IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN 
(Original Jurisdiction) 
 
PRESENT: 
Mr. Justice Asif Saeed Khan Khosa, CJ 
Mr. Justice Mazhar Alam Khan Miankhel 
Mr. Justice Sajjad Ali Shah 
 
Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 200 of 2019 in 
Criminal Appeal No. 238-L of 2013 
(Notice in pursuance of the order passed by this Court on 
13.02.2019 in Criminal Appeal No. 238-L of 2013 to Police 
Constable Khizar Hayat son of Hadait Ullah on account of his false 
statement made before the trial court in a criminal case) 
 
 
In attendance: 
Mr. Ch. Nusrat Javed Bajwa, ASC along 
with Khizar Hayat, Police Constable in 
person. 
 
Mr. 
Ahmed 
Raza 
Gillani, 
Additional 
Prosecutor-General, Punjab 
 
Mr. Munir Ahmed, S.I.  
  
Date of hearing: 
04.03.2019 
 
 
ORDER 
 
 
Asif Saeed Khan Khosa, CJ.: While deciding Criminal 
Appeal No. 238-L of 2013 filed by Muhammad Ilyas convict this 
Court had passed the following judgment on 13.02.2019: 
 
“Asif Saeed Khan Khosa, CJ.:  Muhammad Ilyas 
appellant and some others had allegedly ambushed one 
Muhammad Asif at about 07.30 P.M. on 13.10.2007 in village 
Bathanwala in the area of Police Station Rayya Khas, District 
Narowal and had then fired at and killed him in the backdrop of a 
motive based upon a quarrel between the parties about one year 
prior to the present occurrence. With these allegations the 
appellant and his co-accused were booked in case FIR No. 152 
registered at the above mentioned Police Station during the same 
night and after a regular trial the appellant was convicted by the 
trial court for an offence under section 302(b), PPC and was 
sentenced to death and to pay compensation. The appellant 
challenged his conviction and sentence before the High Court 
through an appeal which was dismissed to the extent of his 
conviction for the offence under section 302(b), PPC but the same 
was partly allowed to the extent of his sentence of death which 
was reduced by the High Court to imprisonment for life. Hence, 
the present appeal by leave of this Court granted on 26.06.2013.  
 
Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 200 of 2019  
 
2
2. 
Leave to appeal had been granted in this case in order to 
reappraise the evidence and with the assistance of the learned 
counsel for the parties we have undertaken that exercise.  
 
3. 
The occurrence in this case had taken place during a 
night and a source of light had been mentioned in the FIR as well 
as in the site-plan of the place of occurrence but admittedly no 
such light or its source had been secured by the investigating 
agency. The ocular account of the incident in issue had been 
furnished before the trial court by Muhammad Boota complainant 
(PW7) and Khizar Hayat (PW8) who were very closely related to 
the deceased inasmuch as the complainant was a brother of the 
deceased whereas the other witness was a cousin of the deceased. 
Khizar Hayat (PW8) had been disbelieved by the High Court and 
his testimony had been ruled out of consideration because on the 
basis of some official record produced before the trial court it had 
been established that in his capacity as an official in the police 
department Khizar Hayat (PW8) was present on his duty at a 
Police Station situated in Lahore, i.e. hundreds of miles away 
from the place of occurrence. Muhammad Boota complainant 
(PW7) had stated in the FIR as well as in his statement before the 
trial court that at the relevant time he was going to see off Khizar 
Hayat (PW8) and another and was, thus, proceeding with them 
towards a bus stop. If presence of Khizar Hayat (PW8) at the 
relevant time had been disbelieved by the High Court then the 
very reason stated by the complainant for his availability at the 
scene of the crime at the relevant time had disappeared. This 
shows that even Muhammad Boota complainant (PW7) had no 
regard for the truth and he too was a planted witness. Instead of 
providing support to the ocular account the medical evidence had 
gone a long way in contradicting the complainant inasmuch as 
the seat of injury attributed to the present appellant in the FIR 
had been changed by the complainant in his statement made 
before the trial court. The duration between death and post-
mortem examination mentioned in the Post-mortem Examination 
Report showed that the murder in question could have taken 
place much prior to the stated time of occurrence. No time of 
death of the deceased had been mentioned in the Post-mortem 
Examination Report. In column No. 3 of the Inquest Report no 
time of death of the deceased becoming known had been 
mentioned. The motive set up by the prosecution had been found 
by the High Court not to have been proved. Nothing had been 
recovered from the appellant’s custody during the investigation of 
this case.  
 
4. 
For what has been discussed above a conclusion is 
inescapable that the prosecution had failed to prove its case 
against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. This appeal is, 
therefore, allowed, the conviction and sentence of the appellant 
are set aside and he is acquitted of the charge by extending the 
benefit of doubt to him. He shall be released from the jail 
forthwith if not required to be detained in connection with any 
other case. 
 
5. 
Before parting with this judgment we have found that 
Khizar Hayat (PW8) was at the time of the present incident 
serving as a Police Constable at Police Station Wahdat Colony, 
Lahore and he had claimed to have seen the present occurrence 
taking place at about 07.30 P.M. on 13.10.2007 in village 
Bathanwala in the area of Police Station Rayya Khas, District 
Narowal. Muhammad Waris, Moharrir/Head Constable (DW1) had 
appeared before the trial court and had produced official record of 
Police Station Wahdat Colony, Lahore quite categorically 
establishing that Khizar Hayat (PW8) was not on leave and was 
Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 200 of 2019  
 
3
present at his duty at Police Station Wahdat Colony, Lahore at 
the time when the present occurrence had taken place in the area 
of Police Station Rayya Khas, District Narowal. On the basis of 
the said record the High Court had categorically concluded that 
Khizar Hayat (PW8) could not be believed to be an eyewitness and 
such finding of the High Court has not been assailed by the 
complainant party or the State before this Court. It is, thus, 
obvious that Khizar Hayat (PW8) had deposed on oath falsely 
before the trial court and on the basis of his false testimony 
Muhammad Ilyas appellant had been sentenced to death by the 
trial court. These facts apparently attract the provisions of section 
194, PPC. Let a notice be issued to Khizar Hayat son of Hadait 
Ullah, caste Jat, resident of Gakhar Wali, Tehsil Pasrur, District 
Sialkot stated to be presently posted at Police Station Qilla Gujjar 
Singh, Lahore to appear before this Court on 04.03.2019 and to 
show as to why he may not be ordered to be proceeded against for 
commission of an offence under section 194, PPC. The Deputy 
Inspector-General of Police (Operations), Lahore is directed to 
ensure appearance of Khizar Hayat before this Court on the 
appointed date.” 
 
2. 
Today Khizar Hayat, who had appeared before the trial court 
as PW8, has appeared in person along with his learned counsel 
and they have tried to convince us that the statement made by 
Khizar Hayat before the trial court in connection with the above 
mentioned criminal case was a true statement and that he had not 
indulged in any falsehood. Paragraph No. 5 of the judgment passed 
by this Court and reproduced above, however, shows a different 
story. It appears that the said Khizar Hayat had deposed falsely in 
the trial of a criminal case in which Muhammad Ilyas accused had 
been convicted and was sentenced to death on the charge of 
murder. Through the above mentioned judgment this Court had 
acquitted the said convict of the charge after disbelieving the 
evidence produced by the prosecution against him, including the 
testimony of Khizar Hayat (PW8). As the said Khizar Hayat had 
ostensibly committed the offence of perjury attracting the 
provisions of section 194, PPC, therefore, the matter is referred to 
the learned District & Sessions Judge, Narowal for proceeding 
against Khizar Hayat in accordance with the law. 
 
3. 
While attending to this matter we have felt that the deeper 
issue involved in the matter relates to the fact that the rule falsus 
in uno, falsus in omnibus had in the past been held by the superior 
Courts of this country to be inapplicable to criminal cases in 
Pakistan which had gradually encouraged and emboldened 
Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 200 of 2019  
 
4
witnesses appearing in trials of criminal cases to indulge in 
falsehood and lies making it more and more difficult for the courts 
to discover truth and dispense justice. We have undertaken an 
exhaustive exercise so as to trace the history of the said rule and 
to understand how the jurisprudence around it has developed in 
Pakistan while also adverting to the relevant Islamic and legal 
provisions dealing with the subject. After a careful consideration of 
the history of the rule, the relevant Islamic provisions and the law 
of the land and after analysing the precedent case-law available on 
the subject we have come to the conclusion that the view that the 
rule is not to be applied to criminal cases in Pakistan was formed 
as a result of taking into account extraneous and practical 
considerations, rather than legal and jurisprudential, and the said 
view is not in accord with the Islamic provisions on the subject 
besides militating against the criminal law of this country 
according to which deposing falsely in a court and commission of 
perjury entail serious penal consequences. While coming to the 
said conclusion we first looked at the rule in its historical 
perspective, then traced through case-law as to how the rule was 
said to be not applicable in Pakistan and how it has been dealt 
with by this Court and lastly analysed the Islamic provisions 
relevant to the matter of giving false testimony. The following 
paragraphs deal with each of these heads turn by turn.  
 
Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus – Historical perspective 
 
4. 
Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is a Latin phrase meaning 
“false in one thing, false in everything.” The rule held that a 
witness who lied about any material fact must be disbelieved as to 
all facts1 because of the reason that the “presumption that the 
witness will declare the truth ceases as soon as it manifestly 
appears that he is capable of perjury” and that “Faith in a 
witness's testimony cannot be partial or fractional….”2 In its 
                                                
1 George Fisher, The Jury's Rise as Lie Detector, 107 Yale L.J. 654 (1997) 
2 Thomas Starkie, A Practical Treatise On The Law Of Evidence, 233 (Boston, 
Wells & Lilly) (1826) 
Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 200 of 2019  
 
5
original form, the rule was mandatory and the notion “was that the 
testimony of one detected in a lie was wholly worthless and must of 
necessity be rejected.”3 John Henry Wigmore, an American jurist 
who served as the Dean of Northwestern Law School from 1901 to 
1929, traced the rule to the Stuart treason trials of the late 17th 
century4. In Trial of Hampden (9 Howell's State Trials 1053, 1101 
(1684)), it was contended while referring to the rule of falsus in 
uno, falsus in omnibus that “If we can prove that what he hath said 
of my lord of Essex is false, he is not to be believed against the 
defendant.” In Trial of Langhom (7 Howell's State Trials 417, 478 
(1679)), it was argued that “If I can prove any one point (in answer 
to that which he hath given evidence) not to be true, then I conceive, 
my lord, he ought to be set aside.” Similarly, it finds mention in 
Trial of Coleman (7 Howell's State Trials I, 71 (1678)) that “[I]t 
would much enervate any man's testimony, to the whole, if he could 
be proved false in any one thing.” Barbara Shapiro, an American 
academic and author, notes that Michael Dalton's early 17th 
century manual for Justices of the Peace advised magistrates that 
when examining accused felons, they should discredit the whole of 
the accused’s story if any part proved false.5  
 
5. 
By the early nineteenth century English judges were telling 
juries that they might - but need not - disbelieve the entire 
testimony of a witness who had lied about a material fact.6 In the 
United States of America, however, the U.S. Supreme Court 
endorsed a mandatory form of the rule as late as 1822, as did 
some state courts well into the twentieth century. In the case of 
The Santissima Trinidad (20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 339 (1822)) it was 
held that when a witness tells a deliberate falsehood, the courts of 
justice are bound to apply the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in 
omnibus. In the famous O. J. Simpson murder trial the Judge in 
                                                
3 John Henry Wigmore, A Treatise On The Anglo-American System Of Evidence 
In Trials At Common Law (1940) 
4 John Henry Wigmore, A Treatise On The Anglo-American System Of Evidence 
In Trials At Common Law (1940) 
5 Barbara J. Shapiro, Beyond Reasonable Doubt and Probable Cause: Historical 
Perspectives on the Anglo-American Law of Evidence (1991) 
6 George Fisher, The Jury's Rise as Lie Detector, 107 Yale L.J. 655 (1997) 
Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 200 of 2019  
 
6
that case instructed the jurors that “[a] witness who is willfully 
false in one material part of his or her testimony is to be distrusted 
in others.”7 
 
False testimonies in the courts in India – An old menace 
 
6. 
In an article Truthful Character of Indian Witnesses (AIR 
1945 Journal 6) Thakur Prasad Dubey, M.A., LL.B., P.C.S. 
(Judicial), Farrukhabad had written about the unfortunate trend of 
false testimonies in courts in the undivided India. He had observed 
as follows:  
 
“It is a well-known fact that Judges even of the Highest Tribunals 
of the land have very often expressed their opinions that 
witnesses in India are greater liars than elsewhere and such an 
opinion yet continues to be entertained throughout the country 
by very many Judges. The Judicial Committee made the following 
observations in a very old case reported in 4 M.I.A. 431 [(1849) 4 
M.I.A. 431 (P.C.), Mudhoo Soodun Sundial v. Suroop Chunder 
Sirkar.] at p.441: 
 
“It is quite true that such is the lamentable 
disregard of truth prevailing among the native 
inhabitants of Hindustan that all oral evidence is 
necessarily received with great suspicion.” 
 
Their Lordships again affirmed their conviction in another case 
reported in 11 M.I.A. 177 [(’67) 11 M.I.A. 177 (P.C.), Wise v. 
Sunduloonissa Chowdhrance.] where it was said: 
 
“In a native case it is not uncommon to find a true 
case placed on a false foundation and supported in 
part by false evidence.” 
 
C. D. Field, an old eminent commentator of Law of Evidence, has 
the following to say on the point: 
 
“There would appear to be an opinion pretty 
generally prevalent that witnesses in India are 
more 
mendacious 
than 
witnesses 
in 
other 
countries and it has repeatedly been stated that 
Judges in India have a far more difficult task to 
perform than Judges in England in consequence of 
the untruthful nature of evidence with which they 
have to deal. (Introduction pp. 30-31, Edn. 8).” 
 
A somewhat familiar observation was made by a Bench of the 
Allahabad High Court in a recent murder case of Azamgarh about 
which there was some controversy in the press. Taylor has 
attempted to give reasons for such a general prevalence of 
falsehood. He says: 
 
“Thus it has been justly observed that a propensity 
to lying has always been more or less a peculiar 
                                                
7 California Jury Instructions, Criminal, Section 2.21.2 (West 1993) 
Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 200 of 2019  
 
7
feature in the character of an enslaved people – 
accustomed to oppression of every kind ……. It is 
little to be wondered at if a lie is often resorted to 
as a supposed refuge from punishment and that 
thus an habitual disregard is engendered.”  
 
He attributes this as one of the causes of the prevalence of the 
disregard for truth generally in India, among the peasants of 
Ireland and among the subjects of Czar (Taylor vol. I, Arts. 45 and 
53, Edn. 8.) It has been suggested in many quarters that on 
account of the growth of modern education this tendency towards 
falsehood has been checked and that there is not so much of 
perjury now as it was before the advent of British system of 
justice in this country. While it has to be conceded that perjury 
and falsehood among the litigants and witnesses in our law 
Courts has been on the increase ever since the establishment of 
Anglo Indian Courts the proposition that its tendency has been 
checked due to modern education does not seem to be warranted 
by the dictates of the experience of those who have been dealing 
with that class of people days after days and years after years. 
The class of people who have received College or University 
education constitute a drop in the ocean so far as population goes 
and that class is seldom seen in our law Courts as parties or 
witnesses.  
--------------------- 
As against this it cannot be denied that perjury in Indian Courts 
has gone on increasing and it has that increasing tendency even 
now. Historically the fact appears to be that after the 
establishment of Anglo-Indian Courts perjury started with the 
town and Bazar people. The honesty of the villagemen remained 
yet untouched for a considerable time. But the impregnable 
traditional honesty of the villagers seems to have begun to give 
way in law Courts in course of time and now we have the 
lamentable deterioration of that class as well.  
 
I do not know how it will strike my learned readers but to me it 
offers itself as a perplexing phenomenon that a race traditionally, 
religiously, culturally and historically honest should in the course 
of less than a century get itself so highly deteriorated in their 
virtues of truth. The causes thereof are not far to seek for those 
who have experiences of the functionings of our modern laws and 
law Courts. Have we pondered over the very common expression 
of our present day witnesses when while speaking of facts outside 
Courts they every day say “I will speak the truth here and will 
have no hesitation in telling the whole truth for it is not a Court.” 
And when they enter the court-room they are completely changed 
and will not have the slightest hesitation in telling the blackest of 
lies. The unravelling of this mystery will lead us to the discovery 
of the real causes of the fall of the moral of the Indian witnesses. 
They seem to feel that the Court is an alien body – a secular 
institution something different from themselves and their social 
and village environments, a place where truth can be mercilessly 
butchered with impunity without the latest compunction. Yet we 
have the counter picture that these witnesses will not easily tell a 
lie before even a Court arbitrator and will seldom tell a lie in a 
village panchait of villagemen. This is certainly a complex riddle 
and it is for the Legislators and thinkers of our land to solve it. 
Perjury is eating up the very vitals of our society and blackening 
the fair pages of our history.  
 
The most important part played for the demoralization of our 
witnesses has been that of the lawyers of the mufassil Courts and 
in some measure that of the mufassil Judges themselves. Our 
technical laws of proof of facts have equally contributed towards 
Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 200 of 2019  
 
8
that cause. It is through lawyers that witnesses pass before they 
appear before the Judge. If they tolerate perjuries and falsehoods 
and actively or passively by connivance or consent allow a false 
witness to state false facts the doors of perjury are flung wide 
apart. These processes being repeated in thousands of instances 
every day throughout the country at the hands of our educated 
Vakils will naturally make lying less odious and give it a sanction 
due to the position they occupy in society even to the hesitant 
and faltering. It is thus that the whole atmosphere of the law 
Courts is becoming nauseatingly intolerable. The over-crowding 
in the profession, the unhealthy spirit of competition, the growth 
of the power of the dominating influence of village barristers who 
can dictate terms for action and whose number has ever been 
increasing are all contributing towards the fall of the professional 
morality among our lawyers. And are not some of the Judges in 
the muffasils abettors of that misfeasance? Do we not often over-
emphasise the number and quantity of witnesses and pay lesser 
attention to more vital materials which can unearth the buried 
truth with greater certainties, I mean elements of circumstances, 
conducts, 
general 
probabilities, 
natural 
permissible 
presumptions, 
documentary 
pieces 
of 
evidence 
and 
the 
demeanour and ways of the delivery and behaviours of parties 
and the witnesses in the Court. Do not some of us bury our heads 
down and go on recording statements hours after hours 
regardless of what passes on in front of us? Do not some of us 
dismiss cases because witnesses on one side are larger in number 
than on the other? Lawyers have to cater to the standards of 
Judges. And do not some of the Courts of appeals in the mufassil 
make similar contributions towards that cause? I am firmly of the 
opinion that if Judges begin to detest false evidence and exercise 
their statutory powers to suppress it, the legal profession will 
shape its way differently. Which of us whether of the Bar or of the 
Bench does not feel that not even 10 percent of our present day 
witnesses make truthful contributions for finding correct facts. 
Yet the useless 90 percent will have to be put in and their 
conscience and those of others who are responsible for the 
conduct of the cases sacrificed. There has arisen a vicious circle 
in which every part is contributing its due share. The criminal law 
of perjury is for all purposes very seldom resorted to and very 
seldom successful. That is another cause which makes liars and 
perjurers bolder and more fearless.   
 
