IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN 
(Review Jurisdiction) 
 
 
PRESENT: 
Mr. Justice Asif Saeed Khan Khosa 
Mr. Justice Ijaz Ahmed Chaudhry 
Mr. Justice Gulzar Ahmed  
 
 
Criminal Review Petitions No. 8-L and 10-L of 2013  
in Criminal Petition No. 896-L of 2012 
(Against the judgment dated 03.01.2013 passed by this Court in 
Criminal Petition No. 896-L of 2012)       
 
 
Nazir Ahmed 
 
         (in Cr.R.P. No. 8-L of 2013) 
Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi  
                                         
(in Cr.R.P. No. 10-L of 2013) 
…Petitioners 
versus 
 
The State, etc. 
 
 
(in both cases) 
 
 
 
 
   
   
    … Respondents 
 
 
For the petitioners: 
Mr. Muhammad Ahsan Bhoon, ASC 
(in Cr.R.P. No. 8-L of 2013)    
 
Khawaja Haris Ahmed, Sr. ASC 
(in Cr.R.P. No. 10-L of 2013) 
                                     
For the State: 
Mr. Ahmad Raza Gillani, Additional 
Prosecutor-General, Punjab 
 
(in both cases) 
 
For the complainant: 
Ch. Muhammad Riaz Ahmad, ASC 
 
(in both cases) 
 
Date of hearing: 
 
 
15.01.2014 
 
 
JUDGMENT 
 
Asif Saeed Khan Khosa, J.: The jurisdiction of this Court, 
as is evident from the provisions of Article 189 of the Constitution 
of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, is not just to decide 
questions of law but it also extends to enunciating principles of law 
which decisions and principles are binding on all other courts in 
the country. The principles of law contemplated by Article 189 
include principles regulating the practices in vogue in the field of 
 
2 
law and some of such practices and the principles enunciated in 
those regards are the subject of the present judgment.  
 
2. 
The facts forming the basis for passage of the judgment of 
this Court under review admit of no ambiguity and the already 
settled principles of practice and propriety applicable thereto pose 
no difficulty of comprehension but the judgment under review has 
been taken exception to not only by the litigant affected by that 
judgment but also by the learned Judge of the Lahore High Court, 
Lahore whose order was set aside by this Court through the said 
judgment. The matter of a litigant filing a review petition before 
this Court is run of the mill but a Judge of a High Court 
approaching this Court in person and seeking review of a judgment 
of this Court is surely out of the ordinary and it may raise many an 
eyebrow in view of the provisions of Article VI of the Code of 
Conduct prescribed by the Supreme Judicial Council adherence to 
which a Judge of a High Court swears while making oath of his 
office. The said Article of the Code of Conduct reads as follows: 
 
“A Judge should endeavour to avoid, as far as possible, being 
involved in litigation either on his own behalf or on behalf of 
others.”  
 
In this peculiar, and rather disturbing, backdrop we have attended 
to different aspects of these review petitions with utmost care and 
have decided to restate some of the relevant principles of law and 
practice with clarity so that in future no Judge may maintain that 
he had difficulty in comprehending or applying the same. 
 
3. 
The facts of the case are that one Muhammad Islam 
Advocate was murdered and in that respect Muhammad Siddique 
complainant (respondent No. 2 herein) had lodged FIR No. 733 at 
Police Station Baseerpur, District Okara on 29.10.2008 for 
offences under sections 148, 302, 149 and 109, PPC. In the FIR 
the complainant had implicated six persons as the culprits 
including Nazir Ahmed (petitioner in Criminal Review Petition No. 
8-L of 2013) and one Madad Ali and according to the FIR Nazir 
 
3 
Ahmed petitioner had caused multiple firearm injuries in the 
abdomen of the deceased whereas Madad Ali co-accused had 
caused firearm injuries on the chest and other specified parts of 
the body of the deceased. During the investigation Nazir Ahmed 
petitioner and Madad Ali co-accused were opined by the police to 
be innocent and they were not even arrested which prompted the 
complainant to file a private complaint in respect of the same 
incident and against the same accused persons who had already 
been nominated in the FIR. After a full-dressed trial conducted in 
the private complaint the learned Additional Sessions Judge, 
Depalpur, District Okara found both Nazir Ahmed petitioner and 
Madad Ali co-accused guilty of the murder and vide judgment 
dated 19.05.2011 he convicted them for an offence under section 
302(b), PPC read with section 34, PPC and sentenced them to 
imprisonment for life each as Ta’zir besides ordering them to pay a 
sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- each to the heirs of the deceased by way of 
compensation under section 544-A, Cr.P.C. or in default of 
payment thereof to undergo simple imprisonment for six months 
each. The benefit under section 382-B, Cr.P.C. was extended to 
them. Nazir Ahmed petitioner and Madad Ali co-convict assailed 
their convictions and sentences before the Lahore High Court, 
Lahore through Criminal Appeal No. 1082 of 2011 jointly filed by 
them. During the pendency of that appeal Madad Ali co-convict 
filed Criminal Miscellaneous No. 01 of 2011 seeking suspension of 
his sentence and release on bail which application was allowed by 
a learned Judge-in-Chamber of the Lahore High Court, Lahore 
(Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi, J.) on 23.01.2012 on the 
grounds that there was previous enmity between the parties; 
Madad Ali was found by the police to be innocent; the complainant 
had filed his private complaint with a delay of six months; and the 
firearm injuries on some specified parts of the body of the deceased 
attributed to Madad Ali in the FIR were non-existent in the Post-
mortem Examination Report pertaining to the deadbody of the 
deceased and in his private complaint the complainant had 
changed the locale of the injuries allegedly caused by Madad Ali so 
 
4 
as to bring them in line with the medical evidence. The operative 
part of the order dated 23.01.2012 reads as under: 
 
“6. 
There is no denial to this factum that the petitioner is 
nominated in the FIR with specific role, however, previous enmity 
between the parties is also an admitted fact. During the course of 
investigation, the petitioner was found innocent by the police and 
as such he was let off. In view of the premium of innocence, the 
complainant filed private complaint with the delay of six months, 
for which no plausible explanation has been rendered by the 
complainant and in the complaint the complainant has changed 
his stance qua locale of injuries ascribed to the petitioner. There 
is contradiction in the ocular as well as medical ocular account. 
Keeping in view the dictum of law laid down in the cases of 1994 
SCMR 453 (Muhammad Afzal and another Versus The State), 
2006 YLR 1953 (Muhammad Waheed Akhtar Versus The State) 
and 2008 MLD 396 (Fayyaz Maqsood and 3 others Versus The 
State), this Court is persuaded to accept this petition and 
suspend the sentence awarded to the petitioner and admit him to 
bail pending disposal of the main appeal subject to his furnishing 
bail bonds in the sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees one lac only) 
with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the 
Deputy Registrar (J) of this Court.” 
 
The said order of the Lahore High Court, Lahore was challenged by 
Muhammad Siddique complainant before this Court through 
Criminal Petition No. 95-L of 2012 which petition was dismissed by 
this Court on 14.03.2012 as having been withdrawn. After 
suspension of Madad Ali co-convict’s sentence and his admission 
to bail Nazir Ahmed petitioner filed Criminal Miscellaneous No. 01 
of 2012 before the Lahore High Court, Lahore seeking the same 
relief for himself but that application was dismissed by another 
learned Judge-in-Chamber of the said Court (Abdus Sattar Asghar, 
J.) on 20.02.2012 for non-prosecution. The order dated 20.02.2012 
reads as follows: 
 
“Despite repeated calls no one entered appearance on 
behalf of the petitioner. Name of learned counsel for the petitioner 
appears in the cause list but there is no intimation with regard to 
his absence. 
 
2. 
Dismissed for non-prosecution.” 
 
Subsequently Nazir Ahmed petitioner made his second attempt for 
the same relief through Criminal Miscellaneous No. 02 of 2012 
which application was dismissed by Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar 
Naqvi, J. on 11.04.2012 with the following order: 
 
5 
 
“Learned counsel for the petitioner, after arguing the case at some 
length, wishes to withdraw the instant petition. Dismissed as 
withdrawn.” 
 
Undeterred by failure of his two earlier applications for suspension 
of sentence and release on bail Nazir Ahmed petitioner made his 
third attempt for obtaining the same relief through Criminal 
Miscellaneous No. 03 of 2012 which was not filed through the 
original learned counsel who had filed and represented him in the 
earlier two applications but was filed through a different learned 
counsel and this time the attempt was crowned with success as 
the same learned Judge-in-Chamber of the Lahore High Court, 
Lahore who had dismissed the second application of the petitioner 
for the same relief suspended his sentence and released him on 
bail on 19.11.2012. The operative part of the order dated 
19.11.2012 passed by Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi, J. reads as 
follows: 
 
“This is the third petition on the subject. The first one 
bearing Crl. Misc. No. 01/2012 was dismissed for non-
prosecution vide order dated20.02.2012, whereas the second 
petition bearing Crl. Misc. No. 02/2012 was dismissed as 
withdrawn vide order dated 11.04.2012. 
---------------------------------------- 
---------------------------------------- 
 
6. 
From the perusal of the record it reveals that the 
petitioner was nominated in the FIR with specific role but during 
the course of investigation, he was found innocent and was let off 
by the investigating agency and thereafter, the complainant filed 
private complaint after a delay of six months for which no 
plausible explanation has been rendered. Moreover, there is 
previous enmity between the parties. The role ascribed to the 
petitioner is that he while armed with .222 bore Rifle fired two fire 
shots, which hit to Muhammad Islaam (deceased), whereas the 
role ascribed to the co-accused, Madad Ali, is that he also made 
two successive fire shots with his rifle .222 bore, which hit his 
chest. Thus, the role ascribed to the petitioner is identical to that 
of his co-accused, namely Madad Ali, whose sentence has already 
been suspended by this Court vide order dated 23.01.2012, 
passed in Crl. Misc. No. 01/2011, filed in Crl. A. No. 1082/2011, 
which was assailed before the august Supreme Court of Pakistan 
through Criminal Petition No. 98-L of 2012 and the same was 
dismissed as withdrawn. 
 
7. 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court is persuaded to 
accept this petition, suspend the sentence awarded to the 
petitioner and admit him to bail pending disposal of the main 
appeal subject to his furnishing bail bonds in the sum of Rs. 
 
6 
1,00,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction 
of deputy Registrar (Judicial) of this Court.” 
 
That order passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore on 
19.11.2012 was assailed before this Court by Muhammad Siddique 
complainant through Criminal Petition No. 896-L of 2012 which 
petition was converted into an appeal and was allowed by this 
Court on 03.01.2013, the impugned order was set aside and bail 
allowed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore to Nazir Ahmed 
petitioner was cancelled. The relevant parts of the judgment 
passed by this Court on 03.01.2013 are reproduced below: 
 
“6. 
The complainant in his private complaint ascribed 
respondent No. 2 the role of causing two injuries on the person of 
the deceased Muhammad Islam on his abdominal area and 
Madad Ali co-convict made two successive fire shots with his .222 
bore rifle which hit the deceased on his chest. Both the aforesaid 
accused having been found guilty by the learned trial Court were 
convicted 
under 
section 
302(b) 
PPC 
and 
sentenced 
to 
imprisonment for life. Madad Ali co-convict of respondent No. 2 
filed Crl. Misc. 01/2011 in Crl. Appeal No. 1082/2011 for 
suspension of his sentence before the learned Lahore High Court, 
Lahore which stood allowed on 23.01.2012 whereby his sentence 
was suspended. Thereafter, respondent No. 2 moved an 
application (Crl. Misc. 01/2012) for suspension of his sentence 
which stood dismissed for non-prosecution as is evident from the 
certificate given by the learned counsel for respondent No. 2 at 
the bottom of Crl. Misc. 03/2012. Thereafter, respondent No. 2 
filed Crl. Misc. 02/2012 before the learned Lahore High Court, 
Lahore, which stood dismissed as withdrawn but on the same 
grounds the third application (Crl. Misc. 03/2012) was allowed by 
the learned Lahore High Court, Lahore by totally ignoring the 
principles for suspension of sentence and other material available 
on record by suspending the sentence of respondent No. 2 
through impugned order. The main ground taken by the learned 
Judge of the Lahore High Court for suspending the sentence of 
respondent No. 2 was rule of consistency having similarity of 
roles ascribed to respondent No. 2 as well as Madad Ali co-
convict, as such, the impugned order has been passed in violation 
of the law laid down by this Court in the case of “The State 
through Advocate General NWFP vs. Zubair and four others” (PLD 
1986 Supreme Court 173) wherein it has been held as under: 
 
8. It might be useful to mention here that the 
second or the subsequent bail application to the 
same Court shall lie only on a fresh ground 
namely, a ground which did not exist at the time 
when the first application was made. If a ground 
was available to the accused at the time when the 
first bail application was filed and was not taken or 
was not pressed, it cannot be considered as a fresh 
ground and made the basis of any subsequent bail 
application. We may also point out, with respect to 
the learned Judge who dealt with the second bail 
application that the mere fact that the learned 
Judge who had rejected the first bail application of 
 
7 
the respondents with the observation that as far as 
the remaining petitioners (the respondents herein) 
are concerned no case had been made out for their 
release on bail, does not mean that the application 
had not been disposed of on merits. It must be 
assumed that he had considered all the pleas or 
grounds raised by the applicant's counsel before 
him and that the same had not found favour with 
him.”  
 
In such circumstances it is apparent on the face of record that 
the ground of similarity of role and rule of consistency was 
available to the petitioner at the time of filing first application for 
suspension of sentence but the learned Judge has totally ignored 
it.  From the tenor of impugned order it appears that the learned 
Judge of the Lahore High Court while suspending the sentence of 
respondent No. 2 has not exercised discretion in a proper and 
judicious manner rather has not at all adverted to the guidelines 
laid down in Zubair’s case (supra).  
 
7. 
In view of the above, we while converting the instant 
petition into an appeal allow the same, set aside the impugned 
order dated 19.11.2012 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore 
in Crl. Misc. 03/2012 in Crl. Appeal No. 1082/2011 and cancel 
the bail granted to respondent No. 2.   
 
8. 
Before parting with this order we may observe that 
discretion exercised by the learned Judge while passing the 
impugned order in the instant case has appeared to us to be 
somewhat 
colourable 
because 
after 
dismissal 
of 
second 
application for suspension of sentence bearing the same ground 
the only difference in the respondent’s third application for the 
same relief was a different learned counsel for that respondent.  
Office is directed to send a copy of this order to the learned Judge 
of the Lahore High Court, Lahore for his information.” 
 
Hence, the present review petitions before this Court. Criminal 
Review Petition No. 8-L of 2013 has been filed by Nazir Ahmed 
petitioner seeking restoration of his bail and Criminal Review 
Petition No. 10-L of 2013 has been preferred by Sayyed Mazahar 
Ali Akbar Naqvi, Judge, Lahore High Court, Lahore praying for 
expunction of some observations concerning him made by this 
Court in paragraph No. 8 of the judgment under review. 
 
4. 
In support of the review petition filed by Nazir Ahmed 
petitioner it has been argued by Mr. Muhammad Ahsan Bhoon, 
ASC that keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case 
as well as the rule of consistency the learned Judge-in-Chamber of 
the Lahore High Court, Lahore was quite justified in suspending 
the sentence of Nazir Ahmed petitioner and in admitting him to 
bail during the pendency of his appeal, particularly when the case 
 
8 
against the said petitioner for such relief was at par with that of 
his co-convict namely Madad Ali who had already been granted the 
same relief by the same Court. Mr. Bhoon has also argued that in 
entertaining and deciding the relevant application of Nazir Ahmed 
petitioner on its merits the learned Judge-in-Chamber of the 
Lahore High Court, Lahore had followed the law declared by this 
Court in the cases of Muhammad Riaz v. The State (2002 SCMR 
184) and Ali Hassan v. The State (2001 SCMR 1047) and, therefore, 
the legitimate exercise of jurisdiction and discretion in the matter 
by the learned Judge-in-Chamber of the Lahore High Court, 
Lahore ought not to have been interfered with by this Court 
through the judgment under review. While referring to the case of 
Makhdoom Javed Hashmi v. The State (2008 SCMR 165) Mr. Bhoon 
has submitted that in an appropriate case this Court may suspend 
the sentence of a convict and grant him bail even through exercise 
of review jurisdiction of this Court. Mr. Bhoon has lastly 
maintained that the contents of paragraph No. 8 of the judgment 
under review tend to cast aspersions not only upon the learned 
Judge-in-Chamber of the Lahore High Court, Lahore but also upon 
him as he was the counsel for Nazir Ahmed petitioner in the said 
petitioner’s third application for suspension of sentence and bail 
which application was allowed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore. 
He, therefore, not only seeks review of the judgment of this Court 
under review but also prays for expunction of the relevant 
observations made by this Court in that judgment. 
 
5. 
Khawaja Haris Ahmad, Sr. ASC appearing for Mr. Justice 
Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi petitioner has submitted that he 
only seeks expunction of the remarks made by this Court in 
paragraph No. 8 of the judgment under review and that he has 
nothing to say regarding the merits or otherwise of Nazir Ahmed 
petitioner’s case for suspension of sentence and bail. The main 
thrust of his submissions has been that the case of The State 
through Advocate-General, N.W.F.P. v. Zubair and 4 others (PLD 
1986 SC 173) was not relevant to the case in hand because 
nothing had been said in that precedent case about maintainability 
 
9 
or otherwise of a subsequent application for bail after dismissal of 
an earlier application for bail as having been withdrawn. According 
to Mr. Khawaja the only precedent cases relevant to the issue 
involved in the present case were the cases of Muhammad Riaz v. 
The State (2002 SCMR 184) and Ali Hassan v. The State (2001 
SCMR 1047) and the relevant order passed by Sayyed Mazahar Ali 
Akbar Naqvi, J. was in accord with the principle laid down in the 
said precedent cases. Mr. Khawaja has maintained that till the 
passage of the judgment under review different Honourable Judges 
of different High Courts of the country had been taking the same 
view of the matter as was taken by Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar 
Naqvi, J. in the order set aside by this Court through the judgment 
under review and even Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi, J. had 
taken the same view in seven other orders passed by him in 
different cases decided by him in the year 2012. In this respect he 
has placed on the record copies of the said seven orders passed by 
Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi, J. and has also referred to the 
cases reported as Wajid Ali v. The State (2009 P.Cr.L.J. 275), 
Mustaqeem v. The State (2005 P.Cr.L.J. 661), Rasheed Ahmad v. 
The State (2007 MLD 1440), Muhammad Mansha v. The State (2006 
P.Cr.L.J. 47), Muhammad Asif alias Kala v. The State (2007 
P.Cr.L.J. 1292), Muhammad Idrees v. The State (2005 MLD 899), 
M. Latif v. The State (1996 MLD 2041) and Akbar Ali v. Jamshaid 
Ali and others (2012 P.Cr.L.J. 1301). Mr. Khawaja has gone on to 
submit that there was no malice on the part of Mr. Justice Sayyed 
Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi petitioner in passing the relevant order in 
the case of Nazir Ahmed petitioner and the mistake, if any, in the 
bona fide order passed by him in the said case could only be 
attributed to confusion and lack of proper understanding of the 
true import of the principle laid down in the above mentioned 
cases of Muhammad Riaz v. The State (2002 SCMR 184) and Ali 
Hassan v. The State (2001 SCMR 1047). He has, therefore, 
maintained that the remarks or observations made by this Court in 
paragraph No. 8 of the judgment under review were uncalled for 
and has urged that this Court may order expunction of the same. 
In the end Mr. Khawaja has submitted that ordinarily no adverse 
 
10
remark or observation is to be made or recorded in a judgment of a 
court without issuing notice to the concerned person or before 
affording him an opportunity of being heard in the relevant 
connection and in this respect he has placed reliance upon the 
cases of Muhammad Punhal v. Abdul Wahid Abbasi and another 
(2003 SCMR 1406), In the matter of expunging certain remarks 
made by a Magistrate against Additional District and Sessions 
Judge, Lyallpur (PLD 1950 Lahore 34), Syed Ali Nawaz Gardezi v. 
Lt.-Col. Muhammad Yusuf (PLD 1963 SC 51) and Malik Firoz Khan 
Noon, Prime Minister’s House, Karachi v. The State (PLD 1958 SC 
(Pak.) 333).  
 
