IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN 
(APPELLATE JURISDICTION) 
 
 
PRESENT: MR. JUSTICE MIAN SAQIB NISAR, HCJ 
 
 
MR. JUSTICE UMAR ATA BANDIAL 
 
 
MR. JUSTICE FAISAL ARAB 
 
 
CIVIL APPEALS NO.300, 346, 812 AND 851 TO 854 OF 2017 
(Against the judgments dated 03.08.2016, 16.01.2017, 14.04.2017, 
22.01.2016, 19.04.2017 and 05.05.2017 of the Islamabad High 
Court, Islamabad passed in Writ Petitions No. 2448, 2612, 
4319/2016, 853-854/2015, 636 and 3046/2016) 
 
 
1. 
Waqar Zafar Bakhtawari 
In C.A.300/2017 
2. 
M/s Superior Security Guards Pvt. Ltd. 
In C.A.346/2017 
3. 
Muhammad Nadeem 
In C.A.812/2017 
4. 
Muhammad Ashiq 
In C.A.851/2017 
5. 
Muhammad Mushtaq 
In C.A.852/2017 
6. 
Muhammad Umer Farooq 
In C.A.853/2017 
7. 
Asad Hussain 
In C.A.854/2017 
 
…Appellant(s) 
VERSUS 
1. 
Haji Mazhar Hussain Shah etc. 
In C.A.300/2017 
2. 
Sher Muhammad 
In C.A.346/2017 
3. 
Malik Ejaz Amjad etc. 
In C.A.812/2017 
4. 
Muhammad Zubair etc. 
In C.A.851/2017 
5. 
Muhammad Zubair etc. 
In C.A.852/2017 
6. 
Muhammad Ameen Chughtai etc. 
In C.A.853/2017 
7. 
Sheikh Abdul Saboor (decd.) thr. Ltd. etc. 
In C.A.854/2017 
 
…Respondent(s) 
 
For the appellant(s): 
Mr. Muhammad Ilyas Sheikh, ASC 
Ch. Akhtar Ali, AOR 
(In C.A.300/2017) 
 
Mr. Naveed Malik, ASC 
(In C.A.346/2017) 
 
Mr. Junaid Akhtar, ASC 
(In C.A.812/2017) 
 
Mr. Fiaz Ahmed Jandran, ASC 
Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, AOR 
(In C.A.851 & 852/2017) 
 
Raja M. Aleem Khan Abbasi, ASC 
(In C.As.853 & 854/2017) 
 
 
For the respondent(s): 
Mr. Mir Afzal Malik, ASC 
(In C.As.300 & 853/2017) 
 
Mr. Waseem Ahmed Qureshi, ASC 
(In C.A.346/2017) 
 
CAs 300,346,812,851/17 etc. 
-: 2 :-
Mr. Tariq Khushnood Qureshi, ASC 
(In C.A.812/2017) 
 
Syed Masood Hussain, ASC 
Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, AOR 
(In C.As.851 & 852/2017) 
 
Mr. Sajid Ilyas Bhatti, ASC 
(In C.A.854/2017) 
 
 
Amicus curiae: 
Syed Najmul Hassan Kazmi, Sr. ASC 
Sardar Muhammad Aslam, ASC 
 
 
Date of hearing: 
20.9.2017 
… 
ORDER 
 
 
MIAN SAQIB NISAR, CJ.- All these appeals with the leave 
of the Court primarily involve the same proposition of law, therefore, 
are being disposed of together. 
2. 
 
In all these cases, the appellants are the tenants of the 
respondents/landlords and the premises in question are situated in 
the Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT). Thus, in order to seek eviction of 
the appellants, the respondents filed applications under the provisions 
of Section 17 of the Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2001 (the 
Ordinance, 2001) on the ground, inter alia, that the period of tenancy 
has expired. Resultantly, the forums below passed the eviction orders 
on the basis of expiry of the term of tenancy.  
3. 
 
Leave in these cases was granted to consider whether the 
expiry of the term of tenancy is one of the grounds as envisaged by 
Section 17 of the Ordinance, 2001 for the eviction of the tenant.  
4. 
 
