IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN 
(APPELLATE JURISDICTION) 
 
 
PRESENT: MR. JUSTICE MIAN SAQIB NISAR 
 
 
MR. JUSTICE GULZAR AHMED 
 
 
MR. JUSTICE UMAR ATA BANDIAL 
 
 
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1560 OF 2008 
(Against the judgment dated 12.8.2002 of 
the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in 
C.R.No.353/1991) 
 
 
Muhammad Ramzan (decd) through L.Rs. etc. 
 
…Appellant(s) 
VERSUS 
Nasreen Firdous etc. 
 
…Respondent(s) 
 
For the appellant(s): 
Mian Abdul Aziz, ASC 
 
 
For respondents 1 to 8: 
Malik M. Tariq Rajwana, ASC 
 
 
Amicus curiae: 
Mr. Khalid Anwar, Sr. ASC 
Mr. Makhdoom Ali Khan, Sr. ASC 
 
 
Date of hearing: 
21.10.2015 
… 
JUDGMENT 
 
 
MIAN SAQIB NISAR, J.- The primary question in this Appeal, 
with leave of the Court dated 30.9.2008, is whether the Civil Courts in 
Pakistan have jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate upon a suit for 
administration with regards to the property situate abroad. 
2. 
 
In the context of the above, the facts in brief are:- that Mst. 
Hafi (now deceased), represented by the appellants as her legal heirs (hereinafter 
called the appellants) being the mother of Muhammad Anwar Irshad (deceased) 
who died in Islamabad on 26.3.1987 filed a suit for administration of his 
property(ies) in the Civil Court at Lahore, claiming that the deceased had 
left behind him Mst. Hafi as mother, Mst. Nasreen Firdous and Abida 
Begum (defendants No.1 and 2) as his widows and the remaining defendants as 
his sons and daughters. It was averred that the deceased had been settled 
Civil Appeal No.1560 of 2008 
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in England and certain movable and immovable property(ies) situate in 
Pakistan as well as in England forms part of his estate (detailed in Schedule A and 
Schedule B of the plaint). It may be pertinent to mention here that the 
respondents/defendants, the legal heirs of the deceased, primarily resisted 
the suit in respect of the property(ies) abroad on the ground that the courts 
in Pakistan have no jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate the matter, 
obviously meaning that they never submitted to the jurisdiction of the 
courts in Pakistan to the extent of the property situated abroad. 
3. 
 
The learned Civil Judge seized of the matter, on the conclusion 
of the trial granted partial decree, in that, the suit to the extent of the 
property(ies) situated in Pakistan was allowed but to the extent of those 
abroad it was dismissed, holding that it does not have jurisdiction. The 
appeal filed by the appellants could not succeed and their civil revision 
before the learned High Court was also dismissed. Thus the judgment and 
decree of the Trial Court was maintained throughout.  
4. 
 
Leave in this case was granted to consider the following 
questions:- 
“(i) 
Whether the courts below have fell in error in not giving 
effect to the mandate of Section 20 of C.P.C 1908 which, inter 
alia, provides that the suit could be instituted within the local 
limits of a place where the defendant resides at the time of the 
commencement of the suit? 
(ii) 
Whether the question of domicile of the deceased 
Muhammad Anwar Irshad could be a determinative factor on 
the question of jurisdiction of the court in the facts and 
circumstances of the instant case? 
(iii) 
Whether in the face of the evidence led to the effect that 
the parties admittedly reside permanently in Pakistan, would it 
not be in accord with the principle of forum non convenience for 
the courts in Pakistan to entertain the suit qua the 
administration of properties situated in England? 
(iv) 
Whether the respondents-defendants having agreed to 
the administration of properties and their respective shares in 
Civil Appeal No.1560 of 2008 
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terms of the Islamic law and having not challenged the 
impugned judgments and decrees of the three courts below, 
invoking the said law, could they be allowed to raise the plea at 
this stage that in the administration of properties in England, 
the law in England would be applicable and not the Islamic 
law?” 
 
 
In the context of the above, two basic questions requiring resolution 
are as follows:- 
a) 
What is the substantive law to be applied? 
b) 
Which court has jurisdiction? 
 
These are completely independent questions which require to be 
considered separately. At present, there appears to be a lot of confusion 
and these two independent questions appear to have been jumbled together 
and thus there is lack of conceptual clarity. 
 
As regarding the question of the applicable substantive law, in order 
to determine the question of jurisdiction of the courts in line with the 
substantive municipal law of Pakistan, we will have to make recourse to 
sections 16 to 20 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC). In so far as 
sections 16 & 20 of the CPC are concerned, they raise complex questions 
leading to the need to conduct a deeper examination of related, but much 
broader issues of reconciliation of private international law in relation to 
the municipal law of Pakistan. The extent of jurisdiction of Pakistani Courts 
will also be determined in view of the established principles of private 
international law. 
5. 
 
