sentence-transformers/squad huggingface dataset:
Passage: Ultimately, Hitler was trapped within his own vision of bombing as a terror weapon, formed in the 1930s when he threatened smaller nations into accepting German rule rather than submit to air bombardment. This fact had important implications. It showed the extent to which Hitler personally mistook Allied strategy for one of morale breaking instead of one of economic warfare, with the collapse of morale as an additional bonus. Hitler was much more attracted to the political aspects of bombing. As the mere threat of it had produced diplomatic results in the 1930s, he expected that the threat of German retaliation would persuade the Allies to adopt a policy of moderation and not to begin a policy of unrestricted bombing. His hope was — for reasons of political prestige within Germany itself — that the German population would be protected from the Allied bombings. When this proved impossible, he began to fear that popular feeling would turn against his regime, and he redoubled efforts to mount a similar "terror offensive" against Britain in order to produce a stalemate in which both sides would hesitate to use bombing at all.

Question: How did Hitler threaten small nations into accepting German rule?

Question: What policy did Hitler hope the bombing of Allies would cause?

Question: What kind of prestige was Hitler hoping for?

Question: Why did Hitler use terror bombing against Britain?
Passage: A major problem in the managing of the Luftwaffe was Hermann Göring. Hitler believed the Luftwaffe was "the most effective strategic weapon", and in reply to repeated requests from the Kriegsmarine for control over aircraft insisted, "We should never have been able to hold our own in this war if we had not had an undivided Luftwaffe". Such principles made it much harder to integrate the air force into the overall strategy and produced in Göring a jealous and damaging defence of his "empire" while removing Hitler voluntarily from the systematic direction of the Luftwaffe at either the strategic or operational level. When Hitler tried to intervene more in the running of the air force later in the war, he was faced with a political conflict of his own making between himself and Göring, which was not fully resolved until the war was almost over. In 1940 and 1941, Göring's refusal to cooperate with the Kriegsmarine denied the entire Wehrmacht military forces of the Reich the chance to strangle British sea communications, which might have had strategic or decisive effect in the war against the British Empire.

Question: Who did Hitler have a conflict over running the air force?

Question: What strategy could have worked against the British Empire?

Question: What did the Kriegsmarine try to gain control over?

Question: Who did Goring refuse to work with in 1940 and 1941?
Passage: The deliberate separation of the Luftwaffe from the rest of the military structure encouraged the emergence of a major "communications gap" between Hitler and the Luftwaffe, which other factors helped to exacerbate. For one thing, Göring's fear of Hitler led him to falsify or misrepresent what information was available in the direction of an uncritical and over-optimistic interpretation of air strength. When Göring decided against continuing Wever's original heavy bomber programme in 1937, the Reichsmarschall's own explanation was that Hitler wanted to know only how many bombers there were, not how many engines each had. In July 1939, Göring arranged a display of the Luftwaffe's most advanced equipment at Rechlin, to give the impression the air force was more prepared for a strategic air war than was actually the case.

Question: What was the major cause of the separation between the Luftwaffe and the other military structure?

Question: What did Goring do because of his fear of Hitler?

Question: What year did Goring display the Luftwaffe's advanced equipment?

Question: Who's bombing program did Goring abandon in 1939?

Question: In what city did Goring display the advance equipment?
Passage: Within hours of the UK and France declaring war on Germany on 3 September 1939, the RAF bombed German warships along the German coast at Wilhelmshaven. Thereafter bombing operations were against ports and shipping and propaganda leaflet drops. Operations were planned to minimize civilian casualties. From 15 May 1940 – the day after the Luftwaffe destroyed the centre of Rotterdam – the RAF also carried out operations east of the Rhine, attacking industrial and transportation targets. Operations were carried out every night thereafter.

Question: Which two countries declared war on Germany on September 3 1939?

Question: The RAF bombed what Germany coast?

Question: What kind of leaflets were dropped?

Question: What were the RAF operations trying to lessen?

Question: What year did the Luftwaffe destroy Rotterdam center?
Passage: Although not specifically prepared to conduct independent strategic air operations against an opponent, the Luftwaffe was expected to do so over Britain. From July until September 1940 the Luftwaffe attacked RAF Fighter Command to gain air superiority as a prelude to invasion. This involved the bombing of English Channel convoys, ports, and RAF airfields and supporting industries. Destroying RAF Fighter Command would allow the Germans to gain control of the skies over the invasion area. It was supposed that Bomber Command, RAF Coastal Command and the Royal Navy could not operate under conditions of German air superiority.

Question: Which tactics were the Luftwaffe excepted to use against Britain?

Question: Why did the Luftwaffe bomb the RAF Fighter Command?

Question: What was the name of the Channel the Luftwaffe bomb to try to gain air superiority?

