financial entities simultaneously. the recent cyberattack on the third - party provider ion cleared derivatives shows how an attack on one software provider may cascade onto their clients. in this specific case, the disruptions to the trading and clearing of financial derivatives remained limited, but we cannot ignore scenarios where the attacks could have propagated quickly, disrupting the financial system. this case signalled the need for financial entities to review their third - party providers, the providers of these third - parties, their cyber resilience levels and the systemic impact that may ensue from a cyberattack on any of these providers. in particular, it is vital to assess critical service dependencies on third - party products and services which could be disrupted or even terminated as a result of a cyberattack. mitigating measures need to be put in place. against this background, the g7 recently updated its fundamental elements for third - party cyber risk management in the financial sector [ 6 ]. in addition, the ecrb set up a working group in 2022 to support third - party cyber risk management. we must have a cyber resilience mindset at all times. the question we must ask is not if a cyberattack will happen, but whether we are ready to respond when it happens. over the past year, the ecrb has worked on a conceptual model for how the financial infrastructure ecosystem could manage such a crisis if it occurred. it has also developed protocols and networks aimed at supporting a collective, consistent and comprehensive response to a cyber crisis by stakeholders. ransomware the proliferation of ransomware is one of the most significant challenges currently facing financial entities. not only may ransomware attacks result in financial loss, they may also severely disrupt operations. even after a ransom is paid, there is no guarantee the decryption key will actually work or that the stolen data will not be publicly disclosed or further misused to extort victims ’ customers, for example. ransomware attacks are growing more sophisticated and damaging, which in turn may enable ransomware threat actors to obtain even more resources. 2022 was one of the most active years for ransomware activity. [ 7 ] however, it was also the first year that the majority of victims of ransomware attacks decided not to pay up [ 8 ], which indicates that the approach towards ransomware attacks is changing. authorities globally are stepping up their efforts to counter ransomware. for instance, the g7 issued fundamental principles on ransomware resilience in

[ 15 ] this opens up new possibilities for malicious individuals to use ai to launch cyberattacks. although ai development firms try to install safeguards to prevent its unethical use, they can be circumvented. the risks from ai need to be clearly understood and addressed through regulation and oversight. by exchanging information among its members and organising roundtables and training, the ecrb is in a strong position to raise awareness of risks at an early stage and accumulate knowledge of these types of threats. for its part, the european commission has proposed a regulation on artificial intelligence that aims to address some of the key risks associated with ai. chart 1 cyber threat landscape for financial market infrastructures in europe note : threats are arranged in descending order of estimated severity. conclusion as we realised some years ago, cyber threats are here to stay. many highly - adaptable threat actors exist who will systematically try to exploit any weakness or vulnerability for illegal purposes. existing threats are becoming more dangerous and new threats are on the horizon. we therefore need to adapt our operational and cyber resilience frameworks constantly at the individual level as well as collectively through strict regulation, enforcement and prosecution. future cooperation between public and private institutions will also be crucial. the ecrb can make a decisive contribution to this effort in relation to the financial system. 1. see forbes ( 2022 ), “ the pandemic ’ s lasting effects : are cyber attacks one of them? ”, 20 july. 2. see european central bank ( 2020 ), “ cyber information and intelligence sharing initiative ( ciisi - eu ). cyber information and intelligence sharing : a practical example ”. 3. see european central bank ( 2022 ), ” key takeaways from the ecrb roundtable on red teaming ( tibereu ) ”. 4. see financial times ( 2023 ), “ the financial system is alarmingly vulnerable to cyber attack ”, 6 february. 5. see reuters ( 2023 ), “ russian ‘ hacktivists ’ briefly knock german websites offline ”, 25 january. 6. see “ g7 fundamental elements for third - party cyber risk management in the financial sector ”, october 2022. 7. see techcrunch ( 2022 ), “ ransomware is a global problem that needs a global solution ”, november. 8. see security week ( 2023 ), “ ransomware revenue plunged in 2022 as more victims refuse to pay up ”, january. 9