Title: Dr.Krishna Menon vs High Court Of Kerala on 22 December, 2022

Kerala High Court
Dr.Krishna Menon vs High Court Of Kerala on 22 December, 2022
Author:
A.Muhamed Mustaque
Bench:
A.Muhamed Mustaque
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
                            PRESENT
         THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE
                               &
        THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE SHOBA ANNAMMA EAPEN
THURSDAY, THE 22ND DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 1ST POUSHA, 1944
                    WP(C) NO. 26500 OF 2020
PETITIONER/S:

           VYSAKH K.G., AGED 31 YEARS, S/O.GOKULDAS,
           KONDRAPPASSERY HOUSE, KUNDALIYOOR, P.O.
           ENGANDIYOOR, THRISSUR DISTRICT, PIN 680 616
           BY ADVS.
           T.C.GOVINDASWAMY
           SMT.KALA T.GOPI
           SRI.B.NAMADEVA PRABHU
           SRI.R.ANEESH


RESPONDENT/S:

    1      UNION OF INDIA
           REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF
           INDIA, MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND TECHNOLOGY,
           NEW DELHI - 110 001.
    2      THE REGISTRAR GENERAL
           HONBLE HIGH COURT OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM.
    3      THE WEBMASTER,
[email protected]
4      GOOGLE INDIA PVT.LTD.NO.3
           RMZ INFINITY - TOWER E OLD MADRAS ROAD, 3RD, 4TH
           AND 5TH FLOORS, BANGALORE - 560 016.
           WP(C) NO. 26500 OF 2020
                                    -2-
     5
          ADDL. R5: GOOGLE LLC ( A LIMITED LIABILITY CO.),
          1600, AMPHIETHEATRE, PARKWAY, MOUNTAIN VIEW, CA
          94043, USA.

          ADDL. R5 IS SUO MOTU IMPLEADED AS PER ORDER DATED
          01/04/2022 IN WPC.26500/2020.
          BY ADVS.


          SHRI B.G.HARINDRANATH
          SHRI SANTHOSH MATHEW
          SMT. RIJI RAJENDRAN
          SHRI C.M.ANDREWS
          SHRI ARUN THOMAS
          SHRI JENNIS STEPHEN
          SMT.KARTHIKA MARIA
          SHRI ANIL SEBASTIAN PULICKEL
          SHRI JAISY ELZA JOE
          SHRI ABI BENNY AREECKAL
          SMT.VRINDA BHANDARI
          SHRI ABHINAV SEKHRI
          SHRI TANMAY SINGH
          SHRI KRISHNESH BAPAT
          SHRI MISHRA ANANDITA VIPINKANT
          SHRI MANU S., ASG OF INDIA
          SMT. MITHA SUDHINDRAN
          SHRI HARISH ABRAHAM
          SHRI ADITYA VIKRAM BHAT
          SHRI AMITH KRISHNAN H.



     THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD
ON   6/10/2022,ALONG   WITH   WP(C).6687/2017   AND   CONNECTED
CASES,   THIS COURT ON 22.12.2022 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
            IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
                            PRESENT
         THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE
                               &
        THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE SHOBA ANNAMMA EAPEN
THURSDAY, THE 22ND DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 1ST POUSHA, 1944
                    WP(C) NO. 6687 OF 2017
PETITIONER/S:

           XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX
           BY ADVS.
           SRI.M.J.THOMAS
           SRI.ADARSH MATHEW
           SRI.VIPIN P.VARGHESE
           SMT. DHANYA T MALLAR
           SRI.DILJITH K.MANOHAR


RESPONDENT/S:

    1      UNION OF INDIA
           REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY BY GOVERNMENT, MINISTRY
           OF COMMUNICATION AND IT DEPARTMENT OF ELECTRONIC
           AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, ELECTRONICS NIKETAN,
           6, CGO COMPLEX, LODHI ROAD, NEW DELHI - 110 003.
    2      GOOGLE INC,
           1600, AMPHIETHEATRE PARKWAY, MOUNTAIN VIEW, CA
           94043, USA REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR.
    3      GOOGLE INDIA (PVT) LTD. NO.3,
           RM2 INFINITY TOWER E OLD MADRAS ROAD, 4TH AND 5TH
           FLOOR, BANGALORE - 560 016.
    4      ADDL.R4. THE REGISTRAR GENERAL,
           HIGH COURT OF KERALA, HIGH COURT ROAD, ERNAKULAM,
           KERALA-682 031.

           IS IMPLEADED AS PER ORDER DATED 29-01-2020 IN IA
           3/19 IN WP(C)
    5      ADDL. R5: GOOGLE LLC (A LIMITED LIABILITY CO.),
           1600, AMPHIETHEATRE PARKWAY, MOUNTAIN VIEW, CA
           94043, USA.
           WP(C) NO. 6687 OF 2017
                                    -2-


          ADDL. R5 IS SUO MOTU IMPLEADED AS PER THE ORDER
          DATED 01/04/2022 IN WPC.6687/2017.
          BY ADVS.
          SRI.C.M.ANDREWS
          SRI.SANTHOSH MATHEW
          SHRI.B.G.HARINDRANATH
          SRI.ADITYA VIKRAM BHAT
          SRI.ANIND THOMAS
          ASSISTANT SOLICITOR GENERAL
          SRI MANU S., DSG OF INDIA
          SRI.SUVIN R.MENON, CGC



      THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD
ON   6/10/2022,ALONG    WITH   WP(C).2604/2021,   7642/2020   AND
CONNECTED CASES,       THIS COURT ON 22.12.2022 DELIVERED THE
FOLLOWING:
            IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
                            PRESENT
         THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE
                                &
        THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE SHOBA ANNAMMA EAPEN
THURSDAY, THE 22ND DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 1ST POUSHA, 1944
                    WP(C) NO. 20387 OF 2018
PETITIONER/S:

           VINU JOHN ALEXANDER
           AGED 26 YEARS
           S/O.ALEXANDER, AGED 26 YEARS,PUTHANPURATH VEEDU,
           AADARSH NAGAR,HOUSE NO.71, PATTOM
           VILLAGE,THIRUVANANTHAPURAM DISTRICT.
           BY ADVS.
           SRI.C.A.CHACKO
           SMT.C.M.CHARISMA
           SMT.MEGHA K.XAVIER
           SRI.P.RAHIM


RESPONDENT/S:

    1      UNION OF INDIA
           REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT,MINISTRY
           OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS, NEW DELHI-110 001.
    2      STATE OF KERALA
           REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT,DEPARTMENT
           OF ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION
           TECHNOLOGY,SECRETARIAT, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM-695
           001.
    3      HIGH COURT OF KERALA
           REPRESENTED BY ITS REGISTRAR GENERAL,HIGH COURT
           ROAD, ERNAKULAM-682 031.
    4      NATIONAL INFORMATICS CENTRENIC
           REPRESENTED BY ITS AUTHORIZED SIGNATORY,CDAC
           BUILDINGS, KELTRON COMPOUND,VELLAYAMBALAM,
           THIRUVANANTHAPURAM-695 031.
    5      INDIAN KANOON
           POST BOX NO.3804, BANGALURU,KARNATAKA, PIN-560
           038, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER.
           WP(C) NO. 20387 OF 2018
                                     -2-


     6    GOOGLE LLC ( A LIMITED LIABILITY CO.)
          1600, AMPLIE THEATRE ,PARKWAY, MOUNTAIN VIEW, CA
          94043, USA.

          ADDL.R6 SUO MOTU IMPLEADED AS PER ORDER DATED
          4/4/2022 IN WPC 20387/2018.
          BY ADVS.
          SRI.M.L.SURESH KUMAR, CGC
          SANTHOSH MATHEW
          SRI.B.UNNIKRISHNA KAIMAL
          ARUN THOMAS
          JENNIS STEPHEN
          KARTHIKA MARIA
          VRINDA BHANDARI
          ABHINAV SEKHRI
          TANMAY SINGH
          KRISHNESH BAPAT
          MISHRA ANANDITA VIPINKANT
          SHRI S.KANNAN SR.GP
          ASSISTANT SOLICITOR GENERAL
          SRI MANU S., DSG OF INDIA
          SRI.SUVIN R.MENON, CGC



      THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD
ON   6/10/2022,   ALONG   WITH   WP(C).6687/2017   AND   CONNECTED
CASES,   THIS COURT ON 22.12.2022 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
            IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
                             PRESENT
         THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE
                                &
        THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE SHOBA ANNAMMA EAPEN
THURSDAY, THE 22ND DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 1ST POUSHA, 1944
                    WP(C) NO. 7642 OF 2020
PETITIONER/S:

           DR.KRISHNA MOHAN
           AGED 60 YEARS
           S/O. DR. P.G. MENON, SASTHARAM, RAMANATHAPURAM,
           PALAKKAD DISTRICT 678 001.
           BY ADVS.
           JACOB SEBASTIAN
           SRI.K.V.WINSTON
           SMT.ANU JACOB

RESPONDENT/S:

    1      HIGH COURT OF KERALA
           HIGH COURT ROAD, MARINE DRIVE, KOCHI 682 031,
           REPRESENTED BY ITS REGISTRAR.
    2      UNION OF INDIA,
           REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT,
           MINISTRY OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS, NEW DELHI 110
           001.
    3      INDIAN KANOON,
           P.O. BOX NO. 3804, BENGALURU, KARNATAKA, 560 038,
           REPRESENTED BY ITS CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER,
           SUSHANT SINHA.
    4      GOOGLE INDIA PVT.LTD.,
           HEAD OFFICE AT BLOCK-1, DIVYASREE OMEGA, SURVERY
           NO. 13, KONDAPUR VILLAGE, HYDERABAD, ANDHRA
           PRADESH 500 032, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHIEF
           EXECUTIVE OFFICER.
    5      STATE OF KERALA,
           REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT,
           DEPARTMENT OF ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION
           TECHNOLOGY, SECRETARIAL, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM 695
           001.
     WP(C) NO. 7642 OF 2020
                              -2-


6   NATIONAL INFORMATICS CENTRE,
    CDAC BUILDINGS, KELTRON COMPOUND VELLAYAMBALAM,
    MANAVEEYAM ROAD, NANDAVANAM, VELLAYAMBALAM,
    THIRUVANANTHAPURAM 695 033, REP. BY ITS DEPUTY
    DIRECTOR, GENERAL.
7   YAHOO INDIA PVT.LTD.,
    UNIT NO. 1261, 6TH FLOOR, BUILDING NO 12,
    SOLITTARE CORPORATE PARK NO. 167, GURU
    HARGOVINDJI MARG, ANDHERI GHATKOPAR LINK ROAD,
    ANDHERI EAST, MUMBAI 400 093, REPRESENTED BY ITS
    CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER.
8   ADDL. R8: GOOGLE LLC ( A LIMITED LIABILITY CO.),
    1600, AMPHIETHEATRE, PARKWAY, MOUNTAIN VIEW, CA
    94043, USA.

    ADDL. R8 SUO MOTU IMPLEADED AS PER ORDER DATED
    01/04/2022 IN WPC.7642/2020.
    BY ADVS.
    B.G.HARINDRANATH
    SANTHOSH MATHEW
    SRI.RIJI RAJENDRAN
    HARISH ABRAHAM
    ARUN THOMAS
    JENNIS STEPHEN
    KARTHIKA MARIA
    ANIL SEBASTIAN PULICKEL
    JAISY ELZA JOE
    ABI BENNY AREECKAL
    VRINDA BHANDARI
    ABHINAV SEKHRI
    TANMAY SINGH
    KRISHNESH BAPAT
    MISHRA ANANDITA VIPINKANT
    AMITH KRISHNAN H.
    C.M.ANDREWS
    ADITYA VIKRAM BHAT
    SHRI S.GOPINATHAN SR.GP
    ASSISTANT SOLICITOR GENERAL
    SRI MANU S., DSG OF INDIA
    SRI.SUVIN R.MENON, CGC
 WP(C) NO. 7642 OF 2020
                                 -2-


      THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD
ON   6/10/2022,   ALONG   WITH   WP(C).6687/2017   AND   CONNECTED
CASES,   THIS COURT ON 22.12.2022 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
            IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
                            PRESENT
         THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE
                               &
        THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE SHOBA ANNAMMA EAPEN
THURSDAY, THE 22ND DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 1ST POUSHA, 1944
                    WP(C) NO. 8174 OF 2020
PETITIONER/S:

    1      JOMINI SAMUEL
           AGED 41 YEARS
           W/O.SAMUEL, KOYIKALETH HOUSE, KOZHENCHERRY,
           PATHANAMTHITTA.
    2      SHEBA ANNA SAMUEL
           D/O.SAMUEL, KOYIKALETH HOUSE, KOZHENCHERRY,
           PATHANAMTHITTA.
           BY ADVS.
           SRI.B.S.SWATHI KUMAR
           SMT.ANITHA RAVINDRAN
           SRI.HARISANKAR N UNNI
           SMT.P.S.BHAGYA SURABHI


RESPONDENT/S:

    1      UNION OF INDIA
           REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, MINISTRY
           OF COMMUNICATION AND IT DEPARTMENT OF ELECTRONIC
           AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, ELECTRONICS NIKETAN,
           6, CGO COMPLEX, LODHI ROAD, NEW DELHI-110003
    2      GOOGLE INDIA (PVT) LTD
           HEAD OFFICE AT BLOCK 1, DIVYASREE OMEGA, SURVEY
           NO.13, KONDAPUR VILLAGE, HYDERABAD, ANDRA PRADESH
           500032 REPRESENTED BY ITS CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
    3      INDIAN KANOON,
           P.O.BOX NO.3804, BENGALURU, KARNATAKA, 500038,
           REPRESENTED BY ITS CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
           MR.SUSHANT SINHA
           WP(C) NO. 8174 OF 2020
                                    -2-




     4    HIGH COURT OF KERALA
          MARINE DRIVE, ERNAKULAM- 682031, REPRESENTED BY
          ITS REGISTRAR GENERAL
     5    ADDL. R5: GOOGLE LLC ( A LIMITED LIABILITY CO.),
          1600, AMPHIETHEATRE, PARKWAY, MOUNTAIN VIEW, CA
          94043, USA.

          ADDL. R5 SUO MOTU IMPLEADED AS PER ORDER DATED
          01/04/2022 IN WPC.8174/2020.
          BY ADVS.
          SRI.RIJI RAJENDRAN
          SANTHOSH MATHEW
          B.G.HARINDRANATH
          C.M.ANDREWS
          SMT.MITHA SUDHINDRAN
          BHARADWAJASUBRAMANIAM.R
          ARUN THOMAS
          JENNIS STEPHEN
          KARTHIKA MARIA
          ANIL SEBASTIAN PULICKEL
          JAISY ELZA JOE
          ABI BENNY AREECKAL
          VRINDA BHANDARI
          ABHINAV SEKHRI
          TANMAY SINGH
          KRISHNESH BAPAT
          MISHRA ANANDITA VIPINKANT
          ADITYA VIKRAM BHAT
          HARISH ABRAHAM
          AMITH KRISHNAN H.
          MANU S., DSG OF INDIA
          SUVIN R.MENON, CGC



     THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD
ON   6/10/2022,ALONG   WITH    WP(C).6687/2017   AND   CONNECTED
CASES,   THIS COURT ON 22.12.2022 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
            IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
                            PRESENT
         THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE
                                &
        THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE SHOBA ANNAMMA EAPEN
THURSDAY, THE 22ND DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 1ST POUSHA, 1944
                    WP(C) NO. 21917 OF 2020
PETITIONER/S:

           DR.NIKHIL S RAJAN
           AGED 37 YEARS
           SON OF SOMARAJAN, RESIDING AT BHARGAVI,
           NELLIMUKKU,KOLLAM, KERALA-691 012
           BY ADVS.
           JOHNSON GOMEZ
           SRI.SANJAY JOHNSON
           SHRI.JOHN GOMEZ
           SMT.SREEDEVI S.


RESPONDENT/S:

    1      THE UNION OF INDIA
           REPRESENTED BY THE JOINT SECRETARY., MINISTRY OF
           INFORMATION AND BROADCASTING, ROOM NO. 552, A-
           WING SHASTRI BHAVAN, NEW DELHI 110 001.
    2      THE REGISTRAR GENERAL,
           HIGH COURT OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM-682 031.
    3      THE WEBMASTER,
           INDIAN KANOON,
[email protected]
.
    4      GOOGLE INDIA PVT. LTD.
           1ST FLOOR, 3 NORTH AVENUE, MAKER MAXITY, BANDRA
           KURLA COMPLEX, BANDRA EAST, MUMBAI, INDIA-400051
    5      ADDL. R5: GOOGLE LLC ( A LIMITED LIABILITY CO.),
           1600, AMPHIETHEATRE PARKWAY, MOUNTAIN VIEW, CA
           94043, USA.

