##el ; this makes no sense when resolution is carried out at parent company level. as regards the measures still needed to finalise the banking union, completing the resolution framework is, in my opinion, the first priority, even more so than deposit insurance, the third pillar of the banking union. mario draghi was most insistent on this in his florence speech of 11 may. i in most large jurisdictions – the united states, the united kingdom and japan – the intervention capabilities of resolution funds are not capped because they are backstopped by the fiscal authorities, without being a burden on public finances, since any public outlays are generally reimbursed by the private sector. during the last financial crisis, market and depositor confidence resulting from a credit line backstopped by the us treasury enabled the federal deposit insurance corporation ( fdic ) to resolve 500 banks without tapping into the resources of the safety net. ii today, in the event of a severe crisis in the european banking union, the resources of the single resolution fund ( srf ) could be depleted. this is why a common backstop for the single resolution fund is urgently needed. let me emphasise that the aim of a common backstop is not to bail out banks or draw on government budgets. such a step would only be taken in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, and all the sums borrowed would page 5 of 6 be gradually repaid by the banking sector. rather, it is about building confidence in bank resolution in europe by showing that it will always be able to intervene effectively in the event of a crisis. such a system will also encourage the lifting of the constraints imposed by certain national authorities on capital and liquidity flows. i regard the european commission's proposal to set up a backstop through a credit line provided by the european stability mechanism ( esm ) as a top priority. we also need a common scheme for providing liquidity to financially sound banks after resolution which is in line with euro area monetary policy rules. of course, a compromise will have to be found in order to make headway on the third pillar of the banking union, deposit insurance. once we have completed the resolution framework, we will be less in need of a shared european scheme. a pragmatic approach could be to introduce a system of loans between national deposit guarantee schemes ( dgs ), with guarantee mechanisms to ensure that liquidity advances do not lead to losses for the lending dgs. this would lead to a sharing

. the acpr has since then actively participated in the work of the technical market risk group of the basel committee. the new rules proposed in the document currently submitted for consultation should permit a return to the impacts initially sought ex ante, i. e. an average increase of 20 % to 30 % in the minimum capital requirement for market risks. beside regulation – thus clarified – and microprudential supervision, macroprudential policies now round off in many countries the financial stability trifecta. in france, the acpr contributes actively to the discussions of the haut conseil de stabilite financiere ( high council for financial stability – hcsf ) chaired by the minister for the economy and finance. in the face of rapid and excessive growth in the debt of several large corporations, the hcsf has adopted a measure which comes into force on 1 july ; it imposes on french systemic banks a limit to their exposures to the most leveraged large non - financial resident corporations. the hcsf nevertheless remains vigilant in the face of the rapid increase in bank lending to the private sector, which stood at + 5. 5 % in the first quarter of 2018. french private debt reached 130 % of gdp at end - 2017, the highest of the large countries in the euro area. since 2014, it has risen by more than 9 % of gdp, while it has declined by 5. 4 % of gdp on average for the euro area. the hcsf stated on 29 march that it stands ready to act. in particular, if we have to decide, at our next meeting, on a countercyclical capital buffer, that would evidently not be in order to stop the lending today : it would be – as the name suggests – to avoid a credit crunch tomorrow when there is a cyclical downturn in the economy, particularly for small and medium - sized enterprises. should banks lack sufficient capital, they could manage the heightened risks thus materialising in their balance sheets by restricting new lending. it is this excessive credit cycle – the risk of “ go and stop ” seen during financial crises – that a moderate capital buffer must seek to smooth out. it should be noted in passing that a clear majority of member states of the european union have adopted other macroprudential measures page 3 of 6 to specifically limit residential lending, constraining households : in my view it is out of the question in france. ii. to reduce fragmentation and improve private risk sharing in