samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
more normal long term equilibrium level. given our economy ’ s heavy dependence on oil and gas, a sharp fall in prices will affect government revenue and could require a drastic cutback in government spending. by putting aside some resources for stabilization, the government would have the ability to cushion the impact on its spending and consequently on the level of economic activity. the rationale for setting up a savings fund is a bit more complex and incorporates both economic and ethical considerations. it says that natural resources are an exhaustible sovereign asset, the benefits of which should be spread over generations. and therefore what a savings fund does is to transform the assets under the ground ( in our case oil and gas ) into a diversified portfolio of financial assets, which are managed so as to yield a high rate of return, which will flow back into the budget as revenue – not now — but when the oil resources have dwindled or have run out. thus, future generations will be benefiting from the oil resources ( not in cash transfers ), but by not having to face expenditure cutbacks because the oil and gas resources would have been depleted. future generations will thus be enjoying the benefits of oil and gas resources even when the oil and gas resources are gone. the flow of investment income from a commodity fund can go on for a very long time after the oil resources are gone, if you have built up sufficient assets and if the country ’ s fiscal position is sustainable over the long term. a recent study done by the imf suggests that, given the expected trend in oil prices over the next two decades, the hsf could possibly build up assets of up to us $ 40 billion by 2020, if we could move to a non - energy fiscal deficit of 10 per cent of gdp ( we are currently at 15 per cent of gdp ). and this is a fairly conservative scenario since it assumes a rate of return on investment of 4 percent in real terms – which is considered average for sovereign funds. the hsf act approved by parliament in march of this year, is very much consistent with best practice legislation for sovereign wealth funds. the legislation provides for clear deposit and withdrawal rules ; a governance structure that incorporates checks and balances and a number of provisions to ensure adequate transparency and accountability. in terms of the basic deposit and withdrawal rules, the act provides : • that on the deposit side, a minimum of 60 per cent of the excess between actual and budgeted revenues must be credited to the fund ( where actual revenues are based on

central bank ’ s fund ; it is the country ’ s fund – for you and for your children and perhaps for your children ’ s children. in addition to ensuring that the purpose and the operations of the fund are well understood, it is important that the public feels social ownership for the fund as this will foster vigilance and ensure accountability, transparency and compliance. in the final analysis, this is a precondition for the fund ’ s success.
capital plan, and stress test rules ( pdf ), 83 fed. reg. 18, 160 ( april 25, 2018 ). return to text 3 the capital planning evaluation remains as part of the normal supervisory process for these firms. return to text 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches

* and long - run expected inflation. to be sure, financial market signals are noisy, and day - to - day movements in asset prices are unlikely to tell us much about the cyclical or structural position of the economy, let alone r * and expected inflation. however, persistent shifts in financial market conditions can be informative. signals derived from financial market data, when combined with signals revealed from surveys of households and firms along with the filtered estimates from econometric models, can together provide valuable and reasonably robust foundations for real - time inference about the direction of travel in r * and expected inflation. for example, a “ straight read ” of interest rate futures prices provides one source of high - frequency information about the destination for the federal funds rate expected by market participants. the destination for the federal funds rate implied by a straight read of futures prices is in turn the sum of the market - implied r * plus market - implied expected inflation. but these signals from interest rate futures are only a pure measure of the - 5expected policy rate path under the assumption of a zero risk premium. for this reason, it is useful to compare policy rate paths derived from market prices with the path obtained from surveys of market participants, which, while subject to measurement error, should not be contaminated with a term premium. market - and survey - based estimates of the policy rate path are often highly correlated. but when there is a divergence between the path or destination for the policy rate implied by the surveys and a straight read of interest rate derivatives prices, i place at least as much weight on the survey evidence — for example, derived from the surveys of primary dealers and market participants conducted by the federal reserve bank of new york — as i do on the estimates obtained from market prices. finally, as another reality check, i, of course, always consult the latest estimate of r * produced by the laubach and williams ( 2003 ) unobservable components state - space model, which, i should point out, includes no information on asset prices other than the short - term nominal interest rate itself. 6 quotes from the treasury inflation - protected securities ( tips ) market can provide valuable information about both r * and expected inflation. tips market data, together with nominal treasury yields, can be used to construct measures of “ breakeven inflation ” or inflation compensation that provide a noisy signal of market expectations of future inflation. but, again, a straight read of breakeven inflation based on tips curve forward real
systemically important markets? and for further details on the new bank start - up unit, see : http : / / www. bankofengland. co. uk / pra / nbsu / pages / default. aspx for further detail on the work of our fintech accelerator see : http : / / www. bankofengland. co. uk / pages / fintech / default. aspx systemic risks associated with credit intermediation including maturity transformation, leverage and liquidity mismatch should be regulated consistently regardless of the delivery mechanism. all speeches are available online at www. bankofengland. co. uk / speeches - what could be the implications for the level of cyber and operational risks faced by regulated firms and the financial system as a whole? to illustrate some of the issues, consider how fintech is affecting the financial services value chain ( figure 1 ). figure 1 : financial services value chain at present, the most significant changes are taking place at the front - end, where innovative payment service providers ( psps ) are providing new user interfaces for domestic retail and cross - border payment services through digital wallets or pre - funded emoney. other aspects of the customer relationships are being opened up. for example, aggregators are providing customers with ready access to price comparison and switching services. this will increase further when aggregators gain access to banks ’ application programme interfaces ( apis ). these new entrants are capturing potentially invaluable customer data which can be used to target non - bank products and services. for example, more than 80 % of incumbent financial institutions thought their customers were already using fintech companies to make payments whilst nearly 70 % thought they were doing the same for fund transfer and around 60 % for personal finance. only 50 % thought their customers were doing so for traditional deposits and savings. see pwc “ global fintech report ” ( 2017 ). the second payment services directive ( psd2 ) will allow, conditional fca authorisation and customer authority, non - banks to access customers ’ bank account data. in the uk, the competition and markets authority has required that the uk ’ s nine largest banks adopt an open banking standard for apis by early 2018. all speeches are available online at www. bankofengland. co. uk / speeches in their current form, these innovations are simply a new front - end to the banking system where fintech providers take a slice of customer revenue and loyalty