           ADDL. R5 IS SUO MOTU IMPLEADED AS PER ORDER DATED
           01/04/2022 IN WPC.21917/2020.
           WP(C) NO. 21917 OF 2020


                                    -2-


          BY ADVS.
          SHRI MANU S., DSG
          SRI.JAISHANKAR V.NAIR, CGC
          B.G.HARINDRANATH
          SRI.SANTHOSH MATHEW
          Riji Rajendran
          C.M.ANDREWS
          SRI.ARUN THOMAS
          SRI.JENNIS STEPHEN
          SRI.VIJAY V. PAUL
          SMT.KARTHIKA MARIA
          SRI.ANIL SEBASTIAN PULICKEL
          SMT.DIVYA SARA GEORGE
          SMT.JAISY ELZA JOE
          SHRI.ABI BENNY AREECKAL
          SMT.LEAH RACHEL NINAN
          MITHA SUDHINDRAN(K/000859/2015)
          ADITYA VIKRAM BHAT
          HARISH ABRAHAM
          AMITH KRISHNAN H.



     THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD
ON   6/10/2022,ALONG   WITH   WP(C).6687/2017   AND   CONNECTED
CASES,   THIS COURT ON 22.12.2022 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
             IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
                             PRESENT
          THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE
                                  &
         THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE SHOBA ANNAMMA EAPEN
THURSDAY, THE 22ND DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 1ST POUSHA, 1944
                     WP(C) NO. 2604 OF 2021
PETITIONER/S:

            xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx
            BY ADV ANITHA MATHAI MUTHIRENTHY


RESPONDENT/S:

     1      THE REGISTRAR GENERAL
            HIGH COURT OF KERALA, COCHIN-682 031.
     2      WWW.INDIANKANOON.ORG
            NO PHYSICAL ADDRESS FOUND, E-MAIL-
[email protected]
3      WWW.MYNATION.NET
            NO PHYSICAL ADDRESS FOUND, E-MAIL-
[email protected]
4      ADDL. R4: GOOGLE LLC ( A LIMITED LIABILITY CO.),
            1600, AMPHIETHEATRE, PARKWAY, MOUNTAIN VIEW, CA
            94043, USA.

            ADDL. R4 SUO MOTU IMPLEADED AS PER ORDER DATED
            01/04/2022 IN WPC.2604/2021.
            BY ADVS.
            B.G.HARINDRANATH
            AMITH KRISHNAN H.
            SRI.SANTHOSH MATHEW
            Smt.Riji Rajendran



      THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD
ON   6/10/2022,   ALONG   WITH   WP(C).6687/2017   AND   CONNECTED
CASES,    THIS COURT ON 22.12.2022 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
            IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
                              PRESENT
         THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE
                                 &
        THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE SHOBA ANNAMMA EAPEN
THURSDAY, THE 22ND DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 1ST POUSHA, 1944
                      WP(C) NO. 12699 OF 2021
PETITIONER/S:

           XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX
           BY ADVS.
           RAJIT
           ARJUN S.


RESPONDENT/S:

    1      UNION OF INDIA
           4TH FLOOR, A-WING, BHAWN, NEW DELHI-110 001,
           REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY-MINISTRY OF LAW AND
           JUSTICE
    2      THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA,
           HIGH COURT ROAD, MARINE RIVE, KOCHI-682 031,
           KERALA REPRESENTED BY THE REGISTRAR GENERAL.
    3      MINISTRY OF TELECOMMUNICATION,
           SANCHAR BHAWAN, 20, ASHOKA ROAD, NEW DELHI-110
           001, REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF
           TELECOMMUNICATION
    4      GOVERNMENT OF KERALA,
           GOVERNMENT SECRETARIAT, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM,
           KERALA-695 001, REPRESENTED BY THE CHIEF
           SECRETARY-GOVT OF KERALA
    5      GOOGLE INDIA PVT LTD,
           NO 3, RMZ INFINITY TOWER E, OLD MADRAS ROAD,
           BANGALORE, KARNATAKA-560 016, REPRESENTED BY ITS
           CEO.
           WP(C) NO. 12699 OF 2021
                                     -2-




     6    INDIANKANOON NO 724,
          1ST FLOOR, 9TH CROSS, 10TH MAIN, INDIRA NAGAR,
          BENGALURU, KARNATAKA-560 038, REPRESENTED BY ITS
          PROPRIETOR SUSHANT SINHA.
     7    ADDL. R7: GOOGLE LLC (A LIMITED LIABILITY CO.),
          1600, AMPHIETHEATRE PARKWAY, MOUNTAIN VIEW, CA
          94043, USA.

          ADDL. R7 IS SUO MOTU IMPLEADED AS PER ORDER DATED
          01/04/2022 IN WPC.12699/2021.
          BY ADVS.
          SRI.GIRISH KUMAR.V., CGC
          BABU PAUL
          Riji Rajendran
          C.M.ANDREWS
          MITHA SUDHINDRAN(K/000859/2015)
          ADITYA VIKRAM BHAT
          HARISH ABRAHAM
          SRI.SANTHOSH MATHEW
          SRHI B.G.HARINDRANATH



      THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD
ON   6/10/2022,   ALONG   WITH   WP(C).6687/2017   AND   CONNECTED
CASES,   THIS COURT ON 22.12.2022 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
            IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
                            PRESENT
         THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE
                                &
        THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE SHOBA ANNAMMA EAPEN
THURSDAY, THE 22ND DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 1ST POUSHA, 1944
                    WP(C) NO. 29448 OF 2021
PETITIONER/S:

           ADITHYA GOKUL M.S.
           AGED 26 YEARS
           GOKULAM HOUSE, KANJIRANOOJI, PERUVAYAL P.O,
           KOZHIKODE - 673008.
           BY ADV BIMALA BABY


RESPONDENT/S:

    1      UNION OF INDIA
           REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY BY GOVERNMENT, MINISTRY
           OF COMMUNICATION AND IT DEPARTMENT OF ELECTRONIC
           AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, ELECTRONICS NIKETAN,
           6, CGO COMPLEX, LODHI ROAD, NEW DELHI - 110003.
    2      GOOGLE INC
           1600, AMPHIETHEATRE PARKWAY, MOUNTAIN VIEW, CA
           94043, USA, REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR.
    3      GOOGLE INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED
           NO.3, RM2 INFINITY TOWER E OLD MADRAS ROAD, 4TH
           AND 5TH FLOOR, BANGALORE - 560016.
           BY ADVS.
           SRI.JAISHANKAR V.NAIR, CGC
           Riji Rajendran
           MITHA SUDHINDRAN(K/000859/2015)



    THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY
HEARD ON 6/10/2022, ALONG WITH WP(C).6687/2017 AND
CONNECTED CASES,      THIS COURT ON 22.12.2022
DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
                                                                        'C.R'

                   A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE

                                    &

                 SHOBA ANNAMMA EAPEN, JJ.
                  -----------------------------------------
           W.P.(C).Nos. 26500/2020, 6687/2017,

            20387/2018, 7642/2020, 8174/2020,

           21917/2020, 2604/2021, 12699/2021 &

                               29448/2021

                  -----------------------------------------
           Dated this the 22nd day of December 2022

                             JUDGMENT
A.Muhamed Mustaque, J.
These      cases       present       a     question           of     seminal

importance in judicial information policy followed

by   the   Courts       in    India.     They      have       been   placed

before     us    on    a    reference      order      of      the    learned

Single Judge, Justice Anil K. Narendran in W.P.

(C).No.6687/2017, dated 15/3/2021, to determine the

questions involved, finally, by an authoritative

pronouncement.         In     the    detailed        reference         order

running     up    to    more    than     80    pages,         the    learned
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:2:-
single      Judge          referred         the       point     of        law        to   be

answered by us, thus:
68. Therefore, the question that has to be considered in
this writ petition is as to whether, in writ petitions
filed    under
Article      226
of         the    Constitution         of    India
seeking     a    writ       of    mandamus           commanding       the       statutory
authority       to    consider        the      application          for     contracting
marriage     under         the
Special        Marriage       Act,       1954
or      for
registration of marriage under the Kerala Registration of
Marriages (Common) Rules, 2008; a writ of habeas corpus
seeking     production           of   fiancée         or    minor    children         under
illegal detention; etc., which are not matters involving
public interest, a party to that proceedings can seek an
order to mask his/her name and address and that of the
party respondent(s) in the cause title of the judgment and
also his/her name and that of the party respondent(s) in
the body of the judgment, in order to protect his/her right
to privacy, described as the 'right to be let alone'.
2.    After          the     reference,              some     more         cases          not

related to family matters, have also been placed

before us for consideration. The points involved

in these cases are related to the publication of

Court      judgments,            other        than         judgments        in       which

anonymity is protected under the law and allowing

free access to such information.
W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:3:-
3.    The     brief       facts       of       each    case    are     set      out

hereunder:
3.(i)        W.P.     (C)     No.          26500      of     2020:     Criminal

proceedings were initiated against the petitioner

for     an    offence        punishable            under
Section       354-D
Indian Penal Code in C.C.No.344/2015 on the file

of    the     Judicial         First          Class    Magistrate          Court,

Chavakkad.
Subsequently,           in    the      Crl.M.C        No.5477/2016           filed

before this Court, the de facto complainant filed

an affidavit stating that she does not wish to

pursue       the     matter          and      consented       to     quash      the

entire       proceedings.            By      judgment      dated      7/9/2016,

Crl.M.C         No.5477/2016                 was      allowed        and        the

proceedings in C.C.No.344/2015 were quashed. This

judgment has been published by Indian Kanoon and

indexed by Google.
The     petitioner           submits           that    the     right       to    be

forgotten being recognized as a part of the right
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:4:-
to privacy and the judgment being of no public

importance, there is no justification for it being

in the public domain.
3.(ii). W.P. (C) No. 21917 of 2020: Petitioner, a

Dentist by profession, was accused in Crime No.

1111 of 2013 of Kollam East Police Station, but

was subsequently acquitted of all the charges in

the year 2019. A bail order dated 9/5/2014 in Bail

Application           No.     2662       of    2014        in     the    above

proceedings was published by the website Indian

Kanoon,         and   the      same     appears       on    a     search    on

Google. The petitioner also submits that the order

on    Indian       Kanoon       incorrectly       states          the    crime

number.
Relying           upon         the        judgment          of
Justice

K.S.Puttaswamy            (Retd)      and      another      v.     Union    of

India and Others
[(2017) 10 SCC 1], the petitioner

submits       that     the     right      to   privacy          includes   the

right      to    be    forgotten.         In   light       of    which,    the
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:5:-
petitioner is entitled to the protection of his

fundamental right to privacy and has a right to

erase contents that are unnecessary, irrelevant,

inadequate or no longer relevant.
3.(iii).         W.P      (C)        8174         of     2020:     The     first

petitioner         (P1)       is     the         mother    and     the    second

petitioner (P2) is her daughter, who is an MBBS

student. The petitioners submit that in the year

2014,       when       P2      was       wrongfully          detained        and

confined,         P1     filed       a     habeas         corpus     petition.

Subsequently,            P2     was        released         and     the     writ

petition        [W.P.       (Crl)     266/2014]           was     closed.    The

grievance of the petitioners is that judgment in

the    above      writ      petition             is    published    by    Indian

Kanoon on its website, which appears on the search

engine, Google, putting the identity of P2 in the

public domain and causing substantial prejudice to

her.
W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:6:-
3.(iv). W.P (C) No. 6687/ 2017: The petitioner, an

Indian resident, had approached this Court in W.P.

(C) No. 23996/2015 for a direction to solemnize

her marriage to a US citizen under the
Special

Marriages Act, 1954
.
The writ petition was disposed of on 7/8/2015 by

this      Court      with      a     direction        to   the   Marriage

Officer to receive the intended marriage notice

and solemnize the marriage. The marriage however,

could not be solemnized due to differences between

the parties.
The petitioner is aggrieved by the publication of
the said judgment
on Indian Kanoon with her name

in the cause title, which has been indexed by the

search engine, Google (respondents 2 and 3).


The petitioner submits that substantial prejudice

has    been      caused      to      her   due   to    the   information

being available in the public domain, which has

caused her mental trauma and agony.
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:7:-
Petitioner           submits          that       the       rule     that       the

publication of Court records will not violate the

right to privacy is subject to the exceptions in

the interest of decency.
It is the petitioner's submission that the first

respondent,           Ministry         of       Communication            and   IT

Department            of       Electronic                 and      Information

Technology, is the nodal agency that regulates and

formulates           the    policies           of    the        Government      in

relation        to    information              technology,         electronics

and    the     internet,         in    light         of    which    it    should

compel the second respondent, an intermediary to

de-index the links to the page.
3.(v). W.P (C) No. 7642 of 2020: Aggrieved by the

publication of the judgments of the learned Single

Judge        of      this       Court           in        Bail     Application

No.7123/2017 in which he was granted anticipatory

bail, and Criminal M.C. No. 4510/2018 by which the

criminal        proceedings           against        the     petitioner        and
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:8:-
his     father        were       quashed,          the      petitioner          has

approached this Court.
The     petitioner,          a       Homoeopathic          Doctor,      submits

that      the     third       respondent,            Indian       Kanoon        has

without the prior permission of this Court, or the

petitioner         as     mandated            by     the    IT    (Reasonable

Security        Practices         and       Procedures       and     Sensitive

Personal          Data       or          Information)            Rules,        2011

published the above judgments, which are available

on     the      respondent           4     and     respondent       7     search

engines.
The petitioner submits that his right to privacy

has     been      violated           and      that    his     right       to    be

forgotten         which          emanates          from     the     right        to

privacy, should be protected.
The petitioner further submits that respondents 5

and 6 regulate intermediaries and are duty bound

to ensure that intermediaries do not infringe the
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:9:-
privacy of persons when exercising their right to

publish.
3.(vi). W.P. (C) No. 20387 of 2018: The petitioner

was the 3rd accused in C.P. No. 61/2011 and the

complainant (CW3) in CP. No. 62/2011, on the file

of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-II,

Nedumangad.
The matter being settled between the parties, the

petitioner and the other accused filed Crl. M.C.

No.    100/2013         to    quash        proceedings      in   C.P.    No.

61/2011        and        Crl.       M.C.       No.109/2013      to    quash

proceedings          in    C.P.      No.       62/2011.   Both   CPs    were

quashed       by    a     common      order      dated    10/1/2013.    The

above two Crl.M.C. Nos.100/2013 and 109/2013 were

published on the website of Indian Kanoon.


The petitioner submits his right to privacy has

been infringed and that no guidelines have been

issued by respondents 1 to 3 regarding publication
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:10:-
of details of individuals in cases that have been

settled between the parties.
3.(vii).          W.P.(C)            No.     12699        of     2021:     The

petitioner's grievance is that the publication of

judgments          disclosing              the   petitioner         and    her

parent's identity, in W.P (C) No.20773/2010 and

Tr.P(C)         No.      353/2013,          where     the       petitioner's

parents are arrayed as parties on opposite sides,

is an intrusion of her privacy.
The petitioner submits that such publication by

the       6th     respondent,               Indian        Kanoon     is    in

contravention            of    the     Hon'ble       Supreme       Court    e-

Committee's             communication               dated        16.07.2013,

directing          all        High     Courts        to        refrain    from

uploading         case     related          information         except    case

number and its status on the internet, in cases

relating to, inter alia, matrimonial matters.
3.(viii). W.P. (C) No. 29448 of 2021: It is the

petitioner's case that he has been falsely arrayed
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:11:-
as accused in Crime No. 734/2020 for the offences

punishable          under
Section             67(B)(a)(b)
of   the

Information Technology Act and
Section 15
of the

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act.


The       petitioner            approached                this       Court      for

anticipatory bail in B.A. No. 6482/2020 and the

same was allowed as per judgment dated 16/10/2020.

This     order      of    the        Court         has    been      published   on

Indian Kanoon which has then been indexed by the

search engine Google. The petitioner submits that

his right to privacy has been infringed.
3.(ix). W.P.(C) No. 2604 of 2021: Aggrieved by the

petitioner's             name,         age,          father's            name   and

residential          address         in     a      judgment         in   O.P.(F.C)

No.64/2019          in     relation             to       her     minor     child's

custody matter being visible to the general public

on various search engines, she has approached this

Court      claiming         that       her         right       to    privacy    as
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:12:-
enshrined under
Article 21
of the Constitution is

being violated.
PROLOGUE:
4.    We      shall         advert        to    the     arguments      and

submissions of the learned counsels who appeared

for the parties and Shri B.G.Harindranath, learned

counsel         for       the        Kerala      High     Court     whose

submissions           are       more      as    an      amicus    curiae,

hereafter under the respective subcategories for a

proper understanding of the issues and arguments

thereon.       We     think      that     before      adverting   to   the

distinct issues, we need to discuss the right of

privacy       of    individuals          and    the    interest   of   the

public qua judicial institutions. Accordingly, we

have categorized the subjects for discussion and

consideration viz. privacy, Courts as democratic

institutions, open data and public interest and

the right to be forgotten, for elucidation on the
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:13:-
broader premises of the issues involved in these

cases:
(I) ON PRIVACY:
5. Humans by nature are social animals. They are

not living in isolation in society. They possess

freedom       and     liberty         of   choice.      Humans    possess

certain          inalienable           rights        which       are     so

fundamental and related to their person and body.

