samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
be assured that you will be supported by international bodies like the cpss and the participating central banks to the extent needed and wherever possible.

cause is deregulation – the decision to put more emphasis on market mechanisms, whether in the move away from planned economies or in the liberalisation of existing market economies. in the financial sector regulators have to find a balance between direct control and allowing the market to find its own equilibrium. the increased emphasis on market mechanisms is in my opinion desirable because of the gains in economic efficiency it can bring. furthermore, it is to some extent inevitable, since the changes in technology have been making regulations increasingly easy to avoid and thus direct control over markets and their participants – albeit still necessary – increasingly hard to maintain. the need for a strategy to make payment systems safer the result of the developments i have just described is a world where markets are more volatile – and where there is more chance that extreme movements in one market will spill over into others. from a regulator ’ s point of view this volatility can be unnerving – so how can we cope? a crucial element is ensuring that the infrastructure is sound. in the financial system the infrastructure is based on three main pillars : the financial institutions, the markets they trade in and, of most interest to this conference, the mechanisms to settle financial transactions in those markets, in other words the payment systems. for the latter pillar adequate procedures of oversight are necessary in order to ensure a well - functioning technical basis. so how do we go about strengthening the payments systems infrastructure to make it more stable? in the light of what i said earlier, i suggest we need a strategy that recognises that the pace of change is extraordinary, ongoing and irreversible. the strategy also needs to take into account the fact that transactions are becoming increasingly complex and interdependent and involve an ever - widening and changing range of participants. this reality has three strategic implications. first, the strategy must be comprehensive across sectors to cope with interdependencies. this means that we should not tackle payment systems in isolation. to be fully effective, the changes to payment systems must be part of a broader plan of reform that also includes not just other settlement mechanisms but also the other two pillars of the financial system, namely financial institutions and financial markets. second, the strategy must be international. it has to recognise that we can no longer safely see payment and settlement system reform as a purely domestic matter. you only have to look at euroclear, cedel, target, s. w. i. f. t., the planned cls bank, visa and master
##quencies. there would also need to be much more clarity and specificity about loss mitigation standards and systems for auditing internal procedures. such a system could more appropriately compensate servicers and sub - servicers for the level of work involved in servicing very different types of loans. specialists could emerge who focus primarily on the routine performing loans or the more involved non - performing ones. if the non - performing specialist was a third party, the existing servicer could either transfer the servicing rights once a loan hits a certain delinquency trigger, or simply have the loans subserviced – of course with high levels of accountability – on a fee - for - services basis until the delinquency is resolved. one structure along these general lines has recently been proposed by fannie mae, freddie mac, and ginnie mae. while many details would need to be worked out and possible implications thought through, i believe it is a promising start. another structural change that would help would be a limit on the extent to which servicers have to advance principal and interest on non - performing loans. in times of high delinquency, this can put considerable financial strain on servicers, which can lead to negative consequences for consumers trying to work with those stressed servicers. this could be addressed by changing secondary market standards so that servicers only have to advance mortgage principal and interest up to, say, 60 or 90 days beyond delinquency. alternatively, they could advance principal and interest payments only as they come in – a so - called “ actual / actual ” schedule. either change would affect the payment streams to investors, but i would imagine that participants in the secondary markets would be able to model with some confidence how this would affect the value of securities and adjust pricing accordingly. this means that future pooling and servicing agreements will need to look different than those of the past. they will need to be much more detailed and provide clarity about what the servicer can and cannot do. they should explicitly allow for loan modifications and other nonforeclosure workout actions when they are determined to lead to a smaller loss to the investor than would a foreclosure. there also needs to be clarity that the servicer is expected to work in the aggregate best interests of the investor, regardless of tranche. and we need to find ways to deal with the problems that arise from the conflicting interests of senior and junior lien interests that can hold up workable alternatives to foreclos

central bankers'speeches
of large corporations and public administrations. i wish you a fruitful conference, and i am confident that it will be another building block on our way to do what has to be done. thank you for your attention.

