resources available to the countries. admittedly, such a solution takes some time. however, the crucial point is that the announcement of the measures establishes clarity and, in doing so, sets the stage for restoring market confidence. the macroprudential mandate in the context of the present challenges it goes without saying that a fundamental cure of the problem certainly requires extensive consolidation as well as reform measures in the countries concerned. and to prevent such a build - up of imbalances in the future, macroprudential analysis has to monitor and to warn when risks emerge. however, such warnings have to be translated into policies and actions. to facilitate the transition from analysis to remedial action, good macroprudential regulation needs an unambiguous mandate which has to be assigned to an authority. and to make it quite clear : the mandate for macroprudential surveillance encompasses not only the banking system. it is clear that, over time, we also have to consider extending macroprudential policies to insurance companies, to securities and derivatives markets as well as to the infrastructure of the financial system. a crucial point with respect to macroprudential policy is the bias towards inaction : nobody wants to take away the punch bowl in the middle of a party. to act nonetheless, at least bis central bankers ’ speeches operational independence of the macroprudential authority from political and banking sector ’ s influence must be ensured. this independence must, however, be combined with appropriate accountability mechanisms. some countries have already adopted national mandates. for example, the uk concentrates micro - and macroprudential policy at the bank of england. france, in contrast, has established a coordinating body for the central bank and the supervisory agencies, which have been partly reformed but remain independent from each other. it is essential that national structures need to mirror broadly the european setup to ensure consistency. this entails the necessity for coordination between involved bodies or within the designated authority. furthermore, a national mandate has to provide for the possibility of issuing warnings and recommendations, both confidential and public. in general, central banks have extensive knowledge of financial markets and the macro economy and should therefore play a prominent role in macroprudential policy. more specifically, in germany, the bundesbank is well suited to conduct independent, well - founded original research and analyses in order to identify a possible build - up of systemic risk at an early stage as part of an ongoing macroprudential surveillance. for the operational task of applying

private sector. as the euro area financial system is mainly bank - based, our future actions must continue to support bank lending to businesses and households as the recovery evolves. i am therefore in favour of keeping this funding instrument as a liquidity backstop in some form in the future, also to avoid possible cliff effects related to future repayments. however, i think that a careful recalibration of its pricing is required. now that the recovery is well underway, the generous pricing of tltro - lending rates can be up to 50 basis points below the average deposit facility rate since april 2020 - is no longer justified. the present calibration of tltro pricing clearly provides riskless arbitrage opportunities for banks. having said that, i am fully aware of the possibility that the negative interest rates on excess liquidity holdings may affect the profitability of bank intermediation in the long run ( since they are primarily funded by their clients ’ deposits ). i hence strongly advocated the introduction of the two - tier system in 2019, which aims to exempt part of credit institutions'excess liquidity holdings from the cost of the negative deposit facility rate. this has been a success in limiting the negative side effects on bank intermediation of low - for - long interest rates, thereby preserving the transmission of monetary policy. the exemption volume is determined as a multiple of banks'minimum reserve requirements, which is currently set at six. when the two - tier system was introduced, in october 2019, total excess liquidity was just above €1. 7 trillion. as a result of the ecb response to the covid pandemic, this has now jumped to €4. 4 trillion, an amount well above the level of reserves necessary to steer market rates towards the deposit facility rate. this frel - floor required excess liquidity - is currently estimated at about €1 trillion. consequently, i would support a more rule - based approach to set the level of the multiplier, as a function of the change in excess liquidity net of both necessary ( frel ) and borrowed reserves ( tltros ). much more than subsidising liquidity provision beyond exceptional circumstances, a well calibrated tiering system belongs to the normal tools of monetary policy as shown by other jurisdictions. let me conclude. we sometimes read that central banks, including the ecb, are presently squeezed by two dilemmas : the first one on their objectives, as central banks would have either