establish increasingly stringent targets and performance standards for otc market participants. in addition, we are working with market participants to enhance the resilience of the triparty repurchase agreement ( repo ) market. through this market, primary dealers and other major banks and broker - dealers obtain very large amounts of secured financing from money market mutual funds and other short - term, risk - averse investors. 3 we are exploring, for example, whether a central clearing system or other improvements might be beneficial for this market, given the magnitude of exposures generated and the vital importance of the market to both dealers and investors. even as we pursue these and similar initiatives, however, the board believes additional statutory authority is needed to address the potential for systemic risk in payment and settlement systems. currently, the federal reserve relies on a patchwork of authorities, largely derived from our role as a banking supervisor, as well as on moral suasion to help ensure that critical payment and settlement systems have the necessary procedures and controls in place to manage their risks. by contrast, many major central banks around the world have an explicit statutory basis for their oversight of these systems. given how important robust payment and settlement systems are to financial stability, and the functional primary dealers are broker - dealers that trade in u. s. government securities with the federal reserve bank of new york. the new york reserve bank's open market desk engages in trades on behalf of the federal reserve system to implement monetary policy. similarities between many payment and settlement systems, a good case can be made for granting the federal reserve explicit oversight authority for systemically important payment and settlement systems. the federal reserve has significant expertise regarding the risks and appropriate riskmanagement practices at payment and settlement systems, substantial direct experience with the measures necessary for the safe and sound operation of such systems, and established working relationships with other central banks and regulators that we have used to promote the development of strong and internationally - accepted risk management standards for the full range of these systems. providing such authority would help ensure that these critical systems are held to consistent and high prudential standards aimed at mitigating systemic risk. consumer protection another lesson of this crisis is that pervasive consumer protection problems can signal, and even lead to, trouble for the safety and soundness of financial institutions and for the stability of the financial system as a whole. consumer protection in the area of financial services is not, and should not be, limited to practices with potentially systemic consequences. however, as

49. 7 billion ( 43. 8 billion euros ). 7 digital currency payments projects from big technology firms that have network advantages have the potential to scale even more rapidly. because the utility of any medium of exchange increases with the size of the network using it, the power of a stablecoin payment system depends on the breadth of its adoption. with nearly one - third of the global population as active users on facebook, the libra stablecoin project stands out for the speed with which its network could reach global scale in payments. stablecoin networks at global scale are leading us to revisit questions over what form money can take, who or what can issue it, and how payments can be recorded and settled. while central bank money and commercial bank money are the foundations of the modern financial system, nonbank private “ money ” or assets also facilitate transactions among a network of users. in some cases, such nonbank private assets may have value only within the network, while in other cases, the issuer may promise convertibility to a sovereign currency, such that this becomes a liability of the issuing entity. stablecoins aspire to achieve the functions of traditional money without relying on confidence in an issuer — such as a central bank — to stand behind the “ money. ” for some potential stablecoins, a close assessment suggests users may have no rights with respect to the underlying assets or any issuer. we have already seen the growth of massive payments networks on existing digital platforms, such as alibaba and wechat. so far, these networks operate within a jurisdiction based on the sovereign currency as the unit of account, and balances are see https : / / www. npci. org. in / product - statistics / upi - product - statistics. - 4transferable in and out of bank or credit card accounts. we have also seen the issuance of stablecoins on a smaller scale, such as gemini or paxos. what would set facebook ’ s libra apart, if it were to proceed, is the combination of an active - user network representing more than a third of the global population with the issuance of a private digital currency opaquely tied to a basket of sovereign currencies. 8 libra, like any stablecoin project with global scale and scope, must address a core set of legal and regulatory challenges. a significant concern regarding facebook ’ s libra project is the potential for a payment system to