In respect of the municipal law of Pakistan, in order to address 
the first question as to the applicable substantive law, the provisions of 
Sections 16 to 20 of the CPC are relevant. It will be determined whether the 
appellants’ suit before the Civil Judge in Lahore was competently filed 
under the laws of Pakistan in relation to the property situated in England. 
Civil Appeal No.1560 of 2008 
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In terms of section 16 C.P.C., such suits, in so far as they relate to 
immovable property, are to be instituted before the Court within whose 
territorial jurisdiction the property is situated. Section 16 ordains:-  
“16. Suits to be instituted where the subject matter situate. --- 
subject to the pecuniary or other limitations prescribed by any 
law, suits --- 
(a) 
for the recovery of immovable property with or without 
rent or profits, 
(b) 
for the partition of immovable property, 
(c) 
for foreclosure, sale or redemption in the case of a 
mortgage of or charge upon immovable property, 
(d) 
for the determination of any other right to or interest in 
immovable property, 
(e) 
for compensation for wrong to immovable property, 
(f) 
for the recovery of movable property actually under 
distraint or attachment, shall be instituted in the Court within 
the local limits of whose jurisdiction the property is situate, or 
in the case of suits referred to in clause (c) at the place where 
the cause of action his wholly or partly arisen:  
 
Provided that a suit to obtain relief respecting or 
compensation for wrong to, immovable property held by or on 
behalf of the defendant may, where the relief sought can be 
entirely obtained through his personal obedience, be instituted 
either in the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction 
the property is situate, or, in the case of suits referred to in 
clause (c) at the place where the cause of action has wholly or 
partly arisen or in the Court within the local limits of whose 
jurisdiction the defendant actually and voluntarily resides, or 
carries on business, or personally works for gain.  
 
Explanation - In this section "property" means property 
situate in Pakistan.” (emphasis added) 
 
Civil Appeal No.1560 of 2008 
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It may be noted that the proviso contained in Section 16 prescribes 
that a suit may also be filed before a Court within the local limits of which 
the defendant resides, carries on business or works if the relief sought can 
be obtained entirely through his personal obedience. We may take this 
opportunity to dispel a commonly held perception that this proviso applies 
to all the categories of suits provided in subsections (a) to (f) of section 16. 
It is stressed that the language of the proviso is very clear and it does not 
apply to suits for determination of a right to, or recovery of immovable 
property. 
 
 
Be that as it may, from the clear and unambiguous language of the 
explanation of Section 16, there remains absolutely no doubt that the 
property(ies) which falls within the purview of the section are those which 
are situated in Pakistan and thus the Pakistani Courts shall have the sole 
and exclusive territorial jurisdiction in respect thereto. In other words, as 
per the mandate of law, the territorial jurisdiction of Pakistani Courts has 
been limited, restricted and circumscribed only to such property(ies) which 
are situated within the territorial boundaries of Pakistan. It may be 
pertinent to mention here that where a word/expression has been defined 
in the statute, it is settled law of interpretation that such word/expression 
has to be given the same meaning until and unless the assignment of such 
meaning would be patently in conflict with the express text of the said 
provision or would destroy the spirit and object of the provisions of law in 
which such expression/word appears or shall lead to an absolute 
absurdity. This principle is no less true for the explanation added to a 
particular section which (explanation) in law is a guideline for the purposes of 
explaining the true intent, object, purpose, letter and spirit of such a 
provision by the legislature itself, with the obvious consequence that the 
legislature means and intends to leave little room and opportunity for any 
Civil Appeal No.1560 of 2008 
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misinterpretation and misapplication of the said section and would desire 
that the scope of the section should be construed in the manner as has 
been explained by the statute.1 Thus, it is clear that the Pakistani Courts 
as per the explanation shall only have the jurisdiction with respect to the 
property(ies) which are subject matter of the suit and falls within the 
territorial domain of Pakistan. 
 
Such interpretation of the relevant provisions of the C.P.C are 
duplicated in the Indian Jurisprudence as will be illustrated by briefly 
making reference to a few cases on the question of jurisdiction of courts to 
try suits pertaining to property situate outside the respective state.  
 
In the case of Premchand v. Hiralal (AIR 1928 Nagpur 295) while 
interpreting section 16 C.P.C, the learned judge agreed with the lower court 
which held that it had no jurisdiction over the movable or immovable 
property situated at Shahdole (outside British India). The learned Judge stated 
that:- 
“It seems to me very clear that the lower Court is right. The 
question is concluded by S.16, Civil P.C, as regards immovable 
property. The explanation to that section states that the word 
‘property’ used therein means property situated in British 
India… Our Courts are governed by the Civil Procedure Code, 
and they cannot deal with immovable property situated where 
that Code does not run.”2 
 
6. 
 
