IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN 
(Appellate Jurisdiction) 
 
 
PRESENT: 
Mr. Justice Asif Saeed Khan Khosa 
Mr. Justice Mushir Alam  
Mr. Justice Dost Muhammad Khan 
 
 
Criminal Appeals No. 210 and 211 of 2015 
(Against the judgment dated 09.03.2015 passed by the Islamabad High Court, 
Islamabad in Criminal Appeal No. 90 of 2011 and Capital Sentence Reference 
No. 01 of 2011) 
 
 
Malik Muhammad Mumtaz Qadri   (in Criminal Appeal No. 210 of 2015) 
 
The State                                       (in Criminal Appeal No. 211 of 2015) 
       
… Appellants                       
versus 
 
The State, etc.                                   (in Criminal Appeal No. 210 of 2015) 
 
Malik Muhammad Mumtaz Qadri   (in Criminal Appeal No. 211 of 2015) 
 
 
 
 
                          
… Respondents 
 
 
For the appellants: 
Mian Nazir Akhtar, ASC 
Khawaja Muhammad Sharif, ASC 
Mr. Ghulam Mustafa, ASC 
(in Criminal Appeal No. 210 of 2015) 
 
Mian Abdul Rauf, Advocate-General, 
Islamabad  
(in Criminal Appeal No. 211 of 2015) 
 
 
For the respondents: 
Mian Abdul Rauf, Advocate-General, 
Islamabad  
(in Criminal Appeal No. 210 of 2015) 
 
Mian Nazir Akhtar, ASC 
Khawaja Muhammad Sharif, ASC 
Mr. Ghulam Mustafa, ASC 
(in Criminal Appeal No. 211 of 2015)  
 
Dates of hearing: 
05.10.2015, 06.10.2015 & 
07.10.2015 
 
 
Criminal Appeals No. 210 and 211 of 2015 
2
JUDGMENT 
 
Asif Saeed Khan Khosa, J.: Almighty Allah has ordained 
in the Holy Qur’an that upon receipt of a news or information the 
men of faith ought to ascertain correctness of such news or 
information before they may act upon the same and that harm 
may be avoided if such news or information is got investigated in 
the first place. The following verses of the Holy Qur’an are relevant 
in this regard: 
 
Surah Al-Hujurat: verse 6 
“O you who have faith! 
If a profligate [person] should bring you some news, verify it, lest 
you should visit [harm] on some people out of ignorance, and then 
become regretful for what you have done.” 
 
Surah An-Nisa: verse 94 
“O you who have faith! 
When you issue forth in the way of Allah, try to ascertain: do not 
say to someone who offers you peace, ‘you are not a believer’, 
seeking the transitory wares of the life of this world. Yet with Allah 
are plenteous gains. You too were such earlier, but Allah did you a 
favour. Therefore, do ascertain. Allah is indeed well aware of what 
you do.” 
 
Surah An-Nisa: verse 83 
“When a report of safety or alarm comes to them, they immediately 
broadcast it: but had they referred it to the Apostle or to those 
vested with authority among them, those of them who investigate 
would have ascertained it. And were it not for Allah’s grace upon 
you and His mercy, you would have surely followed Satan, [all] 
except a few.” 
 
In the following paragraphs of this judgment it shall be highlighted 
as to how the accused person in this case had acted on the basis of 
nothing but hearsay without getting his information ascertained, 
verified or investigated and, as Almighty Allah has warned, he has 
brought harm not only to another person but also to himself. 
Verily, such are the consequences when Almighty Allah’s warnings 
or commands are not heeded to. 
 
2. 
The facts of this case are quite simple and straightforward 
admitting of no ambiguity but the issues posed before us have 
been made to appear existential and of metaphysical proportions 
involving religious beliefs and philosophical reflections. With 
Criminal Appeals No. 210 and 211 of 2015 
3
respect and without prejudice to the strong religious and 
philosophical views expressed before us we must state at the 
outset that we, in terms of our calling and vocation and in accord 
with the oath of our office, are obligated to decide this case in 
accordance with the law of the land as it exists and not in 
accordance with what the law should be. There is no gainsaying 
that the provisions of Article 203G of the Constitution of the 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 categorically oust the 
jurisdiction of this Court in matters of interpretation of the 
Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Qur’an and the 
Sunnah of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) 
falling within the exclusive domain, power and jurisdiction of the 
Federal Shariat Court and the Shariat Appellate Bench of this 
Court with reference to an existing law and essentially this Court’s 
jurisdiction in such matters is limited to application of the 
principles where they are settled. Apart from that, by virtue of the 
provisions of Article 230 of the Constitution, it is one of the 
functions of the Council of Islamic Ideology to interpret the 
Injunctions of Islam with reference to an existing or proposed law 
and we would not like to usurp that function either.   
 
3. 
At about 04.15 PM on 04.01.2011 Mr. Salman Taseer, the 
then Governor of the Province of the Punjab, was returning home 
near Kohsar Market, Islamabad when Malik Muhammad Mumtaz 
Qadri appellant, serving in the Elite Force of the Punjab Police and 
performing the duties of an official guard of the Governor at that 
time, opened fire at Mr. Salman Taseer from his official weapon 
riddling his body with bullets and causing multiple injuries. The 
grievously injured Mr. Salman Taseer was immediately shifted to 
Polyclinic Hospital, Islamabad but upon arrival at the hospital he 
was declared dead. Soon after firing at Mr. Salman Taseer the 
appellant laid down his weapon and surrendered before the other 
official guards deputed on the Governor’s security who arrested 
him at the place of occurrence and secured the weapon of offence. 
Mr. Shehryar Taseer, a son of Mr. Salman Taseer deceased, 
reported the matter to the local police through an application at 
Criminal Appeals No. 210 and 211 of 2015 
4
05.10 PM on the same day whereafter formal FIR No. 06 was 
registered in that regard at Police Station Kohsar, Islamabad at 
05.25 PM during the same evening for offences under section 302, 
PPC read with section 109, PPC and section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism 
Act, 1997. 
 
4. 
After completion of the investigation a Challan was 
submitted before the Anti-Terrorism Court-II, Rawalpindi Division 
& Islamabad Capital Territory which framed a Charge against 
Malik Muhammad Mumtaz Qadri appellant in respect of an offence 
of qatl-e-amd punishable under section 7(a) of the Anti-Terrorism 
Act, 1997 read with sections 302 and 109, PPC to which the 
appellant responded as follows: 
 
“I have not committed murder of an apostate like Suleman Taseer 
(the then Governor Punjab) contrary to dictums of the Holy Quran 
and Sunnah.” 
 
During the trial the prosecution produced fourteen witnesses in 
support of its case against the appellant and also placed on the 
record some documentary evidence including a positive report of 
the Forensic Science Laboratory confirming matching of the crime-
empties with the firearm recovered from the appellant’s possession. 
Nadim Asif, ASI (PW11) and Muhammad Amer Khan, Inspector 
(PW12) furnished the ocular account of the incident and also 
deposed about arrest of the appellant at the spot and recovery of 
the weapon of offence from his custody. Dr. Muhammad Arshad, 
Surgeon (PW1) provided the medical evidence and Ch. Muhammad 
Ali, Assistant Commissioner City, Islamabad (PW9) proved the 
confessional statement made before him by Malik Muhammad 
Mumtaz Qadri appellant under section 164, Cr.P.C. Hakem Khan, 
Inspector (PW14), the investigating officer, stated about the various 
steps taken by him during the investigation of this case. The 
remaining evidence produced by the prosecution was more or less 
formal in nature. In his statement recorded under section 342, 
Cr.P.C. the appellant admitted killing Mr. Salman Taseer and in 
response to the question as to why he had been implicated in this 
Criminal Appeals No. 210 and 211 of 2015 
5
case and as to why the prosecution witnesses had deposed against 
him he stated as follows: 
 
“Salman Taseer, at relevant time, was acting as Governor of the 
Province of Punjab. He was a representative of the Federal 
Government of Pakistan. While holding the position of the 
Governor of a Province of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, he 
publically exposed himself as a sympathiser of condemned 
prisoner namely Mst. Aasia, who was sentenced to death by a 
Court of law for use of derogatory remarks about the Holy Prophet 
Mohammad (Peace Be Upon Him) and directly defiled the name of 
Holy Prophet Mohammad (Peace Be Upon Him). Needless to point 
out that the sentence awarded to the above lady was still holding 
field and the judgment passed by the trial Court, was yet to 
undergo judicial scrutiny in the Courts of appeal. However, 
Salman Taseer in a very derogatory manner on his visit to Jail at 
Lahore, arranged a “Darbar” for making himself available to 
receive only self arranged mercy petition of the condemned 
prisoner. It was not that simple, but Salman Taseer also in his 
interview published on 23.12.2010, in a very shameful manner 
called Blasphemy Law as “Black Law”. To criticize such law and to 
challenge it as it was man made law tantamount to directly 
defiling the sacred name of the Holy Prophet Mohammad (Peace 
Be Upon Him) and was an attempt to lower down this sacred 
provision of Law, which is in consonance with the dictates of 
Quran and Sunnah. In this connection the Daily Express tribune 
of 5.12.2010 (Portion highlighted Mark A to A) and the Daily 
Express (Urdu) dated 23.11.2010, marked B to B at page 8 and 
marked C to C at page 5 are worth mentioning. It is pointed out 
that the news items mentioned above were never denounced by 
Salman Taseer in his life time. This situation reveals that Salman 
Taseer himself was responsible for commission of an offence U/s 
295-C of P.P.C. punishable to death or life imprisonment. Inspite 
of that he was not dealt with in accordance with law, obviously he 
was the lieutenant of President Asif Ali Zardari and a bully of 
Americans. So nature had to take its own course and justice was 
done. It is a lesson for all the apostates, as finally they have to 
meet the same fate.  
 
