facilitate regular compliance checks of their private financial transactions by our external auditor. while we are convinced of the robustness of our ethics framework, such frameworks must, of course, be regularly reviewed against international best practice. the review of our whistleblowing regime is just one example in that regard. concluding remarks let me conclude. while we certainly have to strive constantly for improvements, i believe one has to admit that the ecb has made tremendous efforts and indeed made significant progress in strengthening its accountability, boosting its transparency and further enhancing its integrity mechanisms and good governance. the ecb is, and has always been, open to a balanced dialogue with stakeholders, including the general public, and strives to keep up to date with fast - evolving communication practices, such as q & a sessions on twitter. this study, containing interviews of ecb senior managers and the report by transparency international, is indeed a good example of how the ecb engages in a balanced dialogue with diverse representatives. 4 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches as mentioned earlier, we are convinced that independence requires accountability, and that accountability requires transparency. integrity is a foundation of any good administration. we are confident about what we have achieved, but as central bankers we are always “ vigilant ” and never complacent. thank you for listening, and i look forward to hearing your views. 1 see the future of the euro area 2 see “ the five presidents ’ report : completing europe ’ s economic and monetary union ”, 22 june 2015. 3 a more detailed discussion of the measures taken during the crisis can be found in b. cœure, “ consolidating the euro area ’ s economic recovery ”, introductory remarks prior to an informal exchange of views with the european affairs committee and the finance committee of the national assembly, paris, 13 may 2015 ; and “ outlook for monetary policy in the euro area ”, speech at association d ’ economie financiere, paris, 2 february 4 namely, the “ two - pack ” regulation ( regulation ( eu ) 472 / 2013 ) and the treaty establishing the european stability mechanism. 5 see b. cœure, “ strengthening the greek financial system ”, introductory remarks at a public hearing at the european parliament, brussels, 12 october 2016 6 this is also why in ten days ’ time, alongside the publication of the annual report and as requested by the european parliament, we will publish our feedback on the european parliament resolution, which last year was

tremosa i balcells to express the parliament ’ s judgement on the robustness of our accountability framework towards the parliament. from the ecb ’ s perspective, our accountability framework as defined in the treaty is working well, and has been adapted to the challenges we have faced in recent years by expanding our interactions where and when necessary. transparency transparency is crucial to the ecb ’ s work and it attaches great importance to communicating effectively with the public. transparency helps people understand the ecb ’ s monetary policy, and better public understanding, in turn, makes the ecb ’ s monetary policy more credible and effective. against this background, communication with financial market participants deserves particular attention. i see it as a double - edged sword. clear communication with financial markets enhances the implementation and transmission of monetary policy, but on the other hand it may risk central banks being captured by private interests, or worse, disclosing privileged information. and even the perception of such risks would be harmful. please allow me to present some examples. the european central bank has made significant progress on matters of transparency and good governance. this was noted by the european ombudsman, who commended the ecb for adopting the “ guiding principles for external communication by members of the executive board ” and “ encourage [ d ] it to lead the field on all aspects of good governance ”. the ombudsman more generally acknowledged, when presenting her annual report for 2015 to the european parliament, that the ecb has “ boosted its transparency ”. 7 the guiding principles provide a more concrete and very practical expression of the rules that are already binding on executive board members. they enshrine the ecb ’ s approach to ensuring that financial market - sensitive information is not disclosed to select groups and avoiding giving the impression that an event organiser has a “ prestige advantage ” allowing it to benefit financially from the perception of exclusive contacts with the members of the executive board. the guiding principles also advise the executive board members to include, as a matter of principle, an ecb staff member in bilateral meetings. these principles have also been subscribed to by the chair of the ecb ’ s supervisory board and the other ecb representatives to the supervisory board. in addition, the members of the governing council ( including the executive board members ) observe a “ quiet period ” before monetary policy meetings. this means they avoid making comments or attending meetings that could influence expectations about monetary policy decisions in the seven days before a scheduled meeting on