Having considered the provisions of Section 16, we feel it is 
expedient to make reference to Sections 17 to 19 of the CPC which also deal 
with the territorial jurisdiction of Pakistani Courts. It may be stated that 
Section 16, as per the interpretation given to it above, is the main and 
pivotal section which prescribes for the territorial jurisdiction of the courts 
                                       
1 See PLD 1985 SC 92. 
2 See also Gopi Chand v. Khazan Chand and others (A.I.R. 1938 Lahore 226) and 
Debendra Nath Bhattacharjee v. Amarendra Nath Bhattacharjee (A.I.R 1955 Calcutta 159). 
Civil Appeal No.1560 of 2008 
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in Pakistan (i.e. the courts of plenary civil jurisdiction) and this section, as 
mentioned, has limited its jurisdiction only to the property(ies) which are 
situated in Pakistan with the obvious legal consequence that the 
property(ies) outside Pakistan are expressly excluded from the purview of 
jurisdiction of Pakistani Courts as a whole. Sections 17 to 19 when read 
and construed in the context of the subject matter jurisdiction are basically 
supplemental provisions to Section 16 and in fact and law, cater for a 
situation once the threshold of Section 16 vis-à-vis the jurisdiction of 
Pakistani Courts is crossed; it is then that if the Pakistani Courts have 
jurisdiction over the subject matter, that it should be settled and 
determined as to which court within Pakistan shall have the jurisdiction in 
the given circumstances of the case to try a suit of a particular nature. But 
for the application of these sections (17 to 19 CPC) it is essential that firstly 
the jurisdiction should vest in the Pakistani Courts in terms of Section 16. 
In other words, Section 16 is not only a threshold section for the 
conferment of jurisdiction to the Pakistani Courts but it is the portal 
through which the plaintiff has to enter for the purposes of entering into 
the city of jurisdiction of different courts in Pakistan. If, as per the mandate 
of law, such door is closed upon a plaintiff because the property, subject 
matter of a suit, is not within the limits of Pakistan, then such litigant is 
barred and precluded from invoking the jurisdiction of any other court of 
the country in terms of Sections 17 to 19. In the context of the above, if a 
judgment is required, reference can be made to a case reported as Yusuf 
Abbas and others Vs. Mst. Ismat Mustafa and others (PLD 1968 Karachi 
480) (see paragraph 19 thereof). 
 
With respect to section 18 C.P.C, it maybe added that even if the 
property was situate in Pakistan (which is not the case in the present matter), section 
18 C.P.C will ipso facto be inapplicable for the very reason that there is no 
uncertainty as to the respective jurisdiction of the courts in England in the 
Civil Appeal No.1560 of 2008 
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instant case since the property in question lies within the territorial 
jurisdiction of England. 
 
In a similar vein, section 19 C.P.C is applicable only to suits for 
compensation for wrong to the person or movable property. It further 
applies to torts committed within Pakistan. The instant case has no nexus 
with the law of tort. 
7. 
 
We will now consider whether the present matter falls within 
the purview of section 20 CPC. Learned counsel for the appellants while 
relying upon Section 20 of the CPC contends that the courts below fell in 
error in refusing to exercise the jurisdiction with respect to the property(ies) 
situated in Pakistan because of the reason that the cause of action had 
arisen to the appellants in Pakistan as the deceased had passed away in 
Pakistan and in support of the contention has relied upon Yusuf Abbas’s 
case (supra). Therefore, it seems expedient to consider the legal effect of the 
said section which reads as under:-  
“20. Other suits to be instituted where defendants reside or 
cause of action arises. --- Subject to the limitations aforesaid, 
every suit shall be instituted in a Court within the local limits of 
whose jurisdiction-- 
 
(a) 
the defendant, or each of the defendants where 
there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the 
suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or 
personally works for gain; or  
 
(b) 
any of the defendants, where there are more than 
one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and 
voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works 
for gain, provided that in such case either the leave of the Court 
is given, or the defendants who do not reside, or carry on 
business, or personally work for gain as aforesaid, acquiesce in 
such institution; or  
 
(c) 
the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises.   
Civil Appeal No.1560 of 2008 
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Explanation I.--- Where a person has a permanent dwelling at 
one place and also a temporary residence at another place, he 
shall be deemed to reside at both places in respect of any cause 
of action arising at the place where he has such temporary 
residence.  
Explanation II.--- A corporation shall be deemed to carry on 
business at its sole or principal office in Pakistan or, in respect 
of any cause of action arising at any place where it has also a 
subordinate office, at such place.” 
 
