samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
are highly uncertain, even if the probability of default is low. in general, interest rate risk is readily handled by adjusting maturities of assets and liabilities. but hedging prepayment risk is more complex. to manage this risk with little capital requires a conceptually sophisticated hedging framework. in essence, the current system depends on the risk managers at fannie and freddie to do everything just right, rather than depending on a market - based system supported by the risk assessments and management capabilities of many participants with different views and different strategies for hedging risks. our financial system would be more robust if we relied on a market - based system that spreads interest rate risks, rather than on the current system, which concentrates such risk with the gses. * * * as always, concerns about systemic risk are appropriately focused on large, highly leveraged financial institutions such as the gses that play substantial roles in the functioning of financial markets. i should emphasize that fannie and freddie, to date, appear to have managed these risks well and that we see nothing on the immediate horizon that is likely to create a systemic problem. but to fend off possible future systemic difficulties, which we assess as likely if gse expansion continues unabated, preventive actions are required sooner rather than later. as a general matter, we rely in a market economy upon market discipline to constrain the leverage of firms, including financial institutions. however, the existence, or even the perception, of government backing undermines the effectiveness of market discipline. a market system relies on the vigilance of lenders and investors in market transactions to assure themselves of their counterparties ’ strength. however, many counterparties in gse transactions, when assessing their risk, clearly rely instead on the gses ’ perceived special relationship to the government. thus, with housing - related gses, regulators cannot rely significantly on market discipline. indeed, they must assess whether these institutions hold appropriate amounts of capital relative to the risks that they assume and the costs that they might impose on others, including taxpayers, in the event of a financial - market meltdown. the issues are similar to those that arise in the context of commercial banking and deposit insurance indeed, they are the reason that commercial banks are regulated and subject to stringent regulatory capital standards. traditionally, questions of capital adequacy for financial institutions have been evaluated with regard to credit and interest rate risks. however, in the case of the gses and other

needs to happen, and if the arrc members, the official sector, and end users and other market participants all jointly coordinate in finalizing these plans, then a successful transition can be made with the least disruption to the market, leaving everyone in a better place. bis central bankers ’ speeches
the rt hon sir edward george : macro - economic policy and monetary stability speech by the rt hon sir edward george, governor of the bank of england, at the euromoney bond investors'congress, london, 19 february 2002. * * * thank you padraic for that kind introduction and for honouring me with the euromoney lifetime achievement award. it's nice to be prompted to recall some of the good times - and some of the not so good times in the course of my career at the bank of england which i think of not so much in terms of achievement but of lifelong learning. we've come a long way since 1962 - both nationally and internationally - from different starting points certainly, and moving in fits and starts, at varying speeds and to varying degrees, in a process of continuing, indeed accelerating, change. but standing back and trying to look through the confusion of short - term events, i would pick out three broad trends for comment this morning. the first relates to macro - economic policy, where the earlier emphasis was very much on short - term demand management designed to manage the perceived trade - off between growth and employment, on the one hand, and inflation and a manageable balance of payments position, on the other. monetary policy was used in conjunction with fiscal policy and supported with various forms of direct control to pump up demand, when the economy declined and unemployment rose, until inflation and the balance of payments threatened to get out of hand, at which point all the policy levers were thrown into reverse. it was a recipe for short - termism throughout our economies. we gradually learned from experience - perhaps more slowly in this country than some others - that there is no trade - off between growth and stability in the medium and longer term, and that, in managing demand - which of course we continue to do - we needed to pay far more attention to the underlying, supply - side, capacity of the economy to meet that demand. we came to recognise that direct controls merely addressed the symptoms of instability rather than its causes. we realised increasingly that fiscal policy was not well suited to the task of short - term demand management, and needed to be constrained within prudent limits if debt levels were to be sustainable in the medium - and longer - term. and this left a more distinctive and clearly defined role for monetary policy as the primary instrument for maintaining broad balance consistently over time between aggregate demand and underlying supply. all this has become the accepted wisdom just about everywhere