Mr. Muhammad Ilyas Sheikh, ASC, learned counsel for 
the appellant in Civil Appeal No.300 of 2017 has led the arguments on 
behalf of the appellants’ side against eviction orders and submitted 
that in view of the unambiguous and clear language of Section 17 of 
the Ordinance, 2001 “a tenant in possession of a building or a rented 
land shall not be evicted therefrom except in accordance with the 
CAs 300,346,812,851/17 etc. 
-: 3 :-
provisions of this Section” (emphasis supplied); thus, the Rent Controller 
would only have the jurisdiction to pass an eviction order if the case 
squarely falls within the purview of the said Section; therefore, as 
there is no specific ground mentioned in the noted section, which 
enables the landlord to seek eviction of the tenant on expiry of period 
of tenancy, the impugned orders are not only against the law but 
passed without jurisdiction. He has also submitted that despite the 
expiry of the period of tenancy, a person who was holding the property 
as a tenant shall continue to be a tenant and reference in this behalf 
has been made to the definition of term “tenant” given in Section 2(j) 
of the Ordinance, 2001. He, thus, urged that on account of the expiry 
of the tenancy period, the status of tenant neither extinguishes nor 
changes and he (the tenant) continues to be entitled to occupy the 
property, and shall only be liable to be evicted if the strict grounds set 
out in Section 17 of the Ordinance, 2001 are met with specifically. 
With regard to the effect and implication of Section 6 of the 
Ordinance, it is argued that such provision is subject to the 
provisions of Section 17 of the Ordinance, 2001; meaning thereby that 
it is subservient and subordinate to the said section, but in any case 
Section 6 of the Ordinance, 2001 by itself does not provide any 
ground for eviction of the tenant on expiry of the tenancy period. The 
learned counsel has also submitted that the forums below, for 
justifying the eviction order, have relied upon the provisions of Section 
17(2)(ii)(b) of the Ordinance, 2001, which provides that a tenant can 
be evicted if he “has infringed any condition on which the building or 
rented land is held”. This provision, according to the learned counsel, 
relates to the terms and conditions specified in the tenancy agreement 
under which certain obligations have been imposed upon the tenant, 
CAs 300,346,812,851/17 etc. 
-: 4 :-
but it has nothing to do with the expiry of the period of tenancy and 
eviction on that account. It is also argued that Section 17 of the 
Ordinance, 2001 opens with the negative expression that “a tenant in 
possession of a building or a rented land shall not be evicted therefrom 
except in accordance with the provisions of this Section” (emphasis supplied), 
thus, the mandate of the law for the purposes of eviction of the tenant 
is only restricted to the said section and no other provision of the 
Ordinance in this context can be resorted to, specifically Section 6 of 
the Ordinance, 2001, for the reason that (i) it does not provide the 
ground for eviction and (ii) it is subject to the provisions of Section 17 
ibid. It is further submitted that Section 4 of the Ordinance, 2001 is 
an overriding provision and excludes the application of any other law 
to the issues covered by the Ordinance, 2001, therefore, the general 
law i.e. the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (the Act, 1882) regarding the 
determination of tenancy, the right of holding over and entitlement of 
the landlord to get back the possession of the rented premises on the 
expiry of tenancy term, shall not be attracted. In support of his 
arguments, he has relied upon the judgments of this Court reported 
as Chairman, Federal Board of Revenue Islamabad Vs. Messrs Al-
Technique Corporation of Pakistan Ltd. and others (PLD 2017 SC 
99), Mst. Zarina Khan Vs. Mst. Farzana Shaib (2017 SCMR 330), 
Lucky Cement Ltd. Vs. Commissioner Income Tax, Zone 
Companies, Circle-5 Peshawar (2015 SCMR 1494) and Rana Abdul 
Hameed Talib Vs. Additional District Judge Lahore and others 
(PLD 2013 SC 775) and the judgment of the learned Lahore High 
Court reported as Mst. Munawar Sultana Vs. Additional District 
Judge, Islamabad and 2 others (2005 CLC 1119 at Page 1123).  
CAs 300,346,812,851/17 etc. 
-: 5 :-
5. 
 
