recapitalization capacity by issuing instruments that can bear losses in the event of resolution. supervisors and firms are better equipped to deal with problems that occur. supervisory oversight of systemically important banks has learned the lessons of the crisis and has added a macroprudential perspective. the basel iii framework introduced additional capital and liquidity buffers, which are intended to be usable in a downturn to help maintain the flow of credit to the real economy. significant progress in making banks resolvable before the global financial crisis, the resolution of failing banks was a niche subject. in hindsight, most authorities around the world had given it far too little attention. this was the main reason why authorities had so few options for our global systemic banks in the middle of the crisis. things have changed, and for the better. resolution authorities have sprung up or have been strengthened around the world. and resolution frameworks provide these authorities with the powers to resolve a systemically important bank in a manner that maintains financial stability and reduces taxpayer exposure. the fsb ’ s evaluation shows that investors increasingly expect failing banks to be resolved rather than bailed out. the funding cost advantages enjoyed by systemically important banks have fallen. market prices suggest that investors are now pricing the risk of having losses imposed on them in the event of a bank failure. for most jurisdictions that are home to g - sibs, credit rating agencies no longer assume governments will bail them out. recovery and resolution planning has improved banks ’ capabilities to produce timely, accurate and granular information. timely information in a crisis is key to assessing the scale of a problem and to deciding what to do about it. this additional information has already proved helpful to both banks and authorities during the pandemic. taken together, these resilience and resolution reforms lower the probability of banks failing, reduce the consequences and costs of a bank failure, and provide additional options for dealing with failing banks that simply did not exist before the global financial crisis. reforms are achieving their policy objectives but more work is needed we have to ask ourselves, however, whether we have addressed the problem set out by mervyn king in the wake of the global financial crisis. can authorities now resolve complex international banks without recourse to public funds, while maintaining financial stability? and does the coordinated international approach we have now adopted provide for effective resolution of banks, by ensuring that while they are global in life, we also have a global solution in death? the fsb evaluation provides evidence that the reforms

we want to hear from you. our consultation closes on 30 september. we are keen to receive responses from a wide range of stakeholders. i would highlight the need for responses to be grounded in evidence. the fsb will take account of feedback to the consultation and publish a final report in early 2021. this will also provide us with additional evidence on how banks have responded to the pandemic and any lessons learned for our evaluation. i look forward to your questions. 4 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches