##uable contribution to the coordinated intervention of national authorities in the event of crises of cross - border groups. ( iv ) cooperation agreements and sharing the burden of crises. lastly, it appears desirable to develop mechanisms for coordinated intervention in crises to minimize the impact on markets and, ultimately, on taxpayers. in line with the indications contained in the memorandum of understanding signed by the ministries of finance, central banks and supervisory authorities of the european union in 2008, the economic and financial committee is preparing general recommendations for agreements under which each national authority undertakes a clear commitment with regard to the support it could provide in the event of the crisis of a cross - border group. the details of these burden - sharing agreements should be left to the structures for coordination among supervisory authorities, central banks and finance ministries ( crossborder stability groups ) that will be set up for each banking group. conclusions in the coming months it will be necessary to monitor the implementation of the reform closely and make sure that an ambitious and rigorous approach is adopted, as indicated by the minister for the economy and finance in the note accompanying the transmission to parliament of consob ’ s annual report. ambiguous solutions risk creating confusion of roles and conflicts between authorities ; compromises that in reality maintain the status quo as regards national authorities ’ powers or encourage lax controls do not solve the problems that the crisis has brought out. in my remarks i have tried to outline the points that can determine the success of the reform : • in the first place it is necessary to provide the european systemic risk board ( esrb ) with effective operational instruments and a solid institutional basis, possibly by activating article 105 ( 6 ) of the treaty, which provides for the ecb to be entrusted with specific supervisory tasks ; • then it is necessary to guarantee the independence of the new european authorities : the political authorities can be involved as observers in the process of macroprudential supervision and contribute to the implementation of the esrb ’ s recommendations ; the european securities authorities ( esas ) will have to be exclusively responsible for defining the technical standards of supervision for the european union, with appropriate accountability mechanisms ; • it is also necessary to take determined steps towards effectively uniform rules, with greater recourse to european regulations instead of directives and with the technical standards of the new authorities directly applicable throughout the entire single market without their having to be transposed. moreover, the uniformity of the rules will have to be accompanied by equal degrees of rigour in the supervisory approaches to implementing controls and

de larosiere report, the ecofin council has charged the commission to reinforce the so - called “ infrastructure legislation ” referring to the procedures for the prevention and resolution of crises of cross - border groups. the economic and financial committee has been asked to develop proposals to improve the cooperation mechanisms for managing crises at these intermediaries. ( i ) the instruments for managing crises. in the first place significantly increased harmonization of legislation on the instruments for managing crises is necessary. in fact the large disparities between member states with regard to national authorities ’ powers and responsibilities in early interventions and the procedures for resolving crises prevent the coordinated management of interventions involving cross - border groups. the commission has undertaken to present proposals for european legislation in this field shortly. the procedures laid down in the italian legislation on the management of banking crises, which include preventive measures, have proved effective and could be a useful model for guiding the work carried out at the european level. the possibility of introducing a common procedure for the management of the crises of cross - border banking groups should also be weighed. if this were not feasible, at least the application of the directive on the winding up of credit institutions could be extended to the subsidiaries of foreign banks, as a first step towards a greater degree of harmonization in this field. ( ii ) the removal of obstacles to the transfer of assets within the european union. progress is needed in the harmonization of company and bankruptcy law to remove the obstacles that prevent the transfer of assets and liquidity between the various components of cross - border banking groups. the possibility of ring - fencing assets held in a country leads in fact to solutions that are rational from the standpoint of individual member states but inefficient in terms of enhancing the value of the group ’ s assets ; in some cases ring - fencing may even accelerate insolvency and complicate the management of the crisis. ( iii ) deposit insurance schemes. the commission is also working to reduce the disparities still present in the working of deposit insurance schemes. the recent revision of the directive raised the levels of coverage and shortened reimbursement times, but it did not reduce the wide margins of discretion member states enjoy regarding the funding of the schemes, or the conditions for and the characteristics of the interventions. in promoting a greater degree of harmonization of these aspects, it should also be possible to consider a common deposit guarantee scheme at european level, which could interact with national deposit protection schemes and make an inval