real eu banking union, financial institutions should be an eu matter, both in life and in death. apart from completing the bu, other elements are necessary to continue making progress towards a more complete financial union. from a regulatory perspective, the lack of a sufficiently homogeneous legal basis across the eurozone is evident. while full harmonisation may not be possible in the foreseeable future, there are some critical areas, such as anti - money - laundering, fit and proper standards and insolvency rules at credit institutions, where a common set of rules across the eurozone would foster the integration of the market, improving also the efficiency of supervision and resolution. as regards the institutional side, and looking beyond the bu, i want to highlight a second priority which, in my view, is essential to enhance the capacity of the euro area to cushion macro - financial shocks. this capacity is linked to the development of deep and integrated capital markets. the completion of the capital markets union ( cmu ) would complement the bu and would foster a truly cross - border financial sector, allowing economic agents to smooth asymmetric, national shocks. last, but possibly not least, it may also be time to tackle the absence of a pan - european safe asset. while controversial, the implementation of a single eu risk - free asset would likely become a common benchmark, allowing the prices of equities and bonds across the euro area to reflect fundamental risk more clearly, enhancing the effectiveness of monetary policy and fostering the attractiveness of european capital markets. a safe asset would also help mitigate the bank - sovereign nexus, reduce cross - border safehaven flows in the event of crisis and, ultimately, improve financial integration. of course, we should be cautious to design it in such a way as not to water down the incentives for sound national fiscal policies, which are the essence of achieving safety. 4 / 5 let me conclude. throughout its history, the eu has followed a path towards greater economic and political integration, which has brought clear benefits in terms of economic growth and citizens ’ rights. the bu is an important step in this direction and has been key to addressing the euro crisis. still, the implementation of certain regulatory and institutional elements are needed to reap the economic benefits of an increase in cross - border banking activities. when assessing our capacity to deal with future financial crises, we should not forget that the institutional setting remains incomplete and policy space has been reduced. as memories of the crisis fade, we should strive

in any event, it is desirable that any reform strategy chosen should increase the system ’ s transparency, strengthen its contributiveness ( i. e. the relationship between contributions and benefits ) and, in particular, maintain an automatic adjustment mechanism that ensures the sustainability of the population ’ s future pensions. it is likewise important to recall that the impact of population ageing is not confined to public finances, since it also bears down on the participation rate, productivity and the economy ’ s potential growth ; hence, tackling this phenomenon calls for a broad - brush approach, regarding both the time period envisaged and the set of instruments that should be used. in this respect, the outlook for the spanish economy ’ s long - term potential growth is relatively modest ( see chart 13 ). specifically, on the latest available estimates, which are naturally subject to some degree of uncertainty, our economy ’ s potential growth rate is expected to fall from close to 3 % per annum in 2008 to post - crisis levels slightly below 1. 5 %. this level, though close to that of the euro area, is below that estimated for the most dynamic developed economies. among the key structural factors constraining this growth are the aforementioned population ageing, high structural unemployment and lacklustre productivity. indeed, despite the swift pace of job creation in recent years, unemployment remains very high, especially among certain groups, such as the lesser - skilled, whose unemployment rate is over 25 % ( see chart 14 ). the difficulties some groups face in finding work means that, according to figures for the third quarter of 2018, practically half the unemployed have been in this situation for over a year. of particular importance here is improving the quality of employment, which is affected by the high involuntary part - time status and short duration of employment contracts. such marked segmentation of the labour market hampers, moreover, productivity gains. these market inefficiencies also lie behind – at least in part – the changes in inequality in spain during the crisis. over the course of the spanish recession, strong job destruction, concentrated among certain groups, and the precariousness of many contractual relationships that arose from this more uncertain macroeconomic setting prompted growth in inequality in per capita income, despite the fact that wage differences among workers oscillated less than in other developed economies. the current upturn and, in particular, strong employment creation are allowing some correction of per capita income inequality. however, looking ahead, additional reductions in