IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN 
  
 
(Appellate Jurisdiction) 
 
 
 
 
PRESENT: 
 
 
MR. JUSTICE SH. AZMAT SAEED 
 
 
MR. JUSTICE QAZI FAEZ ISA 
 
 
MR. JUSTICE SAJJAD ALI SHAH 
 
 
 
 
CIVIL APPEAL NO.467 OF 2015 
(On appeal from judgment dated 
18.2.2015, passed by the Election 
Tribunal, 
Rawalpindi 
in 
EP 
No.242/2013/RWP/11/2013) 
 
 
 
Malik Shakeel Awan 
 
… Appellant  
Versus 
Sheikh Rasheed Ahmed and 21 
others 
 
 
… Respondents 
  
 
For the Appellant 
: Mr. Muhammad Ilyas Sheikh, ASC 
Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, AOR 
 
  
For Respondent No.1 : Mr. Abdur Rashid Awan, ASC with 
Mr. M.S. Khattak, AOR 
 
  
Date of Hearing 
: 20.03.2018 
 
JUDGMENT 
 
SH. AZMAT SAEED, J.- This Civil Appeal 
under Section 67(3) of the Representation of the People 
Act, 1976 is directed against the judgment dated 
18.02.2015 of the Election Tribunal, Rawalpindi, whereby 
the Election Petition i.e. EP No.242/2013/RWP/11/2013 
filed by the present Appellant challenging election of 
Respondent No.1 has been dismissed.  
CA.467/2015 
2 
2. 
 
After having read the order authored by my 
learned brother Qazi Faez Isa, J., I find myself unable to 
append my signatures of concurrence thereto. It has been 
suggested that the decision of the instant Appeal be 
deferred till the questions as raised and enumerated by 
him are finally adjudicated by the Full Court. Such 
exercise, if undertaken, is unlikely to be completed before 
the proposed General Election of 2018. Election disputes 
both at the stage of scrutiny of the Nomination Papers 
and subsequently agitated through proceedings before 
the Election Tribunals, the learned High Courts and this 
Court are an integral part of the election process both 
legally and politically. If the course of action as suggested 
by my learned brother Qazi Faez Isa, J., is followed then 
all the election disputes which will inevitably crop up 
before the Returning Officers, Tribunals and the High 
Courts or this Court would also not be adjudicated upon 
till the decision of this Appeal as such election disputes 
too, more often than not revolve around the questions 
raised. In such circumstances, the very validity of the 
proposed General Elections of 2018 would become 
questionable and the acceptance of its result by the 
participants almost impossible. In fact, the entire 
CA.467/2015 
3 
electoral process would be put at risk with repercussions 
too grave even to be contemplated let alone articulated 
herein.  
3. 
 
Even otherwise, the present lis pertains to the 
validity of a judgment of the Election Tribunal challenged 
through the instant Appeal under Section 67 (3) of the 
Representation of the People Act, 1976 (RoPA) while 
through the question raised a very wide net has been cast 
encompassing also the jurisdiction of this Court under 
Article 184(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic 
of Pakistan, 1973 as well as the impact of various 
provisions relating to qualifications and disqualifications 
of Members of the Parliament and the Provincial 
Assemblies. Several of the questions raised obviously do 
not arise at the lis at hand, while the others have been 
answered definitively by this Court in its various 
judgments.  
4. 
 
In our legal system, law evolves brick by brick 
and from judgment to judgment. If the judgments 
pertaining to electoral disputes rendered by this Court 
are carefully read, objectively understood and the ratio 
thereof correctly identified, it would be clear and obvious 
CA.467/2015 
4 
that principles of law, in this behalf, appear to have been 
settled and consistently applied to the facts of each 
individual case. The difference in outcome, if any, is the 
result of difference in the facts of each case. Such 
principles of law do not require any further clarification 
on hypothetical considerations. The confusion, if any, is 
not in the judgments. 
5. 
 
This Court, for that matter any court, seized of 
a lis is required to decide the same rather than to embark 
upon an academic exercise. We cannot shy away from 
adjudicating upon the lis that comes before the Court 
without 
attempting 
to 
ascertain 
and 
identify 
the 
principles of law as developed through the interpretative 
process of the previous judgments of this Court and 
apply the same to the facts of the case. 
6. 
 
Be that as it may, the primary and elemental 
question pertaining to electoral disputes, the various 
jurisdictions which can be invoked for the settlement 
thereof and the matters relating to qualification and 
disqualification of the Members of the Parliament and the 
Provincial Assemblies came up before this Court in the 
case of Sher Alam Khan v. Abdul Munim and others (Civil 
Petition No.3131 of 2017) wherein this Court after 
CA.467/2015 
5 
examining the law as laid down by this Court, inter alia, 
in the judgments reported as (1) Muhammad Jibran 
Nasir and others Vs. The State and others (PLD 2018 SC 
351), (2) Muhammad Hanif Abbasi v. Jahangir Khan 
Tareen and others (PLD 2018 SC 114), (3) Muhammad 
Hanif Abbasi v. Imran Khan Niazi and others (PLD 2018 
SC 189), (4) Imran Ahmad Khan Niazi v. Mian 
Muhammad 
Nawaz 
Sharif, 
Prime 
Minister 
of 
Pakistan/Member National Assembly, Prime Minister’s 
House, Islamabad and 9 others (PLD 2017 SC 265), (5) 
Khawaja Muhammad Asif v. Federation of Pakistan and 
others (PLD 2014 SC 206), (6) Mian Najeeb-ud-Din 
Owaisi and another v. Amir Yar Waran and others (PLD 
2013 SC 482), (7) Malik Iqbal Ahmad Langrial v. 
Jamshed Alam and others (PLD 2013 SC 179), (8) Air 
Marshal (Retd) Muhammad Asghar Khan v. General 
(Retd) Mirza Aslam Baig, Former Chief of Army Staff and 
others (PLD 2013 SC 1), (9) Syed Mehmood Akhtar Naqvi 
v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Law and 
others (PLD 2012 SC 1089), (10) Muhammad Azhar 
Siddiqui v. Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 2012 
SC 774), (11) Muhammad Yasin v. Federation of Pakistan 
through Secretary, Establishment Division, Islamabad 
CA.467/2015 
6 
and others (PLD 2012 SC 132), (12) Shahid Orakzai v. 
Pakistan through Secretary Law, Ministry of Law, 
Islamabad (PLD 2011 SC 365), (13) Muhammad Rizwan 
Gill v. Nadia Aziz and others (PLD 2010 SC 828), (14) 
Nawabzada Iftikhar Ahmad Khan Bar v. Chief Election 
Commissioner Islamabad and others (PLD 2010 SC 817), 
(15) Syed Fakhar Imam v. Chief Election Commission of 
Pakistan and others (PLD 2008 SC 730), (16) Mian 
Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v. President of Pakistan and 
others (PLD 1993 SC 473), (17) Miss Benazir Bhutto v. 
Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 1988 SC 416), 
(18) Farzand Ali v. Province of West Pakistan (PLD 1970 
SC 98), (19) Muhammad Akram v. DCO, Rahim Yar Khan 
and others (2017 SCMR 56), (20) Ch. Muhammad Ashraf 
Warraich and another v. Muhammad Nasir Cheema and 
others (2016 SCMR 998), (21) Jamshoro Joint Venture 
Ltd. and others v. Khawaja Muhammad Asif and others 
(2014 SCMR 1858), (22) Allah Dino Khan Bhayo v. 
Election Commission of Pakistan, Islamabad and others 
(2013 SCMR 1655), (23) Muhammad Khan Junejo v. 
Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, M/o Law 
Justice and Parliamentary Affairs and others (2013 
SCMR 1328), (24) Abdul Ghafoor Lehri v. Returning 
CA.467/2015 
7 
Officer, PB-29, Naseerabad-II and others (2013 SCMR 
1271), (25) Muddasar Qayyum Nahra v. Ch. Bilal Ijaz 
(2011 SCMR 80), (26) Suo Motu Case No. 10 of 2009 
(Complaint regarding establishment of Makro-Habib 
Store on playground) (2010 SCMR 885), and (27) Bartha 
Ram v. Lala Mehar Lal Bheel and another (1995 SCMR 
684), held as under: 
“27. An overview of the afore-quoted 
provisions 
of 
the 
Constitution, 
as 
interpreted by this Court through its 
various 
juridical 
pronouncements 
referred to and reproduced herein above 
leads to an irresistible and irrefutable 
conclusion 
that 
our 
Constitutional 
dispensation 
is 
erected 
upon 
the 
democratic principle that the authority 
vest with the people of Pakistan can only 
be 
exercised 
through 
their 
chosen 
representatives. 
Such 
authority, 
including the power of law making and 
control over the public exchequer is to be 
conferred 
upon 
the 
chosen 
representatives by way of trust and the 
trust can only be reposed upon those who 
are worthy thereof.  
28.  In 
the 
above 
context, 
the 
qualification 
and 
disqualification 
of 
persons, entitled to act as the chosen 
representatives of the people and to act 
on their behalf as Members of the Majlis-
e-Shoora and the Provincial Assemblies 
are set forth in the Constitution itself, 
more particularly, in Articles 62 and 63 
thereof 
as 
well 
as 
other 
sub-
Constitutional legislation. An elaborate 
process 
and 
procedure 
has 
been 
prescribed by law to filter out those who 
are disqualified or not qualified to contest 
the elections to the Majlis-e-Shoora and 
the Provincial Assemblies as is apparent 
CA.467/2015 
8 
primarily from the provisions of ROPA of 
1976. 
With 
regard 
to 
pre-election 
disqualification, such process includes 
objections before the Returning Officer at 
the time of filing of the Nomination 
Papers, an application to the ECP under 
Section 103-A of ROPA of 1976. And 
subsequently, an Election Petition before 
the Election Tribunal established under 
Article 225 of the Constitution. If no 
objection is raised or challenge thrown or 
relevant proceedings initiated before the 
appropriate forum at the appropriate 
time, the disqualification of a candidate is 
not cured nor an abscent qualification 
acquired.   
  
