IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN 
(APPELLATE JURISDICTION) 
 
 
PRESENT: MR. JUSTICE MIAN SAQIB NISAR, HCJ 
MR. JUSTICE MUSHIR ALAM  
MR. JUSTICE SAJJAD ALI SHAH 
 
 
CIVIL APPEALS NO.1583 TO 1598 OF 2014, 970 AND 971 OF 
2013, 4, 5, 606 AND 1152 OF 2015 AND CIVIL PETITION 
NO.2154-L OF 2014 AND CIVIL MISC. APPLICATION NO.484-K 
OF 2014 IN CIVIL APPEAL NO.1598 OF 2014 
(Against the judgments dated 4.8.2014, 29.10.2010, 3.12.2014, 18.3.2015, 
9.6.2015 and 17.4.2014 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi/Islamabad High 
Court, Islamabad/Peshawar High Court, Peshawar/Lahore High Court, Lahore 
passed in C.Ps.No.D-304/2012, D-3195/2010, D-1762/2012, D-658/2012, D-
3530/2011, D-3196/2010, D-2948/2011, D-2947/2011, D-2701/2011, D-
2269/2013, D-2188/2011, D-1642/2012, D-1410/2010, D-4184/2012, D-
153/2012, 
D-1796/2010, 
D-2428/2010, 
W.P.No.4626/2014, 
4628/2014, 
C.P.No.4514/2013, W.P.No.634/2015 and R.A.No.93/2012) 
 
 
M/s Sui Southern Gas Company Ltd. 
In C.A.1583/2014 
M/s Karachi Electric Supply Company 
In C.A.1584/2014 
M/s Karachi Electric Supply Company 
In C.A.1585/2014 
M/s Karachi Electric Ltd. 
In C.A.1586/2014 
M/s Karachi Electric Ltd. 
In C.A.1587/2014 
M/s Karachi Electric Ltd. 
In C.A.1588/2014 
M/s Karachi Electric Supply Company 
In C.A.1589/2014 
M/s Karachi Electric Supply Company 
In C.A.1590/2014 
M/s Karachi Electric Supply Company 
In C.A.1591/2014 
M/s Karachi Electric Ltd. 
In C.A.1592/2014 
M/s Karachi Electric Supply Company 
In C.A.1593/2014 
M/s Karachi Electric Ltd. 
In C.A.1594/2014 
M/s Karachi Electric Ltd. 
In C.A.1595/2014 
M/s Karachi Electric Supply Company 
In C.A.1596/2014 
M/s Karachi Electric Supply Company 
In C.A.1597/2014 
M/s Karachi Electric Supply Company 
In C.A.1598/2014 
Shaheen Airport Services 
In C.A.970/2013 
Shaheen Airport Services 
In C.A.971/2013 
S.M.E. Bank Ltd. Islamabad 
In C.A.4/2015 
S.M.E. Bank Ltd. Islamabad 
In C.A.5/2015 
Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. 
In C.A.606/2015 
President Meezan Bank Ltd., Karachi etc. 
In C.A.1152/2015 
Zohaib Arif, Traffic Loader, etc. 
In C.P.2154-L/2014 
 
…Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s) 
VERSUS 
Federation of Pakistan etc. 
In C.A.1583/2014 
National Industrial Relations Commission etc. 
In C.A.1584/2014 
National Industrial Relations Commission etc. 
In C.A.1585/2014 
Federation of Pakistan etc. 
In C.A.1586/2014 
Federation of Pakistan etc. 
In C.A.1587/2014 
National Industrial Relations Commission etc. 
In C.A.1588/2014 
Federation of Pakistan etc. 
In C.A.1589/2014 
National Industrial Relations Commission etc. 
In C.A.1590/2014 
National Industrial Relations Commission etc. 
In C.A.1591/2014 
National Industrial Relations Commission etc. 
In C.A.1592/2014 
Civil Appeals No.1583 to 1598 of 2014 etc. 
-: 2 :-
Federation of Pakistan etc. 
In C.A.1593/2014 
Federation of Pakistan etc. 
In C.A.1594/2014 
Federation of Pakistan etc. 
In C.A.1595/2014 
Province of Sindh etc. 
In C.A.1596/2014 
Federation of Pakistan etc. 
In C.A.1597/2014 
Federation of Pakistan etc. 
In C.A.1598/2014 
National Industrial Relations Commission etc. 
In C.A.970/2013 
National Industrial Relations Commission etc. 
In C.A.971/2013 
Full Bench, NIRC Islamabad etc. 
In C.A.4/2015 
Full Bench, NIRC Islamabad etc. 
In C.A.5/2015 
Tariq Zameer Siddiqui etc. 
In C.A.606/2015 
Full Bench, NIRC Islamabad etc. 
In C.A.1152/2015 
Manager, Shaheen Airport Services etc. 
In C.P.2154-L/2014 
 
…Respondent(s) 
 
For the appellant(s): 
Mr. Khalid Anwar, Sr. ASC 
Mr. Nisar A. Mujahid, ASC 
Raja Abdul Ghafoor, AOR 
(In C.As.970 & 971/2013) 
 
Mr. Asim Iqbal, ASC 
(In C.A.1583/2014) 
 
Dr. Muhammad Farough Naseem, ASC 
(In C.As.1584, 1585, 1589, 1590, 1591, 1593, 1596, 
1597 & 1598/2014) 
 
Nemo 
(In C.As.1586, 1587, 1588, 1592, 1594 & 1595/2014) 
 
Mr. Tariq Masood, Sr. ASC 
Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, AOR 
(In C.As.4 & 5/2015) 
 
Mr. Shahid Anwar Bajwa, ASC 
Mr. M. S. Khattak, AOR 
(In C.A.606/2015) 
 
Mr. Mehmood Abdul Ghani, ASC 
Mr. M. S. Khattak, AOR 
(In C.A.1152/2015) 
 
Mr. Khalid Ismail, ASC, Sr. ASC. 
(In C.P.2154-L/2014) 
 
 
For the respondent(s): 
Mr. M. Makhdoom Ali Khan, Sr. ASC 
(In C.As.1583, 1585, 1586, 1590  to 1595/2014) 
 
Mr. Rasheed A. Rizvi, Sr. ASC 
(In C.As.1584 & 1587/2014) 
 
Mr. Khalid Ismail, ASC 
(In C.As.4 & 5/2015, 970, 971/2013) 
 
Nemo 
(In C.A.970/2013) 
Mr. Amir Javed, ASC 
(In C.A.1152/2015) 
Mr. Salman Riaz Ch., ASC 
(In C.P.2154-L/2014) 
Civil Appeals No.1583 to 1598 of 2014 etc. 
-: 3 :-
 
 
On Court’s notice: 
Mr. Muhammad Waqar Rana, Addl.A.G.P. 
Mr. Shehryar Qazi, Addl. AG Sindh 
Ms. Asma Hamid, Addl.A.G. Punjab 
Barrister Qasim Wadood, Addl.A.G. KPK 
Mr. Ayaz Swati, Addl.A.G. Balochistan 
Mr. M. Bilal Nadeem, Dy. Registrar, NIRC 
Syed Farrukh Hamayun, Joint Director 
Labour Deptt. Sindh 
Mr. Raja Maqsood, LO Labour Deptt. 
Punjab 
Mr. Mazhar Hussain, SO (Coordination) Ibd 
 
 
For intervener 
Mr. Saleem Khan, ASC 
Qazi Ahmed Naeem Qureshi, ASC 
Mr. Mehmood A. Sheikh, AOR 
 
 
Date of Hearing: 
10.1.2018 
 
JUDGMENT 
 
 
 
MIAN SAQIB NISAR, CJ.- These appeals with the leave 
of the Court vide orders dated 5.9.2013 (C.As. No.970 & 971 of 2013), 
27.11.2014 (C.As. No.1583 to 1598 of 2014), 8.1.2015 (C.As. No.4 & 5 of 2015), 
30.6.2015 (C.A. No.606 of 2015) and 4.11.2015 (C.A. No.1152 of 2015) and 
petition (C.P. No.2154-L of 2014) entail the common question of law thus 
are being disposed of through this common judgment.  
2. 
 
