samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
between 4. 0 and 6. 0 per cent and we remain resolute in this commitment. thank you. i will now take questions. 4 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches

on the flip side, lower productivity means that goods and services will become relatively more expensive over time, which makes it more difficult to reduce inflation. finally, a significant part of the consumer price index ( cpi ) – the'basket'of goods and services that people buy, includes goods and services for which the prices are regulated by the government. these include ppv fares and utilities. in this regard, large and unpredictable regulated price adjustments complicate the job of the central bank in 1 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches containing inflation. bank of jamaica remains committed to pursuing measures to improve the transmission mechanism to facilitate greater and quicker pass - through of policy rate adjustments in the banking system. the correspondence between the minister and the central bank on the inflation target has been published on the bank's website. i will now speak on the mpc's recent decision. monetary policy decision the bank's monetary policy committee ( mpc ) met on the 16th and the 17 th of may and announced the decision yesterday, to maintain : ( i ) the policy interest rate at 7. 0 per cent ; ( ii ) relative stability in the foreign exchange market ; and ( iii ) tight jamaican dollar liquidity conditions. this decision reflects the committee's view that while inflation is continuing its downward trend, it is still not yet firmly anchored within the target range and the risks to future inflation are skewed to the upside. statin reported on wednesday last week that jamaica's annual headline inflation rate at april 2024 was 5. 3 per cent, which is within the bank's target range and lower than the rate recorded at march 2024. the bank is encouraged by this outturn which represented the third consecutive month of lower inflation and the second consecutive month in which annual inflation was within the target range. the april 2024 outturn was also lower than the bank's most recent forecast, mainly due to a faster than projected deceleration in agricultural food inflation. core inflation, which excludes food and fuel prices from the consumer price index, was 5. 7 per cent and although elevated, it was marginally lower than the outturn recorded in march 2024. some of the key drivers of headline inflation, such as international grain prices and inflation expectations continued to decline. inflation in the economies of jamaica's main trading partners has also continued to moderate. however, international oil prices have been volatile. despite the encouraging outturns at march and april, the declining inflation is
payments ’, rba bulletin, march, pp 47 – 56. 6 see becker c, a fang and jc wang ( 2016 ),'developments in the australian repo market ', rba bulletin, september, pp 41 – 46. 7 see stewart c, b robertson and a heath ( 2013 ), ‘ trends in the funding and lending behaviour of australian banks ’, rba research discussion paper no 2013 – 15. 9 / 9 bis central bankers'speeches

and far - reaching elements of deregulation should be done last. in particular, financial deregulation should come last, because, if it did not, the price distortions inherent in a regulated economy would be exacerbated, exaggerated and exploited by a deregulated financial system. but the reality is that deregulation can and should take place when the opportunities are available. carpe diem is the watchword of reformers. this was certainly the case in australia, where financial deregulation preceded other important deregulation – most notably, in the labour market. so there is no simple answer in sequencing. the uncomfortable reality is that much of the “ plumbing ” that needs to be put in place during the process of financial deregulation – in terms of the experience, reputation and institutional structures – takes time to create. waiting for some propitious moment does not solve the problem, because it is largely a process of “ learning by doing ”. but at least if the transition is recognised as tricky, then it may be possible to spread it out over a period to reduce the vulnerability. it might be worth noting that in australia we went through this awkward and vulnerable transition period, with the most obvious manifestation being the “ banana republic ” difficulties in the mid - 1980s. we clearly did not come through this unscathed, but we were lucky that our foreign exchange problems ( which occurred in the mid - 1980s ) did not coincide with our prudential problems ( which occurred in the late - 1980s and early - 1990s ). the two elements – often seen coinciding in the transition – were nicely out of phase for us, and we should be thankful for that. what could be done? in the course of looking at possible changes to the international financial architecture, various ideas have been put forward which, provided they are not seen as panaceas, might help. there are efforts currently underway to obtain more disclosure from hedge funds, and to develop some procedures for “ bailing in ” private - sector creditors. some have suggested that collective action clauses should be built into bonds, and this seems broadly a good idea. other suggestions about private contingent credit lines seem, to me, less likely to contribute much to “ shock - proofing ” the transition, principally because those providing the private - sector contingent credit lines will have an incentive to do offsetting transactions if it seems likely that the contingency will arrive. one helpful change is one of attitude. one problem
attention. i wish you a successful and enjoyable conference. bis central bankers ’ speeches

