// Contract: TwuToken
// Target function: function ecrecovery(bytes32 _hash, bytes memory _sig) internal returns (bool _success, address _recoveredAddress)
7)) {
                if (decimals) {
                   if (_b == 0) {
                       break;
                   } else {
                       _b--;
                   }
                }
                mint *= 10;
                mint += uint(uint8(bresult[i])) - 48;
            } else if (uint(uint8(bresult[i])) == 46) {
                decimals = true;
            }
        }
        if (_b > 0) {
            mint *= 10 ** _b;
        }
        return mint;
    }

    function uint2str(uint _i) internal pure returns (string memory _uintAsString) {
        if (_i == 0) {
            return "0";
        }
        uint j = _i;
        uint len;
        while (j != 0) {
            len++;
            j /= 10;
        }
        bytes memory bstr = new bytes(len);
        uint k = len - 1;
        while (_i != 0) {
            bstr[k--] = byte(uint8(48 + _i % 10));
            _i /= 10;
        }
        return string(bstr);
    }

    function stra2cbor(string[] memory _arr) internal pure returns (bytes memory _cborEncoding) {
        safeMemoryCleaner();
        Buffer.buffer memory buf;
        Buffer.init(buf, 1024);
        buf.startArray();
        for (uint i = 0; i < _arr.length; i++) {
            buf.encodeString(_arr[i]);
        }
        buf.endSequence();
        return buf.buf;
    }

    function ba2cbor(bytes[] memory _arr) internal pure returns (bytes memory _cborEncoding) {
        safeMemoryCleaner();
        Buffer.buffer memory buf;
        Buffer.init(buf, 1024);
        buf.startArray();
        for (uint i = 0; i < _arr.length; i++) {
            buf.encodeBytes(_arr[i]);
        }
        buf.endSequence();
        return buf.buf;
    }

    function provable_newRandomDSQuery(uint _delay, uint _nbytes, uint _customGasLimit) internal returns (bytes32 _queryId) {
        require((_nbytes > 0) && (_nbytes <= 32));
        _delay *= 10; // Convert from seconds to ledger timer ticks
        bytes memory nbytes = new bytes(1);
        nbytes[0] = byte(uint8(_nbytes));
        bytes memory unonce = new bytes(32);
        bytes memory sessionKeyHash = new bytes(32);
        bytes32 sessionKeyHash_bytes32 = provable_randomDS_getSessionPubKeyHash();
        assembly {
            mstore(unonce, 0x20)
            /*
             The following variables can be relaxed.
             Check the relaxed random contract at https://github.com/oraclize/ethereum-examples
             for an idea on how to override and replace commit hash variables.
            */
            mstore(add(unonce, 0x20), xor(blockhash(sub(number(), 1)), xor(coinbase(), timestamp())))
            mstore(sessionKeyHash, 0x20)
            mstore(add(sessionKeyHash, 0x20), sessionKeyHash_bytes32)
        }
        bytes memory delay = new bytes(32);
        assembly {
            mstore(add(delay, 0x20), _delay)
        }
        bytes memory delay_bytes8 = new bytes(8);
        copyBytes(delay, 24, 8, delay_bytes8, 0);
        bytes[4] memory args = [unonce, nbytes, sessionKeyHash, delay];
        bytes32 queryId = provable_query("random", args, _customGasLimit);
        bytes memory delay_bytes8_left = new bytes(8);
        assembly {
            let x := mload(add(delay_bytes8, 0x20))
            mstore8(add(delay_bytes8_left, 0x27), div(x, 0x100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000))
            mstore8(add(delay_bytes8_left, 0x26), div(x, 0x1000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000))
            mstore8(add(delay_bytes8_left, 0x25), div(x, 0x10000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000))
            mstore8(add(delay_bytes8_left, 0x24), div(x, 0x100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000))
            mstore8(add(delay_bytes8_left, 0x23), div(x, 0x1000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000))
            mstore8(add(delay_bytes8_left, 0x22), div(x, 0x10000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000))
            mstore8(add(delay_bytes8_left, 0x21), div(x, 0x100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000))
            mstore8(add(delay_bytes8_left, 0x20), div(x, 0x1000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000))
        }
        provable_randomDS_setCommitment(queryId, keccak256(abi.encodePacked(delay_bytes8_left, args[1], sha256(args[0]), args[2])));
        return queryId;
    }

    function provable_randomDS_setCommitment(bytes32 _queryId, bytes32 _commitment) internal {
        provable_randomDS_args[_queryId] = _commitment;
    }

