sa mga bangko na'yan na bumabagsak?'very easy answer : reported exposures, zero. and the [ philippine ] banks that have exposures, it's the funds they manage for their clients that are exposed. in other words, the client told them to invest. therefore, it's not bank loss. so, that's the typical question i use to get. over time, the questions became more sophisticated,'hindi ba'yung source [ of the collapse ] sa silicon valley [ bank ] ay pagtaas ng policy rate?'ang sagot naman namin : the philippines is different. we are not starting from a severe zero policy rate. our banks are heavier on the portfolio side, the local portfolio side, and the security side. and on top of that, their placements in bsp are also quite large. so, if you take out the placements of bsp with the non - loan assets, the remaining share is only 30 percent. finally - this is where being primitive [ younger bond and capital markets ] is an advantage because the us has such a developed bond market that they have 30 - year bonds. so when the rates change, literally, the impact on the price is huge. to begin with, the hit [ from recent global banking developments ] is smaller and our banks are well - capitalized, well - managed, and well - governed. give yourself a round of applause. and the exceptions, please leave the room. banks lend support to domestic recovery because of that, when we [ the economy ] did recover, the banks played a major role because they are able to lend. when mobility restrictions were lifted, the banks were there to lend. of course, we do see that real estate loans are lagging behind, but maybe for the better, right? because, that's always a question of financial stability, which is : did real estate overdo it? because, historically, a lot of the crisis [ occurs ] because real estate prices kept rising, nobody defaults. because all you had to do was sell what you bought. in other words, the quality of lending was never tested until prices dropped. in a sense, i do not necessarily see the slowdown in real estate lending as a bad thing. maybe it's a correction. as you can see the leading borrowers are information and communication ; real estate is large but in terms of growth rate,

banks during the crisis, and the minimum reserve requirement policy. for example, let us take rediscount lines, which have historically represented as asset with a high risk of recovery for the central bank. banks ’ settlements on the basis of incentives by the monetary authority, both through the payment of monthly installments and through payments made in advance, have acted as an extraordinary money absorption mechanism in recent years. in turn, through weekly auctions of bills and notes, we have sterilized around ars 32 billion since 2005, thus increasing the diversity of instruments and the portfolio ’ s average duration. furthermore, we are developing the repo market, in order to turn the interest rate into an effective monetary policy tool, widening the modality of authorized operations so as to enhance the efficiency of banks ’ liquidity management. in short, the monetary policy adopted by the central bank has made it possible to keep the growth of means of payment under control, within the self - imposed targets set year after year. in this way, the growth of the means of payment was, for the first time since the end of the crisis, below nominal gdp growth, reflecting the prudential bias in our approach. uncertainty about the potential power of transmission mechanisms requires the monetary prudential stance to be gradual but persistent. thus – given that the current inflationary phenomenon has many causes and is derived from an economy in transition that has undergone an unprecedented crisis, with formidable structural changes ( including the destruction of the financial system and many economic institutions ), and where monetary policy transmission channels are still under recovery –, prudence and gradualism positively contribute to achieve intertemporal stability. in turn, and just as most emerging countries have been doing, the central bank continues to implement a prudential international reserve accumulation policy. the current stock of over usd 40 billion is a record high figure and more than triples the lowest amount in early 2003. thus, the central bank generates a true insurance against crises that reduces external vulnerability, lends certainty to public and private investment and develops a domestic capital market in local currency, ensuring macroeconomic equilibrium. international reserves are an indispensable pillar for central bank monetary and financial policy. therefore, they are also the basis for monetary regulation operations to strictly control the balance between supply and demand in the monetary market. with a growing stock of foreign currency, the requirements for an adequate management are greater. thus, during 2006 and so far this year, we got the highest return ( around