the second pillar, the stress test, began in may and will evaluate the ability to maintain adequate solvency levels under stress, using the methodology agreed by the ecb and the european banking authority. this process will conclude in september and the publication of the results of the whole exercise is expected in late october. after this disclosure, those banks facing a capital shortfall will have to submit their recapitalisation plans to the ecb. i would like to say that, as we all know, the spanish financial system has undergone intense restructuring and recapitalisation, as well as a significant consolidation process. i am confident that spanish banks are prepared for this rigorous exercise. setting up the single supervisory mechanism and making it operational is not going to be a simple task. both from the procedural and organisational standpoints, it will be a complex process, requiring great effort, and will be a major responsibility for those who take on the leadership of this new european union - wide institution. bis central bankers ’ speeches ms sabine lautenschlager ’ s responsibilities as member of the executive board of the european central bank and vice - chair of the supervisory board of the ssm place her in a unique position. i have no doubt that her intervention will be extremely interesting and informative to us all. bis central bankers ’ speeches

- prudential tools would allow them to better adjust financial expansions, on the one hand cushioning the impact of contractions and, on the other, helping financial institutions to continue to perform their function of financing the real economy in times of tension. the arsenal of macro - prudential tools has indeed been expanded significantly since the financial crisis. apart from the countercyclical capital buffer, we have the systemic risk buffer, the buffers for global and local systemically important banks, the possibility to limit excessive risk concentrations, to increase capital requirements and to review the risk weighted assets for real estate exposures. these tools will allow us supervisors to develop macro - prudential policies that interact with micro - prudential policies and monetary policy. however, creating macro - prudential tools is not sufficient. to ensure their effectiveness, they must be appropriately assigned from an institutional point of view to avoid so - called inaction bias. in this respect, the spanish government has announced that a macroprudential authority is to be set up, composed of representatives of the ministry of the economy and enterprise, the banco de espana and the national securities market commission. spain was one of the few european countries still without a national macro - prudential authority. by setting up this new authority, spain is complying with the recommendation of the european systemic risk board, which urged eu member states to establish such an authority. the aim of this authority will be to carry out the macro - prudential supervision of the spanish financial system, in order to contribute to the prevention or mitigation of systemic risk. for this purpose, the banco de espana is due to be given new powers in this area. these include, notably, the possibility of activating tools, such as the sectoral countercyclical capital buffer, limiting sectoral credit concentration and others relating to credit standards. giving the banco de espana these new macro - prudential tools clearly strengthens the spanish supervisory system and brings it into line with best international practice. macroprudential policy is especially important in a country like spain, which belongs to a monetary union and a banking union, since – as we have seen in the past – the financial and business cycles of the various countries that make up the currency are not always harmonised with those of the euro area as a whole. considering that the euro area has a common monetary policy and supervisory policy and that there is limited scope for fiscal policy measures, macro - prude