its parts : the asset quality assessment and the baseline and adverse scenarios of stress tests. banks not exceeding any of these thresholds had to submit within two weeks a capital plan for remedying their capital shortfall within a period of six to nine months. with the methodology used, 25 of the 130 banks assessed had a capital shortfall, which for the whole of europe amounted to €24. 6 billion. it should however be noted that, in anticipation of the exercise, many european credit institutions strengthened their solvency over the past year. of the aforementioned 25 banks, 12 increased their capital sufficiently in 2014, so only 13 of them, with a capital shortfall of €9. 5 billion, will have to take additional action to reinforce their solvency. we consider the results of the spanish banks to be positive. only one bank was below the threshold in one of the parts of the exercise, specifically in the asset quality review. in this case the estimated shortfall was very small and, during 2014, the bank took measures to strengthen its capital by an amount well in excess of that needed to cover its shortfall. taking bis central bankers ’ speeches into account these actions, at present all spanish banks amply exceed the thresholds set in the exercise. it should also be noted that spanish banks were the ones that had to make the smallest adjustments as a result of the asset quality review : a total of only 0. 14 % of their riskweighted assets. in conclusion, the results of the comprehensive assessment show that the restructuring process undertaken in the spanish financial system from 2012 has been successful and that our credit institutions face the future with healthy balance sheets and a sound solvency position. similarly, the structural reforms undertaken in recent years have played a crucial role in providing for a firm recovery and in correcting imbalances. it is imperative to stay the course and ensure sufficient growth to reduce the unemployment rate and anchor the economic underpinnings needed to sustain domestic and foreign demand. thank you. bis central bankers ’ speeches

borrow in an emergency. lower inflation and a lower repo rate have made that borrowing cheaper than it otherwise would have been. in these circumstances, it ’ s not at all clear what a sarb qe programme would add. rather than trying to supplant private investors or taking away the risk of investing, we have focused on liquidity. specifically, we have been buying bonds in the secondary market, at different maturities, in the context of a sudden stop in global capital flows. as the central bank, we have unique powers to provide liquidity, and we have used them to restore market functioning. these interventions have been helpful so far. yields have fallen. we didn ’ t set out to lower yields, specifically, but it turns out that market dysfunction was part of the reason why yields were so high. putting all the pieces together, this monetary - fiscal mix allows more spending in the context of a major emergency. we are helping by setting low interest rates, and by ensuring that the government bond market remains liquid. national treasury is able 12 as two economists at the bank for international settlements have put it, ‘ almost any balance sheet policy that the central bank carries out can, or could be, replicated by the government ’. see claudio borio and piti disyatat, november 2009, ‘ unconventional monetary policies : an appraisal ’, available at https : / / www. bis. org / publ / work292. pdf, p. 2. to sell its debt to investors. this approach is going to deliver a historically high level of government spending this year, even adjusting for population growth and inflation, and excluding interest costs. 13 national treasury is not cutting spending in the middle of a crisis ; they are raising it, to the highest levels on record. however, we also need to think about the next few years. national treasury is already planning to run deficits of 14. 6 % of gross domestic product ( gdp ) this year, 9. 3 % of gdp next year, and 7. 7 % the year after that. 14 in this context, high long - term interest rates are a critically important signal about what savings are available. we should be listening to this message, not trying to temporarily suppress it through sarb interventions, which really just switch long - term debt for short - term debt. we are in very difficult circumstances, but qe isn ’ t the answer. we need to focus on real solutions. our