 
Ordinarily, section 20 C.P.C is to be read with and subject to the 
limitations prescribed in section 16 C.P.C, however, since section 16 C.P.C 
does not apply in relation to property situated abroad, section 20 C.P.C will 
have to be read independently in the present case. 
 
In terms of section 20 C.P.C, a suit may be filed in a Court within the 
local limits of which (a) all the defendants were actually and voluntarily 
residing, carrying on business or personally working for gain at the time of 
commencement of the suit, or (b) any of the defendants, where there are 
more than one, actually or voluntarily resides, or carries on business or 
personally works for gain provided that in such cases leave of the Court is 
obtained or the defendants who are not within the Court's jurisdiction 
acquiesce or (c) where the cause of action wholly or partly arises. 
 
The record of the present case clearly illustrates at the very least that 
at all times, all the main contending defendants nos. 1 to 8 were residing, 
carrying business or working outside Pakistan. This assertion is further 
supported by the fact that the address provided for the defendants nos. 1 to 
8 is that of England and it is nowhere suggested that the defendants have 
at any time been residents of Pakistan or carried on business in Pakistan, 
or worked in Pakistan. Therefore, section 20(a) C.P.C evidently does not 
apply to the facts of the given case. 
 
Moving on to consider whether the present case falls within section 
Civil Appeal No.1560 of 2008 
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20(b) C.P.C, let it be said that if it is the case that at least one of the 
defendants permanently resides, carries on business or works in Pakistan, 
then, as necessitated by sub-section (b), leave of the court had to be 
obtained which was not done in the present matter. Furthermore, the 
defendants clearly did not acquiesce in relation to jurisdiction over the 
property situated in England as the jurisdiction of Pakistan in relation to 
the property in England is firmly disputed in the written statement of the 
defendants Nos. 1 to 9. 
 
Finally, sub-section (c) does not help the case of the appellants since 
the question of jurisdiction of the Pakistani Courts in relation to the 
property in Pakistan forms part of a separate cause of action than that in 
relation to the property situated in England. The factum of the distinct 
location of the properties alone gives rise to two separate causes of action. 
 
The aforementioned opinion is supported by a body of cases 
consistently decided by the learned courts of Pakistan. 
To mention but a few, in the case of Mst. Zainab Vs. Mst. Raji & others 
(PLD 1960 SC 229) the Supreme Court of Pakistan stated that even if the 
suit was not barred by section 16, and the Pakistani Courts could not 
assume jurisdiction in relation to property in India, since no effective decree 
could be passed by the Civil Court, their jurisdiction must be held to be 
barred by necessary intendment.  
 
In the case of Nadeem Ghani v. United Bank Limited (2001 CLC 
1904), the Karachi High Court after examining section 20 C.P.C found to 
have jurisdiction to try to suit only because the Principal Office of United 
Bank Limited (defendant No.1) was situated in Karachi and the defendants 
Nos.2 and 3 in that case resided and worked for gain with defendant No.1 
in Karachi, thus falling within the purview of section 20 C.P.C. However, as 
noted above, a perusal of the record reveals that is in an accepted position 
that the deceased and the defendants were at all material times domiciled 
Civil Appeal No.1560 of 2008 
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in England and the defendants have been permanently residing there 
throughout. 
 
In the case of Heman & others v. Fazal (PLD 1955 Lahore 280) the 
learned Judge was only able to find that the Court in Pakistan had 
jurisdiction under section 20 C.P.C since the defendants were all residing 
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court. 
 
In the case of Dr. Abdul Ghani & others v. Ismail & others (PLD 
1958 Lahore 690 DB) there was a dispute in relation to the ownership of 
property abandoned in India at the time of partition. The trial court framed 
issues in relation to the jurisdiction and found that the civil court had 
jurisdiction. Thereafter, arguments were addressed on the issue of 
jurisdiction before the High Court and the case of Heman & others v Fazal 
(PLD 1955 Lah.280) was also cited. The High Court acknowledged that the 
facts of the case were almost identical to the facts in Heman. The High 
Court refused to follow the dictum in Heman and held that the courts in 
Pakistan are not competent to determine rights and interests in immovable 
property situated outside Pakistan The High Court further held that section 
20 of CPC only applied to actions of a personal or transitory nature and not 
to actions of real or mixed kinds, which are exclusively governed by 
sections 16 & 17 of C.P.C. 
 
Going further, in the case of Haroon Ayoob Abdul Karim v 
Sulleman Ahmad & others (CLC 1983 162 SB-Karachi) shareholders of 
a company registered in Bombay filed a suit for accounts in Pakistan. 
Question arose as to whether the Pakistani courts had jurisdiction in 
respect of the subject-matter situated abroad. The learned single judge held 
that:- 
“it is not every action where mere presence of the defendants 
within the jurisdiction of the Court vests the Court with 
jurisdiction to pass a decree in respect of properties situate 
Civil Appeal No.1560 of 2008 
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outside the jurisdiction”. 
 
