both fiscal policy and monetary policy would be forced to make substantial departures from the normal principles. these would be extremely unusual circumstances, however, and do not provide any argument for setting up a permanent stabilisation policy committee. so, my answer to the question on whether monetary and fiscal policy should be developed is yes, but not in the direction lo appears to have in mind. with regard to monetary policy, this means continued improvement of analysis and forecasting methods and to find ways to clarify the balance between the inflation target and the real economy. for fiscal policy it could mean finding ways to make the automatic stabilisers even more effective, but primarily it entails designing preventive systems to enable smoother structural adjustments in the economy when various shocks unavoidably occur. it does not entail any changes in the fundamental role allocation as regards stabilisation policy. summary let me briefly summarise my responses to the three questions. stabilisation policy is important, but one should not overestimate what it can achieve. other economic policy measures are much more important to long - term growth in prosperity. a smoother adjustment process when the economy suffers shocks could benefit employment more than an active stabilisation policy. the allocation of roles between fiscal policy and monetary policy with regard to stabilising the macro economy has functioned well in the new regime and i see no good reason to change it. both fiscal policy and monetary policy can and should develop, but this should occur within the framework of the present allocation of roles regarding stabilisation policy. for monetary policy this is a question of analysing and describing the considerations made between the inflation target and developments in the real economy. the most important issue regarding fiscal policy is not measures aimed at stabilisation, but providing a good general foundation for prosperity growth. thank you!

, are to decide on issues where opinions are divided, the preparatory processes can easily become prolonged. it can also lead to a complete inability to act. if one or more members strongly oppose a decision, this can lead to the issue not being taken up for decision at all. being six people can be particularly problematic when it comes to financial security. in these issues, we have striven to agree. frequently, of course, we have had to take decisions to strengthen financial stability in a reality marked by a financial crisis. in such cases, it would not have been appropriate to show disunity over the best course of action. reservations regarding such decisions could have the opposite effect to that desired. instead of strengthening financial stability, we could weaken it. despite this, our concrete measures functioned well during the financial crisis. at the riksbank, we have, in practice, successively moved away from the principle of all six members of the executive board needing to be involved in and decide on all issues. just i know of only two other authorities with several heads : the swedish national audit office has three heads, of whom one is an administrative head, and the parliamentary ombudsmen have four heads, of whom one is an administrative head. like the riksbank, both of these authorities are under the riksdag, which does not have any extensive experience of appointing and leading authorities. bis central bankers ’ speeches over ten years ago, the five deputy governors were responsible for preparing matters within one or more departments. this was changed even before i came to the riksbank, six years ago, when they were given preparatory responsibility for certain specific areas. eventually a management group was formed. this consists of the heads of department, with the head of the general secretariat as chairman. it took over responsibility for certain strategic issues and responsibility for coordinating many of the daily operational issues which, previously, had largely fallen to the executive board to handle. decision - making responsibility for daily operational issues has been delegated to the heads of department. however, two members of the executive board remained responsible for tabling proposals for decision in issues of monetary policy and financial stability. this was also changed later, so that these two were no longer responsible for tabling proposals for decision, but only acted as spokespersons. when irma rosenberg left, the role of spokesperson for monetary policy disappeared, and when lars nyberg leaves at the end of this year, the role of spokesperson for financial stability will also probably disappear.