said, cbdcs may come in different shapes and forms ; therefore, adequate design and implementation are needed in order to minimise their impact. this is not a minor task and requires careful analysis. there are many interlinked design options and they all have to be considered, both individually and holistically, in order to ensure they are a perfect fit. this is, in fact, what the eurosystem is currently doing in the context of the digital euro. no decision has yet been made regarding its issuance or its final design, but we launched the investigation phase of the project last year in order to ensure we are prepared in the event that future developments warrant its launch. our work is now focused on deepening the conceptual analysis by assessing the different design options, as well as the distribution model. the first step was to identify the use cases to focus on, namely those that better support the policy objectives of a digital euro and facilitate network effects. payments in e - commerce and physical stores, as well as person - to - person payments are, clearly, natural candidates. they either represent important market segments or have a clear potential to grow, and they rely heavily either on cash or on non - european providers and technologies. payments between governments and individuals have also been considered a priority, given their potential synergies with the aforementioned ones. in any case, focusing now on these payment segments does not mean ruling out others, but simply leaving them for future stages. the next step of the analysis has covered what we consider to be the foundational design options. they refer to the way a digital euro should be transferred, the level of privacy and the tools to control excessive use and, hence, limit its impact on the stability of the financial system. as regards the transfer mechanism, we have decided to prioritise a digital euro solution in which transactions are transmitted online and validated by a third party, since this model covers the broadest set of use cases and supports the eurosystem's policy objectives. peer - to - peer validated offline payments are also going to be further explored, but this option presents a number of technical and regulatory challenges that make its time to market more uncertain. privacy is a design consideration that was rated high in importance by respondents to the public consultation we carried out at the end of 2020. 1 in principle, a digital euro should provide the same level of privacy as current digital payment solutions in order to comply with the regulatory framework. however,

miguel fernandez ordonez : the state of spain ’ s economy testimony by mr miguel fernandez ordonez, governor of the bank of spain, before the parliamentary budget committee in relation to the draft state budget for 2011, madrid, 5 october 2010. * * * ladies and gentlemen, i appear before this committee in connection with parliament ’ s discussion of the state budget for 2011. in my view, this budget will be crucial for spain ’ s economic future and it will be subject, more than on any other occasion, to in - depth analysis and close scrutiny not only by spanish society as a whole but also by the main supranational agencies, by our european partners and by the international financial markets on which spanish households, firms and governments obtain the funds they need to finance much of their activity. as is known, spanish budgetary policy responded most forcefully to the global economic and financial crisis, in step with the support programmes for the financial sector, coordinated at european level, and with the firm, resolute action by the european central bank, which drastically cut its interest rates and implemented a wide range of conventional and non - conventional measures to prevent liquidity tensions from ultimately shutting down the european financial system. the fiscal policy response undoubtedly contributed to softening the adverse effects of the crisis on the spanish economy. set against this, however, the surplus on public finances rapidly turned into a burgeoning deficit and public debt moved into an accelerating dynamic which, had it not departed from relatively comfortable levels, would have also placed the debt ratio at excessively high levels. such was the position of our public finances when the greek fiscal crisis, which first became discernible in late 2009 and ultimately burst onto the scene in spring this year, shifted the focus of international economic and financial attention onto the situation of public finances in a broad set of countries. investors rapidly took stock of the potential problems of unsustainability implicit in greek deficit and debt dynamics and they began to closely examine the possible existence of similar risks in other member states. the upshot was that the instability on sovereign risk markets spread to the european economies evidencing the greatest vulnerabilities, whether because of the speed of the recent deterioration in their public finances or because of the scale of the macroeconomic imbalances that had built up before the crisis. i honestly believe that the financial tensions in recent months in europe, in general, and in our country, in particular, were largely due to an overreaction