samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
future, we have no other. ” europe belongs to frankfurt like almost no other city, apart from brussels and strasbourg. the euro sculpture has taken its place alongside the ecb, the ssm, eiopa and also the bundesbank as an expression of this belonging. thanks to your support, the sculpture is now shining again in due splendour. i personally wish to thank all of you very sincerely – and i firmly believe that, in expressing my gratitude, i also speak for many of frankfurt ’ s residents as well as its innumerable international visitors. it remains to be hoped that europe, too, will shine in future with the same lustre as the restored euro sculpture. let us all do what we can to achieve this goal going forward. thank you very much. bis central bankers ’ speeches

andreas dombret : in the heart of europe – europe in our hearts welcoming address by dr andreas dombret, member of the executive board of the deutsche bundesbank, to mark the unveiling of the plaque listing patrons for the euro sign, frankfurt am main, 4 february 2016. * 1. * * introduction ladies and gentlemen i am extremely pleased that you are joining me in celebrating a very special occasion today – the unveiling of the plaque listing patrons of the euro sculpture. when you think of frankfurt, what comes to mind? perhaps the city ’ s famous historical landmarks, such as the romer ( city hall ) or st. paul ’ s? or the skyline, featuring its many skyscrapers? football fans may think of attila, the eagle, worn proudly on players ’ shirts of eintracht frankfurt. you might also think of goethe, the old opera house, the main river, germany ’ s largest airport, and so on. all this is frankfurt ; our city is veritably full of worldrenowned landmarks. however, i ’ m sure that quite a few of us also have in our mind ’ s eye the euro sculpture, which has graced the willy - brandt - platz square between the opera house and the eurotower since the euro was launched – and is thus located right in the heart this city. much as frankfurt itself is located in the geographic heart of europe. 2. in the heart of europe for nearly 15 years, the euro sculpture stood guard before the european central bank, making it clear to all visitors that they were standing at the heart of europe. the sculpture has certainly seen a great deal in that time. when its lights came on for the first time in 2001, the euro area comprised only 12 member states ; the number has now risen to a total of 19. the average forex trading volume that changed hands every day between traders round the world amounted to some €450 billion in 2001 ; it now stands at €1. 7 trillion according to the latest available figures. the euro is undoubtedly the world ’ s second most important currency after the us dollar. yet it has not always been smooth sailing. we all remember the sometimes dramatic events in connection with the recent financial crisis, which dealt a significant blow to the euro area and, in some cases, raised massive doubts about the continued existence of our single currency. it was not least these events which also led to the activists of the occupy movement, in 2011
as to any other euro area country, and our decisions have followed exactly the same rules under this government as under the previous ones. the ecb is the central bank of greece, but we are also the central bank of 18 other countries and we cannot bend our rules to suit the occasion. the greek government can relieve funding constraints by pursuing policies which will open the way to disbursements by other member states under the programme and, ultimately, restore market access. let me add that the ecb ’ s monetary policy stance is currently very accommodative. greece also clearly benefits from this. bis central bankers ’ speeches

’ speeches for the debt held by the ecb itself through the smp, the eu treaties do not allow us to cancel or extend that debt. while the rest of the euro area is already benefiting from quantitative easing, greece is totally isolated from this development. doesn ’ t this undermine the long - term growth prospects of greece and consequently the possibility of reducing unemployment faster? what can the ecb do about it? it is true that one consequence of the policy uncertainty currently prevailing in greece is that the economy is benefiting less than it could from the cyclical rise in demand in the euro area, which our monetary policy is facilitating with visible effects. this is unfortunate for growth and employment in the near term, and one more reason to wish that this period of uncertainty is brought to an end as soon as possible. as regards long - term growth, let me clarify, however, that our asset purchase programme can do little to lift long - term growth, in greece or in any other euro area country. our policy is aimed at bringing euro area inflation back to levels below but close to 2 %. it can engineer a cyclical recovery, not a long - lasting one. long - term growth is driven by the capacity to innovate and to efficiently allocate capital and labour, which hinges on reforms undertaken by governments. why aren ’ t we currently buying greek bonds? for their bonds to be eligible for the ecb ’ s asset purchase programme, euro area countries need to have a sufficiently high credit rating. this requirement can be waived only if an eu - imf programme has been implemented and successfully reviewed, which is not the case today in greece. greek government officials have said that the ecb is using liquidity as a means to blackmail greece. prime minister tsipras even said that the ecb has got a rope around greece ’ s neck. what is your comment on that? decisions by the ecb are guided by rules, not political considerations. following these rules, the ecb has fully played its role as the central bank of greece, continuously increasing its liquidity provision to greek banks to ensure that they can serve the real economy. what we cannot do is fund the government, for example by refinancing greek banks ’ purchases of tbills at a time when the hellenic republic does not have market access. this is due to the fact that, for very good reasons, the eu treaty prohibits any central bank from financing its government. this applies to greece
consumption ”, macroeconomic review, vol. xx ( 1 ), pp. 61 - 65. [ 8 ] department of statistics ( 2020 ), “ rebasing of the consumer price index for general households ”, statistics newsletter singapore, issue 1. © 2021, government of singapore.