In Civil Appeals No.853 and 854/2017, Raja Muhammad 
Aleem Abassi, learned ASC for the appellants, has argued that on 
account of the expression ‘subject to’ used in Section 6 of the 
Ordinance, 2001, such Section in its application is only restricted to 
the case covered by Section 17(4)(b) of the Ordinance, 2001 and the 
proviso there to, which provides that if “the tenancy is for a specified 
period agreed upon between the landlord and the tenant, the landlord 
shall not be entitled to apply under this sub-section before the expiry of 
such period.” The learned counsel for the appellants in other cases 
more or less have made the same submissions. 
6. 
 
The learned counsel for the respondents, however, argued 
that Section 6 of the Ordinance, 2001 in law extinguishes and puts an 
end to a tenancy on expiry of the tenancy period either fixed between 
the parties or that envisaged by the said Section itself, and thereafter, 
renders such tenancy invalid. Resultantly, if the tenant continues to 
occupy the property after the expiry of that period, it shall be an 
infringement of the terms and conditions of tenancy in terms of 
Section 17(2)(ii)(b) of the Ordinance, 2001 and such a tenant shall be 
liable to be evicted. Reliance by the respondents’ side has been placed 
upon the judgments reported as Qaiser Javed Malik Vs. Pervaiz 
Hameed (2009 SCMR 846), Ghulam Abbas Vs. Additional Sessions 
Judge (West) Islamabad and 2 others (2015 MLD 1740), Nadeem 
Raza Abbasi Vs. Sardar Abu Bakar and 2 others (2016 CLC 1051) , 
Pakistan State Oil Company (Pvt.) Vs. Zulekha Khanum and 6 
others (2016 CLC 1850) and, Sh. Amir Farooq Vs. Sh. Usman and 
others (2016 MLD 103).  
7. 
 
Syed Najmul Hassan Kazmi, learned Sr. ASC, and Sardar 
Muhammad Aslam, learned ASC, were appointed as amici curiae in 
CAs 300,346,812,851/17 etc. 
-: 6 :-
these matters. Syed Najmul Hassan Kazmi, learned Sr. ASC has 
submitted that there are three laws on the subject, which are relevant; 
(i) West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 (Ordinance, 
1959); (ii) an amendment made therein in the year 1965, i.e. West 
Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction (Amendment) Ordinance, 1965 
(Amendment Ordinance, 1965) and (iii) Punjab Rented Premises Act 
2009 (Act, 2009). According to him, the object and purpose of the 
Ordinance, 1959 was to restrict the undue increase of rent and also to 
bar the eviction of a tenant which otherwise was done by virtue of the 
general law of the land, namely the Act, 1882. He also mentioned 
Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Ordinance, 1959 and made reference to the 
amendment brought in the said Ordinance vide the Amendment  
Ordinance, 1965 to contend that the Ordinance, 1959 was made 
applicable to all the tenancies, which were prevalent at the time of the 
enforcement of the Ordinance, 1965 and to those created thereafter. It 
is also submitted that even if the special law has an overriding effect 
on the other laws, including the general law, the terms and conditions 
settled between a landlord and the tenant, which were inconsistence 
with the special law could not be given effect to and the special law 
shall prevail; but where there is no conflict, as mentioned above the 
general law shall be applicable. In this respect he has placed reliance 
on the judgment of this Court reported as Mrs. Zarina Khawaja Vs. 
Agha Mahboob Shah (PLD 1988 SC 190 at 199 to 201) to argue that 
while considering the analogous provisions of Sindh Rented Premises 
Ordinance, 1979 (the Ordinance, 1979), this Court has come to the 
conclusion that where the provisions of aforesaid law or the lease 
agreement are not violated, the general law of the land shall be 
attracted.  It has also been mentioned that in this context the general 
CAs 300,346,812,851/17 etc. 
-: 7 :-
law which shall apply is the Act, 1882 . Section 108(q) of the Act of 
1882 clearly postulates that after the determination (expiry) of the 
tenancy period, the tenant is bound to put the landlord back to the 
possession of the lease property. He has also mentioned the preamble 
of the Ordinance, 2001 to submit that the said Ordinance has been 
enforced “to regulate the relations between the landlords and tenants of 
rented premises in the Islamabad Capital Territory and to provide 
matters ancillary thereto or connected therewith”. This is unlike the 
preamble of Ordinance, 1959, which was meant to resist the increase 
in the rent and the eviction of the tenants. It is therefore argued that 
Section 6 of the Ordinance, 2001 has been deliberately made part of 
the Ordinance which provides that “Subject to the provisions of section 
17, no tenancy shall be valid beyond such period as the landlord and 
tenant may, by mutual agreement, fix before or after the commencement 
of the tenancy”. The pith and substance of his arguments is that 
Section 6 ibid should be read in conjunction with Section 17 ibid and 
not in a manner that it shall be held nugatory and redundant, as no 
provision of a statute should be rendered redundant or made 
nugatory. Thus, according to the learned counsel, the provisions of 
Section 17(2)(ii)(b) shall be read with Section 6 of the Ordinance, 2001 
so that both the sections could be saved and harmoniously 
interpreted. In connection with Section 2(j) of the Ordinance, 2001, it 
is argued that this is only meant for the purposes of enabling the 
landlord to seek eviction of his tenant under the provisions of the 
Ordinance, 2001 even after expiry of the term of tenancy, in that a 
person who holds over the property after the expiry of tenancy, should 
be evicted under the provisions of the Ordinance, 2001 rather 
approaching the civil court in its pecuniary jurisdiction; thus, Section 
CAs 300,346,812,851/17 etc. 
-: 8 :-
2(j) ibid cannot be given any enlarged meaning so as to hold that a 
person who is in occupation of a property beyond the tenure of 
tenancy, shall remain to be a tenant for an unlimited and unrestricted 
period and that the landlord shall have to seek his eviction only on the 
ground of default in payment of rent, subletting or personal bona fide 
need, etc. He elaborated that this provision can only be construed as a 
reference for bringing an action against such tenant under the 
provisions of Section 17 of the Ordinance, 2001. 
8. 
 
