samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
regulation on the establishment of the digital euro, 28 june 2023 viii be it for account holding, payments or access to a mobile app. ix panetta, f., a digital euro : widely available and easy to use, speech, 24 april 2023 x bis annual economic report, chapter iii. blueprint for the future monetary system : improving the old, enabling the new, 25 june 2023 xi adrian t., mancini griffoli t., the rise of payment and contracting platforms, imf fintech notes, 19 june 2023. i ii

the pace and in the sequence we judge will best meet our objectives. most importantly, our ability to pay interest on reserves will enable us to raise short - term interest rates even while the quantity of assets we hold is still quite elevated and while the reserve base of the banking system is extraordinarily high. the opportunity for banks to earn interest on a highly liquid risk - free deposit at the federal reserve should put a reasonably firm floor under short - term rates, including the federal funds rate. to date, that floor has been the views expressed are my own and not necessarily those of my colleagues on the federal open market committee. somewhat soft, perhaps because not all participants in the federal funds market can hold deposits at the federal reserve, and because banks have been reluctant to allocate the needed capital to arbitrage a few basis points. but i am confident that when we begin to raise our deposit rate, it will put upward pressure on the rates on competing assets, increasing actual and expected short - term interest rates with the usual types of effects on other interest rates and asset prices. as banks become more comfortable with their capital levels, they will be more willing to undertake the arbitrage to tighten the link between the rate on deposits and short - term market interest rates. still, draining reserves at some point also will be an aspect of exiting. the large volume of reserves is contributing to the loose relationship of our deposit rate and market rates. in addition, although to date the high volume of reserves evidently has not increased bank lending or reduced spreads of rates on bank loans or other assets relative to, say, treasury rates, it could begin to do so if banks start to perceive the risk - adjusted returns on loans as superior to our deposit rate. an increase in lending and narrowing of spreads on bank loans is a necessary and desirable aspect of the return to better - functioning markets and intermediation to promote economic growth. but spreads eventually could become narrower than what would be consistent with underlying risk, and lending could grow more quickly than appropriate for price stability if very high levels of reserves remain in place. we are developing new techniques for draining reserves, including reverse repurchase agreements against mortgage - backed securities and time deposits for banks at the federal reserve. and, of course, we retain the option to sell securities from our portfolio on an outright basis. the range of tools will permit us to drain large volumes of reserves if necessary to achieve the policy stance that fosters our macroeconomic objectives. our
has limited the national sovereignty of fiscal policy. the treaty is primary international law and contains inter alia : • the commitment of member states to avoid excessive deficits • the 3 % threshold • an early warning procedure • the provision to give notice to a member state to take measures to reduce the deficit within a specified time limit • the right to impose fines if a member state fails to comply. the stability and growth pact fleshed out these provisions and streamlined the procedures at the same time. contrary to appearance, the stability and growth pact is not a non - committal statement of political purpose but secondary eu law. permanently fumbling with the pact is a clear sign that political authorities in many member countries were only vaguely aware of the implication of emu on fiscal policy leeway. the pact is a decisive element of the institutional framework of the monetary union. treaty and pact already resemble a partial political union. the technical preconditions for the functioning of emu are in place. if properly applied, this will suffice for the time being. in the medium to long term, however, additional political back - up will be indispensable. emu has tied the participating countries permanently together. national policy choices have become a matter of concern for all. for the lasting success of the politically decentralised monetary union 1. it is crucial to implement structural reforms, thus lifting member countries on to a higher growth path 2. it is crucial to overcome integration and adjustment fatigue 3. it is crucial to embrace reality and accept the fact that national sovereignty in fiscal policy is limited in a monetary union 4. it is crucial to accept the constituting principle of all democracies, the rule of law, which lays down the primacy of law over policy 5. it is crucial to adhere to the stability consensus of maastricht which is additionally put in question by disregarding the suggestions of the ecb and the central banks of the euro area to refine the convention ’ s proposal. it will be necessary to reconcile the “ ever closer union ” with the “ ever wider union ”. today we are further away from a political union than we were when the euro was introduced five years ago. regarding the co - ordination of budgetary policies, we are even thrown back to intergovernmental co - operation. it will be necessary to reconcile the negotiations on the constitution for europe with the damage done to the political stability consensus of maastricht. it is in the european and in

