connection with the banking union. here, too, some quarters are evidently seeking a far - reaching joint solution, but without imposing stricter rules on the other policy areas that are also affected. a genuine european banking supervision can indeed form a major component of closer integration within monetary union. however, such an institutional reorganisation of banking supervision also has to be integrated – into a comprehensive reform of the supervisory regulatory framework and of the respective national scope for economic and fiscal policy. otherwise, too great a burden will be placed on banking supervision. what is crucial for political union is the willingness to hand over national sovereignty. does such a willingness actually exist within the eu? schlesinger : this question always takes me back to the start of european unification. at that time, the main objective was quite a different one – namely, to ensure that there would never again be a war in europe. the plan for a common european army was ultimately blocked by france, even though the loss of sovereignty involved would have been easy to implement. it is actually hard to envisage how a loss of monetary sovereignty could be achieved in the absence of a unified state. weidmann : seeing how reluctant some countries are to relinquish their fiscal policy autonomy – even in return for financial assistance – it is hard to imagine political union being achieved in the foreseeable future. mr schlesinger, should the bundesbank have fought more strongly against monetary union without a political counterweight in the 1990s? schlesinger : all of our demands were fulfilled. but i think we all underestimated just how wide the gulf is in the mindset not only of the political class but also in terms of public opinion in the individual countries concerning the objectives of fiscal policy. i would like to refer you to a chapter by rudolf richter in the publication marking the 50th anniversary of the deutsche mark ( note : fifty years of the deutsche mark : central bank and the currency in germany since 1948 ). he writes that the culture of stability in germany has been able to develop only because it has had the full backing of the general public. if you look at the bis central bankers ’ speeches maastricht treaty, the relevant criteria are there. but you won ’ t find any reference to the member states having to have the same culture of stability. weidmann : political efforts to use the central bank for policy purposes exist in all countries. however, the public ’ s stance on this is probably the crucial factor.

suffice. however, there were also opposing movements within the bundesbank, such as when deciding in 1960 for or against revaluation of the d - mark. schlesinger : during the 1950s, it gradually became clear that the exchange rate of dm4. 20 to the us dollar set by the allies was too favourable to germany. we had an undervalued currency and considerable balance of payments surpluses, with implications for monetary policy : in a system of fixed exchange rates, the bundesbank had to keep buying up foreign currency in order to keep the exchange rate stable. it was thus involuntarily creating central bank money. ludwig erhard, the economics minister, therefore wanted a revaluation...... against which there was considerable opposition! schlesinger : along with chancellor konrad adenauer, the federal association of german industry and the german banks, the bundesbank and its president, karl blessing, were officially opposed to a revaluation, as they feared that this would weaken the export industry. however, there were also proponents of revaluation at the bundesbank, yet their opinions did not become public, with a few exceptions : the then - new vice - president of the land central bank of lower saxony, heinrich irmler, came out in favour of a revaluation in the land central bank ’ s annual report, which caused a major hubbub in frankfurt. however, i bis central bankers ’ speeches would like to add one thing : over the decades, there were no further tensions within the bank with regard to its stability orientation... weidmann : … and that has been the case to this day. despite all our various qualifications and tasks, within the bank, there is a shared vision and a clear commitment to monetary stability. this is unique for such an institution and has also made the bank an attractive option for people applying to work for us. the public good of maintaining price stability and thus contributing to the common good is a major incentive for many. mr weidmann, how did you yourself see the bundesbank, say, while you were at university? weidmann : in 1987 i was studying in france. the banque de france was not yet independent at the time. that is when i first clearly saw the differences in outlook concerning the role of, and oversight over, the central bank. i myself had pretty much “ inhaled ” the bundesbank ’