29. Consequently, where a disqualified 
or unqualified person slips through the 
cracks sneaks into the Majlis-e-Shoora or 
the Provincial Assemblies, his presence in 
the said House can always be challenged 
through exercise of the Constitutional 
jurisdiction of this Court under Article 
184(3) of the Constitution and before the 
learned High Court under Article 199 of 
the Constitution by way of a Writ in the 
nature of quo warranto. Even where a 
matter comes before this Court regarding 
the qualification or disqualification of a 
Member of the Majlis-e-Shoora or the 
Provincial Assemblies otherwise by way of 
proceedings other than under Article 
184(3) of the Constitution, this Court not 
only has the jurisdiction to convert such 
proceedings to proceedings under Article 
184(3) of the Constitution but  is bound 
to do so, as to permit an unqualified or 
disqualified person to continue to defile 
and desecrate the Majlis-e-Shoora or the 
Provincial Assemblies and masqulate as a 
chosen representative of the people would 
amount to frustrating the Constitutional 
provisions. In such an eventuality, if this 
Court looks other way, it would perhaps 
constitute 
a 
failure 
to 
protect 
and 
preserve the Constitution. 
 
 
 
CA.467/2015 
9 
Thus, we find ourselves unable to 
decline the prayer of the Petitioner to 
examine the merits of the case so as to 
determine on the basis of the material 
available on record whether Respondent 
No.1 was qualified or disqualified from 
being 
a 
Member 
of 
the 
Provincial 
Assembly, KPK. Any refusal on our part 
to avoid or evade such an exercise would 
constitutes a departure from the law as 
laid down by this Court and perhaps 
would even amount to a betrayal of the 
Constitution. Hence, we convert these 
proceedings into Suo Motu proceedings 
under Article 184(3) of the Constitution.” 
 
7. 
 
The questions raised by and large have been 
answered 
in 
the 
aforesaid 
judgment, 
which 
was 
challenged in review through Civil Review Petition bearing 
No.106-P of 2018, which was dismissed vide judgment 
dated 05.06.2018 by a Bench of this Court of which my 
learned brother Qazi Faez Isa, J., was also a Member. 
Perhaps thereby endorsing the law as enunciated in the 
judgment without the necessity of hearing by a Full 
Court. In all fairness, it must be mentioned that the 
review was dismissed after the order was scribed by my 
learned brother.  
8. 
 
The observations of Asif Saeed Khan Khosa, J., 
with regard to the perceived lack of clarity in Article 
62(1)(f) of the Constitution in the case reported as Ishaq 
Khan Khakwani and others v. Mian Muhammad Nawaz 
Shairf and others (PLD 2015 SC 275) have been quoted 
CA.467/2015 
10 
as a foundation for some of the questions posed in the 
order. Suffice it to say, much water has flowed under the 
bridge and this aspect of the matter has been dealt with 
by Asif Saeed Khan Khosa, J., himself in the judgment of 
this Court reported as Imran Ahmad Khan Niazi v. Mian 
Muhammad 
Nawaz 
Sharif, 
Prime 
Miniser 
of 
Pakistan/Member National Assembly, Prime Minister’s 
House, Islamabad and 9 others (PLD 2017 SC 265). After 
reproducing the same observations in his note at page 
417, paragraph 116, it was laid down as follows: 
 
“116. 
It 
may 
be 
true 
that 
the 
provisions of Article 62(1)(f) and the likes 
of them had been inserted in the 
Constitution through an amendment by 
an unrepresentative regime of a military 
ruler but at the same time it is equally 
true that all the subsequent democratic 
regimes 
and 
popularly 
elected 
Parliaments did nothing either to delete 
such 
obscure 
provisions 
from 
the 
Constitution or to define them properly so 
that any court or tribunal required to 
apply them may be provided some 
guidance as to how to interpret and apply 
them. Be that as it may the fact remains 
that the said provisions are still very 
much a part of the Constitution and 
when they are invoked in a given case the 
courts and tribunals seized of the matter 
have no other option but to make some 
practical sense of them and to apply them 
as 
best 
as 
can 
be 
done. 
Before 
application of those provisions to real 
cases it is imperative to understand as to 
why such provisions were made a part of 
the Constitution and where do they stand 
in the larger design of the Constitution.” 
 
CA.467/2015 
11 
9. 
 
The issues pertaining to the interpretation of 
Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution has been adjudicated 
upon in the aforesaid judgment primarily via the majority 
view which was also reflected in the judgment passed in 
Civil Petition No.3131 of 2017, where-against a Civil 
Review Petition, as stated earlier has been dismissed by a 
Bench of which my learned brother Qazi Faez Isa, J., was 
a Member.  
10.  
With regard to the exercise of jurisdiction by 
this Court under Article 184(3) of the Constitution, some 
hesitation has been noticed due to the absence of 
provision 
of 
appeal 
against 
a 
judgment 
passed 
thereunder. A settled principle of interpretation of the 
Constitution has been enunciated by my learned brother 
(Qazi Faez Isa, J.) himself in his note in the case reported 
as District Bar Association, Rawalpindi v. Federation of 
Pakistan (PLD 2015 SC 401) wherein he held as follows: 
 
“81.(3)(b)  Effect should be given to every 
word, paragraph, clause and article of the 
Constitution and redundancy should not 
be imported thereto.” 
 
11.  
Thus, we cannot read a right of appeal into the 
Constitution against a judgment/order passed by this 
Court under Article 184(3) by adding a provision to the 
Constitution. We also cannot decline to exercise our 
CA.467/2015 
12 
jurisdiction under the said Article i.e. 184(3) merely 
because no appeal is provided for. Such interpretation 
would 
render 
the 
said 
Article 
redundant 
and 
a 
surplusage which is not permitted while interpreting the 
Constitution.  
12.  
The question pertaining to the length of time for 
which a declaration or finding by a Court of Law that the 
person is not qualified in terms of Section 62(1)(f) of the 
Constitution shall ensure has also been answered in no 
uncertain terms by a five member Bench of this Court 
vide judgment dated 13.04.2018 passed in Civil Appeal 
No.233 of 2015 titled Sami Ullah Baloch v. Abdul Karim 
Nosherwani. 
13.  
Where a misstatement or an inaccuracy or 
concealment is established, the candidate/member would 
always have the opportunity to offer an explanation. 
Such explanation may or may not be found acceptable. 
Such is the ratio of the judgment of this Court rendered 
in the case reported as Sheikh Muhammad Akram v. 
Abdul Ghafoor and 19 others (2016 SCMR 733). In the 
said case, an Election Petition filed before the Election 
Tribunal. In the proceedings, it stood established that a 
criminal case registered against the candidate was not 
CA.467/2015 
13 
mentioned in his Nomination Papers as required. Such 
candidate offered an explanation which was accepted by 
this Court by way of the aforesaid judgment which is 
incidentally authorized by my learned brother Qazi Faez 
Isa, J., and I too was a Member of the said Bench. The 
said view i.e. in case of concealment, discrepancy and 
misstatement in the Nomination Papers an explanation 
thereof may be given by the candidate/member, which 
may or may not be accepted by the court. And only, if 
such explanation is found tenable no penal consequences 
would follow. The question of “strict liability” does not 
arise with regard to misstatements in the Nomination 
Papers. Such view was also followed in the judgments of 
this Court reported as Muhammad Siddique Baloch v. 
Jehangir Khan Tareen and others (PLD 2016 SC 97) and 
Muhammad Hanif Abbasi v. Imran Khan Niazi and others 
(PLD 2018 SC 189). No departure has been made by this 
Court in the cases reported as Imran Ahmad Khan Niazi 
v. Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, Prime Minister of 
Pakistan/Member National Assembly, Prime Minister’s 
House, Islamabad and 9 others (PLD 2017 SC 265) and 
(PLD 2017 SC 692). In the aforesaid case, the 
concealment of assets in the Nomination Papers filed by 
CA.467/2015 
14 
the Respondent in the said proceedings was established 
through an admission. At no point of time any 
explanation was offered, in this behalf. Therefore, the 
question of accepting or rejecting such explanation did 
not arise. Even in the Review Petition, no explanation was 
offered. However, an oblique reference in hypothetical 
term was only made. This aspect of the matter was dealt 
with and adjudicated upon by this Court in the judgment 
passed on such review reported as Mian Muhammad 
Nawaz Sharif and others v. Imran Ahmed Khan Niazi and 
others (PLD 2018 SC 1). Reference, in this behalf, may be 
made to para 11 of the said judgment. The relevant 
portion thereof is reproduced hereunder: 
 
“11. The argument that the omission to 
disclose 
assets 
could 
possibly 
be 
unintentional in the circumstances of the 
case would have been tenable had the 
petitioner been a novice or a new entrant 
in business and politics. But where he 
has been neck deep in business and 
politics ever since early 80s’ it is 
unbelievable that he did not understand 
the simple principle of accounting that 
his accrued and accumulated salary of 
six and a half years was his asset and 
liability of the company he was an 
employee 
of. 
Even 
otherwise, 
this 
argument cannot be given much weight 
when it has not been pleaded by the 
petitioner that the omission to mention 
the asset was accidental, inadvertent or 
unintentional. …” 
  
 
 
       (emphasis supplied) 
 