that it makes the aim of monetary policy much clearer, ie the achievement of an average annual increase of 3 to 6 % for cpix inflation in 2002. the government chose to set the 3 to 6 % target level. the setting of monetary policy instrument values ( like the level of the “ repo rate ” ) is entirely up to the reserve bank. therefore the inflation - targeting variable chosen provides for the instrument independence of the reserve bank, but not goal independence. by means of the mission statement and an explanatory memorandum about the adoption of an inflation - targeting monetary policy framework, the public has been informed about the objectives of monetary policy. on the basis of this information the public can therefore evaluate the actions of the reserve bank in attaining these objectives. 6. transparency of monetary policy the south african reserve bank also fulfils the second condition for independence, namely transparency. government and the public are provided with a stream of information on the monetary policy stance. some of my staff and i regularly appear before the parliamentary portfolio committee on finance. we also issue comprehensive statements following each meeting of the bank ’ s monetary policy committee. the reserve bank ’ s quarterly bulletin, annual economic report and governor ’ s address at the annual meeting of shareholders provide comprehensive analyses of macroeconomic events. a six - monthly monetary policy review will soon be introduced, describing in more detail the decisions taken by the reserve bank. policy is also explained by the governors of the bank and comments on policy are heard at the monetary policy forum meetings. these meetings are held twice a year in the main centres - at least one in each province - and involve organised business, labour, politicians, academics and the media. 7. institutional independence in south africa finally, the present institutional framework in south africa in the form of the south african reserve bank act, act no 90 of 1989, allows the reserve bank a great degree of autonomy in its operations. the reserve bank ’ s functional independence in monetary and related policies is clearly stated in sections 10 and 35 of the south african reserve bank act. section 35 empowers the board of the bank to make rules “ for the good government of the bank and the conduct of its business ”. in section 10 the powers and duties of the central bank are spelled out in great detail. most of the functions described in this section are the normal functions that one would expect a central bank to perform. section 10 ( 2 ) also clearly states that “ the rates at which the bank will discount or redis
. 7 leading change : why transformation efforts fail, john p. kotter, harvard business review, january 2007 and how to beat the transformation odds, mckinsey and company, survey, april 2015. 8 joint statement on innovative efforts to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, board of governors of the federal reserve system, sr 18 – 10, december 3, 2018. 4 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches

and households ’ net worth, which fell substantially as real estate and stock prices dipped, remains well below its previous peak compared with disposable income. so, households have been saving more. the personal saving rate, which rose to 5. 5 percent by the end of 2009 from a recent low of 1. 2 percent in the third quarter of 2005, seems headed even higher in the third quarter. households are “ deleveraging ” ; they are paying down their debts. of course, lenders have also reinforced this tendency as they have tightened underwriting standards for consumer credit, relative to their pre - recession standards. have households completed their deleveraging, so they will soon spend more? although we believe that substantial progress has been made, it is hard to tell how much further this process has to run. for example, the share of household after - tax income that families owe for servicing debts and paying for housing ( including property taxes, homeowners insurance and rents ) has declined sharply over the past two years and is now back to levels last seen in the late 1990s. households have cut the total amount of debt they owe. they are also refinancing outstanding debt to take advantage of the lowest mortgage interest rates since the mid 1950s. we expect the increased rate of mortgage refinancing now in place to continue over the near term. this represents another means by which households can free up income for other uses. now, let ’ s consider the slow housing recovery. housing market activity – both new construction and sales – remains depressed. on the construction side, total housing starts are running at just 600, 000 units per year ( seasonally - adjusted ) in recent months. this is up from 530, 000 units at the trough in the first quarter of 2009 but it is still extremely low by the standards of the last 50 years. in fact, the rate of new construction is so low that there is barely any net growth in the u. s. housing stock these days. one reason why so little housing is being built is that many existing homes stand vacant. we estimate that there are roughly 3 million vacant housing units more than usual. and more vacancies are added daily as the foreclosure process moves homes from families to mortgage lenders. this stock of vacant homes will shrink when fewer are foreclosed upon and more of these homes are sold or rented out. on the sales side, even though low mortgage interest rates and falling home prices have together boosted
which savings - investment imbalances, the growth of complex securitised credit intermediation, changing patterns of maturity transformation, rising embedded leverage, a burgeoning shadow banking sector, and rapid credit - fuelled growth, had created large systemic vulnerabilities. in the future, we need – at national and global level – to be in a much better position to understand and address trends in credit growth, in system - wide leverage and maturity transformation, and in the inter - linkages within the financial system, to identify and constrain emerging risks. for this we require additional system - wide prudential as well as other tools. creating the prudential tools, regulatory set - ups and policy tools required to better constrain system - wide risks, including generating the transparency needed for authorities and markets to be better informed about the risks to the system, is the focus of much of the reform agenda. these changes do of course need to be implemented at national levels. but there is work internationally to generate the tools and policies needed, to promote coherence in implementation and to conduct the monitoring that is required. let me speak to some of these. one central lesson of this crisis is that the system entered it with too little capital, far too small liquidity buffers, and a capital and valuation regime with significant pro - cyclical consequences. much work is underway on bank capital and liquidity that will address these issues. the basel committee proposed last year changes that by end 2010 will expand basel ii risk capture and very significantly increase trading book capital requirements. and the committee ’ s much strengthened liquidity guidelines are in the process of being implemented nationally. further work is underway to strengthen guidance for and monitoring of liquidity management at large cross - border banks. the fsf and its member bodies also produced a set of recommendations to mitigate procyclicality. these call for ( i ) regulatory capital requirements to increase the quality and level of capital in the financial system during strong economic conditions so that they can be drawn down during periods of economic and financial stress ; ( ii ) a revision of the market risk framework of basel ii to reduce the reliance on cyclical value - at - risk based capital estimates ; and ( iii ) to supplement risk - based capital requirements with a leverage ratio to contain the build up of leverage in the banking system. regarding provisioning, we – and now g20 leaders – called on the iasb and fasb to reconsider

13 % - 5 % - - spending on pensions + 10. 2 % + 2. 2 % - - total ageing - related spending + 11. 5 % + 3. 4 % government debt / gdp : projection 346 % almost 200 % rise in public spending as % of gdp 2005 - 2050 source : economic policy committee and european commission projections.
undertakings. ladies and gentlemen, with these few words, i thank you for your attention and i hope that you will find the event insightful. 2 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches thank you. 3 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches

could rise further to as much as usd2. 8 trillion 1. the events which have since unfolded underscore the fact that effectively managing risks associated with mortgage financing encompasses a much broader set of considerations – including the consequences of an adverse and broad downturn in the housing market. the crisis has reinforced the need for banks to consider the cyclical developments in the mortgage financing market more explicitly in their risk assessments. factors such as a sustained growth in house prices, low interest rates and modest equity commitment should inform banks of the risk outlook for the mortgage segment and corresponding risk mitigation actions that are needed to avert potential losses. changes observed in the market features of the business in other countries also foreshadow what may in time characterise the mortgage market in malaysia. in some markets, brokers of home loans are commonplace and a growing proportion of loans are protected by insurance. in an increasingly challenging environment, banks will need to demonstrate that they have sufficiently strong balance sheets, processes, and management plans in place to contain the risks, while providing continued support for portfolio expansion and product innovation in the mortgage financing segment. this will entail continuous assessments of the changing profile of risk and the appropriate consideration of new and alternative ways to manage risks. the board in particular is responsible to ensure that product innovation and the re - packaging of risks in the mortgage portfolio do not outstrip the bank ’ s capacity to manage the associated risks. today, we are pleased to have three distinguished speakers address some of these issues and developments in greater depth. they are dr. yeah kim leng from ram holdings berhad and dr. john lee from kpmg who will share an overview and their perspectives on risks in mortgage markets in malaysia, as well as their experiences with approaches to managing these risks in the light of the many changes taking place in this area. we are also especially honoured to welcome mr. peter pang, the deputy chief executive of the hong kong monetary authority, who will speak on hong kong ’ s experience in the area of mortgage financing. as you all know, hong kong has one of the most developed and healthiest mortgage markets in the region with a delinquency ratio reported at only 0. 04 % in october 2009 2. hong kong ’ s leadership in advancing innovations in sound mortgage risk imf global financial stability report, october 2009. hkma monthly statistical bulletin. management practices over the years, including through the role of the hong kong mortgage corporation ( hkmc ), provides many
( laughs ). the euro symbol is one of the most visible signs in europe. when i see it, i think of how much there is to do to make europe work, to ensure that people have jobs and that they can live a good life. that is why i am working hard at the ecb. it should be the purpose of everything that we do. bis central bankers ’ speeches

