samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
bojan markovic : why foreign analysts and investors view serbian macro prospects so differently from domestic public speech by mr bojan markovic, vice governor of the national bank of serbia, at the icap ’ s 1st credit risk management conference, organised by icap serbia, belgrade, 30 november 2011. * * * i should like to thank mirko djukic for comments and suggestions. ladies and gentlemen, recent turbulences in world financial markets have led to a rise in risk premia in many countries. in case of serbia, these pressures were moderate relative to regional peers, but one cannot be too cautious and should be prepared to act swiftly in order to minimize negative impacts of current turbulences. improving or maintaining serbia ’ s sovereign credit rating in these turbulent times is a challenge of a great importance. this is because it ensures sustainable sources of financing at a lower cost, not only for the government, but also for all other market participants – businesses, households, and banks, alike. the government and the central bank can best contribute to improving credit rating by pursuing policies that ensure long - term macroeconomic stability, such as : maintaining public debt at sustainable level, ensuring price stability in the medium term, and providing stable and resilient financial system. any attempt to „ stimulate ” the economy in an unsustainable way would jeopardize these goals, leading to a rise in the country ’ s risk premium and eventually hurting the very economy it was meant to help. over the past years foreign market participants and credit rating agencies recognized an improvement in serbia ’ s macro prospects. serbian press, however, has been even more deeply than usual flooded with doom - and - gloom commentaries of serbian economic performance during the crisis and especially its macro prospects for the future : “ we are facing inconsistency and incoherency of domestic economic policy daily observed by investors ” ( djordje djukic, biznis i finansije, june 2011 ), “ knocking on the imf doors is a proof of a complete defeat of the domestic economic policy ” ( zarko ristic, pravda, september 2011 ), “ domestic economy is currently in a position of titanic – sending sos signals ” ( sasađogovic, nacionalni građanski, september 2009 ), “ economic collapse looms large ” ( branislav grujic, novosti, august 2011 ). but at the same time, serbia saw its credit rating upgraded

29. 03. 2011 09. 05. 2011 13. 06. 2011 27. 07. 2011 negative 16. 03. 2010 b + new rating 19. 04. 2010 stable 19. 04. 2010 credit rating ( long - term ) bbb bb + bbbbbb bbb - type of change downgraded 28. 9. 2011 date of outlook change * rating as of 31. 8. 2008. bis central bankers ’ speeches
g & levine, d s ( 2012 ), guardians of finance. making regulators work for us, mit press, cambridge. 6 / 6 bis central bankers'speeches

be reduced. reorientation is always complex and requires a lot of time – which, unfortunately, is in very short supply. what will brexit mean for germany? even if the eba will not be coming to frankfurt after all, the city will remain one of many eu financial centres where companies will relocate owing to brexit. in particular, we are noticing that business areas with close proximity to the markets will be making their new home here in frankfurt. and this relocation will have a perceptible impact on the structure of the german financial system. for instance, here in continental europe we have never supervised brokers / dealers as large as those that are now likely to be moving to frankfurt. the german financial centre will therefore be closer to the capital markets. it will then be necessary to counter the negative stimulus of brexit with a positive stimulus towards a deeper, high - performance capital market. this could promote the development of europe ’ s economies. that would require rigorous advancement of the european capital market union project. yet the door needs to be left open for a close and deep partnership with the united kingdom. i am therefore very much in support of a capital market union. in those places where brexit has driven a wedge between our economies, bridges need to be built post - brexit. one opportunity for such a bridge could be, for instance, the topic of central counterparty ( ccp ) clearing. one way of building a bridge here could be through intensive cooperation between uk and eu supervisory authorities, which would also have to include farreaching powers of information and intervention for eu supervisors vis - a - vis uk ccps. to the 3 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches extent that this is assured, i am convinced that this could obviate the need for a large - scale relocation of clearing business, at least from an economic standpoint. the reverse naturally also applies. at all events, london will remain one of the world ’ s leading financial centres. that is why creativity and a truly global outlook will be necessary in order to place future cooperation between the eu27 and the united kingdom on a solid legal footing. for one thing is also clear – the world ’ s fast - growing regions are not going to stand idly by while europe indulges in navel gazing. german and european supervisors alike are making intensive preparations for the post - brexit era. and this is our message : we will certainly not accept " empty suits
jean - claude trichet : interview with les echos english translation of an interview of mr jean - claude trichet, president of the european central bank, conducted by ms francoise crouigneau and mr thibaut madelin ( les echos ), 20 january 2005. the interview was published in the edition of les echos dated 24 january 2005, and the publication of the translation was authorised by les echos. * * * with the inauguration of the new bush administration, are you looking for a greater degree of visibility in respect of american politics and a thawing of transatlantic relations in terms of monetary cooperation? over the past 20 years, which have seen several major political changes on both sides of the atlantic, i have observed great continuity of dialogue and a very high level of mutual confidence between the large central banks. the same can be said of cooperation within g7, among ministers and governors. as regards the future, john snow, the us secretary of the treasury, has already spoken publicly about the need to reduce the budget deficit and maintain a strong dollar. this is of great importance and encouraging. however, let us not forget that we too have work to do on this side of the atlantic. isn ’ t it a case of a “ dialogue of the deaf ” with the americans calling on europeans for more growth, the europeans calling on the united states for smaller deficits and both the americans and europeans calling on the chinese to float free from the weakening dollar? what you call a dialogue of the deaf, i, on the contrary, would describe as broad transatlantic consensus. we agree on the diagnosis and the measures to be implemented : the americans have a savings shortfall to make up and the europeans need more structural reforms in order to increase their growth potential. the problem we share is one of implementing these measures. public opinion in our democracies must be convinced that everyone would benefit from the reforms and that there would be more growth and higher employment. do you really think that nothing has been achieved in the area of reform? surely france and germany feel the opposite is true? not at all. on the contrary, the european central bank ( ecb ) recognises that a number of courageous decisions have been taken in the euro area and it supports those governments and parliaments that are undertaking structural reform. we are mindful of the difficulties that they face and the resistance that they encounter in public opinion. this is why the ecb and the eurosystem go to great lengths to explain

