IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN 
(Appellate Jurisdiction) 
 
 
Present: 
Mr. Justice Mian Saqib Nisar 
Mr. Justice Mushir Alam 
Mr. Justice Maqbool Baqar 
 
Civil Appeal No.1132 of 2007 
Against judgment dated 08.11.2005 of High 
Court 
of 
Sindh 
at 
Karachi, 
passed 
in 
 Constitution Petition.No.D-687 of 2004. 
 
Hyderabad Cantonment Board  
 
 
 
Appellant(s) 
VERSUS 
Raj Kumar & others 
 
 
 
 
 
Respondent(s) 
 
For the Appellant(s): 
 
Mr. Anwar Mansoor Khan, Sr. ASC  
 
For Respondents#7-12:  
Mr. Qasim Mir Jat, Addl. AG, Sindh  
Dr. Saeed Ahmed Qureshi, Focal 
person for Chief Secretary of Sindh 
Ms. Lubna Salahuddin, Addl. Secy. 
Local Government. 
 
Date of Hearing:  
 
20.05.2015  
 
JUDGMENT  
 
Mushir Alam, J-. Leave to appeal was granted on 
17.04.2007 to consider the following:- 
 “After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, we find 
that the question as to whether the Cantonment Executive 
Officer is empowered under Cantonment Act, 1924 to 
charge the service fee from the vehicles being used as public 
transport for use of the facilities provided for the 
convenience of passengers at halting places fixed under 
Motor Vehicle Ordinance, 1965 read with Motor Vehicle 
Rules, 1969 would require consideration in the light of 
relevant provision in the above referred statutes and the 
rules framed thereunder. Therefore, we grant leave in this 
petition to consider the above question.”  
 
2. 
 
Backdrop forming matrix of instant appeal appears to 
be that the appellant-Hyderabad Cantonment Board levied parking 
fee on commercial vehicles plying within Hyderabad city on each and 
every stop i.e. general bus stand situated in the cantonment area of 
Hyderabad through its contractors, which action was successfully 
challenged before the High Court of Sindh through Constitution 
Petition No.D-687 of 2004 and a learned Division Bench of the High 
Court vide impugned judgment dated 08.11.2005, also reported as 
Raj Kumar v. Hyderabad Cantonment Board (2006 MLD 549), on 
C. A.No.1132 of 2007 
                                                           
2
 
examining various provisions of the Cantonment Act, 1924 including 
Sections 25, 60, 61, 62 and 200 thereof came to the conclusion that 
“since there was no provision in the Cantonment Act, 1924 
empowering the Cantonment Board to charge parking fee, such 
levy was without lawful authority”.  
 
3. 
 
Mr. Anwar Mansoor Khan, learned Sr.ASC, representing 
the appellant-Hyderabad Cantonment Board, has contended that the 
Appellant-Cantonment Board, has established Bus Stands at various 
halting places which maintain waiting rooms and wash rooms for 
ladies and gents and further facilities for the bus owners to park 
their buses for the purpose of collecting the passengers. It was urged 
that on account of such services, a nominal fee was imposed and was 
being collected through contractors. According to him, the 
Appellant-Cantonment Board, under Section 200 of the Cantonment 
Act, 1924 is fully empowered to impose such fee. To support his 
contention he has placed reliance on the case of Federation of 
Pakistan v. Durrani Ceramics (2014 SCMR 1630). It was urged 
that fee is charged in respect of services provided, therefore, no 
exception to it could be taken.  
 
4. 
 
It may be observed that said case does not support the 
case of the appellant-Cantonment Board. In the cited case validity of 
Gas Infrastructure Development Cess Act, 2011 was successfully 
challenged in the High Court being ultra vires to the Constitution. 
On examining the legality of the Act, 2011 this Court came to a 
conclusion that subject Cess was not a tax and was not covered by 
the Entry relating to imposition of levy of tax under Part-1 of the 
Federal Legislative List, and it was accordingly held; not validly 
levied in accordance with the Constitution.  
 
5. 
 
Mr. Anwar Mansoor, learned ASC for the Appellant-
Cantonment Board has fairly brought to the notice of this Court a 
judgment of House of Lord reported as  McCarthy & Stone 
(Development) Ltd. v. London Borough of Richmond Upon Thames    
(1994 SCMR 1393), which goes against the Appellant. In the cited 
case, the Appellant were charged fee under Section 87 (1) of the 
Local Government Planning and Land Act, 1980, which was 
unsuccessfully challenged before the Council, being beyond the 
C. A.No.1132 of 2007 
                                                           
3
 
scope of the referred Act of 1980, the Appellant failed in the Court of 
Appeals, which issue was then taken to the House of Lords.  The 
House of Lords considered the legality of the policy of the Council of 
the respondent London Borough of Richmond upon Thames (the 
Council), which it adopted on 2nd July 1985 and under which it had 
made a charge for consultations concerning speculative development 
or redevelopment proposal between the developers and the 
Council’s. Developer engaged into preliminary consultation prior to 
making formal application for planning permission, he was charged. 
Such charges were paid twice for the consultation under protest, 
developer made unsuccessful representation before the Council 
followed by unsuccessful appeal before the Court of Appeals (1990 2 
WLR 1294), which was challenged.  House of Lords, on examining 
the power and function of the Local Authority came to a conclusion 
that fee within the contemplation of the Act, 1980 relates only to 
planning application and not to any pre-application inquiries or 
consultations. It was accordingly held that local government cannot 
charge for services unless it is required by statute to provide such 
services.  
 
