##bank has made the right decision and that there has not really been any other alternative. in the end, a central bank ’ s main task is to maintain confidence in price stability and when there is a risk that this will fail – when the scale starts to tip – there is no other possibility than to give top priority to a faster return to the inflation target. even if the risks linked to debt and housing prices are as large as before, or have even increased as a result of the repo - rate cuts, the problems linked to low inflation have become relatively more important. however, it is unavoidably the case that this places greater responsibility on other public authorities and policy areas with regard to managing developments in household debt and housing prices. i consider it important to note that there has also been criticism from this quarter – as a counterweight to the opinion that in principle everything the riksbank has done in recent see, for instance, malmqvist ( 2014 ), svenska dagbladet ( 2014b, 2014c ) and mitelman ( 2014 ). bis central bankers ’ speeches years, and in particular the leaning against the wind, has been wrong, unjustified and harmful. my most important messages let me conclude by summarising my main messages. the purpose of my review has been to point out the flaws in several notions of how monetary policy in sweden has been conducted in recent years and what the results have been. one thing i hope i have made clear is that it is not reasonable to regard the difference between what the repo rate has actually been in recent years and a fictitious interest - rate development of 0. 25 per cent since july 2009 as a measure of how much the riksbank has leaned against the wind. this is a rather odd reconstruction after the event. nevertheless, much of the criticism has been based on this assumption, for instance, the claim that the riksbank ’ s policy of leaning against the wind after the crisis has cost 60, 000 jobs. as i have shown, the general view among forecasters at the time when the repo rate had been raised to 2 per cent was that it would be necessary to continue to raise the repo rate – and for traditional monetary policy reasons. the increase from 0. 25 to 2 per cent was thus not perceived as particularly remarkable or as purely justified by concern for household debt. i also hope i have convinced you that the low inflation rate in sweden today does not reflect an economy that

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