SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN 
(Appellate Jurisdiction) 
 
 
PRESENT: 
Mr. Justice Gulzar Ahmed 
Mr. Justice Yahya Afridi 
 
 
Civil Petition Nos.4719, 4752-4759, 4791-4795 of 2017 
[on appeal against Order dated 17.10.2017 passed by the Lahore High Court, 
Rawalpindi Bench in Writ Petitions No.2803 to 2806 & 3000 to 3002 of 2014 
and 303 to 309 of 2015] 
 
 
Phoenix Security (Pvt) Limited 
[in all cases] 
…Petitioner(s) 
 
 
VERSUS 
Pir Muhammad & others 
[in CP.4719&4759] 
Nabi Ahmed & others 
[in CP.4752] 
Muhammad Arif & sons  
[in CP.4753&4793] 
Muhammad Abdullah & others 
[in CP.4754&4791] 
Noor Khan & others 
[in CP.4755&4794] 
Muhammad Afzal & others 
[in CP.4756&4795] 
Nabi Ahmed & others 
[in CP.4757] 
Amjad Hussain & others 
[in CP.4758&4792] 
 
…Respondent(s) 
 
 
For the Petitioner(s) 
[in all cases] 
: Mr. Shahid Anwar Bajwa, ASC 
 
  
For Respondent No.1 
(in all cases) 
: Mr. Abdul Rehman Qadir, ASC 
Kh. Muhammad Arif, ASC 
Mr. Muhammad Sharif Janjua, AOR 
 
  
Date of Hearing 
: 30.04.2019 
 
  
 
  
JUDGMENT 
 
 
GULZAR AHMED, J.— By these Civil Petitions for 
leave to appeal, the petitioner-Phoenix Security (Private) Limited 
has challenged the order dated 17.10.2017, passed by the learned 
Judge in Chambers of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench 
by which the writ petitions filed by the petitioner were dismissed, 
while writ petitions filed by the private respondents were allowed 
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by setting aside the judgment of the Punjab Labour Appellate 
Tribunal dated 18.09.2014 and restoring/maintaining the decision 
of the Labour Court dated 14.09.2012.   
2. 
 
The facts of the matter are that the private 
respondents (the respondents) were employed by the petitioner as 
Security Guards.  They all retired on attaining the age of 
superannuation.  The dispute arose between the petitioner and the 
respondents regarding final settlement of their dues pursuant to 
which the respondents filed their respective application under 
Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, before the Authority 
under the said Act, wherein they claimed various dues as unpaid 
wages. These applications were contested by the petitioner before 
the Authority. The evidence was recorded and ultimately vide order 
dated 13.02.2012, the Authority allowed the claims of the 
respondents for unpaid wages. The petitioner filed appeal against 
this order of the Authority before the Labour Court , which after 
hearing the appeal vide its judgment dated 14.09.2012 modified 
the order of the Authority and decreased the amount of unpaid 
wages payable to the respondents. Not being content, the petitioner 
filed revision petitions before the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal 
(Appellate Tribunal). The said revision petitions were heard and 
thereafter the Appellate Tribunal passed the judgment dated 
18.09.2014, whereby further relief was granted to the petitioner 
and the amount of unpaid wages payable to the respondents was 
further reduced. Against this judgment of the Appellate Tribunal 
both the petitioner as well as the respondents filed writ petitions 
before the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench. All the 
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aforementioned writ petitions were heard and decided by the 
impugned order dated 17.10.2017, passed by the learned Single 
Judge by which as noted above the writ petitions filed by the 
petitioner were dismissed while the writ petitions filed by the 
respondents were allowed by maintaining the judgment of the 
Labour Court.  
3. 
 
We have heard the arguments of the learned counsel 
for the parties at substantial length and have also gone through 
the record of the case with their assistance. We have also gone 
through the case law relied upon by both the learned counsel for 
the parties. 
4. 
 
