IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN 
(APPELLATE JURISDICTION) 
 
 
PRESENT: MR. JUSTICE MIAN SAQIB NISAR, HCJ 
MR. JUSTICE UMAR ATA BANDIAL  
MR. JUSTICE IJAZ UL AHSAN 
 
 
CIVIL APPEALS NO.1171, 1179 TO 1187, 1190 TO 
1192, 1198 TO 1236, 1242, 1255, 1274 TO 1276, 
1502 TO 1515 OF 2017 AND 114 OF 2013 
(Against the judgments dated 3.8.2017 and 30.4.2012 of the 
High Court on Sindh, Karachi and Peshawar High Court, 
Peshawar passed in H.C.As.No.83/2015, 263, 268, 271, 264, 
266, 274, 276, I.C.A.No.281/2016, H.C.As.No.306, 265, 278, 
275, 269, 270, 272, 273, 277, 283, 285, 321, 322, 338, 
288/2016, 85, 84/2015  and C.R.No.215/2008) 
 
AND 
 
CIVIL MISC. APPLICATIONS NO.6517, 6204, 
6207, 6936 TO 6940, 8195, 8196, 6723, 6725, 
6727, 6729, 6731, 6735, 6747, 6721, 6733, 6737, 
6741, 6743, 6745, 8394, 8395, 6739 OF 2017 
(Applications for impleadment) 
 
 
M/s Searle IV Solution (Pvt) Ltd. 
In C.A.1171/2017 
M/s Naveena Industries Ltd. 
In C.A.1179/2017 
M/s Artistic Denim Mills (Pvt) Ltd. 
In C.A.1180/2017 
M/s Monnoowal Textile Mills, Ltd. 
In C.A.1181/2017 
M/s Artistic Fabric Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. 
In C.A.1182/2017 
M/s Rizwan enterprises 
In C.A.1183/2017 
M/s Maksons Textile Ltd 
In C.A.1184/2017 
M/s Naveena Industries Ltd 
In C.A.1185/2017 
M/s Sapphire Textile Mills Ltd 
In C.A.1186/2017 
M/s Umair Spinning Mills (PVT) Ltd. 
In C.A.1187/2017 
M/s Kassim Textile Mills (PVT) Ltd. 
In C.A.1190/2017 
M/s Kassim Textile Mills (PVT) Ltd. 
In C.A.1191/2017 
M/s Khas Textile Mills (PVT) Ltd. 
In C.A.1192/2017 
Unilever Pakistan Ltd. 
In C.A.1198/2017 
K- Electric Ltd. 
In C.A.1199/2017 
I.G.I. Insurance Ltd., Karachi 
In C.A.1200/2017 
E.N.I. Pakistan Limited etc. 
In C.A.1201/2017 
Standard Chartered Bank (Pakistan) Ltd. 
In C.A.1202/2017 
National Foods Ltd. 
In C.A.1203/2017 
Schlumberger Seaco Inc. etc. 
In C.A.1204/2017 
Tapal Tea (Pvt.) Ltd. 
In C.A.1205/2017 
Pakistan Petroleum Ltd. & another 
In C.A.1206/2017 
Reckitt Benckiser Pakistan Ltd. 
In C.A.1207/2017 
Vision Holdings Middle East Ltd. & another 
In C.A.1208/2017 
Engro Corporation Ltd. Karachi etc. 
In C.A.1209/2017 
Atlas Honda Ltd. 
In C.A.1210/2017 
Abbott Laboratories (Pakistan) Ltd. 
In C.A.1211/2017 
Engro Foods Ltd. 
In C.A.1212/2017 
J.S. Bank Ltd. & another 
In C.A.1213/2017 
Habib Metro Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. etc. 
In C.A.1214/2017 
Liberty Power Tech Ltd. 
In C.A.1215/2017 
Civil Appeal No.1171 of 2017 etc. 
-: 2 :-
I.B.M. Italia S.P.A. Pakistan 
In C.A.1216/2017 
United Energy Pakistan Limited & another 
In C.A.1217/2017 
Sabre Travel Network Pakistan (Pvt) Ltd. 
In C.A.1218/2017 
M/s Zaman Textile Mills, Ltd. 
In C.A.1219/2017 
M/s Al-Karam Towel Industries(Pvt) Ltd. 
In C.A.1220/2017 
M/s Mekotex (Pvt) Ltd. 
In C.A.1221/2017 
M/s Artistic Fabric Mills (Pvt) Ltd. 
In C.A.1222/2017 
M/s Khas Textile Mills (Pvt) Ltd. 
In C.A.1223/2017 
M/s Sapphire Textile Mills Ltd. 
In C.A.1224/2017 
M/s Hantax Karachi 
In C.A.1225/2017 
M/s Umer Spinning Mill Ltd. etc. 
In C.A.1226/2017 
M/s Latif Textile Mills (Pvt) Ltd. & another 
In C.A.1227/2017 
M/s N.P. Cotton Mills Ltd. 
In C.A.1228/2017 
M/s Diamond International Corporation Ltd. 
In C.A.1229/2017 
M/s Kidney Centre Postgraduate Training 
Institute 
In C.A.1230/2017 
M/s Gul Ahmed Textile Mills Ltd. 
In C.A.1231/2017 
M/s Proctor & Gamble Pakistan (Pvt) Ltd. 
In C.A.1232/2017 
M/s Ismail Industries, Karachi 
In C.A.1233/2017 
M/s Akram Cotton Mills Ltd. 
In C.A.1234/2017 
M/s Sapphire Textile Mills Ltd. 
In C.A.1235/2017 
BGP (Pakistan) International 
In C.A.1236/2017 
Qasim 
International 
Container 
Terminal 
Pakistan Limited & another 
In C.A.1242/2017 
Amreli Steels Ltd. 
In C.A.1255/2017 
M/s Shazeb Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. 
In C.A.1274/2017 
M/s A - Z Pharmaceutical Ltd. 
In C.A.1275/2017 
M/s Unisa Pharmaceutical Ltd. 
In C.A.1276/2017 
Al Baraka Bank (Pakistan) Limited etc. 
In C.A.1502/2017 
Independent Media Corporation Pvt. Ltd. 
In C.A.1503/2017 
Lucky Cement Ltd. & another 
In C.A.1504/2017 
M/s Fatima Fertilizer Co. Ltd. 
In C.A.1505/2017 
Pakistan State Oil Company Ltd. 
In C.A.1506/2017 
Byco Petroleum Pakistan Ltd. 
In C.A.1507/2017 
Dawood Hercules Corporation Ltd. 
In C.A.1508/2017 
M/s Ericsson Pakistan Pvt. Ltd. 
In C.A.1509/2017 
M/s A.F. Ferguson & Co etc. 
In C.A.1510/2017 
Shamoon 
Sultan 
through 
Authorized 
Representative 
In C.A.1511/2017 
M/s Matiari Sugar Mills Ltd. 
In C.A.1512/2017 
M/s Mekotex Pvt. Ltd. etc. 
In C.A.1513/2017 
Team A-Venture Pvt. Ltd. 
In C.A.1514/2017 
Pakistan International bulk Terminal Ltd. 
In C.A.1515/2017 
Collector 
of 
Customs 
Model 
Customs 
Collectorate Peshawar etc. 
In C.A.114/2013 
 
…Appellant(s) 
VERSUS 
Federation of Pakistan and others 
In C.A.1171/2017 
Federal Board of Revenue thr. its Chairman etc. 
In C.As.1179, 1181, 
1185, 1187, 1180 to 
1192 and 1219 to 
1235/2017 
The Collector, Model Customs Collectorate Port 
M. Bin Qasim, Karachi etc. 
In C.As.1180, 1182 
to 
1184, 
1186, 
, 
1198 to 1218, 1236, 
1242, 1255, 1274 to 
1276 and 1502 to 
Civil Appeal No.1171 of 2017 etc. 
-: 3 :-
1515/2017 
M. S. Khyber Spinning Mills Gadoon Ltd. though 
its Chief Executive and another 
In C.A.1182/2017 
 
