tarisa watanagase : the international monetary system remarks by dr tarisa watanagase, governor of the bank of thailand, at the executives ’ meeting of east asia - pacific ( emeap ) – eurosystem high level seminar, sydney, 10 february 2010. * * * liquidity challenges after the crisis while advanced countries at the epicenter of the global financial crisis had to adopt unconventional measures, asian economies did not face liquidity crunch, hence no need for unconventional measures. in the case of thailand, our financial institutions have relied entirely on local deposits and not encountered any liquidity problem. nevertheless, for contingency, the central bank expanded the list of collaterals that can be used to get liquidity from the central bank. as for the international liquidity, there are bilateral central banks swap lines readily available and imf ’ s flexible credit line was also a welcomed prompt response. as you know, asia also has the chiang mai initiative or cmi, which serves to anchor confidence through the psychology channel. on the broader global liquidity issue, there is the triffin dilemma view that the issuer of an international currency can take the advantage of such a special status to stimulate domestic demand and liquidity in the global market. i will return to this point in the later part of my remark. lessons learned from the asian crisis from my first - hand experience in dealing with the asian crisis, i believe that it is important to go back to the origin of the vulnerabilities, be it liquidity or solvency problem. on reflection, i think that the latest global crisis that originated in advanced economies is very similar to that of the asian crisis a decade ago, particularly the boom - bust cycle caused by excess liquidity. and, in the aftermath of this crisis, advanced countries are taking the path of responses that asian countries took over the past ten years. allow me to put into perspective this similar path of crisis responses, so that we can see more clearly what needs to be done individually and globally. experience of thailand and asia in the asian case, thailand in particular, premature opening of the financial sector with the opening of offshore banking units led to excessive capital inflows that could not be effectively arrested by the high interest rate policy, given the fixed exchange rate regime and lack of effective policy tools. the macroeconomic mismanagement was aggravated by lax supervision of financial institutions and the lack of adequate risk awareness by the public and private sectors. all these factors

i conclude this speech, i also want to announce that after this ceremony there will immediately be a press release on the reforms to the primary dealer system. page 5 of 7 the press release is meant to inform the public that all licensed commercial banks will now have direct access to the primary market for government security operations and commercial banks are all eligible to open csd accounts at bou for their clients, they are all able to issue and accept bid submission forms on their clients behalf, settle their clients ’ successful bids and buy their clients ’ securities if the client wishes to sell. this is part of bou ’ s on - going commitment to make investing in government securities easier and more accessible to the public. i also wish to acknowledge the role that this year ’ s award winner has played, especially for its participation in the primary auctions, market making capabilities, consistent pricing as well as timely market intelligence. page 6 of 7 ladies and gentlemen, i am pleased to announce that this year ’ s winner has emerged at the top for the fifth consecutive year, stanbic bank uganda ltd is the primary dealer of the year 2016. i now invite the chairman, board of directors of stanbic bank, mr japheth katto, to receive the award. congratulations to you and your team. i thank you for listening to me. page 7 of 7