It may be noted that while the Authority under the 
Payment of Wages Act has determined a number of claims of the 
respondents as unpaid wages and found them to be payable by the 
petitioner to the respondents, but before us learned counsel for 
both the parties conceded that except for two items of respondents’ 
claim, all other claims of the respondents towards unpaid wages 
stand resolved as the petitioner has paid such unpaid wages and 
even the amount of Rs.25,000/- as additional compensation has 
also been paid to the respondents. The two items that were 
agitated before us and on which decision was sought by the 
learned counsel for the parties is with regard to payment of wages 
for weekly holidays and also for overtime. The claim of the 
respondents is that they have been paid wages for weekly holidays 
and also overtime but not at double the rate of wages, which is 
provided in the West Pakistan Shops & Establishments Ordinance, 
1969 (Ordinance, 1969). 
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5. 
 
Learned counsel for the petitioner at the very outset 
contended that the petitioner is a commercial establishment, 
where it employs 20 or more workmen and the service benefits to 
be paid to its workmen are those which are provided in the 
Industrial 
and 
Commercial 
Employment 
(Standing 
Orders) 
Ordinance, 1968 (Ordinance, 1968) and such service benefits are 
being paid under this Ordinance to its workmen. He also 
contended that the Ordinance of 1968 does not contain any 
provision for requiring payment of wages for weekly holidays nor 
does it contain any provision requiring payment of overtime. He 
further contends that both the items i.e. ‘weekly holidays’ and 
‘overtime’ being not provided in the Ordinance, 1968, thus the rate 
of wages payable for weekly holidays and overtime is also not 
provided in the Ordinance of 1968. He also contended that the very 
term wages has not been defined in the Ordinance, 1968. However, 
the rates of wages in terms of Standing Order 5 of the Schedule to 
the Ordinance of 1968 were duly specified and respondents never 
challenged such rates of wages so specified until their retirement 
on attaining the age of superannuation. He further contended that 
the respondents have based their claim in terms of the Ordinance 
of 1969, which Ordinance is not applicable to the respondents and 
for this he read before us the provision of Section 5(1) (ix) of the 
Ordinance, 1969. He contended that Section 5 of the Ordinance of 
1969 lays down the list, which enumerates the establishments and 
persons to whom the Ordinance shall not apply and item (ix) ibid 
excludes persons employed as “watchman”. He contended that the 
respondents were admittedly employed as Security Guards and as 
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Security Guards they were doing the work of a watchman and thus 
were excluded from the application of the Ordinance of 1969. In 
support of his submissions learned counsel for the petitioner has 
relied upon the case of Zain Packaging Industries Limited, Karachi 
vs. Abdul Rashid and 2 others (1994 SCMR 2222). 
6. 
 
On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the 
respondents contended that the respondents were Security Guards 
and not watchmen and thus were not excluded from the 
application of the Ordinance, 1969. He further contended that for 
the payment of wages, the respondents were entitled to have their 
wages calculated, as per the term wages defined in the Payment of 
Wages Act, 1936 and the term ‘wages’ as defined therein includes 
payment of wages for ‘weekly holidays as well as ‘overtime’ wages 
and the rate applicable would be that as provided in the 
Ordinance, 1969. He also relied upon the Standing Order 8 of the 
schedule to the Ordinance of 1968, to contend that this Standing 
Order also provides for payment of wages for weekly holidays and 
also overtime wages at double the rate of wages. In support of his 
submission he has relied upon the cases of Aurangzaib vs. 
Medipak (Pvt.) Ltd. and others (2018 SCMR 2027), General 
Manager, Pakistan Railways and another vs. Anwar Ahmed Khan 
and others (1995 SCMR 810) and the General Newspaper 
Employees Union, Karachi vs. M/s General Newspaper (Private) 
Limited, Karachi (1993 PLC 428). Learned counsel for the 
respondents further argued that the very writ petitions filed by the 
petitioner before the High Court were not maintainable for that 
they were not verified and signed by the competent official i.e. 
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General Manager (North). To this last submission of the learned 
counsel for the respondents, the learned counsel for the petitioner 
has contended that in the title of the writ petition the word General 
Manager (North) was erroneously mentioned but actually, the 
Company’s Resolution dated 17.05.2013 authorized Manager 
Administration and IR to file the writ petition and not the General 
Manager. He contended that the writ petition as also the affidavit 
in its support was signed by Mr. Mehboob Alam Siddiqui, who was 
the Manager Administration and IR and such has been specifically 
mentioned in the said affidavit. At the outset we have looked at 
this very aspect of the matter and have found that the Resolution 
authorizing filing of writ petition was in favour of Manager 
Administration and IR and in fact it was the Manager 
Administration and IR, who has signed the writ petition and also 
the affidavit in support of the said writ petition, thus this objection 
of the learned counsel for the respondents does not hold much 
weight and the same is answered in negative.  
7. 
 
