issue ( cbi ), should be involved in determining third - country ccp ’ s systemic importance and in supervising systemically important third - country ccps. naturally, changes of this magnitude to the supervisory and regulatory regime are always accompanied by criticism and a degree of uncertainty. eu market participants, in particular, are wondering which third - country ccps they will be able to use going forward, and rightly so. it is 3 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches not my intention to gloss over the fact that the current situation is unsatisfactory for many. it also remains unclear to date whether the uk ’ s systemically important ccps will be able to continue to conduct business with eu market players indefinitely in the current form or whether they will be denied recognition. what we need here is a thorough review. looking ahead, what is crucial in my view is to ensure the stability of the eu ’ s financial system. the announcement by the bank of england to forcibly uncouple eu clearing members from uk ccps in order to ensure that they remain functional in the future and to avoid jeopardising financial stability is just one example of how fragile the current situation is. this process, referred to as “ off - boarding ”, has caused great concern amongst market participants. 5 consequences for the united states ladies and gentlemen, these market participants are not the only ones who are currently criticising the revision of the supervisory and regulatory framework for third - country ccps. in the united states there is mounting criticism of the path that the eu has embarked upon, particularly on the part of the commodities futures trading commission ( cftc ), which is responsible for major us ccps. the cftc has said that it finds it difficult to imagine that us ccps will also be directly supervised by the european securities and markets authority ( esma ) and the eurosystem as the cbi for the euro. admittedly, the american cftc is rather unfamiliar with the idea of central banks participating in the supervision of ccps – which is now a long - standing practice within the eu. this is undoubtedly also related to the historical differences in european and american regulatory practices. parts of the supervisory structure that arose within the eu through emir are far more complex. eu ccps are primarily supervised by their respective national supervisory authority, which takes on a leading supervisory role and is thus comparable to the cftc in the united states. however, there is also a joint supervision component, known as the emir college

medium term. the ecb governing council decided in march to reduce purchases under the app asset purchase programme more quickly than previously intended – from €40 billion in april to €20 billion in june. incoming data since this decision reinforce our expectation that net asset purchases should end in the third quarter. looking ahead, our monetary policy will depend on the incoming data and our evolving assessment of the outlook. adjustments to the key ecb interest rates will take place “ some time after the end of net purchases under the app ”. however, given the high level of uncertainty, adjustments should be gradual. in my view, we must stay alert with respect to upside risks to price stability over the medium term. there is less and less of a concern that a premature monetary policy normalisation could plunge the economy back into the low inflation setting of the previous years. instead, i see that the risk of acting too late is increasing notably. given the extraordinarily high uncertainty surrounding the future path of inflation, we should not delay the exit from the very 5 / 7 bis central bankers'speeches accommodative monetary policy, since a less expansionary monetary policy stance provides the most flexibility. in the current situation, it is therefore more important than ever that central banks act in time. their action should be foreseeable, gradual, and data - dependent. this way, debtors can better cope with an increase in interest rates, and accordingly, risk premia are expected to rise to a limited extent. as inflation in the euro area continues to run high, we need to act. i expect the net purchases under the app to be discontinued at the end of june. and if both the incoming data and our new projection confirm this view in june, i will advocate a first step normalising ecb interest rates in july. as central banks consider how to bring inflation back down to target, it is worth recalling the conditions under which the last, most prominent disinflation episode – the volcker disinflation at the end of the 1970s – played out. over the course of this policy, nominal interest rates in the us rose above 20 %. of course, at that time the situation was different in many respects. debt ratios were much lower than they are today, for both public and private debt. inflation had already been higher in the 1960s and early 1970s. and arguably, before this episode, the fed may have been less independent and less focused on inflation than it is today. there is