samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
sabine mauderer : keynote speech - f20 climate solutions week keynote speech by dr sabine mauderer, member of the executive board of the deutsche bundesbank, at the f20 climate solutions week, frankfurt am main, 15 september 2020. * * * ladies and gentlemen, we are going through challenging times. the covid - 19 pandemic has caused disruptions to our societies and our economies. while the loss of economic wealth is enormous, some countries with stronger social systems and better healthcare infrastructures have been more resilient than others. but every crisis is also an opportunity. so what can we learn from the pandemic? and what are the lessons for the even bigger challenge of climate change? the answer is easy. just like the pandemic, climate change is a global systemic threat many scientists have been flagging for decades. and just like the pandemic, climate change will cause enormous costs for our economies and our societies. so it is not a question of if but how we have to act. here are my three core messages on how to act. they are closely interlinked. first, we need an adequate carbon pricing system. the idea is to incentivise producers and consumers to change their behaviour and to encourage more climate - neutral alternatives. second, we have to raise broad awareness – across the g20 – that we can only combat climate change if the real economies undergo transformation. both the private and public sectors need to fulfil their roles as agents of change. more public and private money needs to flow into research and development, fostering climate - friendly innovation. this will help us master the necessary transformation in the real economy. transformation is a precondition for resilience, and resilience is the key to economic survival. my third and final message goes out to financial institutions : be a real driver of the economic transformation! if and when capital flows more strongly into climate - friendly economic activities, the financial system can play a pivotal role in changing the real economy. this is the spirit of the paris agreement. and to achieve the goals of the paris agreement, financial institutions need better data to assess the financial risks related to climate change. central banks can serve as catalysts here, by fostering international disclosure and standardisation of data. we need to leverage our capacities as monetary policymakers, banking supervisors and guardians of financial stability. ladies and gentlemen, let me stop here and briefly conclude : first, we need an

adequate carbon pricing system. second, our real economies need to transform. and third, financial institutions must be the drivers of the transformation. central banks can act as catalysts. the overarching goal must be a more sustainable and resilient planet. it is worth the effort. many thanks for your attention. 1 / 1 bis central bankers'speeches
in this situation, due attention should be paid to the fact that there are downside risks to economic activity depending on developments in global financial markets and overseas economies. in addition, if financial conditions in japan, as reflected in lending attitudes of financial institutions and issuing conditions in the cp and corporate bond markets, should increase in severity, pressures acting to depress economic activity from the financial side might become more marked. turning to prices, there is a possibility that the inflation rate will decline further if downside risks to economic activity materialize or commodity prices fall further. ii. conduct of monetary policy as i have explained, the outlook for economic activity and prices is uncertain at present. in this situation, the bank will carefully assess the future outlook for economic activity and prices, closely considering the likelihood of its projections as well as factors posing upside or downside risks, and will implement monetary policy appropriately. for the time being, it is particularly important to pay attention to downside risks to economic activity, such as those that may arise from developments in the u. s. and european financial systems and in global financial markets and the consequent downward pressure. since early autumn, when the turmoil in global financial markets and in the u. s. and european financial systems increased in severity, the bank has continued to make efforts, by employing various measures, to ensure market stability and maintain accommodative financial conditions. specifically, against the background of the worldwide decline in u. s. dollar liquidity, the bank introduced u. s. dollar funds - supplying operations as part of the coordinated measures of central banks in september and thereafter expanded such operations. as for yen funds, the bank has introduced a complementary deposit facility to further facilitate the provision of sufficient liquidity, and has been providing funds for over the year - end with more frequency and in larger amounts than last year. in addition, the bank has been actively purchasing cp and japanese government securities under repurchase agreements, thereby ensuring market stability. furthermore, with a view to facilitating corporate financing, the bank has expanded the range of corporate bonds and loans on deeds it accepts as eligible collateral and has decided to introduce a new operation through which financial institutions can borrow low - interest funds from the bank against corporate debt. under this new operation, there will be no explicit ceiling on the total funds available, although the maximum loans available will not exceed the value of the corporate debt pledged as collateral. the bank will continue to make efforts to ensure market stability by conducting appropriate

money market operations such as the provision of sufficient funds during the run - up to the calendar and fiscal year - ends.
##sih.

