together more than 30 central banks and supervisory authorities. the aims of this network include analysis of supervisory practices, of macroeconomic and financial risks, and the means for smoothing financing for the transition to a sustainable economy. undeniably, the implementation of all these aspects with some degree of harmonisation will be a difficult task. but you will agree with me that we are all facing a fundamental challenge and that, as such, we must spare no effort. allow me to refer briefly also to the role financial markets can play in this process of ecological transition. in capital markets we have seen some positive discrimination in the valuation of firms with a lower degree of exposure to climate change, albeit limitedly so. logically, and as in the case of banks, the markets should act as a catalyst for change 4 / 5 towards certain sustainable activities, while discouraging investment in particularly polluting industries. evidently, the attractiveness for investors of issues of green bonds is a sign of the growing concern over the effects of climate change. yet for the aforementioned transmission mechanisms to work properly, the volume of securities traded on these markets must reach a critical mass and be consistently catalogued. to achieve this, the initiatives developed within the european commission are essential : these include most notably the taxonomy for determining the activities that contribute to sustainability in environmental terms, and the “ ecological ” labelling of financial products. we need a common language that can be used both by debt issuers and potential investors, so that these markets may be developed. on this point of financial investments categorised as “ green ”, it is worth recalling that we as central banks are also active investors in financial markets, both in monetary policy operations and in portfolio management relating to reserves. in this connection, as acknowledged in the report by the network of central banks and supervisors, and as recently indicated by mario draghi, we are aware that environmental risks are not yet being built into most of this portfolio ’ s ratings, whether internal or devised by rating agencies. accordingly, in the eurosystem, a thorough review of these risk valuation processes is under way. the aim is to ensure us that all the relevant factors, including environmental ones, for the prudent management of the portfolio held by the central banks are being taken into account. in addition, i should point out that, like the ecb, we resolutely support the initiative recently launched by the european securities markets authority ( esma ). as the regulator of rating agencies,

, much less stockholders, be made whole. consistent with this view, the market clearly believes that large institutions are not too big for uninsured creditors to take at least some loss. spreads on large bank subordinated debt are wider than spreads on similar debt of large and highly rated nonbank financial institutions. indeed, there are no aaa - rated u. s. banking organizations. to be sure, failure to index deposit insurance ceilings has eroded the real purchasing power value of those ceilings. but there is no evidence of any detrimental effect on depositors or depositary institutions, with the possible exception of a small reduction in those profits that accrue from deposit guarantee subsidies that lower the cost of insured deposits. the current deposit insurance ceiling appears more than adequate to achieve the positive benefits of deposit insurance that i mentioned earlier in my statement, even if its real value were to erode further. another argument often raised by smaller banks regarding the need for increased deposit insurance coverage is their inability to match the competition from those large securities firms and bank holding companies with multiple bank affiliates, offering multiple insured accounts through one organization. the board agrees that such offerings are a misuse of deposit insurance. but, raising the coverage limit for each account is not a remedy since it would also increase the aggregate amount of insurance coverage that large multi - bank organizations would be able to offer. the disparity would remain. conclusion several aspects of the deposit insurance system need reform. the board supports, with some modifications, all of the recommendations the fdic made in the spring of 2001 except indexing the current $ 100, 000 ceiling. the thrust of our proposed modifications would call for a wider permissible range for the size of the fund relative to insured liabilities, reduced variation of the insurance premium as the relative size of the fund changes with banking and economic conditions, and a positive premium net of rebates. there may come a time when the board finds that households and businesses with modest resources are having difficulty in placing their funds in safe vehicles and / or that there is reason to be concerned that the level of deposit coverage could endanger financial stability. should either of those events occur, the board would call our concerns to the attention of the congress and support adjustments to the ceiling by indexing or other methods. but today, in our judgment, neither financial stability, nor depositors, nor depositories are being disadvantaged by the current ceiling. raising the ceiling now would extend the safety net, increase the government