IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN 
(Appellate Jurisdiction) 
 
 
Present: 
MR. JUSTICE MUSHIR ALAM 
MR. JUSTICE MANZOOR AHMAD MALIK  
 
 
Civil Appeal No.1519 of 2013 
Against order dated 20.6.2013 of Lahore 
High Court, Lahore, passed in Writ Petition 
No.11584 of 2013. 
 
Haroon-ur-Rashid 
 
 
  
 
 
Appellant(s) 
VERSUS 
Lahore Development Authority, etc.  
 
 
Respondent(s) 
 
For the Appellant(s) 
: 
Mr. Mehboob Azhar Sheikh, ASC 
 
 
 
 
 
  
For the Respondent(s) : 
Mr. Khurram Raza Ch, ASC 
 
 
 
 
 
Rana Umar Saeed Dy. Dir (SFP) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Date of Hearing  
: 
26.02.2016  
 
JUDGMENT 
 
 
 
Mushir Alam, J-. This appeal by leave of the Court is 
directed against order dated 20.6.2013 of Lahore High Court, 
Lahore, whereby Writ Petition No.11584 of 2013 filed by the 
appellant challenging the order of his compulsory retirement 
was dismissed. 
 
2. 
 
Facts, in brief, are that the appellant holding the 
charge of Deputy Director (Revenue), a Grade-18 post in 
Lahore Development Authority (LDA) was suspended from 
service and issued a show cause notice dated 02.7.2012 under 
Section 7(b) read with Section 5(1) (a) of the Punjab 
Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006 
(PEEDA, 2006) for having committed irregularities detailed 
therein. Show cause notice was contested and after hearing, 
major penalty of compulsory retirement from service was 
inflected 
on 
the 
appellant 
by 
the 
Director 
General/Competent Authority of the LDA vide order dated 
Civil Appeal No.1519 of 2013 
 
2
3.8.2012. 
Departmental 
appeal 
was 
dismissed 
by 
the 
Chairman, LDA on 23.4.2013, which was challenged through 
Writ Petition No.11584 of 2013. The learned High Court 
dismissed the petition inter alia holding that:- 
“Learned counsel for the petitioner has admitted 
before this Court that there are no statutory rules 
of service and on the basis of malafide on the part 
of respondents he has filed this constitutional 
petition. I am afraid when there are no statutory 
rules of service and rule of master and servant is 
applicable, therefore, in the light of case law 
referred by learned counsel for the respondents 
i.e. Lahore Development Authority and others 
Versus Abdul Shafiq and others” (1992 PLC 1214) 
as well as an unreported judgment of this Court 
passed in Writ Petition No.11926 of 2011 titled 
“Masood Ahmad Qazi Vs. L.D.A etc” decided on 
18.1.2012, this writ petition is not maintainable. 
Even if it is presumed that there was some malice 
or malafide on the part of respondents, simply 
saying so is nothing until and unless it is proved 
through cogent evidence. The petitioner, if so 
advised, can file a suit for damages, if he has 
wrongly been dismissed from the service. In this 
view of the matter, this petition being not 
maintainable stands dismissed.” 
 
3. 
  
Mr. 
Mehboob 
Azhar 
Sheikh, 
learned 
ASC 
appearing for the appellant contends that the appellant was 
not proceeded under the Lahore Development Authority 
Service Regulations, 1978 (LDA Regulations, 1978) which 
admittedly are non statutory. He was proceeded under the 
PEEDA, which is a statutory enactment and any violation 
thereof or action taken there under is amenable to writ 
jurisdiction and in support of his contention he has placed 
reliance on the case of Muhammad Amin vs. Government of 
Punjab (2015 SCMR 706) wherein it has been held that 
employees of statutory authority who fall within the ambit of 
employee covered under section 2(h) (i) of the PEEDA, 2006 
and are not civil servants, for redressal of  their grievances 
arising out of disciplinary proceedings under PEEDA, 2006 may 
invoke jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the 
Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. 
 
4. 
 