The Islamic Republic of Pakistan is a democratic State 
(Federation) with its Federating Units (Provinces) and the Constitution of 
the Islamic Republic Pakistan, 1973 (Constitution) recognizes and 
creates a balance between the authority of the Federation and the 
autonomy of the Provinces, which recognition has been given an iron 
cladding by virtue of the Eighteenth Amendment, passed vide the 
Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010. This Amendment to 
the Constitution has inter alia introduced a drastic enhancement in 
the legislative authority of the Provinces by deleting the Concurrent 
Legislative List (CLL), whereby previously both the Parliament and the 
Provincial legislatures could legislate on the subjects enumerated 
therein. The omission of the CLL, left only a single
The
Civil Appeals No.1583 to 1598 of 2014 etc. 
-: 4 :-
the Constitution which exclusively list subjects that can be legislated 
upon by the Parliament alone, and by virtue of Article 142(c) of the 
Constitution any subject not enumerated in these two lists would 
subject to the Constitution, be within the legislative competence of the 
Provinces. Entry No. 26 of the erstwhile CLL contained the subjects of 
“welfare of labor; conditions of labor, provident funds; employer's 
liability and workmen's compensation, health insurance including 
invalidity pensions, old age pensions”, whereas, Entry 27 of the same 
dealt with the subjects of “trade unions; industrial and labor 
disputes”. Thus, prior to Eighteenth Amendment, the subject of 
labour and trade unions were in the domain of both the Parliament 
as well as the Provincial Assemblies. The labour laws enacted by the 
Parliament which were applicable in the Federation as well as the 
Federating Units. However, after the Eighteenth Amendment, the 
Parliament enacted the Industrial Relations Act 2012 (IRA 2012) which 
was challenged before the concerned High Courts (all the provincial High 
Courts as also the Islamabad High Court) mainly on the ground that the 
same is incompetently enacted by the Parliament as the subject of 
labour and the trade unions was no more in the legislative domain of 
the Parliament rather within the domain of the Provincial Assemblies. 
All the High Courts held (through judgments impugned herein as also other 
judgments) in favour of the constitutionality/validity of the IRA 2012. 
The factual background as also the questions of law raised in the 
impugned judgments are as follows: 
CA. 970/2013, against order of High Court of Sindh dated 
29.10.2010 passed in C.P. No. 1796-D/2010 (2011 PLC 
105)  
The learned High Court of Sindh was faced with the question 
whether Shaheen Air Port Services, is a charitable organization 
Civil Appeals No.1583 to 1598 of 2014 etc. 
-: 5 :-
on the basis of being part of Shaheen Foundation which is a 
charitable trust set up by the Government of Pakistan, and 
thus whether a charitable organization fell within the ambit of 
the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 and whether the 
same was operative in the interregnum of the lapse of the 
Industrial Relations Act 2008 on 30.4.2010 (as per Section 
81(3) of the said Act) which question, the learned High Court 
answered in the affirmative, holding that the Industrial 
Relations Act 2008/Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969 being 
Federal law was applicable to Shaheen Airport Services as the 
same was operative in more than one Province and that 
Shaheen Airport Services did not qualify as a charitable 
organization in view of the activities that were entailed in the 
operation of its business.  
Another question involved therein was that after the Eighteenth 
Amendment, whereby Entries No.26 and 27 occurring in the 
CLL have been deleted, whether the Industrial Relations 
Ordinance, 1969 has become ultra vires of the Constitution for 
the reason that power to legislate on the subject no more 
existed with the Federal Legislature, the Court held that if a 
Trade Union has membership in more than one Provinces, 
merely because Entries No. 26 and 27 have been deleted, the 
jurisdiction of the Parliament to legislate in respect of 
situations services and items which fall within the inter 
Provincial trade, did not cease to exist. 
CA. 1583/2014, against order of High Court of Sindh dated 
4.8.2014 passed in C.P. No.304-D/2012 (PLD 2014 K 553) 
The learned High Court while considering the question as to 
whether the IRA 2012 is ultra vires of the Constitution, held 
Civil Appeals No.1583 to 1598 of 2014 etc. 
-: 6 :-
that while there is no doubt that the Eighteenth Amendment 
resulted in the deletion of the CLL, some room for concurrent 
legislation by both the Parliament and Provincial Assemblies 
was retained in Article 137 of the Constitution. Moreover, the 
IRA 2012 aimed at protecting the Fundamental Right of the 
citizens to form association provided under Article 17 and since 
Article 141 of the Constitution is clear that Provinces cannot 
legislate on matters beyond their territorial boundaries, it is 
imperative that the Federation steps into and protects such 
right of workers/employees who wish to form inter-provincial 
trade unions/associations, which resolve is further solidified 
with Articles 2A and 8 of the Constitution which emphasize the 
protection of the fundamental rights and relied upon the 
judgment reported as Pakistan Muslim League (N) v. The 
Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2007 SC 642) and the Indian 
judgment of Elel Hotels and Investment Ltd etc. v. Union of 
India (AIR 1990 SC 1664) that advocates a liberal 
construction of the constitutional legislative lists. Thus, holding 
the IRA intra vires of the Constitution, the learned High Court 
held that there is no overlap in the Provincial and Federal law 
since the IRA 2012 applies to inter-provincial establishments 
and its workers/employees, whereas the Sindh Industrial 
Relations Act, 2013 applies to establishments functioning only 
within the Province of Sindh.    
C.A. No.4/2015, against order of Islamabad High Court 
dated 3.12.2014 passed in W.P. No. 4626/2014  
The dispute before the learned Islamabad High Court involved 
the employees of the SME Bank Limited, having its Branches 
throughout the Country i.e. in the Provinces of Punjab, Sindh, 
Civil Appeals No.1583 to 1598 of 2014 etc. 
-: 7 :-
KPK and Balochistan, and also the Islamabad Capital Territory, 
who hired employees on contract basis who had thereafter been 
working for the said Bank for periods of 2 to 13 years and 
terminated them. The Bank contested the grievance notice of 
these employees contending that a fresh grievance notice 
should have been sent to the Bank under the Industrial 
Relations Act 2002 (the prevailing law at the time) which contention 
was not accepted by the learned High Court which finding is 
contested inter alia in the present application before this Court. 
C.A. No.606/2015, against order of High Court Sindh dated 
18.3.2015 passed in CP No. 4154-D/2013 
The Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal directed that the 
grievance petition filed by the worker/employee ought to be 
heard by the NIRC constituted under the IRA 2012. Being 
aggrieved, the Bank challenged the said order through a 
petition under Article 199 of the Constitution on the ground 
that the grievance petition had to be filed with concerned 
Labour Court constituted under the relevant provincial statute 
i.e. the Sindh Industrial Relations Act, 2013 as the matter did 
not lie under the IRA 2012. The High Court held that since the 
IRA 2012 applied to the present case, the proper forum was 
NIRC under the said Act and not the Labour Court set up 
under provincial legislation.  
C.A. No.1152/2015, against order of Peshawar High Court 
dated 9.6.2015 passed in W.P. No.634-P/2015 (2016 PLC 
279) 
The petitioner therein filed grievance petition before the Labour 
Court, Haripur which was remitted to NIRC, Peshawar Bench. 
During the proceedings the right of cross-examination was 
Civil Appeals No.1583 to 1598 of 2014 etc. 
-: 8 :-
struck off, against which, the Bank filed a writ petition, 
however, in the meantime, NIRC accepted the grievance 
petition, consequently the writ petition was withdrawn. The 
appeal filed before the Full Bench of the NIRC Islamabad was 
dismissed and the said order was assailed through another writ 
petition. The learned Peshawar High Court held that the 
allegation that the grievance petition of the petitioner (in the High 
Court) was not maintainable before the NIRC was ill-founded, 
thereby declaring that the NIRC was competent and the IRA 
2012 was applicable to the Meezan Bank Limited (which is a trans-
provincial establishment).    
C.P. No.2154/2014, against order of Lahore High Court 
dated 
17.11.2014 
passed 
in 
Review 
Application 
No.93/2012 
The grievance petition filed by the worker was dismissed by the 
Labour Court on the ground that the IRO is not applicable to 
Shaheen Airport Service. The appeal was allowed and the 
matter was remanded, but the learned Lahore High Court in a 
writ petition directed that as the identical issue was pending 
before this Court the Labour Court would not proceed further 
till the decision of that matter (CP No.11/2011). The review petition 
against that order was dismissed in light of the identical matter 
pending before this Court concerning the question as to 
whether, post the Eighteenth Amendment, the petitioner’s case 
would fall under the provincial law i.e. the Punjab Industrial 
and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 
1968 or the Federal law i.e. the Industrial Relations Ordinance 
1969 or Industrial Relations Act, 2008.  
Civil Appeals No.1583 to 1598 of 2014 etc. 
-: 9 :-
There are some other cases wherein the vires of the Industrial 
Relations Ordinance, 2011 (IRO 2011) and IRA 2012 have been 
considered by the High Courts but the same are not subject matter of 
these appeals/petition. The factual background as also the questions 
of law raised therein are as follows: 
Order of Lahore High Court dated 13.3.2012 passed in Writ 
Petitions No.24691 to 24695 of 2011 (2012 PLC 219) 
The NIRC through order dated 19.8.2011 directed to suspend 
the proceedings before the learned Labour Court. The vires of 
IRO 2011 was challenged through writ petitions on the ground 
that after abolition of CLL by means of Eighteenth Amendment, 
the subject of labour became the provincial subject and as 
such the President of Pakistan had no powers to promulgate 
the IRO 2011. On the basis of Entries No.3, 32 and 59 of Part-I 
of the FLL, the IRO 2011 was declared to be intra vires of the 
Constitution. 
Order of Islamabad High Court dated 27.6.2012 passed in 
Writ Petition No.3472/2011  
The learned High Court declared the IRO 2011 to be intra vires 
of the Constitution on the basis of Entries No.3 and 32 of Part-I 
in the FLL. 
Order of High Court of Balochistan dated 26.6.2014 passed 
in C.P. No.226/2012 (2014 PLC 351) 
While considering the vires of the IRA 2012, the Court held that 
the IRA 2012 was properly enacted by the Parliament and is 
not ultra vires the Constitution, therefore, the IRO 2012, which 
was succeeded by the IRA 2012, cannot be categorized as being 
unconstitutional.  
Civil Appeals No.1583 to 1598 of 2014 etc. 
-: 10 :-
 
  
3. 
 
Heard the learned Counsel for the parties and perused 
the impugned judgments with their able assistance. For brevity, the 
respective arguments of the learned counsel for the parties are not 
cited separately, which shall be considered and dealt with hereinafter 
in our detailed discussion on the questions so formulated. From the 
pleadings/arguments of parties, the following common questions of 
law emerge for determination of this Court: 
(a) 
Whether the promulgation of the Industrial Relations Act, 
2012 was ultra vires of the Constitution by reason of 
encroaching upon the legislative authority of the 
Provinces under Article 141-144 of the Constitution? 
(b) 
What is the extent of legislative competence of the federal 
and provincial legislatures and whether a provincial 
legislature has extra-territorial jurisdiction? 
(c) 
Whether there is an overlap in the legal remedies/forums 
available to the employees/workers who are employed in 
companies/corporations/institutions/establishments in 
more than one Province and what is the precise scope of 
jurisdiction 
of 
the 
National 
Industrial 
Relations 
Commission (NIRC) formed under Section 35 of the IRA 
2012 for inter-provincial/trans-provincial labour and 
trade disputes?  
(d) 
What is the precise scope of jurisdiction of the National 
Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC) formed under 
Section 25 of the Industrial Relations Act 2008 in the 
Civil Appeals No.1583 to 1598 of 2014 etc. 
-: 11 :-
interregnum till the IRA 2012 was not enacted for intra-
provincial labour and trade disputes? 
4. 
 