m. ( 2016 ), “ business, housing and credit cycles ”, working paper series, no 1915, ecb. [ 57 ] see issing, o., “ monetary and financial stability – is there a trade - off? ”, speech at conference on “ monetary stability and the business cycle ”, bank for international settlements, basel, 28 - 29 march 2003. [ 58 ] see ecb ( 2016 ), macroprudential bulletin, issue 1 / 2016, ecb, frankfurt am main, germany, chapter 1. http : / / www. ecb. europa. eu / press / key / date / 2017 / html / sp170330. en. html [ 03. 04. 2017 15 : 53 : 14 ]
convergence provided by this approach, and i think the results will be positive. now it may be that over the longer term, the current structure is judged to be insufficient to meet the needs of a more integrated market, and that a more fundamental re - think of the organisation of eu supervisory responsibilities is necessary. i personally think that this debate will intensify in the next decade. but we would certainly need to proceed with great caution in this debate. i am a firm supporter of the idea that changes should only be made if clear problems are identified. but whatever happens, i think the solutions we have to look for should be cooperative in nature, embracing the needs of all eu member states. this would, in my view, be preferable to an approach which would tend to concentrate responsibilities in the hands of a few member states while the implications of their actions would extend far beyond their borders. taking a more inclusive approach is the way that we have found solutions in the past to european challenges, and i think it is the best way forward. eu - wide financial stability is of interest to all of us. against the background that i have portrayed in my previous comments, it is clear that central banks have a genuine interest in improving their understanding of how the objectives of financial integration and financial stability, or even macroeconomic stability, interact with each other. i already mentioned that this is an area which is under - researched. two years ago, the network on capital markets and financial integration in europe identified this gap and decided to include the relationship between financial integration and financial stability in a list of the network ’ s priority areas, posing a series of stimulating questions aimed at providing some guidance for researchers ’ efforts. i think it is useful to recall the five questions posed by the network : - first, how can financial regulations be designed so as to be conducive to integration while still ensuring financial stability? - secondly, what are the main links between financial integration and contagion? - thirdly, what are the mechanisms that can trigger contagion and financial fragility? - fourth, how does competition in the financial services industry affect the ability of the financial system to withstand shocks? - and finally, how and to what extent do financial crises affect economic activity? as you will have realised, there is an almost perfect correlation between these questions and the main topics of the different papers that make up the excellent and well - balanced programme that the organisers have put together for this conference. this is important