looking back on the modest scale of the damage and the remarkable effectiveness of the countermeasures adopted, the conclusion was drawn that the evolution of that crisis had confirmed both the advent of the great moderation and the merits of good policy. however, as already observed, there was much debate then, and there still is today, about whether monetary policy should not pay more attention to financial and real asset price trends and to the pro - cyclical growth of credit and leverage, and in some instances respond decisively to seemingly “ excessive ” movements. aside from the difficulty of defining what excessive means in practice, it is certainly useful to examine the factors that determine particularly large swings in these prices, just as it is necessary to shed light on the factors that tend to threaten financial stability and disproportionately amplify cyclical fluctuations. many of these factors probably originate not so much in behaviour as in rules and incentives existing in the markets. in the case, for example, of the mortgage loans that triggered the current crisis due to excessive borrowing, two factors surely played a crucial role : ( 1 ) the assumption that the continuous rise in house prices would lower the amount of debt in relation to the value of the underlying asset over time, and ( 2 ) the possibility of obtaining mortgages with loan - to - value ratios of 100 per cent and more. in these cases, and as has long been acknowledged ( for example, with reference to the sharp rise in house prices in the united kingdom recorded in the early 2000s ), it is obvious that it is necessary to resort not so much to monetary policy but to prudential instruments, with limits on the value of collateral that can be used in taking out a loan. the question is why steps of this kind were not taken, quite apart from the failure to use monetary policy ( naturally as a possible second - best instrument ). in the same way, it is legitimate to wonder whether confidence in the ability of financial markets to regulate themselves was not excessive. what role was played, in particular, by the waiving of stricter supervision in many sectors of financial intermediation? this, even disregarding the strength of lobbies and instances of excessive proximity between the supervisors and the supervised. in any event, it is clear that the consequences of a change of trend in the perception and concentration of risks were seriously underestimated, notwithstanding the many analyses and signals that had become available in recent years. excessive deregulation of the financial sphere
make a significant proportion of their commercial real estate investments through investment funds. on a positive note, we conclude that risks at dutch real estate investment funds seem to be well - managed. this is partly because the redemption frequency of these funds matches the illiquid nature of real estate investments. this concludes my introduction. 2 / 2 bis - central bankers'speeches

risks to pop up elsewhere. and, indeed, since 2008 non - bank financial intermediation, or nbfi, has grown much faster than bank intermediation. it now accounts for about half of all financial assets worldwide. so, whereas in the aftermath of the previous crisis the emphasis was very much on the banks, we now have some catching up to do when it comes to reducing systemic risk in non - bank financial markets. where there is a liquidity mismatch, a complex network of exposures, and potentially sudden price swings, it is key we have buffers, flexibility in regulation and safety valves in the system, to contain systemic risk. financial institutions need buffers to absorb losses and liquidity shocks. regulation needs flexibility in order to allow institutions to use these buffers. and the system needs safety valves, like margining, to prevent too much risk pressure being built up. in july, the financial stability board will publish a consultation report with proposals to improve the resilience of money market funds. this work will also consider the relationship between these funds and short - term funding markets. we need to look in particular at whether investors conceive money market funds as equivalent to deposit accounts. and if so, whether money market funds have the resilience to meet the consequent liquidity demands in the event of severe stress. this work will soon be followed by ongoing efforts focused on other open - end funds, margining and bond market structure, and liquidity. the fsb also continues to advance work to improve ccp resilience and resolvability. maintaining a strong global financial system requires a global approach. here, we have one big advantage. we can fall back on a framework of international cooperation that has been tested and proven to work. the financial stability board has coordinated important financial reforms in the past and will continue to do so in the future. indeed, coordinating the post - covid reform agenda to rebuild financial resilience will be central to its work well into next year. almost ninety years have passed since that american president with dutch ancestral roots first took to the airwaves to reassure the public. yet today the challenge to contain systemic risk and keep the financial system resilient is as important as ever. the policy tools we have at our disposal are now much more powerful. but the complexity and dynamism of the financial sector are also far greater. it ’ s a job that ’ s never done. so let
, through its stability - oriented monetary policy strategy, will stand up to these challenges and be successful in maintaining price stability in the euro area. as i have said on behalf of the governing council of the ecb, we believe that the current monetary policy stance will contribute to achieving our objective of price stability in the medium term and of firm anchoring of medium - to long - term inflation expectations. i thank you for your attention.