- 1993 ). dominique began his career as an assistant professor and was subsequently engaged as a professor of economics at the universities of nancy and paris. from 2001 to 2007, he taught economics at the paris institute of political studies. he was also a visiting professor at stanford university in 2000. the title of his speech is “ beyond the crisis – sustainable growth and a stable international monetary system ” – a highly relevant and interesting topic to all of us. i am looking forward to hearing your insights. the floor is yours.
september 28, 2022 ). 4 see 12 u. s. c. § 5365. 5 12 c. f. r. pt. 252, subpart g. 8 / 8 bis - central bankers'speeches

for this easing is that the elections in france, the netherlands and austria did not yield a positive outcome for eurosceptic parties. to sum up this first part we can say that financial markets are currently in quite good shape, driven by an improved economic outlook, benign political developments and an accommodative monetary policy stance. 3. the financial crisis : monetary policy undergoing change the mandate of the eurosystem states quite clearly that maintaining price stability in the euro area is our overriding priority. that is why we conduct monetary policy. in august, the euro area annual consumer price inflation ( hicp ) was 1. 5 %. this is still below the targeted inflation rate of less than, but close to 2 % per year over the medium term. however, the risk of deflation is now universally considered to be very low. in 2014, things looked different : the euro area inflation was steadily declining and bottomed out at – 0. 6 % in january 2015. but this risk has decreased – also supported by our monetary policy measures. the ecb governing council has been pursuing an accommodative monetary policy stance for a while. since june 2014, a move known as quantative easing has been implemented by the eurosystem in order to bolster financing conditions for banks and the real economy. at the same time credit easing has been extended. the main measures were, briefly : targeted longer - term refinancing operations ( also known as tltros ) that provide financing to banks for up to four years, with the amount that an individual bank can borrow being linked to its loans and lending patterns to the private sector, at extremely favourable ( in some cases, negative ) interest rates ; various asset purchase programmes, grouped under the umbrella acronym app ( expanded asset purchase programme ) : an additional covered bond purchase programme ( cbpp3 ) ; an asset - backed securities purchase programme ( abspp ) ; a corporate sector purchase programme ( cspp ) ; and the large - scale public sector purchase programme ( pspp ) as the main instrument to address weak inflation ; the affirmation that full allotment in regular refinancing operations will continue at least until the end of 2017 ; and in terms of policy rates, a very low interest environment with the main refinancing rate, 2 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches which has stood at 0 % since march 2016, and the negative deposit rate ( negative since june 2014 ; currently – 0. 4 %
are not captured by monetary aggregates. with these two pillars and the various indicators, monetary policymaking in the euro area may appear complex, but this reflects the complexities and uncertainties which surround the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in modern economies, and, even more so, in the new economic environment created by the changeover to the euro. against this background, the eurosystem must rely on a whole range of indicators and on a variety of models which help to sharpen and crosscheck the analysis. the efficiency of monetary policy does not rely only on a careful analysis of the monetary, financial and economic situation, but also on the ability to explain monetary policy decisions to the public in a convincing manner. in the case of the eurosystem, this is an even more arduous task than usual, as the single monetary policy must cope with a new environment and be explained to a public from different cultural backgrounds on the basis of new indicators and data. our choice is to base this communication on transparency. this means that our external presentation of monetary policy must fully reflect the internal analysis and discussions which take place within the governing council. i can personally assure you that this is the case. our internal discussions are organised in such a way as to ensure a full and thorough assessment of the two pillars i have just described. our external communications fully reflect this. in addition to a well - defined and informed strategy, the monetary policy of the eurosystem must rely on an efficient operational framework, that is, on a set of instruments and procedures necessary for the implementation of monetary policy. thus far, this framework has proved successful in clearly signalling the stance of monetary policy, in steering short - term market interest rates and in providing liquidity to the banking system in an efficient manner. at the heart of the framework are the weekly refinancing operations which were conducted at interest rates broadly in the middle of the interest rate corridor, which is set by the rates on the two standing facilities. a minimum reserve system ensures the existence of a liquidity deficit in the banking system, which is necessary for the conduct of these weekly open market operations. the credit institutions need only comply with the minimum reserve requirement on average within the reserve period. this contributes to the stabilisation of money market developments. a key element for the functioning of the operational framework has been the target payment system. this payment system interlinks the 15 national real - time gross settlement systems and the ecb ’ s payment system,

