samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
remain steadfast in our dedication to maintaining stability, fostering growth, and safeguarding the interests of customers. the inputs provided by deepak rana, vishal kumar prasad, pramanshu rajput and pradeep kumar are sincerely acknowledged. 7 / 7 bis - central bankers'speeches

is resolutely upheld. managing transitions as we look at the challenges in the financial sector today, it becomes important to address the profound structural shifts that are transforming the shape of the financial sector. these transitions encompass a myriad of factors, each with its own set of 1 / 7 bis - central bankers'speeches unique challenges. these are also complex, multifaceted issues that demand nuanced, adaptable solutions. striking the right balance between encouraging innovation and maintaining the stability and security of the financial sector is always a formidable task. let me elaborate on few of such transitions which we are engaged with. climate transition we are all aware of the global challenge that climate change poses to our planet and its impact which is felt across the world. the transition to a more sustainable, environmentally responsible financial sector is no longer an option but an imperative. as societies demand greater commitment towards a cleaner greener environment, regulators must undertake the task of integrating climate risks into the regulatory frameworks. ensuring that financial institutions consider the environmental impact of their actions while simultaneously managing the flow of credit, demands a delicate balancing act and requires collaborative solutions. the moot question which the regulators have to deliberate on is whether climate risk is a unique risk that need to be captured separately and thus requires a separate framework on a standalone basis or whether it transverses across credit, market and operational risks and can be captured as a part of the existing risk frameworks. another point of debate is whether these risks need to be captured as combination of pillar 2 ( supervisory review ) and pillar 3 ( market discipline and disclosures ) requirements or is it better to capture the risk as part of pillar 1 ( capital and liquidity ) straight way. technology transition technology is reshaping the landscape of finance at an unprecedented pace and has emerged as a transformative force reshaping operations and customer experiences alike. digitalisation is helping to enlarge the options available to customers and lenders, increase efficiency and competition in the provision of financial services, and, more importantly, making these services available to larger segments of the population. as we embrace these technological advancements, it is imperative that regulatory frameworks evolve in tandem to ensure the security, privacy, and integrity of financial system. in an era defined by data, the protection of personal and financial information has come the fore. in india, the digital personal data protection act, 2023 ( dpdp act ) has been recently enacted. such a legislation was necessary for safeguarding individuals'rights
changes because we need to do this to ensure long - term, sustainable correspondent banking relationships in the pacific region. so thank you and enjoy the rest of your evening. 3 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches

michele bullock : remarks - pacific banking forum remarks by ms michele bullock, governor of the reserve bank of australia, at the pacific banking forum 2024 dinner, brisbane, 8 july 2024. * * * good evening, everyone. it's an absolute pleasure to be here. i actually want to just acknowledge that it is naidoc week, national naidoc week, this week. naidoc week, for our visitors, is about recognising the history, culture and achievements of aboriginal and torres strait islander peoples, and the theme this year is :'keep the fire burning! blak, loud and proud.'in that vein, i too would like to begin my remarks by acknowledging the jagera people and the turrbal people. they are the traditional custodians of the land on which we gather today. they've cared for it for millennia and i want to pay my respects to their elders past and present, and i extend that respect to aboriginal and torres strait islander peoples who are here today. i also want to say thanks to the wagga torres strait islander dance performers. that was absolutely wonderful. i really enjoyed that, so well done to them. finally, i'd like to echo assistant treasurer jones'comments and warm welcome, and i'd especially like to welcome my fellow central bank governors, deputy governors and assistant governors who are here tonight. at the bank, we have a longstanding relationship with our pacific partners. many pacific islanders, in fact, call australia home as you know – a lot of them are in the rugby team – and we have a deep interest in promoting their welfare and the interests of our pacific neighbours more generally. so over the past four decades, we at the bank have met annually with central banks from the pacific island countries, timor - leste and new zealand, and, in those meetings, we discuss the challenges that the region is facing and work together to try to implement solutions. the decline in correspondent banking relationships is one of the biggest challenges currently facing the pacific region, and the situation, i think, as you've heard today in your meetings, has deteriorated in recent years. it's progressed from a looming threat to an acute issue that some pacific island countries have actively faced in recent years. so it's not out there on the horizon ; it's here. from the data that we've seen, the decline in the relationships is widespread and the trend appears set
potential to become a significant factor in the provision of credit to households, such a gap could have created pressure for lowering the standards for providing credit in the entire financial system. i attributed tremendous importance to the fact that alongside the implementation of the reform being presented here today, we will soon complete the legislation for establishing a financial stability committee, which will firmly establish the cooperation and coordination among the various financial system regulators. the committee will monitor, provide early identification, and handle risks to the financial system before they are realized. bis central bankers ’ speeches

