samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
and it is easy to check whether it is being followed over the business cycle. in line with the rule, the transfer from the fund was higher than the expected real return of 4 per cent in the cyclical downturn in 2003 and the following two years. since 2006, however, the transfer has been lower. it should also be noted that the target for the rule is the cyclically adjusted transfer, shown by the solid line in chart 6. automatic stabilisers are allowed to work, thereby reducing actual transfers during upturns and increasing them during downturns, as illustrated by the broken line in chart 6. governance structure and management model now, let me turn to the fund management model. the governance structure is based on a clear division of responsibilities between the political authorities and the operational management. • the ministry of finance is the owner of the fund. the ministry defines the mandate and monitors and evaluates performance. • the management of the fund is delegated to norges bank. the bank ’ s task is to implement the investment strategy and exercise ownership rights. norges bank also provides professional advice to the ministry on investment strategies. the fund ’ s investment strategy is to maximise financial return with moderate risk. the longterm strategic allocation is defined in terms of a benchmark portfolio, which consists of equities and fixed income instruments. equities account for 60 per cent of the fund's strategic benchmark portfolio. the size of the fund implies that it currently owns about 1 per cent of listed european equities and ½ per cent of listed equities on a global basis. fixed income instruments account for 40 per cent. furthermore, the ministry has recently decided that the fund should prepare the ground for investing in real estate at 5 per cent of the strategic benchmark portfolio. in time, this will reduce the fixed income share to 35 per cent. norges bank has built an organisation with emphasis on investment returns and based on three fundamental principles : accountability, transparency and professional standards. norges bank manages parts of the funds internally, while parts are managed by external managers appointed by the bank on a commercial basis. active management has become an important part of our investment operations. we believe that the search for excess return has had a strong disciplinary effect on the organisation. transparency and disclosure of information is a key feature of the fund. all investment principles and guidelines as well as strategic advice and second opinion reports are made public. we publish quarterly reports on fund performance, which

. with that, i will pass you to my colleague. 2 / 2 bis - central bankers'speeches
time. so far as dicgc is concerned, investments are permitted only in government securities. a portfolio approach of tracking a broad all sovereign bond index is followed that which yields a reasonable rate of return. only deposits mobilised by branches in india are covered by deposit insurance. in a systemic crisis situation, where market liquidity for even sovereign securities could be affected, it may have to be considered whether a collateralised back stop facility from the central bank could be thought of to enable the deposit insurer to meet immediate needs. recoveries 8. the third important source of funding of deposit insurance systems is recoveries from the assets of the failed banks. principle 18 of the core principles for effective deposit insurance systems prescribes that the deposit insurer should share in the proceeds of recoveries from the estate of a failed bank. in some jurisdictions, deposit insurers have priority in the recovery over other unsecured creditors including larger depositors. in most countries the claims are subrogated to all depositors. in cases where the deposit insurer steps in with sizeable liquidity, there could be case for priority in recovery and in india we have taken this view where the state law accorded priority to other claims. perhaps this is an issue which needs more examination. minimising cost of bank resolution 9. another way in which deposit insurance funds can be conserved is by adopting least cost solutions for bank resolution. the dicgc has a pay - box mandate under the dicgc act, 1961. while the appointment of a liquidator or management of assets of the failed banks in india is not handled by the dicgc, the statute has assigned a role to the corporation in resolution of troubled banks, either through a scheme of reconstruction or amalgamation with another bank. in such cases the corporation is required to pay to depositors to the extent of shortfall in the asset coverage, up to the limits prescribed. of late dicgc in close hong kong ( 3 % ), indonesia ( 2. 5 % ), russia ( stops collection of premium after rr reaches 10 % ). coordination with rbi has been using this provision for dealing with the legacy problem of insolvent cooperative banks rather than the liquidation option in case there are other cooperative banks or even commercial banks willing to take over such banks. such solutions have the potential to serve as least cost option for resolution of troubled banks in the cooperative sector even within the existing legal framework. the incentive and advantage to the acquiring bank is transfer of

