents' fraud allegations in this arbitration.
      
    
    
      3.4
      
        In addition, the Tribunal takes into account that Respondents have been allowed to (extensively) present their position in respect of their fraud allegations (by the submission of new evidence and in argument during the Hearing), and that Claimant has been able to respond to this during the Hearing (including with the submission of counterevidence4) Moreover, Respondents request that they will be allowed to file the New Witness Statement is granted This may bring the Tribunal into a position to decide on Respondents' fraud allegations and the consequences that Respondents attach thereto in a further award The Tribunal concludes that staying this arbitration, or the duration of the setting aside procedure, will prolong this arbitration unnecessarily. In addition, the Tribunal takes into account that before the Partial Final Award was rendered, Respondents' position was that a final award should be rendered as soon as possible and that they did not want to prolong this arbitration.5 Respondents' also explained during the Hearing that they would prefer not to complete the buy back and pay the full purchase price to Claimant as it envisaged that if decisions were reversed and Mr [naam 3] and/or Field Goal would have to pay money back, they could no longer take recourse. However, the Tribunal does not find this a valid reason for prolonging this arbitration. Hence, this arbitration will continue on the basis that the decisions in the Partial Final Award are final and binding, unless the Tribunal decides in a further award that decisions need to be reversed.
      
    
    
      3.5
      
        The Tribunal therefore decides to reject Respondents' request to stay this arbitration for the duration of the setting aside procedure.
      
      
    
    
      4.4
      The Tribunal confirms its decision in Procedural Order No. 16 and decides to the extent necessary that it will allow to the record all evidence submitted by the Parties after the Post PFA Hearing in respect of Respondents' allegations of fraud and Claimant's defences thereto. As set out above, both Parties have been able to comment on each other's position and evidence in several rounds, and the Tribunal can thus, also in light thereof, assess this evidence.
      
    
    
      4.5
      As set out in Procedural Order No. 16, the Tribunal will take as starting point that the Partial Final Award is valid and enforceable. In the Partial Final Award, the Tribunal rejected all claims of Respondents in respect of Claimant's violation of Article 7 SHA as it found, in short, that Respondents were aware of and had consented to SG Yard Line's role and trading activities, and that Respondents had insufficiently substantiated their position against the background of Claimant's counterarguments and evidence. In addition, the Tribunal considered it relevant that Claimant did not realise profits on SG Yard Line's activities and that those activities were to the benefit of the Group.6 These decisions qualify as final and binding as they have been made explicitly and unconditionally.7 The Parties agree that Dutch procedural law on final binding decisions (de leer van de (bindende) eindbeslissingen) determines whether final binding decisions in the Partial Final Award could (or should) be reversed.8 From Dutch procedural law, it follows that the Tribunal is bound by its final binding decisions in the Partial Final Award unless it finds that its decision is based on an incorrect legal or factual ground (onjuiste juridische of  feitelijke grondslag) and then only after it has allowed the Parties to comment thereon.9 The Tribunal will therefore assess on the basis of the new allegations and further evidence submitted by Respondents whether its previous decision in the Partial Final Award that Claimant has not violated its non-compete obligations of Article 7 SHA should be reversed. Respondents argue that the decisions should be reversed as Claimant has committed fraud by lying about its illegitimate trading activities. Although there has been some debate on the threshold of when binding decisions should be reversed, Claimant does not dispute that in case of fraud, reversal should take place.
      
    
    
      4.6
      Before turning to the specific evidence that Respondents rely on, the Tribunal notes that the timing of the alleged violations of Article 7 SHA is relevant. First, the Tribunal observes that Respondents seek a declaration that Claimant violated Article 7 SHA throughout "the validity period of SHA article 7".10 Yet, to support their non­ compete claims, before the Partial Final Award, Respondents only presented evidence for the period before Mr [naam 3] 's dismissal on 3 September 2020. In the Partial Final Award, the Tribunal decided that Article 7 SHA applied up to and including 27 November 2022 and rejected Respondents' request for a declaration of breach for that period. One reason for this decision was that Respondents had consented to SG Yard Line's trades, which did not result in realisation of profits and served the Group's interests.11 Regarding the current fraud allegations, Respondents' contend that these illegal activities occurred after Mr [naam 3] 's dismissal, i.e. from 3 September 2020 up to and including 12 April 2022.12 In view of the deteriorated relationship between the Parties after Mr [naam 3] 's dismissal, the Tribunal finds it improbable that Claimant intended to act in the Group's best interest, if SG Yard Line had traded after 3 September 2020.
      
    
    
      4.7
      The Tribunal will therefore assess the evidence that according to Respondents prove that Claimant committed fraud during this arbitration as SG Yard Line continued trading in the period from 3 September 2020 up to and including 12 April 2022 and that, consequently, Claimant violated art. 7 SHA. Respondents have the burden of proof to establish the relevant facts for their claims in this regard.
      
    
    
      4.8
      In essence, Respondents rely on the following evidence for their fraud allegations: (a) affidavits of Ms [naam 5] and (b) an email from Mr [naam 6] referring to a declaration of Mr [naam 7] . These, and further evidence that Respondents relied on, will be assessed below.
      
      
        (a)	Affidavits of Ms [naam 5]
      
      
    
    
      4.9
      
        On 28 April 2023, Respondents submitted as evidence of fraud an affidavit from Ms [naam 5] , a former employee of SG Yard Line, dated "02/04/2023" as Exhibit R-
        
          243. In Procedural Order 15, the Tribunal decided that it would at a later stage decide whether this new evidence would be admitted to the arbitration file. In Procedural Order 16, the Tribunal noted that this evidence was submitted rather late, as Exhibit R-243 was dated 4 February 2023, but that it nevertheless allowed the admission of Exhibit R-243 to the record of this arbitration. The Tribunal had understood the date of the affidavit to be 4 February 2023 as the writ of summons in the Setting Aside Procedure (which had been submitted by Respondents with their Post PFA Submission) referred to an affidavit of Ms [naam 5] of 4 February 2023 and Respondents had not submitted any other affidavit of Ms [naam 5] in this arbitration.13
      
    
    
      4.10
      After the Tribunal rendered Procedural Order 16, Respondents informed the Tribunal that this understanding was incorrect and that Ms [naam 5] had in fact signed two affidavits: the first on 4 February 2023, which was the one referred to and submitted as evidence in the Setting Aside Procedure (but not in this arbitration), and the second one that was signed on 2 April 2023 and submitted as Exhibit R-243 in this arbitration.14 The Tribunal therefore requested Respondents to also submit Ms [naam 5] 's first affidavit of 4 February 2023 in this arbitration.15 On 12 May 2023, Respondents submitted "Ms [naam 5] 's first affidavit", which was, however, dated 2 (instead of 4) February 2023.16 Following a further response from Claimant on Ms [naam 5] 's affidavits, Respondents also submitted a third affidavit of Ms [naam 5] dated 9 May 2023.
    
