on bank resolution, and in the policy panel on banking crises in the afternoon. as is well known, the response to the global financial crisis also addressed the regulatory landscape for bank recovery and resolution. in europe, the substantial costs of the public recapitalisation of banks in many countries motivated the introduction of a new bank resolution framework ( bank recovery and resolution directive, brrd ), which increases the burden of losses borne by the private stakeholders of institutions in distress, with the aim of reducing the cost for taxpayers. the use of bail - in tools as a general principle is certainly welcome as long as it is expected to reduce banks ’ risk - taking incentives and to reduce distortions to competition associated with too - big - to - fail market perceptions. yet, when it comes to the specific use of the brrd, the old saying of “ the devil is in the detail ” remains valid, as witnessed by the inadequacies of the new framework that emerged during recent cases of bank crisis. as i have mentioned on other occasions, the use of public funds could be less restrained to avoid financial stability risks and economic disruptions that may be caused by a routine recourse to private burden sharing. of course, this is not to say that, in the different forms that banks ’ resolution and liquidation may take, shareholders should not bear the cost of the resolution or the liquidation, administrators and managers should not be removed, or careful recovery plans should not be required. but i am still worried that the straightforward application to banks of the insolvency proceedings normally applied to non - financial companies could lead to unintended consequences, via confidence disruption and contagion, to the rest of the system and to the real economy. and i believe that the issue of how to resolve banking crises in the european banking union in an orderly, quick and efficient manner, also given the difficulty of effectively coordinating all the authorities and institutions involved, still needs to be satisfactorily addressed. this is not to dispute that a well - thought out implementation of bail - in procedures or a proper application of state aid rules in the case of well identified threats to market competition would not be useful. however, theoretical and empirical research should foster a better understanding of the conditions under which a bailin approach is socially optimal. in - depth empirical analysis of the impact of the current implementation of the brrd on the banking sector and on the real economy is of the utmost importance. the development of effective analytical tools to

however, might be conflicting in some points of the cycle. for instance, during downturns macro - prudential policy interventions would imply the loosening of equity buffers, while a purely micro - prudential perspective may aim to preserve or even tighten capital requirements. how to best coordinate the two approaches is a matter which is still unresolved. in the european union this difficulty combines with the institutional framework, which is characterised by different layers of central and domestic authorities. also, most importantly, the interaction of macro - prudential policy with monetary policy, both in its conventional and unconventional forms, provides ample possibilities for future research. in the medium run they reinforce each other. monetary policy aims at maintaining price stability, which is a pre - condition for a sustained and balanced growth. at the same time, financial stability cannot easily be achieved in a persistently depressed economy. in the short run things are however a bit more controversial. on the one hand, macro - prudential policy can mitigate unintended consequences of monetary policy, such as excessive risk taking in times of very low interest rates. on the other hand, macro - prudential policy can interfere with the transmission of monetary policy to economic activity through its tightening or loosening effects on credit conditions. research can provide insights on the extent to which macro - prudential authorities should internalise the macroeconomic consequences of their decisions, and on how to smooth short - run conflicts between monetary and macro - prudential policies ( as well as those of the latter with other policies and measures in fields such as those of taxation and environmental protection ). dramatic developments in financial technology ( fintech ) are creating new services, enlarging the pool of potential competitors of traditional intermediaries, and setting new challenges for macro - prudential authorities. there are many issues that could be fruitfully explored in this second area of interest. perhaps this is where possible conflicts may arise between traditional banking institutions and new institutions operating in the shadow banking system. there might also be complementarities, the more so if banks learn how to take advantage of instruments such as crowd - funding and / or lending based on major advances provided by technology, for instance the use of big data, the diffusion of machine learning or the recourse to distributed ledgers. a field that is very much under investigation at a policy level is that of the so - called cryptoassets, as the best - known of which being bitcoin