. the question of creating digital central bank money has become a topical issue nowadays. we have several answers to this. first, today, commercial bank money is used in most cases. we believe that, in the area of retail, digital commercial bank money could also be used in dlt - based systems. second, many stable coins are digital commercial bank money. third, we could imagine what is referred to as a trigger solution. that means that a dlt - based settlement of any transaction of goods or securities would trigger a payment via conventional payment systems. perhaps it could even trigger a payment in central bank money, e. g. ( for example ) via target2 in the eurosystem. that trigger solution would make use of the stable and [UNK] existing payment systems. and in the case of central bank money, the current access to central bank money would remain unaltered. fourth, digital central bank money in the form of a wholesale token may be considered if a dlt - based settlement system proves superior to conventional systems. in that case, a token could be issued by the central bank to a closed group and for a limited purpose. neither access to central bank money nor the supply of central bank money has to change for that. it is again more of a technical question. repercussions for monetary policy implementation and financial stability could be ruled out. fifth, digital central bank money for the general public, i. e. ( that is ) non - banks, as a sort of “ digital banknote ”, would bring with it a number of knock - on effects that are not very well understood as things stand. if a central bank were to issue digital central bank money for everyone, a potential far - reaching substitution between sight deposits with commercial banks and digital central bank money would result. in addition, further repercussions for financial stability and monetary policy implementation are to be expected. to sum up, we have quite a number of ways to bring cash to the ledger. issuing digital central bank money for everyone is not the only solution. what ’ s more, it is the solution with potentially the furthest - reaching implications for stability, and the highest risk. therefore, it should not be our first choice. these reservations should not be pushed aside lightly. closing remarks ladies and gentlemen, times are changing. however, some requirements stay the same. this is also true with regard to changing structures. concerns have been voiced that the financial industry, and notably the payments landscape,

the business models, of such large international banks. since the adoption of the international basel ii framework in 2005, the complexity of these rules has mushroomed. the basel iii reforms launched in response to the last financial crisis – including the final elements of the basel iii package that we are currently negotiating in basel – have made the rules even more detailed and complicated. we have the guiding principle of the reforms to thank for this : risk - oriented governance and 1 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches regulation are there to help banks allocate capital resources as efficiently as possible. but in order to prevent undercapitalisation, this approach needs very specific rules. this increases the compliance workload – that is, the effort associated with meeting the requirements as well as demonstrating that they ’ ve been met. the basel rules were made for large, internationally active banks – they were not designed with small banks in mind. yet, in europe, we adopted these rules for all european credit institutions alike – including the thousands of small and medium - sized banks with simple business models and regional focus. the motivation for this one - size - fits - all - regulation was to have a single set of rules for the single market. the eu ’ s primary goal of a common, single market meant that one single set of rules was preferred over differentiated sets of rules. proportionality – the principle that rules must be proportionate to the issue they address – played only a secondary role. while this makes good political sense, it has had serious side effects – as it favours large, internationally active banks over smaller institutions. particularly for credit institutions that are able to strongly optimise their employment of capital in order to benefit from higher returns, this is worth all the effort. and it ’ s worth it for especially large credit institutions because they can profit from economies of scale where fixed costs per product fall as the volume of business increases. this then also makes it easier to finance a larger compliance department. smaller, regionally based institutions, however, cannot normally rely on these economies of scale or a strong risk appetite as a source of income. seen from a single - entity perspective, the cost of regulation is similar or even higher for these banks, but their ability to take advantage of these complex strategies is somewhat weaker. in other words, the complicated risk - oriented approach favours banks with a large organisation, whose activities are more complex and which take on greater risks. the reason we should be giving this more thought is that the vast majority