will tend to heighten the competitive nature of the market, which in europe is being reflected, for instance, in the continuing fall in interest - rate margins. however, the process of consolidation may lead to a degree of concentration which impairs competition, although up to a certain threshold competition is tending to increase. the situation is different throughout europe. in germany, at any rate, the five largest banks account for only 17 % of the volume of domestic business. in individual business segments, too, it cannot be said that individual institutions have a position that impairs competition. by contrast, the degree of concentration in other european countries is much higher, reaching 60 to 80 % in some cases. iii. ladies and gentlemen, supervisors naturally need to figure out how to react to these changes. this also involves coming up with an adequate prudential supervisory structure for europe. europe ’ s current banking supervisory structure rests on three pillars : • harmonised regulations with mutual recognition ; • national responsibility for prudential supervision ; and • cooperation and coordination. banking supervision in europe has always evolved to keep pace with developments and changes in the financial sector and, in parallel to the market, has in a sense followed its own internationalisation strategy. to start with, the harmonised banking supervisory regulations characterised by mutual recognition within the framework of the european principle of home - country control are a key factor. in that area, significant overall progress has been made towards a single european market for financial services. however, the intensive cooperation among supervisory institutions in the practical implementation of supervision is also of special importance. that is to say, we need a convergence of prudential supervisory practices. this is not only to give market players a “ level playing field ” at that level, as well, but also to take account of cross - border activities and to keep the administrative costs generated by different supervisory regimes low. to this end, home and host country supervisory authorities are stepping up bilateral cooperation by means of a series of memoranda of understanding. this bilateral cooperation is joined at the european level by well - functioning multilateral cooperation agencies. the “ oldest ” group is the groupe de contact, which focuses on questions regarding the implementation of prudential supervisory regulations and practices. the task of the banking advisory committee of the eu commission is to discuss and observe regulatory plans and supplementary guidelines and to deal with issues of interpretation. the escb ’ s banking supervision committee was formed to enable multilateral cooperation between central banks and banking supervisors

, tel : + 49 ( 0 ) 69 9566 3511 or 3512, fax : + 49 ( 0 ) 69 9566 3077 presse @ bundesbank. de, www. bundesbank. de reproduction permitted only if source is stated. analytical tools vary in their ability to answer these questions. which evaluation approach to choose depends on their relevance to the objectives of the evaluation, their feasibility and replicability for implementation across countries, and their costs in terms of resource inputs and data requirements. as shown by the first fsb evaluations, a robust evaluation strategy combines different ( both qualitative and quantitative ) analytical approaches. in addition to fleshing out analytical concepts, the fsb framework contains a number of arrangements concerning the governance of evaluation work. for instance, the framework recommends that the evaluation process should include means for engagement with external stakeholders. these may include the publication of information on forthcoming evaluation projects, public consultations on evaluation reports before publication, and the publication of evaluation reports. workshops and roundtables of fsb members with academia and participants from the industry and the civil society are means of interaction. the first two evaluations under the framework have been delivered to the g20summit in november 2018 : 7 • the first project investigates the extent to which post - crisis reforms incentiv - ized the central clearing of otc derivatives. it has been the aim of these reforms to make derivatives markets both, safer and more transparent. evaluation results suggest that reforms are providing the intended incentives for central clearing, especially for the most systemic market participants. • the second project evaluates the effect of reforms on the financing of infra - structure. it concluded that effects of the reforms on infrastructure finance were of second order importance relative to other factors such as the macro - financial environment, fiscal and monetary policies. the analyses do not point to a significant effect on the volume and cost of infrastructure finance, while there are some indica _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ consultative and final reports are available at : https : / / www. fsb. org / work - of - the - fsb / implementationmonitoring / effects - of - reforms / seite 8 von 13 deutsche bundesbank, directorate general communications wilhelm - epstein - strasse 14, 60431 frankfurt am main, germany, tel : + 49 ( 0 ) 69 9566 3511 or 3512, fax : + 49 ( 0 ) 69