capacity of foreign households, businesses, and governments. collectively, these factors could lead to pronounced losses among global financial intermediaries and a consequent reduction in the credit supply. in china, a further slowdown in economic growth could worsen financial stresses. many chinese firms, especially in the property sector, are struggling to service very high - 9debt burdens. local governments are also facing increasing fiscal strains. stresses originating in china could spill over to other emerging market economies ( emes ), particularly those highly dependent on trade with china or on credit provided by chinese entities. the spillovers could trigger significant capital outflows from emes, which may already be more susceptible to external shocks given generally heightened debt levels. given the size of its economy and financial system, financial stress in china could be propagated to global markets more broadly through disruptions to economic activity, deterioration of risk sentiment, and a sharp appreciation of the dollar. last but not least, a worsening of global geopolitical tensions, including those involving russia, the middle east, and china, could lead to broad negative spillovers to global markets. russia ’ s ongoing war against ukraine continues to weigh on many economies in a variety of ways, including sustained disruptions to regional trade in food, energy, and other commodities. the conflict in the middle east could generate further risks to energy and financial markets, as well as a worsening of global humanitarian and migration challenges. more broadly, escalation of geopolitical tensions could lead to lower economic activity and increased fragmentation of global trade flows and financial intermediation, raising financing and production costs and contributing to more sustained supply chain challenges and inflationary pressures. the global financial system could be affected by a pullback from risk - taking, declines in asset prices, and losses for exposed businesses and investors. i will conclude by saying that we must remain vigilant to potential shocks that could exacerbate vulnerabilities in the global financial system. thank you for inviting me to speak here. i look forward to participating on the panel. financial stability : resilience and challenges lisa d. cook member board of governors of the federal reserve system central bank of ireland november 8, 2023 the views expressed here are my own and do not reflect those of the board of governors or the federal open market committee

in times of recession. ” in addition, a fully - fledged capital markets union is more necessary than ever, in order to supplement public risk sharing with private risk sharing across the euro area. in conclusion, let me say a few words on chamber music. many of you have already heard the famous piano trio number 2 by franz schubert. the harmony of the three instruments has charmed generations of music lovers, including stanley kubrick in “ barry lindon ”. in this piece, none of the instruments should be the only game in its own town. and none of them should be dominated by any of the other two, otherwise the harmony is broken. quite the contrary, we can hear each instrument and the beauty of the piece comes from the response of each instrument to the others. the same applies to the three macroeconomic policies : monetary, macroprudential and fiscal. they should provide three kinds of stability in a delicate combination of “ synchronisation without domination ”. to overhaul the changing balance between an ex ante written music score and a real - time human interpretation, let us aim at least for “ mutual predictability ” … and this is what today ’ s conference is about, for the macroprudential part of the piece. thank you for your attention. 1 interview of philip r. lane with expansion, 26 february 2021. 2 see for instance colletaz, levieuge & popescu ( 2018 ) : “ monetary policy and long - run systemic risk - taking, " journal of economic dynamics and control, 86 ( c ), pp 165 – 184, and dell ’ ariccia, laeven & suarez ( 2017 ) : “ bank leverage and monetary policy ’ s risk taking channel : evidence from the united states ”. the journal of finance, 72 : 613 – 654. 3 this issue of the financial stability review contains several excellent articles on related subjects, see for example gabriel makhlouf, “ lessons from covid : a macroprudential framework for the market based finance sector ”. 4 istrefi, odendahl and sestieri ( 2020 ) provide evidence on this direction for the case of the federal reserve before the global financial crisis. see, “ fed communication on financial stability concerns and monetary policy decisions : revelations from speeches “, banque de france working paper series no. 779. 4 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches