is not that clear. as i discussed before, actions of monetary policy, such as the greenspan put, may create financial instability. the financial crisis also showed that it has effects on the business cycle and, hence, it has implications on monetary policy. moreover, the transmission channels of monetary policy could be broken down during a crisis. therefore, the state of the financial system should have implications on the conduct of monetary policy of economies following a fit regime since it affects the transmission channels and the business cycle. another issue is whether macroprudential tools may be used to complement monetary policy. for example, adjusting capital requirements over the cycle or introducing dynamic provisioning may have effects on the output gap, inflation and interest rates. this is similar to the case of automatic stabilizers of fiscal policy, which of course have implications on monetary policy. therefore, there should not be conflicts between financial stability and price stability tools, as long as financial regulation reduces the procyclicality of the banking system. from the point of view of the inflation target, this is just part of the environment in which decisions have to be made. perhaps a more controversial issue is the use of macroprudential tools as a substitute for monetary policy. a recent case in some emerging markets has been the use of banks ’ reserve requirements to tighten credit by reducing the need to increase the interest rate, and collateral effects on asset prices, especially the exchange rate. the advantage of using the interest rate for monetary policy is that we have relatively good knowledge of the transmission channels. changes in monetary policy interest rates affect the cost of financing, asset prices and the availability of credit. the macroeconomic consequences of changing regulation are less well understood. tightening restrictions on banks may create disintermediation and move credit to unregulated segments of the market. in addition, the latitude of changes in regulation is much more limited than that of interest rates. a more constructive approach may be to design rule - based countercyclical regulation with a clear purpose to minimize the risk of financial crisis. nevertheless, we still need to learn more about the interactions between monetary and financial policies. final remarks a natural reaction to a crisis is to think that everything is wrong and that all must be changed. emerging markets, and in particular chile, performed well during the crisis, and above all during the recovery. therefore, a first lesson must be on the factors that produced these good results, and macroeconomic management was certainly central to the rapid recovery.

significant reduction in the cpiefe in 2017, owing to different elements. on one hand, the exchange rate trajectory will continue to contribute to reduce imported goods inflation. on the other hand, beyond the effects of comparison basis related to the stamp tax, services inflation is expected to continue to decrease gradually, especially because the reduced inflation at the end of 2016 will affect indexed prices during the early part of 2017. this, in a context where medium - term inflationary pressures are bounded, and where capacity gaps will continue to exist during the entire projection horizon. meanwhile, energy and foods inflation is expected to rise, partly offsetting the effects of the aforementioned elements on headline inflation ( figure 12 ). beyond the presence of higher risks, this forecast assumes that the external impulse facing the chilean economy will be as estimated in september. in particular, external financial conditions will be less favorable, but better terms of trade are expected. the baseline scenario projects a copper price of us $ 2. 35 and us $ 2. 40 per pound in 2017 and 2018, respectively, in line with forecasts by market analysts and with an environment marked by an appreciated dollar and higher interest rates. the oil price, in turn, is revised slightly upward 4 / 19 bis central bankers'speeches from september, to an average of 55 dollars per barrel in 2017 – 2018. growth projections for the world and our trading partners show no changes on aggregate and point to some acceleration in 2017 and 2018 ( table 2 ). as regards the mpr, the baseline scenario uses as a working assumption that it will follow a trajectory comparable to the one assumed in the various expectations indicators. this ensures that monetary policy will remain expansionary throughout the projection horizon. as always, the implementation of monetary policy and any possible adjustments to the policy rate will be conditional on incoming information and its effects on the projected inflation dynamic ( figure 13 ). on the external front, although the market anticipates an increase in the fiscal impulse in the united states, with planned infrastructure works, tax cuts and measures generally intended to boost growth, their details are still unknown, as is the time it will take to carry them out. in that sense, there is the possibility of a significant fiscal package that results in higher economic growth in the us and the rest of the world. however, another possibility is that the impulse disappoints and financial markets deteriorate, ending up in dominating negative effects. the us inflation outlook also poses risks, as it could precipit