##s more quickly. before i suggest how, let me emphasize that here i am speaking for myself only, since the full board will address these issues only in future orders. we have already suggested a limited presumptive safe harbor where an acquisition involves less than $ 2 billion in assets or results in a firm with less than $ 25 billion in total assets. 38 personally, i would set the size of the resulting firm higher than $ 25 billion, but somewhat lower than the $ 50 billion dodd - frank threshold over which a firm is subject to special prudential standards. at the other end of the spectrum, i would urge a strong, though not irrebuttable, presumption of denial for any acquisition by any firm that falls in the higher end of the list of global systemically important banks developed by the basel committee for purposes of assessing board of governors of the federal reserve, capital one financial corporation, mclean, virginia, order approving the acquisition of a savings association and nonbanking subsidiaries ( pdf ), frb order no. 2012 - 2 ( feb. 14, 2012 ) at p. 28. board of governors of the federal reserve, order approving acquisition, pp. 28 – 29. board of governors of the federal reserve, order approving acquisition, p. 30. bis central bankers ’ speeches capital surcharges. 39 firms at the lower end of the basel committee list, or that u. s. authorities may later designate as domestic systemically important banks under a parallel basel committee exercise, 40 might have a slightly less robust, but still significant presumption against acquisitions. i would not apply the presumption in the case of certain de minimis acquisitions or in cases where asset dispositions were judged to offset any increase in systemic risk from the proposed new acquisition. it is reasonable to ask why these negative presumptions are appropriate, given my general view that the absence of both experience and consensus theory make a case - by - case approach necessary. one answer is that, notwithstanding the fact that analytic tools for assessing a firm ’ s systemic footprint are in a relatively early stage of development, everything we do know suggests that the firms on the basel committee list strongly implicate the kinds of systemic considerations mentioned by congress. second, it does seem incumbent on us to provide at least some guidance to firms where we can, particularly to inform smaller, less connected firms of the kinds of mergers that are unlikely to raise financial stability concerns and, conversely

its terms that the losses of any financial company placed into fdic receivership be borne by the private sector stockholders and creditors of the firm. single point of entry can work without exposing taxpayers to loss. although the fdic has authority to provide temporary liquidity to a failed firm, any costs incurred by the fdic in resolving the firm must be recovered completely from either the assets of the firm or assessments on the financial industry. the failed firm ’ s investors, and, if necessary, other large financial firms, will bear any costs. that is “ bail - in, ” not “ bailout. ” another strand of criticism argues that reforms do not go far enough and calls for more activity limits on banking firms, for limiting their size or systemic footprint, or for simply breaking them up. activity limits some have urged the resurrection of the 1930s - era glass - steagall prohibitions – that is, preventing the affiliation of commercial banks with investment banks. this proposal seems neither directly related to the causes of the financial crisis, nor likely to help end too big to fail. the systemic run that led to the financial crisis began with traditional investment banks, such as bear stearns and lehman brothers. the activities of these firms were, of course, not affected by the repeal of glass - steagall. commercial banking firms now engage in activities traditionally associated with investment banking, such as securities underwriting. the combination of these activities under a single corporate umbrella did not contribute meaningfully to the financial crisis. in my view, losses at the commercial banks were more importantly a consequence of bad credit underwriting and the failure of risk management systems to keep up with innovation and the explosive growth in securitization – developments that were not fundamentally driven by the repeal of glass - steagall. size limits there are also calls to further limit the size or systemic footprint of financial firms. limits of this nature require, and deserve, careful analysis. two provisions of existing law already impose size caps on u. s. banking firms. one limits acquisitions of banks by any bank holding company that controls more than 10 percent of the total insured deposits in the united states, and a second, added by dodd - frank, forbids acquisitions by any financial firm that controls more than 10 percent of the total liabilities of financial firms in the united states. in addition, dodd - frank added a new requirement that banking regulators consider “ risk to the stability of the u. s. banking or financial system ” in evaluating