    function verifySig(bytes32 _tosignh, bytes memory _dersig, bytes memory _pubkey) internal returns (bool _sigVerified) {
        bool sigok;
        address signer;
        bytes32 sigr;
        bytes32 sigs;
        bytes memory sigr_ = new bytes(32);
        uint offset = 4 + (uint(uint8(_dersig[3])) - 0x20);
        sigr_ = copyBytes(_dersig, offset, 32, sigr_, 0);
        bytes memory sigs_ = new bytes(32);
        offset += 32 + 2;
        sigs_ = copyBytes(_dersig, offset + (uint(uint8(_dersig[offset - 1])) - 0x20), 32, sigs_, 0);
        assembly {
            sigr := mload(add(sigr_, 32))
            sigs := mload(add(sigs_, 32))
        }
        (sigok, signer) = safer_ecrecover(_tosignh, 27, sigr, sigs);
        if (address(uint160(uint256(keccak256(_pubkey)))) == signer) {
            return true;
        } else {
            (sigok, signer) = safer_ecrecover(_tosignh, 28, sigr, sigs);
            return (address(uint160(uint256(keccak256(_pubkey)))) == signer);
        }
    }

    function provable_randomDS_proofVerify__sessionKeyValidity(bytes memory _proof, uint _sig2offset) internal returns (bool _proofVerified) {
        bool sigok;
        // Random DS Proof Step 6: Verify the attestation signature, APPKEY1 must sign the sessionKey from the correct ledger app (CODEHASH)
        bytes memory sig2 = new bytes(uint(uint8(_proof[_sig2offset + 1])) + 2);
        copyBytes(_proof, _sig2offset, sig2.length, sig2, 0);
        bytes memory appkey1_pubkey = new bytes(64);
        copyBytes(_proof, 3 + 1, 64, appkey1_pubkey, 0);
        bytes memory tosign2 = new bytes(1 + 65 + 32);
        tosign2[0] = byte(uint8(1)); //role
        copyBytes(_proof, _sig2offset - 65, 65, tosign2, 1);
        bytes memory CODEHASH = hex"fd94fa71bc0ba10d39d464d0d8f465efeef0a2764e3887fcc9df41ded20f505c";
        copyBytes(CODEHASH, 0, 32, tosign2, 1 + 65);
        sigok = verifySig(sha256(tosign2), sig2, appkey1_pubkey);
        if (!sigok) {
            return false;
        }
        // Random DS Proof Step 7: Verify the APPKEY1 provenance (must be signed by Ledger)
        bytes memory LEDGERKEY = hex"7fb956469c5c9b89840d55b43537e66a98dd4811ea0a27224272c2e5622911e8537a2f8e86a46baec82864e98dd01e9ccc2f8bc5dfc9cbe5a91a290498dd96e4";
        bytes memory tosign3 = new bytes(1 + 65);
        tosign3[0] = 0xFE;
        copyBytes(_proof, 3, 65, tosign3, 1);
        bytes memory sig3 = new bytes(uint(uint8(_proof[3 + 65 + 1])) + 2);
        copyBytes(_proof, 3 + 65, sig3.length, sig3, 0);
        sigok = verifySig(sha256(tosign3), sig3, LEDGERKEY);
        return sigok;
    }

    function provable_randomDS_proofVerify__returnCode(bytes32 _queryId, string memory _result, bytes memory _proof) internal returns (uint8 _returnCode) {
        // Random DS Proof Step 1: The prefix has to match 'LP\x01' (Ledger Proof version 1)
        if ((_proof[0] != "L") || (_proof[1] != "P") || (uint8(_proof[2]) != uint8(1))) {
            return 1;
        }
        bool proofVerified = provable_randomDS_proofVerify__main(_proof, _queryId, bytes(_result), provable_getNetworkName());
        if (!proofVerified) {
            return 2;
        }
        return 0;
    }

    function matchBytes32Prefix(bytes32 _content, bytes memory _prefix, uint _nRandomBytes) internal pure returns (bool _matchesPrefix) {
        bool match_ = true;
        require(_prefix.length == _nRandomBytes);
        for (uint256 i = 0; i< _nRandomBytes; i++) {
            if (_content[i] != _prefix[i]) {
                match_ = false;
            }
        }
        return match_;
    }

