longer - term refinancing operations ( ltros ) and decides the main refinancing operations to be carried out through a fixed - rate tender procedure with full allotment. ecb cuts the base interest rate from 2. 50 % to 1. 00 %, and introduces the first covered bond purchase programme ( cbpp1 ). ecb activates the securities markets programme ( smp ). the ecb launches the second covered bond purchase programme ( cbpp2 ) and introduces the 3 - year ltros. the ecb announces the outright monetary transactions ( omts ). the ecb cuts the base interest rate to 0. 25 % and introduces forward guidance. the ecb cuts the base interest rate to 0. 05 % and the deposit facility rate to - 0. 20 %, bringing it for the first time in negative territory and introduces the targeted longerterm refinancing operations ( tltro ) with a 4 - year maturity. ecb introduces the expanded asset purchase programme ( app ) and cuts the deposit facility rate to - 0. 30 %. ecb accelerates the expanded asset purchase programme ( app ) and cuts the main refinancing operations ( mro ) rate to 0. 00 % and the deposit facility rate to - 0. 40 %. indeed, the 10 largest central banks now own assets totaling $ 21. 4 trillion, accounting for 29 % of the world economy, up by 10 % from end - 2015, double what it was in midseptember 2008 and almost half the value of all debt in bloomberg ’ s global bond index ( as shown in chart 1 )! chart 1. the combined assets of the 10 largest central banks finally, almost 75 % of the world ’ s central bank assets are controlled by policy - makers in four regions : china, the us, japan and the eurozone. the following six – that is, the central banks of england, brazil, switzerland, saudi arabia, india and russia – each account for an average of 2. 5 %. the remaining 107 central banks tracked by bloomberg, mostly with imf data, hold less than 13 % ( see chart 2 ). chart 2. central banks ’ combined assets chart 3. stock of assets purchased by the four major central banks as a percentage of national gdp source : bank of greece, european central bank, fed, bank of england and bank of japan. note : the ecb ’ s purchased assets in the context of the

, under the first programme changes were made that were important, but still insufficient in relation to the size of the economic problem at hand. this explains the repeated underperformance with respect to the targets of the adjustment programme after the first memorandum. the related revisions would have been avoided had we accepted from the outset our full responsibility for the necessary change in course, once it had become clear that the growth model followed was no longer sustainable. bis central bankers ’ speeches the needed adjustment did not take place to the extent required. the memorandum, which, in any case, contained reforms that should have been implemented long ago, was handled defensively and treated as an external imposition. this defensive stance, however, proved to be totally counter - productive – it magnified the costs of adjustment and deepened and prolonged the recession. a promising new start : a battle has been won, but the war is not over the lack of sufficient policy adjustment brought us to the restructuring of debt and the new loan agreement – choices which, given the circumstances, had become unavoidable. the restructuring improves the dynamics of public debt and creates a more favourable framework for the economy. thus, a very difficult phase of the crisis comes to an end, at great social cost, but without any devastating effects. we now find ourselves at a promising new starting point. in this sense, a battle has been won, but not the war. this is why there can be no slackening off or complacency. on the contrary, continued vigilance, an intensification of efforts and a faster pace are required. in order to succeed now, we need to promptly make fundamental qualitative changes [ mainly ] to the functioning of the state, the operation of the public administration and, more broadly, institutions, the political system, the judicial system, the social partners, as well as the values and attitudes that shape our behaviour. the agreement of society and of political forces is needed on the main issue : the country ’ s european prospects and growth for these changes to proceed, what is needed is the broadest possible consensus across society and the spectrum of political views. citizens must be convinced of the necessity of the changes stemming from the country ’ s choice of euro area membership ; further, they must understand that an eventual failure to implement the changes would entail losses many times greater, as well as an irreparable break - up of social cohesion. it is to be hoped that political forces will agree on