samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
as collateral – both in private lending and in central bank refinancing operations. central banks should be flexible enough to adapt their instruments to changes to the financial environment. but they have to remain inflexible in their overall strategy. in a changing financial environment the only way to maintain credibility is to safeguard the ultimate objective, which is price stability. thank you for your attention.

tout court. in fact, by 2007 the size of the official and shadow banking systems, measured by the total amount of assets, had become essentially the same. 3 but there is also an issue of quality – or, if you prefer, of composition – of finance. due to the increased risk aversion resulting from the financial crisis, collateralised lending is bound to increase in the future, even in markets where traditionally unsecured lending was the most important source of finance ( e. g., the euro area interbank market ). as a consequence, the demand for securitised assets – of the type that shadow banks have learned to create in the past – is set to increase further in the future, as institutions demand such types of debt to use as collateral. to put it in a nutshell, we will continue to need the functions, the financial products and the expertise that the shadow banks have been offering. but, we need to make sure that these activities are performed in a non - disruptive way. the new financial landscape can also reinforce the effectiveness of monetary policy. i already mentioned that most of the funding of financial institutions – whether banks, brokerdealers, hedge funds or shadow banks – is short - term. in other words, a key function of the financial system is maturity transformation. when a central bank takes decisions on the policy rates, it directly affects the marginal price of leverage for these financial institutions. 4 as a result, the behaviour of financial intermediaries – which, by their nature, have high levels of leverage – can be strongly influenced by even small changes in short - term rates. 5 in see figure 3. 1 of t. adrian and h. s. shin ( 2009 ), “ financial intermediaries and monetary economics, ” handbook of monetary economics, forthcoming. see : t. adrian and h. s. shin ( 2009 ), “ financial intermediaries and monetary economics, ” handbook of monetary economics, forthcoming. see : r. g. rajan ( 2005 ), “ has financial development made the world riskier? ” proceedings of the frb kansas city jackson hole symposium “ the greenspan years : lessons for the future ” ; and f. allen and d. gale ( 2007 ), understanding financial crises, oxford university press. other words, short - term interest rates are important in and of themselves, not only because they influence longer - term rates and other asset prices via expectations of future short - term
be remedied under national responsibility. with regard to resolution financing, national fiscal backstops and – as an ultima ratio – the european stability mechanism ( esm ) are of central importance. in the case of legacy risks, it should also be taken into account that direct recapitalisation of banks by the esm breaches the liability principle. after all, the legacy risks arose on the watch of national supervisors. practical application could reveal that subsequent improvements to the current institutional structures might be needed in two areas to ensure that the new resolution mechanisms are effective. first, the decision - making structures of the srm – much like those of the single supervisory mechanism – are extremely complex. the short deadline of one weekend will hardly be sufficient for a restructuring or resolution to be initiated at a large bank in a way that does not place an excessive strain on the system as a whole. for this reason, a check should be carried out on the extent to which the legal framework needs to be altered in order to arrive at more efficient decision - making structures in the resolution mechanism. the second problematic point is the authorities ’ relatively broad scope for discretion, which allows them to exclude private creditors from loss - sharing. this assessment is not an easy one to make. l laeven and f valencia ( 2012 ), systemic banking crises database : an update, imf working paper 12 / 163. bis central bankers ’ speeches the higher the losses assumed by private creditors, the greater the potential negative effects for the stability of the financial system. the lower the private loss absorption, however, the higher the costs for government budgets – and the lower the disciplining effect for investors as well. the resolution authority therefore faces a conflict of interests : if it aims to deflect risks to financial stability, it must trust that ultimately a fiscal backstop will be available. the american model of systemic risk exception is of interest for implementing the liability principle and permitting as few exceptions from the bail - in of creditors as possible. the principle of bailing in creditors can only be deviated from in systemic crises. each deviation must be approved by a clear majority of the relevant decision - making bodies – in this case, the deposit guarantee scheme and the central bank. the finance minister must sign off a deviation in consultation with the president. this is intended to secure the financing of bank restructurings. this is a sensible approach to strengthening the credibility of resolution regimes and being capable of acting during systemic crises at the same time.