…Respondent(s) 
 
 
For the Appellant(s)/ 
Applicant(s): 
 
In C.A.1171/2017 
 
Mr. Abdul Sattar Pirzada, ASC 
In C.As.1179 to 1187, 
1190, 1192, 1219 to 
1235/2017 
 
Mr. Khalid Anwar, Sr. ASC 
Mr. Rashid Anwar, ASC 
In C.As.1198 to 1218, 
1236, 1242, 1255/2017  
and C.M.As.6204, 6207, 
6936 to 6940, 8195 & 
8196/2017 
Mr. Makhdoom Ali Khan, Sr. ASC 
Mr. M. Kassim Mirjat, AOR 
 
In CAs 1274 to 
1276/2017 
 
Mr. Zaheer-ul-Hassan Minhas, ASC 
 
In C.A.114/2013 
 
Dr. Farhat Zafar, ASC 
Mr. M. S. Khattak, AOR 
 
 
In C.As.1502 to 
1515/2017 
Dr. Farough Naseem, ASC 
Mr. Mehmood A. Sheikh, AOR 
 
 
In C.M.As.6517, 6723, 
6725, 6727, 6729, 6731, 
6735, 6747, 6721, 6733,  
6737, 6741, 6743, 6745, 
6735, 6739/2017 
Dr. Farough Naseem, ASC 
Mr. Mehmood A. Sheikh, AOR 
 
 
For the Respondent(s): 
 
For Collector of Customs 
Karachi (in all cases) 
 
Mr. Kafil Ahmed Abbasi, ASC 
 
For Collector of Customs 
Port Qasim Karachi (in 
all cases) 
Raja Muhammad Iqbal, ASC 
Raja Abdul Ghafoor, AOR 
 
 
In C.As.1182, 1186, 1187, 
1192 & 1220/2017 
Mr. Khalid Mehmood Siddiqui, ASC 
 
 
In C.A.1274 to 
1276/2017 
Ms. Misbah Gulnar Sharif, ASC 
 
 
 
For FBR 
Mr. M. Sarfraz Metlo, ASC 
 
 
In C.A.1198/2017 
Mr. Salman Akram Raja, ASC 
Assisted by Mr. M. Asad Lada, Adv. 
 
 
In C.A.1504/2017 
Mr. Rehmanullah, ASC 
 
 
In C.A.1192/2017) 
Dr. Raana Khan, AOR 
 
 
Civil Appeal No.1171 of 2017 etc. 
-: 4 :-
In C.A.114/2013 
Mr. Abdul Latif Afridi, ASC 
 
 
Commission IR 
(Corporate) Multan 
Mr. Salman Bhatti, ASC 
Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, AOR 
 
 
Date of Hearing: 
21.2.2018 
 
JUDGMENT 
 
 
 
MIAN SAQIB NISAR, CJ.- The questions of law and fact 
involved in all the civil appeals in the instant matter are similar thus the 
same are being disposed of through this single judgment. Appellants, 
being importers of different raw materials, had earlier claimed exemption 
of sales tax/customs duties under certain SRO(s) issued in terms of the 
Customs Act 1969 (Customs Act) and the Sales Act, 1990 (Sales Act), or in 
some cases under certain Schedules in the Sales Tax Act which the 
relevant authorities/Assessment Officer(s) under the relevant taxing 
statutes denied them, thereby passing adverse orders to this extent/effect. 
Amongst other things, in some of these appeals the parties are also in 
dispute as to the legal provision under which these orders were passed; 
whether they were passed under Section 32 or Section 80 of the Customs 
Act. Although Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) places a 
limitation on the pecuniary jurisdiction of the civil courts in terms whereof 
the cognizance to try a suit of civil nature is expressly or even impliedly 
barred by the governing law or Statute in the matter concerned, and there 
being an express bar of this nature in Section 217(2) of the Customs Act, 
yet the appellants proceeded to approach the Single Bench of the Sindh 
High Court at Karachi in exercise of its civil jurisdiction for the redressal 
of their grievance against these adverse orders, despite the fact that other 
forums for redressal of their grievances (and subsequent appeals) were 
available with regards to such orders within the mechanism/scheme of 
the Statute (the Customs Act). In doing so the appellants mainly claimed that 
they fell under the exemption(s) laid out in a plethora of judgments of this 
Civil Appeal No.1171 of 2017 etc. 
-: 5 :-
Court whereby inter alia an order tainted with mala fide or one made 
beyond jurisdiction conferred could be challenged through a civil suit 
despite there being an express bar to the cognizance of the same by a civil 
court. These suits were decreed in favor of the respondents by the learned 
Single Bench of the High Court at Karachi in exercise of its civil 
jurisdiction, on merits, holding that the same were maintainable on 
account of falling within the exemptions carved out by the law laid down 
by this Court on the matter, whereas the Division Bench, without going 
into the merits, held that the said suits of the appellants were not 
maintainable and in the same breath held that no suit lay against any 
order, notification etc. relating to a taxing statute, including the Sales Tax 
Act, the Income Tax Ordinance 2001, the Federal Excise Act 2005 and the 
Sindh Sales Tax  on Services Act 2011, unless all the grievance redressal 
remedies provided therein had been exhausted. An ancillary observation 
made by the learned High Court in the judgment impugned is that the bar 
of jurisdiction under the taxing statutes including Section 217(2) of the 
Customs Act is only to the extent of the exercise of the original civil 
jurisdiction by “civil courts”, which it held, includes the Single Bench of 
the High Court in its exercise of the same, however, the Division Bench of 
the High Court can exercise jurisdiction in respect of disputes arising or 
relatable to special laws of taxation under its reference jurisdiction as 
conferred by law under Section 217 of the Customs Act, 1969, Section 51 of 
the Sales Act, Section 227 of the Income tax Ordinance, 2001, and Section 
41 of the Federal Excise Act 2005 under lawful instituted proceedings, and 
also in appropriate cases, under its extra ordinary constitutional 
jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution. The appellants now 
include those in appeal against the impugned judgment as well as those 
affected 
thereby 
under 
the 
blanket 
bar 
of 
civil 
suits 
from 
orders/notifications etc. of all taxing statutes. Amongst other contentions, 
Civil Appeal No.1171 of 2017 etc. 
-: 6 :-
the counsels for the appellants in unanimity submit that the Division 
Bench, through this blanket bar to civil jurisdiction against actions of 
authorities under all taxing statutes, has gone beyond the scope of the 
relief sought by considering laws other than the issue under consideration 
before it, thus in consonance with the principle laid down in H.M. Saya & 
Co. Karachi Vs. Wazir Ali Industries Ltd. Karachi and another (PLD 
1969 SC 65), their applications for permission to file the appeals are 
allowed.   
 
The following questions of law arose which shall be considered in 
this judgment: 
I. 
Whether the appellants fall within the exceptions created by 
the case law to a bar to jurisdiction of civil courts in light of 
the ouster clause in Section 217(2) of the Customs Act, read 
with the limitation to the jurisdiction of civil courts in Section 
9 of the CPC? Whether the suits of the appellants in the civil 
jurisdiction were maintainable? 
II. 
Whether the exercise of the original civil jurisdiction by the 
Single Bench of the Sindh High Court is ultra vires of the 
Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (Constitution) in 
light of Article 25 thereof? And further, whether the exercise of 
this civil jurisdiction by the Single Bench of the Sindh High 
Court will render it a ‘civil court’ for the purposes of the 
ouster clause in Section 217(2) of the Customs Act? 
III. 
Whether the appellants are entitled to the relief sought?  
 
