barriers have become more prevalent. administrative protection in the form of antidumping suits and countervailing duties is a case in point. while these forms of protection have often been imposed under the label of promoting “ fair trade, ” oftentimes they are just simple guises for inhibiting competition. typically, antidumping duties are levied when foreign average prices are below average cost of production. but that also describes a practice that often emerges as a wholly appropriate response to a softening in demand. it is the rare case that prices fall below marginal cost, which would be a more relevant standard. antidumping initiatives should be reserved, in the view of many economists, for those cases where anticompetitive behavior is involved. contrary to popular notions about antidumping suits, under u. s. and wto law, it is not required to show evidence of predatory behavior, or intention to monopolize, or of any other intentional efforts to drive competitors out of business. in the end it is clear that all economic progress rests on competition. it would be a great tragedy were we to stop the wheels of progress because of an incapacity to assist the victims of progress. our efforts should be directed at job skills enhancement and retraining – a process in which the private market is already engaged. thwarting competition, by placing barriers to imports, will prevent the needed transitions of the productive capital stock of the united states and other nations that enable it to continuously concentrate on producing those goods and services most desired by consumers. protectionism will also slow the inevitable transition of the workforce to more productive endeavors. to be sure, an added few years may enable some workers to reach retirement with dignity, but it will also keep frozen in place younger workers whose better job opportunities decline with time. i regret that trade policy has been inextricably linked with job creation. we try to promote free trade on the mistaken ground that it will create jobs. the reason should be that it enhances standards of living through the effects of competition on productivity. it is difficult to find credible evidence that trade has impacted the level of total employment in this country over the long run. indeed, we are currently experiencing the widest trade deficit in history with a level of unemployment close to record lows. certainly, the distribution of jobs by industry is affected by international trade, but it is also affected by domestic trade. it is the relative balance of supply and demand in a competitive

, and a pick - up in investment activity, as uncertainty about the political situation diminishes. after widening to 3. 6 % of gdp in 2018, the current account deficit will range between 3 % and 4 % of gdp in 2019 and 2020. in 2019, the deficit will narrow to 3. 1 % of gdp, due to the 2018 bumper corn harvest and a drop in energy prices. in 2020 – 2021, the current account deficit will widen slightly, on the back of a decrease in gas transit, a poorer grain harvest, and a rise in investment imports after the elections. a widening in the trade deficit will be offset by greater private remittances, supported by the higher incomes of labor migrants. a key assumption of the macroeconomic forecast is that ukraine will continue to cooperate with the imf and enjoy relatively favorable access to the international capital markets. 2 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches at the same time, reasonably high interest rates will contribute to the inflow of debt capital, which, together with continued inflows of foreign direct investment, will finance the current account deficit. external official borrowing and the government ’ s placement of eurobonds will make it possible to repay external public debt, the repayments of which will peak in 2019 – 2020. this will improve the expectations of economic agents and promote macrofinancial stability. as a result, international reserves will hover around usd 21 billion in 2019 and 2020. the usual increase in uncertainty during presidential and parliamentary elections poses the main risk to the said macroeconomic forecast, including ukraine ’ s ability to meet its inflation target in 2020. this, in turn, could affect inflation expectations. external risks are also important. these include : a more significant slowdown in the global economy, including in the economies of ukraine ’ s main trading partners ; a drop in the global prices of the commodities exported by ukraine ; persistently strong labor migration and the resulting pressures on wages ; geopolitical risks, such as an escalation of the azov sea conflict, which could cut export earnings ; uncertainty over the volume of gas transit through ukraine starting in 2020, as pipelines bypassing the country are being built to deliver gas to europe. why did the board decide to leave the key policy rate unchanged? taking into account the updated macroeconomic forecast and the above risks, the nbu board deems it necessary to maintain the existing reasonably tight monetary conditions in order to ensure that inflation returns to its target range in q1