might not always be the same as the preferred resolution strategy that had been originally envisaged. as we found in svbuk, circumstances drive how we act. but for the largest firms, bail - in is always going to be the key tool. in the uk, we have stated and restated that in the context of a bail - in at1 instruments rank ahead of equity and behind tier 2 in the creditor hierarchy. holders of such instruments should expect to be exposed to losses in resolution or insolvency in the order of their positions in this hierarchy. in practice, all this means we as the resolution authority need the operational ability to plan and prepare for the execution of multiple resolution strategies in parallel, as contingency planning for the failure of a firm unfolds and as the weekend itself unfolds. that optionality helps to ensure we are able to best meet our statutory resolution objectives, even when time is short as it can be over a resolution weekend. for firms, this is also why our policy framework asks them to achieve outcomes in resolution. we need firms to have flexible capabilities to support their own resolvability and facilitate actions by the authorities – not systems and processes that cannot adapt. this flexibility in times of crisis or when contingency planning, allows us to respond more effectively to the specific circumstances ; and deliver a better outcome for depositors and other customers of the bank in resolution, and for overall uk financial stability. silicon valley bank uk silicon valley bank or svb, was the 16th biggest bank in the us when it failed due to a combination of sharp and unusually rapid increases in depositor withdrawals and losses on sales of long - dated bonds where the interest risk was not hedged. the deposit run quickly spread to the uk subsidiary, svbuk. on friday 10 march, svbuk saw an extraordinarily rapid run on deposits with outflows of £2. 9 billion – 30 % 3 / 9 bis - central bankers'speeches of its total deposit base. that friday afternoon, us authorities informed the bank that svb would be put into receivership. later on the friday evening, following consultation with hmt, the pra and fca, we announced that absent any meaningful further information, the bank intended to put svbuk into a bip, in line with the planned resolution strategy for svbuk. we were clear that a bip, executed over the weekend, was a viable solution that could be

david ramsden : the weekend starts here speech by sir david ramsden, deputy governor for markets and banking of the bank of england, at the deloitte academy, london, 15 december 2023. * * * good morning. it's a great pleasure to be able to speak to you today on the subject of resolution. thank you to the deloitte academy for hosting. a key lesson i took from working in hm treasury during the global financial crisis is that a credible resolution regime for banks is a cornerstone of financial stability and essential to protect the public purse. without resolution, there were only two choices in that crisis : let banks enter insolvency and cause huge disruption, or bail them out with taxpayers'money. the uk chose the second option, safeguarding financial stability in the process, but at a cost of £137 billion. 1 dealing with the issue of banks that were'too big to fail'has been the key achievement of the post crisis reforms to financial regulation and supervision, in the uk and globally. the financial stability board's ( fsb ) evaluation of the effects of too big to fail reforms opens in a new window showed significant net benefits for society resulting from the reforms ; and market - based measures of systemic risk have fallen. credible resolution is a cornerstone of those reforms. in the uk we now have a range of tools in the resolution toolkit, in the form of the legal powers which are available to be used in the event of a failure of a financial institution. the uk's special resolution regime for banks and building societies, which gives us the legal powers under the banking act 2009, is well established and aligned with international standards for effective resolution regimesopens in a new window, as set out by the fsb. as the uk's resolution authority the bank has capabilities to deal with failing firms according to the circumstances. and we have demonstrated in 2023 our readiness and willingness to act, as quickly as necessary, to apply those powers. when i gave my first speech on resolution back in early 2021 it was almost nine years since the bank last did a resolution. it is nine months since our resolution of silicon valley bank uk ( svbuk ) ; as well as of actions by the swiss authorities to respond to the failure of credit suisse. in resolving svbuk over a single weekend, we were able to successfully deploy the available tools in a way which protected the uk banking system, reduced systemic risk, supported public and