IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN 
( Review/Original Jurisdiction ) 
 
PRESENT: 
MR. JUSTICE ANWAR ZAHEER JAMALI, HCJ  
MR. JUSTICE AMIR HANI MUSLIM 
MR. JUSTICE EJAZ AFZAL KHAN 
MR. JUSTICE MUSHIR ALAM 
MR. JUSTICE IJAZ-UL-AHSAN 
 
C.R.P.49/2016, CRL.O.P.No.186, 193 OF 2016, CMAS.1681/2016, 
7575/2016, 8132/2016, 8143/2016, 8144/2016, 8146/2016, 8147/2016, 
8148/2016 IN CRP.49/2016 IN CA.184-L/2013 AND CMA. 8177/2016 
(On review from the judgment dated 26-01-2016 
passed by this Court in CA. No.184-L/2013) 
Shahid Pervaiz 
Vs. Ejaz Ahmad and others  
C.R.P.50/2016 IN CA.184-L/2013 
(On review from the judgment dated 26-01-2016 
passed by this Court in CA. No.184-L/2013) 
Manzoor Ahmed and others  
Vs. RPO Gujranwala and others  
 
C.R.P.51/2016 IN CA.184-L/2013 
(On review from the judgment dated 26-01-2016 
passed by this Court in CA. No.184-L/2013) 
 
Jamil Ahmed 
Vs. RPO Gujranwala and others 
 
C.R.P.52/2016 IN CA.184-L/2013 
(On review from the judgment dated 26-01-2016 
passed by this Court in CA. No.184-L/2013) 
 
Malik M. Sarwar Awan etc 
Vs. Govt. of Punjab and others  
 
C.R.P.83/2016 IN CA.184-L/2013 
(On review from the judgment dated 26-01-2016 
passed by this Court in CA. No.184-L/2013) 
Awais Malik and others  
Vs. Ejaz Ahmad and others  
 
C.R.P.84/2016 IN CA.184-L/2013 
(On review from the judgment dated 26-01-2016 
passed by this Court in CA. No.184-L/2013) 
 
Mst. Rashida Bashir and another  
Vs. Regional Police Officer, 
Gujranwala and another  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
2
C.R.P.85/2016 IN CA.184-L/2013 
(On review from the judgment dated 26-01-2016 
passed by this Court in CA. No.184-L/2013) 
Syed Jamat Ali Bokhari and others  
Vs. Ejaz Ahmed and others  
 
 
C.R.P.89/2016 IN CA.184-L/2013 
(On review from the judgment dated 26-01-2016 
passed by this Court in CA. No.184-L/2013) 
Muhammad Nawaz and others   
Vs. Chief Secy. Govt. of Punjab 
and others  
 
C.R.P.91/2016 IN CA.184-L/2013 
(On review from the judgment dated 26-01-2016 
passed by this Court in CA. No.184-L/2013) 
Ghulam Dastgir and others  
Vs. Ejaz Ahmad and others  
 
C.R.P.92/2016 IN CA.184-L/2013 
(On review from the judgment dated 26-01-2016 
passed by this Court in CA. No.184-L/2013) 
Muhammad Azam 
Vs. Ejaz Ahmed and others  
 
CRL.R.P.52/2016 IN Crl.O.P.89/2011 
(On review from the judgment dated 12-06-2013 
passed by this Court in Crl.O.P.89/2013) 
 
Awais Malik and others  
Vs. Chief Secy. Punjab and another  
 
CRL.O.P.123/2016 IN CP.1446-L/1997 
(Contempt proceedings arising out of order of this Court 
passed in Civil Petition No.1446-L/1997) 
Akhtar Umer Hayat Lalayka 
Vs. Mushtaq Ahmed Sukhaira, IG 
Punjab, Lahore.  
 
CIVIL MSIC. APPLICATION NO.4435/2016 
(Application against out of turn promotions in the Province of Punjab) 
  
C.R.P.382/2016 IN CA.184-L/2013 
(On review from the judgment dated 26-01-2016 
passed by this Court in CA. No.184-L/2013) 
 
Muhammad Ami Taimoor etc 
Vs. Province of Punjab and others 
 
C.R.P.383/2016 in CA.184-L/2013 
(On review from the judgment dated 26-01-2016 
passed by this Court in CA. No.184-L/2013) 
Mahmood-ul-Hassan Rana etc 
Vs. Province of Punjab and others  
 
 
 
 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
3
C.R.P.454/2016 in CA.184-L/2013 
(On review from the judgment dated 26-01-2016 
passed by this Court in CA. No.184-L/2013) 
Abrar Ahmad Khalil and others  
Vs. Govt. of  Punjab and others 
 
CRL.R.P.174/2016 in Crl.O.P.89/2011 
(On review from the judgment dated 12-06-2013 
passed by this Court in Crl.O.P.89/2013) 
Ghulam Dastgir and others  
Vs. Chief Secretary, Govt. of 
Punjab and others  
 
CRL.O.P.186/2016 in CA.184-L/2013 
(Contempt proceedings arising out of judgment dated 26-01-2016 
passed by this Court in CA. No.184-L/2013) 
Muhammad Azam 
Vs. Mushtaq Ahmad Sukhera etc 
 
Crl.O.P.193/2016 in Crl.O.P.86/2016 in C.P.1000-L/2005 
(Contempt proceedings arising out of the order dated 4.10.2016 
passed by this Court in Crl. O.P.86/2016 in C.P.1000-L/2005) 
Shahid Pervaiz 
Vs. Mushtaq Ahmed Sukhera, IG 
Punjab. Lahore.  
 
Crl.O.P.195/2016 in CA.184-L/2013 
(Contempt proceedings arising out of the judgment dated 26-01-2016 
passed by this Court in CA. No.184-L/2013) 
 
Imtiaz Sarwar 
Vs. Zahid Saeed, Chief Secretary 
Punjab and others  
 
C.R.P.479/2016 in CA.184-L/2013 
(On review from the judgment dated 26-01-2016 
passed by this Court in CA. No.184-L/2013) 
Tahir Sikandar and others  
Vs. The Inspector General of 
Police, Punjab and others  
 
C.R.P.480/2016 in CA.184-L/2013 
(On review from the judgment dated 26-01-2016 
passed by this Court in CA. No.184-L/2013) 
Muhammad Waseem Ijaz 
Vs. IGP Punjab and others  
 
C.R.P.481/2016 in CA.184-L/2013 
(On review from the judgment dated 26-01-2016 
passed by this Court in CA. No.184-L/2013) 
Khalid Mehmood Afzal and others  
Vs. IGP Punjab and others  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
4
C.R.P.482/2016 in CA.184-L/2013 
(On review from the judgment dated 26-01-2016 
passed by this Court in CA. No.184-L/2013) 
Malik Muhammad Sabir 
Vs. IGP Punjab and others  
 
Crl.R.P.191/2016 in Crl.O.P.89/2011 
(On review from the judgment dated 12-06-2013 
passed by this Court in Crl.O.P.89/2013) 
  Shahid Pervaiz, SP 
Vs. Chief Secretary, Govt. of 
Punjab etc.  
 
Attendance 
 
 
For Federal Govt: 
: 
Mr. Ashtar Ausaf, Attorney General for 
Pakistan 
Mr. M. Waqar Rana, Addl. Attorney General  
For Govt. of Pb. 
: 
Barrister Khalid Waheed, Asstt. AG Pb. 
For Govt. of 
Balochistan 
 
: 
Mr. Ayaz Swati, Addl.AG 
 
For Govt. of Sindh 
: 
Mr. Shehyar Kazi, Addl. AG Sindh.  
For Govt. of KPK  
: 
Mian Arshad Jan, Addl.AG 
For ICT: 
: 
Mian Abdul Rauf, AG 
CRP.49/2016, CRP 
191/16 and 
CRP.85/16  
 
: 
Syed Ali Zafar, ASC 
Mr. Zahid Nawaz Cheema, ASC 
Mr. M. Akram Sheikh, Sr. ASC  
(for Respondent No.6 in CRP.85/16) 
 
Crl.R.P.52/16 
CRP.83/16 
 
: 
Kh. Haris Ahmed, Sr. ASC 
CRP.89/16 
: 
Ms. Asma Jahangir, ASC 
CRP.92/16, 382-383, 
480/16, Crl.O.186/16 
 
: 
Mr. Hamid Khan, Sr. ASC 
Mr. M. S. Khattak, AOR 
CRP.50&52/2016,  
454/16, CMA.132/16. 
: 
Mr. Talat Farooq Sheikh, ASC 
Mr. Khalid-Ibn-i-Aziz, ASC 
CRP.51/2016, 
: 
In person.  
CRP.89/16, 91/16,              
Crl. RP.174/16, 
Crl.O.P. 195/16, 
CRP.479/16 & 84/16, 
CMA.4435/16 
: 
Nemo. 
CRP.51/2016 
: 
Jamil Ahmed in person.  
Crl.O.P.123/16 
: 
Malik M. Qayyum, Sr. ASC 
Crl.O.P.193/16 
: 
Mr. Rashid A. Rizvi, Sr. ASC. 
Mr. Qausain Faisal, ASC 
Syed Rafaqat Hussain Shah, AOR 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
5
 
CRP.481/16 
: 
Nemo. 
CRP.482/16 
 
: 
Mr. S. A. Mahmood Sadozai, ASC 
Ch. Akhtar Ali, AOR 
CMA.7575/2016 
in CP.49/16 
 
: 
Nemo. 
CMA.8177/2016 in  
CRP.Nil/2016 
 
: 
Baleegh-uz-Zaman Jawad, ASC 
CMA.8132, 8146, 
8147/16 
: 
Mian Qamar-uz-Zaman, ASC 
Raja Abdul Ghafoor, AOR  
 
CMA.8143-
8144/2016 
: 
Nemo. 
CMA.8148/16 in 
CRP.49/16 
: 
Ch. Akhtar Ali, AOR/ASC 
For the Department  : 
Mr. Kamran Adil, AAIG(Legal) 
Sajjad Hussain, SP 
Shaban Mehmood, DSP Legal 
M Jamshed. SC RPO Office DGK. 
Mushtaq Hussain, SSP. 
 
Date of Hearing 
: 
08-11-2016, 16-11-2016, 29-11-2016,  
 
 
 
 
01-12-2016, 08-12-2016 and 14-12-2016 
 
JUDGMENT  
 
 
 
AMIR HANI MUSLIM, J. - 
 
 
C.R.P 49/2016 etc 
 
 
Shahid Pervaiz Vs. Ejaz Ahmad and others 
 
 
 
The facts relevant for the present proceedings are that on 
04.03.1984, the Petitioner was appointed as Assistant Sub-Inspector in the 
Punjab Police, promoted as Sub-Inspector on 05.07.1987 and then as 
Inspector on 05.03.1990. In the year 1996, while he was posted as S.H.O 
Hanjarwal, the Petitioner participated in an operation for the arrest of 
notorious outlaws Mujahid @ Musa and others, who were involved in the 
murder case of deceased Mureeb Abbas Yazdani. The accused were alleged 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
6
to have started indiscriminate firing at the time of Fajar Prayer in Masjid 
Alkhair at Multan which resulted in the murder of many people and injuries 
to others.  
2. 
 
It is pleaded that as a corollary of this gallantry performance, the 
Police party which carried out the operation was recommended for accelerated 
promotion by the D.I.G, vide letter dated 30.11.1996, under Section 8-A of 
the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974. The Petitioner was recommended for 
promotion as DSP. It is claimed that the committee formed under Section         
8-A read with Rule 14-A of the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment and 
Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974, recommended out of turn promotion of 
all the members of the raiding team including the Petitioner. It is further 
claimed that all the members of the Police Party were promoted out of turn 
except the Petitioner. It has been further pleaded that the Petitioner 
approached the Lahore High Court, by filing Writ Petition No.28879 of 1997, 
with the prayer that he may also be given out of turn promotion like the other 
members of the raiding party.  
3. 
 
The Writ Petition No.28879/1997 of the Petitioner was clubbed 
with an identical Writ Petition No.8147 of 1998, which were allowed and the 
learned High Court directed the Respondent-Department to grant one step out 
of turn promotion to the Petitioner. However, the Department did not accept 
the decision of the High Court and approached this Court through Civil 
Appeal No.259-L of 2000, which was dismissed on the ground of limitation. 
It is pleaded that on dismissal of Appeal of the Government on the ground of 
limitation, the relevant committee was formed under Section 8-A read with 
Rule 14-A, which also recommended out of turn promotion of the Petitioner 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
7
and he was granted one step out of turn promotion as DSP, vide Notification 
dated 24.05.2001, with a rider that the Petitioner would be allowed to wear 
the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police subject to the condition that his 
substantive promotion would be allowed in the course after his seniors get 
promotion.  
4. 
 
It is further pleaded that against the above condition, the 
Petitioner filed another Writ Petition before the Lahore High Court, which 
was allowed and it was directed that a civil servant is entitled to promotion 
from the date he performed his duties as recognized by Section 8-A, therefore, 
the condition incorporated in the Notification dated 24.05.2001 was violative 
of Section 8-A. The Department filed Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal 
before this Court, which was dismissed.  
5. 
 
After dismissal of the Petition of the Department by this Court, 
the Petitioner made a representation to the Government and accordingly he 
was given out of turn promotion, vide Notification dated 16.08.2007, with 
effect from 24.10.1996.  
6. 
 
It was in the year 2013, that this Court in its judgment reported 
as Contempt Proceedings against Chief Secretary, Government of Sindh 
(2013 SCMR 1752), declared the practice/concept of out of turn promotions 
as unconstitutional and against the fundamental rights of the individuals.  
7. 
 
It is pertinent to mention here that after the above-judgment, the 
aggrieved persons filed Review Petitions directly which were also dismissed 
by this Court vide judgment reported as Ali Azhar Khan Baloch vs. Province 
of Sindh (2015 SCMR 456). It is also worthwhile to mention here that both 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
8
the aforesaid judgments were ordered to be sent to the Chief Secretaries of the 
Provinces as well as the Secretary, Establishment Division, with the direction 
to streamline the civil structure in conformity with the principles enunciated 
in the aforesaid judgments.  
8. 
 
The present proceedings emanate from an order of this Court, 
which was passed on 26.01.2016 in Civil Appeal No.184-L of 2013, wherein 
this Court has ordered as under:- 
 
We expect that all out of turn promotions granted 
either to the police personnel on gallantry award or 
otherwise shall be undone within four weeks from today 
and their seniority be re-fixed with their batch mates in 
terms of the directions contained in the aforesaid 
judgments. Out of turn promotions ranging from constable 
to any gazette officers shall be streamlined in terms of the 
aforesaid two judgments. On completion of the exercise, 
the I.G Police Punjab, Home Secretary, Punjab and Chief 
Secretary, Punjab, shall submit compliance report with 
the Assistant Registrar of the Court for our perusal in 
chambers. This order shall be communicated to the I.G, 
Punjab, Home, Secretary, Punjab and Chief Secretary, 
Punjab, for their information and compliance and non-
compliance of this judgment shall expose the concerned 
officials to contempt proceedings.  
 
9. 
 
After the passage of this Order, the Petitioner was relegated to 
the post of DSP, by applying the principles of the aforesaid judgments. It is 
against this order that the Petitioner alongwith others has directly approached 
this Court through Civil Miscellaneous Applications, which came up for 
hearing on 22.02.2016 and were ordered to be registered as a Review Petition.  
CRP.49/2016 etc 
9
Civil Review Petition No.51 of 2016 in C.A.No.184-L/13. 
10. 
 
In this Review Petition, it has been pleaded that the Petitioner 
was appointed as Assistant Sub-Inspector in the year 1998, following which 
he had earned a reputation of being a dedicated and fearless Police Officer. 
Being instrumental in causing arrest of wanted terrorists, he was granted out 
of turn promotion in the year 1991 as Sub-Inspector and then out of turn 
promotion as Inspector in the year 1998, under Section 8-A of the Punjab Civil 
Servants Act, 1974. It has been further pleaded that even in the year 1999, the 
Petitioner was recommended for out of turn promotion as DSP, which 
recommendation was not considered, therefore, he filed numerous writ 
petitions and contempt applications before the Lahore High Court and 
eventually he was promoted as DSP on 20.09.2010.  
11. 
 
It has been pleaded that after an observation made by this Court 
on 26.01.2016, in the case of Civil Appeal No.184-L of 2013, the Petitioner 
is relegated to the post of A.S.I.  
 
Civil Review Petition No.52 of 2016 in C.A.No.184-L/13. 
12. 
 
It has been pleaded that the Petitioner was appointed as Assistant 
Sub-Inspector in the year 1998 and was promoted as officiating Sub-Inspector 
in the year 1990. Later, he was granted one step out of turn promotion as 
Inspector under Section 8-A of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 read with 
Rule 14-A, which was not implemented, therefore, the Petitioner filed Writ 
Petition No.8147 of 1998, which was allowed, by judgment dated 22.06.1996. 
However, the Department challenged the judgment of the learned High Court 
before this Court through Civil Petition No.226-L of 2000, which was 
dismissed, vide judgment dated 26.04.2000. In the intervening period, the 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
10
Petitioner was promoted as DSP and S.P. More or less the case of the other 
Respondents is identical to that of the Petitioner.     
 
Civil Review Petition No.83 of 2016 in C.A.No.184-L/2013. 
13. 
 