At the outset we may take up the point argued by the 
learned counsel for the petitioner that the very Ordinance of 1969 
was not applicable to the respondents, who were employed as 
watchmen. In this regard it will be pertinent to mention here the 
provision of Section 5 (1)(ix) of the said Ordinance, which reads as 
follows: - 
 
“5.  
Ordinance 
not 
applicable 
to 
certain 
establishments and persons. (1) Nothing in this 
Ordinance shall apply to---- 
(i) 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
(ii) 
 ----------------------------------------------------------- 
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(iii) 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
(iv) 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
(v) 
 ----------------------------------------------------------- 
(vi) 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
(vii) 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
(viii) ------------------------------------------------------------ 
(ix) 
Any person employed as manager, travelling 
agent, canvasser, messenger, watchman, care-taker or 
conservancy staff or any person employed exclusively 
in connection with the collections, dispatch, delivery, 
and conveyance of, or custom formalities on goods.” 
[emphasis supplied] 
 
8. 
 
The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner 
is that person employed as watchman in fact performs the work of 
a Security Guard and in any case the term Security Guard and 
watchman are synonymous in that its meaning and work is one 
and the same. In order to understand such submission of the 
learned counsel for the petitioner, which obviously as noted above 
is disputed by the learned counsel for the respondents, we have 
examined the Ordinance of 1969 to find definition of the term 
‘watchman’ but such definition is not available in the said 
Ordinance. No other definition of the word ‘watchman’ was referred 
to us by either of the counsel for the parties, which perhaps may 
be found in any of the labour laws. In the absence of the definition 
of term ‘watchman’ in the very Ordinance of 1969 and in any other 
law, to ascertain its meaning resort has to be made to the 
dictionary meaning and in this regard reference is made to the 
Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, where the term ‘watchman’ 
has been given the following meaning: - 
 
“Watchman. One whose general duties consist of 
guarding, patrolling, and overseeing a building, group 
of building, or other property.” 
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Furthermore the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, New 
8th Edition, has given the meaning of ‘watchman’ and it is as 
follows: - 
 
“Watchman. A man whose job is to guard a building, 
for example a bank, an office building or a factory, 
especially at night.”  
 
 
In the Oxford Thesaurus of English Third Edition, the word 
‘watchman’ has been given the following meaning: - 
 
“Watchman.  Security guard, security man, guard, 
custodian, 
doorman; 
caretaker, 
janitor, 
superintendant, warden, steward, curator.” 
 
9. 
 
On reading of the above meanings given by the three 
dictionaries, the common feature of it is that it is defined by its 
nature of duties and in all three dictionaries the duty of watchman 
has been given that of guarding, patrolling and overseeing the 
building, group of buildings or other property or a man whose job 
is to guard a building, for example, a Bank, an office building or a 
factory, especially at night and in the Oxford Thesaurus of English 
Dictionary a ‘watchman’ has been given a meaning that of security 
guard, security man, guard, custodian, doorman, caretaker, 
janitor, superintendant, warden, steward, curator. Thus in all the 
three meanings given in the noted dictionaries the word ‘guard’ is 
common and in our view the term ‘watchman’ will include a 
security guard, as both the terms, watchman and security guard, 
are synonymous to each other and in the nature of their duties 
also. It is an admitted fact that respondents were employed as 
security guards and by the very nature of their duties they were 
working as a watchman, which term is synonymous to that of a 
9-C.P.Nos.4719, 4752-4759, 4791-4795 of 2017 
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security guard and by virtue of the expressed provision of Section 
5(1)(ix) ibid, the respondents apparently stand excluded from the 
application of the Ordinance of 1969 and thus they cannot claim 
any benefit provided in the said Ordinance.  
10. 
 
