##richt treaty. secondly, its high degree of independence will give the ecb / escb a certain amount of institutional credibility right from the outset. recently, we have heard many voices, among political decision - makers, on the one hand, and academic researchers, on the other, who have emphasized the necessity of the accountability and transparency of the ecb. central banks and central bankers have since the onset of liberalization understood that one essential ingredient of monetary policymaking is openness. the more carefully the central bank explains its thinking to the financial markets, the more readily the markets ’ reactions to monetary policy measures can be predicted. that is to say, openness eases the conduct of monetary policy and strengthens its impact. the role of national central banks in accountability and in promoting transparency within the escb will be that of communicator to national decision - makers, labour market participants and the general public regarding the analyses and views of the ecb, but also specifically regarding the domestic monetary policy transmission mechanism. and the national central bank will need to continue analysing and forecasting its country ’ s inflation path in the regime of the single monetary policy and, on this basis, present its outlook on possible national imbalances and national needs for corrective measures via other segments of economic policy, particularly fiscal policy. * [UNK] * * the single monetary policy will of course bring demanding challenges to peripheral countries whose industrial structures, behavioural modes and business cycles have previously diverged from those of the core countries. as for finland, thorough analyses have showed that external shocks have not been much bigger for finland than for other countries. instead, the domestic reactions in the economy and economic policies to these external shocks have greatly strengthened their effects. in the short run, inflation rates may differ somewhat between emu - member countries, but in the medium term harmonization is necessary. the real costs of this harmonization will be smaller when the common inflation target is more clearly credible and acknowledged and when all sectors are more clearly aiming at it also in the short run. we have seen clear improvement in this kind of awareness in finland during the last few years, but of course it will be acid - tested during the current economic boom. the corporate sector has used a substantial part of its profits from good years to improve its capital structure. it has built up a good buffer to be used in bad times and in covering losses without having to cut wages or reduce staff. since wage developments are the most important cost factor

exigent circumstances. we are carefully considering ways to implement this authority in a manner that protects taxpayers and limits any rise in moral hazard. supervisory issues although central counterparties will provide an additional tool for managing counterparty credit risk, enhancements to the risk - management policies and procedures for individual market participants will continue to be a high priority for supervisors. as the reforms outlined in the act are implemented, the most active firms in bilateral otc markets likely will become active clearing members of central counterparties. as such, the quality of risk management at these firms importantly affects the ability of the central counterparty to manage its risks effectively and to deliver risk - reducing benefits to the markets. capital and margin requirements are central to the prudential regulation of financial institutions active in derivatives markets as well as to the internal risk - management processes of such firms. title vii requires that the cftc, the sec, and prudential regulators adopt capital and margin requirements for the noncleared swap activity of swap dealers and major swap participants. the board, the office of the comptroller of the currency, the federal deposit insurance corporation, the federal housing finance agency, and the farm credit administration are responsible for adopting capital and margin requirements for swap dealers and major swap participants that are banks or other prudentially regulated entities. the commissions are responsible for adopting capital and margin requirements for swap dealers and major swap participants that are not supervised by a prudential regulator. the board of governors of the federal reserve system ( 2011 ), “ federal reserve seeks comment on proposed rule related to supervision of designated financial market utilities, ” press release, march 30. bis central bankers ’ speeches prudential regulators and the commissions are consulting in developing the rules, and all agencies must, to the maximum extent practicable, adopt comparable standards. earlier today, the board and the other prudential regulators released for public comment a proposed rule on capital and margin requirements. our proposal will be open for public comment for 60 days, and we look forward to receiving the public ’ s comments. for capital, our proposal relies on the existing regulatory capital requirements, which already specifically address the unique risks of derivatives transactions. beyond the current requirements, the board and the other u. s. banking agencies played an active role in developing the recent basel iii enhancements to capital requirements agreed to by the basel committee in december 2010. basel iii will, among other things, strengthen the prudential framework for otc derivatives by increasing ot