IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN 
(APPELLATE JURISDICTION) 
 
 
PRESENT: MR. JUSTICE MIAN SAQIB NISAR, HCJ 
MR. JUSTICE MAQBOOL BAQAR  
MR. JUSTICE FAISAL ARAB 
 
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.682 TO 684 OF 2008, 131,233,253,504, 
219 & 220 OF 2011, 678-683, 783 & 729-732 OF 2012, 389-
401 & 710-713 OF 2013, 1632 OF 2014, 565 OF 2015 AND 
1424-1425 & 2470 OF 2016 
(on appeal against the judgments/orders dated 7.11.2007, 18.12.2007, 
05.11.2008, 25.09.2009, 09.07.2009, 29.01.2009, 01.04.2008, 07.04.2008, 
04.05.2012, 05.04.2012, 05.04.2012, 06.06.2012, 19.07.2012, 06.06.2012, 
05.04.2012,13.07.2011, 05.04.2012, 07.12.2011, 10.09.2014, 21.01.2015, 
17.11.2015, 
22.03.216 
of 
the 
Lahore 
High 
Court, 
Lahore 
passed 
in 
W.P.13331/2006, S.T.R.68/2006, S.T.R.13/2007, S.T.A.5/2005, S.T.R.42/2006, 
W.P.13499/2003, 
W.P.16171/2008, 
S.T.A.23/2006, 
S.T.A.2/2007, 
S.T.R.44/2010, S.T.R.29/2010, S.T.R.144/2011, S.T.R.95/2010, S.T.R.36/2011, 
S.T.R.26/2010, S.T.R.76/2010,  STR 55/2009, S.T.R.82/2010, S.T.R.32/2010, 
S.T.R.73/2010 S.T.R.22/2010, S.T.R.77/2009, S.T.R.21/2010, S.T.R.43/2010,, 
S.T.R.85/2010, S.T.R.101/2010, S.T.R.21/2011, S.T.R.62/2011, S.T.R.68/2011, 
S.T.R.69/2011, S.T.R.75/2011, S.T.R.70/2011, S.T.R.22/2011, S.T.R.83/2011, 
S.T.R.130/2011, 
S.T.R.13/2011, 
S.T.R.114/2011, 
S.T.R.89/2014, 
S.T.R.14/2015, S.T.R.194/2015, S.T.R.195/2015, S.T.R.58/2016 respectively) 
 
 
AND 
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 733 OF 2010 
 
 
AND 
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1507 OF 2016 
 
The Collector of Sales Tax, Gujranwala, etc. 
(in CAs 682/08 
& 131/11) 
Assistant Collector (C&E Division) Gujranwala, 
etc. 
(in CA 683/08) 
Dy. Collector of Sales Tax Gujranwala, etc.                   
(in CA 684/08) 
Abbasi Enterprises Unilever Distributor Haripur & 
another                                       
(in CA 733/10) 
The Collector of Sales Tax, & Federal Excise 
Lahore       
(in CAs 233/11) 
Collector of Sales Tax, Lahore                                        
(in CAs 253/11) 
Collector of Sales Tax Faisalabad, etc.                           
(in CAs 504/11) 
Commissioner Inland Revenue, RTO, Faisalabad 
(in CAs 678-
683/12 & 
710/13, 729-
732/12) 
Commissioner 
Inland 
(Rev.) 
Legal 
Division 
Regional Tax Office, Lahore                         
(in CAs 389-
401/13) 
Commissioner Inland Revenue Sialkot                         
(in CA 711/13) 
Director of intelligence & investigation FBR Lahore       
(in CA 712/13) 
Commissioner Inland (Rev) Zone-I Regional Tax 
Officer, Faisalabad                                                      
(in CAs 713/13) 
Commissioner 
Inland 
Rev. 
Zone-II, 
RTO, 
Faisalabad      
(in CAs 1632/14, 
& 565/15, 1424, 
& 
1425 
& 
1507/16) 
Commissioner 
Inland 
(Rev) 
Zone-III 
RTO, 
Faisalabad  
(in CA 2470/16) 
Collector of Customs Federal E & S Tax Multan               
(in CAs 219-
220/11) 
Civil Appeal Nos. 682 of 2008 etc. 
-: 2 :-
 
…Appellant(s) 
VERSUS 
M/s. Super Asia Mohammad Din & Sons etc.            (in CA 682/08) 
M/s. Hanif Straw Board Factory, etc.                            (in CA 
683,684/08) 
The Collector of Sales Tax & Federal Excise, 
Peshawar & others 
(in CA 733/10) 
 