    
      4.11
      In total, Respondents thus submitted three affidavits from Ms [naam 5] : the first affidavit dated 2 February 2023 (Exhibit R-247), the second one dated 2 April 2023 (Exhibit R-243) and the third one dated 9 May 2023 (Annex A to ExhibitR-246).
    
    
      4.12
      Respondents' key argument is that Ms [naam 5] 's affidavit of 2 April 2023 confirms that Mr [naam 3] and/or SG Yard Line was/were trading liquor and other products since Mr [naam 3] 's dismissal on 3 September 2020, and thus that Claimant breached its non­ compete obligations under the SHA.
    
    
      4.13
      The Tribunal finds that Ms [naam 5] 's affidavits are insufficient evidence that SG Yard Line continued trading after 3 September 2020, in violation of art. 7 SHA.
    
    
      4.14
      First, the Tribunal has serious concerns about the credibility of Ms [naam 5] 's affidavits for the following reasons:
      
      
        i) It is undisputed that the affidavits of Ms [naam 5] were obtained through17 and drafted by18 an investigation bureau called Enigma Management Solutions.19 This company was instructed by the Group, likely near the end of 2022, to investigate Mr [naam 3] and his companies for an amount of 80,000 US dollars or euros per month.20 Mr [naam 2] declared at the Post PFA Hearing on 2 May 2023 that SR II had paid this amount four or five times (i.e. 320,000 or 400,000 dollars or euros) and that he was not aware whether the investigation had resulted in any report as the instructions were provided by Mr [naam 1] (who did not attend the Post PFA Hearing).
      
      
      
        ii) According to Claimant, Ms [naam 5] was intimidated and pressurised to sign affidavits and provide documents on SG Yard Line against payment. Ms [naam 5] was also offered money to sign a statement against Mr [naam 3] .21 Respondents dispute this and argue that Ms [naam 5] signed the affidavits voluntarily and without being pressurised or paid. According to Respondents, this is confirmed by her own affidavit22 ("I agreed to submit this affidavit of my own free will. I was not subject to any undue influence, pressure or coercion of any kind and hereby confirm that this is my statement and it is true.") and confirmed by Mr [naam 9] .23 In fact, Respondents argue that Ms [naam 5] was afraid of Mr [naam 3] , and therefore pretended that she was coerced to make statements by and for Respondents.24 The Tribunal notes that Ms [naam 5] 's position on coercion submitted by Respondents on the one hand and Claimant on the other hand are contradictory. In and of itself, this impacts the credibility of the affidavits on which Respondents rely. In addition, the Tribunal finds Claimant's position (that Ms [naam 5] felt coerced to give affidavits) more convincing as it is supported with contemporaneous evidence, i.e. WhatsApp messages exchanged between Ms [naam 5] and Mr [naam 3] in the period 1 February 2023 until 27 April 2023. In these WhatsApp messages (which Respondents have not disputed as messages from Ms [naam 5] ), Ms [naam 5] explains that two men came to her house in January 2023, showed her that they had access to her private emails and asked her to sign an affidavit and to hand over her computer and documents. Ms [naam 5] commented when Mr [naam 3] said that they could not force her to sign anything: "To be honest I didn't like their faces and I am also afraid not to use my signature on those papers since they have it from emails etc. They show me"26 and "they're crazy".27 One of the men that visited Ms [naam 5] was Mr [naam 8] . In the WhatsApp messages she refers to him as a "monster" (when she found on the internet that he had been arrested for aiding in the 'kidnapping' of a child), "shameless" and later told Mr [naam 3] that she was warned by her cousin who is a policeman that he was "dangerous" as he had many connections in Cyprus. Ms [naam 5] also refers to a Cypriot man called [naam 9] , who she assumed to be Mr [naam 8] 's local assistant, who contacted her husband on the phone and by email. The Tribunal assumes that this is the same [naam 9] as Mr [naam 9] , who stated in his affidavit that he was involved by Mr [naam 8] to help to reach out to Ms [naam 5] .28 The WhatsApp messages and phone recordings submitted by Claimant show that Ms [naam 5] is contacted several times to provide documents, hand over her computer and sign a statement. She is told that Mr [naam 3] owes "a huge amount" to a friend of Mr [naam 8] (from the context, it appears that this is a reference to Mr [naam 1] ) and that if she does not sign and they cannot find Mr [naam 3] , she will be called to the court in Amsterdam.29 She further implies that the men are aggressive to her husband and she writes "Its getting very anoid. I lost my privacy and getting my family in trouble" .30 Ms [naam 5] also told them that if they would come again, she would call the police and when they kept contacting her, that she considered reporting them to the police.31 WhatsApp messages and telephone recordings between Mr [naam 3] and Ms [naam 5] suggest a close and friendly relationship, as one would expect from two former colleagues who worked together for two years, even after the Group dismissed Mr [naam 3] .32 This contradicts Respondents' assertion that Ms [naam 5] feigned coercion because she feared Mr [naam 3] . The Tribunal finds Ms [naam 5] 's third affidavit, in which she says "... I was also very afraid of Mr [naam 3] 's reaction. He can be very harsh and mean. Therefore, to protect myself. I constantly pretended as if I was coerced to make my statements") unconvincing. Rather, the evidence on the record supports Claimant's position that agents of the investigation bureau hired by Van Caem and that were paid a substantial amount of money by SR Il, pressured Ms [naam 5] to sign affidavits, including those of 2 April and 9 May 2023, in which she denied coercion. Mr [naam 9] ' affidavit in which he declares that "Ms [naam 5] happily met with me","[s]he was quite eager to tell the truth" and that "I nor anyone else offered or paid Ms [naam 5] for her statements" does not change the Tribunal's assessment of Ms [naam 5] 's evidence.33 First, Respondents acknowledge that Mr [naam 9] is (indirectly) paid by Respondent 4 to obtain information from Ms [naam 5] in Respondents' favour. Second, Mr [naam 9] ' assertions are weak. For example, he claims to be "a close friend of Maria [naam 5] and her husband'' but the WhatsApp messages from Ms [naam 5] show that she did not see him that way. He also ignores the incidents where Ms [naam 5] said she felt intimidated (such as the visit to her house end of January 2023) or fails to back up his statement with messages he exchanged with her husband. Moreover, Mr [naam 9] attached to his affidavit as Annex B an invoice for products sold by SG Yard Line to Rainbow Sari (Rainbow) that is likely a forged document (see also § 4.18 below). The Tribunal notes that Mr [naam 9] said he got this invoice from Ms [naam 5] , but she does not mention it in her third affidavit. The Tribunal therefore does not accept Mr [naam 9] ' statement as reliable and convincing evidence that Ms [naam 5] was not coerced to give her statements.
      
