solve this supply bottleneck. it can help foster macroeconomic stability conducive to business investment, but most of the efforts to address supply - side impediments still need to come from a broader and more balanced set of economic policies including fiscal, industrial, technology, and labor market policies. concluding remarks let me end my talk today by saying that, as a central banker, we should be ambitious in making the best use of all available policy tools and in improving our understanding of the economy as well as the shocks driving it. but setting the ambition higher than the capability of monetary policy would likely prove to be counter - productive. it is an old established wisdom that what monetary policy can best deliver is price stability. while we have learned for a great deal about other aspects of macroeconomic stability, there is little disagreement that price stability must remain the central objective of monetary policy in the long run. abandoning this objective risks de - anchoring price expectations and inducing unnecessary economic volatility. the deployment of supplementary tools can go some way to help relax its limitation, but monetary policy is no panacea. ladies and gentlemen, only by understanding both the power and limits of monetary policy, will the economy be able to reap the most benefit out of this policy lever. the bank of thailand will continue to do our utmost to strive for overall macroeconomic stability, and the long - term prosperity of thailand. thank you. bis central bankers ’ speeches

to back up such a trend, at least as far as the major corporates are concerned. such a development might then have a knock - on effect on lending conditions for smes. at present, the snb is carrying out a survey among banks in order to gain a better idea of the direction in which lending conditions are heading. lessons from these turbulences we can learn a lot from the period of turbulence we are currently experiencing with regard to banking supervision and the stability of the financial system. the financial stability forum ( fsf ) submitted a number of measures to the g7 countries aimed at enhancing the resilience of financial markets. the snb was an active partner in drafting this report. allow me to elaborate on this topic. first, it is astounding that a problem which appears to be confined to one single segment of the mortgage market in one single country could have resulted in crisis of global proportions. we feel that this situation has not only come about because of the globalisation of the financial markets, but also because international banks have become increasingly vulnerable over the last few years – vulnerable because of their thirst for profit and their underestimation of the ensuing risks. second, the banks ’ risk measuring and management instruments could not cope with the crisis. consequently, the actual losses incurred in the area of mortgage - backed securities ( mbs ) clearly surpassed the potential level calculated by the sophisticated statistical models, and the liquidity haemorrhage suffered by the banks was greater than the most pessimistic scenarios had suggested. in other words, the risk measuring systems failed despite the fact that they were being monitored by the best - informed experts around. this summary may sound a little harsh, but is not intended to put the blame on the banks. instead, it illustrates that no model can do complete justice to the complexity of financial instruments and the economic environment in which banks operate these days. third, the events of the last few months raise question marks about the efficiency of the banking supervision standards applied so far. the call for more sophisticated risk measurement systems, supervision and regulation of banks is understandable. there is room for improvement in these areas, and it must be exploited. nevertheless, it should be pointed out that more extensive regulation on its own represents an unsatisfactory response to the growing complexity of banking activities. through the events of recent months, we are called upon to learn the lessons from the banks ’ limited ability to measure risk and – as a logical consequence –