M/s. Farhan Plastic, etc.                                            (in CA 131/11) 
M/s. Meraj Din & Sons, etc.                                       (in CA 233/11) 
M/s. New Art Press (Pvt.) Ltd. etc.                              (in CA 253/11) 
M/s. Tanvir Weaving (PVT) Ltd. etc.                            (in CA 504/11) 
M/s Cresent Textile Mills Faisalabad                          (in CA 678/12) 
M/s Fabritex International C/o. Kay Sons (Pvt) 
Ltd. Faisalabad & another                           
(in CA 679/12) 
M/s Pharianwali Sugar Mills Ltd. Lahore etc.             (in CA 680/12) 
M/s Aftab Soap Factory, Faisalabad                          (in CA 681/12) 
M/s Ihsan Yousaf Textile Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. Faisalabad     (in CA 682/12) 
M/s Sargodha Spinning Mills Ltd. Faisalabad             (in CA 683/12) 
M/s Fateh Habib Textile, Faisalabad & another          (in CA 783/12) 
M/s. Zahid Hafeez Re-Rolling Mills LHR, etc.              (in CA 389/13) 
M/s. Chimera (Pvt) , Ltd., etc.                                     (in CA 390/13) 
M/s. Ejaz & Co.,LHR, etc.                                           (in CA 391/13) 
M/s. D.S. Power Ltd. LHR, etc.                                   (in CA 392/13) 
M/s. Zahoor Cotton Mills. LHR, etc.                           (in CA 393/13) 
M/s. Mirtex Enterprises, LHR, etc.                             (in CA 394/13) 
M/s. Innovox Industries, LHR, etc.                             (in CA 395/13) 
M/s. Hussain Cotex Ltd., LHR                                    (in CA 396/13) 
M/s Barkat Ali Steel Mills, LHR                                  (in CA 397/13) 
M/s. Barkat Ali Re-Rolling Mills, LHR                         (in CA 398/13) 
M/s. Chaudhry Steel Re-Rolling Mills, LHR                (in CA 399/13) 
M/s. Javed Nazir Brothers (PVT) Ltd., LHR                 (in CA 400/13) 
M/s. Al-Macca Press (Pvt.) Ltd., LHR, etc.                   (in CA 401/13) 
M/s. Zeshan Energy Ltd. etc.                                      (in CA 710/13) 
M/s. Asad Brothers Sialkot                                         (in CA 711/13) 
M/s. Umer Textiles                                                     (in CA 712/13) 
M/s. Crescent Textiles Mills Ltd. etc.                          (in CA 713/13) 
M/s Idrees & Company, Chiniot & another                 (in CA 1632/14) 
M/s Al-Haseeb Corporation, Faisalabad etc.               (in CA 565/15) 
M/s Master Textile Processing Mills, Faisalabad etc.      (in CAs 
1424,1425/16) 
M/s Umer Brothers, Faisalaabad & another               (in CA 
1507/16) 
M/s Karimi Traders, Faisalabad                                (in CA2470/16) 
M/s. Joyia Sadat Cotton Industries                            (in CA 219/11) 
M/s. Qadir Agro Industries (Pvt) Ltd. Multan etc.        (in CA 220/11) 
M/s Allah Tawakel Corporation Faisalabad etc.           
(in CA 729/12) 
M/s Bashir Printing Industries (Pvt) Ltd Faisalabad etc.        (in CA 730/12) 
M/s Arfatex Industries (PVT.) Ltd. Faisalabad etc.              (in CA 731/12) 
M/s Mian Zafar & Co. & another                                (in CA 732/12) 
 
…Respondent(s) 
 
 
For the Appellant(s): 
(in CAs 682-684/08, 131, 
233, 253,504/11, 389-401/ 
13, 710, 711, 713/13, 219 
& 220/11) 
 
 
 
     Mr. Izhar-ul-Haq, ASC 
 
 
Civil Appeal Nos. 682 of 2008 etc. 
-: 3 :-
(in 
CAs 
678-683/12, 
783/12, 1632/14, 565/15, 
1424, 1425, 1507, 2470/16 
& 729-732/12) 
     Dr. Farhat Zafar, ASC 
     Mr. M. S. Khattak, AOR. 
     Raja Abdul Ghafoor, AOR. 
 
(in CAs 733/10) 
 
 
 
    Mr. Farhat Nawaz Lodhi, ASC 
    Raja Abdul Ghafoor, AOR. 
(in CAs 712/13) 
     Ch. M. Zafar Iqbal, ASC. 
For the respondent(s): 
(in CA 220/11) 
 
(in CAs 682/08, 397 
and 398/13) 
 
(in CA 733/10) 
 
 
(in CAs 682-684/08) 
 
 
(in CA 131/11) 
 
(in CA 233/11) 
 
(in CA 253/11) 
 
(in CAs 504/11, 396, 
399, 710/13) 
 
(in CAs 678/12, 713/13, 
683/12, 392/13) 
 
(in CA 390/13) 
 
(in CA 400/13) 
 
(in CAs 394, 401/13, 
711/13, 1632/14, 
2470/16, 565/15, 730/12, 
712/13, 732/12) 
 
(in CA 1507/16) 
 
(in CAs 219/11, 729/12, 
731/12, 
 
(in CAs 679-682,783/12, 
382, 391, 393, 395/13, 
1424, 1425/16 
 
     Nemo. 
 
     Syed Naveed Andrabi, ASC. 
 
 
     Mr. Riaz Hussain Azam, ASC. 
    Mr. M. S. Khattak, AOR. 
 
    Mr. Waqar Azeem, ASC. 
 
     
     Nemo.  
 
     Nasir Mahmood Qureshi, ASC 
 
     Nemo 
 
     Mr. Muhammad Iqbal Hashmi, ASC 
 
 
     Nemo. 
 
 
     Mr. Shazib Masud, ASC 
 
     Mian Ashiq Hussain, ASC 
 
 
     Nemo. 
 
