, a non - risk based measure – the leverage ratio – has been introduced. on the liquidity framework, two key ratios have been put in place to enhance liquidity buffers in short and longer - term horizons, with the aim of reducing funding vulnerabilities and increase overall resilience to liquidity drains. here, we should bear in mind that, to a large extent, underlying the new regulatory framework is a better understanding of the concept and measurement of systemic risk, reflected in relatively simple and operational measures to address it. the aim is to have better regulation as a result of the combination of micro - prudential and macro - prudential perspectives, rather than more regulation per se. without pretending to be exhaustive, let me just refer to private sector initiatives which will also contribute to the overall soundness of the financial system. these comprise initiatives in the area of financial market infrastructure, such as the establishment of central counterparties for over - the - counter ( otc ) derivatives clearance. sound market infrastructures with appropriate risk management frameworks should mitigate counterparty risk and contribute to restoring trust in the financial system in the years ahead. the role of the financial sector in constructing a more stable financial system is also critical with respect to disclosure. more disclosure in firms ’ financial reporting and better quality of publicly available firm - level data should enable a better assessment of counterparty risk and for contagion via direct and indirect channels. for macro - prudential analysis, enhanced disclosure will allow a better understanding and measurement of where systemic risk might be via the construction of more accurate indicators of aggregate leverage, correlation and concentration of exposures to specific asset classes and of a firm ’ s level of interconnectedness, for example. furthermore, for financial market players, better quality of information on a counterparty ’ s financial condition should also contribute to enhancing in - house stress testing and strengthen firms ’ risk management systems. this could enable financial institutions to improve their forward - looking capacity in decision - making, resulting in them taking corrective measures with sufficient lead time and being more resilient to market tensions should they arise. concluding remarks the financial sector has an important stake in a stable financial system and therefore in a well - functioning macro - prudential oversight and policy framework. in my remarks today, i have referred to the main areas in which the ecb and the central banking community are investing in order to operationalise the new macro - prudential oversight function entrusted to the

a false sense of omnipotence. listen to your hearts and conscience. always keep in mind that economics is a social science. models will not take away the burden and responsibility of making judgements. economics involves much trial and error – you have to take decisions in the fog when you can barely see your hand in front of your face. this makes our profession exciting! with this in mind, i wish you the best of luck. thank you. [ 1 ] source : national science foundation. [ 2 ] see casey, b. ( 2009 ), “ the economic contribution of phds ”, journal of higher education policy and management, vol. 31 ( 3 ). [ 3 ] graber, d. ( 2018 ), bullshit jobs : a theory, simon & schuster. [ 4 ] see clarida, r., gali, j. and gertler, m. ( 1999 ), “ the science of monetary policy : a new keynesian perspective ”, journal of economic literature, vol. 37, no. 4, pp. 1661 - 1707. [ 5 ] see, for example, hartmann, p. and smets, f. ( 2019 ), “ the first twenty years of the european central bank : monetary policy ”, working paper series, no. 2219, ecb. [ 6 ] see banerjee, a. and duflo, e. ( 2019 ), good economics for hard times, publicaffairs, chapter2. [ 7 ] robinson, j. ( 1955 ), “ marx, marshall and keynes ”, delhi school of economics occasional paper, no. 9. [ 8 ] for a discussion of the limits of knowledge and representation in policymaking, see benassy - quere, a., cœure, b., jacquet, p. and pisani - ferry, j. ( 2018 ), economic policy : theory and practice, second edition, oxford university press, chapter 2. [ 9 ] see cœure, b. ( 2017 ), “ scars or scratches? hysteresis in the euro area ”, speech at the international center for monetary and banking studies, geneva, 19 may. [ 10 ] see, for example, lane, ph. ( 2019 ), “ the philips curve at the ecb ”, 50th anniversary conference of the money, macro and finance research group, london school of economics, 4 september. [ 11 ] see blanchard