me say in conclusion that i consider it essential to preserve, consolidate and reinforce the remarkable unity demonstrated by the international community in the crisis period. we were able to agree on the following major points. first, there was the consensus on the need to increase participation in the informal global governance framework to include all systemic emerging economies. this was illustrated by the g7 passing the baton to the g20 as the primary forum for global economic governance. second, there was consensus – spanning both emerging and advanced economies – in confirming, at the very moment the crisis was unfolding, that market economy rules are the most effective and efficient means to create prosperous economies and societies. third, there was consensus on working together to reinforce rules, regulations and standards in the financial sector with a view to decisively strengthening its resilience and improving the coordination of fiscal and structural policies within a framework for strong, stable and sustainable growth. this was no time for complacency. the unity of the international community made a difference. we avoided a depression, and the recovery began in the second half of 2009. this is still no time for complacency. what we need today is not “ wars ” of any kind, but a strong and renewed commitment to confident and resolute cooperation. together we must say “ no ” to protectionism and “ no ” to beggar - thy - neighbour policies. the international community can and must continue to make a difference by being united and showing a strong sense of medium and long - term direction. i thank you for your attention.

products and for asset - backed commercial paper to european money markets, how did the ecb react? the liquidity squeeze in the interbank money markets that was observed in early august 2007 was triggered by the larger - than - expected funding liquidity needs, or perceived needs, of some banks, while at the same time those financial institutions that had liquidity balances tended to hoard them because of uncertainty about their future liquidity position and increased counterparty risk. in the face of these information asymmetries and heightened uncertainty, the normal functioning of the euro money market was severely impaired. the ecb therefore stepped in and addressed these tensions, initially by launching a series of overnight fine - tuning operations, and subsequently by taking four specific measures to ensure that very short term money market rates remained close to the ecb ’ s policy rate and to contain upward pressures in the longer - term money market. first, the ecb shifted the time pattern of liquidity provision through its main refinancing operations in the interbank money market by providing more liquidity at the beginning of the reserve maintenance period and less towards the end of the period. this “ frontloading ” led to more balanced liquidity conditions and helped to keep very short - term rates close to the key policy rate, without changing the overall amount of liquidity provided. second, responding to banks ’ greater preference for assuring the fulfilment of their liquidity needs on a longer - term basis, the ecb increased the share of refinancing provided via three - month longer - term refinancing operations and reduced the share provided via the one - week main refinancing operations. again, the total amount of outstanding refinancing remained unchanged ; however, the average maturity was extended. third, the ecb undertook a number of specific measures designed to address expected money market tensions around the year - end. and fourth, to ensure the availability of funding denominated in us dollars, the ecb joined a concerted action with other central banks, notably the federal reserve system in december 2007, the aim of which was to improve global funding conditions. it may be useful to clarify that the eurosystem requires adequate collateral from its counterparties for its credit operations. adequate collateral in this context has two dimensions : first, the eurosystem should be protected from incurring losses in its credit operations. second, sufficient collateral should be available to counterparties, so that the eurosystem