say that deposit insurance systems constitute an important element of the financial safety net having the twin objectives of protecting the interest of small depositors and promoting financial stability. adequate funding of deposit insurance systems is crucial to achieving these objectives. indeed, the theme of the conference is apt and the agenda for discussion has been drawn - up very thoughtfully – my compliments to the organisers and best wishes for success of the conference. thank you. thailand ( up to 10. 08. 2011 ), hong kong, malaysia, singapore & taiwan ( all up to 31. 12. 2010 ).
continue to be anchored on inflation targeting. the discipline of the inflation - targeting framework that we adopted in 2002 has helped the bsp focus more on its primary mandate of price stability. more specifically, as inflation risks moderate, bsp will carefully consider opportunities for monetary policy easing amidst tightening financial conditions. we will continue to ensure appropriate levels of market liquidity to maintain confidence in and the efficient functioning of the financial markets. we will calibrate monetary policy to protect our people ’ s real income and purchasing power. we will endeavor to keep inflation at manageable levels as this creates the environment for sustainable long - term growth. the bsp ’ s external sector policy will remain focused on ensuring our external vulnerabilities are limited. more specifically, we will beef up reserves for insurance ; maintain a marketdetermined ( thereby externally competitive ) exchange rate and we will continue to review our fx regulatory environment. banking sector policies will revolve around buttressing the banking system ’ s soundness. the reforms we have so far put in place have created the environment which has resulted in the system ’ s minimal exposure to the global financial market turbulence. we will continue on this track. conclusion i began these brief remarks declaring we have ended 2008 on a much sounder footing than most of our asian neighbors. so far, we have not been as affected by the global financial turmoil. i also said that 2009 would be critical in crafting policy that would allow us to be ready take to advantage of the upturns in the global slowdown when they do materialize. as we concluded 2008 and now look forward to 2009, we reflect upon how we have been able to remain fairly resilient in the face of the challenges we faced in 2008 – macroeconomic prudence. that is, consistently building buffers during the good times to provide us a shield during the bad times. as 2009 rolls in, we will press on with this strategy that has so far kept us in good stead.

heartened by your show of support. as the economist adam smith once said, and i quote : “ civilized society stands at all times in need of the cooperation and assistance of great multitudes. ” bis central bankers ’ speeches it is our hope therefore that the same spirit of cooperation and collaboration will characterize our pursuit of continuing reforms in 2013 and the years ahead. and now, let us offer a toast to all of us coming together for an even stronger, more responsive, more inclusive, and more successful philippine banking system that will underpin a strong and vibrant philippine economy that will bring prosperity and a better quality of life to our country and our people. cheers! bis central bankers ’ speeches
few papers in today ’ s workshop would argue, given the centrality of the us dollar in the international financial and monetary system, a us monetary tightening shock and an appreciation in the broad us dollar index can still induce a widening of emes ’ sovereign credit spreads. worse still, for more vulnerable emes with significant fx mismatches, allowing their currencies to depreciate is not an appealing option ; instead, their central banks may actually have to tighten monetary policy even when global financial conditions are already tightening, in order to support their currencies and prevent their fx liabilities from spiralling out of control. 5. what can and should eme policymakers do? i would argue that “ keeping our own house in order ” is a tried - and - tested recipe for enhancing emes ’ resilience to global monetary policy spillovers. indeed, as a few papers to be presented will show, the extent of global monetary policy spillovers would depend not only on the source economies, but also on the recipient economies, including their economic settings and vulnerabilities. accordingly, macro - prudential measures would provide another line of defence through mitigating macrofinancial imbalances, and many asian emes including hong kong are precursors in this regard. furthermore, policymakers in the region have been working hard to grow the regional local currency bond markets and create a sticky domestic investor base, which help reduce the risk of disruptive capital outflows during times of distress. 6. a few papers to be presented today also offer other valuable policy recommendations, highlighting the importance of good central bank communications, in the sense that : ( 1 ) credible communications to anchor inflation expectations can alleviate the policy tradeoffs faced by eme central banks when external monetary policy shocks arrive, and ( 2 ) clear communications by the fed regarding its monetary policy normalisation may help limit the resulting adverse global spillovers. these research findings corroborate well with our experience as central bankers, who have always been extolling the virtues of clear, credible central bank communication. 7. in closing, while the synchronised global monetary policy tightening will likely result in challenging spillovers to asia and other emes, these difficulties are not insurmountable with the appropriate policy mix. however, formulating the right policy responses to monetary policy spillovers requires a better understanding of various spillover channels as well as mitigating factors that help reduce the sensitivity of emes to

