IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN 
(REVIEW JURISDICTION) 
 
 
PRESENT: 
MR. JUSTICE GULZAR AHMED, HCJ 
MR. JUSTICE IJAZ UL AHSAN  
MR. JUSTICE SAYYED MAZAHAR ALI AKBAR NAQVI 
 
CIVIL REVIEW PETITION NO. 526 OF 2020 IN 
CIVIL PETITION NO. 923 OF 2020 
(To review this Court’s order dated 21.10.2020 passed in Civil 
Petition No. 923/2020) 
 
Abid Hussain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
… Petitioner 
VERSUS 
Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Government of Pakistan through Chief 
of Air Staff, Islamabad 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
… Respondent 
 
For the Petitioner: 
Mr. Manzoor Ahmed Rehmani, ASC 
 
Ch. Akhtar Ali, AOR 
 
On Court’s Call: 
 
Mr. Sajid Ilyas Bhatti, Addl. Attorney Gen 
 
Date of Hearing: 
 
16.02.2021 
 
JUDGMENT 
 
SAYYED MAZAHAR ALI AKBAR NAQVI, J.- Through this petition 
under Article 188 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan, 1973, the petitioner seeks review of the order of this Court 
dated 21.10.2020 whereby Civil Petition No. 923/2020 filed by him 
was dismissed.  
2. 
 
Briefly stated the facts of the matter are that the 
petitioner while serving as Corporal Technician in the Pakistan Air 
Force in Administrative Wing at Faisal Base, Karachi, was charged 
on two counts i.e. under Sections 65 & 71 of Pakistan Air Force Act, 
1953 for an act prejudicial to good order and Air Force discipline and 
for getting firearms training while violating the norms of a disciplinary 
force at Bhimber, Azad Kashmir in the months of April/May, 2003. 
However, he was found guilty of charge under Section 71 of the 
Pakistan Air Force Act, 1953 by the Field General Court Martial vide 
order dated 07.10.2004 and while dismissing him from service, he 
was further burdened with rigorous imprisonment for a term of 9 
years and 8 months. This order was challenged before the Court of 
Appeals i.e. Appellate forum, which also concurred with the findings 
Civil Review Petition No. 526/2020 
2
of the Field General Court Martial vide order dated 19.03.2005. Being 
aggrieved by the orders passed by the Field General Court Martial 
and the Court of Appeals, the petitioner filed Constitutional Petition 
before the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, which was partially 
allowed vide judgment dated 26.04.2010 wherein the sentence of 9 
years 8 months was reduced to 1 year and 6 months SI. The learned 
High Court while deciding the said petition mainly held that the 
petitioner has been convicted and sentenced on the basis of solitary 
statement of one Ghulam Murtaza who was also saddled with similar 
charge and since his case is at par with Ghulam Murtaza, therefore, 
the petitioner also deserves the same punishment as recorded against 
the said Ghulam Murtaza. The petitioner challenged the judgment of 
the High Court before this Court after ten years by filing Civil Petition 
No. 923/2020, which was dismissed vide order dated 21.10.2020, 
hence, the instant petition with prayer to review the said order.  
3. 
 
 Learned counsel for the petitioner inter alia contended 
that the petitioner was charged for committing a civil offence, which 
under the Pakistan Air Force Act, 1953, does not confer jurisdiction to 
Field General Court Martial to try the petitioner; that according to the 
definition clause of the aforesaid Act, “civil offence” means an offence 
which is triable by an ordinary criminal court; that in this view of the 
matter, the petitioner ought to have been handed over to a criminal 
court of ordinary jurisdiction to proceed against him; that as the Field 
General Court Martial has wrongly assumed jurisdiction, the 
conviction and sentence awarded to the petitioner has lost its sanctity 
and the same may be set aside; that this point was raised before the 
High Court and before this Court in the memo of petition, but this 
Court in the judgment under review did not consider this point. 
Lastly, it is contended that the question of limitation is out of the 
purview as the jurisdictional question was specifically raised but it 
was not decided.  
4. 
 
On the other hand, learned Additional Attorney General 
has defended the order under review. He contended that being 
member of a disciplined force i.e. Pakistan Air Force, the petitioner 
was supposed to be dealt with under the Pakistan Air Force Act, 
1953, and was rightly tried and punished under the relevant law by 
the Field General Court Martial.  
Civil Review Petition No. 526/2020 
3
5. 
 
