with systemic risks, there is a lot of merit in taking a closer look at what i would call “ market options ”. to reap the benefits of financial innovation and reduce its risks, we need robust and resilient financial systems and infrastructures. in this respect, concentrating systemic risks in central clearing counterparties for the most important markets ( such as interbank and derivatives markets ) may bring us a long way towards reducing them, provided these ccps are properly regulated. in this respect, i think that locating these infrastructures in the same area as that of the currency they deal in and allowing them access to central bank money are key factors. a last option which is currently gaining some international momentum concerns the possible taxation of financial institutions and activities. in principle, this idea seems quite appealing. however, the diversity of objectives that may be given to such a tax shows that the policy debate must be clarified. in a financial crisis prevention perspective, it is aimed at changing incentives and at forcing financial intermediaries to internalize the risks that their activities generate for the whole system. in a crisis management perspective, it should enable governments to recoup the costs of financial bailouts in a systemic crisis. my main concerns regarding this issue are twofold. my first point concerns the articulation with regulation. the added value of a tax over prudential regulation still remains to be demonstrated for countries, such as france, that have taken advantage of an effective regulatory and supervisory framework and in which public interventions in the financial sector have entailed no net costs to the government. my second point concerns the mitigation of moral hazard. we absolutely have to avoid situations in which the payment of taxes or levies is understood as a de facto bailout policy insurance. in this respect, the allocation of the tax to a resolution fund or to the general budget does not enable public authorities to totally remove such a risk. against this background, i think that an adequate, median way would be to extend the mandate of national deposit guarantee schemes to early intervention tools and resolution powers. moreover, we should build on the experience gained from ex ante risk - sensitive premiums, which seem to be very important for mitigating moral hazard. most of these remarks have focused on the major and vital incentive to enhance financial regulation. let me conclude by looking into the future. a macro - prudential policy framework could provide further room for manoeuvre. indeed, the crisis has illustrated the necessity to

is another illustration of the importance of the terms of trade for economies focused on commodities. after experiencing exceptional growth over the last three years, partly driven by the good performance of cocoa prices, contrary to that of other commodities, activity appears to have slowed down, in the wake of the downturn in prices. the subject is also of major importance for central banks because the challenge here is to find how to implement appropriate counter - cyclical policies in the face of large - scale shocks that monetary policy cannot deal with either on its own or in the long run. in this spirit, i would like to share with you this morning some thoughts on two issues : how important are the terms of trade cycles for the economic and financial situation of the exporting poor countries and their neighbours? and how to mitigate shocks? 1 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches 1. how important are terms of trade shocks for poor and vulnerable countries? to illustrate my point, i will take the example of sub - saharan africa. the super cycle of commodity price growth has coincided with over a decade of strong economic growth in subsaharan africa. the degree of causality between these two developments is the subject of debate. before the cyclical downturn, a large majority of observers emphasised the endogenous nature of african growth and minimised, or even denied, the role of the terms of trade appreciation. however, the current terms of trade shock has led to a reversal of the perception of the african outlook. for oil - exporting countries, the twofold decline in prices between mid - 2014 and early 2016 resulted in large budget and external deficits, calling for a rapid adjustment, due to the weakness or lack of countercyclical leeway. the savings accumulated during the upswing in oil prices proved largely insufficient and the borrowing capacity of the countries concerned remains very limited, although some benefited from debt cancellations under the heavily indebted poor countries initiative. in poor and vulnerable countries where financial development is weak and sovereign indebtedness with the banking sector is predominant, the feedback effects between the deterioration in public accounts and rising debt, on the one hand, and liquidity, or even solvency of the banking system on the other, also foster the propagation and amplification of shocks. the current terms of trade shock thus highlights the excessive dependence of vulnerable and poor countries on commodities. 2. how to mitigate terms of trade shocks? on this subject, it seems essential to distinguish two types