    
    
      4.15
      
        Second, Ms [naam 5] 's affidavits, even if true, are too vague and general to show that Mr [naam 3] and/or SG Yard Line breached art. 7 SHA by trading between 3 September 2020 and 12 April 2022. The statements in Ms [naam 5] 's second affidavit are general, and do not specify any particular trades that would violate art. 7 SHA (e.g. "I was aware that he continued to sell liquor and other products both through his company and through other friends and colleagues"). In addition, these broad accusations are unsupported with documentary evidence ("I did not have access to invoices or bank accounts directly, but I did hear him on the phone (with business associates per the attached list - attached as Annex I) on many different occasions during the Period conducting business and speaking about the different products, brands, quantities, prices and shipment dates including transactions during "The Period'"'. This was both before April 2022 and after April 2022"). Other statements are speculative and not specific ("he was very secretive about his activities and did most things on his own without my help" and "It was clear that Mr [naam 3] was very knowledgeable about the products that he was buying and selling"). In combination with the concerns that the Tribunal has on the credibility and reliability of her affidavits, this evidence is not sufficient to conclude that Mr [naam 3] and/or SG Yard Line traded in violation of art. 7 SHA, and consequently, that Claimant fraudulently withheld information during the arbitration.
        (b) Email from [naam 6]
      
    
    
      4.16
      The second document that Respondents rely on to argue fraud is what they refer to as "a statement of Mr [naam 7] " (of Indu World International FZC).34 According to Mr [naam 6] (an employee of Van Caem) he spoke to Mr [naam 7] (Mr [naam 7] ) who told him that Mr [naam 3] had sold him Corona beer in the summer of 2022 (Exhibit R-244).35 Claimant's response is that this is an internal Van Caem email only, which is insufficient to reverse any binding decisions in the Partial Final Award. The Tribunal agrees with Claimant. The evidence is an internal Van Caem email from Mr [naam 6] to Mr [naam 1] and Mr [naam 4] and copied to Mr [naam 10] (Mr [naam 10] ) of 1 April 2023. Mr [naam 6] refers to a call that he and Mr [naam 10] had with Mr [naam 7] the previous day (i.e. on 31 March 2023), and in which Mr [naam 7] had said that Mr [naam 3] had sold him Corona beer for USD 25,000 last year summer. This, however, is not convincing evidence of a sale in violation of art. 7 SHA. It is an internal email from Respondents from which it cannot be objectively derived that this is what Mr [naam 7] had said, nor is there any supporting document evidencing his statement or the alleged unlawful sale. The internal email also explicitly states that Mr [naam 7] "does not want to get involved''. The Tribunal finds Mr [naam 6] 's email thus insufficient evidence of Claimant's alleged violation of Article 7 SHA and consequently, also insufficient evidence of fraudulent behaviour by Claimant during the arbitration.
      
      
        (c) Invoice Rainbow
      
    
    
      4.17
      The third document that Respondents have submitted as evidence for SG Yard Line's alleged unlawful trading activities, is an invoice in the amount of USD 240,580.36 According to Respondents, this invoice shows "that Mr [naam 3] has been trading via SG Yard Line after 3 September 2020, contrary to what was stated during this arbitration. This invoice reveals a 2021 deal between Mr [naam 3] (SG Yard Line) and Mr [naam 11] (Rainbow SARL)."31 Mr [naam 9] attached this invoice to his affidavit, stating that he had received this document from Ms [naam 5] and that this "is in my view clear evidence that Mr [naam 3] was trading".38 Claimant argued in response that this evidence is ''fabricated'' and ''fake", referring amongst others to typo's and comparing it to a genuine invoice of Labtech Korea to Rainbow.39 In addition, Claimant argued that the invoice refers to the sale of an "incubator", which is a medical device, the sale of which could thus not lead to a breach of Article 7 SHA.40 In response, Respondents stated that they "concede that it appears that the invoice that was enclosed to Mr [naam 9] ' affidavit dated 9 May 2023 is a fake invoice, a forgery. The question, then, is who created this forged invoice, with the subsequent questions being what the consequences thereof are to the parties and what Tribunal should do" .41 Respondents also suggested that Mr [naam 3] could have forged the invoice in order to lure Respondents into submitting forged evidence and that this should therefore be further investigated.
      
    
    
      4.18
      The Tribunal concurs with the Parties that the invoice that has been submitted by Respondents has all appearances of being forged. The invoice contains many typos and differs in format from the one that has been presented by Respondents earlier in this arbitration42 and from two additional invoices that Claimant submitted to demonstrate forgery.43 Respondents, who allege that Claimant defrauded them by carrying on trading in violation of Article 7 SHA after Mr [naam 3] 's dismissal, bear the burden of proof. But this invoice does not persuade the Tribunal that Claimant did so. The invoice is fake and therefore provides no evidence that SG Yard Line traded illegally and Claimant thus breached Article 7 SHA. For this analysis, it does not matter who forged the invoice as irrespective who forced it, it is no valid evidence for the case that Respondents must establish (i.e. SG Yard Line's illegal trading). Furthermore, the Tribunal disagrees with Respondents that the identity of the forger warrants further investigation in this arbitration. As explained, such identity is irrelevant for the question whether the invoice proves SG Yard Line's illegal trading. Moreover, Respondents have not argued that Claimant's alleged fraud during this arbitration involved the forgery of the invoice, nor have they provided any evidence to support their speculation that Claimant induced Respondents to submit a forged invoice. The Tribunal therefore rejects Respondents' request for further investigation of this particular matter in this arbitration, as nothing hinges on it.
      
    
    
      4.19
      Moreover, even if the invoice had been genuine, the Tribunal would still not have found that Claimant acted in violation of Article 7 SHA. Hence, the non-compete provision of Article 7.1 SHA states that "no Shareholder or Affiliate shall compete directly or indirectly with the business of the Group anywhere in the world'' (emphasis added). Claimant has consistently argued that Van Caem was not doing business in the field of medical and laboratory items until Mr [naam 3] was dismissed in September 2020 and therefore any business by SG Yard Line in such items would not constitute a violation of the non-compete. In addition, Claimant argued that SG Yard Line had not set up a side business, but that its involvement with Rainbow was to facilitate Mr [naam 12] , the owner of Rainbow and a long-time friend of Mr [naam 3] , in business during the financial and banking crisis in Lebanon. Respondents have argued that it is incorrect that Van Caem never conducted any business in the field of medical and laboratory items, referring to its division "Klerks Pharma", and that Mr [naam 3] did set up a side business and usurped the corporate opportunity to become active in the field of medical and laboratory equipment.44 The Tribunal finds that Respondents have not sufficiently substantiated their position that the business of Van Caem also comprised the trade in medical and laboratory items. First, Respondents have not provided proof of transactions in the field of medical or laboratory items. Mr [naam 1] stated during the hearing on 12 April 2022 that "we have a company now in over the counter stuff so everything related to medical where there is no basically to pharmacies, where there is no prescription on it". However, Mr [naam 1] or Respondents failed to provide details of this company and when it was set up, failed to explain why these "over the counter products" would be the same business as medical and laboratory items (which, according to Claimant requires special knowledge of these products which would not fit the 'quick trading' business of the Group45) and did not provide evidence of such transactions. To the contrary, in March 2020 (at the beginning of COVID-19) there was consensus between Mr [naam 2] , Mr [naam 6] and Mr [naam 3] that the Group should refrain to do business in "kits or masks" as the Group had no knowledge about these products and trading could result in legal issues.46 Consequently, the Group did not trade in COVID-19 products in 2020, which was confirmed by Mr [naam 2] .47 Second, Respondents did not rebut Claimant's argument that Mr [naam 3] had never heard of Klerks Pharma, that Klerks Pharma changed its name to Van Caem Sports B.V. in 2004 (well before Mr [naam 3] joined in 2009) and in any event did not do any business in the field of medical and laboratory items. Any trading in medical or laboratory equipment by SG Yard Line and/or Mr [naam 3] would thus not result in a violation by Claimant of Article 7 SHA, nor could it qualify as pursuing a corporate opportunity that would belong to the Group.
      