In order to appreciate the submissions made by the 
learned counsel for the parties, we find it expedient to reproduce the 
relevant provisions of law in a sequence. Section 2(j) of the Ordinance, 
2001 defines a tenant and reads: 
2(j) 
“tenant” means any person who undertakes or is bound to 
pay rent as consideration for the possession or occupation of a 
building or rented land by him or by any other person on his 
behalf, and includes,___ 
(i) 
any person who continues to be in possession or 
occupation after the termination of his tenancy; and 
(ii) 
in the event of the death of the tenant, the members of his 
family who continue to be in possession or occupation of 
the building or rented land. 
 
Section 6 of the Ordinance: 
6. Tenure of tenancy. Subject to the provisions of section 17, no 
tenancy shall be valid beyond such period as the landlord and 
tenant may, by mutual agreement, fix before or after the 
commencement of the tenancy: 
Provided that a tenancy in force before the commencement 
of this Ordinance for which no period is fixed shall cease to be 
CAs 300,346,812,851/17 etc. 
-: 9 :-
valid on the expiration of a period of two years from such 
commencement: 
Provided further that a tenancy which comes into force 
after the commencement of this Ordinance and for which no period 
is fixed shall not be valid after expiration of period of six months 
from the date of the receipt by the tenant of a notice in writing 
given by the landlord terminating the tenancy. 
 
While the relevant part of Section 17 of the Ordinance envisages as 
follow: 
17. Eviction of tenant. (1) A tenant in possession of a building or 
rented land shall not be evicted therefrom except in accordance 
with provisions of this section. 
(2) 
A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the 
Controller for a direction in that behalf. If the Controller, after 
giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause 
against the application, is satisfied that:- 
(i) 
………………………………… 
(ii) 
the tenant has without the written consent of the landlord:- 
(a) 
……………………….. 
(b) 
used the building or rented land for purpose other 
than that for which it was leased or has infringed 
any conditions on which the building or rented land 
is held; (emphasis supplied) 
(iii) 
……………………………………. 
(iv) 
……………………………………. 
(v) 
……………………………………. 
Explanation. For the purpose of clause:- 
(i) 
………………………….. 
(ii) 
…………………………. 
(3) 
………………………… 
(4) 
A landlord may apply to the Controller for an order 
directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession:- 
(a) 
…………………………….. 
CAs 300,346,812,851/17 etc. 
-: 10 :-
(b) 
in the case of a commercial building or rented land, if he 
requires it in good faith for his own use or for the use of 
any member of his family: 
 
Provided that where the tenancy is for a specified 
period agreed upon between the landlord and the tenant, 
the landlord shall not be entitled to apply under this sub-
section before the expiry of such period: 
…………………….” 
 