These facts are patent enough to attract the attention of the 
Leaders of the Community, the people who have powers to shape 
the State Policy. Man does not live by bread alone. Take away the 
man’s honesty and you reduce him to the position of a devil. 
Indian Society is in danger due to these increasing law Court 
perjuries and drastic all round measures are necessary to 
eradicate them. It needs the vigilance and the co-operation of all 
sections of people. After we have won the War this subject must 
form one of the most urgent and pressing items of the peace time 
progress. No price will be too high for it. Commissions may be set 
up to devise and recommend ways and means for restoring Indian 
honesty to its historical and traditional standard.”  
 
Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus – Applicability in Pakistan 
 
7. 
The rule was first held not to apply to cases in Pakistan in 
the case of Ghulam Muhammad and others v Crown (PLD 1951 
Lahore 66) and the judgment was authored by Muhammad Munir, 
Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 200 of 2019  
 
9
CJ. The case involved murder of five people for which thirteen 
persons were implicated by the complainant party out of whom ten 
were tried and resultantly nine were found guilty. At the trial two 
of the accused persons took the plea that they were not in the 
village at the time of occurrence and were actually locked up in a 
police station. The learned Additional Sessions Judge disbelieved 
the said plea and came to the conclusion that in fact the said 
accused persons took part in the occurrence. The High Court upon 
re-examining the evidence found that the reasons prevailing with 
the trial court were not borne out of the record and consequently it 
held that the said two accused persons were not present at the 
place of occurrence when the murders were committed. While 
considering the effect of that finding recorded by it the High Court 
observed as follows: 
 
“Now what is the effect of this finding on the prosecution case? If 
there had been no circumstances tending clearly to show that the 
witnesses saw the murders, it would have been our duty to hold, 
that because they named Muhammad and Rahmat, they did not 
see the occurrence and thus to acquit the whole lot. The same 
would have been the result, if there had been no other evidence 
against any one of the appellants tending to show that he did take 
part in the murders.” 
 
But the High Court did not apply the rule holding that: 
 
“Generally when it is proved that some innocent persons have been 
dishonestly implicated in a crime, the Court is entitled, and it is 
safer, to acquit even those who have not been able to prove that 
they were falsely implicated. The rule, however, is not absolute, and 
its indiscriminate application in this Province is as dangerous to 
the administration of criminal justice as the general application of 
the contrary, rule, that in such cases the only persons against 
whom the evidence of the witnesses may be rejected are those who 
succeed in proving their innocence. 
 
Judges with vast and intimate experience of the administration of 
criminal justice in this country have often felt that where falsehood 
has been intentionally mixed with truth, they are under no 
obligation to winnow the grain of truth from the chaff of falsehood. 
Others with equal experience and keen insight into the character 
and mentality of witnesses who generally give evidence in criminal 
cases in this Province have emphasised the grave danger of 
miscarriage of justice if oral evidence were judged by maxim of 
falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, and have considered proof of 
perjury on a material point by itself not to be a sufficient reason to 
reject that portion of the evidence which appears to be true. There 
are other observations on the subject, some plain in language and 
idea; others forceful epigrams, such as, that false evidence can 
never be corroborated, that zero added to a quantity adds nothing 
to that quantity and that whatever quantity be multiplied by zero, 
the result must still remain zero. I have always felt that the 
Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 200 of 2019  
 
10
question of questions for the Judge in such cases, is how to get at 
the truth with that degree of certainty as is always insisted upon in 
criminal cases and it seems to me that if you can do that, the result 
need not be determined by any general rule. It may be that the 
greater and clearer the falsehood, the more difficult the task of 
extracting the truth, but that is the real task before a judge, I have 
never felt any uncertainty about. I cannot, therefore, accept Mr. 
Saleem's contention that since it is proved in this case that the 
witnesses have involved at least two men who could not have taken 
any part in the murders, their evidence against the other accused 
must for that reason alone be rejected.”  
 
8. 
By analysing the reasoning prevailing in the said judgment it 
may pertinently be noticed that the High Court was influenced 
purely by practical considerations relevant to testimonies made in 
the Province of the Punjab. It is obvious that use of the words ‘in 
this Province’ clearly indicated that the scope of the High Court’s 
reasoning was narrow as it was discussing the ‘character’ and 
‘mentality’ of witnesses who gave evidence in that particular 
Province. With utmost respect, such practical considerations ought 
not to have been brought into effect to hold that a principle, which 
is backed by Islamic provisions no less, as will be seen later, is not 
to apply anymore in light of the said considerations. It appears 
that instead of curbing a menace creeping into administration of 
justice the High Court had decided to adopt a pragmatic approach 
and to go along with the menace by bending the principle itself. In 
hindsight that approach was most unwise as it sowed the seeds of 
unchecked falsehood in testimonies not only making the job of a 
judge more and more difficult but also increasingly polluting and 
sullying the stream of justice itself.   
 
9. 
In the above mentioned case the High Court had failed to 
explain how the rule’s application was dangerous to the 
administration of criminal justice and what “grave danger of 
miscarriage of justice” was there “if oral evidence were judged by 
maxim of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus”. It can be seen quite 
clearly that the High Court was influenced by extraneous and 
practical considerations, rather than legal or jurisprudential, 
which led it to conclude that there would be miscarriage of justice 
if the rule continued to apply. A Larger Bench of this Court had 
observed in the case of Mst. Sughran Bibi  v The State (PLD 2018 
Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 200 of 2019  
 
11
SC 595) that “Interpretation of law by this Court ought not to be 
premised on damning generalisations which are nothing but 
subjective.” The reasons advanced by the High Court in the case 
under discussion for doing away with the rule were clearly general 
and subjective in nature and the High Court ought to have been 
careful in that regard.  
 
10. 
The High Court had further observed in that case that “the 
question of questions for the Judge in such cases, is how to get at 
the truth with that degree of certainty as is always insisted upon in 
criminal cases”. We are, however, of the view that the aim while 
deciding criminal cases ought not to be to “get at the truth” but to 
decide a matter in light of the settled legal principles with the sole 
focus on determining whether the evidence on the record proves 
the guilt of the accused person in accordance with the requisite 
standard, i.e. beyond reasonable doubt or not. We, through our 
experience, are of the opinion that trying to ascertain the truth, 
although a noble and ideal effort in its own right, may prove to be a 
slippery slope as the full facts of any criminal case are never 
presented before a court. For a Judge to do complete justice and to 
get to the truth in a criminal case, he needs, as a matter of 
necessity, to have in his knowledge all of the facts relevant to the 
case at hand. As that is never the case, the rule of law and 
consistency in approach can be only fostered and strengthened if 
criminal cases are decided in a uniform way and only and only in 
light of the settled principles of evidence, not by bringing in 
subjective and practical considerations, which invariably will vary 
from one judge to the next.  
 
11. 
As noted above, historically the notion was that the rule was 
mandatory in nature and we are in no doubt that the rule should 
be applied mandatorily. This view stems from the notion that once 
a witness is found to have lied about a material aspect of a case, it 
cannot then be safely assumed that the said witness will declare 
the truth about any other aspect of the case. We have noted above 
that originally the view “was that the testimony of one detected in a 
Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 200 of 2019  
 
12
lie was wholly worthless and must of necessity be rejected.” A good 
application of the said notion can be seen in the case of Mohamed 
Fiaz Baksh v The Queen (PLD 1959 Privy Council 24). The case was 
about a murder for which two men were convicted in trial. Both 
men appealed to the Court of Appeal and the said Court dismissed 
the appeal of one but quashed the conviction of the other and 
ordered a new trial in his case. In ordering a new trial the Court 
was influenced by the fact that the witnesses produced were 
discrepant and had improved on their previous statements. 
However, in upholding the conviction of the other convict it was 
observed by the Court of Appeal as follows: 
 
“… they considered entirely different considerations applied. They 
could find a good deal unfavourable and nothing favourable to 
him in the statements and considered that nothing favourable to 
him could have been obtained therefrom which was not obtained 
at the trial. They accordingly held that the jury’s verdict in 
respect of this appellant could not be disturbed on this ground.” 
 