the euro is a powerful factor in restructuring european economies and unemployment is falling as a result of, in part, structural reforms implemented by governments. it is up to economic policymakers in the euro area to pursue liberalisation, flexibility, fiscal consolidation and public efficiency. it is up to consumers and producers to reap all the benefits of this favourable environment.
bank's financial stability role drawing on our experience of this financial crisis, and discussions concerning framework reform proposals and actual instances in major countries. in addition, the bank should endeavor to ensure that the general stance of emerging market countries, including korea, is fully reflected in the course of reaching a global consensus on financial stability. to this end, we have to participate actively in discussions at g - 20 meetings as well as in the financial stability board ( fsb ) and the basel committee on banking supervision ( bcbs ), both of which our nation joined in march. we have to do our best to set the inflation target, to be adopted for the period from next year onward, at an appropriate level. although inflation targeting per se is assessed to have contributed considerably to price stability, both domestically and internationally, the bank must also review any shortcomings in the system based on its past experiences. the bank should make improvements in its operation, if necessary. among the key projects we are now pursuing, i would like to mention two in particular. the running of the new bok - wire +, which went into operation this may, should be stable and seamless. and every effort must be made to ensure the trouble - free supply and circulation of the 50, 000 - won banknotes, to be introduced from june 23. the various other businesses we handle should also be carried out without the slightest slipup. settlement risk needs to be managed still more thoroughgoingly to cope with the expanded participation of non - bank financial institutions in the payment and settlement system. we must take great pains to ensure that the systems introduced for improving the efficiency of liquidity management, such as fungible issuance and prior fixed rate tenders for monetary stabilization bonds, achieve their desired results. in the management of the foreign reserves, we should do our utmost to upgrade risk management further and come up with ways to achieve stable returns in this period of low interest rates worldwide. my dear colleagues, the direction of financial and economic change at home and abroad remains very uncertain. as a result, the central bank's accurate assessment of the situation and selecting of timely and effective policy options are more important than ever for the national economy. carrying out this mission, the bank should arrange its organizational and personnel management in such a way as to maximize its potential. full consideration also needs to be given to a new organization in charge of activities related to the international financial institutions that the country has recently joined to ensure that it plays its role

and confidence in how the market functions. i expect that cooperative relationship will continue as we see this process through to its conclusion in may next year. bis central bankers ’ speeches
seppo honkapohja : 1st hundred years of the bank of finland speech by mr seppo honkapohja, member of the board of the bank of finland, at the finnish economic association xxxvii annual meeting, helsinki, 12 february 2015. * * * the bank of finland was established in 1811, by an imperial decree of emperor alexander i. we are the fourth oldest central bank operating today. only the swedish riksbank, the bank of england, and banque de france are older. the bank of finland is also more than 100 years older than finland ’ s political independence, which was achieved only in 1917. in this speech i will tell you about the first hundred years of the bank, including its old main building where we have this reception. the first task of the bank of finland was to separate the finnish financial system from sweden by issuing ( rouble - and kopeck – denominated ) notes, and by granting credits to finnish landowners and merchants. the bank of finland was originally established in the city of turku, in the south - west of finland, and moved to helsinki, the new capital of the country, in 1819. initially the bank operated out of a house owned by commercial counselor sederholm, and then moved to the senate house. a purpose - built building was completed on tallinmaki, nikolai street, in 1883. i will shortly tell you more about the main building. despite the efforts of the bank of finland, swedish money remained widely used in finland until 1840, when finland went on the silver standard ( following russia ), and the remaining swedish paper money was withdrawn from circulation. after this milestone, the notes issued by the bank of finland became the dominant means of payment in the country and the circulation was effectively controlled by the bank of finland. finland obtained its own currency unit, the markka in 1860 – i. e. well before the country became independent. this happened in the aftermath of the crimean war and the international financial crisis of 1857 – 58, when the rouble was seriously destabilized and went off the silver standard. in 1865, the head of the financial department of the finnish senate, j. v. snellman, obtained from tsar alexander ii the permission to link the markka to the silver standard independently of the rouble and finland ’ s monetary system was thus effectively separated from russia ’ s. most european countries moved to the gold standard in the 1870s