of organisation and decision making. the ssm will have a carefully calibrated governance structure, involving a supervisory board that interacts with the ecb governing council. at the bottom of the system will be the various national supervisors each feeding up dozens if not hundreds of issues and matters for decision and action, with this volume surging in times of stress. my instinct is that the volume of these decisions is considerably greater in supervision than in monetary policy. it will therefore be important that clear and efficient decision - making procedures, with clear accountability, are put in place. second, it is important that supervisory practices and procedures converge quickly into a common approach. such integration is not easy and will take time, as i know from the fsa which involved the merger of nine and then a tenth organisation into one. in the case of the ssm, we will have at least 17 supervisors from different cultures to meld together. developing a common framework for risk assessment, with a common language for risk and common approaches to inspection and supervisory reviews, will be a process that forges this integration out of necessity and will involve some important early practical design questions. bis central bankers ’ speeches third, and closely related to this last point, it will be important to develop a common supervisory philosophy and risk appetite. will the ssm under the ecb be a principles based supervisor, a rules - based one or some judicious mix of the two? will staff be encouraged – and firms warned to expect – an intrusive approach or not? it is important to articulate the essential elements of the supervisory approach so that front line staff – and the banks they supervise – have a clear understanding of senior management expectations and risk appetite. i would like to see the new single supervisory mechanism give its front line staff a clear mandate to be challenging and assertive with banks in ensuring that risks are not just identified but are definitively mitigated in a time - bound manner. work is underway at the ecb and the national supervisors to start to put these practical building blocks in place. but we have a very tight timeline and much remains to be done. i look forward to the discussion to come on these and the other matters posed by the introduction of the banking union. bis central bankers ’ speeches
response to these impairments in the monetary policy transmission mechanism, the governing council adopted a package of measures between june and october. this package included three main elements : first, two reductions in the key ecb interest rates bringing them to their lower bound ; second, the announcement of a series of eight targeted long - term refinancing operations ; and third, two purchase programmes for asset - backed securities and covered bonds. despite the positive contribution of these measures to an easing of credit conditions across the euro area, inflationary pressures showed no sign of strengthening. on the contrary, the bis central bankers ’ speeches declining trend in headline inflation accelerated towards the end of the year. while the considerable fall in oil prices in the second half of 2014 contributed to this development, it came at the end of a prolonged trend that had already brought inflation to historically low levels, heightening risks of second - round effects. in order to forestall the setting - in of a self - perpetuating process which could pose serious risks to price stability, the eurosystem decided on 22 january 2015 to expand its purchase programmes to include public sector securities. the purchases under the expanded asset purchase programme are intended to be carried out until end - september 2016, and in any case until the governing council sees a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation which is consistent with its aim of achieving inflation rates below, but close to, 2 % over the medium term. taken together, the policy measures adopted have contributed to lower interest rates in capital markets and have helped to transmit these favourable developments through the entire financial intermediation chain. they have produced a visible improvement in the transmission of the ecb ’ s accommodative monetary policy stance to the real economy. this has meant a further considerable easing of financing conditions for households and firms, as evident in a significant decline in the levels of lending rates and in a material compression of their dispersion across the euro area. bank lending rates have declined sharply since summer 2014 ( by 40 to 50 basis points ), and the nominal cost of external financing for euro area non - financial corporations has declined further, standing at 4. 1 % in february. this should in turn promote and strengthen a revival in credit and investment. bank credit to nonfinancial firms increased in the last three months ( to february 2015 ) at an annualised rate of about 2 %, compared with a negative rate last year of less than – 2 %. a broad - based turnaround in loan dynamics

