sentence-transformers/squad huggingface dataset:
Passage: Charles Peirce (1839–1914) was highly influential in laying the groundwork for today's empirical scientific method.[citation needed] Although Peirce severely criticized many elements of Descartes' peculiar brand of rationalism, he did not reject rationalism outright. Indeed, he concurred with the main ideas of rationalism, most importantly the idea that rational concepts can be meaningful and the idea that rational concepts necessarily go beyond the data given by empirical observation. In later years he even emphasized the concept-driven side of the then ongoing debate between strict empiricism and strict rationalism, in part to counterbalance the excesses to which some of his cohorts had taken pragmatism under the "data-driven" strict-empiricist view.

Question: When was Peirce born?

Question: When did Peirce die?

Question: What view did Peirce think had been driven to excess?

Question: Who formed the basis for modern scientific method?

Question: Whose rationalism did Peirce criticize?
Passage: Among Peirce's major contributions was to place inductive reasoning and deductive reasoning in a complementary rather than competitive mode, the latter of which had been the primary trend among the educated since David Hume wrote a century before. To this, Peirce added the concept of abductive reasoning. The combined three forms of reasoning serve as a primary conceptual foundation for the empirically based scientific method today. Peirce's approach "presupposes that (1) the objects of knowledge are real things, (2) the characters (properties) of real things do not depend on our perceptions of them, and (3) everyone who has sufficient experience of real things will agree on the truth about them. According to Peirce's doctrine of fallibilism, the conclusions of science are always tentative. The rationality of the scientific method does not depend on the certainty of its conclusions, but on its self-corrective character: by continued application of the method science can detect and correct its own mistakes, and thus eventually lead to the discovery of truth".

Question: How long before Peirce did Hume write?

Question: How did Peirce view inductive vs deductive reasoning?

Question: How did Hume view inductive vs deductive reasoning?

Question: What did fallibilism say?

Question: What does the scientific method's rationality depend on?
Passage: In his Harvard "Lectures on Pragmatism" (1903), Peirce enumerated what he called the "three cotary propositions of pragmatism" (L: cos, cotis whetstone), saying that they "put the edge on the maxim of pragmatism". First among these he listed the peripatetic-thomist observation mentioned above, but he further observed that this link between sensory perception and intellectual conception is a two-way street. That is, it can be taken to say that whatever we find in the intellect is also incipiently in the senses. Hence, if theories are theory-laden then so are the senses, and perception itself can be seen as a species of abductive inference, its difference being that it is beyond control and hence beyond critique – in a word, incorrigible. This in no way conflicts with the fallibility and revisability of scientific concepts, since it is only the immediate percept in its unique individuality or "thisness" – what the Scholastics called its haecceity – that stands beyond control and correction. Scientific concepts, on the other hand, are general in nature, and transient sensations do in another sense find correction within them. This notion of perception as abduction has received periodic revivals in artificial intelligence and cognitive science research, most recently for instance with the work of Irvin Rock on indirect perception.

Question: Who wrote 'Lectures on Pragmatism'?

Question: When was 'Lectures on Pragmatism' published?

Question: What is 'haecceity'?

Question: What did Irvin Rock write about?

Question: Where has 'perception as abduction' come up repeatedly?
Passage: Around the beginning of the 20th century, William James (1842–1910) coined the term "radical empiricism" to describe an offshoot of his form of pragmatism, which he argued could be dealt with separately from his pragmatism – though in fact the two concepts are intertwined in James's published lectures. James maintained that the empirically observed "directly apprehended universe needs ... no extraneous trans-empirical connective support", by which he meant to rule out the perception that there can be any value added by seeking supernatural explanations for natural phenomena. James's "radical empiricism" is thus not radical in the context of the term "empiricism", but is instead fairly consistent with the modern use of the term "empirical". (His method of argument in arriving at this view, however, still readily encounters debate within philosophy even today.)

