to the future. tonight i would like to outline a few core principles that should guide this pivot forward. first, engagement : to maintain the legitimacy of our work, to increase understanding of it, and to enhance its effectiveness, we must improve our outreach and transparency — including to our membership, other global authorities, the public, and key stakeholders. second, rigor : as we devote more attention to evaluation of new and evolving risks in the financial sector, we must ensure that our assessment of vulnerabilities is based on cuttingedge thinking and a disciplined methodology. and third, analysis : regulation has evolved rapidly in the last decade, and — if we are doing our jobs right — will continue to evolve with rapid developments in the financial sector. an important part of our work must be continual, critical analysis of the effects of regulaton with an eye to making useful improvements where possible. engagement : outreach and transparency let me begin with the principle of engagement, and let me lay the groundwork for this discussion by reviewing the way the fsb was established and its mandate, to see how we can continue to fulfill that mandate going forward. as we all know, the fsb was born out of the crucible of the 2007 – 09 global financial crisis — a crisis that demonstrated in the starkest possible way the importance of global financial stability to the well - being of families and businesses around the world. in the months following the peak of the crisis, the world was struggling with financial 1 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches market turmoil, and the resultant macroeconomic effects were felt by people everywhere around the world. it was clear that the response to this crisis needed to be global, and the g7 and g10, without any emerging market representation, were not the right bodies to organize a global response. as such, the heads of state and government of the g20 called for the financial stability forum ( fsf ), a relatively small and unmuscular group, to expand its membership and to strengthen its institutional framework. the result was the financial stability board, which was designed as a mechanism for national authorities, global standards - setting bodies, and international authorities to identify and address vulnerabilities in the global financial system and to develop stronger regulatory and supervisory policies to create a more resilient global financial system. this new group is more representative of the interconnected global economy and financial system and can more effectively mobilize to promote global financial stability than anything that existed before. whereas

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