The 
case 
of 
the 
appellants/petitioners 
can 
be 
summarized as under: 
(1) 
That by means of the Eighteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution the CLL under which both the Parliament and Provincial 
Legislatures 
had 
jurisdiction 
to 
legislative 
on 
the 
subjects 
enumerated therein was abolished, as such, the matters previously 
covered under Entries No.26 and 27 thereof were no longer under the 
legislative domain of the Parliament, because under Article 142(c) of 
the Constitution, the legislative competence of the Federal Legislature 
is restricted only to the subjects that are enumerated in the Federal 
Legislative List (FLL) and the legislative competence of the Provincial 
Legislatures have exclusive jurisdiction to make laws on all residuary 
subjects. Further, under Article 144 (1) of the Constitution, the 
Parliament can also legislate on any matter not enumerated in the 
FLL only in the eventuality if one or more Provincial Assemblies pass 
a resolution to that effect. Therefore, prior to promulgation of the IRA 
2012 it was necessary that all the four Provincial Assemblies should 
have passed the resolutions authorizing the Parliament to regulate by 
law the subjects that are covered by it, but the said provision of the 
Constitution was not resorted to. In the case of Air League of PIAC 
Employees through President v. Federation of Pakistan M/O 
Labour and Manpower Division Islamabad and others (2011 
SCMR 1254) this Court has held that the Federal Government has 
no power to legislate on the subject of labour welfare and trade 
unions, which subjects, after the Eighteenth Amendment have 
devolved upon the Provinces, which judgment under Article 189 of 
the Constitution is binding on all Courts in Pakistan. Thus, the IRA 
Civil Appeals No.1583 to 1598 of 2014 etc. 
-: 12 :-
2012 is not valid law. It was also the case of the appellants/petitioner 
that the IRA 2012 cannot be validated on the basis of Entry No.3 of 
the FLL on the ground that it is intended to discharge obligation 
under the International Treaties and Conventions such as the ILO 
Conventions 
No.87 
and 
98, 
especially 
when 
the 
Provincial 
Legislatures have already made the laws on the subjects covered by it 
(IRA 2012). Further, by means of the IRA 2012 a parallel legal forum in 
the shape of NIRC established under it (IRA 2012) alongside the Labour 
Courts established under the Provincial laws has been created which 
has resulted in a confusion with regard to the relevant forum to be 
approached.  
(2) 
That since the promulgation of the Government of India Act, 
1935 till the Constitution of 1973, the subject of trade unions and 
workers welfare has consistently never ever been in the Federal 
sphere of legislation. The Parliament, through the Eighteenth 
Amendment, with a deliberate and conscious decision, enhanced the 
quantum of provincial autonomy by abolishing the CLL, which can be 
said to be one of the most important phases in the constitutional 
history of Pakistan; however, the learned High Courts have validated 
the Federal laws as if it had never taken place and the fact of the 
devolution 
of 
powers 
has 
been 
sidelined 
and 
treated 
as 
inconsequential. In fact, the upholding the federal law means an 
increase in the legislative power of the Federation and reduction in 
the legislative power of the Provinces, which is against the intent of 
the Eighteenth Amendment.  
(3) 
That the learned High Courts have unanimously saved the 
Federal laws by interpreting different entries of the FLL on the tacit 
assumption that there never was any entry relating to trade unions 
and labour welfare. Various other entries have been stretched to 
Civil Appeals No.1583 to 1598 of 2014 etc. 
-: 13 :-
include trade unions and workers welfare while disregarding the 
basic fact that this subject was previously the subject matter of 
Entries No.26 and 27 of the CLL which have now been omitted i.e. 
transferred exclusively to the Provincial sphere.  It is obvious that 
entries should be construed while taking an overall view of the 
contents thereof and not in isolation as if the other entries have never 
existed in the first place. The fact that the upholding the Federal 
legislation necessarily means invalidating and striking down either 
full or certain provisions of all four provincial Acts (Provincial Industrial 
Relation Acts). In fact, the findings of the learned High Courts appear to 
be on the basis that there is a vacuum in the law, which in fact was 
not there, as all the four Provincial legislatures had enacted laws 
providing an alternate route.  
(4) 
There is no bar on a Provincial legislature to make trans-
provincial legislation. The rights of the labourers/workers are better 
protected through having Province-wide trade unions rather than 
trade unions which are operating at the Federal level or in other 
provinces and can only be given relief by a single body, namely the 
NIRC.  Further, Article 17 of the Constitution does not contemplate 
the necessity for nationwide trade unions. If the Provincial 
legislatures, considered that a nationwide trade union was beneficial 
they could have provided for the same through the constitutional 
mechanism provided by Article 144 of the Constitution, by 
authorizing the Federal legislature to legislate on this subject. They 
have, however, in their legislative wisdom, consciously decided not to 
do so. It is a legislative policy matter on which the concerned 
legislatures shall be allowed to decide and the learned High Courts 
ought not to interfere therein.  
Civil Appeals No.1583 to 1598 of 2014 etc. 
-: 14 :-
(5) 
As per the definitions of terms ‘employer’, ‘establishment’, 
‘industrial dispute’ and ‘industry’ contained in the Provincial law of 
Sindh, every commercial entity, whether it is operating on a trans-
provincial basis or on a provincial basis, irrespective of the fact as to 
whether it has certain employees in other Provinces apart from Sindh 
would be covered by the Sindh Industrial Relations Act, 2013 (SIRA 
2013).  However, the Federal Act (IRA 2012), as interpreted by the High 
Courts, excludes in totality the jurisdiction of the Provincial Labour 
Courts with regard to the trade unions operating for and in relation 
to any company operating in Sindh which has branches in other 
Provinces. Therefore, this was not a case of vacuum which the 
Federal law, by referring to the so called trans-provincial trade 
unions had filled in.  In fact, it was a blatant usurpation of Provincial 
autonomy by the Federal Government and deprivation of the 
jurisdiction of Provincial Labour Courts by limiting their jurisdiction 
only to those companies which do not have branches in other 
Provinces.   
(6) 
In terms of Section 3 of the SIRA 2013, which deals with trade 
unions and freedom of association, it is specifically provided that 
workers, without any distinction whatsoever, shall have the right to 
establish and join trade unions of their own choice. With the Federal 
law, this Section has been reduced in its scope and ambit and will 
now apply to only those companies which do not have branches in 
other Provinces. There is no justification whatsoever for this arbitrary 
deprivation of the rights of workmen in Sindh merely because the 
company for which they work has branches in different Provinces.  
Likewise, the scope of Sections 17, 34 and 45 of the Act has also 
been reduced; inasmuch as, the right of workmen to take a local 
dispute before a local Court has been infringed.   
Civil Appeals No.1583 to 1598 of 2014 etc. 
-: 15 :-
(7) 
There is a critical distinction between legislative competence 
and fundamental rights. Insofar as the question of legislative 
competence is concerned the same is governed by the Article 142 of 
the Constitution and the Articles relating to fundamental rights are 
irrelevant in this regard. The fundamental rights are the rights 
conferred on citizens of Pakistan and have nothing whatsoever to do 
with legislative competence, which is a totally different concept. The 
learned High Courts have not only mixed together these two 
conceptually distinct and disparate aspects of constitutional 
interpretation but also the concept of legislative competence has been 
subordinated to the concept of fundamental rights. This has been 
done on the assumption that a trans-provincial trade union is 
desirable. Article 7, together with Article 8 of the Constitution, 
controls all the fundamental rights.  These Articles clearly lay down 
restrictions upon the “State”; a restriction from passing a law in 
violation of the fundamental rights.  The definition of State includes 
both the Federal as well as the Provincial organs of the State.  The 
framers of the Constitution, irrespective of the question of legislative 
competence, which has to be determined under Article 142 ibid, 
stipulated that a violation of fundamental rights, either by the 
Federal or by the Provincial legislatures would be illegal.   
(8) 
The learned Baluchistan High Court, upheld the Federal 
Legislation by relying upon the interpretation of US Supreme Court, 
whereby the Entry relating to “commerce” in the US Constitution has 
been stretched to include trade unions and workers welfare, so by 
means of a similar process, the Entry relating to commerce contained 
in Entry No. 27 of Part-I of the FLL in our Constitution, may also be 
so structured. While holding so, the learned High Court has ignored 
the fact that the entries in the US Constitution are very brief, as 
Civil Appeals No.1583 to 1598 of 2014 etc. 
-: 16 :-
against it, the Constitution of Pakistan set out at great length and 
detail various topics which form the subject matter of the jurisdiction 
of the different legislatures, and previously certain entries (Entries No.26 
and 27) of the CLL were dealing with these subjects but were abolished 
and no corresponding entry was included/inserted in the FLL. 
Further, the US Supreme Court is unique in the western world as 
being the only openly politicized judicial institution; whereas, the 
Pakistan Supreme Court is a far better judicial model, therefore, in 
these circumstances, interpretation given by the US Supreme Court 
should not be followed by this Court irrationally.  
(9) 
The learned High Courts have held that a Provincial legislature 
does not have the power to pass laws in relation to companies which 
operate in more than one province. There is nothing on the 
constitutional plane preventing the Provincial Legislature from 
passing a law in relation to trade unions and workmen, which would 
make it compulsory and mandatory for each company to allow all its 
employees, no matter where they are working, to become members of 
a trade union.  Thus, a company incorporated in one Province and 
having its head office therein and a branch office in other Province 
can allow all its workmen to be members of a single union. There is 
nothing unconstitutional or illegal about it, as all the workers can be 
subjected to the laws of the said Province. Since the large companies 
usually have branches in different Provinces e.g. all major banks and 
other corporate entities such as PIA, it is obvious that the jurisdiction 
and legislative competence of the Provinces has been curtailed by the 
learned High Courts. Even otherwise, having different trade unions 
operating in different Provinces will cause no harm and detriment to 
the workmen. It is not obvious that the interest of the small minority 
of workmen in one Province are not co-terminus or identical with the 
Civil Appeals No.1583 to 1598 of 2014 etc. 
-: 17 :-
thousand employees in other Province. If there is only one trade 
union to cover both sets of workmen, then it is obvious that the 
majority view will be based on the interests of the vast majority of the 
workmen while the minority workmen’s grievances may be 
disregarded. The principle of justice being delivered to the door step 
is radically breached by having only one forum at the Federal level, 
namely, NIRC based in Islamabad. In contrast to this, there are more 
than 30 Labour Courts in the different Provinces, therefore, it is 
obviously to the advantage of workmen to be able to have resort to a 
court at their door step. Although the NIRC travels to different 
Provinces, obviously one Court travelling on circuit is not a substitute 
for as many as 30 Courts operating all over the country. 
5. 
 
On the other hand, while supporting the judgments of 
the learned High Court (impugned herein), it is the case of the 
respondents that this Court has always leaned towards preserving 
the competence of the legislature and thus saving a statute rather 
than striking it down. Therefore, while determining the question 
whether any of the Entries of the FLL is wide enough to encompass 
within its ambit the IRA 2012, maximum possible amplitude must be 
provided to the Entries. The subjects of labour and trade unions are 
covered under many of the Entries of the FLL; therefore, the IRA 
2012 was competently legislated by the Federal Legislature. 
Inasmuch as, as relied upon by the learned High Courts, the subjects 
dealt with in the IRA 2012 are covered under Entries No.3, 8, 27, 31, 
32, 58 and 59 of Pert-I and Entries No.3, 13 and 18 of Pert-II of FLL, 
therefore, being covered by the Entries in the FLL, the IRA 2012 
cannot be struck down. Further, a provincial law cannot operate 
beyond the territorial limits of the Province; therefore, the provincial 
Civil Appeals No.1583 to 1598 of 2014 etc. 
-: 18 :-
IRAs cannot secure the rights of the employees working in 
Establishments which are trans-provincial. The IRA 2012, which 
guarantees the employees of inter-provincial establishments to 
organize themselves form trade unions on inter-provincial level and 
to seek appointment of Collective Bargaining Agent and also to have 
an industrial dispute resolution mechanism at the Federal level, is 
not void. With regard to the judgment of this Court in Air League of 
PIAC Employees’ case (supra) it is the case of the respondents that 
though under Article 189 of the Constitution a decision of this Court 
is binding only to the extent it decides a question of law or is based 
upon or enunciates a principle of law but in the said case the issue of 
authority of the Federal or Provincial Legislature to legislate on the 
subjects in issue has not been decided, therefore, the validity the IRA 
2012 has to be determined decisively in the instant proceedings.  
6. 
 
Learned Additional Attorney General for Pakistan fully 
supported the impugned judgments declaring the IRA 2012 to be a 
valid piece of legislation. Learned Additional Advocate General Punjab 
adopted the arguments of learned counsel for the appellants and her 
stance is similar to the appellants that after the abolition of the CLL 
through the Eighteenth Amendment, the subject of labour and trade 
unions falls within the legislative competence of the Provinces and as 
such IRA 2012 is ultra vires the Constitution. Same is the stance of 
learned Additional Advocate General Sindh. Learned Additional 
Advocate General KPK supported the impugned judgments to the 
extent of validity of the IRA 2012 and its applicability only to the 
Establishments existing at trans-provincial level and the Trade 
Unions operating therein. However, according to him the Provincial 
legislation can co-exist with the Federal legislation, as the former 
Civil Appeals No.1583 to 1598 of 2014 etc. 
-: 19 :-
would apply to the Establishments existing at trans-provincial level 
and the Trade Unions operating therein, whereas, the latter would 
apply to the Establishments/Trade unions functioning within one 
Province only. Same is the stance of the learned Additional Advocate 
General Balochistan.   
7. 
 