The aspiration of humans as individuals is to live

with     dignity.         This       notion    of   the    individual's

right to choose a life of his own began to be

confronted         with,      in     history     when     the   sovereign

started limiting his authority. The moral value of

sensations to secure a private life, not entangled

with      the     public        sphere,        created     a    sense    of

possessiveness in man. This individualistic notion

and    idea      of    private       reason     identified       with   the

dignity of the individual is a starting point for

defining privacy as a right. The learned counsel
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:14:-
Shri B.G.Harindranath placing reliance on                                  Peter

Semayne v. Richard Grecham [All ER Rep 62; 5 Co

Rep 91 a], decided by the Court of Kings Bench in

the    year      1604     wherein       the       Court       recognised     the

right of the homeowner to defend his house against

unlawful         entry        even       by       the     King`s      agents,

submitted that no one has the absolute freedom to

encroach on the private life of individuals except

as authorised by law. He also drew attention to

the earliest article on right to privacy written

by Samuel D. Warren; Louis D. Brandeis in Harvard

Law Review, Vol. 4, No. 5. (Dec. 15, 1890), pp.

193-220, 205. In a prelude of this article, the

authors       mention        the     evolution          of     the   right    to

privacy.
Thus, in very early times, the law gave a remedy only for
physical       interference          with       life    and     property,     for
trespasses vi et armis. Then the "right to life" served
only to protect the subject from battery in its various
forms; liberty meant freedom from actual restraint; and the
right to property secured to the individual his lands and
his   cattle.      Later,     there     came      a    recognition    of    man's
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:15:-
spiritual      nature,       of      his       feelings        and       his     intellect.
Gradually the scope of these legal rights broadened; and
now the right to life has come to mean the right to enjoy
life,-the      right    to     be      let     alone;        the     right     to    liberty
secures the exercise of extensive civil privileges; and the
term    "property"       has      grown         to      comprise         every      form    of
possession-intangible, as well as tangible.

Lord    Cottenham      stated          that      a     man     "is       entitled     to    be
protected in the exclusive use and enjoyment of that which
is exclusively his," and cited with approval the opinion of
Lord Eldon, as reported in a manuscript note of the case of
Wyatt v. Wilson, in 1820, respecting an engraving of George
the Third during his illness, to the effect that "if one of
the late king's physicians had kept a diary of what he
heard and saw, the court would not, in the king's lifetime,
have    permitted      him     to      print      and     publish         it;"    and      Lord
Cottenham      declared,          in     respect          to       the     acts     of     the
defendants in the case before him, that "privacy is the
right invaded.
The    principle     which        protects            personal       writings       and    all
other personal productions, not against theft and physical
appropriation, but against publication in any form, is in
reality not the principle of private property, but that of
an inviolate personality.
6.     The problem of the present nature of the right

to privacy, as in these cases, has arisen as an

impact of technology in our lives. Technology has
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:16:-
opened the world around us and created a virtual

public space.             The doors to this public space have

been opened forever, making the identity of the

individual digitally immortal. Digital immortality

defines the continuation of an active or passive

digital       presence         even       after   death.        The     online

presence        of    data     permanently        raises         new   issues

regarding        the      right      to   privacy.        The    social     and

ethical problems in relation to digital immorality

and artificial intelligence which can identify the

data     stored       through        algorithms      are        the    subject

matter of debate across the globe. This problem

before the Courts in India essentially stems from

this new era of technology due to the lack of

legislation          or    regulation.         The    intersection           of

privacy and technology has become a challenge to

the judicial administrator as well. The law Courts

are attempting to keep up with the advancement of

technology           to    bring      changes        in     the       judicial

administration             and       function,       as     well       as    to
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:17:-
champion        the     rights        of    individuals          to       protect

their       privacy.        The       challenges           in   these         writ

petitions         before       us,      throw         up   issues        on   the

judicial        side       and       open       our    eyes     to       judicial

administration. The first and foremost important

task for us, in this case, is defining privacy in

the    context        of    data      made       available          by   parties

before the Court.
In light of the declaration of

privacy as a fundamental right by the Apex Court

in
Justice K.S.Puttaswamy
's case (supra) we are

inclined to define privacy in relation to Court

data      as      data       concerning           the      names         of   the

party/parties and identifying their cause before

the Court. There are different dimensions of the

information before Courts which plays an integral

role in encouraging fair and transparent decision-

making by the Courts, giving them legitimacy and

contributing to the dissemination of information

about the judicial process among the public. This

also     brings       up     friction           between       the    right     to
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:18:-
privacy         and     the     right         to    anonymity.
Justice

Chandrachud            in
Justice         K.S.Puttaswamy
's             case

(supra),        in     relation      to       privacy    and    anonymity,

observed as follows:
312. A distinction has been made in contemporary literature
between anonymity on one hand and privacy on the other.
Both    anonymity      and    privacy     prevent     others   from    gaining
access to pieces of personal information, yet they do so in
opposite ways. Privacy involves hiding information whereas
anonymity involves hiding what makes it personal.
7. Privacy is about choice. This choice is sought

to be extended as anonymity in Court proceedings.

Privacy         in    the    judicial         information      context          is

essentially            related       to       the     contents        of    the

information in the case. Anonymity on the other

hand,      in    the    judicial        information       sphere,          is   a

process of denying information to the public about

the identity of the parties related to a case.

Anonymity is the subject of privacy in a Courtroom

and     there        exists     a    subtle         distinction       between

anonymity and privacy in relation to the contents
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:19:-
of the judicial proceedings. The nature of privacy

can      be     classified            as         informational        privacy.

Undoubtedly,           we      have        to      hold     that      personal

information as above, of the parties in a case,

has to be classified as data forming part of his

or her privacy. The individual's right to exercise

control over his personal data and to be able to

control his/her own life has been recognized in
Justice        K.S.Puttaswamy
's                  case     (supra)     in     the

separate         judgment            authored       by      Justice     Sanjay

Kishan Kaul without recognizing it as an absolute

right.
629. The right of an individual to exercise control over
his personal data and to be able to control his/her own
life    would     also      encompass       his     right    to    control   his
existence on the internet. Needless to say that this would
not be an absolute right. The existence of such a right
does not imply that a criminal can obliterate his past, but
that there are variant degrees of mistakes, small and big.
and it cannot be said that a person should be profiled to
the nth extent for all and sundry to know.
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:20:-
Justice Chandrachud also recognised this right in

the     above      judgment          of   Justice        K.S.Puttaswamy's

case (supra) holding:
248.    Privacy      has     distinct      connotations     including    (i)
spatial      control;      (ii)      decisional    autonomy;     and    (iii)
informational control. Spatial control denotes the creation
of private spaces. Decisional autonomy comprehends intimate
personal choices such as those governing reproduction as
well as choices expressed in public such as faith or modes
of dress. Informational control empowers the individual to
use privacy as a shield to retain personal control over
information pertaining to the person.
8. The interplay of providing information about

the     parties        and     providing        information       on     the

contents of the cause in a Court of law requires a

balancing exercise. It is exactly that exercise

that has to be considered by this Court in these

writ petitions in the absence of any legislation.
Anonymity         though      is     different      from     privacy,     it

becomes       a   facet      of      privacy      when    the   cause    and

content in a case are identified with the parties

in the lis. The privacy aspect of such information
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:21:-
about      the       identity        of     the       parties      cannot       be

separated from the cause that is being considered

by      the       Court         in        open        transparent             court

proceedings.              The        sensitive              and       personal

information of individual parties was exposed to

the public when the Court started making judgments

available through its web portals. Law reporters

beaming court news online, have worldwide online

viewers and followers. The judgments became a gold

mine      of     data      for       online       publishers,            to    the

satisfaction          of     lawyers,          litigants,         researchers

etc. Such publishers and legal databases developed

search         tools         using          algorithms             for        easy

identification of the judgments with reference to

the    name      of     parties,          subject      and     text      of    the

judgments. Search engines like Google help users

find the information they are looking for, using

keywords       and     phrases.        No      one    has    any    grievance

against        the    open,      transparent           court      proceedings

and    the     conduct        of     cases       in    the    open       justice
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:22:-
system.       The     problem         for      them      is    allowing   their

personal         and       private            information         to      remain

permanently in the digital public space, invading

their right to privacy and right to forget the

past. The task for us, therefore, is to decide not

only on the privacy claimed in the present but

also in the future.
II.     ON     EVOLUTION             OF     COURTS        IN    INDIA     AS    A

DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTION AND ITS MARCH TOWARDS THE

DIGITAL AGE:
A. Tracing The Evolution Of Courts In India:
a). Judiciary in India during pre constitutional

era:
9. On a Sunday morning, 10th November 1612, the

Judges of England were summoned before King James

I, upon complaint of the Archbishop of Canterbury.
The    Archbishop          explained               to   the    King   that     the

Judges were delegates of the King and what the
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:23:-
King might do himself when it seemed best to him,

what     he     usually        left     to     these    delegates.         Sir

Edward Coke, considered the greatest Judge at that

time, answered on behalf of the Judges, "that by

the law of England, the King in person could not

adjudge any cause; all cases, civil and criminal,

were to be determined in some court of justice

according        to    the     law    and      custom    of    the    realm.
"But," said the King, "I thought law was founded
upon reason, and I and others have reason as well

as    the     judges."       "True     it      was,"    Coke       responded,

"that God had endowed his Majesty with excellent

science and great endowments of nature; but his

Majesty was not learned in the laws of his realm

of England, and causes which concern the life or

inheritance or goods or fortunes of his subjects

are not to be decided by natural reason, but by

the    artificial         reason      and      judgment       of    the   law,

which law is an art which requires long study and

experience before that a man can attain to the
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:24:-
cognizance of it." [See, 'The Spirit of the Common

Law'       by    Roscoe      Pound].        In     the    history       of    the

English         Court     system,      perhaps          this     conversation

was        the       first           assertive            declaration          of

independence            of   Judges.        In     ancient        times,      the

Judges during the reign of Kings were considered

to be loyal servants of the King. The idea of an

independent judiciary came into existence with the

idea of separation of powers. The evolution of the

independent judiciary in India can be dated back

to the Constitution though independent judiciary,

in     a        limited      sphere,            existed     in        the    pre-
constitutional era as well. The disputes between

private          litigants       were       decided        by    independent

Courts in India in different periods. During the

medieval period (1192-1700 CE), in most parts of

India, the public legal systems in the Centre and

provincial           capitals          were        based         on     Islamic

principles under the Muslim leaders of the Delhi

Sultanate          dynasties          and         the     Mughal        empire.
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:25:-
However,        in    areas          distanced            from   the     standard

institutions of Muslim Rule such as rural India

and       Hindu-dominated                   villages,            local       legal

practices continued. It is important to note that

the    general        principles            of      Islamic      jurisprudence

were     adopted          in   the     Indian         scenario         under   the

Muslim Rulers. The focus of the administration of

justice was through a qazi, who was appointed in

accordance           with      Islamic             law.    The    process       was

neither adversarial nor investigative in a formal

manner of civil procedure.                          There was no scope for

appeal. The resolution of the dispute by qazi was

acceptable           to     all      as      they         were   endowed       with

honesty,        impartiality,               virtuousness           etc.      [See,

"Courts of India, Past to Present", published by

Supreme Court of India (Page 42)].
10. At the beginning of the 18th Century, East

India        Company           took         responsibility             for      the

administration of justice in India, confining to
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:26:-
the     presidency          towns       of      Calcutta,      Madras       and

Bombay. In each of these towns, the Company had

set    up    its     own      Courts.        East    India     Company     was

confronted          with      the      problem        of     administering

justice to persons living beyond the limits of the

Presidency towns. The first important                               step was

taken       in     1772       by      Warren        Hastings       with    the

establishment of the Sadar or Chief Courts. The

Sadar       Dewani      Adalat        was       vested     with     appellate

jurisdiction in civil matters and Sadar Nizamat

Adalat with the power to revise the proceedings of

the Criminal Courts. The Governor and members of

the Bengal Council were the Judges of the Sadar

Dewani      Adalat.        The       Nizamat      Adalat     was    presided

over by an Indian official appointed by the Nawab

Nazim       of   Bengal.        The    East       India     Company       faced

financial difficulties resulting in the passing of

the Regulating Act of 1773. The Bengal Council was

reconstituted           and    a     provision       was     made    for   the

establishment of a Supreme Court of Judicature in
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:27:-
Calcutta of which the judges were appointed by the

Crown. [See for more reading - Orby Mootham's "The

East India Company's Sadar Courts 1801-1834 Pg.3 &

4].
11. The history of the present Courts in India

owes its origin to the Courts established by the

East      India       Company         and       thereafter       during   the

period of the British Empire. The focus of the

East     India        Company        was    purely    of     a    commercial

nature. "As the company began to transform itself

from commercial concern into a political power,

the Mayor's Courts and Justices of the Peace were

found      to    be    incapable           of    fitting   into     the   new

atmosphere as effective agencies for the discharge

of judicial administration. It was to remedy this

defect,         Regulating           Act    established      the     Supreme

Court...." [See Chapter III "Federal Court of India"
by M.V.Pylee].
W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:28:-
12. The Crown appointed the Judges of the Supreme

Court,      marking        a    shift      from      being    a   Company's

Court to a King's Court. The establishment of the

Supreme       Court      under       the       Regulating     Act   allowed

greater intervention by the English Government and

Parliament in Indian affairs and control over the

Company's proceedings. The policy underlying the

Regulating Act caused conflict between the Court

and the Council which led to the passage of the

Act of Settlement of 1781.
This Act
set limits to

the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in matters

concerning revenue to safeguard the interests of

the executive. It also recognised the Civil and

Criminal Provincial Courts, existing independently

of the Supreme Court; and of the Governor-General

and Council as the Chief Appellate Court of the

country.        [See      Chapters         II    &   III     "History   and

Constitution            of      the     Courts        and      Legislative

Authorities in India", by Herbert Cowell]
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:29:-
13. Subsequently, to do away with the anomalous

procedure         followed           by     the      Supreme         Courts,        the

Indian       High      Courts         Act,         1861      was     enacted         to

abolish the Supreme Courts and Sadar Adalat. In

their place, High Courts of Judicature for each of

the     three        Presidencies             were         authorised        to      be

constituted. M.P. Jain in his book "Outlines of

Indian       Legal         History",         writes         about      the        three

Presidency Courts as follows:
The   emergence       of    the    three      High     Courts      was,    indeed,    a
momentous step forward in the process of evolution of a
proper system for the administration of law and justice in
the   country.       For    over     eighty        years,    there    had    been    in
existence      two     parallel       systems         of     judicature      in     the
Presidencies.        The     evolution        of     these       systems    had    been
complicated and divergent. They represented two different
sources of power. The Supreme Courts represented, derived
their jurisdiction from, and were under the control of, the
Crown. On the other hand, the Adalats represented, derived
jurisdiction       from,     and     were      under       the    control    of,    the
Company.
The Judges of the High Court were to hold their

office during the Queen's pleasure. However, with
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:30:-
the enactment of the
Government of India Act
of

1935, the convention of judicial independence was

formalised. Judges were to serve a fixed term and

could      only     be    removed       earlier   by   the   Crown   on

certain fixed grounds.[See Chapter XIX "Outlines

of Indian Legal History" by M.P.Jain]. The author

writes as follows:
The Act
further laid down that no discussion could take

place in the legislature with respect to the conduct of a

High Court Judge in the discharge of his duties. These

safeguards along with the security of tenure and salary,

mentioned above, were regarded as sufficient to maintain

the independence of the High Court vis-a-vis the Provincial

Government.
The Act
of 1935 provided for the establishment of

a   Federal        Court;      its   jurisdiction      extending     to

disputes between the Dominion and the Provinces,

interpretation of Acts or Orders in Council, etc.

The      Federal         Courts      were     also     empowered     to

entertain         appeals        from     judgments,    decrees      and
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:31:-
final orders of any High Court of British India.

[See "Legal and Constitutional History of India",

by M.Rama Jois]
14. The Courts established during the British rule

including the Federal Courts under the government

of
India Act
1935 never reflected the WILL OF THE

PEOPLE.        The    appointment           of    the    judges       and   the

nature of disputes always insulated the interest

of the ruling British from being agitated.
b).    The     Emergence         Of    Judiciary         In    India       As   A

Democratic Institution In the Post-Constitutional

Period:
15. The supremacy of law in India reflected the

WILL      of    the      people,       on        the    adoption      of    the

Constitution            on      26th        November          1949,        which

effectively came into force on 26th January 1950.

