25 % and at least one characteristic suggesting debt - repayment difficulties. vulnerable unsecured debtors are those with less than 25 % housing equity ( including renters ) and at least one characteristic suggesting debtrepayment difficulties. ( b ) based on historical bhps data and more timely information from the annual nmg survey. differences in survey questions and sample size mean the estimates from the two surveys are not directly comparable. bis central bankers ’ speeches chart 13 : chart 14 : corporate financial surplus ( a ) percentage of firms with interest payments greater than profits ( a ) ( b ) per cent united kingdom united states euro area per cent firms with turnover > £1 million firms with turnover < £1 million real estate firms with turnover > £1 million + source : thomson reuters datastream, ecb and bank calculations. ( a ) per cent of gdp except euro area which is as a per cent of gva. sources : bureau van dijk and bank calculations. ( a ) percentage of companies in each category with interest payments greater than their profits before interest. ( b ) data include firms reporting turnover, profit and interest paid. these firms may not be representative of the population. total sample size varies over time, ranging from around 14, 000 in 1990 to over 90, 000 in 2000. changes in the composition of the data set may reduce comparability over time. subsidiaries, as identified from company structures, are excluded. company accounts are assigned to calendar years according to the statement date. the real estate sector is identified using sic ( 2003 ) and sic ( 1992 ) codes ( the sample ranges from around 450 to 1, 600 firms ). bis central bankers ’ speeches chart 15 : chart 16 : changes to uk gross government debt ratio in crisis periods public debt ratios in g7 countries 1929 crash 1990 recession cumulative pp change since start of recession 2008 financial crisis ppp weighted percentage of gdp years since crisis - 5 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 sources : office for national statistics, thomson reuters datastream and bank calculations. sources : imf historical public debt database, imf world economic outlook ( april 2011 ), angus maddison historical statistics and bank calculations. bis central bankers ’ speeches chart 17 : chart 18 : real lending growth rates uk credit - gdp gap ( a ) ( b ) percentage points percentage changes on year earlier norway ( 1988 = 0 ) sweden ( 1990 = 0 ) finland ( 1990 = 0 ) united kingdom ( 2007 = 0 ) + 1 - 0 + 1 9 10

is not so much to reach a precise figure of inflation at the end of september 2016, it is rather to influence medium - term inflation expectations. our march projections will cover 2015, 2016 and 2017. one of the market indicators of the expected inflation rate in five years ’ time for the following five years was at 1. 6 %. this is still historically low … you cannot expect a big impact immediately. we have to start this programme, be patient and do what we said we would do. how would you describe the risks for your mandate of keeping inflation below, but close to, 2 % over the medium term? bis central bankers ’ speeches we have had an extended period over which inflation has been below levels where the governing council wants to see it in the medium term that is below, but not too far from, 2 % and that is why we decided to act further. we have not seen deflation, despite having negative inflation, but we did see a higher risk of deflation. if this risk were to materialise, it would be very damaging. people were a bit confused as to why it took so long to act, given very low and even negative inflation and the fall in expectations. why was this? i don ’ t agree that we are behind the curve. the measures we took in june and september resulted in a significant compression of loan spreads and yields, including in portugal. they had a positive impact on financial conditions in general. the problem is that the volume of loans didn ’ t follow sufficiently. we have seen some improvement, but it is still too little. your measures are aimed at easing credit conditions. but portugal is a very indebted economy. and several countries in europe face that problem. how do we solve a debt problem with more debt? indeed, in portugal and other euro area economies some sectors need deleveraging, and this is what is steadily happening already. qe will help contain the adverse macroeconomic side effects of this necessary process of deleveraging. portfolio rebalancing means some people will sell assets and get cash to buy other assets, or they will spend it partly. if they buy other assets, some will be outside of the eurozone. also banks could sell portfolios of credit to make room for new private loans and buy public debt. for qe to work, would you need aggregate demand to increase through more consumption and investment, or not? qe will stimulate aggregate demand through all of its components. the ecb