the same time as their borrowing requirement was increased. 8 imf ( 2016a ). 8 interest expenditure soared and the countries were forced to make drastic cuts in a number of areas of expenditure. swedish experiences also point to confidence falling rapidly and taking a long time to regain. for many years after the 1990s crisis, sweden suffered from a much higher interest rate than germany, with a very large risk premium on swedish government securities. given the swedish financial system ’ s large degree of international dependence, it is important and necessary to maintain international confidence in the financial system. a robust foreign currency reserve is, in my opinion, an important condition for this. to return to the defence forces metaphor, if other countries know that we have a number of jas fighter planes on standby, it would probably also reduce the risk of a conflict situation arising, where we would have to use them. today, there is a proposal on the table before the government that could in principle entail halving the riksbank's foreign currency reserve. 9 allowing the foreign currency reserve to decline in a situation where the banking sector as a whole and its funding in foreign currency are growing is to say the least a risky venture. this is not only my opinion and the opinion of the riksbank, it is also shared by the international monetary fund. in its article iv review of sweden's economy in 2016, the imf concluded that the foreign currency reserve should not be smaller than it is now. the european central bank, ecb, has also recently issued an opinion recommending that sweden should not reduce the size of its foreign currency reserve below the current level. 10 the foreign currency reserve should be paid for by the banks the cost – or insurance premium – of having a liquidity insurance in the form of a foreign currency reserve is at present charged to the riksbank ’ s earnings and central government finances and is calculated at around sek 400 - 500 million a year. this is, of course, a lot of money, but calculated per inhabitant per year the insurance premium is only sek 40 - 50. this corresponds to around two cups of coffee or half of a cinema ticket. moreover, it is actually a cost that could well be transferred to the banks, which are the primary beneficiaries of such an insurance. one could say – to take it to an extreme – that tax - payers currently subsidise the banks by almost half a billion a 9 the government ’ s

some of the intrinsic features of the g20 come again to the fore : the g20 is composed of countries with different economic structures, different political systems and different short - term interests. such diversity makes it obviously harder to reach consensus, harder for instance than at the level of the g7 which is a similar forum, whose death was also declared prematurely. the g20 remains important for policy dialogue with a view to reaching a common understanding on economic challenges shaping the outlook. such a common understanding is a key condition for being ready to act in a globally cooperative manner when the need arises. therefore, the main question now is how to further improve the g20 ’ s effectiveness as an informal forum for economic policy dialogue. the imf points to the fact that “ growth dynamics further diverge ” at the global level and states that, in particular. “ the advanced economies have recently gained some speed, while the emerging market economies have slowed [ and that ] the emerging market economies, however, continue to account for the bulk of global growth. within each group, there are still broad differences in growth and position in the cycle ” ( see weo, october 2013, chapter 1 ). bis central bankers ’ speeches let me throw out, for discussion among the panellists, three ideas : first, it is essential to return to a more focused agenda. the g20 should concentrate on topics where it can bring genuine value added compared to the activities of the formal institutions which, at the global level, deal with economic policy matters. since the core of the g20 remains the finance ministers and central bank governors ’ meetings, the g20 is not ideally placed to deal with e. g. food security or labour issues. thus, the number of work streams and working groups should be reduced. but the group is well placed to discuss global economic and financial challenges, such as financial regulatory reform, tax issues, macroeconomic policies and global financing. what we need is an effective division of labour between the g20 and the international organisations, with the latter providing technical / analytical input to the informal setting of the g20, but also receiving political signals on key orientations for an effective functioning of the international organisations in the global economy, e. g. that the imf should refine its surveillance of the global economy ; what the priorities and timetables of the fsb should be in terms of global financial regulation ; what route the oecd should take on tax evasion or tax transparency. my second idea –