importance of ensuring that it is implemented in a consistent way across institutions and across countries. this objective is framed in a project undertaken by the basel committee to ensure that the benefits of having risk - sensitive regulation, like basel iii, are not achieved at the cost of an extremely complex legislation which, apart from other problems, brings about results that are not comparable across banks. the banco de espana agrees with this initiative. we are in favor of simplifying current regulations, seeking an appropriate balance – indeed, always a difficult balance - between simplicity, comparability and risk sensitivity. so, we view very positively the transparency exercise carried out by the basel committee, with the publication of the results of the comparative analysis of banks ’ calculations of risk weighted assets, both in the banking and in the trading book. these exercises have identified significant differences which would not cause concern if they were due to real factors, meaning different type of business or risk profiles. there would be a cause for concern if the conclusion of such work still undergoing, together with other initiatives taken by the european banking authority, showed that those differences were largely due to differences in the application of the internal models approved by supervisors. in this vein, i think that the single supervisory mechanism, once fully operational, will bring a higher degree of harmonization across the euro zone. the results of this exercise demand for the basel committee taking measures to reduce those differences, so that the credibility of the solvency ratios is not called into question. however, these measures should not go to such an extreme as to abandon the use of internal methods for calculating capital requirements : these models have been useful for improving banks ’ internal management of risk. we think that the solution may lie along the line of using as a reference for the internal models more standardized models, based on parameters determined by supervisors. let me now move on to the debate on resolution of financial institutions. i will first refer to the financial stability board ’ s work, dealing with resolution strategies and loss absorbing capacity. the fsb has developed a framework to address the “ too - big - to - fail ” ( tbtf ) problem associated with “ global systemically important financial institutions ” ( g - sifis ). as we know, this framework is based on four pillars : an enhanced supervisory intensity ; the requirement of a higher loss absorption capacity ; the existence of effective resolution regimes ; and an improved resilience of market infrastructures. substantial progress has been made in implementing this framework. in particular, the

village level entrepreneurs. under this programme and in observance of 75 years of independence, psos will adopt 75 villages across the country and convert them into digital payment enabled villages. they will conduct two camps in each of these villages to enhance awareness and onboard merchants in the village for digital payments. 11. i appeal to all the stakeholders like industry, payment system operators, media, digital payment users, and others to teach non - users about the merits of digital payments and fulfil the mission of " har payment digital " with every person in the country becoming a digital payments user. 2 / 2 bis - central bankers'speeches