Question: Which Navy was assumed not to be able to operate under German air superiority?
Passage: The Luftwaffe's poor intelligence meant that their aircraft were not always able to locate their targets, and thus attacks on factories and airfields failed to achieve the desired results. British fighter aircraft production continued at a rate surpassing Germany's by 2 to 1. The British produced 10,000 aircraft in 1940, in comparison to Germany's 8,000. The replacement of pilots and aircrew was more difficult. Both the RAF and Luftwaffe struggled to replace manpower losses, though the Germans had larger reserves of trained aircrew. The circumstances affected the Germans more than the British. Operating over home territory, British flyers could fly again if they survived being shot down. German crews, even if they survived, faced capture. Moreover, bombers had four to five crewmen on board, representing a greater loss of manpower. On 7 September, the Germans shifted away from the destruction of the RAF's supporting structures. German intelligence suggested Fighter Command was weakening, and an attack on London would force it into a final battle of annihilation while compelling the British Government to surrender.

Question: Why did the Luftwaffe fail to locate their targets?

Question: What did German crew members face if they were shot down over Britain?

Question: Britain's fabrication of fighter planes out paced Germany by what margin?

Question: How big was the crew of a bomber?

Question: How many aircraft did Britain produce in 1940?
Passage: The decision to change strategy is sometimes claimed as a major mistake by the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (OKL). It is argued that persisting with attacks on RAF airfields might have won air superiority for the Luftwaffe. Others argue that the Luftwaffe made little impression on Fighter Command in the last week of August and first week of September and that the shift in strategy was not decisive. It has also been argued that it was doubtful the Luftwaffe could have won air superiority before the "weather window" began to deteriorate in October. It was also possible, if RAF losses became severe, that they could pull out to the north, wait for the German invasion, then redeploy southward again. Other historians argue that the outcome of the air battle was irrelevant; the massive numerical superiority of British naval forces and the inherent weakness of the Kriegsmarine would have made the projected German invasion, Unternehmen Seelöwe (Operation Sea Lion), a disaster with or without German air superiority.

Question: What does OKL stand for?

Question: What month would the weather window begin to decline?

Question: If serious loss had happened to the RAF where might they have pulled out of?

Question: What is the German name of Operation Sea Lion?

Question: Who had exponential larger naval forces?
Passage: Regardless of the ability of the Luftwaffe to win air superiority, Adolf Hitler was frustrated that it was not happening quickly enough. With no sign of the RAF weakening, and Luftwaffe air fleets (Luftflotten) taking punishing losses, the OKL was keen for a change in strategy. To reduce losses further, a change in strategy was also favoured to take place at night, to give the bombers greater protection under cover of darkness.[b] On 4 September 1940, in a long address at the Sportspalast, Hitler declared: "And should the Royal Air Force drop two thousand, or three thousand [kilograms ...] then we will now drop [...] 300,000, 400,000, yes one million kilograms in a single night. And should they declare they will greatly increase their attacks on our cities, then we will erase their cities."

Question: The Luftwaffe air fleets were taking what kind of losses?

Question: What did the punishing losses to the air fleet cause the Luftwaffe to do?

Question: What kind of strategy did the Luftwaffe use to give their bombers better protection?

Question: What city did Hitler give a speech where he said he would erase British cities?

Question: In what year did Hitler give the speech at Sportspalast?
Passage: It was decided to focus on bombing Britain's industrial cities in daylight to begin with. The main focus of the bombing operations was against the city of London. The first major raid in this regard took place on 7 September. On 15 September, on a date known as the Battle of Britain Day, a large-scale raid was launched in daylight, but suffered significant loss for no lasting gain. Although there were a few large air battles fought in daylight later in the month and into October, the Luftwaffe switched its main effort to night attacks in order to reduce losses. This became official policy on 7 October. The air campaign soon got underway against London and other British cities. However, the Luftwaffe faced limitations. Its aircraft—Dornier Do 17, Junkers Ju 88, and Heinkel He 111s—were capable of carrying out strategic missions, but were incapable of doing greater damage because of bomb-load limitations. The Luftwaffe's decision in the interwar period to concentrate on medium bombers can be attributed to several reasons: Hitler did not intend or foresee a war with Britain in 1939; the OKL believed a medium bomber could carry out strategic missions just as well as a heavy bomber force; and Germany did not possess the resources or technical ability to produce four-engined bombers before the war.

Question: Which British city did the Luftwaffe focus its bombing on?

Question: What was the name of the large air raid that took place in daylight hours in Britain?

Question: What was the main reason the Luftwaffe was not able to cause extensive damage with their missions?