how they can be measured and managed, will be discussed. i'm very tempted to remain with you for your discussions, but sadly i have my own job to do, which makes it impossible for me to stay. but i wish you, padraic, and everyone here an enjoyable and interesting couple of days in what has become the best tradition of this very special event.
##ao. i wish the cross - boundary wealth management connect pilot scheme a great success! thank you! 2 / 2 bis - central bankers'speeches

in utilising information technology. in order to reap the full benefit of this and go on enjoying the combination of high growth and low inflation, it is essential that the right driving forces and conditions are in place. it is important that these matters are discussed, particularly as one cannot expect the economy to transform itself automatically. we have made good progress in recent years by establishing macroeconomic stability, with sound government finances and stable prices. efficient wage formation and a financial system that functions properly are other important pieces. the fact that i have concentrated on these two factors this evening should obviously not be taken to imply that they are all that is needed to complete the puzzle.
granular data would open up new possibilities for analysis by providing new insights into the effects of policies. let me give you an example. in order to analyse issues pertaining to global banks with granular data, the international banking research network was founded. this network brings together 1 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches researchers from around the world. they use micro - level data to better understand the consequences of global banking : country teams work on the same topic in parallel, using their distinct, bank - level data sets to help develop comparable cross - country evidence. although the underlying regulatory data cannot be made public, the results of the common analysis can be shared to inform the policy dialogue. one example is the latest research effort on the impact of changes in prudential policy instruments on lending of global banks ( buch / goldberg 2016 and buch / bussiere / goldberg 2016 ). this project uses a new database that focuses on changes in the intensity of the usage of several widely used prudential tools, taking into account both macroprudential and microprudential objectives. it finds that international spillovers vary across prudential instruments and are heterogeneous across banks. bank - specific factors like balance sheet conditions and business models drive, both the amplitude and direction of spillovers to lending growth rates. spillovers into lending growth from prudential tightening are positive in some cases, and negative in others. spillovers are most likely to occur via the affiliates of foreign banks hosted in a country, although some evidence exists of inward transmission through home - country global banks. this would be in line with an attempt of domestic banks to preserve market shares and to protect the domestic market from international policy spillovers. this example shows : the availability and flexible use of granular data early on is an integral part of any structured process of policy evaluation. other examples are easy to find : one can think of information on channels of transmission of monetary policy across different institutions, sectoral and firm - level drivers of productivity, the build - up of risks to financial stability and the causal impact of regulatory and monetary policies. to put it in a nutshell, we need to implement a new paradigm in statistics, moving away from traditional, aggregate statistics towards the flexible use of ( standardised ) micro data. micro data are collected only once and can be used for multiple purposes, which has the added advantage of a lower statistical reporting burden ( deutsche bundesbank 2016 ). in order to develop this benefit immediately

data gaps initiative ( dgi - 2 ) – first progress report, september 2016. 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches
speeches

