IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN 
         (Appellate jurisdiction) 
 
 
 Present: 
Mr. Justice Mian Saqib Nisar, HCJ 
Mr. Justice Umar Ata Bandial 
Mr. Justice Ijaz ul Ahsan 
Mr. Justice Sajjad Ali Shah 
Mr. Justice Munib Akhtar 
 
Intra Court Appeal No. 07 of 2018 in 
Criminal Original Petition No, 09 of 2018 
(Against the order dated 2.8.2018 passed by this Court 
in Crl. Original Petition No. 09 of 2018) 
 
Talal Ahmed Chaudhry. 
 
 
 
 
 
… Appellant(s) 
                                                     VERSUS 
The State. 
 
  
 
… Respondent(s) 
For the Appellant(s)  
: 
Mr. Kamran Murtaza, Sr. ASC a/w 
 
 
 
 
 
Talal Ahmed Chaudhry. 
 
For the Respondent(s) 
: 
Ch. Aamir Rehman, Addl. Attorney General. 
 
Date of hearing 
 
: 
09.10.2018 
 
 
 
 
 
ORDER 
 
 
Sajjad Ali Shah, J. Through the instant appeal under Section 19 of 
the Contempt of Court Ordinance, 2003, the appellant has impugned the order of 
this Court passed by a three-Member Bench whereby the appellant, after being put 
to trial, was convicted under Sections 3 and 5 of the said Ordinance of 2003 and 
was sentenced to suffer imprisonment till the rising of the Court with a fine of 
Rs.100,000/-. 
2. 
 
Briefly, the appellant who at the relevant time was ‘Minister of State’ 
of the ruling Party PML(N), in his public speeches delivered on 24.1.2018 and 
27.1.2018 duly telecast by different television channels, made the following 
derogatory remarks against the Supreme Court and its Judges:- 
’’
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I.C.A. No.7/2018 
2
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’’ : ىو � �27.01.2018 
ب� � ىر�� ل� � � � � ن � �ا�ا�: 
 ��ا� �ا� � � � � �� � سا ۔� سا �� ود ۔�� � � ۔��ا� �ا� � � ��� ں�
 ��� � رود ��ا ��� ں� ۔� �� �� � � �  � ��ا� جآ � �� � ��� � �
 � سا �� � نا �� زا� ں� ،� �� ے� ��� � وا � � � ں�و � ہرادا �وا ا���� � ��
 زا� ےو �� ، � �� ��ا � ح� سا � ۔� �د � ف�ا � ۔و� ������ � ل� � ��ا�
� �� زا� � � �� �� ���زو � � سا روا ے� �� زا� ��� � ىد� �د �
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3.  
Through a formal note the Registrar of this Court brought the 
contents of the afore-stated speeches to the attention of the Hon’ble Chief Justice of 
Pakistan. The Hon’ble Chief Justice initiated Suo Moto proceedings in Contempt of 
Court in terms of Article 204 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 
1973 and directed to place the matter before a Bench of this Court for hearing 
accordingly.  
4. 
 
Consequently the appellant was issued a show cause notice on 
10.2.2018 to which he responded on 22.2.2018 by filing a written response which 
was considered by the Court on 8.3.2018. After finding the same to be 
unsatisfactory, a formal charge was framed which was read over to him on 
15.3.2018 to which he pleaded “not guilty” and thereafter he was put to trial. 
5. 
 
The prosecution examined only one witness namely Haji Adam son 
of Haji Sahib Khan, Director General (Monitoring) Pakistan Electronic Media 
Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) who produced a letter, transcript and CD 
containing video clips as Exhibits: P-1, P-2 and P-3. The witness, thereafter, was 
duly cross examined by Mr. Kamran Murtaza Sr. ASC for the appellant. Thereafter 
the statement of the appellant under Section 342 Cr.P.C. was also recorded. The 
appellant, however, denied examination under oath according to Section 340(2) 
Cr.P.C. The appellant thereafter produced five witnesses in his defence namely, 
I.C.A. No.7/2018 
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Asrar Ahmed Khan as DW-1, Musaddiq Malik as DW-2, Muhammad Tahir as 
DW-3, Atta Muhammad as DW-4 and Imtiaz Khan as DW-5. These witnesses were 
duly cross examined by the Additional Attorney General for Pakistan. After 
completion of evidence and hearing the parties, the appellant was convicted and 
sentenced as mentioned above.  
6. 
 