The Privy Council held the approach adopted by the Court of 
Appeal as erroneous and concluded as under: 
 
“Their Lordships are unable to accept this reasoning. If these 
statements afforded material for serious challenge to the 
credibility or reliability of these witnesses on matters vital to the 
case for the prosecution it follows that by cross-examination–or 
by proof of the statements if the witnesses denied making them–
the defence might have destroyed the whole case against both the 
accused or at any rate shown that the evidence of these witnesses 
could not be relied upon as sufficient to displace the evidence in 
support of the alibis. Their credibility cannot be treated as 
divisible and accepted against one and rejected against the other. 
Their honesty having been shown to be open to question it cannot 
be right to accept their verdict against one and re-open it in the 
case of other. Their Lordships are accordingly of opinion that a 
new trial should have been ordered in both cases.”  
 
 
12. 
Before we go on to analyse how the Supreme Court of 
Pakistan has dealt with the rule we deem it appropriate to cite a 
few cases in which the social conditions prevailing in the Province 
of the Punjab in the context of evaluating dying declarations have 
been discussed. 
 
Bakhshish Singh alias Bakhshi and others v Emperor  
(AIR 1925 Lahore 549)  
Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 200 of 2019  
 
13
 
“In our opinion it would be hardly safe to convict on the 
uncorroborated dying declaration of Lal Singh because it is well-
known that inhabitants of the Punjab will often in dying 
declaration not only accuse the actual offenders, but will also add 
the names of other enemies.” 
 
Tawaib Khan and another v The State  
(PLD 1970 SC 13) 
 
“In the same line, there are the dying declarations of the deceased 
which have a degree of sanctity under the law, being the 
statements of a dying man, on the belief that he being placed in a 
situation of immediate apprehension of severance of his ties with 
the mundane affairs, he would not tell a lie and implicate 
innocent persons on false charges. But, I consider that in the 
matter of the administration of criminal justice, taking in view the 
present state of our society, the assessment of evidence, whether 
it is the statement of a witness or the statement of a person who 
is dead, is essentially an exercise of human judgment to evaluate 
the evidence so as to find out what is true and what is false 
therein. In this effort, the case has to be considered in all its 
physical environments and circumstances to find out how far the 
evidence or its different parts fit in with the circumstances and 
possibilities that can be safely deduced in the case. In this 
country, the habit, unfortunately, is quite common, now judicially 
recognized, that people do add innocent persons along with the 
guilty to satisfy their sense of revenge and to put the other side to 
the utmost grief. It is difficult to lay down a rigid rule that a 
person who is injured and is under an apprehension of meeting 
his death, would suddenly be gifted, as if by a magic 
transformation, with a clean conscience and a purity of mind to 
shed all the age-old habits and deep-rooted rancours and 
enmities. Even, assuming that the pangs of conscience are there 
at the time to prohibit making of false charges, the question 
arises whether these pangs are strong enough to fortify him to 
resist the promptings and persuasions of his relations and others 
who may be surrounding him at the time and incite him to 
support the pattern of the charge which they have chosen to 
make against the accused persons, whether innocent or guilty? It 
is for this reason that a close scrutiny of the dying declarations 
like the statements of interested witnesses, becomes absolutely 
necessary.” 
 
Muhammad Ameer and another v Riyat Khan and 
others  
(2016 SCMR 1233) 
 
“A dying declaration is an exception to the hearsay rule and, 
thus, the same is to be scrutinized with due care and caution, 
particularly in the backdrop of the observations made by different 
Courts about veracity of a dying declaration in the Province of the 
Punjab and a reference in this respect may be made to the cases 
of Bakhshish Singh alias Bakhshi and others v. Emperor (AIR 
1925 Lahore 549), Tawaib Khan and another v. The State (PLD 
1970 SC 13) and Usman Shah and others v. The State (1969 
PCr.LJ 317).” 
 
 
13. 
We now turn to see how the Supreme Court of Pakistan has 
dealt with the rule in different cases till date: 
Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 200 of 2019  
 
14
 
Tawaib Khan and another v The State  
(PLD 1970 SC 13)  
 
“The maxim “falsus in uno falsus in omnibus” has all along been 
discarded by the courts in this country. Similarly, the rule that 
the integrity of a witness is indivisible, despite its moral virtue, 
has not been endorsed by the superior courts of this country 
without reservations and cannot be accepted as one of universal 
application. In the last analysis, as stated in some of the eminent 
judicial decisions, “the grain has to be sifted from the chaff” in 
each case, in light of its own particular circumstances.” 
 
The State v Mushtaq Ahmad  
(PLD 1973 SC 418) 
 
“Moreover, it has been ruled by this Court in a number of recent 
cases, that having regard to the social conditions obtaining in this 
country, the principle falsus in uno falsus in omnibus cannot be 
made applicable to the administration of criminal justice and 
therefore Courts are under a duty to sift “chaff from the grain”.” 
 
Samano v The State  
(1973 SCMR 162) 
 
“It was next submitted that the fact that the evidence of the eye-
witnesses had not been relied upon as against Fateh Mohammad, 
would react on its credibility as against the present appellants as 
well. The argument of course proceeds on the premise that the 
credit of a witness is indivisible, but the maxim falsus in uno, 
falsus in omnibus has not been followed by the Courts in this 
sub-continent, and it has been repeatedly held that in the context 
of the conditions prevailing in the country, the Courts have a duty 
to sift the grain from the chaff.” 
 
Bakka v The State  
(1977 SCMR 150) 
 
“The principle falsus in uno falsus in omnibus has long since 
ceased to be applied by the Courts in this country, and they have 
always endeavoured to separate the grain from the chaff.” 
 
Khairu and another v The State  
(1981 SCMR 1136) 
 
“It was next submitted that as the prosecution witnesses had lied 
in one essential respect namely, as to the first petitioner having 
been over-powered it was difficult to rely on their ipse dixit as to 
the culpability of the petitioners. The High Court held that the 
rule, falsus in uno falsus in omnibus, is not applicable for 
discarding the evidence of the witnesses as a whole and hence so 
much of the evidence which is credible can be accepted.” 
 
Ghulam Sikandar and another v Mamaraz Khan and 
others  
(PLD 1985 SC 11) 
 
“It is often said that the principle falsus in uno falsus in omnibus 
is not applicable in Pakistan. The same principle has been 
described in some cases, slightly differently; namely, that the 
testimony of an eye-witness should not be treated as indivisible 
Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 200 of 2019  
 
15
although there is no consensus with regard to the later view. A 
contrary view has also been held. Expressed in a more direct 
manner a similar rule in the administration of criminal 
justice which is hall-mark of Islamic Jurisprudence, that 
when a witness has been found false with regard to the 
implication of one accused about whose participation he had 
deposed on oath the credibility of such witness regarding 
involvement of the other accused in the same occurrence 
would be irretrievably shaken. However, as a matter of 
convenience a rule has been developed in Pakistan since the 
famous case of Ghulam Muhammad v. Crown (PLD 1951 Lah. 66) 
propounded by late Chief Justice Muhammad Munir that where it 
is found that a witness has falsely implicated one accused person, 
ordinarily he would not be relied upon with regard to the other 
accused in the same occurrence. But if the testimony of such a 
witness is corroborated by very strong and independent 
circumstances regarding other the reliance might then be placed 
on the witness for convicting the other accused. For further and 
practical application of this rule the following cases can be 
instructive; (particularly if the principle of indivisibility of 
credibility laid down in the Privy Council case Muhammad Faiz 
Bakhsh v. The Queen (PLD 1959 PC 24) is to be ignored :- 
 
Tawaib Khan and another v. The State PLD 1970 SC 13; 
The State v. Mushtaq Ahmad PLD 1973 SC 418; 
Muhammad Shafi and others v. The State 1974 SCMR 289; 
Bakka v. The State 1977 SCMR 150; 
Khairu and another v. The State 1981 SCMR 1136; 
Ahmad etc. v. The State 1982 SCMR 1049; 
Aminullah v. The State PLD 1982 SC 429 and 
Muhammad Nawaz v. The State 1984 SCMR 190. 
 
It is to be emphasised that the sub-rule of “separating the grain 
from the chaff”, has been demonstrated in many cases by 
applying the sure test - whether the same tainted ocular evidence 
has received corroboration from independent and equally strong 
inculpatory evidence/circumstance (sic)/accused.  
 
The afore-discussed main rule shall suffer serious change if 
and when it is examined in the light of the Islamic Principles. 
But for the time being even if the rule generally followed by the 
superior Courts is applied to this case it would be very essential 
to seek strong and independent corroboration against each one of 
the accused on account of various reasons discussed in the High 
Court judgment as also in this judgment.”  
(Bold letters have been supplied for emphasis) 
 
Ziaullah v The State  
(1993 SCMR 155) 
 
“In any case, the rule falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is no longer 
applicable and not unoften the Court has to sift the grain from 
the chaff. Reference in this connection may be made to Khairu 
and another v. The State (1981 SCMR 1136).”  
 
Zulfiqar Ali v The State  
(1993 SCMR 2046) 
 
“It is by now well settled that the maxim falsus in uno falsus in 
omnibus has no universal application and the Courts can sift the 
grain from the chaff and convict those accused whose guilt is 
established beyond any doubt and can acquit those whose 
involvement is not free from doubt.” 
Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 200 of 2019  
 
16
 
Irshad Ahmad and others v The State and others  
(PLD 1996 SC 138) 
 
“Even otherwise maxim “falsus in uno falsus in omnibus” has all 
along been discarded by the superior Courts of this country. In 
order to reach the truth "the grain has to be sifted from the chaff" 
in each case in the light of its own particular facts.” 
 