9. 
 
Heard. It may be necessary to mention here that the 
portions of Section 17 ibid which have been omitted from reproduction 
are the grounds for eviction of tenant, such as, default in the payment 
of rent, reconstruction, causing damage to the rented property, 
nuisance, personal requirement, etc.  It is settled that while 
interpreting the law, a specific provision of any statute, which is 
independent in nature, cannot and should not ordinarily be held to be 
redundant, especially on the touchstone of another independent 
provision of the same statute; rather all possible efforts should be 
made to apply and adhere to the rules of purposive and harmonious 
construction, so that the allegedly conflicting provisions should be 
reconciled and saved. If some precedent law is required in this behalf, 
reference can be made to the judgments reported as Combind 
Investment (Pvt.) Ltd. Vs. Wali Bhai (PLD 2016 SC 730), Lucky 
Cement Ltd. Vs. Commissioner Income Tax, Zone Companies, 
Circle-5, Peshawar (2015 SCMR 1494), Aftab Shahban Mirani Vs. 
Muhammad Ibrahim (PLD 2008 SC 779), Collector of Sales Tax 
and Central Excise (Enforcement) and another Vs. Messrs Mega 
Tech (Pvt.) Ltd. (2005 SCMR 1166), Mirza Shaukat Baig Vs. Shahid 
Jamil (PLD 2005 SC 530) and D.G. Khan Cement Company Ltd. 
Vs. Federation of Pakistan and others (2004 SCMR 456).  
CAs 300,346,812,851/17 etc. 
-: 11 :-
10. 
 
Now applying the above principle, Section 6 of the 
Ordinance, 2001 has to be given some meaning to determine its role in 
the Ordinance. The language of the Section 6 ibid as reproduced above 
is very clear and it mandates that after the expiry of the tenancy 
period, or beyond the tenancy period, no tenancy shall be valid. The 
word ‘valid’ has to be given its ordinary dictionary meaning as it has 
not been defined in the Ordinance. According to the Oxford dictionary 
‘valid’ means “legally binding due to having been executed in 
compliance with the law; legally or official acceptable”. According to 
Black’s Law Dictionary Fifth Edition, ‘valid’ means “Having legal 
strength or force, executed with proper formalities, incapable of being 
rightfully overthrown or set aside. legally sufficient; binding. Of binding 
force; legally sufficient or efficacious; authorized by law.” According to 
Words and Phrases (Permanent Edition) Vol-44 the terms “valid” 
means “in law having legal strength, force, and effect, or incapable of 
being rightfully overthrown or set aside; “valid” means efficient, 
effective; accomplishing what is claimed or intended.”. The word “no” 
appearing in Section 6 of the Ordinance, 2001 renders a tenancy 
beyond the expiry or tenure “invalid”. The term “invalid” has been 
defined in Oxford dictionary as “not valid, not legally recognized 
because it contravenes a regulation of law”. In Black’s law Dictionary 
“invalid” means “not legally binding; without basis in fact”. In Words 
and Phrases Permanent Edition Vol-22A “ invalid” means “of no force; 
weight; cogency; not valid; weak. Law having no force or effect; void, 
null; as an invalid contract”. 
11. 
 