The learned Judge went on to hold that since the records pertaining 
to the company were not available with the defendants either, even by 
obedience of the defendants, no effective order could be passed. The suit 
was accordingly dismissed. 
 
In this respect, it is notable that the presence of the defendant within 
the court’s jurisdiction would not ipso facto grant jurisdiction to the court 
under section 20 C.P.C for the simple reason that the property in question 
is within the territorial jurisdiction of another country which has the sole 
jurisdiction as will be discussed below in detail.  
 
Finally, in the case of Muhammad Sohail Sidddiqui v. Mst. 
Parveen (MLD 2010 1433 SB-Karachi), while discussing the principles in 
relation to letters of administration and succession certificates the learned 
court stated that:- 
“succession of the immovable property is regulated by the Law 
of the Country in which person had his domicile at the time of 
his death and Succession of Immovable property in Pakistan of 
a person deceased is regulated by the Law of Pakistan wherever 
such person may have had his domicile at the time of his death.” 
It thus follows that the appellants cannot further rely on Section 20 C.P.C in 
addition to section 16 C.P.C to argue that the suit was or can competently 
be filed in relation to all property, movable and immovable, situated in 
England. 
 
8. 
 
After having considered the relevant municipal law, we will now 
consider the case relied upon by the appellants in the context of its 
application to the facts of the present case. 
 
The appellants have sought to rely on the Yusuf Abbas case to argue 
that the courts of Pakistan have jurisdiction over property in England and 
Civil Appeal No.1560 of 2008 
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that the facts of the Yusuf case are identical to the facts of their case and it 
is fully applicable to the present situation. 
 
It must be pointed out that the appellants’ reliance on this case is 
flawed for the reason that it originates from an erroneous understanding of 
the ratio of the case. In addition to this, the facts of that case and the facts 
of the present case are completely distinct as will be made clear below. 
 
Two determinative features in the facts of the Yusuf Abbas case are 
not present in the present case: (i) the deceased in that case was domiciled 
in Pakistan hence invoking the jurisdiction of Pakistani courts; (ii) the 
defendants in that case were residing in Pakistan bringing the suit within 
the purview of section 20 C.P.C. 
 
Since the deceased was domiciled in Pakistan, the Pakistani Court 
already possessed jurisdiction under private international law to generally 
administer the entire estate of the deceased and the only issue was in 
relation to immovable property abroad which was subject to the rule of lex 
situs (discussed below). On the contrary, in the present matter, the deceased 
was not domiciled in Pakistan, rather it is undisputed that he was 
domiciled in England. 
 
As far as the obiter dictum in the Yusuf case is concerned, we must 
proceed cautiously before following the obiter. In that case the learned 
Judge was faced with the question of whether the Court could assume 
jurisdiction over immovable property abroad, and move away from the rule 
of lex situs, while administering the estate of the deceased who was 
domiciled in Pakistan. The learned High Court Judge discussed the English 
jurisprudence on this point in England at length in order to ascertain 
whether jurisdiction could be exercised in relation to property situated 
abroad. In this respect, it is pertinent to state that English law on this point 
is imprecise and at times inconsistent, hence the obiter in that case cannot 
be of assistance to the appellants in the present case. 
Civil Appeal No.1560 of 2008 
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9. 
 
The consideration of the substantive position under the 
municipal law of Pakistan leads us to the conclusion that the courts in 
Pakistan lack the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon foreign property in terms 
of the provisions of sections 16-20 C.P.C. 
10. 
 
For the sake of being comprehensive, it may be mentioned here 
that the underlying basis or rationale for restricting the jurisdiction of a 
state within its own territory under municipal law stems from the respect 
for the territorial jurisdiction of another state. It is in this light that the 
principles of private international law must be appreciated. Let us now 
consider the question of jurisdiction under a parallel body of law, that is, 
private international law. 
 
Recourse is made to international law as the property in dispute 
being within the territorial jurisdiction of England invites the application of 
the recognized principles of private international law.. Whilst articulating 
this notion, it is of benefit to quote Ian Brownlie’sPrinciples of Public 
International Law (4th edn, Oxford University Press 2004) 299 wherein it is 
stated:- 
“...a state in normal circumstances maintains a system of courts 
empowered to decide civil cases and, in doing so, prepared to 
apply private international law where appropriate in cases 
containing a foreign element.” 
 
11. 
 
