. as always in financial policy, we should try to strike the right balance between stability and growth. the impact of the war in ukraine on systemic risks it is way too early to assess even the short - term effects of the war in ukraine on financial stability, let alone longer ones. however, i try to provide some very first thoughts. first, let me start from a positive note. the outbreak of the war has not really threatened the functioning of global or european financial markets or financial institutions. neither has the covid19. clearly, the regulatory and institutional reforms undertaken after the global financial crisis have made the global financial system safer and more resilient. second, many european countries had become much too dependent on the fossil fuels imported from russia. using the vocabulary of swans and rhinos, the russian energy imports were a grey rhino in the room : an obvious risk that many countries, politicians and firms found convenient to downplay in good times. but now, the rushed transition to other energy producers and sources is speedening inflation, reducing growth and increasing risks to financial stability. third, the geopolitical tensions have brought new financial stability risks at a forefront. therefore, we must pay increasing attention in our financial stability analysis for example to financial institutions´ resilience against cyber risks in an interconnected world and on the operational capacity of payment systems under stressed conditions. more generally, the experiences of the last few years suggest that we should proactively develop societies that are resilient to adverse shocks. in his recent book, the resilient society, professor markus brunnermeier outlines what that requires. in his broad interpretation of resiliency, resilient societies not only pursue macroeconomic and macroprudential resiliency, but also foster sense of community, reduce inequality to make the social contract more acceptable and innovate to tackle the climate change. key topics of the conference to finish, i want to congratulate the organisers for compiling such a topical and wide - ranging programme for this conference. it is my great pleasure to welcome the accomplished keynote speakers, the nobel laureate bengt holmstrom, pekka ala - pietila, the chairman of the eu´s 2 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches high - level expert group on artificial intelligence and the former president of the nokia corporation as well as doyne farmer, one of the key thinkers in a number of fields ranging from chaos theory, complex systems, ecology and economics, to mention just a few

forced both academics and the policy community to take a broader view than before the crisis : • the costs of financial crises are taken much more seriously than in 2007. hardly anyone now says that we should not worry about possible bubbles as they are developing ; that it is enough to concentrate on mopping up the mess afterwards. bis central bankers ’ speeches • also, a common view now is that price stability alone does not ensure financial stability. markets are not that well behaved. • it is also recognized as a fact that strengthening prudential regulation of banks, even though it has been necessary, is not alone sufficient to ensure that bubbles and crashes do not occur in the asset and credit markets. the answer to the policy dilemma between price stability and controlling credit cycles and property bubbles is now sought from another direction : macro - prudential policy. the use of macro - prudential policy instruments is not now considered to be a part of monetary policy proper. it is, however, generally accepted that central banks should play a key role in the development and use of macro - prudential tools. the use of macro - prudential policy instruments can be an essential complement to monetary policy. in many instances, effective macro - prudential tools may be even a prerequisite for successful monetary policy. to summarize : the more the central banks can trust macro - prudential policy to do its part, the better can monetary policy support the recovery of economic activity and normalization of the inflation rate, in the euro area and elsewhere. it is clear that in the years since the symposium of 2007, the mainstream of economic research has had to adjust its assumptions for monetary policy and the behaviour of financial markets in a more pragmatic and realistic direction than before. it is recognized that, on this matter, theoretical research still has much to learn from the practical experience of central banks ’ attempts to preserve both price and financial stability at the same time. * * * my third and final example from the discussions at jackson hole has to do with a problem that is quite pertinent at present, that is, what kind of monetary policy should be practised in a situation of ultra - low interest rates. the present situation is unique in history. in many countries, including the euro area, the short - term interest rate is close to or even slightly below zero. according to the traditional way of thinking, rates could not go much lower without causing problems in the form of speculative investments in currency ( bank