the governing council, as its supreme decision - making body, is accountable not just for monetary policy issues but also for matters of banking supervision. these two areas of responsibility overlap at the bank level. this, of course, gives rise to conflicts of interest, because after all, banks are not just a crucial element in the monetary policy transmission process ; they are also subject to banking supervision. thus, the ecb has to deal with the conflict of interest of being a banking supervisor with access to central bank liquidity and the other way round a central bank that decides about banks that are important in the monetary policy transmission process. in an effort to minimise such conflicts of interest, a governance structure has been put in place to limit the governing council ’ s involvement in supervisory decisions. speaking personally, i have my doubts whether this set - up will truly help to prevent a clash between the ecb ’ s monetary policy mandate and its role as a banking supervisor. you will most likely have explored this issue in much greater depth early on today. as i mentioned earlier, the ssm is only the first pillar of the european banking union. the second is the european single resolution mechanism which will deal with future bank failures. this mechanism has been operational since 1 january 2016. its task is to realign incentives and make the entire banking system more stable. in cases where a bank is no longer viable, its shareholders and creditors will be first in line to bear the resulting losses – the taxpayer will only be asked to contribute as a very last resort. this is an urgently needed step in the right direction. but in its final form, the european banking union will be made up of three pillars, the final one being a common deposit guarantee scheme. let ’ s make one thing clear – a single deposit guarantee arrangement is certainly the logical next step in terms of financial integration, but it is altogether premature at the present time because it would disequilibriate liability and control. why do i say that? well, we first need to achieve deeper integration before an integrated deposit guarantee scheme can work effectively. a single european banking supervision set - up has been put in place – that much is true – but national economic policy decisions still have a huge bearing on the economic wellbeing of domestic banks. the same holds true for the legal framework – just take insolvency law, which is still very much rooted bis central bankers ’ speeches in the national domain. the existence of different rules has a direct impact on

alessandra perrazzelli : ten years after the alternative dispute resolution ( adr ) directive - a comparative overview of banking and financial adr opening speech by ms alessandra perrazzelli, deputy governor of the bank of italy, at an international conference on alternative dispute resolution schemes in the banking, financial and insurance sectors, rome, 19 december 2022. * * * it has been more than 13 years since the founding of the banking and financial ombudsman in october 2009, and i am delighted to open this international conference on alternative dispute resolution schemes in the banking, financial and insurance sectors, which is a follow - up to a previous and important meeting held in 2017. the banking and financial ombudsman is an alternative resolution system for disputes arising between customers ( consumers and non - consumers ) and intermediaries concerning the provision of banking and financial services. the bank of italy was tasked with setting up the abf by the government, supplying it with resources and taking care of every aspect of its functioning, though obviously leaving the decisionmaking to the members of the panels in order to ensure and safeguard its impartiality and independence. the idea of establishing an ombudsman actually goes back to the 2005 law'on savings '. the expectation that banks and other financial intermediaries would have to join an alternative dispute resolution system for customers was therefore part of a regulatory framework designed to strengthen consumer protection systems, and thus also the protection carried out by the bank of italy, under the assumption that the stability of the financial system as a whole and of intermediaries requires substantial fairness in relations between intermediaries and customers. following the transposition of the european directive on adr ( 2013 / 11 / eu ), in 2015 the bank of italy was appointed as the national competent authority tasked with the monitoring the proper functioning of the system and verifying compliance with the quality requirements envisaged by the directive. there have been considerable changes since the abf was founded, both in the bank of italy, with the creation of a directorate specifically devoted to consumer protection ( as well as to financial education ), and in the abf system. three panels were set up initially in 2009, followed by a further four at the end of 2016 in order to increase the capacity for and the rapidity of responses to customer needs and to step up consumer protection. the ombudsman has received over 210, 000 complaints and adopted more than 200, 000 decisions since it