similar financial firms also highly reliant on short - term funding? if so, are the sources of short - term funding heavily concentrated? is the market for short - term funding likely to be stable in a period of high uncertainty, or is it vulnerable to runs? if shortterm funding were suddenly to become unavailable, how would the borrowing firms react – for example, would they be forced into a fire sale of assets, which itself could be destabilizing, or would they cease to provide funding or critical services for other financial actors? finally, what implications would these developments have for the broader economy? the analysis of risks from a systemic perspective, not just from the perspective of an individual firm, is the hallmark of macroprudential regulation and supervision. and the remedies that might emerge from such an analysis could well be more far - reaching and more structural in nature than simply requiring a few firms to modify their funding patterns. implementing the macroprudential approach in the united states let me be more concrete and talk about the implementation of the macroprudential approach in the context of the evolving u. s. regulatory system. the first required element of macroprudential oversight is a system for monitoring evolving risks to financial stability. beyond assigning individual regulatory agencies this responsibility, the dodd - frank act took the additional step of setting up a new body, the financial stability oversight council, as i mentioned earlier. the council is charged with monitoring the u. s. financial system, identifying risks that threaten the stability of that system, and promoting market discipline and other conditions that mitigate excessive risk - taking in financial markets. the council is made up of 10 voting members – including the federal reserve – and 5 nonvoting members, who serve in an advisory capacity. 1 the secretary of the treasury serves as the chairman of the financial services oversight council. other voting members include the heads of the office of the comptroller of the currency, the securities and exchange commission, the federal deposit insurance corporation, the commodity futures trading commission, the federal housing finance agency, the national credit union administration, the bureau of consumer financial protection, and an independent insurance expert appointed by the president. the latter two seats are not yet filled. bis central bankers ’ speeches the regulatory agencies represented on the council oversee a wide range of participants in the u. s. financial system. the broad membership of the council is intended to limit the tendency of regulators to focus narrowly on the institutions and markets within

and the commission for help, and they also asked the ecb to contribute its expertise at a time when europe needed it most. this setup was codified in the esm treaty and by the co - legislators in the two - pack ; the ecj confirmed its legality. in line with this, the ecb has since provided its advice in programmes in five member states. but we should not forget that the respective national governments are responsible for programme implementation, while the final responsibility for programme design and the disbursement of financial assistance lies with the eurogroup. since 2010, three countries have now successfully completed their programmes, and ireland is a particularly good example of how such programmes can deliver the necessary adjustment and restore financial stability, economic competitiveness and fiscal sustainability. it has shown that a country which takes strong ownership of its programme can come out of it with robust growth and a more stable financial system, and that eventually employment will also rebound. there is no doubt that the adjustment process was painful. but we should keep in mind that the adjustment would have caused significantly more hardship in the absence of financial assistance. the programmes had to address excessive macroeconomic imbalances which had accumulated over several years in the run - up to the crisis, often reflecting misguided national economic policies. as we have said before : don ’ t blame the fire damage on the fire brigade. throughout the programmes in ireland and elsewhere, the ecb has played the role assigned to it under the treaty – to be the central bank for the euro area and to provide liquidity to financial institutions, including those in programme countries, when warranted. at times, this meant that risk - management considerations made it necessary for us to consider the progress of programme implementation when deciding on provision of further liquidity if the soundness of the domestic financial sector was intimately linked to programme success. we did so in full accordance with our rules and legal framework and in full independence. this was the case for ireland. and this continues to be the case for greece and cyprus. please allow me to conclude. bis central bankers ’ speeches five years ago, the programme framework came to life. it is certainly part of our path toward a genuine economic and monetary union to integrate the european stability mechanism and the related programme work fully into the legal framework of the european union ; we again called for this most recently in the five presidents ’ report. but it is even more important that we take decisive steps to avoid a member state needing a programme in the