The questions of law formulated hereinabove are individually addressed 
below and for purposes of convenience and comprehension the arguments 
of the learned counsel of the parties as well as the issues chalked out by 
them have been incorporated therein: 
 
 
Civil Appeal No.1171 of 2017 etc. 
-: 7 :-
I. 
Whether the appellants fall within the exceptions created by a plethora of case 
law to a bar to jurisdiction of civil courts in light of the ouster clause in 
Section 217(2) of the Customs Act, read with the limitation to the jurisdiction 
of civil courts in Section 9 of the CPC? Whether the suits of the appellants in 
the civil jurisdiction were maintainable? 
2. 
 
Mr. Khalid Anwar Sr. ASC, appearing on behalf of the 
appellants, at the outset submits that even though, undoubtedly, there is 
a bar against the civil courts taking cognizance of the issue concerned in 
light of Section 217(2) of the Customs Act read with Section 9 of the CPC, 
however, certain exceptions have been carved out against a bar of such 
nature. The settled law in the judgments reported as Punjab Province v. 
The Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1956 FC 72), The Burmah Oil 
Company (Pakistan Trading) Ltd. Chitagong v. The Trustees of the 
Port of Chitagong (PLD 1962 SC 113), Abdul Rauf and others v. Abdul 
Hamid Khan and others (PLD 1965 SC 671), Muhammad Jamil Asghar 
v. The Improvement Trust, Rawalpindi (PLD 1965 SC 698)¸ Mian 
Muhammad Latif v. Province of West Pakistan (PLD 1970 SC 180), 
and particularly in Abbassia Cooperative Bank v. Hakeem Hafiz 
Muhammad Ghaus and 5 others (PLD 1997 SC 3) is that where the 
jurisdiction of the Civil court is challenged on the ground of ouster of 
jurisdiction it must be shown that, (a) the authority or tribunal in the 
Statute creating such a bar is validly constituted (b) where the order 
passed or action taken by the authority is not tainted with mala fide; (c) 
where the order or action taken was such which could be passed or taken 
under the law which conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the authority or 
tribunal; or (d) where in passing the order or taking the action, the 
principles of natural justice were not violated. If one or more of these four 
conditions are violated an exception is carved out for the Civil Court to 
assume jurisdiction. According to him, in the present appeals ground (b) 
and (c) have been attracted, as in passing the adverse order(s) the 
authority/Assessment Officer acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred 
Civil Appeal No.1171 of 2017 etc. 
-: 8 :-
upon it and the same was tainted with mala fide since the corruption 
prevalent in the Customs House/departments leads its officers to 
discriminate against those not willing to pay over and above what is due 
under the law.  
3. 
 
Mr. Makhdoom Ali Khan, Sr. ASC, while concurring with the 
above submission further relied upon the judgments of this Court in 
Chalna Fibre Company Limited, Khulna and others v. Abdul Jabbar 
and others (PLD 1968 SC 381) at page 387(B), Samiullah v. Fazle Malik 
(PLD 1996 SC 827) at page 830(A), Azra Masood v. Noshaba Moeen 
(2007 SCMR 914) at page 918(A) and particularly Hamid Hussain v. 
Government of West Pakistan (1974 SCMR 356) at page 359(B) which 
fortifies the exceptions created where special laws entail ouster clauses to 
jurisdiction of civil courts, providing in its concluding paragraph that “It is 
a well settled principle that even where the jurisdiction of civil (courts is) 
barred and conferred upon special tribunals, Civil courts being courts of 
ultimate jurisdiction will have the jurisdiction to examine acts of such 
forums to see whether their acts are in accordance with law or are illegal 
and even mala fide”. Furthermore, he stated that the learned Division 
Bench in impugned judgment with regard to the finding that such an 
exemption from bar to jurisdiction has only so far been granted in non-tax 
law related judgments, has failed to take notice of the fact that the 
judgments of  Mian Mohammad Latif v. Province of West Pakistan 
(supra) and The Province of Punjab v. Federation of Pakistan (supra) are 
in fact tax cases wherein it was specifically held that where an act of an 
income tax officer is extraneous to what was mandated under the statute, 
a suit shall lie despite an ouster clause.  Thus, there being no cavil with 
the interpretation of this ouster clause, the contentions of the learned 
counsel for the appellants in unanimity dilated upon the illegality of the 
adverse orders on account of not having being made in consonance with 
Civil Appeal No.1171 of 2017 etc. 
-: 9 :-
the provisions of the Custom Act and on account of the mala fide of the 
authorized officials (Collector Customs and Additional Collector Customs, 
respondents No. 3 and 4 respectively), and thus they claimed that the suits filed 
by them were maintainable since the appellate forum provided within the 
Customs Act is only the forum for appeal where the orders made are not 
tainted with mala fide or illegality. Although these judgments have been 
referred to in the impugned judgment, learned counsel submitted that this 
has only been done in passing and without explaining as to why the 
present cases do not fall under the exceptions carved out in the 
precedents above which clearly provided that in certain circumstances a 
suit in the Civil Court is maintainable, notwithstanding the existence of an 
ouster clause in this regard. On the other hand, Mr. Khalid Anwar took 
strong exception to the fact that the impugned judgment outrightly does 
away with the idea of even entertaining the possibility of an exemption to 
be granted where an ouster clause exists, instead stating that even if an 
issue of mala fide etc is to be raised, the same should be done after the 
hierarchy provided in the statute itself is exhausted and even then the 
learned Division Bench can take cognizance of the same. This approach, 
he submitted, renders the entire purpose of raising a claim of mala fide in 
the decisions of the authorized officials, redundant. It is only upon an 
examination of the merits of the present case that the Court below could 
have determined whether it fell under any of the exemptions carved out by 
the judgments of the Supreme Court and the Division Bench of the same 
court, but not only did the said Court refrain from going into the merits of 
the case, at the very outset in paragraph 5 of the impugned judgment, the 
Court had limited the very scope of the case to merely the questions of 
maintainability of the suits. This in effect, deprived the appellants of the 
exceptions provided by the precedents cited hereinabove. Another plea 
raised by the counsel for the appellants was that if the SRO’s and/or 
Civil Appeal No.1171 of 2017 etc. 
-: 10 :-
Schedules of the Sales tax Act relied on by the appellants were to be 
interpreted correctly, the appellants would have been found to be entitled 
to the same. According to the learned counsel, it is perhaps only the 
inability or rather the lack of willingness of the authority passing the 
adverse orders denying such exemption, that the benefit of the same was 
not extended to the appellants. Fortifying this argument, the learned 
counsel emphasized that it was customary in the past decade or so that 
such exemptions were extended to the products imported by the 
appellants.  
4. 
 
Mr. Farogh Naseem, learned ASC, strenuously argued that in 
light of the judgments cited above, there can be no two opinions that 
where an impugned order or notice of a statutory authority is in breach of 
natural justice, premised upon mala fides or is extraneous to the statute, 
be it in a tax statute or otherwise, a suit would be maintainable. He 
emphasized that even under taxing statutes, what is protected by an 
ouster clause is an action “under the statute”. Obviously then, when an 
action is beyond the parameters of the statute or is mala fide or without 
jurisdiction or in breach of natural justice, the action cannot be reckoned 
to be one “under the statute” and thus cannot be saved under the garb of 
the ouster clause. He also relied on the judgment of Muhammad Jamil 
Asghar’s case (supra) although the facts of the same are not similar to the 
present appeals. Mr. Farogh Naseem, concurred with the above 
submissions, additionally submitting that the Division Bench also missed 
the elementary principle that there are two types of mala fide, i.e. mala 
fide in law and mala fide in fact, and it is the former that the appellants 
rely on since the act of the authorities in not extending the benefit of an 
exemption to the appellants, which is clearly provided under the law is an 
action extraneous to the law and thus a mala fide in law, for which a civil 
suit should be maintainable and relied on the principle of ‘Boni Judicis est 
Civil Appeal No.1171 of 2017 etc. 
-: 11 :-
Ampliare Jurisdictionem’ which means that it is the duty of a good Judge 
to extend his jurisdiction, in which regard he cited River Steam 
Navigation Co v. The Commissioners for the Port of Chittagong (PLD 
1961 Dacca 412). Concluding his arguments he stated that the Division 
Bench further erred in law in holding that in light of the clarification by 
the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) to the effect that the appellants were 
not entitled to the claimed exemptions, resort to departmental proceedings 
would not be an exercise in futility despite the fact that departmental 
proceedings could not possibly go against such clarification from a forum 
much higher in the hierarchy.     
5. 
 
