this version of the speech and the delivered german version the contribution of central banks, within their mandates, has largely been through supportive monetary policies, reforms to the international financial architecture, strengthening the resilience of the financial sector, leading the dialogue on global regulatory reform, playing a key role on the fsb, and assisting in developing strategies for sustainable economic growth. without too much chest - beating for my own guild, i do think that the contribution of monetary policy in addressing the economic challenges is beyond question. in fact, it has been widely recognised that there has, at times, been an overreliance on monetary policy to address the binding growth constraints in many economies. it is thus clear that the g - 20 has taken much action over the years, but the global economic recovery has nevertheless been less than inspiring. hence, we are now witnessing a rise in anti - globalisation rhetoric, a rise in populism, and countries developing greater nationalist tendencies. the g - 20 has an important leadership role to play in unpacking and addressing the reasons for this change in sentiment and highlighting the negative ramifications of an inward bias. we need to emphasise the positive spillovers of globalisation, but also accept that we may have underestimated the number of people were left behind and who did not share in the spoils of globalisation. it is with this in mind then, that germany ’ s focus on ‘ shaping an interconnected world ’ and enhancing resilience is very pertinent. germany ’ s three main pillars for the g - 20 presidency – of ensuring stability, improving viability for the future, and accepting responsibility – reflect continuity of the g - 20 agenda over the years and also aim to tackle the issues i have just spoken of. the issue of accepting responsibility is borne out by the new agenda item, ‘ compact with africa ’, which speaks directly to achieving sustainable economic progress in africa as part of addressing some of the root causes for the various migration crises we have been observing. i will return to this later. disclaimer : there may be minor differences between this version of the speech and the delivered german version i must add that we certainly welcome the more streamlined agenda that the german presidency has put together, particularly in light of the fact that the agenda of the g - 20 had become more bloated over the years, with the increasing risk of detracting from the effectiveness, efficiency and credibility of this forum. we are looking forward to germany ’

general government primary surpluses were recorded. gains in external competitiveness : the external deficit, which exceeded 15 % of gdp in 2008, was eliminated, underpinned by a substantial increase in labour cost competitiveness vis - a - vis our trading partners and an increase in the share of exports to 32 % of gdp today from 19 % in 2009. structural reforms, notably in the labour market, but also in the goods and services markets and in public administration. unlike in other member states that also experienced similar crises, the greek crisis did not come from the banking sector. in an adverse international economic and financial environment, greece was hit by a serious sovereign debt crisis that required three economic adjustment programmes that included, inter alia, substantial structural reforms and severe austerity measures. the sharp 1 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches deterioration of the macroeconomic environment that led to a loss of more than 25 % of gdp over these years bears testimony to the fact that the greek crisis is more far - reaching and lasted longer than initially foreseen. in this adverse macroeconomic environment, unemployment increased to historic high ( post - war ) levels, and disposable income dropped substantially. at the outset of the crisis, deteriorating macroeconomic conditions and sovereign downgrades blocked access to international capital and money markets, thus creating very tight liquidity conditions and pressures to the financial sector. as a consequence, banking sector developments were unprecedented including a large - scale deterioration of greek banks fundamentals and of asset quality. the extent of the deterioration can be described in terms of losses due to the restructuring of greek government bonds held by the private sector ( private sector involvement – psi ) : greek banks suffered losses of about €38 billion in 2011, which was close to 170 % of their total core tier i ( ct1 ) capital at that time. due to the liquidity squeeze, the role of banks as intermediaries was undermined, and the channels for financing the real economy were severely disrupted. in addition, substantial deposit outflows took place from september 2009 to july 2015, primarily relating to the uncertainty of depositors regarding economic and financial developments. it is worth mentioning that the difficulties of credit institutions to provide liquidity to the real economy were further exacerbated by procyclicality, as their capital base had to be used as a buffer against unexpected risks. as a consequence, even higher capital adequacy ratios had to be met, rendering it even more difficult for banks to