on reducing the exposure of european - based banking groups in south east europe. in the context of addressing this issue, the bank of albania has signed a memorandum of cooperation with the european banking authority college in 2015, on exchanging information and harmonising supervisory policies. regarding non - performing loans, the bank of albania continues to be committed to implementing the measures set out in the national plan for reducing them. the reduction of the credit risk, in parallel with the improvement of the banks ’ balance sheets and economic growth, should be accompanied by more realistic lending policies by the banking system. this is a recurring appeal i have made in my public appearances. the implementation of such policies would create the conditions for fulfilling the needs of the economy for financing, which are expected to be upward in the future. the third obstacle is the development level of financial markets and the narrow range of financial instruments. in 2017, the bank of albania, in cooperation with the ministry of finance and economy and the world bank explored options for developing the secondary market of government securities and improving the functioning of the primary market. this project will help in the government securities trading, increasing the investors ’ base, and forming a yield curve that is a representative one for the economy. such a curve enables a better management of liquidity for all the financial agents, as well as a better monetary policy transmission to financial markets. i would like, however, to underline that the development of markets is a long process, which requires cooperation by all economic and financial agents in the economy. * * * turning to the contribution of the bank of albania in the overall improvement of the financial and economic context, i would like to present now our work with regard to safeguarding and promoting financial stability. the main aspects of our work consisted in strengthening the stability 5 / 9 bis central bankers'speeches of the banking system, enhancing its resilience to shocks and adoption of international standards. 3. financial stability and banking system performance in 2017, the activity of the banking system was stable and supported the safeguarding of the financial stability. as at the end of 2017, the share of its assets stood at 92. 5 % of the gross domestic product ( gdp ). the main financial indicators of the banking sector activity improved, and the net financial result of the banking sector grew considerably in 2017. the return on assets ( roa ) of the system increased at 1. 54 %, in december 2017, from 0. 7 % a year earlier, whereas the return on equity (

private partnerships ( ppps ). these take different forms. many employ a mix of public and private funding, with the operation and maintenance of the infrastructure performed by a private enterprise on behalf of the government. the most familiar example of a ppp is the confederation bridge between new brunswick and prince edward island. but there are still relatively few existing ppps in canada. other countries, such as the united kingdom and australia, offer many examples of successful ppp infrastructure. unlike most jurisdictions in canada, these other countries already have a well - developed legal and regulatory framework for ppp investments. each of these methods has advantages, but also problems. in the final analysis, it is all a question of incentives. for example, when infrastructure projects are solely publicly funded, the usual incentives to build and operate efficiently — the incentives to avoid bankruptcy and to make a profit — are not the driving motive behind the investment. the most efficient and timely allocation of resources for infrastructure occurs when the incentives are right. and that framework of incentives usually includes some expectation of profit. this applies this is partly due to varying definitions of infrastructure and the high level of subjectivity involved in assessing " need. " the government of ontario, for example, estimates that the cost of correcting past underinvestment and of building the public facilities that the province needs to accommodate future growth may exceed $ 100 billion. 3 / 4 equally to decisions on what to build and to decisions regarding how to operate the infrastructure once it is in place. the hardest incentive to get right is that of proper pricing. a lack of pricing that appropriately reflects demand and supply conditions may be one reason why there have been relatively few ppp infrastructure projects in canada. it is particularly important to improve pricing mechanisms for services that are provided through public infrastructure. governments have often been unwilling to price - to - market infrastructure - based services. as a result, shortages are managed through non - price rationing, such as rolling electricity blackouts, highway congestion, or waiting lists for government documents or services. and occasionally, we get the opposite problem — an over - build of infrastructure that cannot be justified by demand. new technologies, such as transponders on vehicles to monitor road use, and meters that allow peak - hour pricing of electricity, provide new opportunities to gauge demand for these services, and to price them accordingly. another key incentive with respect to infrastructure investment is the incentive to manage risk. private financing of infrastructure through the markets tends to lead to better assessment of the