s criteria and have proposed grandfathering as a possible solution. others have raised questions about whether the leverage ratio or the risk - based capital framework provides the more appropriate calibration benchmark for the minimum longterm debt requirement. comments from foreign banks have also addressed our proposal to impose internal long - term debt requirements on the u. s. intermediate holding companies of foreign banks and have asked, among other things, whether the proposed requirement should vary more depending on the resolution strategy of the parent foreign bank. we are currently carefully reviewing these comments. one thing is clear : the long - term debt requirement is a critical component in ending too big to fail. the long - term debt requirement together with rigorous resolution plans and operational preparedness, the capital surcharges along with the capital stress tests, and the availability of sufficient amounts of high - quality liquidity where it is most likely to be needed will all substantially decrease the risk that a large financial institution ’ s distress could pose to the broader financial system and help ensure that no banking institution is too large and too complex to fail. they will move us closer to our goal of a safer, more responsible, and more resilient financial system. references adrian, tobias, michael fleming, or shachar, and erik vogt ( 2015 ). “ has u. s. corporate bond market liquidity deteriorated? “ federal reserve bank of new york, liberty street economics ( blog ), october 5. bis central bankers ’ speeches adrian, tobias, michael fleming, daniel stackman, and erik vogt ( 2015 ). “ what ’ s driving dealer balance sheet stagnation? “ federal reserve bank of new york, liberty street economics ( blog ), august 21. adrian, tobias, michael fleming, erik vogt, and zachary wojtowicz ( 2016a ), “ corporate bond market liquidity redux : more price - based evidence, ” federal reserve bank of new york, liberty street economics ( blog ), february 9. - - - - - - - - - ( 2016b ), “ further analysis of corporate bond market liquidity, ” federal reserve bank of new york, liberty street economics ( blog ), february 10. bank for international settlements, committee on the global financial system ( 2016 ). “ fixed income market liquidity ( pdf ), ” cgfs papers, no. 55. basel, switzerland : bis, january. blanchard, olivier ( 2016 ). “ the u. s. phillips

industries, regions, and nations. decisions about policies to directly address climate change should be made by the elected branches of government and thus reflect the public ’ s will as expressed through elections. at the same time, in my view, the fed does have narrow, but important, responsibilities regarding climate - related financial risks. these responsibilities are tightly linked to our responsibilities for bank supervision. 6 the public reasonably expects supervisors to require that banks understand, and appropriately manage, their material risks, including the financial risks of climate change. but without explicit congressional legislation, it would be inappropriate for us to use our monetary policy or supervisory tools to promote a greener economy or to achieve other climate - based goals. 7 we are not, and will not be, a “ climate policymaker. ” like our monetary policy independence, our independence in this area comes with a high level of transparency about our policies and procedures. for details, see board of governors ( 2022 ). while u. s. monetary policy has the dual mandate of maximum employment and price stability, some other central banks have somewhat more expansive mandates. the bank of england and the european central bank both have a primary mandate to maintain price stability but a secondary mandate to support the economic policies of the u. k. government and the european union, respectively ; see the bank of england act 1998, part ii ( 11 ), available from the u. k. national archives at https : / / www. legislation. gov. uk / ukpga / 1998 / 11 / contents, and the treaty on the functioning of the european union, article 127 ( 1 ), available from the european union at https : / / lexparency. org / eu / tfeu / art _ 127. - 4references alesina, alberto, and lawrence h. summers ( 1993 ). “ central bank independence and macroeconomic performance : some comparative evidence, ” journal of money, credit and banking, vol. 25 ( may ), pp. 151−62. bernanke, ben s. ( 2010 ). “ central bank independence, transparency, and accountability, ” speech delivered at the institute for monetary and economic studies international conference, bank of japan, tokyo, japan, may 25, https : / / www. federalreserve. gov / newsevents / speech / bernanke20100525a. htm. board of governors of the federal reserve system ( 2022 ). “ federal reserve board invites