It has been pleaded in this Petition that on 22.06.1982, the 
Petitioner joined the Police Department as Assistant Sub-Inspector and was 
promoted as Sub-Inspector on 29.06.1987. On 16.11.1995, he was further 
promoted to the rank of Inspector. On 18.01.1997, the Petitioner suffered 
injuries in a bomb blast which took place in the premises of the Sessions 
Court, in which the Chief of a banned outfit and fifteen officers lost their lives. 
It is pleaded that in view of his excellent performance, the Petitioner was 
recommended for out of turn promotion as DSP, by the Inspector General of 
Police, Punjab, under Section 8-A of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, read 
with Rule 14-A, which recommendation was not executed, therefore, the 
Petitioner filed Writ Petition before the Lahore High Court. The learned High 
Court disposed of the Writ Petition of the Petitioner with the direction to issue 
formal notification of promotion of the Petitioner as DSP. Thereafter, the 
Department filed two Civil Petitions No.443 and 584-L of 2001 before this 
Court, which was dismissed on the ground of limitation. After dismissal of 
the Petitions of the Department by this Court, the Petitioner made a 
representation to the Home Secretary, Punjab, and eventually he was given 
out of turn promotion as DSP, vide notification dated 27.06.2008, w.e.f. 
18.01.1997 i.e the date of incident. The case of the    other Petitioners is almost 
identical to that of the Petitioner.  
 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
11
 
Crl. Original Petition No.123 of 2016 in C.P.No.1446-L/1997. 
14. 
 
The Petitioner joined the Punjab Police as Inspector in the year 
1989. While posted as S.H.O Piplan, District Mianwali, he eliminated a 
proclaimed offender namely Ahmad Nawaz @ Barbari, a fugitive from law 
since 1979, who was wanted in more than twenty murder and harabba cases. 
The Petitioner was recommended for out of turn promotion under Section 8-
A read with Rule 14-A, but this recommendation for his out of turn promotion 
was not implemented, therefore, he filed Constitution Petition No.2445 of 
1995 before the Lahore High Court, with a prayer to grant him out of turn 
promotion as DSP, which was allowed. The Department filed Civil Petition 
for Leave to Appeal No.1446 of 1997 before this Court, which was dismissed, 
vide order dated 18.04.1998. It has been pleaded that the Government of 
Punjab in compliance with the judgment of the Lahore High Court, promoted 
the Petitioner as DSP vide Notification dated 17.10.1997, effective from 
08.05.1993. In the interregnum, the Petitioner rose to the rank of Deputy 
Inspector General of Police. However, in view of the observations made, on 
26.01.2016, by this Court in Civil Appeal No.184-L of 2013, the out of turn 
promotion granted to the Petitioner as DSP, vide Notification dated 
17.10.1997, has been revoked.  
15. 
 
More or less, the case of all the other Petitioners/Applicants is 
almost identical to that of the Petitioners whose cases have been given in detail 
above.  
16. 
 
Syed Ali Zafar, learned ASC, Counsel for the Petitioner in Civil 
Review Petition No.49 & 85 of 2016, has contended that on 08.11.1987, 
Section 8-A was inserted in the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, to grant out 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
12
of turn promotion to a civil servant who provenly exhibits exemplary 
intellectual, moral and financial integrity and high standard of honesty and 
gives extraordinary performance in the discharge of his duties, and was 
omitted on 17.10.2006. He submits that this Section was regulated by Rule 
14-A of the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment & Conditions of Service) 
Rules, 1974. He next contended that out of turn promotions under the said 
section were declared to have been made lawfully by this Court. In support of 
his contention to establish that this Court, in different cases, directed the 
competent authority to implement the orders passed under Section 8-A of the 
Act, he has relied on the cases of Capt. (Retd). Abdul Qayyum vs. Muhammad 
Iqbal (PLD 1992 SC 184), Government of Punjab vs. Shamsher Ali Khan, 
Additional Commissioner Multan (1992 SCMR 1388), Chief Secretary, 
Government of Punjab vs. Mumtaz Ahmed (1996 SCMR 1945), Abdul 
Ghaffar vs. Deputy Inspector General (1997 PLC (CS) 1150), Government of 
Punjab vs. Muhammad Iqbal (1997 SCMR 1429), I.G Police Lahore vs. 
Qayyum Nawaz Khan (1999 SCMR 1594) Javed Hussain Shah vs. 
Government of the Punjab (2005 PLD (CS) 974) and Sardar Zafar Iqbal Dogar 
vs. Secretary of the Government of the Punjab, Home Department (2006 PLC 
(CS) 164).  
17. 
 
He then referred to the case of Muhammad Nadeem Arif vs. I.G 
of Police (2011 SCMR 408), wherein this Court has observed that the concept 
of out of turn promotion is against the Constitution as well as the injunctions 
of Islam. He submits that the view taken by this Court in the case of 
Muhammad Nadeem Arif (supra) was an obiter dicta, as in this case, the vires 
of Section 8-A were not challenged and only the orders/instructions passed by 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
13
the I.G.P were set-aside. The view taken in this Judgment was followed in 
another case reported as Ghulam Shabbir vs. Muhammad Munir Abbasi (PLD 
2011 SC 516). 
18. 
 
He has further contended that the language of Section 9-A of 
Sindh Civil Servants Act, which has been interpreted by this Court in the case 
of Contempt proceedings against Chief Secretary, Sindh (2013 SCMR 1752), 
was distinct from Section 8-A of the Punjab Civil Servants Act. He contended 
that the Section 8-A was regulated by the Rule 14-A, whereas in Sindh no 
rules were framed to regulate out of turn promotions under Section 9-A, which 
was inserted on 21.02.2002.  He further submitted that for a short period of 
three months starting from 10.02.2005 to 11.05.2005, Rule 8-B was inserted 
in the Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 
1974, to regulate the provisions of Section 9-A. On 31.03.2009, the High 
Court of Sindh in C.P 1595/2005 had declared the out of turn promotions as 
unlawful and directed to re-examine them by a Committee. Consequently, 
Appeals arising out of said judgment came up for hearing before this Court 
and were dismissed as withdrawn. Thereafter six (06) validating laws were 
promulgated which had been examined on the touchstone of constitutional 
provisions by this Court and declared unconstitutional in the case of Contempt 
Proceedings against Chief Secretary Sindh (2013 SCMR 1752) and then in 
review Ali Azhar Khan Baloch vs. Province of Sindh (2015 SCMR 456).  
19. 
 
He next contended that this Court did not strike down the whole 
Section 9-A in its entirety, but only declared the out of turn promotions to be 
unconstitutional, however, the award/reward conferred under this Section 
were kept intact. 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
14
20. 
 
The learned ASC has further submitted that this Court on 
26.01.2016, while disposing of Civil Appeal No.184-L of 2013, has observed 
that the judgments of this Court referred to hereinabove were not being 
followed in letter and spirit in the other provinces. Therefore, he has now filed 
review against the said part of the order. 
21. 
 
He next contended that Section 8-A of the Punjab Civil Servants 
Act, 1974, had not been set-aside by any of the judgments of this Court, 
although Section 9-A of the Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973, which was pari-
materia, had been declared unconstitutional. Moreover, in C.R.P 49/2016, the 
Petitioner Shahid Pervaiz, who joined service on 04.03.1984, was promoted 
on grounds of having judgments of this Court in his favour. He has contended 
that now the question would be whether the declaratory judgments of this 
Court would have any binding effect on the case of the Petitioner on basis of 
the principle of res judicata.  
22. 
 
He further submitted that a statute could only be declared as non-
est, if the legislature is not competent to legislate that law. He submitted that 
law becomes unenforceable so long as a conflict exists with a fundamental 
right and if the fundamental right is for some reasons or the other disappears, 
the law becomes operative again on the basis of doctrine of eclipse.  In this 
regard, he referred to the cases of The Province of East Pakistan vs. MD. 
Mehdi Ali Khan (PLD 1959 SC 387) and Abul A’ la Maudoodi vs. 
Government of West Pakistan (PLD 1964 SC 673) and State of Gujrat vs Shri 
Ambica Mills Ltd. (AIR 1974 SC 1300). 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
15
23. 
 
He has further contended that the effect of a judgment which 
declares a law to be unconstitutional will have to be examined on pending 
cases as well as on future cases.  He has contended that even if a Court declares 
a law to be unconstitutional, it does not affect the past and closed transactions 
and the cases wherein vested rights have been created. In  support of his 
contention, he has relied on the cases of Muhammad Yousaf vs. Chief 
Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner (PLD 1968 SC 101),Nabi 
Ahmed vs. Home Secretary, Government of West Pakistan, Lahore(PLD 
1969 SC 599, Income-tax Officer, Central Circle II, Karachi  vs. Cement 
Agencies Ltd (PLD 1969 SC 322), Miss Asma Jilani vs. Government of the 
Punjab (PLD 1972 SC 139), Al-Jehad Trust vs. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 
1996 SC 324), Asad Ali vs. Federation of Pakistan, (PLD 1998 SC 161) Jamat 
-I - Islami Pakistan vs. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2000 SC 111), 
Muhammad Mubeen-us-Salam and others vs. Federation of Pakistan through 
Secretary, Ministry of Defence (PLD 2006 SC 602), Begum Nusrat Ali Gonda 
v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2013 SC 829), Pakistan, through the Secretary, 
Ministry of Finance vs Muhammad Himayatullah Farukhi (PLD 1969 SC 
407), Mehram Ali vs Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1998 SC 1445), Liaqat 
Hussain vs Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1999 SC 504),Zafar Ali 
Shah vs Pervez Musharraf Chief Executive of Pakistan (PLD 2000 SC 869), 
Attiyya Bibi Khan vs Federation of Pakistan (2001 SCMR 1161), Hussain 
Badshah vs Akhtar 
Zaman 
(2006 
SCMR 
1163), 
Muhammad 
Idrees vs Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan (PLD 2007 SC 681), 
Imran vs Presiding Officer, Punjab Special Court (PLD 1996 Lahore 542), 
Chenab Cement Products vs Banking Tribunal (PLD 1996 Lahore 672), 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
16
Muhammad Aslam vs Muhammad Hayat (PLD 1998 SC 165), Coromandel 
Fertilizers Ltd. Vs. CTO (1992(1) ALT 327), Collector of Customs & Central 
Excise Vs. Oriental Timber Industries.  (1985 SCR(3) 475), Union of India 
Vs. Godfrey Philips  (1985 SCR Supl.(3) 123), West Bemgal Hosiery 
Association vs. State of Bihar (1998 71 STC 298 (CS)), Video Electronics 
Pvt. Ltd  vs.  State of Rajasthan  (1998 71 STC 304 (SC)), Hi-Beam 
Electronics Pvt. Ltd. Vs.  State of Andhra Pradesh (1998 71 STC 305 (SC)), 
Besta Electronics Pvt Ltd.  Vs.  State of Madhya Pradesh (1998 71 STC 307 
(SC)), Indian Cement Case (1998 69 STC 305 (SC)), Blue Star Limited  vs.  
State of Andhra Pradesh (1990 78 STC 48),Brindavan Roller Floor Mills (ILR 
1994 KAR 2196) and the cases of Govindaraju Chetty (1968 22 STC 46), Kil 
Kotagiri Tea Coffee (1988 174 ITR 579 (KER), Suresh Babu (res-judicata) 
(ILR 1998 KAR 3885), DP Sharma Case  (ILR 1987 KAR 3255), Gokaraju 
Case  (1995 Supp 1 SC 271), Avatar Sindh Case (AIR 1979 SC 1991), 
Upendra Nath vs.  Lal (AIR 1945 PC 222), I.C. Golak Nath case  (AIR 1967 
1643), Coromandel Fertilizers Ltd  Vs. Dy. Commissioner of Income-Tax 
(1992 (1) ALT 327), Brindavan Roller Flour Mills Pvt. Ltd.  Vs. Joint 
Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (ILR 1994 KAR 2196), Managing 
Director, ECIL, Hyderabad  Vs. B. Karunakar (AIR 1994 SC 1074), 
Superintendent & Legal  Vs. Corporation of Calcutta (AIR 1967 SC 997), D. 
P. Sharma  Vs. State Transport Authority. (ILR 1987 KAR 3255), Beddington  
Vs.  British Transport Police (1998) 2 AC 143), Kleinwort Benson Ltd  Vs. 
Lincoln City Council  (1998) 3 WLR 1095), Hislop Vs.  Canada (2007) 1 SCR 
429), Murphy and Murphy  vs.  The Attorney General (1982) 1 I.R.).  
CRP.49/2016 etc 
17
24. 
 
He contends that where rights were created under or in pursuance 
of a judgment rendered which attained finality irrespective of the fact that the 
Courts have declared such law to be void in a later judgment, does not open 
the issue resolved in a past and closed transaction on the principle of res-
judicata. In this behalf, he relied on the cases of Mir Afzal and others vs. 
Qalandar and others (PLD 1976 AJ&K 26), Ch. Rehmat Ali vs. Haji Jan 
Muhammad (1983 SCMR 1109), Atiq-ur-Rehman vs. Muhammad Ibrahim 
(1984 SCMR 1469, Noor Muhammad vs. Muhammad Iqbal Khan (1985 CLC 
1280), Mst. Amina Bai vs. Karachi Municipal Corporation (1985 CLC 1979), 
Pir Baksh  vs.  The Chairman, Allotment Committee (PLD 1987 SC 145), 
Kohinoor Sugar Mills Lt  vs. Pakistan (1989 SCMR 2044), Muhammad 
Anwar vs.  M/s Associated Trading Co. Ltd. (1989 MLD 4750), Kharati and 
others vs. Muhammad Ibrahim (1989 CLC 894), Shahzad Hussain vs. Hajra 
Bibi (PLD 1990 Lahore 222), Nazam Din vs. Deputy Settlement 
Commissioner (1990 SCMR 239), Engineer-in-Chief Branch vs. Lalaluddin 
(PLD 1992 SC 207), Feroze Din  vs.  Administrator (1992 CLC 2430), 
Khadim Hussain vs. Govt. of Punjab (1993 SCMR 1869), Rahat Mehmood 
vs. Tariq Rasheed (PLD 1993 Kar. 648), Malik Gul Hassan and Co. vs. 
Federation of Pakistan (1995 CLC 1662), Muhammad Younis vs. Province of 
Punjab (1995 CLC 1834),  Messrs Tank Steel and Re-Rolling Mills Pvt Ltd 
Dera Ismail Khan vs. The Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1996 SC 77), 
Muhammad Sohail vs. Govt. of NWFP (1996 SCMR 218), Muhammad Naqi 
vs. Mst. Rasheeda Begum (1997 MLD 900), Shah Zareen Khan vs. Sada Gul 
(1997 MLD 903), Nazir Ahmad Vs. Abdullah (1997 SCMR 2881), Amanul 
Mulk  vs.  Ghafoor-ur-Rehman (1997 SCMR 1796), Muhammad Ali Naqvi 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
18
vs. Sindh Employees Social Security (1999 PLC (CS) 893), Quetta Textile 
Mills Limited, Nadir House, Karachi. vs. Pakistan (2000 YLR 2683), Allah 
Dawaya vs. Additional District Judge (2002 SCMR 1183), Rukhsana 
Tabassum vs. Kazim Imam Jan (2003 CLC 189 Kar), Hameeda Shamim vs. 
Deputy Commissionr, Karachi (2003 CLC 53 Kar), Ch. Riaz Ahmad vs. 
Punjab Text Book Board, Lahore (2004 PLC (CS) 1243), Mustafa Kamal  vs.  
Daud Khan (PLD 2004 SC 178), Mst. Bashiran Bibi vs. State Life Insurance 
Corporation of Pakistan (2004 CLC 1392), Ghulam Hassan vs. Munawar 
Hussain (2005 CLC 773), Muhammad Saleem vs. Additional District Judge, 
Gujranwala (PLD 2005 SC 511), Messrs Gadoon Textile Mills vs. Chairman, 
Area Electricity Board, WAPDA, Peshawar (PLD 2005 SC 430), Ch. Riaz 
Ahmad vs. Punjab Text Book Board (2006 SCMR 867), Nasir Khan vs. 
Province of Punjab (2006 YLR 87), District Coordination Officer Pakistan 
(2006 MLD 1), Ms. Mumtaz Maqsood vs. Secretary, Revenue Division and 
others (2010 YLR 1869), Aftab Ahmad  vs.  Muhammad Riaz (2010 MLD 
240), Trustees of the Port of Karachi  vs.  Karachi International Container 
Terminal Ltd (2010 CLC 1666), Dr. Hassan Bux Rind vs. Province of Sindh 
(2010 PLC (CS) 228), Syed Ghazanffar Hussain  vs.  Nooruddin (2011 CLC 
1303), Sanaullah vs. Mst. Naseem Begum (2012 MLD 1675), Punoo Khan vs. 
Mst. Iqbal Begum (2012 MLD 1678), Ghulam Akbar Lang  vs. Dewan Ashiq 
Hussain Bukhari (2012 SCMR 366), Abdul Rauf Khan vs. Muhammad Hanif 
(2013 CLC 219), Arshad Ali vs. Muhammad Tufail (2013 CLC 632), Zakir 
Ullah vs. Muhammad Reham (2014 CLC 1026), Ch. Muhammad Siddique vs. 
Executive Engineer Electricity Department AJ &K Bhimber (2015 CLC 60), 
B.C. International (Pvt) Ltd vs. Tahfeen Qayyum (2015 MLD 1347), Jamia 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
19
Masjid Habiba vs. Dhoraji Cooperative Housing Society (PLD 2015 Sindh 
39), Muhammad Nadeem Vs. Government of Balochistan (2015 PLC (CS) 
1143), Upendra Nath vs. Lal (AIR 1940 PC 222), Satyadhyan Ghosal and 
others  vs.  Sm Deorajin Debi and another (AIR 1940 SC 941), Badri Narayan 
Singh vs. Kamdeo Prasad Singh (AIR 1962 SC 338), Amalgamated 
Goalfields Ltd and another Janapada Sbha Chhindwara and others (AIR 1964 
SC 1013), Sheodan Sindh vs. Daryao Kunwar (AIR 1966 SC 1332), 
Virudhunagar Steel Rolling Mills Ltd  vs. Government of Madras (AIR 1968 
SC 1196), Ramagya Prasad Gupta  vs.  Murli Prasad (AIR 1974 SC 1320), 
State of Uttar Pradesh vs.  Nawab Hussain (1977 SC 1680), Muhammad 
Mustafa vs. Mansoor and others (AIR 1977 Allahabad 239), Avtar Sindh and 
others vs. Jagjit Singh and another (AIR 1979 SC 1911), Rangarao  vs.  
Kamalakant (1995 Supp (1) SCC 271), Suresh Babu vs. Smt. S. Susheela 
Thimmegowda (ILR 1998 KAR 3885), R. vs. Sarson [1996] 2 RCS, Canada 
(Attorney General)  vs.  Hislop [2007] 1 SCR 429, Harper vs. Virginia 
Department of Taxation (509 US 86 (1993), Norton vs. Shelby County 118 
US 425 (1886), R vs. Kirby (1957 95 CLR 529), Boddington  vs.  British 
Transport Police (1998 2 AC 143),  Regina vs. Governor of Her Majesty’s 
Prison Brockhill, (2000) 3 WLR 843,Murphy vs. Murphy(Attorney General) 
(1982 IR 241), Thomson vs. St. Cateherine’s College Cambridge, Henerson 
vs. Folkeston Waterworks Co., R vs. Unger (1997 2 NSWLR 990). 
25. 
 