ringgit - denominated papers in our domestic bond market has contributed towards enhancing its depth and breadth. with these developments, this has positioned malaysia to evolve as an international financial centre for islamic finance. in this regard, islamic financial institutions have a significant role to play. the investment in research and development would strengthen the capability for greater innovation by islamic financial institutions. this would increase the potential for a more diverse range of products and services to meet the changing requirements in corporate, retail and investment activities. given the universal nature of the islamic banking licence, the attention given to the capacity for innovation will become an important defining factor in the progress of islamic finance. with the rapid progress on the issuance of prudential and supervisory standards by the islamic financial services board ( ifsb ), islamic finance is now governed by its own international best practices. the establishment of the islamic financial services board in 2002 was part of the efforts to strengthen the international islamic financial architecture. thus far, two standards have been issued, namely the standards for capital adequacy and the guiding principles for risk management for islamic financial institutions. bank negara malaysia will be implementing these ifsb standards for adoption by malaysian islamic banking institutions. the harmonisation of the prudential standards across borders will also enhance the process of global financial integration in islamic finance. the islamic financial institutions are also able to benefit from maximising their balance sheet structure, by leveraging on the profit sharing investment accounts in addition to their own capital. under the ifsb capital adequacy standard, the total risk weighted assets funded by the profit sharing investment accounts will be deducted in the determination of the overall risk weighted capital ratio of the institutions. apart from the core capital and tier - 2 capital, bank negara malaysia will consider the profit sharing investment accounts to be part of the overall islamic banking capital fund for the purpose of determining the single customer limit. ladies and gentlemen, thus far, there are 7 islamic banking window arrangements that have been transformed into subsidiaries. six have now commenced operations. together with two full fledged islamic banking institutions and the 3 new foreign islamic banking players, malaysia now has 12 islamic banking institutions operating under the islamic banking act. there are also 9 takaful operators, including the 4 new takaful operators that will commence business later this year. with this diversity of players and the larger number of institutions that has been established in the islamic financial system, it is envisaged that the development of the sector will gain further momentum with
, we will continue to promote diversity. and we will foster a culture of inclusion based on mutual respect and appreciation. thank you for your attention. 3 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches

garrison, once the defense hub of the british caribbean, were recently declared unesco world heritage sites. ) a major initiative is on to improve government ’ s facilitation of business, especially tourism and international business, and to make the system of fiscal incentives more efficient and transparent. barbadians remain confident of the future of our international business and financial centre in an interconnected digital world. the globalisation of commerce and finance is the present reality and the inexorable future of the 21st century, and small international financial centres like barbados play an essential role in improving the efficiency of international transactions and the competitiveness of international firms. there is a small but growing literature on this, bis central bankers ’ speeches including the forthcoming report on an international conference on this topic which barbados hosted on september 11. barbados bases its appeal to potential investors in our network of double taxation treaties ( dtas ) and tax information exchange agreements ( tieas ), and the fact that our regulatory framework is kept abreast of international standards through reviews by the imf, world bank, the financial action task force on anti - money laundering ( fatf ) and the global forum of the oecd on tax information. in addition the country boasts a small but growing cadre of skilled professionals, and highly competitive support services and infrastructure. barbados ’ growth strategy, led by our private sector, supported by reformed government services, incentives and infrastructure, will yield steadily improving, sustainable growth over the medium term. however, for 2014 the priority remains economic stabilisation and fiscal consolidation. so far the correction in the fiscal deficit is only about 2 percent of gdp, compared with almost 6 percent correction which is the target for the current fiscal year. the second half of the fiscal year is expected to yield larger gains, as some measures ( such a tax to cover waste management expenses ) are biased towards the second half. in addition, government is tightening fiscal controls with the recent establishment of an independent oversight body for state owned enterprises, and the barbados revenue authority, which began operations in april, is expected to improve the efficiency of revenue administration. the imf and the caribbean technical assistance centre are providing assistance with public financial management and tax policy. the service costs of barbados ’ sovereign external debt in 2014 are about 7 percent of the country ’ s foreign exchange earnings on the current account of the balance of payments, and are not expected to exceed 10 percent for the foreseeable future. the domestic financing needs for the target deficit of 6.
##cius quote : “ the man who asks a question is a fool for a minute, the man who does not ask is a fool for life ”. that is why we keep asking. 1 see bis : red book statistics for cpmi countries. 2 see girocard. eu : figures for the first half of 2020. 3 see bis wp 880 : rise of the central bank digital currencies, august 2020. 4 ecb ( 2020 ) : report on a digital euro, frankfurt am main, october 2020. 5 see, for example, bank of thailand / hkma : inthanon - lionrock and mas : project ubin, phase 4 ( cross - border payment versus payment ). 6 see fsb : enhancing cross - border payments : stage 3 roadmap ( october 2020 ). 5 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches

market participants consider this commitment by the eurosystem to be credible. yields on long - term government bonds are at relatively low levels. these low levels reflect a high degree of confidence in the ability of the eurosystem to maintain price stability in the euro area over the longer term. in other words, both inflation expectations and the risk premia associated with inflation uncertainty are low at present, a situation that we wish to maintain. for the bond markets and therefore for companies financing themselves in the market, the high level of credibility attached to the eurosystem is highly beneficial. in particular, the fact that inflation risk premia are low means that companies as well as housing associations seeking long - term financing do not have to pay for the risk that the central bank may not be able to maintain price stability over the longer term. for the economy as a whole, this environment of low costs of long - term financing should be conducive for the private sector to undertake productive investments. companies can also take advantage of the longer planning horizon provided by the knowledge that the cost of capital they employ in their investments will remain stable. i do not have to tell you that this is also of fundamental importance in your sector, i. e. housing. for the last minutes i have focused on the developments in the european financial markets in general rather than what these developments specifically mean for you. i wanted to outline to you the european environment in which you will increasingly be operating. in europe, we are unquestionably moving towards integrated financial markets. clearly, this will have an impact on the financing of housing as well. i have mainly described general consequences and will leave it to you to draw your own conclusions about how this will affect the financing of housing associations.
øystein olsen : the role of monetary policy revisited – welcome address welcome address by mr øystein olsen, governor of norges bank ( central bank of norway ), at the norges bank conference “ the role of monetary policy revisited ”, oslo, 26 september 2013. * * * it is a great honour and pleasure for me to welcome you all to this norges bank conference : the role of monetary policy revisited. in his famous 1967 presidential address before the american economic association, milton friedman set out to answer three interrelated questions. what should be the role of monetary policy? what can it contribute to achieving the major goals of economic policy? and how should it be conducted to contribute the most? five years after the onset of the global financial crisis, these questions are yet again at the forefront of our minds. the crisis and subsequent recession have presented substantial challenges to monetary policy. central banks have responded with great activism and have resorted to unconventional policies such as quantitative easing and an increasing use of forward guidance. and the crisis has led to a review of monetary policy frameworks. successful as monetary policy has been in safeguarding low and stable inflation, many argue that it should take risks to financial stability into account. moreover, a new set of macroprudential policy tools has been proposed to address systemic risks in financial markets directly. in norway, inflation targeting was introduced in 2001. since 2005, we have published a projection of the future path of our key policy rate. this path reflects our view on the role of monetary policy. we consider an interest rate path to be appropriate when it meets three criteria. first, the interest rate should be set with a view to stabilising inflation at our 2. 5 percent target. second, the interest rate path should provide a reasonable balance between the path for inflation and the path for overall capacity utilisation. this implies that inflation targeting is flexible. notwithstanding new macroprudential tools, we see a need to add a third criterion : the interest rate should be set so that monetary policy leans against a build - up of financial imbalances. at norges bank, we remain firmly committed to our flexible inflation targeting framework. but the global financial crisis has taught us to be both modest and inquisitive. experience with new macroprudential policy tools is limited, and institutional frameworks are still in the making. leaning against financial winds remains subject to debate. it is therefore important that we actively seek knowledge. it is

our obligation as central bankers to continuously search for the best practice for monetary policy. and we do not have to agree with friedman's prescriptions to revisit the important questions he posed. we are privileged to have such a distinguished group of central bankers and academics present at this conference to help us with this task. i am looking forward to learning from what i hope will be both an open - minded and a constructive dialogue about the future of monetary and macroprudential policies. thank you. bis central bankers ’ speeches
i would like to thank sarah breeden, victoria cleland, karen jude, nick maclaren, harsh mehta and ali moussavi for their help in the preparation of these remarks. 3 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches

