on the deficit reflecting the unsustainability and transient nature of a large part of the tax system, for me there is a lesson here from banking regulation. just as banks are required not only to make provision for expected loan losses in their accounts, but also have to hold capital reserves to meet unexpected losses, the sgp targets should make allowance for the risk that unexpected fall - offs in revenue may occur. finally, a word on the taxation of financial intermediaries, which is back on the policy agenda. i see that financial transactions taxes are being discussed again, though i suspect that the conclusion will be that they do little for improving the efficiency or safety of the financial system ( they would have done nothing to discourage derivatives related to sub - prime lending, for example ), and also would not generate as much revenue as some suppose. nevertheless, it does seem possible to use some form of pigouvian corrective taxation as a kind of graduated type of regulation, potentially better than outright banning of products, and a useful complement to the regulation - by - ratio that has become the norm over the past quarter century. with such a long list of researchable topics, i look forward to seeing a large international attendance again at infiniti, and i declare the 2010 conference open.

in brussels. the third pillar – the european deposit insurance scheme ( edis ) – is less advanced, with the proposals published by the commission in november 2015 still under discussion at the eu level. * * * current issues compared with the pre - crisis situation, the domestic banking sector is now slimmed down. this has also resulted in a more concentrated banking sector, notwithstanding the decline in lending volumes since the start of the crisis. three of the five retail banks are majority state - owned ( irish and uk ), with the state an important minority shareholder in a fourth. this is atypical compared to most other euro area members. the banking system and more specifically the mortgage market have seen a material improvement over recent years. within our mandate, the central bank remains focused and committed to putting in place measures to address the fundamental causes of the ongoing issues. as i have noted earlier, once risks have been identified, the jsts both require firms to take corrective actions and take supervisory measures to mitigate risks and enhance resilience. in addition to these micro - supervisory actions, systemic risks can be addressed through macroprudential measures taken by the central bank. examples of the former are the range of supervisory actions taken on mortgages that i have referred to earlier ; examples of the latter are the borrower - based mortgage measures enacted in 2015, and recently reviewed in november 2016. the mortgage measures have helped to ensure that those who buy homes now are better prepared to manage their mortgage payments in the event of a future downturn in the economy. following the review, the framework is broadly unchanged, with some limited refinements. the 3. 5 times ceiling on the loan to income ( lti ) ratio remains the anchor of the framework. requirements for buy - to - let borrowers and the exemptions for negative equity mortgage 4 / 6 bis central bankers'speeches borrowers from the measures also remain unchanged. mortgage arrears and how the market is currently functioning are consequences of the crisis, and while a significant part of our work is focused on this, the bank is also mitigating emerging risks and enhancing resilience. one example is identifying weaknesses in new lending practices in some of the retail banks. among these weaknesses found during recent supervisory activity were : a need for better oversight and challenge from boards in relation to the risk appetites of banks, which are used to govern and quantify lending decisions across sectors and borrower types ; strategies focused on driving increased volumes without sufficient