the euro coins, more than 37. 5 billion coins or 90 % of the coins now in circulation with a total value of around eur 12. 4 billion had been frontloaded. broadly speaking, sub - frontloading – the pre - delivery by banks to retailers and other professional target groups – represented an overall amount of 10 to 20 % of the frontloaded amount. given that, in terms of transactions, around 70 % of banknotes are put into circulation via automated teller machines ( atms ), the quick adaptation of these machines was one of the key factors for a smooth changeover. in total, more than 200, 000 atms either on site in bank branches or off site, for example in shopping centres, had to be converted. this was achieved within less than one week. as a result, on average, 75 % of all cash transactions were already effected in euro after only one week. on the whole, the euro banknotes and coins were introduced considerably faster than originally foreseen, not least because of the favourable attitude of and quick acceptance by european citizens. i should like to mention that the changeover has also been smooth outside the euro area. the euro banknotes were received positively in third countries. information to the public has been generally adequate and euro banknotes were readily available in banks and exchange offices, in most cases. with regard to the frontloading of central banks outside the euro area, i should mention that 26 central banks, mainly in central and eastern europe, the mediterranean area and in africa, requested to be frontloaded with euro cash. the total value of the euro banknotes provided to these central banks and to wholesale banks outside the euro area amounted to some eur 4 billion. overall, the eurosystem is proud of and grateful to all actors ’ contributions to this historic process. the enthusiasm of the european citizens to get hold of euro cash can be seen as a clear vote for a united europe. recent global economic developments let me briefly review the current international environment. i feel quite some relief that the world economy has proved relatively resilient to the shock of the terrorist attacks in september of last year. the events of 11 september and their aftermath undoubtedly increased uncertainty, and for some time contributed substantially to the already ongoing deterioration in confidence in most countries. however, there are now more and more signs that the global economic downturn may have come to an end around the end of 2001. at the current juncture, a mild recovery is generally expected

am repeatedly confronted with it, since my confirmation hearing in the european parliament, and have not seen signs of a full understanding of the arguments. the point that i would like to submit for a serious analysis of central bank transparency is that the latter is inextricably linked to accountability. the means and instruments for implementing transparency in any country depend on its institutional and political framework for accountability. just to point to one relevant aspect, a system in which accountability is collegial is different from one in which accountability is individual. the way in which transparency is implemented cannot be the same in the two systems. the european union, which is obviously a very peculiar entity, not comparable to a federation or a state, has a specific system of accountability for its institutions, in particular the commission, the court of justice or the european central bank, where the appointment of the decision - making bodies is partly a responsibility of the member states. such a system foresees collegial, not individual accountability. in such a system, the publication of individual decisions, votes or opinions cannot be foreseen, except for historical purposes. only the result of the collegiate decision can be made public. this is currently the case for the european commission, the court of justice and the european central bank. to be sure, the institutional and political framework underlying the european union is a complex one and maybe not easy to understand. but this framework cannot be ignored in any meaningful and realistic analysis on the way in which the ecb ensures transparency. to move to a system in which the detailed minutes and votes would be published, the ecb statutes would have to be modified to allow for individual accountability, rather than a collegial one. this would require several modifications, including the compositions of the decision - making body and its nomination procedure. it would also most likely require changes in the eu institutional and political framework. differences in the structure of economies represent another issue which is often forgotten in the assessment of central bank policies. divergences in the degree of economic flexibility, in particular, can affect the degree of intrinsic inflation persistence, namely the inertial character of inflation which cannot be reduced by the central bank despite its best efforts. 8 two central banks with similar see for example ubide ( 2005 ). see for instance ehrmann and fratschzer ( 2005 ). see erceg and levin ( 2003 ) and levin and piger ( 2004 ). 5 / 6 credibility and policy strategy might have to implement