disastrous consequences for sids in economic and fiscal terms, most of which are largely dependent on international trade, external finance and few key sectors, often tourism. in 2020, it was estimated that gdp of sids dropped by 6. 9 per cent versus 4. 8 per cent in all other developing countries. in mauritius, we equally witnessed a major gdp contraction of around 15 per cent in 2020, one of the highest in the world i must say. ladies and gentlemen, against such precarious macroeconomic backdrop, we all agree that an effective implementation of the sdgs is key to our development to achieve a more equitable and sustainable future for all. however, as most of you here may be aware, the unctad reported that in 2022, sids collectively received around usd 8 billion, representing 0. 6 per cent of global fdi flows and a 39 per cent increase from 2021. while this is certainly a step in the right direction, it is still inadequate and disproportionately distributed as the top five sids recipients received around 85 per cent of the inflows. the top five recipients were dominican republic, bahamas, maldives, jamaica and timor - leste. among the five african sids, mauritius saw its fdi flows grow by 48 per cent from 2021 to reach usd 625 million in 2022. climate funds were set up by developed nations to assist less - developed countries. while these amounted to usd 35 billion, it is estimated that only some usd 11 billion has been actually disbursed, with the share flowing to sids being even less significant. sids are on the frontline of the climate emergency, bearing the brunt of more frequent and intense extreme weather events, increasing temperatures and sea level rise, all of which threaten people's livelihood and food security, with important ripples on economic and financial stability. these figures are disconcerting but more importantly, they emphasise the urgency of the work ahead of us for removing potential obstacles to mobilise adequate sdg finance. allow me to illustrate with the case of mauritius : to meet its climate obligations by 2030 under the 2015 paris agreement alone, mauritius requires funding estimated at usd 6. 5 billion, 35 per cent of which would be funded by the government and domestic private sector while the remaining 65percent or usd 4. 3 billion would have to be financed externally by 2030. this results in a yearly financing requirement of around usd 700 million, which is no small

. - consumer spending would also be negatively affected, reflecting concerns over future job losses and income prospects. - at least for an initial period, it is likely that there would be disruption at ports and airports if infrastructure is unable to cope with the new arrangements. given the deep supply chain linkages between ireland and the uk, reflected in the reliance on the uk for imports of intermediate goods used in production by irish firms, and also given the scale of food and consumer goods imports from the uk, there would be implications for firms through disruption to their production processes and for households through the price and availability of consumer goods. - exports would fall due to an immediate and large reduction in demand from the uk and the fall in sterling, with some sectors being further affected by any imposition of tariffs and non - tariff barriers. - those sectors – as i discussed – which are more reliant on trade with the uk or which are more vulnerable to the imposition of tariff and non - tariff barriers, such as agriculture, food and smaller scale manufacturing, are likely to be more adversely affected. these effects are also likely to be focused on rural areas and, in particular, the border regions. so, there are a variety of ways that the departure of the uk can adversely affect the irish economy and contribute to a material slowdown in growth. however, it is important to note that in this scenario, our modelling work still suggests that there would be growth in output this year and next. quantifying the impact of a disorderly uk exit through these channels is extremely uncertain but the insight to be taken from this result is that some of the structural elements of the irish economy also have a role to play as the process moves forward. structural factors include the diversified nature of production in many sectors. while some sectors are heavily reliant on the 6 / 8 bis central bankers'speeches uk as an export market, for others, the uk is an important market but nonetheless not the only one. the current status of the public finances are also relevant. there is scope to run a countercyclical fiscal deficit through the operation of automatic stabilisers on tax revenues and transfer payments in the event of a severe downturn. moreover, there is some scope for temporary investment to support trade routes after the uk ’ s departure and temporarily help hard - hit sectors adjust to new realities. of course, while the uk leaving the eu is the most clear current downside risk to the irish economy, there are others