Before dilating upon the questions involved in the instant 
matter in the light of the submissions made by the learned counsel 
as well as the Constitutional and legal provisions and also the 
relevant case-law, it is appropriate to first mention the history of the 
labour related laws which remained applicable from time to time in 
Pakistan. At the time of the independence of Pakistan in 1947, two 
laws on the subject i.e. the Trade Unions Act, 1926 and the 
Industrial Disputes Act, 1941 were holding the field. The Trade 
Unions Act had been enacted to provide for the registration of Trade 
Unions, to specify their function, privileges and powers and other 
incidental matters. Chapter III thereof provided for the rights and 
liabilities of registered Trade Unions. The said Act neither specifically 
conferred on the Trade Unions, whether registered or unregistered, 
either the power to represent workers in any proceedings or the 
persons to resort to authorize a strike. However, Section 15 of the 
said Act specified the objects on which the general funds of a 
registered Trade Union could be spent. In 1927, the Bombay Trade 
unions Regulations were issued under the provisions of section 29 of 
the Act and after the coming into force of the Government of India 
Act, 1935 the Central Government, in 1938, issued the Central Trade 
Unions Regulations in respect of the Trade Unions whose objects 
extended 
beyond 
one 
Province. 
The 
Bombay 
Trade 
Unions 
Regulations were subsequently re-named, with regard to the Province 
Civil Appeals No.1583 to 1598 of 2014 etc. 
-: 20 :-
of Sindh, as the Sindh Trade Unions Regulations, under the 
provisions of Section 3 of Sindh Act 1 of 1951. As far as the 
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is concerned, it came into force on 
l.4.1947 and provided for the Investigation and settlement of 
Industrial disputes by or through the Works Committees, Concilia-
tion Courts Boards of Conciliation, Courts of Inquiry and Industrial 
Tribunals. Under Section 38 thereof, the Industrial Disputes Rules, 
1947 were framed by the Central as well as Provincial Governments. 
However, this Act was repealed and replaced by the Industrial 
Disputes Ordinance, 1959, which was promulgated on 21.10.1959. 
Section 34(1) of the Ordinance of 1959, like Section 36(1) of its 
predecessor Act, entitled a workman, who was a party to a dispute, to 
be represented in any proceedings under the said Ordinance by an 
Officer of a Registered Trade Union. In 1960, the Federal Government 
framed the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1960, superseding 
the earlier Rules of 1938. The Trade Unions Act, 1926 was 
substantially modified by Trade Unions (Amendment) Ordinance, 
1960 (Ordinance No.KIV of 1960), whereby Chapter III-E was added thereto 
providing for the recognition of registered Trade Unions by the 
employers on the fulfillment of certain conditions by such Trade 
Union. In March 1968 the West Pakistan Trade Unions Ordinance, 
1968 and the West Pakistan Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1968 
were promulgated. The right of the Trade Unions to negotiate with the 
employer through its executive, in respect of the matters connected 
with the employment and conditions of work, was retained. In 
November, 1969, the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 was 
enacted to amend and consolidate the laws relating to reformation of 
trade unions and to achieve uniformity, whereby the West Pakistan 
Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1968 was repealed. This new 
Civil Appeals No.1583 to 1598 of 2014 etc. 
-: 21 :-
Ordinance was substantially modified by the Industrial Relation 
(Amendment) Ordinance, 1970 (Ordinance No.XIX of 1970), the Labour 
Laws (Amendment) Ordinance, 1972 (Ordinance No.IX of 1972), the Labour 
Laws (Amendment) Act, 1972 (Act No.V of 1972) and the Industrial 
Relations (Amendment) Act, 1973 (Act No.XXIX of 1973). By the 
Labour Laws (Amendment) Ordinance, 1972, Section 22-A was 
inserted in the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 which provided 
for 
the 
establishment 
of 
the 
National 
Industrial 
Relations 
Commission (NIRC), for settlement of disputes between employers and 
workers. The mechanism for the functioning of NIRC was provided 
under the National Industrial Relations Commission (Procedure and 
Functions) Regulations, 1973. Then comes the Industrial Relations 
Ordinance, 2002, which repealed and replaced the Industrial 
Relations Ordinance, 1969, however, all registered trade unions, were 
saved and were deemed to have been registered under the new 
Ordinance. The Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002 was then 
repealed and replaced by the Industrial Relations Act, 2008; however, 
once again the registered trade unions were saved and were deemed 
to have been registered under the Act, 2008. Importantly, the said 
Act was a temporary enactment as under Section 87(3) thereof it was 
provided that unless repealed earlier, the IRA 2008 shall seize to exist 
on 30.4.2010. Till that date, no legislation was made either to 
supersede or to extend the period of operation of the said law; as 
such, by virtue of the said sunset clause the IRA 2008 stood repealed 
on 30.4.2010. In the meantime, on 20.4.2010, through the 
Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution, the CLL was abolished, 
as such, Entries No.26 and 27 which provided the legislative 
authority to the Federal Legislature alongside the Provincial 
Legislature regarding the subjects, inter alia, of labor and trade 
Civil Appeals No.1583 to 1598 of 2014 etc. 
-: 22 :-
unions, no more remained in field. It is to be noted that Clause (6) of 
newly inserted Article 270AA of the Constitution provided that the 
laws with respect to the matters enumerated in the erstwhile CLL, 
including Ordinances, Orders, rules, bye-laws, regulations and 
notifications and other legal instruments having the force of law, in 
force in Pakistan, immediately before the commencement of the 
said amendment would continue to remain in force until altered, 
repealed or amended by the competent authority. After 30.4.2010 
the Labour Courts, Labour Appellate Tribunal as well as NIRC 
stopped functioning for the reason that the IRA 2008 had lapsed 
and no further legislation had been made by the Federal 
Legislature. When confronted with the issue, the NIRC, Islamabad, 
held that by means of the Eighteenth Amendment, the IRA 2008 
had been protected and was fully operative till altered or amended 
or repealed by the competent authority. As the Labour Courts as 
well as the Labour Appellate Tribunal stopped functioning, the 
then Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court initiated suo motu 
proceedings. 
The 
suo 
motu 
as 
also 
the 
Writ 
Petition 
No.10746/2010 was disposed of on the basis of the report 
submitted on behalf of the Government of Punjab stating therein 
that IRA 2008 stood protected only upto 30.6.2011 in accordance 
with the protection provided under Article 270AA of the 
Constitution. On the same issue, the High Court of Sindh, in 
Constitutional Petition No.D-1432/2010, held that IRA 2008 stood 
repealed on 30.4.2010 by force of Section 87(3) thereof, whereas 
the IRO 1969 stood revived from the said date. The Lahore High 
Court, Rawalpindi Bench, in ICA No.200/2008 held that IRA 2008 
had been protected till 30.4.2011 in view of Article 270AA of the 
Constitution. The 
Islamabad High Court, in Writ Petition 
Civil Appeals No.1583 to 1598 of 2014 etc. 
-: 23 :-
No.4917/2010, also held that in view of Section 87(3) of IRA 2008, 
it (IRA 2008) stood repealed on 30.4.2010.  
 
Thereafter, pursuant to the Eighteenth Amendment, the 
Provincial Legislatures of all the four Provinces made legislation on 
the subjects of the trade unions and labour disputes, etc. In the 
province of Punjab, on 13.6.2010, the Punjab Industrial Relations 
Ordinance, 2010 (PIRO 2010) was enacted, which was to remain 
operative till 10.9.2010, however, the life of the Ordinance was 
extended for a further period of ninety days through a Resolution 
passed by the Provincial Assembly on 23.7.2010. In the meantime, 
on 9.12.2010 the Punjab Industrial Relations Act, 2010 (PIRA 2010) 
was enacted which repealed the PIRO 2010. In the Province of 
Sindh, on 5.7.2010, through the Industrial Relations (Revival and 
Amendment) Act, 2010, the IRO 2008 was revived w.e.f. 1.5.2010 
as if it had never been repealed. In the Province of Khyber 
Pukhtunkhwa, on 14.7.2010, the Khyber Pukhtunkhwa Industrial 
Relations Ordinance, 2010 (KIRO 2010) was promulgated. Likewise, 
in the province of Balochistan, on 22.72010, the Balochistan 
Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2010 (BIRO 2010) was issued, which 
was then replaced on 15.10.2010 by the Balochistan Industrial 
Relations Act, 2010 (BIRA 2010).  
9. 
 
The question whether the IRA 2008 stood repealed on 
30.4.2010; or the same had been protected either till 30.6.2011 or 
permanently; or if it lapsed/got repealed, whether the IRO 1969 
stood revived or not, came up for consideration before this Court in 
Air League of PIAC Employees’ case (supra) wherein, vide judgment 
dated 2.6.2011, it was held that IRA 2008 ceased to continue in 
force w.e.f. 30.4.2010. As no Federal Law remained in the field, 
Civil Appeals No.1583 to 1598 of 2014 etc. 
-: 24 :-
thereafter, on 14.3.2012, the Federal Legislature promulgated the 
IRA 2012. As per its preamble, the purpose of its promulgation was to 
consolidate and rationalize the law relating to formation of trade 
unions, and improvement of relations between employers and 
workmen in the Islamabad Capital Territory and in trans-provincial 
establishments and industry. It was also to recognize the right of 
fundamental right of ‘freedom of association’ as envisaged in Article 
17 of the Constitution, for implementation of the ILO Conventions 
No.87 and 98 and is specifically applicable to only trans-provincial 
establishments. 
10. 
 
Before going to the constitutional questions, it is 
appropriate to first consider the ratio of the judgment of this Court in 
AIR League of PIAC Employees’ case (supra). In the said case, 
neither the constitutionality of any of the Federal legislations nor the 
legislative competence of the Federal Legislature to legislate on the 
subjects of labour and trade unions was considered, rather the only 
issue therein was that whether after the Eighteenth Amendment, the 
IRA 2008 stood protected or not, and if not protected whether the IRO 
1969 revived or not. The Court, without going into validity of the 
federal or provincial legislations, held that IRA 2008 on the basis of 
Eighteenth Constitutional Amendment stood protected and continued 
till 30.6.2011. Further, without considering in detail whether the 
subjects of labour and trade unions fall within the legislative domain 
of Federer or Provincial legislature only made reference of Article 
144(1) of the Constitution. Relevant paras therefrom reads as under:- 
“22. 
At the cost of repetition, it is to be noted that the 
IRA, 2008 stood repealed on 30-4-2010 by virtue of its 
section 87(3), whereas, the provincial legislation was made 
on 13th June, 2010; 5th July, 2010; 14th July, 2010; and 
Civil Appeals No.1583 to 1598 of 2014 etc. 
-: 25 :-
22nd July, 2010 for the provinces of Punjab, Sindh, 
Khyber Pukhtunkhwa and Balochistan, respectively. 
Therefore, there was a period of about two months for 
which there was no legislation, Federal or Provincial, in 
force. The Labour Laws provide the procedure and 
mechanism for the resolution of disputes, registration of 
Trade Unions and establishment of Forum for the redressal 
of grievance of the labourers as well as employers, 
therefore, it is mainly a procedural law and in the light of 
the well- settled principles of interpretation of Statutes as 
mentioned above, the procedural law has retrospective 
effect unless contrary is provided expressly or impliedly, 
the same would thus be applicable retrospectively w.e.f. 
1.5.2010. Further, in the Province of Sindh, the Industrial 
Relations (Revival and Amendment) Act, 2010, the IRA, 
2008 has been revived w.e.f. 1st May, 2010, therefore, the 
interregnum period has already been catered for. 
27. 
Now turning towards the submission of the learned 
amicus curiae on the vires of Provincial Labour Laws on the 
ground that there are many Institutions/Corporations which 
have their branches all over the country and there were 
country wide Trade Unions but now Trade Union can only be 
registered under the legislation of a specific province. It is to 
be noted that instant proceedings have been initiated under 
Article 184(3) of the Constitution with a limited purpose of 
having a declaration that. IRA, 2008 on the basis of 
Eighteenth Constitutional Amendment stood protected and 
continued till 30th June, 2011, therefore, the vires of the 
same cannot be considered in such proceedings. However, as 
stated earlier Article 144(1) of the Constitution has provided 
mechanism for making central legislation in respect of 
matters not covered in the Federal Legislative List. 
29. 
Thus, for the foregoing reasons, it is held that IRA, 
2008 ceased to continue in force w.e.f. 30th April, 2010, as a 
consequence whereof petition is dismissed.” 
It is evident from the above that this Court consciously left open the 
question of the legislative domain of Federal or Provincial Legislature 
Civil Appeals No.1583 to 1598 of 2014 etc. 
-: 26 :-
as also the constitutionality of labour laws. Therefore, the said 
judgment passed by a learned Three-Member Bench of this Court, is 
in no way an impediment in the way of the High Courts or even this 
Court to consider and decide the validity of the IRA 2012.  
11. 
 
At this stage, it is also appropriate to consider the history 
of legislative competence of the federal/provincial legislature 
regarding the subject of trade unions and labour rights, etc. In this 
regard it is to be noted that prior to the creation of Pakistan, the 
subject of trade unions, labour disputes and labour matters were 
mentioned in Entry No.35 of List-I of the FLL and also in Entries No. 
26, 27 and 29 of Part-II of the CLL of the Government of India Act, 
1935. The same was in the Seventh Schedule thereof and was 
controlled by subsection Section 126(2) thereof, which is reproduced 
hereunder:- 
List-I of the Federal Legislative List  
35. 
Regulation of labour and safety in mines and oilfields. 
Part-II of the Concurrent Legislative List 
26. 
Factories. 
27. 
Welfare of labour; conditions of labour; provident 
funds; 
employers' 
liability 
and 
workmen's 
compensation; health insurance, including invalidity 
pensions; old age pensions. 
29. 
Trade unions; industrial and labour disputes. 
Section 
126. 
Control of Federation over Province in certain 
cases.- 
(2) 
The executive authority of the Federation shall also 
extend to the giving of directions to a Province as to the 
carrying into execution therein of any Act of the Federal 
Legislature which relates to a matter specified in Part II of the 
Concurrent Legislative List and authorises the giving of such 
directions: 
Civil Appeals No.1583 to 1598 of 2014 etc. 
-: 27 :-
Provided that a Bill or amendment which proposes to authorise 
the giving of any such directions as aforesaid shall not be 
introduced into or moved in either Chamber of the Federal 
Legislature without the previous sanction of the Governor-
General in his discretion.”  
 
The said subjects were mentioned in Entry No.5 of Part II of the 
Concurrent List in Fifth Schedule of the Constitution of Islamic 
Republic of Pakistan, 1956. The same was controlled by Article 
126(2)(d) thereof, which reads as under:-  
Part-II of the Concurrent List 
5. 
Relations between employers and employees; trade 
unions; industrial and labour disputes; welfare of labour 
including conditions of work; provident funds; 
employers’ 
liability; 
workmen's 
compensation; 
invalidity and old age pensions and maternity benefits; 
vocational and technical training of labour; social 
security and social insurance.   
 
Article 126. 
(2) 
The executive authority of the Federation shall extend 
to the giving of directions to a Province as may appear to the 
Federal Government to be necessary for the purpose of clause 
(1), and the said authority shall also extend to giving of 
directions to a Province-    
(d) 
as to the carrying into execution in the Province 
of any Act Parliament which relates to a matter 
enumerated in Part II of the Concurrent List and 
authorizes the giving of such directions.” 
 
