with respect to the eurosystem ’ s own collateral eligibility criteria and the calibration of its risk control framework. as the work carried out by the fsb has shown, the actual set of information to adequately gauge systemic and firm - level risks arising from securities financing transactions is as a matter of fact rather straightforward. assuming a specific home - currency for the transactions covered, six transaction specific information items are essential : ( 1 ) the counterparty of the transaction, ( 2 ) the principal amount, ( 3 ) the interest rate or lending fee, ( 4 ) information on underlying collateral ( including type, issuer, maturity, currency and valuation of the collateral ), ( 5 ) information on the applied haircut as well as ( 6 ) the tenor or maturity of the transaction. i would add to these also information about re - use of securities. the workshop today intends to assess the grounds designing an infrastructure and data collection set - up ensuring confidentiality, efficiency in the data transmission, but also looking for potential synergies, and ensuring through the publication of different levels of data aggregation to relevant stakeholders that this exercise can be beneficial to regulators or supervisors as well as market participants. the involvement of all relevant stakeholders from the very beginning should allow that synergies can be explored and benefits reaped. turning now to the second of my initial questions, how could these data be better collected? i have earlier this year, in a conference organized by the european commission, 2 launched a proposal to create a eu central database on repos, as a joint effort by public authorities and the financial industry. i am counting on this workshop to launch the practical discussion about the main issues and the challenges to be addressed and, most importantly, the possible solutions for this proposal to become reality. when i first launched my proposal last april i noted that due to its role in macro - prudential financial stability and the closeness of repo to monetary policy, the ecb would be well placed to centralise the data gathering for the euro repo market. this remains true, but today i would like to emphasise that the ecb see constancio, v ( 2012 ) “ shadow banking – the ecb perspective ” speech by vitor constancio, vice - president of the ecb, towards better regulation of the shadow banking system, european commission conference, brussels, 27 april 2012 bis central bankers ’ speeches organised this workshop by taking a wider perspective on the subject and acting just a catalyst.

andrew bailey : governance and the role of boards speech by mr andrew bailey, deputy governor of prudential regulation and chief executive officer of the prudential regulation authority at the bank of england, at the westminster business forum, london, 3 november 2015. * * * it is a pleasure to be speaking at the westminster business forum again. i am going to use my time this morning to set out some thoughts on how at the pra we are thinking about the role of governance and boards in the prudential supervision of deposit takers, insurers and major investment firms. we work very closely with boards, more so than in past approaches to prudential regulation, and i find it a very important, constructive and informative engagement. there is a lot of focus at present on the senior managers and certification regime which will be implemented by next march, and on the proposal before parliament to change one element of the test, namely the presumption of responsibility. this morning i am going to focus on the substance that underpins the regime. also, i am not for the most part going to comment on the issue of diversity in board membership, but not because i think it is unimportant, far from it. the best place to start is the objectives given by parliament to the pra, namely the safety and soundness of firms that we supervise, the protection of insurance policyholders and our secondary objective in respect of competition, best described as requiring us to act in respect of the implications for competition of our own actions and inactions but only to the extent that we are not undermining our primary objectives. at the heart of what we do in the pra is risk assessment. understanding how firms take and manage risk, the controls they have and the quality of risk management, is at the heart of the job of a prudential supervisor. that ’ s what we do every day, and the standards of this work have been raised extensively since the crisis, which was very necessary. i never tire of saying that the pra is a judgement - based supervisor, by which i mean the application of judgement against a framework of rules and regulation. as mark carney said recently in the context of the european union, from which the largest part of our framework of rules and regulations comes : - “ ensuring the bank of england has the instruments necessary to achieve its financial stability objective will depend on the eu continuing to have regulations of the highest standards, which strike the appropriate balance