the footsteps of the us central bank that reduced interest rates in 2001, he should also quote the fed ’ s emphasis that, given the conditions in the u. s economy, these interest - rate reductions are consistent with price stability ; - and if somebody says that price stability is important and so are growth and employment, he should also explain that if we have more than one target we should employ more than one instrument, and we should not expect to attain all targets using one instrument. partial statements may convey the message that an interest rate reduction is an end to itself, regardless of the consequences, thus increasing skepticism regarding the intention of government policy. but clear statements are not enough. the government should strengthen the ability of the bank of israel to maintain price stability and go on with the reform required to change the structure of the domestic financial markets. the main elements of the reform are well known : - removing the obstacles preventing the creation of a non - bank money market, that will include short - term bills ( makam ), commercial papers, certificates of deposit, repos and various derivatives ; - enhancing the competitive structure of long - term institutional investment, by gradually abolishing the issuance of non - tradable government bonds to pension funds, and reduce concentration in this industry ; - and abolish the remaining controls on foreign currency transactions, including the archaic exchange rate band, thus reaching full convertibility of the shekel. * * * the mission to lead the economy out of the recession is indeed awesome. nevertheless, we should not loose sight of our ultimate destination : durable growth, based on a competitive market, integrated with the world economy and operating based on the same ground rules. such an economy should be also better equipped to deal with poverty reduction and other sensitive social issues.
upon all of our various central banks'experiences in operation of policy. bringing my remarks to a close, let me express my hope that this seminar will contribute to closer cooperation among our central banks, by fostering friendships among us. though your days this week may be full, please spare a few moments to gain a taste of korean culture and enjoy the beauty of the autumn season here. thank you.

choongsoo kim : new role of central bank and regional financial cooperation after the global crisis opening address by mr choongsoo kim, governor of the bank of korea, the 47th seacen governors ’ conference, high - level seminar and the 31st meeting of the seacen board of governors, seoul, 13 february 2012. * * * distinguished governors, ladies and gentlemen, i would like to express my gratitude to all my fellow central bank governors for taking part in the 47th seacen governors ’ conference, high - level seminar and the 31st meeting of the seacen board of governors. my special thanks go to 5 distinguished speakers, mr. pier carlo padoan, deputy secretary - general of oecd, mr. stephen p. groff, vice - president of the adb, professor charles engel from university of wisconsin, mr. hannoun from bis and mr. chia from imf who have come from afar to deliver the keynote addresses. it is a great honor and pleasure for us to be hosting the seacen governors ’ conference in seoul again after 13 years. though i stand before you today as the representative of the bank of korea, i bid you welcome on behalf of all the korean people. in the wake of the global financial crisis, emerging market countries recovered faster than the advanced countries. however, the increasing uncertainties surrounding the world economy since then still pose a threat to the asian economies. at this juncture, we should learn the lessons of the global financial crisis. this means setting the financial infrastructure right and establishing an effective policy response system in order to ward off further crises by speeding up global economic recovery. i think now is the time to change the policy stance and also strategies. global financial resources may have in recent years been directed toward financing of unsustainable financial deficits and debt - ridden countries, and little toward growth and job creation. i believe that redirecting of financial resources more toward growth, and more specifically toward countries with high productivity could yield substantial benefits to all in the long run. this is why i see a greater role for asia going forward. asia overcame the global financial crisis well, and has remained resilient to negative spillover from ongoing crisis in europe. moreover, many expect asia to develop even more into an engine of global economic growth. if we look at the outbreak and spread of the global financial crisis and the policies adopted in response, we can draw many precepts and pointers as to the role
banks will continue to play an important role in our financial system in the years ahead, serving the credit needs of the communities they are a part of and know so well. the federal reserve will continue to promote a stronger and more resilient financial system, while carefully considering the effects of our actions on community banks and tailoring supervision appropriately. thank you. community reinvestment act ( cra ) examination frequency policy ”, consumer affairs letter ca 13 – 20 ( november 18 ), http : / / www. federalreserve. gov / bankinforeg / caletters / caltr1320. htm. bis central bankers ’ speeches

