samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
been viewed this way by society as a whole. i would like to thank stuart berry, mark joy, karen jude, harsh mehta, james talbot and matt trott for their help in the preparation of these remarks. 4 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches

philipp m hildebrand : monetary policy challenges – swiss exports in a globalised world speech by mr philipp m hildebrand, chairman of the governing board of the swiss national bank, at the swiss mission to the european union, brussels, 23 november 2010. * * * i would like to thank caroline schmidt and rita kobel rohr for their valuable support in drafting this speech. 1. introduction i am pleased and honored to speak to you today at the swiss mission to the eu. thank you for the invitation and the warm welcome. in the past few decades, globalisation has had a deep impact on the world economy. whether the world has indeed become “ flat ”, as tom friedman put it, remains to be seen. certainly, the notion of a “ global village ”, in which all aspects of life are ever more interconnected, is an apt description of our world today. one of the areas most affected by globalisation is the world economy, which has become highly integrated. this is due not only to technological innovation, but also to the fact that countries have deliberately opened up their economies ; a phenomenon witnessed around the globe in recent decades. the results – greater trade and financial flows – have brought many countries enormous prosperity. this applies to the eu and it certainly applies to switzerland with its small home market. however, the most recent financial and economic crisis has clearly demonstrated that the growing integration of the world economy also entails a number of risks. the international integration of finance and production flows made it possible for the sub - prime crisis in the us real estate market to spread so quickly to so many countries. the global extent of the crisis called for rapid and coordinated intervention. and that is exactly what happened – governments and central banks around the world joined together and took decisive action. the extent of this cooperation was unprecedented in both scale and scope. it prevented a worst - case outcome. nonetheless, the world economy experienced the most severe financial and economic crisis since the 1930s. what was impressive about the crisis was the speed and force with which it spread not only through financial markets, but also impacted world trade. in just three quarters, world trade contracted by 15 %. this was by far the most significant decline since world war two. 1 the slump was particularly pronounced in the goods trade. 2 as a small open economy, switzerland could not escape this historical collapse in world trade. exports and, in particular, goods exports were hit hard. however, compared with other industrialised countries – especially
smes cannot capture a share of the outsourcing market that is now dominated by countries such as india. to take this leap forward, the focus must be on innovation and increasing productivity and competitiveness. the strategy may need strengthened financial support and perhaps more trade and export market facilitation. in singapore, for instance, a new sme loan programme has been introduced to help singaporean firms penetrate global markets. as a start, a similar scheme could be devised under the recently launched caribbean single market programme to enable caribbean smes to develop the potential and capacity to export. while most smes will remain focused on the local market, those that are likely to thrive and expand are the ones that embrace the export challenge and are prepared to adopt new technology, develop new information systems and devise innovative products that are globally competitive. here at home, as part of its diversification effort, the government is investing in the development of a cluster of technology industries linked to the university of trinidad and tobago. this cluster is expected to develop a range of innovative products that can compete at the global level. there is no reason why this should not be fertile ground for the expansion of the sme sector. let me end by again congratulating the nova committee of the trinidad and tobago chamber of industry and commerce for arranging this most important forum. i am sure that the dialogue and the exchange of ideas and experiences that will take place over the next two days will help the sme sectors throughout the caribbean come closer to realizing their potential and expanding their contribution to the transformation of the region. the future of the region is in their hands.

