IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN 
(Appellate Jurisdiction) 
 
 
PRESENT: 
Mr. Justice Umar Ata Bandial 
Mr. Justice Faisal Arab 
Mr. Justice Qazi Muhammad Amin Ahmed 
 
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1400 OF 2019  
(Against the judgment 31.5.2019 passed by High 
Court of Sindh at Karachi in C.P. No.493-D of 2018) 
 
Umaid Ali 
  
 
…Appellant(s) 
 
 
 
 
 
Versus 
 
The Election Commission of Pakistan  
through Secretary Election Commission 
of Pakistan Islamabad & others 
…Respondent(s) 
 
 
For the Appellant(s): 
Mr. Zulfiqar Khalid Maluka, ASC 
 
For Respondent No.5: 
Afnan Karim Kundi, ASC 
 
For Government of Sindh: 
Syed Shabbir Shah, Addl. A.G. 
Sindh 
 
Date of hearing: 
11.03.2020 
 
ORDER 
 
 
 
Umar Ata Bandial, J.  The learned High Court 
through the impugned judgment dated 31.05.2019 has upheld the 
findings of the learned Election Commission of Pakistan (“ECP”) 
vide its order dated 16.01.2018, which held as follows: 
“In the light of above discussion, we are 
of the considered view that respondent 
violated 
the 
provisions 
of 
Section 
36(1)(i)(j) and section 80(2) of the Sindh 
Local Government Act, 2013 and Article 
63(1)(l) of the Constitution. It is proved 
though the documentary evidence that 
respondent was a Government contractor 
(owner of Dhatti one Transport Company 
 Civil Appeal No.1400 of 2019 
2
Umerkot) and received a huge amount of 
Rs.40,27,450/- from Government. Being 
a Government Contractor the respondent 
was not eligible to file nomination papers 
or take part in the Local Government 
Election held in 2015 for the seat of 
Member, Town Committee, Kheme Jo Par 
and thereafter for the seat of Chairman of 
the said Town Committee. The petition is 
accepted.” 
 
2. 
 
Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that 
the disqualification of the appellant is confined to Section 36(1)(i) 
of the Sindh Local Government Act, 2013 (“the Act”), which reads 
as follows: 
S36(1) “A person shall be disqualified from 
being elected or chosen as and from being a 
member of the Council, if- 
(i) he is under contract for work to be 
done or goods to be supplied to a 
council or has otherwise any direct 
pecuniary interest in its affairs.” 
 
Admittedly, the appellant is a Government Contractor but he is not 
a Contractor with any Council nor does he have any direct 
pecuniary interest in the affairs of such Council. Consequently, it 
is submitted that the appellant has been wrongly disqualified for 
holding the elected office of the Chairman, Town Committee, 
Kheme Jo Par, District Tharparkar Sindh. The learned counsel for 
the appellant has then urged that the ECP is the original forum for 
directing removal of a member of a Council under Section 36(2) of 
the Act. No appeal is provided against such decision of the ECP. 
On the other hand, the ECP is the appellate forum under Section 
30 of the Act against a similar direction for removal of a member of 
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3
the Council by the Provincial Government under Section 25 of the 
Act. There is a duality of roles of the ECP in respect of the same 
relief which can lead to a conflict.  
3.  
 
Learned counsel for the respondents submit that the 
impugned order of the ECP dated 16.01.2018 not only disqualifies 
the appellant under clause (i) of Section 36(1) of the Act but also 
on the basis of clause (j) of the said section. The language of that 
clause is reproduced below: 
(j) “he is for the time being disqualified or 
chosen as a member of the Provincial 
Assembly under any law for the time being 
in force.” 
 
His submission is that clause (j) ibid is a residuary or blanket 
provision that incorporates additional disqualifications in Article 
63(1) of the Constitution. Consequently, the admitted status of the 
appellant as a Government Contractor attracts the sanction under 
Article 63(1)(l) of the Constitution which disqualifies a candidate 
who is a Government Contractor. It applies fully to the appellant 
and therefore he is disqualified in the present election. 
4.  
 
