samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
time to work through. bis central bankers ’ speeches

sense of escape ” from the immediacy of the present. the historic records and documents that we have here provide visuals and vignettes that transcend time and help us go down our institutional memory lane. 5. come to think of it, “ it is surprising how much of memory is built around things unnoticed at the time ”. every document, every object, every artifact here records or refers to an event that may just have been an unnoticed part of contemporary setting in real time. but looking back at them from this distance of time, we get a treasure trove of stories about the reserve bank that are diverse and fascinating. there is, for example, the share issue of the reserve bank, the largest in the country, the apprehension that it may get into the hands of “ an exploiting group or caucus ” ; and the attempt to prevent that. then there is the story about the first advertisement by the bank for staff recruitment that caused a traffic jam on the streets of what was then calcutta. 6. or take the story of the rbi seal. the seal was approved by the rbi board. even so, sir james taylor, the then deputy governor of the bank, was disappointed with it. he ordered preparation of fresh sketches by the government of india mint and the security printing press at nasik. his dissatisfaction was with the image of the tiger on the seal, presumably because it did not quite look like a tiger. 7. sir james could not find anyone to photograph a live tiger. so he did the next best thing, and ordered the photographing of the statue of the tiger on the entrance gate at the belvedere in calcutta. sir james was clearly a man hard to please ; he was not happy with those sketches either. 8. “ the tiger ”, wrote sir james, apparently inclined to be a bit ribald, “ looks too like some species of dog, and i am afraid that a design of a dog under a tree would arouse derision among the irreverent ”. 9. a second effort produced better results with the tiger. but the palm tree went wrong. the fastidious sir james wrote again, “ the tiger is distinctly good, but the tree has spoiled it. the stem is too long and the branches too spidery, but i should have thought that by putting a firm line under the feet of the tiger and making the tree stronger and lower, we could get quite a good result from the design ”. 10. the
hearing from both yourself and your celebrant, sir courtney later this morning. once again, we are delighted to have you here in port of spain to participate in the 42nd annual monetary studies conference. i sincerely hope that, in addition to your fruitful conference deliberations, you find some time to enjoy the country. [ please spend freely, domestic demand is sluggish and we need the money ]. thank you.