 
    Mr. M. Ajmal Khan, ASC 
 
     Ex-parte. 
 
 
     N.R. 
 
 
Date of Hearing:  
      31.03.2017 
… 
JUDGMENT 
 
 
MIAN SAQIB NISAR, CJ.- The facts pertaining to 
these appeals, with the leave of the Court, are that the respondents are 
Civil Appeal Nos. 682 of 2008 etc. 
-: 4 :-
manufacturing units/suppliers who made taxable supplies during 
various tax years and filed sales tax returns for the relevant periods. 
They were served with show cause notices under the erstwhile Sections 
11 and 36 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 (the Act) and later the current 
Section 11 thereof. The orders-in-original were passed beyond the 
period of limitation provided in law. Aggrieved, some respondents 
approached the learned High Court directly by way of writ petitions, 
whilst others challenged the orders before the Customs, Excise & Sales 
Tax (Appellate) Tribunal (the Tribunal) which culminated in sales tax 
references before the learned High Court. The learned High Court 
allowed the writ petitions and the references alike through the 
impugned judgments; holding that since the adjudicating authority 
failed to decide the show cause notices within the statutory period 
provided in the first provisos to the erstwhile Sections 11(4) and 36(3) of 
the Act and the current Section 11(5) thereof, the orders were barred by 
time. Leave was granted on 09.04.2008 in the following terms:- 
 
“…whether the limitation of 45 days for completion of 
adjudication proceedings under Finance Ordinance, 2000 
enhanced to 90 days by the Finance Act, 2003 was 
mandatory or directory in nature…” 
  
2. 
 
The moot point is whether the limitation period contained 
in the first provisos to the erstwhile Sections 11(4) and 36(3) of the Act 
and the current Section 11(5) thereof for passing an order thereunder is 
mandatory or directory in nature (note:- as the show cause notices and the orders 
passed pursuant thereto were spread over a span of approximately 15 years, i.e. from 1998 to 
2013, we shall discuss all the relevant provisions which were in force from time to time). The 
relevant law read as under:- 
Civil Appeal Nos. 682 of 2008 etc. 
-: 5 :-
 
Erstwhile Section 36 
1[36. Recovery of tax not levied or short-levied or 
erroneously refunded.–  
⁞ 
(3) The officer of 2[Inland Revenue] empowered in this 
behalf shall, after considering the objections of the person 
served with a notice to show cause under sub-section (1) or 
sub-section (2), determine the amount of tax or charge 
payable by him and such person shall pay the amount so 
determined 3[:] 
 
4[Provided that order under this section shall be 
made within 5[one hundred and twenty] days of issuance of 
show cause notice or within such extended period as 6[the 
7[Commissioner] 8[* * *]] may, for reasons to be recorded 
in writing, fix, provided that such extended period shall in 
no case exceed 9[sixty] days 10[:]] 
 
11[Provided further that any period during which 
the proceedings are adjourned on account of a stay order 
or Alternative Dispute Resolution proceedings or the time 
taken through adjournment by the petitioner not exceeding 
thirty days shall be excluded from the computation of the 
periods specified in the first proviso.] 
 
 
⁞ 
 
Erstwhile Section 11 
12[11. Assessment of Tax.-  
⁞ 
                                       
1 Substituted by the Finance Act, 1996. Omitted by the Finance Act, 2012. 
2 Substituted for the words “Sales Tax” by the Finance Act, 2010. Earlier the same amendment was made by the 
Finance (Amendment) Ordinance, 2010 and the Finance (Amendment) Ordinance, 2009. 
3 Substituted for the full stop by the Finance Ordinance, 2000. 
4 Proviso added by the Finance Ordinance, 2000. 
5 Substituted for the word “ninety” by the Finance Act, 2008 which was substituted for the word “forty-five” by the 
Finance Act, 2003.  
6 Substituted for the words “an officer of Sales Tax” by the Finance Act, 2003. 
7 Substituted for the word “Collector” by the Finance Act, 2010. Earlier the same amendment was made by the 
Finance (Amendment) Ordinance, 2010 and the Finance (Amendment) Ordinance, 2009. 
8 The words, commas and brackets “or, as the case may be, Collector (Adjudication)” omitted by the Finance Act, 
2005. 
9 Substituted for the words “one hundred and twenty” by the Finance Act, 2009 which was substituted for the word 
“ninety” by the Finance Act, 2008. 
10 Substituted for the full stop by the Finance Act, 2003. 
11 Proviso added by the Finance Act, 2009. 
12 Substituted by the Finance Act, 1996. Substituted for the Section 11 by the Finance Act, 2012. 
Civil Appeal Nos. 682 of 2008 etc. 
-: 6 :-
(4) No order under this section shall be made by an officer 
of 13[Inland Revenue] unless a notice to show cause is 
given 14[within five years] to the person in default 
specifying the grounds on which it is intended to proceed 
against him and the officer of 15[Inland Revenue] shall take 
into consideration the representation made by such person 
and provide him with an opportunity of being heard 16[:]] 
 
17[Provided that order under this section shall be 
made within 18[one hundred and twenty] days of issuance 
of show cause notice or within such extended period as 
19[the 20[Commissioner] 21[* * *]] may, for reasons to be 
recorded in writing, fix provided that such extended period 
shall in no case exceed 22[sixty] days 23[:]] 
 
