fsps are, at times, found wanting in these aspects. the rising number of complaints on mis - selling of products by providing incorrect or incomplete information to customers, fraudulent transactions caused due to breach in security protocols, breach of customer privacy, etc., point in this direction. finally, agility in addressing customer grievances needs to be inculcated at all levels of staff. the turnaround time ( tat ) for complaints received within banks / fsps and those referred to them by the ombudsmen offices could then be reduced even further from the existing level of tat. issues to address in consumer protection and grievance redressal the g20 high level principles on financial consumer protection, adopted by the organisation for economic cooperation and development ( oecd ) in october 2011, inter alia, mandate that jurisdictions should ensure that consumers have access to adequate complaints handling and redressal mechanisms that are accessible, affordable, independent, fair, accountable, timely and efficient. such mechanisms should not impose unreasonable cost, delays or burdens on 4 / 7 bis central bankers'speeches consumers. what is the scope for improvement for us vis - a - vis these guidelines? let me talk about some specific issues in this context. 1. timeliness in complaint disposal – irrespective of the minimum time requirement for a complaint examination with all required inputs / documentation from the involved parties, the time frame for disposal has to be reasonable. in this context, you may be aware that we are currently working on a framework to harmonise the tat for resolution of customer complaints and charge - backs in all the electronic payment systems. public expectations are high for early redressal and we too need to evolve a zero - tolerance framework for delays in responses from regulated entities. 2. high level of non - maintainable complaints – while non - maintainable complaints cannot be wished away, given that 48. 9 per cent of the total complaints received during 2017 – 18 were non - maintainable could point to two things : first, the complainants are not aware about the procedural requirements for filing their complaints ; and second, there could perhaps be a tendency to routinely close complaints without adequate examination in some cases. in either case, there is scope for more work from the ombudsman. 3. large proportion of rejections – a sizeable proportion of the maintainable complaints are being rejected, mainly on the ground that the bank was not deficient, and the complaints were

with the overall objectives of monetary policy 3. the selection of intermediate target is also conditional upon the channels of monetary transmission – the process through which monetary policy actions impact the ultimate objectives. historically, although credit targets were prevalent, the concept of a formal intermediate target emerged with the monetarist emphasis on money targeting in an environment of worsening inflation in the 1970s and observed stable relationship among money, output and prices. a number of major central banks such as switzerland, germany, japan, the uk, the usa, france, australia and canada adopted monetary targets in the mid - 1970s. in the 1980s, financial market innovations reduced the need for financial intermediation by the banking system and in turn began to impart volatility to the behaviour of monetary aggregates. the consequent weakening of the stable relationship among money, output and prices made many advanced country central banks to move towards signaling monetary policy stance through setting of interest rates. monetary targeting, however, continued in some form in many bank - based economies in continental europe such as germany, france and switzerland where it was possible to establish money demand stability with redefinition of monetary aggregates. 10. given the under - developed nature of financial markets coupled with the quantitybased credit channel of monetary transmission, money target was considered suitable in case of developing countries. in the 1980s, monetary targeting was adopted in many developing countries such as brazil, china, indonesia, korea, malaysia, peru, philippines, russia and venezuela. as financial innovations spread to developing countries and they became more open to external capital flows, monetary targeting proved less effective. bernanke, ben s. “ constrained discretion and monetary policy ”. remarks before the money marketeers of new york university, new york, february 3, 2003. friedman, b. ( 1990 ), “ targets and instruments of monetary policy ”. in b. friedman and f. hahn ( eds. ) handbook of monetary economics, amsterdam, north - holland. 11. the weakening of monetary targeting framework, both in advanced and developing countries, triggered a search for alternate monetary frameworks. as it was also widely recognised that monetary policy can contribute to sustainable growth by maintaining price stability, beginning with new zealand in 1989, a number of advanced and developing countries moved to “ inflation targeting ”. under this approach, central banks target the final objective, i. e., inflation itself rather than targeting any intermediate variable. among the major central banks, the bank of england ( boe ) formally adopted