Saad Saood Jan, J. stated in his additional note that  
 
“As regards the extension of the maxim falsus in uno falsus in 
omnibus to the appreciation of evidence I am not sure if it stands 
totally discharged. There can be no doubt that a witness who 
deliberately speaks a lie or withholds truth on a material fact 
which should be known to him seriously compromises his 
credibility and it would be unsafe to rely upon his testimony 
alone to convict an accused person. However, there is always a 
possibility that on certain other facts in issue he may have 
spoken the truth; but before a part of his statement can be acted 
upon 
there 
must 
be 
some 
indication 
in 
the 
ambient 
circumstances or in the other evidence on record which lends 
assurance that he could not have lied with regard to that part. 
But for such assurance his whole statement has to be treated as 
suspect and not worthy of credit.” 
 
Zia Mahmood Mirza, J. observed in his additional note 
that  
 
“As regards the principle embodied in the maxim “falsus in uno 
falsus in omnibus” or to put it somewhat differently the rule that 
the integrity/credibility of a witness is indivisible, it has almost 
invariably been held by the superior Courts of this country that it 
has no universal application and the grain has to be sifted from 
the chaff in each case. Late Chief Justice Muhammad Munir in 
the case of Ghulam Muhammad v. Crown PLD 1951 Lah. 66 did 
not accept the contention that since the witnesses had involved at 
least two men who could not have taken any part in the murders, 
their evidence against the other accused must for that reason 
alone be rejected. It was observed that “the question of questions 
for the Judge in such cases is how to get at the truth with that 
degree of certainty as is always insisted upon in criminal cases 
and it seems that if you can do that, the result need not be 
determined by any general rule.” Reference may also pertinently 
be made to Tawaib Khan and another v. The State PLD 1970 SC 
13 wherein it was observed that the maxim “falsus in uno falsus 
in omnibus” has all along been discarded by the Courts in this 
country. Similarly, the rule that the integrity of a witness is 
indivisible, despite its moral virtue, has not been endorsed by the 
superior Courts of this country without reservations and cannot 
be accepted as one of universal application. In the last analysis, 
as stated in some of the eminent judicial decisions, “the grain has 
to be sifted from the chaff” in each case, in the light of its own 
particular circumstances”. Again in Bakka v. The State 1977 
SCMR 150 this Court observed that “the principle falsus in uno 
falsus in omnibus has long since ceased to be applied by the 
Courts in this country, and they have always endeavoured to 
separate the grain from the chaff”. Similar view was taken by this 
Court in Khairu and another v. The State 1981 SCMR 1136 
wherein it was held that the rule “falsus in uno falsus in 
omnibus” “is not applicable for discarding the evidence of the 
witnesses as a whole and hence so much of the evidence which is 
credible can be accepted.’ This view was reiterated in Ziaullah v. 
Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 200 of 2019  
 
17
The State 1993 SCMR 155 holding that the rule “falsus in uno 
falsus in omnibus” is no longer applicable and not unoften the 
Court has to sift the grain from the chaff”. Reference may usefully 
be made to Ghulam Sikandar v. Mamaraz Khan PLD 1985 SC 11 
where this Court while examining the aforenoted principle 
observed that a rule has since been developed in Pakistan that 
where a witness is found to have falsely implicated one accused 
person, ordinarily he would not be relied upon with regard to the 
other accused in the same occurrence, but if the testimony of 
such a witness is corroborated by very strong and independent 
circumstances regarding the other, reliance might then be placed 
on the witness for convicting the other accused.” 
 
Muhammad Ahmad and another v The State and others 
(1997 SCMR 89) 
 
“Needless to point out that it is by now a settled preposition that 
the maxim falsus in uno falsus in omnibus has no universal 
application and not unoften the grain has to be sifted from the 
chaff. Refer Khairu and another v. The State (1981 SCMR 1176).” 
 
Nazeer Ahmad alias Nazeera v The State  
(1998 SCMR 1768) 
 
“… falsus in uno falsus in omnibus (false in one false in all), is no 
more operative and the rule of sifting the chaff from the grain is to 
be applied while apprising the evidence in criminal cases.” 
 
Sardar Khan and 3 others v The State  
(1998 SCMR 1823) 
 
“The maxim “Falsus in uno falsus in omnibus” has not been 
accepted by the superior Courts in Pakistan as having universal 
application. Therefore, it does not, necessarily, follow that where 
the Court does not accept the evidence of a witness against some 
of the accused in a case, the Court cannot accept his evidence 
against the other accused. The Court often sifts the grain from 
the chaff while accepting the evidence of a witness against some 
of the accused in a case and at the same time not relying on his 
version against other accused in the case (see Muhammad Ahmed 
v. State 1997 SCMR 89 and Khairu v. State 1981 SCMR 1176).” 
 
Mir Hassan and others v State and others  
(1999 SCMR 1418) 
 
“In the case of Sardar Khan v. State (1998 SCMR 1823), this 
Court stated the following broad principles for appreciation of 
evidence while deciding the cases involving capital punishment: 
 
The Maxim 'falsus in uno falsus in omnibus' has not been 
accepted by the superior Courts in Pakistan as having universal 
application. Therefore, it does not, necessarily, follow that where 
the Court does not accept the evidence of a witness against some 
of the accused in a case, the Court cannot accept his evidence 
against the other accused. The Court often sifts the grain from 
the chaff while accepting the evidence of a witness against some 
of the accused in case and at the same time not relying on his 
version against other accused in the case (see Muhammad Ahmed 
v. State 1997 SCMR 89 and Khairu v. State 1981 SCMR 1176).” 
 
Khawand Bakhsh and others v The State and others 
(PLD 2000 SC 1) 
Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 200 of 2019  
 
18
 
“The principle of falsus in uno falsus in omnibus would not be 
applicable to their case because of availability of sufficient 
corroboratory material against them. The rule about the 
indivisibility of the testimony of a witness is that ordinarily if he is 
found to have falsely implicated an accused person, he should not 
be relied upon with regard to the other accused in the same 
occurrence, but if his testimony stands corroborated by strong 
and independent circumstances regarding the other, the reliance 
might then be placed on him for convicting the other accused. 
The Courts are required to separate grain from the chaff by 
considering 
whether 
the 
same 
tainted 
evidence 
stands 
corroborated from some independent and strong circumstance or 
evidence. The following cases may be cited where the 
circumstances in which the principle of falsus in uno falsus in 
omnibus and its applicability in Pakistan in different situations 
was elaborately discussed:-- 
 
(i) Tawaib Khan and another v. The State PLD 1970 SC 13, 
(ii) The State v. Mushtaq Ahmad PLD 1973 SC 418, 
(iii) Muhammad Shafi and 4 others v. The State 1974 
SCMR 289, 
(iv) Aminullah v. The State PLD 1982 SC 429 and 
(v) Muhammad Nawaz v. The State 1984 SCMR 190.” 
 
Rashid Khan and another v The State  
(2000 SCMR 854) 
 
“In any event the contention cannot prevail as the maxim ‘falsus 
in uno falsus in omnibus’ does not hold the field anymore having 
been replaced by a more rational methodology of evaluation of 
evidence called ‘sifting grain from the chaff’. Reference in this 
context may be made to the judgments of this Court reported as 
Tawaib Khan v. State (PLD 1970 SC 13) and Samano v. State 
(1973 SCMR 162). The testimony in question can be safely 
believed vis-a-vis the appellant as it is amply corroborated by his 
aforementioned admission.” 
 
Sarfraz alias Sappi and 2 others v The State  
(2000 SCMR 1758) 
 
“The proposition of law in criminal administration of justice 
namely whether a common set of ocular account can be used for 
recording acquittal and conviction against the accused persons 
who were charged for the same commission of offence is an over-
worked proposition. Originally the opinion of the Court was that if 
a witness is not coming out with a whole truth his evidence is 
liable to be discarded as a whole meaning thereby that his 
evidence cannot be used either for convicting accused or 
acquitting some of them facing trial in the same case. This 
proposition is enshrined in the maxim falsus in uno falsus in 
omnibus but subsequently this view was changed and it was held 
that principle enshrined in this maxim would not be applicable 
and testimony of a witness will be acceptable against one set of 
accused though same has been rejected against another set of 
accused facing same trial. However, for safe administration of 
justice a condition has been imposed namely that the evidence 
which is going to be believed to be true must get independent 
corroboration on material particulars meaning thereby that to 
find out credible evidence principle of appreciation of evidence i.e. 
sifting chaff out of grain was introduced as it has been held in the 
cases of Syed Ali Bepari v. Nibaran Mollah and others (PLD 1962 
SC 502), Tawaib Khan and another v. The State (PLD 1970 SC 
Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 200 of 2019  
 
19
13), Bakka v. The State (1977 SCMR 150), Khairu and another v. 
The State (1981 SCMR 1136); Ziaullah v. The State (1993 SCMR 
155), Ghulam Sikandar v. Mamaraz Khan (PLD 1985 SC 11), 
Shahid Raza and another v. State (1992 SCMR 1647), Irshad 
Ahmad and others v. State and others (PLD 1996 SC 138) and 
Ahmad Khan v. The State (1990 SCMR 803).” 
 
