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rising spreads between market and policy rates ) would have for spending and pricing decisions and the availability of credit. characterising the monetary policy stance in this context was particularly complex, and caution was needed when assessing the potential impact of financial tensions on the real economy and the outlook for price stability. in this challenging environment, having a single, clear and unambiguous objective helped to focus attention on the fulfilment of our mandate, at a time when many siren voices were calling for actions in other directions. in turn, this clear focus supported our credibility with the markets and public, while the quantitative definition of price stability provided an anchor for inflation expectations. moreover, our monetary policy strategy ensured that the appropriate medium - term orientation of monetary policy was maintained. maintaining such a mediumterm perspective ensured that we were not unduly influenced by market developments, which – particularly in a context of heightened tensions – can be rather excessive and perhaps near - sighted. 5 these characteristics of the monetary policy strategy imparted a “ steady - handedness ” to our policy decisions, even in the face of the challenges posed by financial market tensions. as a result, we have avoided a “ go - stop ” type of policy, which is well known to have plagued economies in the past. 6 rather than becoming an additional source of uncertainty and volatility in a challenging period, our steady - handed approach has led monetary policy to be a crucial element of stability. importantly, this steady - handedness has bolstered the credibility of our commitment to deliver our objective of price stability and has therefore contributed to ensuring that inflation expectations in the euro area remain firmly anchored. b ) the role of monetary analysis the prominent role our strategy assigns to money was instrumental in this respect. paying due attention to trend developments in money has helped us to look through the transient impact of the many temporary shocks that buffet the economy, to act in a consistent manner over time and to maintain our focus on the medium - term horizon, when the effect of monetary policy on its primary objective – price stability – will materialise in full. in addition, the monetary analysis has ensured that due consideration is given in policy discussions to underlying developments in the level of key nominal variables, thereby supporting the focus of policy discussions on our mandate. as financial tensions emerged, the policy - relevant signal extracted from the broad based monetary analysis conducted at the ecb confirmed that liquidity in the euro area was ample and continued to increase at buoyant rates. the