 
6. 
The learned counsel for Muhammad Siddique complainant 
has maintained that the judgment of this Court under review is a 
just and fair judgment besides being a considered judgment and 
the same addresses and cures a serious malady creeping into 
conducting of criminal cases and, therefore, the same does not call 
for a review. Regarding the scope of review jurisdiction he has 
referred to the case of Muhammad Riaz v. The State (2011 SCMR 
1019). He has complained that despite cancellation of his bail by 
this Court Nazir Ahmad petitioner has so far managed to avoid his 
arrest although no interim relief has been granted to him by this 
Court during the pendency of the captioned review petitions. The 
learned Additional Prosecutor-General, Punjab appearing for the 
State has supported the learned counsel for the complainant and 
has added that these review petitions essentially seek rehearing of 
the merits of the case which exercise lies beyond the scope of 
review jurisdiction of this Court. 
 
7. 
After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and going 
through the relevant record with their assistance we find that there 
are many issues involved in these review petitions and, thus, in the 
background of the facts of this case we have decided to discuss 
and resolve these issues one by one in the light of the principles 
concomitant thereto laid down by this Court from time to time. We 
find that the first issue involved in the review petitions in hand is 
 
11
as to whether the considerations weighing with the learned Judge-
in-Chamber of the Lahore High Court, Lahore for suspending the 
sentence of Nazir Ahmed petitioner and for releasing him on bail 
during the pendency of his appeal were valid considerations for 
grant of the said relief on the merits of the case. We note in this 
context that the reasons prevailing with the learned Judge-in-
Chamber of the Lahore High Court, Lahore for suspending the 
sentence of Nazir Ahmed petitioner and for admitting him to bail 
were that in the Challan case the police had found the petitioner 
innocent; the complainant had filed his private complaint after a 
delay of six months; there was previous enmity between the 
parties; and the sentence of a co-convict of the petitioner namely 
Madad Ali, attributed a role identical to that alleged against the 
petitioner, had already been suspended and he had been admitted 
to bail by the Lahore High Court, Lahore through an order which 
had not been interfered with by this Court. The facts and 
circumstances of the case, however, show that none of the said 
reasons provided a valid or sufficient ground for suspending the 
sentence of Nazir Ahmad petitioner and for his admission to bail 
during the pendency of his appeal before the Lahore High Court, 
Lahore. It ought to have been appreciated by the learned Judge-in-
Chamber of the Lahore High Court, Lahore that any declaration of 
innocence of Nazir Ahmad petitioner recorded by the police in the 
Challan case was irrelevant as the petitioner’s trial had been 
conducted in the complainant’s private complaint and not in the 
Challan case and even otherwise opinion of the police regarding 
the petitioner’s innocence was inadmissible in evidence being 
irrelevant besides such opinion having already paled into further 
irrelevance in view of the judicial verdict recorded by the learned 
trial court in respect of the petitioner’s guilt. The learned Judge-in-
Chamber of the Lahore High Court, Lahore had also failed to 
appreciate that the complainant had filed his private complaint 
when the investigating agency had disappointed and frustrated 
him on account of its alleged collusion with the accused party and 
the reasons for the delay in filing of the private complaint had been 
explained by the complainant before the learned trial court which 
 
12
reasons had been accepted by it as justified. Mere existence of 
enmity between the parties was hardly a valid ground for 
suspending the petitioner’s sentence and for his admission to bail 
because the learned trial court had already adjudged the petitioner 
guilty of the alleged murder and the existing enmity between the 
parties had been found by it to be supporting the motive set up by 
the prosecution. Apart from that existence of enmity between the 
parties and a possibility of false implication of the petitioner on the 
basis of such enmity was a factor which could only be attended to 
and appreciated by the learned appellate court after a detailed 
assessment of the evidence at the time of hearing of the main 
appeal and certainly not at the time of deciding an application 
seeking suspension of sentence and release on bail during the 
pendency of the appeal. The learned Judge-in-Chamber of the 
Lahore High Court, Lahore was also clearly unjustified in holding 
that the case of Madad Ali co-convict was “identical” to that of 
Nazir Ahmed petitioner and, therefore, in view of Madad Ali’s 
admission to bail upon suspension of his sentence Nazir Ahmed 
petitioner was also entitled to the same relief. The learned Judge-
in-Chamber of the Lahore High Court, Lahore had committed a 
serious error in this respect by not appreciating, or ignoring, the 
fact that most of the firearm injuries to the deceased attributed by 
the complainant in the FIR to Madad Ali were non-existent in the 
Post-mortem Examination Report pertaining to the deadbody of the 
deceased and, therefore, in his private complaint the complainant 
had changed the locale of the injuries allegedly caused by Madad 
Ali to the deceased whereas the complainant had throughout been 
quite consistent in his FIR as well as in his private complaint 
regarding the firearm injuries caused by Nazir Ahmed petitioner to 
the deceased which injuries stood duly reflected in the Post-
mortem Examination Report. In view of this factual position it 
could not be urged with any degree of seriousness or held with any 
degree of reasonableness that the case of Nazir Ahmad petitioner 
was identical to that of Madad Ali co-convict for the purpose of 
treating them alike in the matter of suspension of sentence and 
release on bail. For all these reasons a conclusion is irresistible 
 
13
and inescapable that the learned Judge-in-Chamber of the Lahore 
High Court, Lahore was not justified in suspending the sentence of 
Nazir Ahmed petitioner and in admitting him to bail on the merits 
of the case and, thus, cancellation of his bail by this Court brought 
about through the judgment under review cannot be taken any 
legitimate exception to. The learned counsel for Nazir Ahmed 
petitioner has remained unable to point out any error patent on 
the face of the record justifying review of that decision by this 
Court.  
 
8. 
The second issue involved in the present review petitions is 
as to whether all the grounds prevailing with the learned Judge-in-
Chamber of the Lahore High Court, Lahore for suspending the 
sentence of Nazir Ahmed petitioner and for releasing him on bail 
during the pendency of his appeal were available to the petitioner 
at the time of dismissal of his earlier two applications filed before 
the Lahore High Court, Lahore for the same relief and, thus, the 
said grounds could not have been agitated or entertained for 
granting him the same relief through his third application. It may 
be recapitulated that Nazir Ahmed petitioner and Madad Ali co-
convict had been convicted and sentenced by the learned trial 
court on 19.05.2011, the sentence of Madad Ali was suspended 
and he was released on bail by the Lahore High Court, Lahore on 
23.01.2012, the first application filed by Nazir Ahmed petitioner for 
the same relief was dismissed for non-prosecution by the Lahore 
High Court, Lahore on 20.02.2012, the second application filed by 
him for the same relief had been dismissed by the Lahore High 
Court, Lahore on 11.04.2012 as having been withdrawn after the 
learned counsel for the petitioner had addressed arguments “at 
some length” but had remained unable to convince the Court on 
the merits of the case and the third application filed by the 
petitioner for the same relief was allowed by the Lahore High 
Court, Lahore on 19.11.2012. It has already been noted by us 
above that the grounds prevailing with the Lahore High Court, 
Lahore for suspending the sentence of Nazir Ahmed petitioner and 
for releasing him on bail were that in the Challan case the police 
 
14
had found the petitioner innocent; the complainant had filed his 
private complaint after a delay of six months; there was previous 
enmity between the parties; and the sentence of a co-convict of the 
petitioner namely Madad Ali, attributed a role identical to that 
alleged against the petitioner, had already been suspended and he 
had been admitted to bail by the Lahore High Court, Lahore 
through an order which had not been interfered with by this Court. 
It is nothing but obvious from the chronological sequence detailed 
above that all the said grounds were already available to Nazir 
Ahmed petitioner at the time of filing of his first and second 
applications for suspension of sentence and release on bail and the 
said grounds had in fact been mentioned by him in those 
applications and, thus, the said grounds, none of which could be 
termed as a fresh ground, could not be taken or urged by him or 
on his behalf for the purposes of his third application seeking the 
same relief, particularly when the second application filed by him 
had been dismissed as having been withdrawn after his learned 
counsel had argued the matter “at some length” but had remained 
unable to convince none other than Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar 
Naqvi, J. himself for grant of the desired relief to the petitioner. 
 
9. 
In the context of the issue under discussion it may be 
pertinent to mention that on a number of occasions this Court has 
held that the principles for exercise of jurisdiction under sections 
497 and 426, Cr.P.C., one pertaining to grant of bail after arrest at 
the stage of trial and the other relating to suspension of sentence 
and release on bail at the stage of appeal against conviction, are 
essentially the same as the two provisions are analogous, they deal 
with a similar relief and they are parts of the same statute. A 
reference in this respect may be made to the cases of Maqsood v. 
Ali Muhammad and another (1971 SCMR 657), Bashir Ahmad v. 
Zulfiqar and another (PLD 1992 SC 463), Muhammad Nabi and 4 
others v. The State (2006 SCMR 1225) and Raja Shamshad 
Hussain v. Gulraiz Akhtar and others (PLD 2007 SC 564). Over a 
passage of time this Court had noticed some mischiefs and 
malpractices being practised in the matter of applying for bail and 
 
15
from time to time this Court had enunciated and laid down certain 
principles for curbing such mischiefs and malpractices. One of 
such mischiefs and malpractices was repeated or successive filing 
of applications for bail for the same accused person in the absence 
of availability of any fresh ground and another was getting 
subsequent applications for bail fixed before a Judge different from 
the one who had refused the desired relief on an earlier occasion. 
We deem it appropriate to refer here to the leading judgments 
handed down by this Court in these regards and the principles of 
propriety and practice enunciated in the same. In the case of Farid 
v. Ghulam Hassan and others (1968 SCMR 924) this Court had 
observed as follows: 
 
“It should also have been a matter of some concern to the learned 
Judge that one of his brother Judges had already dealt with the 
case and expressed himself strongly against the grant of bail by 
the Additional Sessions Judge. Not only the long established 
practice of his Court, but also the rule of propriety required that 
he should have transferred the application for bail to the first 
Judge for disposal. Such a course would have had the merit of 
avoiding the possibility of two contradictory orders being passed 
in the same case by the High Court. It was urged that the plea of 
alibi was not considered by the High Court while cancelling the 
bail granted to the respondents, but the plea was neither urged 
before the Sessions Judge nor before Mr. Justice Jamil Asghar. It 
could not, therefore, be said that a new circumstance was made 
to appear which justified the passing of a contradictory order.” 
 
In the case of Gul Nawaz alias Gul Mowaz and 2 others v. The State 
(1970 SCMR 667) it had been observed by this Court as under: 
 
“The High Court was in our view also right in holding that 
repeated applications for bail on the same facts did not lie in the 
High Court.” 
 