jean - claude trichet : integration and innovation – the alpha and omega of a successful retail payments market in europe opening remarks by mr jean - claude trichet, president of the european central bank, at the joint ecb / the netherlands bank conference on " retail payments : integration and innovation ", frankfurt am main, 25 may 2009. * * * ladies and gentlemen, it is a great pleasure for me to open this conference on integration and innovation of retail payments. this conference, organised jointly by the european central bank and de nederlandsche bank, brings together participants coming from more than 30 countries of all five continents. the research papers have been carefully selected from an amazing number of submissions. together, we will explore how to interlink policy conduct, research activities and market practice in a field of banking that is not always in the limelight, namely retail banking. retail banking has proven to be an area of stability within the banking business during the recent period of financial turmoil. payments business, which generates about one quarter of all banking revenues, has remained a source of strength. at a time when banks ’ other sources of income are more volatile, they can count on reliable and regular revenues being generated through payment services. the other side of the coin is less alluring. payments business roughly accounts for one third of the operational costs of the banks. in europe, part of these costs is obviously related to the current fragmentation in the retail payments market. overcoming such fragmentation by means of more integration would decrease the operational costs banks are confronted with. this is the link to our topic today. against this background, it is no surprise that today ’ s first theme will be the relevance of retail banking and payments for banks ’ profitability. mr. lavayssiere, director of global financial services capgemini, will make the keynote speech on this theme, and i am sure that his remarks and the following academic session will provide fundamental insights into the economic rationale for the integration and innovation of the retail payments market. successful integration of retail payment markets will not only provide benefits in terms of diminishing costs, it will also contribute to financial stability. restoring confidence in, and improving the resilience of, financial systems is of paramount importance. governments and central banks around the globe have made unprecedented use of their policy tools to fight further economic and financial decline. the ecb and the eurosystem have taken rapid and bold actions in response to the crisis. these measures have been providing refinancing
in terms of economic structures and policies. a single monetary policy implies that lasting divergences in unemployment levels and real growth trends are caused predominantly by different economic structures and economic policies in individual countries. moreover, income levels can more easily be compared across countries which use the same currency. monetary union thus makes it easier for citizens to identify best practices in other countries. this benchmarking benefits all the citizens of the euro area - in much the same way as consumers benefit from increased competition between firms in the form of higher quality and / or less expensive products. good and promising practices or policies can be better identified and more widely implemented, while less successful or ill - designed economic policies are easier to recognise. i am fully aware that it is not easy to implement structural reforms and consolidate government budgets because of the fact that the public opinion is sometimes not fully convinced that everybody would benefit from these reforms. the ecb, for its part, is not lecturing anybody, but considers itself part of the necessary process of awareness raising, of tireless explanation. we all need to explain to the citizens of europe that policies which enhance competition, competitiveness and flexibility contribute to higher employment and will ultimately improve prospects for real wage developments, growth and consolidation of government budgets.