Qutab-ud-Din v The State  
(PLD 2001 SC 101) 
 
“As far as the principle of falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is 
concerned it has got no application so far as criminal justice 
prevailing in this country is concerned. However, the Courts are 
empowered to scan the evidence to reach at a conclusion as to 
whether the evidence furnished by a witness can be believed 
simultaneously against one set of accused and can be discarded 
against the other set of accused, however, subject to independent 
corroboration or particular point qua the accused against whom 
such evidence is to be believed. In this behalf if any authority is 
needed reference can be made to the case of Ghulam Sikandar 
and another v. Mamaraz Khan and others PLD 1985 SC 11. 
Relevant 
para. 
from 
the 
above judgment 
is 
reproduced 
hereunder:-- 
 
“It is often said that the principle falsus in uno 
falsus in omnibus is not applicable in Pakistan. The 
same principle has been described in some cases, 
slightly differently; namely, that the testimony of 
an eye-witness should not be treated as indivisible 
although there is no consensus with regard to the 
later view. A contrary view has also been held. 
Expressed in a more direct manner a similar rule 
in the administration of criminal justice which is 
hall-mark of Islamic Jurisprudence, that when a 
witness has been found false with regard to the 
implication 
of 
one 
accused 
about 
whose 
participation 
he 
had 
deposed 
on 
oath 
the 
credibility of such witness regarding involvement of 
the other accused in the same occurrence would be 
irretrievably shaken. However, as a matter of 
convenience a rule has been developed in Pakistan 
since the famous case of Ghulam Muhammad v. 
Crown (PLD 1951 Lah. 66) propounded by late 
Chief Justice Muhammad Munir that where it is 
found that a witness has falsely implicated one 
accused person, ordinarily he would not be relied 
upon with regard to the other accused in the same 
occurrence. But if the testimony of such a witness 
is corroborated by very strong and independent 
circumstances regarding other the reliance might 
then be placed on the witness for convicting the 
other 
accused. 
For 
further 
and 
practical 
application of this rule the following cases can be 
instructive; 
(particularly 
if 
the 
principle 
of 
indivisibility of credibility laid down in the Privy 
Council case Muhammad Faiz Bakhsh v. The 
Queen (PLD 1959 PC 24) is to be ignored :-- 
 
Tawaib Khan and another v. The State PLD 1970 
SC 13; 
The State v. Mushtaq Ahmad PLD 1973 SC 418; 
Muhammad Shafi and others v. The State 1974 
SCMR 289; 
Bakka v. The State 1977 SCMR 150; 
Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 200 of 2019  
 
20
Khairu and another v. The State 1981 SCMR 1136; 
Ahmed etc. v. The State 1982 SCMR 1049; 
Aminullah v. The State PLD 1982 SC 429 and 
Muhammad Nawaz v. The State 1984 SCMR 190. 
 
It is to be emphasised that the sub-rule of 
“separating the grain from the chaff”, has been 
demonstrated in many cases by applying the sure 
test -- whether the same tainted ocular evidence 
has received corroboration from independent and 
equally strong inculpatory evidence/circumstance 
(sic)/accused.  
 
The afore-discussed main rule shall suffer serious 
change if and when it is examined in the light of 
the Islamic Principles. But for the time being even 
if the rule generally followed by the superior Courts 
is applied to this case it would be very essential to 
seek strong and independent corroboration against 
each one of the accused on account of various 
reasons discussed in the High Court judgment as 
also in this judgment. No such corroboration is 
forthcoming against Khan Beg and Maqbul Illahi. 
Therefore, maintaining their acquittal on this 
ground alone would be amply justified.” 
 
The above view has been followed in the cases (i) Khairu v. State 
1981 SCMR 1136; Muhammad Ahmed v. State 1997 SCMR 89 
and Mir Hassan v. State 1999 SCMR 1418.” 
 
Anwar and another v The State  
(2001 SCMR 1518) 
 
“We are also of the view that the principle of law “falsus in uno, 
falsus in omnibus” is no longer accepted by the superior Courts 
of this country and the Court is under a duty to sift the chaff 
from the grain and find out as to whether a part of the evidence is 
reliable and confidence inspiring.” 
 
Muhammad Zubair and another v The State  
(2002 SCMR 1141) 
 
“It would not be out of place to mention here that maxim ‘falsus 
in uno falsus in omnibus’ is not applicable in prevalent system of 
criminal administration of justice and moreso there is no rule 
having universal application that where some accused persons 
have not been found guilty the other accused would, ipso facto, 
stand acquitted because the Court has to sift the grain from the 
chaff. If any authority is needed reference can be made to cases 
titled Riaz Hussain v. The State (2001 SCMR 177) and Samano v. 
State (1973 SCMR 162).” 
 
Ellahi Bakhsh v Rab Nawaz and another  
(2002 SCMR 1842) 
 
“It is well-settled by now that the maxim “falsus in uno falsus in 
omnibus” has no universal application and it is bounden duty of 
the Court to sift the grain from the chaff. In this regard reference 
can be made to Khairu v. State (1981 SCMR 1136).” 
 
Umar Hayat v. The State  
(2007 SCMR 1296) 
Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 200 of 2019  
 
21
 
“This may be seen that in a case of joint liability, the Court may 
in the light of the rule of sifting the grain from chaff, give benefit 
of doubt to an accused but his acquittal may not be relevant for 
determining the guilt of his co-accused and Court is not obliged 
to acquit all accused on the basis of rule of falsus in uno falsus in 
omnibus which is not followed by the Courts in Pakistan.” 
 
Ghulam Mustafa v The State  
(2009 SCMR 916) 
 
“In our jurisprudence it is by now well established that the legal 
maxim falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is not a universal 
principle to be applied in all criminal cases. However, according 
to settled case-law there are exceptions and if evidence on the 
record warrants a doubt in the credibility of such witnesses then 
indeed their testimony regarding another set of co-accused is to 
be considered with caution and cannot be accepted without strict 
corroboration from other independent and credible sources. In 
this connection reference can be made to the case of Muhammad 
Nawaz v. State 1969 SCMR 132, Shafoo v. State 1968 SCMR 719 
and Allah Ditta v. State PLD 2002 SC 52.” 
 
Khadim Hussain v The State  
(2010 SCMR 1090) 
 
“In fact a futile exercise appears to have been made to press into 
service the doctrine of “falsus in uno falsus in omnibus (false in 
one thing, false in all), which is admittedly not applicable in 
prevalent system of criminal administration of justice and moreso 
there is no rule having universally applicable that where some 
accused were not found guilty the other accused would ipso facto 
stand acquitted because the Court has to sift the grain from 
chaff. Samano v. State 1973 SCMR 162. There is no cavil to the 
proposition that the rule that the integrity of a witness is 
indivisible, despite its moral virtue, has not been endorsed by the 
superior Courts of this country without reservations and cannot 
be accepted as one of universal application. In the last analysis, 
as stated in some of the eminent judicial decisions, the grain has 
to be sifted from the Chaff in each case, in the light of its own 
peculiar circumstances Riaz Hussain v. The State 2001 SCMR 
177.” 
 
Muhammad Zaman v State  
(2014 SCMR 749) 
 
“… mere acquittal of some of the accused statedly involved in the 
commission of crime by the trial Court … by extending benefit of 
doubt to them, will not demolish the case of the prosecution as a 
whole against the remaining accused … as the legal maxim 
“falsus in uno falsus in omnibus” will have no application in such 
circumstances.” 
 
Muhammad Raheel alias Shafique v The State  
(PLD 2015 SC 145) 
 
“Apart from that the principle of falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is 
not applicable in this country on account of various judgments 
rendered by this Court in the past and for this reason too 
acquittal of the five co-accused of the appellant has not been 
found by us to be having any bearing upon the case against the 
appellant.” 
Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 200 of 2019  
 
22
 
Muhammad Afzal v The State  
(2017 SCMR 1645) 
 
“We are mindful of the fact that principle of falsus in uno falsus in 
omnibus is not applicable in our system of administration of 
justice relating to criminal cases and the courts are required to 
sift grain from the chaff in order to reach at a just conclusion but 
it is well settled by now that if some accused are acquitted on the 
basis of same set of evidence the said evidence can be believed to 
the extent of the other accused facing the same trial but the 
courts have to be at guard and are required to look for 
corroborating evidence for maintaining conviction in such like 
cases.” 
 
Munir Ahmad and another v The State and others  
(2019 SCMR 79) 
 
“By now it is well settled that principle of falsus in uno falsus in 
omnibus is not applicable in our system designed for dispensation 
of justice in criminal cases and courts are required to sift grain 
from the chaff in order to reach at a just conclusion.” 
 
14. 
It has surprised us to notice that the only case in this 
country in which some reasons had been recorded for holding that 
the rule falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not to be applied was 
the case of Ghulam Muhammad and others v Crown (PLD 1951 
Lahore 66) wherein Muhammad Munir, CJ. had built an argument 
around the tendency in witnesses in the Province of the Punjab to 
mix truth with falsehood. In the said case no such tendency in the 
other parts of the country had been mentioned but in all the later 
cases the scope of the observations made by Muhammad Munir, 
CJ. had been extended to the rest of the country as a matter of 
course and without any discussion at all! Apart from that 
Muhammad Munir, CJ. was of the view that the job of a judge was 
to discover the truth whereas in our system of criminal justice 
discovering the truth is the job of the investigating agency and the 
judge is to decide as to whether the allegations being leveled 
against an accused person have been proved by the prosecution in 
accordance with the law or not. Such blurring of the distinction 
between the jobs of an investigator and a judge in the reasoning of 
Muhammad Munir, CJ. had remained unnoticed in all the 
subsequent cases on the subject. The said obscurity has, 
unfortunately, gone a long way in distorting the criminal 
jurisprudence in the country besides demeaning the virtue of  
Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 200 of 2019  
 
23
truth and corrupting the sacred concept of justice by extending a 
license to witnesses to tell lies and reducing the judge to a lie-
detector sifting grain from the chaff and looking for a reason to 
convict an accused person on the basis of statements of witnesses 
on oath or solemn affirmation which statements have been 
established to be not “the truth, the whole truth and nothing but 
the truth”. 
 