He further contended that people want certainty in their daily life 
issues, so that they can regulate their life, therefore, law should only be 
revisited in exceptional circumstances, and that although this Court has the 
power to do so, but such power must be exercised sparingly. He, in support of 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
20
his submission, has relied upon the case of Nabi Ahmed vs. Home Secretary, 
Government of West Pakistan, Lahore ( PLD 1969 SC 599) on the issue of 
retrospective effect of judgments.  
26. 
 
He next contended that in a number of judgments, this Court has 
held that even if a law is declared unconstitutional, the benefits accrued there-
under would be protected on the basis of the principle of res judicata, 
therefore, rights created under or in pursuance of judgments rendered which 
have attained finality, would not open past and closed transactions. He 
submits that the binding decisions could not be re-opened and the past could 
not be erased by a judgment of the Court. Justice demands prospective over-
ruling.  
27. 
 
Mr Talat Farooq Shaikh, learned ASC, appeared in C.R.P 50 & 
52/2016 and adopted the arguments of Syed Ali Zafar, ASC and submitted 
that except the Petitioner No. 6, Naveed, who was given anti-dated promotion, 
all other Petitioners were promoted out of turn.  
28. 
 
Mr. Talat Farooq Shaikh, learned ASC for the Petitioners in 
C.R.P.No.454 of 2016, has filed written arguments contending that the 
promotions were granted to the Petitioners in pursuance of the Court orders; 
moreover, the seniority of the Petitioners has been disturbed without any legal 
justification, considering it out of turn promotion though they were never 
granted any out of turn promotion. He also contended that the Department has 
itself issued a list dated 17.06.2016, of the Superintendents of Police, who 
were granted out of turn promotion, but the names of the Petitioners do not 
figure therein.  It was next submitted that the list of SPs, who were not 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
21
promoted out of turn was also issued and the names of the Petitioners appeared 
at Sl. No.20, 23 and 24 of the list, hence the order of withdrawal of promotion 
dated 26.9.2016, was without any lawful authority, because the Petitioners 
were regularly promoted by orders of the Courts in accordance with Punjab 
Civil Servants Act and the Rules. The learned Counsel has also adopted the 
arguments of Syed Ali Zafar, learned Sr. ASC in addition to his own 
submissions.  
29. 
 
Khawaja Haris Ahmed, learned Sr.ASC, appeared in C.R.P 
83/2016 and Crl.R.P 52/2016 and has contended that in both the judgments 
i.e Contempt proceedings (Supra) and Ali Azhar Khan Baloch (Supra), the 
Petitioners were not party. He submits that Section 8-A of the Punjab Civil 
Servants Act, 1974, came into existence in the year 1987 in the province of 
Punjab and its vires were neither challenged nor examined by this Court in 
any of the judgments. He submitted that he does not challenge the findings 
recorded in the judgment of Contempt Proceedings (Supra). He next 
contended that Section 8-A of the Act was regulated by the Rule 14-A, 
whereas in Sindh, there was no rule to regulate Section 9-A that provided for 
out of turn promotion, therefore, the judgments given in peculiar facts and 
circumstances were not applicable to the other provinces. According to the 
learned Counsel, Section 9-A of the Sindh Civil Servants Act in Sindh stood 
alone but Section 8-A was to be regulated through the rules so they were not 
pari materia. Rule 14-A (ibid) had structured the discretion of the competent 
authority.  
30. 
 
He then pointed out that even no notice was ever issued to the 
Advocates General of the other provinces in terms of Order XXVII-A of the 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
22
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and without notice, the application of the 
aforesaid judgments could not be extended to the other provinces.  
31. 
 
On this objection of the learned Counsel, the Court has passed 
the following order:- 
M/s Syed Ali Zafar and Talat Farooq Sheikh, learned ASCs, have 
made their submissions on behalf of their respective review 
petitioners represented by them in C. R. Ps. No. 49, 50 & 52/2016. 
2. 
During the submissions Kh. Haris Ahmed, learned Sr. ASC 
for the review petitioners in C. R. P. No. 83/2016 & Crl. R. P. No. 
52/2016, has raised objection with reference to notice under Order 
XXVII-A CPC. We deem it appropriate that before proceeding 
further with these connected review petitions, let notice of these 
proceedings be issued to the learned Advocate Generals of all the 
four Provinces, learned Advocate General for Islamabad Capital 
Territory and also to learned Attorney General for Pakistan to 
render assistance on the constitutional points involved in these 
petitions. Re-list on 16.11.2016. 
3. 
C. M. As. No. 4240, 6936 & 7261/2016 and Crl. M. A. No. 
338/2016: All these applications for grant of permission to file 
review petitions and to argue the same are allowed subject to all just 
exceptions, therefore, all such review petitions be assigned proper 
numbers and be put up in Court on the next date of hearing. 
 
32. 
 
Khawaja Haris Ahmed, the learned Sr.ASC, has contended that 
the application of judgments of this Court reported as Contempt Proceedings 
Against Chief Secretary (2013 SCMR 1752) and Ali Azhar Khan Baloch vs. 
Province of Sindh (2015 SCMR 456), could not be extended to the other 
Provinces, particularly the Province of Punjab. He submits that he has sought, 
inter alia, the review of paragraph 183 of the judgment reported as 2013 
SCMR 1752, wherein a direction was given to all the Chief Secretaries of the 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
23
Provinces including the Secretary, Establishment Division, Government of 
Pakistan, to streamline the service structure of civil servants in line with the 
principles laid down in the said judgment whereby the term ‘out of turn 
promotion’ was declared against the spirit of the Constitution as well as the 
injunctions of Islam.  
33. 
 
He next contended that the provisions of Section 8A of the 
Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, relating to the out of turn promotion were 
neither examined nor considered by this Court while concluding the aforesaid 
judgment to make the principles enunciated therein applicable to the other 
provinces and the Federal Government. He submitted that such a direction 
contained in paragraph 183 of the judgment is violative of Article 10A of the 
Constitution, which protects the civil rights and obligations of the citizens in 
granting them a fair trial and due process. The Civil Servants of the Punjab 
were not given the opportunity of hearing before reaching such a conclusion 
by this Court, therefore, the findings recorded on the issue of ‘out of turn 
promotion’ contained in the aforesaid judgment could not be made applicable 
to the Province of Punjab.  
34. 
 
While formulating his arguments, he further submitted that the 
circumstances prevalent in the Province of Sindh were distinct, which perhaps 
has influenced the Court to reach such a conclusion whereas in Punjab the 
provisions of Section 8-A were regulated by Rule 14-A of the (Appointment 
and Conditions of Services) Rules, 1974, therefore, grant of out of turn 
promotion to the Petitioners, in any way, could be set at naught. He attempted 
to make a distinction between the provisions of out of turn promotion in 
Section 9-A of Sindh Civil Servants Act and Section 8-A of Punjab Civil 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
24
Servants Act. He stated that in Punjab statute, the discretion conferred under 
Section 8-A was structured and regulated by Rule 14-A, however, in the Sindh 
Civil Servants Act no Rule was enacted to regulate the provision of ‘out of 
turn promotion’, except for a limited period of three months. Therefore, the 
facts as well as the law of the province of Punjab were not pari materia with 
the province of Sindh which was declared un-constitutional. 
35. 
 
He next contended that the aforesaid judgment did not take notice 
of some of the provisions of the Constitution, which have direct bearing on 
the findings recorded by this Court. In this connection, he has referred to 
Article 27(1) of the Constitution, which envisages that no citizen otherwise 
qualified for appointment in the service of Pakistan shall be discriminated 
against in respect of any such appointment on the grounds of only of race, 
religion, caste, sex, residence or place of birth. He submitted that Article 27(1) 
is an exception to Article 25 of the Constitution. According to him, Article 
27(1) has direct nexus to the discrimination in service and ought to have been 
considered while passing the judgment in review.   
36. 
 
He further contended that Article 8(3)(a) of the Constitution, 
excludes the application of any law relating to the members of the Armed 
Forces or of the police or of such other forces as are charged with the 
maintenance of public order, for the purpose of ensuring the proper discharge 
of their duties or the maintenance of discipline among them, was overlooked 
while recording findings on the issue of out of turn promotion. He submits 
that Section 8-A or Section 9-A of both the Provinces were police specific and 
are covered by the exclusion clause of Article 8(3)(a) of the Constitution.  
CRP.49/2016 etc 
25
37. 
 
He next referred to the provision of Section 6 of the General 
Clauses Act and submitted that Section 8-A of the Punjab Civil Servants Act 
was omitted and has the same effect as that of repeal of a statute. In support 
of his contention, he has relied upon the cases of Muhammad Tariq Badr vs. 
National Bank of Pakistan (2013 SCMR 314), Dr. Mukhtar Ahmed Shah  vs. 
Government of Punjab (PLD 2002 SC 757). He concluded that the effect of 
repeal of a provision of law is very much clear, which means that a law ceases 
to have effect but, by no means, it can be said to have undone the prior acts 
effectuated by that provision of law.   
38. 
 
On the point of cut of date, he contended that in the province of 
Punjab, it would be the date when Section 8-A of the Punjab Civil Servants 
Act was omitted which is 17.10.2006, and not the date when it was inserted 
in the Punjab Civil Servants Act.  
39. 
 
Khawaja Haris Ahmad, Sr. ASC argued that the judgment of this 
Court in the case of Contempt proceedings against Chief Secretary Sindh 
(2013 SCMR 1752) was rendered, keeping in view the peculiar facts as well 
as the law in the province of Sindh and the application of the same could not 
be extended to the other provinces, particularly the province of Punjab.                          
40. 
 
He next contended that the out of turn promotions under Section 
8-A were never held to be unconstitutional during its life time and the out of 
turn promotions made under this Section were protected by this Court through 
various judgments. Moreover, the views of the Courts kept on changing by 
the afflux of time. Military Courts which were not considered Constitutional 
at one time have been validated by this Court established through amendment 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
26
in the Constitution. In support of his contentions, he has relied upon the 
judgments of this Court, which according to him, declared out of turn 
promotions as lawful Government of Punjab vs. Shamsher Ali (1992 SCMR 
1388), Abdul Qayyum vs. Muhammad Iqbal Khokhar (PLD 1992 SC 184), 
Government of Punjab vs. Raja Muhammad Iqbal (1993 SCMR 1814), Chief 
Secretary Government of Punjab vs. Raja Mumtaz Ahmed (1996 SCMR 
1945), Government of Punjab vs. Muhammad Iqbal (1997 SCMR 1428), 
Inspector General of Police vs. Qayyum Nawaz Khan (1999 SCMR 1594), 
Muhammad Gulshan Khan vs. Secretary Establishment Division (PLD 2003 
SC 102), Province of Punjab vs. Javed Hussain Shah, Inspector General of 
Police vs. Muhammad Iqbal (2007 SCMR 1864).  
41. 
 
He further submitted that later on the trend changed and the out 
of turn promotions were questioned, however, the law was never struck down. 
He referred to the case of Farhat Abbas vs Inspector General (2009 SCMR 
245), wherein it was observed that performance of duty with due diligence 
and efficiently deserves due appreciation but it cannot be over appreciated out 
of proportion so as to make out case a grievance to the other employees in 
service of the department. In the case of Muhammad Nadeem Arif vs. 
Inspector General of Police (2011 SCMR 408) this Court observed that rules 
should be framed to regulate the out of turn promotion to save the agony of 
the police officials/officers as well as to save the public exchequer from 
unnecessary litigation. He also referred to the cases of Government of Punjab 
vs. Sardar Zafar Iqbal Dogar (2011 SCMR 1239), Ghulam Shabbir vs. 
Muhammad Munir Abbasi (2011 PLC (CS) 763), Muhammad Fahim Soomro 
vs. Waqar Ahmed Qadri (2012 SCMR 680) to substantiate that the law on the 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
27
point was never struck down despite observing it unconstitutional and against 
the injunctions of Islam. This was only done so in the case of Contempt 
proceedings against Chief Secretary Sindh (2013 SCMR 1752) on 
12.06.2013. 
42. 
 
Mr Mohammad Akram Sheikh, learned Sr.ASC, appeared for the 
Petitioner No.6 in C.R.P.No.85 of 2016 and contended that notice in terms of 
Order XXVII-A CPC was not issued to the Advocate General, Punjab and 
subsequent issuance of this notice would not cure this inherent defect. 
Therefore, the judgment under review was per incurim. In this behalf he relied 
on the case of Federation of Pakistan vs. Aftab Ahmed Khan Sherpao (PLD 
1992 SC 723).  
43. 
 
He next contended that though the principle of stare decisis does 
not apply to this Court, but the rights and benefits accrued to the individuals 
through earlier judgments would remain protected. He referred to the case of 
Pir Baksh vs. The Chairman Allotment Committee (PLD 1987 SC 145). 
44. 
 
He further contended that the bar envisaged in Article 8(3) (a) 
would apply to the law relating to the police and such law is exempted from 
the scrutiny of this Court, as the police force has been dealt with differently 
as compared to the other civil servants. He referred to the cases of Inspector 
General of Police vs Mushtaq Ahmed Warriach (PLD 1985 SC 159) and Lt. 
Col. Anwar Aziz vs. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2001 SC 549).  
45. 
 
He next contended that the case of the Petitioner falls within the 
ambit of term “past and closed transaction” and rights accrued in favour of the 
Petitioner could not be taken away by change of law unless specifically 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
28
declared to be applied retrospectively. He referred to the case of Quetta 
Textile Mills reported in 2000 YLR 2683.  
46. 
 
He submitted that in paragraph 183 of the judgment reported as 
(2013 SCMR 1752), the Chief Secretary of the Government of Sindh was 
directed to implement the judgment whereas the Chief Secretaries of the other 
provinces and the Secretary, Establishment Division, Government of 
Pakistan, were directed to streamline the service structure in line with the 
principles laid down in the said judgment. He submitted that there was no 
direction to the other provinces and the Federation to implement the said 
judgment retrospectively, therefore, the Punjab Government should not have 
implemented the judgment.   
47. 
 
He then contended that the concept of out of turn promotion is 
not against the injunction of Islam and the Federal Shariat Court is expressly 
empowered by the Constitution in this behalf to consider the validity of the 
law on the touchstone of the injunctions of Islam. He in this behalf placed 
before this Court an extract from the book titled Seerat Encyclopedia, Volume 
10 which reads as under: - 
 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
29
 
 
 
48. 
 
He submitted that picking best of the best is prerogative of the 
Commander of a Force. Moreover, all the powers are scared trust whether it 
be executive, legislative or judicial, therefore, heavy duty lies on the shoulders 
of the Hon’ble Judges of this Court to discharge their duty. In the present case 
the out of the turn promotion of the Petitioner was declared to be lawful up to 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
30
this Court and now after so many years it would not be justified to apply the 
judgment of this Court retrospectively to undo such promotion. The concept 
that the judgment is not time bound has no sanctity in the eyes of law as vested 
rights have been accrued in favour of the Petitioner.   
49. 
 
Mr. Muhammad Akram Sheikh, learned Senior ASC, has 
submitted written synopsis on behalf of the Petitioners in Civil Review 
Petition No.479 of 2016 in Civil Appeal No.184-L/2013, and contended that 
the direction contained in para No. 1 of C.A 184-L/2013 is not relevant to the 
case of the Petitioners, as interpreted by the Inspector General of Police, 
Punjab (IGPP), while issuing order dated 18.10.2016, whereby promotion of 
the Petitioners as DSP and in lower ranks was undone, holding that the same 
were made ante dating their seniority, which was held in C.A 184-L/2013, as 
violative of the law. He further contended that the order dated 26.01.2016 of 
this Court passed in C.A 184-L/2013, deals with cases of out of turn / 
accelerated promotion / back dated seniority to non-cadre officers in the 
regular cadres and the case of the Petitioners does not fall in any of these 
categories. He has also submitted that terms and conditions of service of the 
officers of Punjab Police upto the rank of Inspector (BS-16) are governed by 
the Punjab Police Rules, 1934. He referred to the Rule 12.8, 13.1 (3) and 13.18 
and submitted that in the case of Gul Hasan Jatoi and others Vs. Faqir 
Mohammad Jatoi and other (2016 SCMR 1254) it has been held by this Court 
that “those police personnel who have completed their statutory period of 
probation, whether it is three years or two years, they shall stand confirmed 
whether or not a notification to that effect is issued.”  
CRP.49/2016 etc 
31
50. 
 