after having been soft last year. and a strengthening in economic growth abroad has provided important support for u. s. manufacturing production and exports. the housing market has continued to recover gradually, aided by the ongoing improvement in the labor market and mortgage rates that, although up somewhat from a year ago, remain at relatively low levels. with regard to inflation, overall consumer prices, as measured by the price index for personal consumption expenditures, increased 1. 4 percent over the 12 months ending in may, up from about 1 percent a year ago but a little lower than earlier this year. core inflation, which excludes energy and food prices, has also edged down in recent months and was 1. 4 percent in may, a couple of tenths below the year - earlier reading. it appears that the recent lower readings on inflation are partly the result of a few unusual reductions in certain categories of prices ; these reductions will hold 12 - month inflation down until they drop out of the calculation. nevertheless, with inflation continuing to run below the committee ’ s 2 percent longer - run objective, the fomc indicated in its june statement that it intends to carefully monitor actual and expected progress toward our symmetric inflation goal. looking ahead, my colleagues on the fomc and i expect that, with further gradual adjustments 1 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches in the stance of monetary policy, the economy will continue to expand at a moderate pace over the next couple of years, with the job market strengthening somewhat further and inflation rising to 2 percent. this judgment reflects our view that monetary policy remains accommodative. ongoing job gains should continue to support the growth of incomes and, therefore, consumer spending ; global economic growth should support further gains in u. s. exports ; and favorable financial conditions, coupled with the prospect of continued gains in domestic and foreign spending and the ongoing recovery in drilling activity, should continue to support business investment. these developments should increase resource utilization somewhat further, thereby fostering a stronger pace of wage and price increases. of course, considerable uncertainty always attends the economic outlook. there is, for example, uncertainty about when — and how much — inflation will respond to tightening resource utilization. possible changes in fiscal and other government policies here in the united states represent another source of uncertainty. in addition, although the prospects for the global economy appear to have improved somewhat this year, a number of our trading partners continue to confront economic challenges. at present, i see roughly equal odds that the u. s.
comparability difficult. basel rules are an internationally accepted regulatory framework providing minimum standards to be met by banks. since 1988, the basel framework has evolved responding to various developments. while the concept of regulatory capital that is aligned to risks in the balance sheet of a bank was enunciated through the capital to risk weighted assets ratio ( crar ) under basel i, the basel ii framework, introduced page 9 of 19 in 2004, brought about better determination of risks by introducing greater granulation of risks of various categories of assets of a bank. basel ii norms hinged on three pillars – capital adequacy, supervisory review, and market discipline. in particular, capital charges were to be made for credit risk, market risk and operational risk that banks faced. the main incentives for adoption of basel ii were ( a ) it was more risk sensitive ; ( b ) it recognised developments in risk measurement and risk management techniques employed in the banking sector and accommodates them within the framework ; and ( c ) it aligned regulatory capital closer to economic capital. these elements of basel ii took the regulatory framework closer to the business models employed in several large banks. in basel ii framework, banks ’ capital requirements were more closely aligned with the underlying risks in the balance sheet. however, the weaknesses of basel ii standards were exposed during the global financial crisis of 2007 - 09 which forced a rethink of the regulatory approach towards capital adequacy requirements. in september 2010, the group of governors and heads of supervision ( ghos ) announced higher global minimum capital standards for commercial banks. this followed an agreement reached in july 2010 regarding the overall design of the capital and liquidity reform package, now referred to as " basel iii ". the enhanced basel framework revises and strengthens the three pillars established by basel ii and extends it in several areas. most of the reforms are being phased in between 2013 and 2019. the important elements of the framework are the following : ( i ) stricter requirements for the quality and quantity of regulatory capital, in particular reinforcing the central role of common equity ; ( ii ) an additional layer of common equity - the capital conservation buffer that, when breached, restricts discretionary pay - outs to help meet the minimum common equity requirement ; ( iii ) a countercyclical capital buffer, which places restrictions on participation by banks in system - wide credit booms with the aim of reducing their losses in credit busts ; ( iv ) a leverage ratio - a minimum amount

for piercing the corporate veil ”, 100 cornell l. rev. 99 10. mcleay, michael, amar radia, and ryland thomas, “ money creation in the modern economy ”, bank of england quarterly bulletin, 2014 q1 page 19 of 19
##rations over the next two days of your meeting.

regard, as i have always done, i thank all the institutions under the financial access partnership that have contributed in various ways towards the spatial mapping project and the bill and melinda gates foundation. i urge financial services providers and the domestic sector regulators to work out modalities of collecting the spatial data of all the financial services touch points. the research and policy analysis department of the bank will champion these efforts. with these few remarks, ladies and gentlemen, i welcome you to this breakfast event and launch the financial access web portal and look forward to further fruitful deliberations. thank you. bis central bankers ’ speeches
economy forward, and to proactively position the banking system to become sound and reliable catalysts of development. realizing this objective is a daunting task and would require all hands to be on deck. the cbn will remain focused in reducing the risk of systemic banking crisis, and promoting general economic and financial sector development. we shall continue to enlist the co - operation and partnership of the bankers ’ committee in accomplishing this objective. i look forward to a cordial working relationship with all of you and i thank you for your kind attention.