Question: Who came up with 'radical empiricism'?

Question: Where were James's pragmatism and radical empiricism intertwined?

Question: When was William James born?

Question: When did William James die?

Question: When did James come up with 'radical empiricism'?
Passage: John Dewey (1859–1952) modified James' pragmatism to form a theory known as instrumentalism. The role of sense experience in Dewey's theory is crucial, in that he saw experience as unified totality of things through which everything else is interrelated. Dewey's basic thought, in accordance with empiricism was that reality is determined by past experience. Therefore, humans adapt their past experiences of things to perform experiments upon and test the pragmatic values of such experience. The value of such experience is measured experientially and scientifically, and the results of such tests generate ideas that serve as instruments for future experimentation, in physical sciences as in ethics. Thus, ideas in Dewey's system retain their empiricist flavour in that they are only known a posteriori.

Question: Who came up with 'instrumentalism'?

Question: What did Dewey think about reality?

Question: When was Dewey born?

Question: When did Dewey die?

Question: What was instrumentalism a modification of?
Passage: In philosophy, idealism is the group of philosophies which assert that reality, or reality as we can know it, is fundamentally mental, mentally constructed, or otherwise immaterial. Epistemologically, idealism manifests as a skepticism about the possibility of knowing any mind-independent thing. In a sociological sense, idealism emphasizes how human ideas—especially beliefs and values—shape society. As an ontological doctrine, idealism goes further, asserting that all entities are composed of mind or spirit. Idealism thus rejects physicalist and dualist theories that fail to ascribe priority to the mind.

Question: What do idealist philosophies say is constructed in our minds?

Question: What types of things are idealist philosophies skeptical about?

Question: Along with physicalist theories, what theories is idealism in conflict with?

Question: In sociology, what sorts of ideas does idealism focus on?
Passage: The earliest extant arguments that the world of experience is grounded in the mental derive from India and Greece. The Hindu idealists in India and the Greek Neoplatonists gave panentheistic arguments for an all-pervading consciousness as the ground or true nature of reality. In contrast, the Yogācāra school, which arose within Mahayana Buddhism in India in the 4th century CE, based its "mind-only" idealism to a greater extent on phenomenological analyses of personal experience. This turn toward the subjective anticipated empiricists such as George Berkeley, who revived idealism in 18th-century Europe by employing skeptical arguments against materialism.

Question: What Indian thinkers were early idealists?

Question: What Greek philosophers had idealistic views?

Question: With what sect of Buddhism was the Yogācāra school affiliated?

Question: In what century did the Yogācāra school arise?

Question: What century did George Berkeley live in?
Passage: Beginning with Immanuel Kant, German idealists such as G. W. F. Hegel, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, and Arthur Schopenhauer dominated 19th-century philosophy. This tradition, which emphasized the mental or "ideal" character of all phenomena, gave birth to idealistic and subjectivist schools ranging from British idealism to phenomenalism to existentialism. The historical influence of this branch of idealism remains central even to the schools that rejected its metaphysical assumptions, such as Marxism, pragmatism and positivism.

Question: What was the ethnicity of Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling?

Question: In what century did Hegel write?

Question: Along with British idealism and existentialism, what philosophy was influenced by the German idealistic tradition?

Question: Along with positivism and pragmatism, what philosophy rejected idealism's metaphysical views but what nevertheless influenced by it?
Passage: Idealism is a term with several related meanings. It comes via idea from the Greek idein (ἰδεῖν), meaning "to see". The term entered the English language by 1743. In ordinary use, as when speaking of Woodrow Wilson's political idealism, it generally suggests the priority of ideals, principles, values, and goals over concrete realities. Idealists are understood to represent the world as it might or should be, unlike pragmatists, who focus on the world as it presently is. In the arts, similarly, idealism affirms imagination and attempts to realize a mental conception of beauty, a standard of perfection, juxtaposed to aesthetic naturalism and realism.