He next contended that every case is to be decided on its own 
peculiar facts and circumstances, therefore, while passing the order dated 
26.01.2016 no opportunity was provided to the Police Officers who were 
likely to be adversely affected. He has relied on the case of Muhammad 
Nadeem Arif Vs. Inspector-General of Police, Punjab Lahore (2010 PLC (CS) 
924). He next contended that the principle of locus poenitentiae will be 
applicable in the case in hand. He has adopted the arguments advanced by Mr. 
Abdul Rahim Bhatti, learned ASC in C.R.P 384/2016 (Muhammad Anwar 
Vs. IGP Punjab and others) and prayed that Respondent No. 1 (IGPP) should 
be directed to review his orders after hearing the Petitioners. 
51. 
 
The Petitioner, Jamil Ahmed, in Civil Review Petition No.51 of 
2016, has appeared in person and filed a written statement, stating therein that 
he adopts the arguments of Messrs Khawaja Haris Ahmed and M. Akram 
Shiekh, learned Sr.ASCs.  
52. 
 
Ms. Asma Jahangir, ASC appearing in C.R.P 89/2016 in C.A 
184-L/2013 on behalf of the Petitioners had adopted the arguments of 
Khawaja Haris Ahmad, ASC except his contentions on Article 27 of the 
Constitution of Pakistan. She contended that there were many errors floating 
on the surface of the impugned judgments, justifying the review. Firstly, the 
Petitioners were never heard before passing the judgments of this Court 
sought to be reviewed. Secondly, no notice in terms of Order XXVII-A of the 
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was given to the Advocate General, Punjab. 
Thirdly, there was distinction between Section 8-A of the Punjab Civil 
Servants Act, 1974 and Section 9-A of the Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973 and 
by striking down the out of turn promotions in the province of Sindh, same 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
32
principle could not be applied to the Province of Punjab. She further submitted 
that in the province of Punjab there was a Committee formed under Rule        
14-A of the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditions of Service) 
Rules, 1974, therefore, unlike the practice in the Province of Sindh the 
discretion to grant out of turn promotion did not vest in a single person and 
such powers were not being exercised arbitrarily. Fourthly, Section 8-A of the 
Punjab Civil Servants Act, was omitted in the year 2006 and it had the same 
effect as that of repeal of a law and hence the vested rights created in favour 
of the Petitioners could not be taken away under the garb of the impugned 
judgments.  She next contended that the question of out of turn promotion was 
one that stemmed out of a government policy, which could not be interfered 
with by the Court. In this regard she has relied upon the case of Dossani 
Travels Pvt Ltd Vs. Ms. Travels Shop Pvt. Ltd (PLD 2014 SC 1). 
53. 
 
She next contended that all of the Petitioners were only given one 
time ‘out of turn promotion’ throughout their career and that too, validly under 
the law prevalent at that time and that too were awarded on good reasons as 
each one of them had acted in an exceptional manner during the discharge of 
their duties. She was of the view that such incentives are given to the 
officers/officials of the forces on the ground of “bravery” in many countries 
of the world, however, she did not point out any country where such benefit 
was being given. She further submitted that by the repeal of Section 8-A in 
Punjab in the year 2006, vested rights accrued in favour of the Petitioners, 
which could not be taken away on the basis of the principle of ‘past and closed 
transactions’. 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
33
54. 
 
She next contended that the judgment of this Court could not be 
given retrospective effect to undo the out of turn promotions validly given, 
under the law in force at the relevant time as the vested rights had accrued and 
the effect of repeal as per the Constitution and the law would be attracted. In 
support of her contention, she has relied upon the cases of Dr Mukhtar Hamid 
Shah vs. Government of Punjab (PLD 2002 SC 757), M.C.B Bank Ltd, 
Karachi Vs. Abdul Waheed Abro and others (2016 SCMR 108), Nazeer 
Ahmad and others vs. Ghulam Mehdi and others (1988 SCMR 824), Taza 
Khan and others Vs. Ahmad Khan and others (1992 SCMR 1371), 
Muhammad Tariq Badr vs. National Bank of Pakistan (2013 SCMR 314), 
Shahida Bibi and others Vs. Habib Bank Limited and others (2016 CLD 
2025), Federation of Pakistan Vs. Dr. Mubashir Hassan and others (PLD 2012 
SC 106), Jannat-ul-Haq and 2 others Vs. Abbas Khan and 8 others (2001 
SCMR 1073), Hakim Ali Zardari Vs. The State (PLD 1998 SC 1), Al-Samrez 
Enterprises Vs. Federation of Pakistan (1986 SCMR 1917), Badshah Gul 
Wazir Vs. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (2015 SCMR 43). 
55. 
 
Mr Hamid Khan, learned Senior ASC, while appearing for the 
Petitioner in C.R.P.No.92 of 2016 in Civil Appeal No.184-L of 2013, 
contends that the Petitioner is aggrieved by the order of the department, 
whereby under the garb of directions of this Court vide order dated 
26.01.2016, regarding implementation of the judgments of this Court reported 
as Contempt Proceedings against Chief Secretary Sindh (2013 SCMR 1752) 
and Ali Azhar Khan Baloch vs. Province of Sindh (2015 SCMR 456), the 
Petitioner was reverted, inter alia, on the ground that he was promoted out of 
turn. The learned Counsel submits that the Petitioner was twice promoted out 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
34
of turn but the issue of his seniority was settled up to this Court by the 
judgment dated 12.12.2013. He contended that the aforesaid judgments of this 
Court were not applicable to the case of the Petitioner, as the matter was 
different and had also become part of the history on the basis of the doctrine 
of “past and closed transaction”, therefore, the matter could not be put to 
another round of litigation to settle what had already been settled by this Court 
and the benefit granted under the valid law could not be taken away.  
56. 
 
Mr. Hamid Khan, learned Sr. ASC appeared for the Petitioners 
in Civil Review Petition 382/2016 and Civil Review Petition 383/2016. He 
contended that all the Petitioners in these Review Petitions were appointed 
and promoted in the Punjab Police on the basis of Sports Policy and the 
maximum promotion one could achieve through the Sports Policy was up to 
the rank of Inspector. He submitted that the Punjab Police issued a Sports 
Policy in the year 1982, which provided for an objective criteria on the basis 
of which incentives in the shape of cash reward or promotion could be granted 
to any police officer/ official and there were hardly 140 police officials/ 
officers, who were inducted and given accelerated promotion in the Punjab 
Police on the basis of this policy. 
57. 
 
He next contended that the participation in sports from our 
country both at national and international levels was facing a continuous 
decline and the country has suffered a rapid downfall in the Sports 
performance, therefore, there was a pressing need to encourage sports 
activities in the country in accordance with Article 259 of the Constitution. 
He submits that although the sportsmen appointed and promoted under this 
policy were part of the Punjab Police, yet they should be categorized 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
35
separately from those who were promoted out of turn on the basis of an act of 
gallantry, based on the principle of intelligible differentia. In this regard he 
referred to the case of I. A Sherwani Vs. Government of Pakistan (1991 SCMR 
1041).  
58. 
 
He further contended that this category was never discussed in 
the judgments wherein the out of turn promotion was declared ultra vires the 
Constitution. He submitted that induction and accelerated promotion on the 
basis of sports policy has been a recognized method, which is based on the 
performance shown by an officer/official at national and international level. 
He added that since physical fitness and strength were of value to the duties 
entrusted to a Police Officer/Official, such inductions and promotions should 
be encouraged. Different departments like WAPDA, NBP, PIA, Air Force etc 
were also encouraging the sportsmen, representing the country at national and 
international level, by offering incentives in the shape of cash rewards as well 
as promotions. He contended that if the promotion of sportsmen in the Punjab 
Police is undone, then they will be discriminated against those who are getting 
the same benefit in other government departments.   
59. 
 
He next contended that in the case of Contempt proceedings 
against Chief Secretary Sindh (2013 SCMR 1752) the rationale on the basis 
of which out of turn promotions were held against the Constitution cannot be 
applied to the persons promoted on the basis of Sports, and it was not possible 
for the authority to wrongly exercise its powers under the garb of Sports 
Policy since it was based on an objective criteria of winning championships 
and or gold medals. He submits that the principle of legitimate expectancy 
was also attracted in their case. 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
36
60. 
 
He next contended that undoing of such promotions will be 
against the spirit of Article 10A of the Constitution which guaranteed “due 
process” and if the sportsmen, who have earned promotions on the basis of a 
valid sports policy are demoted, the principle of locus poenitentiae would be 
fully attracted, because the Sports Policy had become a mature practice in the 
Punjab Police since 1982 and has assumed the force of law which could not 
be deviated. In this regard he has relied on the case of Nazir Ahmad Vs. 
Pakistan (PLD 1970 SC 453).  
61. 
 
Mr. Hamid Khan, learned Sr. ASC for the Petitioners has filed 
written arguments in C.R.P.No.480 of 2016 on behalf of 13 DSPs. He has 
submitted that in pursuance of order dated 12.12.2013 of this Court passed in 
Civil Appeal No.840/2012, seniority list of Inspectors dated 01.11.2012, was 
circulated and finalized. Another final seniority list of DSPs dated 01.07.2014, 
was circulated vide notification dated 01.07.2014, showing dates of 
promotion of all the Petitioners w.e.f. 12.02.2009 and 12.01.2010. He has 
further submitted that the seniority of the Petitioners as Inspector was adjusted 
w.e.f. 16.11.1995, alongwith colleagues of their own batch and this seniority 
list has assumed finality under the Orders of this Court.  
62. 
 
He has next submitted that the seniority of the Petitioners through 
order dated 10.11.2016 of the Department has been disturbed and adjusted 
from 1999, which means that they have been promoted after 11 years, whereas 
their juniors have been promoted after 7 years and in some cases after 5 years. 
So the Petitioners have been rendered junior as Inspectors of Police on the 
pretext of implementation of the order of this Court dated 26.01.2016 passed 
in Civil Appeal No.184-L/2013. He has next submitted that the order dated 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
37
10.11.2016, passed by the IGP, Punjab is violative of the orders of this Court 
dated 08.03.2011, 12.07.2011 and 05.01.2012 passed in HRC No.1038/201. 
Furthermore, the said order of the Department is also violative of the 
judgement of this Court dated 12.12.2013 passed in Civil Appeal 
No.840/2012 and order dated 08.04.2014 passed in CRP No.2/2014. 
63. 
 
He has also submitted that the case of the Petitioners has nothing 
to do with out of turn promotions and they have neither been promoted out of 
turn nor have benefited from ante-dated fixation of seniority, hence, order of 
this Court dated 26.01.2016, is not applicable to the present case. He has also 
referred to the case of Gul Hasan Jatoi and others Vs. Faqir Muhammad Jatoi 
(2016 SCMR 1254) and submitted that adjustment of seniority from the date 
of confirmation after completion of the period of probation would reflect the 
actual position of seniority of the Petitioners and such subsequent adjustment 
cannot be treated as out of turn promotion or ante-dated fixation of seniority.   
64. 
 
He has also submitted that the seniority of the Petitioners as 
Inspectors in the year 2008 and DSPs in the seniority list of 2014 are past and 
closed transaction and cannot be re-opened at this stage. Moreover, the 
Petitioners were condemned un-heard violating the fundamental principle of 
audi alteram partem and Respondent No.1/IGP Punjab was bound to give 
opportunity of hearing to the Petitioners before withdrawing their promotions 
as DSPs after about 7 years without any justification. This is also violative of 
due process of law as enshrined in Article 10A of the Constitution. He next 
submitted that the withdrawal of promotion of the Petitioners is violative of 
the principle of locus poenitentiae and the right to continue as DSPs has been 
vested in the Petitioners. Furthermore, the impugned order of IGP, Punjab 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
38
suffers from bias and mala-fide.  He has prayed that the seniority of the 
Petitioners as DSPs reflected in the final seniority list circulated on 
01.07.2014, may be revived and restored.      
65. 
 
Malik Muhammad Qayyum, Sr. ASC appeared on behalf of the 
Petitioner in Crl.O.P 123/2016 in C.P 1446-L/1997 and submitted that the 
Petitioner displayed gallantry beyond the call of his duty in an encounter, 
which took place on the night between 30th and 31st October, 1992 wherein 
Ahmad Nawaz alias Barbri, a notorious criminal and proclaimed offender was 
killed. Based on this act of gallantry, the Petitioner was recommended for 
accelerated promotion by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Sargodha 
Range, Sargodha but this recommendation was turned down by the Inspector 
General of Police, Punjab. Thereafter, a Writ Petition was filed before the 
Lahore High Court which was accepted and the Lahore High Court directed 
for the grant of out of turn promotion on 03.12.1996. The Petition filed by the 
government before this Court (C.P 656-L/1997) was dismissed as being 
barred by time. However, the Petition (C.P 1446-L/1997) filed by Rana Shujat 
Ali Khan, compatriot Inspector of the Petitioner was dismissed by this Court 
and thereafter, on 17.10.1997, notification regarding promotion of the 
Petitioner was issued by the Government of Punjab pursuant to the Judgment 
of this Court in C.P 1446-L/2016, which was also affirmed on 18.04.1998, by 
dismissal of the Review Petition. He further submitted that now the said 
notification dated 17.10.1997, issued by the Governor of Punjab has illegally 
been withdrawn by the department on 17.02.2016 as the Inspector General of 
Police is not competent to withdraw the same of his own without any reference 
to or order of the Government.  
CRP.49/2016 etc 
39
66. 
 
He next contended that neither the Petitioner nor the Government 
of the Punjab were parties to the case out of which judgments in the case of 
Contempt proceedings against the Chief Secretary Sindh (2013 SCMR 1752) 
and Ali Azhar Khan Baloch Vs. Province of Sindh (2015 SCMR 456) had been 
passed. He submitted that these judgments were not binding on the Petitioner.  
67. 
 
He next contended that the order of out of turn promotion of the 
Petitioner was issued in terms of Section 8-A of the Punjab Civil Servants 
Act, 1974 and this provision was omitted from the statute in the year 2006 and 
the said provision was not the subject matter of the judgments of this Court 
i.e. 2013 SCMR 1752 and 2015 SCMR 456, therefore, the said judgments 
could not be applied to the case of the Petitioner.  
68. 
 
He further contended that the law in Punjab was repealed long 
before the two judgments Contempt proceedings (Supra) and Ali Azhar 
Baloch (Supra) were delivered by this Court and there was no question of the 
same being brought to life again and then declaring it against the Constitution. 
Regarding the effect of omission of law, he referred to the cases of Dad 
Muhammad and another Vs. Additional District Judge Quetta and others 
(1996 SCMR 1868), Idrees Ahmad and another Vs. Hafiz Fida Ahmad Khan 
and 4 others (PLD 1985 SC 376), Muhammad Tariq Badar and another Vs. 
National Bank of Pakistan (2013 SCMR 314) and Raja Shaukat Mehmood Vs. 
Azad Jammu & Kashmir and another (2003 PLC (CS) 424). 
69. 
 
He next contended that even if the judgments in the cases of 
Contempt proceedings (Supra) and Ali Azhar Baloch (Supra) are assumed to 
be applicable to the case of the Petitioner, yet those cases which have become 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
40
past and closed and have been concluded giving rise to vested rights cannot 
be reopened and interfered with on the basis of these judgments. In this regard 
he relied on the cases of Income Tax Officer (Circle-II), Karachi and another 
Vs. Cement Agencies Ltd and another (PLD 1969 SC 322), Pir Bakhsh and 
another Vs. Chairman Allotment Committee (PLD 1987 SC 145), Hussain 
Badshah and another Vs. Akhtar Zaman and others (2006 SCMR 1163), 
Mehram Ali Vs. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1998 SC 1445), Dr. Subra 
Manian Swami Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and others (AIR 2015 SC 460), Akhtar 
Hussain Siddique Advocate Vs. The Province of Punjab (1999 CLC 951), Atia 
Bibi Vs. Federation of Pakistan (2001 SCMR 1161), Molasses Trading & 
Export Vs. Federation of Pakistan and another (1993 SCMR 1905), Province 
of East Pakistan Vs. Sharafat Ullah and others (PLD 1970 SC 514), 
Commissioner of Income Tax, Karachi Vs. Eastern Federal Union Company 
(PLD 1982 SC 247), Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation Vs. Muhammad Azam 
Katper and others (2002 SCMR 1023) and Ch. Textile Mills Vs. Income Tax 
Officer (PLD 1988 Lahore 440). 
70. 
 
He next contended that the judgments of this Court generally 
apply prospectively and cannot destroy the rights which have already been 
accrued to a person. He relied on the cases of Pensionary benefits of Judges 
(PLD 2013 SC 829), Victor Linkletter Vs. Victor G. Walker Warden (381 U.S 
618), Muhammad Yousaf Vs. Chief Settlement Commissioner (PLD 1968 SC 
101), Muhammad Yousaf Vs. Essa Jan (2009 SCMR 1169), Mst. Atiya Bibi 
Vs. Federation of Pakistan (2001 SCMR 1161), Muhammad Farooq Vs. 
Muhammad Hussain (2013 SCMR 225), Mehram Ali Vs. the Federation (PLD 
1998 SC 1145), Pir Bukhsh Vs. Chairman Allotment Committee (PLD 1987 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
41
SC 145), Asad Ali and others Vs. Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 
1998 SC 161). 
71. 
 
He next contended that in any case the judgment delivered in 
favour of the Petitioner is protected by the doctrine of res judicata, estoppel 
and conclusiveness. The Petitioner, the I.G.P Punjab and the Government of 
Punjab are bound by the judgment of this Court passed in C.P 1446-L/1997 
which had attained finality in the review petition on 18.07.1997 and these 
judgments, being conclusive and binding, operate as res judicata. In this 
regard he relied on the cases of Pir Bukhsh Vs. Chairman Allotment 
Committee (PLD 1987 SC 145), Dr. Subra Manian Swami Vs. State of Tamil 
Nadu and others (AIR 2015 SC 460). 
72. 
 
