slide 5 ). these correlations were sometimes not easy to detect simply because, contrary to headline inflation, underlying price pressures are often moving through the global economy at varying speeds, as it takes time for changes in supply and demand in one country to affect prices elsewhere. of course, such correlations say little about the ultimate source of the shock, and hence the appropriate policy response. in an integrated global economy, inflation may co - move across economies for two reasons : either because of common shocks that hit all countries simultaneously, even if not symmetrically, such as the oil shocks of the 1970s, or because of idiosyncratic or regional shocks, such as the asian financial crisis of 1997 or the euro area sovereign debt crisis of 2012, that are large enough to affect output and prices worldwide. today, we are seeing both forces at work. household wealth from accumulated savings boosts corporate pricing power the common shock relates to the impact of the pandemic on global household wealth and firms ’ pricing power. strict lockdowns across virtually all countries allowed households around the world to accumulate huge amounts of involuntary excess savings. in the united states, these amount to about usd 2. 7 trillion, or 16. 9 % of annual disposable income in 2019. in the euro area, this figure is € 900 billion, or 12. 4 % of annual disposable income in 2019. to a considerable extent, these savings stem from the forceful fiscal policy response to the crisis. in the euro area, for example, furlough schemes have helped keep many people in employment, protecting labour incomes, while us households benefited from generous stimulus cheques ( slide 6, left - hand side ). although excess savings are distributed unequally both across and within economies, they have visibly boosted corporate pricing power by generating an environment in which consumers worldwide are both more willing and more able to tolerate price increases. 3 / 8 bis central bankers'speeches this can be seen in two ways. one is through the particularly strong price dynamics in contact - intensive services industries. restaurants, cinemas and other service providers are increasing their prices as economies reopen ( slide 6, right - hand side ). in the euro area, these sectors are currently the main drivers of services price inflation, which is at its highest level in 20 years. these catch - up effects are not happening simultaneously across economies, as social contact restrictions are being removed at different speeds. but they are happening in most advanced economies because fiscal policy has

in crisis times, the demand for cash surges even higher. at mid - march this year, the weekly increase in the value of banknotes in circulation almost reached the historical peak of €19 billion. 4 the ecb ’ s debate on cbdcs is therefore mainly analytical. whether and when it becomes more of a policy debate will largely depend on the preferences of households. we are always willing to innovate in the form of money and payment services that we provide. if, for instance, people voiced a preference tomorrow for plastic or polymer banknotes rather than the traditional paper ones, we would happily accommodate them. in the same vein, we closely follow technological developments and reflect on the type of money and payments that are best suited to the needs of an increasingly digital economy. the lack of a concrete “ business case ” for a cbdc at present should and does not stop us from seriously exploring the optimal design of a cbdc so that we will be well prepared should we ever 1 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches take a policy decision to issue a digital currency. to this end, we have set up a task force on a cbdc within the eurosystem. let me give you a preview of our deliberations, starting with different design options. legally solid despite fancy design? most of the money issued by central banks is in fact already digital, albeit not called cbdc. this is true for the bulk of the money issued through our wholesale credit operations with our counterparties. at present, access to the central bank balance sheet offers the possibility to access digital central bank money. what could change in the future is the scope of the parties eligible to access our central bank balance sheets. indeed, this lies at the heart of the discussion on cbdcs. a wholesale cbdc, restricted to a limited group of financial counterparties, would be largely business as usual. however, a retail cbdc, accessible to all, would be a game changer. so a retail cbdc is now our main focus. setting up a cbdc would require a solid legal basis, in line with the principle of conferral under eu law. one key consideration here is whether a retail cbdc could and should have the same legal tender status as banknotes and coins. in practice, legal tender status implies that a cbdc would have to be usable at any location and under any condition, possibly even offline. without legal tender status, the legal basis would need to be clarified