in which that in formation is publicized and shared. banks must increase their level of technical knowledge, including expertise in products, production methods, markets, about the firms applying for loans, particularly in this recession, when loan applications tend to be for generic purposes and less tied to investment plans, which are easier to evaluate objectively. 14 we are moving towards a different financial system from the one we are used to. policies, laws and practices must be geared to allowing firms – especially innovative ones – to have more of their own capital, paid in by the owners or from specialized funds, but also raised on the capital market. 15 for this reason italian smes must take a decisive step towards ensuring as stiglitz and greenwald say ( 2014 ), starting from arrow ’ s lesson ( 1962 ), “ learn to learn, learning ”. phelps ( 2013 ). levine ( 2014 ). see, for example, beck ( 2013 ) and cbi ( 2012 ). bain & company and iif ( 2013 ). according to our calculations, today in italy there are 500 enterprises that meet the criteria and would benefit by being listed on the stock exchange. bis central bankers ’ speeches that information about their status is reliable and widely available. the level of bank debt will have to be reduced. banks in turn must accelerate a change that has already begun for some of them. they too are entering a new phase in which it is essential for them to be very well capitalized because of the risks of which we are now all well aware : they must therefore satisfy the general conditions of profitability, transparency and good governance that will allow them to obtain funding at competitive rates ( to pass on to lending rates, reducing them ) and, if necessary, to raise new capital rapidly and in sufficient quantity. besides improving their capacity to understand which companies to lend money to, they must also add financial consultancy to their traditional lending activities, thus helping firms to decide the best level and composition of their financial liabilities and supporting their entry to the markets. these new services could build income streams that would at least offset the loss of a part of traditional banking activities. conclusion we italians told ourselves from the outset that we were not to blame for the global financial crisis, and it was true : on the eve of the flare - up, we had a financial and a banking system that were largely immune to the problems famously discovered in the anglo - american systems. our fault was another : over the preceding decade we allowed the economy to

s place in assessing creditworthiness and without being a burden on the budget in the immediate, but only after bankruptcy is announced and within the limit of the ratio of insolvencies to the total guarantees granted. a good example is already provided by the central guarantee fund operating under the aegis of the ministry for economic development, which partially guarantees banks that grant loans to small firms and participates in the latter ’ s screening. since 2009 the fund has granted guarantees on loans amounting to more than €40 billion. the scale of the fund ’ s operations could be further increased. see, among others, panetta ( 2014 ) and the classic stiglitz and weiss ( 1981 ) cited therein. agenda possibile ( 2013 ), panetta ( 2014 ). haselmann, pistor and vig ( 2010 ). bis central bankers ’ speeches securitizations serve essentially to distribute the risk inherent in bank loans to smes among a large number of bank and non - bank institutional investors. in view of the small size of the loans, it is necessary to create asset - backed securities, i. e. packages of loans in the form of bonds, of which it is not too difficult to assess the quality, and place the various tranches with different investors according to their risk appetite. operations can be carried out by the originator banks themselves or by other financial entities. these instruments could also be backed in part by public guarantees. notable among the possible investors are insurance companies, which are often hard put in the present phase of the cycle to find desirable investments for their technical provisions in terms of risk / return and maturity. to develop such a market some regulatory problems must be overcome, firstly at international level. the global financial crisis has discredited instruments such as abs, which were abused by pushing their complexity and opacity to the limit. but the abuses can be forbidden without eliminating the instrument itself, which retains its rational basis. the ecb has launched a very large programme for the purchase of simple and transparent abs in order among other objectives to facilitate the financing of smes. the bank of italy and ivass are following the matter closely. with great rapidity this summer ivass drafted amendments to the regulations on insurance companies ’ investments consistent with the new legislative provisions introduced recently to increase the competitiveness of the italian economy. the new prudential regulations, aimed at achieving greater diversification of risk, will also allow insurance companies to grant credit directly subject