CA.467/2015 
15 
Why no explanation was given or attempted to be given 
will always remain a mystery. 
14.  
The 
distinction 
between 
an 
offence 
contemplated by Section 9 sub-section (v) of the NAB 
Ordinance, 1999 for possession of assets beyond known 
sources of income and the lack of qualification in terms 
of Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution arising from the 
concealment of assets in the Nomination Papers is rather 
obvious. The proceedings before the Accountability Court 
under the NAB ordinance are criminal in nature unlike 
the proceedings which may result in a declaration that a 
person is not honest on account of concealing of assets in 
his Nomination Papers. The fora in which the proceedings 
are initiated are distinct. The former commence in the 
Accountability Court while the latter would arise from a 
Tribunal 
established 
under 
Article 
225 
of 
the 
Constitution in the High Court or in this Court in its 
Constitutional jurisdiction. The consequences are also 
distinct and different. A person found guilty of an offence 
under Section 9 of NAB Ordinance would be convicted for 
a term of imprisonment and disqualified while in the 
latter case a person, if elected, would be de-seated and 
may also be held not to be qualified.  
CA.467/2015 
16 
15.  
However, more critical difference is that while 
in proceedings under the NAB Ordinance, if it is proved 
that a person owns property or assets it is for such 
person to answer the question as from which lawful 
pecuniary resources such assets were acquired. In the 
eventuality, it is discovered that an asset or assets have 
not been mentioned in the Nomination Papers and owned 
by the candidate or his dependants, the question 
required to be answered is totally different. He is 
expected to explain why such assets were not mentioned 
in the Nomination Papers (not how such assets were 
acquired). The requirements of the two provisions should 
not be intermingled. This distinction, in this behalf, was 
kept in view by this Court while adjudicating upon in the 
case reported as Imran Ahmad Khan Niazi v. Mian 
Muhammad 
Nawaz 
Sharif, 
Prime 
Minister 
of 
Pakistan/Member National Assembly, Prime Minister’s 
House, Islamabad and 9 others (PLD 2017 SC 265). It 
was established, in fact, admitted, that the assets owned 
were not mentioned in the Nomination Papers and no 
explanation, in this behalf, was offered, hence, the 
provisions of Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution were held 
to be attracted. As regard to the source of funds for the 
CA.467/2015 
17 
acquisition of assets allegedly held by the Respondents 
directly or indirectly that matter was referred to 
proceedings under the NAB Ordinance. 
16.  
The law as laid down by this Court in this 
behalf i.e. with reference to Article 62(1)(f) of the 
Constitution 
is 
unequivocal 
consistent 
and 
well 
established. It is the said principles of law which would 
require to be applied for a fair adjudication of the lis at 
hand. 
17.  
Adverting now to the facts of the instant case, 
the main thrust of the contentions of the learned counsel 
for the Appellant was that Respondent No.1 had 
deliberately concealed his immovable property i.e. 
agricultural land in his Nomination Papers. It was his 
case that Respondent No.1 had declared his holdings to 
be 983 Kanals 17 Marlas while it has been established on 
record through cogent evidence that the said Respondent 
owned 1049 Kanals and 13 Marlas in Village Raman, 
Tehsil Fateh Jang, District Attock as is evident from 
Ex.P-1 Goshwara Malkiet pertaining to the ownership of 
Respondent No.1 in the said Village. Reference, in this 
behalf, was also made to Ex.P-2. The defence, in this 
behalf, put forward by the said Respondent was that 
CA.467/2015 
18 
there was only an inadvertent discrepancy in the 
Nomination Papers regarding the land holding as a result 
of a miscalculation.   
18.  
With the help of the learned counsel, we have 
examined the evidence produced by the parties. The 
Nomination Papers filed by Respondent No.1 was brought 
on record as Ex.P-4. It was tendered into evidence on 
behalf of the present Appellant and is an admitted 
document. The said Nomination Papers Ex.P-4 consists 
of 96 pages. At page 4 against item No.14, the said 
Respondent has declared his land holding as 968 Kanals 
and 13 Marlas for the year 2012 and 983 Kanals and 17 
Marlas approximately for years 2010-2011. The details of 
such agricultural land are given at page 79 of the 
Nomination Papers. With regard to the land holding in 
Village Raman, the date of purchase of each parcel of 
land and the quantum thereof has been specified (There 
is reference to agricultural land claimed to have bought 
and sold in another village which is not the subject 
matter of the dispute as raised by the Appellant). The 
details of the land purchased and the date of such 
purchase by Respondent No.1 given at page 79 of the 
Nomination Papers are as follows: 
 
 
 
CA.467/2015 
19 
Land Measuring 
Date of purchase 
Kanals 
Marlas 
71 
 
05 
29.5.1986 
128 
17 
29.5.1986 
 
199 
 
18 
03.5.1986 
101 
 
18 
05.7.1986 
427 
 
16 
28.02.1996 
110 
 
15 
29.3.1997 
08 
 
04 
18.6.1998 
33 
04 
04.10.1999 
 
Total 
      
1081 
 
 
17 
 
 
 
19.  
A simple mathematical exercise reveals that as 
per the details provided by Respondent No.1 in his 
Nomination Papers at page 79, he owns 1081 Kanals and 
17 Marlas of land and in the grand total it has been 
incorrectly mentioned as 983 Kanals and 17 Marlas. This 
error appears to have crept into the printed Nomination 
Papers. 
The 
miscalculation 
between 
the 
area 
of 
agricultural land owned by Respondent No.1 scribed in 
the printed form and as mentioned item wise in the 
details at page 79 of the Nomination Papers is self-
evident. As per the details, Respondent No.1 has perhaps 
declared a little more land than as alleged by the 
CA.467/2015 
20 
Appellant, thus, it can hardly be accused of concealing 
any asset especially as a portion of the land appears to be 
undivided share in various Khasra Numbers as is evident 
from the documents Ex.P-1 and P-2 produced by the 
revenue staff who entered the witness box on behalf of 
the Appellant. In the circumstances, the explanation 
offered 
appears 
to 
be 
reasonable 
and 
logical. 
Consequently, the conclusion drawn by the Election 
Tribunal that there was no concealment of agricultural 
land in the Nomination Papers filed by Respondent No.1 
is based upon a correct and judicious appreciation of the 
evidence available on the record and in accordance with 
the law as laid down by this Court. Hence, no exception 
can be taken to such finding. 
20.  
The Appellant also questioned the property i.e. 
House No.40, Sector-A, Golf City, Expressway, which 
respondent claimed to have acquired from Bahria Town. 
The said property is mentioned the Nomination Papers. 
The payments made for acquiring the same is also not 
disputed. Only issue raised by the Appellant is that its 
correct market value has not been disclosed in the 
Nomination Papers. In support of such contentions, the 
learned counsel for the Appellant referred to the 
CA.467/2015 
21 
statement of PW-7 an employee of Bahria Town. As noted 
above, the amount paid by the said Respondent for the 
said property is not disputed by either the Appellant or 
PW-7. 
Such 
consideration 
finds 
mention 
in 
the 
Nomination Papers. PW-7 stated that the other allottees 
paid a higher price for the similar properties but no 
document in support of such contention was produced by 
him. The payments by other purchasers would be a 
matter of record but the same was concealed from the 
Election Tribunal by PW-7. Furthermore, no document 
public or private evidencing any contemporaneous 
transaction of property in the vicinity disclosing the 
consideration has been produced in evidence by the 
Appellant. Nothing from the record of the Sub-Registrar 
of documents, in this behalf, is available. No person who 
entered into any such transaction of sale of property in 
the same area entered the witness box to prove or 
disprove the value of such property. In this view of the 
matter, it cannot be held that Respondent No.1 made any 
misstatement regarding the value of the said property, 
the ownership of which has been mentioned in the 
Nomination Papers along with the consideration paid 
therefor. In the circumstances, the finding by the learned 
CA.467/2015 
22 
Election Tribunal that there is no misstatement, in this 
behalf, with regard to the aforesaid House in the 
Nomination Papers is borne out from the record. No 
ground for interference with such findings has been 
made out by the learned counsel for the Appellant. 
21.  
A half-hearted attempt was made by the 
learned counsel for the Appellant to dispute the income 
and sources thereof as mentioned by Respondent No.1 in 
his Nomination Papers. Such income is reflected in the 
Income Tax Returns of the said Respondent which are 
also available on the record and appended with the 
Nomination Papers as well as for earlier financial years 
produced by the Appellant himself wherein the source of 
income is set fourth. The Appellant could not through 
evidence 
disprove 
the 
declaration 
made 
by 
the 
Respondent in this behalf. No moveable asset or bank 
account or source of income other than as disclosed in 
the Nomination Papers has been proved in evidence by 
the Appellant. In this view of the matter the learned 
Election 
Tribunal 
rightly 
held 
that 
no 
material 
concealment or misstatement, in this behalf, in the 
Nomination Papers has been proved.  
CA.467/2015 
23 
22.  
Some allegations with regard to the conduct of 
the election on the day of the election and thereafter were 
raised before the learned Election Tribunal but not 
proved and not pressed before us during the course of 
hearing of this Appeal. 
23.  
In view of the above, no exception can be taken 
to the findings returned and judgment delivered by the 
learned Election Tribunal while dismissing the Election 
Petition filed by the Appellant. Consequently, this Appeal 
must fail and is dismissed accordingly. 
 