Mr. Khurram Raza Chaudhry, learned ASC for the 
respondents-LDA has defended the impugned order. He 
Civil Appeal No.1519 of 2013 
 
3
contends that though the LDA is created under the Lahore 
Development Authority Act, 1975 (LDA Act, 1975) but services 
of employees of the LDA are governed under the LDA 
Regulations, 1978 framed under Section 45 of LDA Act, 1975 
which are non-statutory as held in the cases reported as 
Muhammad Saeed Ahmed Khan and 2 others vs. Secretary to 
Government of the Punjab, Housing  and Physical Planning 
Department and 3 others (PLD 1983 Lahore 206) and Javaid 
Iqbal vs. Azad Government of the State of Jammu and 
Kashmir and 2 others (1992 PLC 1214). According to learned 
counsel, this Court, in a number of cases, including the ones 
reported as Zeba Mumtaz v. First Women Bank Ltd (PLD 1999 
Supreme Court 1106); PIA Corporation v. Suleman Alam Rizvi 
(2015 SCMR 1545); Abdul Wahab v. HBL (2013 SCMR 1383); 
Pakistan Defence Officers’ Housing Authority v. Jawaid Ahmed 
(2013 SCMR 1707); Nazir Gillani v. Pakistan Red Crescent 
Society (2014 SCMR 982); and Pakistan International Airline 
Corporation and others v. Tanweer-ur-Rehman and others (PLD 
2010 
Supreme 
Court 
676), has 
consistently held that 
relationship between a statutory corporation or authority and 
its employees is that of a ‘master and servant’ and no writ 
would be maintainable against the disciplinary proceedings 
taken under non-statutory rules of service. He also contends 
that since after the case reported as Muhammad Mubeen-us-
Salam v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2006 Supreme Court 172), 
employees of the LDA, not being Civil servant, cannot invoke 
jurisdiction of Service Tribunal either, only remedy if any lies by 
way of suit before the civil court. According to learned 
counsel, no interference in the rightful exercise of jurisdiction 
by the High Court in declining to interfere in the departmental 
matter is called for. 
 
5. 
 
Heard the arguments and perused the record. 
There is no cavil to the factual matrix of the case that the LDA 
created under the LDA Act, 1975 is a statutory authority and 
disciplinary matters and proceedings against its employees, 
Civil Appeal No.1519 of 2013 
 
4
admittedly were governed under the LDA Regulations, 1978 
framed under Section 45 of the LDA Act, 1975. However, 
pursuant to the promulgation of Punjab Removal from Service 
(Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000 (RSO, 2000), enacted on 
18.09.2000, the employees both in the service of Government 
of 
Punjab 
and 
or 
in 
service 
of 
statutory 
corporation/authority/body for the purpose of disciplinary 
matters and proceedings were brought within the regime of 
RSO, 2000 which was succeeded by Punjab Employees 
Efficiency, Discipline Act, 2006 (PEEDA, 2006), promulgated on 
17th October, 2006. Section 2(h) of PEEDA, 2006 recognizes two 
sets of employees; one in the government service or those 
who are members of a civil service of the Province or who hold 
civil post in connection with affairs of the Province and 
another set of persons in the employment of corporation, 
corporate body, autonomous body, authority, statutory body 
or any other organization or institution set up, established, 
owned, managed or controlled by the Government by or 
under any law for the time being in force or a body or 
organization in which the Government of Punjab has a 
controlling share or interest and also includes the Chairman 
and the Chief Executive and the holder of any other office 
therein. Thus it could be seen that irrespective whether a 
person is in the Government service or a member of a civil 
service (per section 2(h)(ii) of PEEDA) or is in employment of 
corporation or corporate or statutory body (per section 2(h)(i) 
of PEEDA) could be proceeded departmentally in disciplinary 
matter under the uniform statutory disciplinary dispensation. 
Any proceedings taken, penalty imposed in terms of PEEDA, 
2006 could be agitated before the departmental hierarchy by 
way of appeal, review and or revision before the competent 
authority detailed therein. 
 
6. 
 
We have come across case of Muhammad 
Masood v. Market Committee (2014 PLC (CS) 1080), where an 
employee of Market Committee, invoked the writ jurisdiction 
Civil Appeal No.1519 of 2013 
 
5
of the High Court against the action taken under the PEEDA, 
2006. Constitution Petition and so also the review Petition were 
dismissed holding that the Petitioner was a Civil Servant; his 
remedy lies under Section 19 of the PEEDA, 2006 before the 
Punjab Service Tribunal.  
 
7. 
 
