rates with maturities up to one week were brought back to usual levels. however, tensions remained in money market rates for maturities above one week. in order to support a normalisation in this money market segment, the ecb decided to implement two supplementary longer - term refinancing operations, the first decision being taken on 21 august and the second on 6 september, both with the usual maturity of three months. in preparing and deciding upon the various operations, the eurosystem remained, as usual, in close contact with other central banks, including in particular, but not exclusively, the federal reserve, the bank of japan, the bank of england, the bank of canada and the swiss national bank. these other central banks also took steps, each within the parameters of their own operational framework. when comparing the steps taken by the various central banks, it is important to take account of these differences in operational frameworks. in any case, it is important to stress that the eurosystem has shown its capacity to react both promptly and effectively to these challenges. i am convinced that, given the circumstances, we did the right thing at the right level at the right time. monetary policy stance through these liquidity operations, the ecb fulfilled one of its key responsibilities, namely to ensure an orderly functioning money market. i will now turn to our primary objective, namely that of delivering price stability over the medium term and be credible in the delivery of price stability over the medium and long term. i would like to emphasize that our primary mandate calls for our monetary policy stance to deliver price stability in the medium term. once the level of interest rates is decided we have the responsibility to ensure the smooth functioning of the segment of the money market that we influence. the two responsibilities are clearly separated and should not be mixed. on 6 september the governing council decided to leave the key ecb interest rates unchanged. the incoming macroeconomic data confirmed that risks to price stability remain on the upside over the medium term, as identified by both our economic and monetary analysis. the incoming macroeconomic data also again confirmed the strong fundamentals of the euro area economy and support a favourable medium - term outlook for real gdp growth. data on activity in the third quarter – from various confidence surveys and indicatorbased estimates – remain overall favourable. the latest data on unemployment indicate improving labour market conditions and the global economic activity is expected to remain robust, as the likely slowdown in the united states is expected to be largely offset by the

members of stronger international institutions and fora. growing economic and financial interdependence led, in his view, to the identification of public goods not only at country or regional level but also at world level. a couple of examples would be global financial stability or a multilateral trade system. as i will further elaborate below, he was no fan of benign neglect and of leaving exchange rates solely in the hands of the market. once again, we can see today how compatible his view of the world is with the current international situation. tommaso ’ s call for greater cooperation and supranationality in certain areas of policymaking was fascinatingly complemented by his full belief in the principle of subsidiarity, also enshrined in the maastricht treaty, according to which each policy should be conducted by the lowest and least centralised competent authority possible. from this perspective, the ideas of cooperation and supranationality were understood as economic necessities, not as abstract political stereotypes. not long ago tommaso became actively involved in an initiative of the triffin international foundation, which is based in louvain - la - neuve. last february he delivered a speech entitled “ the ghost of bancor ”. bancor was a far more ominous presence than il commendatore don pedro who drags don giovanni to hell in mozart ’ s opera of the same name. his aim in that speech was to revisit the arguments proposed by j. m. keynes in 1943 for a new international monetary system and eventually a world currency called bancor. tommaso argued that the “ triffin dilemma ” is still unresolved : if the main international standard and reserve currency is a national currency there is an insurmountable inconsistency between domestic needs ( in the short term ), and global policy needs ( in the long term ). this inconsistency had led, over time, to the collapse of the bretton woods system in the late 1960s and early 1970s. it was not resolved either under the us dollarbased non - system that took its place : a market - led system without a clear anchor. over the last 10 – 15 years this has been referred to as bretton woods ii. however, tommaso noted that “ exchange rates were determined by a bizarre combination of market behaviour and of policy actions vis - a - vis the dollar. floating european currencies, including the euro, were