After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, it 
transpires that since the appellant is a Government Contractor the 
disqualification under section 36(1)(i) ibid does not apply to the 
appellant because the disability thereunder extends to a contractor 
of a local Council. Accordingly, the only issue in controversy 
between the parties is whether the appellant is disqualified under 
clause (j) of Section 36(1) of the Act because that would attract 
clause (l) of Article 63(1) of the Constitution.  The language of 
clause (j) ibid leaves much to be desired because it is not clear how 
“disqualified or chosen as a member of the Provincial Assembly” 
makes any sense. If as suggested by the learned counsel for the 
 Civil Appeal No.1400 of 2019 
4
respondents, the words ‘or chosen’ are to be ignored to arrive at 
the intended meaning then that amounts to ignoring the literal 
words and to reading down in order to ascertain the meaning of 
the statutory provision. On the other hand, if the words “from 
being elected” are read into the said provision after the word 
“disqualified” then such reading in is also avoided by the courts 
unless the intention of the law maker is clear. To ascertain the 
intention of the law maker if one looks at the other provisions of 
section 36(1) ibid, it is noticeable that these reproduce almost 
verbatim clauses (a), (b), (c) & (d) of Article 63(1) of the 
Constitution. Clause (c) of the Act, that reproduced clause (c) of 
Article 63(1) of the Constitution, was subsequently repealed on 
27.08.2015. Clauses (f) & (g) of section 36(1) ibid correspond with 
the terms of clauses (h) & (g) of Article 63(1) of the Constitution but 
with the reduction of the period of disqualification. Clause (h) of 
section 36(1) ibid mirrors the provisions of clauses (i) & (j) of Article 
63(1) of the Constitution. In the same manner clause (i) of section 
36(1) ibid adopts the disqualification listed in clause (l) of Article 
63(1) of the Constitution. The scope of the disqualifications under 
Article 63(1) have been modified in the Act to cater to the 
requirements of elected representatives of local Councils. In the 
above context, the modifications of the disqualifications contained 
in Article 63(1) of the Constitution for incorporation into the Act 
have made the Provincial Legislature’s intention clear about the 
nature and extent of disability of candidates for election to a 
Council under the Act. 
The statedly general or blanket 
disqualification incorporated through clause (j) of Section 36(1) of 
the Act, therefore, cannot again import the disqualifications under 
 Civil Appeal No.1400 of 2019 
5
Article 63(1) of the Constitution that have already been 
incorporated with modification in clauses (a) to (d), (f), (g), (h) & (i) 
of section 36(1) of the Act. Otherwise, clause (j) of section 36(1) ibid 
would either be repeating the incorporated disqualifications from 
Article 63(1) of the Constitution or undoing the modifications made 
thereto in section 36(1) of the Act. Although clause (j) of Section 
36(1) ibid is unclear and vague, we are not convinced that clause 
(j) of the Act intends to repeat what is already stated in clauses (a) 
to (i) of section 36(1) of the Act.  Accordingly, the rule of reading in 
or reading down is not attracted to the facts of this case. The 
application of such an aid while interpreting or construing a 
statutory provision has been dealt with in the case reported as 
Abdul Haq Khan & others vs. Haji Ameerzada & others (PLD 
2017 SC 105, at page 117): 
“As a matter of statutory interpretation, 
Courts generally abstain from providing 
casus omissus or omissions in a statute, 
through construction or interpretation. 
An exception to this rule is, when there 
is a self-evident omission in a provision 
and the purpose of the law as intended 
by the legislature cannot otherwise be 
achieved, or if the literal construction of 
a particular provision leads to manifestly 
absurd or anomalous results, which 
could not have been intended by the 
legislature. However, this power is to be 
exercised cautiously, rarely and only in 
exceptional circumstances.”  
 
Following the above dictum, we are of the view that the Court 
cannot come to the assistance of the respondents to construe 
 Civil Appeal No.1400 of 2019 
6
clause (j) of Section 36(1) of the Act to bear a meaning which is not 
apparent or clear from the words thereof. Nor is the need for the 
suggested attribution of a blanket disqualification in clause (j) of 
section 36(1) ibid evident from the intention of the law maker. This 
is because clauses (a) to (i) of Section 36(1) of the Act mirror the 
disqualifications contained in Article 63 of the Constitution. At 
best, clause (j) of Section 36(1) of the Act may encompass such 
other disqualifications in Article 63(1) of the Constitution that have 
not already been incorporated in Section 36(1) of the Act. In this 
behalf, clauses (n) & (o) of Article 63(1) of the Constitution dealing 
with willful default may be covered in clause (j) of Section 36(1) of 
the Act. However, this aspect is not germane to the present 
controversy and may be considered in some other appropriate 
case. Consequently, we are not inclined to agree with the 
impugned judgment that the appellant is disqualified under clause 
(j) of section 36(1) of the Act for admittedly being a Government 
Contractor. The relevant disqualification is section 36(1)(i) which 
disbars only a contractor of the Council and not a contractor of the 
Government. As a result, findings recorded in the impugned 
judgment of the ECP dated 16.01.2018 and affirmed by the learned 
High Court in its impugned judgment dated 31.05.2019 are in 
error. This appeal is, therefore, allowed. 
5. 
 
The Provincial Government is also directed to re-
examine and amend the language of Section 36(1)(j) of the Act as 
necessary to bring it in conformity with the intention of the 
legislature. 
 
Judge 
 
 Civil Appeal No.1400 of 2019 
7
 
 
Judge 
 
 
Judge 
Islamabad, the 
11th March, 2020 
Meher + Ghulam Raza  
 
APPROVED FOR REPORTING.