. that is, they rank countries from the richest down to the poorest. in the past, i have been critical of these rankings because there are so many statistical assumptions that are involved in their construction that the results are very approximate, and therefore cannot form the basis of policy interpretation or aspiration. to illustrate this, table 1 shows the rankings for the year 2000 as calculated by three separate organisations - the world bank, the oecd ( organisation for economic co - operation and development ) and penn world tables ( university of pennsylvania ). as you can see, there is a good deal of similarity between the three rankings, but australia ’ s position is variously recorded as seventh, tenth and twelfth out of 22 countries. table 1 gdp per capita rankings - oecd countries, 2000 penn world tables world bank oecd united states united states united states norway switzerland norway canada norway switzerland denmark iceland denmark switzerland belgium iceland ireland denmark ireland australia canada canada iceland japan netherlands japan austria austria netherlands netherlands australia belgium ireland belgium austria australia japan sweden germany germany finland finland finland united kingdom france italy germany sweden sweden france united kingdom united kingdom italy italy france new zealand spain new zealand spain new zealand spain portugal portugal portugal greece greece greece ppp weights. sources : penn world tables ; world bank ; oecd. notwithstanding these reservations, it should be pointed out that the period when australia was slipping down the rankings appears to have ended ( table 2 ). using the penn world tables, australia has moved up from tenth in 1990 to seventh in 2000, while the world bank numbers show it moving up from sixteenth in 1990 to ninth in 2002. i do not wish to make much of this, given my reservations about these rankings, but at least it should put a stop to stories about how we are falling behind. table 2 gdp per capita rankings - penn world tables switzerland united states united states united states united states switzerland switzerland norway new zealand canada canada canada denmark norway japan denmark australia iceland denmark switzerland sweden denmark iceland ireland canada sweden sweden australia united kingdom australia norway iceland netherlands netherlands finland japan norway france australia netherlands france belgium france belgium belgium austria belgium austria finland germany austria sweden iceland japan netherlands finland austria finland germany united kingdom italy italy italy germany ireland united kingdom united kingdom france spain new zealand new zealand italy japan greece ireland new zealand greece spain spain spain portugal ireland portugal portugal portugal greece greece table 2 ( cont ) gdp per capita rankings - world bank switzerland switzerland norway united states united states united states norway norway ireland iceland iceland denmark denmark denmark iceland canada canada canada austria

if we are not careful, there is a potential for conflict between generations. the young may resent the tax burden imposed on them to pay for pension and health expenditure on the old. this will particularly be the case if they see the old as owning most of the community ’ s assets. housing is the most obvious example, where people of my generation have benefited from 30 years of asset price inflation, while new entrants to the workforce struggle to buy their first home. at the same time, people - retirees in particular - are likely to be feeling less secure as they may be disappointed with the rates of return they are receiving on their savings. it seems to me that the community has not yet come to terms with the fact that nominal rates of return on financial and real assets are likely to be much lower over the coming decade or so than over the previous two decades. returns were held up first by inflation ( although, to some extent, this was illusory ) and then by an asset price boom that lasted from 1983 to 2000 - the final instalment of which reached bubble proportions in many countries. we are presently witnessing the unwinding of this unsustainable situation. a good illustration of the long swings in rates of return is illustrated below by the change over the past 130 years in real equity prices in the united states. graph 6 the potential for intergenerational conflict exists in all countries, and their future economic success depends in some sense on how they handle it. the countries that will do worst are those where the population is aging the fastest, and those where their governments have given the most generous promises. again, we are looking mainly at europe to find this combination of problems. but even in australia, the conflict could become a problem and lead to all sorts of behavioural changes. at the very least, we should question the assumption that age and poverty are positively related and that concessions to alleviate the latter should be directed at the former. in fact, i think we will have to go further and be pre - emptive in conditioning the public, particularly the grey - headed part, to accept that policy must be forward looking and directed to ensuring a vigorous australian economy and society 20 years hence. this will mean giving priority to tomorrow ’ s working - age population, rather than satisfying the demands of yesterday ’ s. last time i spoke at this forum, i ended by making a plea for raising the priority attached to improving the level of excellence in tertiary education.