euro area economy remains depressed. only if all economies act with the necessary force to contain the recession will the loss in output for the entire eurozone be minimized. then there ’ s the risk of political spillovers if responses are asymmetric. any perception that common action is absent in times of desperate crisis would dilute public support for the european union — an effect that is already visible in countries on the frontline of the health crisis. unchecked, these perceptions will weaken centripetal forces in the union and strengthen centrifugal ones. ultimately, they could erode trust in the euro. so it ’ s clear why a forceful, symmetric european response is needed. failure to act now will not insulate taxpayers from the costs of this crisis. quite the opposite : it will amplify those costs when they finally come due. it will also weaken the policy responses already being undertaken. 1 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches for example, without visibility on future sovereign funding costs and rollover risks, government guarantees on bank loans will either be priced differently across countries — or fewer such loans will be extended. either way, the result will be fragmentation and a more persistent loss of economic potential. a european fiscal response must be based around three principles. first, the size of the fiscal reaction should be proportionate to the magnitude of the shock. second, it should not aggravate fragmentation stemming from differences in initial fiscal positions. third, it should not skew the playing field within the european single market. viable firms should be able to withstand this crisis no matter where in the eurozone they are located. the fiscal response of european countries has thus far been inconsistent with these principles. the countries least affected by the pandemic have enacted the largest fiscal responses, while the worst - affected countries have taken the smallest steps. this appears to be, in part, because the latter fear being unable to shoulder the debt burden that an optimal response would entail. the threat to the single market is clear : uneven fiscal support implies that a firm ’ s location, rather than its business model, will be the decisive factor in determining whether it survives this crisis. rather than transfers between member states or a mutualisation of existing debts, what is needed now is for countries to use their collective strength to ensure that the european response is commensurate with the size of the shock and that all countries can benefit from low funding costs and zero rollover risk. as policymakers debate the

technicalities that allow for a combination of adverse scenarios ; - started to execute fixed - price ( unlimited amount ) weekly reverse repo transactions and longer term reverse - repo transactions, and extended the list of eligible collateral for these transactions, to better suit the liquidity needs of the banks ; - doubled the usage rate of the required reserves in order for banks to use more of their reserves with the central banks, should they need it during the maintenance period ; - prepared and forwarded to parliament changes in the deposit insurance legislation. the approval of these changes has provided our depositors with a significant and permanent increase in the maximum amount of their deposits that is fully insured ; - lowered in january 2009 our policy interest rate by 50 basis points, to 5. 75 percent, on the back of declining inflationary pressures. since then, concern about the exchange rate developments and potential impact on inflationary expectations and financial stability have been dominating the discussions ; in addition, in an improved framework of the internal discussions and decision - making, we are reviewing our “ back - up ” plans, to assess the possibility of new actions, should we encounter a worsening scenario. now is the time to introduce policies that will strengthen the economic environment and the financial stability in our region... in a global level, it has now become clear that the recent crisis was a consequence of wrong incentives that supported unbalanced financial activity development and misconception of risk assessment, pricing and management. the supervisory institutions, trapped sometimes in situations of complicated structures, insufficiency of resources, inability to follow and understand market financial innovations and risk location, were not able to correct the situation in due time. the need to restore and maintain financial stability during this unprecedented crisis, has called for swift, coordinated and extraordinary measures by the public authorities, both in the area of monetary and fiscal policies. central banks have abandoned almost any restriction and have even adopted unconventional measures in providing liquidity to the financial markets. governments have shown a very strong commitment to reduce systemic risk by saving important financial institutions, provide guarantees for inter - bank lending, raise the level of deposit guarantees for the public etc. this crisis is providing the public authorities and markets wherever in the world, with the best opportunity to identify deficiencies and correct those for preventing a similar crisis in the future. such task requires strong and visionary measures, which in the medium term will enable the strengthening of the supervisory architecture in different levels, but also will create conditions, including macroeconomic and