24[Provided further that any period during which 
the proceedings are adjourned on account of a stay order 
or Alternative Dispute Resolution proceedings or the time 
taken through adjournment by the petitioner not exceeding 
thirty days shall be excluded from the computation of the 
periods specified in the first proviso.]  
⁞ 
 
Current Section 11 
25[11. Assessment of Tax and recovery of tax not levied or 
short-levied or erroneously refunded.―  
⁞ 
(5) No order under this section shall be made by an officer 
of Inland Revenue unless a notice to show cause is given 
within five years to the person in default specifying the 
                                       
13 Substituted for the words “Sales Tax” by the Finance Act, 2010. Earlier the same amendment was made by the 
Finance (Amendment) Ordinance, 2010 and the Finance (Amendment) Ordinance, 2009. 
14 The words inserted by the Finance Act, 2008. 
15 Substituted for the words “Sales Tax” by the Finance Act, 2010. Earlier the same amendment was made by the 
Finance (Amendment) Ordinance, 2010 and the Finance (Amendment) Ordinance, 2009. 
16 Substituted for the full stop by the Finance Ordinance, 2000. 
17 Proviso added by the Finance Ordinance, 2000.  
18 Substituted for the word “ninety” by the Finance Act, 2008 which was substituted for the word “forty-five” by the 
Finance Act, 2003. 
19 Substituted for the words “an officer of Sales Tax” by the Finance Act, 2003. 
20 Substituted for the word “Collector” by the Finance Act, 2010. Earlier the same amendment was made by the 
Finance (Amendment) Ordinance, 2010 and the Finance (Amendment) Ordinance, 2009. 
21 The words, commas and brackets “or, as the case may be, Collector (Adjudication)” omitted by the Finance Act, 
2007. 
22 Substituted for the words “one hundred and twenty” by the Finance Act, 2009 which were substituted for the word 
“ninety” by the Finance Act, 2008 which was substituted for the word “forty-five” by the Finance Act, 2003. 
23 Substituted for the full stop by the Finance Act, 2009. 
24 Proviso added by the Finance Act, 2009. 
25 Substituted by the Finance Act, 2012. 
Civil Appeal Nos. 682 of 2008 etc. 
-: 7 :-
grounds on which it is intended to proceed against him and 
the officer of Sales Tax shall take into consideration the 
representation made by such person and provide him with 
an opportunity of being heard:  
 
Provided that order under this section shall be 
made within one hundred and twenty days of issuance of 
show cause notice or within such extended period as the 
Commissioner may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, 
fix provided that such extended period shall in no case 
exceed ninety days:  
 
Provided further that any period during which the 
proceedings are adjourned on account of a stay order or 
Alternative Dispute Resolution proceedings or the time 
taken through adjournment by the petitioner not exceeding 
thirty days shall be excluded from the computation of the 
period specified in the first proviso.  
⁞ 
 
26[74. Condonation of time-limit.–Where any time or 
period has been specified under any of the provisions of the 
Act or rules made thereunder within which any application 
is to be made or any act or thing is to be done, the 
27[Board] may, in any case or class of cases, permit such 
application to be made or such act or thing to be done 
within such time or period as it may consider appropriate 
28[:] 
 
 
29[Provided that the Board may, by notification in 
the official Gazette, and subject to such limitations or 
conditions as may be specified therein, empower a 
30[Commissioner] to exercise the powers under this section 
in any case or class of cases.]] 
 
 
31[Explanation.– ………………………………………] 
 
                                       
26 Added by Finance Ordinance, 2002. 
27 Substituted for the words “Central Board of Revenue” by the Finance Act, 2007. 
28 Substituted for the full stop by the Finance Act, 2004. 
29 Proviso added by the Finance Act, 2004. 
30 Substituted for the word “Collector” by the Finance (Amendment) Ordinance, 2009, the Finance (Amendment) 
Ordinance, 2010 and the Finance Act, 2010. 
31 Explanation added by the Finance Act, 2011. 
Civil Appeal Nos. 682 of 2008 etc. 
-: 8 :-
Since the first provisos to the erstwhile Sections 11(4) and 36(3) of the 
Act and the current Section 11(5) of the Act are identical, save for the 
time limit prescribed and the officers mentioned therein, we are using 
the erstwhile Section 36(3) (as originally inserted in the Act) as notionally 
representative of the other sections and any reference to the said 
provision and the terms used therein are to be taken to include the 
corresponding provisions and terms of the erstwhile Section 11(4) and 
the current Section 11(5) of the Act and the subsequent amendments 
made therein from time to time (unless stated otherwise). 
3. 
 
The learned counsel for the petitioner/department argued 
that once the first proviso to Section 36(3) of the Act had been inserted, 
a time frame came to be prescribed for the officer of Sales Tax (the 
‘officer’) to pass an order under the said section and the same is not 
mandatory but rather directory especially considering that this period 
can be extended by the Collector under the first proviso itself and by the 
Board (or Collector notified by the Board) under Section 74 of the Act. He was 
of the opinion that the order passed by the officer after the stipulated 
period would not be vitiated merely on the ground that it had been 
passed beyond such time frame; therefore, the impugned orders of the 
learned High Court were liable to be set aside. Conversely, the learned 
counsel for the respondents submitted that the word ‘shall’ appearing in 
the first proviso to Section 36(3) of the Act rendered the provision 
mandatory and the officer was bound to pass the order within the 
stipulated period. Further, whilst time could be extended under the Act, 
such extension could not be for an unlimited period but only for the 
period specified therein. 
4. 
 