We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner as well 
as learned Law Officer at length and have also perused the relevant 
record with their able assistance. It would be in fitness of things to 
decide the question of venue of trial. The crux of the arguments 
advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that under the 
Pakistan Air Force Act, 1953, the Field General Court Martial had no 
jurisdiction to try the petitioner, rather the same was within the 
domain of the ordinary criminal court. To resolve this argument, it 
would be advantageous to reproduce Section 4(xi) & (xvi) of the 
Pakistan Air Force Act, 1953, which define “civil offence” and 
“criminal court” in the following language:- 
 
“4(xi) “civil offence” means an offence which is triable by a 
Criminal Court; 
 
4(xvi) “Criminal Court” means a Court of ordinary criminal 
justice in any part of Pakistan or established 
elsewhere 
by 
the 
authority 
of 
the 
Federal 
Government”;  
 
The words “civil offence” and “criminal court” are introduced in the 
laws enacted to deal with the personnel of the Armed Forces of 
Pakistan. The word “civil offence” has been defined in Pakistan Navy 
Ordinance, 1961, in the same language as has been used in the 
Pakistan Air Force Act, 1953. However, this expression has been 
outlined more clearly in the Pakistan Army Act, 1952, in the following 
terms:- 
 “8(3). “Civil offence” means an offence which, if 
committed in Pakistan, would be triable by a criminal 
court.” 
 
It is not out of context to mention that in ordinary meanings, the word 
“criminal court” refers to a court constituted to deal with criminal 
offences. It is an established rule of interpretation of the statute that 
any provision of law has to be given its ordinary meanings in 
ordinary circumstances unless and until it interprets a different 
connotation. This Court in the case of Dr. Zahid Javed Vs. Dr. Tahir 
Riaz Chaudhry (PLD 2016 SC 637) has categorically held that “when 
language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, then the Court 
must give effect to each word used in the statute and it would not be 
open to the Courts to adopt a hypothetical construction on the ground 
that such construction is more consistent with the alleged object and 
Civil Review Petition No. 526/2020 
4
policy of the Act.” The definition of “criminal court” though confines 
itself to a court established to deal with the criminal acts and 
omissions but close scrutiny of the language used by the Legislature 
while defining the word “criminal court” in the three enactments 
dealing with Armed Forces of Pakistan i.e. Pakistan Air Force Act, 
1953, Pakistan Army Act, 1952 and Pakistan Navy Ordinance, 1961, 
shows that it actually is a departure to give specific meanings 
regarding the definition of “criminal court” in which the domain of 
constitution of criminal court has been extended with special 
emphasis qua the authority of the Federal Government.  
6. 
 
Broadly speaking the expression “civil offence” & 
“criminal court” are alien to Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 and Code of 
Criminal Procedure, 1898. Chapter II of Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, 
deals with “General Exceptions” wherein the word “offence” is 
defined at number 40 in the following terms:- 
“40. "Offence": Except in the chapters and sections 
mentioned in clauses 2 and 3 of this section, the word 
"offence" denotes a thing made punishable by this Code.”  
 
However, there is an exception to the general law, which is 
spelled out from Section 5(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 
1898, which speaks about trial of offences against other laws. 
Section 6 of the Cr.P.C. categorizes the criminal courts into (i) High 
Court of a Province (in original/appellate jurisdiction), (ii) Courts of 
Sessions, (iii) Courts of Magistrates.  
7. 
 
Undeniably the petitioner was Corporal Technician i.e. a 
junior officer, therefore, was “airman” according to Section 4(viii) of 
the Pakistan Air Force Act, 1953, which says “airman” means any 
person subject to this Act other than an officer or a warrant officer”. 
According to Section 4(iv) “Air Force” means officers, warrant Officers 
and airmen…….”. Therefore, there is no doubt that the petitioner was 
subject to the Pakistan Air Force Act, 1953. The petitioner was 
convicted for the charge under Section 71 of the Pakistan Air Force 
Act, 1953. The expression “civil offence” is brainchild of the Pakistan 
Air Force Act, 1953. The same is reproduced as follows:- 
 
"71. Civil offences.___(1) Subject to the provisions of section 
72, any person subject to this Act who at any place in or 
beyond Pakistan commits any civil offence shall be deemed 
to be guilty of an offence against this Act and, if charged 
therewith under this section shall be liable to be dealt with 
Civil Review Petition No. 526/2020 
5
under this Act and, on conviction, be punishable as follows, 
that is to say :- 
 
(a) 
if the offence is one which would be punishable 
under any law in force in Pakistan with death or 
with imprisonment for life, he shall be liable to suffer 
any punishment, assigned for the offence by the 
aforesaid law or such less punishment as is in this 
Act mentioned; 
 
 
 
(b) 
in any other case, he shall be liable to suffer any 
punishment, assigned for the offence by any law in 
force in Pakistan, or to suffer short imprisonment or 
such less punishment as is in this Act mentioned;  
 
Provided that, where the offence of which any such 
person is found guilty is an offence liable to hadd 
under any Islamic law, the sentence awarded to him 
shall be that provided for the offence in that law”. 
 