advanced economies, the ecb ’ s response was fully comparable with that of the other major central banks. thanks to its independence, the ecb has been able to adapt its policy response and reaction function. preserving this key asset will allow the ecb to adapt to future circumstances and ensure the effectiveness of its measures. this is all the more important considering that the desirability and relevance of central bank independence are increasingly being challenged around the world. as i argued in my introduction, the best way to preserve the ecb ’ s independence is to ensure a commensurate degree of central bank accountability. during the past eight years, our accountability practices have evolved and intensified in response to the quest for scrutiny that emerged from the crisis. 2 i have always appreciated the ability of this parliament to react to citizens ’ demands, support, concerns and channel them in a constructive manner during our discussions here. and i would like to personally thank you for this. i am confident that this parliament – and this committee in particular – will continue the good work it has done during my term as ecb president. this, in turn, will further strengthen the effectiveness of the ecb ’ s actions and citizens ’ trust in the eu project. thank you for your attention. i am now at your disposal for questions. 1 see draghi, m. ( 2011 ), “ hearing at the committee on economic and monetary affairs of the european parliament ”, brussels, 19 december. 2 see fraccaroli, n., giovannini, a. and jamet, j. - f. ( 2018 ), “ the evolution of the ecb ’ s accountability practices during the crisis ”, economic bulletin, issue 5, ecb. 5 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches
, where rick mishkin introduced the topic. 3 at that time, the prevalent thinking in central banking circles was what professor issing later called “ the jackson hole consensus ”, meaning that it is better for monetary policy only to “ clean ” ( up afterwards ) than to “ lean ” ( against the wind ). after the hard lessons we learned over the last five years the case for benign neglect of asset booms and only picking up the pieces afterwards is not so strong any more. the crisis experience supports rather the idea that financial excesses are better prevented as they happen than only managed after they have caused a recession. this would be the best way to prevent “ downward financial dominance ” which could arise if monetary policy could not effectively counteract credit contraction. unconventional tools and the independence of monetary policy recent experience shows that the central banks ’ box of potential tools is actually very deep, and if it has become necessary to utilize unconventional tools, as in the present crisis, these new tools have been developed and deployed. in the case of the ecb, the new tools have included the transition to full allotment auctions, the long term refinance operations up to three years, widening of the scope of eligible collateral, and the various bond purchase programmes. the most recent of these is the omt programme announced last summer but not yet commenced in practice. the development of new tools has been justified. the slip of the depressed economies to dangerous deflation has been averted, and the debt and banking problems have not developed into systemic financial meltdowns in the affected countries. we have seen that central banks can pursue successful price stability policy also under very difficult conditions. the events around the world since the collapse of lehman brothers are evidence of that. deflation has been avoided despite a severe recession in many countries. however, there are also certain problems with relying on the enlarged toolkit of the central banks. the ability to act in crisis has led to the central banks being even called “ the only game in town ”. we should resist this idea and beware of the danger that problems which are fundamentally political could be pushed to central banks to solve. a division of responsibilities between appointed officials and elected politicians should be preserved. monetary policy cannot administer the needed structural transformation in the real sector of the economy or solve excessive deficit problems of governments. there are situations where the central banks just have to act and do their best to stabilize the economy, even if they would have to use tools which go beyond

equipped to face the challenges ahead. as you strive to enhance the well - being and dignity of your members and improve their professional status, you also magnify the values essential in attaining the bsp vision and mission. let us therefore join hands as we embrace the changes in the way world - class central bankers perform their tasks! thank you and good day!
measured by the harmonised index of consumer prices increased to 1. 9 % in may 2018 and, on the basis of current futures prices for oil, headline inflation is likely to hover around its current level for the remainder of the year. while measures of underlying inflation remain generally muted, they are higher than earlier low levels. domestic cost pressures are strengthening amid high levels of capacity utilisation and tightening labour markets. so against this background, the governing council carefully reviewed the progress towards a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation to levels below, but close to, 2 % in the medium term. our assessment on the progress made was guided by the three criteria of convergence, confidence and resilience. first, on convergence, headline inflation should be well on track towards reaching levels below, but close to, 2 % over the medium term, which is also supported by our staff projections. 1 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches second, on confidence, uncertainty around the inflation outlook has further diminished. in addition, high levels of capacity utilisation and a progressive tightening in labour markets provide increasing confidence that price and wage pressures will emerge more strongly and show through in inflation developments. finally, on resilience, the projected sustained adjustment in the path of inflation is expected to be maintained even without additional net asset purchases. in summary, we concluded at our meeting on 14 june that progress towards a sustained adjustment in inflation has been substantial. the underlying strength in the euro area economy, together with well - anchored, longer - term inflation expectations, provide grounds to be confident that the sustained convergence of inflation towards our inflation aim will continue in the period ahead, even after a gradual winding down of net asset purchases. let me reiterate the governing council ’ s policy decisions on our policy instruments. first, we anticipate reducing the current monthly pace of net asset purchases of €30 billion to €15 billion at the end of september 2018 and ending net purchases at the end of december 2018. second, we intend to maintain our policy of reinvesting the principal payments from maturing securities purchased under the asset purchase programme for an extended time after the end of net purchases, and in any case for as long as necessary to maintain favourable liquidity conditions and an ample degree of monetary accommodation. third, we expect the key ecb interest rates to remain at their present levels at least through the summer of 2019, and in any case for as long as necessary to ensure that the evolution of inflation remains aligned with our

