but we should let slovenia's example inspire us. with the right approach, we can move forward and become more technologically advanced while ensuring everyone can benefit from the gains. and when everyone benefits, europe benefits too. over three - quarters of citizens in slovenia feel attached to europe, and almost two - thirds identify as both slovenian and european – levels that are well above their respective eu averages. 9 conclusion let me conclude. in today's uncertain world, europe must learn " to stand and withstand ". and it can do so by looking to slovenia as an example of how to overcome challenges that come its way. first, we must work hard to sow the seeds of success. and then, as the folk singer vlado kreslin sings, " vse se da " – " everything is possible ". thank you. 1charney, n. ( 2017 ), slovenology : living and traveling in the world's best country, beletrina, p. 40. 2 as argued in jakac - bizjak, v. ( 2003 ), " national library of slovenia ", in drake, m. a. ( editor ), encyclopedia of library and information science, crc press, p. 2080. 3 see the ecb's web page on " slovenia ". 4 slovenia business development agency, " automotive industry – a trusted partner in the european value chain ". 5 republic of slovenia ( 2024 ), " slovenia establishes itself as an electric vehicle manufacturer with the production of electric renault twingo ", 24 july. 6 european commission ( 2024 ), " slovenia : a snapshot of digital skills ", 30 july. 7 see the oecd's web page on " income inequality ". 8 oecd ( 2024 ), " economic surveys : slovenia 2024 ". 3 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches 9 european commission ( 2024 ), " standard eurobarometer 101 - spring 2024 ". 4 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches

, coupled with the provision that medium - term objectives do not necessarily have to be reached within the horizon of a country ’ s stability programme. in sum, the preventive arm of the pact, as recently revised, provides a useful framework for surveillance and benchmarking of sound fiscal policies and the reform might strengthen the pertinent provisions. however, if it is implemented in a minimalist fashion, the required adjustment and fiscal policy paths may not be consistent with determined consolidation, sufficient safety margins and adequate debt reduction. as regards the corrective arm, it should be recalled that the original sgp aimed to strike a balance between the quasi - automatic application of the excessive deficit procedure and the inherent room for discretion in the procedures and in the role of the ecofin council. this combination of automaticity and discretion was intended to deter ( and, if necessary, ensure the prompt correction of ) excessive deficits. and this, in the opinion of the ecb, would anchor expectations of fiscal discipline in emu. the reform of the sgp ’ s corrective arm makes decisions on the existence of excessive deficits and on the setting of deadlines for correcting them less automatic and more explicitly conditional on discretion in the assessments of the underlying economic and budgetary situations. the reform even relaxes certain rules. for example, the softening of the exceptional circumstances clauses and the list of other relevant factors are indicative of the increased discretion and potential relaxation of fiscal discipline. it can, of course, be argued that this enhanced flexibility in assessing the existence and correction of deficits by itself does not impose a looser application of the procedure compared with what was done in the recent past. yet it can facilitate a more lax implementation, which could imply higher and more protracted deficits for a member country and the euro area as a whole. this is a cause for serious concern. ii. implications for the interaction of fiscal and monetary policy the second set of questions i would like to address is as follows : what are the implications of the sgp reform for the interaction of fiscal and monetary policy? and what role should the european central bank play in this context? given the impact of fiscal policies on key macroeconomic variables, it goes without saying that fiscal policies can have significant implications for monetary policy. indeed, the danger that unfettered fiscal policies could create tensions in emu and undermine macroeconomic stability, in general, and monetary policy, in particular, is the raison d ’ etre for the sg