Mr. Salman Akram Raja, learned ASC appearing on behalf of 
the Respondent-FBR, focused his arguments mainly on the contention of 
the appellants’ counsel that the adverse orders of the Respondent 
Collectorate were without jurisdiction. In this context he strenuously 
relied on Justice Kaikaus’ words in Badrul Haque Khan v. The Election 
Tribunal, Dacca and others (PLD 1963 SC 704) that where there is 
jurisdiction to decide a particular matter then there is jurisdiction to decide it 
rightly or wrongly and the fact that the decision is incorrect, does in no 
manner render it without jurisdiction. The customs officials therefore, in 
passing the concerned adverse orders/decisions, cannot be held to have 
acted without jurisdiction merely because they may have committed an 
error in interpretation of the law. In this regard he relied on the judgment 
in Badrul Haque Khan’s case (supra), wherein at page 736 it was held that 
“Unless a case of mala fides or a mere colorable exercise of jurisdiction 
could be made out, the decision cannot be without lawful authority” and a 
mere error in law or fact alone cannot render a decision without 
jurisdiction. In Muhammad Hussain Munir and others v. Sikandar and 
others (PLD 1974 SC 139) at page 142, in consonance with the judgment 
in Badrul Haque Khan’s case (supra), and quoting it with approval it was 
Civil Appeal No.1171 of 2017 etc. 
-: 12 :-
held that “it will be going too far to say that every little breach of a rule by 
allowing, evidence to coming, which in strict law might not be thought 
admissible, would constitute an act without jurisdiction”. The same was this 
Court’s view in Zulfikar Khan Awan v. Secretary, Industries and 
Mineral Development, Gov. of Punjab & others (1974 SCMR 530) as 
well as Raunaq Ali etc. v. Chief Settlement Commissioner and others 
(PLD 1973 SC 236), Abdul Rehman Bajwa v. Sultan and others (PLD 
1981 SC 522). However, he further clarified in this context that where a 
decision made is held to be made without the proper application of the law 
in place, the remedy for such a defect can only be sought by taking such 
decision to the prescribed grievance redressal forum, which in the present 
case is to be found in the appeal to the Collector under Section 193 or the 
Appellate Tribunal under Section 194 (as the case may be) since any 
determination under a special law such as the Customs Act, requires a 
certain level of knowledge and expertise which must be taken advantage of 
by approaching the abovesaid forums first and only after exhausting these 
remedies can the High Court be approached under Section 196 of the 
Customs Act. In support of this argument he relied on the judgements of 
Ms. Binaco Traders v. Federation of Pakistan (2006 PTD 1491), as well 
as Ms. Rohi Ghee Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Collector of Customs (2007 
PTD 878). To jump the gun by filing a civil suit directly would render such 
forums redundant. On the other hand he submitted that the decision with 
regards to the entitlement of exemption from duty and taxes or reduction 
in tax liability in respect of a person or establishment, otherwise, includes 
scrutiny and determination of disputed facts by the specialized forums 
and the authorities provided under the taxing statutes, including Customs 
Act, hence, it does not fall within the domain of original civil jurisdiction of 
the Civil Court particularly, in view of the specific bar in terms of Section 
217 of the Customs Act.  
Civil Appeal No.1171 of 2017 etc. 
-: 13 :-
6. 
 
Barrister Sarfaraz Ali Metlo, ASC, learned counsel for the FBR 
submitted a list of judgments specific to tax law wherein in the presence of 
a statutory remedy, a suit on the civil side was held to be barred which 
include; Raleigh Investment v. Governor General (PLD 1947 Privy 
Council 19) at page 25(G), CIT v. The Tribune Trust (PLD 1947 Privy 
Council 247) at para 3 on page 255, The Batala Eng. V. I.T.O. (1973 
SCMR 282) page 283(A), Tahir A. Khan v. CBR Sindh (2003 YLR 196) at 
page 199 (C, D, E & G), Chemitex Ind. V. Sup. S.T. (1999 PTD 1184) at 
page 1187(A), Aluminum Processing v. FOP (2003 PTD 1411) at page 
1428(G), Binaco Traders’ case (supra) at page 1499(E & H), Rohi Ghee 
Industries’ case (supra) at page 885(C), Malik A Qayyum v. DG Int. 
(SBLR 2015 Sindh 969), Collector v. Universal Gateway (2005 SCMR 
37) at page 44(A&B) Amin Textile Mills v. CIT (2000 SCMR 201) at page 
203 para 3, Federation of Pakistan v. M/s Millennium Pharma (2011 
PTD 690) etc. However, learned counsel largely adopted the arguments of 
Mr. Salman Akram Raja, ASC.  
7. 
 
In order the appreciate the minutiae of the issue of 
maintainability of the civil suits filed by the appellants against the 
decisions of the taxing authorities/Assessing Officer under the special law 
of the Customs Act, it would be advantageous to reproduce the pivotal 
provisions viz. Section 217(2) of the Customs Act which bars the 
cognizance of the same by the civil courts under Section 9 of the CPC as 
well as Section 9 (ibid.) itself:  
“Section 9 of the CPC: 
9. The Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein 
contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature 
excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or 
impliedly barred. 
Section 217(2) of the Customs Act: 
S.217. (2) No suit shall be brought in any civil court to set 
aside or modify any order passed, any assessment made, any 
Civil Appeal No.1171 of 2017 etc. 
-: 14 :-
tax levied, any penalty imposed or collection of any tax made 
under this Act.” 
 
There is not an iota of doubt that Section 9 of the CPC provides that the 
civil courts shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit in relation to any 
civil matter except when the same is expressly or impliedly barred by the 
law. A plain reading of Section 217(2) reflects that the jurisdiction of the 
“civil courts” has in fact been barred for any assessment made, any tax 
levied, any penalty imposed or collection of any tax made “under the Act”. 
The two operative terms to determine such a bar of jurisdiction, therefore, 
are “civil court” and “under this Act”. The gist of the contentions of the 
counsel for the appellants boils down to just one aspect; that the actions 
of the statutory authorities being challenged are not made “under the Act” 
and hence the ouster clause does not apply. This is where the exceptions 
carved out from the bar to jurisdiction of the civil courts under the various 
judgments of this Court come into play. The judgments in Punjab 
Province v. The Federation of Pakistan (supra) Burmah Oil Company’s 
case (supra), Abdul Rauf’s case (supra), Jamil Asghar v. The 
Improvement Trust (supra), Mian Muhammad Latif’s case (supra), 
Hakeem Hafiz Muhammad Ghaus’ (supra) Chalna Fibre v. Abdul 
Jabbaru (supra), Samiullah’s case (supra), Azra Masood’s case (supra) and 
Hamid Hussain’s case (supra) categorically provide exemptions to such a 
bar to jurisdiction. An articulate illustration of these exceptions can be 
found in the judgment of Hakeem Hafiz Muhammad Ghaus’ case (supra) 
in the following words: 
“It is also well-settled law that where the jurisdiction of the 
Civil court to examine the validity of an action or an order of 
executive authority or a special tribunal is challenged on the 
ground of ouster of jurisdiction of the Civil court, it must be 
shown (a) that the authority or the tribunal was validly 
constituted under the Act; (b) that the order passed or action 
taken by the authority or the tribunal was not mala fide; (c) 
Civil Appeal No.1171 of 2017 etc. 
-: 15 :-
that the order passed or action taken was such which could be 
passed or taken under the law which conferred exclusive 
jurisdiction on the authority or the tribunal; and (d) that in 
passing the order or taking the action, the principles of natural 
justice were not violated.”    
 