global monetary policy shocks. i would therefore like to thank you all for taking the time to join our workshop today, which brings together seasoned researchers and policymakers dedicated to understanding these vital issues. i look forward to their insights and i hope you enjoy the workshop. thank you. last revision date : 25 august 2022
up and sovereign and corporate spreads spiralled. the announcement and prompt implementation of the pandemic emergency purchase programme ( pepp ) stabilised markets. it quickly instilled confidence when the market failed to coordinate. one reason why the pepp was so powerful was its flexibility, which allowed the ecb to provide liquidity when and where it was most needed. purchases were allocated flexibly across time, asset classes and jurisdictions. just like the omt, which was never used, the pepp ’ s backstop function worked primarily via the confidence channel. flexibility only had to be used briefly at the peak of the crisis. after that, the mere existence of flexibility and our clear commitment to use it when necessary were sufficient to coordinate markets on the “ good ” equilibrium. but while the pepp was able to stabilise markets, it could not sustainably reverse fragmentation by itself. the process of re integration was only set in motion when the proposal for a sizeable european recovery fund was announced ( slide 4 ). monetary and fiscal actions thus reinforced each other. while the pepp restored private cross - border risk - sharing, the next generation eu ( ngeu ) package created – for the first time in the history of the euro – a channel for public risk - sharing at european level. bond market integration in an era of rising interest rates determined monetary and fiscal support during the pandemic contributed to a compression of risk premia. sovereign bond spreads fell to their lowest level in many years, despite significantly higher public debt levels. while ngeu is going to provide continued fiscal support over the coming years, monetary policy has turned less accommodative in light of the persistent surge in inflation. as monetary support is being withdrawn around the world, we are seeing a decompression of risk premia across market segments, including in euro area bond markets. the extent and pace of the current repricing are driven by a number of forces. on the positive side, three fundamental factors can, ceteris paribus, be expected to support market sentiment and thereby mitigate upward pressure on bond yields. favourable average sovereign borrowing costs the first factor is that most governments have taken advantage of years of historically low interest rates by lengthening the average maturity of outstanding debt and locking in favourable financing costs ( slide 5 ). hence, the pass - through of a rise in interest rates to total sovereign financing costs will be gradual over the coming years, as the average nominal interest rate to

2019 ), “ public debt and low interest rates, ” american economic review, vol. 109, no 4, pp. 1197 - 1229. 11. bankowski, k., bouabdallah, o., domingues semeano, j., dorrucci, e., freier, m., jacquinot, p., modery, w., rodriguez - vives, m., valenta, v. and zorell, n. ( 2022 ), “ the economic impact of next generation eu : a euro area perspective ”, occasional paper series, no 291, ecb.
somewhat. we have repeatedly emphasised that an annual distribution of chf 2. 5 billion cannot be guaranteed in the long term.

the fxcs in early october. as was the case with the first phase, there will be three opportunities for market participants to provide feedback on the material. we will endeavour to make clear how the feedback provided has been addressed. the intent is for the full code to be published in may 2017. i will now talk about a couple of the areas that are addressed in the first phase of the code, which is already in the public domain. in the first phase, topics were covered that the market was looking for guidance on sooner rather than later and that were potentially having an adverse effect on market functioning. one example of this is around information sharing, where many market participants have highlighted that they are unsure what information can be conveyed to counterparties and other market participants. while it is clear ( or at least should be ) that disclosing the details of a client ’ s order book to a counterparty is not acceptable, market participants have noted that there is much less clarity around what level of aggregation, say, is necessary in order to convey market colour appropriately. as a result, it appears some market participants are being very conservative in sharing information, which can have implications for the effective functioning of the market. this is notwithstanding the guidance provided in this area in the global preamble put out by the global foreign exchange committees, in march 2015. 4 the global code takes the material in the global preamble and fleshes it out a bit more, including with some examples of what is, and isn ’ t appropriate communication, and why. there will be more examples provided in the second phase of the code. similarly, there have been diverse opinions around what is appropriate behaviour in terms of order handling. while there have been some very public instances of inappropriate behaviour around order handling which have come to light in recent years, in other areas, the market is seeking greater guidance as to what principles should be followed, including the different standards that may apply depending on whether an intermediary is functioning as principal or agent. 5 http : / / www. bis. org / about / factmktc / fxwg. htm. http : / / www. rba. gov. au / afxc / about - us / pdf / global - preamble. pdf. i am not using these terms in the legal sense that is sometimes the case in particular jurisdictions, but rather in terms of common market parlance. bis central bankers ’ speeches this is one area that was not adequately
the name of my colleague, bis central bankers ’ speeches jean - pierre danthine – for their hard work and their solidarity with the snb. we thank our shareholders for their continuing support. and we thank you all for taking such a great interest in the activities of the snb. finally, we would also like to thank our former colleague and chairman of the snb governing board, philipp hildebrand, for the good collaboration we enjoyed over the years. we very much regret his resignation and the circumstances leading up to it. thank you for your attention. bis central bankers ’ speeches