deck to governor ’ s ifctf keynote address
domestic credit. the central bank will shortly appear before the oireachtas finance committee in public session to discuss the variable rate mortgages bill ( 2016 ), which proposes to give the bank the power to cap variable mortgage rates charged by lenders. out of respect to the committee and its deliberations, i don ’ t intend to make extensive comment on the bill here, other than to say that the central bank will fully explain its reservations about the bill at the committee hearing. in a nutshell, we believe that the bill would conflict and interfere with our monetary and prudential mandates, while having counterproductive effects for borrowers. furthermore, the central bank has a prudential regulation and consumer protection mandate, but is not a competition authority, and that is an important distinction. there is a competition authority in the country, namely the competition and consumer protection commission, with which the bank engages and exchanges to the fullest extent of our respective mandates. the same distinction applies at european level, where the european commission is the competition 1 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches authority while prudential supervision of banks is entrusted to the european central bank. naturally, however, we will work both to the letter and spirit of any law the oireachtas may ultimately pass. in the meantime, it may be useful to explain precisely what our role is in relation to mortgage interest rates. our job is to ensure transparency for borrowers and facilitate switching. this is why, earlier this year, we strengthened our disclosure requirements on lenders. the central bank directed lenders to give sufficient notice when they change the interest rate they charge, to explain in layman ’ s terms the rationale for such changes, and to facilitate their customers who are in a position to switch to a different mortgage or to a different lender. when lenders do not honour these consumer protection obligations, when they fail to point out to their customers the options open to them, or worse, when they mislead or bring their customers to pay more interest than they should, the central bank acts forcefully. and to emphasise that point, the central bank has driven all mortgage lenders to review their mortgage books to ensure that all borrowers who should have been on tracker mortgages are on tracker mortgages, and compensated accordingly if incorrect rates were applied. as part of this programme of work, we have just reprimanded and fined springboard and ordered it to pay redress for serious failings in

perspective on the central bank and welcome your questions. 1 www. centralbank. ie / press - area / speeches / pages / macro - financialperspectives. aspx 5 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches
##fy the volatility. amid the fragile global financial climate, the thai financial markets have been relatively resilient compared to those of other emerging markets, thanks to thailand ’ s strong external position. current account position last year registered a surplus of 9 percent of gdp, and is projected to remain at that level in 2016. our international reserves have been at a healthy level, standing at around three times of the short - term external debt and 1. 3 times of the total external debt. foreign holdings of the thai government and bank of thailand bond outstanding are less than 9 percent, compared with more than 30 percent in some other emerging markets in the region. external debt of the corporate sector has been relatively low, and mostly belongs to large companies, which manage their exchange rate risk sufficiently well. bis central bankers ’ speeches while thailand ’ s financial strength serves as a buffer against external shocks, it is important that the private sector is not complacent and should continue to be prudent in their financial risk management. global financial volatility can definitely trigger two - way movements of currencies and asset prices. as a small open economy, thailand cannot escape, but to find effective ways to live with the global volatility. on the bank of thailand ’ s part, under the flexible exchange rate regime, currency movement serves as the first line of defense against unexpected external events. we continue to be prudent in using an appropriate mix of policy tools to help prevent excessive volatility of the currency and asset prices. in addition, to build market resilience in the longer run, we embrace on financial market developments, as deep and liquid markets would better absorb large swings in capital flows. we also plan to further relax capital flow regulations to allow more balanced flows in and out of the country, which would enhance stability against short - term speculative flows. ladies and gentlemen, moving from the financial side to the real side, let me share with you the monetary policy committee ’ s latest assessment to summarize where the thai economy stands at the moment. this year, the thai economy is projected to gradually recover, driven mainly by government spending and the tourism sector. government spending, mainly through small investment projects, has lent support to the recent economic recovery. contribution from large - scale infrastructure projects is expected to become more evident in the latter half of this year. meanwhile, tourism has been an important growth driver, with a broad - based improvement in a number of tourists from china and other

gather here tonight, i hope we will continue to work together on the route to enhancing competitiveness and sustainable development of thailand. kob khun krub. bis central bankers ’ speeches