and predictable, rate. that, in turn, will encourage more rational, longer - term, economic decision - making and investment, which will help indirectly to improve underlying, supply - side, performance. similarly, today ’ s macro - economic orthodoxy requires fiscal policy to be directed to restricting government borrowing to levels that can be sustained into the medium and longer term, without either forcing up real yields or implying the prospective need for progressively rising tax rates - which could otherwise damage the development of private sector economic activity. now in some respects we have made considerable progress over the past two years and more. inflation in many countries - including virtually all the industrial countries but not confined to them - is now consistently lower than it has been for ages. that in itself has contributed to lower interest rates and to the lower nominal bond yields that i have described. but, in addition to that, fiscal consolidation, which has lowered the combined government deficits of the g7 countries from around $ 600 billion in 1994 to around $ 540 billion last year, has helped to reduce real yields, notwithstanding the continuing demand for capital from the developing world. and the really good news is that this macro - economic discipline has been accompanied by sustained economic expansion, with world gdp as a whole growing at an annual rate of some 3½ - 4 %. now of course there have been quite marked differences in the performance of individual countries within this overall picture. some of the transition economies have seen a brutal contraction of output which is only now beginning to stabilise. and there have been marked fluctuations in the growth rates of some of the emerging countries. growth in parts of asia, for example, is now moderating, cyclically, to a more sustainable pace, while parts of latin america continue to recover from the set - back they suffered two years ago. among the industrial countries, too, economic developments have diverged over the past two years. in the united states and in this country, for example, inflation has been contained to around 3 % with continuing growth and low or falling unemployment. and this pattern looks set to continue. in japan and on the continent of europe, on the other hand, while inflation has been even lower, activity has been disappointingly weak, and unemployment on the continent at least has risen to quite frightening levels. and while there is now the prospect of a moderate pick - up in activity in these countries, that is not yet assured. japan, which is in many respects a unique case, faces substantial fiscal consolidation
to 2. 5 percent, and will depend on factors that include a bank ’ s size, complexity, and interconnectedness, as measured by a variety of indicator variables. 8 these progressive surcharges are effectively a type of price - based regulation, and therefore should have the advantages i just noted. to be clear, this taxation aspect of capital requirements is not their only appeal, or even their primary one. even if it were almost costless to impose higher capital requirements on bigger banks – so that doing so provided essentially no disincentive to bank size – it might still be a good idea to do so, for purely prudential reasons. in other words, capital requirements serve as both a prudential buffer and a tax, and can be a useful regulatory tool for both reasons. see hughes and mester ( 2011 ) for a recent contribution to the literature on scale economies in banking. see bcbs ( 2011 ) for a description of the methodology. bis central bankers ’ speeches however, a proponent of size caps might reasonably reply : “ fine, but how do i know that these surcharges are actually enough to change behavior – that is, to exert a meaningful influence on the size distribution of the banking system? ” after all, the analogy between a capital requirement and a tax is somewhat imperfect, since we don ’ t know exactly the implicit tax rate associated with a given level of capital. some view capital requirements as quite burdensome, which would mean that even a 2 percent surcharge amounts to a significant tax and, hence, a strong incentive for a bank to shrink, while others have argued that capital requirements impose only modest costs, which would imply little incentive to shrink. 9 this uncertainty about the ultimate effect of a given capital - surcharge regime on the size distribution of banks could potentially tip the balance back in favor of quantity - based regulation, like size caps. and indeed, if we were faced with a static, once - and - for - all decision, i don ’ t think economic reasoning alone could give us a definitive answer as to whether caps should be preferred to capital surcharges. this ambiguity is in some sense the central message of weitzman ’ s original analysis. one way to resolve this tension is to refrain from putting ourselves in the position of having to make a once - and - for - all decision in a setting of substantial uncertainty. rather, it might be preferable to try to learn from the incoming

2017 ). “ public trust in government : 1958 - 2017, ” webpage, pew research center, www. people - press. org / 2017 / 12 / 14 / public - trust - in - government1958 - 2017. tucker, paul ( 2017 ). “ what is macroprudential policy for? making it safe for central bankers, ” speech delivered at “ financial systems and the real economy, ” a conference sponsored by bank negara malaysia and the bank for international settlements, held in kuala lumpur, march 31, https : / / www. bis. org / publ / bppdf / bispap91 _ keynote. pdf.