The first proviso to Section 36(3) of the Act (as it stood at the time 
it was inserted) stipulated that orders passed thereunder ‘shall be made 
Civil Appeal Nos. 682 of 2008 etc. 
-: 9 :-
within forty-five days’ of the issuance of the show cause notice or 
within such extended period as the officer may, for reasons to be 
recorded in writing, fix, provided that such extended period ‘shall in no 
case exceed ninety days’. There were basically two time frames: (i) a 
period of forty-five days within which the officer was to pass an order 
under Section 36 of the Act; and (ii) a period of ninety days which was 
the maximum period for which the officer could grant extension of time 
(with reasons recorded in writing) for passing of the order under Section 36 
supra. The word ‘shall’ as opposed to ‘may’ has been used on both 
occasions when prescribing the maximum time period in the first 
proviso. It is settled law that when the word ‘shall’ is used in a provision 
of law, it is to be construed in its ordinary grammatical meaning and 
normally the use of word ‘shall’ by the legislature brands a provision as 
mandatory32, especially when an authority is required to do something 
in a particular manner. Reference in this behalf may be made to the 
case of Haji Abdul Karim and others Vs. Messrs Florida Builders 
(Pvt) Limited (PLD 2012 SC 247) wherein, whilst interpreting Order 
VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, this Court held that 
the Courts were bound by the word ‘shall’ used therein which made it 
mandatory to reject a plaint if it appeared from the statements in the 
plaint that it was barred by any law. In effect the deployment of the 
word ‘shall’ in this context denuded the Courts of their discretion in this 
behalf. Similarly, in the judgment reported as Safeer Travels (Pvt.) 
Ltd. Vs. Muhammad Khalid Shafi through legal heirs (PLD 2007 SC 
504) it was held with regard to Section 16(2) of the Sindh Rented 
Premises Ordinance, 1979 that the word ‘shall’ made it obligatory for 
the Court to strike off a defence in case of default. Therefore we find 
                                       
32 See the case of Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif Vs. President of Pakistan and others (PLD 1993 SC 473). 
Civil Appeal Nos. 682 of 2008 etc. 
-: 10 :-
that the use of the word ‘shall’ is a strong indicator that the provisos in 
question are mandatory in nature.  
5. 
 
Learned counsel for the appellants argued that the word 
‘shall’ is not always to be construed as mandatory but rather the 
determining factor is whether non-compliance with a provision entails 
penal consequences or not. He stated that since no such consequences 
flowed from Section 36(3) of the Act thus the proviso was directory 
notwithstanding the fact that the word ‘shall’ was used therein.  
6. 
 
The ultimate test to determine whether a provision is 
mandatory or directory is that of ascertaining the legislative intent. 
While the use of the word ‘shall’ is not the sole factor which determines 
the mandatory or directory nature of a provision, it is certainly one of 
the indicators of legislative intent. Other factors include the presence of 
penal consequences in case of non-compliance, but perhaps the 
clearest indicator is the object and purpose of the statute and the 
provision in question. It is the duty of the Court to garner the real 
intent of the legislature as expressed in the law itself. Reference may be 
made to the cases of Syed Zia Haider Rizvi and others Vs. Deputy 
Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Lahore and others (2011 SCMR 420), 
in Re. Presidential Election, 1974 (AIR 1974 SC 1682), Lachmi 
Narain Vs. Union of India (AIR 1976 SC 714), and Dinesh Chandra 
Pandey Vs. High Court Of Madhya Pradesh and another [(2010) 11 
SCC 500].  
7. 
 
From the plain language of the first proviso, it is clear that 
the officer was bound to pass an order within the stipulated time period 
of forty-five days, and any extension of time by the Collector could not 
in any case exceed ninety days. The Collector could not extend the time 
according to his own choice and whim, as a matter of course, routine or 
Civil Appeal Nos. 682 of 2008 etc. 
-: 11 :-
right, without any limit or constraint; he could only do so by applying 
his mind and after recording reasons for such extension in writing. 
Thus the language of the first proviso was meant to restrict the officer 
from passing an order under Section 36(3) supra whenever he wanted. 
It also restricted the Collector from granting unlimited extension. The 
curtailing of the powers of the officer and the Collector and the negative 
character of the language employed in the first proviso point towards its 
mandatory nature. This is further supported by the fact that the first 
proviso was inserted into Section 36(3) supra through an amendment 
(note:- the current Section 11 of the Act, on the other hand,  was enacted with the proviso from 
its very inception in 2012). Prior to such insertion, undoubtedly there was no 
time limit within which the officer was required to pass orders under 
the said section. The insertion of the first proviso reflects the clear 
intention of the legislature to curb this earlier latitude conferred on the 
officer for passing an order under the section supra. When the 
legislature makes an amendment in an existing law by providing a 
specific procedure or time frame for performing a certain act, such 
provision cannot be interpreted in a way which would render it 
redundant or nugatory. Thus, we hold that the first proviso to Section 
36(3) of the Act [and the first proviso to the erstwhile Section 11(4) and the current Section 
11(5) of the Act] is/was mandatory in nature.  
8. 
 