Bringing our attention to bear on the principles of private 
international law, the law governing matters of cross-border succession to 
property are dealt with in line with the concepts of lex situs and lex 
domicilii. In order to understand these two concepts, we can turn to 
Cheshire, a renowned international law jurist, (Private International Law, Sixth End., 
p. 550). 
 
As noted by Cheshire, one of the cardinal rules of private 
Civil Appeal No.1560 of 2008 
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international law in matters of cross-border succession is that the movable 
property of the deceased person is regulated by the laws of the country in 
which the deceased is domiciled; in the present case, the law of England 
constitutes the law of the country in which the deceased was domiciled. As 
to immovable property, the recognized rule governing real or immovable 
property is that such property is subject to the laws of the place within 
which it is situated; again, in the present case the laws of England will be 
applicable since the property in dispute is situated in England. This is the 
principle of lex loci rei sitae (or more commonly referred to as lex situs) which governs 
the question of jurisdiction as far as the immovable property is concerned.  
 
The rationale for these two principles, lex domicilii and lex situs is 
clearly to address and solve the problem posed by the notion of Conflict of 
Laws by resorting to the two stated concepts. 
 
It is of benefit to quote Cheshire who  stated:- 
“...only the Courts of Situs can make an effective decree with 
regard to land”. 
 
 
The courts of situs in the instant case are the courts of England by 
reason of the fact that the disputed property is situated in England. 
 
Pakistan recognizes these well-settled rules  of private international 
law as can be ascertained from a perusal of section 5 of the Succession Act, 
1925 which is reproduced below:- 
“5. 
Law regulating succession to deceased person’s 
immoveable and movable property respectively: (1)  Succession 
to the immoveable property in Pakistan of a person deceased 
shall be regulated by the law of Pakistan, wherever such person 
may have had his domicile at the time of his death. 
(2) 
Succession to the moveable property of a person 
deceased is regulated by the law of the country in which person 
had his domicile at the time of his death.” 
Civil Appeal No.1560 of 2008 
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This Section clearly acknowledges the application of international 
law, particularly in matters of succession. 
12. 
 
In the preceding paragraphs, after considering and applying 
the relevant municipal law under C.P.C (sections 16 to 20 respectively), we 
concluded that the jurisdiction of the courts of Pakistan is not extended to 
property situated outside its territory. We have further attempted to very 
briefly consider the applicable principles of private international law to 
answer the same question of jurisdiction and there too, as has been 
illustrated, we found that the courts of Pakistan must not adjudicate upon 
property which is situated in another country as the governing principles 
will be those of private international law as opposed to the municipal law of 
Pakistan. 
 
Viewed in this light, it is incumbent upon the courts of Pakistan to 
keep the principles of Conflict of Laws or Private International Law in mind 
whilst dealing with matters involving questions of cross-border succession. 
These principles are based on mutual respect for and recognition of, the 
judicial systems and the laws of other countries. 
13. 
 
The property in dispute is undoubtedly and indisputably 
located inside the territorial jurisdiction of England thus barring the 
jurisdiction of Pakistan over the subject-matter property situated in 
England.  
 
A state may extend its jurisdiction to its nationals abroad, however, in the 
instant case, the deceased held dual nationality being both a Pakistani and 
a UK national simultaneously.  
 
In the case of Nadeem Ghani (supra) at paragraph 22 the Karachi 
High Court stated as follows:- 
Civil Appeal No.1560 of 2008 
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“It is universally accepted that according to the comity of 
nations all legislation of a country is territorial, all exercise of 
jurisdiction is territorial in nature and the laws of a country 
apply to all its subjects, things and acts within its territory.” 
 
 
This case aptly noted the international principle of absolute nature of 
a state’s territorial jurisdiction is not to be extended beyond its territory 
and within the territory of another state, since in that case, it will be 
interfering with the territorial jurisdiction of England. 
 
Additionally, it may be mentioned that the courts in Pakistan should 
respect and give effect to (subject to certain exceptions), the judicial decisions of 
other countries on the same subject under the principle of 'judicial comity.' 
While acknowledging the doctrine of judicial comity, Mark Janis, (‘An 
Introduction to International Law 327 2003) noted that:- 
Roughly speaking, courts, according to the doctrine of 
international judicial comity, should apply foreign law or limit 
domestic jurisdiction out of respect for foreign sovereignty.  
 
 
The doctrine of judicial comity, being recognized and applied in the 
courts around the globe, was correctly acknowledged by the Lahore High 
Court in the case of Louise Anne Fairley v. Sajjad Ahmed Rana (PLD 
2007 Lahore 300). 
 
