one bank was fined for doing business with sudan despite economic sanctions imposed for engaging in genocide. 3 another bank manipulated electricity markets in california and michigan. 4 other banks helped u. s. citizens evade taxes. 5 i will not review the full litany. notably, none of these recent episodes had anything to do with capital william c. dudley, enhancing financial stability by improving culture in the financial services industry, remarks at the workshop on reforming culture and behavior in the financial services industry, october 20, 2014. cf. william c. dudley, opening remarks at reforming culture and behavior in the financial services industry : workshop on progress and challenges, federal reserve bank of new york, november 5, 2015, ( “ the banking scandals that followed the financial crisis are evidence that something fundamental is wrong. i would encourage each of you to consider not just specific examples of misconduct, but the patterns within them that point to underlying causes. i suspect we will see a strong overlap with those factors that contributed to the financial crisis. ” ). seethomas c. baxter, jr., reflections on the new compliance landscape, remarks at the new compliance landscape : increasing roles – increasing risks conference, july 24, 2014. see order approving stipulation and consent agreement, in re make - whole payments and related bidding strategies, no. in 11 – 8 - 000, in 13 – 5 - 000, u. s. federal energy regulatory commission ( july 30, 2013 ). see baxter, supra n. 3. bis central bankers ’ speeches levels or liquidity ratios. the many post - crisis reforms to bank balance sheets – including the dodd - frank act and new standards developed by the basel committee on bank supervision and the financial stability board - provided necessary bulwarks against systemic risks. capital and liquidity requirements, and the enhanced testing surrounding them, have made banks and the financial system more resilient to stress. but those new laws, regulations, and standards have done little to curb banker misconduct. each post - crisis episode demonstrates a narrow cultural focus on short - term gain and disregard of broader social consequences. last year the new york fed challenged the industry to consider many factors that have contributed to recent, widespread misconduct. there are no simple answers and that discussion is continuing. this year, by contrast, our focus has been more on solutions - what ’ s working, and what is not. in both years, we have offered three messages to the industry. first, cultural problems are

william c dudley : the global implications of diverging monetary policy settings in advanced economies panel remarks by mr william c dudley, president and chief executive officer of the federal reserve bank of new york, at the sixth high level conference on the international monetary system : monetary policy challenges in a changing world, zurich, switzerland, 12 may 2015. * * * it is a pleasure to have the opportunity to participate in today ’ s conference. in keeping with this session ’ s mandate, i will focus my remarks on the global implications of u. s. monetary policy normalization – paying particular attention to the potential implications for emerging market economies ( emes ). i put the focus here because these economies were greatly affected in 2013 during the so - called “ taper tantrum ” and many of these economies have been under stress from the weakness in global commodity prices. as always, what i have to say today reflects my own views and not necessarily those of the federal open market committee ( fomc ) or the federal reserve. but before i get to the implications for emes and what the fed should do or not do to mitigate the impact, a few words on the timing of normalization. to be as direct as possible : i don ’ t know when this will occur. the timing of lift - off will depend on how the economic outlook evolves. since the economic outlook is uncertain, this means the timing of liftoff must also be uncertain. at the same time, though, i can be clear about what conditions are needed for normalization to begin. if the improvement in the u. s. labor market continues and the fomc is “ reasonably confident ” that inflation will move back to our 2 percent objective over the medium - term, then it would be appropriate to begin to normalize interest rates. because the conditions necessary for liftoff are well - specified, market participants should be able to think right along with policymakers, adjusting their views about the prospects for normalization in response to the incoming data. this implies that liftoff should not be a big surprise when it finally occurs, which should help mitigate the degree of market turbulence engendered by lift - off. nevertheless, i think it would be naive not to expect some impact. after more than six years at the zero lower bound, lift - off will signal a regime shift even though policy would only be slightly less accommodative after lift - off than it is before. i expect that this will have implications