 
I may put a question to the prosecution “If a Muslim due to 
“Sub-o-Shattim” and “Ertad” does not render himself liable to dual 
liability of being killed? The act which is embedded with both 
“Sub-o-Shattim” and “Ertad” touches the heights of gravity. Here 
prosecution has to show that due to Shatum one does not become 
“Murtad” (apostate) and that “Murtad” is not liable to be killed? 
This preposition would definitely settle fate of the case, one way or 
other. Personal life of Salman Taseer shows that right from early 
times he proved himself as an infidel. He married three times. His 
one wife was “Sikh” by religion. He arranged his so called marriage 
in a secret way with that lady in New Delhi in India. From that 
wedlock a son named Aatish Taseer was born. On attaining youth 
above Aatish adopted Journalism in London and once or twice 
traveled to Pakistan to see his father Aatish Taseer wrote a book 
titled “Stranger to History” and it was published by “Mc 
CLELLAND STEWART OF LONDON”. The author while describing 
his father Salman Taseer writes at page 21 & 22 of the Book 
Stranger to History (Book attached) 
 
 
“My father who drank scotch every evening, never fasted or 
prayed even ate pork and once said “It was only when I was in jail 
and all they gave me to read was Koran- and read it back to front 
several times – that I realized there was nothing in it for me”. 
Criminal Appeals No. 210 and 211 of 2015 
6
 
 
His lifestyle, faith and living with a lady of non Muslim 
faith, reflecting his act of living in constant state of Zinna under 
the pretext of marriage (not permissible in Islam) speak volume of 
his character and associated matters.  
 
 
On the faithful day, I being member of Elite Force I was 
deployed as one of the member of the Escort Guard of Salman 
Taseer, the Governor Punjab. In Koh-i-Sar Market, the Governor 
with another after having lunch in a restaurant walked to his 
vehicle. In adjoining mosque I went for urinating in the washroom 
and for making ablution. When I came out with my gun, I came 
across Salman Taseer. Then I had the occasion to address him, 
“your honour being the Governor had remarked about blasphemy 
law as black law, if so it was unbecoming of you” Upon this he 
suddenly shouted and said, “Not only that it is black law, but also 
it is my shit”. Being a Muslim I lost control and under grave and 
suddenly provocation, I pressed the trigger and he lay dead in 
front of me. I have no repentance and I did it for “Tahafuz-i-
Namoos-i-Rasool” 
Salman 
offered 
me 
grave 
and 
sudden 
provocation. I was justified to kill him kindly see my 
accompanying written statement U/s 265(F)(5) of Cr.P.C.” 
 
The appellant opted not to make a statement on oath under 
section 340(2), Cr.P.C. and did not produce any witness in his 
defence. He, however, submitted a written statement under section 
265-F(5), Cr.P.C. maintaining that he was “justified” in killing Mr. 
Salman Taseer and also placed on the record some newspaper 
reports. 
 
5. 
After recording the evidence and attending to the final 
arguments of the learned counsel for the parties the learned 
Judge, Special Court-II, Anti-Terrorism, Rawalpindi Division & 
Islamabad Capital Territory convicted Malik Muhammad Mumtaz 
Qadri appellant for an offence under section 302(b), PPC vide 
judgment dated 01.10.2011 and sentenced him to death and to 
pay a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- to the heirs of the deceased by way of 
compensation under section 544-A, Cr.P.C. or in default of 
payment thereof to undergo simple imprisonment for six months. 
Through the same judgment the trial court also convicted the 
appellant for an offence under section 7(a) of the Anti-Terrorism 
Act, 1997 and sentenced him to death and to pay a fine of Rs. 
1,00,000/- or in default of payment thereof to undergo simple 
imprisonment for six months.  
 
Criminal Appeals No. 210 and 211 of 2015 
7
6. 
Malik Muhammad Mumtaz Qadri appellant challenged his 
convictions and sentences before the Islamabad High Court, 
Islamabad through Criminal Appeal No. 90 of 2011 which was 
heard by a learned Division Bench of the said Court along with 
Capital Sentence Reference No. 01 of 2011 seeking confirmation of 
the sentences of death passed by the trial court and vide judgment 
dated 09.03.2015 the appeal filed by the appellant was dismissed 
to the extent of his conviction and sentence recorded by the trial 
court for an offence under section 302(b), PPC and the connected 
Capital Sentence Reference was answered in the affirmative to that 
extent but the appeal was partly allowed to the extent of his 
conviction and sentence recorded by the trial court for an offence 
under section 7(a) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 which conviction 
and sentence were set aside and he was acquitted of that count of 
the Charge. 
 
7. 
Subsequently 
Malik 
Muhammad 
Mumtaz 
Qadri 
filed 
Criminal Petition No. 197 of 2015 before this Court seeking leave 
to appeal against the above mentioned judgment delivered by the 
Islamabad High Court, Islamabad and assailing his conviction and 
sentence for an offence under section 302(b), PPC whereas the 
State preferred Criminal Petition No. 275 of 2015 before this Court 
seeking leave to appeal against the same judgment and challenging 
acquittal of Malik Muhammad Mumtaz Qadri from the charge 
under section 7(a) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. On 14.05.2015 
this Court allowed both the said Criminal Petitions and granted 
leave to appeal therein by passing the following order: 
 
“Criminal Petition No. 197 of 2015 
 
 
The record of the case shows that Malik Muhammad 
Mumtaz Qadri petitioner had admitted killing Governor Salman 
Taseer and this is so evident from the petitioner’s statement 
recorded under section 164, Cr.P.C., his response to the charge 
framed against him and his answers to questions No. 3 and 8 put 
to him at the time of recording of his statement under section 342, 
Cr.P.C. It has vehemently been argued by the learned counsel for 
the petitioner that the killing of the deceased by the petitioner was 
on account of the deceased having committed blasphemy in terms 
of section 295-C, PPC and in that backdrop the petitioner was 
justified in murdering the deceased. After hearing elaborate 
submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner we are of the 
Criminal Appeals No. 210 and 211 of 2015 
8
opinion 
that 
the 
following 
questions, 
inter 
alia, 
require 
consideration of this Court: 
 
i) 
Did any utterance of the deceased in fact amount 
to blasphemy in terms of section 295-C, PPC and 
was sufficient record available in this case to 
presume 
commission 
of 
blasphemy 
by 
the 
deceased? The learned counsel for the petitioner 
has read out from clippings of two newspaper 
reports which prima facie tend to show that the 
deceased had said something about the law framed 
for the offence of blasphemy and its improper 
application and apparently the deceased had not 
uttered any word defiling the sacred name of the 
Holy Prophet Muhammad (Peace Be Upon Him).  
 
ii) 
If the petitioner entertained an impression that the 
deceased had committed blasphemy then did the 
petitioner, acting in his private capacity, have any 
legal justification to kill the deceased without 
having recourse to the law? In this respect Article 9 
of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan, 1973 may be relevant which stipulates 
that no person shall be deprived of his life or 
liberty save in accordance with law.  
 
iii) 
Even if the petitioner entertained an impression 
about commission of blasphemy by the deceased 
and even if he was motivated by any religious 
sentiment in that regard still could the petitioner 
kill the deceased at a time when he was performing 
the duties of a guard of the deceased and was 
performing official functions, wearing an official 
uniform, using an official weapon and possessing 
officially supplied bullets? It would be relevant in 
this context to consider as to whether a person 
given in the protection of the petitioner could be 
deprived of his life by the petitioner himself and as 
to whether committing such a murder would not 
offend against the religious injunctions, precepts or 
traditions. 
 
iv) 
If the petitioner had confessed killing the deceased 
before the learned trial court at different stages of 
the trial then was it not a case attracting the 
provisions of section 304, PPC and section 302(a), 
PPC which offence carries the punishment of death 
only and has no alternative sentence?  
 
v) 
In case the petitioner’s conviction is not interfered 
with by this Court then are there any mitigating 
circumstances available on the record warranting 
reduction of the petitioner’s sentence from death to 
imprisonment for life or not? It may be relevant in 
the present context that the petitioner had no 
personal enmity with the deceased and he had 
acted only under a religious motivation. It may also 
be relevant in this context that the petitioner could 
be said to have acted cruelly and brutally in the 
matter as he had riddled the deceased’s body with 
as many as thirty-two injuries caused by twenty-
eight bullets.  
 
Criminal Appeals No. 210 and 211 of 2015 
9
2. 
The questions mentioned above, amongst others, require 
consideration of this Court. This petition is, therefore, allowed and 
leave to appeal is granted for the purpose.  
 
Criminal Petition No. 275 of 2015 
 
3. 
It has inter alia been contended by the learned Advocate-
General, Islamabad appearing for the petitioner/the State that 
while holding that the case in hand did not attract the definition of 
‘terrorism’ contained in section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 
the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad had completely failed to 
advert to the provisions of section 6(1)(c) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 
1997 which stipulate that an offence of murder committed for the 
purpose of advancing a religious cause or for the purpose of 
intimidating and terrorizing the public or government officials 
amounts to terrorism triable by an Anti-Terrorism Court. He has 
also argued that the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad had fallen 
in error in holding that because there was insufficient evidence 
regarding spreading of fear and insecurity in the society as a 
result of the petitioner’s action, therefore, the case in hand was 
not a case of terrorism. According to him the High Court had failed 
to appreciate that the definition of terrorism contained in section 6 
of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 had relevance to the design or 
object of the perpetrator of the offence and not to the fall out of an 
offence creating a sense of fear and insecurity in the society. In 
this respect he has relied upon the cases of Basharat Ali v. Special 
Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court-II, Gujranwala (PLD 2004 Lahore 199), 
Mohabbat Ali and another v. The State and another  (2007 SCMR 
142), Bashir Ahmed v. Muhammad Siddique and others (PLD 2009 
SC 11), Ahmed Jan v. Nasrullah and others (2012 SCMR 59) and 
Tariq Mahmood v. The State and others (2008 SCMR 1631). The 
learned Advocate-General, Islamabad has gone on to submit that 
the jurisdiction of an Anti-Terrorism Court is to be determined on 
the basis of the allegations leveled in the FIR, the statements made 
under section 161, Cr.P.C. and the attending circumstances of the 
case becoming available on the record and, thus, an ultimate 
acquittal of the respondent from the charge under section 7(a) of 
the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 did not preclude the learned Anti-
Terrorism Court from trying the case in hand and in this respect 
he has relied upon the cases of Allah Din and 18 others v. The 
State and another (1994 SCMR 717) and Mumtaz Ali Khan Rajban 
and another v. Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 2001 SC 
169).  
 
