by corporates and international organisations. important new steps were taken in 2007, when it was decided to increase the equity allocation and invest in new markets. the fund could thereby become a larger shareholder in more companies and in more countries. by increasing the equity allocation from 40 to 60 percent during the financial crisis, the fund doubled its average stake in the world ’ s 3 / 7 bis central bankers'speeches publicly traded companies to around 1 percent. 5 since 2011, norges bank has also invested in real estate. and most recently, earlier this year it was decided to increase the equity allocation in the gpfg to 70 percent. in the course of 20 years, the fund has changed from being a small lender to a handful of countries to becoming the world ’ s largest sovereign wealth fund. the gpfg is invested in thousands of companies worldwide and now owns the equivalent of close to 1. 5 percent of all large listed companies in the world. such a large ownership stake entails rights and obligations. as the fund has grown, there have been increasing expectations and demands concerning what the gpfg should not own and the type of owner it should be. as the manager of the gpfg, norges bank is to act as a responsible investor and exercise the fund ’ s shareholder rights in line with the ministry ’ s management objectives. in parallel with the growth of the gpfg and the broadening of the management mandate, norges bank ’ s organisation and governance structure have evolved in response to growing responsibilities and complexities. the most important change came as early as 1998, which was to organise nbim as a dedicated investment management unit, with responsibility for the investments in the fund. nbim now has a staff of around 600, with about half working outside norway, while norges bank central banking operations has a staff of 340. today, nbim and central banking operations are two virtually independent operational areas at norges bank. the governor is the chair of the executive board and at the same time general manager of central banking operations. under a resolution of the executive board, nbim is to have its own chief executive officer with a specific job description, mandate and separate lines of reporting to the executive board. the executive board ’ s total board time and the number of items for consideration have increased considerably in recent years. this pertains especially, but not exclusively, to investment management matters. in 2015, the executive board appointed two new committees, an ownership

has earned considerable oil and gas revenues since the 1970s. in 1976, the provincial government established the alberta heritage savings 5 / 7 bis central bankers'speeches trust fund ( ahstf ), where these revenues were invested. chart : alberta heritage savings trust fund at the outset, the ahstf had a number of objectives. in addition to saving for the long term, the ahstf was also tasked with strengthening and diversifying the economy of alberta and improving the quality of life of albertans. individually, these are admirable aims, but as an overall objective for investment management, they are more demanding. retrospectively, it is difficult to measure the fund ’ s contribution to a more diversified economy or to an improved quality of life of residents. such purposes may also conflict with a desire to save for the future. alberta has chosen to adjust course along the way. the management objective of the fund is now to maximise long - term returns at a prudent level of risk. chart : important considerations for the future the central bank law commission advises against multiple objectives for the management of the gpfg. the commission underscores that a change of manager for the gpfg should not occur if this entails that other considerations overshadow the aim of maximising long - term returns. norges bank concurs with this view. using the fund to attain policy objectives such as environmental, foreign, regional or industrial policy goals may easily come at the expense of high, long - term returns. the other area i would like to address is the division of responsibilities in the governance model. it must be explicit, with a clear division of roles and responsibilities. the current governance model for the gpfg is based on a delegation of responsibilities and powers from one level to another. a control and supervisory line runs in parallel from the manager upward to the storting. regardless of whether the fund remains under the aegis of the bank or is organised in a separate entity, its governing bodies and management must be held to account. this also requires that the parties at the various levels in the governance hierarchy respect the powers and delegated authority actually conferred on them. a lack of clarity in decision - making responsibility may adversely affect investment management in the long term. the third potential pitfall concerns the composition of the board of a new management entity. the central bank law commission emphasises that such a board must have expertise in finance and investment management, but also expertise beyond the purely financial