This Court had gone a step further in this respect in the case of 
Chaudhry Muhammad Khan v. Sanaullah and another (PLD 1971 
SC 324) as is evident from the following passages of the judgment 
delivered in that case: 
 
“The order passed by the learned Judge allowing bail to the 
respondent No. 1 was thus based on misconstruction of the 
record and it also suffered from the impropriety pointed out by 
this Court in the case of Farid v. Ghulam Hussain and others 
(1968 SCMR 924). Dealing with a similar case in which a learned 
 
16
Judge had allowed bail to an accused person who had been 
refused bail by another Judge, it was observed by this Court: 
 
"It should also have been a matter of some concern 
to the learned Judge that one of his brother Judges 
had already dealt with the case and expressed 
himself strongly against the grant of bail by the 
Additional Sessions Judge. Not only the long 
established practice of his Court, but also the rule 
of 
propriety 
required 
that 
he 
should 
have 
transferred the application for bail to the first 
Judge for disposal. Such a course would have had 
the merit of avoiding the possibility of two 
contradictory orders being passed in the same case 
by the High Court. It was urged that the plea of 
alibi was not considered by the High Court while 
cancelling the bail granted to the respondents, but 
the plea was neither urged before the Sessions 
Judge nor before Mr. Justice Jamil Asghar. It 
could 
not, 
therefore, 
be 
said 
that 
a 
new 
circumstance was made to appear which justified 
the passing of a contradictory order." 
  
We fail to see why the rule laid down in Farid v. Ghulam 
Hussain and others which must have been brought to the notice 
of the learned Judge was not followed in the present case. We 
were told that when interim bail was granted the first Judge was 
not available. But having granted interim bail to the respondent 
No. I he should have stayed his hand and sent the case back to 
the first Judge who had in the first instance refused bail. 
 
We do not want to lay more stress on this point except to 
point out to the learned Judge the constitutional duty that any 
decision of the Supreme Court shall to the extent that it decides a 
question of law or is based upon or enunciates a principle of law 
is binding on all other Courts in Pakistan and that all Judicial 
authorities throughout Pakistan shall act in aid of the Supreme 
Court. If these provisions of the Constitution were given due 
consideration, we are sure that the second learned Judge would 
not have passed the order dated 31st July 1970, which in effect 
was tantamount to countermanding the order of the first learned 
Judge. 
  
In the circumstances, the order granting bail to the 
respondent No. 1 cannot be sustained on any hypothesis. It is 
erroneous in law, is based on misconstruction of record and 
suffers from the impropriety that another learned Judge having 
refused bail it was necessary that the case be sent to him for 
passing final orders. 
  
We, accordingly, allow the appeal and set aside the order 
dated 31st July 1970 of the High Court granting bail to the 
respondent No. 1. He shall surrender to his bail bond forthwith.” 
 
Another ground was broken by this Court in this regard in the case 
of Muhammad Khan v. Muhammad Aslam and 3 others (1971 
SCMR 789) by holding as follows: 
 
“Since leave was granted this Court has in more than one case 
pointed out that as a judgment delivered in a criminal case is not 
 
17
open to review under the Code, it is not proper for a learned 
Judge of the High Court to allow bail to an accused person who 
has been earlier refused bail by another Judge of the same Court. 
It does not mean that once bail is refused by the High Court no 
fresh application for bail will lie. If fresh grounds have come into 
existence bail may be allowed, but in such a case the rule of 
propriety and harmony of the Court requires that the case be 
referred to the same learned Judge who had earlier refused bail.” 
 
The case of Saleh Muhammad v. The State and another (1983 
SCMR 341) was the next case in line wherein the same principle 
was reiterated as under: 
 
“It will be observed that the request of the respondent for bail was 
once rejected on merits by the first order of the High Court, dated 
14-10-1980 and normally, unless the repeated request was made 
on grounds other than those available at the time of the first 
application, no fresh application on merits could be entertained 
by the High Court.” 
 
 
Both the mischiefs and malpractices under discussion were 
subsequently commented upon by this Court in the case of Khan 
Beg v. Sajawal and others (PLD 1984 SC 341) in the following 
words: 
 
“That being the legal position, the plea that the challan had not 
been filed in the trial Court but is still with the Magistrate could 
hardly furnish a fresh ground for re-opening of the bail matter 
disposed of on 4-2-1984. Nor could the interval of ten days 
between the disposal of the first petition and the filing of the 
second, be said to amount to delay in the trial of the case. 
Normally a bail petition should be placed before the same Judge 
who had dealt with the earlier petition. We are told that the 
learned Judge who had dealt with the earlier petition had 
returned to Lahore. Even so, the petition could have been sent to 
Lahore for hearing by the same learned Judge. The practice of 
withdrawing a petition from before one Judge and then making a 
fresh petition soon thereafter so that the same be dealt with by 
another Judge cannot be approved. We are satisfied that no 
proper or fresh ground existed for making or entertaining the 
second bail petition. We, therefore, convert this petition into 
appeal and allow it. The impugned order granting bail to 
respondents 1 to 7 is set aside.” 
 
 
Then came the landmark case of The State through Advocate-
General, N.W.F.P. v. Zubair and 4 others (PLD 1986 SC 173) 
wherein this Court dealt with the mischiefs and malpractices 
under discussion in some detail and laid down the relevant 
principles with exactitude and clarity leaving no room for any 
 
18
mischievous machination. The relevant passages of the judgment 
rendered in that case are reproduced below: 
 
“5.  
We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at 
length and have also gone through the case-law on the subject. 
 
With profound respect to the learned Judges of the High 
Court who dealt with second bail application, we notice that a 
salutary and well-established principle relating to the hearing of 
successive bail applications filed by the accused persons in the 
same case (or in the cross-case), has been violated in this case. 
As already mentioned the learned Judge who heard the first bail 
application declined to hear their subsequent bail application on 
the ground that he had already expressed his opinion thereon. No 
doubt, on general principle, a Judge having once expressed his 
opinion of a lis should, ordinarily, decline to hear the same 
matter again directly or collaterally. There are, however, 
well-known exceptions to this rule, one of which is hearing of a 
review application where ever this power is given by statute. The 
other is the general practice which has been established by series 
of judgments delivered by this Court as well as by the High 
Courts during the last about 20 years, namely, that when a bail 
application of one or more accused is heard by a learned Single 
Judge of the High Court, it is he alone who should also hear all 
the subsequent bail applications filed by the same or other 
accused in the same case, or the cross-case. The following 
authorities may be referred to in this connection:- 
 
(1) Farid v. Ghulam Hussain 1968 SCMR 924. 
(2) Muhammad Khan v. Sanaullah PLD 1971 SC 324, 
(3) Muhammad Khan v. Muhammad Aslam 1971 SCMR 789.  
(4) Khan Beg v. Sajawal PLD 1984 SC 341.  
(5) Muhammad Adam v. The State 1968 P.Cr.L.J. 152.  
(6) The State v. Muhammad Yousaf 1979 P.Cr.L.J. 665.  
(7) Ghulam Hussain v. Karim Bakhsh NLR 1980 Criminal 248. 
  
6.  
It is held in some of these judgments that if a Judge of the 
High Court has heard the bail application by an accused person 
all subsequent petitions for bail by the same accused or in the 
same case should be referred to the same Bench which had 
disposed of the earlier petition. 
 
7.  
Another principle enunciated in some of the rulings is that 
it is the duty of the counsel to mention in a bail application filed 
by him the fact of having filed an earlier bail application, also 
stating the result thereof. Failure on the part of the counsel to do 
so would, in fact, amount to professional misconduct because the 
concealment of the fact of the dismissal of the earlier bail 
application of the accused or the co-accused and getting a 
subsequent bail application decided by another Judge of the 
same Court may result in conflicting judgments and disharmony 
to the Court. It was held in the case of Farid v. Ghulam Hussain 
(1968 SCMR 924) that where one Judge of the High Court has 
expressed himself against the grant of bail, another learned Judge 
of the same High Court in accordance with the long established 
practice and rule of propriety, when moved for bail of an accused 
or his co-accused in the same case should transfer such bail 
application for disposal to the same Judge who had already dealt 
with the matter earlier in order to avoid contradictory order. The 
latest ruling on the subject is Khan Beg v. Sajawal (PLD 1984 SC 
341) where, apart from holding that all subsequent bail 
applications in the same case should be placed before the same 
 
19
learned Judge who had dealt with the earlier bail application, this 
Court also disapproved the practice of withdrawing a petition 
from one Judge and then making a fresh bail application, soon 
thereafter, so that same may be dealt with by another Judge. 
 
The aforementioned principles enunciated by these 
judgments are based on the salutary principles, inasmuch as the 
practice of filing successive bail applications in the same case by 
the same person or his co-accused and getting it fixed before a 
different Judge, is not only likely to result in conflicting 
judgments but also tends to encourage malpractice by the 
accused persons and to bring the judicial system into disrepute, 
because in the event of a conflicting order being given by another 
learned Judge in a subsequent application, an impression, 
though false, may be created that the second order was based on 
extraneous considerations. It is mainly to avoid this that this 
Court has emphasized, over and over again, that subsequent bail 
application must be placed for disposal before the same learned 
Judge who had dealt with the first bail application and also that 
the counsel must disclose the fact of having filed a previous 
application and to state the result thereof. It is regrettable that 
this salutary rule was overlooked by the learned Judges who dealt 
with the second bail application in the present case. 
  
8.  
It might be useful to mention here that the second or the 
subsequent bail application to the same Court shall lie only on a 
fresh ground namely, a ground which did not exist at the time 
when the first application was made. If a ground was available to 
the accused at the time when the first bail application was filed 
and was not taken or was not pressed, it cannot be considered as 
a fresh ground and made the basis of any subsequent bail 
application. We may also point out, with respect to the learned 
Judge, who dealt with the second bail application that the mere 
fact that the learned Judge who had rejected the first bail 
application of the respondents with the observation that as far as 
the remaining petitioners (the respondents herein) are concerned 
no case had been made out for their release on bail, does not 
mean that the application had not been disposed of on merits. It 
must be assumed that he had considered all the pleas or grounds 
raised by the applicant's counsel before him and that the same 
had not found favour with him. It may be pointed out, with great 
respect, that the notion that each contention raised before the 
Court in a bail application must be dealt with separately or 
repelled by recording elaborate reasoning is totally misconceived. 
We are of the view that in the present case the learned Judge who 
dealt with the second bail application had in fact embarked on a 
review of the order of the learned Judge who had earlier 
dismissed the first bail application.” 
 
