administrative costs, financing the total or partial transfer of assets and / or liabilities, or financing bridge banks. a number of countries have recently introduced ( sweden and hungary ) or announced plans to introduce ( germany, france and the uk ) bank levies, though the objectives and implementation schemes differ significantly. considering the current conditions of the financial sector and the costs that banks will incur to conform with the new capital standards, in my opinion the timing of additional expense should be assessed carefully. however, if such initiatives are pursued, it is important that they proceed in a coordinated manner and, in this sense, the commission ’ s proposal appears to be a sensible way forward ; a number of issues, related for example to the precise scope, financing and governance of resolution funds still need to be addressed. the role of dgs deposit guarantee schemes should be able to absorb the impact of medium magnitude crises or, where possible, to promptly intervene to avoid bank failures in the interest of depositors. the more effective a dgs, the greater will be depositor confidence, reducing the risk of bank runs and limiting contagion from banks in distress. much work is underway at international fora to strengthen the role of dgs. the effort to harmonise and enhance their risk minimiser role is particularly welcomed. the contribution that dgs can bring to open market solutions, helping to preserve the continuity of important business activities and avoid the disruption of customer relationships, mainly in the interest of depositors, will be increasingly important. the important collaboration between the basel committee and the international association of deposit insurers ( iadi ), who joined forces to address a range of issues including coverage, funding and reimbursement, resulted in the “ core principles ” focusing on, among others, public awareness and cooperation with other safety - net participants, including central banks and supervisors. the principles are designed to be adaptable to a broad range of country circumstances, settings and structures. the “ core principles ” form a non - compulsory framework for deposit insurance. however, they are testimony of the will to establish best practices for national authorities committed to enhance or put in place effective deposit insurance schemes. the eu directive on dgs steps taken in the eu to strengthen the regulation on dgs move in the right direction. the commission proposal of july 2010 aims to enhance depositor protection and convergence of eu dgs by harmonizing scope, coverage and funding mechanisms. it raises fixed coverage to €100, 000 per depositor,

held on the eurosystem balance sheet into the market — likely into repos or short - term government securities. this, in turn, could have created additional demand for highly - rated euro collateral, at a time when some segments of money markets, in particular the market for euro area repo and short - term government securities, are showing signs of collateral scarcity ( chart 2 ). the early indications are that the decision on the remuneration of government deposits has been effective. following the announcement of the change in the remuneration of non - monetary policy deposits, the recent increase in the spread between the yield for short - term euro government securities and interest rate swaps has been partially reversed. ( chart 3 ). at the same time, as the change in the ceiling for the remuneration of governments will only come into effect today, the full effects of the measure may only become visible over time, and we remain attentive to the spread between different money market rates as well as collateral scarcity concerns. the temporary change in the remuneration ceiling for government deposits gives government deposit holders extra time to undertake a smooth and gradual return of their deposits to the market. from the ecb ’ s perspective, it remains the case that encouraging market intermediation of these deposits remains desirable in the long term. in the meantime, the temporary change will allow us to assess the adjustments of money markets across market segments to the return to positive interest rates and thereby also reduce uncertainty about the pass - through of the changes in the ecb interest rates to money markets. chart 3 change in 3 - month bill to ois spread de and fr ( left side ) ; change in 2 - year bond to ois spread de and fr ( right side ) ( percentage ) sources : bloomberg and ecb calculations. notes : the charts display the change in 3 - month bill to overnight indexed swap ( ois ) spread and 2 - year bond to ois spread for germany and france between the july and september governing council meetings ( blue bar ) and the change since the september governing council meeting ( yellow bar ). the latest observations are for 13 september 2022. 1. i am grateful to pamina karl for her contribution to this speech. 2. for more general considerations on this new phase of euro area monetary policy, see also lane, p. r. ( 2022 ), “ monetary policy in the euro area : the next phase ”, remarks to the policy panel at the annual