stability concerns. similarly, in times of crisis when risks materialise, capital buffers that can be released by authorities can support monetary policy via their impact on the supply of credit from banks. while the system had ample structural buffers at the start of the coronavirus ( covid - 19 ) crisis, buffers that could be released – like the countercyclical capital buffer – accounted for only 0. 2 % of risk - weighted assets at the end of 2019. this imbalance between structural and releasable buffers has gained more attention in the macroprudential debate since the beginning of the pandemic. there is growing consensus on the need to reassess the current balance between structural and releasable buffers and to create what i would call macroprudential space that could be used in a system - wide crisis. i would like to suggest three guiding principles. first, the creation of macroprudential space should be capital - neutral. in other words, we should amend or rebalance certain existing buffer requirements rather than creating additional buffer requirements. second, we need strong governance to ensure that capital buffers are released ( and subsequently replenished ) in a consistent and predictable way across countries in the face of severe, system - wide economic stress. centralising macroprudential action at the euro area - level, based on a clear objective framework, could foster a timely policy response and reduce fragmentation across national borders. and third, the creation of macroprudential space should not modify national authorities ’ existing macroprudential responsibilities and competences as allocated within the current regulatory framework. let me conclude. we have come a long way on the path to completing the banking union. but we are not there yet. what remains to be done is ambitious. but it is ambitious and achievable. when the pandemic crisis struck this time last year, the joint european response revealed the strength of a united europe that can react and move forwards swiftly. let us seize this moment and this opportunity to improve. 1 the target size of the single resolution fund ( srf ) is set at 1 % of covered deposits by the end of 2023. the srf will eventually amount to almost €70 billion. on 14 july 2020 the total amount was approximately €42 billion. see single resolution board ( 2020 ), “ srf grows to €42 billion after latest round of transfers ”, 14 july. 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches

s home member state. credit risks and potential losses are thus borne mainly by financial institutions in other eu or non - eu countries, and – once bank shareholders and creditors have been bailed in – taxpayers in those countries may ultimately have to foot the remaining bill. for this reason, market authorities, prudential supervisors and central banks have a keen interest in other countries complying with the highest financial and operational ccp risk management standards. they rely on home authorities to carry out prudent due diligence. such cooperation with other authorities has been enshrined by the cpmi and the international organisation of securities commissions ( iosco ) as responsibility e of the principles for financial markets infrastructures ( pfmi ). given the stakes involved, blind trust is not enough. i would argue that we must strike a balance 1 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches between facilitating market integration through cross - border access and safeguarding the ability of authorities to fulfil their statutory tasks and objectives. finding this equilibrium is, of course, a challenge and i welcome the work carried out by the financial stability board, at the behest of the japanese g20 presidency, to address potential regulatory causes of market fragmentation. 3 as i see it, fragmentation is not always caused by overlapping regulations, but often by a failure to cooperate. mutually acceptable solutions can and should be found to meet the legitimate expectations of all the authorities involved. the scope of these solutions may differ depending on the degree of interconnectedness. at the european level, for example, where financial markets are highly interdependent and integrated, it is clear that the cross - border stability implications are significant and in many ways exceed those of our banking sector. supervisory coordination at the eu level should reflect this close nexus. unfortunately, however, the competence for ccp supervision remains almost exclusively national. in this respect, despite significant legislative efforts, the lack of ambition of the current revision of the european market infrastructure regulation ( emir ) is regrettable. 4 given that the brunt of default risk in eu ccps is borne by their clearing members, most of whom are directly supervised at the european level, the principle of aligning liability and responsibility clearly implies european supervision of eu ccps. the current text can at best be seen as a modest step in that direction. at the global level, we should strive for an international framework based on two pillars : proportionality and cooperation. proportionality means that where financial stability implications are limited, outcomes