IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN 
(APPELLATE JURISDICTION) 
 
PRESENT: 
MR. JUSTICE GULZAR AHMED, C.J. 
MR. JUSTICE IJAZ UL AHSAN 
MR. JUSTICE SAYYED MAZAHAR ALI AKBAR NAQVI 
 
CIVIL APPEALS NOs. 902 AND 903 OF 2020 
(Against the judgment dated 10.3.2020 of the Peshawar High 
Court, Mingora Bench, (Dar-ul-Qaza), Swat passed in Writ 
Petitions No.71-M/2019 & 108-M/2019) 
 
 
1. 
 University 
of 
Malakand 
through 
Registrar & another Vs. Dr. Alam Zeb 
etc. 
 
 
In CA 902/2020 
2. 
 Vice 
Chancellor, 
University 
of 
Malakand & another Vs. Dr. Imtiaz 
Ahmad etc. 
 
In CA 903/2020 
 
For the Appellant(s): 
Mr. Khaled Rehman, ASC 
Mr. Muhammad Hamayun, Asst. Registrar 
Legal 
(In both cases) 
 
 
For the Respondent(s): 
Mr. Muhammad Asif Yousafzai, ASC 
(For respondent No. 1 in CA 902/2020) 
(For respondents 1-7 in CA 903/2020) 
 
Mr. Muhammad Sharif Janjua, AOR 
 
 
 
Date of Hearing: 
03.02.2021 
… 
JUDGMENT 
 
SAYYED MAZAHAR ALI AKBAR NAQVI, J.- Through these appeals 
by leave of the Court, the appellant has called in question the vires 
of the impugned judgment dated 10.03.2020 passed by the 
Peshawar High Court, Mingora Bench, whereby the Writ Petitions 
filed by the respondents were allowed and the respondent No. 1 in 
Civil Appeal No. 902/2020 and respondents No. 1-7 in Civil Appeal 
No. 903/2020 were held entitled to payment of salary during the 
period they remained abroad while availing leave for higher studies, 
which was duly sanctioned by the competent authority.  
2. 
 
Briefly stated the facts of the matter, are that 
respondent No. 1 in Civil Appeal No. 902/2020 and respondent Nos. 
1-7 in Civil Appeal No. 903/2020 were initially appointed as 
CIVIL APPEALS NO.902 AND 903 OF 2020 
-: 2 :-
Lecturers on contract basis on different dates in the years 2001 to 
2005. The contract of the respondents was extended from time to 
time on the basis of their performance. Subsequently, their services 
were regularized in the year 2007. They applied for study leave 
abroad for the sake of higher studies (Ph.D program). Their 
applications were duly processed and as a consequence, those were 
allowed by the Vice Chancellor of the University and the 
respondents were allowed study leave for different tenures without 
payment of salary. They were also selected for overseas scholarship 
for higher studies due to their academic qualifications. On return 
after completion of their studies, they approached the appellant 
authority with the request that their leave without pay may be 
treated as leave with full pay. The request was considered by the 
Syndicate in its meeting held on 27.05.2013 and was turned down. 
The respondents then preferred review to the Syndicate, which was 
placed before the Syndicate in its next meeting held on 25.12.2013. 
The Syndicate constituted a Committee to look into the matter and 
report. On receipt of the report, the review was once again placed 
before the Syndicate in its meeting held on 28.06.2014 but it also 
met the same fate. Ultimately the respondents filed appeals before 
the Chancellor/Governor KPK but they were also dismissed vide 
order dated 06.11.2018. This led to their filing of Writ Petitions 
before the Peshawar High Court, which have been allowed vide 
impugned judgment dated 10.03.2020. Hence, these appeals by 
leave of the Court. 
3. 
 
