conclusions at the time the treaties were drafted, financial stability and the potential differences between financial and business cycles were not a primary consideration. the treaty provisions do not point towards a clear, unambiguous role for the ecb. certain economic approaches may now suggest different ways of coping with financial stability challenges that, on some occasions, would involve a wider role for central banks. but the ecb, as an institution bound by the rule of law, has to operate within the limits set by the treaties. article 127 ( 5 ) of the treaty implies that the ecb has only a contributory and supporting role with regard to financial stability. this role is partly discharged through its advisory role in the preparation of eu or national acts. beyond that, the ecb ’ s financial stability role is embedded within the ecb ’ s basic monetary policy task and the ecb ’ s microprudential supervisory tasks. the specific macroprudential tasks contained in the ssm regulation are supplementary in nature, and do not confer any general competence on the ecb in the field of macroprudential policy. these are primarily legal conclusions that also reflect the relative positions of public institutions in terms of independence and accountability. beyond these considerations, however, there are political and economic considerations that have not been addressed here. 1 see central bank governance and financial stability : a report by a study group chaired by stefan ingves, bank for international settlements, 2011. 2 article 2 of theteu. 3 article 5 ( 2 ) of the teu. 4 article 5 ( 3 ) and ( 4 ) of the teu. 5 garry j. schinasi, “ defining financial stability ”, imf working paper wp / 04 / 187, 2004, 3 ; william a. allen and geoffrey wood, “ defining and achieving financial stability ”, journal of financial stability, vol. 2, 2006, 152. 6 the notion of financial stability is often discussed in terms of the concept of systemic risk. galati and moessner, “ macroprudential policy – a literature review ", dnb working paper, no 267 ( 2010 ), 13. 7 so that individuals can still access their accounts, businesses can still operate payments, and banks can refinance themselves by borrowing from each other or the central bank. some of the definitions of financial stability include the notion that economic actors can operate without fear of disruption, of financial instability, being a material factor in their decisions, william a.

to contribute directly to the achievement of the objectives. when it comes to financial stability, however, the ecb is tasked with contributing to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent authorities. there is a critical difference here. 11 if the ecb were tasked with contributing to the attainment of financial stability, it would – like the eu in the field of networks – have leeway to identify policies that better serve the achievement of this aim. however, the ecb ’ s role in contributing to financial stability would instead seem to be equivalent to the category of union competences with the narrowest possible scope, namely supplementary or supporting competences. 12 in these fields, the eu can only support actions of the member states13 “ without thereby superseding their competence in these areas ”. 14 thus it is clear that the ecb has neither exclusive powers in the field of financial stability nor competence to act on its own. “ contribution ” does not establish a competence for independent and stand - alone action. to contribute to the attainment of an aim is to support it ; the basic identification of how the aim of financial stability is to be achieved thus lies with other “ competent ” institutions. and so does the primary responsibility. exactly how the ecb should carry out this contributory role is not specified in either the treaty or the statute of the escb – unlike monetary policy, for which the ecb ’ s functions and operations are set out in detail. the ecb can use its usual tools, to the extent that they are suitable, to contribute to financial stability. the ecb ’ s advisory functions are of great relevance in this context. article 127 ( 4 ) of the tfeu calls for consultation on the basic tasks listed in the preceding paragraph. only then does paragraph ( 5 ) mention financial stability, but the council decision implementing this part of the treaty also included the obligation to consult on national acts that influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. regarding union legislation, 3 / 7 bis central bankers'speeches in the chapter on prudential supervision, article 25 of the statute of the escb states that the ecb “ may offer advice to and be consulted by the council and the commission on the scope and implementation of union legislation ” relating to the stability of financial system. according to article 141 ( 2 ) of the tfeu, for member states with a derogation the ecb “ shall … hold consultations concerning issues falling within the competence of the national central banks