Learned counsel for the respondents has argued that 
the term wages, as defined in the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (the 
Act of 1936), includes the wages payable for weekly holidays so 
also overtime wages at double the rate of wages. It will be 
advantageous here to reproduce the definition of term ‘Wages’ as 
given in the Act of 1936, which is as follows: - 
“(vi) “wages” means all remuneration, capable of being 
expressed in terms of money, which would, if the terms of 
the contract of employment, express or implied, were 
fulfilled, be payable, whether conditionally upon the 
regular 
attendance, 
good 
work 
or 
conduct 
or 
other behaviour of the person employed or otherwise, to a 
person employed in respect of his employment or of work 
done in such employment and includes any bonus or 
other additional remuneration of the nature aforesaid 
which would be so payable and any sum payable to such 
person by reason of the termination of his employment, 
but does not include: 
(a)  the value of any house-accommodation, supply of 
light, water, medical attendance or other amenity, or of 
any service excluded by general or special order of 
the Government 
(b) * * * * 
(c)  any travelling allowance or the value of any 
travelling concession; 
(d) any sum paid to the person employed to defray 
special expenses entailed on him by the nature of his 
employment; or 
(e) * * * *” 
 
11. 
 
The perusal of the definition of wages as given in the 
Act of 1936 apparently shows that it means all remuneration, 
capable of being expressed in terms of money, which would, if the 
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terms of the contract of employment, express or implied, were 
fulfilled, 
be 
payable, 
whether 
conditionally 
upon 
regular 
attendance, good work or conduct or other behaviour of the person 
employed or otherwise, to a person employed in respect of his 
employment or of work done in such employment and includes any 
bonus or other additional remuneration of the nature aforesaid 
which would be so payable and any sum payable to such person 
by reason of the termination of his employment. Although the 
definition of the term ‘wages’ as defined in the Act, is 
comprehensive and inclusive of all types of remuneration capable 
of being expressed in terms of money, which would, if the terms of 
the contract of employment, express or implied, is fulfilled, be 
payable to the employee. This will in our view include the wages for 
weekly holidays and also overtime wages but the difficulty which is 
apparent is that the Act does not provide the rate at which wages 
of weekly holidays or overtime have to be paid and for that the only 
thing referred to by this definition is that of a contract of 
employment. The respondents have not shown any contract of 
employment where provision may have been made for payment to 
them wages of weekly holidays and overtime wages at double the 
rate of wages. Earlier we have also noted that the employer is 
required to publish the rate of wages in term of Standing Order 5 
of the Schedule to the Ordinance of 1968 and even the 
respondents have not been able to demonstrate or show to us that 
such publication of rate of wages provided for payment of weekly 
holidays and overtime wages at double the rate of wages. The 
respondents, as is apparent from the record, have performed work 
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on weekly holidays and have also performed overtime work but in 
the very evidence they have admitted that they have been paid 
wages for these weekly holidays so also overtime wages. Even 
otherwise in the case of Zain Packaging Industries Limited (Supra) 
a three member bench of this Court while examining the term 
wages appearing in the Standing Order 12(6) of the Schedule to the 
Ordinance of 1968, has specifically held as follows: - 
 
