do so for the upi too within the next couple of months. the uti, by uniquely identifying each transaction, is essential to avoid double - counting und under - counting of transactions when aggregating data. the uti structure will be based on the lei of the generating entity, thus ensuring the uniqueness of each issued uti while allowing a plurality of generating entities. the upi – meanwhile – will allow flexible aggregation of different types of derivatives products by grouping various reference data elements, which are important for a specific analysis. consistent with the global dimension i mentioned at the beginning of my remarks, the cpmiiosco guidance refers to international standards, in particular iso, when applicable, in order to ensure international standardisation and a process for adapting the standard if needed. and the cpmi and iosco will also harmonise definitions and formats for a wide range of other critical data elements in the coming months. of course, this work is highly relevant to the global otc derivatives data aggregation effort, and for achieving the outcomes initially expected from tr reporting. yet, it could also serve purposes additional to the regulatory ones by, for example, simplifying pre - and post - trade processes performed by market participants and financial market infrastructures. additionally, the industry could easily leverage the upi by including more granular information on products, as needed for confirmation, risk management or other purposes. of course, globally harmonised data are of great interest to global market players, which would then have just one rule for all the jurisdictions in which they operate. the harmonisation approach followed by the cpmi and iosco is intended to be flexible and scalable to accommodate the evolution of markets, such as new products being traded, regulatory regimes and messaging standards. some jurisdictions such as the eu have introduced data harmonisation in contexts other than trade reporting – mifid ii for example – to support pre - and post - trade transparency. this reflects the fact that the same harmonised data may be used in different regulatory contexts and that such an approach simplifies data management by both authorities and the industry. consistent implementation of these standards should now be our priority. the fsb has set up a working group in charge of the governance for the uti and the upi, working in close collaboration with cpmi and iosco, so that implementation is achieved as swiftly and as consistently as possible across jurisdictions. the fsb has just started to publically consult on governance arrangements for a global uti.

spanish style rule - based dynamic provisioning. this latter stabilizer seems unfortunately not likely to be included in the reform package. it is very important that these kind of automatic stabilizers are built into the new regulatory framework. it is important that they are rule - based. leaving stabilization to the discretion of regulators will always give more uncertain results. rules are often preferable even if they have to be crude and suboptimal. norway is part of the european economic area, and eu regulations are thus applicable in this country. within the remaining national discretion, norwegian regulations are laid down by the ministry of finance, and implemented by the financial supervisory authority. but norges bank aims to be an active advisor on these issues. our work on macroprudential supervision provides insights that we wish to share with other supervisory authorities. the second component of macroprudential policies consists of short and medium term measures to alleviate the effects from the procyclical behaviour of financial institutions. there are two macroprudential aspect of procyclicality. it is the common exposures of a group of financial institutions. and it is the interconnectivity of financial institutions through trading and credit relationships. common exposures are probably the most important of these interdependencies for crisis generation. individual institutions can look perfectly healthy even when vulnerabilities are building up on the systemic level. the prime example of this phenomenon is naturally lending stimulating a price bubble in the property market. developing time - varying macroprudential policies is not straightforward. the interest rate policy targets the inflation rate, and cannot always be set as would be appropriate for asset prices. there might be conflicting targets. we should thus be looking for new instruments. as you are certainly aware, most of the macroprudential policy instruments that have been proposed are the same as those already being used for microprudential purposes. examples are loan - to - value or loan - to - income limitations, and add - ons to the risk weights on relevant bank exposures. the latter instrument is being used in new zealand, where supervisors have recently introduced a 15 percentage point risk weight add - on to property lending. since these instruments are also microprudential, they are all in the domain of the financial supervisory authority and are needed there. but the macroprudential objective is different from the microprudential, and may call for different calibration of the instruments. the implementation may for practical reasons