desired culture. through our supervisory process, we have seen that a number of firms have started this process by developing or refining employee surveys and 360 feedback processes to target issues of behavior and bis central bankers ’ speeches culture. some firms are incorporating case study discussions into training programs to highlight ethical dilemmas and decision - making. some are revamping senior level promotion criteria to reinforce what are the desired characteristics and behaviors of leaders. these efforts are at various stages in terms of their depth, breadth and maturity. supervisors will need to see how these frameworks evolve, and more importantly, see evidence of how these efforts yield results in the form of more open and routine escalation of issues, consistent application of “ should we ” versus “ could we ” in business decisions, rigor in identifying and controlling of conduct risk, and how compliance breaches factor into compensation. measurement and accountability for progress in developing a healthier culture across the industry is paramount to us as supervisors and central bankers. an important measurement of progress is employees ’ assessment of their firm ’ s culture. to this end, we encourage the industry to harness the various individual efforts that have been initiated at a number of firms in order to develop a comprehensive culture survey. this anonymous survey would be fielded across firms each year by an independent third - party and the results shared with supervisors. having a common survey instrument would promote benchmarking of, and accountability for, progress on culture and behavior. a core element of any firm ’ s mission and culture must be a respect for law. federal reserve guidance advises that banks should strive to “ [ m ] aintain a corporate culture that emphasizes the importance of compliance with laws and regulations and consumer protection. ” 4 to maintain such a culture, senior leaders must promote effective self - policing. if audit uncovers an instance of fraud in one unit, the firm ’ s leadership should ask, “ where else could this behavior occur? ” if the press reports fraud at a competitor in a particular business line, the same self - assessment should apply. “ could this happen to us, could we have a similar problem here? ” when fraud is detected, boards and senior leaders must ensure that they are informed promptly, and that a thorough inquiry is undertaken at once. the senior leaders of financial firms, and those who report to them, must also be proactive in reporting illegal or unethical activity. early self - reporting sends a powerful message to employees and to regulators about a firm ’ s respect for law.

jean - pierre danthine : are central banks doing too much? translation of a speech given in french by mr jean - pierre danthine, vice chairman of the governing board of the swiss national bank, at the foire du valais, martigny, 9 october 2014. * * * the speaker thanks fabian gunzinger for his valuable support in drafting this speech. he is also indebted to irma cruz, till ebner, peter kuster, claudia strub and the snb language services for their assistance. introduction in recent years, central banks have been active in their attempts to mitigate the financial crisis and its aftermath, and they have also assumed a more prominent role in the regulatory efforts to prevent similar crises in the future. this has led many commentators to ask the question i raised in the title of this speech : are central banks doing too much? the short answer to the question – you may not be surprised – is “ no ”. the measures which central banks have taken since the beginning of the financial crisis in 2007 are a direct consequence of the severity of the crisis itself. first, conventional central bank measures – cutting interest rates, providing liquidity and acting as lender of last resort – were required to prevent the collapse of the financial system. second, the use of various unconventional measures was a responsible step to support weak recoveries, given the shortage of available alternatives. and third, a reinterpretation of central banks ’ financial stability mandate towards a more active role in crisis prevention is necessary to reduce the need for another round of extensive crisis management in the future. this, in a nutshell, is the main argument of my speech today. in what follows, i will elaborate on the rationale behind the conventional and unconventional measures that central banks have adopted to mitigate the crisis, and explain why central banks need to play an active role in the new regulatory framework which is being implemented in response to the crisis. central banks may not exactly have a reputation for being big innovators. but just as the foire du valais has developed into french - speaking switzerland ’ s pre - eminent fair over the past 50 years by successfully combining innovation with its core strengths, central banks have evolved over the past few decades by remaining focused on their core mandate – price stability – while adapting to a changing environment and being open to learn new lessons when they present themselves. the financial crisis was such a moment, and a reinterpretation of central banks ’