two key areas in which the ecrb could drive improvements forward : information sharing and crisis management. this year, thanks to your commitment and contribution, we have set up two working groups of experts drawn from your institutions and we have made significant progress in these areas. i would like to sincerely thank you for your contributions and for sustaining our spirit of trust and collaboration. the ecrb working group on information sharing will tell us about their proposed model, which sets out the building blocks for sharing information and intelligence. it is clear that, among other things, financial infrastructures should have effective cyber threat intelligence processes ; they should actively participate in information - sharing arrangements and collaborate with trusted stakeholders within the industry. the working group ’ s proposal seeks to address this by facilitating information and intelligence sharing, enabling you to better protect yourselves and the wider ecosystem. as discussed at our last meeting, regulatory reporting on cyber incidents is intentionally not part of this work. we will also receive an update on the work of the ecrb working group on crisis management, and we will touch upon third - party risk and ecosystem recovery and coordinated reconciliation. as you may guess from my brief remarks today, we have a great deal of work ahead of us. i believe that sharing information, knowledge and expertise among financial infrastructures and authorities in a non - regulatory context remains essential for tackling the cyber challenge we all face. i am convinced that we can only do this by joining forces. i want to thank you for being here today and i look forward to a fruitful discussion. 1 ecb ( 2018 ), cyber resilience oversight expectations, december. 2 committee on payments and market infrastructures and international organization of securities commissions ( 2016 ), guidance on cyber resilience for financial market infrastructures, june. 3 ecb ( 2018 ), tiber - eu framework, may. 4 ecb ( 2018 ), unitas crisis communication exercise report, december. 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches

by the european central bank ’ s governing council. as regards the first condition, the impairments to the monetary policy transmission mechanism have noticeably declined, not least thanks to the monetary policy measures carried out by the european central bank, in particular the development of omts. the euro area is confronting a slow but steady recovery. certain member states that in 2011 and 2012 were subject to market overreactions are now seeing signs of positive growth. irrespective of the fact that yields for government bonds have reacted in varying degrees to new economic developments, there has been a clear reduction in the yield spreads compared to the situation in 2012. it is not the aim of omts to harmonise interest rates regardless of the differences between member states ’ macroeconomic or budgetary situation. concerning the second condition, two euro area member states are currently undergoing esm macroeconomic adjustment programmes. however, none of these programmes allow primary market purchases through the esm to the government bonds market. in conclusion, i can state that omts are in principle available as monetary policy instruments. the conditions for their crisis and location - related activation are, however, not currently met. possible volumes and potential risks for the federal budget with regard to the possible volume of omts it remains the case that no ex ante quantitative limits are set on the size of omts in order to prevent market participants from adjusting to this situation and using these instruments for their own purposes to the detriment of the effectivity of the monetary policy instruments put in place. notwithstanding this, the possible volume of omts is in fact quantitatively limited to one to three - year government bonds, which are suitable for omts. government bonds with a maturity of on to three years form only a small part of the entire volume of government bonds. the court of justice of the european union has confirmed that it follows from this that the commitments that the european central bank enters into are, in fact, circumscribed and limited. in order to ensure that maturities are not significantly shortened, it is foreseen that the european central bank ’ s governing council will closely monitor the maturity structure and the termination of new issues of government bonds in the concerned member states. thus the volume of omts is limited in a variety of ways. in assessing the potential risks of omts it should be taken into account that, in principle, the use of monetary policy instruments to maintain price stability entails financial risks for the eurosystem. this applies not