what the central bank has to do is to ensure that the transmission of monetary policy functions properly again. the instruments we need for doing so are at our disposal. however, our hands are tied where disruptions to the socio - economic transmission mechanism are concerned. returning to more realistic views when making election promises and both explaining and implementing unpopular measures wherever necessary are the prerogative and responsibility of the – national – political domain. werner schneyder, an austrian political satirist, once said that europe consists of countries that do not want to be ruled by what they themselves have decided. that must change. only then will it be possible to sustainably resolve the crisis. bis central bankers ’ speeches

term. since the euro was introduced, inflation in the euro area has tended to be too low rather than too high ( slide 3 ). the annual inflation rate for the euro area as a whole has averaged 1. 7 % since 1999. and the rate for germany has been 1. 4 %, significantly lower than during the period before the introduction of the euro. stable prices have been accompanied by significant economic growth ( slide 4 ). over the past decade, in no other large industrialised nation has real per capita income growth been stronger than in germany. in 2015 prices, each german has on average about €6, 000 more in their pocket now than they did ten years ago. in italy, by contrast, average per capita income has remained broadly flat over the same period. at the same time, german unemployment fell to its lowest level since reunification. these developments are all the more remarkable given the huge global disturbances we have seen in recent years, such as the financial crisis, the euro area crisis, trade tensions between the united states and china, and the united kingdom ’ s departure from the eu. economic success in germany is reflected in high and rising approval rates for the euro ( slide 5 ). support for the euro in germany is higher than it has ever been. eight out of ten persons in germany support the euro, which is above the european average. and although trust in the ecb has typically been lower than in the euro itself, it remains above the european average in germany. given these positive figures, it is surprising that the ecb has for years faced such fierce public criticism in germany. the media and politicians never tire of pointing out the supposed perils and deficiencies of today ’ s monetary policy. wide - ranging public debate and well - founded criticism are crucial for an independent institution like the ecb. however, the central criterion by which the ecb must be judged is whether it is fulfilling its mandate. in germany, however, criticism is all too often combined with claims and accusations that have no basis in fact. in addition – and this is something that worries me – discussions are taking place in an atmosphere of rising aggression and a coarsening of the language. german media have, for example, made references to “ count draghila ” who “ sucks dry ” german savings accounts, or “ the biggest expropriation project since the soviet dismantling of industry and east german forced collectivisation ” ( slide 6 ). such images are hardly conducive