In the Constitution of 1962, there was only one legislative list 
pertaining to the subjects within the legislative competence of Central 
Legislature, provided in Third Schedule, however, the subjects 
pertaining to labour disputes and trade unions, etc., were not 
mentioned in the said list. The said Schedule was controlled by 
Article 131(2)(c) thereof, which reads as under: - 
Civil Appeals No.1583 to 1598 of 2014 etc. 
-: 28 :-
131. 
Central law-making power.-  
(2) 
Where the national interest of Pakistan in relation to – 
(c) 
the achievement of uniformity in respect of any matter 
in different parts of Pakistan, 
 
So requires, the Central Legislature shall have power to make 
laws (including laws having extra-territorial operation) for the 
whole or any part of Pakistan with respect to any matter not 
enumerated in the Third Schedule.  
 
In the Interim Constitution of 1972, Part-II of CLL in Fourth Schedule 
deals with the subject of trade unions and labour disputes, which 
was controlled by Article 138 thereof, which read as under: - 
Concurrent List 
29. 
Welfare of labor; conditions of labor, provident funds; 
employer's liability and workmen's compensation, 
health insurance including invalidity pensions, old age 
pensions. 
 
31. 
Trade unions; industrial and labor disputes. 
 
Before the Eighteenth Amendment, two Legislative Lists were 
available in the Constitution of 1973, namely, the FLL, which 
contained the subjects in respect whereof the Federation could 
legislate and the CLL, which contained the subjects in respect 
whereof either the Federation or a Province could legislate; whereas, 
the subjects which were not found in either of these two lists, were 
within the exclusive domain of the Provinces. The Entries No.26, 27 
and 30 of the CLL in the Fourth Schedule dealt with the issue of 
trade unions and labour welfare, etc., which was controlled by Article 
70 thereof. The same are reproduced here under:- 
Concurrent Legislative List 
26. 
Welfare of labor; conditions of labor, provident funds; 
employer's liability and workmen's compensation, 
health insurance including invalidity pensions, old age 
pensions. 
27. 
Trade unions; industrial and labor disputes. 
Civil Appeals No.1583 to 1598 of 2014 etc. 
-: 29 :-
30. 
Regulation of labor and safety in mines, factories and 
oil- fields. 
70. 
Introduction and passing of Bills.- (1) 
A 
Bill 
with respect to any matter in the Federal Legislative List may 
originate in either House and shall, if it is passed by the House 
in which it originated, be transmitted to the other House; and, if 
the Bill is passed without amendment, by the other House also, 
it shall he presented to the President for assent. 
(4) 
In this Article and the succeeding provisions of the 
Constitution, "Federal Legislative List" means the Federal 
Legislative List and the in the Fourth Schedule. 
 
Reference in this regard may also be made to the provisions of the 
Constitution of India which contains three legislative lists i.e. the 
Union list, the State list and the Concurrent List. Entries No.22 to 24 
of the Concurrent List in Seventh Schedule thereof deals with the 
subjects of trade unions and labour disputes, etc. and is controlled 
by Article 246 thereof, therefore, the Union as well as the States has 
joint powers to legislate in respect thereof. The same is reproduced 
below: - 
Concurrent List, List-III 
22. 
Trade unions; industrial and labour disputes. 
23. 
Social security and social insurance; employment and 
unemployment. 
24. 
Welfare of labour including conditions of work, 
provident 
funds, 
employers 
liability, 
workmens 
compensation, invalidity and old age pensions and 
maternity benefits. 
246. 
Subject matter of laws made by Parliament and by the 
Legislatures of States.- (1) Notwithstanding anything in clauses 
(2) and (3), Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with 
respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I in the 
Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the Union 
List). 
(2) Notwithstanding anything in clause (3), Parliament, and, 
subject to clause (1), the Legislature of any State also, have 
power to make laws with respect to any of the matters 
Civil Appeals No.1583 to 1598 of 2014 etc. 
-: 30 :-
enumerated in List III in the Seventh Schedule (in this 
Constitution referred to as the Concurrent List). 
(4) Parliament has power to make laws with respect to any 
matter for any part of the territory of India not included (in a 
State) notwithstanding that such matter is a matter enumerated 
in the State List. 
12. 
 
The relevant provisions of the Constitution of 1973 are 
Articles 97, 137, 141 to 144 of the Constitution, which for reference 
are reproduced below:- 
97. 
 Extent of executive authority of Federation. - 
Subject to the Constitution, the executive authority of the 
Federation shall extend to the matters with respect to which  
Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) has power to make laws, 
including exercise of rights, authority and jurisdiction in and 
in relation to areas outside Pakistan: 
Provided that the said authority shall not, save as expressly 
provided in the Constitution or in any law made by  Majlis-e-
Shoora (Parliament), extend in any Province to a matter with 
respect to which the Provincial Assembly has also power to 
make laws. 
137. 
Extent of executive authority of Province.- Subject 
to the Constitution, the executive authority of the Province 
shall extend to the matters with respect to which the 
Provincial Assembly has power to make laws:  
Provided that, in any matter with respect to which both  
Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) and the Provincial Assembly of 
a Province have power to make laws, the executive authority 
of the Province shall be subject to, and limited by, the 
executive authority expressly conferred by the Constitution or 
by law made by  Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) upon the 
Federal Government or authorities thereof. 
141. 
Extent of Federal and Provincial laws. Subject to the 
Constitution,  Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) may make laws 
(including laws having extra-territorial operation) for the 
Civil Appeals No.1583 to 1598 of 2014 etc. 
-: 31 :-
whole or any part of Pakistan, and a Provincial Assembly may 
make laws for the Province or any part thereof. 
142. 
Subject-matter of Federal and Provincial laws.- 
Subject to the Constitution- 
(a) 
Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) shall have exclusive 
power to make laws with respect to any matter in the 
Federal Legislative List; 
(b) 
Majlis-e-Shoora 
(Parliament) 
and 
a 
Provincial 
Assembly shall have power to make laws with respect 
to criminal law, criminal procedure and evidence; 
(c) 
Subject to paragraph (b), a Provincial Assembly shall, 
and Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) shall not, have 
power to make laws with respect to any matter not 
enumerated in the Federal Legislative List; and  
(d) 
Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) shall have exclusive 
power to make laws with respect to all matters 
pertaining to such areas in the Federation as are not 
included in any Province. 
 
143. 
Inconsistency between Federal and Provincial 
Law.- If any provision of an Act of a Provincial Assembly is 
repugnant to any provision of an Act of Majlis-e-Shoora 
(Parliament) which Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) is competent 
to enact, then the Act of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament), 
whether passed before or after the Act of the Provincial 
Assembly, shall prevail and the Act of the Provincial 
Assembly shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void. 
144. 
Power of  Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) to legislate 
for  one or more Provinces by consent.-(1) If  one or more 
Provincial Assemblies pass resolutions to the effect that  
Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) may by law regulate any matter 
not enumerated the Federal Legislative List in the Fourth 
Schedule, it shall be lawful for Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) 
to pass an Act for regulating that matter accordingly, but any 
act so passed may, as respects any Province to which it 
applies, be amended or repealed by Act of the Assembly of 
that Province. 
The learned High Courts while holding the IRA 2012 to be intra vires 
of the Constitution has relied upon following entries of the FLL: - 
Civil Appeals No.1583 to 1598 of 2014 etc. 
-: 32 :-
Part-I 
3. External affairs; the implementing of treaties and 
agreements, including educational and cultural pacts and 
agreements, with other countries; extradition, including the 
surrender of criminals and accused persons to Governments 
outside Pakistan. 
27. Import and export across customs frontiers as deemed by 
the Federal Government, inter-provincial trade and 
commerce, trade and commerce with foreign countries; 
standard of quality of goods to be exported out of Pakistan. 
31. Corporations, that is to say, the incorporation, regulation 
and winding-up of trading corporations, including banking, 
insurance and financial corporations, but not including 
corporations owned or controlled by a Province and carrying 
on business only within that Province, or cooperative 
societies, and of corporations, whether trading or not, with 
objects not confined to a Province, but not including 
universities. 
32. International treaties, conventions and agreements and 
International arbitration.  
58. Matters which under the Constitution are within the 
legislative competence of Majlis- e-Shoora (Parliament) or 
relate to the Federation. 
59. Matters incidental or ancillary to any matter enumerated 
in this Part. 
Part II: 
3. Development of industries, where development under 
Federal control is declared by Federal law to be expedient in 
the public interest; institutions, establishments, bodies and 
corporations administered or managed by the Federal 
Government immediately before the commencing day, 
including the [Pakistan Water and Power Development 
Authority 
and 
the 
Pakistan 
Industrial 
Development 
Corporation]; all undertakings, projects and schemes of such 
institutions, 
establishments, 
bodies 
and 
corporations, 
Civil Appeals No.1583 to 1598 of 2014 etc. 
-: 33 :-
industries, projects and undertakings owned wholly or 
partially by the Federation or by a corporation set up by the 
Federation. 
13. Inter-provincial matters and co-ordination. 
18. Matters incidental or ancillary to any matter enumerated 
in this Part. 
 
13. 
 
It is well established this Court, while considering the 
vires of a legislative enactment under its powers of judicial review, 
can consider not only the substance of the law but also the 
competence of the legislature. Further, though it is an accepted 
principle that no mala fide can be attributed to the legislature, 
however, the bona fides of the legislature as also the purpose and 
object of a statute may also be considered in the determination of the 
vires of a statute. The vires of a statute can also be determined on the 
ground that the legislation is colourable. In the instant case the only 
issue involved is the legislative competence of the Parliament vis-à-vis 
the legislative authority of the Provincial legislature. In this regard it 
is to be noted that there is always a presumption in favour of the 
constitutionality of a legislative enactment unless ex facie it appears 
to be violative of any of the Constitutional provisions and in a case 
where two opinions with regard to the constitutionality of an 
enactment are possible, the one in favour of the validity of the 
enactment is to be adopted. Meaning thereby that when a law is 
enacted by the Parliament, the presumption lies that Parliament has 
competently enacted it (law), and if the vires of the same (law) are 
challenged, the burden always lies upon the person making such 
challenge to show that the same (law) is violative of any of the 
fundamental rights or the provisions of the Constitution. It is also a 
cardinal principle of interpretation that law should be interpreted in 
Civil Appeals No.1583 to 1598 of 2014 etc. 
-: 34 :-
such a manner that it should be saved rather than destroyed. The 
Courts should lean in favour of upholding the constitutionality of a 
legislation and it is thus incumbent upon the Courts to be extremely 
reluctant to strike down laws as unconstitutional. This power should 
be exercised only when absolutely necessary for injudicious exercise 
of this power might well result in grave and serious consequences. 
Reliance in this regard may be placed upon the  cases of Province of 
East Pakistan v. Sirajul Haq Patwari (PLD 1966 SC 854), Mehreen Zaibun 
Nisa Vs. Land Commissioner, Multan and others (PLD 1975 SC 
397), M/s Elahi Cotton Mills Ltd and others Vs. Federation of 
Pakistan through Secretary M/o Finance, Islamabad and 6 others 
(PLD 1997 SC 582), Dr. Tariq Nawaz v. Govt. of Pakistan (2000 
SCMR 1956), Mian Asif Islam v. Mian Mohammad Asif (PLD 2001 
SC 499), Pakistan Lawyers Forum and others Vs. Federation of 
Pakistan and others (PLD 2005 SC 719), Master Foam v. Govt of 
Pakistan (PLD 2005 SC 373), Federation of Pakistan through 
Secretary, Ministry of Finance and others v. Haji Muhammad 
Sadiq 
(PLD 
2007 SC 133), 
Syed 
Aizad 
Hussain 
v. 
Motor 
Registration Authority (PLD 2010 SC 983), Dr. Mobashir Hassan 
v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2010 SC 265), In re: Regarding 
Pensionary Benefits of the Judges of Superior Courts (PLD 2013 
SC 829) , M.L. Kamra v. Chairman-cum-Managing Director, New 
India Assurance Co. Ltd. & Anr [(1992) 2 SCC 36], M/s. Ispat 
Industries Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs, Mumbai [(2006) 9 
SCALE 652], Manish Maheshwari vs Asstt. Commissioner Of 
Income Tax (AIR 2007 SC 1696), Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd vs 
Maddula Ratnavalli & Ors [2007 (6) SCC 81] and also to the case 
reported as Lahore Development Authority through D.G. and 
others Vs. Ms. Imrana Tiwana and others (2015 SCMR 1739). In 
Civil Appeals No.1583 to 1598 of 2014 etc. 
-: 35 :-
the last mentioned case, this Court has held that “The power to strike 
down or declare a legislative enactment void, however, has to be 
exercised with a great deal of care and caution. The Courts are one of 
the three coordinate institutions of the State and can only perform 
this solemn obligation in the exercise of their duty to uphold the 
Constitution. This power is exercised not because the judiciary is an 
institution superior to the legislature or the executive but because it 
is bound by its oath to uphold, preserve and protect the Constitution. 
It must enforce the Constitution as the Supreme Law but this duty 
must be performed with due care and caution and only when there is 
no other alternative.” The Court after relying upon Cooley: "Treatise 
on Constitutional Limitations, Pages 159 to 186”, H.M. Seervai: 
"Constitutional Law of India, Volume I, Pages 260 to 262”, Mr. A.K. 
Brohi: "Fundamental Law of Pakistan, Pages 562 to 592”, Mr. Justice 
Fazal Karim: "Judicial Review of Public Actions, Volume I, Pages 488 to 
492”, summarized the rules which must be applied in discharging the 
duty to declare laws unconstitutional, which read as under: -  
(a) 
There is a presumption in favour of constitutionality and a law 
must not be declared unconstitutional unless the statute is 
placed next to the Constitution and no way can be found in 
reconciling the two; 
(b) 
Where more than one interpretation is possible, one of which 
would make the law valid and the other void, the Court must 
prefer the interpretation which favours validity; 
(c) 
A statute must never be declared unconstitutional unless its 
invalidity is beyond reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt must 
be resolved in favour of the statute being valid; 
(d) 
If a case can be decided on other or narrower grounds, the 
Court will abstain from deciding the constitutional question; 
(e) 
The Court will not decide a larger constitutional question than 
is necessary for the determination of the case; 
(f) 
The Court will not declare a statute unconstitutional on the 
Civil Appeals No.1583 to 1598 of 2014 etc. 
-: 36 :-
ground that it violates the spirit of the Constitution unless it 
also violates the letter of the Constitution; 
(g) 
The Court is not concerned with the wisdom or prudence of the 
legislation but only with its constitutionality; 
(h) 
The Court will not strike down statutes on principles of 
republican or democratic government unless those principles 
are 
placed 
beyond 
legislative 
encroachment 
by 
the 
Constitution; 
(i) 
Mala fides will not be attributed to the Legislature. 
14. 
 