Mr. Kamran Murtaza learned Sr. ASC appearing for the appellant 
submitted that the appellant deeply regrets his words and submits an unconditional 
apology if the utterances on 24.1.2018 and 27.1.2018 amounted to contempt of this 
Court. It was contended that the Courts had always shown magnanimity and 
restraint in taking stern action against alleged contemnors. Therefore, since the 
appellant has thrown himself at the mercy of this Court and begged pardon, a 
similar treatment ought to be given to him by setting aside his sentence which in 
fact has disqualified him under Article 63(1)(g) by debarring him from taking part 
in politics for a period of five years. Mr. Kamran Murtaza while citing the 
judgment of this Court in Contempt proceedings against Imran Khan, Chairman, 
Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PLD 2014 SC 367) contends that in the said case this 
Court has held that proceedings of such nature are to be viewed on the golden 
principles of forgiveness, remission and pardon enshrined in Islam, which is one of 
the hallmarks of the Islamic system of dispensation of justice. A prudent 
Qazi/Judge entrusted with the onerous task of dispensation of justice is supposed to 
be composed and cool minded so as to tactfully deal with such petty notions and 
remarks, which might have been made in good faith or due to a slip of the tongue. 
Moreover, just and fair remarks made unconsciously or under the tide of 
momentary emotions, in somewhat harsh language, are not to be readily taken in 
the negative sense, but as means for soul-searching and improvement in the system. 
Learned counsel further relied on paragraph 5 of the judgment of this court 
delivered in the case of Riaz Hanif Rahi vs. Saeed-uz-Zaman Siddiqui (2011 SCMR 
948) wherein it was observed that where a personal opinion is not derogatory to the 
I.C.A. No.7/2018 
4
judiciary and the viewpoint does not ridicule the judiciary, all fair comments are 
rather a healthy sign of the public reposing trust owed to its judicial system. He 
further referred to the case of General (Retd.) Mirza Aslam Baig (PLD 1993 SC 
310) to contend that the Court in this case was of the view that though contempt 
was established, severe admonition and reprimand was sufficient to retrieve the 
honor and dignity of the Court and the purpose and object of the law of contempt 
stood satisfied. Lastly, counsel relied on the case of Habibul Wahab Elkheiri vs. 
Khan Abdul Wali Khan and 4 others (PLD 1978 SC 85) and contended that in 
similar circumstances Mr. Abdul Wali Khan had made very offensive remarks but 
the Court had considered his statement in the context in which it was made and 
came to the conclusion that he had no intention of maligning the Court or 
attributing motives to any of the Judges. His apology was accepted, and it was held 
that the dignity and the authority of the Court has been duly vindicated and that it 
was not necessary to proceed any further in the matter. Mr. Kamran Murtaza, in the 
circumstances, contends that the appellant had no intention of maligning the Courts 
or ridiculing any of the Judges through utterances made on 24.1.2018 and 
27.1.2018, therefore, in view of the principles laid down by this Court in the 
referred judgments, the appellant ought to be forgiven and pardoned.  
7. 
 
Before we examine the submission and the worth of the apology so 
tendered, we would like to reiterate the consistent view of this Court that the real 
object and the ultimate purpose in the mind of the Court while initiating contempt 
proceedings is not to afford protection to the judges from imputation to which they 
might be exposed personally as individuals or to satisfy the ego of a judge by 
punishing such person, instead, it is to maintain and strengthen the confidence of 
the public in general and the litigants, in the Court and to vindicate the honor and 
dignity of the Court to ensure that the administration of justice is not diminished or 
weakened. On the other hand, it is also true that Courts in the matter of contempt 
tend to show grace and magnanimity towards the alleged contemnor in cases where 
I.C.A. No.7/2018 
5
the contemnor without justifying his action/statement shows his repentance, 
remorse and at the earliest opportunity submits an unconditional apology by 
throwing himself at the mercy of the Courts. However, this is not a rule of thumb 
and cannot be applied to every case as an apology tendered does not automatically 
purge the contemnor of the contempt and may not necessarily be accepted unless 
the Court from the surrounding circumstances is satisfied about the bona fide of the 
contemnor. 
8. 
 