The learned Counsel lastly contended that the judgment in the 
case of Dr. Mobashir Hassan and others Vs. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 
2010 SC 265) i.e National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) case, was 
distinguishable on three grounds. Firstly, NRO was promulgated on 
05.10.2007 and its vires were challenged within three days of its promulgation 
and within a week on first date of its hearing, this Court was pleased to pass 
an interim order, whereby any benefit under NRO was made subject to the 
outcome of the case. Secondly, in the NRO case it was observed that the 
President of Pakistan cannot issue an Ordinance of the nature which the 
Parliament is not empowered to enact. So there was an inherent defect in the 
promulgation of the NRO. Thirdly, no defense was put by Federation of 
Pakistan and no beneficiary has come forward to protect his benefits.  
CRP.49/2016 etc 
42
73. 
 
Mr. M. Bilal, learned Senior ASC, has filed written arguments in 
C.M.A.No.1681/2016 in C.R.P.No.49 of 2016, contending that the Petitioner 
joined Punjab Police as Assistant Sub-Inspector on 29.4.1985 on sports basis 
and thereafter was promoted to the rank of Sub-Inspector and was confirmed 
in that rank by the competent authority with effect from 27.09.1986. She was 
promoted to the rank of Inspector on 20-12-1991. Thereafter, in August 2005, 
on the recommendations of the Departmental Promotion Committee, she was 
appointed as DSP. In light of order dated 26-01-2016, passed by this Court in 
Civil Appeal No.184-L/2013, a large number of promotions of Police Officers 
were withdrawn by the IGP and Addl. IGP, Punjab, vide order dated 17-02-
2016. As a result of order dated 17-02-2016, the date of promotion of the 
Applicant were revised, inter alia, on the ground that her batch mates in her 
range were promoted from the said dates. The CCPO Lahore vide order dated 
03-03-2016, re-fixed her seniority against which the Applicant has already 
filed a departmental representation on 30-07-2016.     
74. 
 
He next contended that the judgments reported as Contempt 
Proceedings against Chief Secretary, Government of Sindh (2013 SCMR 
1752), Ali Azhar Khan Baloch Vs. Province of Sindh (2015 SCMR 456) and 
order dated 26-01-2016, of this Court in Civil Appeal No.184-L/2013, have 
no bearing on the case of the Applicant as no findings have been recorded by 
this Court regarding appointment on sports basis, which has become a regular 
practice and is prevailing even in other departments like Pakistan Customs, 
Pakistan Railways, HBL, NBP, PIA, WAPDA and Pakistan Air Force. He 
further submitted that even Article 259(2) of the Constitution also encourages 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
43
promotions on the basis of sports. Moreover, the “Sports Policy, 1982” has 
become a mature practice and the same cannot be undone.  
75. 
 
He further contended that the principles of “past and closed 
transaction” and “locus poenitentiae” are fully attracted to the case of the 
Applicant. In this regard he has relied upon the case of Application by Abdul 
Rehman Farooq Pirzada vs. Begum Nusrat Ali Gonda Vs. Federation of 
Pakistan (PLD 2013 SC 829). He further contended that the Applicant has 
been condemned unheard as a result of which her fundamental rights 
guaranteed under Article 10-A and 25 of the Constitution have been affected. 
In this regard he has relied upon the cases of Contempt Proceedings against 
Syed Yousaf Raza Gillani, PM (PLD 2012 SC 553) and (Babar Hussain Shah 
vs. Mujeeb Ahmed Khan (2012 SCMR 1235).  The learned Counsel has also 
adopted the arguments advanced by Mr. Hamid Khan, learned Sr. ASC in 
CRP No.382/2016 and 383/2016.   
76. 
 
Mr. Muhammad Qamar-uz-Zaman, learned ASC appeared for 
the applicant / Petitioner in C.M.A.No.8132/2016 in C.R.P.No.49/2016, and 
has filed his written submission in which it is contended that case of the 
applicant lady is not of “out of turn promotion”. She was appointed as Sub-
Inspector in Punjab Police on 27.11.1986. Thereafter, due to her outstanding 
performance shown in the arrest of a desperado, her admission to the List-F 
was anti-dated and she was promoted as Inspector w.e.f 21.01.1988 and when 
her juniors were promoted as DSP, having ignored the applicant, the 
Notification dated 02.11.1999 for her promotion as DSP was issued in light 
of the judgments of this Court dated 15.04.1999 and 20.10.1999. Thereafter, 
she was promoted as S.P w.e.f 05.10.2012.  
CRP.49/2016 etc 
44
77. 
 
It is next submitted that now the IGP in light of order dated 
26.01.2016 of this Court, passed in C.A 184-L/2013, has withdrew her 
promotion as S.P and thereafter also withdrew her promotion as DSP and 
relegated her to the post of Inspector. While withdrawing her promotion, it 
has specifically been mentioned that the Notification dated 02.11.1999 (for 
her promotion as DSP) was issued under the judgment of this Court.  
78. 
 
It is also contended that the IGP, Punjab is not competent to 
whittle down the effect of judgments dated 15.04.1999 and 20.10.1999, 
passed by this Court as the same had attained finality. Moreover, under Article 
185 (2) (b) of the Police Order, 2002 all rights, privileges, obligations or 
liabilities acquired, accrued or incurred under the Police Act, 1861 have been 
saved and the saving clause of Police Order, 2002 do not confer any authority 
to the IGP, Punjab to undo the ‘past and closed transactions’. Therefore, now 
after lapse of 18 years the IGP could not withdraw her promotion. 
79. 
 
Mr. S. A. Mahmood Saddozai, learned ASC appearing for the 
Petitioner in C.R.P.No.482 of 2016 has submitted his written contentions that 
the Petitioner joined Police Department on 30.1.1980 as ASI and was placed 
in Balochistan Police. After 7 years he was promoted as officiating Sub-
Inspector (S.I) w.e.f 15.01.1987, thereafter, he was confirmed as S.I w.e.f 
22.05.1993. He was transferred to Rawalpindi Range, Punjab Police on 
24.05.1993 and his name was placed at the bottom of the seniority of 
officiating Sub-Inspectors instead of placing in the list of confirmed Sub-
Inspectors. He then filed departmental representation, which was not 
responded to. He approached the Punjab Service Tribunal where his Service 
Appeal was allowed on 27.03.2000, directing the Respondents to place his 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
45
name at the bottom of seniority list of confirmed Sub-Inspectors of 
Rawalpindi Range. In compliance with the said judgment his name was placed 
in list ‘F’ w.e.f 01.11.1995 and thereafter, he was promoted as officiating 
Inspector w.e.f 16.11.1995 and confirmed as Inspector w.e.f 16.11.1995 by 
order dated 29-08-2001.  He was further promoted to the rank of DSP vide 
order dated 12.02.2009.   
80. 
 
It was next contended that by wrongly applying the judgments of 
this Court in the cases of Contempt Proceedings against Chief Secretary, 
Government of Sindh (2013 SCMR 1752), Ali Azhar Khan Baloch Vs. 
Province of Sindh (2015 SCMR 456) and order dated 26-01-2016, of this 
Court in Civil Appeal No.184-L/2013, the Petitioner has been victimized and 
reverted back to as Inspector besides his seniority has been re-fixed after 
promotion to the rank of Inspector w.e.f 17.10.2001.  
81. 
 
It was next contended that the above cited judgments of this 
Court have no nexus with the case of the Petitioner therefore, the order dated 
10.11.2016, reverting him to the rank of Inspector may be set aside.   
82. 
 
The 
Petitioner 
has 
submitted 
written 
arguments 
in 
Crl.O.P.No.195/2016 in C.A.No.184-L/2013, contending that the term ‘out of 
turn promotion’ as per its literal meaning means to get promotion while 
superseding someone who is senior to the promoted officer, whereas vide 
order of the Department dated 16.11.1991, the Petitioner was granted 
proforma promotion alongwith his batch mates as per his seniority and not a 
single person/officer, senior to him, was superseded, therefore, the promotion 
of the Petitioner cannot be termed as out of turn promotion. He has next 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
46
submitted that vide notifications dated 18.03.2016, 23.06.2016 and 
28.03.2016, issued by the Respondent - Department, whereby his promotions 
to the post of Inspector, DSP and SP, respectively have been withdrawn, are 
violative of the judgments passed by this Court, as well as of the Punjab 
Service Tribunal, which speaks about the malicious and mala fide acts of the 
Respondents. He has next submitted that vide order dated 26.01.2016, passed 
in Civil Appeal No.184-L/2013, directions were issued regarding withdrawal 
of out of turn promotions, but the Respondents have deliberately victimized 
him without his fault and even without hearing. Therefore, he has prayed for 
initiation of contempt proceedings against the Respondents and to restore him 
to the post of Superintendent of Police.  
83. 
 
Syed Mansoor Ali Bukhari, learned ASC has submitted written 
arguments in C.R.P.No.481/2016, and contended that while hearing HRC 
No.2103-G/2011, 1038/2010 and 6679-P/2011, on 12.7.2011, this Court has 
observed that all the representations pending must be decided within a period 
of one week and no promotion / demotion / change in seniority shall be made 
till final orders are passed. He further submitted that on 12.12.2013, while 
hearing Civil Appeal No.840/2012, this Court had directed the departmental 
authority to issue the final seniority list, after hearing the objections of the 
parties in terms of the judgments of this Court, within a period of one month.  
84. 
 
He has next submitted that names of the Petitioners were 
appearing in the list, which was accordingly submitted in this Court in 
pursuance of the order dated 12.12.2013. However, at the time of notifying 
the same, names of the Petitioners were excluded. He has next submitted that 
the Petitioners filed representations against the notified seniority list of DSPs 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
47
dated 01-07-2014, but no response was given; thereafter, objections were 
submitted to the IGP, Punjab but the same proved abortive.  
85. 
 
He has also submitted that the Respondents were bound to follow 
the directions of this Court vide order dated 08.03.2011, which, inter alia, 
stipulate as under  : - 
i. 
Seniority list of the incumbent in all the cadres 
shall be updated for the purpose of the 
promotions 
against 
permanent 
existing 
vacancies, 
ii. 
All vacancies will be worked in respect of the 
present cadre to be filed in within due course 
of time,  
iii. 
Judgment delivered by the Apex Court, High 
Court, 
or 
Service 
Tribunal 
shall 
be 
implemented within the above stipulated 
period,  
iv. 
Final 
seniority 
list 
be 
prepared 
and 
promotions be made according to that list.  
v. 
Promotions shall be made in accordance with 
law and on merits in terms of seniority-cum-
fitness basis. 
 
86. 
 
He has next submitted that the order of this Court dated 
26.01.2016, is quite within four corners of law and does not warrant any 
interference, therefore, the same should be maintained to foster the ends of 
justice.      
87. 
 
In response to the notice issued to the learned Attorney General 
for Pakistan under Order XXVII A CPC, he has filed written arguments. He 
has contended therein that the judgments pronounced in relation to the Sindh 
Civil Servants Act, could not be extended to the Province of Punjab on the 
touchstone of Article 241 of the Constitution and that Section 8-A which 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
48
remained on the statute book was never challenged during its life time and the 
promotions given under this Section were protected upto this Court. He has 
submitted that the actions taken under the said provision are protected in the 
light of Section 6 of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act, 1956.  
88. 
 
He has contended that the promotions made under the said 
Section are past and closed transaction. In support of his submission, he has 
relied on the cases of Income Tax Officer Karachi vs. Cement Agencies (PLD 
1969 SC 322), Pir Baksh and another vs. Chairman Allotment Committee 
(PLD 1987 SC 145).  
89. 
 
He has next submitted that the term ‘omission’ and ‘repeal’ has 
the same effect. He further submits that Section 8-A was never declared 
discriminatory as envisaged by Articles 8(1) and (2) of the Constitution, 
therefore, application of the principles propounded in the judgments under 
review with respect to the Province of Punjab would be prospective and that 
the rights accrued to the Petitioners through the judgments of this Court are 
protected under the principle of res judicata.   
90. 
 
He has next submitted that if the application of the principles 
enunciated in the judgments under review is extended to the Province of 
Punjab and that too on the basis of an omitted provision, it would amount to 
violating the principle of legislative competence and independence as 
recognized by this Court in the case of Province of Sindh vs Mutihidda Qumi 
Movement (Civil Appeal No.760 to 765).  
91. 
 
He has next submitted that in terms of Article 7 of the 
Constitution, the term ‘State’ includes a Provincial Assembly and in order to 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
49
make a declaration under Article 199(1)(a) of the Constitution, it would be 
necessary that the party should be before the Court and the Government of the 
Punjab was not a party at the time of hearing of the proceedings which 
culminated into judgments under review, and issuance of notice at this stage 
would not cure this defect.  
92. 
 
He has further submitted that any adverse findings against the 
Petitioners would be against Article 10A of the Constitution and that the ratio 
of the judgments under review is against the spirit of the Constitution.   
93. 
 
We have heard the learned Counsel for the Petitioners and have 
gone through the written synopsis submitted by them. The opportunity to file 
written synopsis was afforded to the learned Advocate General, Punjab, as 
well as the learned Attorney General for Pakistan, but the Advocate General, 
Punjab, did not file any written synopsis. We have perused the material on 
record with the able assistance of the learned Counsel and the learned Law 
Officer. Before examining the issues raised in these proceedings, we intend to 
reproduce certain material facts which formed the basis of the present 
proceedings.  The first order in this regard passed by this Court on 26.01.2016 
in Civil Appeal No.184-L of 2013, is reproduced hereunder: - 
“3. 
The learned Additional Advocate General, Punjab, 
states that the Punjab Government has started 
implementing judgment of this Court reported as 
Contempt Proceedings Against Chief Secretary Sindh 
(2013 SCMR 1752) and Ali Azhar Khan Baloch vs. 
Province of Sindh (2015 SCMR 456) and till date 
substantial portion of seniority of the Police personnel has 
been re-fixed. We support that morale of police personnel 
be boosted, as intended in the aforesaid impugned 
legislations, and on their exhibiting exceptional acts of 
gallantry, they should be given awards and rewards on 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
50
merits. In order to confer award or reward on the police 
officer for his act of gallantry the Sindh Government will 
constitute a committee under Rule 8-B, to evaluate the 
performance of the police officer upon whom the proposed 
award or reward has to be bestowed. However, out of turn 
promotion in police force would not boost the morale of 
the police force, on the contrary by impugned legislative 
instruments granting out of turn promotion to police 
officers, has demoralized the force. This Court in the case 
of Watan Party reported in (PLD 2011 SC 997) has 
already directed the Sindh Government to depoliticize the 
police force. The out of turn promotions have engendered 
inequalities and rancor among the batch mates/course 
mates, rendering many of them junior/subordinate to their 
junior colleagues. Under Section 9-A, the Sindh 
Government, has granted out of turn promotions to the 
civil servants, who do not belong to police force. By using 
the word ‘Gallantry’ in section 9-A of the Act of 1973, the 
legislature never intended to grant out of turn promotion 
to civil servants other than police force, but the Sindh 
Government has extended this benefit to civil servants. We 
for the aforesaid reasons stated hereinabove, are clear in 
our mind that the impugned legislations on the issue of out 
of turn promotion and grant of backdated seniority are 
violative of Articles of the Constitution referred to 
hereinabove and are liable to be struck down. 
 
 
 
94. 
 
There is one more judgment of this Court in Civil Petition 
No.2058 to 2060 of 2014 decided on 05.12.2014 (Gul Muhammad and others 
vs. Government of KPK through its Chief Secretary and others) which has not 
been noticed by either party on the issue, wherein while maintaining the 
judgment of a learned Division Bench of the Peshawar High Court, this Court 
has refused the leave. The backdrop of the proceedings was that the 
Petitioners-Police Officers of KPK in the aforesaid petitions had approached 
the Peshawar High Court, challenging the withdrawal of their out of turn 
promotions through notifications issued by the competent authority in 
compliance with the judgments of this Court in 2013 SCMR 1752 and 2015 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
51
SCMR 456. The learned Peshawar High Court after discussing the issues had 
concluded that the principles enunciated on the issue of out of turn promotion 
in the aforesaid judgments would extend to all the provinces including the 
KPK and the competent authority was justified in withdrawing out of turn  
promotions.   
 
95. 
 
The Punjab Government in terms of Article 189 of the 
Constitution had complied with the judgments of this Court reported in 2013 
SCMR 1752 and 2015 SCMR 456, by issuing notifications whereby out of 
turn promotions granted to the police officers at times, pursuant to the 
provisions of Section 8-A of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, were 
withdrawn.  
96. 
 
The Punjab Government did not seek review of the judgments 
referred to hereinabove besides the orders passed by this Court in Civil Appeal 
No.184-L of 2013, on the issue of out of turn promotions.  
 
97. 
 
Before we address the submissions made by the learned ASCs, 
we may examine the context in which the present proceedings have arisen. 
The Petitioners are either the beneficiaries of the exercise of power under 
Section 8-A of the Act, 1974, who were granted out of turn promotions or are 
claimants to such out of turn promotions. It needs to be appreciated that in 
matters relating to service, there are certain rights or benefits which are 
granted or which accrue to the civil servants without affecting the rights or 
interests of other civil servants while other benefits accruing to civil servants 
necessarily affect the rights or interests of other civil servants. The former 
category includes financial benefits, training, transfer, posting etc. while the 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
52
latter category includes seniority, promotions, etc. where any arbitrary 
exercise of power by the authority may adversely affect rights of other civil 
servants in such matter. The out of turn promotions are inherently destructive 
of the rights of other officers who, though senior and entitled to be considered 
for promotion before the beneficiaries of out of turn promotions, are bypassed 
as a result of out of turn promotions. Thus each out of turn promotion must 
necessarily have a corresponding affected officer, who suffers due to this 
exercise despite being completely blameless. He suffers for no fault of his 
own when he is bypassed in favour of the beneficiary of such an exercise. 
Unless he voluntarily waives his rights, in which case the promotion could no 
longer be described as out of turn, the Courts ought not to ignore his rights in 
matters brought before it for adjudication, irrespective of his presence or 
absence before the Court in a particular case.  
 
