stimulate the economy and mitigate the effects from economic shocks during times of difficulties that may arise in the future. the researches will assess whether we are experiencing a new equilibrium or other problems exist in the transmission of accommodative policies, and whether the resilience and reactions against these shocks remain similar to the pre - crisis periods. in the meantime, regulatory and adjustment processes that accompany monetary policy decision - making ( especially those that will follow the return of the past to normality ) may trigger temporary shocks with effects on both the european economy and the small economies related to it. again, it is the duty of research to investigate potential shocks and model them in the framework of models corroborating central banks decision - making. this situation is not unique to albania, but is a global - wide problem. therefore, we are happy to see here participation from all the regions, whose research will introduce new experiences, of benefit to us not only from their conclusions but also from the methodologies they have applied. fortunately, the topics that will be discussed address the whole spectrum of central banks ’ interest and will enrich our experience with the opinion and focus of your scientific research. i hope you will find bank of albania ’ s experience interesting, informative and valuable for your current and future scientific research. i take this opportunity to thank the regional and european central banks for their high consideration and valuable contribution to the reputation of our research workshop. finally, i wish you a successful and fruitful workshop and hope to meet you again in future activities of the bank of albania. thank you! 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches

instance, in that decisions on the repo rate would be taken by an executive board consisting of six members. interest rate decisions were previously made by the governing board, whose successor, the general council, now has the main task of appointing the members of the executive board. the six members of the executive board are also forbidden by law to seek or take instructions when making monetary policy decisions. the legislation is largely in line with the applicable legislation in other parts of the eu. these changes have contributed to further strengthening our credibility. the fact that the political system in a democracy chooses to delegate such an important task as monetary policy to an authority with such a high degree of independence as the riksbank is not in principle completely uncontroversial. but as i implied earlier, there are good reasons why one, with a clear majority has chosen to do so. i will like to take the opportunity to develop this point. why has monetary policy been delegated? one could say that the riksbank is at the end of a delegation chain. the swedish people have elected a parliament which has in turn legislated on the riksbank ’ s objective and appointed the general council of the riksbank. the general council in turn appoints the six members of the executive board, who take the monetary policy decisions. the fact that some tasks in society, such as monetary policy, are delegated in this way may be appropriate for several reasons. this applies perhaps mainly when there is a risk that political decisions might be taken with too short a time horizon. this problem is dealt with in monetary policy by the riksbank having a high degree of independence and a clear statutory task. our independent position is thus an important – perhaps even an essential – condition for being able to maintain low and stable inflation in the long term. it is a necessary condition for credible monetary policy. a further example connected with the same argument concerns the delegation of the management of the state finances to the swedish national debt office – the state ’ s own internal bank. that " allocation of responsibility ” is also important for monetary policy. i spoke earlier about occasions long ago when the central bank was forced to use its banknote printing presses to finance government deficits that for various reasons had got out of hand. this type of behaviour is of course incompatible with price stability. it is therefore important for the credibility of monetary policy that there are rules for how state borrowing should be handled and that monetary financing is forbidden. according to the law