4. 
The 
contentions 
of 
the 
learned 
Advocate-General, 
Islamabad noted above require consideration. This petition is, 
therefore, allowed and leave to appeal is granted for the purpose. 
 
5. 
The office is directed to club the appeals arising out of the 
above mentioned two petitions so that they may be heard together. 
The office is also directed to fix the appeals for regular hearing in 
the month of October, 2015, as agreed between the learned 
counsel for the parties.” 
 
Hence, the present appeals before this Court. 
 
8. 
We have heard Mian Nazir Akhtar, ASC and Khawaja 
Muhammad Sharif, ASC appearing for Malik Muhammad Mumtaz 
Qadri convict-appellant and Mian Abdul Rauf, Advocate-General, 
Criminal Appeals No. 210 and 211 of 2015 
10
Islamabad appearing for the State at considerable length and have 
minutely gone through the record of the case with their able 
assistance besides carefully perusing all the religious texts and 
material produced or referred to during the arguments. In the 
following paragraphs we propose to separately discuss and deal 
with all the arguments advanced before us from both the sides. 
 
9. 
In a case of murder two questions are of paramount 
importance and they are 
 
(i) 
was it the accused person facing the trial who 
had committed the murder in issue?   
and 
(ii)  
if it was the accused person facing the trial who 
had committed the murder in issue then did he 
have any factual or legal justification for 
committing that murder? 
 
In the case in hand the answer to the first question had been 
provided by Malik Muhammad Mumtaz Qadri appellant himself by 
admitting at every stage of the case that he, and he alone, had 
committed the murder of Mr. Salman Taseer. During the 
investigation, in his confessional statement recorded by a 
Magistrate under section 164, Cr.P.C., in his reply to the Charge 
framed by the trial court, through some suggestions put by his 
learned counsel to different prosecution witnesses, in his 
statement recorded under section 342, Cr.P.C., in his written 
statement filed under section 265-F(5), Cr.P.C., through the final 
arguments advanced by his learned counsel at the conclusion of 
the trial and also before the High Court, at the leave granting stage 
before this Court and during the submissions made by his learned 
counsel before this Court at the time of hearing of the present 
appeals it had and has consistently been maintained by Malik 
Muhammad Mumtaz Qadri and his learned counsel that Mr. 
Salman Taseer had been done to death by none other than Malik 
Muhammad Mumtaz Qadri appellant at the date, time and place 
Criminal Appeals No. 210 and 211 of 2015 
11
alleged by the prosecution. In these circumstances the question as 
to who had committed the murder of Mr. Salman Taseer may not 
detain us any further. 
 
10. 
The second question as to whether Malik Muhammad 
Mumtaz Qadri appellant had any factual or legal justification for 
committing the murder of Mr. Salman Taseer or not has been and 
is the real bone of contention in this case. This aspect of the case 
can be divided into two parts, i.e. factual justification and legal 
justification and we now proceed to discuss these parts separately 
with reference to the record of the case as well as the submissions 
made by the learned counsel for the parties before us. 
 
11. 
The factual justification consistently advanced by Malik 
Muhammad Mumtaz Qadri appellant has been that in his capacity 
as the Governor of the Province of the Punjab Mr. Salman Taseer 
had committed blasphemy. Two separate parts of such factual 
justification have been highlighted by the learned counsel for the 
appellant. The first part is that after conviction and sentence of one 
Mst. Asia Bibi, a Christian lady, in some case for committing the 
offence of blasphemy Mr. Salman Taseer had paid a visit to that 
lady inside a jail and on that occasion and also in some television 
programme aired later on he had observed that the minorities in 
Pakistan enjoyed adequate constitutional and legal protections, 
Mst. Asia Bibi had been convicted not under any law introduced by 
the Quaid-i-Azam or Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto but under a law 
promulgated by Zia-ul-Haq which was a black law, according to his 
own inquiries Mst. Asia Bibi was innocent in the matter, Mst. Asia 
Bibi was a poor and hapless woman, her conviction and sentence 
had brought a bad name to our system inside the country and 
abroad and he had obtained an application from Mst. Asia Bibi for 
seeking some relief for her from the relevant quarters. For proving 
such utterances of Mr. Salman Taseer the appellant had produced 
two newspaper reports before the trial court which had been 
placed on the record as Mark-A and Mark-B. It has been 
maintained by the learned counsel for the appellant that the above 
Criminal Appeals No. 210 and 211 of 2015 
12
mentioned utterances of Mr. Salman Taseer were blasphemous. 
The second part of the factual justification advanced by the 
appellant was that immediately before the present occurrence the 
appellant had said to Mr. Salman Taseer that it was unbecoming of 
him as a Governor to have remarked about the blasphemy law as 
black law upon which Mr. Salman Taseer had responded by saying 
that “Not only that it is black law, but also it is my shit” which 
response was also blasphemous and the same had gravely and 
suddenly provoked the appellant. On the basis of the above 
mentioned two factual aspects the learned counsel for the 
appellant has canvassed that Mr. Salman Taseer had committed 
blasphemy and had also provoked the appellant and, therefore, the 
appellant was quite justified in killing him. The learned Advocate-
General, Islamabad appearing for the State has, however, 
vehemently argued that none of the said factual aspects asserted 
by the appellant had been lawfully proved or duly established on 
the record of this case and, therefore, the same cannot be made a 
basis for claiming any relief for the appellant. 
 
12. 
In a criminal case whenever an accused person wants the 
court to accept that his action was justified in the peculiar 
circumstances of the case the provisions of Article 121 of the 
Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 come into play which provide as 
follows: 
 
“121. Burden of proving that case of accused comes within 
exception.- 
When a person is accused of any offence the burden 
of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within 
any of the General Exceptions in the Pakistan Penal Code (Act XLV  
of 1860), or within any special exception or proviso contained in 
any other part of the same Code, or in any law defining the 
offence, is upon him, and the Court shall presume the absence of 
such circumstances. 
 
Illustrations 
 
(a) 
A, accused of murder, alleges that, by reason of 
unsoundness of mind, he did not know the nature of the act. 
 
The burden of proof is on A. 
 
(b) 
A, accused of murder, alleges that, by grave and sudden 
provocation, he was deprived of the power of self-control. 
 
The burden of proof is on A. 
 
Criminal Appeals No. 210 and 211 of 2015 
13
(c) 
Section 325 of the Pakistan Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860) 
provides that whoever, except in the case provided for in section 
335, voluntarily causes grievous hurt, shall be subject to certain 
punishments. 
A is charged with voluntarily causing grievous hurt under 
section 325. 
The burden of proving the circumstances bringing the case 
under section 335 lies on A.”  
 
Grave and sudden provocation offered by a victim to the assailant 
is surely one of the exceptions within the contemplation of the 
above mentioned Article 121 which exception was previously 
recognized by Exception No. 1 to the erstwhile section 300, PPC 
and is now covered by the provisions of section 302(c), PPC. The 
law is quite settled by now that if an accused person wants the 
court to believe that some words or actions of the victim had 
provoked him and on the basis of such provocation he had killed 
the victim then in all such cases the court is to presume the 
absence of the circumstances being asserted by the accused 
person in support of his plea and it is for the accused person to 
prove through positive and legally admissible evidence that some 
provocation was actually offered to him by the victim and such 
provocation was grave and sudden. In the present case both the 
parts of the factual justification advanced by the appellant had 
clearly remained unproved by him. As regards the Mst. Asia Bibi 
related utterances attributed to Mr. Salman Taseer no specific date 
or time of such utterances or the exact words uttered had been 
established on the record, the jail and the city wherein he had 
statedly made the relevant observations were variantly described, 
the television channel or the programme referred to had not been 
named, the reporters who had prepared the newspaper reports 
Mark-A and Mark-B had not been produced as witnesses, both the 
said newspaper reports were not duly exhibited in evidence and the 
said reports had never been lawfully proved. Mark-A was a 
newspaper report published after the murder of Mr. Salman 
Taseer, i.e. many months after the alleged utterances had been 
made by him and the said report was purely speculative in nature 
as the reporter had only speculated that Mr. Salman Taseer had 
been murdered because of some utterances he had made some 
Criminal Appeals No. 210 and 211 of 2015 
14
months ago. In that report the reporter had never claimed that he 
had himself heard Mr. Salman Taseer saying what was alleged to 
have been said by him. Mark-B was a newspaper report about 
some observations statedly made by Mr. Salman Taseer in a 
programme aired by a television channel and in that report neither 
the television channel nor the programme had been named nor the 
reporter had claimed to have personally heard or seen Mr. Salman 
Taseer making those observations. Even the date and time of airing 
of the television programme had not found any mention in the said 
newspaper 
report. 
During 
their 
cross-examination 
some 
suggestions were put by the appellant to both the eyewitnesses 
produced by the prosecution regarding the Mst. Asia Bibi related 
utterances allegedly made by Mr. Salman Taseer but both of them 
had categorically stated that those suggestions were incorrect. It is 
true that a similar suggestion put to the investigating officer was 
accepted by him to be correct but at the same time it is equally 
true that no source of knowledge of the investigating officer about 
correctness of such suggestions had been disclosed by the 
investigating officer himself or was established on the record by the 
appellant. Apart from that, even if the Mst. Asia Bibi related 
utterances attributed to Mr. Salman Taseer were to be accepted as 
duly proved still all that Mr. Salman Taseer had allegedly said on 
that occasion conveyed an impression that, according to Mr. 
Salman Taseer, the law regarding commission of blasphemy had 
been promulgated by an unrepresentative military ruler and the 
same was a black law because in the absence of proper safeguards 
against its misuse it was being utilized as a vehicle of oppression 
against innocent people and weaker segments of the society 
including religious minorities. In the alleged utterances Mr. 
Salman Taseer had never, directly or indirectly, made any 
observation about the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon 
him) so as to attract the definition of blasphemy contained in 
section 295-C, PPC which definition is relevant only to a person 
who “by words, either spoken or written, or by visible 
representation, or by any imputation, innuendo or insinuation, 
directly or indirectly, defiles the sacred name of the Holy Prophet 
Criminal Appeals No. 210 and 211 of 2015 
15
Muhammad (peace be upon him)”. It is, therefore, difficult to 
accept that the Mst. Asia Bibi related alleged utterances of Mr. 
Salman Taseer amounted to commission of blasphemy by him and 
it is even more difficult to accept that such utterances could be 
treated by the appellant to be providing provocation to him which 
provocation was neither grave nor sudden so as to attract any 
general or special exception recognized by the Pakistan Penal 
Code. We have already observed above that even if any such 
exception could be said to be attracted to the case in hand it was 
for the appellant to prove the circumstances attracting such 
exception through positive and legally admissible evidence which 
he had completely failed to produce. In these circumstances the 
judicial presumption regarding absence of such circumstances 
contemplated by Article 121 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 
stood reinforced. 
 