      
        (d) Affidavit of Mr [naam 9]
      
      
    
    
      4.20
      Initially, on 3 May 2023, Respondents requested that they could submit a statement of Mr [naam 9] to reply to and rebut the WhatsApp messages exchanged between Ms [naam 5] and Mr [naam 3] on 8, 21 and 24 April 2023 that Claimant had shown during the Post PFA Hearing and which the Tribunal then requested to be submitted to the file. According to Respondents, this would be a one page affidavit about his contact with Ms [naam 5] , in which he would declare that there was no coercion or anything like that.48 In Procedural Order 16, the Tribunal allowed Respondents to file a witness statement to rebut Claimant's new evidence.49 By email of 9 May 2023, Respondents submitted Mr [naam 9] ' affidavit (including two annexes: Ms [naam 5] 's third affidavit and the Rainbow invoice, both of which have been addressed above). In addition, Respondents claimed that Mr [naam 9] ' statement was "essential for the establishment of the fraud".50 The Tribunal takes this to mean that Respondents regard Mr [naam 9] ' affidavit as separate and independent proof of the alleged fraud by Claimant. Claimant argues that Mr [naam 9] is 'untrustworthy'.51
      
    
    
      4.21
      The Tribunal dismisses Mr [naam 9] ' statement as inadequate evidence of Claimant's alleged fraud. Mr [naam 9] ' testimony amounts to little more than hearsay from Ms [naam 5] (e.g. "Ms [naam 5] told me that Mr [naam 3] had always been trading very actively, but has done his best to cover his tracks. After his dismissal from his previous company, he became, as I understood from Ms [naam 5] , very secretive"), which the Tribunal finds unconvincing and in the current circumstances is insufficient to establish fraud.52 Mr [naam 9] ' inference that Mr [naam 3] was trading rests only on the (fake) invoice.53 The Tribunal also questions Mr [naam 9] ' credibility as a witness (see also § 4.14 above). The Tribunal therefore rejects Mr [naam 9] ' affidavit as insufficient proof of Claimant's fraud.
      
    
    
      4.22
      In conclusion, the Tribunal finds that Respondents have submitted insufficient evidence for their allegation that Claimant committed fraud during the arbitration because SG Yard Line and/or Mr [naam 3] continued trading in violation of Article 7 SHA after Mr [naam 3] 's dismissal on 3 September 2020.
      
    
    
      4.23
      There has been some debate between the Parties on when a party should be allowed to elaborate on allegations of fraud. In this respect, Respondents referred to the Supreme Court decision Waterschappen/Milieutech, in which it was decided that if a party develops a suspicion of fraud affecting a binding decision in an interim award, the arbitrators must give the party who has sufficiently stated its position ('voldaan aan zijn stelplicht') the opportunity to explain its position that fraud has been committed by the other party.54 According to Respondents, this means that the Tribunal should allow Respondents to further elaborate on their fraud allegations and to hear Ms [naam 5] and Mr [naam 9] as witnesses.55 Following Claimant's reply that the invoice submitted with Mr [naam 9] ' affidavit was forged, Respondents' counsel replied that they immediately reached out to Mr [naam 9] and then for the first time spoke directly via a Zoom meeting to Ms [naam 5] (on 12 May 2023) and that they needed more time "to delve into this further and want to understand what the hell is going on here".56 Respondents followed up with a letter to the Tribunal of 14 May 2023 in which they gave possible explanations as to who could have forged the invoice, a summary of the conversation between Respondents' counsel and Ms [naam 5] and the offer to submit the recording of the Zoom meeting as evidence. Again, Respondents stated that they believed they were not given sufficient opportunity to present their case in respect of the invoice and the allegations of fraud, with reference to Articles 21(2) and 58 NAI Rules and Article 1036(2) DCCP and that the Tribunal has a duty "in getting to the bottom of what clearly seems to be an unacceptable situation of fraud".57 Claimant, for its part, argues that the threshold to investigate fraud and reverse binding decisions is high and was not met by Respondents. Alternatively, Claimant argues that Respondents have had sufficient opportunity to present their case, that due process was not violated and that the Tribunal should expeditiously render its decision.
      
    
    
      4.24
      The Tribunal notes that it has wide discretionary power to decide on the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of the evidence.58 The Tribunal finds that Respondents have had ample chance to make their case for fraud and that they will not be allowed a further opportunity to elaborate on their case and/or to hear witnesses, for the following reasons.
      
    
    
      4.25
      First, Respondents have had enough time to argue their position on the alleged fraud: they gave their evidence at the Post PFA Hearing and afterwards, they were allowed to expand on their position several times and submit more evidence (including witness statements) to back it up. Second, the Tribunal disagrees that Respondents should be provided with another opportunity to argue their case on the fake invoice that they themselves submitted as proof of fraud. The Tribunal can decide that this evidence does not show Claimant's fraud in respect of the non-compete, and nothing else hinges on it. In any case, Respondents' guess that Mr [naam 3] might have forged the invoice has no evidence to support it and so the Tribunal does not need to look into it further (see also § 4.18 above). Third, the Tribunal has found above that even if Ms [naam 5] 's statements were true, they would not show fraud. The Tribunal therefore does not find it necessary to hear her as a witness. As Mr [naam 9] ' conclusion about Mr [naam 3] 's trading is not based on his own knowledge but only (i) a repetition of what is included in Ms [naam 5] 's second affidavit and (ii) the fake invoice, the Tribunal does not find his testimony is relevant either. Finally, the Tribunal notes that Respondents have taken a lot of time to make their case and have been given ample opportunity to do so. Ms [naam 5] 's second affidavit of 4 April 2023 is largely the same as her first one of 4 February 2023, but her first was not submitted and her second affidavit and the fraud claims were only submitted on 28 April 2023. Mr [naam 6] 's email mentioned a phone call of 30 March 2023 but related to a supposed transaction in the summer of 2022. Respondents did not explain why they actioned and submitted this evidence so late. This is dubious, and even more so as it turned out that Respondents had instructed an investigation bureau by the end of 2022 and by the time of the Post PFA Hearing, had paid a lot of money to this investigation bureau. The Tribunal cannot avoid the impression that Respondents are 'drip feeding' evidence to then ask for more time to expand on their position. The time pressure that Respondents claim to be under cannot be blamed on anyone but themselves and is thus no reason to provide Respondents with a further opportunity to present their case either. In addition, the Tribunal must safeguard against unreasonable delay of the proceedings and takes into account considerations of procedural economy. 59 Therefore, the Tribunal rejects Respondents' requests to elaborate on their case and to hear Ms [naam 5] and Mr [naam 9] as witnesses.
      
