; • views of traditional banks about the payments via mobile phones supplied by mobile phone companies and assessment of the preparation degree of banks for cooperation or competitiveness ; • new trends for the increase of payments security. which is the place of biometric elements? congratulations and thank you for the work you do. you are part of the future. we all are looking forward to the next meeting of a continuous discussion on the forthcoming innovations. bis central bankers ’ speeches

ensure financial stability. these measures are, in effect, a proposed fourth regulatory pillar. the evolution of this multi - pillar approach is an understandable response to the severity of the financial crisis and ensuing recession. there are differing, though not necessarily mutually exclusive, views as to what methods will be most effective in limiting the incidence and severity of future financial crises. thus, we should not be surprised to see a variety of regulatory measures in both agency actions and legislative reform packages. indeed, building a regulatory system with multiple instruments has advantages, since established my remarks today reflect my own views and not necessarily those of my colleagues on the federal reserve board or the federal open market committee. regulatory mechanisms each have well - documented shortcomings, and the effectiveness of new ones will necessarily be uncertain. yet some fear that the result will be an unwieldy system that will contain too many half measures, rather than a few strong regulatory mechanisms. others worry that the multiplicity of regulatory instruments will suppress not just behavior that is excessively risky in light of expected social returns, but also some socially desirable financial intermediation. the result would be lower potential economic growth rates. there is also concern that imposing additional forms of regulation on already supervised institutions could drive more financial activity into unregulated firms and markets. certainly, with multiple instruments comes the need for meshing them into an effective system of regulation, in which the shortcomings of each regulatory tool will be offset by other tools in what must surely be a dynamic process of adjusting to new financial products and practices. channeling the information provided by market assessments of financial institutions and organizing opportunities for public comment on the regulatory process can play a key role in achieving a self - critical, dynamic regulatory system. incorporating market discipline into the regulatory system despite years of interesting academic work on incorporating market discipline into financial regulation, it has to this point been consigned to a mostly cosmetic role. one obvious consequence of this neglect was that moral hazard grew unchecked, as expectations of government support for the financial system meant that potential losses from risky behavior – even where understood by market participants – were not fully internalized by the counterparties of, and investors in, large financial institutions. but the underpricing of risk also meant that market judgments on such institutions were not as useful for regulatory purposes as they could have been. any market signal about the absolute or relative health of a financial firm will always contain considerable noise. and market signals will be of less use if,