firms'financing options for investing in the technologies needed for the twin transition. europe's competitiveness and ability to invest also hinge on further progress being made towards banking union. a complete banking union would support more integrated 3 / 5 bis - central bankers'speeches banking services across the euro area and strengthen the global competitiveness of our banking sector. finally, the third key dimension of a unified european response is the need for deeper integration of our single market to strengthen europe's overall competitiveness and resilience. the single market remains incomplete. but it is essential for europe's long - term competitiveness. 4 a more integrated single market would help unleash europe's growth potential, boosting our shared prosperity. measures to strengthen the single market could, for example, focus on reducing red tape and excessive regulation, both at eu and national levels. this would provide incentives to invest and innovate, as 61 % of eu firms consider business regulations to be an obstacle to investment. 5 in addition, a more competitive and integrated electricity market is also crucial for completing the single market and supporting the green and digital transitions. the digital transition would also be further supported by a digital euro. progress in this direction would support cross - border trade, investment, and growth. it would also enhance innovation through increased incentives for research and development. the impact of such progress would be considerable – ecb analysis shows that the single market raised the region's gdp per capita by 12 % to 22 % between 1993 and 2008. 6 a more integrated single market would also strengthen our resilience. we now know that europe's heavy reliance on external demand and global supply chains can be a weakness. we should therefore leverage and further exploit the full scale of our internal market for goods and services. this will require comprehensive reform, but it has the potential to re - establish the single market as an engine of growth, innovation and competitiveness. conclusion let me conclude. europe has demonstrated its ability to navigate turbulent times. in the face of the current economic and geopolitical challenges, policymakers must be bold enough to take the further steps needed to advance european integration. as simone veil remarked in her inaugural speech as president of the european parliament here in a plenary session 45 years ago : " if the challenges facing europe are to be met, we need a europe capable of solidarity, of independence, and of cooperation. " her words resonate strongly today. we must seize the opportunity to bolster

following : if it is difficult to identify a risk - free rate in a currency union, this means that there is no risk - free asset either, besides the central bank ’ s own liabilities, the currency. whether this peculiar situation adds to the challenges facing the central bank of a monetary union, in terms of signal - extraction and analysis of expectations, i leave to you as a topic for reflection. the crisis has also proved the important role that central banks play in influencing the yield curve through both their conventional and unconventional policies ; including forward guidance, asset purchases and enhanced credit support. this raises a host of questions about the relative effectiveness of these policies, but also about conventional yield curve models and whether they adequately capture the mechanisms that explain the role of these policies, particularly given that for tractability and simplicity real - world complications like credit and liquidity premia, pricing anomalies and even the influence of the macro economy and monetary policy are often not directly considered. it is well known that during decades the fields of finance and macroeconomics dealt with interest rates, asset prices and the yield curve in a total different way and without much interaction. as diebold and rudebusch point out in their book published last year on “ yield curve modelling and forecasting ” : 3 “ in macro models, the entire financial sector is often represented by a single interest rate with no accounting for credit or liquidity risk and no role for financial intermediation or financial frictions. similarly, finance models often focus on the consistency of asset prices across markets with little regard for underlying macroeconomic fundamentals. to understand important aspects of the recent financial crisis … a joint macrofinance perspective is likely necessary ”. the macro - finance approach to the analysis of the yield curve had several developments even before the crisis. in 2006, hordahl, tristani and vestin, 4 ( the last two, ecb diebold, f. x. and g. rudebusch, ( 2013 ), “ yield curve modelling and forecasting : the dynamic nelson - siegel approach ”, princeton university press. hordahl p., o. tristani and d. vestin, ( 2006 ), “ a joint econometric model of macroeconomic and term structure dynamics ”, journal of econometrics, 131. see also by the same authors ( 2008 ), “ the yield curve and macroeconomic dynamics ”, economic journal, royal economic society, vol. 118 ( 533 ). bis