13. 
The second part of the factual justification advanced by the 
appellant pertained to a verbal exchange allegedly taking place 
between the appellant and Mr. Salman Taseer immediately prior to 
opening of fire by the former upon the latter. The contents of the 
alleged exchange of words asserted by the appellant through his 
statement recorded under section 342, Cr.P.C. have already been 
reproduced above. It may be reiterated that even in respect of this 
factual aspect of the case the onus of proof was squarely on the 
appellant but he had utterly failed to discharge that onus. In his 
first version before the investigating officer the appellant had not 
mentioned any such verbal exchange taking place with Mr. Salman 
Taseer immediately preceding the firing. During the trial some 
suggestions were put by the defence to both the eyewitnesses 
produced by the prosecution regarding the asserted exchange of 
words but such suggestions were categorically denied and 
controverted by both of them. It may be relevant to mention here 
that the words forming the verbal exchange put to the two 
eyewitnesses through suggestions were different and they were 
also different from the words mentioned by the appellant in his 
statement recorded under section 342, Cr.P.C. The record of the 
Criminal Appeals No. 210 and 211 of 2015 
16
case shows that at the time of the present occurrence Mr. Salman 
Taseer was accompanied by his friend namely Sheikh Waqas 
whose presence at the spot at the relevant time was also confirmed 
by the site-plan of the place of occurrence. As the onus to prove 
the asserted verbal exchange between the appellant and Mr. 
Salman Taseer was on the appellant, therefore, the appellant could 
have produced the said Sheikh Waqas as a defence witness or he 
could have applied before the trial court for summoning of the said 
witness as a court witness so as to establish taking place of the 
asserted verbal exchange between the appellant and Mr. Salman 
Taseer but the appellant had taken no such step. In the absence of 
any confirmation of the asserted verbal exchange by the 
eyewitnesses produced by the prosecution and in the absence of 
production of Sheikh Waqas as a defence witness or his 
summoning as a court witness the only other person who could 
prove or establish the asserted exchange of words between the 
appellant and the victim was none other than the appellant himself 
but admittedly he had declined to appear before the trial court as 
his own witness by making a statement on oath under section 
340(2), Cr.P.C. Failure of the appellant to enter the witness-box for 
making a statement in respect of that asserted fact amounted to 
withholding the best available evidence and such failure on his 
part had given rise to an inference adverse to truthfulness of the 
appellant’s factual assertion made in that regard. During his 
arguments the learned counsel for the appellant was questioned by 
us regarding complete lack of evidence regarding this part of the 
factual justification advanced by the appellant and all that he 
could submit was that it had become available on the record that 
some of his injuries had been received by Mr. Salman Taseer on 
the frontal parts of his body and that at some point of time 
immediately before the firing at him he was facing the appellant 
and, thus, it could be presumed that some conversation must have 
taken place between the appellant and Mr. Salman Taseer at that 
stage. In this context it has also been submitted by him that great 
number of injuries caused by the appellant to his victim indicated 
receipt of grave provocation by the appellant and this hinted at 
Criminal Appeals No. 210 and 211 of 2015 
17
taking place of some exchange of words between the appellant and 
his victim which had gravely provoked the appellant at the spot. 
Such submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant have, 
however, been found by us to be nothing but speculative. The onus 
of proof on this issue was on the appellant and it cannot be said 
that the requisite onus had been discharged by the appellant on 
the basis of a mere speculation, more so when such speculation 
did not relate to the content of the conversation supposedly taking 
place which content was the very basis of the factual justification 
being advanced for the murder. We have, thus, felt no hesitation in 
concluding that this part of the factual justification advanced by 
the appellant was nothing but an afterthought and even this part 
of the factual justification had remained far from being proved or 
established on the record.  
 
14. 
As regards the issue of availability of any legal justification 
with Malik Muhammad Mumtaz Qadri appellant for murdering Mr. 
Salman Taseer the said issue has also been addressed by the 
learned counsel for the appellant from two diverse angles. The first 
angle is that commission of blasphemy by Mr. Salman Taseer had 
provoked the appellant and as the murder of Mr. Salman Taseer 
had been committed on account of serious provocation offered by 
the victim, therefore, the appellant’s case attracted some general 
and special exceptions recognized by the Pakistan Penal Code and, 
thus, his action did not fall within the purview of section 302(b), 
PPC. The second angle is that being a devout Muslim the appellant 
was under a religious and moral, and hence legal, obligation to kill 
an apostate who had committed the offence of blasphemy, 
particularly when the State had failed to take any legal action 
against the offender. 
 
15. 
 We note that both the above mentioned angles of the legal 
justification advanced are premised upon an alleged commission of 
the offence of blasphemy by Mr. Salman Taseer and the resultant 
provocation statedly received or entertained by the appellant which 
factual premise had, as observed above, remained totally unproved 
Criminal Appeals No. 210 and 211 of 2015 
18
on the record of this case in accordance with the law. It goes 
without saying that no court of law can decide a question of law on 
the basis of a fact which itself remains not established in terms of 
the legal requirements. When confronted with this legal position 
the learned counsel for the appellant referred to section 79, PPC 
which reads as under: 
 
“79. 
Act done by a person justified, or by mistake of fact 
believing himself justified, by law.- Nothing is an offence which 
is done by any person who is justified by law, or who by reason of 
a mistake of fact and not by reason of a mistake of law in good 
faith, believes himself to be justified by law, in doing it. 
 
Illustration 
 
A sees Z commit what appears to A to be a murder. A in the 
exercise, to the best of his judgment, exerted in good faith of the 
power which the law gives to all persons of apprehending murders 
in the Act, seizes Z, in order to bring Z before the proper 
authorities. A has committed no offence, though it may be true if Z 
was acting in self-defence.” 
 
By relying upon the provisions of section 79, PPC the learned 
counsel for the appellant has maintained that even if as a matter of 
fact Mr. Salman Taseer had not committed the offence of 
blasphemy within the meanings of section 295-C, PPC still the 
appellant mistakenly believed that Mr. Salman Taseer had 
committed the said offence and, therefore, the appellant had 
committed no offence by murdering him. We have, however, found 
such an interpretation of section 79, PPC advanced by the learned 
counsel for the appellant to be misconceived and unacceptable. 
According to our understanding the said section has two parts and 
for clarity of comprehension the said section can be read as 
follows: 
 
(i)  
Nothing is an offence which is done by any 
person who is justified by law in doing it. 
 
(ii)  
Nothing is an offence which is done by any 
person who by reason of a mistake of fact and not by 
reason of a mistake of law in good faith believes 
himself to be justified by law in doing it. 
Criminal Appeals No. 210 and 211 of 2015 
19
 
As regards the first part of section 79, PPC the accused person has 
to refer to and rely upon some express and existing legal provision 
which makes his act justified by law. In the present case the 
learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to refer to any 
express and existing legal provision in the entire body of laws of 
this country authorizing any person to kill another person on his 
own because such other person had, or was perceived to have, 
committed the offence of blasphemy. As far as the second part of 
section 79, PPC is concerned the accused person has to establish 
that by reason of a mistake of fact he believed in good faith that his 
act was justified by law and such belief that his act was justified 
by law was not based upon a mistake of law. This provision 
contemplates that if there had been no mistake of fact and if the 
fact perceived by the accused person to exist actually existed as a 
fact then the act of the accused person was such that it was 
justified by law. This provision also makes it clear that the accused 
person’s belief in his act being justified by law should not be based 
upon a mistake of law. This provision further requires that the 
accused person must act in good faith. Applying these tests to the 
case in hand it is quite apparent that even if due to a mistake of 
fact the appellant entertained an impression that Mr. Salman 
Taseer had committed the offence of blasphemy still there was no 
valid basis available with the appellant to believe that his act of 
killing Mr. Salman Taseer was justified by the law of the land. It is 
also obvious that if the appellant believed that his act was justified 
by law then such belief was based upon a mistake of law and, 
therefore, the provisions of section 79, PPC were inapplicable to the 
case. As regards the requirement of good faith it cannot be argued 
with any degree of seriousness that the decision of the appellant to 
take the law in his own hands was based upon good faith. The 
appellant was a serving officer of the police department at the 
relevant time and he, of all the persons, would have known about 
the importance and requirement of recourse to the law. A police 
officer acting in a matter by taking the law in his own hands may 
be termed as the worst manifestation of bad faith. Section 52, PPC 
Criminal Appeals No. 210 and 211 of 2015 
20
defines “Good faith” and clarifies that “Nothing is said to be done 
or believed in “good faith” which is done or believed without due 
care and attention”. In the case in hand the appellant had never 
claimed that he had himself heard or read the Mst. Asia Bibi 
related utterances attributed to Mr. Salman Taseer, he had never 
claimed that he had tried to get his impression or information 
about commission of the offence of blasphemy by Mr. Salman 
Taseer verified in any manner whatsoever, he had acted in the 
matter on the basis of nothing but hearsay and even the asserted 
verbal exchange between him and Mr. Salman Taseer statedly 
taking place immediately prior to the occurrence had not been 
proved by him through any positive evidence at all. In these 
circumstances it could not be said that the appellant had acted in 
the matter with “due care and attention” and, hence, in “good 
faith” within the meanings of section 79, PPC read with section 52, 
PPC. For all these reasons the arguments addressed by the learned 
counsel for the appellant on both the angles of the legal 
justification advanced by the appellant have failed to convince us.        
 
