. existing firms for existing firms, we consider brexit as part of our ongoing supervisory approach. as i have described already, my vision for the irish financial services sector is that it is well managed, well regulated and sustainably serves the needs of the economy and its consumers over the long term. in this context, when the central bank assesses the firms we regulate, we are essentially looking at four objectives from a prudential supervision perspective. regulated firms should : 1. have sufficient financial resources, including under a plausible but severe stress. 2. have sustainable business models. 3. be well governed, with appropriate cultures, effective risk management and control arrangements in place. 4. be able to recover if they get into difficulty, and if they cannot, they should be resolvable in an orderly manner without significant externalities or taxpayer costs. brexit has the potential to affect each of these, and all financial services firms should be evaluating the impact of brexit on these aspects of their business. from a regulatory and supervisory perspective, a primary concern is to ensure that regulated firms that have business models with direct or indirect exposures to the uk economy address and plan appropriately for the potential negative impacts of brexit. therefore, we expect regulated firms across all sectors to consider, plan and adapt to the potential implications for their business models and revenue streams. it is the responsibility of firms ’ boards to assess the potential impact of brexit on their firm and to plan accordingly. this should include early engagement with the central bank and relevant uk authorities as appropriate. new or materially changing entities in terms of new entities or business lines, we have been working for some time with a range of firms who have recognised that they need to relocate some of their activities in order to continue to access the eu market after brexit. once again there are asymmetries here. brexit is an imposed and undesired cost for businesses. there is the potential cost of setting up a new business in a different location, 6 / 11 bis central bankers'speeches seeking authorisation, finding premises, relocating staff and so on. perhaps more importantly for some firms there are ongoing costs and frictions associated with reorganising business lines, funding flows, booking models, and so on. it is understandable that firms want to minimise these costs and frictions. but our gatekeeping role is hugely important in mitigating financial stability risks and protecting market integrity and customers in ireland

focussed on using brexit as an opportunity to diverge from eu rules and regulations, particularly in the area of financial services, although i note the cbi report published this week which suggests that this is not a uk business ambition19. in the short - term, the uk government is working to integrate the current body of eu financial services law into domestic uk law. in the medium - to - longer - term, however, the position is less certain. as i said at the outset, we do not yet have a final withdrawal agreement, despite the latest progress announced on 19 march ; nor is the future trading relationship known. as such, a risk of material divergence between the eu and uk regulatory frameworks is one which must occupy some time as part of wider brexit preparations. divergence in the future might be problematic for the following reasons. firstly, access to eu markets for financial services is based on the concept of equivalence, or the idea that the firms seeking access to the single market from outside the eu have broadly comparable regulatory requirements as those present in the eu. this seeks to ensure a level playing field for eu and non - eu firms ; maintain high prudential standards and investor protection outcomes ; and ensure financial stability aims are met by applying stringent standards to the riskiest firms operating in the eu, regardless of where their home country is. a materially divergent future uk regime would place any relationship based on equivalence in doubt, especially as equivalence assessments require an update periodically and there is no guarantee of the outcome of future assessments. this is clearly less than ideal in terms of building a long - term, mutually - beneficial framework of access between uk and eu financial markets. it also heightens political risk as a focus for the regulatory community given the potential disruption that a sudden withdrawal of equivalence could generate. from regulatory perspective it is desirable, given the size and role of london as a financial centre, that some form of sustainable link between the eu and the uk is found. indeed, it is important that the eu continues to play an active and engaged role in international financial markets and does not seek to introduce barriers to well - functioning markets where key risks can be managed appropriately. secondly, on a more practical level, following the uk ’ s departure from the eu there will be a loss of experience and expertise when uk regulators are no longer sitting at the table. whilst this might sound like a relatively minor issue given the other challenges brexit presents, as a regulator i