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organizations in the united states - those that our screening criteria determine to be core banks - should be subject to the most sophisticated version of basel ii. to be clear, we are not proposing to implement either the standardized or the foundation internal - ratings - based ( f - irb ) approaches within the united states. the twenty banks that we are assuming will be under basel ii in this country either by, or shortly after, the initial implementation date would account for about 99 percent of the foreign assets held by the top fifty domestic u. s. banking organizations. we believe that this high percentage clearly signals our intent to meet our obligation to ensure cross - border competitive equality of capital regimes. that the same twenty banks also currently account for approximately two - thirds of the domestic assets of u. s. banking organization indicates their importance to our banking and financial system. these entities must operate under the best risk - management standards with the most risk - sensitive capital treatment. we do not intend to require the thousands of other banking organizations in the united states, including u. s. subsidiaries of foreign banks that do not meet the mandatory criteria, to adopt basel ii. unless they choose to adopt basel ii, they will remain under our current regulatory capital rules, which are based on basel i. those banks remaining under basel i will not be subject to an explicit regulatory capital charge for operational risk. to be sure, any of these organizations can choose the basel ii requirements whenever they want, provided they meet the infrastructure prerequisites of the a - irb and the ama approaches to basel ii. we believe that the cost - benefit nexus will make this option infeasible for most of these banks in the years immediately ahead, but ultimately that decision resides with the banks themselves. nonetheless, as the cost of risk - management techniques decline with their wider dissemination and as counter - parties and stakeholders seek the comfort that comes with banks'application of more - sophisticated risk - management techniques, the larger regional banks may wish to migrate from rules based on basel i to those based on basel ii. even if larger regional banks do not formally choose to operate under basel ii for regulatory purposes, we expect they may wish to make use of the risk - management process that underlies basel ii. indeed, i should emphasize that the movement toward more - sophisticated risk management, the prerequisite of a - irb and ama, is occurring, and would continue to occur, independent of basel ii. this movement is clearly a market trend reflective