samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
will bring it through many uncertainties to a successful end. thank you for your attention. references i francois villeroy de galhau, monetary policy post - pandemic : balancing between science and art, predictability and reactivity, speech, 27 august 2022. ii in a letter to frederick ii, king of prussia, on april 6, 1767. iii blanchard, panel discussion, presented at “ monetary policy : a journey from theory to practice. an ecb colloquium held in honor of otmar issing, march 2006.

“ pay - as - you - go ” systems do not share risks between generations. in fact, they transfer the income risks of retired people to working people and their dependents who thereby bear the risks of both generations. intergenerational social security ’ s defining characteristic would be a plan to pool the risks that different generations hold, including macro economic risks. c innovation and risk should we be somehow concerned by the speed of this innovation process or, as r. rajan has put it, " has financial development made the world riskier "? according to a “ benign ” view, financial innovation has improved the efficiency and increased the resilience of the financial system. risks are spread among more agents, willing and able to have them. financial intermediaries are provided with sufficient incentives to improve their risk - management techniques. therefore, the financial system is better able to absorb shocks without increasing the effects of such shocks on the economy. broadly speaking, this seems correct to me. the financial system has coped with remarkable success and with few signs of instability with the various episodes of financial turmoil and shocks in recent years. market - functioning difficulties were short - lived. the impact of these episodes on the real economies of industrialised countries was generally limited. however, we want to make sure that financial institutions and markets help to absorb and redistribute the shocks occurring in the real economy. we don't want them, in general, to be an additional source of shocks. in this regard, two specific questions come to the mind of policy makers. the first relates very simply to our ability to understand what is going on in the financial system when innovations permanently introduce additional layers of sophistication and complexity. as is often the case with financial innovations, evaluating the risk they entail requires the use of complex techniques that are not always sufficiently tried and tested 6. the second issue, singled out by rajan himself, is about incentives, an issue made especially important by the shift from depository intermediation to professional asset management. the system of incentives under which managers operate should be closely and permanently aligned with the interests of investors. this is, in my view, a very productive area for future research for academics and regulators alike. let me conclude by two points about central banks. first, they have a natural interest in the efficiency and stability of the financial system. asset prices are a key channel through which monetary policy is transmitted to the real economy. the ability of the financial system
- occupied and rental housing and the level of mortgage originations might be quite different. thank you very much for your attention this afternoon. i would be happy to take any questions that you might have. bis central bankers ’ speeches