The view that Pakistan should respect and give effect to the judicial 
decisions of other countries finds further support from section 13 C.P.C 
which reads, in so far as it is material, as under:- 
“13. 
When foreign judgment not conclusive.-- A foreign 
judgment shall be conclusive as to any matter thereby directly 
adjudicated upon between the same parties or between parties 
under whom they or any of them claim litigating under the same 
title except--  
 
(a) 
Where it has not been pronounced by a Court of 
Civil Appeal No.1560 of 2008 
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competent jurisdiction; 
 
(b) 
Where it has not been given on the merits of the 
case; 
 
(c) 
Where it appears on face of the proceedings to be 
founded on an incorrect view of International Law or a refusal 
to recognize the law of Pakistan in cases in which such law is 
applicable; 
 
(d) 
Where the proceedings in which the judgment 
was obtained are opposed to natural justice;  
 
(e) 
Where it has been obtained by fraud; 
 
(f) 
Where it sustains a claim founded on a breach of 
any law in force in Pakistan.” 
 
 
It is clear that foreign judgments are conclusive as to any matter 
thereby adjudicated upon and Pakistani courts must recognize and enforce 
the same. However, before enforcing any foreign judgment, a Pakistani 
court will have to ensure that it does not fall within any of the exceptions 
contained in section 13 C.P.C. For example, a Pakistani Court may not 
consider a foreign judgment to be conclusive if it has been pronounced by a 
Court of incompetent jurisdiction. In order to ascertain whether a judgment 
has been pronounced by a Court of competent jurisdiction, Pakistani courts 
will necessarily have to examine the principles of private and public 
international law to determine whether the subject matter of the foreign 
judgment fell within the jurisdiction of the foreign Court. If the judgment is 
found to have been pronounced in excess of the foreign Court's jurisdiction 
in view of the parallel body of law, that is, private international law, it will 
be deemed to have not been pronounced by a court of competent 
jurisdiction rendering the judgment inconclusive. When viewed in this light, 
it is correct to state that since the deceased and the defendants were 
Civil Appeal No.1560 of 2008 
-: 19 :-
domiciled in England, the English courts will have jurisdiction and their 
verdict on the matter, in respect of property situate there should be 
considered final by the Pakistani Courts. 
 
Similarly, under section 13(c) C.P.C it is expressly acknowledged that 
a foreign judgment will not be conclusive where it appears to have been 
founded on an incorrect application or understanding of private 
international law or a refusal to recognize the law of Pakistan where such 
law is applicable. These provisions, along with section 5 of the Succession 
Act 1925 establishes, beyond any doubt, that the courts of Pakistan 
recognize the principles of private international law and are bound to apply 
the same wherever necessary. 
 
A corollary to the above is that if a Pakistani court passes a judgment 
without regard to the principles of private international law, its 
pronouncement may not be considered to be conclusive by foreign courts 
for having usurped the jurisdiction of a foreign court, even if in substance 
the case is rightly decided. 
 
In light of the above we are persuaded to hold that Pakistan must 
refrain from exercising its jurisdiction because the property in dispute is 
situated within the territorial jurisdiction of England.  
 
14. 
 
This logically leads us to the second question, as stated in the 
Leave Granting Order, which can be answered in the affirmative. The very 
nature of the present case invites the operation of private international law; 
as such the domicile of the deceased will be a determinative factor to the 
extent of the movable property of the deceased abroad. The movable 
property abroad will be subject to rule of lex domicilii. Such a rule finds 
further support in the present case because not only was the deceased 
domiciled in England; he was also a British national in addition to holding 
a Pakistani nationality. 
 
The appellants have further tried to argue that the deceased’s 
Civil Appeal No.1560 of 2008 
-: 20 :-
domicile continued to be of Pakistan in terms of section 7 of the Succession 
Act 1925. However, this argument is not sustainable in view of section 9 
and 10 of the Succession Act 1925. Section 9 of the Succession Act 1925 
states that the domicile of origin only prevails until a new domicile is 
acquired. Section 10 of the same act states that a man acquires a new 
domicile by taking up his fixed habitation in a country other than the 
country of his origin. The determination of the question of domicile can be 
slightly difficult at times since it involves an element of subjectivity. 
However, in the present case it is an admitted position that the deceased  
had taken up permanent residence in England and acquired a new domicile 
which will prevail over his domicile of origin. Reference can be made to the 
mentioned sections below: 
“7.   
Domicile of origin of person of legitimate birth. The 
domicile of origin of every person of legitimate birth is in the 
country in which at the time of his birth, his father was 
domiciled, or, if he is a posthumous child, in the country in 
which his father was domiciled; or, if he is a posthumous  child, 
in the country in which his father was domiciled at the time of 
the father's death. 
……. 
9. Continuance of domicile of origin. The domicile of origin 
prevails until a new domicile has been acquired. 
10. Acquisition of new domicile. A man acquires a new 
domicile by taking up his fixed habitation in a country which is 
not that of this domicile of origin.” 
 