Subsequently some clarifications were made in this regard by this 
Court in the case of In re: To revisit “The State v. Zubair” [PLD 1986 
SC 173 (PLD 2002 SC 1 and 2002 SCMR 171) in the following 
terms: 
 
“6. 
In the light of the observations made, the case-law referred 
to in order dated 24.09.2001, the submissions made by the 
learned Attorney-General for Pakistan, the stance taken at the 
Bar by the learned Advocates-General/Additional Advocates-
General and the reproduced reports of the Registrars of the 
 
20
Federal Shariat Court and the High Courts, there can be no 
dispute with the proposition that there is a pressing need to 
lessen the intensity of the ratio in Zubair (supra) vis-à-vis the 
forum for disposal of second or subsequent bail applications. 
Resultantly, the interim order dated 24.09.2001 is confirmed with 
the following modifications/clarifications: 
 
(1) 
Constitution of the Benches is the exclusive 
function of the Chief Justice. 
 
(2) 
Ordinarily, subsequent bail application by 
the same accused or in the same case must be 
placed for disposal before the same Single 
Judge/Division Bench of the High Court which had 
dealt with the first bail application. 
 
(3) 
If the learned Single Judge who had dealt 
with the first bail application is not available and 
departure from (2) above is unavoidable, the 
learned Chief Justice concerned may refer the 
second or subsequent bail application to another 
learned Single Judge at the Principal Seat or 
Permanent Benches/Circuit Benches, as the case 
may be.  
 
(4) 
Where the first bail application is heard and 
disposed of by a Division Bench which is not 
available either at the Principal Seat or the 
Permanent Benches/Circuit Benches at the time of 
filing of the second or subsequent bail application 
then such bail application shall be heard by a 
Division Bench of which one of the Judges was a 
Member of the Division Bench which dealt with the 
first bail application. If none of the Members of the 
Division 
Bench 
which 
heard 
the 
first 
bail 
application is available, the learned Chief Justice 
concerned 
may 
assign 
the 
subsequent 
bail 
application to any appropriate Division Bench at 
the 
Principal 
Seat 
or 
the 
Permanent 
Benches/Circuit Benches, as the case may be.  
 
(5) 
Subsequent bail applications shall be filed, 
heard and disposed of at the Principal Seat or the 
Permanent Benches/Circuit Benches, as the case 
may be, where the first bail application was filed 
and finally disposed of. In the event of non-
availability of the learned Single Judge or the 
learned Member/s of the Division Bench, who had 
dealt with the earlier bail applications, the office at 
the Principal Seat shall obtain appropriate orders 
from the learned Chief Justice and the office at the 
Permanent Benches/Circuit Benches shall obtain 
appropriate orders from the learned Chief Justice 
through fax or on telephone for fixation of 
subsequent 
bail 
application 
before 
other 
appropriate Benches, in the interest of expeditious 
and inexpensive dispensation of justice in bail 
matters.  
 
(6) 
Subsequent bail application shall not be 
entertained unless accompanied by copies of 
earlier bail applications and copies of orders 
thereon.” 
 
 
21
The above mentioned principles of practice and propriety laid down 
by this Court from time to time have consistently been followed by 
the courts in the country ever since. A later case in the same 
thread was the case of Ali Sheharyar v. The State (2008 SCMR 
1448). 
 
10. 
The echo or resonance of the principles of propriety and 
practice enunciated by this Court in the above mentioned cases 
was also heard in India and in the case of Shahzad Hasan Khan v. 
Ishtiaq Hasan Khan and another (AIR 1987 SC 1613) the Supreme 
Court of India had observed as follows: 
 
“Long standing convention and judicial discipline required that 
respondent's bail application should have been placed before 
Justice Kamleshwar Nath who had passed earlier orders, who 
was available as Vacation Judge. The convention that subsequent 
bail application should be placed before the same Judge who may 
have passed earlier orders has its roots in principle. It prevents 
abuse of process of court in as much as an impression is not 
created that a litigant is shunning or selecting a court depending 
on whether the court is to his liking or not, and is encouraged to 
file successive applications without any new factor having 
cropped up. If successive bail applications on the same subject 
are permitted to be disposed of by different judges there would be 
conflicting orders and a litigant would be pestering every judge till 
he gets an order to his liking resulting in the creditability of the 
court and the confidence of the other side being put in issue and 
there would be wastage of courts' time. Judicial discipline 
requires that such matter must be placed before the same judge, 
if he is available for orders. Since Justice Kamleshwar Nath was 
sitting in Court on June 23, 1986 the respondent's bail 
application should have been placed before him for orders. 
Justice D. S. Bajpai should have respected his own order dated 
June 3, 1986 and that order ought not to have been recalled, 
without the confidence of the parties in the judicial process being 
rudely shaken.” 
 
Later on in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Captain Buddhikota 
Subha Rao (1990 PSC 797) the Supreme Court of India had made 
somewhat similar observations in the following words: 
 
“In the present case the successive bail applications preferred by 
the respondent were rejected on merits having regard to the 
gravity of the offence alleged to have been committed. One such 
application No. 36 of 1989 was rejected by Suresh, J. himself. 
Undeterred the respondent went on preferring successive 
applications for bail. All such pending bail applications were 
rejected by Puranik, J. by a common order on 6th June, 1989. 
Unfortunately, Puranik, J. was not aware of the pendency of yet 
another bail application No. 995/89 otherwise he would have 
 
22
disposed it of by the very same common order. Before the ink was 
dry on Puranik, J.'s order, it was upturned by the impugned 
order. It is not as if the court passing the impugned order was not 
aware of the decision of Puranik, J., in fact there is a reference to 
the same in the impugned order. Could this be done in the 
absence of new facts and changed circumstances? What is 
important to realize is that in Criminal Application No. 375 of 
1989, the respondent had made an identical request as is obvious 
from one of the prayers (extracted earlier) made therein. Once 
that application was rejected there was no question of granting a 
similar prayer. That is virtually overruling the earlier decision 
without there being a change in the fact-situation. And, when we 
speak of change, we mean a substantial one which has a direct 
impact on the earlier decision and not merely cosmetic changes 
which are of little or no consequence. Between the two orders 
there was a gap of only two days and it is nobody's case that 
during these two days drastic changes had taken place 
necessitating the release of the respondent on bail. Judicial 
discipline, propriety and comity demanded that the impugned 
order should not have been passed reversing all earlier orders 
including the one rendered by Puranik, J. only a couple of days 
before, in the absence of any substantial change in the fact-
situation. In such cases it is necessary to act with restraint and 
circumspection so that the process of the Court is not abused by 
a litigant and an impression does not gain ground that the 
litigant has either successfully avoided one Judge or selected 
another to secure an order which had hitherto eluded him. In 
such a situation the proper course, we think, is to direct that the 
matter be placed before the same learned Judge who disposed of 
the earlier applications. Such a practice or convention would 
prevent abuse of the process of court inasmuch as it will prevent 
an impression being created that a litigant is avoiding or selecting 
a court to secure an order to his liking. Such a practice would 
also discourage the filing of successive bail applications without 
change of circumstances. Such a practice if adopted would be 
conducive to judicial discipline and would also save the Court's 
time as a Judge familiar with the facts would be able to dispose of 
the subsequent application with despatch. It will also result in 
consistency. In this view that we take we are fortified by the 
observations of this Court in paragraph 5 of the judgment in 
Shahzad Hasan Khan v. Ishtiaq Hasan Khan [1987] 2 SCC 684. 
For the above reasons we are of the view that there was no 
justification for passing the impugned order in the absence of a 
substantial change in the fact-situation. That is what prompted 
Shetty, J. to describe the impugned order as 'a bit out of the 
ordinary'. Judicial restraint demands that we say no more.” 
 
11. 
The discussion made above shows that for suspending the 
sentence of Nazir Ahmed petitioner and admitting him to bail 
during the pendency of his appeal on the basis of the grounds 
which could not have been urged or entertained through his third 
application for the same relief the learned Judge-in-Chamber of the 
Lahore High Court, Lahore had failed to follow or had chosen to 
disregard or trump the well-established principles enunciated by 
this Court governing successive applications for bail which 
principles were binding on him by virtue of the provisions of Article 
 
23
189 of the Constitution. In this view of the matter cancellation of 
Nazir Ahmed petitioner’s bail by this Court through the judgment 
under review hardly warrants any reconsideration or review. 
 
12. 
Through his review petition and also through Criminal 
Miscellaneous Application No. 23 of 2014 filed in his review 
petition Mr. Justice Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi petitioner 
has, however, maintained that the principles governing successive 
applications for bail enunciated in the precedent cases referred to 
above were not applicable to a situation where an earlier 
application for bail had been dismissed as having been withdrawn 
and in such a situation a subsequent application for bail could be 
entertained and decided on its merits even on the basis of the 
same grounds which were available and had been urged before 
dismissal of the earlier application as having been withdrawn. In 
view of such stance having been taken before us the third issue 
relevant to the present review petitions is as to whether dismissal 
of Nazir Ahmed petitioner’s second application for suspension of 
sentence and release on bail by the learned Judge-in-Chamber of 
the Lahore High Court, Lahore as having been withdrawn after his 
learned counsel had unsuccessfully addressed arguments in 
support of that application foreclosed any possibility of obtaining a 
favourable order in that regard from the same Court through the 
petitioner’s third application when the third application was based 
upon the same facts and grounds which were available and urged 
at the time of decision of his second application. In other words, 
the question is as to whether for the purposes of a subsequent 
application for bail on the basis of the same facts and grounds 
dismissal of an earlier application for bail as having been 
withdrawn after addressing arguments and failing to convince the 
court has the same legal effect and consequence as dismissal of 
such application on the merits or not. Such a question came up for 
consideration before this Court, probably for the first time, in the 
case of Muhammad Riaz v. The State (2002 SCMR 184) decided on 
18.01.2001 and it was observed in that case as follows: 
 
 
24
“The other vital issue was about the scope of the second bail 
application and the observations of this Court have been 
reproduced supra. In the instant case, the earlier bail application 
Criminal Miscellaneous No. 4101-B-2000 was disposed of by a 
learned Division Bench of the Lahore High Court comprising Mr. 
Justice Khalil-ur-Rehman Ramday and Mr. Justice Dr. Munir 
Ahmad Mughal and the order passed therein dated 24-7-2000 
reads as under:-- 
 
“Having argued the matter at some length, prays 
for permission to withdraw this petition. Dismissed 
as withdrawn." 
      
