reaching consequences. as a result, climate - related risks are surrounded by deep uncertainty and tail risks cannot be ruled out. for these reasons, the ngfs has described the first climate scenario analyses as learning opportunities that need further fine - tuning. the ngfs is exploring additional scenarios and looking at options for introducing shortterm scenarios. moreover, the ngfs aims to further expand and improve the sectoral granularity and the geographic coverage as well. other factors to consider going forward are geopolitical shifts and changes in global energy markets. russia's invasion of ukraine has upended energy markets, with likely long - term impacts for energy prices and energy security. these developments also carry implications for the transition to net zero and the associated risks. on the one hand, high and volatile prices reinforce incentives to speed up the energy transition and boost renewable energy. on the other hand, as governments are moving to secure energy supplies and keep energy prices in check, there is a non - negligible risk of carbon lock - in. 2 for instance, according to the international energy agency ( iea ), global coal consumption hit an all - time high in 2022. 3 likewise, new, longer - term contracts for liquefied natural gas deliveries may complicate the transition away from fossil fuels. in this environment, the ngfs sees a higher risk of a delayed or disorderly transition. the network is working on including these developments in the upcoming iteration of the climate scenarios. these planned updates will further enhance the usability of the ngfs scenarios. last but not least, the issue of data availability and data quality has been a longstanding problem. we all know that the lack of consistent and granular data continues to be an obstacle that complicates the adequate calibration of shocks in stress testing models. central banks and supervisors can play a part in overcoming this obstacle. last summer, the ngfs launched a directory for climate data with over 700 links to relevant data sources. the directory supports financial sector stakeholders in finding relevant climate - related data sources and facilitates access to these data. in addition, in december 2021, the ngfs published a guide on climate - related disclosures for central banks. the eurosystem took up this " invitation ". starting in march 2023, it will publish climate - related information on its corporate bond holdings and its non - monetary policy portfolios on a yearly basis. the bundesbank already took a first step in july 2022.

is particularly important with regard to less significant institutions that we give national supervisors sufficient scope to account for the particular characteristics of individual institutions. supervising lsis should be a matter for national supervisors. this would conform with the principle of subsidiarity and represent the most effective and efficient solution. 5. taking decisions ladies and gentlemen, striking a balance between harmonisation, subsidiarity and proportionality is a prerequisite for reaping the full benefits of european banking supervision – and it is certainly a formidable challenge. yet there is another challenge we have to master if european banking supervision is to work. the challenge i ’ m talking about now has to do with decision - making processes. since the ecb is responsible for european banking supervision, the governing council is the highest decision - making body, not just for monetary policy issues but also for matters of banking supervision. these two areas of responsibility intersect at the banks. besides being a crucial element in the monetary policy transmission process, banks are also the object of banking supervision. this, of course, gives rise to conflicts of interest, as it creates a banking supervisor with access to central bank liquidity. in practice, a situation may arise in which the governing council might be tempted, out of monetary policy concerns, to alter decisions that the supervisory board proposed from a supervisory perspective. to minimise such conflicts of interest, a governance structure has been put in place to limit the governing council ’ s involvement in supervisory decisions. time will tell whether this structure truly helps to avoid conflicts of interest between monetary policy and banking supervision, or whether it might have been better to create an independent banking supervisor. 6. what about regulation? supervisors can only ever be as effective as the rules and regulations they apply. and in this regard, the financial crisis has exposed a number of shortcomings in the regulatory framework. amongst other things, the crisis underscored the need for a more harmonised regulatory approach – ideally one which would eventually create a level playing field for supervisors and banks alike. in europe, we have done a lot of work to meet these requirements – first and foremost by introducing the single rulebook. amongst other things, this package implements the basel iii framework and assures the harmonised implementation of the rules throughout all member states. nevertheless, there is still room for further improvement. today, european supervisory legislation offers around 150 options to choose from. and at the national level, these options have been exercised in many different ways. to be sure, sometimes