The Section 8-A was regulated by the Rule 14-A, whereas 
in Sindh no rules were framed to regulate out of turn 
promotions under Section 9-A, which was inserted on 
21.02.2002. 
98. 
 
In a series of judgments, this Court has declared out-of-turn 
promotions as being unconstitutional, un-Islamic, and void ab initio. The 
principle of unconstitutionality attached to the instrument providing for out of 
turn promotion was laid down first in the case of Muhammad Nadeem Arif 
vs. I.G of Police (2011 SCMR 408). The view taken in this judgment was 
followed in another case reported as Ghulam Shabbir vs. Muhammad Munir 
Abbasi (PLD 2011 SC 516); wherein it was held that out of turn promotion 
was not only against the Constitution, but also against the Injunctions of 
Islam; and that reward or award should be encouraged for meritorious public 
service but should not be made basis for out of turn promotion. 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
53
99. 
 
In another case, Suo Moto case No.16/2011, this Court again 
deprecated the practice of conferring out of turn promotions in the following 
terms:- 
“It is also a hard fact that the police has been politicized by 
out of turn promotions and inductions from other departments 
time and again, through lateral entries which has brought 
unrest amongst the deserving police officers waiting their 
promotions on merits. The posting and transfers of the police 
officers also lack merits. The complete service record of a 
police personnel which could reflect posting and transfer is not 
maintained by the relevant wing. Even many police officers 
posted within the Karachi on senior positions lack 
qualifications and competence both……If this is the state of 
affairs, how can there be peace in Karachi. It seems instead of 
depoliticizing police force further damage has been caused by 
the government by introducing their blue eyed persons in 
police force through lateral entries and then granting them 
retrospective seniority and out of turn promotions.” 
100.  
Subsequently, this Court reiterated, inter alia, the principle of 
declaring the law of out of turn promotion unconstitutional and void ab initio 
in the Contempt proceedings against Chief Secretary, Sindh (2013 SCMR 
1752). The relevant para is reproduced as under:- 
“158. On the issue of out of turn promotions, the impugned 
enactments are discriminatory persons/class specific and 
pre-judicial to public interest, as it would be instrumental 
in causing heart burning amongst the police officers 
whose inter-se seniority and legitimate expectation of 
attaining upper ladder of career would be affected. The 
out of turn promotions to the police officers and other civil 
servants by virtue of Section 9-A would affect the 
performance of hundreds of thousands of the civil servants 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
54
serving in the Sindh Government. The impugned 
instruments on out of turn promotions are neither based 
on intelligible differentia nor relatable to lawful objects 
and by the impugned instruments the entire service 
structure has been distorted, affecting the inter-se 
seniority between the persons, who are serving on cadre 
posts after acquiring job through competitive process and 
their seniorities were and are superseded by the powers 
granted to the Chief Minister through Section 9-A.” 
 
101.  
This Court also highlighted the pernicious effects of the 
conferment of out of turn promotions, at paras 161 and 162 (ibid):- 
“161...........The ultimate casualty of the impugned instruments 
would not only be the establishment of meritocratic public 
service but more ominously the certainty of law which 
undermines both legitimate expectancy individually among the 
civil servants as regards the smooth progression of their career, 
but also the overall administrative environment. Article 143 of 
the Constitution has been promulgated to harmonize and 
regulate the service of the civil servants from federal government 
and provincial governments on their opting for All Pakistan 
Unified Group/PSP. The impugned legislation would distort 
interse seniority of the civil servants not only within the province 
but also the federal civil servants. 
162. The absorption and out of turn promotion under the 
impugned legislative instruments will also impinge on the self- 
respect and dignity of the civil servants, who will be forced to 
work under their rapidly and unduly promoted fellow officers, 
and under those who have been inducted from other 
services/cadres regardless of their (inductees) merit and results 
in the competitive exams (if they have appeared for exam at all) 
and as a result the genuine/bonafide civil servants will have 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
55
prospects of their smooth progression and attainment of climax 
of careers hampered, hence the impugned instruments are 
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The laws are made to 
achieve lawful object. The impugned legislative instruments do 
not advance this concept while conferring powers on the Chief 
Minister to grant out of turn promotions, on the contrary the 
unstructured discretion vested in him has infringed the valuable 
rights of the meritorious civil servants of legitimate expectancy 
of attaining climax of careers.” 
 
102.  
The Court then determined the unconstitutionality of the out of 
turn promotion and provided a direction for boosting the morale of police 
personnel at Paragraph 164 of the said judgment:- 
“164. We support that morale of police personnel be 
boosted, as intended in the aforesaid impugned 
legislations, and on their exhibiting exceptional acts of 
gallantry, they should be given awards and rewards on 
merits. In order to confer award or reward on the police 
officer for his act of gallantry the Sind Government will 
constitute a committee under Rule 8-B, to evaluate the 
performance of the police officer upon whom the proposed 
award or reward has to be bestowed. However, out of turn 
promotion in police force would not boost the morale of 
the police force, on the contrary by impugned legislative 
instruments granting out of turn promotion to police 
officers, has demoralized the force. This Court in the case 
of Watan Party reported in (PLD 2011 SC 997) has 
already directed the Sindh Government to depoliticize the 
police force. The out of turn promotions have engendered 
inequalities and rancor among the batch mates/course 
mates, rendering many of them junior/subordinate to their 
junior colleagues. Under section 9-A, the Sindh 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
56
Government, has granted out of turn promotions to the 
civil servants, who do not belong to police force. By using 
the word ‘Gallantry’ in section 9-A of the Act of 1973, the 
legislature never intended to grant out of turn promotion 
to civil servants other than police force, but the Sindh 
Government has extended this benefit to civil servants. We 
for the aforesaid reasons stated hereinabove, are clear in 
our mind that the impugned legislations on the issue of out 
of turn promotion and grant of backdated seniority are 
violative of Articles of the Constitution referred to 
hereinabove and are liable to be struck down.”  
 
103.  
The Review Petitions were filed against the aforementioned 
judgment by the Sindh Government besides those who were aggrieved on 
their de-notification in terms of the directives contained therein. These 
Review Petitions were dismissed on 05.01.2015, by a three Member Bench of 
this Court, maintaining the findings recorded in the judgment reported in 2013 
SCMR 1752. The judgment passed in Review Petitions is reported in 2015 
SCMR 456. The learned Counsel for Petitioners raised a number of grounds 
challenging various findings of this Court, including the issue of out of turn 
promotion. Upholding the unconstitutionality and nullity of the legislative 
instrument pertaining to out of turn promotions, this Court recorded the 
following findings which are reproduced hereunder:- 
 
 
 
 
OUT OF TURN PROMOTIONS. 
122. The issue of out of turn promotions has been                               
dealt with by us in detail in the judgment sought to 
be reviewed and we reached the conclusion that it 
was violative of Article 240, 242, 4, 8, 9 and 25 of 
the Constitution. Mr. Adnan Iqbal Chaudhry, 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
57
learned Advocate Supreme Court has contended 
that section 9-A of the Act has not been struck down 
by this Court, while declaring the out of turn 
promotion s as un-constitutional. We are mindful of 
this fact as we have held that the Competent 
Authority can grant awards or rewards to the Police 
Officers, if they show act of gallantry beyond the 
call of duty. However, we had struck down the very 
concept of ‘out of turn promotion’ being violative of 
Constitution for the reasons incorporated in paras 
158 to 164 of the judgment under review.  
“126. The contention of the learned ASC that the 
judgment of the High Court of Sindh relating to the 
out of turn promotion is still in field, therefore, he 
prayed for formulation of a Committee to scrutinize 
the cases of the Police Officers, who were given out 
of turn promotion, is without substance. We have 
already declared “out of turn promotion” as 
unconstitutional, therefore, after recording such 
findings, the need of forming a Committee under 
Rule 8-B for scrutinizing the cases of Police 
Personnel is of no significance. However, they 
could be awarded or rewarded compensation for 
their exceptional acts of gallantry.”  
104.  
Through the successions of its orders, this Court has consistently 
maintained the unconstitutionality, and the consequential nullity of the 
instruments providing for the out of turn promotion. 
 
 
Article 189 of Constitution 
105.  
Under Article 189, this Court is the court of last resort and laws 
declared or principles enunciated by it are binding on all the subordinate 
courts and authorities in Pakistan as reflected in Farhat Azeem vs. Waheed 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
58
Rasul (PLD 2000 SC 18). We have also held that the decisions of this Court 
laying down the proposition in law are laws binding on all, regardless whether 
they were party to the proceedings or not M/s Star Diamond Co vs. Union of 
India (PTCL 1988 FC 229). It has also been held by us that even a decision of 
Supreme Court for which no reasons are given would be binding upon the 
Courts in the Country Safdar Ali vs Conservator of Forests (1987 PLC (CS) 
55). Likewise, where amendment in an Act was made prior to a decision of 
Supreme Court, declaration of law by Supreme Court would override the 
amendment in the Act and nullify its effect by virtue of Article 189 of the 
Constitution (PLD 1986 SC 14). Finally, the doctrine of stare decisis is not 
applicable to this Court. This Court in the case of Hitachi Limited vs. Rupali 
Polyester (1998 SCMR 1618), has concluded that the Supreme Court is not a 
slave of doctrine of stare decisis and can change or modify its view with the 
passage of time. All the courts and public institutions are bound to follow the 
principles laid down by this Court. No exception to this principle can be 
created under the garb of rule or procedural niceties.  
 
 
Difference between Section 8-A of PCSA and 9-A of SCSA: 
106.  
It has been contended that the language of Section 9-A of Sindh 
Civil Servants Act, which has been interpreted by this Court in the case of 
Contempt proceedings against Chief Secretary, Sindh (2013 SCMR 1752), 
was distinct from Section 8-A of the Punjab Civil Servants Act. For ready 
reference both the provisions are reproduced in juxtaposition as under:- 
Section 8-A of Punjab Civil Servants 
Act, 1974 
Section 9-A of Sindh Civil Servants 
Act, 1973 
 
Notwithstanding anything contained in 
this Act or any other law for the time 
being in force or in any contract, or 
“Notwithstanding anything contained in 
this Act or any other law for the time 
being in force or any judgment, a civil 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
59
rights claimed or acquired under any 
judgment of any Court or Tribunal, a 
civil servant who provenly exhibits 
exemplary intellectual, moral and 
financial integrity and high standard of 
honesty 
and 
gives 
extraordinary 
performance in the discharge of his 
duties, may be granted out of turn 
promotion or award or reward in such 
manner as may be prescribed” 
 
servant who provenly exhibits, the act of 
gallantry while performing his duties or 
very exceptional performance beyond the 
call of duty, may be granted out of turn 
promotion or award or reward in such 
manner as may be prescribed” 
 
 
 
107.  
Even a perfunctory comparison of the two provisions would 
vouchsafe the following facts:  
i. 
Both provisions are substantively similar in nature and cater to 
the same purpose, i.e., out-of-turn promotion, which this Court 
has already declared unconstitutional and a nullity ab initio;  
 
ii. 
Both provisions create a new exception or category of promotion 
to the existing framework of service rules, in the name of out-of-
turn promotion, whereas such promotion is alien to the concept 
and scheme of civil service rules, read with Articles 4, 9, 14, 18, 
25 and 240, 242 of the Constitution; 
 
iii. 
Both provisions overtly militate against the settled law and 
principles of promotion based on merit, inter se seniority, annual 
performance reports and so on;  
 
iv. 
Both provisions are discriminatory and violative of the 
fundamental rights of other civil servants who have been affected 
by the out of turn promotions, despite the fact that they may stand 
a notch up in merit, inter se seniority and even competence from 
the beneficiary of such promotions; 
 
v. 
Measured on the touchstone of ‘pith and substance’, both the 
provisions seem to have been instrumentalized for the same 
purpose—out of turn promotion.  
 
108.  
In view of the above similarities, the contention of the learned 
Counsel that the two provisions may be differentiated on the basis of the 
language used, holds no ground. Both provisions are similar in nature and 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
60
cater to the same purpose - out of turn promotion - which we have consistently 
held to be unconstitutional and void ab initio. Therefore, we are not persuaded 
by the argument that an exception may be created in the case of Section 8-A 
of PCSA.  
109.  
It was also contended that Section 9-A of Sindh Civil Servants 
Act, which has been interpreted by this Court in the case of Contempt 
Proceedings against Chief Secretary, Sindh (2013 SCMR 1752), was distinct 
from Section 8-A of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, in that Section 8-A was 
regulated by the Rule 14-A, whereas in Sindh no rules were framed to regulate 
out of turn promotions except for a short period of three months starting from 
10.02.2005 to 11.05.2005, Rule 8-B was inserted in the Sindh Civil Servants 
(Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974, to regulate the 
provisions of Section 9-A. 
110.  
We fail to appreciate the principle of law underlying this 
submission. It is settled law that the operation of a statute or any statutory 
provision is not dependent upon framing of the Rules. In some cases the 
absence of Rules may affect the enforceability or operatability of the statute, 
as happened in the case of Section 9-A of the Sindh Civil Servants Act, where 
the Rules were to prescribe the procedure for claiming benefits under the 
provision and such could not be claimed unless the procedure prescribed in 
the statute was adopted. However, for considering the constitutionality or 
otherwise of a statute on the touchstone of the Constitution or Fundamental 
Rights, framing or non-framing of the Rules under that statute could hardly 
be relevant. The framing of Rules would be generally relevant for determining 
as to whether the power under the statute has been exercised properly or not, 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
61
but the existence of Rules could neither save nor destroy the constitutional 
validity of the Rules. Thus, the reasoning in the earlier judgments with respect 
to Section 9-A of the Sindh Civil Servants Act, is fully applicable to Section 
8-A of the Punjab Civil Servants Act.  
111.  
Yet another anomalous consequence of this argument is that 
while two identical provincial laws are enacted and acted upon and one 
province repeals the law while the other continues with its operations. 
Subsequently, the vires of the law that continues on the statute books is 
examined by the Court and its provisions have found to be inconsistent with 
the Constitution or Fundamental Rights with the result that the benefits 
conferred or availed thereunder, unless protected by the category of past and 
closed transaction, have to be reversed and its deleterious effects undone. This 
category, quite obviously, consists of the cases wherein ‘out of turn 
promotion’ was granted to individuals, pursuant to the judgments of the High 
Court, Service Tribunal and the Supreme Court. They shall remain intact 
unless reviewed. Even otherwise, it does not appeal to logic that in such a 
situation, while those benefitting from a law which continued to be on the 
statute book and eventually found to be ultra vires the Constitution would 
stand deprived of such illegal benefits, those continuing to enjoy the same 
under the omitted/repealed law in other Province would stand protected. If an 
illegal benefit was accrued or conferred under a statute, whether repealed 
(omitted) or continuing, and its benefits continue to flow in favour of 
beneficiaries of such an unconstitutional Act, and it is declared ultra vires, the 
benefits so conferred would have to be reversed irrespective of the fact that 
the conferring Act was still on the statute book or not. Where such an 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
62
anomalous situation surfaces – i.e. where one province continues to 
countenance the benefits of an unconstitutional (though repealed/omitted) 
Act, while the other Provincial statute has been struck down on the same 
touchstone, and thereby determined whether those enjoying benefits pursuant 
to the repealed law are entitled to continue to do so, such reversal of benefits 
is imperative.   
A statute could only be declared as non-est, if the 
legislature is not competent to legislate that law:- 
112.  
Undoubtedly, the legislature enjoys much leeway and 
competence in matters of legislation, but every law enacted may not 
necessarily be tenable on the touchstone of the Constitution. It is the sole 
jurisdiction of this Court, under the law and the constitution to look into the 
fairness and constitutionality of an enactment and even declare it non-est, if it 
is found to be in conflict with the provisions of the Constitution. Thus, 
legislative competence is not enough to make a valid law; a law must also pass 
the test at the touchstone of constitutionality to be enforceable, failing which 
it becomes invalid and unenforceable.  
113.  
Normally the courts make utmost efforts to save a piece of 
legislation from becoming invalid. But in certain cases, the courts also apply, 
inter alia, the doctrine of severance to remove a piece of legislation that 
distorts the scheme of a parent law, or deviates from the provisions of the 
Constitution. While dealing with the issue on the effect of law declared to be 
non est, a 14 Member Bench of this Court in the case of Dr Mobashir Hassan 
vs. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2010 SC 265), has reached the following 
conclusion:- 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
63
“169. It may be noted that the President has an authority 
under Article 89 of the Constitution to promulgate an 
Ordinance, but cannot issue temporary legislation, which 
the Parliament is not empowered to do. A thorough 
perusal of the Federal and the Concurrent Lists persuades 
us to hold that the President was not empowered to issue 
the NRO, 2007 as the subjects covered by its Section 2, 6, 
and 7 fall beyond the scope of these lists. As far as its 
manifestations is concerned, it has already been done by 
the Parliament before whom the NRO 2007 was placed, 
but the same was withdrawn subsequently under Rule 139 
of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in the 
National Assembly, 2007, as impliedly the National 
Assembly refrained itself from making it as an Act of 
parliament. Inasmuch as, the actions taken from the date 
of its inception till the expiry of its constitutional life of 
120 days under Article 89 of the Constitution from 5th 
October 2007 to Ist February, 2008, benefits derived by 
some of the persons have not been protected, and the 
Government (either Federal of provincial) has also not 
insisted to allow retention of the benefits derived out of it 
to the accused persons during the said period. More so, 
none of the beneficiaries, who have drawn benefit during 
the said stipulated period from 5th October 2007 to 31st 
July, 2009, when vide judgment dated 31st July 2009, all 
the Ordinances were declared to have been shorn of 
permanency, have not come forward to protect their 
benefits, although hearing of these petitions has been 
widely publicized in print and electronic media. Thus in 
view of theory of ultra vires, explained in Cooley’s 
Constitutional Limitations, reference of which has been 
made by Chief Justice Cornellius (as then he was) in 
Fazlul Quader Chowdhry vs. Muhammad Abdul Haque 
(PLD 1963 SC 486), wherein it has been observed that 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
64
“for the constitution of the State is higher in authority than 
any law, direction, or order made by anybody or any 
officer assuming to act under it, since such body or officer 
must exercise a delegated authority, and one that must 
necessarily be subservient to the instrument by which the 
delegation is made; in any case of conflict the fundamental 
law must govern, and the act in conflict with it must be 
treated as of no legal validity”, we are of the opinion that 
the NRO, 2007 is void ab initio, therefore, the parties who 
have derived benefit shall not be entitled for the same from 
5th October, 2007 and all the cases withdrawn under 
Section 2, 6, & 7 of the NRO, 2007 shall stand revived 
immediately. The Courts seized with the matters shall 
proceed to decide the same, considering that the NRO 
2007 was never promulgated.  
171. We have examined the respective contentions of the 
learned counsel for the parties as well as the vires of the 
NRO, 2007 on the touchstone of various Articles of the 
Constitution, and have come to the conclusion that the 
NRO, 2007 as a whole, particularly its Sections 2, 6 and 
7, is declared void ab initio being ultra vires and violative 
of Articles 4, 8, 12, 13, 25, 62(f), 63(1)(h), 63(1)(p), 89, 
175, 227 of the Constitution, therefore, it shall be deemed 
non est from the day of its promulgation i.e. 5th October 
2007 as a consequence whereof all steps taken, actions 
suffered, and all orders passed by whatever authority, any 
orders passed by the Courts of law including the orders of 
discharge and acquittals recorded in favour of accused 
persons, are also declared never to have existed in the eyes 
of law and resultantly of no legal effect.  
172. Resultantly, all cases in which the accused persons 
were either discharged or acquitted under Section 2 of the 
NRO, 2007 or where proceedings pending against the 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
65
holders of public office had got terminated in view of 
Section 7 thereof, a list of which cases has been furnished 
to this Court and any other such cases/proceedings which 
may not have been brought to the notice of this Court, 
shall stand revived and relegated to the status of pre-5th of 
October, 2007 position.” 
114.  
The present matter falls in the latter category. Section 8-A, or 
similar instruments of law, clearly falls foul of the principles laid down in a 
series of cases by this Court. Therefore, legislative competence alone cannot 
be made a ground of saving the impugned provision, unless the relevant 
Constitutional provisions are amended, which is not the case in hand. 
Even if a Court declares a law to be unconstitutional, 
it does not affect the past and closed transactions and 
the cases wherein vested rights have been created. 
115. 
 