8. 
 
The 
impugned 
judgment 
incorrectly 
states 
that 
such 
exemption has not been granted in tax statutes as the judgments of Mian 
Muhammad Latif’s case (supra) and Province of Punjab v. Federation of 
Pakistan (supra) clearly contradict such an untenable conclusion. However 
the burden then lies on the appellants to prove that they fall within the 
above exceptions in order to circumvent this bar to the jurisdiction of the 
civil courts. Since the appellants’ counsel mainly relied on the exemption 
from the general bar to jurisdiction on the ground of the orders/actions 
taken by the authority/Assessment Officer being beyond jurisdiction, first 
the precise scope of the jurisdiction of the Assessment Officer/authority 
needs to be determined. The relevant provisions of the Customs Act in this 
regard are reproduced below: 
“32.  False statement, error, etc.- (1) If any person, in 
connection with any matter of customs,-  
(a)  
makes or signs or causes to be made or signed, or 
delivers or causes to be delivered to an officer of 
customs any declaration, notice, certificate or other 
document whatsoever, or  
(b)  
makes any statement in answer to any question put to 
him by an officer of customs which he is required by or 
under this Act to answer, or 
(c )  
submits any false statement or document electronically 
through automated clearance system regarding any 
matter of Customs  
knowing or having reason to believe that such document or 
statement is false in any material particular, he shall be guilty 
of an offence under this section. 
….. 
(3) Where, by reason of any inadvertence, error or 
misconstruction, any duty taxes or charge has not been levied 
or has been short-levied or has been erroneously refunded, the 
person liable to pay any amount on that account shall be 
served with a notice within three years of the relevant date 
Civil Appeal No.1171 of 2017 etc. 
-: 16 :-
requiring him to show cause why he should not pay the amount 
specified in the notice; 
 
80. Checking of goods declaration by the Customs.- (1) On 
the receipt of goods declaration under section 79, an officer of 
Customs shall satisfy himself regarding the correctness of the 
particulars of imports, including declaration, assessment, and 
in case of the Customs Computerized System, payment of duty, 
taxes and other charges thereon.  
(2) An officer of Customs may examine any goods that he may 
deem necessary at any time after the import of the goods into 
the country and may requisition relevant documents, as and 
when and in the manner deemed appropriate, during or after 
release of the goods by Customs;  
(3) If during the checking of goods declaration, it is found that 
any statement in such declaration or document or any 
information so furnished is not correct in respect of any matter 
relating to the assessment, the goods shall, without prejudice 
to any other action which may be taken under this Act, be 
reassessed to duty, taxes and other charges levied thereon. 
…… 
193.  Appeals to Collector (Appeals).- (1) Any person 
including an officer of Customs aggrieved by any decision or 
order passed under sections 33, 79, 80 and 179 by an officer 
of Customs below the rank of Additional Collector may prefer 
appeal to the Collector (Appeals) within thirty days of the date 
of communication to him of such decision or order:  
Provided that an appeal preferred after the expiry of thirty 
days may be admitted by the Collector (Appeals) if he is 
satisfied that the appellant has sufficient cause for not 
preferring the appeal within that period. 
….. 
194. Appellate Tribunal.- (1) The Federal Government shall 
constitute an Appellate Tribunal to be called the Customs 
Appellate Tribunal consisting of as many judicial and 
technical members as it thinks fit to exercise the powers and 
discharge the functions conferred on the Appellate Tribunal by 
this Act. 
196. Reference to High Court. –  (1) Within ninety days of the 
date on which the aggrieved person or Collector or Director 
of Intelligence and Investigation, or Director of Valuation, as 
the case may be, was served with order of the Appellate 
Tribunal under sub-section (3) of section 194B, the aggrieved 
person or any officer of Customs not below the rank of an 
Additional Collector or Additional Director, authorized by the 
Collector or Director in writing, may prefer an application, in 
Civil Appeal No.1171 of 2017 etc. 
-: 17 :-
the prescribed form along with a statement of the case, to the 
High Court, stating any question of law arising out of such 
order.” 
The facts of the present appeals do not involve any aggrieved party 
approaching the Collector (Appeals) under Section 193, or the appellate 
Tribunal under Section 194. Thus the jurisdiction, to be determined with 
regards to the exception granted under the Hakeem Hafiz Muhammad 
Ghaus’ case (supra) etc. is the jurisdiction of the Assessment 
Officer/authority either under Section 32 or Section 80 of the Customs 
Act. The contention of the appellants is that the adverse actions/orders 
were under Section 32 whereas the respondents insist that in fact the 
adverse orders were reassessment orders made under Section 80 of the 
Customs Act. This difference in stance is vital because if the said 
actions/order were initiated/passed under Section 32 ibid, then as per 
sub-Section (3) thereof, no show cause notice in this regard was ever 
served upon the appellants. It has been the case of the appellants that the 
demand cannot be claimed to be a reassessment order since it lacks the 
basic features/characteristics/attributes of the same as provided for and 
required under Section 24 of the General Clauses Act 1897. A perusal of 
the adverse orders reveals the use of the words “assessment” in 
determining the tax liability of the appellants, therefore, in the absence of 
any evidence produced on the part of the appellants to prove that the 
order/actions were made under Section 32 ibid, it can be assumed that 
the said adverse orders were reassessment orders under Section 80 ibid 
and thus in conformity with the law. Even otherwise, the precedent laid 
down in Badrul Haque Khan’s case (supra) with regard to an action/order 
being beyond jurisdiction is that it will be going too far to say that every 
little breach of a rule would constitute an act “without lawful authority”. 
So far as the nature of the act/action was such that it can be said to be 
made within the powers given to it (the authority passing the order or 
Civil Appeal No.1171 of 2017 etc. 
-: 18 :-
taking the action) for determination/assessment under the Statute, it 
cannot be said to be beyond jurisdiction. The nature of the power 
exercised by the authority/Assessment Officer was within its powers to 
assess, reassess and determine the tax liability of a person, and since the 
same is in consonance with the spirit of Section 80 ibid, it cannot be said 
to be beyond jurisdiction. This approach finds further support in the 
judgment in Badrul Haque Khan’s case (supra) wherein it was held that “I 
do not see any difference in a case where the question of law decided is a 
matter on which two opinions can easily be held and a case where the 
decision on a question of law appears to be clearly erroneous.”. The same 
view was held in Muhammad Hussain Munir’s case (supra), Zulfikar 
Khan Awan’s case (supra) as well as Raunaq Ali’s case (supra), Abdul 
Rehman Bajwa’s case (supra) as well as in Ms. Friend Engineering 
Corporation v. Government of Punjab (1991 SCMR 2324) wherein this 
Court held that by “jurisdiction” is meant a power to hear and decide a 
legal controversy between parties, and if the order is contrary to the law 
that would not render it as one without jurisdiction. We, therefore, hold that 
the 
adverse 
orders/actions 
by 
the 
Assessment 
Officer/Customs 
authorities cannot be said to be beyond jurisdiction and thus fail to 
circumvent the bar to jurisdiction of civil courts imposed on the civil 
courts under Section 217(2) of the Customs Act. Although the appellants 
have also relied on the exception where an action/order is tainted with 
mala fide, no proof or tangible argument in this regard has been raised 
besides blowing smoke of the allegedly prevalent corruption in the 
Customs Department. Therefore we conclusively hold that the appellants 
do not fall within the ambit of the exceptions carved out by the judgments 
of this court with respect to a bar to the jurisdiction of civil courts. 
However, this does not mean that a wrong interpretation of the law cannot 
be corrected thus leaving the aggrieved remedy-less; as correctly 
Civil Appeal No.1171 of 2017 etc. 
-: 19 :-
highlighted 
in 
the 
impugned 
judgment, 
the 
grievance 
redressal 
mechanism in the Customs Act as well as other taxing statutes and the 
hierarchy of appellate forums created thereunder are remedies available to 
the person/entity aggrieved by an adverse order of the Assessment 
Officer/Customs Officer, and only after the exhaustion of the same should 
the Division Bench of High Court be approached under Section 196 of the 
Customs Act. A crisp overview of the assessment of duty on imported 
goods under the Customs Act and the grievance redressal system provided 
in the statute for objections to such assessment is as follows: Section 80 
ibid prescribes the manner in which an officer of Customs shall satisfy 
himself as to the correctness of the good declaration made by or on behalf 
of the importer whereas under sub-section (3) thereof the officer of 
Customs has the power to reassess the duty, taxes or other charges levied 
under 
the 
Customs 
Act; 
any 
person 
aggrieved 
of 
such 
assessment/reassessment may appeal to the Collector under Section 193 
of the Customs Act, and the next forum of appeal from this is the 
Appellate Tribunal under Section 194 of the Customs Act. Any person 
aggrieved of the orders of the Appellate Tribunal may then file a reference 
to the High Court pursuant to Section 196 of the Customs Act, subsection 
(4) of which stipulates that such reference may be heard by no less than 
two judges of the High Court.  
9. 
 