will indeed defend the minimum exchange rate, if need be. financial markets are constantly changing their assessment of risks. a situation may also occur in which the market decides to test the defence of the minimum exchange rate. consequently, the snb is present in the foreign exchange market at all times and is always prepared to purchase unlimited quantities of euros at chf 1. 20 per euro, in order to enforce the minimum exchange rate. when trading took place at less than chf 1. 20 per euro, it was only for a few seconds and resulted from market idiosyncrasies. since 6 september, the best rate in the market for the sale of euros against swiss francs has never fallen below chf 1. 20. the snb was thus able to successfully enforce the minimum exchange rate even under extremely difficult conditions. bis central bankers ’ speeches these considerations clearly show that the introduction of a minimum exchange rate is associated with risks. under certain circumstances, implementing such a rate can lead to a very considerable expansion of foreign currency reserves. the snb is prepared to bear the risk. indeed, in summer 2011, the situation had become so acute that, by early september, the snb felt that there was no longer any alternative to introducing a minimum exchange rate. doing nothing would have had an extremely negative impact on our economy. even at a rate of chf 1. 20 per euro, the swiss franc remains overvalued. we are acutely aware that considerable challenges still remain for the swiss economy, despite the minimum exchange rate. one particular reason for this is the fact that the international economy is recovering at only a moderate pace. in addition, there is a very high level of uncertainty in the international environment. an appreciation of the swiss franc at the current time would again expose switzerland to considerable risks and, once more, endanger both price stability and the stabilisation of the economy. given this situation, the snb will enforce the minimum exchange rate with the utmost determination. if developments in the international economy are worse than foreseen, or if the swiss franc does not weaken further as expected, renewed downside risks for price stability could emerge. should the economic outlook and the threat of deflation require it, the snb is prepared at any time to take further measures. as you will probably have deduced from this account, seen from today ’ s vantage point, interest rates in switzerland are likely to remain low for a while yet. this expansionary monetary
leads to another – for tax purpose or for clearance. these days, reserve bank ’ s name is also very liberally used. payments are stated to have been assured by reserve bank ’ s governor or sometimes even in my name. an email is sent out stating that some fund has been deposited on your behalf and the money is sitting in reserve bank of india which you can claim. very recently, i came across a unique incident. an indian lady came across a gentleman, claimed to be settled in uae, through the portal of a marriage bureau. their association grew and they decided to marry on an appointed date when the gentleman would arrive in india. on the appointed date, that lady received a phone call stating that the gentleman had arrived but since he had a huge amount of foreign currency and for which, there would be need to pay some duty, some registration charges etc. she paid rs. 55000. next day, a call said that the person had been taken to delhi where another clearance, a certificate from reserve bank of india was needed which could establish that it was not dirty money and so on. in each such instances that i am mentioning people have ended up paying at least five to seven lakh of rupees. most of these are well educated people, many of them are professionals, doctors, doctorate by education, post graduates, lawyers. it is only after paying up a sizeable amount they smell the rat and come forward for grievance redressal. it is this category of people that i call the “ greed driven illiterates ”. there are several of them who have put their money in plantation schemes, emu farming, multi - level marketing schemes and have burnt their fingers. 7. let me now come to the third category – whom i have named “ information – deprived illiterates ”. there is rapidly growing middle class in the country. in addition, there is rapid urbanization and a large number of people migrate from the rural to urban areas. as the middle class grows, urbanization increases ; so do the financial needs of the people – these are lifestyle needs for savings / credit / investments / retirement planning etc. the need may be for consumer goods, vehicles, house, investment requirement, mutual fund, insurance etc. the providers of these products / services are becoming increasingly sophisticated by the day as they are in possession of more and more information and have the capability to apply more analytics. 8. on the contrary, the consumers, the recipients of these

time. as the bank looks forward to the future, we trust that this exhibition would be the rbi ’ s mite to the cause of financial literacy in india. we trust it will evoke interest and take banking and finance not only to bankers and students of economics but also to the common person.