  
   
 
 
      Judge 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      Judge 
 
‘APPROVED FOR REPORTING’ 
Mahtab H. Sheikh/* 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
Announced on ______________ at _______________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judge 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN 
(Appellate Jurisdiction) 
 
 
 
Present: 
MR. JUSTICE SH. AZMAT SAEED 
MR. JUSTICE QAZI FAEZ ISA 
MR. JUSTICE SAJJAD ALI SHAH 
 
 
 
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 467 OF 2015 
(On appeal from the judgment dated 18.02.2015 of 
the Election Tribunal, Rawalpindi passed in EP 
No.242/2013/RWP/11/2013) 
 
 
 
Malik Shakeel Awan. 
 
 
 
 
… Appellant 
VERSUS 
Sheikh Rasheed Ahmed and others.  
 
… Respondents 
 
 
 
For the Appellant  
: 
Mr. Muhammad Ilyas Sheikh, ASC.  
Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, AOR. 
 
For Respondent No. 1 
: 
Mr. Abdur Rashid Awan, ASC.  
Mr. M. S. Khattak, AOR. 
 
Date of Hearing 
 
: 
March 20, 2018. 
 
JUDGMENT  
 
Qazi Faez Isa, J.  This appeal assails the judgment of the Election 
Tribunal, Rawalpindi (“the Tribunal”) dated February 18, 2015 
whereby the Election Petition filed by the appellant was dismissed. 
 
2. 
The appellant challenged the election of Sheikh Rasheed 
Ahmed (respondent No. 1), who won the National Assembly seat from 
NA-55, Rawalpindi-VI by getting 88,627 votes against the appellant’s 
75,306 votes. The elections were held on May 11, 2013. The appellant 
through his Election Petition assailed the candidature of Sheikh 
Rasheed Ahmed on a number of grounds, including that he had on 
solemn affirmation misdeclared his source of income and the bank 
profit earned by him, suppressed his total agricultural land holding 
Civil Appeal No. 467 of 2015 
2 
and misdeclared the value of his house. The other grounds taken in 
the Election Petition and in this Appeal were not pressed before us.  
 
3. 
Mr. Muhammad Ilyas Sheikh, the learned counsel representing 
the appellant, states that the Nomination Form filed by Sheikh 
Rasheed Ahmed, on the basis of which he contested elections, is 
dated March 28, 2013 and was submitted to the returning officer on 
April 2, 2013. The disclosure as required to be made in serial 12, 14 
and item 4 of the Nomination Form, the “Statement of Assets and 
Liabilities” and the document attached thereto titled “Details of 
Immovable Assets” is contrary to the facts. To understand the learned 
counsel’s contentions it would be appropriate to reproduce the same:  
 
“12. 
The income tax paid by me during the last three years is given 
hereunder: 
 
Total Income 
**Source of Income 
Tax Year 
Total Income Tax 
Paid 
3134761/- 
PROFIT/PROPERTY 
2010 
Rs. 316341/- 
3075048/- 
“ 
2011 
Rs. 307349/- 
2248089/- 
“ 
2012 
Rs. 224883/- 
 
Note I: Attach copies of income tax returns of the years mentioned above. 
**If more than one sources of income, attach detail.” 
 
 
“14. 
The agricultural income tax paid by me during the last three years is 
given below: 
 
Tax Year 
Land Holding 
K     M 
Agricultural 
Income 
Total Agricultural 
Income Tax Paid 
2010 
983-17 (APPROX) 
-NIL- 
-NIL- 
2011 
983-17        “ 
-NIL- 
-NIL- 
2012 
968-13        “ 
-NIL- 
-NIL- 
 
Note II: Attach copies of agricultural tax returns of the last three years 
mentioned above.” 
 
 
STATEMENT OF ASSETS AND LIABILITIES 
ASSETS 
 
ASSETS 
Cost of Assets 
Remarks 
4. IMMOVABLE PROPERTY 
 Open plots, houses, 
apartments, 
under 
construction 
properties, 
agricultural property, 
etc. (attach location, 
description, built up 
area 
and 
present 
market value of the 
house/apartment 
in 
which 
you 
are 
presently living). 
 
 
 
 
 
Rs.16,773,500/- 
 
 
 
 
 
DETAILS ATTACHED 
Civil Appeal No. 467 of 2015 
3 
 
 
DETAILS OF IMMOVABLE ASSETS 
 
S.No. 
ASSETS 
VALUE 
1 
D-267, Al-Rashid Market, Sarafa Bazar, 
Rawalpindi 
1,655,500 
2 
House No. 40, Sector-A, Golf City, Bahria Town 
10,200,000 
3 
Land Village Rama, Tehsil Fateh Jhang, 
District Attock 
3,768,000 
4 
House, Farm, Shed etc, Fateh Jhang, District 
Attock 
800,000 
5 
Tractor Trolly etc 
350,000 
TOTAL 
16,773,500 
 
 
According to the learned counsel, Sheikh Rasheed Ahmed in 
his Nomination Form disclosed that he owned 968 kanals and 13 
marlas of agricultural land in the year 2012, which was a false 
declaration, as he owned 1081 kanals of land (“the agricultural 
land”). He also made a false declaration of his House No. 40, situated 
in Sector-A of Golf City, Bahria Town (“the said house”) by 
mentioning its value to be ten million and two hundred thousand 
rupees even though its value at the time of its sale was forty eight 
million rupees. 
 
4. 
That with regard to the matter of the discrepancies in the 
payment of income tax the learned counsel refers to documents, 
however, from these documents it is difficult to establish the 
allegation.  
 
5. 
To support his contention with regard to the agricultural land 
the learned counsel refers to the Goshwarah Haqeeqat (Exhibit P-1) 
and Jamabandi (Exhibit P-2) for the years 2008-09 which show the 
respondent No.1’s agricultural land holding to be 1049 kanals and 13 
marlas. These two documents were produced through the witness 
(PW-8) Basharat Ali, Patwari of Halqa Rama, Tehsil Fateh Jhang, 
District Attock. PW-8’s predecessor Babar Khan, Patwari, had earlier 
come to give evidence before the Tribunal and had produced Exhibit 
Civil Appeal No. 467 of 2015 
4 
R-1 showing the respondent No. 1’s land holding, but before he could 
be cross-examined he was transferred. Exhibit R-1 shows respondent 
No.1’s agricultural land holding in the said halqa to be 1038 kanals 
and 8 marlas. He submits that even if Exhibit R-1 which respondent 
No. 1 admits is accepted, then too the respondent No. 1 in his 
Nomination Form had shown his agricultural land holding to be 968 
kanals and 13 marlas whereas admittedly it was 1038 kanal and 19 
marlas, therefore, he had not disclosed 70 kanals and 6 marlas of his 
agricultural land. The learned counsel refers to the affidavit-in-
evidence (Exhibit P9) of the appellant, the relevant portion whereof is 
reproduced hereunder: 
 
“Respondent No. 1 owned agricultural land measuring 1049 
Kannals 13 Marlas in Mouza Ramma Tehsil Fateh Jang 
District 
Attock 
however 
as 
per 
details 
attached/appended/mentioned in his nomination papers he 
declared land measuring 963 Kannals 13 Marlas. In this 
way he concealed 81 Kannals of land situated in the said 
Mouza. Respondent No. 1 himself declared his ownership, 
in his Wealth Statement, in the said Mouza as 1068 
Kannals 08 Marlas as on 30-06-12 and land measuring 
1083 Kannals 12 Marlas as on 30-06-11 whereas in his 
nomination papers he concealed his said ownership and 
declared as 968 Kannals 13 Marlas as on 30-06-12 and 983 
Kannals as on 30-06-11.” 
 
The learned counsel submits that neither Basharat Ali (PW-1) 
nor the appellant (PW-8) were cross-examined on their testimony of 
the agricultural land holding of respondent No. 1 and thereby the fact 
of nondisclosure of the said agricultural land was deemed to be 
admitted by respondent No. 1. The learned counsel further states 
that respondent No. 1 in paragraph 14 of his affidavit-in-evidence 
(Exhibit R/3) stated that he owned 1081 kanals and 17 marlas of 
land, therefore, admittedly respondent No. 1 did not disclose 113 
kanals and 4 marlas of land. The relevant portion from the affidavit-
in-evidence of respondent No. 1 is reproduced hereunder:  
Civil Appeal No. 467 of 2015 
5 
 
“14. The Deponent owned and possessed land measuring 
1081 kanals 17 marlas located at Mozia Rama, Tehsil 
Fateh Jang District Attock. The Deponent never 
concealed the ownership of the said property either in 
his returns filed before the tax department or in the 
nomination papers. Due to miscalculation the area 
has been shown as 968 kanals 13 marlas. If it is 
calculated correctly it comes 1081 kanals 17 marlas. 
The 
election 
Petitioner 
failed 
to 
examine 
the 
nomination papers seriously and not only stated 
wrongly in his election petition but also falsely 
deposed through Exhibit P/9 regarding the said 
land.” 
 
The appellant’s counsel states that in his cross-examination 
respondent No. 1 also admits that he had not mentioned his entire 
agricultural land holding in his Nomination Form, the relevant 
portion whereof is reproduced hereunder: 
 
“It is correct that I did not mention my total owned land 
measuring 1080/1090 Kanals in my nomination papers. 
Volunteered, that during the counting of measurement of 
land before the RO [Returning Officer] there was no 
calculator and for the first time in the nomination papers, 
the RO desired the exact measurement of land and there 
might be some mistake occurred in the nomination papers, 
however, the details of total land was attached. It is 
incorrect to suggest that my volunteered portion is 
incorrect, false and afterthought.” 
 