There another rule of interpretation that entries in a 
Legislative List are to be interpreted liberally. Reliance in this regard 
may be made to the following cases: 
(a) 
In United Provinces Vs. Mt. Atiqa Begam (AIR 1941 FC 16) it was 
held that “none of the items in the lists is to be read in a narrow or 
restricted sense and each general word therein should be held to 
extend to all ancillary and subsidiary matters which can fairly and 
reasonably be said to be comprehended in it.  
(b) 
In Navinchandra Mafatlal Vs. The Commissioner of Income Tax, 
Bombay City (AIR 1954 SC 58) it was held that “the cardinal rule of 
interpretation, however, is that words should be read in their ordinary, 
natural and grammatical meaning subject to this rider that in 
construing words in a constitutional enactment conferring legislative 
power the most liberal construction should be put upon the words so 
that the same may have effect in their widest amplitude.” 
(c) 
In Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi vs The State Of Bombay (AIR 
1959 SC 459) it was held as under: - 
“It is well settled that these heads of legislation should not be 
construed in a narrow and pedantic sense but should be given 
a large and liberal interpretation. As was observed by the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in British Coal 
Corporation v. The King [(1935) A.C. 500]:- 
"Indeed, in interpreting a constituent or organic statute such as 
the Act, that construction most beneficial to the widest 
possible amplitude of its powers must be adopted."  
 
The Federal Court also in the United Provinces V. Atiqa 
Begum [(1940) F.C.R. 110] pointed out that none of the items 
in the Lists is to be read in a narrow or restricted sense and 
that each general word should be held to extend to all ancillary 
Civil Appeals No.1583 to 1598 of 2014 etc. 
-: 37 :-
or subsidiary matters which can fairly and reasonably be said 
to be comprehended in it.”  
(d) 
In M/S New India Sugar Mills Ltd vs Commissioner Of Sales Tax, 
Bihar (AIR 1963 SC 1207) it was held that “the entry should be 
interpreted in a liberal spirit and not cut down by narrow technical 
considerations. The entry in other words should not be shorn of all its 
content to leave a mere husk of legislative power.” 
(e) 
In Navnit Lal C. Javeri v. K.K. Sen, Appellate Assistant 
Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay (AIR 1965 SC 1375) it was 
held as under: -  
“It is hardly necessary to emphasise that the entries in the Lists 
cannot be read in a narrow or restricted sense, and as observed 
by Gwyer, C.J., in the United Provinces v. Atiqa Begum, 1940 
FCR 110: AIR 1941 FC 16, "each general word should be held 
to extend to all ancillary or subsidiary matters which can fairly 
and reasonably be said to be comprehended in it". What the 
entries in the Lists purport to do is to confer legislative powers 
on the respective Legislature in respect of areas or fields 
covered by the said entries; and it is an elementary rule of 
construction that the widest possible construction must be put 
upon their words.”  
(f) 
In Assistant 'Commissioner of Land Tax, Madras, and others v. 
Buckingham and Carnatic Co. Ltd. [(1970) 75 ITR 603] it was 
held as under: - 
“The legislative entries must be given a large and liberal 
interpretation, the reason being that the allocation of the 
subjects to the lists is not by way of scientific or logical 
definition not by way of a mere simplex enumeration of broad 
categories. We see no reason, therefore, for holding that 
Entries 86 and 87 or List I preclude the State Legislature from 
taxing capital value of lands and buildings under Entry 49 of 
List II. In our opinion there is no conflict between Entry 86 of 
List I and Entry 49 of List II. The basis of taxation under the 
two entries is quite distinct. As regards Entry 86 of List I the 
basis of the taxation is the capital value of the asset.”  
(g) 
In Elel Hotels and Investment Ltd. and another Vs. Union of India 
(AIR 1990 SC 1664) = [(1989) 3 SCC 698)], wherein the Indian 
Supreme Court held as under:- 
"6. 
… … The cardinal rule of interpretation is that the entries in 
the legislative lists are not to be read in a narrow or restricted 
sense and that each general word should be held to extend to 
all ancillary or subsidiary matters which can fairly and 
reasonably be said to be comprehended in it. The widest 
possible construction, according to the ordinary meaning of 
the words in the entry, must be put upon them. Reference to 
Civil Appeals No.1583 to 1598 of 2014 etc. 
-: 38 :-
legislative practice may be admissible in reconciling two 
conflicting provisions of rival legislative lists. In construing 
the words in a Constitutional document conferring legislative 
power the most liberal construction should be put upon the 
words so that the same may have effect in their widest 
amplitude.”  
(h) 
In Union Of India & Anr., Etc. Etc vs A.Sanyasi Rao & Ors., Etc. 
Etc (AIR 1996 SC 1219) it was held that: - 
As held by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Sri Ram Ram 
Narain Medhi vs. State of Bombay (AIR 1959 SC 459), the 
heads of legislation in the lists should not be construed in a 
narrow and pedantic sense, but should be given a large and 
liberal interpretation. To similar effect are the decisions of this 
Court in Calcutta Gas Company (Proprietary) Ltd. vs. State of 
West Bengal and others (AIR 1962 SC 1044 at p. 1049) 
and Banarasi Das and others vs. The Wealth Tax Officer and 
others (AIR 1965 SC 1387). In Union of India vs. Shri 
Harbhajan Singh Dhillon (1971 (2) SCC 779 at p.792), the 
Court quoted its earlier decision in Harakchand Ratanchand 
Banthia and others vs. Union of India and others (1969 (2) 
SCC 166), wherein it was held thus:- 
".... The entries in the three Lists are only legislative heads or 
fields of legislation, they demarcate the area over which the 
appropriate Legislatures can operate." 
(i) 
In Godfrey Phillips India Ltd. & Anr Vs. State of U.P. [(2005) 2 
SCC 515] it was held that “where there is the possibility of legislative 
overlap, courts have resolved the issue according to settled principles 
of construction of entries in the legislative lists. The first of such 
settled principles is that legislative entries should be liberally 
interpreted, that none of the items in the list is to be read in a narrow 
or restricted sense and that each general word should be held to 
extend to ancillary or subsidiary matters which can fairly and 
reasonably be said to be comprehended in it.”  
“The second principle is that competing entries must be read 
harmoniously. The proper way to avoid a conflict would be to read 
the entries together and to interpret the language of one by that of the 
other.” [reliance in this regard was placed upon the cases of 
Governor General in Council vs. Province of Madras [(1945) FCR 
179 at pg. 191-192]; State of Bombay vs. Narottamdas 
Jethabhai (AIR 1951 SC 69); Bar Council of U.P. vs. State of U.P. 
& Anr. (AIR 1973 SC 231) = [(1973) 1 SCC 261]; D.G. Ghose & 
Co. (Agents) (P) Ltd. vs. State of Kerala & Anr. [(1980) 2 SCC 
410]; Federation of Hotel and Restaurant vs. Union of 
Civil Appeals No.1583 to 1598 of 2014 etc. 
-: 39 :-
India [(1989) 3 SCC 634] and State of West Bengal vs. Kesoram 
Industries (AIR 2005 SC 1646) = [(2004) 10 SCC 201], In the 
matter of Central Provinces and Berar Sales of Motor Spirit and 
Lubricants Taxation Act, 1938 (AIR 1939 FC 1)] 
(j) 
In Sh. Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar etc. etc. Vs. State of Gujarat 
and anr. etc. etc. [(1995) Suppl. (1) SCC 596] it was held as under: - 
“It is settled law of interpretation that entries in the Seventh 
Schedule are not powers but fields of legislation. The 
legislature derives its power from Article 246 and other related 
Articles of the Constitution. Therefore, the power to make 
the Amendment Act is derived not from the respective entries 
but under Article 246 of the Constitution. The language of the 
respective entries should be given the widest scope of their 
meaning, fairly capable to meet the machinery of the 
Government settled by the Constitution. Each general word 
should extend to all ancillary or subsidiary matters which can 
fairly and reasonably be comprehended in it. When the vires 
of an enactment is impugned, there is an initial presumption of 
its constitutionality and if there is any difficulty in ascertaining 
the limits of the legislative power, the difficulty must be 
resolved, as far as possible in favour of the legislature putting 
the most liberal construction upon the legislative entry so that 
it may have the widest amplitude. Burden is on the appellants 
to prove affirmatively of its invalidity. It must be remembered 
that we are interpreting the Constitution and when the court is 
called upon to interpret the Constitution, it must not be 
construed in any narrow or pedantic sense and adopt such 
construction which must be beneficial to the amplitude of 
legislative powers. The broad and liberal spirit should inspire 
those whose duty is to interpret the Constitution to find 
whether the impugned Act is relatable to any entry in the 
relevant List.” 
(k) 
In Bharat Hydro Power Corp. Ltd. & Ors. Vs. State of Assam & 
Anr. [(2004) 2 SCC 553] 
it was held as under: - 
“It is likely to happen from time to time that enactment though 
purporting to deal with a subject in one list touches also on a 
subject in another list and prima facie looks as if one 
legislature is impinging on the legislative field of the another 
Legislature. This may result in large number of statutes being 
declared unconstitutional because the legislature enacting law 
may appear to have legislated in a field reserved for the other 
legislature. To examine whether a legislation has impinged in 
the field of other legislatures, in fact or in substance, or is 
incidental, keeping in view the true nature of the enactment, 
the Courts have evolved the doctrine of "pith and substance" 
for the purpose of determining whether it is legislation with 
respect to matters in one list or the other. Where the question 
for determination is whether a particular law relates to a 
particular subject mentioned in one list or the other, the courts 
look into the substance of the enactment. Thus, if the 
Civil Appeals No.1583 to 1598 of 2014 etc. 
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substance of enactment falls within Union List then the 
incidental encroachment by the enactment on the State List 
would not make it invalid. This principle came come to be 
established by the Privy Council when it determined appeals 
from Canada or Australia involving the question of legislative 
competence of the federation or the States in those countries.” 
(l) 
In Messrs Haider Automobile Ltd. Vs. Pakistan (PLD 1969 SC 
623) it was held as under: - 
“The items in the legislative list, as was observed in the case 
of the United Provinces v. Mst. Atique Begum and others 
(AIR 1941 FC 16) are not to be read in any narrow or pedantic 
sense. Each general word therein should be held to extend to 
all ancillary or subsidiary matters which can fairly and 
reasonably be said to' be comprehended within it. These items 
describe only comprehensive categories of legislation by a 
word of broad and general meaning. Thus, by being given the 
authority to legislate in respect of the Constitution, 
organisation, jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme Court, 
the Central Legislature, in my view, acquired the jurisdiction 
also to legislate with regard to the number of Judges to be 
appointed, the salaries to be paid to them and the terms and 
conditions upon which they were to serve in the Supreme 
Court.” 
(m) 
In Pir Rashid-ud-Daula and 3 others v. The Chief Administrator 
of Auqaf, West Pakistan (PLD 1971 SC 401), it was observed as 
under: - 
"In a Federal Constitution, in which an elaborate division of 
Legislative powers is attempted, it is inevitable that 
controversy should arise whether one or the other Legislature 
is encroaching on the other's legislative field, for, no matter 
how careful the draftsman or how exhaustive the legislative 
lists it is not possible to provide for all conceivable 
eventualities or to categories each subject of legislation under 
a specific label. It is for the resolution of such controversies 
that the Courts have evolved certain basic tests. A careful 
examination of the relevant decisions indicates that the main 
principles deducible from them are:-- 
(i) 
That legislation, the validity of which has to be tested, 
must be scrutinized in its entirety in order to determine its 
true character in pith and substance. (Great Saddelory Co,. 
Ltd v. The King (AIR 1921 PC 148). 
(ii) 
That after considering the legislation as a whole in pith 
and substance it has to be seen as to with respect to which 
topic or category of legislation in the various fields, it 
deals substantially and directly and not whether it would in 
actual operation affect an item in the forbidden field in an 
indirect way. (Subrahmanyan Chettiar v. Muttuswami 
Gourdan AIR 1941 PC 47). 
(iii) 
That none of the items in the lists is to be read in a narrow 
or restricted sense and each general word therein should be 
held .to extend to all ancillary and subsidiary matters 
Civil Appeals No.1583 to 1598 of 2014 etc. 
-: 41 :-
which can fairly and reasonably be said to be 
comprehended in it. (United Provinces v. Atiqa Begum 
AIR 1941 FC 16). [emphasis supplied] 
(iv) 
That where there appears to be apparent overlapping in 
respect of the subject-matter of the impugned legislation it 
must first be considered whether a fair reconciliation 
cannot be effected by giving to the language of the federal 
and concurrent context bear is yet one that can properly be 
given to it. (Governor-General-in-Council v. Province of 
Madras AIR 1945 PC 98). 
(v) 
That a general power ought not to be so construed as to 
make a particular power conferred by the same Act arid 
operating in the same filed a nullity. (In re: C. P. Motor 
Spirit Act AIR 1939 FC 1)." 
(n) 
In Fauji Foundation and another v. Shamimur Rehman (PLD 
1983 SC 457), it has been held as under: - 
"Item No. l as worded should be construed not in a narrow or 
restricted sense but in a wider sense so as to include all 
ancillary or subsidiary matters which can reasonably be 
included within it".  
(o) 
In Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation Vs. Pakistan 
through the Secretary, Ministry of Finance (1992 SCMR 891) 
after relying upon the cases of Navinchandra’s case (supra) and Mst. 
Atiqa Begum’s case (supra), it was held as under: - 
“The Constitution provides governance to the country, confers 
rights, privileges and liabilities on the citizens and also 
controls the working in all fields of life. It is a living document 
and is to be interpreted in a widest possible manner to ensure 
continuity and balance in the several constituents and organs 
of the State. The item in the list in respect of which the power 
of taxation can be exercised should not be interpreted in a 
restricted and pedantic manner.”  
(p) 
In Messrs Elahi Cotton Mills Ltd and others Vs. Federation of 
Pakistan through Secretary M/o Finance, Islamabad and 6 others 
(PLD 1997 SC 582) it was held as under: - 
"The power to levy taxes is a sine qua non for a State. In 
fact it is an attribute of sovereignty of a State. … The 
entries in the Legislative List of the Constitution are not 
powers of legislation but only fields of legislative heads. 
The allocation of the subjects to the lists is not by way of 
scientific or logical definition but by way of mere simple 
enumeration of broad catalogue. … An entry in the 
Legislative List must be given a very wide and liberal 
interpretation.  
 
