it, especially in emerging market economies where the need seems to be greatest. different countries have approached this topic differently ( chong and poole 2013 ). the report ‘ roadmap to infrastructure as an asset class ’, [ 3 ] which g20 finance ministers and governors endorsed in march, proposed several initiatives that should help, including to : enhance project preparation so that projects are more ‘ bankable ’ align the risk of projects to the risk profile of investors increase the data available on projects promote quality infrastructure and good governance improve local currency capital markets in emerging markets explore the creation of standardised contracts for activities such as financing and risk sharing. some of these initiatives can work as collaborative efforts with the private sector. others, such as aligning risks, may require more effective use of credit enhancement from the public sector or from supranational agencies, such as the multilateral development banks ( mdbs ). this is seen as a way of ‘ crowding in ’ private finance rather than have the mdbs fund the project themselves. here's where the australian experience might be instructive. as a central banker, i can look around the world and see that most countries have settled on the idea of having a specialist, independent agency to carry out the kinds of responsibilities that central banks usually have, such as setting monetary policy or running the payments system. the same is true for many kinds of financial https : / / www. rba. gov. au / speeches / 2018 / sp - ag - 2018 - 06 - 15. html 3 / 8 6 / 15 / 2018 how infrastructure fits in | speeches | rba regulation. it is less common to have an autonomous agency involved in analysing and assessing microeconomic policy. but in australia, we do have something like that in the productivity commission. and similarly we have an independent statutory authority for assessing and prioritising infrastructure projects, infrastructure australia. as a non - specialist it is not possible for me to quantify what difference this makes. but if common frameworks and rigorous, pre - emptive analysis help – and i believe they do – then australia's experience will surely be instructive for other economies wanting to improve their infrastructure. what is the current state of play in australia? in comparison to some countries, international research suggests that australia is fairly well served by its current infrastructure. [ 4 ] but with a strongly growing population, we face a challenge of ensuring that the stock of infrastructure keeps pace with expanding needs. utilities

, mostly by excluding goods with high price volatility from the relevant inflation measure or by tying the index to price developments in neighbouring countries. further caveats concerning wage - indexation point out that it introduces rigidities into labour markets, which hampers adjustment processes. lastly by mitigating the cost of inflation for wage earners it may reduce the will to fight inflation. hereby wage - indexation influences the incentives and hence the credibility of the authorities. the monetary policy of the eurosystem and the time inconsistency problem 2. 1 central banking and the time inconsistency problem the insight on the time inconsistency problem of monetary policy made it clear that some sort of commitment device was necessary in order to overcome the inflation bias of monetary policy. research had shown that under discretionary monetary policy certain equilibria were not attainable in the presence of rational agents. in the 1980s several proposals were made on how to resolve this problem. one idea was for the monetary authority to invest in " good reputation " by continuously fighting inflation and by this shape the expectations of the private sector concerning future inflation. in the end it was the economist kenneth rogoff who showed that a good solution was to delegate monetary policy to an independent central bank. the incentives set for the central bank had to be such that it would be able to make economic agents believe in its determination to deliver price stability. for instance, one could make the central bank president ’ s wage depend on the degree of price stability that his policy delivers. new zealand went even further as according to his employment contract, the governor can be dismissed if the inflation rate exceeds the target. the governor of the bank of england has to explain the underlying reasons and to present appropriate monetary policy measures if inflation deviates more than 1 p. p. from the target set by the government. so to delegate monetary policy to an independent central bank was supposed to allow for a good balance between credibility and flexibility. on the grounds of these arguments central banks throughout the world were reformed with a special focus on giving them more operational independence. independent central banks have to keep in touch with markets and guide market participants through sensible monetary policy. the central banks ’ obligations are mainly twofold. on the one hand a central bank has to conduct monetary policy such that price stability is maintained. on the other hand, central banks can help to stabilise the economy, when it is shaken by fluctuations. those obligations are two sides to one medal and