As regards the submission of the learned counsel for the 
appellants that the time period in the first proviso was only meant to 
ensure that orders were passed within a reasonable time and in fact, 
the orders could have been passed beyond the stipulated time period if 
the department were able to show that special circumstances existed 
warranting the same, suffice it to say that there is no justification 
whatsoever to read ‘special circumstances’ and ‘reasonable time’ into 
Civil Appeal Nos. 682 of 2008 etc. 
-: 12 :-
the said proviso. It is settled law that the principle of reading in or 
casus omissus is not to be invoked lightly, rather it is to be used 
sparingly and only when the situation demands it. In fact the Courts 
should refrain from supplying an omission in the statute because to do 
so steers the Courts from the realms of interpretation or construction 
into those of legislation.33 This principle has been aptly dealt with by 
this Court in judgment reported as Abdul Haq Khan and others Vs. 
Haji Ameerzada and others (PLD 2017 SC 105) in which it was 
observed that:- 
 
The reading in of words or meaning into a statute when its 
meaning is otherwise clear is not permissible. As a matter 
of statutory interpretation, Courts generally abstain from 
providing casus omissus or omissions in a statute, through 
construction or interpretation. An exception to this rule is, 
when there is a self-evident omission in a provision and the 
purpose of the law as intended by the legislature cannot 
otherwise be achieved, or if the literal construction of a 
particular provision leads to manifestly absurd or 
anomalous results, which could not have been intended by 
the legislature. However, this power is to be exercised 
cautiously, rarely and only in exceptional circumstances. 
 
Therefore, we find that the wording of the first proviso to Section 36(3) 
of the Act contained no ambiguity or obscurity warranting reading in of 
the aforesaid phrases. 
9. 
 
Another aspect of the matter is that when a statute requires 
that a thing should be done in a particular manner or form, it has to be 
done in such manner. But if such provision is directory, the act done in 
breach thereof would not be void, even though non-compliance may 
entail penal consequences. However, non-compliance of a mandatory 
provision would invalidate such act. In this context, reference may be 
                                       
33 Principles of Statutory Interpretation (13th Ed.) by Justice G. P. Singh. 
Civil Appeal Nos. 682 of 2008 etc. 
-: 13 :-
made to the case of Rubber House Vs. Excellsior Needle Industries 
Pvt. Ltd. (AIR 1989 SC 1160). Thus, having held the first proviso to 
Section 36(3) supra to be mandatory, the natural corollary of non-
compliance with its terms would be that any order passed beyond the 
stipulated time period would be invalid.  
10.   
Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that in terms 
of the second proviso to Section 36(3) of the Act, the time consumed by 
virtue of stay orders or adjournments not exceeding thirty days was 
to be excluded from the calculation of the time period in the first 
proviso. We find that such exclusion could not exceed 30 days as per 
the clear mandate of the provision itself.  
11. 
 
Learned counsel for the appellants also stated that the 
Collector under the first proviso to Section 36(3) of the Act was 
empowered to grant extensions. Learned counsel for the respondent 
argued that the Collector could only extend time during the subsistence 
of the time limit provided in the former part thereof, accordingly, as per 
Section 36(3) of the Act, once the time period of forty-five days for 
passing the order under the section ibid had passed, no extension could 
be granted. We do not find any force in this argument. Undoubtedly the 
Collector has the power to grant extensions which cannot exceed ninety 
days, as is manifest from the wording of the latter part of the first 
proviso, however it is not incumbent upon the Collector to extend the 
time within the currency of the initial time period of forty-five days: it is 
entirely possible to extend the time even after the expiry of the initial 
time period but the critical period in this regard is ninety days because 
at the expiry of this maximum period time cannot be further extended. 
By way of illustration, as per the first proviso to Section 36(3) of the Act, 
if an officer fails to pass an order within forty-five days (the initial time 
Civil Appeal Nos. 682 of 2008 etc. 
-: 14 :-
period), the Collector need not grant an extension within such forty-five 
days, instead he can do so after the said number of days. However, 
since the latter part of the first proviso only allows him to grant an 
extension of ninety days, thus any extension granted must not exceed 
the maximum limit of one hundred and thirty five days (forty-five plus 
ninety) from the date of the show cause notice. 
12. 
 