over the last few months and that will continue in the coming period is in fact both a modest and a difficult one. it is to ensure that accounting conventions fully reflect the reality of financial activities and are not overambitious. this undoubtedly means reviewing the role of fair value in the accounting treatment of financial instruments. thank you for your attention.
accounts volume measures will be compiled using chained moving bases, instead of the traditional fixed base measures. thus, these statistics are set in a level that can be compared with that of other oecd member countries. as i stated recently, various indicators point out that activity and domestic demand will decelerate in the coming months. nevertheless, we believe that it will do so at a slower pace than we expected a few months ago. in our december monetary policy report we projected a baseline scenario where growth ranged between 3. 75 and 4. 75 %. some of the risk factors that in december we envisaged could reduce growth during this year – accounting for the downward bias that we announced then – have had a better evolution than forecast at the time. examples are the recent evolution of demand, which coupled with the signs of a tight labor market suggest that output gaps are fairly limited. another example are the terms of trade, which take place in an environment where the likelihood of more catastrophic external bis central bankers ’ speeches scenarios seems to have diminished. in march, private expectations point to a growth in gdp close to 4. 5 % this year, having been in the range of 4 % at the end of 2011. at the same time that some risks have diminished, others appear. an important matter for us is the widening of the current account deficit, explained by the dynamics of spending. in spite of the high level of our terms of trade, and following current account surpluses in 2009 and 2010, we estimate that in 2011 we had a small current account deficit and in 2012 it could expand further. this matter needs to be analyzed in depth. on the other hand, a lower deceleration of domestic demand, in the context of narrow output gaps, could give rise to inflation pressures. during the last months core inflation measures converged towards 3 % at a speed higher than forecast. although this evolution may well be a lagged adjustment of core inflation, after it remained persistently at low levels during several months, its path must be carefully monitored, more so in the light of a narrowing of capacity gaps and a tightening of the labor market. overall, in recent weeks, market expectations have raised the projections of short - term inflation. in addition, in the short term, inflation is affected by supply shocks that can have significant effects. developments in the international oil market do not help the outlook for domestic inflation. recent geopolitical tensions in the middle east, which, among other consequences, led to an

and are well aware of its devastating effects on our more vulnerable population. the objective is bis central bankers ’ speeches clear, but the difficulties we face are in its implementation, with the caution demanded by the complex macroeconomic environment. thank you. bis central bankers ’ speeches
growth and development of the country. an increasingly liberalising foreign exchange regulatory regime will be an essential ingredient to this vision. thank you.

, the model that the united states has now turned to, appropriate? can we apply the same regulatory regime for both wholesale and retail banks? the burden of all the above questions is to identify the drawbacks in the present regulatory regimes and indicate possible solutions. there is no doubt that we must pursue all these questions. in doing so, i would urge that we remember two things. the first thing to remember is that no one size fits all. for example, universal banking may be good in some countries and in some situations, and not so in others. the second thing to remember is that some regulations arguably have been behind the curve. there is no denying that regulations have to keep pace with innovations. but in doing so, we must be mindful of the risks of over tightening regulations so much that they stifle innovation. while on the subject of reforming regulation, there is also the larger question of risk modelling. true, the probability of risk follows a normal distribution – popularly called the bell curve. but our regulatory regimes have been tailored to respond to the central, higher probability portion of the bell curve. typically, we ignored the black swan lying in the long tail of the curve. we now know from the benefit of hindsight that this was a fatal flaw. the black swan represents the low probability, high risk events that pose systemic risk. while our regulatory regimes were tailored to address institutional failures, they were not equipped to address systemic failures. so, the issues for debate are the following. what are the flaws of the current regulatory regimes? how do we fix them? in what ways can international cooperation be fostered in this regard? how do we address the black swan systemic risk events? 4th debate : how do we address regulatory arbitrage? around the world, regulations governing the banking system have typically been quite stringent on the premise that the interests of the depositors need to be protected. but under the very nose of the regulators grew a very extensive and complex network of a “ shadow banking system ”, comprising hedge funds, broker - dealers, private equity funds, structured investment vehicles and conduits and money market funds. this shadow banking system was typically highly leveraged, and had an extensive nexus with the banking system. however, the shadow banking system suffered much lighter regulation. this “ regulatory arbitrage ” encouraged loose practices, hunt for quick yields and non - transparent and risky financial products. when the systems began to unravel, it was realised that many of these
for vital issues regarding the agenda. i desire you all success with the materialization and accomplishment of your present and future projects and i conclude by wishing all the foreign guests at this conference a good stay in romania. i am now giving the floor to mr kurt puchinger, coordinator of the eu strategy for the danube region and chair of the first session, to start the conference. thank you. bis central bankers ’ speeches