6. 
 
Charging 
provisions 
in 
any 
statute 
are 
strictly 
construed. It was conceded by the learned ASC for the Appellant-
Cantonment Board that any pecuniary burden, by whatever 
nomenclature it may be inflicted may it be in the name of tax, cess, 
fee, toll, or rate etc could only be inflicted, provided it has a valid 
statutory sanction. 
 
7. 
 
Mr. Anwar Mansoor Khan, learned Sr.ASC for the 
appellant has placed reliance on Section 200 of the Cantonment Act, 
1924, which according to him provides legal backing for the subject 
fee. The said provision for ease of reference is reproduced as under:- 
“200. Levy of stallages, rents and fees.- A [Board] 
may- 
 
(a) charge for the occupation or use of any stall, shop, 
standing, shed or pen in a public market, or public 
slaughter-house, or for the right to expose goods for sale in 
a public market, or for weighing or measuring goods sold 
therein, or for the right to slaughter animals in any public 
slaughter-house, such stallages, rents and fees as it thinks 
fit; or 
 
(b) with the sanction of the [Competent Authority], farm the 
stallages, rents and fees leviable as aforesaid or any portion 
thereof for any period not exceeding one year at a time; or 
 
C. A.No.1132 of 2007 
                                                           
4
 
(c) put up to public auction, or with the sanction of the 
[Competent Authority], dispose of by private sale, the 
privilege of occupying or using any stall, shop, standing, 
shed or pen in a public market or public slaughter-house for 
such term and on such conditions as it thinks fit.” 
 
8. 
 
Extraction of money in any form may it be a tax, cell, 
toll fee, charge or rate or levy by whatever nomenclature it is 
classified could be extracted by the government and or public 
authority under a valid legislative instrument by the competent 
legislature (one may refer to Article 70 read with Article 73 (1A)(3) 
(a),  Article 77  read with Article 141 read with Entry No.54 of the 
Federal Legislative List). A bare perusal of the provision of Section 
200 of the Act, 1924 as reproduced above, shows that it is “levy of 
stallages rent and fee” for providing stall, shop, standing shed, pen 
and for other defined commercial activities on the vendors dealing in 
goods and for the slaughter of animals in public market or public 
slaughter houses respectively and that too subject to sanction by the 
competent authority. Parking fee is not envisioned under the 
referred provision. Cantonment Board has no authority to enlarge 
the scope of charging section and include, conjecture and or read 
some activity which is not envisioned or is not the contemplation of 
the charging Section 200 ibid as relied upon by the learned ASC for 
the appellant-Cantonment Board.  
 
9. 
 
In a case reported as “Exide Pakistan Limited Vs. 
Cantonment Board (2012 CLC 1124)”, imposition of “Shop Board 
Fee” under Section 200 of the Cantonment Act, 1924 was challenged. 
The High Court examined various provisions of the Act of 1924 and 
came to a conclusion that “Shop Board Fee” appears to be an entirely 
different genre of fee more akin to advertisement/Signboard [fee] of 
the shop, which did not fall within the contemplation of stallages, 
rent and fee within the sanction of Section 200 of the Cantonment 
Act, 1924.”  
 
10. 
 
Learned counsel was not able to point out any other 
provisions of Cantonment Act, 1924 that could empower and or 
authorize the Cantonment Board to charge the subject parking fee. 
Mr. Anwar Mansoor Khan, learned ASC for the appellant-
Cantonment Board, vainly attempted to argue that under the 
Cantonment Ordinance, 2002, the Cantonment Board is specifically 
empowered to levy parking fee in terms of Section 243 read with 
C. A.No.1132 of 2007 
                                                           
5
 
Entry No.9 of the first schedule which provides “fee for parking of 
vehicles on site provided by the Cantonment administration”. 
 
11. 
 
Indeed, such power to impose parking fee is available 
under the Cantonment Ordinance, 2002. But it is of no avail to the 
Appellant for the simple reason that such Ordinance has not as yet 
been enforced. In terms of subsection (3) of section 1 of the 
Ordinance, 2002, the Ordinance, or any provision thereof, will 
become operational only on such date as may be notified by the 
Federal Government. Mr. Anwar Mansoor Khan has fairly conceded 
that no such notification has been issued so far. Such arguments 
failed before the High Court. That being the legal position, he cannot 
rely on any law to justify impugned parking fee, which is still in 
hibernation and not implemented as yet. No other contention was 
raised. No infirmity in the impugned judgment is found.  
 
12. 
 
The appeal is accordingly dismissed.    
 
 
Judge 
 
 
 
Judge 
 
 
 
Judge 
 
ISLAMABAD, THE 
20th of May, 2015 
Not Approved For Reporting 
M.Zubair/*