As regards the reliance placed on Section 74 of the Act, it 
provides that where a time frame has been stipulated in the Act within 
which an act or thing is to be done, the Board, or the Commissioner 
notified by the Board, are empowered to permit such act or thing to be 
done within such time period as they may consider appropriate. Passing 
an order under Section 36(3) of the Act is certainly an act or thing to be 
done under the Act. Therefore the Board (which expression shall hereinafter 
include Commissioner notified by the Board) has the power under Section 74 of 
the Act to permit the passing of an order under the aforesaid section 
within such time period as it may consider appropriate. While applying 
the principles of harmonious construction, we find that the proviso is 
restricted in its application to the section it is attached to, whereas 
Section 74 of the Act is of general applicability and shall apply to all the 
provisions of the Act and the rules framed thereunder. This provision 
will undoubtedly have an overriding effect over the first proviso to 
Section 36(3) supra and can be held to be an exception thereto. The 
purpose of Section 74 supra is to give a separate overriding power to the 
Board to permit any act or thing to be done under the statute within 
such time period as it may deem appropriate, which undoubtedly is 
independent of any other provision of the Act which provides a time 
frame. To restrict the time period that can be granted under Section 74 
supra to the maximum period available under the first proviso to 
Civil Appeal Nos. 682 of 2008 etc. 
-: 15 :-
Section 36(3) of the Act would render the former absolutely redundant 
and superfluous, which cannot be countenanced under the settled rules 
of interpretation which do not allow such redundancy to be attributed 
to the legislative intent. Therefore, where the Board has permitted the 
passing of an order under the proviso within a time frame different from 
that contained therein, this new time frame shall be deemed to be the 
relevant one. However this does not mean that in exercise of its power 
under Section 74 of the Act, the Board will have unfettered and 
unbridled authority to extend time when, and for however long, it feels 
it expedient to do so. Rather time would only be extended in certain 
cases, after application of mind and that too for a reasonable amount of 
time. For the purposes of settling the reasonable time, we hold that 
after the expiry of the two time periods envisaged by the first proviso to 
Section 36(3) of the Act, i.e. forty-five days [within which the order under Section 
36 of the Act is to be passed] and a further ninety days [extended period under the first 
proviso to Section 36(3) ibid], the Board should have six months within which 
it may grant extension of time under Section 74 supra which (extension) 
can also not exceed six months. If the reasonable time mentioned above 
also lapses, then the rule of past and closed transaction shall apply 
because it is inconceivable in law that:- (a) the Board would have 
infinite and unlimited time within which it can grant extensions under 
Section 74 supra; and (b) the Board can grant infinite and unlimited 
extension under Section 74 ibid; to obliterate the vested rights that 
stand created in favour of the taxpayer on account of such lapse of 
time. In this respect, the judgment reported as Federal Land 
Commission through Chairman Vs. Rais Habib Ahmed and others 
(PLD 2011 SC 842) is relevant in which this Court, while relying upon 
the settled principles of past and closed transaction and reasonable 
Civil Appeal Nos. 682 of 2008 etc. 
-: 16 :-
time, stipulated that a period of six months was the reasonable time for 
the purposes of exercise of power by the Federal Government under 
Section 25 of the Land Reforms Act, 1977. Thus we are of the opinion 
that while undoubtedly the Board has the power under Section 74 
supra to extend the time limit and permit an order under Section 36 
supra to be passed within such time or period as it may consider 
appropriate, such power must be exercised within a reasonable time 
period of six months from the date when the time period provided in the 
first proviso to Section 36(3) supra and the extension granted 
thereunder have lapsed, and such power can only be exercised (by the 
Board under Section 74 supra) to grant an extension of not more than a 
reasonable time period of six months.  
13. 
 
In view of the findings given hereinabove, it is appropriate 
to consider the relevant facts of each case which are tabulated below:- 
 
Civil 
Appeal 
No. 
Date of 
show cause 
notice 
Date of order in 
original 
Limitation 
period 
Observations 
682/2008 
06.04.1998 
No order passed as yet. 
90 days 
Beyond time 
683/2008 
22.06.2000 
24.02.2004 
45 days 
Beyond time 
684/2008 
19.06.2000 
30.10.2000 
45 days 
Beyond time 
131/2011 
06.04.2002 
31.07.2002 
45 days 
Beyond time 
233/2011 
31.05.2004 
02.01.2006 
90 days 
Beyond time 
253/2011 
21.11.2001 
20.08.2003 
45 days 
Beyond time 
504/2011 
23.04.2005 
28.03.2006 
90 days 
Beyond time 
219/2011 
09.09.2004 
30.04.2005 
90 days 
Beyond time 
220/2011 
17.05.2002 
28.10.2002 
45 days 
Beyond time 
678/2012 
07.11.2001 
23.07.2003 
45 days 
Beyond time 
679/2012 
11.12.2006 
23.10.2008 
90 days 
Beyond time 
680/2012 
27.11.2001 
08.05.2002 
45 days 
Beyond time 
681/2012 
19.07.2001 
18.10.2001 
45 days 
Beyond time 
682/2012 
20.03.2006 
30.12.2006 
90 days 
Beyond time 
683/2012 
12.02.2002 
30.05.2002 
45 days 
Beyond time 
783/2012 
15.11.2007 
20.09.2008 
90 days 
Beyond time 
729/2012 
09.08.2003 
31.03.2005 
90 days 
Beyond time 
730/2012 
19.02.2009 
13.10.2009 
120 days 
Beyond time 
731/2012 
09.08.2003 
24.11.2004 
90 days 
Beyond time 
732/2012 
06.11.2006 
14.12.2007 
90 days 
Within time 
Civil Appeal Nos. 682 of 2008 etc. 
-: 17 :-
(extension 
granted by the 
Board) 
389/2013 
04.03.2002 
30.11.2005 
45 days 
Beyond time 
390/2013 
12.04.2001 
17.08.2001 
45 days 
Beyond time 
391/2013 
19.05.1999 
17.06.2004 
45 days 
Beyond time 
392/2013 
10.11.2004 
12.10.2005 
90 days 
Beyond time 
393/2013 
12.12.2002 
11.11.2004 
45 days 
Beyond time 
394/2013 
17.10.2008 
12.02.2009 
120 days 
Within time 
395/2013 
22.10.2007 
28.02.2008 
90 days 
Beyond time 
396/2013 
13.03.2004 
18.05.2005 
90 days 
Beyond time 
397/2013 
10.03.2004 
10.06.2005 
90 days 
Beyond time 
398/2013 
28.06.2003 
20.03.2004 
90 days 
Beyond time 
399/2013 
21.09.1998 
19.06.1999 
No limitation 
period 
Before 
insertion of 
proviso 
400/2013 
07.05.2005 
06.10.2005 
90 days 
Beyond time 
401/2013 
21.05.2005 
21.10.2005 
90 days 
Beyond time 
710/2013 
28.11.2007 
30.12.2008 
90 days 
Beyond time 
711/2013 
22.04.2005 
26.12.2006 
90 days 
Beyond time 
712/2013 
28.05.2007 
12.09.2008 
90 days 
Within time 
(extension 
granted by the 
Board) 
713/2013 
17.12.2004 
16.05.2005 
90 days 
Beyond time 
1632/2014 09.08.2003 
06.04.2004 
90 days 
Beyond time 
565/2015 
16.05.2003 
12.06.2004 
45 days 
Beyond time 
1424/2016 15.05.2012 
05.10.2012 
120 days 
Beyond time 
1425/2016 14.03.2012 
04.10.2012 
120 days 
Beyond time 
2470/2016 14.12.2012 
19.04.2013 
120 days 
Beyond time 
 