It is needless to reiterate that it is a well-settled proposition of 
law that an entry in the Legislative List must be given a very 
wide and liberal interpretation.  
Civil Appeals No.1583 to 1598 of 2014 etc. 
-: 42 :-
(q) 
In Commissioner of Sales Tax and others Vs. Hunza Central 
Asian Textile and Woollen Mills Ltd. and others (1999 SCMR 
526) it was held as under: - 
19. The Darned Attorney-General is correct in his submission 
that Legislative entries in a Constitution are to be interpreted 
liberally. This principle is well recognized and was recently 
confirmed by this Court in its judgment (Full Bench of 5 
Judges) in the case of Elahi Cotton Mills Ltd. (PLD 1997 SC 
582). While considering the term "income-tax" in Entry No.49 
in Part I of the Federal Legislative List (Fourth Schedule) of 
the 1973 Constitution, it was observed that, from the case-law 
and treatises considered in the judgment, one of the principles 
deducible therefrom is that while construing the said word 
"income" used in the entry in the Legislative List, restrictive 
meaning cannot be applied … . While interpreting the word, it 
was recognized that the rule of interpretation of any entry in 
Legislative List is that the same should be given widest 
possible meaning. …   
24. As observed, legislative entries should be given liberal and 
very wide interpretation and that the judicial approach in this 
regard should be dynamic rather than rigid. Another principle 
that has been noted in the earlier part of this judgment is that 
the Legislature enjoys a wide latitude in the matter of selection 
of persons subject-matter, events etc. for taxation. … 
From the perusal of above case law, the following principles of 
Constitutional interpretation with regard to the Entries in the 
legislative lists emerge: - 
(1) 
The entries in the Legislative Lists of the Constitution are 
not powers of legislation but only fields of legislative 
heads; 
(2) 
In construing the words in an Entry conferring legislative 
power on a legislative authority, the most liberal construction 
should be put upon the words.  
(3) 
While interpreting an Entry in a Legislative List it should be 
given widest possible meaning and should not be read in a 
narrow or restricted sense;  
Civil Appeals No.1583 to 1598 of 2014 etc. 
-: 43 :-
(4) 
Each general word in an entry should be considered to extend 
to all ancillary or subsidiary matters which can fairly and 
reasonably be said to be comprehended in it; 
(5) 
If there appears to be apparent overlapping in respect of the 
subject-matter of a legislation, an effort has to be made to 
reconcile the Entries to give proper and pertinent meaning to 
them.  
(6) 
A general power ought not to be so construed so as to make a 
particular power conferred by the same legislation and 
operating in the same filed a nullity.  
(7) 
Legislation under attack must be scrutinized in its entirety to 
determine its true character in pith and substance; 
(8) 
After considering the legislation as a whole in pith and 
substance, it has to be seen as to with respect to which topic or 
category of legislation in the various fields, it deals 
substantially and directly and not whether it would in actual 
operation affect an item in the forbidden field in an indirect 
way.  
15. 
 
In the light of the above principles, now we shall 
consider the vires of the Federal legislation i.e. IRA 2012. In this 
regard, the most important aspect of the matter is that there are 
two types of establishments/organizations/ industries; firstly, 
the industries, etc. functioning within the territorial limits of 
one Province only, and secondly, certain other establishments, 
etc. functioning within the territorial limits of more than one 
Province or even in all the four Provinces as well as the Federal 
Civil Appeals No.1583 to 1598 of 2014 etc. 
-: 44 :-
Capital Territory. Now the moot question arises whether, 
notwithstanding the fact that the authority to legislate with 
regard to the matters concerning the trade unions and unfair 
labour practices vests with the Federal Legislature or not, a 
Provincial legislature can legislate with regard to the trade 
union/establishments functioning at trans-provincial level. In 
this regard it is to be noted that Article 97 of the Constitution 
provides that “subject to the Constitution, the executive authority of the 
Federation shall extend to the matters with respect to which the both 
Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) has power to make laws, including 
exercise of rights, authority and jurisdiction in and in relation to areas 
outside Pakistan”. Under the said Article, the executive authority of 
the Federation is not restricted to the areas within Pakistan but also 
extended in relation to the areas outside Pakistan. However, as per 
proviso thereto, “the said authority shall not, save as expressly 
provided in the Constitution or in any law made by Majlis-e-Shoora 
(Parliament), extend in any Province to a matter with respect to which 
the Provincial Assembly has also power to make laws”. Under Article 
137 of the Constitution, “subject to the Constitution, the executive 
authority of the Province shall extend to the matters with respect to 
which the Provincial Assembly has power to make laws”. As per 
proviso thereto, “in any matter with respect to which both  Majlis-e-
Shoora (Parliament) and the Provincial Assembly of a Province have 
power to make laws, the executive authority of the Province shall be 
subject to, and limited by, the executive authority expressly conferred 
by the Constitution or by law made by Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) 
upon the Federal Government or authorities thereof”. Further, as per 
Article 141 of the Constitution, “subject to the Constitution, Majlis-e-
Civil Appeals No.1583 to 1598 of 2014 etc. 
-: 45 :-
Shoora (Parliament) may make laws (including laws having extra-
territorial operation) for the whole or any part of Pakistan, and a 
Provincial Assembly may make laws for the Province or any part 
thereof”. Under Article 142 of the Constitution, the Parliament has 
exclusive power to make laws with respect to (1) any matter in the 
FLL, (2) criminal law, criminal procedure and evidence and (3) all 
matters pertaining to such areas in the Federation as are not 
included in any Province; whereas, a Provincial Assembly has power 
to make laws with respect to (1) criminal law, criminal procedure and 
evidence and (2) any matter not enumerated in the FLL. Under Article 
232(2) of the Constitution, in case of emergency, the Legislative 
authority of the Federation extends to enacting laws for a Province, or 
any part thereof, with respect to any matter not enumerated in the 
FLL. Thus, from the above provisions of the Constitution it is clear 
that the Federal Legislature has extra-territorial authority to legislate, 
but no such extra-territorial authority has been invested with the 
Provincial Legislature. Thus, the Provincial Legislature has no 
legislative competence to legislate law regulating the trade 
unions functioning at trans-provincial level. Needless to observe 
that to deal with such a matter, the Constitution itself has provided a 
mechanism i.e. entries No.58 and 59 in Part-I of FLL, whereby the 
Federal Legislature has been mandated to legislate in order to 
preserve and regulate a right, which in its exercise transcends 
provincial boundaries, especially one guaranteed under Article 17 of 
the Constitution. The scope of Entries No.58 and 59 shall be 
discussed in detail at the latter part of the judgment, considering the 
scope of the Entries in the FLL.  
16. 
 
