”, however, that suggestion failed to meet with general approval. another extremely interesting parallel is that both currencies are older than their respective, nowadays independent, states. as you will no doubt know, the introduction of the d - mark preceded the establishment of the federal republic of germany, even if only by a short period. the 50th anniversary of the introduction of the d - mark will remind us again of that. a ceremony to mark that occasion will take place in frankfurt ’ s paulskirche on june 20. but the less than one year that the d - mark is older than the federal republic of germany is nothing in comparison with the pacesetter role played by the finnish markka. the markka was actually introduced over 50 years before independent finland was born. hence we are all the happier that the finns are prepared to let the markka be absorbed into the euro. and that change is actually meeting with more approval in finland than in germany. but there has been one problem in connection with finland ’ s qualification for monetary union. a few months of membership in the exchange rate mechanism of the ems are lacking. when we in the bundesbank were drafting our convergence report, we racked our brains wondering what we could do. strictly speaking, finland ought to have joined the ems in winter 1995 - 96. but we in the central bank council then recalled that, as everybody knows, the finns are always somewhat downcast and despondent in winter. that is because of the lack of sunshine. we thought it would be unfair to expect the finns to take such an important decision as joining the erm in the depths of winter. but after a fine summer it was very much easier for the finns to take that step. and so we agreed in the central bank council of the bundesbank not to express any criticism of finland in this matter. [UNK] we found that all the easier since finland ’ s successes in the field of stability policy have been of such a lasting nature. and that, of course, is what matters most. in the other case in which a few months of erm participation were lacking, by the way, things were not quite so easy. vii sirkka, once again, thank you very much for your address, and the very best wishes to you in your new and important assignment. i am sure our cooperation will be as confident as it has already been in the past few years. [UNK]

, the authorities obviously need specific and extensive powers. the broad model is provided by the deposit insurance corporations of the usa and canada. the uk has recently introduced such powers, having learnt the hard way that we needed them. a number of other countries in the eu adapt their normal corporate insolvency regime for the special structure of banks, but do not all have the option to break up and transfer different parts of the business. this is the subject of the recent consultation paper published by the european commission. 5 in the uk, the bank of england has become the special resolution authority. we have been helped by the hands - on operational expertise necessary for our market operations and for running the wholesale payments system. this new responsibility has given us an interesting vantage point on the preconditions for effective resolution. in the first place, let me tell you that it is very information - intensive. it requires a lot of detail on how a bank ’ s business is structured and run. and that information needs to be available at an early stage. amongst many things, it includes details of netting and derivative contracts, and i am struck that, in the us, the fdic now requires troubled banks to demonstrate that they could report each day the relevant details of derivative portfolios. the bank of england plans to consider whether or not something like that might be warranted in the uk. more generally, the uk fsa has said that the authorities will need to be assured that firms are able to provide the necessary data to assess resolution options and to execute the authorities ’ chosen strategy. but it is not just the resolution authority which needs lots of information. potential bidders for all or parts of an ailing bank do too – of the kind typically offered to bidders in a “ friendly ” m & a transaction. banks probably need routinely to maintain such “ data rooms ” as part of their contingency plans – something which the fsa is examining. as will be abundantly clear from this brief review, the “ recovery and resolution plan ” enterprise requires the regulators to work closely with the resolution authorities, and with central banks as liquidity providers. in the uk, wearing our “ resolution authority ” hat, the bank hopes to be able to work closely with individual banks and the fsa in helping to specify and guide what is needed in practice. my colleague andrew bailey will be discussing in more detail tomorrow one of the issues raised by past cases. the enterprise also entails thinking beyond the resolution of modest -