    
    
      4.26
      Based on the above, the Tribunal rejects Respondents' allegations that Claimant committed fraud during the arbitration as Mr [naam 3] and/or SG Yard Line traded in violation of Article 7 SHA. Consequently, the Tribunal sees no reason to reverse any of its binding decisions in the Partial Final Award.
      
    
    
      2.17.
      In het hoofdstuk waarin de Arbiters hebben geoordeeld over de proceskostenveroordeling staat, voor zover van belang, het volgende: “The Tribunal agrees with Claimant that the conduct of Respondents hampered the efficient conduct of the proceedings. Respondents have made several requests to delay decisions in this arbitration (in all phases), all of which the Tribunal has rejected. Respondents have submitted numerous unsolicited filings, including belated submission of new evidence and arguments. Respondents have also levelled fraud allegations against Claimant, which were rejected.” 
    
    
      2.18.
      Tegen het Arbitrale eindvonnis staat geen hoger beroep open. VCG c.s. hebben aangekondigd tegen het Arbitrale eindvonnis een vernietigingsprocedure te zullen starten bij het gerechtshof Amsterdam.
      
      
    
  
  
    
      3Het geschil
    
    
      3.1.
      VCG c.s. vorderen:
      
      
        
          primair:
          de tenuitvoerlegging van het Arbitrale eindvonnis (gedeeltelijk) te schorsen totdat onherroepelijk is beslist in de aanhangige vernietigingsprocedure en de nieuwe vernietigingsprocedure, met dien verstande dat:
        I. FG wordt gelast de VCG Aandelen conform de als productie 52 overgelegde concept leveringsakte te leveren uiterlijk op 3 augustus 2023 tegen betaling van USD 6 miljoen, althans een door de voorzieningenrechter te bepalen bedrag, ten laste van de bankgarantie, die als productie 8 is overgelegd, met bepaling dat gedurende de schorsing het restant van de bankgarantie niet getrokken mag worden en als zekerheid voor FG blijft staan, en voor het geval FG hieraan niet vrijwillig tijdig voldoet op de voet van artikel 3:300 Burgerlijk Wetboek (BW) te bepalen dat deze uitspraak in de plaats komt van bedoelde medewerking aan het in die akte bepaalde; en
        II. FG wordt gelast om na levering van de VCG Aandelen USD 6 miljoen, althans een door de voorzieningenrechter te bepalen bedrag, te trekken onder de bankgarantie met bepaling dat SR II daarmee voor de Purchase Price minus de onder (I) genoemde zekerheid is gekweten; en
        III. wordt bepaald dat VCG c.s. geen dwangsommen verbeuren,
        een en ander eventueel onder voorwaarden die de voorzieningenrechter geraden voorkomen, en
      
      
      
        
          subsidiair: 
        
        I. FG te gelasten de VCG Aandelen conform de als productie 53 overgelegde concept leveringsakte te leveren op uiterlijk 3 augustus 2023 tegen betaling van de Amount Due, als omschreven in voornoemde akte, ten laste van de bankgarantie, die als productie 8 is overgelegd, en voor het geval FG hieraan niet vrijwillig tijdig voldoet op de voet van artikel 3:300 BW te bepalen dat deze uitspraak in de plaats komt van bedoelde medewerking aan het in die akte bepaalde, en
        II. FG te gelasten na levering van de VCG Aandelen de Amount Due te trekken onder de bankgarantie die als productie 8 is overgelegd, met bepaling dat SR II daarmee voor de Amount Due is gekweten; en
        III. te bepalen dat VCG c.s. geen dwangsommen verbeuren.
      
      
      
        
          primair en subsidiair vorderen VCG c.s. FG te veroordelen in de proces- en nakosten, beide te vermeerderen met de wettelijke rente. 
      
      
    
    
      3.2.
      Op de standpunten van partijen wordt hierna, voor zover van belang, nader ingegaan. 
      
      
    
  
  
    
      4De beoordeling
    
      4.1.
      De vordering van VCG c.s. komt erop neer dat zij willen dat SR II de prijs van de VCG Aandelen pas na levering van die aandelen door FG aan SR II hoeft te voldoen en tegen een lager bedrag dan zoals door de Arbiters bepaald (primair) en subsidiair dat SR II de prijs van de VCG Aandelen pas na levering van die aandelen door FG aan SR II hoeft te voldoen.
      
      
        
          Juridisch kader
        
      
      
    
    
      4.2.
      De tenuitvoerlegging van een arbitraal vonnis kan worden geschorst. Bij de beslissing op dat schorsingsverzoek moet de rechter zich een voorlopig oordeel vormen over de vordering tot vernietiging van het arbitrale vonnis en daarnaast de belangen van partijen afwegen (HR 4 december 2020, ECLI:NL:HR:2020:1952).
      
    
    
      4.3.
      Op grond van artikel 1065 lid 1 Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering kan een partij de vernietiging van een arbitraal vonnis vorderen. Bij de beoordeling van de vernietigingsvordering moet de rechter – behalve voor zover deze vordering erop is gebaseerd (i) dat een geldige overeenkomst van arbitrage ontbreekt of (ii) dat in strijd met hoor en wederhoor is gehandeld, dan mag de rechter voluit toetsen – terughoudend zijn. Een vernietigingsprocedure mag niet worden gebruikt als een verkapt hoger beroep. Het algemeen belang bij een effectief functionerende arbitrale rechtspleging brengt immers mee dat de burgerlijke rechter slechts in sprekende gevallen dient in te grijpen in arbitrale beslissingen.
      
