double - layer securitisations. in november 2009 it announced the eligibility requirement that, as of 1 march 2010, at least two ratings must comply with the minimum rating threshold applicable to abss. moreover, on 23 december 2009 the ecb launched a public consultation on the establishment of loan - by - loan information requirements for abss in the eurosystem collateral framework. debate in the united states, where the most independent institution, namely the federal reserve, is subject to attacks and pressures from various corners, including legislative initiatives aiming to curtail its powers. a final concern regarding international cooperation is this : there is no doubt that the “ volker rule ” represents a new topic for discussion and that there is a risk that not all countries will want to follow this path, out of a wish not to penalise the financial institutions based in their own countries through the new regulations on separation. as has been the case in the past, it can be expected that vast financial resources will be employed in an attempt to influence political decisions and to stand in the way of a proposal of this kind. it would be a shame if the authorities in major countries put the interests of these institutions ahead of those of the taxpayers and ahead of global interests. this brings me to the role that central banks can play in supporting more sustainable credit flows. recent work shows that price stability is necessary, but not sufficient to ensure a homogenous flow of credit to the economy and avoid financial instability. in particular, if monetary policy concentrates solely on inflation objectives, it might, in some circumstances, end up being too accommodative of credit cycles and fuel speculative bubbles. such a risk tends to become more apparent when interest rates are kept at a very low level for an extended period of time. on the other hand, it appears to be a difficult task for a central bank to use one instrument, such as interest rates, to achieve two objectives at the same time, namely price stability and financial stability. this is the reason why central banks should also be equipped with macroprudential instruments, distinct from monetary policy, which can be used in order to avoid the excessive pro - cyclicality of credit. these instruments should enhance the stability and resilience of the banking sector over the business cycle, as well as the sustainability of the balance sheet structures of borrowers. a more efficient allocation of credit should result, thus helping to avoid the build - up of financial imbalances and contributing to improved economic performance.

to sum up this part, the new steady state will be characterised by higher capital ratios and lower leverage in the banking sector, and probably also less recourse by the banking system to market financing in general, and to securitisation in particular. this will allow for more stable credit growth, which is less subject to pro - cyclicality, especially that deriving from supply factors. credit growth will also be less affected by financial market volatility. 17 4. the transition the transition from the old equilibrium, which was really one of imbalance, to a new, more sustainable one cannot be instant, as that would involve an excessive adjustment with potentially recessionary effects. nor can it take too long as this would risk creating incentives to return to the unsatisfactory behaviour exhibited prior to the crisis. defining the transition phases is possibly the most difficult challenge. the transition is characterised not only by the lag between decisions relating to new prudential regulations and their application, of which i spoke earlier, but also by the extraordinary measures in terms of monetary and financial policy, adopted by governments and central banks to combat the recession and support the financial system in facing the systemic crisis. in fact, recent studies have shown that securitisation and credit derivatives tend to increase the supply of bank loans ; see, for instance, estrella, “ securitisation and the efficacy of monetary policy ”, economic policy review, vol. 8 ( 1 ), federal reserve bank of new york, 2002 ; hirtle, “ credit derivatives and bank credit supply ”, federal reserve bank of new york staff report, n. 276, 2007 ; y. altunbas, l. gambacorta, d. marques - ibanez, “ securitisation and the bank lending channel ”, european economic review, vol. 53, issue 8, 2009. the major central banks have promptly and forcefully responded to the crisis with a broad variety of measures. the classical prescription by walter bagehot, which describes central banks as lenders of last resort, has proven to be as valid today as it was 137 years ago when “ lombard street ” was first published. 18 accommodating the sudden increase in the demand for liquidity prevented a disorderly de - leveraging process, prevented illiquid but solvent banks from going bust, and, more broadly, sustained confidence in the economy. the steps taken by central banks have taken them into, up to now,