should, for that reason alone, be left on the back burner. autonomous monetary policy autonomous monetary policy is a kind of “ absorber ” of economic shocks. it is meant to reduce their impact and smooth the economic cycle. it prevents an economic contraction being borne by the unemployed and those on low incomes more than is necessary. certainly, the more flexible is your economy ( in terms of public finances, the labour market, and so on ), the easier it is to cope with shocks and the less monetary policy is needed. however, the case of the eurozone shows how tricky it is when the absorber in the form of monetary policy is switched off and nothing replaces it. the shocks are bigger and hurt more. listeners themselves can answer the question of whether the labour market and labour law are likely be made more or less flexible ( and dismissals made easier ) in the future. in doing so, they will answer the question of whether there will be a need in the future for more or less domestic monetary policy in the czech republic, a country whose conservative population is so averse to upswings and downswings. 1 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches the “ convergence trilemma ” the standard “ monetary trilemma ”, which you know very well ( a country cannot simultaneously have a fixed exchange rate, an open capital account and autonomous monetary policy ), is accompanied in a converging economy of our kind with something i call the “ convergence trilemma ”. no country can simultaneously have high convergence growth, a fixed exchange rate, and low macroeconomic imbalances, be they internal or external. in our case, catching up with our wealthier, low - inflation western peers means a long - term tendency for our currency to appreciate. this is hardly consistent with a permanently fixed exchange rate. the paradox of the eurozone the eurozone paradox is that the best possible members of the club are the countries that are so stable themselves in monetary and economic terms that they don ’ t need “ to buy in stability and credibility ”. such countries have fewer and fewer reasons to adopt the euro. conversely, the more a country begs to have the euro, the bigger the problem it will represent. this explains why almost no one is conducting a euro debate in sweden, even though it does not have a derogation and many would like to see it in the eurozone. canonically, the same goes for us : either we can continue to stabilise ourselves

national bank for doing exactly that in the bad times of 2013. they then happily add that greece would have benefited from having its own currency and that germany is profiting from the euro being weaker than the deutschmark would have been. the same, however, doesn ’ t go for the czech republic after 2013. these endearing 2 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches inconsistencies are present throughout the population. here again, however, the eurozone and its satellites offer parallels. you in copenhagen have a fixed exchange rate against the euro ( and previously had a fixed rate against the mark ) and thus in effect “ buy in ” monetary policy from frankfurt. you have your own notes and coins but not your own monetary policy. note this fine “ scandinavian paradox ” : you have an opt - out from the euro following the 2000 referendum, yet you do not make your own monetary policy, nor did you before the euro was created, whereas the swedes do not have an opt - out ( although they have been trying not to fulfil the criteria and not to join ever since rejecting the euro in their 2003 referendum ), yet they pursue autonomous monetary policy. i sometimes wonder whether the czech sitting - on - the - fence approach is heading towards the danish model. it wouldn ’ t be my choice, but it ’ s good to be prepared. the price of entering goes up, or the bulgarian thorny road to the euro yes, some new eu members are still keen to join the eurozone. especially in bulgaria, the desire is understandable : the country has held a fixed exchange rate visa - a - vis the euro since the common currency ’ s inception. just like denmark, bulgaria has outsourced its monetary policy to frankfurt, but unlike denmark, it would also like to become an official member of the club to enjoy all the benefits of using one of the most prestigious world currencies. on paper, at least, bulgaria appears to be an ideal candidate : unlike many of the current members of the eurozone, it actually fulfils the key maastricht criteria. but the idea of bulgarian membership is not an appetizing one to many technocrats at the ecb and to the representatives of some eurozone member states. so, for many years, bulgarians have been tacitly discouraged from applying to erm ii, the antechamber of the euro. this year, however, they tried their luck : perhaps they felt that the