 
In this regard reference may be made to 1975 SCMR 265, Ms Amtul 
Naseer Sami vs. Secretary Health, Govt of Baluchistan wherein at p.267 
this court held that the “residence must answer on qualitative and 
quantitative test, and that the courts have regarded naturalization, 
Civil Appeal No.1560 of 2008 
-: 21 :-
purchase of house or burial ground, exercise of political rights, financial 
expectations, establishment of children in business, place where a man’s 
wife and family reside as indicia of his intention in regard to residence.” In 
light of the above, it is clear that the newly acquired domicile of the 
deceased (domicile of England) will prevail in the present situation. 
15. 
 
As regarding question (iii), this issue has been framed due to 
the incorrect appreciation of facts by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 
This, as it appears from question (i) and (iii) in the Leave Granting Order, 
has erroneously led the Supreme Court to believe that all the parties in the 
case are admittedly residing in Pakistan. This proposition is incorrect in 
light of the record available from which it is immediately discernible that 
the deceased and the material defendants have been permanently residing 
in England. As noted earlier, this is evidenced by the fact that in all the 
pleadings filed by the appellants themselves, the address of the 
respondents provided is that of England alone. Therefore, on the correct 
appreciation of facts, it is maintained that the courts in Pakistan lack 
jurisdiction in so far as it is rightly discovered that the defendants did not 
reside permanently in Pakistan. 
16. 
 
As regarding the final question (iv), suffice it to say that this 
point has not been pressed by the learned counsels for the parties. 
17. 
 
It light of the entire discussion undertaken, it may be stated 
that even if the rules of private international law are disregarded, the suit of 
the appellants in relation to the property situated abroad could only be 
entertained if it was brought within the purview of section 20 C.P.C., as is 
clearly laid down in paragraph 21 of the judgment in the Yusuf Abbas case. 
But for the reasons stated above and from the given facts of the case, the 
present matter does not fall within the purview of section 20 C.P.C. Hence, 
Jurisdiction in relation to the property situated in England will necessarily 
have to be determined with regard to the relevant principles of private 
Civil Appeal No.1560 of 2008 
-: 22 :-
international law. The courts of Pakistan could only take cognizance in 
relation to the immovable property situated in Pakistan subject to the 
limitations prescribed in section 16 of the C.P.C. It may be contended that 
they should not even have determined the rights to the movable property in 
Pakistan inter se the parties in derogation of the rule of lex domicilii in 
private international law. However, this element may have become 
irrelevant since the defendants submitted to the jurisdiction of Pakistani 
courts in relation to the movable property in Pakistan and therefore the 
Pakistani courts were competent to determine the rights of the parties in 
relation to the same. But there is no legal justification for the courts in 
Pakistan to assume jurisdiction over any property, movable or immovable, 
situated in England. 
 
Conclusion: As can be discerned from the preceding discussion, 
cross-border succession gives rise to the most important question of 
jurisdiction of the courts. It must be understood that the question of 
jurisdiction is separate from the issue of the applicable law. It is correct to 
state that the English courts may apply Muslim law in such a case, hence 
the question to be addressed never revolved around the law applicable, 
rather the question was ultimately whether the courts in Pakistan had the 
jurisdiction as under sections 16 to 20 C.P.C to entertain the suit in 
question and adjudicate upon the disputed property in England. Based on 
the reasons detailed above, this Court has answered the question in the 
negative, affirming the concurrent findings and conclusion of the courts 
below. The plain application of the relevant sections of C.P.C provides that 
the courts in Pakistan will have jurisdiction in respect to property situated 
in Pakistan. The said sections do not envisage an extra-territorial exercise 
of jurisdiction, neither is such an extra-territorial exercise of jurisdiction 
desirable in clear violation of sections 16-20 C.P.C and also in line with the 
established and recognized principles of private international law.  
Civil Appeal No.1560 of 2008 
-: 23 :-
 
In view of private international law this Court finds that the 
international responsibility of Pakistan to respect the territorial jurisdiction 
of England cannot be ignored. It has never been disputed that the property 
in dispute is situated outside Pakistan. As far as the Pakistani courts 
possessed jurisdiction over to the property situated in Pakistan, the 
decision was given in favor of the plaintiff Mst. Hafi (now deceased). 
18. 
 
In light of the foregoing, the discussion of the applicable law 
and the reasons given thereafter led to the conclusion that this appeal fails 
and is accordingly dismissed. 
 
 
 
JUDGE 
 
 
 
JUDGE 
 
 
 
JUDGE 
Announced in open Court 
on 16.12.2015 at Islamabad 
Approved For Reporting 
Waqas Naseer/*