the rationale of the reform without playing down the potential risks associated with the implementation of basel iii, to which the acp pays close attention, i believe that this reform can be successfully implemented. allow me to mention some reasons for this conviction and offer some avenues for actions : – first, french banks, which have complied with basel 2. 5 rules since december 2011, are in a strong position to meet the new capital adequacy requirements when they come into force. moreover, french banks are ahead of the basel iii schedule. currently with core tier 1 capital ratios of over 9 %, the main french groups demonstrate their ability to meet the european banking authority deadline of 30 june 2012. they should also fully comply with the new basel iii requirements by 2013. – the acp is closely monitoring credit institutions ’ preparations for basel iii. by doing so, any problems can be identified at an early stage and issues relating to its implementation can be addressed, which i believe is essential for a smooth transition. more generally, in addition to the individual monitoring of banks ’ preparation, coordination between supervisors and the players concerned is also important to ensure a clear understanding of the rules and identify any questions relating to the reform and their potential consequences. the acp liaises on a regular basis with the profession on all prudential matters. indeed, today ’ s conference is a prime illustration of this. – it is also essential to closely monitor and take into account the impact of the new regulations on the financial system and the economy and to assess the different interactions in order, if necessary, to deal with the unforeseen consequences of basel iii. in this respect, the acp, which maintains close links to the banque de france and operates under its aegis, is naturally particularly attentive to and involved in all these matters. this is why we are accompanying the prudential reform with more general and macroeconomic reflections on the financing of the economy, and in particular on credit developments and the relationship between banking regulation and monetary policy. the new liquidity ratios therefore cannot be applied as they stand as they do not take into account all their consequences and interactions beyond the prudential objectives themselves, which include in particular the functioning of the interbank market, the level of intermediation or the conditions bis central bankers ’ speeches of monetary policy implementation. i therefore believe that the work underway on the calibration of these ratios is of the utmost importance in order to properly manage all the consequences of these

christian noyer : the end of the financial dictatorship? introduction by mr christian noyer, governor of the bank of france and chairman of the board of directors of the bank for international settlements, to session 5 “ the end of the financial dictatorship? ”, aix - en - provence economic forum, aix - en - provence, 6 july 2013. * 1. * * firstly, is finance really a dictatorship? this question isn ’ t new : already petronius, in roman times, at the start of our modern era, asked : “ what use are laws when money is king? ” the question seems rhetorical, and you can sense in its resignation that the latin writer ( who, incidentally, was born in the nearby city of marseille ) was already worried about the difficulties of establishing the primacy of politics over finance. i ) it is true that the world of finance does have considerable powers : • the power to create and support economic development. in its most traditional forms, this is finance ’ s most crucial role – and power : it is an essential cog in the wheel of economic activity, allocating capital, supplying credit and enabling the management of risk. more than just “ the sinews of war ”, it can be seen as the lifeblood flowing through our veins. • but also a highly destructive power : it was the unchecked sophistication of finance and the excesses this caused that lay behind the 2007 - 2008 financial crisis, a crisis that subsequently transformed into an economic, social and political crisis. limited losses on subprime loans ultimately led to the destruction of millions of jobs throughout the world, and the links between finance and the real economy were cruelly laid bare. ii ) but finance can certainly not be considered “ all powerful ” : in my opinion, the world of finance only has the political power that state governments choose to give it. • granted, the difficulties some countries were facing, notably in the euro area, were exacerbated by financial market pressures – think back to the attacks on italian debt in the summer of 2011. but if the markets were able to exert this pressure, it was because those countries had, in a sense, put themselves at their mercy by demanding that they finance their ever - expanding public deficits, even during periods of growth. • in nearly all the crises faced by the euro area since 2009, it is true that market reactions were often brutal and even extreme. but these reactions were frequently