sentence-transformers/squad huggingface dataset:
Passage: A major consideration was the possible Soviet reaction in the event that the US intervened. The Truman administration was fretful that a war in Korea was a diversionary assault that would escalate to a general war in Europe once the United States committed in Korea. At the same time, "[t]here was no suggestion from anyone that the United Nations or the United States could back away from [the conflict]". Yugoslavia–a possible Soviet target because of the Tito-Stalin Split—was vital to the defense of Italy and Greece, and the country was first on the list of the National Security Council's post-North Korea invasion list of "chief danger spots". Truman believed if aggression went unchecked a chain reaction would be initiated that would marginalize the United Nations and encourage Communist aggression elsewhere. The UN Security Council approved the use of force to help the South Koreans and the US immediately began using what air and naval forces that were in the area to that end. The Administration still refrained from committing on the ground because some advisers believed the North Koreans could be stopped by air and naval power alone.

Question: What was the Truman administration concerned about that was preventing them from getting involved in the Korean conflict?

Question: What agency approved the use of force in South Korea?

Question: Why did the US not send in ground troops after the United Nations approved the use of force?

Question: Who believed that if the issues in Korea were not dealt with the communist aggression would spread?

Question: What resources did the US devote to South Korea after the Security Council approved engaging in an armed conflict?
Passage: On 25 June 1950, the United Nations Security Council unanimously condemned the North Korean invasion of the Republic of Korea, with UN Security Council Resolution 82. The Soviet Union, a veto-wielding power, had boycotted the Council meetings since January 1950, protesting that the Republic of China (Taiwan), not the People's Republic of China, held a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. After debating the matter, the Security Council, on 27 June 1950, published Resolution 83 recommending member states provide military assistance to the Republic of Korea. On 27 June President Truman ordered U.S. air and sea forces to help the South Korean regime. On 4 July the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister accused the United States of starting armed intervention on behalf of South Korea.

Question: Who condemned the actions of North Korea?

Question: Which permanent member of the UN Security Council boycotted council meetings in protest of Taiwan's seat in the United Nations?

Question: What resolution encouraged Security Council Members to send military assistance to the Republic of Korea?

Question: Who accused the United States of beginning an armed intervention in South Korea?

Question: What did UN Security Council Resolution 82 accomplish?
Passage: The Soviet Union challenged the legitimacy of the war for several reasons. The ROK Army intelligence upon which Resolution 83 was based came from U.S. Intelligence; North Korea was not invited as a sitting temporary member of the UN, which violated UN Charter Article 32; and the Korean conflict was beyond the UN Charter's scope, because the initial north–south border fighting was classed as a civil war. Because the Soviet Union was boycotting the Security Council at the time, legal scholars posited that deciding upon an action of this type required the unanimous vote of the five permanent members.

Question: What country challenged the legitimacy of the Korean War?

Question: Where did the intelligence information that led to the passage of Resolution 83 come from?

Question: What type of vote is required for the Security Council to commit to military action in Korea.

Question: How many permanent members did the UN Security Council have?

Question: What charter did the US believe was violated by intervening in the Korean conflict?
Passage: By mid-1950, North Korean forces numbered between 150,000 and 200,000 troops, organized into 10 infantry divisions, one tank division, and one air force division, with 210 fighter planes and 280 tanks, who captured scheduled objectives and territory, among them Kaesong, Chuncheon, Uijeongbu, and Ongjin. Their forces included 274 T-34-85 tanks, 200 artillery pieces, 110 attack bombers, some 150 Yak fighter planes, 78 Yak trainers, and 35 reconnaissance aircraft. In addition to the invasion force, the North KPA had 114 fighters, 78 bombers, 105 T-34-85 tanks, and some 30,000 soldiers stationed in reserve in North Korea. Although each navy consisted of only several small warships, the North and South Korean navies fought in the war as sea-borne artillery for their in-country armies.

Question: How many infantry divisions did N. Korea have engaged in the war?

Question: What was the maximum number of North Korean troops engaged in the war?

Question: How many reserve soldiers did North Korea have?

