areas benefit from financial stability and stable prices, conflicts of interest can surface. 4. central bank independence is protected by institutional safeguards. in europe, primary law assigns a strong role to central bank independence, central bank governors have terms of office which are decoupled from the regular electoral cycles, and central banks enjoy a high degree of operational independence. in addition, complementary institutional frameworks and clear rules are needed that delineate the role of monetary, fiscal, and macroprudential policies. absent such frameworks, monetary policy can come under fiscal or financial dominance. 5. transparency, accountability, and communication are equally important to sustain public support of independence. this can be a balancing act : on the one hand, transparency requires a structured policy cycle. evaluation frameworks are needed to link policy objectives to policy instruments and to analyse the intended and unintended consequences of policy choices. such evaluation frameworks are of a rather technical nature and tuned to an expert audience. on the other hand, the general public needs to be convinced that the central bank acts in the public ’ s best interest and that non - elected technocrats protect the public good “ stability ”. translation from the language spoken by technocrats to the language spoken by the general public is an art rather than a science. this translation and a continuous dialogue with the public are crucially needed though – in particular in times of structural change and a high degree of uncertainty about the future. 1. ( new ) challenges for central bank independence [ 3 ] with inflation rates running up to 10 % in the euro area, the core mandate of central banks – price stability – is a key policy issue today. [ 4 ] according to a eurobarometer poll conducted in the fall of 2022, 42 % of respondents in europe mention rising prices and ( high ) costs of living as the most important issues facing the eu ( european union ). [ 5 ] this number has increased by 8 percentage points since the summer. other main risks such as energy supply ( 29 % ) and the international situation ( 20 % ) rank second and third. the macroeconomic situation has indeed changed quite radically, which has implications for the perception of central banks. over much of the past decades, as inflation was low, central bank independence has hardly been at the centre of public policy debates. there has been " rational inattention " with regard to inflation and the core mandates of central banks. central bank independence mitigates direct political intervention into their policy objectives

) on top of own fund requirements to support transfers in fdic - like insolvency proceedings? • can the srf and dgss work as complementary instruments according to the envisaged crisis management solution? www. bportugal. pt • should recourse to resolution funds and dgss continue to be considered state aid on the basis of a pure administrative decision ( by dg comp ) with the ensuing consequences? until there is the political will to decide and implement the required structural solutions and establish a clear roadmap to revise brrd and complete banking union ( including a fullyfledged edis ), small technical steps must be made in order to mitigate the big stability risks that are hidden by the false sense of security that prevails. a credible path must be progressively built towards strengthening trust among member states, namely through reasonable and balanced regulation that reduces to a minimum its potential disruptive spillovers. xiii let me conclude. as jean monnet once wrote, “ i have always believed that europe would be built through crises, and that it would be the sum of their solutions. ” xiv however, we have only half - implemented the lessons learned from the biggest crisis affecting the common currency. as president juncker recently reminded us, “ [ w ] e should not wait for the next crisis to do what we know we have to do. ” xv as described before, we do know what remains to be done. only by delivering it can we truly be accountable to european citizens. thank you for your attention. as prepared for delivery. evidenced by the eurogroup president ’ s letter to the president of the euro summit of 15 june 2019, on the deepening of the economic and monetary union : “ we recognise that further technical work will be needed on defining a transitional path to the steady state banking union for relevant elements and their sequencing, adhering to all the elements of the 2016 roadmap. this work should include a roadmap for beginning political negotiations on a european deposit insurance system. we have therefore mandated the hlwg to continue this work and report back by december 2019. ”, available at https : / / www. consilium. europa. eu / media / 39769 / eurogroup - president - letter - to - euro - summitpresident. pdf, and the high - level working group chair report on the strengthening of the banking union, including edis available at https : / / www