The question as to whether cognizance of a suit against such 
adverse orders may be taken by the Single Bench of the Sindh High Court 
at Karachi in exercise of its civil jurisdiction, and whether it also falls 
within the definition of “civil courts” for the purposes of Section 217(2) of 
the Customs Act, is addressed in the second formulation below. 
II. 
Whether the exercise of the original civil jurisdiction by the Single Bench of the 
Sindh High Court is ultra vires of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan (Constitution) in light of Article 25 thereof? And further, whether the 
exercise of this civil jurisdiction by the Single Bench of the Sindh High Court will 
render it to be a civil court for the purposes of the ouster clause in Section 217(2) 
of the Customs Act? 
Civil Appeal No.1171 of 2017 etc. 
-: 20 :-
10. 
 
An ancillary submission made Mr. Khalid Anwar, learned Sr. 
ASC is that the suits which were taken up in exercise of the civil 
jurisdiction by the Single Bench of the Sindh High Court for the District of 
Karachi, are saved from the ouster clause in Section 217(2) of the 
Customs Act which only bars the jurisdiction of the Civil courts to set 
aside or modify any order passed, any assessment made, any tax levied, 
any penalty imposed or collection of any tax made under the said Act. 
Therefore, the exercise of original civil jurisdiction by the Single Bench of 
the Sindh High Court remains unaffected by the said ouster clause. 
Reading out the bar contained in Section 217(2) of the Customs Act, he 
emphasized on the words “civil court”, thus stating that it is only 
cognizance by the ordinary civil courts which is barred, perhaps on 
account of the lack of expertise that a Civil Judge may have in the matter; 
however, cognizance by the Single Bench of the High Court is by no means 
barred under the said Section.  
11. 
 
With regards to the constitutionality of the exercise of civil 
jurisdiction by the Single Bench of the Sindh High Court at Karachi, by 
way of providing a background of the origin of the same, he read out the 
language of Section 2 of the Bombay Act No.1 of 1906 which established 
the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in Sindh, which he submitted was 
the highest Court of Appeal in civil and criminal matters for the Province 
of Sindh and it was a District Court and Court of Sessions for Karachi. 
This Court of the Judicial Commissioner, he stated, continued to function 
until the enactment of the Sindh Courts Act 1926 (Act of 1926) which came 
into force in 1940, by way of a notification published in the official gazette 
by the Sindh Government. Section 3 of the Act of 1926 established a Chief 
Court of Sindh; Section 8 of this Act empowered the Chief Court of Sindh 
to be the highest civil and criminal court of appeal and revision for Sindh. 
He then read out Section 8 of the Act of 1926 which he categorically 
Civil Appeal No.1171 of 2017 etc. 
-: 21 :-
submitted cannot be read in isolation without reading it with Section 22 of 
the same Act. The latter Section provides that there shall be in each civil 
district other than, that of Karachi a district court and the Provincial 
Government shall appoint a district judge to each such court. He specifically 
highlighted that from the constitutional perspective the most important 
thing to note is that the Act of 1926 is a provincial statute hence prima 
facie  it appears that the status of the Chief Court can only be seen as a 
provincial Court i.e., civil/criminal Court for the District of Karachi. 
Relying heavily on the judgment of this Court reported as Province of 
Sindh v. Haji Razzaq (PLD 2017 SC 207) (which he submitted has also been 
followed by this Court in the judgment of Mian Akbar Hussain v. Mst. Alishbai (PLD 1991 SC 
985)) he stated that the original conception of the law was that this Court 
was merely the creation of a Provincial Statute, whereby the Single Bench 
of the High Court was exercising the power of a District Court therefore it 
essentially had the same status but has been given an elevated 
designation. Radical changes followed thereafter; referring to Section 219 
of the Government of India Act, 1935 which defines a “High Court” to 
include the Chief Court in Sindh, stressing on the words “deemed to be a 
High Court”. Reading out the proviso to the same, he pointed out that on 
this date there were already a certain number of High Courts for example 
in Calcutta, Lahore, Madras, etc., and these Courts in Sindh, etc., could 
have been converted into High Court(s). He conceded that this proviso was 
deleted in the year 1955 by the Order of 1955(supra). In 1955 it was 
constituted as the Karachi Bench of the West Pakistan High Court, it is no 
longer as it was previously, deemed to be a High Court under Section 
219(ibid), and now it is of the same status as the Lahore High Court. Thus, 
after perusal of this decisive constitutional change, there remains no 
doubt about the constitutionality of the Single Bench of the Sindh High 
Court which pursuant to Section 219 was given the status of a High 
Civil Appeal No.1171 of 2017 etc. 
-: 22 :-
Court.  Mr. Farogh Naseem, ASC, who also appeared on behalf of the 
appellants, relying upon the same judgment in Haji Razzaq’s case (supra) 
presented a completely contrasting contention, stating that the Single 
Bench of the Sindh High Court in Karachi was in fact exercising a special 
jurisdiction as opposed to an ordinary civil jurisdiction. Concentrating 
particularly on the historical background of this exercise of civil 
jurisdiction by the Single Bench of the High Court, in this regard he relied 
heavily on the judgment in Firdos Trading Corporation  v. Japan 
Cotton & General Trading Co. Ltd. (PLD 1961 Karachi 565) wherein 
Mr. Waheeduddin J. held that “it is therefore perfectly clear that this 
jurisdiction is of special nature and is not the ordinary civil jurisdiction of 
the West Pakistan High Court....”. He further relied upon page 222 of the 
judgment in Haji Razzaq’s case (supra) wherein Waheeduddin J.’s view 
was again concurred with in holding that:  
“The scheme of the Establishment of West Pakistan Act, 1955, 
clearly shows that as a special measure Karachi Bench was 
allowed to continue to perform the duties of the principal civil 
Court of original jurisdiction in Karachi, which is a special 
jurisdiction and by no stretch of argument can be considered 
as the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the West Pakistan 
High Court as is generally known. The history of the 
establishment of the High Courts in this sub-continent shows 
that there were only three Courts which were conferred 
ordinary original civil jurisdiction within certain limits under 
their Letters Patent. No other High Court established under 
the High Courts Act of 1861 or under the Government of India 
Act, 1915 or under the Government of India Act, 1935 was 
invested with powers of ordinary civil jurisdiction. The Chief 
Court of Sindh was no doubt a High Court within the meaning 
of section 219 of the Government of India Act, but the 
jurisdiction which it exercised in the civil district of Karachi 
was not that of an ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the 
High Court but it was only performing the duties of the 
principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction within the district 
of Karachi under a special statute viz. section 8 of Sindh 
Courts Act, 1926.” [Emphasis supplied] 
 
Civil Appeal No.1171 of 2017 etc. 
-: 23 :-
Thus he concluded stating that cognizance of a civil suit by the Single 
Bench of the Sindh High Court at Karachi in this special jurisdiction, is 
not barred under Section 217(2) of the Customs Act.    
12. 
 