The very democratic character of                         the Constitution

ensured the creation of institutions accountable

to    the      people.       The      Legislature,         Executive         and
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:32:-
Judiciary, though form different pillars of the

state, in essence, are created to sustain the Will

of the people. One of the aspects of democracy is

the creation of an independent judiciary.
In the

First Judges Case,
S.P Gupta v. Union of India
[1981        Supp        SCC    87],         the       Court      spoke     about        the

concept           of      independence                 of      the      judiciary         as

follows:
The concept of independence of the judiciary is a noble
concept          which     inspires          the       constitutional       scheme       and
constitutes the foundation on which rests the edifice of
our democratic polity. If there is one principle which runs
through the entire fabric of the Constitution, it is the
principle of the rule of law and under the Constitution, it
is    the    judiciary          which    is        entrusted       with    the    task    of
keeping every organ of the State within the limits of the
law    and       thereby       making    the       rule     of    law   meaningful       and
effective. It is to aid the judiciary in this task that the
power       of    judicial       review        has      been      conferred      upon    the
judiciary         and     it     is     by     exercising          this    power     which
constitutes one of the most potent weapons in armory of the
law,    that       the     judiciary         seeks        to     protect   the     citizen
against violation of his constitutional or legal rights or
misuse of abuse of power by the State or its officers. The
judiciary stands between the citizen and the State as a
bulwark against executive excesses and misuse or abuse of
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:33:-
power    by   the     executive       and    therefore        it    is   absolutely
essential that the judiciary must be free from executive
pressure or influence and this has been secured by the
Constitution makers by making elaborate provisions in the
Constitution to which detailed reference has been made in
the judgments in Sankalchand Sheth's case (supra). But it
is   necessary        to    remind     ourselves       that    the       concept   of
independence        of     the    judiciary       is   not    limited       only   to
independence from executive pressure or influence but it is
a    much     wider        concept    which       takes      within      its   sweep
independence from many other pressures and prejudices. It
has many dimensions, namely fearlessness of other power
centers, economic or political, and freedom from prejudices
acquired and nourished by the class to which the Judges
belong".
16. The independent judiciary was thus obliged to

ensure that the supremacy of law prevailed. The

Constitution envisages that the judiciary not only

states the law through an interpretative process

but also protects the Constitution and democracy.

In that process, the judiciary cannot act like

unelected         legislators               and    erode           parliamentary

supremacy to legislate by undermining the rule of

law. The essence of democracy, characteristically,

is    defined       by      the      role    of    each       institution          to
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:34:-
sustain         the         balance         contemplated                 in     the

Constitution, making each independent in its own

sphere.       Democracy         literally           means      rule        by    the

people.        The     term      is       derived        from        the       Greek

dēmokratia, which was coined from dēmos ("people")

and    kratos        ("rule")        in    the      middle          of   the    5th

Century BCE to denote the political systems then

existing in some Greek city-states, notably Athens

[Source       online        Britannica,        viewed          on    11/12/24].

The     independent          judiciary         being       a    creation          of

democracy,         must      also     possess        the       character          of

democratic            institutions             by        allowing             public

scrutiny.        In     a    true     liberal        democracy,               public

opinion is necessary. This public opinion prevents

missteps and allows institutions to improve their

functioning. "One of the major political theorists

of obligatory public processes was Jeremy Bentham;

he argued that a host of institutions ought to

operate       under      the     principle          of    "publicity,"            so

that the "Tribunal of Public Opinion" could assess
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:35:-
the results. Through publicity ("the very soul of

justice"), judges, while presiding at trial, would

themselves         be     "on        trial."       The       idea   of    public

oversight of judges coupled with legal protections

for    judicial         independence              was    a    departure    from

Renaissance           conceptions            of         judges,     who    were

beholden to the monarchs who appointed them. The

public's        new      authority          to      judge      judges     (and,

inferentially,             the        government)helped              to    turn

"rites" into "rights." The more that spectators

were     active       participants               ("auditors,"       to    borrow

again from Bentham), the more Courts could serve

as a venue for the dissemination of information"
[See      article        "Reinventing              Court      as    Democratic

Institution",            authored         by       Judith      Resnik].     The

judiciary in India being a democratic institution,

needs        to         possess          and        reflect         openness,

transparency            and     accountability;               the   essential

elements and values of democracy.
W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:36:-
B.      Enhancing            Judicial           Standards         To      Ensure

Credibility:
17.     In    a    quest        to   ensure          credibility         and    to

sustain        people's         confidence,            judges      themselves

through internal mechanisms adopted core judicial

values. Restatement of values of judicial life as

adopted by the full Supreme Court on 7th May 1997,

assured the public of confidence in the judicial

system. Besides, Bangalore Principles of Judicial

Conduct        2002      adopted       by        a    judicial      group       on

strengthening judicial integrity, in a meeting of

Chief      Justices        at    the     Hague,            gave   momentum      to

judicial ethics and standards to be followed by

all.
C.    Evolving         Accountability                And    Transparency        In

Judicial Function In The Era Of Digital Space:
18. The independence of the judiciary cannot be

assessed          in   isolation         of      its       functioning.        The

functioning             of       the            judiciary,          on         both
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:37:-
administrative and judicial sides, must carry the

edifice        of    the    democratic           character       to     sustain

public      confidence.          Accordingly,           Courts        in    India

generally follow an open Court justice system. The

closed-door          justice         system       is    a      challenge       to

public confidence.
19.
In      Supreme         Court          Advocates        on
Record

Association and another v. Union of India
[(2016)

5 SCC 1], the Court opined on judicial function

and public confidence as follows:
Indisputably,        this   concept      of     independence     of    judiciary
which     is    inextricably         linked      and   connected       with   the
constitutional        process        related      to   the     functioning     of
judiciary       is     a    "fixed-star"          in    our     constitutional
consultation and its voice centres around the philosophy of
the Constitution. The basic postulate of this concept is to
have a more effective judicial system with its full vigour
and vitality so as to secure and strengthen the imperative
confidence of the people in the administration of justice.
20.     The     functioning           of        the    Court     and       public

confidence are mutually interlinked to ensure the

independence of the judiciary and augur confidence
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:38:-
about the judges who are administering justice.
The     judiciary         cannot        ignore          measures     to     gain

public confidence and is compelled to adopt steps

for enhancing transparency in its functioning. The

judiciary          was      quick          to     embrace          Information

Communication            Technology             (ICT)      tools    to    bring

transparency to the administration of justice. One

of     the     challenges            faced       by     lawyers,         clerks,

litigants        etc.      was       the    lack      of    information      on

details of the cases before the Court. The Court

also found it difficult to provide information to

all, with its limited human resources. One of the

objectives of the e-committee of the Supreme Court

of India is to make the justice delivery system

accessible,             cost-effective,                 transparent          and

accountable. ICT tools are used in the judiciary

for     improving         the        justice       delivery        system     to

enhance       efficiency,            timelines,         better      access    to

justice, provide citizen-centric services etc. In

Swapnil Tripathi v. Supreme Court Of India [(2018)
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:39:-
10 SCC 639], the Apex Court in the context of

live-streaming            of     Court         proceedings,              elaborated

the         concept         of          open               justice,        judicial

accountability            and        transparency                and     opined     as

follows:
As no person can be heard to plead ignorance of law, there
is    corresponding        obligation            on        the   State    to    spread
awareness      about     the     law     and      the       developments       thereof
including the evolution of the law which may happen in the
process of adjudication of cases before this Court. The
right to know and receive information, it is by now well
settled, is a facet of
Article 19(1)(a)
of the Constitution
and for which reason the public is entitled to witness
Court proceedings involving issues having an impact on the
public at large or a section of the public, as the case may
be. This right to receive information and be informed is
buttressed by the value of dignity of the people. One of
the proponents has also highlighted the fact that litigants
involved in large number of cases pending before the Courts
throughout the country will be benefitted if access to
Court proceedings is made possible by way of live streaming
of Court proceedings. That would increase the productivity
of    the   country,      since        scores         of    persons      involved   in
litigation in the Courts in India will be able to avoid
visiting the Courts in person, on regular basis, to witness
hearings and instead can attend to their daily work without
taking leave.
W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:40:-
The      Apex        Court      after          a     discussion           on     the

importance of open justice                         system in the light of
Article        145    (4)
of     the       Constitution,             153-B    of

Civil Procedure Code 1908 and
section 327
of Code

of Criminal Procedure 1973 held as follows:
Live-streaming          of     proceedings           is     crucial       to     the
dissemination of knowledge about judicial proceedings and
granting full access to justice to the litigant. Access to
justice can never be complete without the litigant being
able to see, hear and understand the course of proceedings
first hand. Apart from this, live-streaming is an important
facet     of     a    responsive      judiciary            which    accepts      and
acknowledges that it is accountable to the concerns of
those who seek justice. Live-streaming is a significant
instrument      of    establishing         the      accountability        of   other
stake-holders in the justicing process, including the Bar.
Moreover, the government as the largest litigant has to
shoulder       the   responsibility         for      the    efficiency     of    the
judicial       process.      Full    dissemination          of     knowledge     and
information about Court proceedings through live-streaming
thus subserves diverse interests of stake holders and of
society in the proper administration of justice.
21. The approach as above, alludes to the emphasis

on    public         interest        to    make       open       justice        more

intimately           connected       to    the       people        and    to    have
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:41:-
trust      and      confidence             in      the   justice       delivery

system. The judiciary neither wields the power of

armoury nor has the executive fiat of force to

enforce its decisions, except the force of public

opinion. The carefully crafted transparency is the

fountainhead of the clamoring independence that it

vouches for. In a liberal democracy, every public

institution is built on public reasoning. Public

reasoning         endorses           collective          affirmation         on   a

larger common good.
III. OPEN DATA AND LEGAL ECOSYSTEM:
22. In a liberal and democratic system, judicial

administration is only a part of the larger legal

ecosystem. In the larger legal ecosystem, justice

and     law     enforcement           integrate          with     the       socio,

economic,        political           and      cultural      aspirations           of

the society and the state. In such a scenario, the

Court      cannot        claim        a      monopoly      over       the    data

available           with       the           judiciary.         The         modern
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:42:-
government           will         have      to       solve     many     issues

pertaining           to      the      legal          ecosystem,       on    the

assimilation of data with different stakeholders

focusing on               governance, welfare and the common

good      of      the        citizens.            Rapid    advancement       in

artificial intelligence and machine learning would

alter      the     approach          of     the      government       and   the

stakeholders            in    solving         many     problems       plaguing

administration and policy-making.                             Data analytics

can offer solutions to increase accountability and

drive      social         good,      welfare         policy     formulations

etc. Withholding data would be detrimental to the

public interest. Though Courts have not formed any

policy on open data, the larger public interest

compels        the      judiciary          to      share     data    with   the

public, stakeholders, researchers, government etc.

The    Government            of    India          announced    the    National

Data Sharing and Accessibility Policy in 2012. An

open data platform in India has been set up by the

National Informatics Centre in compliance with the
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:43:-
Open Data Policy of India. The objectives of the

policy        are      to     have          community         participation,

citizen         engagement             to          help    the      Government

formulate           policies              and        to     ensure         better

governance. The data available with the Court, if

shared,        would        be       of       immense        help     to    many

stakeholders.               For      example,        the    police    will    be

able to identify the issues relating to lopsided

investigations.             The      Government           will   be   able     to

take       measures           regarding              human       trafficking,

establishing Courts to tackle any particular kind

of offence etc. In the larger interest, the data

collected must be shared to benefit governance as

well.      Therefore,            the       Court      cannot     ignore       the

larger legal ecosystem in which administration of

justice operates while deciding a matter of this

nature.
IV     ON THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN:
A. Evolution Of The Right To Be Forgotten:
W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:44:-
23. The right to be forgotten is a right that

developed as a consequence of the dignity of an

individual, adopted to forget the past and live in

the present. It is based on the broader rights in
Articles 7
and
8
of the Charter of Fundamental

Rights of the EU (Charter).
Article 7
relates to

the     general        right         to      privacy        of    individuals.
Whereas,
Article 8
grants protection of personal

data     as     a    fundamental             right         subject         to    other

fundamental           rights         [See
Art.     52(1)
of     the

Charter].
24. Although the Data Protection Directive of 1995

(Directive 95/46/EC) contained no express right to

be forgotten, the Court of Justice of the European

Union (CJEU) in its decision in the Google Spain

v.    AEPD      [Case      C-131/12            Judgment          of    the       Court

(Grand        Chamber)         Google              Spain     SL       v.        Agencia

Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD], held that

an implied right existed in the Directive.
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:45:-
25. The CJEU relied upon
Articles 6
, 12
and
14
of

the Directive 95/46/EC to hold that individuals

have control over their personal information and a

general         right       to       "erase"        said      information.
"
Article 6(1)
unequivocally provides that personal

information may not be kept for any longer than

necessary        to    fulfill       the       purpose     for    which    the

information was originally collected.
Article 12
not only grants individuals the right to block the

processing of any information that does not comply

with       the      Directive's            requirements           but     also

provides         the      right       to       apply     to      have     such

information erased.
Article 14
grants EU citizens

the     right       to     object       to      data     processing        and

requires         the     controller            to   comply       with   valid

objections." [See Shaniqua Singleton, "Balancing A

Right To Be Forgotten With Right To Freedom Of

Expression In The Wake Of Google Spain v. AEPD,

GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L., Vol. 44]
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:46:-
26. In Google Spain v. AEPD, the grievance of the

plaintiff         was    that        links       to    newspaper     articles

relating          to     his         insolvency         proceedings         were

available         on      a    Google            search      of    his     name.

Contending that although the article was truthful,

it     injured          his     reputation             and    violated       his

privacy, thereby warranting erasure as it was no

longer relevant. Although the CJEU did not direct

the     removal         of     the     article         itself      which     was

published lawfully, it directed Google to remove

links        to        the      webpage            containing        personal

information on any of the four conditions, such as

where information was i)inadequate, ii)irrelevant,
iii)no        longer          relevant,           or      iv)excessive        in

relation        to     the     purposes          of    the    processing      at

issue.        This       was     to       be       applicable       even     to

information            published          lawfully           and   that      was

factually correct. The CJEU held:
[I]t is undisputed that activity of search engines plays a
decisive role in the overall dissemination of those data in
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:47:-
that it renders the latter accessible to any internet user
making a search on the basis of the data subject's name,
including to internet users who otherwise would not have
found the web page on which those data are published.
27. The recognition of this right to be forgotten

is     further          supported        by     the   General    Data

Protection          Regulation         (GDPR)     which    supersedes

Directive 95/46/EC and expressly recognises this

right.
Article 17
of the GDPR lays down when a

data subject can exercise the right of erasure,

the obligation of data controllers to erase links

to third-party websites, and the exceptions to the

when the right can be exercised.
B. Defining The Right To Be Forgotten:
28. The right to be forgotten is derived from the

broader category of the right to privacy. Cécile

de Terwangne in her paper "Internet Privacy and

the    Right      to    be    Forgotten/      Right   to   Oblivion",

defines the right to be forgotten as 'the right

for natural persons to have information about them
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:48:-
deleted after a certain period of time.' The basis

of    this     right        to   be       forgotten           being      'internet

privacy',         this       concept               relates       to     individual

autonomy,          rather         than             secrecy       or      intimacy.

Terwangne writes:
In the context of the Internet this dimension of privacy
means      informational         autonomy            or      informational     self
determination.        The    Internet         handles        huge     quantities   of
information relating to individuals. Such personal data are
frequently       processed:          it     is      disclosed,        disseminated,
shared, selected, downloaded, registered and used in all
kinds of ways. In this sense, the individual autonomy is in
direct relation to personal information. Information self
determination        means       the      control         over      one's   personal
information,        the     individual's             right     to     decide   which
information about themselves will be disclosed, to whom and
for what purpose.
29. The right to be forgotten consists of various

facets or forms of rights which is important in

defining the extent of this right. Professors W.

Gregory Voss And Celine Castets-Renard's in their

paper "Proposal For An International Taxonomy On

The Various Forms Of The "Right To Be Forgotten":
W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:49:-
A Study On The Convergence Of Norms" categorize

the    right        to   be     forgotten              into    five     different

rights. The 'right to rehabilitation' is a right

that existed prior to the digital age and refers

to social reintegration subsequent to a judicial

conviction.          Legislation             in    the        United     Kingdom,

France, the United States etc. provides for the

erasure        of    conviction            records            subject       to     the

fulfillment of certain conditions. The 'right to

erasure/deletion'               is     a     right       provided           by   data

protection legislation. It allows for the erasure

of     personal          data        where        it     is     inaccurate         or

obsolete.
Article 17
of the GDPR sets out this

right to erasure when the data collected is no

longer relevant for the purposes it was originally

processed,          where       consent          is     withdrawn        by      data

subject etc. This right is subject to freedom of

speech and expression, public interest in the area

of public health, archiving for public interest

etc.     This       right       to     erasure/deletion                is    not    a
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:50:-
general       right      and     applies            only    in     the   limited

cases enumerated in the data protection law.                                   The

authors Voss and Renard write that the right to

erasure/deletion 'is not an overarching right to

be forgotten, but merely the possibility to have

data deleted in certain circumstances'.
30.     The      'right        to      delisting'           and       'right    to

oblivion' are facets of the right to be forgotten

in the digital context. The right to delisting or

de-indexing is the right of individuals to request

search       engines       to        delink         web    pages      containing

personal information about them. The authors Voss

and Renard write:
This     applies       where         the      information        is   inaccurate,
inadequate, irrelevant or excessive for the purposes of the
data processing. This right operates in the context of
search engines' processing of personal data and, which are
considered as "controllers" under Directive 95/46170. The
CJEU's decision involves a mere right to delisting (and not
to be completely forgotten) because the court orders the
erasure of web links, but not the related article. In other
words, "the source is preserved". Finally, in order to
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:51:-
recognize      a    right    to      delisting,      neither     the     economic
interest     of    the    operator     of    the    search   engine       nor   the
interest of the general public in having access to that
information         shall     prevail        over    the     data        subject's
reputation and privacy.
31. Whereas, the 'right to obscurity' according to

the authors refers to making personal information

relatively hard to find.                    According to Hartzog and

Stutzman,          information         is       obscure      online        if   it

lacks       one      or     more       key       factors        i.e.      search

visibility, unprotected access, identification, or

clarity that are essential for its discovery or

comprehension.              However,            there      is       no      legal

recognition of this right at present. [See Woodrow

Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, The Case for Online

Obscurity, 101 CALIF, L. REV. 1, 4 (Feb. 2013).]
32. The last categorisation of the right is the

'right to oblivion' which allows individuals to

demand        the        deletion       of       personal        information

collected          by     information           society      services.          An

example of this right can be seen in the personal
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:52:-
data protection law of Nicaragua. The authors Voss

and Renard, with regard to the right to oblivion,

write:
The right to oblivion of data collected by information
society services is a real right to be forgotten which can
be exercised without the condition of providing evidence.
It is not necessary to prove that the data are irrelevant,
out-of-date, or illegal. Besides, it is not merely a right
to obscurity, because the data are deleted. Therefore, it
is a broad right to obtain the erasure, meeting a social
demand for this right, especially with respect to social
network services.
33. The interpretation of the extent to which this

right to be forgotten will be applicable in India,

is an important consideration in determining the

liability of the different stakeholders, actors,

publishers etc. and the extent to which this right

will        be      available           in        different     judicial

proceedings.          Whether        the       right   is   available    on

current as well as future claims is a question to

be answered by us in the context of the different

factual       matrices         before      us.     This     right   to   be
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:53:-
forgotten is predicated on the past, as is evident

from     its      nomenclature              which       includes     the     term

"forgotten".            Therefore,                 it    can    only        apply

retrospectively, on information that has already

been disclosed, rather than being claimed to mask

information ex-ante.
C.     Right To Erasure:
34. Under
Article 17
of the GDPR, individuals have

the right to have their personal data erased if

the personal data is no longer necessary for the

purpose        for     which         it       was       collected.     In    the

European         context,            the       right       to   erasure        is

considered as the right to be forgotten. However,

in the Indian context, we are looking at these

concepts by relating them to fundamental rights.