and more recently latin america are demonstrating, the economic challenges of the day require more and even deeper regional cooperation. for us here in the caribbean, regional cooperation may not merely be a desirable policy option, it may be vital for our very survival. the theme of this year ’ s conference – financial stability, crisis preparedness and risk management in the caribbean – is both appropriate and timely. just when we thought we had survived the worst of the international financial crisis, we were blindsided by the collapse of the stanford bank and the demise of cl financial, the largest conglomerate in the caribbean. the later crisis has involved not only trinidad and tobago ( with clico, british american and the clico investment bank ), but it has also touched barbados, guyana and suriname ( that have clico subsidiaries ) as well as the oecs and the bahamas, where the baico insurance companies operated. while the impact is still unfolding, there is no doubt that, when the numbers are in, the crisis of cl financial would have had an enormous human and fiscal cost. if there is any positive, it is that the crisis should finally constitute a long awaited wake - up call ; one that we cannot ignore and one that carries powerful lessons that we need to address immediately. in passing, i would like to identify three main lessons : the first is the urgent need for all regional jurisdictions to strengthen national financial legislation and regulatory practices ; the second imperative is the establishment of a framework to facilitate closer collaboration among regional regulators in the regulation of cross - border institutions ; and the third imperative is the establishment of a national crisis management plan which details how regulatory authorities would react in the event of a systemic financial crisis. an examination of the conference agenda indicates that these issues will be fully covered in the next three days. one couldn ’ t help but notice also the impressive list of presenters and participants. this should provide for stimulating discussion such that, at the end of this conference we should be able to benefit from new insights for assuring regional financial stability. it is indeed fitting that this year ’ s conference will honor the work of a great caribbean economist and intellectual – professor c. y. thomas. let me congratulate c. y. for his sterling contribution to the region, in a career spanning more than four decades. your early work in the area of monetary and financial economics has helped shape the minds of generations of students and policy - makers in the caribbean and in other parts of the world. i do look forward to
the current economic environment in a deterioration of the headline budget balance but not in excessive deficits. the importance of the functioning of automatic stabilisers in the euro area should not be underestimated. in the euro area, the contribution to economic stabilisation made by these stabilisers is generally higher, on average, than in other industrialised countries due to the high sensitivity of revenues and expenditures to economic fluctuations in europe. however, we have serious doubts about the efficiency of discretionary fiscal policies. activist policies may have pro - cyclical effects, given the time - lags involved. in addition, they risk undermining the confidence of economic agents in the fiscal framework and in its stability. as regards the monetary policy of the ecb, let me start by presenting the principle which forms the foundation of the macroeconomic institutional framework in the euro area. this principle is that of a sound monetary policy aimed at maintaining price stability. the ecb's governing council takes its monetary policy decisions within the framework of a welldesigned monetary policy strategy. less than one month ago, we confirmed our definition of price stability as a " year - on - year increase in the harmonised index of consumer prices ( hicp ) for the euro area of below 2 % ". we also confirmed our medium - term orientation. at the same time, we clarified that in the pursuit of price stability we aim to maintain inflation rates below but " close to 2 % " over the medium term. this clarification underlines the ecb's general commitment to provide a sufficient safety margin to guard against potential risks of deflation. it also addresses the issue of the possible presence of a measurement bias in the hicp and the implications of inflation differentials within the euro area. let me turn now to the factors which need to be taken into consideration by monetary policy at the current juncture. the first few months of this year were dominated by the uncertainty related to the escalation of geopolitical tensions in the middle east. this environment, which was also characterised by rising oil prices, was clearly not beneficial for investment and, more generally, economic activity in the euro area and at the global level. as a result, economic growth was relatively weak in early 2003 and expectations for economic growth, at least for this year, have had to be scaled back. the rapid conclusion of the military activities was accompanied by a normalisation in oil prices and a rebound in stock markets. both developments indicate that

policy action ; 6. public authorities play a role in three fields : removing obstacles to consolidation, setting standards, and ensuring an integrated regulatory and oversight framework.
harvesh seegolam : the future of central bank money in a digital world keynote address by mr harvesh seegolam, governor of the bank of mauritius, at the international monetary fund / world bank community of central bank technologists workshop on the theme of " the future of central bank money in a digital world ", port louis, 26 april 2023. * * * members of the board of directors of the bank of mauritius first deputy governor, bank of mauritius of the international monetary fund and of the world bank representatives of other central banks the chairperson, and the chief executive of the mauritius bankers association chief executives of banks and financial institutions members of the media distinguished guests ladies and gentlemen a very good morning. i am pleased to welcome you at the bank of mauritius. at the outset, i wish to put on record the proactiveness we witnessed from the international monetary fund, the world bank, the bank for international settlements and other central banks with respect to this event. the mere presence of international institutions and central banks representatives from across the world testifies both the willingness and interest in the future of money and the role of central banks i wish to convey my gratitude to the imf / world bank group community of technologists for allowing the bank of mauritius the opportunity to host this meeting, the more so that i understand that it is for the very first time that this meeting is being held outside washington d. c. ladies and gentlemen, it is very fitting that the theme for this landmark meeting is " the future of central bank money in a digital world ". for us as central bankers, preparing for the future means getting everything right, now itself. central bank digital currencies a€ “ cbdcs as we commonly call them - entail much more than mere digital representations of a central bank currency. cbdcs may have critical implications on both domestic and international economic and financial stability. like it or not, the fact remains that unexpected frictions inevitably emerge when it comes to designing a cbdc or implementing and operating it. central bankers have their own legitimate apprehensions which drive them to always tread very carefully. sometimes, even too carefully to the taste of fintechs or operators of new payment technologies. cooperation, information and experience sharing among 1 / 5 bis - central bankers'speeches the central banking community are therefore necessary to help address concerns and learn from peers on how to overcome stumbling blocks. one of the major stumbling blocks in my opinion is coming to terms with