It may be observed that pursuant to dicta laid 
down in the case of Muhammad Mubeen-us-Salam (PLD 2006 
SC 602) an employee of an authority or statutory corporation 
cannot be conferred a status of a civil servant or in service of 
the Province or a post in connection with the affairs of the 
Province under Article 240, thus not amenable to the 
jurisdiction of Services Tribunal constituted under Article 
212(1)(a) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 
1973. In this view of the matter, in the case of Muhammad 
Dawood v. Federation of Pakistan (2007 PLS (CS) 1046), a 
larger (three members) Bench of Sindh High Court, declared 
Section 10 of the of the RSO, 2000 conferring appellate 
jurisdiction on the Service Tribunal, in respect of matter arising 
out of disciplinary proceedings under RSO, 2000 as ultra vires of 
Article 212 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 
1973. Remedy of appeal against the final order passes under 
Section 16 or Section 17 of PEEDA, 2006 has been extended to 
“any employee” aggrieved” or “affected employee” before 
the Punjab Service Tribunal; extending the analogy of 
Muhammad Dawood case (2007 PLC (CS) 1046), provisions of 
Section 19 of PEEDA, 2006 (which is contemporaneous to 
Section 10 of RSO, 2000) would be ultra vires. It is settled 
position in law that while interpreting the law or any provision 
of any statute all efforts are made by the Court to save the 
statute by applying various tools of interpretation one of the 
rule of harmonious construction being rule of reading down 
and rule of severance. Rule of reading down, a statutory 
provision means that a statutory provision is generally read 
and or toned or narrowed down, applying restrictive meaning 
in its application. Rule of severance means to trim down or 
Civil Appeal No.1519 of 2013 
 
6
slice away invalid portion which is otherwise generally 
considered to be part of statute or provision, purpose is to 
save as much as to bring the statute or provision within the 
ambit of constitution and law as declared by the superior 
Courts and to protect it from being declared ultra-vires or 
unconstitutional as a whole. If such trimming or slicing away is 
possible then the Court declare such part to be beyond the 
legislative competence and leave the reminder valid and 
operative. In the case of Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C 
Mazdoor Congress (AIR 1991 SC 101=1990 SCR Supl. (1) 142), 
Indian Supreme Court cited with approval the meaning and 
scope of the word 'reading down' and 'Severance' dealt with 
on page 7, para B in Australian Federal Constitutional Law by 
Colin Haward, which reads as follows: 
“The High court presumes the validity of legislation 
to the extent that it will not of its own motion raise 
questions of constitutionality. Legislation is treated 
as valid unless the parties to litigation challenge it 
on constitutional grounds. The techniques of 
construction 
known 
as 
reading 
down 
and 
severance are corollaries of this presumption. 
Reading down puts into operation the principle 
that so far as it is reasonably possible to do so, 
legislation should be construed as being within 
power. It has the practical effect that where an Act 
is expressed in language of a generality which 
makes it capable, if read literally, of applying to 
matters beyond the relevant legislative power, the 
court will construe it in a more limited sense as keep 
it within power” 
 
And Further: 
 
“It does not necessarily follow that because a 
statute cannot be read down, it is wholly invalid. 
The presumption of validity leads naturally to the 
view that where a statute cannot be held wholly 
valid it should be held valid at least to the extent 
that it is reasonably possible or practicable to do 
so. Where reading down is not available the court 
next decides where there is a case for severing the 
invalid parts of the statute from the parts which, 
standing alone, are valid. If this can be done the 
court declares only the invalid parts of the statute 
from the parts which, standing alone, are valid to 
be beyond power and leaves the remainder 
operative” 
 
8. 
 
In the case of Province of Sindh through Chief 
Secretary 
v. 
M.Q.M. 
through 
Deputy 
Convener 
(PLD 
Civil Appeal No.1519 of 2013 
 
