number of important measures. one of these is the treaty on stability, coordination and governance in the economic and monetary union. this treaty, which is due to become effective on 1 january 2013, comprises a fiscal compact. its main component is anchoring the commitment to enact laws, requiring budgets of member states to be at least close to balance in structural terms. nevertheless, structural adjustments are needed not just for public finances but also to address macroeconomic imbalances. both areas remain the preserve of national governments. the process of implementing necessary policy measures at the national level has already begun in some countries. labour markets have been deregulated, and institutional impediments to competition have been eliminated. some signs of success are already emerging in the export sectors of crisis - hit countries. the budgetary situation has also improved. markets, however, are not yet fully convinced that these efforts will be sustained. but one thing is clear : although the first steps have been taken, further extensive consolidation measures and structural reforms are very much necessary. the eurosystem responded to the crisis by cutting interest rates and launching non - standard monetary policy measures. it provided, for the first time, three - year liquidity in two longer - term refinancing operations. another non - standard measure, the securities market programme, has been the subject of debate. we at the bundesbank continue to believe that purchases of government bonds by the eurosystem reduce pressure on governments of countries that are in the markets ’ spotlight to consolidate their budgets and embark on structural reforms. by no means, they should become the “ new normal ”. through these measures, monetary policy is increasingly strained. it makes a world of difference whether it is the eurosystem or a stand - alone central bank, like the bank of japan, that is using its balance sheet as a tool to combat a crisis. in the eurosystem ’ s case, balance sheet measures and the risks of losses related to them have an important implication. they involve shifting burdens from the taxpayers of one member state to those of another. such bis central bankers ’ speeches burden - sharing, however, is the task of democratically elected fiscal policymakers and not of monetary policy. there is no quick fix for the european sovereign debt crisis. however, the measures already taken by some countries are steps in the right direction. if this direction is maintained, if the segregation of monetary policy from fiscal policy is upheld and once a decision is taken on the monetary

. furthermore, from 2008 on a revised enterprise taxation will be valid. i don ’ t want to keep secret, that there is still some way to go, however. just to mention one or two examples : some 25 % of the new jobs in germany are temporary, whereas only 4 % of the labour force stock is temp - work. this shows the need for further amendments of the labour market flexibility. another example is the german deficit. from my point of view we are right now in a good position to go for a balanced budget and we are still a good way off. concluding remarks let me conclude : a monetary union does not automatically lead to a high decree of competitiveness and good economic performance, but the remove of the “ veil of exchange rate ” puts the finger on the root of the matter, i. e. the structural weaknesses of a country. taking all this together, germany is a classic example of how market - related adjustments can work and be effective under the rules of a monetary union.