Learned counsel for the appellants inter alia contended 
that grant of leave is neither a vested right nor the respondents can 
claim the same as such; that the learned High Court has 
misinterpreted Rule 89 of the Service Rules of University of 
Malakand, according to which study leave can be granted to an 
employee who has put in at least three years service in the 
University or its constituent units; that the word ‘employee’ means a 
regular employee having three years service and not the contract 
employee and all the respondents were contract employees at the 
time when the study leave was granted to them; that the writ 
petitions were hit by the doctrine of laches as leave without pay was 
CIVIL APPEALS NO.902 AND 903 OF 2020 
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granted in the year 2007 whereas the writ petitions were filed in 
2019 after a lapse of 12 years.  
4. 
 
On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents 
contended that although the respondents were initially appointed on 
contract basis but subsequently their services were regularized and 
their previous service was also directed to be considered for the 
purpose of seniority; that according to Rule 89 of the Service Rules, 
an employee who has three years of service on his credit can be 
granted leave on full pay; that the word ‘employee’ according to the 
Rules means a person who is being paid from the University funds. 
He lastly contended that the impugned judgment passed by the 
High Court is well reasoned and in accordance with the spirit of law 
and the same may be maintained.  
5. 
 
We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have 
perused the record of the case.  
6. 
 
Firstly, we will take the issue as to whether the writ 
petitions were hit by laches or not because according to learned 
counsel for the appellants leave without pay was granted to the 
respondents in the year 2007 whereas the writ petitions were filed 
in 2019 after a lapse of 12 years, therefore, the writ petitions were 
hopelessly barred by limitation. However, we have noted that 
although leave without pay was granted to the respondents in the 
year 2007 but after their return they remained knocking the door of 
the department to get the relief and ultimately in the year 2014 their 
request was turned down by the competent authority. Thereafter, 
they filed appeal before the Chancellor of the University i.e. Governor 
KPK which was rejected on 06.11.2018. In this view of the matter, it 
can safely be said that finally the cause of action accrued to the 
respondents on 06.11.2018, therefore, the writ petitions filed on 
24.01.2019 were within time.   
7. 
 
Now we will advert to the question whether the word 
‘employee’ mentioned in Rule 89 of the Service Rules covers a 
contract employee or does it mean a regular employee. It would be in 
order to reproduce the said Section, which reads as follows:- 
“89. Study leave on full pay may be granted to an 
employee who has put in at least three years service in 
the University or its constituent units. It shall not be 
granted to an employee within three years of the date 
on which he/she has the option of retiring. Nor should it 
CIVIL APPEALS NO.902 AND 903 OF 2020 
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be granted to an employee who is about to retire on 
proportionate pension.” 
 
8. 
 
The learned High Court in paragraph 9 of the impugned 
judgment has dealt with this issue. Relevant portion of the judgment 
reads as under:- 
“9. 
We have considered the respective contentions of the 
parties in the context of the Rules. In Rule 89, the word 
‘employee’ is mentioned who is eligible to study leave with 
pay with the additional qualification that he must have three 
years of service in the University, and no distinction has 
been drawn in the said rule, as to whether the said 
employee is a regular employee of the University or his 
employment is on contract basis. Rule 4(h) of the Rules, the 
‘university employee’ has been defined to mean a person 
who holds a post in the university service and who is paid 
from the University funds whereas ‘regular appointment’ has 
also been defined in Rule 4(f). Thus, the occurring of word 
‘employee’ in Rule 89 appears to be intentional and not an 
accidental slip or a draftsman’s error. Viewing the aforesaid 
rule through the prism of literal construction, which 
envisages that a word used in the statute is to be given its 
ordinary meaning and the Court has indeed no authority to 
read a word into an Act of the parliament or omit the same 
unless clear reason for it is to be found within the four 
corners of the Act itself. ‘Maxwell on the Interpretation of 
statutes’ (12th Edition) has explained this position as under:- 
“It is a corollary to the general rule of literal 
construction that nothing is to be added to or 
taken from a statute unless there are adequate 
grounds to justify the inference that the 
legislature intended something which it omitted 
to express. Lord Mersey said: “It is a strong 
thing to read into an Act of Parliament words 
which are not there, and in the absence of clear 
necessity it is a wrong thing to do”. “We are not 
entitled,” said Lord Loreburn L.C. ‘to read 
words into an Act of Parliament unless clear 
reason for it is to be found within the four 
corners of the Act itself.” A case not provided 
for in a statute is not to be dealt with merely 
because there seems no good reason why it 
should have been omitted, and the omission 
appears 
in 
consequence 
to 
have 
been 
unintentional.  
 
