decisions, we have to work together in running an organisation. then there is the risk that a policy of openness inhibits the internal discussion. ( that is the background to the published minutes not reporting exactly what each member said at the meeting. ) a third problem and the one that has attracted most attention has to do with our external communication. before commenting more on the third point, it is perhaps advisable to point out that these problems had already been recognised when the new system was launched. that i mention them here should not be taken to mean that they have caused concern since then. more personification the changes from the beginning of this year were prepared at the riksbank last autumn. after contacts with the bundesbank, the bank of england and others, a structure was drafted for the communication of monetary policy. eight to ten monetary policy meetings a year would be held at set times. press notices and inflation reports in connection with these meetings would form the corpus of our joint communications. divergent opinions would not be revealed before the minutes have been published some time after each meeting. this arrangement does impose some restrictions on the outspokenness of board members. in the interval between a meeting and the publication of the minutes, members have to refrain from commenting on what happened at the meeting and may not express an opinion that differs from the majority view of the forward - looking monetary policy. that is why we made it clear from the start that we aimed to shorten this interval, as we have now begun to do. my impression is that this system has worked quite well. there are no indications that the market as a whole misinterprets the riksbank more than before. what we do see is a greater personification of the monetary policy debate ; but that was predictable. it tallies with the media tendency, particularly in broadcasting, to dramatise events by presenting conflicting opinions. today, different points of view can be clearly attached to particular individuals. one feature of this discussion is the classification of board members as doves or hawks. it so happens that when i joined the riksbank, one of the largest business journals actually described me as a dove - hawk ( the literal translation of the swedish for goshawk ). i wonder whether the writer was aware that the goshawk is the most murderous of all the hawks and preys mostly on doves. with a central bank that clearly targets inflation, however, this way of classifying board members is not particularly

to a rapid future increase in inflation. the board ’ s majority therefore considered that an immediate tightening was not needed. with inflation expectations firmly anchored around the 2 % target, we judged there was scope for waiting with an interest rate increase. calmer monetary policy discussion some of the earlier autumn conferences were preceded by monetary policy discussions that were rather intensive. in that respect the past year has been relatively calm, even though the situation has changed so rapidly. last autumn there was, of course, considerable anxiety but the riksbank ’ s quick succession of interest rate cuts was well received. in sweden, moreover, we were spared most of the european discussion about political pressure on monetary policy. as i see it, this was partly because our policy framework provided such clear arguments for our actions – inflation would turn out to be below the target if the interest rate was not reduced. during the past year the riksbank ’ s appraisal of economic activity and inflation prospects has been revised about as much as and more or less concurrently with the opinions of other observers. the sizeable changes in economic assessments are thus something we have in common with others. individual economists and analysts have naturally voiced views or criticism from time to time but i at least have not encountered more concerted criticism of our economic and inflation assessments. ( figure 1 ). the path of the krona last autumn generated more heated discussions. the riksbank saw the depreciation as essentially connected with the international financial unrest. this made investors more averse to risk, with effects that hit small markets in particular. other observers attached greater weight both to what they perceived as a lack of clarity in monetary policy and to structural problems in the swedish economy and sweden ’ s position outside the euro area. the risks in the latter respect were presented in a rather lurid light. as regards interventions, the riksbank has been very restrictive in recent years but early last october we found they were called for. the marked depreciation of the krona did not reflect the fundamental situation in the swedish economy. it is seldom possible to demonstrate clear effects of interventions and that could not be done on this occasion, though the depreciation was broken during the day in question. later in the autumn the krona appreciated again. it seems to me that two main factors lie behind the krona ’ s appreciation in the past twelve months. one is a normal rebound from last autumn ’ s excessive weakening. this happened during the winter and was particularly pronounced because the