Question: What type of naval ships did the South and North Koreans have?
Passage: In contrast, the ROK Army defenders were relatively unprepared and ill-equipped. In South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (1961), R.E. Appleman reports the ROK forces' low combat readiness as of 25 June 1950. The ROK Army had 98,000 soldiers (65,000 combat, 33,000 support), no tanks (they had been requested from the U.S. military, but requests were denied), and a 22-piece air force comprising 12 liaison-type and 10 AT6 advanced-trainer airplanes. There were no large foreign military garrisons in Korea at the time of the invasion, but there were large U.S. garrisons and air forces in Japan.

Question: What was the problem with the ROK Army?

Question: Who declined the ROK's request for tanks?

Question: In what country did the US maintain air forces and garrisons?

Question: Who reported that South Korea's military was not ready for combat?
Passage: On Saturday, 24 June 1950, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson informed President Truman that the North Koreans had invaded South Korea. Truman and Acheson discussed a U.S. invasion response and agreed that the United States was obligated to act, paralleling the North Korean invasion with Adolf Hitler's aggressions in the 1930s, with the conclusion being that the mistake of appeasement must not be repeated. Several U.S. industries were mobilized to supply materials, labor, capital, production facilities, and other services necessary to support the military objectives of the Korean War. However, President Truman later acknowledged that he believed fighting the invasion was essential to the American goal of the global containment of communism as outlined in the National Security Council Report 68 (NSC-68) (declassified in 1975):

Question: Which Secretary of State did President Truman hold discussions about how the US would respond to the invasion of South Korea?

Question: What did the US not want to see repeated?

Question: The US involvement in the Korean War was important to achieving what goal?

Question: What report discussed the United States's goals for containing communism?

Question: The North Korean invasion of South Korea was compared to what event?
Passage: As an initial response, Truman called for a naval blockade of North Korea, and was shocked to learn that such a blockade could be imposed only 'on paper', since the U.S. Navy no longer had the warships with which to carry out his request. In fact, because of the extensive defense cuts and the emphasis placed on building a nuclear bomber force, none of the services were in a position to make a robust response with conventional military strength. General Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was faced with re-organizing and deploying an American military force that was a shadow of its World War II counterpart. The impact of the Truman administration's defense budget cutbacks were now keenly felt, as American troops fought a series of costly rearguard actions. Lacking sufficient anti-tank weapons, artillery or armor, they were driven back down the Korean peninsula to Pusan. In a postwar analysis of the unpreparedness of U.S. Army forces deployed to Korea during the summer and fall of 1950, Army Major General Floyd L. Parks stated that "Many who never lived to tell the tale had to fight the full range of ground warfare from offensive to delaying action, unit by unit, man by man ... [T]hat we were able to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat ... does not relieve us from the blame of having placed our own flesh and blood in such a predicament."

Question: Why was the US naval blockade not feasible?

Question: Why was the US not able to provide an adequate response to the Korean invasion?

Question: Who was tasked with reorganization and deploying of the US military?

Question: Who was forced to retreat back to the Pusan Peninsula due to unpreparedness?

Question: Who stated that winning the war does not excuse putting US troops into a bad situation?
Passage: Acting on State Secretary Acheson's recommendation, President Truman ordered General MacArthur to transfer matériel to the Army of the Republic of Korea while giving air cover to the evacuation of U.S. nationals. The President disagreed with advisers who recommended unilateral U.S. bombing of the North Korean forces, and ordered the US Seventh Fleet to protect the Republic of China (Taiwan), whose government asked to fight in Korea. The United States denied ROC's request for combat, lest it provoke a communist Chinese retaliation. Because the United States had sent the Seventh Fleet to "neutralize" the Taiwan Strait, Chinese premier Zhou Enlai criticized both the UN and U.S. initiatives as "armed aggression on Chinese territory."

Question: What general provided material to the Republic of Korea and evacuated US nationals?

Question: Who disagreed with the idea of unilaterally bombing the North Korean military?

Question: What fleet was sent to the Taiwan Strait?

Question: Fearing the provocation of Communist China, what country's request for combat troops did the US deny?

