- building concerning the design and enforcement of policies that countries should implement. take, for example, the pre - crisis debate on the risks stemming from global imbalances. the current account deficit in the united states was seen by some as problematic, as they believed it would eventually trigger a balance of payments crisis or a sudden and strong depreciation of the us dollar with global ramifications. others instead argued that the current see in particular the seminal paper by obstfeld, m., and rogoff, k. ( 2002 ), “ global implications of self - oriented national monetary rules ”, quarterly journal of economics, vol. 117, no 2, pp. 503 – 35. this may partly also depend on the model set - up characterised by limited policy trade - offs. see also b. cœure ( 2014 ), keynote address at the ecb - imf conference on the “ international dimension of conventional and unconventional monetary policy ”, frankfurt am main, 30 april 2014, forthcoming in a special issue of the journal of international money and finance. bis central bankers ’ speeches account deficit was not of concern given the international status of the us dollar ; the positive valuation effects and the positive net foreign income balance were seen as evidence that the current account deficit in the us was sustainable. as a matter of fact, we did not experience a us balance of payments crisis, even though we did experience a spectacular global financial crisis. 9 what was the connection between global imbalances and the global financial crisis? what were the drivers of those global imbalances? the debate has still not been settled. similarly, i would claim that the main obstacle today to international monetary policy coordination is the lack of consensus on ( and maybe even of understanding of ) the degree of slack in the labour and product markets of the major economies. reaching a consensus on the nature of spillovers is not straightforward either. most models of international monetary policy coordination assume that policy - makers are able to identify the types of shock and how they are transmitted to the domestic and global economy. but this is often not the case in practice. for instance, there have been marked differences in the views on the global impact of federal reserve announcements. on the one hand, some have argued that the fed ’ s monetary policy is driving a global financial cycle. 10 on the other hand, others have argued that the key driving forces of capital flows are global risk and uncertainty, with a much looser connection to us monetary policy

##ominated lending. 2 banks from emerging economies also have a stronger regional orientation, in particular in southeast asia, central america and the commonwealth of independent states. 3 regulators have been tempted to ring - fence their domestic financial systems. restrictions on intra - european for euro area countries the cross - country correlation between the savings and investment - to - gdp ratios fell continuously from 0. 6 in the early 1990s to essentially zero in 2005 ; similarly, for non - euro area oecd countries it even fell from almost one to zero over the same time span. after the global financial crisis the correlation rose sharply to 0. 6 for the euro area and 0. 75 for non - euro area oecd countries. see ivashina, v., scharfstein, d. s., stein j. c. ( 2012 ), “ dollar funding and the lending behavior of global banks ”, nber working paper no 18528, november. see bank for international settlements ( 2014 ), “ eme banking systems and regional financial integration ”, cgfs papers, no 51. bis central bankers ’ speeches cross - border liquidity flows or the us rules for foreign banking organisations may be seen as examples. such a “ de - globalisation ” scenario, if confirmed, could become self - validating and have profound effects on the degree of international risk - sharing, spillovers and the global allocation of savings, and therefore on global long - term growth. shifting economic centre of gravity since the early 2000s the world has also witnessed impressive growth rates in emerging economies, which have exceeded those in the advanced world. in particular the brics ( brazil, russia, india, china and south africa ) have more than doubled their share of global gdp from less than 10 % in 2000 to 21 % in 2013 ; similarly, other low and middle - income economies have seen their share increase from 7 % in 2000 to 12 % in 2013. the rise of emerging economies is also illustrated by the eastward shift of the world ’ s economic centre of gravity, which is occurring at a faster speed than ever before in human history. and the shift towards a multipolar world is in turn reflected in changes to global institutions and fora, as evidenced by the switch in relative importance between the g7 and the g20, and the ongoing governance reforms at the imf. in line with the shift in economic centre of gravity, the currency constellation in the ims may also be gradually changing. in particular in light