Coming to the submission on the issue in hand, it has not been 
disputed or denied before us that the offending words uttered by the appellant in his 
speeches made on 24.01.2018 and 27.01.2018, the gists whereof have been 
reproduced above, were prejudicial to the integrity and independence of the 
judiciary of Pakistan and surely detrimental to the safe administration of justice 
beside tending to bring this Court and the judges of this Court into disrespect and 
ridicule. It is important to note that the case law referred to by the learned counsel 
for the appellant in order to plead that the Courts in contempt proceedings have 
always been showing magnanimity and restraint and avoid taking any stern action 
against the alleged contemnor who begs an apology by throwing himself at the 
mercy of the Court pertain to instances where this Court has come to the conclusion 
that the offending words/speech were made in good faith without any intention of 
scandalizing the Court or to bring its judges into disrespect, contempt or to abuse 
the judiciary but were made to project a genuine issue, however the selection of 
words in projecting their point of view was improper. It is, therefore, important that 
before we consider the apology tendered at the appellate stage and that too orally 
through an advocate, the circumstance in which the derogatory and insulting 
remarks against the judges of this Court and the judiciary as an institution were 
made be examined.  
9. 
 
It is very important to note that the offending speech was made by the 
appellant after this Court had pronounced its verdict in the case of Imran Ahmed 
I.C.A. No.7/2018 
6
Khan Niazi vs. Muhammad Nawaz Sharif (PLD 2017 SC 692) and had declared that 
Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif the then Prime Minister of Pakistan was not honest 
in terms of Section 99(f) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976 (ROPA) 
and Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution and, therefore, disqualified to be a Member 
of the Parliament, soon thereafter some of the Members of the ruling party (PML-
N) in order to show their allegiance with Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif started a 
campaign of maligning the Office of the Hon’ble Chief Justice of Pakistan and the 
Judges of this Court in public gatherings and on electronic media. The appellant 
being one such firebrand speaker has deliberately and intentionally in the stated 
background, through the stated utterances, attacked the integrity and independence 
of the judiciary to please and support his leader with the sole intent to ridicule and 
lower the respect and to shake the confidence of people at large from the safe 
administration of justice. This conduct compelled the Court to initiate contempt 
proceedings against him for undermining the authority, integrity and independence 
of this Court. The tenor and content of the speech of the appellant clearly shows 
that it was designed and worded to scandalize the Court and to bring the Hon’ble 
Judges of this Court into hatred, ridicule or contempt. In the circumstance, the 
utterance made by the appellant can by no stretch of imagination be termed as 
bona-fide or to highlight a genuine issue to earn him a lenient view in the light of 
the dicta laid down by this Court in the cases referred to by the learned ASC for the 
appellant.    
10. 
 
Besides, an apology consists of acknowledgement of commission of 
contempt and an unequivocal expression of regret for such commission whereas in 
the instant case the appellant throughout has been trying to justify his offending 
statement by taking different pleas and even the apology so tendered was in case 
his justification with regard to the offending statement was not accepted. 
Unfortunately we see neither genuine remorse nor sincerity on the apology which 
in the instant case is being used by the Appellant to get out of a difficult situation 
I.C.A. No.7/2018 
7
that he finds himself in for having used intemperate and contemptuous language 
against the highest Court of the country and the Judges.  
11. 
 
Additionally, the apology so tendered on behalf of the appellant 
cannot be accepted as it does not meet the requisite criteria laid down by a five-
Member Bench of this Court in the case of Syed Masroor Ahsan and others vs. 
Ardeshir Cowasjee and others (PLD 1998 SC 823) which has been followed in a 
number of cases including Baz Muhammad Kakar and others vs. Federation of 
Pakistan through Ministry of Law & Justice and others (PLD 2012 SC 923) and 
Ch. Iftikhar Ahmed, IG Islamabad and others vs. the State (2018 SCMR 1385) 
consisting of the same number of Judges, in the following terms:- 
“96. It is, therefore, quite apparent that if apology is tendered it 
would not automatically purge the contemnor from the contempt 
and may not necessarily be accepted unless the Court from 
surrounding circumstances is satisfied about his bona fides. The 
acceptance or rejection of apology, therefore, depends upon the 
volume and nature of contempt allegedly committed. However, 
prepondered view revolves around the bona fides of the 
contemnor and satisfaction of the Court about genuineness of the 
apology being tendered. 
97. Some of the fundamentals for accepting the apology can be 
enumerated as: 
(a) The apology must be offered at the earlier stage of the 
contempt proceedings and may not be postponed till fag-
end of the proceedings. 
(b) The apology must be unconditional, unreserved and 
unqualified. 
(c) The apology should not only appear but must also 
satisfactorily represent sincere and genuine remorse and 
should not be half-hearted or mere formality.  
(d) The contemnor should not endeavour to justify his 
conduct”.    
 