Question: Who is the Chinese premier that called the actions of the US and the United Nations an act of aggression?
Passage: The Battle of Osan, the first significant American engagement of the Korean War, involved the 540-soldier Task Force Smith, which was a small forward element of the 24th Infantry Division which had been flown in from Japan. On 5 July 1950, Task Force Smith attacked the North Koreans at Osan but without weapons capable of destroying the North Koreans' tanks. They were unsuccessful; the result was 180 dead, wounded, or taken prisoner. The KPA progressed southwards, pushing back the US force at Pyongtaek, Chonan, and Chochiwon, forcing the 24th Division's retreat to Taejeon, which the KPA captured in the Battle of Taejon; the 24th Division suffered 3,602 dead and wounded and 2,962 captured, including the Division's Commander, Major General William F. Dean.

Question: What battle is considered the US's first significant fight in the Korean War?

Question: Which infantry division was involved in the Battle of Osan?

Question: Where was the 24th Division forced to retreat to what location?

Question: At what Battle did the 24th Infantry Division suffer major losses?

Question: In what country is the US's Task Force Smith located?
Passage: By August, the KPA had pushed back the ROK Army and the Eighth United States Army to the vicinity of Pusan in southeast Korea. In their southward advance, the KPA purged the Republic of Korea's intelligentsia by killing civil servants and intellectuals. On 20 August, General MacArthur warned North Korean leader Kim Il-sung that he was responsible for the KPA's atrocities. By September, the UN Command controlled the Pusan perimeter, enclosing about 10% of Korea, in a line partially defined by the Nakdong River.

Question: How did the KPA hurt the Republic of Korea's intellectual core?

Question: Who was held responsible for the actions of the KPA?

Question: Where did the Eighth United States and ROK get pushed back to?

Question: What body of water provided a natural border to the UN command-controlled Pusan perimeter?

Question: How much of Korea was under the control of the United Nations?
Passage: Although Kim's early successes had led him to predict that he would end the war by the end of August, Chinese leaders were more pessimistic. To counter a possible U.S. deployment, Zhou Enlai secured a Soviet commitment to have the Soviet Union support Chinese forces with air cover, and deployed 260,000 soldiers along the Korean border, under the command of Gao Gang. Zhou commanded Chai Chengwen to conduct a topographical survey of Korea, and directed Lei Yingfu, Zhou's military advisor in Korea, to analyze the military situation in Korea. Lei concluded that MacArthur would most likely attempt a landing at Incheon. After conferring with Mao that this would be MacArthur's most likely strategy, Zhou briefed Soviet and North Korean advisers of Lei's findings, and issued orders to Chinese army commanders deployed on the Korean border to prepare for American naval activity in the Korea Strait.

Question: Why did Zhou Enlai want a commitment the Soviet Union to commit to supporting the Chinese troops?

Question: Where did North Korea predict that MacArthur would enter Korea?

Question: Who helped North Korea prepare for war by surveying the country?

Question: Where did the Chinese military deploy troops in preparation for the arrival of US troops?

Question: Even though it was predicted that the Korean War would end in August, who was less than optimistic about the prediction?
Passage: In the resulting Battle of Pusan Perimeter (August–September 1950), the U.S. Army withstood KPA attacks meant to capture the city at the Naktong Bulge, P'ohang-dong, and Taegu. The United States Air Force (USAF) interrupted KPA logistics with 40 daily ground support sorties that destroyed 32 bridges, halting most daytime road and rail traffic. KPA forces were forced to hide in tunnels by day and move only at night. To deny matériel to the KPA, the USAF destroyed logistics depots, petroleum refineries, and harbors, while the U.S. Navy air forces attacked transport hubs. Consequently, the over-extended KPA could not be supplied throughout the south. On 27 August, 67th Fighter Squadron aircraft mistakenly attacked facilities in Chinese territory and the Soviet Union called the UN Security Council's attention to China's complaint about the incident. The US proposed that a commission of India and Sweden determine what the US should pay in compensation but the Soviets vetoed the US proposal.

Question: Which army was trying to capture Teague and the Naktong Bulge?

Question: What did the US Air Force's daytime attacks cause the KPA to do?

Question: Why did the Soviet Union complain about the action of the US to the UN Security Council?

Question: Along with India, what other nation was to determine the how much the US would have to compensate China?