##land. co. uk / speeches
strengthening oversight and regulation of shadow banking ; a policy framework for addressing shadow banking risks in securities lending and repos ( pdf ) ( basel : financial stability board, november ) ; and financial stability board ( 2013 ), strengthening oversight and regulation of shadow banking : policy framework for addressing shadow banking risks in securities lending and repos ( pdf ) ( basel : financial stability board, august ). bis central bankers ’ speeches which a difficult tradeoff between financial stability considerations and near - term growth or price stability aims will need to be made. bis central bankers ’ speeches

speech date : 12 / 04 / 21 speaker : deputy governor henry ohlsson venue : lo sveriges riksbank se - 103 37 stockholm ( brunkebergstorg 11 ) tel + 46 8 787 00 00 fax + 46 8 21 05 31 registratorn @ riksbank. se www. riksbank. se hidden wealth * expansionary monetary policy causes asset prices to rise and thereby makes those who own assets wealthier. but this wealth is unevenly distributed among households, and therefore the income from it ( capital income ) will also be unevenly distributed. expansionary monetary policy can thus lead to more uneven capital income. at the same time, unemployment decreases when monetary policy is expansionary. this makes labour income more even than it otherwise would have been. as the effects on capital income and labour income counteract each other, it is unclear what effect the expansionary policy has on income distribution in total. but this does not stop higher asset prices leading to more uneven wealth distribution. in this speech, i will highlight a phenomenon that can mitigate this effect. i will start with an example that illustrates what i mean by hidden wealth. the norwegian oil fund is one of the world ’ s largest funds. in 2019, the value of the fund was 285 per cent of norway ’ s nominal gdp. norway's revenue from oil operations are added to the fund and the assets are then invested abroad. the nominal return has been a good 6 per cent a year on average since the fund started in 1996. every year, the norwegian state may utilise the fund ’ s average real return. the real return is assumed to be 3 per cent per year on average. about 20 per cent of the norwegian government budget is currently financed via the oil fund. but who owns the oil fund ’ s wealth? and who receives the return on the oil fund ’ s wealth? the direct answer is the norwegian state. indirectly, however, it is the norwegian tax - payer who owns the oil fund ’ s wealth and benefits from it. however, this is not wealth created as a result of the decisions of private individuals to buy assets of different kinds, which can then rise in value. the decisions to create the oil fund and on how it is to be managed have been political – the wealth of the fund is collective in nature. neither can norwegians sell their “ shares ” in the oil fund. * i would like to thank iida hakki
consumer spending should also be supported by an improvement in labour market conditions. these considerations underpin our confidence in a continuation of the economic recovery, an expectation which is mirrored by available forecasts and projections. it is also in line with financial market developments over the past few weeks. obviously, any forward - looking assessment is subject to risks and uncertainties. on the external side, the adverse terms - of - trade effects of recent rises in oil and other commodity prices pose risks at shorter horizons, while the persistence of global imbalances implies some uncertainties over the medium term. on the domestic side, uncertainties surrounding fiscal policy and structural reforms in some euro area countries seem to have contributed to preventing a more vigorous improvement in consumer confidence. a continued commitment to and greater clarity about the content and timing of these crucial reforms, supported by a better understanding of their necessity and benefits for all citizens, would help to resolve this uncertainty and thereby mitigate the associated risks for the euro area economy. turning to price developments, annual hicp inflation rates will exhibit some short - term volatility over the coming months, as we already indicated on the occasion of previous meetings of the governing council. according to eurostat ’ s flash estimate, annual hicp inflation was 2. 0 % in april, after 1. 7 % in march. while no detailed information is available as yet, the recent rise in annual inflation rates is likely to mainly reflect a strong base effect in the energy component resulting from the marked decline of oil prices a year ago. moreover, recent oil price increases have exerted additional upward pressure. as these factors will also play a role in the next few months, inflation rates of 2 % or somewhat above are possible over the short term. despite these recent, less positive developments, over longer horizons we expect inflation rates to remain in line with price stability. in particular, wage developments should remain moderate. the latest data on wage growth in the fourth quarter of 2003 lend support to this view. our outlook for price developments is in line with available forecasts and projections. however, at the current juncture, the increase in commodity prices in general, and oil prices in particular, may pose an upside risk to price stability. it will therefore remain important to pay close attention to inflation expectations. moving on to the monetary analysis, annual m3 growth has moderated only slowly since the summer of 2003. while there is evidence of continued portfolio shifts out of m3 into longer - term assets, the pace of this adjustment