7
2014  SC 531), it was held by this Court that at the time of 
“reading down” of a statute two principles had to be kept in 
view; first that the object of “reading down”  was primarily to 
save the statute and in doing so the paramount question 
would be whether in the event of reading down; could the 
statute remain functional; second would the legislature have 
enacted the law if that issue had been brought to its notice 
which was being agitated before the Court. In this view of the 
matter, Courts have a duty to construe and apply laws to 
specific fact situations. Sometimes they have to construe a 
particular law as meaning nothing and sometimes they have 
to construe the law as meaning something different from the 
letter of the law passed by the Parliament. The offending 
provision or part of it is read down to the extent it is necessary 
to give it legal effect, or will be severed if it cannot be read 
down, and the remaining part and provisions of the statute will 
remain in tact. Section 19 of the PEEDA, 2006 as it reads, 
encompasses remedy before the Punjab Service Tribunal to 
both the employees of statutory corporation/ body/authority 
covered under Section 2(h)(i) and so also to the civil servants 
falling under section 2(h)(ii) ibid. As discussed above, it is only 
the civil servants by virtue of Article 240 read with Section 260 
of the Constitution, who are amenable to the jurisdiction of 
Services Tribunal constituted under Article 212(1)(a) of the 
Constitution of Pakistan, 1973. This is what was held by this 
Court in Mubeen us Salam Case (PLD 2006 SC 602) supra while 
interpreting deeming provision of section “2-A” of the Service 
Tribunal Act, 1973, whereby employees of governmental 
controlled corporation etc. were treated as civil servants and 
given access to the Service Tribunal for the redressal of their 
grievance arising out of disciplinary proceedings.  Section 2-A 
ibid was declared ultra-vires and it was further held that the 
Service Tribunal is established in pursuance of Article 212 of the 
Constitution and has been conferred exclusive jurisdiction only 
in respect of disputes relating to terms and conditions of civil 
Civil Appeal No.1519 of 2013 
 
8
servant under the Civil Servants Act, 1973 and such jurisdiction 
could not be extended to any other category. In this view of 
the matter, harmonious construction dictated by rule of 
reading down and rule of severance provisions of Section 19 
of PEEDA, 2006 was examined which reads as follows; 
“19. Appeal before Punjab Service Tribunal.- (1) 
Notwithstanding anything contained in any other 
law for the time being in force, any employee 
aggrieved by any final order passed under Section 
16 or 17 may, within thirty days from the date of 
communication of the order, prefer an appeal to 
the Punjab Service Tribunal established under the 
Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974 (Punjab Act, IX of 
1974). 
 
(2) If a decision on a departmental appeal or 
review petition, as the case may be, filed under 
section 16 is not received within a period of sixty 
days of filing thereof, the affected employee may 
file an appeal in the Punjab Service Tribunal within 
a period of thirty days of the expiry of the aforesaid 
period, whereafter, the authority with whom the 
departmental appeal or review is pending, shall not 
take any further action. (underlined to add 
emphasis)” 
 
9. 
 
In view of the discussion made above, instead of 
interpreting and or giving literal meaning to the term 
“employee aggrieved” as used in subsection (1) and the 
“affected employee” as used in sub section (2) of Section 19 
of PEEDA, such terms are to be harmoniously interpreted to 
save the provision from casualty of striking it down. Such terms 
are to be read down and given restrictive and toned down 
meaning and employing ‘rule of severance’ to be understood 
as those employees falling under the category of employee 
within the contemplation of section 2 (h)(ii) of PEEDA only; thus 
while 
construing 
phrases 
“employee 
aggrieved” 
and 
“affected employee” respectively used in Section 19 of 
PEEDA, 2006 as reproduced above, category of employees of 
statutory corporation etc. per section 2(h)(i) ibid,  are to be 
severed and sliced away for the purposes of extending 
remedy before the Service Tribunal, it is only than provisions of 
Section 19 ibid could be saved from being struck down as ultra 
vires of the Constitution and law as declared by this Court and 
Civil Appeal No.1519 of 2013 
 
9
noted above. Thus the remedy of appeal before the Punjab 
Service Tribunal against any order passed under Sections 16 & 
17 of the PEEDA, 2006 could only be invoked and availed by 
the employees falling within the ambit of Section 2(h)(ii) of 
section 19 ibid; before the Punjab Service Tribunal and not by 
employees of statutory corporation etc. falling under section 
2(h)(i) of PEEDA, 2006.  
 
10. 
 
It may be observed that employees of a statutory 
corporation etc. were deprived of their right of appeal before 
the Service Tribunal (extended under Section 2-A of Service 
Tribunals Act, 1973 since declared ultra vires) pursuant to 
judgment rendered in the case of Muhammad Mubeen-us-
Salam vs. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2006 Supreme Court 602) 
and 
in 
case 
of 
Muhammad Idrees 
 
vs. 
Agricultural 
Development Bank of Pakistan and others (PLD 2007 Supreme 
Court 681) this Court found  a way out  for the employees of 
statutory Corporation/ Authorities/ bodies etc. who were 
proceeded under the Removal from Service (Special Powers) 
Ordinance, 2000 to invoke jurisdiction under Article 199 of the 
Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. 
 