you well in taking the profession forward. 4 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches
euros than the corresponding rates for contracts denominated in us dollars. in a similar vein, the benchmark ten - year government bond yield in the euro area – the german bund yield – is broadly comparable to the yield on the ten - year treasury note. this shows that in the current circumstances, international comparisons of policy rates provide limited information about the effective credit conditions prevailing in individual markets. one key reason for lower market rates is the fact that spreads are lower in the euro area, a positive interpretation of which would point to somewhat lower credit and liquidity risk premia. non - standard measures let me now turn to the exceptional policy actions that we have taken in response to the crisis – the so - called “ non - standard ” measures. as you will recall, when the very significant stress in interbank markets first manifested itself in august 2007, the ecb immediately stepped into the breach and accommodated the temporarily elevated liquidity demand from the banks through a fixed rate operation with full allotment, providing €95 billion to the market within a few hours. overnight lending of the same kind continued to be provided albeit with lower volumes during the following three days. so we can say that the ecb was the first central bank in the turmoil to engage in non - standard measures. when in mid - september 2008 interbank trading came to a virtual halt, the ecb had to engage in a new mode of liquidity provision. we started to provide refinancing well above the levels that banks had absorbed to fulfil their reserve requirements in normal times. let me explain to you how and why we did this. there are three main building blocks to our new approach. 1 ) our primary concern was to maintain the availability of credit for households and companies at accessible rates. we significantly adapted our regular operations in the crisis. since then, we have followed a new “ fixed rate full allotment ” tender procedure and we have significantly expanded the maturity of our operations. this means that banks have been granted access to essentially unlimited liquidity at our policy interest rate at maturities of up to six months. to appreciate fully what this means, let us step back for a moment and look at what we do in normal times. in normal times, we auction a given amount of central bank credit, mainly in refinancing operations with a one - week maturity, and let competition among bidders determine the interest rate at which that credit will become available to the banking system as a whole

i thank you for your attention.
take your questions. 3 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches

and the elaboration of tools and models for the analysis of economic data. the second dimension relates to ongoing efforts of the euro area to implement structural reforms in the labour and good markets. these reforms aim to make these markets more flexible, strengthening the euro area ’ s competitiveness and its resilience to shocks. several such reforms have been already implemented and many more are to come. this is a factor that adds uncertainty to the stability of economic relationships in the euro area, a factor that the central bank has to take into account when taking policy decisions. the third dimension of structural change in europe is that associated with enlargement. the integration of these new countries will affect the european economy through a change in trade patterns, capital and labour flows and a higher level of competition. the enlargement will no doubt provide new opportunities for trade and investment flows. some effects are already visible in a high degree of economic integration between the current member states and the acceding countries. lower trade costs and an increase in competition associated with the enlargement of the single market can have a significantly positive impact on growth in the european economy as a whole. but the side effect might be, again, a somewhat diminished ability to extrapolate statistical patterns seen in the past to forecast the future, at least for some time. one notable source of dynamics in structural relationships, looking forward, will be the convergence across income and productivity levels. for acceding countries as a whole, per capita income today is less than half of the average of the euro area, so the potential for trade creation and redirection of existing trade and production specialisation patterns is enormous. in the end, increasing prosperity and living standards will be forthcoming for the whole union. and along the way the drive towards reallocation of production and re - specialisation will call for changes. the ecb ’ s monetary policy concept europe ’ s transition to the single currency, no doubt, marked a time in which the signal extraction problem in understanding economic developments was most acute. yet, the transition was smooth and the abrupt switch in the process by which agents form their expectations, that many observers had predicted, did not materialise after all. so, amidst the challenges that loom in our future, we are reassured that we did make it and that it bears testimony to our capacity to weather difficulty. on the eve of the euro changeover, markets immediately recognised the new rules of the game. they adjusted swiftly to the new monetary policy environment
control during normalization, ” “ money markets and monetary policy implementation ” and “ implementation of open market operations in a time of transition. ” see the minutes from the fomc meeting of june 16 – 17, 2015. bis central bankers ’ speeches

