prices ; hence, restructuring measures were necessary to address inherent risks in the financial institutions, which were coming from : bis central bankers ’ speeches • high leverage ; • falling asset quality ; • funding constraints ; • insufficient capitalization ; • fragmentation and conflicts of interest in supervision ; such measures were associated with public intervention in the financial system ( mostly banks ), increasing further the linkage between “ banks and sovereigns ” and creating more “ moral hazard ”. at this point, a financial regulatory reform was necessary at international level, to address such risks. under the guidance of the g20, broader and more comprehensive regulatory reforms were designed, with a special contribution by basel committee, the financial stability board, imf / wb group and many other. such reforms were aiming to : • strengthen the resilience of the financial system ; • avoid future similar crisis ; in more details, such reforms included : • improving the surveillance superstructure of the financial system, through : – establishing institutions with macro - prudential powers to monitor, assess and address systemic risk ( in eu – esrb, ecb ; in us – fsoc ; in uk – fpc ; etc. ) ; – reducing fragmentation and possible conflicts of interest in supervision, and achieve supervision consistency : notably in eu through the “ banking union / single supervisory mechanism ” : ecb – eba – esrb ; in uk – boe – pra – fpc ; – new directives to ensure timing and effective restructuring of banking business ( brrd ) ; – better design and use of tools to assess resilience of financial institutions to risks, like stress - testing ( in eu – eba / ecb ) ; • improving the financial system infrastructure, through : – better protecting the “ core ” banking activity from other activities like “ proprietary investment ” through new rules and proposals ( in us – the “ volcker ” rule ; in uk – proposals of the “ vickers ” commission ; in eu – proposals in “ liikanen ” report ) ; – improving clearing and settlement of securities transactions and streamlining financial reporting ; – improving deposit guarantee schemes • improving in banks under “ basel iii ” : – the quantity and quality of the capital ; – the funding structure – their risk management requirements and capabilities ; to summarize, the legacy of previous financial excesses and the following crisis, is a changing financial landscape ultimately determined by international financial regulatory reform, local financial market characteristics and the crisis impact itself. bis central bankers ’ speeches following

and tax uncertainty that weighs on businesses and households has become a condition for trust and therefore growth. and it means preventing the monetary policy support for the financing of the economy from being obliterated by the higher interest rates that result from our fiscal drift. it is a difficult path, but it is possible if we aim for two benchmarks, two anchors. the first significant step towards credibility must be taken in 2025 : we must return this year to a deficit as close as possible to 5 % of gdp, and clearly below 5. 5 %. we also need to set a medium - term target of a 3 % deficit in 2029. this figure aligns with our european commitments, but most importantly, it also corresponds to the level that will finally enable us to stabilise our debt ratio. the first step may partially consist of targeted tax rises, but the second step will have to rely essentially on more effectively controlled and more efficient spending, not only by central government departments but by local authorities and social security bodies, which together account for 64 % of total expenditure. across the board, france spends more than its neighbours – over 9 % of gdp more in total ; this effort to generate fair savings will be more effective if it is prepared, documented and shared as of now. i believe, minister, that these are indeed your intentions in the ongoing dialogue, and that this is in the national interest, which must come before any individual or partisan interests. 3. a year without recession and paving the way for a recovery my third wish is in response to the return of a spectre to europe : the fear of recession. it is haunting europe once again, as it did in late 2022, but more in words than in figures. our forecast for growth is 0. 9 %. iv true, the risks to this figure are on the downside ; true, the french economy is growing at a slower pace ; but no, we do not currently foresee a recession. while there are objective reasons for the collective gloom, it should not give rise to excessive pessimism. the expected recovery should take place in 2026 and 2027, with growth of around 1. 3 % – provided there is a gradual reduction in uncertainty this year. indeed, wages are now rising faster than inflation, which will generate gains in purchasing power that are more evenly distributed across the population. consumption should therefore pick up, and the aggregate savings rate should fall, while remaining above its pre - covid level