. 8 % of gdp ). while the 2015 and 2016 reforms did attempt to further curtail pension benefits, they exempted old retirees until july 2018. as a result, the fiscal adjustment delivered by the latest reforms is borne by new generations of retirees with longer careers, thus worsening benefit - contribution links and raising issues of intergenerational fairness. on the other hand, the system can no longer finance itself through rising contributions ; high social security contributions increase the tax burden on labour and lead to a fall in gdp in the medium term. note also that under the current supplementary ndc scheme they generate future pension obligations too. this context of unfolding pension cuts shows that an adequate and, at the same time, sustainable “ social security only ” system is not affordable under the present circumstances in greece. ownership of reform efforts is difficult, but may be strengthened by policies that increase incomes for pensioners in the future, thus providing appropriate social safety nets and mitigating socio - political resistance or the risk of reversal. such policies include extending working lives and improving the employability of older workers, encouraging private savings or, most commonly and to the point, supplementing pension accumulation from public first pillar schemes with occupational pensions of second pillar and personal pension of third pillar schemes. retirement financial security should not, and cannot, be provided from one source : social security funds, employer - sponsored retirement plans and personal savings should all be seen as indispensable and complementary parts of a single system that secure its affordability, adequacy and sustainability. in order to form such an integrated system, all stakeholders should understand their respective roles : the state should not insist on retaining the monopoly of retirement benefits ; employers should cease misinterpreting their role in providing security to their employees only during their labour time but should extend it, most importantly, after their retirement ; and citizens should not forget about the role their personal savings play in ensuring their own retirement financial security. 3 / 6 bis central bankers'speeches the benefits of an occupational pension system are obvious : first and foremost, it increases the post - retirement financial resources of the labour force. it increases the productivity of the workforce as it constitutes an efficient means of deferred remuneration and, finally, it increases the total investments in the country by being an alternative to banks, but very efficient, way of financing the real economy. occupational pension funds ( or else called iorps ) were introduced in greece by law 3029 /

who redeem should receive a price for their units that reflects the discount needed to sell the required proportion of a fund ’ s assets in the specified redemption notice period ; and redemption notice periods should reflect the time needed to sell the required proportion of a fund ’ s assets without discounts beyond those captured in the price received by redeeming investors. our next steps are to consider how these principles could be implemented and, in particular, the stress against which liquidity measures and redemption terms should be calibrated. we expect to publish the review ’ s conclusions in the summer and these will, where appropriate, inform the development of uk standards for open - ended funds. our conclusions will also inform our international engagement for example with the fsb, iosco and other competent authorities on the financial stability risks of asset management activity. ii. creating monetary policy space effective market functioning matters for price stability as well as financial stability. during the crisis, the impaired banking system and dysfunctional corporate debt markets muted the transmission of monetary stimulus and led to inefficiencies in risk - sharing and capital allocation. ultimately, companies and households bore a heavy cost. strains in monetary policy transmission were particularly pronounced in the euro area, where the fragmentation of markets along national lines meant cuts to the ecb ’ s policy rates were not passed through equally in all countries. households and companies of comparable credit worthiness faced different borrowing rates depending on their location. these problems worsened over 2012, when markets began to price in some redenomination risk in a few euro - area countries. it fell to benoit and his fellow members of the ecb ’ s governing council to fix the problem. all speeches are available online at www. bankofengland. co. uk / news / speeches throughout the crisis, the ecb rightly and swiftly injected huge quantities of additional reserves into the system, as asset - backed commercial paper and the interbank markets dried up. in response to the worsening sovereign debt crisis in 2012, the governing council created outright monetary transactions, a programme whose very existence eliminated the unwarranted and self - reinforcing fears of a euro - area break - up and restored sovereign bond spreads to levels more consistent with credit rather than currency risk. during this time, benoit added his voice to the calls for a capital markets union, not least because it would broaden the transmission mechanism and increase the potency of monetary policy. he also recognised that the ecb ’ s actions could only tackle the