    function provable_randomDS_proofVerify__main(bytes memory _proof, bytes32 _queryId, bytes memory _result, string memory _contextName) internal returns (bool _proofVerified) {
        // Random DS Proof Step 2: The unique keyhash has to match with the sha256 of (context name + _queryId)
        uint ledgerProofLength = 3 + 65 + (uint(uint8(_proof[3 + 65 + 1])) + 2) + 32;
        bytes memory keyhash = new bytes(32);
        copyBytes(_proof, ledgerProofLength, 32, keyhash, 0);
        if (!(keccak256(keyhash) == keccak256(abi.encodePacked(sha256(abi.encodePacked(_contextName, _queryId)))))) {
            return false;
        }
        bytes memory sig1 = new bytes(uint(uint8(_proof[ledgerProofLength + (32 + 8 + 1 + 32) + 1])) + 2);
        copyBytes(_proof, ledgerProofLength + (32 + 8 + 1 + 32), sig1.length, sig1, 0);
        // Random DS Proof Step 3: We assume sig1 is valid (it will be verified during step 5) and we verify if '_result' is the _prefix of sha256(sig1)
        if (!matchBytes32Prefix(sha256(sig1), _result, uint(uint8(_proof[ledgerProofLength + 32 + 8])))) {
            return false;
        }
        // Random DS Proof Step 4: Commitment match verification, keccak256(delay, nbytes, unonce, sessionKeyHash) == commitment in storage.
        // This is to verify that the computed args match with the ones specified in the query.
        bytes memory commitmentSlice1 = new bytes(8 + 1 + 32);
        copyBytes(_proof, ledgerProofLength + 32, 8 + 1 + 32, commitmentSlice1, 0);
        bytes memory sessionPubkey = new bytes(64);
        uint sig2offset = ledgerProofLength + 32 + (8 + 1 + 32) + sig1.length + 65;
        copyBytes(_proof, sig2offset - 64, 64, sessionPubkey, 0);
        bytes32 sessionPubkeyHash = sha256(sessionPubkey);
        if (provable_randomDS_args[_queryId] == keccak256(abi.encodePacked(commitmentSlice1, sessionPubkeyHash))) { //unonce, nbytes and sessionKeyHash match
            delete provable_randomDS_args[_queryId];
        } else return false;
        // Random DS Proof Step 5: Validity verification for sig1 (keyhash and args signed with the sessionKey)
        bytes memory tosign1 = new bytes(32 + 8 + 1 + 32);
        copyBytes(_proof, ledgerProofLength, 32 + 8 + 1 + 32, tosign1, 0);
        if (!verifySig(sha256(tosign1), sig1, sessionPubkey)) {
            return false;
        }
        // Verify if sessionPubkeyHash was verified already, if not.. let's do it!
        if (!provable_randomDS_sessionKeysHashVerified[sessionPubkeyHash]) {
            provable_randomDS_sessionKeysHashVerified[sessionPubkeyHash] = provable_randomDS_proofVerify__sessionKeyValidity(_proof, sig2offset);
        }
        return provable_randomDS_sessionKeysHashVerified[sessionPubkeyHash];
    }
    /*
     The following function has been written by Alex Beregszaszi (@axic), use it under the terms of the MIT license
    */
    function copyBytes(bytes memory _from, uint _fromOffset, uint _length, bytes memory _to, uint _toOffset) internal pure returns (bytes memory _copiedBytes) {
        uint minLength = _length + _toOffset;
        require(_to.length >= minLength); // Buffer too small. Should be a better way?
        uint i = 32 + _fromOffset; // NOTE: the offset 32 is added to skip the `size` field of both bytes variables
        uint j = 32 + _toOffset;
        while (i < (32 + _fromOffset + _length)) {
            assembly {
                let tmp := mload(add(_from, i))
                mstore(add(_to, j), tmp)
            }
            i += 32;
            j += 32;
        }
        return _to;
    }
    /*
     The following function has been written by Alex Beregszaszi (@axic), use it under the terms of the MIT license
     Duplicate Solidity's ecrecover, but catching the CALL return value
    */
    function safer_ecrecover(bytes32 _hash, uint8 _v, bytes32 _r, bytes32 _s) internal returns (bool _success, address _recoveredAddress) {
        /*
         We do our own memory management here. Solidity uses memory offset
         0x40 to store the current end of memory. We write past it (as
         writes are memory extensions), but don't update the offset so
         Solidity will reuse it. The memory used here is only needed for
         this context.
         FIXME: inline assembly can't access return values
        */
        bool ret;
        address addr;
        assembly {
            let size := mload(0x40)
            mstore(size, _hash)
            mstore(add(size, 32), _v)
            mstore(add(size, 64), _r)
            mstore(add(size, 96), _s)
            ret := call(3000, 1, 0, size, 128, size, 32) // NOTE: we can reuse the request memory because we deal with the return code.
            addr := mload(size)
        }
        return (ret, addr);
    }