 
 
 
 
  (Sd.) 
       
 
 
 
 
Judges.” 
 
  
A bare reading of the above order clearly shows that 
decision on merit was not at all pressed and the counsel in his 
own wisdom or on the instructions of his client desired to 
withdraw the first bail application. In such-like cases it cannot be 
said that the case had been decided on merits, nor it can be 
asserted that certain grounds were raised but were repelled or 
had found favour with the learned Judges as the case may be. 
---------------------------------------- 
---------------------------------------- 
 
The extract from Zubair's case reproduced in the preceding 
paragraph of this judgment shows that the case had been heard 
at length and all grounds which were available were pressed 
because the first bail application was rejected with the 
observation that: "As far as rest of the petitioners are concerned, 
no case has been made out for their release on bail". It was 
further held that it did not mean that the application had not 
been disposed of on merits and further that it must be assumed 
that the learned Judge had considered all the pleas or grounds 
raised by applicant's counsel before him and that the same had 
not found favour with him. It was further laid down that notion 
that each contention raised before the Court in a bail application 
must be dealt with separately or repelled by recording elaborate 
reason was totally misconceived. 
 
  
We are therefore, of the view that withdrawal of a bail 
application would not mean that its disposal was on merits or the 
ground had been taken into consideration, therefore, in our view 
there is no bar in moving a second bail application after 
withdrawal of the first one but inevitably the second bail 
application should be heard by the same Judge or the Judges 
who had allowed the withdrawal of the first application. In the 
present case, the first bail application was allowed to be 
withdrawn by a learned Division Bench of the Lahore High Court 
consisting of Mr. Justice Khalil-ur-Rehman Ramday and Mr. 
Justice Munir Ahmad Mughal but the judgment impugned was 
delivered 
by 
a 
different 
Bench 
comprising 
Mr. 
Justice 
Khalil-ur-Rehman 
Ramday 
and 
Mr. 
Justice 
Zafar 
Pasha 
Chaudhry. On the touchstone and criteria laid down in Zubair's 
case in our view the second bail application ought to have been 
heard by the same learned Bench who had permitted the 
withdrawal of the earlier bail application. 
 
  
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that withdrawal of an 
application simpliciter does not mean that the same was dealt 
with on merits or on the grounds pressed. However, the situation 
would be different if the earlier bail application was decided on 
merits and in such case while deciding the subsequent bail 
application, of course, the ground which was not urged although 
 
25
the same was available would not constitute a fresh ground 
justifying the filing of second bail application. Secondly, propriety 
requires that the bail application dismissed in terms or order 
impugned be heard by the same learned Bench who had earlier 
allowed the withdrawal of the first bail application. In this view of 
the matter, we allow this appeal and remand this case to the 
learned Lahore High Court for re-hearing of the bail application 
by the same learned Bench who had permitted to withdraw the 
first application in terms of order dated 24-7-2000.” 
 
13. 
The case of Muhammad Riaz (supra) was followed by the case 
of Ali Hassan v. The State (2001 SCMR 1047) decided on 
01.03.2001 wherein the said issue had been dealt with by this 
Court in the following manner: 
 
“5.  
We have carefully examined the respective contentions as 
agitated on behalf of the parties. We have gone through the 
impugned judgment. The controversy revolves around the 
interpretation of the dictum as laid down in Zubair's case (supra) 
which has already been interpreted/clarified recently by this 
Court in Criminal Appeal No. 458 of 2000 (Muhammad Riaz v. 
The 
State) 
and 
relevant 
portion 
whereof 
is 
reproduced 
hereinbelow:-- 
---------------------------------------- 
---------------------------------------- 
 
6.  
It transpires from the scrutiny of record that Criminal 
Miscellaneous Appeal No. 4130-B and Criminal Miscellaneous 
Appeal No. 1803-M of 1999 were not pressed and withdrawn 
which makes it abundant clear that the same were not disposed 
of on merits and in view of the interpretation/clarification of 
Zubair's case (supra) as mentioned hereinabove, Criminal 
Miscellaneous Appeal No. 75-B of 2000 is not hit by the dictum 
laid down in Zubair's case (supra). In such view of the matter the 
appeal is accepted and the impugned order is set aside and case 
is remanded back to learned Lahore High Court and Criminal 
Miscellaneous Appeal No. 75-B of 2000 shall be treated as 
pending and decided in accordance with law and merits after 
affording proper opportunity of hearing to all concerned.” 
  
14. 
We have gone through the judgments delivered in the cases 
of Muhammad Riaz and Ali Hassan (supra) quite minutely. The 
case of Ali Hassan had proceeded simply on the basis of what had 
been held earlier on in the case of Muhammad Riaz and, therefore, 
it is important to understand as to what was the ratio decidendi of 
the case of Muhammad Riaz. We find that what was held in the 
judgment delivered in that case was as under: 
 
(i) 
In Zubair’s case the earlier application for bail 
had been dismissed on the merits of the case whereas 
 
26
in the case of Muhammad Riaz the earlier application 
for bail had been dismissed as having been withdrawn. 
 
(ii) 
Dismissal of an application for bail as having 
been withdrawn “simpliciter” is not to be equated with 
a dismissal on the merits.     
 
(iii) 
Withdrawal 
of 
an 
application 
for 
bail 
“simpliciter” does not preclude or debar “moving” of 
another application for bail. 
 
(iv) 
If the earlier application for bail had been 
decided on the merits then a subsequent application 
for bail can be “moved” only on the basis of grounds 
which were not existing or available till the decision of 
the earlier application. 
 
(v) 
In a case of withdrawal of an earlier application 
for bail and also in a case of its decision on the merits 
a subsequent application for bail is to be fixed before 
and heard by the same Judge(s) who had dealt with 
the earlier application. 
 
We have particularly noticed, and we observe so with profound 
respect, that in the said judgment no specific comment had been 
made on as to what constituted withdrawal “simpliciter” and on as 
to whether there was any difference between withdrawal 
“simpliciter” and withdrawal after addressing arguments and 
failing to convince the court on the merits. An indication is, 
however, available in the said judgment as to what was deemed to 
be withdrawal “simpliciter” and in this respect the following 
observation made in the judgment may be referred to: 
 
“We are therefore, of the view that withdrawal of a bail application 
would not mean that its disposal was on merits or the ground 
had been taken into consideration, therefore, in our view there is 
no bar in moving a second bail application after withdrawal of the 
first one” 
(underlining has been supplied for emphasis) 
 
The said observation made in the judgment indicates that filing a 
subsequent application for bail on the same grounds was held to 
be permissible where withdrawal of the earlier application was not 
preceded by consideration of the grounds for bail on their merits. 
Such understanding of that judgment is fortified by a later 
observation made in that judgment which reads as under: 
 
27
 
“For the foregoing reasons, we hold that withdrawal of an 
application simpliciter does not mean that the same was dealt 
with on merits or on the grounds pressed.” 
(underlining has been supplied for emphasis) 
 
The above mentioned observations made in that judgment throw 
some light on what was meant in that judgment by withdrawal 
“simpliciter” but, with great reverence for the Honourable Judges 
deciding the said case, we find that exposition of that issue in the 
said judgment was not the finest example of judicial clarity. We 
note that on the one hand withdrawal of an application for bail 
after arguing the matter at some length was held to be withdrawal 
“simpliciter” and not constituting a bar against filing of another 
application for the same relief on the basis of the same facts and 
grounds but on the other hand the above mentioned observations 
were made which declared that withdrawal “simpliciter” did “not 
mean that” the application for bail had been “dealt with on merits 
or on the grounds pressed”. The said observations tended to hold 
that in a case wherein withdrawal of an application for bail had 
come about after the grounds for bail had been “pressed” and 
“dealt with” was not a case of withdrawal “simpliciter”. After a very 
careful analysis of what had been held and what had been 
observed in that judgment and after a cautious and judicious 
examination and scrutiny of the issue involved we understand that 
what is reasonably discernable or deducible is that if an 
application for bail was withdrawn without addressing any 
argument on the merits of the case then another application for 
bail on the basis of the same facts and grounds can be filed but if 
the “merits” and the “grounds pressed” had been “dealt with” by 
the court before allowing withdrawal of an application for bail or, 
in other words, an application for bail was withdrawn after 
addressing arguments on the merits of the case but failing to 
convince the court then a fresh application can be filed and 
entertained only on the basis of grounds which were not existing or 
available till disposition of the earlier application for the same 
 
28
relief. This was the understanding and the premise upon which the 
judgment under review in the present case had proceeded.  
 
15. 
It may not be out of place to mention here that the judgment 
under review in the present case has already been approvingly 
referred to and in fact followed by a different 3-member Bench of 
this Court in the case of Amir Masih v. The State and another (2013 
SCMR 1059 & 1524) decided on 03.05.2013 and it had been 
observed in that case as under: 
 
“5. 
Learned High Court has dismissed the bail application of 
the petitioner on the ground that earlier application filed by him 
was dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 5.12.2012. In the 
case of The State through Advocate-General, N.W.F.P. v. Zubair and 
4 others (PLD 1986 SC 173) it was held by this Court that the 
grounds which were available at the time of withdrawal of the 
earlier application shall be deemed to have been considered and 
dealt with and the second application can only be filed on the 
fresh ground. The relevant portion is reproduced as under:-- 
 
“8. 
It might be useful to mention here that the 
second or the subsequent bail application to the 
same Court shall lie only on a fresh ground, namely, 
a ground which did not exist at the time when the 
first application was made. If a ground was 
available to the accused at the time when the first 
bail application was filed and was not taken or was 
not pressed, it cannot be considered as a fresh and 
made the basis of any subsequent bail application. 
We may also point out, with respect to the learned 
Judge, who dealt with the second bail application 
that the mere fact that the learned Judge who had 
rejected the first bail application of the respondents 
with the observation that as far as the remaining 
petitioners (the respondents herein) are concerned 
no case had been made out for their release on bail, 
does not mean that the application had not been 
disposed of on merits. It must be assumed that he 
had considered all the pleas or grounds raised by 
the applicant’s counsel before him and that the 
same had not found favour with him. It may be 
pointed out, with great respect that the notion that 
each contention raised before the Court in a bail 
application must be dealt with separately or 
repelled by recording elaborate reasoning, is totally 
misconceived. We are of the view that in the 
present, case the learned Judge who dealt with the 
second bail application had, in fact embarked on a 
review of the order of the learned Judge who had 
earlier dismissed the first bail application.  
 