11. 
 
Plethora of the cases relied upon by learned 
counsel for the respondent all emanates in respect of the 
employees 
of 
statutory 
corporations 
and 
or 
authority 
governed under the non statutory rules who invoked the 
jurisdiction either of the Service Tribunal under section 10 of the 
repealed RSO, 2000 or under Article 199 of the Constitution of 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 invariably in all the cases this 
Court also considered whether the relationship between the 
employer and employee is governed under any statutory rules 
or not, for the purposes of determining forum for the redressal 
of grievance. There appeared some anomaly in some of the 
cases noted above as the implication of statutory intervention 
in disciplinary matter under RSO, 2000 was neither raised nor 
examined by this court, which anomaly was attended to in the 
Civil Appeal No.1519 of 2013 
 
10
subsequent case reported as of Pakistan International Airline 
Corporation and others vs. Tanweer-ur-Rehman and others 
(PLD 2010 Supreme Court 676) in para 19 at page 689 thereof 
it was held by this Court as under:- 
“However, this question needs no further discussion 
in view of the fact that we are not of the opinion 
that if a corporation is discharging its functions in 
connection with the affairs of the Federation, the 
aggrieved persons can approach the High Court 
by 
invoking 
its 
constitutional 
jurisdiction, 
as 
observed hereinabove. But as far as the cases of 
the 
employees, 
regarding 
their 
individual 
grievances, are concerned, they are to be 
decided on their own merits namely that if any 
adverse action has been taken by the employer in 
violation of the statutory rules, only then such action 
should be amenable to the writ jurisdiction. 
However, if such action has no backing of the 
statutory rules, then the principle of Master and 
Servant would be applicable and such employees 
have to seek remedy permissible before the Court 
of competent jurisdiction.”       
 
 
12. 
 
In a recent pronouncement of this Court in the 
case of Pakistan Defence Housing Authority vs. Javed Ahmed 
(2013 SCMR 1707) anomaly prevailing as to availability of 
remedy 
to 
the 
employees 
of 
statutory 
corporation/authority/body was authoritatively resolved and 
clarified by a larger bench of  five Members of this Court, 
wherein employees of Defence Officers Housing Authorities, 
PIA, Pakistan Steel Mills, N.E.D, University of Engineering and 
Technology, Pakistan State Oil and SME Bank were heard 
together and in all the cases cited by the learned counsel for 
the respondents-LDA, were also considered in paragraph 57 
thereof at page 1746 and para 60 at page 1748, which read 
as under:- 
“57. The right of appeal is a substantive right. The 
respondents were deprived of the said right not by 
an legislative amendment but by a judicial opinion 
and that too on the analogy of the law laid down in 
Mubeen us Islam’s case (PLD 2006 SC 602) and 
Muhammad Idrees’s case (PLD 2007 SC 681). In both 
these cases, the effect of the Ordinance 2000 and 
that it was a statutory intervention was not a moot 
point. It is well established that an appeal is 
continuation of trial. Would it be a fair trial if an 
accused is shorn off his right of appeal? Would the 
deprivation of right of appeal not amount to judicial 
sanctification of all the orders passed by the 
Civil Appeal No.1519 of 2013 
 
11
departmental authorities awarding various penalties 
to the employees and would it not be violative of 
the fundamental right to a “fair trial and due 
process” 
as 
ordained 
in 
Article 10A of 
the 
Constitution? Could the respondent-employees not 
invoke Article 199 of the Constitution to seek due 
compliance of the Ordinance 2000 for ensuring fair 
trial and due process? If the constitutional scheme 
and the purpose of law are kept in view, the answer 
to all these queries has to be in the affirmative and 
the constitutional petitions filed by the respondents 
seeking enforcement of their said right would be 
maintainable. 
 
