not be healthy. relative government indebtedness is already higher than in many other emerging markets. also, mexico ’ s sovereign credit risk perception, as measured by cds premiums, has remained above that of other countries with the same rating. furthermore, rating agencies have given mexico a clear warning this year in the form of a downward change in perspective. a second contributing factor to peso depreciation may be markets ’ disappointment on lowerthan - expected growth in mexico. a third cause may stem from uncertainty on the forthcoming u. s. presidential election and its implications. finally, given the depth and liquidity of the peso market, and the fact that derivatives are used to hedge peso positions and as a proxy for other emerging - market asset investments, price swings for the mexican currency may be exacerbated. volatility could easily increase in the future, in light of so many unknown global geopolitical and financial variables. this situation could be even more risky in the face of mexico ’ s high exposure to foreign holdings of peso - denominated government debt. these holdings represent one of the highest proportions of the total outstanding of local currency debt in the emerging - market group, decreasing somewhat during the last two years, at close to a third, with the drop concentrated mainly in short - term securities. the still high ratios of foreign holdings could be interpreted as a positive sign. the tables could rapidly turn, however, if perception of strength evaporates. therefore, it is absolutely urgent that mexico strengthen its fiscal stance in an unambiguous way, cutting public expenditures significantly in order to stabilize, and eventually reduce, total government debt to gdp. obviously, monetary policy should also continue to carry its weight in the effort to fortify macroeconomic fundamentals. recent economic developments and outlook since 2014, gdp has risen at a relatively stable rate of around 2. 3 percent year - on - year, including a dip in the 2016 second quarter. two offsetting forces have contributed : expansion in services and decelerating industrial production. recently, the pace has slowed in both sectors. the main drag on industrial output has been a contraction in mining, driven by a longstanding decline in oil extraction. manufacturing production has also been slowing to almost no growth recently. to a large extent, these developments have resulted from a falling trend in u. s. manufacturing production and a contraction in manufacturing exports to the united states since 2015, despite the significant real depreciation of the

( ii ) having taxonomies that reflect differences on the needs and priorities of each country but also allow for international comparability, and ( iii ) promote broad adoption of esg criteria and foster transparency on the methodologies of esg rating service providers. 4. upgrading risk management practices to include climate related risks among financial 2 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches institutions. just as we carefully and continuously monitor traditional financial risks, climaterelated risks should become part of routine risk management for financial institutions and supervisors. i. traditional regulation instruments, like capital requirements, might be ill - suited to address these new risks. therefore, we must encourage and facilitate financial institutions and supervisors to undertake forward looking methodologies such as stress tests and long - term scenario analysis for climate - related risks. ii. the ngfs scenarios provide a good starting point in this respect to facilitate comparability. iii. all financial intermediaries should be subject to a minimum of disclosure and risk management practices related to climate risks to avoid loopholes that could generate severe distortions both to the climate and financial stability agendas. iv. beware that applying climate related regulation only on banks or certain financial institutions could have significant unintended consequences, including disintermediation and risk - shifting. many institutions cannot act and build capacities alone, particularly on climate risk scenario analysis. this is a complex task that requires new skills, long - term forward - looking methodologies and dialogue with climate scientists. integrating scenario analysis into risk management would allow financial institutions and markets to price financial risks better. this is uncharted territory for all, we all need to cooperate with each other at the national and international levels. question 3. can you please elaborate on how to generate capital mobilization and investment in climate mitigation and adaptation in mexico and emdes in general? in this respect, what are the challenges? the agenda for the mobilization of climate related finance is very much focused on developed countries. the emerging economies and ldcs issues and strategies that are needed to advance the agenda in these regions are not being adequately identified. one example of high concentration of green investments in advanced economies can be seen in capital markets the issuance of green and sustainability related bonds and loans from 2015 to 2020 by emerging countries, excluding china, represented only 11 % of the total volume globally ( when including china this percentage increases to 18 % ). as for green bonds, the figure is only 8 % excluding china, and 22 % with china. with the