 
That the appellant’s learned counsel submits that in view of the 
referred to documents, the evidence and the admission of respondent 
No. 1, it is incontrovertibly established that respondent No. 1 
misdeclared his agricultural land holding in the Nomination Form. 
The learned Presiding Officer of the Tribunal had also come to the 
conclusion that respondent No. 1 had not disclosed his entire 
agricultural land, but, according to the learned counsel, the learned 
Presiding Officer had illegally discounted it by holding, that “the 
difference in the measurement of agricultural land mentioned in the 
Civil Appeal No. 467 of 2015 
6 
documents above by no stretch of imagination amounts to concealment 
of assets”. 
 
6. 
That as regards the said house the learned counsel for the 
appellant states that respondent No. 1 did not purchase the said 
house for Rs.10,200,000/-, as shown in his Nomination Form, but 
instead for Rs.48,000,000/-. He refers to the testimony of Sheikh 
Amjid, General Manager (Operations) of Bahria Town, Rawalpindi 
(PW-7) who produced the attested copy of “Allotment Certificate” 
issued by Bahria Town (Pvt.) Limited which shows that Bahria Town 
(Pvt.) Limited had allotted the said house to respondent No. 1. This 
witness testified that, “the market value of the said house at the time 
of booking was Rs.48,000,000/- and now the market value of this 
house is more than Rs.60,000,000/-”. The learned counsel states that 
respondent No. 1 however took the plea that he had paid only ten 
million rupees and its balance price was adjusted by giving 15 kanals 
and 4 marlas of his agricultural land to Bahria Town (Pvt.) Limited, 
however, when he was asked whether a sale deed was registered with 
regard to the said 15 kanals and 4 marlas of agricultural land or 
whether its transfer was effected by the Revenue authorities by 
mutation or otherwise, respondent No. 1 stated that, “this was his 
[Bahria Town (Pvt.) Limited] responsibility to transfer this land and if I 
am not going to transfer, the allotment of my house shall automatically 
be cancelled”. But, respondent No. 1 did not produce any document 
to support his contention that the allotment of his house would be 
cancelled. In response to the question about the market value of his 
agricultural 
land, 
respondent 
No. 
1 
answered 
that 
it 
was 
Rs.3,768,000/-, and as mentioned in the Nomination Form, 
therefore, the learned counsel states, that if this value is accepted it 
Civil Appeal No. 467 of 2015 
7 
would mean that the said 15 kanals and 4 marlas was worth just a 
few thousand rupees and shown to be two hundred thousand rupees 
in his Nomination Form, however, such value was false as the price 
of the said house was forty eight million rupees, and it is 
unbelievable that it was purchased for about one fifth of its price. 
With regard to the said house, the learned Presiding Officer of the 
Tribunal had held that, “even if there is a difference of price, it cannot 
be said to be a case of concealment of asset as respondent No. 1 had 
declared ownership of the said house”. The learned counsel states 
that the Nomination Form requires both the declaration of the asset 
as well as its “value” and the learned Presiding Officer could not have 
discarded one component thereof, and in doing so committed a 
material illegality. 
 
7. 
Mr. Ilyas Sheikh, the appellant’s learned counsel, refers to 
section 12(2)(a) and (f), section 78(3)(d), and section 99(1)(f) of the 
Representation of the People Act, 1976 (“ROPA”) and Article 62(1)(f) of 
the Constitution to support his case for the disqualification of 
respondent No. 1. Reliance was also placed upon the following cases: 
Muhammad Rizwan Gill v Nadia Aziz (PLD 2010 Supreme Court 828), 
Shamuna Badshah Qaisarani v Muhammad Dawood (2016 SCMR 
1420), Muhammad Ahmad Chatta v Iftikhar Ahmad Cheema (2016 
SCMR 763), Muhammad Yousaf Kaselia v Peer Ghulam Mohy-ud-Din 
Chishti (PLD 2016 Supreme Court 689), Imran Ahmed Khan Niazi v 
Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif (PLD 2017 Supreme Court 265) 
(“Panama Papers-I”), Imran Ahmed Khan v Muhammad Nawaz Sharif 
(PLD 
2017 
Supreme 
Court 
692) 
(“Panama 
Papers-II”) 
and 
Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v Imran Ahmed Khan Niazi (PLD 2018 
Supreme Court 1) (“Panama Papers-III”). The learned counsel states 
Civil Appeal No. 467 of 2015 
8 
that the recent judgments of this Court and particularly those in the 
Panama Papers’ cases hold that the court may look at any material 
which comes before it and if the material suggests that a candidate 
has not disclosed all his assets in the Nomination Form he be 
disqualified and declared not to be honest/ameen in terms of section 
99(1)(f) of ROPA and Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution and thereby 
attract permanent disqualification. And, the nondisclosure and 
misdeclaration of assets was not excusable by respondent No. 1 who, 
as per his own showing, was an old hand in politics having been a 
member of the National Assembly, “for six times consecutively”. The 
learned counsel states that the appellant’s case is better than the 
facts of the Panama Papers’ cases wherein the elected person had 
denied the receipt of salary, but which was deemed to have become 
his asset. In the present case respondent No. 1 admits that he had 
not disclosed all of his agricultural land, and had falsely declared 
that he had given away 15 kanals and 4 marlas of land as part-
payment for the purchase of the said house. The learned counsel 
concludes by stating that the respondent No. 1 himself was one of the 
petitioners in the Panama Papers’ cases (Constitution Petition No. 30 
of 2016) therefore he cannot expect to be judged by a different 
standard himself. 
 
8. 
Mr. Abdur Rashid Awan, the learned counsel representing 
respondent No. 1, relies upon the impugned judgment of the Tribunal 
which, according to him, is based on a correct assessment of facts 
and conforms with the legal principles enunciated by this Court. He 
states that the Election Petition did not specifically mention the 
agricultural land which was not disclosed nor the correct value of the 
said house in paragraph 14 but simply alleged that properties had 
Civil Appeal No. 467 of 2015 
9 
been concealed by respondent No. 1 in his statement of assets. The 
appellant only made these specific allegations in his affidavit-in-
evidence, which, according to the learned counsel, was not a part of 
the pleadings. As regards the agricultural land the learned counsel 
took two fold pleas, firstly that the document titled “Details of 
Agricultural Land” provides the complete particulars of the 
agricultural land but a mistake in calculation was committed in 
clause 14 of the Nomination Form, and, alternatively, that, if at all 
nondisclosure is established it was a bona fide mistake and cannot 
be equated with a misdeclaration entailing disqualification and/or 
attracting the disqualification contemplated by section 99(1)(f) of the 
ROPA and/or Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution. He next states that 
no advantage would accrue to respondent No. 1 in not disclosing all 
his agricultural lands nor would he gain an advantage by not 
showing the real value of the said house. The learned counsel states 
that judgments in the Panama Papers’ cases are not applicable to 
appeals filed under section 67(3) of the ROPA because the Panama 
Papers’ cases arose out of a petition directly filed before this Court 
under Article 184(3) of the Constitution.  
 
9. 
We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and with 
their assistance examined the available record and the referred to 
cases. 
 
10. 
The learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to 
satisfy us with regard to the alleged discrepancies in the payment of 
income tax and bank profit earned by respondent No. 1. Therefore, it 
would not be appropriate for us to declare that respondent No. 1 had 
provided incorrect information regarding his income tax on the basis 
Civil Appeal No. 467 of 2015 
10 
of mere inference nor will it be appropriate to enable the appellant to 
make out his case by recording additional evidence before this Court. 
 
11. 
That with regard to the agricultural land and the said house 
Issue No. 9 was framed by the Tribunal: “Whether the respondent No. 
1 concealed the facts of his properties in the declaration of assets 
against the provisions of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan”. As regards the matter of agricultural land there is un-
rebutted evidence that respondent No. 1 owned more land than 
shown by him in his Nomination Form which respondent No. 1 
admits to be 113 kanals and 4 marlas or 70 kanals and 6 marlas as 
per Exhibit R-1 which land was not disclosed by him in his 
Nomination Form. The document titled “Details of Agricultural Land”, 
referred to by the learned counsel representing respondent No. 1, 
also does not help him because therein respondent No. 1’s land 
holding is shown to be 968 kanals and 13 marlas so the plea of 
miscalculating is not sustainable. It is however entirely possible that 
this nondisclosure was an oversight by respondent No. 1 particularly 
when there appears to be no benefit or advantage accruing to him on 
account of such nondisclosure. 
 
12. 
As regards the value of the said house, the General Manager 
(Operations) of the Bahria Town (Pvt.) Limited had mentioned that at 
the time of booking the price of the said house was forty eight million 
rupees, however, admittedly Bahria Town (Pvt.) Limited received a 
payment of only ten million rupees and, if the respondent No. 1 is to 
be believed, 15 kanals and 4 marlas of land, as consideration thereof. 
However, the said 15 kanals and 4 marlas of land admittedly still 
stands in the name of respondent No. 1; there is no sale deed, sale 
agreement, exchange deed or any other kind of agreement to support 
Civil Appeal No. 467 of 2015 
11 
the story put forward by respondent No. 1. Moreover, neither 
respondent No.1 nor Bahria Town (Pvt.) Limited informed the 
Revenue authorities about the purported sale/transfer/exchange of 
the 15 kanals and 4 marlas of agricultural land despite the fact that 
respondent No. 1 had acquired the said house in the year 2011, well 
before the evidence in the case was recorded by the Tribunal. The 
said Allotment Certificate (Exhibit P-8) does not mention the price of 
the said house nor that it was issued in part exchange for 15 kanals 
and 4 marlas of agricultural land. Respondent No. 1’s Nomination 
Form and Details of Immovable Assets also did not disclose this. 
There is yet another aspect to consider, Bahria Town (Pvt.) Limited is 
a corporate entity, and the accounts of every company are required to 
be audited and submitted to the concerned authorities. If Bahria 
Town (Pvt.) Limited had actually acquired 15 kanals and 4 marlas of 
land it needed to be disclosed, but not a single document in this 
regard was produced nor did the representatives of the company 
testify that the company had disclosed such land in its official 
records. However, the Sales Executive and Finance Manager referred 
to Exhibit R-2 an undated letter written by them, but there is no 
signature of respondent No. 1 on Exhibit R-2, despite there being a 
place for the “Buyer: Sheikh Rasheed Ahmed” to sign it. In the 
absence of respondent No. 1’s signature Bahria Town (Pvt.) Limited 
would not be able to hold respondent No. 1 to this alleged sale. The 
question also arises why would a limited liability company act in this 
unconventional manner and contravene the laws governing it? 
Whether respondent No. 1 did not have the requisite ‘white money’, 
that is money duly declared to the income tax authorities, or he was 
given the said house at almost one-fifth of its price as a political 
favour, and the part-exchange of agricultural land was just a sham 
Civil Appeal No. 467 of 2015 
12 
explanation to conceal the truth, would require us to delve in the 
realm of conjecture, which we consciously do not want to. We are 
however clear that there is sufficient evidence on record to establish 
that respondent No. 1 misdeclared the value of the said house in his 
Statement of Assets, the correct value of which was not less than 
forty eight million rupees. 
 
