, banks with lower ratings only have a small number of counterparties. the exchange rates below chf 1. 20 per euro were concluded by banks that do not have an agreement relating to limits with the snb, in other words, by banks that cannot or do not wish to trade with the snb. the snb was at all times prepared to buy unlimited quantities of euros at chf 1. 20 per euro. all market participants were at all times aware of this snb purchase offer, including the banks without an agreement relating to limits. consequently, banks which sold euros for less than chf 1. 20 did not receive the best market price and had – relatively speaking – to accept losses. since there is no compulsion to make business transactions at the best prices, such anomalies cannot always be excluded. however, they can only be maintained for a very short period. how is the snb organised in operational terms for implementing the minimum exchange rate? since the introduction of the minimum exchange rate, the snb has monitored the foreign exchange market from market opening in asia on sunday evening to market closing in new york on friday evening without any interruption. the same applies to holidays. the interbank market, which is the market of relevance for the snb, includes its counterparties. the snb accepts well over 100 banks with more than 700 trading desks as counterparties. thanks to this network of contacts, the global foreign exchange market is almost completely covered. on the part of the snb, the trading limits amount to some hundreds of billions of bis central bankers ’ speeches euros a day. these limits can be flexibly adjusted by the snb, should this be necessary. via electronic trading systems, the banks have access at all times to the offers. the snb ’ s strategy for implementing the minimum exchange rate has proved effective – including in the last few days. on the relevant interbank market, chf 1. 20 per euro qualifies as the lowest exchange rate. consequently, the minimum exchange rate applied at all times. does the minimum exchange rate continue to apply? yes. without any qualification. the snb has successfully enforced the minimum exchange rate and will continue to do so, without any restrictions. the swiss franc is still overvalued and represents a substantial challenge for the swiss economy. the snb continues to expect that the swiss franc will weaken. should the economic outlook and the risk of deflation so require, the snb stands ready

condition for the effective and successful operation of the eth and the snb. for without independence, ladies and gentlemen, research cannot be free and monetary policy cannot be shielded from special interests. but independence is neither a law of nature nor a matter of course. rather, it is rooted in the population's belief that our institutions deliver their best results when they are independent. in other words, independence pays off for the population because they benefit from stable prices and scientific progress. but how can this belief best be upheld, especially given that it is continuously being challenged by a wide range of stakeholders? what does independence rely on? first, the eth and the snb must genuinely live their independence and perform their tasks as well as they possibly can. in the case of the eth, for example, this means always conducting unbiased research, sharing its results with interested parties, thereby making them accessible and verifiable, and meeting the highest educational standards. for the snb this means ensuring that monetary policy is always geared to maintaining price stability. but it also means constantly developing its analyses and methodologies. maintaining a dialogue with the academic community is very important here. 2 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches second, both institutions must be accountable. the snb must report comprehensively on its activities to the federal assembly and to the public. the eth board, on the other hand, must report annually to the federal council on the fulfilment of its strategic objectives. and third, if the eth and the snb are to retain their independence, it is essential that they only pursue objectives that are covered by their mandates and for which they have the appropriate instruments. a special interest - driven expansion of our remits would not be compatible with our independence as enshrined in law. moreover, such an expansion would have no democratic legitimacy and this could sooner or later lead to a restriction of independence. the eth and the snb must limit their activities to those areas for which the legislature granted them independence and the requisite instruments. moreover, if they are to continue fulfilling their statutory mandates, neither institution can allow itself to stand still. on the contrary, they must be highly flexible in order to respond to a rapidly changing environment. this is why the law affords the eth and the snb substantial latitude when it comes to the fulfilment of their tasks. a look at the recent past demonstrates just how important this latitude is : geo