”. absent sizeable structural reforms, the main risk would be what the report calls an “ inflationfirst ” scenario, where a rise in inflation would eventually force central banks to increase monetary policy interest rates, which in turn would prevent an acceleration of economic activity. i fully support the report ’ s emphasis on the importance of structural reforms to place the global economy on a sound footing and to make markets work better. in fact, the crisis has clearly shown the limits of the self - regulatory capabilities of markets, particularly financial markets, and their consequences on financial and, ultimately, macroeconomic stability. i also agree with the report ’ s main policy advice, centred inter alia on investments in r & d and incentives for equity financing over debt. however, in order to ensure an orderly adjustment of the global economy and to allow structural reforms to rapidly kick - start the real economy, appropriate macroeconomic policies are also needed. in this vein, i do not share the report ’ s negative assessment of the current monetary policy stance that would be “ harming the prospects of a sustainable recovery ”. this view – which appears not in line with the one expressed in other recent oecd assessments and policy bis central bankers ’ speeches suggestions – seems to me to overlook the reasons behind the current monetary stance, while focusing too much on the possible unintended consequences. in a context of very low commodity prices and long - lasting weakness of both global and domestic demand, in advanced countries disinflationary pressures and slack in the economy are still high, although with differences among the main economies. under these circumstances, a wait - and - see approach to monetary policy would be unwarranted : rather, central banks observe economic developments, ponder risks and may need to act forcefully. the current low level of policy rates is the appropriate reaction to current cyclical conditions, not an arbitrary choice of central banks ; a less accommodative stance, particularly given the high debt levels as a consequence of the crisis, could lead to a deflationary spiral with severe consequences both for the real economy and the financial sector. this holds true in particular for the euro area, where unused productive capacity and labour are greater than in other advanced economies. estimates by banca d ’ italia staff ( which do not consider further possible non - linear effects ) show that in the absence of the measures adopted by the ecb governing council between june 2014 and december 2015, both annual inflation and gdp growth in the area would be

the somewhat puzzling fall in aggregate productivity growth in the aftermath of the crisis. this holds true for non - financial companies in both advanced countries and, above all, emes. the firm - level analysis highlights a structural change in the evolution of productivity across companies and sectors : from a single cutting - edge group of “ incumbent ” companies bis central bankers ’ speeches displaying high levels – but low or negative growth rates – of productivity to the emergence of a second group of “ high - growth ” companies characterised by faster productivity growth. this finding suggests that it is critical to understand the drivers that underlie these changes. the report rightly emphasises the impact that corporate finance decisions may exert on productivity. four financial strategies are identified that make a difference between high and low productivity growth at a company level : higher spending on r & d ; lower debt - to - equity ratio ; higher free cash flow ; and more m & a deals. the analysis sheds lights on critical macro - financial linkages. what i find very instructive is that these strategies are all part and parcel of the structural policies that are called upon to trigger economic risk - taking, investment and ultimately growth. as far as financial markets are concerned, two fundamental drivers of change are technology and regulation. this is well documented in the chapter of the report on stock markets, which i find particularly insightful. here, there seems to be an issue of finding the right balance between the advantage of having more numerous and more specialised trading venues and the disadvantage of fragmenting trading liquidity. the possibility to trade a listed share in various markets promotes competition among providers of financial services. the availability of “ dark ” trading venues ( i. e. with little transparency in pre - trade information ) seems to allow institutional investors and other large players to place sizeable orders without giving rise to adverse price changes. on the other hand, it is important that such “ dark ” trading pools do not undermine a level playing field and a correct handling of conflicts of interest. putting the various types of trading venues on a more even footing is the objective of some recent regulatory initiatives in advanced countries. the availability of consolidated real - time price and volume data to market participants is another important factor. the report also considers under the notion of fragmentation issues related to the fundamental heterogeneity of economic agents and conditions. a case in point is life expectancy, which varies greatly ( both in levels and trends ) across individuals depending on socio - economic factors such as education