60. It was not disputed before this Court by 
appellants  learned counsel that the respondent-
employees were “persons in corporation service” 
within the meaning of section 2(c) of the Ordinance 
2000 and except  in the case of N.E.D. University, 
they were proceeded against under the said law. 
This was a ‘statutory intervention and the employees 
had to be dealt with under the said law. Their 
disciplinary matters 
were 
being 
regulated 
by 
something higher than statutory rules i.e. the law i.e. 
Ordinance, 2000. Their right of appeal (under section 
10) had been held to be ultra vires of the 
Constitution by this Court as they did not fall within 
the ambit of the Civil Servants Act, 1973, [(in Mubeen 
us Salam’s case (PLD 2006 SC 602) and Muhammad 
Idrees’s case (PLD 2007 SC 681)]. They could in these 
circumstances 
invoke 
constitutional 
jurisdiction 
under Article 199 of the Constitution to seek 
enforcement of their right guaranteed under Article 
4 of the Constitution which inter alia mandates that 
every citizen shall be dealt with in accordance with 
law. The judgment of this Court in Civil Aviation 
Authority (2009 SCMR 956) supra is more in 
consonance with the law laid down by this Court 
and the principles deduced there from as given in 
para 50 above.”          
 
13. 
 
Thus, it could be seen that anomaly as to 
availability of forum for the aggrieved or affected  employees 
of 
statutory 
corporation/authority/body 
against 
whom 
disciplinary proceedings are initiated and or any penalty is 
inflicted under statutory dispensation has been removed. In 
the 
case 
where 
the 
employees 
of 
statutory 
corporation/authority/body 
are 
proceeded 
under 
the 
statutory rules or any statutory dispensation like RSO, 2000 or 
PEEDA, 2006 etc action of the competent authority could be 
challenged under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan of 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973.  
Civil Appeal No.1519 of 2013 
 
12
14. 
 
Above rule was retreated with reference to action 
taken against an employee of a statutory authority falling 
within the category of employee falling under Section 2 (h)(i) 
of PEEDA, 2006 in the case of Muhammad Amin and another 
vs. Government of Punjab and others (2015 SCMR 706= PLC 
(CS) 1082)),  wherein employee of Market Committee Sialkot, 
having no statutory rules, challenged action taken under 
PEEDA, 2006 in writ jurisdiction, was denied relief on the 
premise that he being Civil Servant, his remedy does not lie 
under Article 199 of the Constitution, this Court set aside the 
judgment and in paragraph 7  at page 709 it was observed as 
follow:- 
“Section 19 of the Act of 2006 which has been 
made applicable by virtue of Section 2(h)(i) of the 
Act of 2006 read with Section 35 of the Ordinance, 
regulates the services of the petitioners. Section 19 
of the Act of 2006 which appear to have been 
amended subsequently clearly draws a line 
between the Civil Servants and the employees 
defined under section 2(h)(i) of the Act of 2006. The 
Civil Servants who are proceeded against under 
the provisions of the Act of 2006 have to approach 
the Punjab Services Tribunal against a final order 
passed by the Departmental Authorities. The other 
employees who are covered under Section 2(h)(i) 
of the Act of 2006, if aggri4eved by a final order 
passed by the Departmental Authorities under 
Section 16 or 17 of the Act of 2006 can seek 
redressal of their grievances before the High 
Court.” 
 
15. 
 
In view of the foregoing discussion, the judgment 
rendered in the case of Muhammad Masood v. Market 
Committee (2014 PLC (CS) 1080), does not lay down the 
correct law and so also impugned judgment is not sustainable.  
It is abundantly clear that the respondent is an employee of 
Lahore Development Authority, a statutory authority created 
under Section 4 of Lahore Development Authority Act, 1975, 
proceeded 
under 
PEEDA, 
2006, 
which 
is 
a 
statutory 
intervention in disciplinary matter, therefore, irrespective of the 
fact that the rules framed under Section 45 of the Lahore 
Development Authority Act, 1975 are non statutory yet the 
respondents were not proceeded under the Rules,1978 but 
under the  PEEDA, 2006 which is a statutory enactment and 
Civil Appeal No.1519 of 2013 
 
13
even a level up of the statutory rules. Therefore, High Court has 
jurisdiction to examine the proprietary of the impugned action 
taken against the respondents under the PEEDA, 2006.  
 
16. 
 
Accordingly, the impugned order is set aside and 
the appeal is allowed. Writ Petition No.11584 of 2013 is 
remanded to the learned Lahore High Court for decision on 
merits as expeditiously as possible.                
Judge 
 
 
Judge 
 
 
 
Announced by me in open Court  
on ________ at Islamabad.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judge 
 
 
Approved for Reporting 
arshed/*