of the riksbank's employees worked directly with monetary policy and financial stability when we began this journey ( even fewer if we include all those who worked with the manufacture of cash in our companies ) ; today, more than one third of our employees work in these policy fields. traditional operational duties for a central bank like cash management, payment system, asset management and statistics still occupy a significant share of our workforce, but they are not dominating the organization like they used to. managing independent and self - financed institutions, we must find ways to constantly put the pressure of efficiency on the organisation ourselves. we do not have the “ time to market ” pressure that private companies have. this raises questions that in my opinion have appeared far too seldom on our agendas ; questions about management, about setting objectives and managing resources, about internal control and, not least, questions about governance. how should we lead the operations of a central bank? generally, a central bank may learn from any type of successful organisation, we are not that different. but we face a special challenge. our governance model has often been created to arrive at a well - founded monetary - policy decision. such a decision benefits from a careful process with a wide - ranging discussion of different scenarios that finally results in a collective decision - making discussion in ( in our case ) a group of six. this is a structure that has worked well for our policy decisions, but few organisations voluntarily choose a collective of six individuals for the operational management of its activities. our challenge has thus been to draw a clear line between the structure for making policy decisions and that for other decisions. at the riksbank, this has entailed relieving the executive board of responsibility for day - to - day management and transferring this responsibility to a lower level in the line organisation. this has been – and still is – easier said than done and requires constant attention. it also demands discipline on the part of those at the top of the organisational chart. nevertheless, this has been important in not burdening those at the top with micro - management tasks and in ensuring that no decisionmaker has an information advantage ahead of a policy decision. a final reflection regarding internal matters ( following the perspectives of what we should do and how we should do it ) is in fact where? our playing field is increasingly stretching beyond national borders, above all in the case of stability work in an open economy with cross - border banking operations. in the central bank of the past, international work

policy on stability were taken with a consensus that was considerably broader than is sometimes suggested by the political debate. a good foundation for the years ahead has now been laid, although high unemployment is still a serious problem for sweden ’ s economy. the positive picture is underpinned by institutional reforms to the budget process and the status of the riksbank. 2. three fields of importance for monetary policy now i should like to turn to some issues or policy fields that are of major practical importance for monetary policy. they are : fiscal policy, the labour market, wage formation and competitive conditions in the swedish economy. it is generally the case that the more price stability is supported by other policy fields, the greater the contribution monetary policy can make to other economic policy goals. good fiscal foundation but storing up for lean years is advisable fiscal policy is relevant for monetary policy in a number of ways. fiscal decisions affect the room to manoeuvre in monetary policy not only via their direct impact on demand — and hence on inflation — but also by how they influence economic policy ’ s credibility. a fiscal policy that is perceived as being untenable in the longer run can raise doubts about the overall policy commitment to low inflation and stability. to this should be added fiscal policy ’ s influence on the macro economy. the ways in which taxes are levied and public revenue is spent influence the behaviour of households and firms, which may thereby — generally in the longer run — alter the economy ’ s inflation propensity. today, however, i shall not be developing this aspect. in the first respect — fiscal policy ’ s impact on economic activity — the picture is clear - cut : in recent years the fiscal stance has been very tight. of course, this has contributed to the low rate of inflation and in this sense it has assisted monetary policy. with the current fiscal proposals for the years ahead, however, the stance will not be as tight as before. but to some extent the growth of household income is still being restrained by the overall change in taxation and public spending. as regards credibility, there has been a marked improvement. last year the government laid down a long - term objective for government finances which goes further than the average of the corresponding commitments in europe. over the business cycle the budget balance is to average a surplus of 2 per cent of gdp. the riksdag has approved this objective. the riksbank finds this objective reasonable. a budget surplus over the business cycle can contribute to a