new debate. debate on whether policyholders should pay for the mistakes insurers make. debate on which insurers should fall under the regime. and debate on whether a national framework threatens the level playing field. today, i want to give you a bit more insight into how the dutch recovery and resolution regime for insurers works. those of you familiar with the brrd – the bank recovery and resolution directive – might recognize some of these resolution tools and practices. however, practical implementation for insurers can sometimes be very different than for banks. i ’ d like to focus on three features in particular : ‐ the resolution toolkit ‐ the public interest test ‐ and governance under the new regime. these three aspects should provide a good overview of the new regime, and how it works. if you would like me to clarify any points during this presentation, feel free to ask. but if you have more general questions, please save them until the end. there will be plenty of time for discussion afterwards. part i : the dutch resolution toolkit so let ’ s first look at a couple of items in our resolution toolkit. some of the resolution instruments are not new to dnb, as they were also part of our previous regime. however, they may have gone under a different name. or their use may have been subject to more limitations. resolution instruments the four resolution instruments are basically the same as in the brrd : bail ‐ in, sale of business, bridge institution and asset separation. with a bail ‐ in, we can write down or convert equity or debt, or restructure insurance policies. this instrument is not completely new, as dnb could already change insurance contracts and pass losses on to shareholders. but there are some differences. for instance, in the past we were only able to change insurance contracts in combination with a portfolio transfer. the new act makes it possible to change insurance contracts within an insurer. another difference is that an ex ‐ ante judicial review is no longer needed before we can use resolution instruments. as of next year, dnb can use resolution instruments without court permission. a bail ‐ in can be a controversial instrument, especially when it is possible to bail ‐ in policyholders. there is one important point to remember here though. and that is, it is only possible to use a resolution instrument when no creditor will be worse off than in insolvency. with a bail ‐ in, the insurance product can be continued, so policy

needs an increased'risk consciousness'and to build up its resources to monitor and mitigate all kinds of financial risk. the fsb's proposals, along with the work undertaken by the standard - setting bodies ( ssbs ), should provide a foundation for greater consistency and cooperation among authorities in the regulation and supervision of crypto - asset activities and markets. until 15 december 2022, the fsb is soliciting comments on its published recommendations. and i encourage you to participate in this public consultation. we want to hear from you, because we want our policy proposals to be as effective and efficient as possible. as you can see, it takes time to develop a regulatory and supervisory approach. but it is not new for regulators and supervisors to have to deal with regulatory catch - up. this is inherent to a landscape that supports financial innovation. nevertheless, the speed of developments in the crypto eco - system, including the recent market turmoil, has given us all the more reason to develop an appropriate and globally consistent regulatory framework. catching up with the rapidly changing environment is therefore our highest priority. a catch - up that strengthens the stability of the financial system. a catch - up that strongly underpins the public's trust in a system that has developed and evolved over many centuries. the bank of amsterdam offers an inspiring example of how financial innovations can advance an economy – and of how things can turn out badly. it is the fsb's goal to learn from the past – and to stimulate innovations that improve the global financial system, while also advancing and protecting its stability. crucial in this regard, is adequate regulation, and supervision, of governance, risk management, and 4 / 5 bis - central bankers'speeches transparency. these are quintessential elements of a well - functioning financial system that passes the litmus test of the public's trust. i trust you are with me on this. thank you. 1 the full history of the bank of amsterdam, and the lessons it carries for the governance of digital money, has been described by jon frost ( bis ), hyun song shin ( bis ) and peter wierts ( dnb ) in a bis working paper ( no. 902 ) : an early stablecoin? the bank of amsterdam and the governance of money 2 i have to credit carmen m. reinhart and kenneth s. rogoff with popularizing this phrase. in their seminal work – " this time is different " ( 2009, princeton university