Question: What kind of bombers was Germany not able to build?
Passage: Although it had equipment capable of doing serious damage, the problem for the Luftwaffe was its unclear strategy and poor intelligence. OKL had not been informed that Britain was to be considered a potential opponent until early 1938. It had no time to gather reliable intelligence on Britain's industries. Moreover, OKL could not settle on an appropriate strategy. German planners had to decide whether the Luftwaffe should deliver the weight of its attacks against a specific segment of British industry such as aircraft factories, or against a system of interrelated industries such as Britain's import and distribution network, or even in a blow aimed at breaking the morale of the British population. The Luftwaffe's strategy became increasingly aimless over the winter of 1940–1941. Disputes among the OKL staff revolved more around tactics than strategy. This method condemned the offensive over Britain to failure before it began.

Question: What year did the OKL become aware that Britain would be a possible target?

Question: What disagreements did the Luftwaffe staff center around?

Question: Poor intelligence and what other problem made it difficult for the Luftwaffe to do extreme damage?

Question: What did the disputes between the staff cause to happen to the strategy against Britain?
Passage: In an operational capacity, limitations in weapons technology and quick British reactions were making it more difficult to achieve strategic effect. Attacking ports, shipping and imports as well as disrupting rail traffic in the surrounding areas, especially the distribution of coal, an important fuel in all industrial economies of the Second World War, would net a positive result. However, the use of delayed-action bombs, while initially very effective, gradually had less impact, partly because they failed to detonate.[c] Moreover, the British had anticipated the change in strategy and dispersed its production facilities making them less vulnerable to a concentrated attack. Regional commissioners were given plenipotentiary powers to restore communications and organise the distribution of supplies to keep the war economy moving.

Question: Coupled with British quick reactions what cause operational capacity hard to achieve?

Question: What was an important fuel in the Second World War?

Question: Who was given permission to restore power and move supplies to keep the war moving?

Question: What kind of bombs were effective in the beginning but became less so with time?

Question: What did Britain do that helped make the new strategy less effective?
Passage: Based on experience with German strategic bombing during World War I against the United Kingdom, the British government estimated after the war that 50 casualties— with about one third killed— would result for every tonne of bombs dropped on London. The estimate of tonnes of bombs an enemy could drop per day grew as aircraft technology advanced, from 75 in 1922, to 150 in 1934, to 644 in 1937. That year the Committee on Imperial Defence estimated that an attack of 60 days would result in 600,000 dead and 1,200,000 wounded. News reports of the Spanish Civil War, such as the bombing of Barcelona, supported the 50-casualties-per-tonne estimate. By 1938 experts generally expected that Germany would attempt to drop as much as 3,500 tonnes in the first 24 hours of war and average 700 tonnes a day for several weeks. In addition to high explosive and incendiary bombs the enemy would possibly use poison gas and even bacteriological warfare, all with a high degree of accuracy. In 1939 military theorist Basil Liddell-Hart predicted that 250,000 deaths and injuries in Britain could occur in the first week of war.

Question: How many casualties did the British government estimate for every ton of bombs dropped?

Question: As technology increased what was the amount of bombs that could be dropped in 1937 per day?

Question: How many tons did experts expect Germany to drop in the first 24 hours of the war?

Question: What committee estimated that 60 days of attacks would result in 600,000 deaths?

Question: Who was the military theorist in 1939 who said 250,000 deaths and injury could occur in the first week of war in Britian?
Passage: In addition to the dead and wounded, government leaders feared mass psychological trauma from aerial attack and a resulting collapse of civil society. A committee of psychiatrists reported to the government in 1938 that there would be three times as many mental as physical casualties from aerial bombing, implying three to four million psychiatric patients. Winston Churchill told Parliament in 1934, "We must expect that, under the pressure of continuous attack upon London, at least three or four million people would be driven out into the open country around the metropolis." Panicked reactions during the Munich crisis, such as the migration by 150,000 to Wales, contributed to fear of societal chaos.

Question: What was the biggest fear aerial attacks would cause besides death and wounded?

Question: Psychiatrists believe in 1938 that mental trauma could reach how many millions?

Question: Where did 150,000 migrate during the Munich crisis?

Question: Who told Parliament that after long periods of attacks people would leave the cities for the country?
Passage: The government planned to voluntarily evacuate four million people—mostly women and children—from urban areas, including 1.4 million from London. It expected about 90% of evacuees to stay in private homes, and conducted an extensive survey to determine available space. Detailed preparations for transporting them were developed. A trial blackout was held on 10 August 1939, and when Germany invaded Poland on 1 September a blackout began at sunset. Lights would not be allowed after dark for almost six years, and the blackout became by far the most unpopular aspect of the war for civilians, more than rationing.:51,106 The relocation of the government and the civil service was also planned, but would only have occurred if necessary so as not to damage civilian morale.:33

Question: The government planned to evacuate 1.4 million from which city?

