to take on more risk. as a result, the basel accord capital ratios are an increasingly less reliable guide to the true capital strength of the firm and thus are less and less useful to both the public and private sectors. importantly, the banking institutions for which the existing capital standards are the most distorted are in many cases the very institutions whose disorderly failure would be most likely to impose systemic risks. in light of these developments, in my judgment, it is of the highest priority that, for the most financially sophisticated and complex banks, we make the capital standards more reflective of the risks that they are, in fact, taking. as i hope everyone in this room is fully aware, such efforts are well under way. in january of this year, the basel committee on banking supervision released its second consultative paper for the new basel capital accord and asked for public comment by the end of may. let me emphasize that we really do need and desire public comment on our proposals. no one in the supervisory community believes that we have solved, or even at this point know how to solve, all of the problems with the 1988 accord. success will come only if both supervisors and private market participants bring their best ideas to the table. moreover, we fully expect that the new accord, like the old accord, will be a living document that is revised as technology and other aspects of the economic environment evolve. let me also acknowledge that the new capital proposals are complex, and the documentation we released in january is, to say the least, daunting. but this complexity reflects the reality that, at least for a small number of generally large and internationally active banking organizations that are engaged in a wide range of traditional and not - so - traditional banking activities, modern risk taking and risk management are complex. moreover, risk management is increasingly susceptible to quantification and statistical analysis. the new accord attempts to respond to these facts for those relatively few institutions to which this reality applies while making only minor changes to the existing capital standards for the vast majority of banking organizations. indeed, an important reason for the new accord's complexity is that it proposes three alternative capital standards to allow for a wide range of needs and risk management practices at individual institutions and for the evolution of both over time. a second priority for bank supervisors is to continue to develop procedures that make sure no bank is too big to fail in these senses : that stockholders can lose all, that existing management can be replaced, that uninsured creditors can suffer losses

organizations from shuttering, putting them in a better position to keep workers on and to hire them back as the economy continues to recover. the main street lending program ( main street ) has been of significant interest to this committee and to the public. many of the businesses affected by the pandemic are smaller firms that rely on banks for loans, rather than public credit markets. main street is designed to facilitate the flow of credit to small and medium - sized businesses. in establishing the facility, we conducted extensive outreach, soliciting public comment and holding in - depth discussions with lenders and borrowers of all sizes. in response to feedback, we have continued to make adjustments to main street to provide greater support to small and medium - sized businesses and to nonprofit organizations such as educational institutions, hospitals, and social service organizations. nearly 600 banks, representing well more than half of the assets in the banking system, have either completed registration or are in the process of doing so. about 230 loans totaling roughly $ 2 billion are either funded or in the pipeline. main street is intended for businesses that were on a sound footing pre - pandemic and that have good longer - term prospects but which have 1 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches encountered temporary cash flow problems due to the pandemic and are not able to get credit on reasonable terms as a result. main street loans may not be the right solution for some businesses, in part because the cares act states clearly that these loans cannot be forgiven. our credit facilities have improved lending conditions broadly, including for potential main street borrowers. the evidence suggests that most creditworthy small and medium - sized businesses can currently get loans from private - sector financial institutions. many of our programs rely on emergency lending powers that require the support of the treasury department and are available only in unusual circumstances. by serving as a backstop to key credit markets, our programs have significantly increased the extension of credit from private lenders. however, the facilities are only that — a backstop. they are designed to support the functioning of private markets, not to replace them. moreover, these are lending, not spending powers. many borrowers will benefit from these programs, as will the overall economy, but for others, a loan that could be difficult to repay might not be the answer. in these cases, direct fiscal support may be needed. our economy will recover fully from this difficult period. we remain committed to using our full range of tools to support the economy for as long