started back on 1 april 2014 with corep ( common solvency ratio reporting ) – the submission and correction process will be automated as far as possible, as the ssm continues to takes shape. 6 the reported data will be machine - checked for technical correctness as well as subjected to initial specialist entry checks. at the end of the process, erroneous reports will be automatically rejected. each individual submission will be subjected to several thousand automated checks. institutions must expect error messages and be able to deal with not yet standardised contents and formats. overarching examinations of economic, financial and large exposure data mean that institutions will need to cross - check figures down to the very last detail, even if they stem from different systems. the timeframe for corrections by institutions is being reduced. this means, inter alia, that banks ’ internal correction processes need to be made more efficient and consistent, which might require more resources. i think that the challenges i have presented can be summarised in the following areas of action for banks ’ it financial architecture : data governance and data architecture need to be optimised in order to enhance the quality, accuracy and integrity of data. analytical and reporting processes need to facilitate faster decision - making and direct availability of the relevant information. processes and databases for the areas of finance, control and risk need to be harmonised. increased automation of the data exchange processes with the supervisory authorities is required. fast and flexible implementation of supervisory requirements by business units and it necessitates a modular and flexible architecture and appropriate project management methods. banks must ensure that their it is equipped for this. further developments and framework conditions are in the pipeline : the ssm is gradually harmonising the banking supervision reporting system at the european level. thus, new frameworks are continually being developed in a european context. the ecb and eba are setting out requirements in liaison with the national competent authorities. corep and large exposure reporting have already had to report for the first time in line with european requirements. the requirements concerning the scope and contents of reporting have increased significantly, while the response times for new requirements have been slashed. this trend looks set to continue in the future. new standards such as bcbs 239 require the relevant institutions to have integrated and automated data processing in place. the europe - wide standardised corep provides a binding solvency reporting system. bis central bankers ’ speeches european harmonisation of credit reporting is presently being discussed ( analytical credit dataset – anacredit )

these, which also has a direct impact on their it. 2. the banking union – a response to the financial market crisis the current financial and sovereign debt crisis has also exposed flaws in the architecture of banking supervision. i would therefore like to highlight four weak points that we have either eliminated or are working towards eliminating on the road to a european banking union. german corporate governance code as approved by the code ’ s government commission on 24 june 2014. bis central bankers ’ speeches 1. consistent european banking supervision banking supervision at the national level was replaced on 4 november 2014 by direct, ecb - led supervision of the largest european banks. under the single supervisory mechanism ( ssm ), all prudential reporting data from significant banks are now collected by a central authority, with information assessed in a manner that allows cross - border comparisons to be drawn. 2. harmonisation of banking supervision the establishment of a uniform prudential framework has brought about greater harmonisation of banking oversight in member states, with regulatory arbitrage being prevented by shifting responsibility for banking supervision and resolution to the european level. 3. liability cascade in the event of resolution one lesson the crisis has taught us is that no bank should be “ too big to fail ” : if the worst comes to the worst, they must be able to fail. the single resolution mechanism ( srm ) defines this usually self - evident liability cascade, according to which shareholders and creditors are first and second in line to absorb any losses. taxpayers are the last link in this chain of liability. 4. capital backing for government bonds on the other hand, high levels of sovereign debt can also destabilise the domestic banking sector – i am referring specifically to the zero risk weighting of government bonds. in future, this vicious circle between sovereign and banking risks could be broken by implementing appropriate measures. after all, we have seen that government bonds are not risk - free. that is why the preferential regulatory treatment afforded to government bonds and other exposures to the public sector, in particular, needs to be brought to an end. the idea behind the banking union is a common financial regulatory framework, known as the single rulebook, and rests on two main pillars. the first pillar is central, joint responsibility for banking supervision under the aegis of the ecb. this has already been put in place in the shape of the ssm. the second pillar is the srm, which is responsible for the recovery and resolution of insolvent banks in times