off - with higher growth and more jobs - if and when the reforms of the lisbon agenda are delivered. we are now at your disposal for questions.
##ing inflation expectations, credibility helps to reduce uncertainty about future developments and to stabilise the economy. this makes the economic agents understand more easily the interest rate decisions in the short term and the central bank reaction function in the long - term.

the past year was indeed intended to break a self - sustaining inflationary psychology. households ’ and firms ’ inflation expectations have peaked, supporting this assessment. our latest monthly business survey, released a week ago v, shows that business page 8 sur 13 leaders are adapting their selling prices accordingly. for the first time in august, the share of industrial firms that have decreased their selling prices ( 6 % ) is larger than the share of firms that have increased them ( 4 % ). … but risks to be rightly assessed however, the criticism that we have done too much misses two points in my opinion. it somewhat overestimates the risks to growth : what we presently see – and forecast – is a slowdown, not a recession ; and employment remains at record highs, which is a positive surprise. and it underestimates the persistence of inflation. headline inflation has indeed come down rapidly. but regarding underlying inflation, the news is less clear - cut. the hicpx rose to 5. 7 % in march this year but fell back to 5. 3 % in august. in the eurosystem, we look at a battery of indicators and those that try to identify instant inflation are lower than this, below 3 % ; they all point in the right direction. nevertheless, annual nominal wage growth remains sustained, although showing early signs of peaking : it is page 9 sur 13 forecasted to reach in average 5. 3 % in the euro area in 2023, and 4. 3 % and 3. 8 % respectively in 2024 and 2025. furthermore, some commentators talk about “ the difficulty of the last mile ” in the return of inflation back to the 2 % target. however, this phrase supposes nonlinearities in the phillips curve, which have not been really identified in the european case. and some suggest that as a result we should accept that “ nearenough ”, say 3 %, is close enough to target rather than set a much tighter policy in the pursuit of 2 %. i am not fixated on 2. 0 % to the nearest decimal place, but i do believe that it would be very counterproductive to change or relax our inflation target, either explicitly or implicitly. one lesson about the future just like the criticism about the past, this unwarranted criticism can nevertheless serve a useful lesson. the risk is not that we have already done too much. it is possibly that we could do too much in the future. let me elaborate
tarisa watanagase : dealing with volatile capital flows welcome address by dr tarisa watanagase, governor of the bank of thailand, at the 42nd seacen governors ’ conference, bangkok, 28 july 2007. * * * your excellency minister of finance, mr. rodrigo de rato, mr. herve hannoun, fellow governors, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, i would like to begin by extending a very warm welcome to all of you to bangkok. we are pleased to host the 42nd seacen governors ’ conference and the 26th meeting of seacen board of governors here in bangkok. i would also like to express my sincere appreciation to his excellency chalongphob sussangkarn, finance minister of thailand, for his presence here to officially open the conference. this year ’ s theme on “ living with volatilities : is seacen prepared for rising fluctuations in exchange rate and capital flows? ” comes at an opportune moment, given a recent volatile and uncertain market conditions. this volatility has posed challenges to central banks in maintaining monetary and financial stability. let me share with you some of my views on this very important issue. it is traditionally believed that emerging markets are subject to more volatile capital flows than developed countries due to underdevelopment of our financial markets and weak institutions. thus, putting in place a more flexible exchange rate policy, credible monetary policy and sound domestic financial system could help emerging markets reduce the volatility of capital flows as well as its negative effect on the economic stability. the asian financial crisis in 1997 taught us a number of painful lessons from volatile capital flows associated with such weak institutions. since then, we have seen a large number of developing countries moving towards flexible exchange rate regime, adopting inflationtargeting framework, and improving the resilience of financial system. yet, the challenges from volatile capital flows have become more intensified and we still see the implications of volatile capital flows on our economies. we are, therefore, very fortunate to have with us mr. rodrigo de rato, managing director of the imf, and mr. herve hannoun, deputy general manager of the bis, to share their views and insight on this issue. i believe that we can greatly benefit from the imf ’ s new surveillance framework, which put greater emphasis on the volatile financial market, as well as from the bis expertise on analysis of capital flows during the morning session. i am certain that