Question: What does ἰδεῖν mean in English?

Question: By what year was "idealism" a word in English?

Question: Whose worldview contrasts with that of idealists in the ordinary sense of the word?

Question: What language is ἰδεῖν?
Passage: Any philosophy that assigns crucial importance to the ideal or spiritual realm in its account of human existence may be termed "idealist". Metaphysical idealism is an ontological doctrine that holds that reality itself is incorporeal or experiential at its core. Beyond this, idealists disagree on which aspects of the mental are more basic. Platonic idealism affirms that abstractions are more basic to reality than the things we perceive, while subjective idealists and phenomenalists tend to privilege sensory experience over abstract reasoning. Epistemological idealism is the view that reality can only be known through ideas, that only psychological experience can be apprehended by the mind.

Question: What is the term used for philosophies that consider the spiritual to be of paramount importance?

Question: What branch of idealism believes that reality is fundamentally nonphysical?

Question: What branch of idealism sees abstracts as more real than perceived objects?

Question: Along with phenomenalists, what idealists believe the senses are more important than reason?

Question: What branch of idealism believes that we can only know the real world via ideas?
Passage: Subjective idealists like George Berkeley are anti-realists in terms of a mind-independent world, whereas transcendental idealists like Immanuel Kant are strong skeptics of such a world, affirming epistemological and not metaphysical idealism. Thus Kant defines idealism as "the assertion that we can never be certain whether all of our putative outer experience is not mere imagining". He claimed that, according to idealism, "the reality of external objects does not admit of strict proof. On the contrary, however, the reality of the object of our internal sense (of myself and state) is clear immediately through consciousness." However, not all idealists restrict the real or the knowable to our immediate subjective experience. Objective idealists make claims about a transempirical world, but simply deny that this world is essentially divorced from or ontologically prior to the mental. Thus Plato and Gottfried Leibniz affirm an objective and knowable reality transcending our subjective awareness—a rejection of epistemological idealism—but propose that this reality is grounded in ideal entities, a form of metaphysical idealism. Nor do all metaphysical idealists agree on the nature of the ideal; for Plato, the fundamental entities were non-mental abstract forms, while for Leibniz they were proto-mental and concrete monads.

Question: Who is a notable subjective idealist?

Question: What famous philosopher was a transcendental idealist?

Question: Who are subjective idealists opposed to?

Question: Along with Plato, what notable philosopher rejected epistemological idealism?

Question: Who believed the essence of reality to be composed of monads?
Passage: Christian theologians have held idealist views, often based on Neoplatonism, despite the influence of Aristotelian scholasticism from the 12th century onward. Later western theistic idealism such as that of Hermann Lotze offers a theory of the "world ground" in which all things find their unity: it has been widely accepted by Protestant theologians. Several modern religious movements, for example the organizations within the New Thought Movement and the Unity Church, may be said to have a particularly idealist orientation. The theology of Christian Science includes a form of idealism: it teaches that all that truly exists is God and God's ideas; that the world as it appears to the senses is a distortion of the underlying spiritual reality, a distortion that may be corrected (both conceptually and in terms of human experience) through a reorientation (spiritualization) of thought.

Question: In what philosophy was Christian idealism often rooted?

Question: What philosophy influential in the medieval church was opposed to Christian idealism?

Question: In what century did Christian thought begin to be influenced by the scholasticism of Aristotle?

Question: Along with the Unity Church, what contemporary religious movement may be regarded as idealist?

