growth, albeit from the very depressed average pace that prevailed more - educated workers and older workers both have lower structural unemployment rates, at least historically ; see aaronson, hu, seifoddini, and sullivan ( 2015 ). the box “ the labor force participation rate for prime - age individuals ” in the board ’ s july 2018 monetary policy report contains a discussion of recent developments in labor force participation rates for prime - age individuals ; see board of governors ( 2018, pp. 8 – 10 ). for more on labor ’ s share of national income and price inflation, see clarida ( 2014, 2016 ). - 5throughout most of the expansion. indeed, as of the first quarter of this year, productivity in the nonfarm business sector rose 2. 4 percent over the previous four quarters, its fastest pace since 2010 when the u. s. economy was coming out of the great recession. by contrast, in both the 2001 – 07 and 1982 – 90 economic expansions, productivity growth was actually slowing relative to its average pace during those expansions. that said, while identifying inflection points in trend productivity growth in real time is notoriously difficult, a pickup in trend productivity growth relative to the pace that prevailed earlier in the expansion is a possibility that we should not, i believe, dismiss. 8 another structural change relevant for monetary policy is that price inflation appears less responsive to resource slack than it did in the past. that is, the short - run price phillips curve appears to have flattened, implying a change in the dynamic relationship between inflation and employment. 9 a flatter phillips curve is, in a sense, a proverbial double - edged sword. it permits the federal reserve to support employment more aggressively during downturns — as was the case during and after the great recession — because a sustained inflation breakout is less likely when the phillips curve is flatter. 10 however, a flatter phillips curve also increases the cost, in terms of economic output, of reversing unwelcome increases in longer - run inflation expectations. thus, a for more on productivity growth, see brynjolfsson, rock, and syverson ( forthcoming ). for evidence of a flattening of the slope of the phillips curve in the united states and abroad, see, among others, simon, matheson, and sandri ( 2013 ) ; blanchard, cerutti, and summers ( 2015 ) ; and bank for international settlements ( 2017 )

anita angelovska - bezoska : statistical implications of the new financial landscape remarks by ms anita angelovska - bezoska, vice - governor of the national bank of the republic of macedonia, at a panel discussion at the 8th ifc conference “ statistical implications of the new financial landscape ”, bank for international settlements, basel, 8 – 9 september 2016. * * * contributors to the note : ana mitreska and maja andreevska. since the burst of the crisis, central banking community has been providing unprecedented monetary stimulus with a view of influencing financial conditions and thus reviving the growth. the measures have gone far beyond the pre - crisis mode of operation. if conducting a monetary policy in the pre - crisis period seemed like steering a ship with rudder being enough powerful to protect against the waves, the waves that emerged in 2007 – 2008 were too strong and reliance only on the traditional instrument posed a risk of sinking. thus, when the central banks approached / reached zero - lower bound, they were compelled to start experimenting with new policy tools such as balance sheet policies, forward guidance and in more recent period, even more extremely, with negative policy interest rate. has this monetary accommodation served the purpose of influencing the financial and economic conditions? while there is ample evidence that the measures have succeeded in influencing financing conditions, so far there is not strong empirical evidence on their impact on output and inflation. in fact, despite the ample liquid and ultra - low interest rates, the output growth remains weak and inflation stubbornly low pointing to a weak monetary transmission mechanism. this new puzzling reality has triggered more profound discussion on the monetary policy frameworks with the academia and policy making community. are the main traditional monetary policy principles - price stability as a main objective, some form of flexible it as a most adequate strategy, policy rate as a main instrument - still valid? as crisis clearly demonstrated that price stability is not a guarantee for financial stability and that financial instability can have long lasting effects on output and inflation, the discussions focus on the need to take into account financial stability in the monetary policy frameworks. thus, the question : is the so called “ flexible it ” enough flexible to deal with the current and future challenges or maybe as some observers have suggested, a thought should be given to the other alternative strategies such as targeting price level or nominal gdp. the discussions even touch upon the question of adding explicit financial stability objective. for example, as borio ( 2016 ) claims ” if mandates ( of