16. 
Faced with the above mentioned insurmountable difficulties 
in establishing before us that the appellant had any legal 
justification available with him for committing the murder of Mr. 
Salman Taseer the learned counsel for the appellant has turned to 
the religion of Islam which even otherwise has remained the 
primary focus of all his arguments advanced before us. He has 
argued that committing blasphemy is a grave offence in Islam and 
if a Muslim commits the murder of a person guilty of committing 
blasphemy then he commits no offence at all and he cannot be 
punished for the murder committed by him. In support of this 
plank of his arguments the learned counsel for the appellant has 
referred to the written statement submitted by the appellant before 
the trial court under section 265-F(5), Cr.P.C. wherein references 
had been made to different verses of the Holy Qur’an including 
Surah At-Taubah: verse 12, Surah At-Taubah: verses 13, 14 & 15, 
Surah Al-Maidah: verse 33, Surah Al-Hujurat: verse 2, Surah An-
Nur: verse 63, Surah Al-Baqarah: verse 104, Surah Al-Ahzab: verse 
Criminal Appeals No. 210 and 211 of 2015 
21
57, Surah An-Nisa, verse 65, Surah At-Taubah: verses 64, 65 & 
66, Surah Al-Mujadilah: verses 20 & 21 and Surah Al-Anfal: verses 
12, 13 & 14. In the same written statement of the appellant 
references had also been made to about thirty Ahadith (traditions) 
of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) reported in 
different religious texts. The appellant had also referred in that 
written statement to two decisions rendered by Caliphs Umar and 
Ali (May Allah Almighty be pleased with them) and to opinions 
recorded by some renowned scholars of Islam in respect of liability 
of a person who has committed blasphemy. The said written 
statement of the appellant also contained opinions of some 
religious scholars justifying extrajudicial killing of an apostate and 
also of his supporters and maintaining that the deadbody of an 
apostate is not to be given a cleansing bath and no funeral prayers 
are to be offered for him. Apart from referring to the said written 
statement filed by the appellant under section 265-F(5), Cr.P.C. the 
learned counsel for the appellant has also placed on the record 
some other material containing some more references concerning 
commission of blasphemy and justifying killing of an apostate. The 
learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently maintained 
before us that in the impugned judgment passed by the Islamabad 
High Court, Islamabad, particularly in paragraphs No. 28, 29 and 
30 thereof, some observations had been made by the High Court 
which observations, according to the learned counsel for the 
appellant, did not interpret the Islamic law regarding blasphemy in 
its true and correct perspective. We have gone through all the 
above mentioned texts, references and material very carefully and 
with the deepest veneration and respect that they deserve but at 
the same time we are also conscious of the contours and scope of 
the jurisdiction that we can exercise in the present proceedings, 
particularly in the context of Articles 203G and 230 of the 
Constitution referred to in the opening part of this judgment and 
also in the context of Article 175(2) of the Constitution which 
mandates in no uncertain terms that “No court shall have 
jurisdiction save as is or may be conferred on it by the 
Constitution or by or under any law”. We may only observe in this 
Criminal Appeals No. 210 and 211 of 2015 
22
context that we as Muslims are fully aware and convinced of the 
most exalted position held by the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace 
be upon him) in the eyes of Almighty Allah as well as in the hearts 
and minds of the Ummah and the followers of the Islamic faith. It 
goes without saying that deepest respect and profound reverence 
for the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) is an article 
of faith with all of us. Be that as it may the issue involved in this 
case is not as to whether anybody is allowed to commit blasphemy 
by defiling the sacred name of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace 
be upon him) or not or as to whether a person committing 
blasphemy can be killed by another person on his own or not but 
the real question involved in the present case is as to whether or 
not a person can be said to be justified in killing another person on 
his own on the basis of an unverified impression or an 
unestablished perception that such other person has committed 
blasphemy. A close and careful examination of all the references 
made and the religious material produced in this case by the 
appellant and his learned counsel shows, and shows quite clearly 
and unmistakably, that such references and material pertain to 
cases where commission of blasphemy stands established as a fact 
and then the discussion is about how the apostate may be treated 
and not a single reference made or instance referred to in the 
material produced permits killing of a person on the basis only of 
an unverified impression or an unestablished perception regarding 
commission of blasphemy. In the case in hand there is nothing on 
the record to show that the appellant had made any effort 
whatsoever to get the Mst. Asia Bibi related utterances attributed 
to Mr. Salman Taseer verified in any manner. An attempt had, 
however, been made by the appellant during the trial to improve 
his case in that regard by introducing the story of a verbal 
exchange taking place between him and Mr. Salman Taseer 
immediately prior to the occurrence of murder but we have already 
concluded above that this part of the story introduced by the 
appellant was an afterthought and the same had also remained far 
from being proved in accordance with the law. As mentioned above, 
in the Holy Qur’an Almighty Allah has repeatedly warned those 
Criminal Appeals No. 210 and 211 of 2015 
23
who start believing in hearsay without getting it ascertained, 
verified or investigated or conduct themselves on the basis of such 
hearsay. The appellant, therefore, would have done better if, 
notwithstanding his professed religious motivation in the matter, 
he had paid heed to those warnings of Almighty Allah as well 
before an unjustified killing of another on the sole basis of hearsay. 
An unjustified killing of a human being has been declared by 
Almighty Allah as murder of the entire mankind.   
 
17. 
When specifically questioned by us in that respect the 
learned counsel for the appellant has maintained that it is not just 
defiling the sacred name of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be 
upon him) which constitutes blasphemy but criticizing the law 
regarding blasphemy is also blasphemous. We may record in this 
context that for canvassing such a point of view the learned 
counsel for the appellant has not placed reliance upon any 
scripture of divine origin but has referred to some scholastic 
interpretations of human origin. In our country the offence of 
blasphemy has been defined in section 295-C, PPC and by dictate 
of the oath of our office we are bound to decide matters in 
accordance with the Constitution and the law and, thus, we have 
found it difficult to act in this case on the basis of a definition of 
blasphemy advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant 
which definition travels beyond the scope of the statutory 
definition of the same in the law of the land. Apart from that in a 
democratic society citizens have a right to contend, debate or 
maintain that a law has not been correctly framed by the State in 
terms of the mischief sought to be suppressed or that the law 
promulgated by the State ought to contain adequate safeguards 
against its misapplication or misuse by motivated persons. It goes 
without saying that seeking improvement of a manmade law in 
respect of a religious matter for better or proper enforcement of 
such law does not ipso facto amount to criticizing the religious 
aspect of such law. An example at hand is that of the Hudood laws 
introduced in this country in the year 1979 which were followed by 
persistent protest against their misapplication and misuse against 
Criminal Appeals No. 210 and 211 of 2015 
24
weaker segments of the society and religious minorities which 
protest had led to various amendments made in those laws and in 
the Pakistan Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure from 
time to time in the later years. For instance, through an 
amendment section 156-B had been introduced in the Code of 
Criminal Procedure which provides as follows: 
 
“156-B. 
Investigation against a woman accused of the 
offence of Zina.- Notwithstanding anything contained in this 
Code, where a person is accused of offence of zina under the 
Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 (VII of 
1979), no police officer below the rank of a Superintendent of 
Police shall investigate such offence nor shall such accused be 
arrested without permission of the Court. 
 
 
Explanation.-- In this section ‘zina’ does not include ‘zina-
bil-jabr’.” 
 
