on monetary, financial market and other economic developments. in my view, the introductory statement is very similar to what other central banks call summary minutes. this statement is followed by a questions and answer session, giving the journalists the opportunity to question the president or myself on any issue. this press conference provides a forum for presenting policy decisions as promptly as possible. the fact that some academics also recommend this procedure to other central banks can certainly be regarded as a positive assessment of our approach. another key instrument of our communication policy is the ecb monthly bulletin. the monthly bulletin is intended to provide the public with a thorough assessment of the economic situation as well as with articles covering topical issues important for the single monetary policy. moreover, speeches such as this one today and other public appearances of members of the executive board, for example at hearings of the european parliament, are an important channel of communication with the public. the ecb also participates actively in academic debate. finally, a lot of information is accessible on the ecb ’ s website. all in all, the information supplied by the ecb goes beyond the requirements of the treaty establishing the european community. against this background, it is not clear to me which additional relevant information academics and financial market participants hope to obtain from the publications of minutes and voting records. on the contrary, there is a non - negligible risk that focusing too much on individual words and deeds, i. e. the voting behaviour, is likely to obscure the clarity and coherence of the council ’ s policy signals. moreover, the publication of voting records could lead to pressure being brought to bear on the governors of the ncbs by national politicians and interest groups. this, in turn, could endanger the euro area focus which all members of the governing council committed themselves to right from the outset, as well as the open and productive character of our discussions. with regard to the calls for a publication of inflation forecasts, i should like to stress that, in order to be a helpful communication tool, the publication of forecasts requires extremely careful preparation. not only must it be guaranteed that the forecasts are of sufficient quality, the public also has to be educated on how to read a forecast. a misunderstanding of the fundamental assumptions underlying a forecast or a misinterpretation of the role of the forecast in the context of the overall strategy can easily lead to a situation where the interpretation of the governing council ’ s monetary policy decisions is not facilitated, but complicated. this is

the first stages of the crisis in ensuring widespread confidence that all relevant intermediaries can access liquidity. it may be useful, by way of comparison, to note that whereas we had about 450 active counterparties before the crisis, the federal reserve had about 20. these facts may demonstrate to you the dimension of our outreach to the financial system in the euro area and its effectiveness in insuring against a systemic liquidity threat. our measures to safeguard the banking system ’ s access to liquidity have resulted in a considerable expansion of the eurosystem ’ s balance sheet, which reached a peak of 19 % of gdp at the height of the crisis around the turn of the year. since then, we have seen liquidity flows moving back from our balance sheet to the money market. this is a sign of improving confidence and more favourable conditions. we therefore see some indication that the functioning of the money market is improving. how does the ecb ’ s non - standard policy compare with the approaches taken by other central banks also grappling with the turmoil in financial markets? since mid - september 2008, the federal reserve has embarked on a policy of direct “ credit easing ”. this policy involves, first, the provision of liquidity directly to borrowers and investors in key credit markets and, second, the purchase of debt instruments such as commercial paper or assetbacked securities. these measures are targeted at directly addressing instability or declining credit availability in critical non - bank channels of intermediation. clearly, while sharing a common purpose, the ecb and the federal reserve have relied on different channels of transmission. and as i explained earlier, this is justified by the profound differences in the financial and economic structures of the euro area and the united states. in the context of the euro area, guaranteeing steady access to credit for households and companies largely means preserving the viability of the banking system. banks play such a dominant role in our economy that it was appropriate until now for our non - standard measures to be implemented through the intervention in and with the active participation of the banks. as for possible additional non - standard measures in the future, i will stick to what i said at my last press conference : the governing council will take any new decision on 7 may. at this stage we have agreed not to give any further indications but will, on that day, provide all the necessary information on anything that is decided. conclusions i have spoken about differences in the approaches to crisis management of major central banks, which