We may have to distinguish this right on broader

aspects. We have already observed that the right

to be forgotten is predicated on the past. The

right to erasure does not depend upon the passage
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:54:-
of time or any period. Erasure means to delete. In

the      Indian        scenario,             these        rights           rest     on

fundamental rights not like in Europe, where it is

based on European directives and more or less a

regulatory          mechanism             exists         related           to     data

transmission             or          dissemination               of        personal

information.           Therefore,              the       right        to    erasure

cannot be understood in the same manner, as we

refer to the right to be forgotten. The right to

be forgotten can be claimed to erase memory to

move forward in life with dignity. Whereas, when

the    information            is     incorrect           or   irrelevant           the

right to erasure can be claimed. In a given case,

a    party,      if    implicated              in    a    criminal         case     is

later, on investigation found to be innocent and

has no connection with the crime involved, such a

party      may    be    permitted            to      invoke      the       right    to

erasure          immediately              to        delete       all        details

published online. In a claim based on the right to

be    forgotten,         what        is    to       be   considered          is    the
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:55:-
interest of a party to erase memory related to

events in the past and to build a future with

sincerity and good deeds and move forward in life.

This is the distinction we want to draw here.


PROBLEMS STATED:
35.(a) The publication of Court judgments online

in criminal matters offends the fundamental right

i.e the right to be forgotten.
35.(b) Judgments arising out of matrimonial and

family disputes are purely private disputes. Law

recognizes the protection of privacy. Therefore,

the publication of judgments online and allowing

them      to     be     viewed       in       the   digital   space   is

violative of privacy.
35.(c) Publishers of judgments, like Indian Kanoon

and other law journals, have no right to publish

the details of parties ignoring the privacy rights
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:56:-
of    litigants          which       includes      their    right    to    be

forgotten.
35.(d) The absence of a judicial policy regulating

uploading of judgments containing details of names

of    parties        and    allowing        them     to    be   indexed   by

search engines in the digital space is violative

of the right to privacy of litigants.
35.(e) Search engines, like Google, shall erase or

redact personal data contained in the judgments

from the digital domain.
35.(f) Digital eternity in retaining judgments in

the    digital        domain         forever    is   violative      of    the

fundamental right to be forgotten.


REFRAMING          THE      DISCUSSION          ON    THE       JUDICIARY'S

APPROACH        TO    BUILDING         MEASURES       TO    RAISE    PUBLIC

CONFIDENCE           AND      ALLOWING          JUDGMENTS       CONTAINING

PERSONAL DATA IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE:
W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:57:-
36. The identity of the judiciary based on public

confidence          is    not        ordinarily         possible      without

there being free flow of information on judicial

functioning. A litigant or an accused before Court

of law is a private person on whom the public

seldom      shows        interest       to      gaze.       Therefore,      they

question       why       their       personal        data    is    allowed    to

appear in the public sphere. On the same lines, if

a   litigant        or    accused       is      a    public       figure,    the

curiosity of the public to watch judicial conduct

and function is so high. Often, the media carries

headlines of breaking news with minute-by-minute

details of the Court proceedings, including what

the    judge      spoke      during       the        proceedings      in    such

cases where a public figure is involved. In open

justice, as we discussed earlier, the Courtroom

must afford an opportunity to the public to form

opinions        about       its       functioning.            This    is     the

foremost          consideration                 in      building       public

confidence. It is not necessarily the case details
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:58:-
of 'X' or 'Y' that a commoner wants to know, but

the information on how a case of 'X' or 'Y' is

decided        in     the     Court        of     law.       However    scant

curiosity           may       have       been         shown      in     Court

proceedings, Courts cannot count on the number of

people interested, to deny such information from

coming into the public sphere. The sense of public

sphere must guide the Court in allowing judgments

to come into the public domain. Jürgen Habermas, a

German      philosopher          and     social       theorist,        defines

the concept of 'Public Sphere' as:
We mean first of all a realm of our social life in which
something approaching public opinion can be formed. Access
is guaranteed to all citizens. A portion of the public
sphere comes into being in every conversation in which
private individuals assemble to form a public body. They
then behave neither like business or professional people
transacting         private    affairs,         nor   like    members    of   a
constitutional order subject to the legal constraints of a
state bureaucracy. Citizens behave as a public body when
they confer in an unrestricted fashion-that is, with the
guarantee of freedom of assembly and association and the
freedom to express and publish their opinions-about matters
of general interest. In a large public body this kind of
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:59:-
communication        requires        specific    means   for    transmitting
information and influencing those who receive it"
[See     The      Public       Sphere:An         Encyclopedia        Article

(1964)        Stable       URL:       http://links.jstor.org/sici?
sici=0094-033X%28197423%290%3A3%3C49%3ATPSAEA

%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Z viewed on 13/12/22]
37. Courtrooms by virtue of
Section 153-B
of CPC

and
Section 327
of Cr.P.C. are statutorily public

spheres         where       people         are     allowed          to     view

proceedings and form public opinion. The very idea

of keeping Courtrooms open to the public is to

safeguard        the     open        Court      principle      which      is   a

fundamental aspect of the democratic ecosystem.
38.     The      rationale           behind
Section       74
of    the

Evidence         Act      making        judicial         records         public

records is to allow the public to have access to

the     information           in      such      records.       Indian       law

recognizes Open Court justice. "The phrase 'Open

Courts', refers to a longstanding practice, mostly
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:60:-
in common law countries, wherein all proceedings

before a Court of law are held in full public

view. If proceedings are held in full public view

it follows that anybody, be it a court reporter or

a journalist or an innovator like Indiankanoon.org

can produce such data."                    [See the research report

on "Open Courts in the Digital Age: A prescription

for an Open Data Policy" by VIDHI Centre for Legal

Policy, Page 9].              This research also refers to the

jurisprudential             underpinnings           of         'Open     Court'

practices.           The research has relied on the works

of Jeremy Bentham, John Bowring (ed)(William Tait,

Edinburgh 1843) 316, 355). Bentham justified 'Open

Courts' on the following reasoning:
In the darkness of secrecy, sinister interest and evil in
every      shape     have   full     swing.       Only    in    proportion     as
publicity has place can any of the checks applicable to
judicial injustice operate.                Where there is no publicity
there      is   no   justice.        Publicity     is    the    very    soul   of
justice.        It is the keenest spur to exertion and the surest
of   all    guards     against       improbity.      It    keeps       the   judge
himself while trying under trial.
W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:61:-
39. It is pointed out in the research that Open

Courts will help to ensure the integrity of the

process          by       acting           as           a      check     against

arbitrariness, perjury and abuse of power. In Open

Court      proceedings,            any     onlooker            is    entitled    to

watch      proceedings         and       report         any     case    that    the

Court considers. If that cannot be prevented, can

Courts      prevent         uploading             and       publishing    of    the

judgments online? It is here that the issue of

anonymity related to privacy crops up. The parties

may not have any objection to the uploading of the

judgments by masking the details of the litigants.

There may be a plethora of reasons for a litigant

to prevent disclosure of the names or the content.

That perhaps requires a balancing exercise to be

generally        guided       by     the          governing         informational

policy of the judiciary. In the research conducted

by VIDHI, they also allude to opposite interests,

juxtaposing           the    right         to      information          with    the

right to privacy. After referring to
Article 8
of
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:62:-
the
Right to Information Act, 2005
the research

admits that a balancing exercise has to be evolved

regarding the right to privacy and that disclosure

of personal information in litigation, is in the

larger public interest. This is the problem and

dilemma       in     these        cases.        We     cannot          ignore     the

privacy       rights         of      individuals.            We    also       cannot

ignore      the     larger        public        interest          of    the   Court

making      judicial         function           open    to    all       to    ensure

public confidence.
Section 8(1)(j)
of the Right to

Information           Act,        2005      exempts           disclosure           of

information related to personal information which

has    no     relationship            to   any         public      activity        or

interest and such information if disclosed would

result       in    an     invasion         of     the        privacy         of   the

individuals.            We    have      already         noted          the    larger

public interest related to the Open Court system.

The public has every right to know how a judge

conducted a particular case with details of the

parties, contents etc. The digital platform only
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:63:-
allows easy access to such information through the

digital space. Nevertheless, it was available to

the public in all respects in the brick-and-mortar

system       as    well.       The     mere       extension      of   an    Open

Court system in a digital space cannot itself be

called violative of privacy rights, in the absence

of     any    law       laid      down       in    this     regard    by     the

Parliament. Law has already recognised the Open

Court system.
40.          Justice              Chandrachud               in
Justice

K.S.Puttaswamy
's               case         (supra),        discussed        the

threefold requirement when the right to privacy,

including informational privacy, is restrained. It

reads thus:
310.    While      it    intervenes         to    protect   legitimate      State
interests, the State must nevertheless put into place a
robust regime that ensures the fulfilment of a threefold
requirement.           These   three        requirements      apply    to     all
restraints        on    privacy      (not   just    informational     privacy).
They emanate from the procedural and content-based mandate
of
Article 21.
The first requirement that there must be a
law in existence to justify an encroachment on privacy is
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:64:-
an express requirement of
Article 21.
For, no person can be
deprived       of     his       life     or      personal         liberty            except      in
accordance         with     the       procedure         established            by     law.       The
existence of law is an essential requirement. Second, the
requirement of a need, in terms of a legitimate State aim,
ensures       that    the       nature    and          content       of    the       law     which
imposes       the      restriction             falls          within       the        zone        of
reasonableness mandated by
Article 14
, which is a guarantee
against arbitrary State action. The pursuit of a legitimate
State    aim       ensures       that     the          law    does     not         suffer     from
manifest       arbitrariness.             Legitimacy,                as        a     postulate,
involves       a     value       judgment.             Judicial       review          does       not
reappreciate or second guess the value judgment of the
legislature but is for deciding whether the aim which is
sought to be pursued suffers from palpable or manifest
arbitrariness. The third requirement ensures that the means
which are adopted by the legislature are proportional to
the object and needs sought to be fulfilled by the law.
Proportionality            is    an    essential             facet    of       the    guarantee
against arbitrary State action because it ensures that the
nature and quality of the encroachment on the right is not
disproportionate to the purpose of the law. Hence, the
threefold requirement for a valid law arises out of the
mutual interdependence between the fundamental guarantees
against arbitrariness on the one hand and the protection of
life    and    personal          liberty,        on     the     other.         The    right       to
privacy, which is an intrinsic part of the right to life
and    liberty,       and       the    freedoms         embodied          in       Part    III    is
subject       to     the    same       restraints             which       apply       to     those
freedoms.
W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:65:-
41. On the right to privacy written by Samuel D.

Warren; Louis D. Brandeis in Harvard Law Review,

Vol. 4, No. 5. (Dec. 15, 1890), pp. 193-220, the

authors opine that the right to privacy does not

extend to publications made in Court.
2. The right to privacy does not prohibit the communication

of   any   matter,      though       in    its     nature   private,   when      the

publication is made under circumstances which would render

it   a   privileged      communication             according    to   the   law   of

slander and libel.
Under this rule, the right to privacy is not invaded by any
publication made in a court of justice, in legislative
bodies, or the committees of those bodies; in municipal
assemblies,       or    the    committees           of   such   assemblies,      or
practically by any communication. made in any other public
body, municipal or parochial, or in any body quasi public,
like the large voluntary associations formed for almost
every purpose of benevolence, business, or other general
interest; and (at least in many jurisdictions) reports of
any such proceedings would in some measure be accorded a
like privilege. Nor would the rule prohibit any publication
made by one in the discharge of some public or private
duty, whether legal or moral, or in conduct of one's own
affairs, in matters where his own interest is concerned.
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:66:-
42. Individual privacy rights must yield to the

larger       public         interest         in      the    absence        of    any

legislation.            The          Court          has     limitations           in

balancing           interests             affecting            a        class     of

individuals           and     that        of       public    interest.          This

exercise has to be done by the Legislature. The

Court, however, may address the fundamental rights

claimed       by    individuals              which        might     not    have    a

bearing on the collective goal. The Court cannot

assume the role of the legislature to address a

class and command the law. If the Court attempts

to    carry      out     such        an    exercise         on     a    notion    of

upholding fundamental rights, it would in essence

be     encroaching            upon          the       competency          of     the

legislature            to     make          laws.          However,        nothing

prevents        the    Court         from          adjudicating         individual

grievances             and       balancing                 such         individual

grievances         against       public             interest       as    referable

under
Section 8(1)(j)
of the Right To Information

Act, 2005 if such individual rights have reasons
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:67:-
to    depart.       Ronald       Dworkin,         in    his   famous      book

'Taking Rights Seriously' argues that, "Individual

rights are political trumps held by individuals.

Individuals have rights when, for some reason, a

collective goal is not a sufficient justification

for denying them what they wish, as individuals,

to     have       or      to         do,    or     not    a      sufficient

justification           for     imposing         some    loss    or   injury

upon them." [See Introduction, pg. xi].
43. The Madras High Court in
Karthick Theodre v.

Registrar General, Madras High
Court and Others

[2021 SCC Online Mad 2755], the judgment authored

by Justice N.Anand Venkatesh, considered the issue

of whether an accused, who has been acquitted of

all the charges as against him, had the right to

seek     erasure        of     personal          information      from     the

public       domain.         The       learned      Judge       opined,     at

para.37, as follows:
37. There must be a proper policy formulated in this regard
by means of specific rules. In other words, some basic
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:68:-
criteria or parameters must be fixed, failing which, such
an exercise will lead to utter confusion. This Court must
take judicial notice of the fact that the criminal justice
system     that    is    prevalent          in       this    country   is     far   from
satisfactory. In various cases involving heinous crimes,
this     Court     helplessly          passes         orders    and    judgments      of
acquittal         due     to     slipshod             investigation,          dishonest
witnesses      and      lack     of    an     effective        witness      protection
system. This Court honestly feels that our criminal justice
system is yet to reach such standards where courts can
venture to pass orders for redaction of name of an accused
person on certain objective criteria prescribed by rules or
regulations.       It     will    be     more        appropriate       to   await    the
enactment of the Data Protection Act and Rules thereunder,
which may provide an objective criterion while dealing with
the plea of redaction of names of accused persons who are
acquitted        from    criminal           proceedings.         If    such     uniform
standards        are     not     followed            across    the     country,      the
constitutional courts will be riding an unruly horse which
will prove to be counterproductive to the existing system.
44.     As     rightly          opined           by     the     learned        Judge,

formulation of uniform standards is the job of the

Legislature             after     evaluating                various      parameters

and    balancing          different              interests        including          the

interest of the public. The Courts cannot remain

oblivious          to     their         limitation              in     formulating

standards         to     bind         different             interests.        We    are,
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:69:-
therefore,         of     the        view    that      the   Court      cannot

prevent the dissemination of case details in the

public      domain       citing        the      privacy      of   individual

litigants.
45. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in its judgment in

R. Rajagopal alias
R.R. Gopal And Another v. State

of T.N. And Others
[(1994) 6 SCC 632] held that

the    right      to    privacy        does      not    extend     to   Court

records and other public records.
(1) The right to privacy is implicit in the right to life

and liberty guaranteed to the citizens of this country by
Article 21.
It is a "right to be let alone". A citizen has

a right to safeguard the privacy of his own, his family,

marriage,       procreation,          motherhood,       child-bearing      and

education among other matters. None can publish anything

concerning the above matters without his consent -- whether

truthful or otherwise and whether laudatory or critical. If

he does so, he would be violating the right to privacy of

the person concerned and would be liable in an action for

damages. Position may, however, be different, if a person
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:70:-
voluntarily thrusts himself into controversy or voluntarily

invites or raises a controversy.
(2) The rule aforesaid is subject to the exception, that

any publication concerning the aforesaid aspects becomes

unobjectionable if such publication is based upon public

records including court records. This is for the reason

that once a matter becomes a matter of public record, the

right    to    privacy      no    longer     subsists     and   it   becomes    a

legitimate subject for comment by press and media among

others.       We    are,    however,    of      the   opinion   that    in    the

interests of decency [
Article 19(2)]
an exception must be

carved out to this rule, viz., a female who is the victim

of a sexual assault, kidnap, abduction or a like offence

should not further be subjected to the indignity of her

name and the incident being publicised in press/media.
46. It is true that the judgment in Rajagopal's

case      (supra)           was      rendered         much      before       the

declaration by the Apex Court that the right to

privacy        is     a    fundamental           right.      However,        this

Court cannot ignore the major premise on which the

decision           was     rendered      in      Rajagopal's         case.     In
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:71:-
Rajagopal's           case,          the    Apex     Court    held        that

publication          based      on      public      records    cannot      be

objected to on the ground of the right to privacy.