 
“From the preceding discussion, it follows that 
'wages' have been defined differently in various 
statutes relating to labour matters keeping in view the 
object of each legislation. Therefore, the definition of 
'wages' given in one statute cannot be called in aid to 
interpret the provisions of another statute unless the 
two statutes are in pari materia or the legislature has 
expressly provided that the words and expressions 
defined in one statute shall have the same meaning in 
the other statute. The word ' wages' has not been 
defined in the Ordinance. The legislature has also not 
provided that the 'wages' will have the same meaning 
as defined in the Act. In these circumstances, the word 
'wages' used in Standing Order 12(6) of the Ordinance 
could not be interpreted with the help of definition of 
'wages' as given in the Act. The word 'wages' therefore, 
has to be interpreted according to its ordinary 
meaning. In its ordinary sense 'wages' would include 
all payments made to a workman by his employer on a 
regular and permanent basis periodically in lieu of his 
services. As a corollary, therefore, payments made to a 
workman which are contingent in nature would not 
form part of the 'wages'. Therefore, in order to 
determine whether a particular payment received by a 
workman is part of his wages, it is necessary to 
ascertain the nature of such payment. The fact that 
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the payment made to a workman is described as an 
allowance of one kind or the other is not a 
determinative factor to make such payment or to 
exclude it from being treated as part of the 'wages'. If a 
workman 
is 
receiving 
certain 
payments 
on 
a 
permanent basis, regularly, not dependent upon any 
contingency or existence or otherwise of certain 
conditions, then notwithstanding the fact that such 
payment may be described as an allowance of some 
kind, will be treated as part of his wages. However, if it 
can be shown that certain payments made to a 
workman are dependent on existence of certain 
contingency or conditions and such payments could 
be discontinued when the contingency or the condition 
disappear, the payment cannot be treated as part of 
the 'wages' of the workman. Therefore, the question 
whether a particular payment to the workman is part 
of his wages' or not is to be decided with reference to 
the facts and evidence in each case.’ 
 
Thus, the very definition of the term wages, as given in the 
Act of 1936 in terms of the judgment as noted above, could not be 
taken into consideration while dealing with the payment of wages 
to the employees working under the Ordinance of 1968. 
12. 
 
Learned counsel for the respondents has heavily relied 
upon the provision of Standing Order 8 of the Schedule to the 
Ordinance of 1968 to contend that under this provision also the 
respondents are entitled to payment of wages for weekly holidays 
and overtime wages at double the rate of wages and in this regard 
has made reference to the cases of Aurangzaib (supra), Anwar 
Ahmed Khan (supra) and the General Newspaper Employees Union, 
Karachi (supra), but incidentally none of the cited judgments deal 
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with the question that has been raised by the learned counsel for 
the respondents before us. However, in order to fully appreciate the 
argument of the learned counsel for the respondents, the provision 
of Standing Order 8 of the Schedule to the Ordinance of 1968 is 
reproduced below: - 
 
“8. 
Leave.—(1) Holidays and leave with pay shall be 
allowed as hereinafter specified: - 
(a) 
annual holidays, festival holidays casual leave 
and sick leave as provided for in Chapter IVA of 
the Factories Act, 1934 (XXV of 1934); and  
(b) 
other holidays in accordance with the law, 
contract, custom and usage. 
2. 
……………………………..”  
 
13. 
 
