IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN
(Appellate Jurisdiction)
I
PRESENT:
MR. JUSTICE GULZAR AHMED, CJ
MR. JUSTICE IJAZ UL AUSAN
MR. JUSTICE MUNIB AKHTAR
Civil Appeal No.749 of 2021
On appeal from order dated 16.07.2020 of
High Court of Balochistan at Quetta, passed
in C.P.No. 1233 of 2017.
Pakistan Electric Power Company 
..Appellant(s)
Versus
Syed Salahuddin & others 
.Respondent(s)
For the Appellant(s) 
Mr. Munawar Iqbal Duggal, ASC
Syed Rafaqat Hussain Shah, AOR
For Respondents# 1&2 
Mr. Kamran Murtaza, Sr.ASC
(via video link from Quetta)
For Respondents# 3&4 
Nemo
Date of Hearing 21.12.2021
JUDGMENT
IJAZ UL AHSAN, J-. This appeal by leave of
the Court arises out of a judgment of the High Court of
Balochistan at Quetta dated 16.07.2020. Through the
impugned judgment, a constitutional petition bearing
No.1233 of 2017 filed by Respondents No.1 and 2 (Syed
Salahuddin Sahibzada Karim Jan) was allowed and the
Appellant-PEPCO was directed to notify their promotions
as Superintending Engineers (BS-19) with effect from
13.10.2016 instead of 14.04.2017 and they were also
- 
Civil Appeal No.749°f 2021 
2
held entitled to pensionary and all other benefits as
Superintending Engineers (BS- 19) with effect from
13.10.2016.
2. Briefly stated the facts necessary for decision
of this Appeal are that Respondents No.1 and 2
approached the High Court of Balochistan by way of a
constitutional petition seeking a direction that action of
the Appellant of notifying them in BS-19 on 14.04.20 17
after their juniors were promoted in the next grade on
13.10.2016 was illegal with a further direction to the
Appellant to notify them in BS-19 with effect from the
date when their juniors were notified i.e. 13.10.2016. The
petition was contested on various legal and factual
plains. One of the main grounds urged by the Appellant
was that the Respondents were admittedly employees of
Quetta Electric Supply Company ("QESCO") which was a
separate and distinct legal entity incorporated under the
Companies Ordinance, 1984 which did not have any
statutory rules. In the absence of any statutory rules,
alleged violation of terms and conditions of QESCO would
not attract the constitutional jurisdiction of the High
Court as held by this Court, vide judgment dated
21.06.2012 passed in C.P.No.1591 of 2011 titled Chief
Executive Officer PESCO, Peshawar v. Muhammad Aftab-
ur-Rehman and others.
S
Civu A ppeal No.749 of 2022 
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3. Leave to appeal was granted by this Court on
24.05.202 1 in the following terms:
"The learned ASC for the petitioner-PEPCO inter alia
contends that there are no statutory rules of service
governing the employees of the petitioner-PEPCO and the
High Court has erred in law in observing that the employees
of the petitioner are governed by the statutory rules of service
and thereby allowed the constitutional petition filed by the
Respondents.
2.
Having heard the learned counsel and going through
the impugned judgment, we are inclined to grant leave to
appeal in this case to consider inter alia the reasons
recorded in our last order dated 24.05.2021 as well as the
submissions made before us today. Appeal stage paper
books be prepared on the available record. However, the
parties are at liberty to file additional documents, if any
within a period of one month. As the matter relates to service,
the Office is directed to fix the same for hearing in Court
expeditiously, preferably after three months.
3.
Since the impugned judgment has been rendered by a
Division Bench of the High Court, the appeal arising out of
the instant petition be fixed before a three member Bench of
this Court."
4.
The learned counsel for the Appellant-PEPCO
submits that the High Court failed to take into
consideration the fact that Respondents No.1 and 2 were
employees of QESCO which does not have statutory rules
and any alleged violation of terms and conditions of
service of the said Respondents would not attract the
constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court. He further
maintains that where terms and conditions of employees
of a statutory body are not regulated by rules framed
civil Appeal No. 749 of 2021
- under any Statute but under the rules and instructions
issued for its internal use, the constitutional jurisdiction
of the High Court cannot be invoked. He maintains that
the impugned judgment of the High Court fails to take
notice of the law laid down by this Court in the case of
"Pakistan Defence Officers' Housing Authority and others
v. Lt. Col. Sed Jawaid Ahmed" (2013 SCMR 1707). He
adds that the impugned judgment has not even
considered a Division Bench's decision of the same Court
reported as "Ali Gohar Mazar v. Federation of Pakistan
through Chief Executive Officer, Quetta Electric Supply
and others" (2010 PLC (CS) 353), where it was clearly
and categorically held that employees of QESCO could
not invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the High
Court.
