cre markets, statistical gaps are more pervasive, with even the available price data not being of sufficient quality. a study by the ecb and eurostat concluded that only nine eu countries have their own commercial property price statistics, six more obtain them from private sources, and 13 eu countries have no price data at all. where cre statistics from official sources are available, they are not derived using a harmonised methodology. there is similarly patchy coverage in statistics for rent indices and rent yields, vacancy rates, transaction numbers and values, and to a lesser extent, construction starts and construction completions. as a result, policymakers are often forced to rely on non - data information sources, such as surveys or market participants ’ reports. data on the financial system ’ s exposures to commercial real estate have comparable shortcomings, while information on lending standards is very limited. closing these data gaps would offer several advantages for policymakers. first, it would enhance the ability of macroprudential authorities to assess systemic risks exante. for rre, more granular data on lending standards would enable the identification of risks that may be building up in the tail of the distribution, risks that are typically hidden by average figures – for example, loans with high debt - to - income ( dti ), debt - service - to - income ( dsti ) or loan - to - value ( ltv ) ratios. in the cre segment, wider data coverage would provide a clearer picture of market developments and improve the assessment of potential vulnerabilities. data on rent indices and rent yields for cre, for example, would help indicate whether a given price level reflects realised returns, or inflated expectations of future returns. details on vacancy rates and building permits would help in assessing property supply and demand. and transaction numbers and values could serve as an indicator of market liquidity, conveying information on potential market overheating or on vulnerability to fire sales should banks or investors have to quickly recover their positions. more complete cre data would also help inform monetary policymakers of the impact of the policy stance on cre markets. decomposing the rental yield into the risk - free rate and the risk premium can help in identifying whether price developments reflect fundamentals. a highly compressed or negative spread between yields and the risk - free rate can indicate an overvalued property market. second, harmonising key definitions and concepts would facilitate cross - country comparisons of 2 / 4 bis central bankers

this explains the “ affordable housing ” measures taken by the clinton administration and the “ ownership society ” of the bush administration. financial innovation has also been facilitated by the interest rates kept low for an extended period of time. the problem arises – and arose – when the transition to the new equilibrium is very long, longer than expected. if the transition is longer than expected, financial engineering is no longer a solution and can become a problem. the debt burden becomes unsustainable and cannot be repaid, starting by the less well - off, whose incomes do not keep pace with property values inflated by low interest rates. the sub - prime crisis was created by excessive debt, taken on not by the wealthy, as happened on other occasions in the past, but by the less well - off, whose relative position in society was slipping. debt had given them the illusion of being able to live for a few years beyond their means. the gist of this first thought is that the crisis sprang from an unsuccessful attempt to square dahrendorf ’ s circle. the failure involved not recognising that technological and global processes bring about a longer and more difficult than expected transition for one part of the population. it consisted of deluding oneself that such a transition can be facilitated by easy debt and low interest rates. recognising this failure is the first step towards not failing again. the second thought comes from the way in which our societies have responded to the crisis. without making a value judgement, but considering only the efficiency and timeliness of actions that have been implemented to tackle the crisis and counter its negative effects, there is no denying that in most cases the reaction has been slow. this slowness has added to the cost of the crisis itself and to the scale of the adjustment required. let me offer a couple of examples. if lehman brothers ’ bankruptcy had been avoided in september 2008, through an effective and timely intervention, there would probably not have been the collapse of confidence that in the months thereafter affected the global economy. the rescue package – tarp – would very probably have been much less than the usd 700 billion needed to restore calm to the markets. in europe – to take another example – if the greek government had decided to intervene with corrective action as early as autumn 2009, having just discovered the budget hole left by its predecessor, it could have avoided the sovereign debt crisis and the drastic adjustment programme which it then had to put in place under pressure from the markets. if the european