      
        
          De door VCG c.s. aangevoerde vernietigingsgronden
        
      
      
      
        
          Fraude/bedrog
        
      
      
    
    
      4.4.
      VCG c.s. hebben aangevoerd dat, nadat het Arbitrale tussenvonnis was gewezen, zij hebben ontdekt dat [naam 3] fraude en/of bedrog heeft gepleegd, omdat hij heeft gelogen over het feit dat hij na zijn ontslag op staande voet geen concurrerende activiteiten heeft verricht. VCG c.s. stellen daartoe dat zij na het wijzen van het Arbitrale tussenvonnis een verklaring in handen hebben gekregen van de voormalige directeur van Yard Line, waaruit blijkt dat [naam 3] van oktober 2020 tot en met augustus 2022 concurrerende activiteiten heeft verricht. Ook van een andere persoon hebben VCG c.s. een verklaring ontvangen dat [naam 3] een grote partij bier aan hem had verkocht. [naam 3] heeft bedrog gepleegd in de zin van artikel 1068 Rv. VCG c.s. hebben de Arbiters tijdens de laatste zitting van de arbitrale procedure op 2 mei 2023 verzocht de procedure aan te houden, omdat ook op dit punt vernietiging van het Arbitrale tussenvonnis wordt gevorderd in de aanhangige vernietigingsprocedure. In plaats van de arbitrage procedure aan te houden, wilden de Arbiters de beschuldiging van fraude zelf afdoen. Deze beslissing mochten de Arbiters niet nemen, omdat zij in het Arbitrale tussenvonnis al definitief hadden beslist op de non-concurrentievorderingen van VCG c.s. De Arbiters zijn daarmee teruggekomen van een bindende eindbeslissing, hebben in strijd gehandeld met het gesloten stelsel van rechtsmiddelen en daarmee in strijd met hun opdracht en regels van openbare orde. VCG c.s. hebben vervolgens een verklaring in het geding gebracht en het aanbod gedaan om twee getuigen te horen. De Arbiters hebben dit getuigenaanbod ten onrechte afgewezen, aldus steeds VCG c.s.
      
    
    
      4.5.
      Voorop staat dat de Arbiters niet zijn teruggekomen van een bindende eindbeslissing. Zij zijn immers in het Arbitrale eindvonnis niet teruggekomen van hun oordeel dat FG artikel 7 SHA niet heeft geschonden. Nadat het Arbitrale tussenvonnis was gewezen hebben VCG c.s. aan de hand van nieuw en van na de datum van het Arbitrale tussenvonnis opgekomen bewijsmateriaal aangevoerd dat FG (lees: [naam 3] ) ook na zijn ontslag op staande voet artikel 7 SHA had geschonden en derhalve tijdens de Arbitrale procedure fraude had gepleegd door hierover niet de waarheid te vertellen. De Arbiters hebben echter geen reden gezien de arbitrage aan te houden in afwachting van de uitkomst van de aanhangige vernietigingsprocedure en hebben beslist de beschuldiging van fraude zelf af te doen. Dit alles is zorgvuldig afgewogen en ook uitgebreid gemotiveerd.
      
    
    
      4.6.
      Bij de afhandeling van de fraudebeschuldiging hebben de Arbiters oog gehad voor de belangen van VCG c.s. door hen in de gelegenheid te stellen deze beschuldiging uitgebreid nader uit te werken. Dat het VCG c.s. op een gegeven moment niet meer was toegestaan opnieuw nader bewijs in te dienen dan wel nog twee getuigen te horen, is een eigen afweging van de Arbiters. Het is aan de Arbiters om op enig moment te beslissen dat zij over voldoende informatie beschikken om een oordeel te kunnen vellen. Uit de overwegingen van de Arbiters blijkt dat zij gemotiveerd hebben besloten het bewijsaanbod te passeren. Kennelijk speelde bij die beslissing ook mee dat de Arbiters het gevoel hadden dat VCG c.s. steeds “druppelsgewijs” (drip feeding) bewijs aandroegen om vervolgens meer tijd te vragen om hun standpunten te mogen uitwerken en ook dat VCG c.s. door de wijze waarop zij geprocedeerd hebben de Arbitrale procedure opzettelijk en nodeloos hebben vertraagd.
      
      
        
          Schending artikel 7 SHA door FG/ [naam 3]
        
      
      
    
    
      4.7.
      De Arbiters hebben in 15.54 en 15.55 van het Arbitrale tussenvonnis overwogen dat [naam 3] artikel 7 SHA niet heeft overtreden, omdat [naam 2] wist van de activiteiten die hij verrichtte voor Yard Line. Verder hebben de Arbiters overwogen dat door [naam 2] uitdrukkelijke “weerleggingsverklaringen” (rebuttal statements) hadden kunnen en moeten worden aangeboden indien hij inderdaad niet wist van de activiteiten van [naam 3] voor Yard Line. 
      
    
    
      4.8.
      Volgens VCG c.s. raken deze overwegingen kant noch wal in het licht van de getuigenverklaring die [naam 2] tijdens de arbitrageprocedure heeft afgelegd. [naam 2] heeft verklaard dat hij niet wist van de activiteiten van Yard Line en dat hij hiervoor geen toestemming heeft gegeven aan [naam 3] . Dit onderdeel van het Arbitrale tussenvonnis dient te worden vernietigd, omdat de Arbiters voorbij zijn gegaan aan essentiële stellingen van VCG c.s. en daarmee hun opdracht hebben geschonden, omdat sprake is van een verrassingsbeslissing vanwege schending van het beginsel van hoor en wederhoor en de Arbiters hun opdracht hebben geschonden, aldus steeds VCG c.s.
      
    
    
      4.9.
      Vanzelfsprekend is niet elke voor (een van de) partijen verrassende beslissing ook een ontoelaatbare, met de goede procesorde strijdige, verrassingsbeslissing. Van een verassingsbeslissing is sprake als de beslissing wordt gebaseerd op een grondslag die de partijen tijdens het processuele debat niet hebben aangevoerd ter ondersteuning van hun specifieke vorderingen of verweren. Dat is hier niet het geval. FG heeft juist in de arbitrale procedure aangevoerd dat [naam 2] wist van de activiteiten die [naam 3] verrichtte voor Yard Line en dat [naam 2] daar toestemming voor had gegeven. 
      
    
    
      4.10.
      Ook wanneer de rechter (in dit geval de Arbiters) binnen de door partijen getrokken grenzen van de rechtsstrijd blijft, kan hij partijen voor ontoelaatbare verrassingen stellen. Dat is aan de orde, indien hij partijen onvoldoende in de gelegenheid heeft gesteld zich uit te laten over de stellingen, stukken of andere bescheiden die hij aan zijn beslissing ten grondslag heeft gelegd. Dit is niet gebleken. VCG c.s. hebben in haar Statement of Defence and Counterclaim, de Post Hearing Brief en Reply Post Hearing Brief betoogd dat [naam 2] geen toestemming heeft gegeven voor de activiteiten van [naam 3] voor Yard Line. Op dit punt is door VCG c.s. een schriftelijke getuigenverklaring van [naam 2] overgelegd. VCG c.s. hebben aldus voldoende de gelegenheid gehad zich over dit onderwerp uit te laten. Kennelijk hebben de Arbiters de getuigenverklaring van [naam 2] anders gewaardeerd dan VCG c.s. hadden gewild. De waardering van bewijs en getuigenverklaringen is echter aan de Arbiters. Dat is een inhoudelijk oordeel en geen grond voor vernietiging van het Arbitrale tussenvonnis.
      
    
    
      4.11.
      Voor zover de Arbiters ten aanzien van dit onderwerp niet op alle stellingen van VCG c.s. zijn ingegaan en deze niet expliciet hebben verworpen, is dit evenmin een grond voor vernietiging van het Arbitrale tussenvonnis. Het is aan de Arbiters om te beoordelen welke stellingen van partijen relevant zijn voor de beoordeling van de vorderingen.
      
