per se requires the fundamental ingredient of instilling trust and confidence. supervisors and authorities responsible for financial stability are presently contemplating the best options for strengthening of the risk sensitivity of the prudential framework, in the expectation of the emergence of a new financial architecture. one area remains that in the best interest of one and all, there should be increased trust - based cooperation between the financial service provider and the oversight authority. this basic ingredient is no doubt key to a continued successful development of an efficient and secure market infrastructure that meets the fast - changing needs of our financial sector. mutual cooperation can but benefit our financial system. while hsbc bank is engaged in marketing its custodian service provider role, our economy shall certainly gain in the process – our jurisdiction is projected in the global business arena as a credible international financial centre. allow me to congratulate this initiative of hsbc group and convey my best wishes to the management and staff of hsbc bank ( mauritius ) limited. i thank you for your attention. bis central bankers ’ speeches

other major central banks may not be taking “ moral hazard ” considerations into account. the ecb made it clear from the start of the turmoil that it attached large importance to the issue of the possible effects on future incentives and behaviour of banks of its actions, while noting that concerns about moral hazard should nevertheless not prevent from providing appropriate policy responses to the turmoil. more specifically, in the euro area concerns about sowing the seeds of moral hazard were mitigated by the observation that the ecb had not made changes to its existing operational framework from the start of the turmoil. indeed, although by changing the amounts and time patterns of liquidity provision and the occasional conduct of extraordinary refinancing operations, the ecb had departed from past regularities followed in the steering of liquidity conditions, it had not made structural changes to its existing operational framework that may be rightly or wrongly seen as aiming to provide relief to any specific financial institutions or sectors bearing substantial losses as a result of past imprudent risk taking. indeed, the ecb ’ s more active management of liquidity conditions was achieved by making few changes to its traditional way of using instruments and tools that were already part of its operational arsenal from the start of the turmoil. moreover, the focus of the ecb ’ s interventions was to adjust aggregate liquidity conditions so as to continue to deliver the desired monetary policy stance and to provide support to the money market and banking sector from a systemic perspective rather than with the purpose of supporting specific institutions in trouble. the ability to respond to the challenges posed by the turmoil using the existing toolbox reflected three key features of the eurosystem ’ s operational framework : ( 1 ) it grants access to central bank liquidity to a very large range of counterparties ; ( 2 ) it accepts a rather wide spectrum of private and public collateral in its refinancing operations and marginal lending facility ; and ( 3 ) it conducts open market operations on a relatively large scale, partly reflecting the level of reserve requirements. thus, unlike other central banks, from the start of the turmoil the eurosystem was in a position to reach a large number of financial institutions and to mitigate their funding liquidity risks, thereby providing support to the money market as a whole, without the need to make significant amendments to its framework. the large spectrum of assets accepted as collateral represented an additional channel through which the eurosystem helped to mitigate the refinancing risk of categories of assets for which secondary market liquid