the european monetary union although euro banknotes and coins only began to circulate in 2002. portugal was among its eleven founding member states. for millions of young european citizens the euro is the only national currency they know. it is common knowledge that the establishment of the economic and monetary union was the most far - reaching political step in the history of european integration. likewise, we have always known that the architecture set up in maastricht was incomplete and risk - inducing, particularly due to the absence of mechanisms to cope with asymmetric shocks. its architects implicitly admitted that the missing components would sooner or later be added, as a result of the integrationist momentum. however, history has repeatedly proven that determinism can be a mistake... up until the onset of the financial crisis, we lived under a kind of ‘ spell ’. in many countries, the decrease in interest rates boosted indebtedness, while there were illusory improvements in living conditions. neither the economic agents nor the authorities managed to clearly perceive that the monetary union would necessarily entail a new economic regime : the centralisation of monetary and foreign exchange policies warranted a completely different policy mix. fiscal and income policies acquired greater importance, but, in fact, fiscal policy was also subject to heavy constraints. when the international financial crisis broke out, it progressed rapidly, quickly exposing and enhancing the accumulated imbalances within the union. the response to the crisis focused on strengthening the coordination between fiscal policies, the development of new financing mechanisms, and the establishment of the banking union and, of course, non - standard monetary policy measures. this was far from insignificant, but, in some cases, it was perhaps a little late and surely was not enough. in many ways, we were entering a new territory as it was with the implementation of adjustment programmes, which pose unique challenges in countries within a monetary union. we need to drive the economic and monetary union reform forward. it is indeed time for reform. part of this reform merely consists in finalising the previous cycle of reforms by completing the banking union with the implementation of its third pillar and by endowing the single resolution 3 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches fund with the adequate financial resources to fully accomplish its mission. no debate is more sterile than the one on whether to reduce or to share risks. in truth, we must do both. and, in some ways, we have been doing just that. as many contend, it is human nature to only

elisa ferreira : from repair to vision - conceptions for a common beneficial and resilient financial architecture and institutional framework in the eu address by ms elisa ferreira, vice - governor of the bank of portugal, on the panel " from repair to vision : conceptions for a common beneficial and resilient financial architecture and institutional framework in the eu " at the " financial stability conference 2018 ", lisbon, 31 october 2018. * * * the setting up of the single rulebook in the european union ( eu ) and the launch of the banking union ( bu ) with its rules and institutions constitute a commendable success of the post - crisis financial sector reforms in europe ; however the lack of political will to complete the architecture seriously jeopardises its key benefits. recent cases highlighted what i would call an ‘ accountability conundrum ’. banks nowadays are mostly ‘ european in life but remain national in death ’. this means that, while supervisory and resolution decisions are mostly taken at european level, the ensuing consequences still lie with taxpayers at national level, with potential serious impacts on national budgets. as the ultimate guarantor of financial stability remains national, but with limited tools to act, this ‘ accountability conundrum ’ needs to be solved. this unstable balance that emerged in the eu prevents economic agents from fully reaping the expected benefits of economic integration. europe needs concrete plans going forward, and must address pressing questions on what is still missing to safeguard financial stability. absent a fully - fledged european deposit insurance scheme ( edis ) in the short to medium term, a plan is urgently needed for the interim period ( until the bu can be completed ). among the possible topics for debate, i would suggest : 1. first, the development of a specific institutional regime to address member states ’ concerns over the risks of potential failures of cross - border banking groups : host member states within the bu need tools to address financial stability risks arising from locally systemic undertakings ; the absence of such instruments currently hinders progress on issues such as : ( i ) the adoption of waivers on liquidity and capital, and ( ii ) the removal of options and national discretions ( onds ) which are in close connection, among others, with : the rethinking of the single point of entry ( spe ) / multiple point of entry ( mpe ) resolution models ; in particular, the generalisation of the spe model within the bu requires that both the concerns at group level ( home ) and