The Standing Order 8(1) ibid, as has been reproduced 
above, deals with the subject of leave and it provides that holidays 
and leave with pay shall be allowed as specified therein i.e. annual 
holidays, festival holidays, casual leave and sick leave as provided 
in Chapter IVA of the Factories Act, 1934 (the factories Act) and 
other holidays in accordance with law, contract, custom and 
usage. So for as the first item dealt with by Standing Order 8 ibid 
is concerned, it is in respect of annual holidays, festival holidays, 
causal leave and sick leave, as is provided in Chapter IVA of the 
Factories Act. As reference to Chapter IVA of the Factories Act has 
been made, we have gone through such Chapter and for ease of 
reference it is reproduced as follows: 
“Chapter IV-A - Holiday with Pay 
49-A. Application of Chapter. - (1) The provisions of 
this Chapter shall not apply to a seasonal factory.  
(2) 
The provisions of this Chapter shall not operate 
to the prejudice of any rights to which a worker may 
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be entitled under any other enactment, or under the 
terms of any award, agreement or contract of service. 
49-B. Annual holidays. - (1) Every worker who has 
completed a period of twelve months continuous 
service in a factory shall be allowed, during the 
subsequent period of twelve months holidays for a 
period of fourteen consecutive days, inclusive of the 
day or days, if any, on which he is entitled to a holiday 
under sub-section (1) of section 35.  
(2) 
If a worker fails in any one such period of twelve 
months to take the whole of the holidays allowed to 
him under sub-section (1), any holidays not taken by 
him shall be added to the holidays to be allowed to 
him under sub-section (1) in the succeeding period of 
twelve months, so however that the total number of 
holidays which may be carried forward to a succeeding 
period shall not exceed fourteen.  
(3) 
If a worker entitled to holidays under sub-
section (1) is discharged by his employer before he has 
been allowed the holidays, or if, having applied for and 
having been refused the holidays, he quits his 
employment before he has been allowed the holidays, 
the employer shall pay him the amount payable under 
section 49-C in respect of the holidays. 
Explanation. - A worker shall be deemed to have 
completed a period of twelve months continuous 
service in a factory notwithstanding any interruption 
in service during those twelve months brought about 
by 
sickness, 
accident 
or 
authorised 
leave 
not 
exceeding ninety days in the aggregate for all three, or 
by a lock-out, or by a strike which is not an illegal 
strike, or by intermittent periods of involuntary 
unemployment not exceeding thirty days in the 
aggregate; and authorised leave shall be deemed not to 
include any weekly holiday allowed under section 35 
which occurs at beginning or end of an interruption 
brought about by the leave. 
49-C. Pay during annual holiday. - Without prejudice 
to the conditions governing the day or days, if any, on 
which the worker is entitled to a holiday under sub-
section (1) of section 35, the worker shall, for the 
remaining days of the holidays allowed to him under 
section 49-B, be paid at a rate equivalent to the daily 
average of his wages as defined in the Payment of 
Wages Act, 1936 (IV of 1936), for the days on which he 
actually worked during the preceding three months, 
exclusive of any earning in respect of overtime.  
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49-D. Payment when to be made. - A worker who has 
been allowed holidays under section 49-B shall, before 
his holidays begin, be paid half the total pay due for 
the period of holidays. 
49-E. Power of Inspector to act for worker. - Any 
Inspector may institute proceedings on behalf of any 
worker to recover any sum required to be paid under 
this Chapter by an employer which the employer has 
not paid. 
49-F. Power to make rules. - (1) The Provincial 
Government may make rules to carry into effect the 
provisions of this Chapter.  
(2) 
Without prejudice to the generality of the 
foregoing power, rules may be made under this section 
prescribing the keeping by employers of registers 
showing such particulars as may be prescribed and 
requiring such registers to be made available for 
examination by Inspectors.  
49-G. Exemption of factories from the provisions of 
this Chapter. –  
Where the Provincial Government is satisfied that the 
leave rules applicable to workers in a factory provide 
benefits substantially similar to those for which this 
Chapter makes provision, it may, by written order 
exempt the factory from the provisions of this Chapter. 
49-H. Casual leave and sick leave. -  
(1) 
Every worker shall be entitled to casual leave 
with full pay for ten days in a year. 
(2) 
Every worker shall be entitled to sixteen days 
sick leave on half average pay in a year. 
49-I. Festival Holidays. - (1) 
Every worker shall be 
allowed holidays with pay on all days declared by the 
Provincial Government to be festival holidays. 
(2) 
A worker may be required to work on any festival 
holiday but one day's additional compensatory holiday 
with full pay and a substitute holiday shall be allowed 
to him in accordance with the provisions of section 
35.”  
 
