of very sensitive information, and the disclosure of this information may have severe consequences. although the ecb became aware of the subpoenas being imposed on swift in june 2002, this information could neither be transmitted to third parties nor be made public. moreover, the ecb has no authority to supervise swift with regard to compliance with data protection laws. the difficult questions arising in that regard must be addressed by the relevant data protection authorities, as data protection is a matter which falls outside the ecb ’ s competence. 3. conclusions let me now conclude my remarks with a brief summary of the main points i have made. first, the g10 central banks, including the ecb, perform the oversight of swift under the leadership of the nbb. as such, our responsibilities are precisely to ensure that swift has an appropriate framework in place to avoid systemic risks. in executing these responsibilities, the central banks – as overseers – rely not on a comprehensive legal framework, including powers to impose sanctions, but on “ moral suasion ”. second, compliance with the us subpoenas fell outside the context of financial stability and thus outside the remit of our oversight role. third, we did not give swift any blessing in relation to its compliance with these subpoenas. in fact, we could not have given any such authorisation even if we had wanted to, as this fell outside our competence. therefore, swift remained solely responsible for its decisions. the conclusion that swift ’ s compliance with the us subpoenas was and is beyond the remit of oversight by central banks remained unchallenged in the belgian data protection authority ’ s report of 27 september 2006.

jean - claude trichet : interception of bank transfer data from the swift system by the us secret services statement by mr jean - claude trichet, president of the european central bank, at the public hearing at the european parliament on the interception of bank transfer data from the swift system by the us secret services, brussels, 4 october 2006. * * * madame la presidente, monsieur le president, mesdames et messieurs les membres de la commission des libertes civiles, de la justice et des affaires interieures, mesdames et messieurs les membres de la commission des affaires economiques et monetaires, je suis ici aujourd ’ hui pour vous expliquer plus en detail le role de la bce dans la surveillance de swift apres que swift a repondu aux citations a comparaitre emises par le tresor americain en vertu de son programme de traque du financement du terrorisme ( terrorist finance tracking programme ). comme je l ’ ai deja explique dans ma lettre du 3 aout 2006 en reponse a m. le parlementaire klinz, la bce est membre du groupe de surveillance de swift ( swift ’ s co - operative oversight group - og ). par consequent, je voudrais, dans la premiere partie de ma declaration, preciser les objectifs et le mandat de ce groupe de surveillance. dans un deuxieme temps, j ’ exposerai les contraintes juridiques decoulant des statuts du systeme europeen de banques centrales et de la banque centrale europeenne dans ce domaine, y compris le regime de confidentialite en vigueur. a la suite de la declaration de m. praet, je serai a votre disposition pour repondre a toutes vos questions. 1. umfang der aufsichtstatigkeit zunachst einmal mochte ich darauf eingehen, was die aufsichtstatigkeiten der zentralbanken umfassen und wie dies im fall von swift in der praxis umgesetzt wird. wie ihnen bekannt sein durfte, sind die zahlungs