conference in chicago, we have been hearing a range of perspectives not only from academic experts, but also from representatives of consumer, labor, community, business, and other groups. we are drawing on these insights as we assess how best to achieve and maintain maximum employment and price stability. in july, we began discussing topics associated with the review at regularly scheduled fomc meetings. we will continue reporting on our discussions in the minutes of fomc meetings and will share our conclusions with the public when we complete the review later this year. 5 thank you very much for your time and attention. i look forward to the conversation and the question - and - answer session to follow. 1 these remarks represent my own views, which do not necessarily represent those of the federal reserve board or the federal open market committee. i am grateful to brian doyle of the federal reserve board staff for his assistance in preparing this text. 2 the most recent summary of economic projections is an addendum to the minutes of the december 2019 fomc meeting. see board of governors of the federal reserve system ( 2020 ), “ minutes of the federal open market committee, december 10 – 11, 2019, ” press release, january 3. 3 see the statement regarding monetary policy implementation and balance sheet normalization, which is available on the board ’ s website at www. federalreserve. gov / newsevents / pressreleases / monetary20190130c. htm. also see the balance sheet normalization principles and plans, available on the board ’ s website at www. federalreserve. gov / newsevents / pressreleases / monetary20190320c. htm. 4 see the statement regarding monetary policy implementation, which can be found on the board ’ s website at www. federalreserve. gov / newsevents / pressreleases / monetary20191011a. htm. 5 information about the review and the events associated with it is available on the board ’ s website at www. federalreserve. gov / monetarypolicy / review - of - monetary - policy - strategy - tools - and - communications. htm. 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches
andreas dombret : " basel iii - are we done now? " statement by dr andreas dombret, member of the executive board of the deutsche bundesbank, statement by dr andreas dombret, member of the executive board of the deutsche bundesbank, at the institute for law and finance conference on basel iii, frankfurt am main, 29 january 2018. * * * thanks nicolas, it ’ s a great pleasure to contribute to this panel. and, on behalf of the bundesbank, i am happy to see that so many outstanding experts accepted our invitation. please let me start with a confession : i strongly support the basel iii finalisation package – in these times, a global minimum standard is a crucial ( and noteworthy ) success. it contributes to stabilising the global financial system and prevents regulatory arbitrage. when talking about basel iii, many banks or lobbyists may think : “ things are never as bad as they seem. ” of course, they are hoping for of a less strict implementation of the basel standards. but i have to say that i, in their stead, would not cherish these hopes. looking ahead, all basel committee member jurisdictions must do everything in their power to ensure full implementation. but as important as basel iii is, we should not forget what it was made for — and what not. the basel iii standards are, first, minimum standards for, second, internationally active banks. let me say a few words about the first point : since basel standards are minimum standards, a country may decide to set stricter requirements. the second qualification of the basel iii standard is that it is for internationally active banks. as such, jurisdictions are free to apply a different set of rules to smaller, only nationally active banks that pose no threat to international financial stability. in sum, then, we should focus on truly global aspects, like regulating globally active banks, while leaving it to nation states to carry out those tasks that they are better suited to take care of, for example the regulation of locally active banks. in this sense, let ’ s not forget the former governor of the bank of england, mervyn king, who said : “ banks are global in life, but national in death. " to make one thing quite clear : there is no alternative to global standards, but within their implementation, we must not forget that a “ one size fits all ” approach does not always reflect national different banking systems. so, in sum : yes,

inspire you to invent and discover macroprudential mechanisms which policy makers could put to appropriate use in practice. then the year 2012 might, in hindsight, turn out to have been a genuine “ annus mirabilis ”. i wish you all a very successful conference. thank you for your attention. bis central bankers ’ speeches