inflation and resource utilisation? then the answer is simple. but what if it is a question of risks that threaten the financial system? or perhaps everything at once? we in sweden are not alone in struggling with these issues. around the world there is intensive debate on the management of systemic risk – what is usually known as macroprudential supervision. as i have already mentioned, we in the eu have agreed to establish a european systemic risk board to monitor the build - up of systemic risk in the member states and to recommend measures to deal with it. it is of course necessary that we in sweden have a framework ready to respond to any such recommendations, in the form of allocation of responsibility and tools. happily, the government has now appointed a financial crisis commission with the task of looking more closely into these issues. this is good news, and the sooner we can reach a satisfactory solution regarding how best to allocate responsibility, powers of authority and tools, the better. and although i do not wish to anticipate the commission ’ s inquiry, i see a future role for the riksbank with regard to macro - prudential supervision. monitoring and preventing systemic risk is very much in line with our current macro - oriented work on safeguarding price stability. not least because the cyclical factors affecting price stability may lead to the build - up of systemic risk. increase the resilience of the banking sector 4 the third type of measure concerns, as i said, strengthening the banking sector ’ s resilience in general. this is important not just because of the current developments in the housing market. the financial crisis showed very clearly that the current regulatory framework for the banking sector is inadequate. although swedish banks escaped relatively lightly this time, we could see how banks in other countries suffered acute liquidity and capital shortages. and this is why we now have an international agreement on the new regulatory framework for the banking sector – basel iii – which establishes new minimum requirements that the banks must meet with regard to both capital and liquidity. this is, of course, welcome. but the fact is that some weaknesses still remain. for example, the implementation period for the basel iii rules is very long. this may be justified with regard to countries where the economy is still on its knees, to avoid slowing down a recovery. but in a country that is doing as well as sweden there is less reason to wait before introducing the new regulations. moreover, the swedish banks already meet many of the requirements

mojmir hampl : to be or not to be in the eurozone? an answer from prague speaking points by mr mojmir hampl, vice governor of the czech national bank, at st. antony's college, university of oxford, oxford, 21 may 2018. * * * ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon. first let me thank dr charles enoch for his kind invitation to speak here today. it is really an honour for me. i was thinking for quite some time about what approach to take today. should it be a totally rigorous, perfectly balanced and as - full - of - data - as - possible description of the macro and monetary realities of our country? or should it be more the personal testimony of a policy maker co - responsible for the monetary zone called the czech republic for almost 12 years now? on the advice of my adviser i decided that the second option might be more appropriate. we should listen at least sometimes to our good advisers after all. so, the czech republic is a mid - sized european country of 10. 5 million inhabitants. it entered the eu in 2004 and has no opt - out from euro adoption, so legally we are obliged to join and to make every effort to be there as soon as possible. yet there is basically no major political power in our country pushing for euro adoption at the moment. it is not part of the real political agenda, and we now have a fourth or so government in a row declaring that this issue will be left “ for the next government after the next elections ” – so it is being postponed to political infinity. the anteroom for euro adoption, the erm ii, is not being considered either. this approach has the full backing of the central bank. ten years ago, supporting the euro was a sign of “ good social morals among the better classes ”, whereas today only the brave confess to ardently supporting it. that ’ s how much the mood of the elite and the electorate has changed over the last decade. why is that so? here my eight personal comments come into play. 1. the euro and political union : a stateless monetary union is inherently unstable. a currency is usually a consequence, not a cause, of the establishment of a state. in europe, however, we began to build the “ currency house ” from the roof down, and then in 2008 everyone was very surprised at how the tiles flew off when the first wind appeared. is there a prospect of a political union – a