I.C.A. No.7/2018 
8
12. 
 
In the circumstances, notwithstanding the fact that the apology 
tendered by the appellant does not meet the required standard laid down by this 
Court or lacks bona fide, we are of the view that the contempt committed by the 
appellant is so grave that the apology is not sufficient to purge the contempt. 
 
13. 
 
On merits, learned counsel for the appellant, without denying or 
disputing the contents of the speeches as reproduced above, contends that the 
proceedings initiated on the basis of such utterances are in gross violations of 
Article 19 of the Constitution which guarantees freedom of speech to the citizen. 
Therefore, the appellant should not be punished under the Ordinance of 2003. 
14. 
 
The right to freedom of speech and expression as guaranteed under 
Article 19 of the Constitution admittedly is not absolute, unlimited or unfettered but 
subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by the law and one such restriction so 
imposed is in relation to the contempt of Court. The protective cover so provided to 
freedom of speech and expression cannot be stretched to cover a speech, comment 
or publication which may tend to influence, impede, embarrass or obstruct the 
administration of justice, scandalizes the Court and brings the Hon’ble Judges of 
this Court into hatred, ridicule or contempt. The argument justifying offending 
remarks used against the judiciary by taking the shield of freedom of speech and 
expression as guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution was considered and 
turned down by the three-Member Bench of this Court in the order impugned by 
holding that:- 
“It is undeniable that every citizen has been conferred right of 
freedom of speech and expression and such right has been 
conferred in Article 19 of the Constitution, which is one of the 
fundamental right provided in Para-II of the Constitution. 
However, such freedom of speech and expression given to every 
citizen has been made subject to reasonable restrictions imposed 
by law in the interest of the glory of Islam or the integrity, 
security or defence of Pakistan or any part thereof, friendly 
relations with the foreign States, public order, decency or 
I.C.A. No.7/2018 
9
morality, or in relation to contempt of Court, [commission of] or 
incitement of an offence. Thus it is apparent that contempt of 
Court is one of the law to which the fundamental right of every 
citizen to freedom of speech and expression has been subjected 
to. In exercising the fundamental right of freedom of speech and 
freedom of expression, if a citizen impinges upon and 
transgresses the reasonable restrictions of law of contempt of 
Court, he will make himself culpable and liable to be proceeded 
against under the contempt of Court Law. The rationale of 
imposition of conditions on freedom of speech and expression as 
underlined by the Constitution itself is that the citizens while 
exercising such right have to maintain decency and decorum and 
not in a manner, which will infringe upon the rights of other 
citizens or transgress the mandate of law in relation to the 
working of State Institutions. Further the rationale of making of 
law of contempt by the Constitution itself and by promulgation of 
the Ordinance is as a matter of public policy to secure the law of 
the land which it is the duty of the Court to uphold and to secure 
the judges and the Court from being scandalized into hatred or 
ridicule. The contempt law thus is meant basically to maintain 
the efficacy of the Courts of justice and to secure public 
confidence in the administration of justice”.    
 
15. 
 