13. 
That having determined that respondent No. 1, did not disclose 
all his agricultural land and misdeclared the value of the said house 
in his Nomination Form the consequences of such nondisclosure and 
misdeclaration need consideration. If the principle or rule of strict 
liability is applicable respondent No. 1 will have to be disqualified. 
But, if the strict liability rule is not applicable then the consequences 
of the said nondisclosure and misdeclaration need to be explored 
further. However, in cases where the nondisclosure or misdeclaration 
gives an illegal advantage to a candidate then such nondisclosure or 
misdeclaration would terminate his candidature, and if he has been 
elected to his disqualification and consequent removal. For example, 
if a person was convicted of an offence under the National 
Accountability Bureau Ordinance, 1999 (“the NAB Ordinance”) but 
his Nomination Form did not disclose his conviction or give an earlier 
date of his conviction to mislead that the ten year period of 
disqualification (section 15 of the NAB Ordinance) had already 
expired; such a misdeclaration or nondisclosure would violate the 
NAB Ordinance as it would enable an unqualified person to 
participate in the elections. Similarly, a person who isn’t yet 25 years 
of age, which is the minimum age to contest National Assembly 
elections (Article 62(1)(b) of the Constitution and section 99(1)(b) of 
the ROPA), misdeclares his date of birth to falsely show himself to be 
Civil Appeal No. 467 of 2015 
13 
25 years of age or older; such a person too merits removal because he 
was not competent to contest. However, a misdeclaration where, for 
instance, the candidate who is 26 years old mistakenly mentions his 
age as 25 years, such misdeclaration did not overcome or disregard a 
law which prohibited his participation in the elections and therefore 
it could be categorized as inconsequential. In the case of Sheikh 
Rasheed Ahmed the misdeclaration made by him apparently did not 
offend any law, in that if he had disclosed his entire land holding and 
had shown the value of the said house to be forty eight million rupees 
he would still be able to contest the elections. 
 
14. 
There are judgments of this Court which apply the principle or 
rule of strict liability and hold that any nondisclosure or misdeclaration 
results in disqualification; Panama Papers-II and III evidently advocate 
this principle or rule. A member of the National Assembly, who was 
subsequently elected by a majority of the members of the National 
Assembly to be the Prime Minister, was disqualified as a member of the 
National Assembly and, consequently, as the Prime Minister, because he 
did not disclose the income said to have been earned by him as he had a 
work permit (Iqama) of Dubai, United Arab Emirates the issuance of 
which was conditional on the iqama holder being paid a salary, therefore, 
irrespective of whether he actually received a salary, it was sufficient to 
constitute his “earnings” and then deemed to have become his asset, the 
nondisclosure 
whereof 
was 
held 
by 
this 
Court 
to 
constitute 
misdeclaration and, hence, as a consequence he was disqualified in 
terms that, “he is not honest in terms of section 99(1)(f) of the ROPA 
and Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution”. Even though it was not held by 
this 
Court 
that 
the 
candidate 
suffered 
from 
any 
inherent 
disqualification and if he had disclosed his said salary/asset he 
Civil Appeal No. 467 of 2015 
14 
would have been disqualified. Panama Paper-II and III, therefore, 
clearly apply the strict liability principle, however, they did not follow 
other judgments of this Court which held that misdeclaration or 
nondisclosure 
would 
only 
result 
in 
disqualification 
if 
the 
nondisclosure or misdeclaration circumvented a legal disability or 
disqualification: Muhammad Siddique Baloch v Jehangir Khan 
Tareen (PLD 2016 Supreme Court 97) and Sheikh Muhammad 
Akram v Abdul Ghafoor (2016 SCMR 733), which will be discussed in 
paragraph 18 hereinbelow after discussing the Panama Papers’ cases. 
 
15. 
In Panama Papers-I the learned Ejaz Afzal Khan, J, had 
discussed the scope of Article 62 of the Constitution and section 99 
of the ROPA with regard to the disclosure and accounting of a 
candidate’s assets, as under: 
 
 
“A reading of Article 4 of the Constitution would reveal that 
no person shall be compelled to do that which the law does 
not require him to do. While a reading of Article 62 and 63 
of the Constitution and Section 99 of the ROPA would 
reveal that none of them requires any member of Parliament 
to account for his assets or those of his dependents even if 
they are disproportionate to his known means of income. 
Section 12(2)(f) of the ROPA requires him to disclose his 
assets and those of his spouse and dependents and not the 
means whereby such assets are acquired. Where none of 
the provisions of the Constitution or the Act dealing with 
disqualification requires a member of Parliament to account 
for his assets and those of his dependents, even if they are 
disproportionate to his known means of income, how could 
this Court on its own or on a petition of any person under 
Article 184(3) of the Constitution require him to do that, 
and declare that he is not honest and ameen if he does not 
account for such assets.” (at pages 485-6) 
 
“… disqualifications envisaged by Article 62(1)(f) and Article 
63(2) of the Constitution in view of words used therein have 
to be dealt with differently. In the former case the Returning 
Officer or any other fora in the hierarchy would not reject 
the nomination of a person from being elected as a member 
of Parliament unless a court of law has given a declaration 
that he is not sagacious, righteous, non-profligate, honest 
and ameen. Even the Election Tribunal, unless it itself 
proceeds to give the requisite declaration on the basis of the 
material before it, would not disqualify the returned 
Civil Appeal No. 467 of 2015 
15 
candidate where no declaration, as mentioned above, has 
been given by a court of law. The expression “a court of law” 
has not been defined in Article 62 or any other provision of 
the Constitution but it essentially means a court of plenary 
jurisdiction, which has the power to record evidence and 
give a declaration on the basis of the evidence so recorded.” 
(at page 490SS) 
 
 
 
 
 
In the same case another learned member of the Bench Sh. 
Azmat Saeed, J, had held that: 
 
“25. In the above backdrop to hold that an MNA, who may 
(or may not) own an undeclared property yet his 
explanation for the source of the funds for acquiring such 
property, though legally irrelevant, is not acceptable, hence, 
such MNA is disqualified, is a legal absurdity under the 
laws of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.” (at page 524) 
 
“30. Before the said provisions can be pressed into service, 
there must be a declaration by Court of law. At the risk of 
stating the obvious, it may be clarified that the Courts of 
law are concerned with the matters of law not morality. 
There can be no manner of doubt that the term “honest” as 
employed in Article 62(1)(f) refers to legal honesty, an 
objective concept and not mere moral or ethical honesty, 
which is subjective. The Courts have never wandered into 
the realm of morality, in this behalf.” (at page 525) 
 
 
“36. In all the aforesaid cases, the applicability of Article 
62(1)(f) of the Constitution was considered. In no case, any 
person was disqualified under the said Article in the 
absence of an established and proved breach of a legal 
obligation or violation of a law. In no case, the question of 
Article 62(1)(f) was even seriously considered in the absence 
of at least specific allegations of breach of a legal obligation 
or violation of law. No judgment of this Court has been cited 
at the bar where a person has been disqualified under 
Article 62(1)(f) for being dishonest where such alleged 
dishonesty did not offend against the law or involve a 
breach or non-fulfillment of a legal obligation.” (at page 527) 
  
“37. Such is the true and obvious import of Article 62(1)(f) 
of the Constitution, as has been consistently without any 
exception interpreted and applied by this Court. Article 
62(1)(f) of the Constitution cannot be permitted to be used 
as a tool for political engineering by this Court nor should 
this Court arrogation unto itself the power to vet candidates 
on moral grounds, like a Council of Elders as is done in a 
neighbouring 
Country. 
Under 
our 
Constitutional 
dispensation, 
Pakistan 
is 
to 
be 
governed 
by 
the 
Representatives chosen by the people and not chosen by 
any Institution or a few individuals.” (at page 528) 
 
 
Civil Appeal No. 467 of 2015 
16 
 
Ijaz ul Ahsan, J, after elaborately and competently setting out 
the applicable legal provisions stated that only “a Court or Tribunal of 
competent jurisdiction” could determine whether a candidate had 
submitted a “statement of assets and liabilities which is found to be 
false in material particulars,” as under: 
“In terms of Section 42-A(4) of the RoPA if a member 
submits the statement of assets and liabilities which is 
found to be false in material particulars, he may be 
proceeded against under Section 82 of the RoPA for 
committing an offence of corrupt practice. If found guilty by 
a Sessions Judge under Section 94 of the RoPA, such 
member is punishable with imprisonment for a term which 
may extend to three years or with fine which may extend to 
Five Thousand Rupees or with both. In case, it is 
established in a Court or Tribunal of competent jurisdiction 
that a candidate has concealed any of the assets required to 
be disclosed under the statement of assets and liabilities in 
his Nomination Papers or his Annual Statement of Assets 
and Liabilities, the same may constitute basis for his 
disqualification inter alia under the provisions of Articles 62 
and/or 63 of the Constitution.” (at page 638) 
 