##rations over the next two days and to declare the 2nd gulf african bank annual east and central african islamic conference officially opened. thank you.
mimeo. countercyclical fiscal policy is based on fiscal rules that increase government spending in response to a negative output gap, and reduce it in response to a positive output gap. patient fiscal policy, in addition, keeps government spending at an elevated level, conditional on the short - term rate reaching the zero lower bound, even when the output gap closes. as such, this policy would have attempted to recover some of the previously accumulated output losses. 16. hazell, j. et al. ( 2020 ), op. cit. 17. measures of underlying inflation aim to filter out short - term volatility in headline inflation in order to capture the low - frequency component of inflation. such measures help central banks to distinguish in real time the “ signal ” on medium - term inflationary pressure contained in inflation data from the “ noise ” stemming from temporary or idiosyncratic factors. the measures of median inflation presented in chart 5 give an indication of how broad - based movements in inflation are. see ehrmann, m., ferrucci, g., lenza, m. and o ’ brien, d. ( 2018 ), “ measures of underlying inflation for the euro area ”, economic bulletin, issue 4, ecb. 18. second - round effects describe a situation where a temporary deviation of inflation from target becomes entrenched in wage and price - setting behaviour and then becomes persistent. 19. see the box entitled “ household saving ratio dynamics and implications for the euro area economic outlook ”, in ecb ( 2021 ), eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, june. 20. 0. 3 % in 2021 and 1. 3 % in 2022, beyond the measures already factored into the ecb ’ s baseline for our june projections. ex - post, i. e. factoring in the growth - enhancing impact of the extra investment spending, budgetary costs compared with the baseline would be 0. 9 % in total for 2021 and 2022. 21. panetta, f. ( 2021a ), op. cit.

given more flexible structures in the markets, a lastingly stable euro will be able to fully exploit the undoubtedly large potential for economic benefits, and then it will also be able to foster political integration. – 6 – to sum up : the euro is not the final aim of european integration. even in 28 days ’ time it will remain a future - oriented project. for it is not just a question of introducing the euro. the euro also requires ongoing monetary stability. and the euro requires a sufficient degree of political consensus on the basis of economic dynamism and flexibility. only in this way can potentially dangerous political conflicts be avoided in the long run. we are investing great hopes and expectations in this future - oriented project associated with the euro. all those involved are responsible for doing what is necessary to ensure that these hopes and expectations are fulfilled.
, the definition of systemic institutions is still blurred, and given the evolution of financial innovation, what today may be a non - systemic institution may eventually become systemic. indeed, a non - systemic institution on a worldwide basis could be systemic from the point of view of particular economies. again, these issues are not new in emerging market economies, which in general have more capitalized banks. in chile, most of the industry already satisfies the requirements that are supposed to be in place by 2019. moreover, there are larger requirements for banks that have high market share. there are other areas where we have already made significant progress, such as restrictions on currency mismatches, liquidity management and the use of derivatives. in all of these cases, the central bank of chile has authority to set prudential regulation. for banks, these relate with authorizing the use of derivatives, regulation regarding market and liquidity risk, among others. in other areas, the central bank also has a say in “ systemic ” regulation, such as overall limits for pension funds. this scheme accommodates recent policy concerns, since it avoids the conflict of interests that arises from mixing the micro supervisor with the monetary authority, while preserving an institution that provides a broad look at the stability of the financial system. this being said, however, there is a need to continue strengthening coordination instances with other regulators. in this sense, the recent creation of a financial stability committee in chile should improve coordination among regulators and have a view on financial stability and risks. over time, and as learning takes place, some legislation should be introduced in order to enhance the effectiveness of the committee. in the central bank, evaluation of financial vulnerabilities and strengths is performed bi - annually in our financial stability report. finally, regarding the interactions between macroprudential policies and monetary policy, i would like to make some comments. 4 the traditional view has been influenced by the tinbergen principle, by which there should exist as many instruments as policy targets. this view is reinforced by the fact that, as i argued above, the interest rate is too blunt of an instrument to deal with asset price bubbles and financial dislocations. therefore, we can think of a separation between the interest rate – the monetary policy instrument to achieve the inflation target – and macroprudential tools to deal with financial stability. see also bernanke ( 2011 ) for discussion on these issues. bis central bankers ’ speeches however, and perhaps unfortunately, the separation