with a view to creating liquid markets of distressed debt, efforts will be required to foster the development of an npl servicing industry, to improve data quality and access, and to remove tax and legal impediments to debt restructuring. the european parliament also has an important role to play in a number of key legislative dossiers. some relate to the banking union, with the proposed european deposit insurance scheme and the introduction of “ risk - reduction ” measures in the context of the upcoming revision of the legislative pillars of the single rulebook for banks – namely the bank recovery and resolution directive ( brrd ), the capital requirements regulation ( crr ) and the capital requirements directive ( crd ). others relate to the capital markets union ( cmu ). in particular, the negotiations concerning the securitisation regulation need to be finalised soon. securitisation can play a very important role in increasing bank funding to the economy but regulatory uncertainty is detrimental to european securitisation markets. we consider that the commission has put forward a strong package that balances a revival of the european securitisation markets with the preservation of a prudent regulatory framework. progress needs to be made in other areas too, in particular insolvency law and taxation, as announced in the commission ’ s communication. it will also be necessary to address the financial stability aspects of cmu as part of the macroprudential review. a stable, profitable and competitive financial sector is essential for sustainable economic growth. but the reverse is also true. this is why we need more decisive action to raise the potential growth rate of the economy. first, let me echo your draft resolution. the implementation of structural reforms needs to be substantially stepped up. this concerns, in particular, policy actions to raise productivity and improve the business environment. we will soon discuss the annual growth survey 2017, which touches upon these exact issues. we should make the best use of the annual cycle of economic governance by ensuring that recommendations – including euro area recommendations – are really taken into account and effectively implemented. 3 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches second, fiscal policies should also support the economic recovery, while remaining in compliance with the fiscal rules of the european union. for instance, a more growth - friendly composition of fiscal policies could boost growth. this leads me to my final and concluding point. conclusions during our last plenary exchange in february i said that the cohesion of europe was being tested. since then, the challenges
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have seen in banking, a macroprudential approach may be useful to lean against the build - up of cyclical vulnerabilities or to address concentration risk. but we mustn't lose sight of how complex and diverse the nbfi ecosystem is. and the difference in how systemic risk propagates. in the nbfi sector this is likely driven more by activities and collective actions, and less by the size of specific entities, as it is in banking. and so, macroprudential policy for nbfi might differ in important ways from the approach used in banking. a further consideration for macroprudential policy is the need to enhance our capabilities in the area of data and analytical tools. the data landscape for nbfi is not as well developed as for banks. to improve this, the fsb is exploring ways to enhance the availability, quality and usability of data. we are also working on the development of additional metrics and new analytical tools to monitor nbfi vulnerabilities on an ongoing basis. for example, stress testing of funds is an important topic for which the fsb will organise a workshop in july, jointly with iosco. lastly, we know that macroprudential policy has important cross border implications, including in terms of reciprocity and home - host considerations. these call for international cooperation. the fsb is well placed to support efforts to achieve this, working alongside key standard setters, like iosco. 3 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches let me wrap up. we have seen several market incidents recently. incidents that were due to vulnerabilities in the nbfi sector. and though the incidents were overcome, in some cases relying on extraordinary central bank interventions, the underlying vulnerabilities and the amplifiers of stress are still largely in place. this means, for example, that investment funds remain vulnerable to further liquidity strains. and so, it is critical to finalise and implement international reforms to enhance nbfi resilience. thereafter, we will be well placed to assess whether any regulatory gaps remain and to move forward toward a macroprudential approach. today's conference provides an important opportunity to discuss what that could look like. this fantastic building we are gathered in, is set on a solid foundation. with a resilient –'irishweatherproof'– structure. and it is actually two buildings – unified around an atrium that draws in the light. very
solutions, nor further delays, are viable options if we want to tackle the npl burden and avoid a renewed build - up of npls in future cyclical downturns. 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches

vitor constancio : we need a coordinated european npl strategy. how to deal with europe ’ s market for lemons? opinion piece by mr vitor constancio, vice - president of the european central bank, 5 july 2017. * * * one of the most pressing issues for euro area banks is the nearly €1 trillion of non - performing loans ( npls ) on their balance sheets. while the average euro area npl ratio has declined gradually from a peak of 8 % in 2013, it still remains at 6 % and differences across countries are marked : six countries still have npl ratios of more than 10 %, significantly more in some cases. this is not just a problem for banks. the flip side of npls is over - indebtedness among households and firms, and this poses a macroeconomic challenge – banks restrict credit supply and distressed firms curtail investment, which in turn hampers economic growth. asset quality issues were exacerbated by the global financial crisis. when the crisis hit, the surge in npls blocked the ability of many banks to deal with distressed debt. npl resolution, though not a panacea for all banking problems, could bring significant benefits. it is not easy to estimate the effects of resolving npls. however, scenario - based analysis indicates that replacing npls with performing assets could increase the aggregate return on equity of euro area banks by more than 1 percentage point, with some countries ’ banking sectors gaining up to 5 percentage points. it is therefore essential to find a solution to the npl problem, but we must recognise that it will take time and no single instrument is likely to be a “ magic bullet ”. rather, it will require a comprehensive strategy involving a panoply of instruments. the ecb is already working on this and has issued clear guidance to the banks it directly supervises. but supervisory action is not enough on its own. the private sector and national and european authorities also have roles to play. several significant impediments affect the prices of npls, to varying degrees across euro area countries. the market for distressed debt can be characterised as a “ market for lemons ”. this is a situation where investors demand a premium to protect themselves from the uncertainty that better - informed banks will try to sell them assets whose credit quality is worse than it may seem on the surface. this results in limited market activity, as the prices that investors are prepared to pay for npls are much lower
without it, i see no reliable way of breaking the sovereign - banking nexus. bis central bankers ’ speeches