14. 
 
While dictating the judgment, it came to our attention that 
in Civil Appeal No.394/2013, the show cause notice was issued on 
17.10.2008 while the order was passed on 12.02.2009 which was 
within the limitation period of 120 days. In Civil Appeal No.399/2013, 
the show cause notice was issued on 21.09.1998 and the order was 
passed on 19.06.1999 therefore the matter pertained to the time period 
when the proviso containing the limitation period was not yet inserted 
into the Act hence, such limitation period did not apply thereto. In Civil 
Appeal No.712/2013, the show cause notice was issued on 28.05.2007 
and the order was passed on 09.09.2008. However there are letters of 
Civil Appeal Nos. 682 of 2008 etc. 
-: 18 :-
the Board on record suggesting that the time period was extended up 
till 30.09.2008 under the second proviso to Section 45(1) read with 
Section 74 of the Act. Thus the order was passed within time. Similarly, 
in Civil Appeal No.732/2012, the show cause notice was issued on 
06.11.2006 and the order was passed on 14.12.2007, whereas there is 
a letter of the Board on record indicating that the time period was 
extended up till 31.12.2007 under the provisions ibid hence the order 
was passed within time. Therefore these four noted appeals are 
separated from the rest of the cases and the office is directed to fix them 
for re-hearing. 
15. 
 
In the remaining appeals, all the orders of the officers were 
time barred as they were passed beyond the time period provided in the 
respective law existing at the relevant point in time and there is no 
material on the record in any of the cases suggesting that time was 
extended [under the second part of the first proviso to Section 36(3) of the Act or Section 74 
thereof] for passing an order under Section 36 of the Act or that there 
was any stay order or adjournment granted on the request of the 
assessee [under second proviso to Section 36(3) of the Act] warranting exclusion of 
a period of 30 days from the limitation period in the first proviso, 
therefore, Civil Appeal Nos.682 to 684 of 2008, 131, 233, 253, 504, 219 
and 220 of 2011, 678 to 683, 783 and 729 to 731 of 2012, 389 to 393 
and 395 to 398, 400, 401, 710, 711 and 713 of 2013, 1632 of 2014, 
565 of 2015 and 1424 to 1425 and 2470 of 2016 are dismissed.  
16. 
 
The above are the detailed reasons for our short order of 
even date which reads as under:- 
  
“For the reasons to be recorded later and without in any 
manner limiting our jurisdiction to appropriately enlarge 
the scope of the detailed judgment, we hold that the 
Civil Appeal Nos. 682 of 2008 etc. 
-: 19 :-
provisions of Section 11 and the erstwhile Section 36 of the 
Sales Tax Act, 1990 (the Act) are mandatory in nature. The 
Collector/Commissioner has the power to extend the time 
within which an order under either of the Sections supra is 
to be passed; besides, such time can also be extended in a 
particular case or class of cases by the Federal Board of 
Revenue (or the Commissioner if empowered by the said Board) 
as per the provisions of Section 74 of the Act. In the light of 
the above, all these petitions (except Civil Appeals No. 
733/2010 and 1507/2006) are dismissed on the above 
question of law.  
 
C. As.733/2010 AND 1507/2016 
 
 
 
Due to their peculiar facts, these cases are 
separated from the aforementioned cases and are to be re-
listed.”  
 
 
CHIEF JUSTICE 
 
 
 
JUDGE 
 
 
 
JUDGE 
ISLAMABAD. 
31st March, 2017. 
Approved for reporting 
Mudassar/