Question: Why did India and Sweden never determine how much the US would compensate China?
Passage: Meanwhile, U.S. garrisons in Japan continually dispatched soldiers and matériel to reinforce defenders in the Pusan Perimeter. Tank battalions deployed to Korea directly from the U.S. mainland from the port of San Francisco to the port of Pusan, the largest Korean port. By late August, the Pusan Perimeter had some 500 medium tanks battle-ready. In early September 1950, ROK Army and UN Command forces outnumbered the KPA 180,000 to 100,000 soldiers. The UN forces, once prepared, counterattacked and broke out of the Pusan Perimeter.

Question: Where in the United States was the tank battalion located?

Question: What is Korea's largest port?

Question: Besides the United States, what other country sent military personnel to Korea?

Question: Who had the fewest number of troops in Korea?

Question: Who was able to counterattack and move the KPA away from the Pusan Perimeter?
Passage: Against the rested and re-armed Pusan Perimeter defenders and their reinforcements, the KPA were undermanned and poorly supplied; unlike the UN Command, they lacked naval and air support. To relieve the Pusan Perimeter, General MacArthur recommended an amphibious landing at Inchon (now known as Incheon), near Seoul and well over 100 miles (160 km) behind the KPA lines. On 6 July, he ordered Major General Hobart R. Gay, Commander, 1st Cavalry Division, to plan the division's amphibious landing at Incheon; on 12–14 July, the 1st Cavalry Division embarked from Yokohama, Japan to reinforce the 24th Infantry Division inside the Pusan Perimeter.

Question: Why did General MacArthur suggest an amphibious landing at Inchon?

Question: Who did General MacArthur ask to plan the amphibious attack?

Question: Where did the 1st Infantry deploy from?

Question: Why were KPA forces unable to adequately defend themselves against UN forces?
Passage: Soon after the war began, General MacArthur had begun planning a landing at Incheon, but the Pentagon opposed him. When authorized, he activated a combined U.S. Army and Marine Corps, and ROK Army force. The X Corps, led by General Edward Almond, Commander, consisted of 40,000 men of the 1st Marine Division, the 7th Infantry Division and around 8,600 ROK Army soldiers. By 15 September, the amphibious assault force faced few KPA defenders at Incheon: military intelligence, psychological warfare, guerrilla reconnaissance, and protracted bombardment facilitated a relatively light battle. However, the bombardment destroyed most of the city of Incheon.

Question: Who initially opposed General MacArthur's landing plan?

Question: What Corps included 40,000 men from the 1st Marine Division?

Question: Who coordinated the efforts of the ROK Army, Marine Corps and the US Army to stage a successful battle?
Passage: After the Incheon landing, the 1st Cavalry Division began its northward advance from the Pusan Perimeter. "Task Force Lynch" (after Lieutenant Colonel James H. Lynch), 3rd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, and two 70th Tank Battalion units (Charlie Company and the Intelligence–Reconnaissance Platoon) effected the "Pusan Perimeter Breakout" through 106.4 miles (171.2 km) of enemy territory to join the 7th Infantry Division at Osan. The X Corps rapidly defeated the KPA defenders around Seoul, thus threatening to trap the main KPA force in Southern Korea.

Question: Whose nickname was 'Task Force Lynch'?

Question: What was the 106 mile push through enemy territory called?

Question: Who was defeated near Seoul, Korea?
Passage: On 18 September, Stalin dispatched General H. M. Zakharov to Korea to advise Kim Il-sung to halt his offensive around the Pusan perimeter and to redeploy his forces to defend Seoul. Chinese commanders were not briefed on North Korean troop numbers or operational plans. As the overall commander of Chinese forces, Zhou Enlai suggested that the North Koreans should attempt to eliminate the enemy forces at Inchon only if they had reserves of at least 100,000 men; otherwise, he advised the North Koreans to withdraw their forces north.

Question: Who was sent to Korea to act as an advisor to Kim Il-Sung?

Question: Why did Kim Il-Sung redeploy his military troops?

Question: Who was not being briefed on the operational plans or the number of troops in combat?