Mr. Salman Akram Raja, ASC supported the view in the 
impugned judgment in this regard, submitting that there can be no cavil 
with the assertion that the Learned Single Bench at Karachi in exercising 
original civil jurisdiction, in effect acts in the capacity of a civil court and 
therefore, to say that the bar to jurisdiction of civil courts under Section 
217(2) does not apply to the Single Bench is absolutely untenable. 
Fortifying this argument, he read out Section 8 of the Act of 1926, 
whereby the Chief Court at Sindh was established and under Section 8 
thereof the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the Chief Court was outlined 
in that “The Chief Court shall be the highest civil Court of appeal and 
revision ….and the principal civil Court of original jurisdiction for the civil 
district of Karachi and shall be the Court of Session and shall exercise the 
powers and perform the duties of a Sessions Judge in the Sessions Division 
of Karachi”. Thus there can be no ambiguity in the fact that the principle 
original jurisdiction of Sindh High Court at Karachi is neither the ordinary 
nor the extra ordinary civil jurisdiction of the Court, but simply the civil 
court's jurisdiction. Concurring with the view laid out in the impugned 
judgment, he submitted that the restrictions and qualification imposed in 
terms of Section 9 of CPC, are equally applicable in respect of a suit before 
High Court in exercise of original civil jurisdiction. 
13.   
In light of the above arguments, it is evident that in this 
context, the only judgment of this Court in the field which carefully 
examines the exercise of the civil jurisdiction by the Single Bench at 
Karachi and the implications of the same on its status is found in Haji 
Razzaq’s case (supra) wherein on page 219 a brief background of the 
origin of such jurisdiction is comprehensively explained:  
Civil Appeal No.1171 of 2017 etc. 
-: 24 :-
“Accordingly the Governor-General by G.G. Order No.19 of 
1955 created the West Pakistan High Court with its seat at 
Lahore and Benches at Karachi and Peshawar and Circuit 
Courts at other places within the Province consisting of such 
Judges as may from time to time be nominated by the Chief 
Justice. Para 3 of this Order provided that the High Court shall 
have such original, appellate and other jurisdiction and such 
powers and authority in respect of the territories included in the 
Province of West Pakistan as the High Court of Judicature at 
Lahore had immediately before the commencement of this 
Order, in respect of the territories in relation to which it 
exercised appellate jurisdiction. The Letters Patent of the 
Lahore High Court was also applied to West Pakistan High 
Court subject to such modification and alteration as the 
provisions of the Establishment of West Pakistan Act, 1955 or 
any order made thereunder or any other law for the time being 
in force may warrant. Under para 5 of the said Order it is laid 
down that notwithstanding anything in this or in any other law 
for the time being in force, the Bench of the High Court at 
Karachi shall have the same original civil jurisdiction for the 
civil district of Karachi and the same criminal jurisdiction and 
powers of the Court of Session for the Sessions Division of 
Karachi, as 
were exercisable, immediately before the 
commencement of this Order, by the Chief Court of Sindh under 
section 8 of the Sindh Courts Act, 1926, subject to the power of 
the Governor-General to direct that, as from a specified date 
such jurisdiction and powers shall cease to be exercisable by 
that Bench and as from that date that Bench shall cease to 
exercise that jurisdiction and powers.” 
 
From the above articulate synopsis of the historical background of the 
Sindh High Court, it transpires that the Governor General through the 
High Court of West Pakistan (Establishment) Order (Order No.XIX) of 1955 
(Order of 1955) created the High Court of West Pakistan with its seat inter 
alia at Karachi. Under para 5 of the said Order it has been provided that 
notwithstanding any other law for the time being in force, the Bench of the 
High Court at Karachi shall have the same original jurisdiction for the civil 
district of Karachi as was exercised prior to the commencement of this 
Order under the Act of 1926; the jurisdiction thus is the same but the 
status has been elevated. Prior to the Order of 1955, the “Chief Court” by 
virtue of Section 219 of the Government of India Act, 1935, was deemed to 
Civil Appeal No.1171 of 2017 etc. 
-: 25 :-
be a High Court, whereas after the enactment of this Order of 1955 the 
same had been given the permanent status of a High Court bringing it at 
par with other High Courts. The Single Bench of the Sindh High Court is 
therefore a “High Court” and cannot be equated with any other civil court 
and hence falls outside of the ambit of the ouster clause. This view finds 
support in Haji Razzaq’s case (supra) wherein this Court came to the 
conclusion that the Chief Court of Sindh was not a District Court within 
the meaning of section 2(4) of the Civil Procedure Code. The definition of 
“District Court” has been given at page 223 of the Haji Razzaq’s case 
(supra) wherein it was held that: 
“It will be pertinent to refer here to the definition of "district" in 
section 2(4) of the Civil Procedure Code. In this definition a 
clear distinction is made between the local limits of the 
jurisdiction of a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction 
and the local limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of 
the High Court. It reads as under: 
'District means the local limits of the jurisdiction of a principal 
Civil Court of original jurisdiction (hereinafter called a 'District 
Court') and includes the local limits of the ordinary original 
civil jurisdiction of a High Court.' 
This distinction also appears from the definition of "District 
Judge" in section 3(17) of the General Clauses Act, which is in 
the following terms:- 
District Judge shall mean the Judge of a principal Civil 
Court of original jurisdiction, but shall not include a 
High Court in the exercise of its ordinary or 
extraordinary original civil jurisdiction." 
It appears to me that the expression "Principal Civil Court of 
original jurisdiction" is not so much a description of any 
particular class of Courts, as a designation thereof. But there 
can be no doubt that this jurisdiction is distinct from the 
ordinary civil jurisdiction of the High Court.” 
 
14. 
 
This Court thus agreed with the finding in para No.12 of the 
judgment of Thadani, J. reported as In the Matter of Muhammad Osman 
Sumro (AIR 1948 Sindh 89) wherein he observed that 'It is not disputed 
Civil Appeal No.1171 of 2017 etc. 
-: 26 :-
that this Court is a High Court. But … as I have pointed out before, if this 
Court is a district Court, when exercising its original civil jurisdiction, by 
reason of section 2(4), C.P.C., the right of appeal would also be governed by 
the Code of Civil Procedure from a decision of a single Judge of this Court. 
In view of section 14, Sindh Courts Act, 1926, however, I do not think such 
an interpretation is permissible”. Therefore, even prior to the Order of 
1955, this Court, in light of Section 14 of the Act of 1926, was a “High 
Court” merely exercising the original civil jurisdiction for the District of 
Karachi. As insisted upon by the learned counsel for the appellants, we 
are convinced by the argument that in light of the above, the Single Bench 
of the Sindh High Court, regardless of what jurisdiction it exercises, is a 
"High Court” and will always remain a High Court because it is a 
constitutional Court and is not a District Court, therefore the two cannot 
be equated by any stretch of imagination. 
15. 
 