exchanges liquidity by improving exports performance and capital inflows. • fourth, the need to think of ways to lessen our dependency on fuel products. in this regard, the development of alternative energy sources and public transportation with low levels of fuel consumption will become a must in the years to come. distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen : stepping into year 2006, it is common that in entering the new year, we would define the expectations we want to achieve as well as identify challenges we hope to overcome within the coming year. in my view, the major challenge we will face in 2006 will be to bring the economy to a new equilibrium. from the external point of view, several international institutions have projected that the growth prospects for the world economy will not change much. it will remain at around 4. 3 %, with america and china still as the main engine in the global economic growth. based on those external conditions, we predict that the dynamics of the 2006 economy will largely depend on coordination between monetary, fiscal, and the real sector ’ s policies. such coordination needs to be done optimally to manage macro economy stability while promoting economic growth. • from the monetary side, bank indonesia will consistently make efforts to reduce the rate of inflation to a single digits in 2006 to allow interest rates to be gradually lowered in order to boost consumption and private sector investment. • from the fiscal side, fiscal stimuli through government consumption and investment would provide a strong jump start towards economic recovery, especially if the government could make use of the unrealized 2005 budgeted spending, carry it forward to 2006 and immediately make it realized within the first quarter of this year. • from the real sector side, economic prospects will be more dynamic if the previously planned infrastructure projects can be realized. if coordination of these policies is able to be conducted coherently, we will see an improved economic growth supported by the needed investment and consumption levels from the second semester of 2006 overall, bank indonesia projects that the 2006 gdp will reach 5. 0 - 5. 7 %. growth of that level is predicted to be achievable if investment financing sources from both domestic and abroad can be secured. aside from stimuli provided by government ’ s capital expenditures, i expect the banking industry to continue its role in funding long - term investment projects. an optimistic level of economic growth may be achieved if the banking industry at least maintains last year ’ s level of credit extensions. foreign sources are also assumed to play a significant role as well. it was noted
to announce the next steps. we have a great deal of discussion in the governing council, and then we decide. we have a toolbox that we are ready to use if our assessment concludes that our objective of price stability will not be achieved. the signals we give are not so much to do with the tools themselves, but not having any hesitation to use them. president draghi has said several times that we have various tools at our disposal and we will see which are the most appropriate. but we will not hesitate to use them if we consider it necessary to do so. if our mandate is at risk, we will act without hesitation, as we did in recent years. we do not see a risk of deflation, but we admit that the pressures on prices are weak, and that this weakness in price development is extending to the medium term. q – is greece your biggest failure? a – i think that greece is the biggest failure of greece itself. it is a failure of the pre - crisis policy. it is true that it has been very difficult. q – after all these years of great difficulty, the numbers are still not very positive... a – no, but i would qualify it a little better. first, the size of the problem was enormous, and much greater than expected for several reasons. the big problem in greece is greece itself and the difficulty that its society has to unite. that ’ s where large divisions appear, as well as a kind of decision paralysis, which is worse. a crisis feeds on itself, the fears grow, market confidence is lost, and we enter into a terrible vicious cycle – then comes outside intervention, trying to force a solution. so i think the biggest asset of a country is the ability of its society to come together in difficult times. q – but if we look at debt, although greece is much larger, it will still be very difficult to find a way to pay it. a – no, not if the country applies a sound policy. bis central bankers ’ speeches q – no? a – even in greece, the oecd indicators show that the labour market is performing rather well at the moment. clearly there is still a lot to do, but i would not lose hope. when a country faces its problems, it is successful. but we must reach a consensus on reforms, which i think portugal has generally achieved. i know there are elections and all that, but every month will count in order for confidence to return

i have no doubt about this commitment in our debate on the future of emu. and i hope that the debate in this country in the coming years will confirm that there can be no doubt about this commitment in britain. many thanks for your attention. bis central bankers ’ speeches
need an excessively tight initial policy - as is occasionally expected in the markets. the starting interest rate level in january 1999 is therefore likely to be comparatively close to the present low interest rates in the large countries within the euro area. a stable euro will uphold the tradition and the heritage of the d - mark. that implies responsible handling of its international role as a reserve and investment currency. it also implies regarding internal stability as a contribution to open external borders. the euro will be an instrument of competition and not of insulation from the outside world. admittedly, it will not hold up continental drift in geographical terms. a stable currency cannot do everything. but a stable euro will strengthen the foundations for an orderly world economy and for productive global competition.