country. domestically, it is imperative that the new financial institutions law be enacted to give us the necessary power to implement, among other things, the all - important consolidated supervision and prompt corrective action over financial institutions. finally, i would like to thank you all for participating in this workshop, especially those of you who have contributed to the self - assessment exercise that has already been in progress. your continued cooperation and support will certainly be much needed in the months and years ahead. i wish you all an interesting and useful workshop. thank you very much.
the greatest extent possible, does not distort or stifle the meaningful functioning of our markets. we must remember that the same price signals that are so critical for the allocative process in the short run also signal profit opportunities for long - term supply expansion. moreover, they stimulate the research and development that will unlock new approaches to energy production and use that we can now only scarcely envision. i look forward to a future that is bright in more ways than one.

of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in the main macroeconomic models. financial sector developments did not seem to affect this mechanism, because financial intermediation was assumed to be fully efficient. and generally, the interest rates faced by households and businesses typically moved in line with movements in central bank policy rates. true, there were some models that incorporated financial frictions into macroeconomics. 4 central banks themselves were also aware of the role of monetary and financial markets in the monetary policy transmission mechanism. the first eurosystem research network at the ecb studied the so - called bank lending channel, which maintains that banks play a crucial role in the transmission of monetary policy. but the impact of financial frictions was generally estimated to be small in developed countries and these frictions were therefore absent from the canonical models used for monetary policy analysis. financial economists of course studied banks and financial markets much more closely, but they used predominantly partial equilibrium models and showed less interest in the way the financial system interacted with the wider economy. in fact, the pre - crisis paradigm in macroeconomics predicted neither the onset nor the severity of the crisis in any meaningful fashion for the conduct of policy. unconditional trust in the selfrepairing capacities of financial markets, or simple neglect, had led to deregulation and lax supervision in the years preceding the crisis. low quality capital with little loss - absorbing capacity, underestimation of asset risk, excessive and overlooked leverage, ignorance of the interconnections, disregard for the liquidity buffers, low resilience of the funding markets, and pervasive fraud, especially in the sub - prime sector were just a few of the factors that produced the most severe financial crisis since the great depression. the evolution of the financial and sovereign debt crises as the crisis unfolded, the interbank funding market dried up and credit availability contracted sharply. annual credit growth to the private sector fell from 9. 3 % in 2007 q4 to – 2. 1 % in 2009 q3 in the united states and from 8. 5 % to 0. 7 % in the euro area over the same period. the effect on economic activity was sudden and significant. between 2008 q3 and 2009 q2, gdp declined by 2 / 7 bis central bankers'speeches 3. 6 % in the united states and by 4. 9 % in the euro area. though the initial effect of credit contraction was similar in the united states and the european union ( eu ), its propagation