purchases and guarantees during the period 2007 – 2011 amounted to nearly $ 5 trillion. this is equivalent to 16 % of the gdp of these economies, or nearly $ 5, 000 per citizen. 2 but, this is only a lower bound of the cost of the crisis. if we also include the impact on gdp and the loss of production relative to its pre - crisis trend, the costs rise. this has been showed by several studies, including the one just mentioned by imf economists, which estimates that banking crises that occurred between 1970 and 2000 are resulting in output losses of more than 20 % on average if we look at all countries, and more than 30 % of gdp in advanced economies. 3 these results are in line with the bis finding that the median discounted cumulative loss of output over the course of a crisis in the same period was about 19 % of pre - crisis gdp. 4 now, the question of exactly how much regulation leads to the optimal outcome in terms of long - term growth is, of course, debatable. but let me underline that ambitious attempts have been made by the bis, but also the oecd and others, to assess the net effect of recent regulatory reform measures, and the results generally point in one direction : that the net effect of reforms is positive. in addition, let me also underline that the basel committee has not been blind and deaf to the worries expressed by the industry about excessive regulation. many adjustments have been made, not least when it comes to the new liquidity regulation. it is also standard procedure that new regulations are subject to industry consultation and in many cases additional discussions also take place with the industry itself, as well as with investors, to avoid unintended consequences. in this context, however, let me remind us all that the reactions we get from the banking industry are sometimes slightly biased, if i dare say so. a telling example is the lobbying effort during the design of the basel ii framework. as part of that work, in 2003 the committee consulted on a new securitisation framework, which, with the benefit of hindsight, turned out to be very weak. yet the comments from the industry on the proposed securitisation framework were in general quite alarming. allow me to quote just a couple of the replies to the consultation proposal that the committee received ( all of which are publicly available ) : • one bank wrote : “ the prescribed risk weightings for securitisation exposure ( s ) …

in recent days, which is still 3 / 9 bis - central bankers'speeches considerably higher than in other euro - area countries equally affected by the sovereign debt crisis of ten years ago. in order to lower the yield spread decisively and persistently, fiscal prudence and policies designed to put the country back on a high growth path remain crucial. savings in italy : uncertainty and economic growth in the current economic climate, savings trends reflect opposing pressures. on the one hand, savings are supported by households'precautionary response to the high uncertainty surrounding the economic outlook ; on the other hand, they are weakened by attempts to maintain adequate levels of consumption in the face of sharply rising price pressures. in italy, in line with the trends observed in the other major euro - area countries, households'propensity to save has continued to decline, a trend under way since the second quarter of 2021, after the exceptional upturn recorded in the most acute phase of the pandemic, when it rose, with wide fluctuations, from less than 10 per cent at the end of 2019 to 18 per cent in early 2021. for households as a whole ( i. e. including producer households ), the propensity to save stood at 11 per cent in the second quarter of 2022, around 2 percentage points lower than in the last quarter of 2021. in absolute terms, households'savings neared €35 billion in the three months ending in june, still 13 per cent higher than before the outbreak of the pandemic ( after almost doubling in the months immediately thereafter ), despite taking into account the price hikes recorded by the consumption deflator. in the first six months of this year, the decline in real terms slightly exceeded 16 per cent, as a result of prices rising by more than 3 percentage points. however, aggregate trends mask considerable heterogeneity within the sector. indeed, the capacity to save varies greatly among households : for many low - income households, savings might have been zero or negative. savings were likely concentrated in upper middle - income households, whose share of expenditure for essential goods, for which price increases have been particularly steep, is relatively small. in june, owing to the sharp fall in asset prices, the value of households'financial wealth fell by almost €350 billion compared with the end of 2021, to around €4, 900 billion. conversely, real wealth – consisting mainly of real estate – amounted to €6, 250 billion, up by €