    
    
      4.12.
      Volgens VCG c.s. hebben de Arbiters hun oordeel volledig gebaseerd op de verklaring van [naam 3] . VCG c.s. hebben aangevoerd dat zij in de arbitrageprocedure tot in detail hebben uiteengezet waarom de verklaring van [naam 3] leugenachtig is. Ook op dit punt hebben de Arbiters essentiële stellingen van VCG c.s. miskend, hebben zij buiten de opdracht gehandeld en is het Arbitrale tussenvonnis in strijd met de openbare orde, aldus steeds VCG c.s.
      
    
    
      4.13.
      Deze stelling komt er in feite op neer dat VCG c.s. het niet eens zijn met de waardering door de Arbiters van het door partijen aangedragen bewijs. Dat is een inhoudelijk oordeel en zoals eerder gezegd geen grond voor vernietiging van het Arbitrale tussenvonnis. 
      
    
    
      4.14.
      VCG c.s. stellen dat de Arbiters in rechtsoverweging 15.56 van het Arbitrale tussenvonnis niet hebben uitgelegd hoe zij tot hun uitleg van artikel 7 SHA zijn gekomen. De Arbiters hebben in die artikelen ten onrechte de voorwaarde gelezen dat pas sprake is van schending van artikel 7 SHA als winst wordt behaald. Voortbouwend op deze foute uitleg van artikel 7 SHA concluderen de Arbiters vervolgens ten onrechte in rechtsoverweging 15.57 dat zij overtuigd zijn van de juistheid van de stelling van [naam 3] dat geen winst is gerealiseerd en hij de intentie had te handelen in het belang van VCG c.s. Tegen de juistheid van de stellingen van [naam 3] hebben VCG c.s. onder meer aangevoerd dat volgens de eigen stellingen van Yard Line zij op een enkele transactie na geen verlies heeft geleden. Verder heeft VCG c.s. aangevoerd dat de ‘profit’ van Yard Line eruit bestaat dat zij een inkoopnetwerk heeft opgebouwd ten detrimente van Van Caem. De Arbiters zijn op deze verweren in het geheel niet ingegaan en hebben daarmee essentiële stellingen van VCG c.s. onbehandeld gelaten. Hadden de Arbiters deze stellingen van VCG c.s. wel in aanmerking genomen, dan waren zij mogelijk tot een andere conclusie gekomen. Als zodanig hebben de Arbiters wederom hun opdracht geschonden. Verder geldt dat de Arbiters hun oordeel ten aanzien van de transacties door Yard Line met derden zo gebrekkig hebben gemotiveerd, dat het met een geheel ongemotiveerde beslissing moet worden gelijkgesteld, aldus steeds VCG c.s.
      
    
    
      4.15.
      De uitleg van de Arbiters van artikel 7 SHA is een inhoudelijk oordeel en is zoals eerder gezegd geen grond voor vernietiging van het Arbitrale tussenvonnis. Van de motivering van hun uitleg van artikel 7 SHA door de Arbiters kan in redelijkheid niet worden gezegd dat deze zo onbegrijpelijk is dat daarin geen enkele steekhoudende verklaring voor de beslissing valt te onderkennen. In rechtsoverweging 15.36 van het Arbitrale tussenvonnis hebben de Arbiters het standpunt van VCG c.s., dat FG artikel 7 SHA heeft geschonden, omdat FG een inkoopnetwerk heeft opgebouwd, weergegeven. Uit de uitleg die de Arbiters hebben gegeven aan artikel 7 SHA volgt dat zij deze stelling van VCG c.s. niet hebben gevolgd. Bij de uitleg van een bepaling in een overeenkomst is overigens ook niet vereist dat de Arbiters expliciet alle stellingen van een partij daarover behandelen. Verder geldt, zoals al eerder overwogen, dat het aan de Arbiters is om te beoordelen welke stellingen van partijen relevant zijn voor de beoordeling van de vorderingen.
      
      
        
          Schending artikel 7 SHA door VCG c.s.
        
      
      
    
    
      4.16.
      Tot slot hebben VCG c.s. als vernietigingsgrond aangevoerd dat de Arbiters ten onrechte hebben geoordeeld dat VCG c.s. artikel 7 SHA hebben geschonden. VCG c.s. hebben geen belang bij de beoordeling van hetgeen zij op dit punt hebben aangevoerd. VCG c.s. willen namelijk met dit kort geding bereiken dat SR II de koopprijs van de VCG Aandelen pas na levering hoeft te betalen, al dan niet tegen een lager bedrag dan zoals door de Arbiters vastgesteld in het Arbitrale eindvonnis. VCG c.s. vinden namelijk dat niet zij maar FG artikel 7 SHA heeft overtreden en FG een boete heeft verbeurd van € 7,5 miljoen, die kan worden verrekend met de koopprijs van de VCG aandelen. Echter, als al door het gerechtshof wordt geoordeeld dat het Arbitrale eindvonnis moet worden vernietigd ten aanzien van het oordeel dat VCG c.s. artikel 7 SHA hebben geschonden, dan heeft dit geen invloed op de koopprijs van de VCG Aandelen en levert dit voor VCG c.s. geen verrekeningsvordering op. Het zal er slechts toe leiden dat VCG c.s. geen boete hoeven te betalen aan FG. 
      
    
    
      4.17.
      Dit alles betekent dat voorshands niet aannemelijk is dat de door VCG c.s. aanhangig gemaakte en nog aanhangig te maken vernietigingsprocedure voldoende kans van slagen heeft. 
      
      
        
          Belangenafweging
        
      
      
    
    
      4.18.
      VCG c.s. hebben aangevoerd dat de vrees bestaat dat FG het geld dat zij voor de VCG Aandelen ontvangt van VCG c.s. onmiddellijk zal doorboeken naar buitenlandse bankrekeningen en aldus voor toekomstig verhaal zal verduisteren. FG heeft een Zwitserse bankrekening en is een lege vennootschap. VCG c.s. zijn niet bekend met enig actief van FG. Er is dan ook een heel groot restitutierisico wanneer VCG c.s. in de vernietigingsprocedures in het gelijk worden gesteld, maar het Arbitrale eindvonnis reeds ten uitvoer is gelegd. Bij toewijzing van de subsidiaire vordering staat FG niet met lege handen. Zij ontvangt dan immers een bedrag van USD 6 miljoen. VCG c.s., althans SR II, beschikt niet over de financiële middelen om enig bedrag aan FG te betalen. VCG heeft op vordering van FG een bankgarantie gesteld ten gunste van FG als zekerheid voor betaling van de VCG Aandelen door SR II, voor een bedrag van maximaal USD 16.525.000,00. De bankgarantie kan pas worden getrokken nadat de VCG Aandelen zijn geleverd. Als het bedrag van USD 6 miljoen wordt getrokken onder de bankgarantie, houdt FG zekerheid voor een bedrag van USD 10.525.000,00 uit hoofde van deze bankgarantie, aldus steeds VCG c.s.
      
