against climate change will be won or lost. energy demand in asia is expected to double by 2030 on the back of economic growth, urbanisation, and rising affluence. some 45 million people in southeast asia still do not have access to electricity. fossil fuels will continue to play an important role in meeting the energy demands of asia, at least for the next few years. the key to addressing the tension between development and decarbonization lies in credible and inclusive transition pathways, based on strong public - private partnerships. transition plans should enable progressive decarbonisation that is aligned to net zero goals while taking account of developmental needs and providing support for communities to pivot to new growth opportunities in a green economy. the gfanz asia - pacific network has the potential to spearhead this effort in asia, mobilising banks, insurers, asset managers, and service providers in this part of the world, and facilitating alignment in a credible and inclusive transition towards net zero. i am pleased to be part of this effort as chair of the advisory board of the gfanz asiapacific network, from two perspectives. first, as chair of the network of central banks and financial supervisors for greening the financial system ( “ ngfs ” ), i look forward to opportunities for collaboration between the ngfs and gfanz, exploring further how financial regulators and financial institutions can work together to address climate related risks and advance the net zero agenda. second, from the perspective of the mas, which is actively working with the financial industry to develop green finance solutions, markets, and infrastructure, i look forward to opportunities for partnership between mas and the gfanz asia - pacific network to promote a vibrant green finance ecosystem here in asia. the task ahead is daunting. asia is diverse – across stages of economic development, and across a variety of climate related risks and transition challenges. but the task is hugely purposeful, and if we succeed, transformative. for if we can successfully help asia transition to net zero, it will go a long way in getting the world to net zero. thank you very much. * * * * *

##dependence is necessary for the smooth operation of the single monetary policy, because it facilitates the transmission of monetary policy throughout the euro area. • the prevailing view was that persistent capital flows from the north to the south, which financed the current account deficits of the south during the early years of emu, were an equilibrating force – capital moved from countries where the rate of return on investment was low to those where it was high. • the elimination of exchange rate risk was interpreted by markets and institutions as an elimination of all risks. credit risk was essentially ignored. • with the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2008 and the re - pricing of risk, the ample capital inflows to the eu periphery were suddenly reversed. • this sudden reversal led to a negative feedback loop between banks and public finances, exacerbating the effects of financial instability on the real economy. • in some countries, such as spain, the sudden reversal led to a collapse in demand, a collapse in asset prices and bank distress. the bank distress then fed back into a fiscal and, ultimately, sovereign crisis. a similar narrative can be told for ireland. in other member - states, such as greece, the sudden reversal initially affected the refinancing of debt and subsequently inflicted damage on the banking system following the haircut of greek government debt. • as a result, the crisis revealed important weaknesses in the eu architecture and inadequacies in the implementation of the structures that had been put in place. bis central bankers ’ speeches • first, the existing framework of economic governance was not sufficient to prevent the creation of imbalances. the stability and growth pact was not properly enforced and there was no mechanism in place for monitoring external imbalances. • second, the increased interdependence between financial institutions and markets, which was the result of the monetary union and the ensuing financial integration, was not accompanied by a more unified regulatory framework. • third the link between financial stability and the financial cycle had been largely ignored. the architects of monetary union chose to keep financial sector supervision and regulation largely at the level of the nation state, with insufficient coordination of macro and micro - prudential supervision. policy responses to the crisis • in this unprecedented global crisis, governments, central banks and international organizations reacted with coordinated actions. these actions included first, direct monetary and fiscal interventions, aiming at enhancing liquidity to maintain system stability and support the economy ; second, a broader mobilization to res