Thus, as per the clear mandate of Section 6 ibid, such a 
tenancy shall come to an end after the expiry of the term of tenancy 
and if thereafter the tenant holds such a property without the consent 
CAs 300,346,812,851/17 etc. 
-: 12 :-
of the landlord, it shall be a clear violation and the infringement of the 
condition of the tenancy, on which the property was held by him, 
because the condition of tenancy is for a particular period of time 
either by the terms stipulated in the tenancy agreement or by the 
afflux of time, which is specified in Section 6 (ibid.) itself. Thus, the 
case is squarely covered by Section 17(2)(ii)(b) of the Ordinance, 2001. 
Much emphasis has been made on the language of Section 17(1) of the 
Ordinance, 2001 that a tenant shall not be evicted except in 
accordance with the provisions of the said Section, wherein certain 
specific grounds have been provided and Section 6 ibid has been made 
subject to Section 17 ibid which means that it is subordinate and 
subservient to the said Section. In this regard it is to be noted that in 
Black’s Law Dictionary, fifth Edition, the term “subject to” has been 
defined as under:- 
“Liable, subordinate, subservient, inferior, obedient to; 
governed or affected by; provided that; provided; answerable 
for.” (emphasis supplied) 
 
Thus, the expression “subject to” cannot always be construed as 
‘limited to’, but can also be read as “provided that” or “provided”, 
which means that Section 6 ibid would be applicable provided that 
there is a ground available in Section 17 ibid. Therefore, applying the 
above said definition to the expression “subject to” a tenant, who holds 
the property beyond the term of tenancy, under Section 17(2)(ii)(b) of 
the Ordinance, 2001 shall be evicted from the premises which is held 
on the condition for holding it for a specific period of time if he 
continues to occupy the rented property beyond such period without 
the “written consent” of the landlord. Eviction of the tenant thus will be 
CAs 300,346,812,851/17 etc. 
-: 13 :-
on the grounds of violation of the term of tenancy which will be seen 
as a condition of the tenancy agreement. This purposive and 
harmonious interpretation of Section 6 ibid, when it interplays with 
the provisions of Section 17 ibid gives effect to both the allegedly 
conflicting provisions of the Ordinance, 2001. If some other meaning is 
given thereto, it shall render Section 6 ibid completely redundant, with 
the consequence that though the tenancy after the expiry of the agreed 
or statutory period has come to an end and is extinguished as per 
section 6 ibid, yet the landlord cannot seek the eviction of the tenant 
and may have to seek eviction only on any of the grounds mentioned 
specifically in Section 17 ibid, such as, default in payment of rent, 
subletting, reconstruction, personal requirement, damage to the 
property. This would lead to ludicrous legal consequences in that not 
only shall Section 6 ibid be rendered redundant and nugatory; it shall 
allow a tenant of the property to continue to occupy the property 
though he has no right to occupy the same, as his tenancy per the 
command of law is no more valid. This shall be the most illogical and 
most ineligible interpretation of Section 6 ibid when read with Section 
17(2)(ii)(b) of the Ordinance, 2001. So far as the argument that in the 
Act, 2009 a separate ground for eviction, on account of expiry of 
tenancy, is specifically mentioned is concerned; suffice it to say that in 
some later laws on the same subject, Provinces have become wiser to 
make the law more clear. However, it does not mean that the law 
earlier in force in Islamabad should be interpreted on the basis of a 
later provincial enactment. As far as the argument about the definition 
of the ‘tenant’ provided in Section 2(j) (supra) is concerned, we are of the 
considered view that the definition given therein is for the purpose of 
conferment of jurisdiction upon the Rent Controller, and provides the 
CAs 300,346,812,851/17 etc. 
-: 14 :-
landlord a right to apply for eviction of the tenant occupying the rented 
property on an invalid tenancy under the provisions of the Ordinance, 
2001. It does not affect either the clear provisions of Section 6 and/or 
the provisions of Section 17(2)(ii)(b) of the Ordinance, 2001.  
12. 
 
Thus, we conclude that as after expiration of the tenancy 
period, a tenant, though can continue to hold over the possession of 
the rented premises, but his tenancy is rendered invalid, in that, it has 
come to an end and if there is no express consent of the landlord to 
extend the tenancy period the tenant shall be guilty of having infringed 
the conditions of tenancy, rendering him liable to be evicted under 
Section 17(2)(ii)(b) of the Ordinance, 2001 . In the light of the above, 
we do not find any merit in these appeals, which are hereby dismissed. 
No orders as to the costs.  
 
 
CHIEF JUSTICE 
 
 
 
 
JUDGE 
 
 
 
 
JUDGE 
Announced in open Court 
on 21.12.2017 at Lahore 
Approved For Reporting 
Mudassar/