5. The learned counsel for Respondents No.1 and
2 has however defended the impugned judgment. He
maintains that the employees of QESCO and Pakistan
Electric Power Company ("PEPCO") are governed by the
statutory rules in view of the fact that Pakistan WAPDA
Employees (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 1978 have
been adopted by the Board of Directors of QESCO in its
meeting dated 28.06.2005. Therefore, by reason of such
adoption, the employees of QESCO and PEPCO are 
governed by the statutory rules.
Civil Appeal No.7490(2021 
5
6. We have heard the learned counsel for the
parties and gone through the record. It appears that
Respondents No-1 and 2 were Electrical Engineers and
inducted into service of WAPDA on 23.11.1985 and
15.08.1984 respectively. Subsequently, when bifurcation
of WAPDA as envisaged in Section 8(vii) of the WAPDA
Act, 1958 took place whereby the Power Wing of WAPDA
was restructured into generation, transmission and
distribution of electrical power, different corporate
entities/ companies were established under the then
Companies Ordinance, 1984. The Appellant had been
given the mandate to take control and manage the
process of transition of WAPDA Power Wing into
aforementioned corporate entities. Consequently, services
of the contesting Respondents were transferred by the
Appellant to QESCO in the year 2003-04 after obtaining
consent from them, as they were local residents of
Balochistan and wished to serve in their Province. While
serving at QESCO, the said Respondents were promoted
as Executive Engineers on 23.06.2007 and 02.02.2007
respectively after observing all codal formalities. As per
Manpower Transition Programme, a centralized seniority
list of officers serving in BS-18 and onwards in different
Energy related Corporations was being maintained by
PEPCO and promotion was also the mandate of PEPCO.
CIIM Appeal X..749 of 202) 
6
7. The record also indicates that promotion cases
of 145 senior Engineers, on the basis of integrated
seniority list were considered by PEPCO Selection Board.
In the said seniority list, Respondents No.1 and 2 were
placed at Nos. 118 and 119 respectively. In this respect,
PEPCO Selection Board considered the question of
promotions on the basis of parameters elaborated in
PEPCO Promotion Policy ("the Policy"). Key Performance
Indicators ("KPI5") and Mobile Meter Reading Data
("MMR") were evaluated/ considered to determine the
performance of every individual on the basis of data
collected from respective Distribution Companies. After
considering all material aspects, the Selection Board
recommended promotion of 57 senior Engineers,
including Respondents No.1 and 2, out of 145 senior
Engineers to the rank of Superintending Engineers (non-
generation) (BS- 19). However, out of the said 57 senior
Engineers, the Board recommended immediate
promotions of 35 senior Engineers unconditionally
whereas the remaining 22 senior Engineers, including
Respondents No.1 and 2 were recommended for
promotion subject to certain conditions. In the case of
Respondents No.1 and 2, they were recommended for
promotion with the condition that, "their performance will
be monitored for next three months and if found
ciVil A ppeal IV,. 749 of 2021 
7
satisfactory, promotion orders will be issued accordingly".
Following the recommendations of the Board conditional
promotion letters were issued clearly stating as under:
'The performance of the officers after their
promotion will be evaluated on the basis of defined KPIs
for a period of six months, extendable for further three
months. In case of failure to perform in accordance with
the prescribed KPIs for the post, the promotion of the
officers will be reviewed. It was also categorically
stated that promotion of officers at Serial Nos. 1 to 34,
will be purely on temporary basis and they will not
claim seniority/promotion over those who may
otherwise be senior to them."
8. It appears from the record that performance
evaluation of a number of senior Engineers including
Respondents No.1 and 2 as per KPIs was requested from
QESCO after completion of three months vide letter dated
04.11.2016 by the Appellant. The requisite performance
evaluation of the said officers was provided and after
examination of the same, reports were compiled and
summarized and cases of 17 officers including
Respondents No.1 and 2 were sent for approval of
promotion by the competent authority. Out of the said 17
officers, promotion orders of 10 officers having
satisfactory performance were issued on 26.12.2016.
However, the performance of remaining officers including
Respondents No.1 and 2 having not been found 
satisfactory were recommended to be observed for further
CMM A ppeal Np 79 o[2021
three months. On expiry of such period of three months,
the competent authority after being satisfied to some
extent with their performance issued their promotion
orders and they were accordingly promoted with effect
from 14.04.2017. Respondents No.1 and 2 were aggrieved
of their promotion with effect from 14.04.2017 and
sought promotion from the date on which their juniors
were promoted i.e. 13.10.2016. The High Court allowed
their petition by observing that lawful justification for
issuing promotion orders of different senior officers on
different dates had not been provided. It was further
observed that there was no justification available on the
record as to why the recommendations dated 12.08.20 16
were not given effect across the board. The High Court
therefore recorded a finding that General Manager (HR)
PEPCO/the Appellant had acted with malice in issuing
promotion orders of the Respondents on 14.04.20 17
instead of 13.10.2016. The aforenoted narration of the
procedure adopted by the Appellant-PEPCO makes it
abundantly clear that it had placed on record all material
documents showing fulfilment of procedural formalities
on the basis of which some Engineers were promoted
immediately and the others conditionally for which valid 
1
reasons which fell within the purview of PEPCO Selection
Board were furnished.