This Chapter IVA in Section 49B deals with annual holidays, in 
Section 49C deals with pay during annual holidays, in Section 49D 
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deals with payment when to be made, in Section 49E empowers 
Inspector to act for worker, Section 49F gives powers to the 
Government to make rules, Section 49G provides for exemption of 
factories from the provisions of this Chapter, Section 49H deals 
with causal leave, sick leave and Section 49I deals with festival 
holidays.  Nowhere, in this Chapter, there is a provision for making 
payment of wages of weekly holidays or that of overtime, as it 
concerns itself only to the annual holidays, casual leave, sick leave 
and festival holidays.  The second item, i.e. clause (b) of Standing 
Order 8(1) ibid, provides other holidays in accordance with law, 
contract, custom and usage. In the evidence available on the 
record it is clear that the respondents were entitled to payment of 
wages for weekly holidays so also overtime wages in that such an 
assertion has been made by the respondents in their evidence and 
they have also stated that they have been paid wages by the 
petitioner for the work performed by them on weekly holidays and 
also they have been paid overtime wages. This assertion of the 
respondents in their evidence, in our view, could be considered as 
a contract between the petitioner and respondents or a custom and 
usage where the petitioner has been obtaining from the 
respondents work on weekly holidays and have also been paying to 
the respondents wages for the weekly holidays and similarly the 
petitioner has been obtaining from the respondents overtime work 
and at the same time has been paying wages to the respondents 
for such overtime.  The respondents, however, in their evidence 
have not stated anywhere that there was a contract between the 
petitioner and respondents or there was a custom or usage of 
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paying double the rate of wages by the petitioner to the 
respondents for working on weekly holidays or for overtime.  The 
respondents 
have, 
through 
their 
evidence, 
succeeded 
in 
establishing the fact of payment to them of wages by the petitioner 
for weekly holidays so also for overtime but at nowhere they have 
been able to establish the factum of the rate at which such wages 
were paid to them by the petitioner except the one which was 
actually paid by the petitioner to the respondents.  Thus, 
apparently there seems to be no non-compliance of the petitioner 
of Standing Order 8(1)(b) of the Schedule to the Ordinance of 1968 
for that wages for weekly holidays and overtime were paid by the 
petitioner to the respondents and they have accepted such 
payment without raising any objection while in service.  No law 
apart from the Ordinance of 1969 was relied upon by the learned 
counsel for the respondents for calculation of double the rate of 
wages and it has already been noted above that the Ordinance of 
1969 is not applicable to the respondents as they stand specifically 
excluded from its application and thus any benefit extended by the 
Ordinance of 1969, the petitioner in law will not be liable to pay 
the same to the respondents. No contract, custom or usage was 
either pleaded or asserted in the evidence by the respondents nor 
was any such thing shown to us by the learned counsel for the 
respondents, except what is asserted by the respondents in their 
evidence is that they worked on weekly holidays and wages for that 
was paid to them and that they worked overtime and overtime 
wages were paid to them. The rate of wages of the weekly holidays 
and the rate of overtime wages that is double the rate of wages, 
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was not established by the respondents in their evidence to be 
payable to them either by contract, custom or usage and thus in 
the absence of such evidence, we cannot assume that the 
petitioner was required to pay wages to the respondents for weekly 
holidays and overtime at double the rate of wages.  For doing so, 
the respondents ought to have established this factum either 
through contract, custom or usage, and none of these three items 
were at all proved. We have noted that the rate of wages was 
required to be published by the petitioner in terms of Standing 
Order 5 of the Schedule to the Ordinance of 1968 and it is not the 
case of respondents that such wages were not published by the 
petitioner.  The respondents by failing to produce such published 
rate of wages have not been able to establish that the rate so 
published contain in them the rate of wages for weekly holidays 
and overtime at double the rate of wages.  In any case it is not the 
case of the respondents that they have not been paid wages as was 
published by the petitioner in terms of Standing Order 5 ibid.  
14. 
 
From the over all discussion, as made above, it is 
amply established that the respondents have worked for weekly 
holidays and performed overtime work but at the same time they 
have been paid wages for both weekly holidays and overtime and 
that their case that they be paid double the rate of wages, the same 
apparently is not established on record nor the law provides for the 
same for that nothing was cited before us. Thus, the only 
conclusion we can reach is that the respondents were not entitled 
9-C.P.Nos.4719, 4752-4759, 4791-4795 of 2017 
- 19 - 
 
 
 
to claim wages for weekly holidays and overtime wages at double 
the rate of wages, as was claimed by them.  
15. 
 
The two questions posed to us have been answered 
with the finding that the respondents are not entitled to payment 
of wages for weekly holidays and overtime at double the rate of 
wages, as claimed by them.  Thus, the impugned order of the High 
Court to this extent is not sustainable. These petitions are, 
therefore, converted into appeals and are allowed to the extent that 
the impugned order of the High Court stands modified in that the 
respondents are not entitled to payment of wages for weekly 
holidays and overtime wages at double the rate of wages as 
claimed by them.  
 
    
 
 
 
 
JUDGE 
 
 
 
 
 
Bench-II 
ISLAMABAD 
APPROVED FOR REPORTING 
Rabbani*/ 
JUDGE 
 
 
 
 
Announced in open Court on 03.10.2019. 
 
 
 
 
    JUDGE