6. 
As far as the case-law cited by the learned counsel for the 
petitioner in (i) Ali Hassan v. The State (2001 SCMR 1047) and (ii) 
Muhammad Riaz v. The State (2002 SCMR 184) is, concerned, the 
latest case which has been disposed of on this point is 
 
29
Muhammad Siddique v. The State (Criminal Petition No. 896-L of 
2012) wherein it has been held by this Court that if earlier 
application is dismissed as withdrawn, the second application 
can only be filed on any fresh ground and not on the same 
grounds which were available at the time of the disposal of the 
earlier application. Relevant portion from the said judgment is 
reproduced herein below:-- 
 
“In such circumstances it is apparent on the face of 
record that the ground of similarity of role and rule 
of consistency was available to the petitioner at the 
time of filing first application for suspension of 
sentence but the learned Judge has totally ignored 
it. From the tenor of impugned order it appears that 
the learned Judge of the Lahore High Court while 
suspending the sentence of respondent No. 2 has 
not exercised discretion in a proper and judicious 
manner rather has not at all adverted to the 
guidelines laid down in Zubair’s case (supra).” 
 
Thus the latest view of this Court is to be followed and the 
learned High Court has rightly dismissed the application which 
could only be entertained on the fresh grounds, hence, this 
petition being without merits is, hereby, dismissed and leave is 
refused.” 
 
The judgment under review has also been referred to with approval 
by another 3-member Bench of this Court in the case of 
Muhammad Naveed v. The State and another (Criminal Petition No. 
324-L of 2013 decided on 03.05.2013) in the following terms: 
 
“Even this Court in a recent judgment passed in Criminal Petition 
No. 896-L of 2012 titled Muhammad Siddique v. The State has 
held that even if the application is dismissed as withdrawn, 
subsequent application is not entertainable until and unless any 
fresh ground is urged.” 
 
16. 
We have also noticed that the understanding of the 
meanings of withdrawal “simpliciter” propounded above already 
stands expressed and iterated by this Court in the case of Rizwan 
Ali v. The State, etc. (Criminal Petition No. 658-L of 2013 decided 
on 16.07.2013) as follows: 
 
“We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, the learned 
Additional Prosecutor-General, Punjab appearing for the State 
and Saleem Akhtar complainant in person and have gone through 
the record of this case with their assistance. It has been agreed 
between the learned counsel for the petitioner, the learned 
Additional Prosecutor-General, Punjab and the complainant 
appearing in person that the principle laid down by this Court in 
the case of Muhammad Siddique v. The State (Criminal Petition 
No. 896-L of 2012) and in the case of Amir Masih v. The State and 
 
30
another (2013 SCMR 1059) has not been correctly applied by the 
learned Judge-in-Chamber of the Lahore High Court, Multan 
Bench, Multan to the facts of the present case vis-à-vis the 
present petitioner namely Rizwan Ali. On the basis of such 
consensus all of them have requested that this petition may be 
converted into an appeal and the same may be allowed, the 
impugned order passed by the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, 
Multan on 19.06.2013 may be set aside and the matter of the 
petitioner’s bail may be remanded to the Lahore High Court, 
Multan Bench, Multan for its decision afresh on the merits of the 
case. In the peculiar circumstances of the case we have found the 
consensus between the parties to be justified because the merits 
of the petitioner’s case for bail had never been attended to by the 
Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan in the orders passed 
by it in all the three successive applications filed by the petitioner 
for the said relief and every time such application was allowed to 
be withdrawn the withdrawal so sought and allowed was nothing 
but withdrawal simpliciter. This petition is, therefore, converted 
into an appeal and the same is allowed, the impugned order 
passed by the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan on 
19.06.2013 is set aside, Criminal Miscellaneous No. 2084-B of 
2013 shall be deemed to be pending before the said Court and the 
same shall be decided afresh after attending to the merits of the 
petitioner’s case for bail.” 
(underlining has been supplied for emphasis) 
 
In the said case of Rizwan Ali all the earlier applications for bail 
filed by an accused person had been dismissed by the Lahore High 
Court, Multan Bench, Multan as having been withdrawn without 
any argument having been addressed or heard on the merits of the 
case and, therefore, this Court had treated the earlier withdrawals 
as withdrawal “simpliciter”. The approach adopted in that case was 
expressly followed by this Court in the later case of Umar Hayat v. 
The State, etc. (Criminal Petition No. 786-L of 2013 decided on 
31.07.2013) as under: 
 
“The situation in the present case is almost identical to that in 
the case of Rizwan Ali v. The State, etc. (Criminal Petition No. 658-
L of 2013 decided on 16.07.2013) and, thus, we are minded to 
pass an order in the present petition similar to that passed in the 
case of Rizwan Ali (supra) and the learned counsel for the parties 
have also agreed on that course to be adopted. This petition is, 
therefore, converted into an appeal and the same is allowed, the 
impugned order passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore on 
02.07.2013 in Criminal Miscellaneous No. 3987-B of 2013 is set 
aside, the said criminal miscellaneous petition shall be deemed to 
be pending before the said Court and the same shall be decided 
afresh after attending to the merits of the petitioner’s case for 
bail.”    
 
17. 
With great regard and respect for the Honourable Judges of 
this Court deciding the cases of Muhammad Riaz and Ali Hassan 
 
31
(supra) we have observed that it had never been considered in the 
judgments passed in the said cases that if a Judge had allowed a 
counsel to withdraw an application for bail after the counsel had 
addressed arguments on the merits of the case and had remained 
unable to convince the court in that regard then even if such 
withdrawal of the application for bail is to be deemed as 
withdrawal “simpliciter” still on the basis of the same set of facts 
and on the basis of the same grounds urged through a subsequent 
application for bail the Judge concerned cannot take a view and 
reach a conclusion different from that taken or reached by him in 
the earlier round and that if the Judge concerned takes a different 
view and reaches a different conclusion in the subsequent round 
then he may inevitably invite many allegations including those of 
inconsistency or extraneous influence which may impinge upon his 
competence or integrity. This aspect of the issue had specifically 
been adverted to by this Court in the landmark case of The State 
through Advocate-General, N.W.F.P. v. Zubair and 4 others (PLD 
1986 SC 173) referred to by us earlier on in this judgment. It had 
been observed by this Court in that case that permitting such a 
course to be adopted may open doors for conflicting judgments and 
encouraging malpractices which may bring the judicial system into 
disrepute by creating an impression that the subsequent 
favourable orders were based upon extraneous considerations. It 
had also been observed in that case that a subsequent favourable 
order in the same case on the basis of the same set of facts may be 
perceived as reviewing an earlier unfavourable order which may 
not be permissible in law. To us even a possibility of creating an 
impression in respect of extraneous considerations may speak 
volumes against permitting such a course to be adopted. We may 
add that the case in hand itself is a case in point as the learned 
Judge-in-Chamber of the Lahore High Court, Lahore had 
dismissed Nazir Ahmed petitioner’s second application for 
suspension of sentence and release on bail as having been 
withdrawn after the learned counsel for the petitioner had 
addressed arguments on the merits but had failed to convince the 
leaned Judge-in-Chamber for grant of the desired relief but 
 
32
through his third application filed through a different learned 
counsel for the same relief and based upon the same facts and 
grounds the desired relief had been extended to Nazir Ahmed 
petitioner 
by 
the 
same 
learned 
Judge-in-Chamber. 
Such 
inconsistency of approach adopted by the learned Judge-in-
Chamber had prompted, nay compelled, this Court to record some 
observations in the judgment under review concerning the conduct 
of the learned Judge-in-Chamber expunction of which observations 
is sought by him through one of the review petitions under 
consideration. We may add that we have particularly noticed with 
interest that in the cases of Muhammad Riaz and Ali Hassan 
(supra) it had only been observed by this Court that after 
withdrawal “simpliciter” of an earlier application for bail another 
application for the same relief can be “moved” but it had never 
been observed therein that the same Judge can be inconsistent 
and can take a different view or reach a conclusion different from 
the one reached by him on the same set of facts and on the same 
grounds in the earlier round. 
 
18. 
This brings us to the last issue as to whether the 
observations made by this Court in the judgment under review 
concerning the conduct of Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi, J. 
were justified in the circumstances of the case. We may observe at 
the outset that it is quite unpleasant to discuss the conduct of a 
Judge of the superior judiciary through a judgment but we are 
compelled to undertake such an exercise in this case because it is 
none other than a Judge of a High Court himself who has formally 
approached this Court and has insisted that we may comment 
upon some comments already made by this Court about his 
conduct.  
 
19. 
It 
may 
be 
clarified 
straightaway 
that 
Nazir 
Ahmed 
petitioner’s bail had been cancelled by this Court because the facts 
of the case did not justify suspension of his sentence and release 
on bail during the pendency of his appeal and the law had not 
been correctly applied to his case by the Lahore High Court, 
 
33
Lahore. A bare perusal of paragraph No. 8 of the judgment under 
review shows, and shows quite clearly, that the observations made 
therein regarding the learned Judge had not been made with 
reference to his wrong decision on the law and facts of the case but 
the observations were based squarely upon his inconsistency in 
the matter which inconsistency, unfortunately, created an 
impression regarding an extraneous consideration coming into 
play. For facility of reference the said paragraph of the judgment 
under review is reproduced below: 
 
“8. 
Before parting with this order we may observe that 
discretion exercised by the learned Judge while passing the 
impugned order in the instant case has appeared to us to be 
somewhat 
colourable 
because 
after 
dismissal 
of 
second 
application for suspension of sentence bearing the same ground 
the only difference in the respondent’s third application for the 
same relief was a different learned counsel for that respondent.”             
 
In this view of the matter the stance of the learned Judge and his 
learned counsel before us that the learned Judge had entertained 
and decided the third application for suspension of sentence and 
release on bail filed by Nazir Ahmed petitioner in the light of the 
law declared by this Court in the cases of Muhammad Riaz and Ali 
Hassan (supra) has appeared to us to be a stance which completely 
misses the point in issue. The issue fairly and squarely was 
inconsistency creating an impression of extraneous consideration 
and not correct application of the law or otherwise. 
 