low carbon economy. more and more investors are going to assess whether companies ’ net zero commitments square up with their actions. 5 central banks as catalysts for greening the financial system allow me to circle back to my initial question : why am i – a central bank official – telling you all this? because central banks play an important role in tackling climate change and boosting sustainable finance. we ensure stable financing conditions and make sure that banks are sound and resilient. these are necessary conditions for long - term planning and investments in sustainable innovations by companies and investors. in addition, central banks are analytical powerhouses. we monitor the state of the economy and can share our outstanding expertise. central banks need to protect their balance sheets from climate risks as well. this is why last week, the eurosystem decided on further steps to incorporate climate change considerations into its monetary policy operations. step by step, we will decarbonise our corporate bond holdings. that means that we will look at the climate performance of the bond issuers and increase the share of assets issued by companies with a better climate performance. this will create an incentive for companies to improve their climate performance. that way, we are catalysing the greening of the financial system. 6 conclusion ladies and gentlemen, allow me to conclude. we are facing unprecedented challenges. the question is not if but how our economies will change. in times of geopolitical, economic and climatic upheaval we all must be ready to adapt to new realities. that goes for the aviation industry as much as for every other industry. let ’ s get to work. footnotes : 1. cresswell - clay et al. ( 2022 ), twentieth - century azores high expansion unprecedented in the past 1, 200 years. nature geoscience 1 – 6 [ https : / / www. nature. com / articles / s41561 - 022 - 00971 - w. epdf? sharing _ token = jklz5ttrzc7er8guiwf6drgn0jajwel9jnr3zotv0njf2mqj3gnnp2gk0lvghsjzk _ a57jgsx9ewnlvhndsl2haid99h5i16iyohbvkk1dxvehqj02s2dw [UNK] 2. european investment bank ( 2022 ),
www. bos. frb. org / economic / neer / neer1998 / neer498b. htm yellen, janet ( 2006 ), “ monetary policy in a global environment, ” speech delivered at the conference “ the euro and the dollar in a globalized economy, ” university of california at santa cruz, santa cruz, california, may 27. http : / / www. frbsf. org / news / speeches / 2006 / 060527. pdf ( 346 kb pdf )

##led into shares and mutual funds. we use the financial markets much more than we did just ten years ago. this means that we have good reason to be concerned over their functioning. it has also meant that questions regarding financial stability have acquired greater importance on the international political agenda. at the same time as use of the markets has grown, new instruments are being traded that are increasingly complicated in structure and their risk content has become more difficult to assess. various forms of derivative have been developed, for instance, to spread risks more efficiently. this in itself creates conditions for reducing the vulnerability of the banks as well as the financing costs of the investments. essentially, this development benefits long - term growth. in recent years, the use of credit risk derivatives and securitisation has increased, for instance. however, there is a risk that the complexity of these instruments will increase the difficulty of seeing to which credit risks companies and banks are actually exposed. the complexity of the financial instruments and the fact that they are often found, in various forms, on both the asset side and the liability side of companies'balance sheets as well as " off balance sheet ", makes it difficult to detect the financial risks within banks and companies. this is particularly serious as an increasing number of households have their savings in these companies'shares, but nor is it easy for professional analysts and portfolio managers to see. the collapse of the american company enron can serve as an example of the problems connected with the development of complicated financial instruments. a lack of understanding of the instruments used and a lack of transparency in the company's accounting meant that directly after the collapse there was considerable concern over possible contagion effects. here i do not mean the evident breach of the regulations in force, where auditors burn documents and senior managers sell shares in the company prior to publishing negative information. enron raises a number of other, in the long term more fundamental, issues. today, i shall limit myself to discussing three of these. firstly, enron was basically an energy company, which in time came to pursue financial operations on a large scale, but without coming under the supervision to which financial companies are normally subjected. the lack of supervision also applied to long term capital management, ltcm, some years earlier. one might wonder whether function rather than company type might not be a better base for supervision. there is otherwise a risk that functions essential to society and thus needing protection will be transferred to companies not subject to supervision. at the same