Question: What notable idealist was responsible for a "world ground" theory?
Passage: Plato's theory of forms or "ideas" describes ideal forms (for example the platonic solids in geometry or abstracts like Goodness and Justice), as universals existing independently of any particular instance. Arne Grøn calls this doctrine "the classic example of a metaphysical idealism as a transcendent idealism", while Simone Klein calls Plato "the earliest representative of metaphysical objective idealism". Nevertheless, Plato holds that matter is real, though transitory and imperfect, and is perceived by our body and its senses and given existence by the eternal ideas that are perceived directly by our rational soul. Plato was therefore a metaphysical and epistemological dualist, an outlook that modern idealism has striven to avoid: Plato's thought cannot therefore be counted as idealist in the modern sense, although quantum physics' assertion that man's consciousness is an immutable and primary requisite for not merely perceiving but shaping matter, and thus his reality, would give more credence to Plato's dualist position.[citation needed]

Question: Who regarded Plato as the oldest exponent of metaphysical objective idealism?

Question: What sort of dualist is Plato regarded as?

Question: What was another term for forms in Plato's theory of forms?

Question: What branch of physics might support a worldview similar to Platonic dualism?
Passage: With the neoplatonist Plotinus, wrote Nathaniel Alfred Boll; "there even appears, probably for the first time in Western philosophy, idealism that had long been current in the East even at that time, for it taught... that the soul has made the world by stepping from eternity into time...". Similarly, in regard to passages from the Enneads, "The only space or place of the world is the soul" and "Time must not be assumed to exist outside the soul", Ludwig Noiré wrote: "For the first time in Western philosophy we find idealism proper in Plotinus, However, Plotinus does not address whether we know external objects, unlike Schopenhauer and other modern philosophers.

Question: What sort of philosopher was Plotinus?

Question: According to Noiré, who was the first true Western idealist?

Question: What issue did Schopenhauer discuss that Plotinus did not?

Question: What did the Enneads believe might not have existence outside of the soul?
Passage: Subjective Idealism (immaterialism or phenomenalism) describes a relationship between experience and the world in which objects are no more than collections or "bundles" of sense data in the perceiver. Proponents include Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, an Anglo-Irish philosopher who advanced a theory he called immaterialism, later referred to as "subjective idealism", contending that individuals can only know sensations and ideas of objects directly, not abstractions such as "matter", and that ideas also depend upon being perceived for their very existence - esse est percipi; "to be is to be perceived".

Question: Along with phenomenalism, what is another term for subjective idealism?

Question: Of what see was Berkeley bishop?

Question: What was Berkeley's ethnicity?

Question: What does esse est percipi mean?

Question: What did Berkeley consider things like matter to be?
Passage: Arthur Collier published similar assertions though there seems to have been no influence between the two contemporary writers. The only knowable reality is the represented image of an external object. Matter as a cause of that image, is unthinkable and therefore nothing to us. An external world as absolute matter unrelated to an observer does not exist as far as we are concerned. The universe cannot exist as it appears if there is no perceiving mind. Collier was influenced by An Essay Towards the Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World by "Cambridge Platonist" John Norris (1701).

Question: Who was known as the "Cambridge Platonist"?

Question: Who was notably influenced by John Norris?

Question: When was An Essay Towards the Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World written?

Question: What sort of reality did Collier believe was knowable?
Passage: and proliferation of hyphenated entities such as "thing-in-itself" (Immanuel Kant), "things-as-interacted-by-us" (Arthur Fine), "table-of-commonsense" and "table-of-physics" (Sir Arthur Eddington) which are "warning signs" for conceptual idealism according to Musgrave because they allegedly do not exist but only highlight the numerous ways in which people come to know the world. This argument does not take into account the issues pertaining to hermeneutics, especially at the backdrop of analytic philosophy. Musgrave criticized Richard Rorty and Postmodernist philosophy in general for confusion of use and mention.

Question: Who coined the term "thing-in-itself"?

Question: Who invented the idea of a "table-of-commonsense"?

Question: Who came up with the idea of "things-as-interacted-by-us"?

Question: Who spoke of the "warning signs" of idealism?