16. 
Panama Papers-I had set up a joint investigation team (JIT) to 
investigate whether respondent No. 1 therein held properties and 
companies abroad in his own name or through others (benami) and 
the source of funds utilized for purchase of such properties. In 
Panama Papers-II after considering the report submitted by the JIT 
the learned Ejaz Afzal Khan, J, on behalf of the Court determined as 
under: 
“It has not been denied that respondent No. 1 being 
Chairman of the Board of Capital FZE was entitled to 
salary, therefore, the statement that he did not withdraw 
the salary would not prevent the un-withdrawn salary from 
being receivable, hence an asset. When the un-withdrawn 
salary as being receivable is an asset it was required to be 
disclosed by respondent No. 1 in his nomination papers for 
the Elections of 2013 in terms of section 12(2)(f) of the 
ROPA. Where respondent No. 1 did not disclose his 
aforesaid assets, it would amount to furnishing a false 
declaration on solemn affirmation in violation of the law 
mentioned above, therefore, he is not honest in terms of 
section 99(1)(f) of the ROPA and Article 62(1)(f) of the 
Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.” (at page 
710) 
Civil Appeal No. 467 of 2015 
17 
 
 
However the principles enunciated by his lordship in Panama 
Papers-I were not discussed. Some may contend that the aforesaid 
observations in Panama Papers-I are at variance with Panama 
Papers-II and III. 
 
17. 
Panama Papers-III was a judgment on the review petition filed 
against the judgment of Panama Papers-II. This judgment too was 
only authored by the learned Ejaz Afzal Khan, J, who held that: 
“…we could not have shut our eyes when an asset of the 
petitioner arising out of IQAMA (work permit) having 
surfaced during the investigation of the case and admitted 
by him to be his in no uncertain terms, was not found to 
have been disclosed in his nomination papers in terms of 
Section 12(2)(f) of ROPA.” (at page 19) 
 
 
The aforesaid conclusion was arrived at by referring to a 
number of judgments: Hassan Nawaz v Haji Muhammad Ayub (PLD 
2017 Supreme Court 70), Mehmood Akhtar Naqvi v Federation of 
Pakistan (PLD 2012 Supreme Court 1089), Sadiq Ali Memon v 
Returning Officer (2013 SCMR 1246). The learned Ejaz Afzal Khan, J, 
stated that the judgments of this Court cited by the other side were 
“distinguishable on facts and law”; the said cited judgments included 
the judgments in Muhammad Siddique Baloch v Jehangir Khan 
Tareen (PLD 2016 Supreme Court 97) and Sheikh Muhammad 
Akram v Abdul Ghafoor (2016 SCMR 733). The judgments in the 
cases Hassan Nawaz and Sadiq Ali Memon, which were relied upon in 
Panama Papers-III, were cases in which candidates were suffering 
from an inherent disqualification to contest elections because they 
were holding the nationality of another country. 
 
18. 
The cases of Muhammad Siddique Baloch and Sheikh 
Muhammad Akram were stated in Panama Papers-III to be 
Civil Appeal No. 467 of 2015 
18 
“distinguishable” however it was not elaborated how they were 
distinguishable and why the legal principle enunciated therein was 
not applicable. The principle enunciated in the case of Muhammad 
Siddique Baloch is reproduced below: 
 
“29. At this juncture, it is important to emphasize that in 
cases involving a finding of fact about the disqualification of 
a returned candidate in election matters, such finding must 
be based on affirmative evidence and not on presumptions, 
inferences and surmises…For that reason and the and the 
serious 
consequences 
that 
follow 
a 
finding 
of 
disqualification under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution, an 
additional evidentiary safeguard is adopted by the Court, 
namely, that any reasonable hypothesis available in the 
recorded evidence to avoid the disqualification of the 
returned candidate ought to be adopted by the Court of 
law.” (at page 119T and U) 
 
Another three member Bench of this Court in the case of 
Sheikh Muhammad Akram which involved a candidate who did not 
disclose a pending criminal case against him was not disqualified 
because this nondisclosure did not give the candidate any advantage. 
The changes made to Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution pursuant to 
the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution, whereby the 
declaration in respect of matters contained therein was required to be 
made by a court of law, was also noted. The relevant portions from 
the judgment are reproduced hereunder: 
 
“…a candidate is not disqualified to contest elections merely 
because a criminal case is pending against him. Non-
disclosure of a pending case can not be equated with the 
non-disclosure of a criminal case in which a person has 
been 
convicted 
and 
one 
which 
may 
entail 
his 
disqualification. Incidentally, no one objected to the 
appellant’s candidature when he submitted his nomination 
papers. If such an objection had been taken, the appellant 
could have provided the requisite information of the said 
pending criminal case, as required by paragraph 4 (above) 
of the Nomination Form and resolved the matter, as the 
Returning Officer is required to provide the candidate an 
opportunity to, ‘allow any such defect to be remedied forthwith’ if 
he deems that such defect is not of a ‘substantial nature’ as 
per proviso (ii) to subsection (3) of section 14 of the Act. 
Civil Appeal No. 467 of 2015 
19 
However, no objection was raised and this defect in the 
nomination paper was not remedied and the appellant was 
allowed to contest the elections. The people of the 
constituency elected the appellant from a field of 21 
candidates. Would the electorate, or sufficient number of 
them to change the result, not have voted for him if they 
knew about the pendency of the said case?” (at page 743) 
 
“The appellant had also not lied to gain a benefit to which 
he was not otherwise entitled to, i.e. to be able to contest 
elections, therefore, the disqualification contained in 
Section 99(1)(d),(e) and (f) of the Act, which were the same 
as those contained in Article 62(1)(d),(e) and (f) of the 
Constitution would not be attracted. It may also be 
observed that the stipulation requiring a candidate to be 
‘sagacious, righteous and non-profligate and honest and 
ameen’ contained in Section 99(1)(f) of the Act was the same 
as contained in Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution prior to 
the Eighteenth Amendment. However, (after the Eighteenth 
Amendment) the said provision has been changed and to 
now attract the disqualification there must be a declaration 
by a court. Article 62(1)(f) now reads as follows: 
 
“he is sagacious, righteous, non-profligate, 
honest and ameen, there being no declaration 
to the contrary by a court of law.” 
(at page 745) 
 
“16. The mandate given by the electorate must not be 
interfered with on hyper-technical grounds. Unfortunately, 
the Hon’ble Tribunal thought otherwise, as it not only set 
aside the election of the most popular candidate chosen by 
the people to represent them, but did so for factors wholly 
extraneous to the law.” (at page 747) 
 
 
Panama Papers-III also did not discuss the aforequoted 
principles expounded in Panama Papers-I (paragraph 15 above). 
 
19. 
After the Panama Papers-II and III the case of Muhammad 
Hanif Abbasi v Imran Khan Niazi (PLD 2018 Supreme Court 189) was 
decided by another three member Bench of this Court where the 
strict liability rule was also not followed: 
 
“Arithmetical accuracy in reconciling amounts and events 
is not required in such a case of misdeclaration of assets. 
Only a coherent account of the sources of funds, their 
application and movement should be shown by reference 
to consistent and reliable evidence, even though it may 
suffer from gaps…” (at page 284) 
 
Civil Appeal No. 467 of 2015 
20 
 
20. 
Once the facts of a case have been ascertained the applicable 
law is applied to arrive at a decision. However, when the facts are 
clear but different benches of this Court, comprising of the same 
number of judges, have taken divergent views the matter needs 
urgent resolution. Another question which requires determination is 
whether the matter of nondisclosure or misdeclaration is to be 
treated differently if the case is heard by the Supreme Court in its 
appellate jurisdiction (section 67(3) of the ROPA) from a case heard 
by this Court in its extraordinary original jurisdiction (Article 184(3) 
of the Constitution). There is yet another matter which needs to 
considered and conclusively settled. 
 
