these issues into consideration, the snb decided in august 2012 not to issue an immediate proposal to the federal council for activation of the ccb. it will reassess the situation regularly. the second key question pertaining to the functioning of the ccb is whether it is an effective instrument to strengthen the resilience of the financial system and thus help to limit negative spillovers ( slide 7 ). the impact of higher capital ratios and more provisions on the resilience of banks is self - evident. this is also the case from a system - wide perspective. to assess the effectiveness of the ccb in strengthening resilience, we can draw some lessons from historical experience, namely the swiss real estate crisis in the early 1990s. internal calculations suggest that, had the proposed ccb regime been in place in the run - up to that crisis, the resilience of the system as a whole would have increased significantly. from an aggregate perspective, this additional capital would have absorbed a large portion of the losses that were reported as a result of the crisis. the third key question is : to what extent the ccb is able to contain the build - up of excesses? imf ( 2011 ), drehmann et al ( 2011 ). namely, domestic mortgage volume indicators and domestic residential real estate price indicators. for a detailed description of this principle of “ guided discretion ”, cf. snb ( 2012 ). both measures are designed to have a dampening effect on house prices and mortgage volume momentum. the former will be effective from january 2013, the latter already from july 2012 with a transition period until november 2012. bis central bankers ’ speeches here, international empirical evidence suggests that tighter capital requirements have, on average, a dampening impact on credit volume. this impact of tighter capital on lending is greater when the implementation period is shorter. 17 moreover, the increase in capital requirements may lead to a significant reduction in the likelihood of a systemic crisis. 18 expectations concerning the effectiveness of leaning against the credit cycle must remain realistic, however. there is no guarantee that activating the ccb will fully eliminate future imbalances in the swiss mortgage and real estate markets. inherent uncertainty regarding the strength of its impact and hence the appropriate calibration remains. moreover, if banks hold significant capital cushions even before the ccb is activated, the desired countercyclical effect on credit growth may be weakened. we can note, however, that even if the ccb has no effect on aggregate

). bis central bankers ’ speeches blinder, alan s. and reis 2005 : understanding the greenspan standard. prepared for the federal reserve bank of kansas city symposium, the greenspan era : lessons for the future, jackson hole, 25 – 27 august 2005. cgfs 2010 : macroprudential instruments and frameworks : a stocktaking of issues and experiences. crowe, christopher et al 2011 : policies for macrofinancial stability. options to deal with real estate booms. imf staff discussion note, sdn / 11 / 02. danthine, jean - pierre 2012 : reconciling price stability and financial stability. speech held at the alumni conference, university of zurich, 24 january 2012. danthine, jean - pierre 2011 : after the crisis : improving incentives in the financial sector. speech held at the founding event of the school of finance, university of st. gallen, 20 may 2011. de nicolo, gianni et al 2012 : externalities and macroprudential policy. imf staff discussion note, sdn / 12 / 05. drehmann, mathias et al 2011 : anchoring countercyclical capital buffers : the role of credit aggregates. bis working papers no 355. haldane, andrew g. 2010 : the $ 100 billion question. comments at the institute of regulation & risk, hong kong, 30 march 2010. imf 2011 : global financial stability report 2011. grappling with crisis legacies. swiss national bank 2012 : implementing the countercyclical capital buffer in switzerland. concretising the swiss national bank ’ s role. fact sheet, june 2012. white, william 2009 : should monetary policy “ lean or clean? ” federal reserve bank of dallas working paper no. 34. bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches