’ re here to discuss today and tomorrow. but these are also questions that are not easily answered. for there are several concerns that we need to take into account : – for one, giving central banks a larger role in financial stability may blur the lines between different policies. – and the fact that financial stability involves so many different actors, makes things even more complicated. – also : central banks may end up becoming more political than they were in the decades before the crisis. – and this, of course, will then give rise to a legitimate concern about a possible democratic deficit. the all - important question, therefore, is : how we can preserve our independence with regard to price stability, while at the same time broadening our responsibilities? in my view, it is therefore vital to foster a clear understanding of what central banks can and cannot do in each of their responsibilities and in each of their roles. not until then can we avoid unreasonable expectations about what central banks can – and cannot – achieve. one way of improving the understanding of the role of central banks is to find new ways to increase transparency and accountability. after all, independence on the one hand, and transparency and accountability on the other, are two sides of the same coin. ladies and gentlemen, bis central bankers ’ speeches let me end by returning to the start of our conference. i ’ m confident that this conference in celebration of our bicentennial is going to give us plenty of food for thought, and will also shed some light on the questions i just identified. the decades before the crisis were perhaps a period of relative calm. the aftermath of the crisis challenges us to look into the future, into the role of central banks over the next two decades. if only, because we need to bring our core functions more closely together, while preserving our independence where required. given our long history as an institution at the heart of society and our continuing dedication, i believe we have proved to be of immense value as a contributor to sustainable prosperity. and i am confident that we will continue to be so. i thank you for your attention. and i wish you all a fantastic conference. bis central bankers ’ speeches

fresh eye as to which banks the basel iii standards should apply. three : social media and digitalisation are having an enormous impact on banking. one tweet can cause a bank run, and that bank run is most likely to be a digital one : the outflow of deposits at svb happened much faster than expected, rendering the rates that are currently being used in liquidity coverage ratio calculations obsolete. so it is time to reconsider the calibration of the lcr and our stress tests. apart from these lessons, the failure of svb also raises four questions. one : are there shortcomings in the way we handle interest rate risk? in europe, the basel standards for interest rate risk have been introduced under the institution - specific pillar 2 requirements, and they apply to all banks. the recent turmoil underlines the importance of this regulation, as well as the need for continued vigilance. 2 / 5 bis - central bankers'speeches and that brings me to the second question : are our current assumptions about customer behaviour and deposit duration conservative enough in today's digital world? a third important question to ask is whether unrealised losses need to be better reflected in the capitalisation of banks. and finally, we should ask ourselves whether instruments that are not marked to market daily are adequately reflected in liquidity buffers. these are valid questions that i think should be addressed. because events are opportunities to learn – to improve is to change. in this context, it is also important to consider recent events on this side of the atlantic – namely what happened to credit suisse. what i would call an idiosyncratic incident. the result of a series of mismanaged problems in recent years, compounded by significant outflows of deposits at the end of 2022. credit suisse did not fail, but was sold to ubs. one interesting question to ask here is this : why did finma, the swiss supervisor, use a market – and not a resolution solution – to enable this sale? we have come a long way in improving crisis preparedness in the banking sector. in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, resolution frameworks were established. frameworks based on the fsb's key attributes. at the same time, crossborder cooperation principles between national regulators were introduced. of course, there have not been many bank failures since the key attributes were first published. which, in a sense, makes every new case a rare and unique