Section 156-B, Cr.P.C. did not tinker with the offence of Zina itself 
or with the religious aspects of the same but through introduction 
of some procedural safeguards it only made it difficult for an 
innocent person to be maliciously subjected to an unnecessary 
investigation or trial for that offence. Keeping in view the strong 
religious sentiments in our society it ought to be understood quite 
clearly that any call coming from serious quarters for reform in the 
laws regarding religion related offences can only be a call for 
introducing safeguards against misapplication or misuse of such 
laws by motivated persons and such call is ordinarily not to be 
construed as a call against the religious aspects of the offences 
covered by such laws. Similar is the case as far as the offence of 
blasphemy is concerned. It is of critical importance to mention 
here that in one form or the other laws against offending religious 
sentiments have been a part of the Pakistan (previously Indian) 
Penal Code since its enactment in the year 1860 by the British 
Government with an aim to protect the religious feelings, 
sensibilities and sensitivities of different religious groups or classes 
of persons. Section 295 has been a part of the Code since its 
inception and the same provides protection to places of worship of 
all religions so that the religion of any class of persons is not 
insulted. Through an amendment section 295-A was added to the 
Criminal Appeals No. 210 and 211 of 2015 
25
Code in the year 1927 for preventing deliberate and malicious acts 
intended to outrage religious feelings or beliefs of followers of all 
religions. Later on the Code was further amended to include 
section 295-B against willful defiling, damaging or desecrating the 
Holy Qur’an and still later the Code was again amended and 
section 295-C was introduced against defiling the sacred name of 
the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him). Such 
improvements of the Code over time through suitable amendments 
thereof was never considered as an affront to any religion and, 
therefore, a call for improvement of section 295-C, PPC for the 
purpose of providing safeguards against its misuse through 
leveling of false allegations ought not to be considered as 
objectionable because the religion of Islam loathes leveling of false 
allegations which is a serious offence in itself. A bare look at the 
definition of blasphemy contained in section 295-C, PPC shows 
that apparently the statutory definition restricts blasphemy to 
defiling the sacred name of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be 
upon him) and even the learned counsel for the appellant impliedly 
considers such definition of blasphemy to be inadequate or 
incomplete because, on the basis of the views of some religious 
scholars, he maintains that criticizing the law regarding blasphemy 
also falls within the mischief of blasphemy. This by itself amply 
demonstrates that the definition of blasphemy contained in section 
295-C, PPC may be considered by some to be needing improvement 
so as to bring it in line with the true scope of the concept of 
blasphemy and, likewise, there may be others who may feel that 
some procedural and other safeguards need to be introduced so 
that it should become difficult to level or prosecute a false 
allegation regarding commission of the offence of blasphemy. The 
above mentioned reference to introduction and amendment of the 
Hudood laws in the country makes it evident that in all matters, 
including religious, there is an on-going effort to keep the laws of 
the land updated through amendments so as to meet the emerging 
challenges and also to provide safeguards against mischievous 
manipulations, misapplication or misuse of the existing laws. It is 
an unfortunate fact which cannot be disputed that in many cases 
Criminal Appeals No. 210 and 211 of 2015 
26
registered in respect of the offence of blasphemy false allegations 
are leveled for extraneous purposes and in the absence of adequate 
safeguards against misapplication or misuse of such law by 
motivated persons the persons falsely accused of commission of 
that offence suffer beyond proportion or repair. In one of the 
Judicial Training Toolkits prepared by the Legal Aid Society, 
Karachi the following statistics have been recorded: 
 
“The known blasphemy cases in Pakistan show that from 1953 to 
July 2012, there were 434 offenders of blasphemy laws in 
Pakistan and among them were, 258 Muslims (Sunni/Shia), 114 
Christians, 57 Ahmadis, and 4 Hindus. Since 1990, 52 people 
have been extra-judicially murdered, for being implicated in 
blasphemy charges. Among these were 25 Muslims, 15 Christians, 
5 Ahmadis, 1 Buddhist and a Hindu. 
 
During 2013, 34 new cases were registered under the blasphemy 
laws. While at least one death sentence for blasphemy was 
overturned during the year, at least another 17 people were 
awaiting execution for blasphemy and at least 20 others were 
serving life sentences. Although the government has never carried 
out a death sentence for blasphemy, NGOs reported that at least 
five persons accused of blasphemy had died in police custody in 
recent years. 
 
The majority of blasphemy cases are based on false accusations 
stemming from property issues or other personal or family 
vendettas rather than genuine instances of blasphemy and they 
inevitably lead to mob violence against the entire community.” 
 
In the case of Muhammad Mahboob alias Booba v. The State (PLD 
2002 Lahore 587) a learned Division Bench of the Lahore High 
Court, Lahore had traced the history of the law of blasphemy in the 
sub-continent and had not only taken judicial notice of the 
rampant misuse of that law by unscrupulous people trying to settle 
their personal scores but had also pointed out the hazards of 
investigation of such cases by untrained and poorly advised 
investigating officers. Some of the observations made in that case 
are relevant to the present context and the same are, therefore, 
reproduced below:     
 
“15.  
Historically speaking the Blasphemy Law was enacted by 
the British to protect the religious sentiments of the Muslim 
minorities in the Sub-Continent before partition against the 
Hindu majority. After the creation of Pakistan, the Muslims 
themselves were in majority. Section 295-A of the Pakistan Penal 
Code was enacted in 1927. In 1980, section 295-A was added to 
the P.P.C. In 1982, section 295-B was introduced. While in 1986, 
Criminal Appeals No. 210 and 211 of 2015 
27
section 295-C was legislated. Initially life imprisonment was the 
sentence prescribed. However, in 1991 this was replaced with 
mandatory death penalty. 
  
16.  
It appears that ever since the law became more stringent, 
there has been an increase in the number of registration of the 
blasphemy cases. A report from the Daily Dawn of 18th July, 
2002, says that between 1948 and 1979, 11 cases of blasphemy 
were registered. Three cases were reported between the period 
1979 and 1986. Forty four cases were registered between 1987 
and 1999. In 2000 fifty two cases were registered and strangely, 
43 cases had been registered against the Muslims while 9 cases 
were registered against the non-Muslims. The report further 
states that this shows that the law was being abused more 
blatantly by the Muslims against the Muslims to settle their 
scores. Because the police would readily register such a case and 
without checking the veracity of the facts and without taking 
proper guidance from any well-known and unbiased religious 
scholar, would proceed to arrest an accused. That an Assistant 
Sub-Inspector or a Moharrir was academically not competent to 
adjudge whether or not the circumstances constitute act of 
blasphemy. 
   
-------------------------- 
 
18.  
In this case we have observed that the investigation of this 
case which involves a death sentence and where the allegations 
were of blasphemy, was entrusted to an official of the rank of an 
Assistant Sub-Inspector who has himself admitted about his own 
level of education in his statement, the portions of which have 
been reproduced above. The D.S.P. (Legal) was never produced to 
state who guided him in proposing that a case of blasphemy was 
made out against the appellant. The most preposterous fact of the 
case is brought on the file by the statement of Adalat Khan (P. 
W.2), according to which pencils and markers, ordinarily 
obtainable from the market and purchased by someone other 
than the appellant, and secured through memo. Exh.P.A., were 
used as an incriminating evidence against the appellant/convict. 
  
-------------------------- 
 
23.  
Needless to say that when the case of the prosecution was 
per se infirm going into a debate pertaining to Fiqah at the end of 
the trial Court was totally unnecessary, particularly when the 
learned trial Court had taken no help from any jurisconsult or 
any Islamic Scholar having known credentials. The nature of the 
accusations overwhelmed the trial Court to such an extent that it 
became oblivious of the fact that the standard of proof for 
establishing such an accusation and as required, was missing. 
Mere accusation should not create a prejudice or a bias and the 
duty of the Judge and as has also been ordained by our Holy 
Prophet (s.a.w.), is to ascertain the facts and the circumstances 
and look for the truth with all the perseverance at his command. 
  
--------------------------  
  
30.  
As we have seen in the recent past cases of such-like 
nature are on the increase and we have also observed element of 
mischief involved. This calls for extra care at the end of the 
Investigating Officers. Whereas, we have seen the failure, 
inefficiency and incompetence of the Investigating Officer in 
handling the present case with all its consequences. Therefore, we 
direct the Inspector-General of Police, Punjab, Lahore, to ensure 
that whenever such a case is registered, it be entrusted for 
Criminal Appeals No. 210 and 211 of 2015 
28
purposes of investigation to a team of at least two gazetted 
Investigating Officers preferably those conversant with the Islamic 
Jurisprudence and in case they themselves are not conversant 
with Islamic Law, a scholar of known reputation and integrity 
may be added to the team and this team should then investigate 
whether an offence is committed or not and if it comes to the 
conclusion that the offence is committed, the police may only 
then proceed further in the matter. 
  
31.  
In view of the sensitivities involved and the rise in the 
accusations of this type which can be easily made besides what is 
proposed on the investigational side, we further propose that the 
trial in such-like case be held by a Court presided over by a 
Judicial Officer who himself is not less than the rank of a District 
and Sessions Judge.” 
 
The procedural safeguards against misapplication or misuse of the 
law regarding the offence of blasphemy proposed or directed by the 
Lahore High Court, Lahore through the above mentioned judgment 
were never termed, and could never justifiably be termed, as 
blasphemous by any quarter. In this backdrop any call for reform 
of the law regarding the offence of blasphemy ought not to be 
mistaken as a call for doing away with that law and it ought to be 
understood as a call for introducing adequate safeguards against 
malicious application or use of that law by motivated persons. 
Commission of blasphemy is abhorrent and immoral besides being 
a manifestation of intolerance but at the same time a false 
allegation regarding commission of such an offence is equally 
detestable besides being culpable. If our religion of Islam comes 
down heavily upon commission of blasphemy then Islam is also 
very tough against those who level false allegations of a crime. It is, 
therefore, for the State of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to 
ensure that no innocent person is compelled or constrained to face 
an investigation or a trial on the basis of false or trumped up 
allegations regarding commission of such an offence. 
 
18. 
As a sequel to the discussion made above a conclusion is 
irresistible, unavoidable and inescapable that it was Malik 
Muhammad Mumtaz Qadri appellant who had committed the 
murder of Mr. Salman Taseer at the date, time and place alleged by 
the prosecution and also that the appellant had no factual or legal 
justification available with him for committing the said murder. In 
Criminal Appeals No. 210 and 211 of 2015 
29
view of this conclusion reached by us the conviction of the 
appellant recorded by the trial court for an offence under section 
302(b), PPC and upheld by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad 
has been found by us to have been validly recorded and upheld.  
 