20. 
We note that in the case of Noraz Akbar v. The State and 
another (2011 P.Cr.L.J. 852) decided by Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar 
Naqvi, J. on 29.11.2010 it had been held by him as under:  
 
“4.  
At the outset learned counsel for the petitioner when 
questioned that what is fresh ground available with the petitioner 
as his earlier such bail application already stands dismissed, 
learned counsel states that the earlier bail application was not 
dismissed on merits and the instant application is to be 
considered as his first bail petition. To substantiate his version, 
learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on 
Muhammad Riaz v. The State (2002 SCMR 184).  
---------------------------------------- 
---------------------------------------- 
 
7.  
Firstly I dilate upon the question that whether the instant 
 
34
bail petition being second petition on the subject, can be given 
weight in absence of any fresh ground, which is pre-requisite for 
filing such petition. There is no cavil to this proposition that there 
is no fresh ground available with the petitioner and the grounds 
taken herein were already available with the petitioner at the time 
of filing of first bail petition. Therefore, the same is not 
maintainable in view of ratio decidendi of august Supreme Court 
of Pakistan in the case of Gul Nawaz alias Gul Mowaz and 2 
others v. The State (1970 SCMR 667) wherein Mr. Justice 
Hamoodur Rahman, the then Hon'ble Chief Justice, being author 
of the order had held as under; 
 
"The High Court was in our view also right in 
holding that repeated applications for bail on the 
same facts did not lie in the High Court." 
 
8.  
Now question arises that whether the instant petition can 
be termed as second bail petition or the first one. Having much 
regard for the case law cited by learned counsel for the petitioner, 
I may submit here that bare perusal of the order dated 4-11-
2010, passed in Criminal Miscellaneous No. 11712-B of 2010, 
whereby the petitioner's earlier bail petition was dismissed, 
reflects that after arguing the case at some length, learned 
counsel for the petitioner requested to withdraw the petition, 
which in the interest of justice was allowed. Had the petitioner 
very good case, learned counsel for the petitioner might have not 
withdrawn the same after arguing at some length.” 
(underlining has been supplied for emphasis) 
 
It is quite noticeable that the case of Muhammad Riaz (supra) had 
been taken notice of by Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi, J. in the 
said order dated 29.11.2010 but still while dealing with the 
subsequent application for bail he had refused to take a view or 
reach a conclusion different from that taken or reached by him in 
the earlier round because the facts of the case and the grounds for 
bail had not undergone any change. The said order further shows 
that according to the reported, and therefore considered, view of 
Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi, J. dismissal of an earlier 
application for bail as having been withdrawn after arguments had 
been addressed in support of such application at some length 
clearly indicated that the Judge concerned did not feel persuaded 
to grant bail on the facts disclosed and the grounds urged and, 
thus, the counsel for the accused person requested for withdrawal 
of the application which request was acceded to by the Judge. As 
the facts of that reported case had not undergone any material 
change and no fresh ground had become available to the accused 
person in that case for his subsequent application for bail, 
therefore, Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi, J. did not want to be 
 
35
inconsistent in the matter in that case. It is unfortunate that in the 
present case the same learned Judge had decided to proceed 
otherwise and that had allowed many an eyebrow to be raised. 
 
21. 
Another aspect of this matter, equally disturbing, is that if 
the facts of the case and the grounds available to Nazir Ahmed 
petitioner for suspension of his sentence and release on bail during 
the pendency of his appeal were the same at the time of applying 
for such relief through his second and third applications then if 
such facts and grounds were valid and sufficient for granting the 
desired relief on the third occasion then the said relief ought not to 
have been denied to him by the same learned Judge on the second 
occasion. This implies that either a due relief was denied to the 
said petitioner on the second occasion or an undue relief was 
extended to him on the third occasion. In this backdrop engaging 
the services of a different learned counsel by Nazir Ahmed 
petitioner for his third attempt for the same relief on the same 
facts and grounds and the said learned counsel’s crowning with 
success in that attempt was a matter which ostensibly provided 
fodder to an impression about an extraneous consideration coming 
into play and the same seemingly reflected adversely upon the 
learned Judge’s conduct. The principles of consistency and 
propriety demanded that if the facts and the grounds were the 
same and they were valid and sufficient for granting the desired 
relief then the learned Judge ought to have allowed Nazir Ahmed 
petitioner’s second application and if the said relief was not due on 
the same facts and grounds then the learned Judge ought to have 
been consistent and he should have dismissed the third 
application as well. In these peculiar circumstances of the case 
this Court could reasonably entertain an impression that the 
exercise of discretion in the matter by the learned Judge was 
“somewhat colourable”. 
 
22. 
There is yet another aspect of this matter which is also quite 
disconcerting. Through Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 23 
of 2014 filed by him in his review petition Mr. Justice Sayyed 
 
36
Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi petitioner has himself brought on the 
record of this case copies of seven other orders passed by him 
wherein after dismissing the earlier applications for bail filed by 
some accused persons as having been withdrawn after having 
heard the arguments of the accused persons’ learned counsel at 
some length on the merits of the case he had allowed bail to the 
same accused persons through their subsequent applications for 
the same relief filed on the basis of the same facts and grounds 
within a few weeks or months of dismissal of the earlier 
applications. This surely reflects or depicts a conscious pattern 
being followed by the learned Judge which is a pattern which 
cannot be approved. It shows that in the first round the learned 
Judge refuses the desired relief to an accused person but in the 
second round the same facts and grounds are found to be valid 
and sufficient for the same relief. Unfortunately the said pattern 
also fits into the facts and circumstances of the present case. We 
must admit that we are at a loss to understand why such a pattern 
is being followed by the learned Judge and what can be the factual 
or legal justification for adopting such a pattern.  
 
23. 
It is important to mention here that in the judgment under 
review this Court had been particularly careful and had 
deliberately stopped short of naming therein the learned Judge-in-
Chamber of the Lahore High Court, Lahore or the learned counsel 
for Nazir Ahmed petitioner appearing before the said Court in 
connection with that petitioner’s third application for suspension 
of sentence and release on bail and the judgment under review had 
not even been approved for reporting. All that care had been taken 
by this Court only to save the learned Judge-in-Chamber and the 
concerned learned counsel from any embarrassment that may be 
caused to them by naming them in the judgment. In that backdrop 
there was hardly any occasion for issuing notice to the learned 
Judge-in-Chamber or the learned counsel before recording the 
observations made in paragraph No. 8 of the judgment under 
review because that would have ensured their embarrassment 
which this Court deliberately wanted to avoid. Apart from that we 
 
37
have heard the learned counsel for Mr. Justice Sayyed Mazahar Ali 
Akbar Naqvi petitioner and Mr. Bhoon at some length in 
connection with the present review petitions and such subsequent 
hearing neutralizes the effects of any previous omission in hearing 
them. 
 
24. 
For what has been discussed above both the captioned 
review petitions are dismissed. Nazir Ahmed petitioner may be 
arrested forthwith and be lodged in the jail from which he had 
been released so as to serve the sentence passed against him by 
the learned trial court. He may, however, approach the Lahore 
High Court, Lahore for any relief if and when any ground for such 
relief accrues to him under the law.  
 
25. 
Before parting with this judgment we would like to, for the 
benefit of all concerned, restate the principles of propriety and 
practice enunciated by this Court thus far regarding filing, 
entertaining and deciding applications for bail, cancellation of bail 
or suspension of sentence and release on bail during the pendency 
of an appeal in criminal cases and would expect all the courts 
below to scrupulously and meticulously adhere to and follow the 
same. The said principles, as enunciated in the precedent cases 
referred to above and some others, are as follows: 
 
(Note: A reference here to an application for bail may be 
read as a reference to all applications for bail, 
cancellation of bail or suspension of sentence and 
release on bail during the pendency of an appeal in the 
same criminal case or its cross-case filed by the same 
accused person, any other accused person, the State or 
the complainant party.)  
 
(i) 
At the bottom of every application for bail it is 
obligatory to attach a certificate regarding non-filing of 
any such application before the same court previously 
and, in case of a repeated or successive application, a 
certificate disclosing filing of any such application 
previously by the same accused person, any other 
accused person, the State or the complainant party 
before the same court in the same criminal case or its 
cross-case and such certificate must also disclose the 
 
38
number of the previous application, the date of its 
decision and the name of the Judge dealing with and 
deciding the same. No subsequent bail application is 
to be entertained unless the same is accompanied by 
copies of the earlier bail applications and copies of the 
orders passed thereon.  
 
(ii) 
All repeated or successive applications for bail 
must be fixed for hearing before and heard and 
decided by the same Judge(s) who had dealt with and 
decided any earlier application for bail unless the 
Judge or one or some of the Judges dealing with and 
deciding the earlier application(s) is/are not available 
at 
the 
relevant 
station 
of 
posting/Principal 
Seat/Bench.  
 
(iii) 
Dismissal of an application for bail after 
attending to the merits of the case amounts to 
rejection of all the grounds available or in existence till 
the time of such dismissal whether such grounds were 
actually taken or urged or not and whether such 
grounds were expressly dealt with in the order of 
dismissal or not.  
 
(iv) 
In case of dismissal of an earlier application for 
bail on the merits of the case a subsequent application 
for the same relief can be filed and entertained only if 
it is based upon a fresh ground, i.e. a ground which 
was not available or in existence at the time of decision 
of the earlier application. 
 
(v) 
Withdrawal simpliciter of an earlier application 
for bail before addressing or hearing of any argument 
on the merits of the case does not preclude filing of a 
subsequent application for the same relief before the 
same court and its decision by such court on the 
merits of the case. In all cases of withdrawal of such 
an application the court must faithfully record in its 
order as to whether withdrawal of the application had 
been requested and allowed after addressing and 
hearing of some or all the arguments on the merits of 
the case or withdrawal of the application had been 
requested and allowed before addressing and hearing 
of any argument on the merits of the case. 
 
(vi) 
In a case of withdrawal of an earlier application 
for bail after addressing and hearing of some or all the 
arguments on the merits of the case no subsequent 
application for the same relief can be filed before or 
entertained by the same court unless such subsequent 
application is based upon a fresh ground, i.e. a ground 
which was not available or in existence at the time of 
disposition of the earlier application.   
                 
 
39
 
26. 
The Office is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the 
Registrars of all the High Courts in the country who are directed to 
ensure that every Judge and Magistrate dealing with criminal 
cases within the jurisdiction of each High Court receives a copy of 
this judgment and complies with the principles of practice and 
propriety enunciated or recapitulated herein. 
 
 
Judge 
 
 
Judge 
 
 
Judge 
 
 
 
Announced in open Court at Islamabad on 22.01.2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judge 
 
Islamabad 
22.01.2014 
 
Approved for reporting.  
 
Arif