been combined into large, complex, and opaque trust companies that were not members of the nych. this resulted in runs on those trusts, which led to broader liquidity problems. although the nych had the ability to provide liquidity to those trusts, the provision of that liquidity was delayed. it appears that at the time, the nych was, reasonably, observing some form of bagehot's dictum when deciding whether to provide liquidity. under that dictum, you want to know that the institution to which you're providing liquidity is solvent. if it isn't, then the liquidity extension could be akin to throwing good money after bad. but because the trust companies at the time weren't member institutions, the clearinghouse didn't have a good enough understanding of their balance sheets to know whether they were solvent. 5 some banks refused to clear checks from other institutions, which led to an erosion of depositor confidence and more failures. this historical example points to another aspect of a payment system that is important - resilience of the system. these problems highlighted by the 1907 panic - coordination failures and a lack of resilience - could have been mitigated with the help of a central bank. paul warburg, an influential banker at the time, argued that such a central bank could " establish and maintain a perfect system of credit, enabling the general banks to transform cash credits into actual cash with such absolute ease and certainty that the use of cash credit, instead of actual cash, will not cease, no matter what may happen. " 6 in 1913, congress agreed and created the federal reserve. it positioned the federal reserve at the center of the banking system by establishing a nationwide check - 2 / 5 bis - central bankers'speeches clearing system and a telegraph wire transfer service that is now known as fedwire®. the fed was also intended to function as a lender of last resort so that suspension of payments would no longer be necessary. in the 1970s, the fed promoted more efficient check - clearing by adding the automated clearinghouse service. our job in providing these services and carrying out our responsibilities was and continues to be to make sure the payment system functions efficiently and resiliently, promoting the kind of confidence that is vital for a modern economy. the lesson from this history, as relevant now as ever, is that the payment system has been one of those areas in which the best efforts of the private sector have sometimes fallen short. the

like to thank caroline mehigan and micheal o ’ keeffe for their contribution to my remarks. 2. for the seminal piece see autor et al 3. for an overview see for example : http : / / www. oecd. org / trade / understanding - the - global - trading - system / why - open - marketsmatter / 4. note that ireland had a very free trade policy position from independence in 1921 until 1932 when protectionist policies were introduced in line with the practice elsewhere. 5. in 1961, ireland applied to join the european economic community. 6. the extent of our openness also complicates the interpretation of our statistics, so it is important to look at a number of measures of trade for example than gross exports and imports. 7. using the oecd wto tiva database ( 2014 ) indicator “ domestic value added in foreign final demand - partner shares ” the us demanded 18 per cent and the seu excluding the uk accounted for 33 per cent. 8. merchandise exports are often used to measure irish goods exports as they do not include contract manufacturing for example. in 2014 for comparison ( bracket values for 2018 ), merchandise exports to the uk were 14 % ( 11 % ) of the total, the us accounted for 22 per cent ( 28 % ) with 40 per cent ( 39 % ) going to the eu non - uk. 9. see the cso data 10. oecd tiva database data for 2014. 11. exports for jan - jun 2019 : food and live animals ( 5688 million euro ), beverages ( 720 million euro ), or 16 per cent of the total merchandise exports. 12. see https : / / www. esri. ie / publications / how - openness - to - trade - rescued - the - irish - economy 13. see table 1, calo & herzberg ( 2019 ), this paper also provides a forward looking view on financial sectors after brexit. 14. https : / / www. ifsc. ie / page. aspx? idpage = 6 15. amounting to 318, 000 people – https : / / www. cso. ie / en / releasesandpublications / ep / pfdi / foreigndirectinvestmentinireland2017 / ae / 16. ireland produces three quarters of global production of orthopedic knees with many medical technology firms based around