was minus €93 billion in distressed countries. of course, in principle firms from distressed countries can issue securities in non - distressed countries. in practice, however, it is legally complicated due to issues of different governing law, especially when securities are traded along a chain of financial intermediaries. this analysis points to two missing pieces in the euro area financial market : lack of retail banking integration and lack of capital market integration. the low level of retail banking integration reflects several factors, but diverging approaches to supervision and resolution are certainly among them. for one, the persistence of national borders in a european financial market has in the past created compliance costs and reduced the synergies of banking integration. a european commission survey in 2005 found that opaque supervisory approval procedures were a major deterrent to cross - border banking m & as. 4 moreover, national considerations may have reinforced the fragmentation of retail markets during the crisis. for example, some commentators have argued that supervisors erected de facto “ internal capital controls ” 5 within the euro area, which restricted the flow of funds between banks and within cross - border banks. a similar pattern can be observed in how national authorities in the euro area have dealt with failing banks. in general, non - viable banks were merged with other national banks, rather than being wound down or broken up and sold off. thus, what could have been an opportunity to increase foreign competition in domestic markets, and indeed to work through the crisis more quickly, in some cases ended up increasing national concentration. to give a comparison with the us, the fdic has resolved around 500 banks since 2008, mainly by selling parts of banks to other banks, whereas the equivalent figure for the euro area is around 50. 6 all this suggests that the move towards a genuine banking union in the euro area could help create the conditions for deeper retail banking integration. a single supervisory mechanism ( ssm ) should lead to harmonisation of rules and standards, and also remove distortions created by national borders. and a single resolution mechanism ( srm ) should ensure that see ecb report on financial integration in europe, march 2007. an example of this view is veron, n. ( 2013 ), “ banking nationalism and the european crisis ”, october. sapir, a. and wolff, g. ( 2013 ), “ the neglected side of banking union ”, note presented at the informal ecofin 14 september 2013, vilnius. bis central bankers ’ speeches banks are resolved from a european perspective and according to least

localised shocks. this would create private risk - sharing across the euro area and shield regions from localised credit crunches. but a level playing field for banking would also enable risk reduction. increased cross - border competition between banks, backed by a solid system of european supervision and the winding down of unwarranted national protections, could further incentivize banks into getting their balance sheets in order. at the same time, the srf and edis would also constitute a form of private risk - sharing by providing a final, powerful backstop. they enable bank resolution, limit contagion in the case of bank defaults thereby contributing to safeguarding overall financial stability. this, in turn, would reduce the need for public risk - sharing in the first place. such an approach is borne out by the experience of other advanced economies, such as the united states, where hundreds of banks were resolved successfully by the federal deposit insurance corporation with no long - term fiscal costs. while the case for completing the banking union is strong, supporting edis is seen by some as tilting at windmills. indeed, three years after the initial commission proposal, progress has been very limited. but the potential benefits of edis are not the illusions of a romantic daydreamer like don quixote ; they are, in fact, very real. edis would provide uniform confidence in deposits across europe which would be beneficial for all european economies, as no single banking system is immune to a potential bank default. edis would therefore further underpin emu by ensuring that a €1 deposit is just as safe, and just as valuable, wherever you are in the euro area. fostering the resilient and sustainable development of europe ’ s financial landscape completing the post - crisis agenda is therefore crucial, but we should not only look back. after dealing with banking sector fragilities, we should now be shifting our attention to the steadily growing non - banking system, which is changing europe ’ s financial landscape and whose potential to contribute to growth has not been fully unlocked. a range of banking activities is increasingly carried out by non - banks, notably insurance companies and the investment fund sector at large. total assets of the euro area investment fund sector have expanded by roughly 170 % between 2008 and 2017, on account of both net cash inflows and rising asset valuations. 2 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches deeper and more efficient bond and equity markets in europe would permit economies of scale and allow capital