Having decided the question regarding the legislative 
Civil Appeals No.1583 to 1598 of 2014 etc. 
-: 46 :-
competence of the Provincial legislature, now we shall consider 
the question whether the IRA 2012 is a valid piece of legislation or 
not, and whether by promulgating the said Act, the Federal 
Legislature has gone beyond its legislative competence and 
encroached upon the authority of the Provincial Legislature. In this 
regard it is to be noted that although through the Eighteenth 
Amendment the CLL (Entries No.26 and 27 whereof covered the subjects, inter alia, 
of labour disputes and trade unions) was abolished from the Constitution, 
however, a new Entry No.32 in Part-I of the FLL was introduced 
which covered the subjects of “International treaties, conventions and 
agreements and International arbitration”. Previously, somewhat 
similar subjects were available in Entry No.3 of Part-I of the FLL, i.e. 
“External affairs; the implementing of treaties and agreements, 
including educational and cultural pacts and agreements, with other 
countries; extradition, including the surrender of criminals and accused 
persons to Governments outside Pakistan”. It has been argued by the 
learned counsel for the appellants that if the interpretation of Entry 
No.3 of Part-I of FLL as made by the learned High Courts is presumed 
to be correct, then the Federal legislature could enlarge its legislative 
powers and legislate on any subject it chooses simply because the 
Executive has signed a treaty in relation to that topic; this would 
negate the basic concept of division of powers on which our 
constitutional structure has been erected. In this regard it is to be 
noted that the Parliament through Eighteenth constitutional 
amendment, though abolished the CLL which contained the subjects 
of labour practices and trade unions (Entries No.26 and 27 of the CLL), but 
with conscious application of mind, through insertion of the new 
Entry No.32 ibid in the FLL, brought within the legislative 
competence of the Federal Legislature the matters relating to the 
Civil Appeals No.1583 to 1598 of 2014 etc. 
-: 47 :-
international treaties, conventions, etc.; obviously, while doing so, it 
(Parliament) was conscious of the fact that the matters relating to trade 
unions and labour disputes, etc., have been dealt with and protected 
under the International Labour Organization’s Conventions No.87 
(Convention concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise) 
and 98 (Convention concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise 
and to Bargain Collectively) which are covered under Entries No.3 and 32 of 
Part-I of the FLL. Thus, the Federal Legislature has legislative 
competence to legislate in this regard to discharge the obligations 
created under the International Treaties and Conventions. Therefore, 
the IRA 2012 has been validly enacted by the Parliament.  
17. 
 
Additionally, Entries No.58 and 59, which fall at the end 
of the Part-I of the FLL, have their own significance. These two entries 
are independent and unfettered. Entry No.58 ibid covers the “Matters 
which under the Constitution are within the legislative competence of 
Majlis- e-Shoora (Parliament) or relate to the Federation”. Further, 
Entry No.59 deals with the “Matters incidental or ancillary to any 
matter enumerated in this Part”. From the plain reading of these two 
Entries, it is clear that besides the subjects enumerated in the 
previous Entries, these Entries provide extended powers to the 
Federal Legislature; inasmuch as, by means of these Entries, the 
legislative competence of the Federal Legislature extends not only to 
the matters which under the Constitution are within the legislative 
competence of the Parliament but also to the matters which relate 
to the Federation and also the matters incidental or ancillary 
thereto. Thus, in addition to the matters specifically enumerated in 
any of the Entries in Part-I of the FLL, the matters which in some way 
relate to the Federation would also fall within the legislative 
Civil Appeals No.1583 to 1598 of 2014 etc. 
-: 48 :-
competence of the Parliament. This interpretation also finds support 
from the fact that in terms of Article 141 of the Constitution, a 
Provincial Legislature does not possess extra-territorial legislative 
competence and therefore, cannot legislate with regard to a subject 
which in its application has to transcend the provincial boundaries. It 
is to be noted that as clarified by the learned High Court the resort to 
Entry No.58 ibid could only be made to deal with an extra-ordinary 
situation i.e. when a matter may fall within the legislative competence 
of the Province but when it comes to its application it has to travel 
beyond the territorial boundaries of the Province, bringing it into the 
domain of the Federal Legislation. Thus, it is held that the federal 
legislature has the competence to legislate relating to the 
Establishments/Trade Unions functioning at the Federal as well as 
trans-provincial level.  
18. 
 
There is yet another Entry in Part-II of the FLL which 
provides the legislative authority to the Federal Legislation, namely, 
entry No. 13 which covers “Inter-provincial matters and co-ordination”. 
This Entry also has two parts, firstly, the inter-provincial matters 
and secondly, inter-provincial co-ordination. It is clear that under the 
command of this Entry too, the Federation has competence to enact 
laws relating to the inter-provincial matters/Trade Unions. Further, 
Entry No.18 thereof covers the “Matters incidental or ancillary to 
any matter enumerated in this Part”. This Entry further enlarges the 
scope of the above Entry. Thus, it is held that even on the basis of 
Entries No.13 and 18 ibid, the IRA 2012 is a valid piece of legislation.  
19. 
 
As we have already held that the subjects of labour and 
trade unions fall within the scope of Entries no.3, 32, 58 and 59 of 
Part-I and Entry No.13 and 18 of Part-II of FLL, we do not deem it 
Civil Appeals No.1583 to 1598 of 2014 etc. 
-: 49 :-
appropriate to enter into the scope of Entries No.27 and 31 as also 
other Entries which have been relied upon by the learned High Court 
to uphold the validity of Federal legislations.  
20. 
 
At this juncture it is to be noted that when a provincial 
legislature is not competent to legislate with regard to the workmen of 
trans-provincial establishments, obviously the Federation has to 
interfere in the matter with a Federal Legislation to preserve and 
protect the fundamental rights of the said workmen ensured under 
Article 17 of the Constitution. We are in agreement with the 
observation made by the learned High Court that though in a Federal 
system, provincial autonomy means capacity of a province to govern 
itself without interference from the Federal Government or the 
Federal legislature, but as the Provincial legislature does not possess 
extra-territorial legislative authority i.e. it cannot legislate regarding 
the establishments operating beyond the territorial boundaries of 
that province. In absence of a Federal legislation, the right to form a 
trade union that can operate beyond the provincial boundaries could 
not be secured by any provincial law, and as such, any matter or 
activity of a trans-provincial nature would remain unregulated. The 
only solution to the above said problem is a Federal legislation. The 
effect of non-promulgation of IRA 2012 would be that the employer 
would not recognize the right of the workmen to form a countrywide 
trade union and carry out unified activities in his establishment at 
trans-provincial level; and also the number of workmen working in 
each unit of an establishment working in a certain Province would be 
counted separately which in turn would have adverse impact on the 
rights of the workmen, in so far as applicability of benefits and 
security of job granted under various labour laws are concerned as 
certain rights granted under various labour laws become available to 
Civil Appeals No.1583 to 1598 of 2014 etc. 
-: 50 :-
the workmen depending upon the total strength of the workmen in an 
establishment. Needless to observe that as mentioned in its 
preamble, the object of promulgation of IRA 2012 is “to consolidate 
and rationalize the law relating to formation of trade unions, and 
improvement of relations between employers and workmen in the 
Islamabad 
Capital 
Territory 
and 
in 
trans-provincial 
establishments and industry”. Further, as per Section 3 thereof “it 
shall apply to all persons employed in any establishment or 
industry, in the Islamabad Capital Territory or carrying on 
business in more than one province”. Hence, the parliament in its 
wisdom has intentionally left it for a Province to make legislation 
concerning the establishments/trade unions functioning only within 
the limits of that Province, without transgressing the territorial limits 
of the said Province. Thus, neither does the IRA 2012 in any manner, 
defeat the object of the Eighteenth Amendment nor does it destroys 
or usurps the provincial autonomy or the principle on which the 
Federation was formed under the Constitution; rather it facilitates to 
regulate the right to form unions at trans-provincial level, which 
could not be attained through a provincial law. 
21. 
 
With regard to the question about the jurisdiction of the 
NIRC formed under Section 25 of the Industrial Relations Act 2008 
(which stood repealed w.e.f. 01.05.2010) in the interregnum till the 
promulgation of IRA 2012, suffice it to say that as held by this Court 
in Air League of Piac Employees’s case (supra) during the 
interregnum period w.e.f. 01.05.2010, when no Industrial Relations 
Law was holding the field, the workers had remedy under the 
ordinary laws prevailing at that time, because in absence of a 
special law, the ordinary/general laws come forward to fill in the 
vacuum. Further, the IRO 2012 does not destroy any existing right, 
Civil Appeals No.1583 to 1598 of 2014 etc. 
-: 51 :-
rather by means of Section 33 thereof, all the existing rights stood 
preserved and protected, as such, it cannot be said that it affects any 
right or obligation created by other laws, including any provincial 
law. This Court has dealt with the issue of applicability of laws 
during the interregnum period when any law was repealed or 
declared ultra vires, and it has been repeatedly held that at the 
best the newly enacted law would be deemed to have retrospective 
effect by necessary implication because such change would only be 
deemed to be procedural [see: Government of N.-W.F.P. v. Said 
Kamal Shah  (PLD 1986 SC 360) and Sarfraz v. Muhammad 
Aslam Khan (2001 SCMR 1062)]. The Labour Laws provide the 
procedure and mechanism for the resolution of disputes, 
registration of Trade Unions and establishment of Forum for the 
redressal of grievance of the labourers as well as employers, 
therefore, it is mainly a procedural law and in the light of the well 
settled principles of interpretation of Statutes, the procedural law 
has retrospective effect unless contrary is provided expressly or 
impliedly [see: Air League of Piac Employees’s case (supra)]. 
Thus, it is held that the IRA 2012 would be applicable 
retrospectively w.e.f. 01.05.2010, when the IRO 2008 ceased to 
exist.  
22. 
 
There is yet another question involved in the matter, 
namely, the appellant-Shaheen Airport Services is a charitable 
organizations or not. It is the case of the appellant that charitable 
organizations are excluded from the operation of both the federal and 
provincial law, therefore, regardless of the question whether the 
appellant is a trans-provincial establishment for purposes of the 
federal law or whether it comes within the ambit of the provincial law, 
the appellant falls outside the purview of both the IRA, 2012 and the 
Civil Appeals No.1583 to 1598 of 2014 etc. 
-: 52 :-
SIRA, 2013, resultantly, no trade union can be registered within the 
appellant. In this regard it is to be noted that the learned High Court 
has considered this question in detail and has held that the Federal 
law was applicable to Shaheen Airport Services as the same was 
operative in more than one Province and that Shaheen Airport 
Services did not qualify as a charitable organization in view of the 
activities that were entailed in the operation of its business. We are in 
agreement with the findings of the learned High Court.  
23. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the appeals as also the 
petition are dismissed and it is held as under: - 
(1) 
the Federal Legislature has extra-territorial authority but 
no such extra-territorial authority has been conferred to 
the Provincial Legislature by the Constitution; 
(2) 
the Federal legislature does, but the Provincial 
Legislature does not, have legislative competence to 
legislate to regulate the trade unions functioning at 
trans-provincial level; 
(3) 
the matters relating to trade unions and labour disputes, 
etc., having been dealt with and protected under the 
International Conventions, are covered under Entries 
No.3 and 32 of Part-I of the FLL. Thus, the Federal 
Legislature has legislative competence to legislate in this 
regard;  
(4) 
under the command of Entry No.13 in Part-II of the FLL, 
the Federation has competence to enact laws relating to 
the inter-provincial matters, Entry No.18 thereof further 
enlarges the scope of the said Entry; therefore, the 
Civil Appeals No.1583 to 1598 of 2014 etc. 
-: 53 :-
Federal Legislature has legislative competence to legislate 
in this regard too;  
(5) 
the IRA 2012 neither defeats the object of the Eighteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution nor does it destroy or 
usurp the provincial autonomy; 
(6) 
the IRA 2012 has been validly enacted by the Parliament 
and is intra vires the Constitution;  
(7) 
the workers of the establishments/industries functioning 
in the Islamabad Capital Territory or carrying on 
business in more than one provinces shall be governed 
by the Federal legislation i.e. IRO 2012; whereas, the 
workers of establishments/industries functioning or 
carrying on business only within the territorial limits of a 
province shall be governed by the concerned provincial 
legislations;   
(8) 
as we have held that the IRA 2012 is valid piece of 
legislation, it is held that the National Industrial 
Relations Commission (NIRC) formed under Section 35 of 
the IRA 2012 has jurisdiction to decide the labour 
disputes, etc., relating to the employees/workers of 
companies/corporations/institutions/establishments 
functioning in more than one Province; 
(9) 
the IRA 2012, being a procedural law, would be 
applicable retrospectively w.e.f. 01.05.2010, when the 
IRO 2008 ceased to exist; and 
(10) 
M/s Shaheen Airport Services is not a charitable 
Civil Appeals No.1583 to 1598 of 2014 etc. 
-: 54 :-
organization and IRA 2012 is applicable to it as it is 
operating in more than one Province. 
 
 
CHIEF JUSTICE 
 
 
 
JUDGE 
 
 
 
JUDGE 
Announced in open Court 
on 28.3.2018 at Islamabad. 
Approved for reporting 
Waqas/*