19. 
We have also attended to the question as to whether the 
provisions of section 302(a), PPC stood attracted to this case or not 
and have found that although Malik Muhammad Mumtaz Qadri 
appellant had at all stages of this case admitted killing Mr. Salman 
Taseer yet he had always advanced some factual, legal or religious 
justifications for such act of his. The appellant had pleaded not 
guilty to the Charge framed against him and, therefore, it was not 
possible to equate his qualified admission regarding killing Mr. 
Salman Taseer with an unqualified confession of guilt so as to 
attract the provisions of sections 304 and 302(a), PPC to the facts 
of this case. 
 
20. 
The next question to be considered is as to whether by 
committing the murder of Mr. Salman Taseer, the then Governor of 
the Province of the Punjab, the appellant had also committed the 
offence of ‘terrorism’ as defined by section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism 
Act, 1997 or not which offence is punishable under section 7(a) of 
the said Act. Section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, as it stood 
at the time of the present occurrence, provided as follows: 
 
“6.  
Terrorism.—(1) In this Act, “terrorism” means the use or 
threat of action where:  
 
(a) 
the action falls within the meaning of subsection 
(2), and 
  
(b) 
the use or threat is designed to coerce and 
intimidate or overawe the Government or the public or a 
section of the public or community or sect or create a 
sense of fear or insecurity in society; or  
 
(c) 
the use or threat is made for the purpose of 
advancing a religious, sectarian or ethnic cause.  
 
(2)  
An “action” shall fall within the meaning of subsection (1), 
if it: 
 
(a) 
involves the doing of anything that causes death;  
 
Criminal Appeals No. 210 and 211 of 2015 
30
---------------------------- 
 
(3)  
The use or threat of any action falling within sub-section 
(2) which involves  the use of firearms, explosive or any other 
weapon is terrorism, whether or not sub-section (1)(c) is satisfied.  
 
(4)  
In this section “action” includes an act or a series of acts. 
 
(5)  
In this Act, terrorism includes any act done for the benefit 
of a proscribed organization. 
 
(6)  
A person who commits an offence under this section or any 
other provision of this Act, shall be guilty of an act of terrorism. 
 
(7)  
In this Act, a “terrorist” means:- 
 
(a)  
a person who has committed an offence of terrorism 
under this Act, and is or has been concerned in the 
commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism. 
 
(b)   
a person who is or has been, whether before or after 
the coming into force of this Act, concerned in the 
commission, 
preparation, 
or 
instigation 
of 
acts 
of 
terrorism, shall be included in the meaning given in clause 
(a) above.” 
 
 
A plain reading of section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 shows 
that while defining ‘terrorism’ the said section bifurcates the same 
into two parts, the mens rea for the offence falling in section 6(1)(b) 
or (c) and the actus reus of the offence falling in section 6(2) of the 
Act and in order to attract the definition of terrorism in a given 
case the requisite mens rea and actus reus must coincide and 
coexist. The provisions of section 6(5), (6) and (7) of the Act also 
indicate that there may be some other actions of a person which 
may also be declared or recognized as acts of terrorism by some 
other provisions of the same Act. Restricting ourselves to the 
provisions of section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 for the 
present purposes we note that in a case where the action involves 
the doing of anything that causes death [section 6(2)(a)] and such 
causing of death is designed to coerce and intimidate or overawe 
the Government or the public or a section of the public or 
community or sect or create a sense of fear or insecurity in society 
[section 6(1)(b)] or such causing of death is for the purpose of 
advancing a religious, sectarian or ethnic cause [section 6(1)(c)] 
there the causing of death of the victim is to be accepted and 
treated as terrorism triable exclusively by an Anti-Terrorism Court. 
As far as the case in hand is concerned the action of Malik 
Criminal Appeals No. 210 and 211 of 2015 
31
Muhammad Mumtaz Qadri appellant involved firing at Mr. Salman 
Taseer and thereby causing his death and, thus, his actus reus fell 
within the ambit of section 6(2)(a) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. 
As regards the appellant’s mens rea he had himself stated in his 
statement recorded by the trial court under section 342, Cr.P.C. 
that the murder of Mr. Salman Taseer committed by him was “a 
lesson for all the apostates, as finally they have to meet the same 
fate”. That statement of the appellant clearly established that he 
not only wanted to punish Mr. Salman Taseer privately for the 
perceived or imagined blasphemy committed by him but the 
appellant also wanted to send a message or teach a lesson to all 
others in the society at large who dared to follow Mr. Salman 
Taseer’s suit. In this view of the matter the causing of death of Mr. 
Salman Taseer by the appellant was surely designed to intimidate 
or overawe the public or a section of the public or to create a sense 
of fear or insecurity in the society so as to attract the requisite 
mens rea contemplated by section 6(1)(b) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 
1997. Apart from that it cannot be seriously contested that the 
appellant had committed the murder of Mr. Salman Taseer for the 
purpose of advancing a religious cause and, thus, even the mens 
rea contemplated by section 6(1)(c) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 
stood fully attracted to the case of the appellant. In these 
circumstances we have entertained no manner of doubt that the 
action of the appellant and the intention, design or purpose behind 
such action fully attracted the definition of terrorism contained in 
section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and, therefore, he was 
correctly and justifiably punished by the trial court under section 
7(a) of the said Act for committing the offence of terrorism. In 
paragraph No. 44 of the impugned judgment the Islamabad High 
Court, Islamabad had set aside the appellant’s conviction and 
sentence recorded by the trial court under section 7(a) of the Anti-
Terrorism Act, 1997 on the sole ground that sufficient evidence 
had not been brought on the record by the prosecution to establish 
that the murder committed by the appellant had in fact created 
any sense of fear or insecurity in the society. We have found such 
an approach adopted by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad vis-
Criminal Appeals No. 210 and 211 of 2015 
32
à-vis the offence of terrorism to be utterly misconceived. The 
provisions of section 6(1)(b) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 quite 
clearly contemplate creation of a sense of fear or insecurity in the 
society as a design behind the action and it is immaterial whether 
that design was actually fulfilled or not and any sense of fear or 
insecurity was in fact created in the society as a result of the 
action or not. It is the specified action accompanied by the 
requisite intention, design or purpose which constitutes the offence 
of terrorism under section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and 
the actual fallout of the action has nothing to do with 
determination of the nature of offence. In this view of the matter we 
find ourselves in agreement with the learned Advocate-General, 
Islamabad that Malik Muhammad Mumtaz Qadri appellant’s 
acquittal by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad from the charge 
under section 7(a) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 is liable to be set 
aside and consequently his conviction for the said offence recorded 
by the trial court needs to be restored. 
 
21. 
It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant 
that the Charge framed in this case contained only one count in 
respect of committing “the offence of qatl-e-amd punishable under 
clause (a) of section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 read with 
sections 302 and 109, PPC” and as no separate charge had been 
framed by the trial court in respect of an offence under section 6 
read with section 7(a) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, therefore, 
after recording the appellant’s conviction and sentence for an 
offence under section 302(b), PPC the trial court could not 
separately and additionally convict and sentence the appellant 
under section 7(a) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. We have 
examined this argument with reference to the record of the case 
and have observed that at no stage of his trial the appellant had 
ever raised any objection in the above mentioned regard or had 
ever claimed that he had been misled or prejudiced on the basis of 
any irregularity in the Charge framed or on account of any 
misjoinder of charges. In view of such conduct of the appellant 
before the trial court the provisions of section 537, Cr.P.C. provide 
Criminal Appeals No. 210 and 211 of 2015 
33
a complete answer to the argument advanced by the learned 
counsel for the appellant in this regard. Apart from that this Court 
has clarified in many cases that the offences of murder and 
terrorism are distinct and separate offences and a person found 
guilty of committing murder while committing the offence of 
terrorism is to be convicted and sentenced separately for the said 
offences. In the present case the trial court had followed the law 
declared by this Court in that respect and, thus, no legitimate 
exception can be taken to the course adopted by the trial court in 
that regard.   
 
22. 
As regards the sentences passed or to be passed against 
Malik Muhammad Mumtaz Qadri appellant both the learned 
counsel for the appellant have argued with emphasis that in the 
peculiar circumstances of this case the appellant does not deserve 
a sentence of death either for the murder committed by him or for 
indulging in terrorism. In this regard it has been argued that the 
appellant had no personal enmity with Mr. Salman Taseer and his 
only motivation for committing the murder of Mr. Salman Taseer 
was religious. It has also been argued that the appellant had been 
provoked firstly by the Mst. Asia Bibi related blasphemous 
utterances of Mr. Salman Taseer and secondly by his verbal 
exchange with the appellant immediately before his murder and, 
thus, the case in hand was a case of a continuing provocation as 
well as of grave and sudden provocation offered to the appellant at 
the spot. It has further been argued that the motive set up in the 
FIR had not been proved by the prosecution and lack of proof of 
motive set up by the prosecution is a valid ground for reduction of 
a sentence of death to imprisonment for life on a capital charge. It 
has lastly been pointed out in this context that according to the 
record of the case the appellant had acted under the influence of 
some religious speakers on the basis of whose inciting, provocative 
and instigating speeches made in a religious meeting the appellant 
had made up his mind to kill Mr. Salman Taseer and, thus, his 
conduct in the matter was not that of a free agent acting on his 
own. As against that the learned Advocate-General, Islamabad has 
Criminal Appeals No. 210 and 211 of 2015 
34
maintained that the appellant was a trained police officer who was 
deputed to guard Mr. Salman Taseer against any physical harm 
but while performing that duty the appellant had allowed his 
personal 
emotions 
and 
feelings 
to 
overtake 
his 
official 
responsibility and, therefore, the treachery committed and the 
deception resorted to by the appellant had rendered him 
undeserving of any sympathy in the matter of sentence.    
 
