- all solution will probably not be reached, given the country - specific financial conditions and institutional arrangements. however, this does not necessarily exclude looking into the arguments for or against either alternative. as i already said, i believe that it is better to have supervision integrated in the central bank. first of all, the ongoing complex challenges to financial and economic stability call for identifying, using and corroborating tons of information in order to articulate the adequate policies. the central bank relies on its database and expertise, which are prerequisites for managing such a challenging environment. beyond this major advantage, there are also other benefits of such an institutional arrangement. independence from political influence is essential for effective supervision. and central banks are institutions enjoying a high level of independence that a newly - established government agency would not be able to gain, at least in the short run. besides, clearly acknowledging the links between price stability and financial stability means that they need to be taken into account when formulating the monetary policy. moreover, as benoit cœure pointed out, data collected and analyses conducted as part of banking supervision provide valuable information about the financial sector and may feed into the assessment of the state of the economy, being useful for the monetary policy decision - making process. of course, literature identifies some disadvantages of integrating supervision in the central bank. the risk of this arrangement resulting in a too loose monetary policy, due to the conflicting objectives, which i have already referred to, is an important drawback. however, as beck and gros stressed in an article from 2012, with the rise of macro - prudential regulation as an additional tool, it is not clear whether price and financial stability still conflict with each other. bis central bankers ’ speeches another disadvantage is that the reputation and / or the independence of the central bank might be undermined : if its decisions and actions in the area of supervision and resolution are perceived as wrong or suboptimal, this may negatively affect the credibility of the monetary policy, as it is conducted by the same institution. moreover, the temptation of politicians to capture the central bank may rise, as it has much more power than in the case when its only mission is to deliver price stability. the various arrangements on assigning banking supervision also have a bearing on the design of the national macroprudential authority. depending mainly on who conducts the supervision of banks, different institutional solutions are adequate for this authority : it may be represented by a committee or board comprising representatives of

). increasing access to finance in this sector is among the eu priorities. it is also true that this portfolio accounted for the highest post - crisis npl ratio in the european union. at its peak, the average npl ratio for small and medium enterprises reached around 20 percent at european union level. in romania, the ratio was 35 percent, while the npl ratio for microenterprises accounted for 53 percent. therefore, the same lesson learnt from the household sector also applies here : the small and medium enterpises ’ financial inclusion should unfold in a sustainable way. on the other hand, the experience with macroprudential instruments for companies is extremely limited at the european level. for example, france has recently implemented a measure focusing on highly indebted firms, but it applies only to large companies. therefore, i think that deepening this area of research is very useful for macroprudential policymakers. in romania we have also tried to come up with solutions that might improve small and medium enterprises ’ financial inclusion. our macroprudential authority – the national committee for macroprudential oversight, comprising representatives from the central bank, the ministry of public finance, and the financial supervisory authority – adopted last year a recommendation to the government, seeking to improve financial discipline in the economy and the financial soundness of firms. i strongly believe that addressing these structural vulnerabilities in the corporate sector will significantly increase the number of bankable firms and enhance the financial inclusion of small and medium enterprises. last, but not least, the climate - related topics have become more and more prominent worldwide. the financial system should not ignore the effects of climate risks. central banks and supervisory authorities have joined the scene. there is a significant interest at eu level in the role of sustainable finance, a high - level expert group on sustainable finance being established by the union. the network for greening the financial system, that brings together 34 members, out of which 8 are central banks and supervisory authorities, highlighted the role of climate risks as a source of financial vulnerabilities. not only the increased frequency and severity of extreme weather can translate into economic and financial losses for the real economy and the financial system, but consequences can also arise from transitioning to a low - carbon economy. governments ’ climate policy, new technologies and consumer preferences will be the main drivers influencing the developments in carbon - intensive sectors. having in mind the important ramifications, a coherent policy mix is needed in order to