This question was also raised before this Court during the 
proceedings of the aforementioned Review petitions, where a number of 
contentions were made in this regard. It was contended that the Judgment 
under review should have been effective prospectively; that the benefits 
accrued to the Petitioners by the impugned legislative instruments, which 
were struck down by this Court, could not have been withdrawn as their rights 
were protected by the principles of locus poenitentiae; that the judgment under 
review was in personam and did not apply to others; and that judgments 
always applied prospectively and not retrospectively. In that regard, reliance 
was placed on the case Regarding Pensionary Benefits of the Judges of 
Superior Courts from the date of their respective retirements, irrespective of 
their length of service as such’ (PLD 2013 SC 829). However, this Court did 
not agree with the contentions and observed that:- 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
66
“129.......Now, it is a settled law of this Court that 
no right or obligation can accrue under an 
unconstitutional law. Once this Court has declared 
a legislative instrument as being unconstitutional, 
the effect of such declaration is that such legislative 
instrument becomes void ab initio, devoid of any 
force of law, neither can it impose any obligation, 
nor can it expose anyone to any liability.” 
“130. In the case in hand, the benefits extended to 
the Petitioners through the impugned legislation, 
were not only violative of law but were also 
declared ultra vires of the Constitution. In such like 
circumstances, the benefits, if any, accrued to the 
Petitioners by the said legislative instruments shall 
stand withdrawn as if they were never extended to 
them. The judgment relied upon by Syed Iftikhar 
Hussain Gillani is distinguishable on facts. Under 
the said judgment, this Court had re-visited the 
earlier judgment of this Court titled as Accountant 
General Sindh and others vs. Ahmed Ali U. 
Qureshi and others (PLD 2008 SC 522) by which 
the retired Judges were granted pensionary 
benefits. In the said case, it was held that the 
pensionary benefits granted to retired Judges were 
violative of the scheme and as such the judgment 
was declared as per incurium, declaring further 
that no pensionary benefits could be granted to any 
retired Judge, unless he serves for five years in 
office. In the present proceedings, this Court has 
struck down the legislative instruments by which 
benefits were extended to a class of persons, in 
complete disregard of the service structure 
mandated by the provisions of Articles 240 and 242 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
67
of the Constitution. Through the legislative 
instruments, which were struck down by this Court, 
undue favours were extended to a few individuals, 
for political considerations against the mandate of 
the Act and the recruitment Rules framed 
thereunder. Such instruments were held to be 
violative of Articles 4, 8, 9, 14 and 25 of the 
Constitution. Through these legislative instruments, 
many of the Petitioners were absorbed and/or given 
out of turn promotions or back-dated seniority, 
depriving other meritorious Civil Servants of their 
seniority and smooth progression in career. A 
substantial number of unfit and unmeritorious 
Officers were thus absorbed/ promoted out of 
turn/given back-dated seniority in important 
cadres, services and posts by extending undue 
favors by the Authorities, skipping the competitive 
process. Such absorptions etc, which were not 
permissible under the Civil Servants Act, had 
practically obliterated the Constitutional and legal 
differentiations that existed amongst various 
cadres, posts and services. We have already 
observed in our judgment that the legislative 
instruments, which were struck down by this Court, 
had engendered a culture of patronage, bringing 
more politicization, inefficiency and corruption in 
the Civil Service.” 
116. 
 
As to the claim that the out of turn promotions are covered by the 
doctrine of past and closed transaction, the infirmity of the argument is self-
evident. Sometimes there are wrongs without individual victims while in other 
cases there are identified individual victims. The brunt of out of turn 
promotions is always borne by the individual officers who were bypassed due 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
68
to out of turn promotions. The damaging effect on the careers of deserving 
officers who suffered due to these out of turn promotions continue during 
service and even after retirement in terms of pensionary benefits. If the 
beneficiaries of this illegal exercise are reverted to the positions to which they 
would have been entitled to, on their respective merit and promotion, on their 
turn, this would immediately open up vistas of promotion for those deserving 
officers who were earlier bypassed due to out of turn promotions.   
117.  
In the light of the rules and principles laid down by this Court, 
we with respect are not inclined to agree with the proposition that vested rights 
that were created under a law subsequently declared unconstitutional by this 
Court have attained finality under doctrine of past and closed transaction, and 
that they are immune from the application of the aforementioned judgments 
of this Court. We have maintained that vested rights are generated only under 
a valid and uncontested instrument of law. An instrument that was still born 
or treated by this Court as non est is barred from creating any vested rights, 
let alone being protected under the doctrine of past and closed transactions. 
we believe that it is our duty to protect the rights and interests created under a 
law and also to deny the enjoyment of rights created under an invalid law. In 
the instant case, the Petitioners are claiming the protection of rights that were 
created under a law that has failed to pass the test of constitutionality, as 
determined by this Court; hence, they cannot take the plea of past and closed 
transaction.  
118.  
The contention of the learned Counsel that the effect of the 
aforesaid judgments which declares the concept of out of turn promotion 
unconstitutional cannot be extended to apply retrospectively on the cases 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
69
where law granting out of turn promotions was omitted, is without force. 
Insofar as the issue of examining the provisions of a repealed statute is 
concerned, such an exercise is carried out by Courts in routine in the context 
of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, as well as Article 264 of the 
Constitution of Pakistan. Whenever any right, obligation, privilege or liability 
acquired, accrued or incurred under the repealed law is raised, the Courts are 
necessarily required to examine the provisions of the repealed statute. Thus, 
there is neither any reason in principle nor any precedent which bars the 
Courts from examining the provisions of a repealed statute in a case pending 
before it on the touchstone of its inconsistency with the provisions of the 
Constitution or the Fundamental Rights, as enumerated in the Constitution. 
Any other conclusion would lead to the absurd consequences that while the 
statute remains on the statute book, the Courts can examine its vires but once 
it was repealed by a subsequent statute, its effect, even if ex facie inconsistent 
with the Constitution or Fundamental Rights goes beyond the realm of judicial 
review. If such were the effect of repeal, then all that would be required to 
create a protected class of legislation is promulgation of patently 
unconstitutional statutes creating rights in favour of certain interested persons 
which though completely destructive of the Fundamental Rights of others, 
stood protected behind an impenetrable wall by the mere repeal of the statute 
through such unconstitutional Act. Such would not only be a fraud upon the 
statute but would be completely destructive of the rule of law and 
constitutional governance. Thus, there is no reason which compels the Court 
to sustain such an absurd proposition. As and when a repealed statute is 
invoked or raised in support of any claim, right, office or act, before the Court, 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
70
the Court would always be entitled to examine its validity on the touchstone 
of the Constitution and Fundamental Rights. We have not been able to 
discover any instance from our own history as well as that of other legal 
systems with entrenched judicial review on the touchstone of the Constitution, 
where the Courts have refrained from examining the vires of the statute on the 
mere ground that at the time of review such law stood repealed by a 
subsequent statute.  
119.  
However, when a statute (whether existing or repealed) is found 
to be ultra vires the Constitution, the Court is empowered – indeed, mandated 
– to examine whether any person continues to enjoy the benefits of the ultra 
vires statute, or whether any state of affairs continues to exist as a result, and 
if it is found so, the Court is mandated to undo the same, provided that the 
benefit or state of affairs in question is not a past and closed transaction. For 
instance, the case of an employee who had enjoyed an out of turn promotion 
pursuant to a law found to be ultra vires the Fundamental Rights, who now 
stands retired and or died, it would constitute a past and closed transaction 
inasmuch as it would be a futile exercise to re-open the case of such an 
employee. On the other hand, employees who were so promoted under such a 
statute and who continue to remain in service, would be liable to be restored 
to the position that existed prior to the benefit conferred under the statute 
found inconsistent with Fundamental Rights. Indeed, once a statute has been 
declared as being unconstitutional for any reason, all direct benefits 
continuing to flow from the same are to be stopped. Reference in this behalf 
may be made to the case of Dr. Mobashir Hassan vs Federation of Pakistan 
(PLD 2010 SC 265). Even during hearing, we called upon the learned Counsel 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
71
for the Petitioners to satisfy us that the term ‘out of turn promotion’ used in 
Section 8-A is not violative of the provisions of Constitution guaranteeing 
fundamental rights to the civil servants. But none of them had addressed us 
on the issue.  
120.  
In view of the above, we cannot accept the argument that while 
the beneficiaries of the repealed law could invoke its provisions to justify their 
out of turn promotions and yet raise an impenetrable bar, if the Court seeks to 
examine its consistency with the provisions of the Constitution and the 
Fundamental Rights. Indeed the case of the Petitioners claiming out of turn 
promotion under the repealed statute of Punjab is on a weaker wicket as 
compared to the officers whose out of turn promotions were sought to be given 
cover by a subsisting law. Yet when a subsisting statute was declared 
unconstitutional due to its violation of Fundamental Rights, a preferential 
treatment could hardly be sustained on the basis of a repealed statute.  
121.  
This Court in the cases of Fazlul Quader Chowdhry vs. 
Muhammad Abdul Haque (PLD 1963 SC 486) and Muhammad Mubeen ul 
Salam vs. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2006 SC 602), has held that “in any 
event, on questions relating to the constitutionality of actions, the ground of 
laches cannot prevail, for their can be no estoppel against the Constitution 
and an Act which is unconstitutional cannot become constitutional by lapse 
of time, nor can it vest anyone with any kind of legal right to benefit from such 
an unconstitutional act.” These judgments further concluded that “this Court 
cannot be refrained from examining the constitutionality of a law because of 
lapse of time, therefore, notwithstanding any objection, if the constitutionality 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
72
of a law is under challenge, its vires can be examined despite the fact that it 
had remained on the statute book for a considerable time.”  
122.  
Indeed, raising such a question would lead to disastrous 
consequences; some of them are enumerated as under:- 
i. 
Citizens would lose their legitimate rights to 
usurpers merely by the lapse of time and under the 
garb of closed and past transactions; 
ii. 
In practical terms, declaring a law void and non est 
would make no difference as the undue benefits 
would continue to be enjoyed by the undeserving 
persons, under the garb of closed and past 
transactions, and at the cost of deserving persons. 
iii. 
The aims of justice would be defeated at the hands 
of a mechanical force of time; in other words, a 
mere operation of time would upstage the operation 
of law. 
iv. 
More alarmingly, this Court may come to lose its 
inherent jurisdiction to review a previous judgment, 
or any aspect of it, which may have remained 
hidden in the procedural or technical folds or 
escaped the testing at the altar of constitutional law.  
v. 
If allowed to be hampered by procedural niceties, 
this Court, or High Courts, may find it difficult to 
exercise their discretionary powers to render justice 
to the victims of an invalid law or of a law that has 
been declared void ab initio by this Court.  
vi. 
Annulling a law on constitutional grounds and yet 
protecting the rights created there-under would 
create an absurd situation, requiring the courts to 
enforce the provisions of substantive/constitutional 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
73
laws, without disturbing the principle of closed and 
past transactions. 
vii. 
The blind application of the principle of past and 
closed transactions may also lead to defeat the very 
intent of legislature, in addition to causing hardship 
cases.  
viii. Finally, upholding a prima facie unconstitutional 
provision merely on the grounds of past and closed 
transaction would subjugate the rules of judicious 
construction to a mindless adherence to temporal 
considerations, whereas the very concepts of 
retrospectivity and prospectivity of laws are rooted 
in the golden tenets of equity and fairness, not in the 
mechanical passage of time.    
123.  
We are clear in our view that the issue of past and closed 
transaction (except what has been concluded in paragraph 111) does not arise 
in the instant case as we have already declared void ab initio the legislative 
instruments that provided for out of turn promotions. In other words, the 
provisions of section 8-A of PCSA created no vested rights in favor of the 
Petitioners because it was void from the moment of its inception. The 
principle of past and closed transaction would apply in the cases where rights 
are created under a valid law, even though such laws are allowed to lapse or 
removed from statutes. It is critical to differentiate between the rights created 
under a valid law and those claimed under a law that was void ab initio, 
regardless of the fact that this Court declared its invalidity or 
unconstitutionality after some times.  
124.  
The Counsel have relied on certain judgments in support of their 
contentions. We have perused them and found that most of these were passed 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
74
before this Court examined the vires of the law providing for out of turn 
promotion in its constitutional jurisdiction in the case of Nadeem Arif. This 
judgment was followed later in a series of cases decided by this Court in 
constitutional jurisdiction. A fourteen Member Bench of this Court in the case 
of Justice Khurshid Anwar Bhinder vs. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2010 SC 
483), has concluded that “where the Supreme Court deliberately and with the 
intention of settling the law, pronounces upon a question of law, such 
pronouncement is the law declared by the Supreme Court within the meaning 
of Article 189 and is binding on all the Courts of Pakistan. It cannot be treated 
as mere obiter dictum. Even obiter dictum of the Supreme Court, due to high 
place which the Court holds in the hierarchy in the country enjoy a highly 
respected position as if it contains a definite expression of the Court’s view 
on a legal principle, or the meaning of law. The principles enunciated by this 
Court in respect of the provisions of law pertaining to out of turn promotion 
hold the ground.  
125.  
The contentions of the learned Counsel Khawaja Haris, Sr. ASC, 
pertaining to applicability of Article 27(1), are beyond appreciation. This 
Article protects the citizens from discrimination based on race, religion, caste, 
sex, residence and place of birth in matter of appointment to service of 
Pakistan. However, it does not open the doors of other forms of discrimination 
or nepotism under the garb of some rules that are patently unconstitutional 
and against the very scheme of the civil services. Were it so, a number of 
constitutional provisions such as Articles 4, 8, 9, 14, 18 and 25 would lose 
their significance and the entire edifice of social justice and equality before 
law would become vulnerable to various exceptions created under the 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
75
perverse interpretation of Article 27(1).  Moreover, the ambit of Article 27 (1) 
is confined only to the initial appointments and not the appointments by way 
of promotion; therefore, to stretch it any further would contort or destroy the 
very spirit of this important constitutional provision. Article 27 (1) is 
complementary to Article 25 and should be read in tandem.  
126.  
The learned Counsel Khawaja Haris attempted to argue that 
Section 8-A of P.C.S.A falls within the exclusionary clause of Article 8 (3) 
(a) of the Constitution as it is a police specific section. With respect, we find 
this argument flawed and misconceived, because the exclusion clause deals 
with the situation where the law enforcement agencies are required to 
maintain public order at the perils of some law which is otherwise protected 
under Article 8(3) (a). In other words, the exclusionary clause has nothing, 
whatsoever, to do with the Civil Servants Act which governs the terms and 
conditions of the civil servants including the police force. 
127.  
The further contention of learned Counsel Khawaja Haris, 
Sr.ASC, on the point of applicability of the cutoff date of Section 8-A of the 
Punjab Civil Servants Act, which was omitted on 17.10.2006, is also without 
force. The contention to treat a certain law which otherwise was held as void 
ab initio from a particular date in itself, is self-contradictory. We have already 
held that a law which was declared by this Court as un-constitutional from the 
date of its inception cannot be treated as being so from a date when it was 
omitted or repealed.  
128.  
We have already dealt with the contentions of Messrs Hamid 
Khan, Muhammad Akram Shiekh and Ms. Asma Jehangir, on the issue of past 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
76
and closed transaction in our foregoing paragraphs. Mr Muhammad Akram 
Sheikh, the learned Sr.ASC, has attempted to argue that the out of turn 
promotion is permissible in Islam and has relied upon an extract (reproduced 
above) from Seerat Encyclopedia, Volume 10. We do not find any substance 
in his contention nor has he advanced any argument except relying upon the 
above extract from the book, which has no nexus with the proposition he has 
advanced.   
129.  
We have also perused the written synopsis of the learned 
Attorney General for Pakistan, received by us through mail. In substance he 
has only advanced his arguments that the judgments under review should 
apply prospectively. He has further contended that the principles enunciated 
in the judgments under review would not extend to the Province of Punjab. 
The grounds on which these arguments have been advanced are already dealt 
with by us in the foregoing paragraphs, therefore, we are of the considered 
view that the points raised, having already been answered in the judgments 
under review and this judgment, merit no consideration.  
130.  
The learned Counsel for the Petitioners have attempted to draw 
a distinction in the judgments under review, inter alia, on the ground that no 
rules were framed to form a committee for scrutinizing the out of turn 
promotion to a Police Officer in the Province of Sindh, whereas in Punjab 
Rule 14-A was introduced to ensure transparency in grant of out of turn 
promotion. we have noticed from the available record that even this 
distinction is missing. The committee constituted under Rule 14-A had failed 
to draw a line between the job description of a Police Officer and the 
justification for grant of out of turn promotion. It is the duty of a Police Officer 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
77
to arrest an accused or recover drugs and if he performs well, the law provides 
that such officer should be decorated with awards and rewards, but grant of 
out of turn promotion, in no way, is permissible, in view of the reasoning 
recorded by this Court in the judgments under review. The Committee 
constituted under Rule 14-A, has completely lost sight of the duty of a Police 
Officer while awarding them out of turn promotion. We have noticed 
numerous instances, which clearly speak that they in discharge of their duties 
were bound to perform such acts and if they were found to have done 
something extraordinary, they could have been decorated with awards, 
rewards or compensated with any amount. Although there are a number of 
glaring instances of out-of-turn promotions granted by the committee which 
do not conform to the set principles, however, we find it inappropriate to delve 
into each instance in order to examine the merits of the said promotions.We 
have already laid down the principle that the very concept and practice of out-
of-turn promotions are violative of the services rules and the provisions of the 
Constitutions, hence, the question of merit of these promotions do not matter 
our considerations.   
SPORTS POLICY, 1982 
131.  
For ease of reference, the Sports Policy of 1982, is reproduced 
hereunder: - 
 