., freier, m., maier, s., garcia - miralles, e., pidkuyko, m., ricci, m. and riscado, s. ( 2023 ), " inflation, fiscal policy and inequality : the distributional impact of fiscal measures to compensate consumer inflation ", occasional paper, ecb, forthcoming. 4 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches
honoured to 3 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches give the floor to professor fischer. 4 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches

to an intergovernmental agreement, currently under negotiation. under the general approach, the single resolution fund will be built up by contributions from banks over a maximum 10 - year period. should adequate funds not be available, the general approach states that national authorities should be responsible. however, the continuation of national funding of resolution has a significant drawback. it implies that the negative - feedback loops which have been experienced between banks and sovereigns will remain. thus, the issue of whether common backstop arrangements will be in place, both for the transition period and in the steady state, is in question. in addition, i believe that the 10 - year period should be shorter in order to minimise the period during which, effectively, a credible backstop will not exist. even at the end of the 10 years, the resources of the fund could be depleted. in such a situation, it would be useful if the single resolution fund were able to bis central bankers ’ speeches borrow from the markets or have access to funds from the european stability mechanism. however, the challenges do not end there. the european parliament is taking a somewhat different approach. it envisages that it will play a greater role in decision - making procedures. it also has reservations about the clear nature of the backstop. in short, there is still some way to go to forging an agreement on all aspects of bank resolution in the banking union. finally, the harmonisation of deposit guarantee schemes will help prevent the emigration of funds in search of better coverage. the scheme will begin operation in january 2016. over time, however, it might be wise to revisit the issue of going beyond harmonisation to creating an eu - wide fund, in order to further break links in the negative feedback loops that can develop between banks and the state. where do we stand? since the onset of the crisis, policymakers in the crisis countries have made significant progress in addressing fiscal and external imbalances. the euro area has achieved an improvement in its fiscal deficit from 6. 4 per cent of gdp in 2009 to 3. 2 per cent in 2013. fiscal adjustment in programme countries has been extremely impressive. in greece, the fiscal consolidation is one of the largest ever achieved by any country under an imf programme : between 2009 and 2013, the fiscal deficit was reduced by some 13 percentage points of gdp. the structural fiscal deficit – that is, the deficit that corrects for the business cycle – has shrunk by 19 percentage points
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would be under increased strain during 2012 – 13 due to higher level of npas. the gross npas of the banking system has increased from 2. 36 percent in march 2011 to 3. 25 percent in june 2012. restructured standard accounts as a percent of gross advances have doubled from 2. 7 percent in 2009 to 5. 4 percent as at june 2012 with substantial increase in restructuring in certain sectors. data indicates that restructuring is largely resorted to in case of industrial sector accounts, particularly, large industries, as against smaller borrowal accounts such as agriculture, micro and small enterprises. the persistently high level of npas and increase in restructured accounts continues to pose a significant constraint on banks ’ abilities to reduce lending rates, thereby, in a sense, penalizing the honest borrowers. corporates need to innovate and embrace technology to improve their productivity and efficiency so that their costs can come down, they remain bis central bankers ’ speeches competitive and continue to service their obligation as borrowers. banks on their part must look to arrest the deterioration in asset quality by adopting better risk management practices like better credit appraisal, closer monitoring of borrowal accounts, greater information sharing among banks and by carrying out elaborate viability studies before restructuring. while npas / restructuring of assets cannot be wished away, they need to be effectively curtailed so as to ensure that the lendable resources of banks are maximized. on its part, rbi has mandated banks to put in place an effective mechanism for information sharing by december 2012 and to sanction ad hoc loans / renewal of loans to new or existing borrowers only after obtaining / sharing the information. lack of enabling environment according to the doing business rankings 2013, india ranks way down at 132 out of 185 countries in the global index of countries in “ ease of doing business ” ; 41 places below china, 51 places below sri lanka and 116 places below taiwan. explosive growth can only be achieved if there is an enabling economic environment. this requires governmental policies for quicker clearances, which encourage business and long term investment. recently, some steps have also been announced to stabilize the government finances and contain fiscal deficits within manageable levels. government has also taken steps to encourage public investment as well as public private partnerships in infrastructure and to tap into available technology and capital from around the world. i firmly believe that for achieving explosive growth, it is imperative that macroeconomic environment stabilizes, inflation and inflation expectations come down to comfortable levels and the twin deficits are
, as it is essential for fulfilling the mandate that they themselves have defined. the distributional consequences of monetary policy, if there are any, and other risks such as moral hazard and financial stability, must be addressed by other tools. these include fiscal policies, macroprudential policies and banking supervision – policies that are more targeted and therefore inherently more appropriate for close scrutiny by legislators. faced with future crises, central banks will adhere to their mandates and use their independence to fulfil them. in our case, the ruling of the european court of justice has shown that we can use all the tools within our mandate to tackle future challenges to price stability. we cannot foresee now what those challenges might be, but if and when they arise, they may require us to adjust our policy space once more to meet our mandate. the instruments we deploy in such conditions, and the safeguards that accompany them, will be commensurate with the nature of the challenges we face. and it is crucial that we are at all times transparent and accountable in our actions. 1 see kydland, f. and prescott, e. ( 1977 ), “ rules rather than discretion : the inconsistency of optimal plans ”, journal of political economy, 85 ( 3 ), 473 – 491 and barro, r. and gordon, d. ( 1983 ), “ rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy ", journal of monetary economics, vol. 12, no 1, pp. 101 – 121. 2 see davis, j. ( 2012 ), “ inflation expectations have become more anchored over time ”, economic letter, dallas fed, vol. 7, no 13. 3 alesina, a. and summers, l. ( 1993 ), “ central bank independence and macroeconomic performance : some comparative evidence ”, journal of money, credit and banking, 25 ( 2 ), pp. 151 – 162. 4 see, among many others, cukierman, a., webb, s., and b. neyapti ( 1992 ), “ measuring the independence of central banks and its effect on policy outcomes ”, the world bank economic review, 6 ( 3 ) : 353 – 398 ; berger, h. and de haan, j. and s. eijffinger ( 2001 ), “ central bank independence : an update of theory and evidence ”, journal of economic surveys, 15 ( 1 ) : 3 - 40

