will help to ensure that npls remain a problem of the past once they have been dealt with. to that end, it lays out how we expect banks to provision for new npls. more specifically, it refers to exposures that are newly classified as non - performing as of 1 april 2018. the addendum is not a binding document, but it specifies our expectations and will thus serve as a starting point for our dialogue with each bank. conclusion ladies and gentlemen, rest assured that i have not exhausted the topic of my speech. but i may well have exhausted you. so i will conclude quickly and painlessly. first, banks are important for the economy, particularly here in europe. that said, it might be good to add a bit more capital market to the mix ; but that is a topic for another day. second, banks must be able to fail. if they are not, the economy will suffer in the long run. but if banks fail, they must do so in an orderly manner. if not, financial stability will suffer in the short run. the new european resolution framework helps to make orderly failure possible. third, failure is the least desirable outcome, of course. we need banks which are profitable and resilient in the first place. stronger regulation and supervision can do their bit. in the end, however, it is up to the banks themselves to ensure they lead long and healthy lives. 8 / 9 bis central bankers'speeches and with these three messages this long speech comes to an end. thank you for your attention. 9 / 9 bis central bankers'speeches

support the adjustment process of these economies. increasing product market competition, particularly in the services sectors, would also facilitate the restructuring of the economy and encourage innovation and the adoption of new technologies. at their meeting on 28 – 29 october 2010 the eu heads of state and government agreed on the reform of the european union ’ s economic governance. the proposals put forward by president van rompuy represent a strengthening of the existing framework for fiscal and macroeconomic surveillance in the european union. however, the governing council considers that they do not go as far as the quantum leap in the economic governance of monetary union that it has been calling for. in particular, the governing council is concerned that there would be insufficient automaticity in the implementation of fiscal surveillance, that there is no specification of the rule to reduce the government debt ratio, and that financial sanctions have not been explicitly retained under the macroeconomic surveillance procedure. with regard to the macroeconomic surveillance procedure in particular, the new system of mutual surveillance would need to concentrate firmly on euro area countries experiencing sustained losses of competitiveness and large current account deficits. it should be determined by transparent and effective trigger mechanisms. it would be essential that the assessments of macroeconomic imbalances and recommendations for corrective action be given broad publicity at all stages of the surveillance process. the public and the markets can be confident that the governing council remains firmly committed to delivering on its mandate of maintaining price stability over the medium term. we are now at your disposal for questions.