i want to talk about next. 2 see t. chernis and t. webley, “ nowcasting canadian gdp with density combinations, ” bank of canada staff discussion paper no. 2022 - 12 ( may 2022 ). - 4inflation is still too high since peaking at 8. 1 % in june, inflation has declined to 6. 9 %. and when we strip out volatile price changes, we see that year - over - year core inflation also stopped rising in the past couple of months, plateauing at around 5 %. there are also early indications that momentum in inflation is easing. three - month rates of core inflation have declined to about 3½ %. this easing is visible across various subcomponents of the consumer price index. for instance, price increases for various durable goods are starting to ease as consumer spending has softened and global supply disruptions have lessened. and our rate increases have helped cool the unsustainably hot housing market. with the decline in house prices, shelter inflation has moderated, despite rising interest costs and rents. these developments are encouraging, but as i mentioned earlier, we also see some reasons for concern. overheated domestic demand continues to drive price increases in hard - todistance services such as hotels and restaurants. a better balance of demand and supply could take time to have an impact here. another area where we have seen less progress is food price inflation — especially compared with inflation of other goods. prices here have continued to increase despite most agricultural commodity prices being well below their pandemic highs. to make meaningful progress toward our inflation target, we need to see threemonth rates of inflation come down even further and be sustained. in short, there remains a firmness or stickiness to inflation — and to near - term inflation expectations. inflation expectations remain a concern i ’ d like to spend a little time explaining why the bank has been closely monitoring what is happening with inflation expectations. it ’ s because history has shown us that high inflation expectations can lead to higher and more persistent inflation. this was the bitter experience of the 1970s. during that decade, we saw both high unemployment and high inflation. a key challenge at that time was that inflation expectations kept rising. remember, this was before central banks adopted inflation targeting. this means there was no target to anchor expected inflation. as a result, households and businesses saw no reason to believe that prices wouldn ’ t simply continue to climb at a rapid pace. they

of inflation targeting in the early 1990s. increasing transparency spac e to emph asize 3 panel a uses the consumer price index ( cpi ) excluding food and energy prices since our a key preferred measures of core inflation do not go back to the 1970s. panel b uses cpi - median but point. looks similar if the other preferred measures are used instead. to place this text - 6helped anchor inflation expectations and reinforced the credibility of our monetary policy framework. we have taken many actions over the past 30 - some years to help canadians better understand our decisions and the kinds of issues that preoccupy us. this includes : • publishing our monetary policy report • issuing news releases to explain our decisions • expanding the governor ’ s opening statement at news conferences to provide more insights into the issues that we discussed during our policy deliberations we are also releasing more data and analysis than ever before. and we ’ ve greatly expanded our educational materials online and through our museum. in addition, we have been listening more : • through the work of our regional offices, we regularly engage with the private sector and financial market participants to gather perspectives and identify local economic developments. • our governor and deputy governors are also engaging with a more diverse group of stakeholders from the business world, labour groups and civil society organizations. the bank has also been actively exploring additional ways to enhance transparency, especially around our monetary policy decisions. 4 earlier this year, we volunteered to undergo a pilot review of our broader transparency practices under the international monetary fund ’ s new central bank transparency code. 5 in its report, the international monetary fund recognized that the bank sets a high benchmark for overall transparency. in addition, the report characterizes the bank ’ s monetary policy framework as comprehensive, transparent and understandable. the report also contained recommendations, including that the bank begin publishing a summary of deliberations after each of our policy decisions — something that we were already considering. starting in january, we will do exactly that. roughly two weeks after each monetary policy decision, we will publish a summary of deliberations on our website. 4 for background information on the approaches taken by other central banks in publishing information on their policy deliberations as well as issues of particular relevance to the bank of canada, see m. jain, w. muiruri, j. witmer, s. kozicki and j. harrison, “ summaries of central bank policy deliberations in a canadian context, ” bank of canada staff discussion paper