The reasoning reproduced above appears to be in consonance with the 
consistent view of this Court taken by a five-Member Bench in the case of Syed 
Masroor Ahsan (supra), again followed in number of cases including in the case of 
Baz Muhammad Kakar (supra), in the following terms:- 
“Fundamental 
rights 
wherever 
exercised, 
impose 
corresponding restrictions for ensuring protection of collective 
benefit and safety including preservation of the society and its 
morals. Absolute liberty of an individual for doing what he 
pleases even with regard to innocent matters can sometimes be 
detrimental. Therefore, object of the exercise of rights should be 
subservient to common good. Observations made in Atkin v. 
Children Hospital (1923) 261 US 555) can be referred. Bare 
perusal of Article 19 of the Constitution postulates reasonable 
I.C.A. No.7/2018 
10 
restraints whereby citizen while exercising his right of freedom 
of speech or  expression and freedom of Press is prohibited to 
conduct himself in any manner which may violate security or 
defence of Pakistan or part thereof, or could affect friendly 
relations with Foreign States, in the same way citizen under 
freedom clause is bound to ensure that his freedom does not 
strike against public order, decency or morality or provisions 
regarding contempt of Court. The right of freedom further 
prohibits incitement of citizen for committing any offence. 
Therefore, owning the responsibility of honouring the dictates 
of Constitution the Supreme Law of the country firmly embodied 
in Article 19 of the Constitution, every citizen while making 
speech, expressing himself or causing publication in the press is 
obligated to refrain from all such acts which may be calculated 
to constitute contempt of Court. For emphasis we may impress 
upon normal circumstance, which under the Constitution 
disdains 
immoral, 
indecent, 
anti-State, 
or 
un-Islamic 
Publications, expressions or speeches. It equally creates an 
obligation for the citizen, while exercising his right to ensure 
that his comment with regard to conduct of a Judge or the 
Court should not be violative of law. From scrutiny of the 
precedent case-law and all relevant factors coupled with 
fundamental rights, the Authors of editorial/articles, Publishers, 
Editors of newspapers or journals or Advocates have bounden 
duty to avoid from using strikingly pungent language which 
smacks of loud bitterness or aimed at emitting intemperate 
expression 
or 
abnormal 
understanding 
suggesting 
scandalization of the Court or cause obstruction to the 
impartial administration of justice”. 
16. 
 
Examining the offending speeches on the touch stone of the law laid 
down by this Court in the judgments cited above, we are of the considered view 
that the offending speeches impinge upon and transgress the bench mark of 
reasonable restriction imposed by the Constitution itself as well as the law on the 
subject. The appellant in fact has crossed the boundary of decency and morality by 
a calculated move with an aim to obstruct and diminish the administration of justice 
I.C.A. No.7/2018 
11 
and, therefore, he cannot be allowed to escape the consequences by pleading 
freedom of speech and expression.  
17. 
 
It was next contended that the charge so framed was defective as it 
did not contain the contents of the public speeches dated 24.1.2018 and 27.1.2018 
and, therefore, no punishment could be imposed upon the appellant on the basis of 
such defective charge. The contention needs examination of the record which 
reflects that the contents of the offending speeches were brought to the notice of the 
Hon’ble Chief Justice by the learned Registrar of this Court on 1.2.2018 through a 
written note. The Hon’ble Chief Justice of Pakistan on the same day constituted a 
Bench and directed the Office to list the matter for hearing on 6.2.2018. 
Accordingly notices were issued. The appellant effected appearance on 6.2.2018 
when the Court examined the transcript of the offending speeches dated 24.1.2018 
and 27.1.2018 made by the appellant and after finding the speeches derogatory, 
initiated proceedings under Article 204 of the Constitution read with Section 5 of 
the Ordinance of 2003 and directed issuance of show cause notice. In consequent to 
the show cause notice, appellant effected his personal appearance on 13.2.2018 and 
requested for time to engage a counsel. The matter was adjourned to 19.2.2018 and 
on that date the appellant’s counsel sought time to furnish response to the show 
cause notice and ultimately furnished such response on 22.2.2018. Per record, when 
the case had came up for hearing on 26.2.2018, the appellant himself appeared and 
on his request, he was allowed to examine the transcript containing contemptuous 
speeches which was already annexed with the paper books supplied to him. Again 
on 6.3.2018 when the case came up for hearing, the learned Sr. ASC for the 
appellant stated that though he has gone through the transcript of the offending 
speeches but he has not been provided a compact disk wherein such offending 
speeches were recorded. The C.D. (Compact Disc) was accordingly provided to the 
appellant and the matter was adjourned to 8.3.2018. On the said date, the response 
submitted by the appellant was examined and the matter was placed for framing of 
I.C.A. No.7/2018 
12 
charge on 14.3.2018. The charge was accordingly framed and read over to the 
appellant which specifically stated the making of offending speeches by the 
appellant on 24.1.2018 and 27.1.2018. 
18. 
 
No doubt the contents of the speeches were not reproduced in the 
charge but it is not the case that the appellant was misled or prejudiced on account 
of such omission. We have even repeatedly asked the appellant who was present in 
person as well as his counsel about the prejudice if any caused to the appellant on 
account of not detailing the speeches in the charge. However, they were not able to 
point out any prejudice caused to the appellant as throughout the appellant knew 
the derogatory utterances made by him leading to the initiation of the instant 
proceedings. Additionally, the appellant in his statement under Section 342 Cr.P.C. 
was confronted and his response was sought on the derogatory utterances. Though 
he admitted that he made such statement in his speech and press talk but according 
to him, these were edited and do not contain reference to the context. However, no 
explanation was provided as to the editing or the context in which such derogatory 
utterances were made. Even the C.D. containing the audio and visual recording of 
the derogatory speeches was played in open court to seek a possible explanation 
from the appellant, however, the appellant or his counsel had no answer but to take 
refuge of seeking an unconditional apology. The apology patently lacks remorse 
and sincerity and is being tendered to avoid consequences without showing lack of 
intent to malign the Court or any of the Hon’ble Judges. The contemnor has tried to 
explain away and justify his actions and has tendered an apology only as a matter 
of abundant caution and as a fall back. Such an apology cannot be accepted. 
Further, it has been settled by this Court in a number of cases, that since there is no 
yardstick available to fix the essential factors which a charge must contain, 
therefore, an omission or defect in charge which does not mislead or prejudice the 
right of the accused could be regarded as material and made the basis to vitiate a 
trial on the ground of error or omission in framing charge, it does not even make a 
I.C.A. No.7/2018 
13 
case of remand. Reference can readily be made to the case of Nadir Shah vs. the 
State (1980 SCMR 402), S.A. K. Rehmani vs. the State (2005 SCMR 364), M 
Younus Habib vs. the State (PLD 2006 SC 153) and Malik Muhammad Mumtaz 
Qadri vs. the State (PLD 2016 SC 17). The argument, therefore, fails.      
19. 
 
Additionally, the record reflects that the appellant in his Section 342 
Cr.P.C. statement refused examination under oath to show his bona fide and to explain 
what exactly he meant by such utterances. At this juncture, we may reiterate that the 
proceedings for contempt of Court are sui generis in their nature and being unique and one 
of a kind, contain some elements of both civil and criminal trial. Therefore, the principle 
of criminal trial that the burden of proof barring few exceptions never shifts to the 
accused, has hardly any application. In such cases once the prosecution has brought on 
record all the incriminating and contemptuous material attributed to the alleged contemnor 
and confronted to him while recording his statement under Section 342 Cr.P.C., then the 
burden shifts to the alleged contemnor to prove his innocence by showing his bona 
fide and proving that the offending statement was never meant to undermine the 
authority or obstruct/embarrass the administration of justice. The appellant has 
failed miserably in discharging that burden. The impugned order takes note of all 
pleas and defences taken by the Appellant and gives elaborate reasons for 
discarding the same. The learned counsel for the Appellant has not been able to 
show any legal, procedural or jurisdictional defect, error or flaw in the impugned 
order that may warrant any interference in the impugned order.  
20. 
 
In the end, it was halfheartedly contended that the list of the witnesses 
provided by the prosecution did not contain the summary/gist of the evidence to be 
adduced by such witness, however,  the  learned  counsel  could not point out any statute 
or  case  law  in  support  of  his  contention.  To  our  mind,  the  only  law  which 
requires mentioning  of  gist/summary  of  facts against the name of every witness 
which he would depose is Section 7(2) of the Family Court Act,  1964  which  
provides  that the plaint to be accompanied by a Schedule giving the number of 
witnesses intended to be produced in support of the plaint, the name and addresses 
I.C.A. No.7/2018 
14 
of the witnesses and brief summary of the facts to which they would depose. This 
being a provision of Special Law and of course is applicable to the category of 
cases provided therein. Even the study of case law on the subject would show that 
the requirement laid down by Section 7(2) of the Act 1964 is only directory in 
nature as instead of providing penal consequences for its non-compliance, it 
specifically through second proviso empowers the Court to permit the parties to call 
any witness at any later stage if the Court considers that the evidence of such 
witness is in the interest of justice.   
21. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, this Intra Court Appeal is found meritless 
and, therefore, dismissed.   
 
Chief Justice 
 
 
Judge 
 
Judge 
 
Judge 
 
 
Judge 
Islamabad 
October 09, 2018 
Approved for reporting 
A. Rehman/