Perjury is a serious offence in Pakistan 
 
15. 
The Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 (PPC) contains many offences 
dealing with perjury and giving false testimony. The very fact that 
there is a whole chapter, numbered XI, dedicated to such offences 
amply testifies to the fact that matters relating to giving of 
testimony were taken very seriously by those who drafted the PPC 
and their continued retention in the PPC ever since reflects the will 
of the legislature, which is the chosen representative body of the 
people of Pakistan through which they exercise their authority 
within the limits prescribed by Almighty Allah. The following 
sections, listed under Chapter XI titled “Of False Evidence And 
Offences Against Public Justice”, highlight the fact that giving false 
testimony has been treated to be a very serious matter entailing 
some serious punishments.  
 
191. Giving false evidence: Whoever being legally bound by an 
oath or by an express provision of law to state the truth, or being 
bound by law to make a declaration upon any subject, makes any 
statement which is false, and which he either knows or believes to 
be false or does not believe to be true, is said to give false 
evidence. 
 
 
192. 
Fabricating 
false 
evidence: 
Whoever 
causes 
any 
circumstance to exist or makes any false entry in any book or 
record, or makes any document containing a false statement, 
intending that such circumstance, false entry or false statement 
may appear in evidence in a judicial proceeding, or in a 
proceeding taken by law before a public servant as such, or before 
an arbitrator, and that such circumstance, false entry or false 
statement, so appearing in evidence, may cause any person who 
in such proceeding is to form an opinion upon the evidence, to 
entertain an erroneous opinion touching any point material to the 
result of such proceeding, is said “to fabricate false evidence”. 
 
193. Punishment for false evidence: Whoever intentionally 
gives false evidence in any stage of a judicial proceeding, or 
Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 200 of 2019  
 
24
fabricates false evidence for the purpose of being used in any 
stage of a judicial proceeding, shall be punished with 
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend 
to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine;  
 
and whoever intentionally gives or fabricates false evidence in any 
other case, shall be punished with imprisonment of either 
description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall 
also be liable to fine. 
 
194. Giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to 
procure conviction of capital offence: Whoever gives or 
fabricates false evidence, intending thereby to cause, or knowing 
it to be likely that he will thereby cause, any person to be 
convicted of an offence which is capital by any law for the time 
being in force, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or 
with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten 
years, and shall also be liable to fine;  
 
if innocent person be thereby convicted and executed: and if 
an innocent person be convicted and executed in consequence of 
such false evidence, the person who gives such false evidence 
shall be punished either with death or the punishment 
hereinbefore described. 
 
195. Giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to 
procure conviction of offence punishable with imprisonment 
for life or for a term of seven years or upwards: Whoever gives 
or fabricates false evidence intending thereby to cause, or 
knowing it to be likely that he will thereby cause, any person to 
be convicted of an offence which by any law for the time being in 
force is not capital, but punishable with imprisonment for life, or 
imprisonment for a term of seven years or upwards, shall be 
punished as a person convicted of that offence would be liable to 
be punished. 
 
196. Using evidence known to be false: Whoever corruptly uses 
or attempts to use as true or genuine evidence any evidence 
which he knows to be false or fabricated, shall be punished in the 
same manner as if he gave or fabricated false evidence. 
 
197. Issuing or signing false certificate: Whoever issues or 
signs any certificate required by law to be given or signed, or 
relating to any fact of which such certificate is by law admissible 
in evidence, knowing or believing that such certificate is false in 
any material point, shall be punished in the same manner as if he 
gave false evidence. 
 
198. Using as true a certificate known to be false: Whoever 
corruptly uses or attempts to use any such certificate as a true 
certificate, knowing the same to be false in any material point, 
shall be punished in the same manner as if he gave false 
evidence. 
 
199. False statement made in declaration which is by law 
receivable as evidence: Whoever, in any declaration made or 
subscribed by him, which declaration any Court of Justice, or any 
public servant or other person, is bound or authorized by law to 
receive as evidence of any fact, makes any statement which is 
false, and which he either knows or believes to be false or does 
not believe to be true, touching any point material to the object 
for which the declaration is made or used, shall be punished in 
the same manner as if he gave false evidence. 
 
Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 200 of 2019  
 
25
200. Using as true such declaration knowing it to be false: 
Whoever corruptly uses or attempts to use as true any such 
declaration, knowing the same to be false in any material point, 
shall be punished in the same manner as if he gave false 
evidence. 
 
201. Causing disappearance of evidence of offence, or giving 
false information to screen offender: Whoever, knowing or 
having reason to believe that an offence has been committed, 
causes any evidence of the commission of that offence to 
disappear, with the intention of screening the offender from legal 
punishment, or with that intention gives any information 
respecting the offence which he knows or believes to be false; 
 
if a capital offence: shall, if the offence which he knows or 
believes to have been committed is punishable with death, be 
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term 
which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine; 
 
if punishable with imprisonment for life: and if the offence is 
punishable with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment 
which may extend to ten years, shall be punished with 
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend 
to three years, and shall also be liable to fine; 
 
if punishable with less than ten years’ imprisonment: and if 
the offence is punishable with imprisonment for any term not 
extending to ten years, shall be punished with imprisonment of 
the description provided for the offence, for a term which may 
extend to one-fourth part of the longest term of the imprisonment 
provided for the offence, or with fine, or with both. 
 
202. Intentional omission to give information of offence by 
person bound to inform: Whoever, knowing or having reason to 
believe that an offence has been committed, intentionally omits to 
give any information respecting that offence which he is legally 
bound to give, shall be punished with imprisonment of either 
description for a term which may extend to six months, or with 
fine, or with both. 
 
203. 
Giving 
false 
information 
respecting 
an 
offence 
committed: Whoever, knowing or having reason to believe that 
an offence has been committed, gives any information respecting 
that offence which he knows or believes to be false, shall be 
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term 
which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. 
 
204. Destruction of document to prevent its production as 
evidence: Whoever secretes or destroys any document which he 
may be lawfully compelled to produce as evidence in a Court of 
Justice, or in any proceeding lawfully held before a public 
servant,  as such, or obliterates or renders illegible the whole or 
any part of such document with the intention of preventing the 
same from being produced or used as evidence before such Court 
or public servant as aforesaid, or after he shall have been lawfully 
summoned or required to produce the same for that purpose, 
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a 
term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. 
 
209. Dishonestly making false claim in Court: Whoever 
fraudulently or dishonestly, or with intent to injure or annoy any 
person, makes in a Court of Justice any claim which he knows to 
be false, shall be punished with imprisonment of either 
Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 200 of 2019  
 
26
description for a term which may extend to two years, and shall 
also be liable to fine. 
 
211. False charge of offence made with intent to injure: 
Whoever, with intent to cause injury to any person, institutes or 
causes to be instituted any criminal proceeding against that 
person, or falsely charges any person with having committed an 
offence, knowing that there is no just or lawful ground for such 
proceeding or charge against that person, shall be punished with 
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend 
to two years, or with fine, or with both,  
 
and if such criminal proceeding be instituted on a false charge of 
an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or 
imprisonment for seven years or upwards, shall be punishable 
with imprisonment of either description for a term which may 
extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine. 
 
 
Holding that the rule falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is 
inapplicable in this country practically encourages commission of 
perjury which is a serious offence in this country. A court of law 
cannot permit something which the law expressly forbids. 
 
16. 
It can be seen from the analysis of the judgments mentioned 
above that the main reasoning given for not applying the rule 
relates to the social conditions prevalent in the country. It seems 
that because it was felt by the superior Courts that generally 
witnesses testifying in criminal cases do not speak the whole truth 
and have a tendency to exaggerate or economise with the real 
facts, there is a danger of miscarriage of justice in the sense that a 
real culprit may go scot free if a court disbelieves the whole 
testimony on account of reaching the conclusion that the 
testimony was false in some respect. With all due respect, we feel 
that such an approach, which involves extraneous and practical 
considerations, is arbitrary besides being subjective and the same 
can have drastic consequences for the rule of law and dispensation 
of justice in criminal matters.  
 
Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus - Islamic provisions: 
 
17. 
It was held in the case of Ghulam Sikandar (supra) that 
“Expressed in a more direct manner a similar rule in the 
administration of criminal justice which is hall-mark of Islamic 
Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 200 of 2019  
 
27
Jurisprudence, that when a witness has been found false with 
regard to the implication of one accused about whose participation 
he had deposed on oath the credibility of such witness regarding 
involvement of the other accused in the same occurrence would be 
irretrievably shaken. ------- The afore-discussed main rule shall 
suffer serious change if and when it is examined in the light of the 
Islamic Principles.” Adverting to the Islamic principles relevant to 
the issue at hand we note that the following verses of the Holy 
Qur’an deal with the matter of giving testimony: 
 
“And do not mix the truth with falsehood or conceal the truth 
while you know [it]” 
(Surah Al-Baqarah: verse 42) 
 
“And let not the witnesses refuse when they are called upon”  
(Surah Al-Baqarah: verse 282) 
 
“And do not conceal testimony, for whoever conceals it-his heart 
is indeed sinful”  
(Surah Al-Baqarah: verse 283) 
 
“O you who have believed, be persistently standing firm for Allah, 
witnesses in justice, and do not let the hatred of a people prevent 
you from being just. Be just, that is nearer to righteousness. And 
fear Allah; indeed, Allah is acquainted with what you do” 
(Surah Al-Ma’idah: verse 8) 
 
“O you who have believed, be persistently standing firm in justice, 
witnesses for Allah, even if it be against yourselves or parents and 
relatives”  
(Surah An-Nisa: verse135) 
 
“So follow not [personal] inclination, lest you not be just. And if 
you distort [your testimony] or refuse [to give it], then indeed 
Allah is ever, with what you do, acquainted” 
(Surah An-Nisa: verse 135) 
 
“And establish the testimony for [the acceptance of] Allah”  
(Surah At-Talaq: verse 2) 
 
“…And we will not withhold the testimony of [i.e. ordained by] 
Allah. Indeed, we would then be of the sinful.”  
(Surah Al-Ma’idah: verse106) 
 
“And avoid false statement” 
(Surah Al-Haj: verse 30) 
 
“And they who do not bear witness to what is false”  
(Surah Al-Furqan: verse 72) 
 
 
From the above, it can be seen that giving testimony its due 
importance and weight is an obligatory duty and those who stand 
firm in their testimonies are among the people of righteousness 
Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 200 of 2019  
 
28
and faith. Among the necessities of faith is giving truthful 
testimony even if against oneself or a relative. If there are no other 
witnesses that would enable justice to be done and there is a fear 
that someone’s right may be lost, it then becomes the individual 
responsibility of the few available witnesses to testify. Islam not 
only enjoins giving testimony, it also forbids concealing it because 
concealing evidence is something that is disapproved in Islam and 
detested by nature. Giving false testimony has many evils for it 
supports falsehood against truth and promotes injustice and 
aggression against justice. It also effaces fairness and equity and 
poses danger to public safety and security. 
 
18. 
According to the corpus of traditions of the Holy Prophet 
(Peace Be Upon Him), false testimony is one of the greater sins and 
the following Ahadith demonstrate the significance attached to 
giving true testimony: 
 
It was narrated by Hazrat Anas (RA) that the Prophet (PBUH) was 
asked about the great sins. He said, they are (1) To join others in 
worship with Allah; (2) To be undutiful to one's parents; (3) To kill 
a person (which Allah has forbidden to kill) (i.e. to commit the 
crime of murdering) and (4) to give a false witness.8 
 
It was narrated by Hazrat Abdullah (RA) that the Prophet (PBUH) 
said if somebody takes a false oath in order to get the property of 
a Muslim (unjustly) by that oath, then Allah will be angry with 
him when he will meet Him.9 
 
“To testify falsely tantamounts to polytheism.” It is mentioned in 
Tafsir Abdul Al-Fath Razi that the Holy Prophet (PBHU) repeated 
said statement thrice and then quoted verse No. 30 of Surah Al-
Haj stating that “… And avoid false statement.” 
 
 
19. 
The Offence of Qazf (Enforcement of Hadd) Ordinance, 1979 
deals with the offence of Qazf, which has been defined by virtue of 
section 2 of the said Ordinance as: 
 
“Whoever by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by 
signs or by visible representations, makes or publishes an 
                                                
8 The Translation of the Meanings of Sahih Al-Bukhari (Arabic-English), Volume 
III, Dr. Muhammad Muhsin Khan (Islamic University, Al-Medina Al-
Munawwara), 4th Edition, Kazi Publications, page 499 
9 The Translation of the Meanings of Sahih Al-Bukhari (Arabic-English), Volume 
III, Dr. Muhammad Muhsin Khan (Islamic University, Al-Medina Al-
Munawwara), 4th Edition, Kazi Publications, page 515 
Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 200 of 2019  
 
29
imputation of ‘zina’ concerning any person intending to harm, or 
knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will 
harm the reputation, or hurt the feelings, of such person, is said 
except in the cases hereinafter excepted, to commit ‘qazf’.” 
 
The Holy Qur’an while dealing the offence of Qazf ordains that: 
 
“And those who accuse chaste women and then do not produce 
four witnesses - lash them with eighty lashes and do not accept 
from them testimony ever after. And those are the defiantly 
disobedient” 
(Surah Al-Noor: verse 4) 
 
“And those who accuse their wives [of adultery] and have no 
witnesses except themselves - then the witness of one of them 
[shall be] four testimonies [swearing] by Allah that indeed, he is of 
the truthful” 
(Surah Al-Noor: verse 6) 
 
“And the fifth [oath will be] that the curse of Allah be upon him if 
he should be among the liars” 
(Surah Al-Noor: verse 7) 
 
“But it will prevent punishment from her if she gives four 
testimonies [swearing] by Allah that indeed, he is of the liars” 
(Surah Al-Noor: verse 8) 
 
“And the fifth [oath will be] that the wrath of Allah be upon her if 
he was of the truthful” 
(Surah Al-Noor: verse 9) 
 
The verses reproduced above highlight the importance Islam places 
on the requisite standard of evidence to be achieved. It can be seen 
that the Holy Qur’an puts a great emphasis upon the need to meet 
the requisite standard of evidence, so much so that for a person 
levelling the allegation of Zina but not meeting the given standard, 
it not only provides for a penal punishment, but also for 
withdrawal of such a person’s civic right to give evidence in all 
matters of his life. 
 
20. 
Article 2 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan, 1973 declares that “Islam shall be the State religion of 
Pakistan.” Clause (1) of Article 227 of the Constitution mandates 
as follows: 
 
“All existing laws shall be brought in conformity with the 
Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah, 
in this part referred to as the Injunctions of Islam, and no law 
shall be enacted which is repugnant to such Injunctions.” 
 
Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 200 of 2019  
 
30
According to Article 189 of the Constitution “Any decision of the 
Supreme Court shall, to the extent that it decides a question of law 
or is based upon or enunciates a principle of law, be binding on all 
other courts in Pakistan”. Declaring by this Court that the rule 
falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is inapplicable in Pakistan is 
enunciation of a principle of law and has a binding effect. If 
inapplicability of that rule militates against the Injunctions of 
Islam and if such inapplicability cannot be enacted by the 
Parliament on account of its repugnance to the Injunctions of 
Islam then this Court may not be in a position to introduce such 
inapplicability through an enunciation of a principle of law or to 
continue with the same any more. A court of law cannot grant a 
licence to a witness to tell lies or to mix truth with falsehood and 
then take it upon itself to sift grain from chaff when the law of the 
land makes perjury or testifying falsely a culpable offence. A court 
also has no jurisdiction to lay down a principle of law when even 
the Parliament is expressly forbidden by the Constitution from 
enacting such a principle as law. The inapplicability of this rule in 
Pakistan was introduced by Chief Justice Muhammad Munir in the 
year 1951 at a time when Article 227 of the Constitution was not 
in the field but after introduction of the said constitutional 
prohibition the enunciation of law by his lordship in this field, like 
the infamous doctrine of necessity introduced by his lordship in 
the constitutional field, may not hold its ground now, as already 
predicted and foreseen by this Court in the case of Ghulam 
Sikandar (supra) in the following prophetic words: 
 
“Expressed in a more direct manner a similar rule in the 
administration of criminal justice which is hall-mark of Islamic 
Jurisprudence, that when a witness has been found false with 
regard to the implication of one accused about whose 
participation he had deposed on oath the credibility of such 
witness regarding involvement of the other accused in the same 
occurrence would be irretrievably shaken. ------- The afore-
discussed main rule shall suffer serious change if and when it is 
examined in the light of the Islamic Principles.”  
 
21. 
We may observe in the end that a judicial system which 
permits deliberate falsehood is doomed to fail and a society which 
tolerates it is destined to self-destruct. Truth is the foundation of 
Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 200 of 2019  
 
31
justice and justice is the core and bedrock of a civilized society 
and, thus, any compromise on truth amounts to a compromise on 
a society’s future as a just, fair and civilized society. Our judicial 
system has suffered a lot as a consequence of the above mentioned 
permissible deviation from the truth and it is about time that such 
a colossal wrong may be rectified in all earnestness. Therefore, in 
light of the discussion made above, we declare that the rule falsus 
in uno, falsus in omnibus shall henceforth be an integral part of our 
jurisprudence in criminal cases and the same shall be given effect 
to, followed and applied by all the courts in the country in its letter 
and spirit. It is also directed that a witness found by a court to 
have resorted to a deliberate falsehood on a material aspect shall, 
without any latitude, invariably be proceeded against for 
committing perjury. 
 
22. 
The office of this Court is directed to send a copy of this 
order to the Registrars of all the High Courts in the country with a 
direction to send a copy of the same to every Judge and Magistrate 
within the jurisdiction of each High Court handling criminal cases 
at all levels for their information and guidance.     
  
 
 
(Asif Saeed Khan Khosa) 
Chief Justice  
 
(Mazhar Alam Khan Miankhel) 
Judge 
  
(Sajjad Ali Shah) 
Judge 
Islamabad 
March 04, 2019 
Approved for reporting. 
 
Arif