rather it is a free informal alternative to going to court. over the next several months the ombudsman ’ s office will intensify its education and outreach programs through direct contact with the public and through its new website. i would like to invite the financial sector to join us in educating the public on financial matters. let me once again thank you for joining us at this ground breaking event. i have full confidence that all parties present here today will ensure the success of the operations of the office of the financial servicesombudsman which will redound to the benefit of our society as a whole.
christian noyer : is the euro a success story? speech by mr christian noyer, governor of the bank of france, at the paris europlace international forum, tokyo, 29 november 2006. * * * it is a great pleasure for me to be here today and to have the opportunity to address such a distinguished audience. i want to talk to you about a success story : the euro. as you well know, there have been difficult times for european integration. the treaty creating a constitution for europe was not ratified last year and the future of political integration is fraught with uncertainties. also, much remains to be done, in terms of structural reform, if the european countries want to achieve the same level of long term growth as other developed economies. nevertheless, i feel very optimistic. and the reason for this optimism is the euro. the single currency has the potential to bring enormous benefits to european nations, which they can use to achieve a high degree of stability and prosperity. 1 ) what are those benefits? the first, and most obvious, is price stability. over the last five years, inflation has stayed broadly in line with the price stability objective set by the european central bank, i. e. inflation below but close to 2 % over the medium - term. gone are the days when european citizens had to worry about the purchasing power of their savings. this stability goes beyond the behaviour of prices. inflation expectations themselves have been remarkably stable, including during the recent period when oil prices jumped to levels no one could have expected only a year ago. this, by itself, illustrates the credibility achieved by the eurosystem, after only six years of existence. second, european households and companies are reaping the benefits of that credibility. long term interest rates stand at an historically low level, around 100 basis points below the level in the united states. so, even after the recent increases in short term rates, monetary and financial conditions remain extremely favourable for investment and growth. and indeed, we might be witnessing in europe the start of period of sustained and stable growth, at least if current projections and surveys prove to be right in the coming months. a third benefit of the euro is the boost it gives to financial integration in europe. in many segments, european financial markets have reached the depth and liquidity which, up to now, were the preserve of dollar markets. this stimulates productive investment, helps in restructuring ( as witnessed by the current wave of m & as ) and, more

##inish the binding nature or the efficiency of the pact. let me conclude by mentioning how much we have achieved in europe over the last fifty years. the eu has reached a diversified but, broadly speaking, very ambitious level of integration : it is complex because the degree of integration is largely dependent on which areas are at stake, it is ambitious since, in some areas precisely, the system is completely integrated and relies on one single policy. the euro, in that regard, is both the symbol of our achievements and our best hope for the future of european integration. thank you.
short sterling futures contracts. changes in implied forward rates normally taken from : 11 : 30am to 12 : 30pm for interest rate announcements ; 10 : 00am to 12 : 00pm for ir publication ; and 9 : 00am to 10 : 30am for minutes publication. reuters measure : difference between the actual repo rate change and the mean expectation of the economists

