charging more, they are losing more money. closing message in closing, this is a very, very attractive future, but we all have to realize that it is not easy. many things have to be done. at the same time, the fact that it will take seven years should not paralyze us. we have to think, " well, what are the things that could be done sooner? " with that, you can rest assured that the bsp will continue to strive for a regulatory environment that promotes the right balance of innovation, competition, and consumer protection. we also remain committed to establishing robust frameworks that protect the interest of all stakeholders. 3 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches with open finance ph, we take a big step in unlocking equal access to financial services for all filipinos toward building a cyber - resilient and open digital economy. maraming salamat, at mabuhay ang ating bansang pilipinas 4 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches

gdp taken into account. 4 another manifestation of costs is the possible overvaluation of assets. in some stock markets, pe ratios are higher than long - term averages, in spite of the fact earnings prospects are restrained by relatively low growth outlooks. also, the gaps between housing and consumer price indices in some advanced countries, such as switzerland, australia, and norway, have been rising rapidly in the last few years. a final manifestation of costs is the possibility that negative rates hurt banks, as well as money market funds and other non - bank financial institutions such as insurance companies, with no clear payoff in terms of economic growth. for example, in a recent survey conducted by the ecb, banks estimated that the most important effects from negative rates include lower net interest income and lending rates, as well as squeezed loan margins. the estimated impact on lending volume is minimal. 5 these imbalances and pressures could set the stage for significant disruptions to the functioning of markets down the road. given the fact policy makers are still reaching deep into their bags of tools to tune markets years after the crisis, another period of severe turmoil would likely be even more problematic. see engen, e. m., et al. ( 2015 ), “ the macroeconomic effects of the federal reserve ’ s unconventional monetary policies, ” board of governors of the federal reserve system finance and economic discussion series 2015 – 005, january. see borio. c. et al. ( 2015 ). “ the costs of deflation : a historical perspective, ” bis quarterly review, march. see buttiglione, l., et al. ( 2014 ). “ deleveraging? what deleveraging? ” geneva reports on the world economy 16, icmb and cepr. see ecb ( 2016 ). the euro area bank lending survey, april, pp. 21, 47. bis central bankers ’ speeches emerging economies between a rock and a hard place let ’ s now look at the implications of extraordinary monetary accommodation in advanced countries for emerging markets. this policy at first led to more favorable financial conditions. starting in 2010, emerging economies drew greater portfolio capital flows and enjoyed both rising commodity prices and bouts of financial asset appreciation. starting in 2014, however, with markets anticipating u. s. monetary normalization and fears mounting on the health of the chinese economy, the tables turned. 6 a positive result of the financing bonanza was that the share of nonresident holdings of localcu