Question: What sort of philosopher was Richard Rorty?
Passage: A. A. Luce and John Foster are other subjectivists. Luce, in Sense without Matter (1954), attempts to bring Berkeley up to date by modernizing his vocabulary and putting the issues he faced in modern terms, and treats the Biblical account of matter and the psychology of perception and nature. Foster's The Case for Idealism argues that the physical world is the logical creation of natural, non-logical constraints on human sense-experience. Foster's latest defense of his views is in his book A World for Us: The Case for Phenomenalistic Idealism.

Question: What sort of thinkers were Foster and Luce?

Question: What book was written by A.A. Luce?

Question: What year saw the publication of Sense without Matter?

Question: Who wrote A World for Us: The Case for Phenomenalistic Idealism?

Question: Whose work is Sense without Matter regarded as updating?
Passage: The 2nd edition (1787) contained a Refutation of Idealism to distinguish his transcendental idealism from Descartes's Sceptical Idealism and Berkeley's anti-realist strain of Subjective Idealism. The section Paralogisms of Pure Reason is an implicit critique of Descartes' idealism. Kant says that it is not possible to infer the 'I' as an object (Descartes' cogito ergo sum) purely from "the spontaneity of thought". Kant focused on ideas drawn from British philosophers such as Locke, Berkeley and Hume but distinguished his transcendental or critical idealism from previous varieties;

Question: What school of thought did Berkeley belong to?

Question: What sort of idealist was Descartes?

Question: In what section was Descartes criticized?

Question: In what edition was there a Refutation of Idealism?

Question: When was the second edition published?
Passage: In the first volume of his Parerga and Paralipomena, Schopenhauer wrote his "Sketch of a History of the Doctrine of the Ideal and the Real". He defined the ideal as being mental pictures that constitute subjective knowledge. The ideal, for him, is what can be attributed to our own minds. The images in our head are what comprise the ideal. Schopenhauer emphasized that we are restricted to our own consciousness. The world that appears is only a representation or mental picture of objects. We directly and immediately know only representations. All objects that are external to the mind are known indirectly through the mediation of our mind. He offered a history of the concept of the "ideal" as "ideational" or "existing in the mind as an image".

Question: Who wrote Parerga and Paralipomena?

Question: What type of knowledge did Schopenhauer believe the ideal to be?

Question: According to Schopenhauer, to what can the ideal be attributed?

Question: What did Schopenhauer believe we were restricted to?

Question: What did Schopenhauer believe were the only things we could know?
Passage: Friedrich Nietzsche argued that Kant commits an agnostic tautology and does not offer a satisfactory answer as to the source of a philosophical right to such-or-other metaphysical claims; he ridicules his pride in tackling "the most difficult thing that could ever be undertaken on behalf of metaphysics." The famous "thing-in-itself" was called a product of philosophical habit, which seeks to introduce a grammatical subject: because wherever there is cognition, there must be a thing that is cognized and allegedly it must be added to ontology as a being (whereas, to Nietzsche, only the world as ever changing appearances can be assumed). Yet he attacks the idealism of Schopenhauer and Descartes with an argument similar to Kant's critique of the latter (see above).

Question: Who censured Kant for his agnostic tautology?

Question: Along with Schopenhauer, whose idealism did Nietzsche attack?

Question: Nietzsche's attack on Schopenhauer used an argument similar to Kant's attack on who?
Passage: Absolute idealism is G. W. F. Hegel's account of how existence is comprehensible as an all-inclusive whole. Hegel called his philosophy "absolute" idealism in contrast to the "subjective idealism" of Berkeley and the "transcendental idealism" of Kant and Fichte, which were not based on a critique of the finite and a dialectical philosophy of history as Hegel's idealism was. The exercise of reason and intellect enables the philosopher to know ultimate historical reality, the phenomenological constitution of self-determination, the dialectical development of self-awareness and personality in the realm of History.

Question: According to Hegel, what sort of idealist was Fichte?

Question: Who did Hegel see as a subjective idealist?

Question: What sort of idealist did Hegel define himself as?

Question: How did Hegel believe historical reality to be knowable to a philosopher?