you set up investment programmes in the countries involved! cœure : let me first answer mr ratz. the very narrowly defined primary objective of the ecb is to maintain price stability in the euro area. to achieve this goal, we have a great number of different instruments at our disposal, which we have used as the situation required. the ecb can choose its instruments, but it is not allowed to reinterpret the treaty. turning to the subject of capitalism, i respect your views, mr aschmoneit, but the issue is outside the ecb ’ s area of responsibility. we operate in an environment that is framed by treaties which have been approved by the citizens of europe and which provide for europe to be set up as a social market economy. it is within this market economy that the ecb operates. sz : what is your personal view on capitalism? cœure : my view on capitalism is similar to what the former british prime minister winston churchill said about democracy : it is the worst of all the systems, except for all the others that have already been tried. capitalism can be extremely dangerous and cruel. the markets triggered the financial crisis, which is why we need strict rules. with those in place and being checked strictly, capitalism can function well. over the past 40 years, the market economy system has enabled hundreds of millions of people to climb out of poverty. in europe, we have political institutions that can regulate the market, while that is not the case at the global level : despite having a global market economy, there are no global institutions. it is europe ’ s biggest chance that we are able to control the market economy in this way, and we should make full use of it. ratz : that ’ s not true. you are not controlling capitalism. you are giving capitalism ever more free reign. for example, the memorandum for greece has interfered massively with the right to health care and the freedom of wage negotiations. i have never read any statement by the ecb in which it has said that europe needs to do more to control capitalism. however, i do accept that the ecb is in a difficult contractual situation. with the focus being on price stability, its mandate is too narrowly defined. the ecb should actually be able to finance governments. nevertheless, the ecb is independent and therefore not democratically accountable. the ecb itself might propose how its democratic accountability could be improved. cœure : on monetary financing of governments,
the correct monetary policy instrument. the snb will continue to enforce it with the utmost determination. bis central bankers ’ speeches

is seen in aggregate uncertainty for one - year - ahead inflation expectations. 15 armantier et al. ( october 2022 ). 16 armantier et al. ( october 2022 ). 17 mertens and williams ( 2021 ). 18 the equivalence of the uncertainty test about interest rates and inflation test breaks down if the natural rate of interest rate is subject to permanent shocks. by continuing to use our site, you agree to our terms of use and privacy statement. you can learn more about how we use cookies by reviewing our privacy statement.
* * * * * * * * * once again, i want to express my sincere thanks to central banking publications and lombard street research for the honour of this most prestigious award. this is a proud moment for the members of our staff who have put in endless hours developing a prize - winning site.

. since then, canada has experimented with a number of monetary policy frameworks, including the gold standard, the bretton woods system of pegged exchange rates and monetary growth targeting. none of these frameworks was able to deliver low and stable inflation. 2 see, for example, t. macklem, “ a measure of work ” ( speech to the winnipeg chamber of commerce, winnipeg, october 4, 2012 ) ; a. cote, “ inflation targeting in the post - crisis era ” ( speech to the calgary cfa society, calgary, november 18, 2014 ) ; d. dodge, “ canada ’ s monetary policy approach : it works for canadians ” ( speech to the edmonton chamber of commerce, edmonton, june 26, 2001 ) ; and g. thiessen, “ can a bank change? the evolution of monetary policy at the bank of canada 1935 – 2000 ” ( lecture to the faculty of social science, university of western ontario, october 17, 2000 ). - 3it has also been tested by crisis. the covid - 19 pandemic has been an immense shock to our economy, and our framework has proven resilient. when the pandemic hit, economic activity plummeted and inflation fell sharply as many prices were discounted. the combination of exceptionally weak demand and negative inflation risked causing deflation and economic depression. at the outset of this crisis, the framework guided our policy response, including the use of forward guidance and quantitative easing. it also guided our decisions to taper and then end quantitative easing. our monetary policy was complemented by an exceptional fiscal policy response, and together they put a floor under the crisis and supported recovery. combined with effective vaccines, these policies have worked. our economic recovery is now well advanced. but as we are all aware, the global economic rebound has generated elevated inflation in canada and many countries. to a large extent, this reflects the unique circumstances of the pandemic. with global demand recovering faster than disrupted supply chains can respond, the prices for many goods have increased sharply. while we expect inflation to ease in the second half of 2022, we are closely watching inflation expectations and wage costs. and we will ensure that the forces pushing up prices do not become embedded in ongoing inflation. our framework enables us to do just that. reviewing our framework the review of our framework every five years is also a key feature of the canadian system. the joint nature of the agreement between the government and the bank of canada reinforces both