mitigating policies. the potential for overlap seems ample. given the global mandates of the fsb and the imf, effective collaboration could have these two organisations focussing on the analysis of linkages and contagion channels across the main macro areas and on developing policy bis central bankers ’ speeches options to contain spillover risk. the esrb, the fsoc and analogous national and regional institutions elsewhere could focus on sources of risk arising within their jurisdictions and devise policy measures to address domestic developments. the coming years will be crucial to assess the functioning of the new framework and to minimize potential inefficiencies. references altunbas, y., l. gambacorta and d. marques - ibanez ( 2010 ), “ does monetary policy affect bank risk - taking? ”, ecb working paper, no. 1166. angelini, p., s. neri and f. panetta ( 2010 ), “ monetary and macroprudential policies ”, mimeo, banca d ’ italia. bank of england ( 2009 ), “ the role of macroprudential policy : a discussion paper ”, november. bean, c. ( 2003 ), “ asset prices, financial imbalances and monetary policy : are inflation targets enough? ”, bis working papers, no. 140. borio, c. ( 2003 ), “ towards a macroprudential framework for financial supervision and regulation? ”, bis working papers, no. 128. borio, c. ( 2010 ), “ implementing a macroprudential framework : blending boldness and realism ”, keynote address for the bis - hkma research conference on “ financial stability : towards a macroprudential approach ”, honk kong sar, 5 – 6 july 2010 ( available at http : / / www. bis. org / repofficepubl / hkimr201007. 12c. pdf ). borio, c., and h. zhu ( 2008 ), “ capital regulation, risk - taking and monetary policy : a missing link in the transmission mechanism? ”, bis working papers, no. 268. carosio, g. ( 2010 ), “ central banking after the crisis : responsibilities, strategies, instruments ” paper presented at the oenb – 38th economic conference, june 1. catte, p., p. cova, p. pagano and i. visco ( 2010 ),

the country. some of the bcs in the past have abused the trust placed in them by the banking system and defrauded their customers. as bcs generally serve a less ‘ financially literate ’ population, it is important that their activities are brought under closer scrutiny by the banks. the banks have to take ownership of bcs that they employ and also put in place appropriate grievance redressal mechanism for cases involving them. ( ii ) msmes : rbi has recently set out guidelines on ‘ framework for revival and rehabilitation of micro, small and medium enterprises ’ for early resolution of stress in the accounts of msmes, following an ordinance by government of india. under this framework, the revival and rehabilitation of msme units having loan limits up to rs. 25 crore is envisaged. further, with a view to provide timely financial support to msmes facing financial difficulties during their life cycle, rbi had advised the banks to review their existing lending policies and incorporating therein, among others, provisions for sanctioning of standby credit facility in case of term loans, additional working capital limits, mid term review of regular working capital limits, and timelines for credit decisions. b. synergizing the roles of pccos and internal banking ombudsmen ( ibos ) in the banks : as i understand the customer grievance redressal architecture in the banking sector suffers from certain structural inconsistencies. i am compelled to make this statement as i see scope for greater role clarity and synergy in how the pccos & the ibos in the banks operate. i believe the pccos which act as bcsbi ’ s nodal point of contact with the member banks and serve as extended arms of bcsbi for monitoring implementation of codes in the banks at all levels must play a more preventive role. for that to happen, the pcco needs to be suitably senior in hierarchy with reporting lines to the ceo / customer service committee of the board. i understand, however, that currently this is not uniformly so. similarly, the office of the internal banking ombudsman which has been in place in the banks for almost last two years does not seem to have become an effective forum. our objective in institutionalizing the office of ibo was to ensure resolution of a majority of the complaints at the level of bank itself. office of ibo was envisaged as the ultimate authority to which all unresolved / partially resolved complaints were to be