categories, segment a and segment b. segment b activities encompass banking business conducted essentially with non - residents and global - business - licence - holders. segment b is thus essentially directed to the provision of international financial services generating “ foreign source income, ” which is taxed under a special preferential regime. all other banking business is classified under segment a. this favourable tax treatment of foreign source income has acted as a catalyst in the expansion of the regional and international banking business of banks. the unification of the banking licence has subjected banks to increased competition in both segments of their activity. the challenge for banks which are now operating under the same single regime, is to be innovative in order to be able to tap specific and niche markets, both locally and overseas. to give you a better picture of the monetary challenges confronting a small open economy like mauritius, i believe it would be useful if i dwell a little on the new framework for the conduct of monetary policy that was introduced by the bank in december 2006, that is just a few weeks before i joined. under this new framework, the bank established a “ corridor ” that would effectively provide a ceiling and a floor for overnight interbank interest rates. effective 18 december 2006, when this framework was introduced, the repo rate was set at 8. 50 per cent. in order to manage the overnight interbank interest rate in an effective manner, the bank stated that it would supply, or absorb, liquidity against collateral at its discretion and in whatever volume was required to hold the overnight interbank interest rates close to the repo rate. the bank initially established a “ corridor ” that was symmetrical around the repo rate. thus, the bank was expected to lend money to banks at the ceiling of the “ corridor ” which was set at 50 basis points above the repo rate. in a similar manner, the bank was expected to absorb excess funds at the floor of the “ corridor ” which was set at 50 basis points below the repo rate. the ceiling and the floor of the “ corridor ” were expected to move in the same direction, and with the same magnitude, as the changes in the repo rate. currently, the repo rate stands at 9. 00 per cent. the experience so far with the new monetary policy framework has been a mixed one. while banks ’ deposit and lending interest rates have generally moved in tandem with changes in the key repo rate, market interest rates at the short - end of the yield curve have tended to move
amando m tetangco, jr : of ironies and synergy speech by mr amando m tetangco, jr, governor of bangko sentral ng pilipinas ( bsp, the central bank of the philippines ), at the first asean corporate governance conference and awards “ governance transformation in asean : reform and priorities ”, manila, 14 november 2015. * * * can self - interest lead to the greater good? prior to adam smith1 it was counter - intuitive to say, “ yes. ” human nature, in its narrowest sense, if you must, is anathema to the proposition that individuals naturally uphold the common good. but proceeding from smith ’ s theory, we tap individuals ’ natural inclination to pursue their own interests. we motivate them to see that good governance works to their benefit. self - interest therefore is channelled to nationally desirable ends. another “ irony ” results - supervised entities are now competing to adopt good governance principles! in doing so, there is cooperation with regulated entities. competition toward cooperation. this provokes another thought : can the regulator partner with the regulated? i believe so. when standards are merely imposed from the top - down, results can be unsustainable. to have sustainability, interests of the regulator and the regulated must converge. can more granular measurement lead to unlimited possibilities? in the asean capital markets forum ( acmf ), i believe the answer is “ yes ”. since its initiation four years ago under the acmf implementation plan, the asean corporate governance scorecard ( acgs ) has raised awareness for tangible benefits of good governance practices among publicly listed companies. the scorecard has become increasingly more than a compliance metric or tickbox. rather, it is now a tool to achieve organizational alignment and focus. 2 oecd studies show that investors have greater confidence in firms whose governance standards are measured and clearly understood, consequently allowing better access to equity and debt finance3, leading to reduced cost of capital4, and thus translating to improved share value5. these are goals both regulators and the regulated desire. since the initiative began in 2011, regulators have championed good governance principles. it is for “ your own good, ” we say. and, we have not been off - the - mark in our pronouncement. our advocacy has been heard. mckinsey has found that boards of directors of corporations are increasingly “ more confident in their knowledge of the companies they serve and more strategic in

. as we say in the vernacular, maraming salamat and mabuhay po tayong lahat. bis central bankers ’ speeches