: 1385 ), chapter 3, article 3. changes for more efficient communication ever since the inflation target was introduced, openness and clarity have been guiding principles for us. we have gradually implemented changes to become more transparent and more efficient in our communication. in february we presented for the first time our own forecast of the development of the policy rate over the coming years, something that our colleagues in norway and new zealand have also done. and as i mentioned earlier – a central bank can hardly be much more open and clear with regard to its monetary policy intentions. this increases the opportunities for evaluation and accountability. it has also become easier for us to explain our decisions and forecasts and to outline alternative scenarios for the interest rate. we are better able to live up to the requirements made in our interaction with the general public and the financial markets. there are also other examples of measures taken to increase our openness. here i am thinking about the publication of minutes from the monetary policy meetings, our monetary policy reports, the many speeches held by executive board members every year and the hearings of the governor by the riksdag committee on finance. clarity, not just openness – quality, not just quantity but efficient communication is not merely about quantity, it also concerns quality. publishing a lot of information and doing so very often does not necessarily make the message clearer and the communication more efficient. it is not enough to merely be open. one might say that it is a question of giving the right information at the right time and about expressing oneself clearly. this is an important aspect that ties in with a survey of central banks recently made by jp morgan. there the riksbank was ranked as the most open central bank. but the main message of the study was that a central bank, once it had passed a particular degree of openness, perhaps did not become much more predictable by providing even more information. and i believe there is some truth in this. at least if the central bank is already very open, the quality of the communication may be more important than the quantity. and we are consciously working all the time to become even better with regard to clarity and efficiency in our communication. as recently as a couple of weeks ago, we executive board members decided to take a few further steps in this direction. to begin with, the public minutes of the monetary policy meetings will now state which of the board members has said what in the general discussion. this means that we have both a correct decisionmaking procedure and

omt programme, where the bank undertakes to buy a country ’ s government securities if the country in question meets the fiscal policy targets set. see, for example, king ( 2013 ). bis central bankers ’ speeches bank of japan, but which it has found difficulty attaining. it remains to be seen how well they will succeed and how confidence in the central bank as an independent institution will be affected, as well as what consequences this might have. independence not a given – the central bank may also need to adapt i think that it is important that the central bank never takes its independence for granted. it should always ask the question of whether the policy it conducts can be expected to result in the economic development that was aimed at when the central bank was granted its independence. an important part of this is, of course, that the central bank does its best to attain the objectives it has been allocated. but another part, which has perhaps not received as much attention, is that the central bank must also take into account fundamental changes in the economy that may make it necessary to adapt its behaviour. there could be many examples of changes in the functioning of the economy that could trigger such a need to adapt. but let me illustrate what i mean with an example that has been highlighted, for instance, in the imf ’ s most recent world economic outlook. a slightly surprising observation in recent years is that inflation has not fallen very much during the recession connected to the financial crisis, despite a dramatic fall in demand in many countries and a sharp rise in unemployment. the contrast in relation to earlier economic downturns, when inflation fell much more, is fairly surprising. this development has caused some analysts to talk about “ the missing deflation ”. 5 the so - called phillips curve, which shows the relationship between the rate of inflation and economic activity, appears to have flattened compared with before. 6 one possible explanation for this development is that the monetary policy conducted in recent decades around the world – where independent central banks have primarily focussed on attaining low and stable inflation – has gradually succeeded in anchoring inflation and inflation expectations. this has meant that the phillips curve has stabilised in a situation with low average inflation. it is not entirely clear why this would also have contributed to reducing the slope of the phillips curve, but we cannot rule out the possibility that if expectations are anchored better, price - setting and wage formation will be less sensitive to changes in economic activity. so, even if a monetary policy aimed at keeping