line that represents the potential growth path it is supposed to follow. this owes to the fact that it is in a vicious cycle under which a decline in aggregate demand on the back of a continued fall in prices – that is, a state of deflation – leads to a further fall in prices. in order to revitalize the economy, which has fallen into this vicious cycle of deflation and a decline in aggregate demand, bold monetary easing – the first arrow – is effective and imperative as a means of stopping the continued fall in prices and bringing economic activity to the level that should have been achieved. this represents the thinking behind the bank ’ s current monetary easing policy. it is exactly what i have been emphasizing as a researcher for a number of years. as i said before, it will take some time until the effects of the first arrow ( monetary policy ) permeate the economy. it is for this reason that the effects of the second arrow ( fiscal policy ) will first materialize, and as the effects of monetary easing strengthen, the actual economic growth path will approach the potential growth path shown as the dotted line in slide 2. in contrast, the third arrow ( growth strategy ) plays a role of raising the potential growth path depicted by the dotted line. in other words, while monetary policy and fiscal policy are the policies to restore economic strength from its temporary decline to being in a sound state, the growth strategy is meant to raise the capabilities of the economy itself. for japan ’ s economy to achieve long - term growth, this growth strategy is a key to success. ii. what is “ quantitative and qualitative monetary easing ”? now, i would like to focus my speech on today ’ s main theme : the first arrow, which is the monetary easing policy the bank has been conducting. on january 22, 2013, the bank newly introduced the “ price stability target ” of 2 percent in terms of the year - on - year rate of change in the consumer price index ( cpi ). furthermore, the bank decided on april 4 to enter a new phase of monetary easing both in terms of quantity and quality in order to achieve that target at the earliest possible time, with a time horizon of about two years. this is the bold monetary easing policy called “ quantitative and qualitative monetary easing ” ( hereafter qqe ). i would now like to explain, as plainly as possible, the key features of the monetary easing that the bank has been conducting. however,
country needs, but they are critical steps in moving forward. we can square the circle of policy complementarity by moving faster on the reform of the energy sector and other structural reforms that would make south africa ’ s investment environment more attractive to domestic and foreign capital. thank you.