Question: When was it advised for North Koreans to attempt to defeat the opposing forces at Inchon?
Passage: On 25 September, Seoul was recaptured by South Korean forces. American air raids caused heavy damage to the KPA, destroying most of its tanks and much of its artillery. North Korean troops in the south, instead of effectively withdrawing north, rapidly disintegrated, leaving Pyongyang vulnerable. During the general retreat only 25,000 to 30,000 soldiers managed to rejoin the Northern KPA lines. On 27 September, Stalin convened an emergency session of the Politburo, in which he condemned the incompetence of the KPA command and held Soviet military advisers responsible for the defeat.

Question: What emergency session was called by Stalin?

Question: How many troops made it back to the KPA lines after retreating?

Question: Who was held responsible for the defeat of North Korean troops?

Question: Who reclaimed the Seoul?

Question: What city was left vulnerable by North Korea's quick retreat?
Passage: On 27 September, MacArthur received the top secret National Security Council Memorandum 81/1 from Truman reminding him that operations north of the 38th parallel were authorized only if "at the time of such operation there was no entry into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese Communist forces, no announcements of intended entry, nor a threat to counter our operations militarily..." On 29 September MacArthur restored the government of the Republic of Korea under Syngman Rhee. On 30 September, Defense Secretary George Marshall sent an eyes-only message to MacArthur: "We want you to feel unhampered tactically and strategically to proceed north of the 38th parallel." During October, the ROK police executed people who were suspected to be sympathetic to North Korea, and similar massacres were carried out until early 1951.

Question: What memorandum stated the circumstances for engaging in conflict above the 38th parallel?

Question: Who controlled the newly restored government of the Republic of Korea?

Question: Who sent a message to MacArthur giving him the authority to proceed past the 38th parallel?

Question: Who executed people who were believed to be loyal to North Korea?

Question: What year did the executions stop?
Passage: On 30 September, Zhou Enlai warned the United States that China was prepared to intervene in Korea if the United States crossed the 38th parallel. Zhou attempted to advise North Korean commanders on how to conduct a general withdrawal by using the same tactics which had allowed Chinese communist forces to successfully escape Chiang Kai-shek's Encirclement Campaigns in the 1930s, but by some accounts North Korean commanders did not utilize these tactics effectively. Historian Bruce Cumings argues, however, the KPA's rapid withdrawal was strategic, with troops melting into the mountains from where they could launch guerrilla raids on the UN forces spread out on the coasts.

Question: Who vowed to intervene if the US was to engage in conflict North of the 38th parallel?

Question: The tactics Zhou Enlai advised the North Koreans to use during their withdrawal was the same the Chinese used to escape event?

Question: Who believes that the North Koreans only appeared to fail to effective execute their withdrawal plan?

Question: What may have been North Korea's goal in the way they rapidly withdrew from South Korea?

Question: Who's control did the Chinese Communists escape in the 1930's?
Passage: By 1 October 1950, the UN Command repelled the KPA northwards past the 38th parallel; the ROK Army crossed after them, into North Korea. MacArthur made a statement demanding the KPA's unconditional surrender. Six days later, on 7 October, with UN authorization, the UN Command forces followed the ROK forces northwards. The X Corps landed at Wonsan (in southeastern North Korea) and Riwon (in northeastern North Korea), already captured by ROK forces. The Eighth U.S. Army and the ROK Army drove up western Korea and captured Pyongyang city, the North Korean capital, on 19 October 1950. The 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team ("Rakkasans") made their first of two combat jumps during the Korean War on 20 October 1950 at Sunchon and Sukchon. The missions of the 187th were to cut the road north going to China, preventing North Korean leaders from escaping from Pyongyang; and to rescue American prisoners of war. At month's end, UN forces held 135,000 KPA prisoners of war. As they neared the Sino-Korean border, the UN forces in the west were divided from those in the east by 50–100 miles of mountainous terrain.

Question: Who issued a statement calling for North Korea's unconditional surrender?

Question: Who authorized giving troops the ability to follow the North Korean forces north?

Question: How did the 187 Airborne Regimental Combat Team prevent North Korean leaders from fleeing?

Question: How many North Korean prisoners of war were held by UN forces?