extend my best wishes for successful deliberations during this three - day conference and commend the organisers for their efforts. may the next three days be filled with fruitful exchanges, innovative ideas, and collaborative solutions that would contribute to the process of keeping our financial system resilient, future ready, and crisis resistant. 1 dr sheri marina markose, professor of economics, university of essex, colchester, uk & cbdc academic advisory group, bank of england & uk hm treasury. 2 dr. hiroko oura, head, financial sector assessments and policies division, mission chief, fsap, india, imf, washington dc, usa. 3 through a combination of training programs, workshops, seminars, and conferences, the college equips supervisors with the knowledge, skills, and tools necessary to fulfil their responsibilities effectively. 4 the gross non - performing assets ( gnpa ) ratio for the scheduled commercial banks ( scbs ) was 2. 74 per cent at end march 2024 ( provisional ), down from 3. 87 per cent as on march 31, 2023 and 5. 82 per cent as on march 31, 2022. the capital to risk weighted assets ratio ( crar ) at 16. 8 per cent at end march 2024 is also much above the minimum regulatory requirement. the gnpa ratio of nbfcs was 3. 96 per cent at end march 2024 ( provisional ), down from 5. 03 per cent at end march 2023, and 6. 29 per cent at end march 2022. the capital to risk - weighted asset ratio ( crar ) at 26. 58 per cent at end march 2024 is also well above the minimum regulatory requirement. 5 the erstwhile departments of banking supervision, non - banking supervision and cooperative banking supervision were merged to form a single unified department of supervision. 6 refer paragraph 2 of governor's monetary policy statement dated june 7, 2024 ( https : / / www. rbi. org. in / scripts / bs _ pressreleasedisplay. aspx? prid = 58049 ) 5 / 6 bis - central bankers'speeches 6 / 6 bis - central bankers'speeches

karolina ekholm : some lessons from the financial crisis for monetary policy speech by ms karolina ekholm, deputy governor of the sveriges riksbank, at a meeting, stockholm, 4 december 2009. * * * one question that has been much debated over the past year is to what extent monetary policy has contributed to the financial crisis, which we have not quite seen the end of yet. another – partly related – question is to what extent the policy conducted by central banks in the future should try to counteract potential bubbles 1 building up so that we can ultimately avoid a new dramatic financial crisis with substantial consequences for the real economy. these are the questions i intend to focus on today. one conclusion that can be drawn in the light of the deepest recession in the world economy since the second world war is that it is important to try to counteract, in various ways, bubbles building up that will then risk causing substantial problems in the real economy when they burst. how this should be done, and who should bear the main responsibility for this task, are difficult questions to which there are at present no exact answers. the responsibility for a balanced development of the economy does not rest solely with the central banks ; it also lies with the financial supervisory authorities and the legislators. on the other hand, a central bank like the riksbank has considerable responsibility with regard to managing the consequences of a financial crisis and can therefore also be assumed to have a strong interest in preventing such crises from arising. at the same time, a central bank does not have so many instruments to try to influence developments such as credit growth and asset prices. the policy rate is a fairly blunt instrument in this context. this does not mean that financial indicators are not taken into account in interest rate decisions, which has been the case in sweden on a number of occasions. but there is also reason to consider the possibility of using other tools than the policy rate. in this speech i shall begin by describing the causes behind the crisis. in this context i will explicitly discuss the question of to what extent monetary policy in the early 2000s might have contributed to developments. i shall argue against the opinion that monetary policy was a crucial factor behind the financial crisis. this does not mean, however, that i do not consider there are arguments in favour of central banks being more active when there is a risk of bubbles building up. i shall attempt to develop these arguments here today. a financial crisis with substantial consequences for the real economy the financial