23. 
We have carefully attended to the above mentioned 
contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant and the 
learned Advocate-General, Islamabad with reference to the record 
of the case. As regards the asserted religious motivation of the 
appellant we note that even if the appellant had entertained an 
impression about commission of blasphemy by Mr. Salman Taseer 
and even if he was motivated by any religious sentiment in that 
regard still the appellant could not kill Mr. Salman Taseer at a time 
when the appellant was performing the duties of a guard of Mr. 
Salman Taseer and was performing official functions, wearing an 
official uniform, using an official weapon and possessing officially 
supplied bullets. The learned Advocate-General, Islamabad has 
termed such conduct of the appellant to be treacherous because he 
had killed a person given under his protection and he had 
employed 
deception 
for 
the 
purpose 
which 
amounted 
to 
dishonourable conduct. We have been told that the appellant was 
born in a religious family and had been brought up in religious 
traditions. If that were so then the appellant would have been 
aware that a person given in his protection, whatever be the 
credentials of such person, could not be deprived of his life by the 
appellant himself and that committing such person’s murder by 
the appellant would offend against religious precepts or traditions. 
The appellant’s grooming in religious traditions would also have 
taught him to distinguish between the requirements of his job for 
which he was paid from the public exchequer and acting on the 
basis of his personal sentiments. The appellant’s religious training 
would also have guided him in the matter of discerning between 
hearsay and fact and he would have been conscious that, as 
Criminal Appeals No. 210 and 211 of 2015 
35
referred to in the opening lines of this judgment, Almighty Allah 
has warned against believing hearsay or conducting oneself on the 
basis of unverified news or information. In this backdrop the self-
serving argument based upon religious motivation of the appellant 
has been found by us to be unacceptable, particularly when this 
argument is squarely based upon an alleged commission of 
blasphemy by Mr. Salman Taseer which assertion had never been 
proved before the trial court through any lawfully adduced 
evidence at all.  
 
24. 
What has been observed by us in the preceding paragraph 
can also be said about the argument that the appellant was 
provoked by some earlier utterances attributed to Mr. Salman 
Taseer and by the verbal exchange taking place at the spot as it 
has already been concluded by us above that none of those two 
events had been proved by the appellant before the trial court in 
accordance with the law and the onus of proof in that respect was 
on the appellant. We have also concluded above that the story 
advanced by the appellant about an exchange of words between 
him and Mr. Salman Taseer at the place of occurrence was nothing 
but an afterthought. It has been argued before us that great 
number of injuries caused by the appellant to his victim showed 
that the appellant had received grave provocation but this aspect of 
the matter again stems from the story belatedly advanced by the 
appellant about a verbal exchange between him and the victim at 
the spot which story had never been proved by the appellant 
through any positive evidence at all. A ground for mitigation of 
sentence cannot be pressed into service on the basis of something 
which had never been proved on the record.  
 
25. 
The argument based upon the motive set up by the 
prosecution having remained unproved has also failed to impress 
us. The motive asserted in the FIR was that Mr. Salman Taseer 
had his own point of view in respect of various important national 
issues and for that reason different religious and political groups 
were indulging in serious propaganda against him and were also 
Criminal Appeals No. 210 and 211 of 2015 
36
issuing threats that he would be murdered. The prosecution might 
have remained unable to establish involvement of any religious or 
political group in the murder of Mr. Salman Taseer but it had 
certainly succeeded in proving that the appellant’s motivation for 
the murder of Mr. Salman Taseer was nothing but some of his 
views although the contents of those views and those views being 
blasphemous had never been established by the appellant in 
accordance with the law as the onus for proving the same was 
exclusively on him. The place of motive in a case of murder is to 
establish as to who would be interested in killing the person 
murdered and such factor is to provide corroboration to the ocular 
account furnished by the prosecution but where the accused 
person admits killing the deceased there the primary purpose of 
setting up the motive stands served. According to Article 21 of the 
Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 a motive set up by the prosecution 
may be proved even by the conduct of the accused person and the 
conduct of the appellant in the present case had gone a long way 
in proving the motive set up by the prosecution. Apart from that 
Article 2(4) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 provides that “A 
fact is said to be proved when, after considering the matters before 
it, the Court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so 
probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of 
the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists.” In 
the circumstances of this case the motivation of the appellant was 
so obvious that only an imprudent man could conclude that his 
motivation was other than what the prosecution had asserted. 
Considering the prosecution’s case regarding the motive in 
juxtaposition with the appellant’s stance and conduct we have felt 
no hesitation in concluding that the prosecution had succeeded in 
proving the motive set up by it and, therefore, the argument that 
the sentence of death may be withheld in this case on account of 
lack of proof of motive has no legs to stand upon. 
 
26. 
The contention that the appellant had acted under the 
influence of some others and, thus, his culpability stood 
diminished on that score has been found by us to be a contention 
Criminal Appeals No. 210 and 211 of 2015 
37
which is not based upon any evidence whatsoever. Although it had 
been alleged in the FIR that the appellant had committed the 
murder of Mr. Salman Taseer at the behest of some political and 
religious groups and in his confessional statement recorded by a 
Magistrate under section 164, Cr.P.C. the appellant had said 
something about his inspiration for the murder coming from the 
speeches made by some persons during a religious meeting yet 
none of those factors carried any evidentiary value at all. An FIR is 
not a substantive piece of evidence and the prosecution had not 
brought even an iota of evidence on the record regarding the 
appellant acting at the behest of anybody else. The appellant’s 
statement recorded under section 164, Cr.P.C. was inadmissible in 
evidence because it had unlawfully been recorded on oath. Apart 
from that in his written statement submitted before the trial court 
under section 265-F(5), Cr.P.C. and also in his statement recorded 
by the trial court under section 342, Cr.P.C. the appellant had 
abandoned the above mentioned stand taken by him in his 
statement recorded under section 164, Cr.P.C., he had declined to 
make his own statement before the trial court on oath under 
section 340(2), Cr.P.C. and he had also failed to produce any 
witness in his defence. In these circumstances the claim that the 
appellant had acted under the influence or at the behest of 
somebody else was a claim which was based upon no evidence at 
all. It may be pertinent to observe in this context that at the time of 
the present occurrence the appellant was not a child of an 
impressionable age but was a fully grown up and trained police 
officer and, thus, his acting under the influence of somebody else 
has appeared to us to be a contention which is even otherwise 
difficult to accept. 
 
27. 
  There are some other aspects of this case which are 
relevant to the issue of sentencing of the appellant and they must 
also be stated for the record. The law of the land does not permit 
an individual to arrogate unto himself the roles of a complainant, 
prosecutor, judge and executioner. The appellant was a trained 
police officer who knew the importance of recourse to the law. The 
Criminal Appeals No. 210 and 211 of 2015 
38
appellant was very well aware of the case of Mst. Asia Bibi who was 
alleged to have committed the offence of blasphemy and through 
the course of law she had been convicted for that offence by a trial 
court. If the appellant had suspected Mr. Salman Taseer to have 
committed the offence of blasphemy then he should also have 
adopted the legal course knowing that the embargo contained in 
the provisions of Article 248 of the Constitution against criminal 
proceedings against a serving Governor of a Province was only 
temporary in nature and not permanent. Apart from that the 
appellant had acted in this case on the basis of nothing but 
hearsay and he had murdered the serving Governor of his Province 
without making any effort whatsoever to get his information about 
commission of blasphemy by Mr. Salman Taseer verified or 
confirmed. Throughout the world a police officer committing a 
crime is dealt with more sternly in the matter of his sentence than 
an ordinary person because an expectation is attached with a 
police officer that in all manner of circumstances he would conduct 
himself strictly in accordance with the law and under no 
circumstances he would take the law in his own hands. If the 
asserted religious motivation of the appellant for the murder 
committed by him by taking the law in his own hands is to be 
accepted as a valid mitigating circumstance in this case then a 
door shall become open for religious vigilantism which may deal a 
mortal blow to the rule of law in this country where divergent 
religious interpretations abound and tolerance stands depleted to 
an alarming level. It may also be relevant in the context of the 
appellant’s sentence that in the execution of his design he had 
riddled his victim’s body with as many as twenty-eight bullets 
causing thirty-two grievous injuries which clearly showed that the 
appellant had acted cruelly and brutally in the matter and such 
cruelty and brutality demonstrated by the appellant detracts from 
any sympathy to be shown to him in the matter of his sentence. 
Having said all that it is difficult to ignore that in his statement 
recorded under section 342, Cr.P.C. the appellant had also 
maintained that Mr. Salman Taseer used to indulge in different 
kinds of immoral activities. This part of the appellant’s statement 
Criminal Appeals No. 210 and 211 of 2015 
39
had opened a window to the appellant’s mind and had clearly 
shown that it was not just the alleged commission of blasphemy by 
Mr. Salman Taseer which prompted the appellant to kill him but 
there was some element of personal hatred for Mr. Salman Taseer 
which too had played some part in propelling the appellant into 
action against him. Such mixture of personal hatred with the 
asserted religious motivation had surely diluted, if not polluted, the 
acclaimed purity of the appellant’s purpose. For all the reasons 
detailed above no occasion has been found by us for reducing the 
appellant’s sentence from death to imprisonment for life for the 
offences of terrorism and murder committed by him. The usual 
wages for the crimes of the nature committed by the appellant is 
death and in the circumstances of this case the appellant deserves 
no less. 
 
28. 
As a sequel to the discussion made above Criminal Appeal 
No. 210 of 2015 filed before this Court by Malik Muhammad 
Mumtaz Qadri convict is dismissed, Criminal Appeal No. 211 of 
2015 preferred before this Court by the State is allowed and 
consequently the convictions and sentences of Malik Muhammad 
Mumtaz Qadri recorded by the learned Judge, Special Court-II, 
Anti-Terrorism, Rawalpindi Division & Islamabad Capital Territory 
on 01.10.2011 are restored.       
 
 
(Asif Saeed Khan Khosa) 
Judge 
 
 
(Mushir Alam) 
Judge 
 
 
(Dost Muhammad Khan) 
Judge 
 
Islamabad 
October 07, 2015 
 
Approved for reporting.