the second pillar of interest rate control : liquidity supply. in order for central banks ’ remuneration rates to effectively achieve interest rate control, central banks supply reserves in appropriate quantities to achieve the interest rate target. in some environments, this requires central banks to forecast demand for liabilities and execute open market operations to supply needed reserves. in recent years, the demand for many central bank liabilities has become higher and less predictable. however, most central banks have been operating with abundant liquidity surpluses, which has limited the impact of this reduced predictability on implementation. 12 as central banks embark on balance sheet reduction, however, understanding demand for liabilities may become more important. the demand for digital currencies is not well understood, as these are instruments for which there is no precedent or experience. for a cbdc, central banks would have to understand the behavior of the demand for this new liability. if stablecoins were to be issued by commercial banks, it would also be important to understand drivers of growth in these coins and how that growth might affect banks ’ demand for reserves. trend growth in these central bank liabilities could be quite different than it is for other liabilities, such as cash or reserve holdings of traditional banks. and, the variability in demand could potentially be high, driven by shifts in the market environment or in response to geopolitical developments or other exogenous events. this variability could be amplified if digital currencies were available internationally, potentially leading to larger flows. the variability could create new challenges for supplying the appropriate amount of reserves to the banking system to ensure that administered rates continue to control rates, and could lead to a need for larger liquidity surpluses to ensure interest rate control. one way to manage growth or variability in demand, and the associated impact on demand for reserves in the banking system, could be to impose limits on how much of a cbdc individuals or institutions could hold. some central banks are actively considering such limits. 13 however, these could also diminish the use cases for cbdc and reduce the potential for consumers and businesses to take advantage of the payment benefits. stablecoins may not have the same types of holding limitations, which could lead to faster growth or more variability in demand. at least one jurisdiction is considering the potential use of holding limits or transaction limits on stablecoins on a temporary basis, to manage the possible shift from commercial bank deposits during a transition to new forms of digital money. 14 central banks could
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cycle. for example, our survey of property price professionals showed that – upon introduction – the measures had a substantial dampening effect on house price growth expectations. and, based on different analytical approaches, a range of estimates show that house prices, and the house price to income ratio, would have been higher in the absence of the measures. 7 another lens through which to consider the drivers of developments in the housing market is in terms of the relationship between house prices and rents. looser credit conditions typically result in house prices growing faster than rents – as they did in ireland before the financial crisis. over the past decade, though, ireland has seen a smaller deviation between growth in house prices and rents relative to some other advanced economies. this suggests that loose credit conditions have not been a key driver of house prices. rather, a key factor putting upward pressure on both house prices and rents has been a persistent imbalance between the demand for, and supply of, places to live. it is clear that this supply - demand imbalance in the housing market remains one of the most pressing challenges in ireland, both from a social and economic perspective. the source of these challenges stems from the supply side of the housing market and the mortgage measures are not a policy instrument that can address these underlying issues. however, as both irish and international experience has shown, a fully functioning and sustainable housing market is not achieved by excessive leverage in the household sector or fragile mortgage finance. let me now turn to the evolution of financing in the commercial real estate ( cre ) market. as a general observation, the nature of financing in the cre market is more complex. and there are more gaps in data around financing sources compared to the mortgage market. 8 this, in and of itself, entails its own risks. and it is an area where we need to continue making headway. in the face of such data constraints, regular engagement with the sector has been a key vehicle for us to strengthen our understanding around the evolution of financing. over the past decade, a key element of the evolution of financing in the commercial property market has been the changing nature of investors. much of the investor base in the market before the financial crisis was domestic – whether it was property developers, private investors or syndicates. since the crisis, we have seen increased diversification in the investor base, with a much greater presence of international sources of capital. on average, over the past decade, around 60 % of investment in the commercial property market has been