The judicial function is a public function and the

records        are     treated         as       public    records.    Every

litigant approaches the Court knowing fully well

that the details of the case and the details of

the party would form part of the public records.
47. We have already adverted to the nature of the

right to be claimed as the right to be forgotten.

It cannot be claimed in respect of current records

or proceedings before the Court. The right to be

forgotten if claimed in current proceedings would

be an affront to the principle of open justice and

the     larger       public          interest.      The    'right    to    be

forgotten' is contextually related to the past,

and cannot be claimed as a 'right in presentium'.

An individual has every right to live their life

in    the     moment,        erasing        the     past.    This    is    an
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:72:-
essential facet of the right to live with dignity.

Merely as in the past, he has been subject to

accusation of a crime or had been involved in a

crime, shall not haunt him his entire life. The

very idea of a fixed term of imprisonment is to

erase his past and move forward with a new lease

of life, after the sentence.
If such an individual

is not allowed to erase his past and control the

information          on    his       person,      no     doubt,    it    would

violate his right to live with dignity. However,

the    Court      cannot       make     a       declaration    in   current

proceedings,            acknowledging              the     right        to     be

forgotten to erase data for the current and the

future. That will be against the very essence of

the recognition of the right as a right to be

forgotten. The Apex Court in the privacy judgment

in    para.636        of
Justice        K.S.       Puttaswamy
's          case

(supra),realising              this      aspect,         put   forward        as

follows:
W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:73:-
636.     Thus,      the      European       Union        Regulation         of    2016
[ Regulation No. (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament
and    of   the     Council     of   27-4-2016          on   the    protection       of
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal
data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing
Directive         No.        95/46/EC       (General          Data        Protection
Regulation).] has recognised what has been termed as "the
right to be forgotten". This does not mean that all aspects
of earlier existence are to be obliterated, as some may
have    a   social      ramification.       If     we    were      to    recognise   a
similar right, it would only mean that an individual who is
no longer desirous of his personal data to be processed or
stored, should be able to remove it from the system where
the    personal       data/information           is     no   longer       necessary,
relevant,      or       is    incorrect      and        serves      no    legitimate
interest.      Such      a   right   cannot        be    exercised        where    the
information/data is necessary, for exercising the right of
freedom of expression and information, for compliance with
legal obligations, for the performance of a task carried
out in public interest, on the grounds of public interest
in the area of public health, for archiving purposes in the
public interest, scientific or historical research purposes
or statistical purposes, or for the establishment, exercise
or defence of legal claims. Such justifications would be
valid in all cases of breach of privacy, including breaches
of data privacy.
48.    In     individual         cases,          the      Court         may,     after

adverting to time and space, order the erasure of

past        records.          However,           nothing         prevents          the
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:74:-
Legislature             from         bringing              in       Legislation

recognizing          the    right         to       be    forgotten      to    erase

such records after the expiry of such period as it

deems fit to fix. Further, laying down the grounds

when such a right to be forgotten can be exercised

is    the      prerogative           of     the         Legislature.       As   the

right to be forgotten is not an absolute right, it

is    crucial        that     the      legislature              enumerates      the

grounds when an individual can claim this right.
Art. 17
of GDPR lays down grounds such as, where

information is no longer necessary, withdrawal of

consent        by    individuals,              unlawful         processing       of

information etc. The Article reads thus:
1. The data subject shall have the right to obtain from
     the controller the erasure of personal data concerning
     him or her without undue delay and the controller shall
     have      the   obligation       to     erase       personal   data     without
     undue delay where one of the following grounds applies:
a.    the personal data are no longer necessary in
               relation     to   the      purposes        for   which   they    were
               collected or otherwise processed;
W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:75:-
b. the data subject withdraws consent on which the
              processing is based according to point (a) of
Article 6(1)
, or point (a) of
Article 9(2)
, and
              where there is no other legal ground for the
              processing;
c. the     data     subject          objects        to    the     processing
              pursuant      to
Article           21(1)
and    there     are    no
              overriding legitimate grounds for the processing,
              or the data subject objects to the processing
              pursuant to
Article 21(2);
d. the personal data have been unlawfully processed;

          e. the     personal         data          have     to     be     erased     for
              compliance with a legal obligation in Union or
              Member     State       law      to     which    the        controller    is
              subject;
f. the personal data have been collected in relation
              to   the    offer      of      information           society    services
              referred to in
Article 8(1).
2. Where the controller has made the personal data public
     and is obliged pursuant to paragraph 1 to erase the
     personal       data,     the     controller,             taking       account     of
     available technology and the cost of implementation,
     shall      take     reasonable            steps,        including       technical
     measures, to inform controllers which are processing
     the personal data that the data subject has requested
     the erasure by such controllers of any links to, or
     copy or replication of, those personal data.
W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:76:-
3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to the extent that
     processing is necessary:
a. for exercising the right of freedom of expression
              and information;
b. for     compliance        with       a     legal    obligation     which
              requires processing by Union or Member State law
              to which the controller is subject or for the
              performance of a task carried out in the public
              interest or in the exercise of official authority
              vested in the controller;
c. for reasons of public interest in the area of
              public health in accordance with points (h) and
(i) of
Article 9(2)
as well as
Article 9(3);
d. for archiving purposes in the public interest,
              scientific      or      historical          research      purposes      or
              statistical purposes in accordance with
Article
              89(1)
in   so     far    as      the    right    referred      to    in
              paragraph 1 is likely to render impossible or
              seriously        impair          the       achievement       of        the
              objectives of that processing; or

          e. for    the     establishment,             exercise    or    defence      of
              legal claims.
The legislature alone is competent to enumerate

such     grounds        and      carve         out       exceptions        to        the

claims       of    such      a       right        to     be     forgotten.           The
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:77:-
judiciary is not competent to legislate and lay

down legal norms for a class.
ANSWERING THE PROBLEMS STATED:
A. Criminal Records And The Right To Be Forgotten:
49.    The     demand       of       persons         involved      in   criminal

cases that their records have to be erased or the

names redacted based on the right to be forgotten

is, essentially, claimed in respect of the records

of recent origin. The right to be forgotten can be

claimed to erase past records. The learned counsel

for    one     of    the     petitioners,                 Shri   Johnson      Gomez

argued that the implication of this is that a bail

order      pertaining         to      a     client         in    the   year   2013

alone      appears         in        the       public       domain      and     his

subsequent          acquittal         from          all    charges      finds    no

place in the digital domain. It was argued that in

the absence of rules, the Court shall not upload

the judgment online. Similarly, Smt. Kala T. Gopi,

submitted that her client who was involved in a
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:78:-
criminal case and charge-sheeted in the year 2013,

had compromised with the de facto complainant and

the     entire       criminal          case       was     quashed      by    this

Court. However, on a search online of his name,

the    case      quashed       by     this        Court      appears    in   the

digital       space       affecting          his       image    and     denting

marriage prospects. The learned counsel Smt. Kala

T. Gopi submits that the judgment has two parts,

one related to personal data of the individual and

the other related to the facts and law. It is

submitted that absolutely, there was no necessity

to     publish        the      names         of        the    parties       while

uploading the judgment. Advocate Smt. Bimala Baby

appearing        for     one     of        the    petitioners       submitted

that      her       client           had     approached          this       Court

aggrieved by an exhibition of a bail order online.
It is submitted that due to crawling and indexing,

her    client's        name      appears          on    the    search   engine

Google. Learned counsel points out that the moment

the client's name is typed into the search engine,
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:79:-
the    case      details        related            to   him    appear.           Shri

Jacob        Sebastian          appearing               for        another        writ

petitioner argued that his client is a well-known

doctor and whenever his name is typed into Google,

a judgment in a bail application and criminal case

appears in the results. These cases are from the

years      2017     and     2018.         Similar        prayers       also      have

been     made     in    W.P.(C).           No.20387           of    2018    to    the

effect of removing names and contents of the case

of    the     petitioner             in     the      Criminal        M.C.       filed

before this Court in the year 2013.
50.     As    adverted          to    earlier,           the       right     to    be

forgotten can be claimed as a right to erase past

memory.        The      public            records        relating          to     the

petitioners who were either accused or parties to

the criminal proceedings cannot be erased forever.

The    digital         space     is       a        dynamic     space       allowing

vibrant         data       to        be       refreshed            without        the

constraints of time and space. The boundaries of
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:80:-
privacy have no limitations in the digital space.

In the real world, humans have limitations created

by space and time. In the normal course of human

conduct, time will erase memory. This particular

problem in a digital space of allowing information

to remain forever would certainly affect the right

claimed as a right to be forgotten. The internet

has     unlimited         capacity          to    remember.       The    Court

cannot generally balance the interest claimed by

the individuals and the information available in

the    digital         domain        for    eternity.       The   Court,      no

doubt,      would       be    able     to       form   an   opinion      after

adverting         to    the     attending          circumstances         of    a

particular case to order the removal of personal

data or erasure of such data from digital space

after      considering          the        factors     relating     to    such

cases.
51. Thus, we are of the opinion that the claim to

erase or redact personal information based on the
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:81:-
right to be forgotten, in current proceedings or

proceedings          concluded          recently           is   a     myth      and

cannot be relied on to prevent the uploading of

judgments in the Court Information System.


B. The Right To Privacy Claimed In Matrimonial,

Family, Custody Matters Etc.:
52.    The     learned         Counsel           Shri    B.G.   Harindranath

fairly submitted that the law already recognizes

the     right       to     privacy         in      matrimonial,         family,

custody disputes etc. The counsel placed reliance

on
Section       22
of    the      Hindu          Marriage      Act,   1955

which reads thus:
22 Proceedings to be in camera and may not be printed or
published. (1) Every proceeding under this Act shall be
conducted in camera and it shall not be lawful for any
person to print or publish any matter in relation to any
such proceeding except a judgment of the High Court or of
the Supreme Court printed or published with the previous
permission of the Court.
(2)   If    any    person      prints     or      publishes     any    matter    in
contravention of the provisions contained in sub-section
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:82:-
(1), he shall be punishable with fine which may extend to
one thousand rupees.
53. The learned counsel also referred to
Section

11
of    the    Family      Courts         Act,    1984   which     reads

thus:
11. Proceedings to be held in camera.-In every suit or
proceedings to which this Act applies, the proceedings may
be held in camera if the Family Court so desires and shall
be so held if either party so desires. -In every suit or
proceedings to which this Act applies, the proceedings may
be held in camera if the Family Court so desires and shall
be so held if either party so desires.
54.     We    also     find      that     under       regulation       48   of

Adoption Regulation, 2022 there is a complete bar

against       the     publication         of     details      of    adoptive

parents,        name     of     the    child,         etc.,   which     reads

thus:
48. Confidentiality of adoption records.―All agencies or
authorities involved in the adoption process shall ensure
that    confidentiality        of    adoption     records     is   maintained,
except as permitted under any other law for the time being
in force and for such purpose, the adoption order may not
be displayed on any public portal.
W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:83:-
55. Advocate Babu Paul submitted that an office

memorandum         has      already       been      issued      by     the    High

Court in relation to matrimonial matters.
56.     In      family,      matrimonial,            child       custody          and

adoption matters, if the legislature had already

intended        to    protect        the     privacy       of    the    parties

involved therein, merely for the reason that it

does not exist in other laws related to family,

matrimonial disputes etc, the Court cannot hold

that the protection to the right to privacy does

not exist in such matters. The recognition of the

right      to    privacy        as   a     fundamental          right        is   of

recent       origin        in     our      country.        The        protection

accorded         to        privacy         in      matrimonial,           family

disputes,         custody         and      adoption        in     a    slew       of

legislations              signifies        that      the        open    justice

principle            is     not      in          contemplation          of        the

legislature          in     those       matters.      The       legislature's

wisdom to deny open Court function to the public
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:84:-
is    essentially            a    recognition               of   the     protective

rights       of     the          parties          in    relation         to       their

privacy.       In     those        circumstances,                we    are    of   the

considered view that in matters related to family

disputes,          matrimonial            disputes,              child       custody,

invoking        writ      jurisdiction                 of     this      Court,      the

Court shall not publish details of the parties to

identify        the      cause          before          the      Court       if     the

party/ies          desire         so.    The          learned         counsel      Shri

Vipin V.Varghese appearing for the petitioner in

WPC 6687/2017 submitted that his client approached

this      Court         seeking          a        relief         invoking          writ

jurisdiction            to       conduct          a     marriage         under      the
Special           Marriage              Act,           1954
which           never

materialised            in       spite       of        this      Court       granting

relief to solemnise marriage with the person who

resides       in    a   foreign          country            under      the
Special

Marriage Act, 1954
. According to the counsel, the

Google search engine exhibits his client's name

and links the judgment delivered by this Court.
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:85:-
Though this matter is not directly arising from a

Family Court jurisdiction, taking note of the fact

that the jurisdiction of this Court was invoked to

solemnise the marriage, we are of the view that in

such     matters,         on     request           of    the    parties,      the

Registry shall mask the names and details of the

parties, in recognition of the right to privacy in

relation to matrimonial and related affairs.
57.     Similarly,          it       is      the        case    of     the   writ

petitioner in 2604/2021 that the writ petitioner

had approached this Court on an earlier occasion

in a dispute related to custody. So also is the

claim      of    the    writ         petitioner          in    12699    of   2021

arising from a family dispute.
C. Publishing Judgments By Indian Kanoon And In

Other Online Law Journals:
58.    The      Case     Information               System      software      is   a

giant move under the initiative of the e-committee

to make the Indian Judiciary more transparent and
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:86:-
more      litigant        friendly.           The   CIS   versions      are

available for District Judiciary and High Courts

exclusively. This Case Information System software

for the District Judiciary is created under the

guidance        of    the      e-committee,         Supreme    Court     of

India through the software team at the National

Informatics Center (NIC), Pune. The whole idea of

CIS, in a nutshell, is that the litigant should be

able to view the daily status of his case, the

orders of the case, hearing dates of his case, the

progress of the case on any particular date etc.

online      from      any    part    of       the   world.    [Source   e-

committee Of Supreme Court Of India Website Viewed

On 14/12/22] The Judgments are gold mines of data.

In a few of the cases, the challenge is in regard

to permitting the use of Court Information Systems

by technology innovators in the legal domain like

Indian Kanoon. On typing a subject or name of the

parties, one can easily search and find out the

cases they are looking for on the Indian Kanoon
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:87:-
website. Indian Kanoon obtains judgments from the

Case      Information            System         of     Courts       which       are

accessible and free of cost. The Courts shall have

no    copyright          claim       over       judgments      as    the       same

forms part of public records.
Under the Copyright

Act
1957, reproduction for judicial reporting, or

reproduction or publication of judgments are not

infringements of copyright. Indian Kanoon provides

access      to     different          statutes         and    case    laws      of

various       Courts       and       the    Supreme      Court       of    India,

free of charge.             The reliefs sought against Indian

Kanoon      are     to     block       the       personal      data       of   the

petitioners          and     also      to       remove       and    erase       the

disclosure          of     the        identity         of     some        of   the

petitioners herein.                   Though there was resistance

on the side of Indian Kanoon in regard to the

maintainability             of       the        writ    petition          seeking

prayers against them, we are not considering the

above at this juncture for the simple reason that

substantial            relief          is        sought       against           the
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:88:-
publication of the judgment by the High Court on

the      websites         and        the       portal,       and          allowing

Indiankaoon and other publishers to obtain data

from     Case      Information         System.         Advocate           Santhosh

Mathew,        learned        counsel           appearing           for    Indian

Kanoon      further       submitted            that    the     law    does      not

prohibit        the     publication            of     public    records         and

Indian Kanoon never published judgments with the

personal details of the parties in cases where the

anonymity of parties is protected. He also tried

to distinguish between the right to be forgotten

with the right of erasure. The judgments forming

part of the Court records are public documents as

referable under
Section 74
of the Indian Evidence

Act.     There      cannot       be   any       dispute        in    regard      to

publishing the contents of the judgment even if

such judgments are ordered to be masked in regard

to the details of the parties to protect their

identity. We have already overruled the right to

claim      privacy       in    the    public          sphere     in       an   Open
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:89:-
Court system.             The Courtroom is open to all. The

Court cannot gloss over the protection available

to publishers of judgments under
Article 19(1)(a)
of     our     Constitution.               Reporting        and    publishing

judgments         are     part       of       freedom       of    speech     and

expression and that cannot be taken away lightly

without the aid of law.
D.    Absence       of    Judicial           Policy    or    Rules      Linking

Judgments Online And In Digital Space:
59. Transparency and informed consent are part of

good       governance           in         administration.           Informed

consent        in     this      context            postulates      that      the

litigant is aware that his or her personal details

in     the     case      will        be      published       on   the      Court

website. The autonomy of a litigant to choose a

public       forum       or     private            forum    to     adjudicate

disputes amenable for private adjudication is not

lost sight of. In private forums, litigants need

not have such worries of publication of judgments
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:90:-
in     the      public       domain.            The     approach        of    the

judiciary         to    help         litigants         be   informed         about

their case in an easily accessible way though is a

laudable service to them, has its pitfalls. They

have not been informed about the publication of

their        case          details          online          with       personal

identifications. We have overruled the objections

on    the     ground       of    privacy         and    the     right    to    be

forgotten but that doesn't mean that the judiciary

will      have        unbridled         power          over     the     choices

exercised        by    a    litigant        who       has     approached      the

Court seeking justice. The litigant must be put on

notice about the publication of judgments online.