effective resolution regimes for financial institutions ” ( 4 nov. 2011 ), available at http : / / www. financialstabilityboard. org / publications / r _ 111104cc. pdf. extending the g - sifi framework to domestic systemically important banks. the framework is still in development stages fsb, a progress report submitted to g - 20 ministers and governors on april 2012. http : / / www. financialstabilityboard. org / publications / r _ 120420b. pdf bis central bankers ’ speeches
dimitar bogov : improving education and access for children and youth to financial services address by mr dimitar bogov, governor of the national bank of the republic of macedonia, at the 3rd annual regional meeting for europe and central asia ( eca ), skopje, 2 – 3 october 2014. * * * dear ministers, esteemed guests, dear ladies and gentlemen, it is my honor and privilege to welcome you all here in skopje, macedonia to this important event for the region of europe and central asia. the aim of this meeting is to gather together in one place the regional leading policy - makers, financial institutions and experts that are engaged in the issues of children and youth access to financial services, financial inclusion and financial education, employability and entrepreneurship opportunities, to share success stories and challenges. there has been some progress made in these fields because of the existence of international movements such as child and youth finance international that are keen to develop a generation that will be better prepared to prevent future financial crisis by increasing the financial education, access to finance, employability and entrepreneurship skills of children and youth. on a global level, significant progress has been achieved in advancing the mentioned priorities. important steps have already been made in the area of improving access to financial services in the previous years. access needs to be complemented by the quality of the financial services. the quality of financial services and the participation in the financial system is equally important for all participants in the system. children and youth are participants as well. they are undoubtedly part of every economy, part of the societies and their opinion matters. what we need to do today and tomorrow, is to make sure that all 70 children and youth participants from across europe and central asia will present to the policy makers their action points for creating appropriate and sustainable youth economic opportunities. as the mission of child and youth finance international states : “ by ensuring youth are included as active participants in the decision - making process we believe that the policies shaped will be more youth - focused and inclusive, and the youth themselves will be more inclined to agree with the policies as they helped create them. ” there is an existence of appreciation that the level and quality of financial education and financial inclusion of youth in every economy will have a significant impact on the prospect for sustainable growth. the financial inclusion will also provide an opportunity for further advancement that would support and facilitate sustainability of financial stability. a key point for ensuring the financial stability is the financial capability of consumers itself so that they can meaningfully participate

is no longer a complement to our regular tasks, but it is one of them – a separate and important task. thank you. 1 dincer / eichengreen / geraats revised central bank transparency data set for 1998 – 2015, april 2019. 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches
financial accounts regulation bill, which aims to regulate the use of bank accounts and e - wallets in online transactions to address proliferation of cybercrimes. this is also pending in the senate committee on banks. finally, let me highlight key points of my presentation. the country is on the road to full economic recovery ; banks continue to be in a position of strength to support economic recovery ; the pandemic has helped accelerate the sustainability agenda and digitalization of the financial system ; and, amid all the challenges and uncertainties, the bsp remains committed to provide a conducive environment for digital innovation and sustainability.

spur domestic credit expansion. non - performing loans remain manageable with npl ratio at 4. 2 percent. the npl coverage ratio, which shows the banks'allowance for potential losses from bad loans, is high at 86. 1 percent. meanwhile, the capital adequacy ratio of universal and commercial banks reached 17. 4 percent on a consolidated basis. this is well above the minimum thresholds of 10. 0 percent set by the bsp and 8. 0 percent by the bank for international settlements. finally, the net profit of the banking system is up by a remarkable 44. 8 percent year - on - year as of december 2021. against this backdrop, our country has kept its investment - grade ratings all throughout the pandemic. this is despite a wave of downgrades globally, which validates the resilience demonstrated by our economy amid the pandemic. when the pandemic struck, the bsp stepped in to provide additional emergency support to the government ’ s broad - based health and fiscal programs. on top of this, we implemented a wide range of regulatory relief measures aimed at : first, extending financial relief ; second, boosting bank lending ; and third, promoting continued access to financial delivery and services. the bsp extended some of these measures until yearend to sustain the credit growth momentum and ensure continued access to financial services. at the height of the pandemic, we strengthened our earlier digitalization efforts through the digital payments transformation roadmap. we have twin targets by 2023, which i consider personal goals. first, that at least half of financial transactions in the country are done digitally … … and second, that at least 70 percent of filipino adults have transaction accounts. i am optimistic about hitting these two objectives as the economy shifts from a cash - heavy to a cash - lite economy. now, let me cite some of our initiatives. together with the philippine payments management inc. or ppmi, we launched the qr ph personto - merchant facility in october 2021. we are also collaborating with ppmi to broaden the use cases for three digital payment streams this year. first is the interoperable bills pay facility, which will address the existing fragmented bills payment mechanism. second is the request to pay facility, which will empower payees to initiate collections of nonrecurring receivables. third is the direct debit, which will allow customers to better manage recurring payments. we have also issued the open