-T
Civil Appeal No. 749 of 2022
9. We also find that there was no justification or
basis for the High Court to come to the conclusion that
GM (HR), PEPCO had acted with malice. We have 
I
scanned through the record and do not find any material
that may even remotely point towards mala fide or malice
on the part of the functionaries of the Appellant. We
therefore find that the finding recorded by the High Court
relating to malice and absence of lawful reasons or
justification for promoting different officers on different
dates was not based on the record and arose out of
misinterpretation and misconception of proceedings of
I
the Selection Board as reflected in the Minutes. We are
also of the view that the PEPCO Selection Board was
competent in the matter and imposition of conditions
including evaluation of officials in view of their
performance on the basis of defined KPIs for a period of
three months extendable by another three months was
neither unlawful nor unreasonable and squarely fell
within the parameters of the Policy and directives of the
competent authorities.
10. There is yet another aspect of the matter. A
specific objection regarding jurisdiction of the High Court
to entertain the petition was raised which was dealt with
in the following manner:
Civil Apucol No. 742 of 2021 
10
"The petitioners being employees of QESCO/PEPCO are
governed by statutory rules ana as sucri rn.e
constitutional petition filed by the Respondents under
Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of
Pakistan, 1973 is maintainable.
We find that in the first place, there was no
ground to hold that the Respondents were governed by
the statutory rules. Admittedly, the Respondents by their
own choice had joined QESCO which is a distinct and
separate legal entity having been incorporated in the
erstwhile Companies Ordinance, 1984 and has its own
Board of Directors. Just by reason of the fact that
QESCO had adopted existing rules of WAPDA for its
internal use does not make such rules statutory in the
context of QESCO. It was clearly and categorically held
by this Court in Pakistan Defence Officers Housiflg
Authority (ibid), Pakistan Telecommunication Company
Ltd through its Chairman v. Igbal Nasir and others (PTA])
2011 SC 132) as well as Pakistan International Airlines
Corporation and others v. Tanveer ur Rehman and others
(PLD 2010 Sc 676) that where conditions of service of
employees of a statutory body are not regulated by
rules/ regulations framed under the Statute but only by
rules or instructions issued for its internal use, any
violation thereof could not normally be enforced through
constitutional jurisdiction and they would be governed by
the principle of "master and servant". The learned High
CU,u Avoeo( Np 749 of 2021 
11
Court appears to have not been assisted properly in the
matter and therefore omitted to notice the said principle
of law laid down in the aforenoted case and reiterated
repeatedly in a number of subsequent judgments of this
Court.
11. Further, while assuming jurisdiction in the
matter, the learned High Court omitted to appreciate that
in case of an employee of a Corporation where protection
cannot be sought under any statutory instrument or
enactment, the relationship between the employer and
the employee is governed by the principle of "master and
servant" and in such case the constitutional jurisdiction
of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution
cannot be invoked. We also find that although a
judgment of this Court dated 07.03.2019 in the case of
employees of IESCO was brought to the notice of the
High Court in which a similar finding was recorded
regarding non-availability of constitutional jurisdiction to
the employees of IESCO, the Court appears to have
misinterpreted and misconstrued the ratio of the same
and therefore arrived at a conclusion which appears to be
contrary to the settled law on the subject. We also notice
that a judgment of a Division Bench of the same High
Court escaped the notice of the High Court of
Balochistan whereby it had clearly held that employees of
F
CluE? Appeal No. 749 of 2021 
12
QESCO could not invoke its constitutional jurisdiction.
Further, a judgment of this Court rendered in the case of
Chief Executive Officer PESCO, Peshawar (ibkl) examined
the question of jurisdiction of the High Court under
Article 199 of the Constitution in matters relating to
employees of PEPCO which is identically placed insofar
as it was also incorporated under the Companies
Ordinance, 1984 pursuant to bifurcation of various
Wings of WAPDA into separate corporate entities and it
came to the conclusion that since PEPCO did not have
statutory rules, the High Court lacked jurisdiction to
interfere in matters involving employment disputes
between PEPCO and its employees. The ratio of the said
judgment was clearly attracted to the facts and
circumstances of this case, which appears to have
escaped the notice of the High Court. We are therefore in
no manner of doubt that in view of the fact that QESCO
does not have statutory rules governing the terms and
conditions of service of its employees, the relationship
between the Appellant-PEPCO and Respondents No.1
and 2 was governed by the principle of "master and
servant" and the Respondents could not have invoked t
 H
constitutional jurisdictional of the High Court for
redressal of their grievances.
Civil Appeal No. 749 of 2021 
13
12. For the foregoing reasons, we find that the
impugned judgment of the High Court dated 16.07.2020
rendered in C.P.No, 1233 of 2017 is unsustainable and is
accordingly set aside. Consequently, the appeal is
allowed.
ISLAMABAD. THE
2.1.12.2021
ZR/*
NOT APPROVED FOR REPORTING