exploited, while frequent interregulatory meetings can allow regulators to capture many of available synergies between their activities. indeed, one particularly useful proposal by the fslrc is to put the financial sector development council on a firmer footing. it is a good venue for inter - regulatory cooperation, and its benefits are further augmented by personal interactions. for instance, chairman sebi and i try to get together once every month to note and resolve issues. at the same time, while negotiations and cooperation between regulators can overcome organizational barriers, it is not wise to give a regulator a responsibility and leave the tools for exercising that responsibility in other hands. the rbi has responsibility for managing the internal and external value of the rupee, and more broadly, for macroeconomic stability. as a number of multilateral agencies and academics have recognized, the ability to shape capital inflows is now a recognized part of the macro - prudential tool kit. but by taking away control over internal capital inflows from the rbi, isn ’ t the fslrc taking away an important tool from the rbi? if it ain ’ t broke … lest all this sound like an unthinking defence of regulatory turf, let me add that there are places where the rbi could give up powers. for instance, if the government wants to manage its own debt, there is no reason for the rbi to stand in the way. i don ’ t believe the government suffers any less from conflicts of interest in debt management ( unlike the views of the fslrc ), but the rbi could well carry out the government ’ s instructions without any loss in welfare. i imagine, however, that the government will depend on deputations from the rbi for a while for advice. instead, think of my remarks as an attempt to draw out the important and undoubted benefits of the fslrc report, while eschewing grand schemes with dubious chances of success. undoubtedly our laws need reform, but that is no reason to try entirely new approaches to legislation, overlaid on entirely new regulatory structures, complemented by entirely new oversight over regulation. undoubtedly, we have had, and will have, periods when regulators have not gotten along with each other. but is that a reason to merge some organizations and break up others, perhaps ensuring dysfunctionality along many other dimensions? after all, there is no single regulatory architecture that has emerged with distinction from the crisis. instead, different regulatory architectures have succeeded or failed based on

##ent with their business strategy and comparative advantage to make it an integral part of their corporate plans. these plans broadly include self - set targets in respect of rural brick and mortar branches opened ; business correspondents ( bc ) employed ; coverage of unbanked villages with population above 2000 as also other unbanked villages with population below 2000 through branches / bcs / other modes ; no - frill accounts opened including through bc - ict ; kisan credit cards ( kcc ) and general credit cards ( gcc ) issued ; and other specific products designed by them to cater to the financially excluded bis central bankers ’ speeches segments. the implementation of these plans is being closely monitored by the reserve bank. the domestic scbs have been mandated in the monetary policy statement – april 2011 to open at least 25 per cent of their total number of branches to be opened during a year in unbanked rural ( tier 5 and tier 6 ) centres. further, banks have been advised in the monetary policy statement of may 2013 to front - load the opening of branches in unbanked rural centres over a 3 year cycle co - terminus with their fip ( 2013 – 16 ). credit will be given for branches opened in unbanked rural centres in excess of 25 percent in a year which will be carried forward to the subsequent year of the fip. this is expected to accelerate the progress in opening of bank branches in the rural areas. 2. relaxed know your customer ( kyc ) requirements – to facilitate easy access to bank accounts, know your customer ( kyc ) requirements have been simplified to such an extent that small accounts can be opened with self - certification in the presence of bank officials. further, rbi has allowed “ aadhaar ” the unique identification number allotted by uidai, goi to be used as one of the eligible document for meeting the kyc requirement for opening a bank account. recently in september 2013, we have allowed banks to provide e - kyc services based on aadhaar, thus paving the way for account opening of all the people. 3. allowing correspondent banking – in january 2006, the reserve bank permitted banks to utilise the services of intermediaries in providing banking services through the use of business facilitators and business correspondents. the bc model allows banks to do “ cash in – cash out ” transactions at a location much closer to the rural population, thus addressing the last mile problem. 4. combination of branch and bc structure to deliver financial inclusion