, in close consultation with public health and medical professionals. but all of us have our own decisions to make as well, and those decisions will depend on public confidence that it is again safe to undertake various activities. from an economic perspective, we hope to learn a lot from your experiences and from what you ’ re hearing from your colleagues, customers, and communities : how they ’ re coping with that uncertainty now, how they ’ re thinking about a future that ’ s harder to plan for, and what matters most as they navigate the path. the feedback we get from our community and business contacts has always been crucial in how we conduct monetary policy. in extraordinary times such as these, it takes on even greater importance. i want to thank you again for providing that insight and look forward to the conversation. thank you. 1 / 1 bis central bankers'speeches

first six propositions, has been largely validated by modern research. what about the other propositions? friedman ’ s seventh point, that money affects real outcomes in the short run but that in the long run output is determined entirely by real factors, such as enterprise and thrift, is of particular importance for both theory and policy. the proposition that money has no real effects in the long run, referred to as the principle of long - run neutrality, is universally accepted today by monetary economists. when friedman wrote, however, the conventional view held that monetary policy could be used to affect real outcomes - for example, to lower the rate of unemployment - for an indefinite period. the idea that monetary policy had long - run effects - or, in technical language, that the phillips curve relationship between inflation and unemployment could be exploited in the long run proved not only wrong but quite harmful. attempts to exploit the phillips curve tradeoff, which persisted despite friedman ’ s warnings in his 1968 presidential address to the american economic association, contributed significantly to the great inflation of the 1970s - after the great depression, the second most serious monetary policy mistake of the twentieth century. the diagnosis of inflation in friedman ’ s eighth proposition, also controversial when he wrote, is likewise widely accepted today. of course, as we all know, friedman noted the close connection between inflation and money growth, though carefully acknowledging that excessive money growth could have many causes. as milton and rose discussed in chapter 9 of the 1980 edition of free to choose, popular views in the 1960s and 1970s ( and even the views of some federal reserve officials ) held that inflation could arise from a variety of non - monetary sources, including the power of unions and corporations and the greediness of oil - producing countries. an unfortunate implication of these views, whose deficiencies were revealed by bitter experience under president nixon, was that wage - price controls and other administrative measures could successfully address inflation. we understand today that the great inflation would simply not have been possible without the excessively expansionist monetary policies of the late 1960s and 1970s. some of friedman ’ s descriptive propositions remain the subject of active research. for example, much research has investigated both theoretically and empirically the interactions of fiscal policy, monetary policy, and inflation. friedman ’ s view that fiscal deficits are inflationary only if they result in money creation, his ninth proposition, remains broadly accepted, but work by scholars such as thomas sargent, neil wallace, and michael woodford has shown that these links can