 
We see no reason to infer from the plain reading of 
Rule 89 that the word employee occurring in the said rule 
means a regular employee and the period of his employment 
should be on regular side and not on a contract base 
because the rules itself have defined both types of employees 
differently in the definition clause.”  
 
9. 
 
A close reading of the above portion of the impugned 
judgment leaves no room to believe that the word ‘employee’ 
mentioned in Rule 89 means a regular employee. The learned High 
CIVIL APPEALS NO.902 AND 903 OF 2020 
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Court has very elaborately dealt with this issue and we find no 
reason to differ with the findings of the High Court.  
10. 
 
Now the question, which remains to be decided is 
whether the respondents had the requisite service of three years in 
terms of Section 89 ibid or not. Despite that the word ‘employee’ 
used in Section 89 ibid means a regular employee, in the present 
case it would not be of any benefit for the appellant department. The 
record shows that although the respondents were appointed on 
contract basis on different dates in the years 2001 to 2005 but their 
services were regularized in the year 2007. It is clearly mentioned in 
their regular appointment orders that their previous service shall be 
considered for the purpose of seniority, therefore, it can be 
concluded that the total length of service rendered by the 
respondents at the  time of availing the leave was more than three 
years, which entitles them to study leave with full pay.  
11. 
 
The learned High Court in paragraph 10 of the 
impugned judgment has also dealt with the issue, as to when the 
respondents were allowed study leave then after availing the same 
and after joining the duties, whether they are not estopped by their 
conduct to claim the said study leave with full pay. The learned High 
Court after relying on the judgments of this Court came to the 
conclusion that as a rule of evidence estoppel can be invoked by a 
party, however, the same cannot be accepted against the statutory 
obligation of a person even though one party might not have 
expressly claimed his right which was available to him under the 
law. This Court in the case of Zarai Taraqiati Bank Limited Vs. Said 
Rehman etc (2013 SCMR 642) has candidly held that “there is no 
estoppel against law”. The same view was expressed by Indian 
Supreme Court in the cases of Union Territory, Chandigarh Admn 
Vs. Managing Society, Goswami, GDSDC (AIR 1996 SC 1759) and 
P.R. Deshpande Vs. Maruti Balaram Haibatti (AIR 1998 SC 2979) by 
holding that principle of estoppel does not apply against statute and 
it has no application when statutory rights and liabilities are 
involved. As it is now well settled that no estoppel exists against 
law, therefore, keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the 
cases, we are compelled to observe that one wrong of the 
respondents of not claiming their right earlier cannot be acted upon 
CIVIL APPEALS NO.902 AND 903 OF 2020 
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as a precedent when it comes to give effect to the express words of a 
statute. If a person has been bestowed some legal right by 
law/statute and he omits to claim such legal right for a certain 
period of time, it does not mean that he has waived his legal right 
and subsequently he cannot claim such right. Inherent power and 
doctrine of estoppel cannot be applied to defeat the provisions of 
statute. When the statute clearly provided that study leave on full 
pay may be granted to an employee who has put in at least three 
years service, the appellant authority ought not to have refused the 
respondents their right guaranteed under the statute.     
12. 
 
For what has been discussed above, we find that the 
learned High Court has passed a well reasoned judgment to which 
no exception can be taken. The appeals having no merit are 
accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs. 
 
 
 
 
CHIEF JUSTICE 
 
 
 
JUDGE 
 
 
 
JUDGE 
Islamabad, the 
3rd of February, 2021 
Approved For Reporting 
Khurram