aren ’ t currently affected by the single supervisory and resolution mechanisms of the banking union, they do need to comply with the single rulebook. incidentally, the european banking authority plays an important role in this regard. not only does the eba ensure a harmonised interpretation of the rules, it also promotes interaction and dialogue on supervisory practices in the member states. and as i ’ m sure you all know, it is currently headquartered in london. so if the uk voted to leave the eu, the eba wouldn ’ t only have to find a new home ; it would also have to rebuild the prudential cooperation with the uk from scratch. so a “ leave ” vote throws up a vast number of planning issues and raises considerable uncertainty. but even if the electorate came out in favour of “ remain ”, there would still be some loose ends to deal with in the relationship between the uk and the rest of the european union. just consider, for instance, the question as to how the revision of the eu rules that were agreed in the event the uk remains in the eu actually affects economic and political dynamics within the eu. 3. strengthening crisis resistance : the long - term outlook for the eu ladies and gentlemen, the outcome of the referendum is something that britain will have to resolve on its own – it is not something we will be able to influence. what we can influence, though, is the eu itself, and its ability to function. and this is where i see the far more consequential issues affecting europe ’ s future. for the uk referendum should be understood less as the result of the anticipated benefits of exiting – earlier on, i gave you an insight into some imponderables and risks of leaving the union – but more as the outcome of widespread dissatisfaction with the european union. and, should the uk vote to remain in the union, the referendum will most likely not represent a resounding commitment on the part of britons to the eu. bis central bankers ’ speeches in addition, as we all know, dissatisfaction with the eu is not a purely uk phenomenon, but instead has grown significantly in many member states. support for eurosceptic parties is mounting. a uk vote in favour of brexit could also launch a movement in other member states to look into ways of leaving the eu. moreover, even if the uk votes today to remain, we cannot expect underlying attitudes towards the european union to change overnight. motives for dissatisfaction may partly be found in domestic politics

proceedings and herald a protracted spell of uncertainty. what a brexit would mean in practice depends to a large extent on what ’ s hammered out in brexit negotiations. while the mechanics of leaving the eu are now codified in article 50 of the treaty of european union, that article only maps out the process and preliminary twoyear timeframe within which an agreement is to be negotiated between the union and the withdrawing member state. both sides would undoubtedly be interested in maintaining the existing trade links. but at the same time, there should be no doubt that the eu should resist any efforts by the uk to cherry - pick the most advantageous terms. c fuest, der brexit ist okonomisch irrational ( in wirtschaftswoche, 27 may 2016 ). bis central bankers ’ speeches a glance at the agreements that exist with other countries makes it plain that sharing a market always means sticking to a common set of standards as well. the european free trade association ( efta ) for iceland, liechtenstein and norway, for instance, is tied up with membership of the european economic area ( eea ). but this also means applying the full set of eu legislation, a notable component of which is the freedom of movement – an issue that “ brexiteers ” have cited in the run - up to the referendum as one of the reasons why they think the uk should leave the union. by contrast, the alternative model used by switzerland, which is not part of the eea, does not initially envisage the country having freedom to access the common market. in all likelihood, individual arrangements which grant access won ’ t be possible without concessions. and with a jungle of contractual small print to contend with, time constraints will mean that the negotiating parties will be unable to repeatedly redraft proposals in their efforts to hammer out an agreement. so it ’ s anything but certain how the legal situation will ultimately pan out. the terms of the eu treaty would remain in force during the negotiation period. but businesses on both sides of the channel would be unable to forge out any longer - term plans as long as these conditions haven ’ t been clarified – so planning uncertainty is bound to be costly. and it ’ s very much up in the air whether the spell of uncertainty will be over after two years or whether the negotiating parties will have agreed by mutual consent to extend the negotiating period. putting aside the tall order of gauging the economic fallout of a brexit decision