towards a more political one, among other factors, have shaped how the constitutional principles underlying europe ’ s central banks are used. but the biggest test was the great financial crisis, which is still shaking the foundations of our societies today. what has changed for central banks? how have they adjusted? what changes are still needed? and what changes must be resisted? during the first half of the ecb ’ s existence, it only saw a few changes. one important one was the forward - looking adjustment concerning how the decision - making process worked. a voting rotation principle was proposed, which would cap the number of voting members at 21. this amendment to the ecb statute, proposed by the governing council, was adopted with no changes by the european council, commission and parliament. the governing council made use of the statute ’ s flexible adjustment procedure again last year following a suggestion of the general court on the interpretation of the role of the ecb regarding clearing and payment systems. this time around, the commission started to interfere with the minimal changes the ecb had recommended, followed by more extensive changes by the parliament and yet more by the council, which even added a new objective to this chapter on monetary functions and operations. these amendments – if adopted – would bring monetary policy instruments under the control of the legislators – a clear violation of the independence principle of the treaty. obviously, the treaty ’ s fundamental principles cannot be modified by this simplified amendment procedure. the discussion is ongoing. let me now turn to the operational side. in the ecb ’ s first ten years there was only a slight clarification of the quantitative definition of price stability, the ecb ’ s prime objective, which was subsequently defined as headline inflation of below, but close to, 2 % over the medium term. throughout the crisis, no further attempts to change the strategy, definition or numerical value of our objective gained any traction. however, during the crisis one could see a trend developing around monetary policy implementation, with major changes to instruments, communication and accountability. 2 / 6 bis central bankers'speeches outside the central bank, but influencing it on the institutional side, the major policy response to the crisis has been to strengthen emu and to attempt to reinforce economic coordination and amend the fiscal rules. additionally, a crisis management tool, the european stability mechanism, was created as an intergovernmental body outside the treaties. at the same time, a banking union was set up with a single supervisor, a single resolution authority and a still

operate efficiently without endangering sound fiscal positions in the longer term. moreover, governments are encouraged to push ahead with reforms relating to the size and structure of public expenditure and revenue, which will also create room for tax cuts and absorb the fiscal costs of population ageing. in the field of structural reforms allow me to refer briefly to the adoption of the broad economic policy guidelines. if implemented in a determined manner, structural reforms will contribute to expanding the euro area's potential for non - inflationary growth and to reducing its high level of unemployment. we are now at your disposal for questions.