barry whiteside : risk focused supervision address by mr barry whiteside, governor of the reserve bank of fiji, at the apecfrti workshop on “ risk focused supervision ”, nadi, 18 november 2013. * * * dr sungbok lee – apec frti / ksp secretariat ms sue jefferey – apec frti / ksp secretariat distinguished resource persons workshop participants ladies and gentlemen introductory comments good morning and bula vinaka. i am delighted to be asked to deliver the welcome address and open this very important workshop organised by the apec financial regulators training initiative ( frti ) in conjunction with the knowledge sharing programme of the republic of korea ( ksp ). i might add that the reserve bank of fiji is also honoured to host this event and showcase our country to our visitors. let me take this opportunity to extend to you, and especially to our foreign guests, a warm fijian welcome to this workshop, which is being held at this famous tourist destination of denarau island. i am informed that apart from the resource persons who are from korea, the philippines and australia, we have assembled with us participants from as far away as mongolia and zambia. we don ’ t often have visitors from these parts of the world, so let me say a warm welcome to gaadulam, said and joseph! indeed i see this gathering as an opportunity for great cultural exchanges, in addition to the specialised knowledge and skills you will be acquiring. importance of the workshop ladies and gentlemen, there could not have been a better time for this workshop than now, given the strategic importance of financial stability to the overall performance of our economies. risk - based or risk - focused supervision is a subject area which continues to receive the attention of supervisory authorities worldwide. the international banking scene has, in recent years, witnessed strong trends towards globalization and consolidation of financial systems. stability of our respective financial systems has become the central challenge to bank regulators and supervisors throughout the world. the multi - lateral initiatives leading to the evolution of international standards and codes, and evaluation of our compliance to these standards and codes, represent solid attempts to address this challenge. the key objective of prudential supervision is to maintain stability and confidence in the financial system in our jurisdictions, thereby reducing the risk of loss to depositors and other creditors. in addition, supervision is also directed towards verifying compliance with laws and regulations governing financial institutions and their activities. we cannot deny that the growing diversities and complexities of banking business

philipp hildebrand : the independence of the swiss national bank speech by mr philipp hildebrand, chairman of the governing board of the swiss national bank, at avenir suisse, zurich, 21 june 2011. * * * the speaker would like to thank peter kuster for his support in preparing this paper. in addition, his thanks go to rita kobel rohr for her helpful comments when drawing up the speech. is the independence of the swiss national bank so extensive that it stands outside the reach of our democratic system based on the separation of state powers, on checks and balances? the topic of central bank independence is a matter of discussion beyond the borders of switzerland. around the world, a debate has started on the limits to power, in general, and the independence of central banks, in particular, and in some cases radical demands have been made. 1 because many central banks found themselves obliged to resort to large - scale unconventional measures during the financial crisis, it is not surprising that the debate is raging now. central banks are indeed very special institutions. they hold the banknote - issuing monopoly and provide the domestic money market with liquidity. consequently, they can never really be short of money. in switzerland, the state has conferred the banknote - issuing monopoly on the snb. this means that it always has the requisite means for meeting its obligations in swiss francs. however, that does not stop it from making losses. as you know, the snb had to report a large annual loss in 2010. this was due to exchange rate losses on the foreign currency holdings. these had increased substantially in the course of our foreign exchange market interventions, which we carried out in order to counter the deflationary threat identified by us. the loss and the increased risk in our central bank balance sheet is a matter which we take very seriously. the annual loss has provoked critical remarks, in particular as regards our independence and our ostensibly far - reaching powers. it is understandable that people will question the extensive measures we had to take to manage the financial crisis. that is all part of life in a democratic society. i am therefore grateful for this opportunity to present to you, in the next few minutes, my thoughts on the essence, the boundaries and the pitfalls of our independence. i hope i will be able to clarify one or two misunderstandings in the process. the reason why the snb is independent is not because it happens to suit the members of the governing board, which is