. this measure of long - term inflation expectations refers to an annual rate of hicp expected to prevail five years ahead. ( 5 ) survey of prominent financial and economic forecasters as published by consensus economics inc. this measure of long - term inflation expectations refers to an annual rate of inflation expected to prevail between six and ten years ahead. source : ecb ii. does one size fit all? while the success of the monetary union in delivering low inflation and a credible currency is beyond dispute, the issue of whether a single monetary policy can “ fit ” all member states of the euro area, continues to be hotly debated. i ) emu : an optimum – currency – area perspective emu brought unique challenges for monetary policy. critical observers took the view that a single monetary policy was doomed to failure because the euro area does not fulfill the prerequisites of an optimum currency area ( oca ). this implies that if national economies are affected by asymmetric exogenous shocks or if shocks are transmitted to different degrees in different economies, because of unique economic and institutional characteristics in national economies, the mechanisms which could temper their impact either do not exist or are not strong. it is certainly true that the euro area is characterized by a lack of labour mobility, because of linguistic and cultural differences. there is also an absence of a significant centralized fiscal transfer mechanism. in these circumstances, so the argument goes, shocks are likely to lead to widening inflation differentials so that a common nominal interest rate in the monetary union results in diverging real interest rates among countries. for member countries with relatively - strong domestic demand and a higher - than - average inflation rate, the lower real interest rate fuels domestic demand and national inflation. conversely, for countries with relatively - weak domestic demand and a lower - than - average inflation rate, the high real interest rates put further downward pressures on domestic demand and inflation. a one - size monetary policy, in other words, does not fit all. the foregoing, traditional view of optimum currency area is static in nature. it assumes that a country ’ s characteristics, such as its degree of trade integration, are immutable. the experience of the euro area, however, suggests that participation in a monetary union may itself induce changes in economic structure and performance. indeed, a good deal of academic research, much of it reflecting the experience of the european monetary union, also indicates that the creation of a monetary union can itself create conditions

war less appealing and creates hopes for a more peaceful world. in the post - globalisation era, the universal push towards democratisation seems to have reached its limits. some of the most striking examples of the stronger focus on isolationism are the uk vote in favour of its exit from the eu and the trump presidency in the us. donald trump won the us presidential elections by countering his opponent ’ s more globalist approach with a campaign built on the principle of “ america first ”, a slogan which was initially used by congressman charles lindbergh for promoting the case for the us to stay out of the war against nazi germany. in the brexit campaign, the “ leave ” camp appealed to voters by promising to take back control of their national destinies and sovereignty previously relinquished to the “ technocratic ” european union. post - globalisation also has the potential to affect the existing global governance system comprising institutions, rules and alliances, which have underpinned global prosperity since world war ii. one such institution is the 164 - member world trade organisation, the cornerstone of the multilateral trading system. the wto has seen its stature diminish lately and now faces an uncertain future, partly also as a result of rising protectionist trade practices and interventionist economic policies ( as opposed to free market policies ) that are even adopted by some of the world ’ s great powers, circumventing the multilateral system ’ s rules and bypassing the wto ’ s central role as an arbitrator in global trade conflicts. yesterday ’ s sessions on contemporary issues in the wto and the institutions and governance of international economic law offered some useful insights into the future of the organisation, that are particularly poignant at this turning point for globalisation. the economic and political expansion of regional poles such as china has marked a shift away from the conventional us hegemony and towards authoritarianism around the world, e. g. in turkey. the third globalisation era following the end of the cold war has indeed been a time of unprecedented stability under america ’ s primacy. china has already demonstrated that it seeks a more visible role on the world stage and wants to put itself at the heart of globalisation – as 13 / 26 bis central bankers'speeches outlined in president xi ’ s speech to the world economic forum in davos a year ago. this rhetoric has been supported by china ’ s ‘ belt and road initiative ’, which has received more than $ 50 billion in financing since its