 
Subject: 
PROMOTION OF SPORTS IN THE POLICE  
 
 
 
 
FORCE 
 
 
 
 
 
Memorandum 
It was observed at the D.Is.G’s conference held on 2nd and 3rd of December, 
1981 that not only the general standard of sports had been gradually going 
down but the interest in games had also been sagging for the past few years. 
Since physical fitness is one of the principal trait of a professionally sound 
police officer, it was felt that necessary incentives and stimuli be provided 
for promotion of sports and physical fitness in Police Force. In order to 
achieve the objective in view, rewards and promotions to outstanding 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
78
sportsmen have been considered imperative. Comprehensive standing 
instructions as outlined below are, therefore, being issued for strict 
compliance at all levels. D.Is.G. and SSP are particularly emphasized to 
kindly evince personal interest and ensure that the talent, wherever 
available, is given due recognition and good sportsmen are encouraged to 
give better performance: - 
i) 
All Heads of Police Offices will ensure that the following 
major games are played daily in unit lines, except for closed 
holidays. Not only necessary facilities be provided in this 
behalf but an endeavor should be made to raise District / 
Unit teams, where necessary talent is forthcoming: - 
a) 
Athletics 
b) 
Hockey 
c) 
Football 
d) 
Volleyball 
e) 
Basketball 
f) 
Kabaddi 
g) 
Wrestling 
h) 
Polo (for Lahore, Rawalpindi, DG Khan and 
PTC/Sihala only. 
 
ii) 
Inter District / Unit Tournaments. 
a) 
Range D.Is.G will organize Inter-District Range 
Tournaments in the above games by 15th of 
November each year. 
b) 
The individual sportsmen and members of teams 
winning Inter-District Range Tournaments shall be 
given commendations Certificates Class II which 
Rs.200/- as cash reward while the runner-up 
Commendation Certificate Class II with Rs.100/- 
as cash reward.  
c) 
Constable exhibiting outstanding performance 
shall be considered for entry into list “A” “B-1” 
and “C” as the case may be, by the Range D.Is.G. 
iii) 
Inter Range Sports. 
a) 
Inter Range Punjab Police Sports Tournaments 
shall be organized by the Director-General, Sports, 
Punjab Police by 15th December every year. 
b) 
Policemen securing first position in any individual 
event in Athletics and members of the teams 
winning the Police Inter Range Championship 
shall be awarded C.C. Class 1 with Rs.1000/- as 
cash reward while the runners-up given C.C. Class 
II with Rs.500/- as cash reward. 
iv) 
Selection of Teams and Training 
a) 
Punjab Police Teams shall be selected by the 
Director-General, Sports, Punjab Police by 15th 
December each year and he would organize 
training camps at stations considered suitable for 
improved hard training.  
b) 
The Members of the Punjab Police teams when 
called for camp training by the Director-General 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
79
Chief Sports Officer, shall immediately be relieved 
by the Heads of Police Officers. 
v) 
Posting of Sportsmen 
Members of the Punjab Police Teams shall normally be 
posted close to the Provincial, Divisions or District HQrs, 
as the case may be. 
 
vi) 
Promotions 
a) 
Police Officers selected in the provincial teams for 
National Competition shall be awarded a C.C. 
Class 1 with Rs.5000/- as rewarded every time they 
are picked-up for such representation. 
b) 
Members of the Police Teams or individual Police 
Officers who win the National Championship in 
any game or an individual event in Athletics  
1. 
Shall be placed on List B-1, promoted as 
Offg; HCs and sent for the next immediate 
lower School Course, if they happen to be 
Constables. 
2. 
Shall be confirmed, promoted as officiating 
A.S.Is and sent for the next immediate 
Intermediate School Course, if they happen 
to be officiating H.Cs. 
3. 
Shall be confirmed and promoted to the next 
higher rank if they are officiating as ASI, SI 
or Inspector, in case of ASIs and S.Is, they 
shall be nominated for the next immediate 
Upper School Course as well. 
4. 
They shall also be awarded C.C. Class 1 
with a cash reward of Rs.7,500/-. 
5. 
Police members of the National teams who 
win Gold Medal in Word/Asian Olympic 
Games or World Cup shall be given one step 
promotion, brought on next immediate 
promotion course and also awarded a cash 
reward of Rs.10,000/- with a letter of 
appreciation by the Inspector-General of 
Police, Punjab, which shall be placed on 
their Character Rolls.   
vii) 
Promotion Indicated under Items (vi) (b) above, will, 
however, be admissible once in two years and an officer 
earning promotion on sports basis to the next rank should 
have served for at least two years since the date of his last 
promotion on similar basis.  
viii) 
Meritorious performance by G.Os will also be duly 
recognized by offering them suitable souvenirs.  
 
The above instructions should please be given vide circulation and brought 
to the notice of all ranks. 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
80
 
132.  
We have heard the learned Counsel for the Petitioners Messrs. 
Hamid Khan and others on the issue of out-of-turn promotions pursuant to the 
Sports Policy, and we have also perused the said Policy. With respect, we do 
not subscribe to the contentions of the learned Counsel. The Sports Policy 
broadly lays down two paths of accelerated promotions for the officials. One 
prescribes the courses and examinations, in addition to the performance in the 
sports competitions, in order to be qualified for out-of-turn promotions. 
However, the other path provides for the out-of-turn promotions to the 
members of National teams who win Gold Medal in World/Asian Olympic 
Games or World cup.  
133.  
We believe that there is some justification for allowing out-of-
turn promotions, and that too up to the level of ASIs only, due to the fact that 
certain qualifications/courses/examinations have been prescribed in the 
Policy in order to be qualified for such promotions. In other words, there is no 
element of an arbitrary or selective choice of candidates for the accelerated 
promotions and they have to meet the bare minimum requirements of the 
Police Rules.  
134.  
As far as the accelerated promotions in terms of Sub-clause (5) 
of Clause VI of the Sports Policy are concerned, we are of the view that such 
promotions are in conflict with the provisions of Punjab Civil Servants Act, 
1974, and the rules framed thereunder, and which Act itself is created pursuant 
to the provisions of Articles 240 and 242 of the Constitution.  
135.  
Moreover, there seems no justification to allow the police 
officers to enjoy accelerated promotions on the basis of their performance in 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
81
sports activities, while this Court has declared out of turn promotion granted 
through statutory instrument to be ultra vires the provisions of the 
Constitution, on the ground of proven gallantry. In fact, promoting sports at 
the cost of professionalism within the police force will lead to ominous 
consequences. The efficient police officers will be demoralized if they are 
superseded by their junior colleagues, which in turn will also affect the overall 
performance of police in maintaining law and order.  
136.  
This Court has already held in a series of judgments that acts of 
gallantry, no matter how commendable and appreciated by the society, do not 
justify out-of-turn promotions as they necessarily lead to impingement of the 
fundamental rights of fellow officers in terms of blocking their smooth 
progression of careers and impinging their respect and honor as protected 
under Articles 9 and 14 of the Constitution. Hence, this policy to the extent of 
accelerated promotions is not sustainable, being violative of the service laws 
and the provisions of the Constitution. This Court in a series of judgments has 
held that policy making is the domain of the executive and the Courts 
normally do not interfere in such matters, but when a policy is violative of the 
fundament rights of individuals, the Courts are obliged to examine such policy 
in judicial review. We are fortified by the judgments of this Court reported as 
Ghulam Rasool Vs.  Government of Pakistan through Secretary, 
Establishment Division Islamabad (PLD 2015 SC 6), Dossani Travels Pvt. 
Ltd  Vs.  Travels Shop (Pvt) Ltd. (PLD 2014 SC 1), Iqbal Zafar Jhagra and 
Senator Rukhsana Zuberi  Vs.  Federation of Pakistan (2014 PTD 243), 
OGRA through Secretary  Vs.  Midway II, CNG Station (2014 SCMR 220), 
Watan Party   Vs.  Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2013 SC 167), Alleged 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
82
Corruption in Rental Power Plants etc.   (2012 SCMR 773),  Dr. Akhtar 
Hassan Khan  Vs.  Federation of Pakistan  (2012 SCMR 455),  Executive 
District Officer (Revenue), District Khushab at Jauharabad  Vs.  Ijaz Hussain 
(2011 SCMR 1864),  Al-Raham Travels and Tours (Pvt.) Ltd.   Vs.  Ministry 
of Religious Affairs, Hajj, Zakat and Ushr  (2011 SCMR 1621),  Punjab 
Public Service Commission  Vs.  Mst. Aisha Nawaz  (2011 SCMR 1602), Suo 
Motu Case No.10 of 2007 ) (PLD 2008 SC 673) and Wattan Party through 
President  Vs.  Federation of Pakistan through Cabinet Committee of 
Privatization, Islamabad (PLD 2006 SC 697). 
137.  
The learned Counsel for the Petitioners, Mr. Hamid Khan, has 
contended that the accelerated promotions on the basis of Sports Policy are 
allowed to the officers who belong to a group that is separate from the main 
police group, and hence, distinction has to be drawn. Apparently, this 
contention does not seem convincing given the fact that we have perused the 
record and found that there exist no separate group of sports in the Punjab 
Police. In fact, serving police officers are participating in the sports 
competitions and they are the subjects of accelerated promotions on the basis 
of their performance. We have already held that seniority and promotions of 
the police officers are to be fixed/decided on the basis of the required 
standards provided in the service rules, hence accelerated promotions cannot 
be accorded on the basis of an officer’s performance in a sports competition. 
138.  
However, it would be open to the government to frame rules 
providing a Sports Group within police in order to encourage and incentivize 
sports, which will not form part of the regular police force. In other words, the 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
83
members of Sports Group shall not be assigned field posting, but will be 
restricted to their specialized Group.    
139.  
The Learned Counsel Mr. Hamid Khan has referred to Article 
259 of the Constitution to substantiate his point that the said Policy has been 
framed to promote sports in terms of the said Article. The perusal of Article 
259, however, does not provide for any accelerated promotion and in fact 
confines the awards to the extent of decorations to be given by the President 
under the Federal Law. It may also be pointed out that the context of Article 
259 is entirely different and it deals with the awards to be given to citizens by 
way recognizing their varied services and performances. It cannot be stretched 
beyond the given parameters to include accelerated promotions, by way of the 
said Policy; hence, the contentions of the learned Counsel are without 
substance.  
140.  
We cannot lose sight of one important aspect of the case that the 
Punjab Government/Competent Authority has withdrawn all out of turn 
promotions earned by the police officials, in terms of Section 8-A of the 
Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974. As a consequence, hundreds of thousands of 
police personnel have acquired their lawful right to promotion/seniority, 
which was denied to them owing to the invalid omitted law i.e. Section 8-A 
of the Act. In fact, a right has been created in favour of hundreds of thousands 
of Punjab Police personnel due to withdrawal of all out of turn promotions by 
the Punjab Government/Competent Authority. The police personnel in whose 
favour this right to gain lawful promotion/seniority has been created, were not 
impleaded as party to the present proceedings, therefore, these proceedings on 
this score alone merit dismissal.   
CRP.49/2016 etc 
84
141.  
During the hearing of these proceedings, one of the Petitioners’ 
Counsel has prayed that the judgment of this Court in the case of Gul Hassan 
Jatoi vs. Faqir Muhammad Jatoi reported in (2016 SCMR 1254), may also be 
made applicable to Punjab Police, inter alia, on the ground that Police Rules 
are abused by the authorities with regards to termination of probation and not 
sending the police officials to different examinations/courses under Chapter 
XIII of the Police Rules on their turn. The Police Rules are applicable both to 
the Sindh Police and the Punjab Police. We are cognizant of the fact that delay 
in promotion of police officials affect their morale as they work hard in 
performing their duties. This Court in paragraphs 74 and 75 of the aforesaid 
judgment has given the following directions: - 
“74. 
It has been observed that in many cases the Police personnel 
have completed their statutory period of probation but they were not 
confirmed for want of notification, and as result of which such 
officials have suffered in terms of delayed promotion or loss of 
seniority, which is a sheer negligence and abuse of power on the 
part of the competent authorities concerned. Hence, we are of the 
view that this practice must be brought to an effective end so that 
injustice may not be perpetrated against such officials. Therefore, 
in future those Police Personnel who have completed their statutory 
period of probation, whether it is three years or two years, they shall 
stand confirmed whether or not a notification to that effect is issued. 
75.  
We have further observed that a cherry picking is made in 
the case of selection of Police personnel for police training or 
practical training despite the fact they have completed their 
required period to be eligible for such trainings, which amounts to 
denying them of timely promotion for the next scale; hence, we 
direct that in future, competent authority shall ensure that the Police 
personnel who have completed their required period to be eligible 
for trainings shall be forthwith sent for the training; and in case 
such police officials are bypassed for such trainings on account of 
default by the department, or to extend a favor to the junior, or 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
85
negligence by the authority concerned, their inter-se seniority and 
the accompanying financial entitlements shall not be effected on 
account of their late joining or completion of training.”    
 
These directives shall also be applicable to all the Police officials who 
are governed by Police Rules, 1934 and the competent authority shall ensure 
compliance to streamline the service structure of the police by redressing the 
heart burning and dismay of the police officials at the hands of high ups, who 
abuse their discretion in violation of the Police Rules.  
142.  
Before parting with this judgment, we acknowledge the 
assistance of the Senior Counsel rendered by them on the issues at hand, which 
will have far reaching effect on the working of the police.  
143.  
For the aforesaid reasons, all the listed Review Petitions and the 
Applications are dismissed. The I.G.P, Punjab, the Home Secretary, Punjab, 
and the Secretary, Establishment Division, are directed to comply with the 
judgment, by fixing the seniority of all the Police Officers who were given out 
of turn promotion alongwith their batch-mates, as if they were never given out 
of turn promotion. However, the orders of withdrawal of out of turn promotion 
passed by the Department/Competent Authority shall be recalled against the 
Police Officers who had earned out of turn promotions, pursuant to the 
judgments of superior Courts/Service Tribunals, as discussed in paragraph 
111 of this judgment. For the purpose of compliance of this judgment, 
necessary D.P.C/Board, as the case may be, shall be immediately held without 
further loss of time and a compliance report be submitted to the Registrar of 
this Court for our perusal in Chambers. This exercise shall be completed 
within a period of one month. The Advocate General, Punjab, and the learned 
CRP.49/2016 etc 
86
Attorney General for Pakistan shall communicate the directives of this Court 
to the relevant authorities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judge  
 
 
Judge 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judge  
 
 
Judge 
 
 
Announced in open Court at Islamabad on _____________2016. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judge. 
 
Approved for reporting.