In many jurisdictions where strict personal data

protection laws are in force, they have adopted

such a policy of informed consent. The following

are    the     details          of    the       privacy       notice    in    the

judiciary in the UK.[See https://www.judiciary.uk/

(viewed on 14/12/2022)]:
What is your personal data?
W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:91:-
Personal data is any information about a living individual
that can be used to identify them, for instance, name,
address, date of birth, email address, qualifications.
It may also include what are known as special categories of
personal       data.        This      is       information           concerning       an
individual's racial or ethnic origin, political opinions,
religious or philosophical beliefs, Trade Union membership,
genetic or biometric data, health data, or data concerning
their sex life or sexual orientation.
What do we mean by processing?
When    we   refer     to    processing             we   mean   any    activity      the
judiciary, while exercising a judicial function, perform on
or with your personal data such as collection, storage,
adaptation, destruction, or other use. This includes, but
is not limited to, taking notes during court or tribunal
hearings,      drafting       and      having            published     judgments      or
orders.
How do we process your personal data?
The    judiciary     process         your     data       consistently        with   data
protection law. This is set out in the UK General Data
Protection Regulation, the Law Enforcement Directive and
the Data Protection Act 2018.
Why do the judiciary process your data?
The    judiciary     process         your     data        in   court   and    tribunal
proceedings to carry out their constitutional function of
doing justice according to law. They do so to support the
rule of law.
W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:92:-
Legal basis for processing

The judiciary process your data in the exercise of the
statutory      and    inherent        common         law    jurisdiction       of   the
courts and tribunals. They do so as this is necessary in
the    public     interest       or       in       the     exercise    of     official
authority      vested     in    them.          The   public        interest    is   the
administration of justice.
The judiciary may also process your data whilst acting in a
judicial capacity when to do so is necessary to comply with
legislation or where it is in their legitimate interest to
do so.
Sharing your personal data

Court and tribunal proceedings are, except in exceptional
circumstances or where required by law, such as rules of
court or a court or tribunal order, required to be held in
public. This is an aspect of the constitutional right to
open justice.
There is generally therefore no expectation of privacy in
personal      data      which        is    processed          by     the    judiciary
exercising judicial functions.
Your personal data may be shared by the judiciary whilst
acting in a judicial capacity with, but not limited to,

   ● parties to court cases and their legal
       representatives;
● witnesses to court cases;
W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:93:-
● other courts and tribunals in the United Kingdom, such
       as the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom;
● HM Courts and Tribunals Service;
● law reporters and the media generally;
● public authorities;
● regulatory bodies; and

     ● the public.
Your personal data may also be shared with other courts and
tribunals       in     other     countries           where       this      is    necessary
further to the administration of justice or to comply with,
or to fulfil, legal obligations.
Publication of your personal data

Personal        data      processed         by       the       judiciary        exercising
judicial functions may be published in court or tribunal
orders     or    judgments.          This       is   necessary          in      the   public
interest of the administration of justice. It is necessary
to    enable     individuals          to      understand          their      rights        and
obligations, which is an aspect of the rule of law.
Publication       of      judgments        is    also      a    requirement           of   the
constitutional principle of open justice and is necessary
means to support the rule of law. As such it is in the
public interest.
A court or tribunal may, where it is strictly necessary in
the    interests          of   the   administration              of     justice,       place
restrictions         on    personal        data,      such      as    an     individual's
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:94:-
name, which is placed in a judgment. It may also hold legal
proceedings in private and place restrictions on access to
court       and   tribunal       files.     Such    decisions        are     judicial
decisions and can only be taken within legal proceedings.
Individuals wishing to raise such matters should seek legal
advice.
Subject Access Rights

The     UK    General      Data      Protection         Regulation         ordinarily
provides individuals with rights concerning their personal
information,        such     as    the     right    to    request      a     copy   of
information held by the organisation that has processed it.
Those    rights      do    not    apply     where    your    personal        data   is
processed by the judiciary exercising judicial functions.
If    you    wish    to    obtain       access     to    personal      information
processed by the judiciary exercising judicial functions
you may be able to do so under provisions set out in rules
of    court,       such    as     the    Civil     Procedure        Rules,    Family
Procedure         Rules,    Criminal        Procedure       Rules     or     relevant
Tribunal Procedure Rules. You should refer to those rules
or to information provided by His Majesty's Courts and
Tribunals Service.
Further Information about Data Protection

If    you    wish    to    receive       further    information        about    data
protection law generally you can contact the Information
Commissioner at:
Information Commissioner's Office

Wycliffe House, Water Lane, Wilmslow, Cheshire SK9 5AF
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:95:-
Tel: 0303 123 1113

Visit       the     Information        Commissioner's        Office     website
(external link, opens in a new tab)

You should be aware that where the judiciary are exercising
judicial      functions      the      Information     Commissioner      has    no
supervisory authority.
Further Information about this Privacy Notice

If you are unhappy with any aspect of this Privacy Notice
or have concerns about how your personal data was processed
by    the   judiciary       exercising       judicial    functions    you     can
contact the Judicial Data Protection Panel. The Panel can
be contacted via the Judicial Office Data Privacy Officer
at:
11th Floor Thomas More Building,

Royal Courts of Justice,

London WC2A 2LL

Or by email:
[email protected]
60. It is imperative for the judiciary to give

notice of the publication of judgments and about

privacy        on     its     websites           to   reflect     the       true

character of a democratic institution. It is also

desirable         for     the        High    Court      to   consider         the

constitution of grievance redressal mechanisms and
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:96:-
also to appoint an officer to redress grievances

on the administrative side.
E. SEARCH ENGINES AND DIGITAL ETERNITY:
61. Google India and Google Global have been made

party to these proceedings. A search engine is a

software        programme            that       helps    users       find       the

information          they     are      looking      for       online,       using

keywords        or      phrases.         The      information         in        the

digital space would remain there forever unless it

is    erased        using      technological            tools.       The     data

available on the internet for eternity is a direct

affront to the right to be forgotten.                                Google is

one    of     the     providers         of      search    engine.          It   is

popularly known as Google search. It is reported

that more than 3.5 billion searches per day are

handled by the search engine. It is claimed by

Google      that      they      continuously            map    the    web       and

other sources to connect users to provide the most
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:97:-
relevant and helpful information. [See Google.com

viewed on 15/12/2022].
62.       The      learned           Senior          Counsel     Shri    Sajan

Poovayya        argued       in      extenso         and     submitted   that

Google neither discharges a public function nor is

under        the       State         authority.            Therefore,        no

directions are warranted against them.                            A detailed

argument has been raised by the counsel stating

that Google LLC., a company incorporated in the US

is not a publisher and only an intermediary. The

learned        counsel         relied           on     various     judgments

arising       from      domestic         Courts        and     international

Courts.         Pointing out to the judgment in Google

LLC. v. Defteros [(2022) HCA 27] of the Australian

High Court, the counsel submitted that the act of

providing hyperlinks in a search or re-search does

not     amount       to    publication.                Therefore,       it   is

submitted         that      the      Google          search    engine    only

enables the parties to access information that is
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:98:-
already        available         in     the         public      domain.     The

learned counsel further argued that the relevant

provisions of Information Technology (Intermediary

Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules,

2021 (hereafter Intermediary Rules) categorically

recognizes         and     exempts         transient        and    incidental

storage from the ambit of publishing or hosting.

It is submitted that it is the publisher that is

responsible          for      the      content         it      creates     and,

therefore,         the     direction           is    to   be      passed   only

against       the     publishers           and      not     against      Google

search. His argument was that intermediaries are

not responsible for the unlawful actions of third

parties. The learned Counsel also raised arguments

on the right to privacy claimed by the petitioner

and submitted that the right to privacy is not an

absolute        right       but       is       subject       to    reasonable

restrictions. He also submitted that the right to

know is an indivisible facet of the Constitution.

The right to privacy claimed cannot result in the
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:99:-
effacement of public records. The learned counsel

relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in Shreya

Singhal v. Union of India [(2013) 12 SCC 73] and

submitted          that      intermediaries           are     not    in     a

position to determine the legitimacy or veracity

of any claims for removal in the absence of Court

order       directing          intermediaries           to    take       such

action.        The learned Counsel appearing for Google

India submitted that they are neither necessary

nor a proper party in the proceedings as they are

not     operating          the       search    engine        online.      The

learned Central Government Counsel relying on                             the

Intermediary          Rules      submitted       that    Google      is    an

intermediary           and     they     are    also     bound       by    the

Intermediary Rules. He referred to various rules

and the nature of content in the search engine and

submitted          that      Google      would    come        within      the

meaning       of    an     intermediary,         as   defined       in    the

Rules. The learned Government Pleader, Shri Kannan

submitted that the High Court is a Court of record
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:100:-
and    publication           of      judgments          online    would        only

serve the public interest.
63. We are not called upon here to determine the

responsibility               or      liability           of      Google         for

publishing          judgments          online           in    terms       of     the

Intermediary            Rules.         The       publication              of     the

judgments online and allowing the same to remain

online forever may infringe upon the right of a

party based on the right to be forgotten.                                 We have

already adverted to the nature of a right that can

be claimed as a right to be forgotten. If the

judgments         of    the       Court      are    allowed          to    remain

online for eternity, certainly, it would invade

such rights of the parties. The problem that has

arisen        in       the        absence          of        legislation          is

determining            the    period        or     circumstances               under

which a party can invoke the aforesaid right. We

are     not     remaining            oblivious          to    this    fact.       A

litigant may in the future, approach this Court to
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:101:-
remove          online       content.          In    the     absence      of

legislation, the Court may have to recognise his

right and direct removal of such content available

online on a case-to-case basis. The contention by

the learned counsel for Google that they are only

an intermediary and they are not liable for the

contents         or    publication             of   the    judgments,     no

doubt, the said contention has to be upheld. We

are not here to decide upon compliance or non-

compliance            with     the     Intermediary          Rules.      The

argument of the learned Central Government Counsel

that Google has to be treated as an intermediary

and therefore has to follow the Intermediary Rules

does      not     require        meritorious          consideration       in

these cases. We are called upon, in these cases,

to decide on the points involved qua fundamental

rights claimed by the petitioners. Irrespective of

these rules, the State and non-State actors are

bound      to    respect       the   fundamental           rights   of   the

citizens. There is no difficulty in identifying
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:102:-
Google        as    a    non-State        actor       by    its      nature    of

function and operation which could have an impact

on    the     socio,       cultural,         economic          and    political

life     of    the       citizen.      They       are      qualified     to    be

identified as a non-State actor. Even in the OECD

Guidelines for Multi-national Enterprises, guiding

principles          on     business          and      human       rights,      an

enterprise like Google is liable as a non State

actor       for      human      rights           violation.          Google    is

incorporated in the United States of America and

OECD is an intergovernmental organisation of which

US is also a party. The Guidelines aim to promote

positive contributions by enterprises to economic,

environmental and social progress worldwide.                                  [See

OECD     Guidelines          for      Multi-national            Enterprises,

2011 Edition]. Further, there is no difficulty in

holding that the claim based on fundamental rights

can      be        enforced          horizontally.             However,        the

judgments          are    public       records          and,    making        them

available          to     the    public          to   view      through       the
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:103:-
process of a search made online, cannot be found

fault with. At the same time, we cannot hold that

Google is content blind to the publications made

online; can they allow any prohibited nature of

content to appear online? For example, paedophilic

content.         An algorithm means a set of procedures

used      for     solving            a    problem         or       performing     a

computation.             In          the           era        of       artificial

intelligence, it is quite possible for Google to

identify the nature of the content and remove the

same.       Google is not a mere passive conduit. They

are now using AI tools to identify the needs and

requirements of a user online and attempting to

bring      out     the     best          results         in     what   they     are

looking for online. Keeping aside the Intermediary

Rules etc., we are of the firm view that Google

cannot       claim       itself           as       a     mere      intermediary,

allowing the contents to appear for the viewers or

users in the digital platform. The publication of

any valid records is protected by the Constitution
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:104:-
as forming part of
Article 19(1)(a)
, the right to

freedom of speech and expression.                              There is no

difficulty           for       Google          during        the     era       of

advancement of AI to create a tool and identify

particular data and remove the same.                               If that is

not done, it would really infringe the claim based

on the right to be forgotten.
64. In summation, we hold as follows:
i.    We declare that a claim for the protection

of    personal        information         based     on       the    right     to

privacy cannot co-exist in an Open Court justice

system.
ii. We hold that right to be forgotten cannot

be     claimed        in     current           proceedings          or   in    a

proceedings          of     recent      origin.         It     is    for      the

Legislature to fix grounds for the invocation of

such a right. However, the Court, having regard to

the     facts       and     circumstances          of        the    case      and

duration involved related to a crime or any other
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:105:-
litigation, may permit a party to invoke the above

rights      to     de-index          and   to    remove    the     personal

information of the party from search engines. The

Court, in appropriate cases, is also entitled to

invoke principles related to the right to erasure

to allow a party to erase and delete personal data

that is available online.
iii. We declare and hold that in family and

matrimonial cases, arising from the Family Court

jurisdiction or otherwise and also in other cases

where the law does not recognise the Open Court

system,        the     Registry        of       the    Court   shall     not

publish       personal        information         of     the   parties    or

shall not allow any form of publication containing

the identity of the parties on the website or on

any    other       information         system         maintained    by   the

Court if the parties to such litigation so insist.
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:106:-
iv. We       hold       that    the       Registry     of    the    High

Court is bound to publish privacy notices on its

website in both English and Vernacular languages.
RELIEFS:
65.(i). W.P. (C) No. 26500 of 2020: The petitioner

was involved in a crime. Thereafter, based on an

order of this Court, the criminal complaint was

quashed       as    the     de       facto       complainant       raised   no

objection.          We are of the view that this is not a

case where the petitioner can invoke the right to

be     forgotten          to     delete          past    records.           We,

therefore,         decline           the   prayer       and   dismiss       the

petition.
65.(ii).        W.P.       (C)       No.     21917      of    2020:         The

petitioner was involved in a crime. His grievance

for     removal        from          the   digital       domain       of    his

involvement in a criminal case and of a bail order

obtained by him cannot be acceded to. The writ

petition is, therefore, dismissed.
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:107:-
65.(iii). W.P. (C) No. 8174 of 2020: The matter

pertains         to      a     habeas            corpus     petition.        The

petitioner          approached          this       Court     alleging        the

detention of her daughter.                          We do not find any

reason to hold that the personal information shall

not be published online. The writ petition fails,

and is accordingly, dismissed.
65.(iv). W.P. (C) No. 6687 of 2017: The petitioner

approached         this      Court       for       solemnising      marriage

under the
Special Marriage Act
.                           Since the matter

is related to matrimonial and family affairs, and

we have recognised the right to privacy in such

matters, we hold that the petitioner is entitled

to    the    relief       sought.           This     Court    has     already

granted       interim        relief       in      tune     with   the   final

reliefs sought. We make the interim relief granted

absolute.
65.(v). W.P. (C) No. 7642 of 2020: The petitioner

was    involved        in    a       criminal       case    related     to   an
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:108:-
allegation of rape.                   This Court had quashed the

proceedings against the petitioner and his father.

We are not inclined to grant reliefs sought for

removal of the judgment in the public domain.                                  The

writ        petition          fails         and       is,        accordingly,

dismissed.
65.(vi).         W.P.      (C)       No.    20387       of       2018:         The

petitioner         was    involved         in     a   criminal      case       and

approached this Court for quashing the criminal

case.       The petitioner and the de facto complainant

settled. The criminal case was quashed in the year

2013.       According        to      us,    the       petitioner         is    not

entitled to the relief sought. Dismissed.
65.(vii).         W.P.       (C)      No.       12699       of     2021:       The

petitioner         approached          this       Court      earlier          in   a

Transfer petition related to a matrimonial case.