    
    
      4.19.
      FG heeft aangevoerd dat zij voor de aankoop van de VCG Aandelen miljoenen euro’s heeft moeten lenen, welke lening zij nog aan het aflossen is. FG zal bij toewijzing van de subsidiaire vordering haar aandelen en daarmee ook haar aandeelhoudersrechten verliezen en slechts een deel van de prijs van de VCG Aandelen ontvangen. Dat FG pas na levering van de VCG Aandelen betaald krijgt door trekking van de bankgarantie brengt grote risico’s mee voor FG. De bank heeft aangegeven niet op de derdengeldenrekening van de notaris te willen betalen en pas te zullen uitkeren nadat SR II in verzuim is komen te verkeren doordat levering heeft plaatsgevonden zonder betaling van de koopsom. Als de vordering van VCG c.s. wordt toegewezen, hoeven zij pas vijf dagen nadat de VCG Aandelen zijn geleverd, te betalen. Dit geeft VCG c.s., die dan al wel over de aandelen beschikt, alle tijd om de uitbetaling te frustreren. FG heeft geen enkel vertrouwen meer in VCG c.s. Partijen waren al eens dicht bij een definitieve oplossing, maar op het moment dat de vaststellingsovereenkomst kon worden getekend, kwamen VCG c.s. opeens met nieuwe eisen waardoor het niet tot een oplossing is gekomen. FG wil na jarenlang procederen en miljoenen te hebben besteed aan juridische kosten deze kwestie afsluiten. Dit moet gebeuren volgens het systeem van de SHA, de instructies van de Arbiters zoals neergelegd in het Arbitrale eindvonnis en overeenkomstig de notariële akte zoals opgesteld door de notaris. VCG c.s. zijn een onderdeel van Van Caem. Van Caem is een grote speler op de wereldmarkt. VCG heeft een equity van USD 76.812,00. SR II heeft sinds 2015 een bedrag van USD 56.830.000,00 ontvangen. FG kan zich dan ook niet aan de indruk onttrekken dat geen sprake is van betalingsonmacht, maar van betalingsonwil aan de zijde van VCG c.s. Het restitutierisico en de aannemelijkheid van de vordering zijn communicerende vaten. Vernietiging van een arbitraal vonnis is sowieso een hoge uitzondering en in dit geval is er geen grond voor vernietiging van de arbitrale vonnissen. Tot restitutie van enig bedrag zal het dan ook niet komen, waardoor een eventueel restitutierisico in een belangenafweging niet of nauwelijks van gewicht kan zijn, dit alles aldus FG. 
      
    
    
      4.20.
      Uitgangspunt is dat SR II de koopprijs van de VCG Aandelen voorafgaand aan de levering op de derdengeldrekening van de notaris moet storten en dat vervolgens levering en betaling van de aandelen gelijktijdig plaatsvindt. Vaststaat dat partijen geen enkel vertrouwen meer in elkaar hebben na alle beschuldigingen die over en weer zijn geuit en de procedures die tussen hen zijn gevoerd. FG heeft daarbij ook nog gewezen op het allerlaatste moment afketsten van een definitieve oplossing, omdat VCG c.s. met aanvullende voorwaarden kwamen. VCG c.s. hebben dit niet betwist. In dit licht bezien is het begrijpelijk dat FG verlangt dat het bedrag van de koopprijs van de VCG Aandelen voorafgaand aan de levering wordt gestort op de derdengeldrekening van de notaris. Dat SR II, althans VCG c.s., niet over voldoende financiële middelen beschikt om de koopprijs van de VCG Aandelen te voldoen, is door FG betwist. Als SR II al niet over voldoende financiële middelen beschikt, valt niet in te zien waarom SR II, althans VCG c.s., die onderdeel zijn van Van Caem, geen financiering kunnen regelen. Hetgeen VCG c.s. over hun financiële positie hebben aangevoerd, doet overigens ook onvoldoende af aan het uitgangspunt dat de koopprijs van de VCG Aandelen voorafgaand aan de levering op de derdengeldenrekening van de notaris moet worden gestort. 
      
    
    
      4.21.
      Hiervoor is al geoordeeld dat niet aannemelijk is dat de door VCG c.s. aanhangig gemaakte en nog aanhangig te maken vernietigingsprocedures voldoende kans van slagen hebben. Omdat voorshands dus sprake is van een harde vordering van FG op VCG c.s. speelt het restitutierisico slechts een beperkte rol. FG wordt gevolgd in haar stelling dat het na jaren procederen een keer klaar moet zijn. Verder speelt mee dat uit de arbitrale vonnissen blijkt dat VCG c.s. de procedure onnodig groot heeft gemaakt en heeft vertraagd. Zo schrijven de Arbiters in het Arbitrale tussenvonnis dat: ‘The Tribunal cannot avoid the impression that Respondents are 'drip feeding' evidence to then ask for more time to expand on their position.’, en in het Arbitrale eindvonnis dat: ‘The Tribunal agrees with Claimant that the conduct of Respondents hampered the efficient conduct of the proceedings. Respondents have made several requests to delay decisions in this arbitration (in all phases), all of which the Tribunal has rejected. Respondents have submitted numerous unsolicited filings, including belated submission of new evidence and arguments.’. Gelet op het voorgaande is het eventuele restitutierisico ondergeschikt aan het belang van FG bij volledige betaling van de koopprijs van de VCG Aandelen.
      
    
    
      4.22.
      De conclusie is dat de vorderingen van VCG c.s. worden afgewezen.
    
    
      4.23.
      Als de in het ongelijk gestelde partij zullen VCG c.s. worden veroordeeld in de kosten van dit geding, tot op heden aan de zijde van FG begroot op € 676,00 aan griffierecht en € 1.619,00 aan salaris advocaat. De verzochte nakosten worden toegewezen op de wijze zoals in de beslissing vermeld.
      
      
    
  
  
    
      5De beslissing
    De voorzieningenrechter
    
    
      5.1.
      weigert de gevraagde voorzieningen,
      
    
    
      5.2.
      veroordeelt VCG c.s. in de proceskosten, tot op heden aan de zijde van FG begroot op € 2.295,00, te vermeerderen met de wettelijke rente over dit bedrag vanaf vijftien dagen na heden, tot aan de voldoening,
      
    
    
      5.3.
      veroordeelt VCG c.s. in de na dit vonnis ontstane kosten, begroot op € 173,00 aan salaris advocaat, te vermeerderen met € 90,00 en de kosten van het betekeningsexploot ingeval betekening van dit vonnis plaatsvindt, te vermeerderen met de wettelijke rente over de nakosten vanaf vijftien dagen na heden, tot aan de voldoening,
      
    
    
      5.4.
      verklaart deze kostenveroordelingen uitvoerbaar bij voorraad.
      
      
        Dit vonnis is gewezen door mr. E.A. Messer, voorzieningenrechter, bijgestaan door mr. M.F. van Grootheest, griffier, en in het openbaar uitgesproken op 2 augustus 2023.
      
    
  
  
    type: MvG 
    coll: MV