(2) The powers of a court‑martial or an officer exercising 
authority under section 82 or section 86 to charge and to 
punish any person under this section shall not be affected 
by reason of the fact that the civil offence with which such 
person is charged is also an Air Force offence. 
 
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any 
other law for the time being in force, a person who becomes 
subject to this Act by reason of his being accused of an 
offence mentioned in clause (dd) of section 2 shall be liable 
to be tried or otherwise dealt with under this Act for such 
offence as if the offence were an offence against this Act 
and were committed at a time when such person was 
subject to this Act; and the provisions of this section shall 
have effect accordingly.” 
 
8. 
 
Section 71(1) clearly lays down that if any person who is 
subject to the Pakistan Air Force Act, 1953, commits a civil offence, he 
shall be deemed to be guilty of an offence against this Act and shall 
be liable to be dealt with under the Pakistan Air Force Act, 1953. Sub-
sections 1(a) and 1(b) and its proviso prescribe punishment for 
different kind of offences. The words “any person subject to this Act 
who at any place in or beyond Pakistan commits any civil offence 
shall be deemed to be guilty of an offence against this Act and, if 
charged therewith under this section shall be liable to be dealt with 
under this Act” need no elaborative interpretation.  
9. 
 
Section 72 of the Pakistan Air Force Act, 1953, is an 
exception to the aforesaid Section 71. It speaks about civil offences, 
which are not triable by courts-martial in the following manner:- 
“72. Civil offences not triable by courts‑martial. A person 
subject to this Act who commits an offence of murder 
against a person not subject to Military, Naval or Air Force 
Civil Review Petition No. 526/2020 
6
law, or of culpable homicide not amounting to murder 
against such a person, or of zina or zinabiljabr in relation to 
such a person, shall not be deemed to be guilty of an 
offence under this Act and shall not be tried by a 
court‑martial, unless he commits any of the said offences:- 
 
(a) 
while on active service, or 
 
(b) 
at any place outside Pakistan, or 
 
(c) 
at 
a 
frontier 
post 
specified 
by 
the 
Federal 
Government by notification in this behalf.” 
 
10. 
 
In the case of Said Zaman Khan Vs. Federation of 
Pakistan (2017 SCMR 1249), the accused although was a civilian but 
was involved in launching attacks on the Pakistan Army. This Court 
candidly held that although he was a civilian but due to his acts, he 
became subject of Pakistan Army Act. It was held as under:- 
“The offence of which the Convict was accused is obviously 
punishable under the ordinary law of the lands triable by a 
Criminal Court, hence, constituted a "civil offence" as defined 
by subsection (3) of section 8 and liable to be tried by the 
FGCM in view of the provisions of section 59 of the said Act. 
 
11. 
 
In the famous case of Cox Vs. Army Council ([1963] AC 
48, House of Lords), the petitioner while serving in the British Army in 
Germany was charged before a District Court Martial under Section 
70 of the Army Act, 1955 for committing a “civil offence” i.e. driving 
without due care and attention contrary to Section 3(1) of the Road 
Traffic Act, 1960 and was sentenced to be severely reprimanded. He 
appealed on the ground that the charge under Section 70 of the Army 
Act, 1955, is not correct as it does not disclose an offence; that the 
charge is not a civil offence within the meaning of said Section 70, 
and that the act of driving without care and attention is not an act 
which can be committed in England. The Court of Appeals dismissed 
his appeal by holding as under:- 
“This Court accordingly holds that section 70 is upon its true 
construction an offence-creating section, and it covers an act 
committed abroad by a person subject to military law which, if 
committed in England, would have constituted an offence 
under section 3(1) of the Road Traffic Act, 1960. The appellant 
was, therefore, rightly convicted of the civil offence with which 
he was charged.” 
            
The definition of the word “civil offence” also came under discussion. 
The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as follows:- 
Civil Review Petition No. 526/2020 
7
“Before dealing with this argument, it is desirable to analyse 
section 70 of the Army Act, which provides as follows: “(1) Any 
person subject to military law who commits a civil offence, 
whether in the United Kingdom or elsewhere, shall be guilty of 
an offence against this Section. (2) In this Act the expression 
‘civil offence’ means any act or omission, (a) punishable by the 
law of England, or (b) which, if committed in England, would 
be punishable by that law; and in this Act the expression ‘the 
corresponding civil offence’ means the civil offence the 
commission of which constitutes the offence against this 
section.” The letters (a) and (b) have been introduced by this 
court to facilitate reference hereafter. “Civil offence” means, of 
course, a civil as opposed to a purely military offence.” 
 
(Underlined to lay emphasis) 
 
The appeal before the House of Lords was also dismissed and in 
doing so, the House of Lords further elaborated the meaning of word 
“civil offence” as under:- 
“I have made no mention of a point which may deserve 
consideration in some future case. It will have been observed 
that “civil offence” is defined by Section 70(2) as meaning not 
only any “act” but also any “omission” which, if committed in 
England would be punishable by the law of England.”  
(Underlined to lay emphasis) 
 
12. 
 