remarks by lesetja kganyago, governor of the south african reserve bank, at the jse / nyse market close event, new york, 10 october 2022 good afternoon distinguished guests, investors, members of the media, south african delegates, and new york stock exchange representatives. it is a privilege to address you here today, following the signing of a new memorandum of understanding ( mou ) between the johannesburg stock exchange ( jse ) and the new york stock exchange ( nyse ). this new mou will foster closer ties between the two markets, and is aimed at increasing economic partnerships and trade opportunities. it is encouraging that the jse and nyse will continue to explore new areas of cooperation and collaboration in strengthening their value propositions for their respective markets. south africa shares significant economic interests with the united states ( us ). south africa is the us ’ s largest african trading partner and has the most diversified and industrialised economy on the continent. despite the rapid growth in asian economies, the us remains one of south africa ’ s top five main trading partners. 1 in 2021, us exports to south africa totalled us $ 5. 5 billion − a 25. 8 % increase from 2020, while us imports from south africa totalled us $ 15. 7 billion − a 38. 5 % increase. there are approximately 600 us businesses operating in south africa and many use south details are available at http : / / www. dirco. gov. za / foreign / bilateral / usa. html africa as their regional headquarters, 2 and a springboard for greater opportunity on the african continent. these structural features of our economic relationship are stable and will certainly grow in the coming years. nevertheless, the global economic environment is challenging and is likely to remain as such for the next year or so, as we all find our way out of the economic repercussions of the covid - 19 pandemic. critical to shaping our path will be considered policies that seek to reduce volatility and uncertainty, and which aid the long - term investment that underpins sustainable economic growth. let me focus briefly on the global economy and south africa ’ s response. this is an unusually challenging time for the global macroeconomy. high inflation has now taken centre stage in the global debate on monetary policy, as prices continue to climb at rates last seen decades ago. 3 we have seen major central banks raising interest rates at the fastest pace in a generation. the current inflation surge has
questions. new housing loans ( excluding renegotiations ) remained at a low of eur 8. 7 billion in november, even though the conditions for a gradual recovery now seem to be in place : households'wait - and - see attitude should gradually dissipate as house prices begin to fall. mortgage rates should stabilise, in line with ecb and livret a passbook rates, with long - term rates finally falling, and with a return to a quarterly usury rate. the hcsf standards are not the explanation here, since banks have the capacity to lend more by making greater use of flexibilities, ii in particular with the three new adjustments decided in december. iii to clear up the misunderstanding that still seems to exist about banks'willingness to lend, i would like to reiterate my support, like the minister, for a market - wide agreement to re - examine creditworthy loan applications : this mechanism can be put in place by the end of january, and it must be simple, accessible and efficient. i would like to add a wish with regard to household savings : that sufficiently attractive returns on life insurance be accompanied by the use - in a proportionate manner - of available reserves to promote a smooth transition, in particular for the benefit of the euro fund. 2. 2 the reawakening of europe iv let's face it : neither europe nor the franco - german couple are in the best of shape, just a few months before the european elections. in each country, the temptation is to focus on the – very real – domestic problems, but i firmly believe that this would be a mistake : we face more shared challenges than ever before, and the solutions are just as shared. the pioneering success of the european model in the 20th century consisted in reconciling economic growth and social justice. our promise for the 21st century should be to combine growth and sustainability, prosperity and ecology ; to achieve this promise, we can and must harness the potential of three powerful levers. the single market is often seen only as a legacy from the past, from jacques delors, that great european who first set down roots at the banque de france. to quote the french president, his memory invites us to " reconcile the french with the economy, france with europe, and europe with its future ". precisely, page 5 of 5 the potential of the single market is far from having been fully tapped. according to the imf, deeper integration would

attention. i wish you a successful and enjoyable conference. bis central bankers ’ speeches
##ntial bis central bankers ’ speeches supervision. it will be particularly important to strike the right balance between ensuring fair competition by treating the same risks equally and, at the same time, allowing for varying market and banking structures as far as these cater for the heterogeneous needs of the real economy. however, this supervisory approach must not exist only on paper, but must also be infused with life. i see ese as playing an important role here. ese can support us supervisors in conveying the new supervisory standards and thus make a crucial contribution to consistent and high - quality supervisory practice in the ssm. as supervisors in a system currently encompassing 17, and soon 18 countries, however, we need not only technical expertise but also communication and teamworking skills. we need not only specialists but also first - class networkers. this corresponds to ese ’ s approach, which from the beginning was aimed at creating a joint european supervisory culture. and this is why there has always traditionally been a social event at each ese seminar. this conference is no exception, and i am already looking forward to an evening of exciting and stimulating conversation. 5. conclusion ladies and gentlemen, ese can look back upon a successful history, and i am convinced that the ssm will make good use of ese ’ s expert knowledge and experience. i wish the organisers of the european supervisors education initiative and all their helping hands every success for the coming challenges. there are two thoughts i want to leave you with before i invite you to help yourselves at the buffet and look more closely at the works of art under the motto of “ frankfurt, goethe, money ”. the first thought is : the banking union can succeed only if every single one of us, supervisors and supervised alike, is ready to take action and welcome the new. the second thought is – and this is addressed not only to the ese seminar participants, but to all parties involved in the banking union – we must be willing to keep learning, to open ourselves to new ideas and experiences, and to bring along the “ doubting thomases ”, the hesitant ones, for the ride. the bundesbank will make every effort to support this process – with words, and with deeds. thank you for your attention. bis central bankers ’ speeches

can be for the better – and by future - proofing our banks and perhaps also our personal choices – we can create not a grave but a braver new world, which is more inclusive, more responsible, more sustainable, and more prosperous. technology will provide the means, but a more liveable, sustainable planet will provide the purpose. thank you. 8 / 8 bis central bankers'speeches