jean - claude trichet : the great financial crisis – lessons for financial stability and monetary policy introductory remarks by mr jean - claude trichet, president of the european central bank, at the colloquium in honour of mr lucas papademos, vice - president of the european central bank, frankfurt am main, 20 may 2010. * * * ladies and gentlemen, introduction the subject of this colloquium – “ the great financial crisis ” – could be no other since lucas papademos ’ tenure will be remembered for the immense challenges for financial stability and monetary policy that have arisen since the trigger of the subprime crisis in 2007. lucas played a key role at both the global and european levels in tackling these challenges. he was among those who were prescient about the considerable build - up of risks in the years before the crisis. he placed significant efforts in developing and adapting financial stability analysis to the fundamental and far - reaching changes in the financial system we have witnessed in the past decade, particularly as a result of increasing financial integration and innovation. when the crisis unfolded, lucas was one of the foremost policy - makers in devising the actions required to stabilise the financial system. he also played a substantial part in setting the ground for regulatory reform, namely through his participation in the financial stability forum, later board, and in several european and eurosystem fora, a number of which he chaired himself. i am therefore delighted that we were able to organise this colloquium with such a set of distinguished speakers, all of which have their exceptional professional standing deeply associated with the financial crisis, either as policy - makers, crisis managers, academics or proponents of regulatory initiatives. my introductory remarks this afternoon are organised around the title of this colloquium. my aim is to review policies in the last few years and draw some policy conclusions. i will first touch upon some of the lessons for financial stability, where lucas ’ s contribution was especially important, as responsible for the financial stability function, and then turn to the experience with monetary policy. lessons for financial stability the financial crisis erupted in august 2007, when off - balance sheet vehicles that had been set up by banks to manage portfolios of complex structured credit securities ran into funding liquidity problems. although initially a liquidity squeeze, concerns about counterparty credit risks quickly spread as uncertainties intensified about the nature and extent of exposures of banks to what we now call “ toxic assets ”. and, as

sabine lautenschlager : interview with welt am sonntag interview by ms sabine lautenschlager, member of the executive board of the european central bank and vice - chair of the supervisory board of the european central bank, with welt am sonntag, conducted by ms anja ettel and ms anne kunz on 30 july 2018 and published on 5 august 2018. * * * 15 september marks the tenth anniversary of the collapse of the us investment bank lehman brothers. you were then the chief banking supervisor at the federal financial supervisory authority ( bafin ). do you remember that day? yes, i can remember it vividly. i was in the bafin that weekend and participated in the crisis calls with the international supervisors. i saw at first hand how things came to a head that weekend. in the night from sunday to monday, the us colleagues decided not to rescue lehman. three of us were holding the fort at the bafin that night. were you immediately aware of the magnitude of what was happening? we knew that the collapse of such a bank would not leave the financial world unscathed. nonetheless, we all underestimated the severity of the fallout. nobody foresaw a crisis of confidence that would bring whole markets to a standstill. would lehman still be possible today? i would never say that there will never be another crisis. but there ’ s no doubt that institutions and supervisors are now better prepared. banks hold much more capital and liquidity. their risk management and corporate governance are better too, albeit not yet good enough at every institution. one theory has it that the financial crisis would not have unfolded as it did if more women had been on the banks ’ boards. is there some truth in that? i don ’ t know about that – but there is good reason to believe that mixed teams come up with better results. unfortunately, women are still under - represented at board level. not in supervision though. there have always been more women in supervision. but i would resist any attempt to attribute certain behaviours solely to gender. people at the top need to have qualities such as assertiveness and decisiveness – that goes for men and women. and that applies in supervision too. for example? as a supervisor i have to state unpleasant truths and take tough decisions ; i have to fight my corner time and time again. and that leaves its mark. people are shaped by their profession. how do you react to the criticism that supervision