In view of the above, it can safely be concluded that the 
word “civil offence” though alien to Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, 
however, the acts and omissions similar to those offences relating to 
civilians are ordinarily triable by criminal courts in Pakistan. The 
expression “civil offence” is exclusively brainchild of the statute 
relating to the offences committed by members of the armed forces, 
hence, any person who is subject to law of the armed forces, if 
commits civil offence, would be dealt with under the procedure laid 
down in the respective enactments. However, the provision of Section 
5(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, is an exception and that 
can be pressed into to avail the application of said provision for the 
purposes of taking cognizance to deal with the matter in the spirit of 
the enactment. The intent of the law makers is that any offence, 
which is punishable under ordinary law of Pakistan, if committed by 
a person who is subject to the law of armed forces including Pakistan 
Air Force, he would be dealt with under the respective law of the 
armed forces.   
13. 
 
In view of what has been discussed in the preceding 
paragraphs, the Field General Court Martial had full jurisdiction to try 
the petitioner. We have noted that although the point of jurisdiction 
was taken in the memo of petitions before this Court and the High 
Civil Review Petition No. 526/2020 
8
Court but it was never argued. Nonetheless, the petitioner should 
have taken the jurisdictional point before the court of first instance.   
14. 
 
So far as the merits of the case are concerned, we have 
noted that this Court in the order under review has very elaborately 
dealt with the matter in paragraphs 2 & 3 of the order to which no 
exception can be taken. The said paragraphs read as under:- 
“2. 
The petitioner was not alone as there were other 
persons also who received firearm training, couple of them 
were in the service of Air Force. One of those was Ghulam 
Murtaza, who appeared as witness for the prosecution. 
Ghulam Murtaza in his deposition had stated that he was 
inquisitive to know as to how the Mujahidin get training in 
the camps. For such purpose, he obtained one week leave 
on the pretext of solving domestic problems. He also 
deposed that the petitioner also obtained training with him. 
Though such exculpatory statement is not sufficient to 
convict a co-accused, however, in the evidence it has come 
on the record that the petitioner did go to the place where 
other persons were being imparted firearm training. The 
petitioner stated that he did not go inside where training 
was imparted; that thereafter he came back with his senior 
and went to his native town. In his statement, he narrated 
how he reached that unknown place from Sargodha by 
public transport and did not inquire his senior where he 
was going. He also stated that he did not bear the travel 
expenditure and only when he reached the unknown place, 
he came to know that it was a firearm training camp. The 
High Court, while keeping in view the fact that the 
prosecution witness who confessed his guilt was given less 
punishment, reduced the sentence awarded to 
the 
petitioner from nine years eight months RI to one year six 
months RI as was awarded to Ghulam Murtaza.  
 
3. 
After ten years of such decision and after getting 
released from jail after serving his sentence, the petitioner 
has filed this petition in the year 2020. Keeping aside the 
delay on one side, we proceeded to examine the merits of 
the case and found that there was sufficient material on 
record for awarding punishment. The High Court has 
already taken a lenient view by reducing the sentence from 
nine years eight months to one year and six months. No 
case for interference has been made out. This petition is, 
therefore, dismissed and leave refused.”  
 
15. 
 
The proceedings carried out by the Field General Court 
Martial were appropriate and all the legal requirements of law were 
fully adhered to meet the ends of justice. The petitioner was given full 
opportunity to plead his case. This Court has repeatedly held that 
review jurisdiction vested in this Court under Article 188 of the 
Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, read with Order 
XXVI of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980, can be invoked only when 
there is an error apparent on the face of the record, or for ends of 
Civil Review Petition No. 526/2020 
9
justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the court. Such 
jurisdiction is not open to allowing re-hearing or re-arguing the merits 
of a case. Learned counsel for the petitioner could not point out any 
error apparent on the face of record, which could warrant interference 
by this Court. Besides, we have noted that the petitioner had 
challenged the judgment of the High Court before this Court after a 
lapse of more than ten years. He could not give any plausible reason 
for such an inordinate delay. Not challenging the order of the High 
Court means that the petitioner had accepted the decision. It is a well 
settled proposition of law that irrespective of the fact that the order is 
vague, without jurisdiction or illegal, one must approach the 
competent court of law to challenge the same within time prescribed 
by law. Where a right is required to be asserted, it has to be done 
vigilantly and no indulgence can be shown to indolent and negligent 
litigant.  
16. 
 
For what has been discussed above, this review petition 
is dismissed.  
 
 
 
 
CHIEF JUSTICE 
 
JUDGE 
 
JUDGE 
Islamabad, the  
16th of February, 2021 
Approved For Reporting 
Khurram