er hub better data, to inform better policy - deputy governor sharon donnery 16 december 2019 speech opening remarks at the sixth conference on household finance and consumption good morning, and welcome to the sixth conference on household finance and consumption1. i would like to thank both my colleagues in the central bank of ireland and the ecb for all their hard work in organising what promises to be a fascinating network event. looking at the programme, and the range of topics ; from inflation, housing, credit, and business cycles, to inequality, demographic change, and of course, monetary policy, you ’ re in for a stimulating couple of days. what i see as a common thread across this diverse range of issues is ultimately, how better data informs better policy. like many policy institutions, a decade ago, the crisis, prompted us to reflect on the type of data we collect, how it is analysed, and, crucially, how the analysis feeds through to policy decisions. the work that you, the network, are doing and what we will discuss today, is critical to how we make policy, how we decide, and how what we do affects society. but it ’ s important we don ’ t just think about the gaps in data that emerged in the past. we also need to develop data in areas that have grown and changed recently, such as non - bank, or market based finance. finally, today, i wish to note how data can enhance debates and policy discussion where before it had been unavailable. for example, today the central bank of ireland is launching a report on the national claims information database ( ncid ), a report that will add important numbers and facts to a widely debated topic here in ireland. understanding household balance sheets through data, the irish household finance and consumption survey ( 2013 ), provided really important insights in to household finances in the wake of the crisis. we know that high - leverage households were twice as likely to face credit constraints, even after controlling for different income shocks faced by households ( leblanc & lydon 2019 ). the cross - country evidence paints a similar picture – amongst euro area households in 2013 / 14, irish households were the most indebted and the most likely to be credit constrained – almost one - in - five households at the time ( ibid ). heavily indebted households reduce their spending by significantly more in response to a given income shock. this partly explains why ireland experienced one of the largest drops in consumer spending during the
##ness of bank and government finance. secured and unsecured money markets : the us and the euro area experience money markets are vital funding markets for financial institutions. i would like to highlight some key developments across various money market segments from the onset of the financial crisis to its most critical point in the autumn of 2008, and the trends that have been observed since then. while my main focus will be on the euro area, i will allude to some us developments as well, not only because the crisis had its origins in the us sub - prime market, but also to underscore the importance of the different structural characteristics of the two financial systems in determining which money market trends affected banks ’ access to funding most. bis central bankers ’ speeches the start of the financial crisis in the summer of 2007 was triggered by a sudden re - pricing in the us sub - prime mortgage market, on account of risks not being properly reflected in the price of the related instruments, in particular mortgage - backed securities and collateralised debt obligations. a market - wide reassessment of financial risk led to sharp increases in premia and spreads across credit markets. opacity in banks ’ balance sheets, coupled with uncertainty about the real valuation of their assets, led to acute tensions in the markets for credit instruments. the crisis became systemic when these tensions spread to money markets worldwide in early august 2007. some banks were facing direct exposures to “ toxic ” sub - prime assets ; others needed liquidity to be able to honour committed credit lines to so - called conduits, bank - sponsored investment funds. these off - balance sheet entities, a part of the large shadow banking sector in the us, became unable to roll over short - term financing in the us asset - backed commercial paper market ( abcp ) amid great uncertainty about asset valuations. 1 these events reinforced each other and generated uncertainty about both the solvency and liquidity of money market participants, as the extent of sub - prime exposures was unknown and counterparties could not distinguish good banks from bad. 2 longer - term unsecured money markets, the most heavily exposed to counterparty credit risk, showed signs of stress, as signalled by the spread between the three - month unsecured interbank rate ( libor for the us and euribor for the euro area ) and the overnight index swap in three months ’ time ( ois ), a standard measure of tensions in unsecured markets. 3 chart 1 shows the spread

. people were interested in each other and took time to greet each other, like bikers still do now. you see that a lot less these days. 5 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches
sense, it is a day that i expect we all are looking forward to. thank you. i would be pleased to take your questions. bis central bankers ’ speeches

. in 2005 the banco de espana instituted its bank customer ’ s portal. this provides consumers with overall information on the risk characteristics of different products, on their rights and on the commissions applied by institutions to their customers. a provisional evaluation of the results is very favourable, but at the same time leaves no room for complacency. this is an area where we must make greater efforts, improving co - ordination with other supervisory and consumer protection agencies. issues as basic as the advisability of diversifying saving between entities and products, or the absence of high returns unless greater risk is involved, are not yet part of consumers ’ basic financial culture. and while this remains so, consumers will be exposing themselves to risks without being aware they are incurring them. national co - ordination mechanisms between the ministry of economy and supervisors were also strengthened in 2005. in response to ecofin ’ s recommendations, a memorandum of understanding was signed by the ministry of economy ( not only in its main function, but also in its capacity as supervisor of the insurance industry ), the banco de espana and the cnmv ( national securities market commission ) on co - operation in financial stability. this agreement, which is the natural extension to the national realm of that signed in the eu by the ministries of finance, central banks and banking supervisors, without modifying their respective powers, simply gives written expression to what were already fluid relations between the ministry and supervisors. as a direct consequence of this agreement, a national financial stability committee was set up and has since begun operating. as usual, the final part of my address shall be devoted to the recognition and appreciation of the banco de espana staff for their effort and dedication, and to the members of the executive commission and of the governing council for their support and collaboration. especially so on this occasion, as this speech marks the end of an intense and enriching professional experience for me. it has been a privilege to work, along with the deputy governor, the directors - general and the members of this council, at the helm of this institution over the past six years. i believe that during this period we have succeeded in preparing this institution for the role it must play as a consequence of the new institutional framework emu membership entails and the role the spanish economy is called on to perform on the global stage. this has all been possible thanks to the efforts and dedication of our staff, and also thanks to your professionalism, steadfastness, independent judgment and institutional loyalty,
, including some quantitative estimates that draw on the analysis of ammer and others ( 2016 ). 4 for a more detailed discussion, see fischer ( 2016 ) and bernanke ( 2015 ). 5 see international monetary fund ( 2017 ). 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches

salvatore rossi : the launch of solvency ii – the implementation of the new regime : open issues, implications for business models, and effects on institutional and financial communication * * * keynote address by mr salvatore rossi, senior deputy governor of the bank of italy and president of ivass ( istituto per la vigilanza sulle assicurazioni ), at the ivass conference 2016, rome, 3 march 2016. ladies and gentlemen, i am delighted to welcome you to this conference on the launch of solvency ii. i want to thank victoria saporta, chair of the international association of insurance supervisors ( iais ), gabriel bernardino, chair of the european insurance and occupational pensions authority ( eiopa ), frank grund of bafin and all the other panelists, for kindly accepting our invitation. i also want to thank you all, the audience, for being so numerous. this is the proof that the topic we will be discussing today – namely the solvency ii implementation challenges we are facing only two months after the entry into force of the new regime – is of great relevance, for both regulators and the industry. indeed, this is not the first conference on solvency ii and will not be the last. actually a lot of other conferences and seminars have already taken place since the project started. but we still need some more discussion, and a deeper and wider comprehension of the implications of this multifaceted issue. we will start with a keynote speech by gabriel bernardino. two panel discussions will follow. the first one on the most relevant and controversial aspects of solvency ii implementation. the second one devoted to a specific but crucial feature of the new framework : information disclosure. the panelists are very distinguished and well known representatives of both the supervisory community and the industry. the moderators will be ferdinando giugliano, former editorial writer of financial times, now at the italian newspaper la repubblica, and fausto parente of ivass. alberto corinti, member of the board of ivass and of the management board of eiopa, will offer some concluding remarks. i am sure that we will gain important insights from today ’ s debate, also based on everybody ’ s concrete experience in the past few weeks of the new regime. now a few introductory words on my part. solvency ii was born on 1st january 2016 after a pregnancy lasting more than 10 years. we all remember the last thrilling moments when the directive omnibus ii,
in the case of the reserve bank of new zealand : • the objective is clear - we must deliver inflation outcomes of between 0 and 3 %. • also clear is the division of responsibility - it is the governor who is solely charged with delivering the agreed inflation objective. • to that end, the governor has decision - making authority required to undertake the task delegated to him - ministers are not consulted on monetary policy matters in the normal course of events. indeed, to preserve the independence of the central bank, ministers are not informed of our periodic monetary policy decisions until just ahead of the public announcement and well after the decisions have been formally committed. • having assigned the governor the responsibility and authority to make decisions in line with the specified objective, we have a board of directors whose primary task is to monitor the governor ’ s performance and thereby to hold him accountable for the quality of his decisions. ultimately, the board could recommend the governor ’ s dismissal should they feel that he is not diligently or competently pursuing the objective established for him - although, of course, there are intermediate courses of action available to the board before reaching such a drastic conclusion. • and finally, our framework demands a high degree of transparency. for example, the formal target for monetary policy is established in a published agreement. the bank is obliged to publish formal statements laying out how monetary policy has evolved and why, and pointing the way forward for future decisions. a select committee of the parliament routinely reviews the bank ’ s conduct of policy in a public hearing. and while the act provides for the government to over - ride the agreed policy targets agreement in certain circumstances, it also requires that to be done in a public process. specific issues of institutional form let me deal with a selection of the more specific issues which emerge in the design of an inflation targeting regime. this is necessarily just a small subset of the issues we could discuss, but hopefully i can shed some perspectives on some of the more significant institutional choices. an independent central bank? inflation targeting and central bank independence tend to go hand in hand although it is certainly possible to conceive of structures where that is not the case. the case for central bank independence is well understood and well covered in the literature on time inconsistency. in essence, the public, and particularly its elected representatives, are likely to face incentives which bias them in favour of tolerating the risk of increased inflation. that bias emerges as a consequence of the long and variable lags associated with

percent every year for next decade to meet 1. 5°c paris target iea ( 20 04 2017 ) deep energy transformation needed by 2050 to limit rise in global temperature endorsement unclassified