localised shocks. this would create private risk - sharing across the euro area and shield regions from localised credit crunches. but a level playing field for banking would also enable risk reduction. increased cross - border competition between banks, backed by a solid system of european supervision and the winding down of unwarranted national protections, could further incentivize banks into getting their balance sheets in order. at the same time, the srf and edis would also constitute a form of private risk - sharing by providing a final, powerful backstop. they enable bank resolution, limit contagion in the case of bank defaults thereby contributing to safeguarding overall financial stability. this, in turn, would reduce the need for public risk - sharing in the first place. such an approach is borne out by the experience of other advanced economies, such as the united states, where hundreds of banks were resolved successfully by the federal deposit insurance corporation with no long - term fiscal costs. while the case for completing the banking union is strong, supporting edis is seen by some as tilting at windmills. indeed, three years after the initial commission proposal, progress has been very limited. but the potential benefits of edis are not the illusions of a romantic daydreamer like don quixote ; they are, in fact, very real. edis would provide uniform confidence in deposits across europe which would be beneficial for all european economies, as no single banking system is immune to a potential bank default. edis would therefore further underpin emu by ensuring that a €1 deposit is just as safe, and just as valuable, wherever you are in the euro area. fostering the resilient and sustainable development of europe ’ s financial landscape completing the post - crisis agenda is therefore crucial, but we should not only look back. after dealing with banking sector fragilities, we should now be shifting our attention to the steadily growing non - banking system, which is changing europe ’ s financial landscape and whose potential to contribute to growth has not been fully unlocked. a range of banking activities is increasingly carried out by non - banks, notably insurance companies and the investment fund sector at large. total assets of the euro area investment fund sector have expanded by roughly 170 % between 2008 and 2017, on account of both net cash inflows and rising asset valuations. 2 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches deeper and more efficient bond and equity markets in europe would permit economies of scale and allow capital

area accounts. dedicated ad hoc surveys, for example in the context of the esrb ’ s work at an eu - wide level, should also contribute to shedding light on this topic. sufficiently granular information would facilitate linking the regulated financial sector with the shadow banking sector. in addition, enhancing information on financial conglomerates – banking groups with substantial activities over and beyond the banking sector – would be essential, as nonbanking activities may be systemically important. in the case of financial conglomerates, contagion and concentration risks can be exacerbated by the increased intra - group complexity and potential conflicts of interest. at the micro - level, improvements to data for characterising interconnectedness are being pushed forward by several initiatives with different objectives and time lines. let me mention three : ( i ) the revision of the reporting framework for large exposures by the eba ( for microprudential supervision ), ( ii ) the fsb ’ s common template ( limited to a small number of globally systemic institutions ) to improve data on global banking interlinkages and ( iii ) a uk exercise to collect interbank data on recovery and resolution plans ( with very detailed instrument and maturity breakdowns ). while these initiatives address primarily micro - prudential data needs for the time being, their use for macro - purposes could be envisaged, provided that data confidentiality is preserved and that requests are duly justified. for macro - prudential oversight, the importance of reducing gaps in the data on credit and funding exposures beyond jurisdictions and the sample of global players, appears particularly relevant. as the crisis has illustrated, the structure of bank liabilities and the way in which assets are funded are of utmost importance for understanding maturity mismatches and interlinkages. related to funding, data gaps also arise from limited information on the degree of asset encumbrance stemming from secured funding, as well as from inadequate data on the levels and characteristics of innovative sources of funding used by banks. at present, these elements are essential for analysing fragilities in the funding models of banks established in the eu. uncertainty about the level of banks ’ asset encumbrance is also hampering market participants ’ capacity to assess banks ’ creditworthiness, thereby reducing the availability and increasing the costs of unsecured funding. risks to financial stability can also stem from novel sources of funding such as exchange traded funds ( etfs ) or liquidity swaps. there is no consistent