Question: What trial took place on August 10 1939?

Question: What was most unpopular affect of the war with civilians ?

Question: How long were lights not allowed on after dark?

Question: Why did the government and civil service not want to relocate during the war?
Passage: Much civil-defence preparation in the form of shelters was left in the hands of local authorities, and many areas such as Birmingham, Coventry, Belfast and the East End of London did not have enough shelters. The Phoney War, however, and the unexpected delay of civilian bombing permitted the shelter programme to finish in June 1940.:35 The programme favoured backyard Anderson shelters and small brick surface shelters; many of the latter were soon abandoned in 1940 as unsafe. In addition, authorities expected that the raids would be brief and during the day. Few predicted that attacks by night would force Londoners to sleep in shelters.

Question: What civil-defense efforts were left to local authorities to handle?

Question: What year did the shelter program finish?

Question: Why were the shelters soon abandoned in 1940?

Question: Why were Londoners forced to sleep in shelters?
Passage: Very deeply buried shelters provided the most protection against a direct hit. The government did not build them for large populations before the war because of cost, time to build, and fears that their very safety would cause occupants to refuse to leave to return to work, or that anti-war sentiment would develop in large groups. The government saw the Communist Party's leading role in advocating for building deep shelters as an attempt to damage civilian morale, especially after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 1939.:34

Question: What kind of sentiment did the government fear would developed in large group shelters?

Question: Who did the government see as a leading advocate for building deep shelters?

Question: What was the name of the Pact of August 1939?
Passage: The most important existing communal shelters were the London Underground stations. Although many civilians had used them as such during the First World War, the government in 1939 refused to allow the stations to be used as shelters so as not to interfere with commuter and troop travel, and the fears that occupants might refuse to leave. Underground officials were ordered to lock station entrances during raids; but by the second week of heavy bombing the government relented and ordered the stations to be opened. Each day orderly lines of people queued until 4 pm, when they were allowed to enter the stations. In mid-September 1940 about 150,000 a night slept in the Underground, although by the winter and spring months the numbers had declined to 100,000 or less. Noises of battle were muffled and sleep was easier in the deepest stations, but many were killed from direct hits on several stations.

Question: Why did the government refuse to allow the London Underground stations to be used as shelters?

Question: Underground officials were ordered to lock the stations during raids but opened how long after the orders?

Question: In 1940 how many people were sleeping in the Underground stations?

Question: Muffling the sound of batter made what easier in the Underground Stations?

Question: Why were many killed in Underground Stations?
Passage: Communal shelters never housed more than one seventh of Greater London residents, however. Peak use of the Underground as shelter was 177,000 on 27 September 1940, and a November 1940 census of London found that about 4% of residents used the Tube and other large shelters; 9% in public surface shelters; and 27% in private home shelters, implying that the remaining 60% of the city likely stayed at home. The government distributed Anderson shelters until 1941 and that year began distributing the Morrison shelter, which could be used inside homes.:190

Question: What was the largest number to use Underground shelters in September 27, 1940?

Question: In 1940 what percentage used the Tube for a sleeping shelter?

Question: Where did 60% of populations stay?

Question: What year did the government start giving out Morrison shelters?

Question: Where could the Morrison shelters be used?
Passage: Public demand caused the government in October 1940 to build new deep shelters:189–190 within the Underground to hold 80,000 people but were not completed until the period of heaviest bombing had passed. By the end of 1940 significant improvements had been made in the Underground and in many other large shelters. Authorities provided stoves and bathrooms and canteen trains provided food. Tickets were issued for bunks in large shelters to reduce the amount of time spent queuing. Committees quickly formed within shelters as informal governments, and organisations such as the British Red Cross and the Salvation Army worked to improve conditions. Entertainment included concerts, films, plays and books from local libraries.

Question: What year did the government start to build new deep shelters?

Question: How many people were the new shelters going to hold?

Question: What helped cut down time standing in the queue for shelters?

Question: Which two groups help improve life in the shelters?

Question: What kind of trains provided food in the shelters?
Passage: Although the intensity of the bombing was not as great as prewar expectations so an equal comparison is impossible, no psychiatric crisis occurred because of the Blitz even during the period of greatest bombing of September 1940. An American witness wrote "By every test and measure I am able to apply, these people are staunch to the bone and won't quit ... the British are stronger and in a better position than they were at its beginning". People referred to raids as if they were weather, stating that a day was "very blitzy".:75,261 However, another American who visited Britain, the publisher Ralph Ingersoll, wrote soon after the Blitz eased on 15 September that:

Question: What witness wrote that these people are staunch to the bone and won't quit?

Question: With the intense bomb what did not happen as great as prewar predictions expected?

Question: People called the raids very blitzy like they were talking about what?