. and nakajima, m. ( 2016 ), “ doves for the rich, hawks for the poor? distributional consequences of monetary policy ”, international finance discussion papers, no 1167, board of governors of the federal reserve system. 22 to exclude the impact of variations in the stocks of assets / liabilities on net interest income, changes are computed by applying asset and liability rates of return on notional asset and liability stocks in the first quarter of 2008 or the first quarter of 2014, and expressed as a percentage of gdp. sources : eurostat, ecb and ecb staff calculations. 23 see adam, k. and zhu, j. ( 2015 ), “ price level changes and the redistribution of nominal wealth across the euro area ”, working paper series, no 1853, ecb ; see also household finance and consumption network ( 2016 ), “ the household finance and consumption survey : results from the second wave ”, statistics paper series, no 18, ecb. 8 / 8 bis central bankers'speeches
is practically blocked for these countries because of a continued flight to quality? answer : i am sure that these countries will take the appropriate steps to face up to these challenges themselves. question : that means that they shouldn ’ t hope for external help? answer : the very fact of belonging to the single currency area is, in itself, a significant contribution to facing up to this situation. question : the financial crisis worsened considerably in the autumn. would the world look different now if the us investment bank had been rescued? answer : i don ’ t want to go into the major difficulties of individual institutions in september. it is clear to me that the financial crisis has worsened significantly since mid - september and has moved into a new phase. but even if all organisations that were in trouble had been rescued, it would have remained necessary for central banks and governments on both sides of the atlantic to take extremely bold measures in order to be prepared for systemic liquidity and insolvency risks. question : how do you explain the fact that, despite the ongoing banking crisis, the ecb ’ s statistics do not yet indicate the existence of a credit crunch in the euro area? answer : what is true is that we see a certain weakening in the dynamics of loans to enterprises. but the rate of growth of outstanding loans to non - financial corporations has remained robust in double - digit figures. however, since bank lending standards have been tightening significantly for some time and the financial crisis entered a new phase only in mid - september, we must observe all developments very closely and remain attentive to new facts and figures. question : the major investor warren buffett once described credit derivatives as “ financial weapons of mass destruction ”. do you share this view? answer : i wouldn ’ t necessarily use that formulation myself. but the level of complexity and lack of transparency reached in the production, marketing and selling of these financial market instruments indeed proved to be destructive and contributed substantially to the fragility of financial markets. question : the reputation of the ecb has been strengthened by the crisis. has it also profited financially from the brisk demand for the greater amount of liquidity made available? answer : i will wait for all our accounts to be finalised. question : in october you considerably expanded the collateral framework for credit operations. since then you have accepted more risky securities as collateral. how high is the ecb ’ s exposure as a result? answer : like all other central banks, we have been more forthcoming as regards our

##rations over the next two days of your meeting.