The     petitioner          also      approached          this      Court          in

regard to a dispute related to passport arising

out    of    a    matrimonial          dispute.           Considering          the
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:109:-
nature        of      the        dispute           involved,            and     the

publication of the judgment in the public domain,

we are of the view that a right to privacy would

be     invaded.         Accordingly,              we    allow         this     writ

petition       and     direct         Google      LLC       to    de-index     the

names      and     also      direct        the        Registry        to     ensure

Indian Kanoon hides the personal information of

the parties online.
65.(viii).           W.P.     (C)      No.        29448      of       2021:     The

petitioner           was     involved            in     a        crime.        The

petitioner is aggrieved by the publication of the

order in bail online. In light of our views, Writ

Petition        is    only       to    be        dismissed.           Accordingly

dismissed.
65.(ix). W.P.(C) No. 2604 of 2021:                               The petitioner

had      approached           this       Court         earlier          in     O.P.

(FC).No.64/2019             to   obtain          custody         of    the    minor

child. By publication of the judgment online, the

identity and name of the child are revealed. That
 W.P.(C).Nos.26500/2020 & con.cases
-:110:-
being      the     case,       the   petitioner      is    entitled    to

relief in this case. There shall be a direction to

the additional respondent Google LLC to de-index

the     judgment         in     O.P.(FC).No.64/2019         and   there

shall      also     be     a   direction       to   the    Registry    to

ensure that Indian Kanoon redacts the names and

personal information of the parties or removes the

publication of the judgment.
65.(x). The Registrar of the High Court of Kerala

is directed to publish the privacy notice within

two months in both English and Malayalam languages

on the websites of the High Court and the District

Judiciary.
All cases stand disposed of as above.                      No costs.
Sd/-
A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE, JUDGE
                                                    Sd/-
SHOBA ANNAMMA EAPEN, JUDGE
ms
                                      APPENDIX OF WP(C)
26500/2020
PETITIONER EXHIBITS
EXHIBIT P1        A TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT DATED
                  07/09/2016 RENDERED IN CRIMINAL MC
                  NO.5477 OF 2016 BY THE HO'BLE HIGH
                  COURT.
EXHIBIT P2        A TRUE COPY OF SCREEN SHOT WITH
                  REFERENCE TO THE PETITIONER'S
                  COMMUNICATION WITH THE INDIAN KANOON.
EXHIBIT P3        A TRUE COPY OF THE WEB SITE POLICY OF
                  THE 3RD/4TH RESPONDENT.
EXHIBIT P4        A TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT RENDERED BY
                  HON'BLE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA IN WP
                  NO.62038/2016 BY JUDGMENT DATED
                  23/1/2017
EXHIBIT P5        TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT OF THE HON'BLE
                  HIGH COURT OF ORISSA, CUTTACK IN BLAPL
                  NO.4592 OF 2020 DATED 23/11/2020.
APPENDIX OF WP(C) 6687/2017


PETITIONER EXHIBITS
EXHIBIT P1        TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT IN
                  WP(C)NO.23996/2015 DATED 7/8/2015
EXHIBIT P2        TRUE COPY OF THE WEB PAGE.
EXHIBIT P3        TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER SEND TO THE 3RD
                  RESPONDENT DATED 12/12/2016
RESPONDENT EXHIBITS
EXHIBIT R3(a)     TRUE COPY OF THE TERMS OF SERVICE OF
                  GOOGLE SEARCH ENGINE.
APPENDIX OF WP(C) 20387/2018


PETITIONER EXHIBITS
EXT.P1:            TRUE COPY OF ORDER DATED 10.01.2013 IN
                   CRL.M.C.NO.100/2013.
EXT.P2:            TRUE COPY OF ORDER DATED 10.01.2013 IN
                   CRL.M.C.NO.109/2013.
EXT.P3:            TRUE COPY OF REQUESTS MADE BY
                   PETITIONER'S FATHER THROUGH THE WEBSITE
                   OF 5TH RESPONDENT ALONG WITH THE
                   COMMUNICATION OF 5TH RESPONDENT.
EXT.P4:            TRUE COPY OF GENERAL INFORMATION
                   PROVIDED IN THE WEBSITE OF 5TH
                   RESPONDENT.
EXT.P5:            TRUE COPY OF LAWYER DATED 21.03.2018
                   CAUSED TO THE 5TH RESPONDENT THROUGH
                   THEIR WEBSITE.
EXT.P6:            TRUE COPY OF REPLY SENT BY 5TH
                   RESPONDENT THROUGH E-MAIL.
RESPONDENT EXHIBITS
Exhibit R3(A)      TRUE COPY OF THE OFFICE CIRCULAR NO.
3/2017 DATED 21/12/20176 ISSUED BY THE
                   3RD RESPONDENT
                 APPENDIX OF WP(C) 7642/2020


PETITIONER EXHIBITS
EXHIBIT P1        A TRUE COPY OF THE AFFIDAVIT DATED
                  OCTOBER 17, 2017 FILED ON BEHALF OF THE
                  VICTIM BEFORE THIS HONOURABLE COURT IN
                  BAIL APPLICATION NO. 7123/2017.
EXHIBIT P2        A TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT DATED
                  NOVEMBER 7, 2017 IN BAIL APPLICATION NO.
                  7123/2017 OF THIS HONOURABLE COURT AS
                  PUBLISHED IN INDIANKANOON. ORG.
EXHIBIT P3        A TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT DATED
                  DECEMBER 5, 2018 IN CRIMINAL M.C. NO.
                  4510/2018 OF THIS HONOURABLE COURT AS
                  PUBLISHED IN
                  HTTPS//SERVICES.ECORUTS.GOV.IN/ECOURTIND
                  IAHC/CASES/.
EXHIBIT P4        A TRUE COPY OF THE SCREENSHOT OF THE
                  GOOGLE SEARCH RESULTS FOR DR. KRISHNA
                  MOHAN.
EXHIBIT P5        A TRUE COPY OF THE CORRESPONDENCE
                  THROUGH EMAIL BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND
                  THE THIRD RESPONDENT.
EXHIBIT P6        A TRUE COPY OF THE DISCLAIMER PUBLISHED
                  ON INDIANKANOON.ORG TITLED WHY IS MY
                  COURT CASE ON INTERNET.
EXHIBIT P7        A TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT RENDERED BY
                  HE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTEST IN GOOGLE
                  SPAIN SL, GOOGLE IN C.V. AGENCIA
                  ESPANOLA DE PROTECTION DE DATOS (ES),
                  MARIO COSTEJA GONZALEZ.
APPENDIX OF WP(C) 8174/2020


PETITIONER EXHIBITS
EXHIBIT P1        TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT IN WP(CRL.)
                  NO.266/2014 DATED 30.06.2014
EXHIBIT P1(A)     TRUE COPY OF THE DOWNLOADED JUDGMENT IN
                  WP(CRL.) 266/2014 DATED 30.06.2014 AS
                  PUBLISHED BY RESPONDENTS 2 AND 3 IN
                  THEIR WEB PAGE
EXHIBIT P2        TRUE COY OF THE PRINT OUT OF WEB PAGE OF
                  THE 3RD RESPONDENT
RESPONDENT EXHIBITS
Exhibit R3(1)     TRUE COPY OF THE CERTIFICATE OF
                  INCORPORATION OF THE 3RD RESPONDENT
                  DATED 23/07/2014.
Exhibit R3(2)     TRUE COPY OF THE BOARD RESOLUTION OF THE
                  3RD RESPONDENT AUTHORIZING THE DEPONENT
                  TO REPRESENT THE 3RD RESPONDENT.
Exhibit R3(3)     TRUE COPY OF THE REPORT OF THE JOINT
                  PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE ON PERSONAL DATA
                  PROTECTION BILL, 2019 DATED DECEMBER 16,
                  2021.
Exhibit R3(4)     TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER OF THE HIGH COURT
                  OF GUJARAT IN DHARAMRAJ BHANUSHANKAR
                  DAVE V., STATE OF GUJARAT, SCA NO.1854
                  OF 2015.
Exhibit R3(5)     TRUE TYPED COPY OF THE
CASE REMOVAL
                  POLICY OF THE RESPONDENT, WHICH IS
                  DISPLAYED ON ITS WEBSITE AT
                  HTTPS://INDIANKANOON.ORG/COURT CASE
                  ONLINE.HTML
Exhibit R3(6)     A TRUE AND CORRECT COPY OF CLAUSE 20 AND
                  CLAUSE 63 OF DATA PROTECTION BILL, 2021.
                  APPENDIX OF WP(C) 21917/2020


PETITIONER EXHIBITS
EXHIBIT P1          A TRUE IMAGE OF THE GOOGLE SEARCH
                    RESULTS OF NIKHIL S RAJAN AS ON
                    20.09.2020.
EXHIBIT P2          A TRUE COPY OF THE BAIL ORDER DATED 9TH
                    MAY 2014 PASSED BY THE HON'BLE HIGHCOURT
                    OF KERALA, IN BAIL APPLICATION NO. 2662
                    OF 2014.
EXHIBIT P3          A TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT DATED
                    11.02.2019 PASSED BY THE HON'BLE COURT
                    OF THE II ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE,
                    KOLLAM.
EXHIBIT P4          A TRUE COPY OF THE REPRESENTATION DATED
                    22.09.2020 SUBMITTED TO RESPONDENT NO.3.
EXHIBIT P5          A TRUE COPY OF THE REPRESENTATION DATED
                    07.10.2020 SUBMITTED TO RESPONDENT NO.1.
EXHIBIT P6          A TRUE COPY OF THE REPRESENTATION DATED
                    07.10.2020 SUBMITTED TO RESPONDENT NO.4.
EXHIBIT P7          A TRUE COPY OF THE REPRESENTATION DATED
                    07.10.2020 SUBMITTED TO RESPONDENT NO.2.
RESPONDENT EXHIBITS
EXHIBIT R3(1):      TRUE COPY OF THE CERTIFICATE OF
                    INCORPORATION DATED 23/07/2014 ISSUED BY
                    GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF
                    CORPORATE AFFAIRS IN THE NAME OF THE 3RD
                    RESPONDENT.
EXHIBIT R3(2):      TRUE COPY OF THE BOARD RESOLUTION
                    APPOINTING MR.SUSHANT SINHA AS THE TRUE
                    AND LAWFUL REPRESENTATIVE OF TYE 3RD
                    RESPONDENT COMPANY.
EXHIBIT R3(3):      TRUE COPY OF THE INTRODUCTION OF THE
                    JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE PERSONAL DATA
                    PROTECTION BILL, 2019.
APPENDIX OF WP(C) 21917/2020
-2-
EXHIBIT R3(4):    TRUE COPUY OF THE CASE REMOVAL POLICY OF
                  3RD RESPONDENT WHICH IS DISPLAYED ON ITS
                  WEBSITE AT
                  HTTPS://INDIANKANOON.ORG/COURT CASE
                  ONLINE.HTML.
EXHIBIT R3(5):    TRUE COPY OF THE CLAUSE 20 AND CLAUSE 62
                  OF HE PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION BILL,
                  2019.
EXHIBIT R3(6):    TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 19/01/2017
                  IN SCA NO.1854 OF 2015 OF THE HIGH COURT
                  OF GUJARAJ AT AHMADABAD.
EXHIBIT R3(7):    TRUE COPY OF THE DISCLAIMER POLICY OF
                  3RD RESPONDENT WHICH IS DISPLAYED ON ITS
                  WEBSITE AT
                  HTTPS://INDIANKANOON.ORG/DISCLAIMER.HTML
                  .
EXHIBIT R3(8):    TRUE COPY OF THE EMAIL DATED 30/11/2018
                  SENT BY THE PETITIONER AS WELL AS THE
                  RESPONSE DATED 30/11/2018 OF RESPONDENT
                  NO.3.
EXHIBIT R3(9):    TRUE COPY OF THE EMAIL DATED 21/12/2019
                  SENT BY THE PETITIONER AS WELL AS THE
                  RESPONSE DATED 26/12/2019 OF RESPONDENT
                  NO.3.
EXHIBIT R3(10):   TRUE COPY OF THE EMAIL DATED 22/09/2020
                  AND REMINDER EMAIL DATED 03/10/2020 SENT
                  BY THE PETITIONER'S COUNSEL AS WELL AS
                  THE RESPONSE DATED 09/10/2020 OF
                  RESPONDENT NO.3.
APPENDIX OF WP(C) 2604/2021

PETITIONER EXHIBITS
EXHIBIT P1        A TRUE COPY OF THE PAGE OF GOOGLE SEARCH
                  WHEN THE PETITIONER'S NAME SEARCHED.
EXHIBIT P2        A TRUE COPY OF THE PAGE OF YAHOO SEARCH
                  WHEN THE PETITIONERS NAME IS SEARCHED.
EXHIBIT P3        A TRUE COPY OF THE PAGE OF MICROSOFT
                  BING WHEN THE PETITIONERS NAME IS
                  SEARCHED.
EXHIBIT P4        A TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT DATED
                  06.02.2019 IN OP(FC) 64/2019.
EXHIBIT P5        A TRUE COPY OF THE WEBPAGE OF THE 2ND
                  RESPONDENT WITH THE PERSONAL DETAILS OF
                  THE PETITIONER ALONG WITH THE JUDGMENT
                  IN OP(FC) 64/2019.
EXHIBIT P6        A TRUE COPY OF THE WEBPAGE OF THE 3RD
                  RESPONDENT WITH THE PERSONAL DETAILS OF
                  THE PETITIONER ALONG WITH THE JUDGMENT
                  IN OP(FC) 64/2019.
EXHIBIT P7        A TRUE COPY OF THE REPRESENTATION DATED
                  22.01.2021 ALONG WITH THE POSTAL
                  RECEIPT.
RESPONDENT EXHIBITS
Exhibit R1(A)     TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER DATED 23/04/2019
                  SENT BY E-COMMITTEE OF THE HONOURABLE
                  SUPREME COURT OF INDIA TO THE HONOURABLE
                  THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE HIGH COURT OF
                  KERALA
Exhibit R1(B)     TRUE COPY OF THE HIGH COURT OFFICE
                  MEMORANDUM NO. ECC6/35942/2019 DATED
                  18/05/2019
Exhibit R1(C)     TRUE COPY OF THE OFFICE CIRCULAR
                  NO.3/2017 DATED 21/12/2017 ISSUED BY THE
                  HONOURABLE HIGH COURT OF KERALA
Exhibit R1(D)     TRUE COPY OF THE OFFICE CIRCULAR NO.
2/2019 DATED 30/09/2019 ISSUED BY THE
                  HONOURABLE HIGH COURT OF KERALA,
                 APPENDIX OF WP(C) 2604/2021
-2-
Exhibit R1(E)   TRUE COPY OF THE OFFICE CIRCULAR NO.
4/2020 DATED 22/12/2020 ISSUED BY THE
                HONOURABLE HIGH COURT OF KERALA
                 APPENDIX OF WP(C) 12699/2021


PETITIONER EXHIBITS
Exhibit P1         A TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT IN WPC
                   20773/2010 RENDERED BY THIS HONBLE COURT
                   DATED 10.8.2010
Exhibit P2         A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER IN TRPC
                   353/2013 DATED 22.7.2014 OF THIS HOBLE
                   COURT
Exhibit P3         TRUE COPY OF THE SCREEN SHOT OF THE
                   SEARCH RESULTS OF THE 5TH RESPONDENT
Exhibit P4         TRUE COPY OF THE SCREENSHOTS OF THE
                   JUDGMENT IN WPC NO 20773 OF 2010 FROM
                   THE WEBSITE OF THE 6TH RESPONDENT
Exhibit P5         TRUE COPY OF THE SCREENSHOTS OF THE
                   JUDGMENT IN TRPC NO 353 OF 2014 FROM THE
                   WEBSITE OF THE 6TH RESPONDENT
Exhibit P6         A TRUE COPY OF THE COMMUNICATION FROM
                   THE E-COMMITTEE OF THE HONBLE SUPREME
                   COURT OF INDIA TO ALL HIGH COURTS DATED
                   16.7.2013
Exhibit P7         TRUE COPY OF THE EXPLANATION OF THE 6TH
                   RESPONDENT PUBLISHED ON HIS WEBSITE
RESPONDENT EXHIBITS
Exhibit R2(a)      TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER DATED 23/04/2019
Exhibit R2(b)      THE TRUE COPY OF THE OM DATED 18/5/2019
Exhibit R2(c)      TRUE COPY OF THE OFFICE CIRCULAR
                   NO.3/2017 DATED 21.12.2017
Exhibit R2(d)      TRUE COPY OF THE OFFICE CIRCULAR
                   NO.2/2019 DATED 30.09.2019
Exhibit R2(e)      TRUE COPY OF THE OFFICE CIRCULAR
                   NO.4/2020 DATED 22/12/2020
                APPENDIX OF WP(C) 29448/2021


PETITIONER EXHIBITS
Exhibit P1        TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT DATED
                  16.10.2020 PASSED BY THIS HON'BLE COURT
                  IN B.A NO. 6482/2020.
Exhibit P2        TRUE COPY OF THE WEB PAGE SHOWN IN
                  GOOGLE.
Exhibit P3        TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER SEND TO THE 3RD
                  RESPONDENT DATED 22.10.2021 BY THE
                  PETITIONER.