21. 
Article 184(3) of the Constitution states that only matters of 
“public importance with reference to the enforcement of the 
Fundamental Rights” can be attended to by this Court when 
exercising powers thereunder. When a question of public importance 
with reference to the enforcement of the Fundamental Rights arises, 
this Court (under Article 184(3) of the Constitution) can pass an 
order of the nature mentioned in Article 199 of the Constitution. 
However, when a High Court passes an order under Article 199 of the 
Constitution it can be appealed before this Court (under Article 185 
of the Constitution), but when this Court exercises jurisdiction under 
Article 184(3) of the Constitution the order can not be assailed in 
appeal. Precedents of this Court have held that the right of appeal is 
a substantive right and not one of mere procedure (see, Manzoor Ali v 
United Bank Limited, 2005 SCMR 1785, Muhammad Azhar Siddiqui 
v Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2012 Supreme Court 774 and Pakistan 
Defence Officer’s Housing Authority v Jawaid Ahmed, 2013 SCMR 
Civil Appeal No. 467 of 2015 
21 
1707). In the case of Pakistan Defence Officer’s Housing Authority a 
five member Bench of this Court held, that: 
 
“The right of appeal is a substantive right…Would it be a 
fair trial if an accused is shorn off his right of appeal? 
Would the deprivation of right of appeal not amount to 
judicial sanctification of all the orders passed by the 
departmental authorities awarding various penalties to the 
employees and would it not be violative of the fundamental 
right to a “fair trial and due process” as ordained in Article 
10A of the Constitution?” (paragraph 57, pages 1746K and 
1747L and M)  
 
 
22. 
When hearing the review petition in Panama Papers-III this 
Court was cognizant that no appeal is provided for against an order 
passed under Article 184(3) of the Constitution. This Court therefore 
held that greater care and circumspection is required to be exercised: 
 
“The argument that much greater care has to be exercised 
in upholding the order disqualifying the petitioner in terms 
of section 99(1)(f) of ROPA and Article 62(1)(f) of the 
Constitution when no appeal lies against it is more of an 
apprehension as we being conscious of our duties have 
dealt with this case with much greater care and 
circumspection in the judgment under review and while 
hearing and deciding this petition for review.” (at page 23) 
 
However, one can as of right file an appeal against a judgment 
or order which can not be done in a review petition. Moreover, unlike 
an appeal the parameters of a review petition are circumscribed. The 
constraints imposed by Order XXVI of the Supreme Court Rules of 
1980 govern a review petition and provide that a judgment or order 
may be set aside only on very limited grounds, such as an error 
apparent on the face of the record. An appeal however is not bound 
by these constraints. A review petition is required to be heard by the 
same 
judges 
(as 
far 
as 
practicable) 
who 
had 
passed 
the 
judgment/order under review, however, an appeal is never heard by 
the same judges. 
Civil Appeal No. 467 of 2015 
22 
 
23. 
In Panama Papers-I Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution, which 
provides that an adverse declaration with regard to a person’s 
sagacity, righteousness, profligacy, honesty and whether or not 
he/she is ameen, must be declared by a court of law, which was 
expounded to mean a court of “plenary” or “competent” jurisdiction 
(paragraph 15 above) which suggests the exclusion of the Supreme 
Court when exercising its extraordinary original jurisdiction under 
Article 184(3) of the Constitution. The question therefore arises 
whether a person can be disqualified under Article 62(1)(f) of the 
Constitution by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 
184(3) of the Constitution? Another important matter which requires 
consideration is whether disqualification under Article 62(1)(f) of the 
Constitution is for the duration of the assembly, in respect whereof 
elections are held, or is permanent? The scope of Article 225 of the 
Constitution, which specifically deals with election disputes, also 
needs to be considered and whether on the principle of the specific 
excluding the general this Article excludes resort to Article 184(3) of 
the constitution in respect of individual election disputes. And, to 
what extent, if at all, can an election dispute be categorized as a 
matter of “public importance” and which particular Fundamental 
Right stands infringed, which needs “enforcement”? It would not be 
fair to one or other of the contesting parties herein if we decide this 
case at this stage because in doing so we would be preferring one set 
of views to another and not on the basis of a clear declaration of law, 
which is bound to give rise to misgivings. It is therefore all the more 
necessary that the questions which have arisen be thoroughly 
examined and answered.   
 
Civil Appeal No. 467 of 2015 
23 
24. 
When divergent views are expressed by different benches of the 
same number of judges of this Court the matter needs early 
resolution and all the more so when, “Any decision of the Supreme 
Court shall, to the extent that it decides a question of law or is based 
upon or enunciates a principle of law, be binding on all other courts of 
Pakistan” (Article 189 of the Constitution). The applicable test with 
regard to elections and the qualification-disqualification of candidates 
is indeterminate and has serious repercussions, which assume 
criticality in an election year. The terms of the National and the four 
provincial assemblies will conclude in a few months and general 
elections will be held. Confusion would result when returning officers 
throughout the country apply different Supreme Court decisions in 
accepting or rejecting candidates’ Nomination Forms. And confusion 
will be further perpetuated when, after the elections have been held, 
election petitions are filed before election tribunals designated to hear 
and decide them in the absence of a clear legal pronouncement on 
the subject. Matters would then come up before this Court in its 
appellate jurisdiction and possibly too in its extraordinary original 
jurisdiction 
under 
Article 
184(3) 
of 
the 
Constitution. 
Legal 
uncertainty may undermine the credibility of the electoral process, 
embitter political adversaries, encourage political commentators and 
the public to cast uncalled for aspersions on the returning officers, 
the election tribunals and possibly on this Court as well if the 
interpretation of the law favourable to a party is not applied. We must 
make every effort to dispel any impression that different persons are 
treated differently. Justice must not only be done but be seen to be 
done too. Every endeavour therefore should be made to resolve the 
prevailing legal uncertainty. The eligibility of members of Parliament 
Civil Appeal No. 467 of 2015 
24 
should be “decided in accordance with one single and definite 
measure”. 
 
25. 
We therefore request the Hon’ble Chief Justice to constitute a 
bench, preferably the Full Court, since every judge of this Court has 
heard election disputes and acquired invaluable knowledge which will 
undoubtedly better help to decide the following questions of law, 
which have arisen in this appeal, and which will also arise in other 
cases: 
 
Q.1. Does every nondisclosure or misdeclaration in the Nomination 
Form result in the disqualification of a candidate or only those 
whereby one has circumvented some inherent legal disability to 
participate in an election? 
Q.2. If a petition does not disclose the particular facts, on the basis 
of which disqualification is sought, can these be considered 
when subsequently disclosed in the affidavit-in-evidence of the 
petitioner or which may otherwise be discovered during the 
hearing before the tribunal/court? 
Q.3. Does Article 225 of the Constitution exclude the application of 
Article 184(3) of the Constitution to election disputes? 
Q.4. If the answer to the foregoing question is in the negative, then 
is an election dispute regarding an individual’s qualification or 
disqualification a matter of “public importance” which requires 
the “enforcement” of a Fundamental Right and if so can it be 
determined under Article 184(3) of the Constitution? 
Q.5. If the answer to the foregoing question is in the affirmative, are 
the procedural and evidentiary rules governing election 
petitions and appeals under the ROPA the same as those 
governing petitions under Article 184(3) of the Constitution? 
Civil Appeal No. 467 of 2015 
25 
Q.6. Does the “court of law” mentioned in Article 62(1)(f) of the 
Constitution include the Supreme Court when exercising 
jurisdiction under Article 184 (3)? 
Q.7. If a candidate is disqualified on account of nondisclosure or 
misdeclaration does such disqualification subsist only till the 
next elections or is it permanent? 
 
26. 
Some of the aforesaid questions were also formulated by this 
Court in the case of Ishaq Khan Khakwani v Mian Muhammad Nawaz 
Sharif (PLD 2015 Supreme Court 275, at pages 283-4) however the 
case was decided on facts, and the questions remained unanswered. 
One of the seven learned members of the Bench observed, that: 
 
“It is with this in view and in order to avoid controversy as 
to the meaning of Article 62(1)(f) and 63(1)(g) of the 
Constitution and the terms ‘honest’ and ‘ameen’ used 
therein, that the foregoing questions must be adjudicated 
to provide guidance through precedent. Such precedent 
can ensure that constitutional questions and challenges as 
to the qualifications/disqualifications and eligibility of 
members of Parliament are decided in accordance with one 
single and definite measure; otherwise there can be vastly 
divergent and differing approaches which could be taken 
by various returning officers or election tribunals as per 
their reading and understanding of the Constitution. This 
in turn has the potential of leading to and rendering any 
election controversial bearing in mind that there are 1070 
constituencies and if, based on past statistical data, there 
are on average 10 candidates in each constituency, there 
will be more than 10,000 aspirants for elected office in the 
National and Provincial Assemblies who will require 
scrutiny and evaluation on the touchstone of Articles 62 
and 63 of the Constitution. In the last general elections 
cases did come up where contradictory and inconsistent 
Civil Appeal No. 467 of 2015 
26 
decisions were handed down by Returning Officers for 
want of guidance through precedent.” (at page 291)  
 
“4. 
The question as to which Civil Court will have 
jurisdiction 
to 
make 
the 
declaration 
or 
conviction 
envisioned by Articles 62 and 63 will also need to be 
decided… .” 
 
 
 
Another distinguished member of the Bench repeated the 
prescient warning he had issued decades earlier: 
 
“…the vague, uncertain, obscure and conflicting terminology 
used in different provisions of Articles 62 and 63 of the 
Constitution…is bound to confuse the electorate at large, 
hound the candidates and their voters, embarrass the 
Returning Officers at the time of scrutiny of nomination papers, 
confound the Election Tribunals and become a nightmare for 
the lawyers and Courts in the years to come.” 
 
27. 
We are aware that most probably by the time the aforesaid 
questions are answered the tenure of the present National Assembly 
would be over. However, the determination of these questions is long 
overdue and must not be delayed further and should be settled 
finally. 
 
28. 
Since the aforesaid questions require interpretation of the 
Constitution and the ROPA, notices be given to the Attorney-General 
for Pakistan, the Advocate-Generals of the four provinces and the law 
officer representing the Islamabad Capital Territory, all of whom 
should submit in writing their respective answers to the questions 
and support their answers with reasons. Notices be also issued to the 
Chief Election Commissioner and the Election Commission of 
Pakistan. 
 
 
ORDER OF THE BENCH  
 
 
 
This Civil Appeal i.e. CA No.467/2015 (Malik 
Shakeel Awan v. Sheikh Rashid Ahmed etc.) is hereby 
dismissed by a majority of two to one, with Qazi Faez Isa, J’s 
holding that first the matter be referred to a Bench comprising 
of the Full Court to decide the questions of law identified and 
enumerated by him.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judge  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judge  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judge 
Announced on ______________ 
At _______________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judge