Obviously, a literal interpretation of Section 217(2) would lead 
to the conclusion that only “civil courts” are barred from taking 
cognizance of civil suits arising out of disputes regarding the claim of 
entitlement to exemption from tax duties under the Customs Act. Had it 
been the intention of the Legislature to bar the cognizance of any court 
exercising civil jurisdiction, the language of the said provision would have 
used the words “civil original jurisdiction” and not simply used the term 
“civil courts”. This approach can be grasped better when looked at with 
the rich history of this exercise of civil jurisdiction by the Single Bench of 
the High Court, an overview of which has been beautifully encapsulated in 
the judgement of Haji Razzaq’s case (supra); the Legislature was aware of 
such exercise of special jurisdiction and thus had its intention been to 
place a complete bar on cognizance by any court exercising such 
jurisdiction, it would have used language that clearly reflected its intent. 
The question of the status of the Single Bench of the Sindh High Court at 
Civil Appeal No.1171 of 2017 etc. 
-: 27 :-
Karachi, stands conclusively decided in the judgment of Province of 
Sindh v. Haji Razaq judgment(supra) which relies almost entirely on 
Justice Waheeduddin Ahmed, J’s judgment in Firdous Trading 
Corporation v. Japan Cotton and General Co. Ltd. (supra) wherein he 
had in unequivocal words stated that: 
“I have not the slightest doubt on the language of section 3 of 
Sindh Act, 1926 and the definition of "District" in section 2(4) 
of the Civil Procedure Code, that it was exercising District 
Court jurisdiction in contradistinction to the ordinary original 
civil jurisdiction of the High Court. In my opinion the mere 
fact that the Sindh Chief Court later on was included within 
the definition of High Court under section 219 of the 
Government of India Act, did not change the nature of this 
jurisdiction” 
This view, being the conclusive view of this Court ever since Haji Razzaq’s 
case (supra) as the settled law on the matter shall prevail. We therefore 
hold that the High Court of Sindh, is a ‘High Court’ and for this reason, 
the Single Bench of the Sindh High Court was correct in holding the suits 
of the appellants to be maintainable. A statutory provision must be 
interpreted within the meaning that is attributed to it by the language and 
specific words used by the Legislature, and the principles of law dictate 
that redundancy cannot be attributed to any word used therein. Section 
217(2) therefore, only bars the cognizance of suit filed under the civil 
jurisdiction exercised by the civil courts, and this bar cannot be extended 
to include the exercise of the same jurisdiction by the Single Bench of the 
Sindh High Court at Karachi. As for the question regarding whether, 
Article 25 of the Constitution can be said to have been violated by allowing 
such special jurisdiction to the Sindh High Court while the same is not 
available to other Provinces is concerned, suffice it to say that such 
jurisdiction has been exercised by the Sindh High Court at Karachi as far 
back as the pre-partition era. Striking a careful balance between the 
fundamental right to be treated in accordance with the law under Article 4 
Civil Appeal No.1171 of 2017 etc. 
-: 28 :-
of the Constitution and Article 25 thereof, the principles of justice would 
require that the litigants in Sindh High Court at Karachi are not deprived 
of this forum of grievance redressal which is limited to only Karachi, as 
this right to approach such forum has accrued to them over decades and 
the law mandates certainty in the judicial administration system.  
III. 
Whether the appellants are entitled to the relief sought?  
16. 
 
In the present appeals, the appellants have successfully been 
able to obtain interim injunctions some of which date back to as long as 
ten years ago, thus in the process the Federal Exchequer has been 
deprived of tax money worth millions of rupees. When this situation was 
pointed out to the learned counsel for the parties, the appellants’ counsel 
Mr. Khalid Anwar, was quick to respond and stated that in terms of 
monetary gains, filing of writ petitions and approaching the courts in fiscal 
matters is in fact more expensive for importers/appellants than it is to pay 
the required tax applicable under the law. However, he stated that if he 
were 
to 
today 
take 
a 
pebble 
and 
throw 
it 
at 
the 
Custom 
House/Department at Karachi, there is an 80% probability that it will hit 
a corrupt official. Corruption has become a plague in the Custom 
House/Department and no one has any faith in its officials. Secondly he 
submitted that as opposed to the High Court in Lahore where writ 
petitions are heard by a Single Bench, in Karachi writ petitions are heard 
by Division Benches and there are only two Division Benches hearing tax 
related matters. If a uniform system is introduced and more Division 
Benches of the High Court at Sindh start hearing tax matters, the civil 
jurisdiction of Single Bench of the Sindh High Court at Karachi will no 
longer be invoked by parties. If the same cannot be done, in the 
alternative those aggrieved by the orders of tax authorities under taxing 
statutes such as the Customs Act should be allowed to continue to 
approach the Singh Bench at Karachi in its civil jurisdiction with a 
Civil Appeal No.1171 of 2017 etc. 
-: 29 :-
guideline given to the same to dispose of tax disputes expeditiously within 
a period of a year or less. While the real picture may not be as grim as 
painted by the counsel for the appellant to advance his case, the counsel 
for the respondents could offer no concrete argument to refute such 
claims of prevailing corruption. In order to grow economically, it is 
imperative that even the ugliest truths be acknowledged in order to 
commence the journey of curbing, correcting and reducing this 
unfortunate menace that not only our country, but all of South Asia faces. 
17. 
 
Keeping in view the alarming allegations made above, it is 
directed, that while the Single Bench of the Sindh High Court at Karachi 
may still take cognizance of any suit arising out of an action/order of the 
tax authorities/Customs Officers, such jurisdiction must be sparingly 
exercised by the Single Bench and the suits must be expeditiously decided 
within the period of one year or less so that these suits are not used by 
aggrieved parties as a means to deprive the Public Exchequer of the taxes 
due for years on the basis of interim injunctions. Furthermore, as a 
guiding principle, to bring some certainty and uniformity in the treatment 
of such suits, the suits filed and those that have already been filed must 
only be entertained on the condition that a minimum of 50% of the tax 
calculated by the tax authorities is deposited with the authorities as a 
goodwill gesture, so that on conclusion of the suit, according to the correct 
determination of the tax due or exempt (as the case may be), the same may be 
refunded or the remaining balance be paid. 
18. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, while allowing these appeals, it is 
held and directed as under:- 
(1) 
the 
adverse 
orders/actions 
by 
the 
Assessment 
Officer/Customs authorities cannot be said to be 
beyond jurisdiction and thus fail to circumvent the bar 
to jurisdiction of civil courts imposed under Section 
217(2) of the Customs Act; 
Civil Appeal No.1171 of 2017 etc. 
-: 30 :-
(2) 
the Single Bench of the Sindh High Court, regardless of 
what jurisdiction it exercises, is a “High Court” and will 
always 
remain 
a 
High 
Court 
because 
it 
is 
a 
constitutional Court and is not a District Court. 
(3) 
Section 217(2) ibid only bars the cognizance of suit(s) 
filed under the civil jurisdiction exercised by the civil 
courts, and this bar cannot be extended to include the 
exercise of the same jurisdiction by the Single Bench of 
the Sindh High Court at Karachi; 
(4) 
allowing such special jurisdiction to the Sindh High 
Court, while the same is not available to other 
Provinces, does not violate the provision of Article 25 of 
the Constitution;  
(5) 
the suits of the appellants filed before the Single Bench 
of the Sindh High Court at Karachi are maintainable; 
(6) 
despite the fact that the Single Bench of the Sindh High 
Court at Karachi can take cognizance of any suit arising 
out of an action/order of the tax authorities/Customs 
Officers, such jurisdiction must be sparingly exercised 
and the suits must be expeditiously decided within the 
period of one year or less; and 
(7) 
the suits, which are already pending or shall be filed in 
future, must only be continued/entertained on the 
condition that a minimum of 50% of the tax calculated 
by the tax authorities is deposited with the authorities. 
19. 
 
As the main appeals are allowed, the applications for 
impleadment are disposed of accordingly. 
 
 
 
CHIEF JUSTICE 
 
 
 
JUDGE 
 
 
 
JUDGE 
Announced in open Court 
on 27.6.2018 at Islamabad 
Approved for reporting 
Waqas Naseer