autonomy of action and by sufficient resources for intervening in the markets. it is in the nation's interest to preserve this achievement. thank you for your attention, and for your interest in the swiss national bank and its activities.
• suspension of dividend payments of financial institutions - in order to maintain capital levels by banks as regards the enabling of lending, cbk may suspend all dividend payments of financial institutions. * * * finally, allow me to conclude my discussion by emphasizing that the central bank of the republic of kosovo, fully implementing the recommendations of the health institutions, has immediately succeeded in restoring its function to full normality and 100 % functionality. cbk has established a work continuity team and an inter - institutional committee has been established between the cbk, the treasury and the banking association to ensure the smooth functioning of the financial system in the country. therefore, we will continue to provide all services to the economy of the country, providing readiness to undertake all necessary measures in order to maintain financial stability and support the economy of the country.

the regulatory requirements of 12 percent, while the liquidity indicator is 35. 7 percent, similarly, higher than the regulatory requirement of 25 percent. we also have positive results in the insurance sector and other sectors. 1 / 2 bis - central bankers'speeches the central bank of the republic of kosovo is certain that it will continue to have the support of the international monetary fund and we will continue the successful cooperation with the international monetary fund. once again, allow me to thank the representatives of the international monetary fund for the contribution and continuous support of kosovo and the central bank. thank you. 2 / 2 bis - central bankers'speeches
control as a means to better overall economic performance. interestingly, once a central bank has adopted an explicit inflation target, as we have, and is held to account for it, the move towards greater transparency is speeded up. for it quickly becomes apparent that monetary policy will be more successful in meeting the target if both the public and financial markets understand the factors affecting inflation as well as the central bank ’ s assessment of those factors and its likely response. here in canada, we found that, as we consistently met our targets, public expectations about future inflation changed - the more credible the bank ’ s commitment to the targets became, the more canadians formed their plans on the assumption that the future trend of inflation would stay inside the target range. over time, a credible commitment to inflation control also sets other positive developments in motion. as credibility rises, uncertainty about future inflation diminishes. interest rates are lower than otherwise and investment in machinery, equipment, and technology increases, leading to stronger economic growth in the longer run. but that is not all. as canadians become more confident that inflation will be controlled, they are less quick to react to unexpected disturbances that could affect inflation. this contributes to greater economic stability and gives the bank of canada a bit more time to assess the extent and persistence of such disturbances. greater public confidence thus gives the bank more latitude to explore the limits of the economy ’ s capacity to produce and to create jobs without setting off inflation pressures that undermine the sustainability of the economic expansion. transparency and accountability in monetary policy require effective communication. at the bank, we have undertaken a series of initiatives to improve our communications with the public. five years ago, we redesigned our annual report to make it a more reader - friendly yearly account of how we have managed the bank and how effectively we have carried out our main responsibilities. at that time, we also introduced a monetary policy report, which is published every six months - in may and november. this report describes our management of monetary policy and gives the bank ’ s assessment of recent economic information as well as our outlook for the economy and inflation. after the release of each monetary policy report, we meet with media as well as with business economists and financial analysts. in addition, i appear before a parliamentary committee to discuss the report ’ s contents. both of these initiatives are important parts of the accountability process. six months, however, has been proven to be rather a long time between monetary policy reports, especially for market participants and economists who follow

the bank remains committed to delivering a trend of inflation that is inside the target range of 1 % to 3 %. because the long and the short of it is that low and stable inflation is a crucial ingredient for a durable, healthy economic expansion.