used to only a very small extent, were decried as insufficient. one trillion euro at least, if not two trillion or more, were seen as necessary. instruction of an editor of the economist to his newly recruited reporters ecb press conference 11 / 04 / 2001 bis central bankers ’ speeches one idea pushed forcefully by the “ international expert opinion ” was to “ leverage ” existing funds, by offering incentives to private and public entities to provide additional funds. and indeed, throngs of european officials worked night and day to devise and agree on two options to leverage the european financial stability facility ( efsf ). today the two instruments are there. they could work. will they ever be used? the caravan of the “ commentariat ” had already moved on. no - one speaks about leveraging the efsf anymore. in fact, the actual investors in efsf bonds were put off by the leveraging options, because it made the efsf structure more risky and less understandable. the searchlight of attention of the markets and the commentary shifts fast. yesterday it was the firewalls. then it was growth. today it is spain. for sure, all of these issues require action. but designing and agreeing on responses takes time. no wonder that policy - makers are criticised for constantly being “ behind the curve ”. markets want to see immediate and forceful action from europe ’ s politicians. and their criticism of the slowness of the european crisis response is in part justified. but democratic politics takes time. it is open, noisy, and messy. we cannot do “ crisis management by politburo ”. we need effective communication and a proper public debate. this is especially true for the envisaged next steps towards deeper integration in eurozone. why am i telling you this? because it sheds light on the nexus between a new class of opinion formers, financial markets and policy outcomes. for the euro area and the ecb, the situation is even more peculiar, because the influential “ commentariat ” comes predominantly from outside the euro area. the big english - language newspapers, the news agencies and wire services that shape opinions in the economic and financial sphere on the continent are all writing from outside the euro area. there is, of course, nothing wrong with friendly outside advice. and i certainly do not wish to come across as whining and complaining. but it simply remains a fact : the analysis, discourse and policy prescriptions that are propaga

the place where securities are issued do not affect investors ’ clearing and settlement costs. it also means that the conditions at which banks obtain central bank money is not affected by the location of the securities they use as collateral. purely domestic retail payments as well as clearing and settlement activities in the eu are relatively cost effective and safe, but there is still progress to be made as regards cross - border arrangements. we at the ecb have a particular interest in the clearing and settlement infrastructure because of its role in the implementation of monetary policy. moreover, a major malfunctioning in this area might have important implications for the financial system at large and threaten financial stability. the ecb is active in this field in various ways. first, through the development of target 2. integration in payment systems and the euro money markets was achieved very quickly after the introduction of the euro because of the existence of target, the large - value payment system operated by the eurosystem. this will soon be replaced by target 2, which will reinforce the benefits from a common infrastructure. it will also provide for a harmonised level of services and a single price structure. target 2 is a clear illustration of how public authorities can contribute to financial integration by providing a common technical infrastructure. the second way the ecb is active in this area is through the removal of the remaining obstacles to integration. the report prepared by the group headed by alberto giovannini identified three types of barriers to efficient and competitive markets : differences in technical requirements and market practice ; tax differences ; and issues relating to legal certainty. for its part, the ecb contributes to removing these obstacles mainly by acting as a catalyst for improvement and by encouraging discussion among the relevant players. we also try to harmonise our central bank procedures and operations, which is beneficial to integration. finally, we also contribute to an integrated regulatory and oversight framework for clearing and settlement. we set risk management standards for the securities settlement systems that are used for our credit operations. we also regularly assess the systems that hold collateral for our operations. in a broader perspective, given the potential effects of the failure of a major clearing and settlement system, we think that public standards for risk management are essential. the escb, in co - operation with the committee of european securities regulators, is currently developing such standards for eu clearing and settlement systems. assessment of the progress that has been made in cross - border banking i remain very much convinced that the framework to foster financial integration in europe is now largely in place. my