policy to the fostering of growth and employment. dealing with structural problems is the task of policies other than monetary policy. let me now give the floor to the vice - president to report on various aspects of the preparatory work for stage three. ( a ) preparations for the “ changeover weekend ” with less than 60 days to go before the start of stage three, we are obviously attaching particular importance to the provision of a framework allowing for a smooth changeover to the euro. we began our preparations a long time ago and i am confident that the escb will be in a position to deliver its entire complex infrastructure to the markets by the morning of 4 january 1999. i expect the banking and financial community in the euro area to be fully aware both of the logistical challenge that the changeover weekend represents and of the need for careful preparation. given the concentration of migration operations to the euro to be conducted by a multitude of financial agents ( i. e. payment systems, securities settlement systems, custodians, individual banks, exchanges and financial information providers ) in the period from 31 december 1998 to 4 january 1999, the escb is preparing to work together with other public authorities to orchestrate the necessary policy responses to any unexpected events. to this end, the governing council has set up an ad hoc “ changeover weekend committee ” which will organise the monitoring of developments vis - a - vis the final migration to the euro within the ecb and the national central banks and in the banking and financial industry, both prior to and during the changeover weekend. additional details on the preparation of the changeover weekend are provided in a separate press release which is to be issued to you this evening. ( b ) payment systems issues with regard to euro payment and settlement systems, i should like to draw your attention to recent developments which suggest that many market participants consider the euro a special currency to which the traditional rules applied elsewhere in the developed world would not necessarily be applicable. initiatives were taken, or allowed to develop, that have no precedent in the arrangements concerning other currencies. this relates in particular to the granting of payment finality and intraday credit in a currency other than a country ’ s own. therefore, the governing council considered it appropriate to issue a policy statement clearly spelling out the fact that the rules which apply to all of the other currencies in the world will also apply to the euro, and that the ecb bears the same responsibilities as all the other central banks in the world

vitor constancio : in defence of monetary policy opinion piece by mr vitor constancio, vice - president of the european central bank, 11 march 2016. * * * this week the ecb adopted new measures to reinforce its monetary policy in the face of recent headwinds. that decision was taken against a backdrop of vocal scepticism in the media and markets. the sceptics ’ reasoning is two - pronged. first, that monetary policy is not sufficient to address the present low growth trend ; and second, that monetary policy is increasingly ineffective in any case. the notion that monetary policy alone cannot raise trend growth is mostly true but trivial, especially if the challenges of secular stagnation highlighted by robert gordon in his brilliant new book are considered. the g20 has appealed for the use of other policies, notably fiscal and structural reforms. while other policies would certainly be welcome, one can have justified doubts about their implementation. for a start, active stabilising fiscal policy is restricted by law in the eu and by politics in the us. more generally, countries that could use fiscal space, won ’ t ; and many that would use it, shouldn ’ t. that leaves us with structural reforms. some, like upgrading education and judicial efficiency, are important but take a long time to implement and to produce results. the structural reforms economists often have in mind ( i. e. liberalization and deregulation of markets ) lead to lower wages and prices in the short - term, which does not help inflation normalisation. and concerning unemployment, higher productivity often initially implies labour saving. structural reforms are essential for long - term potential growth, but it is difficult to see how they could spur growth significantly in the next two years, especially when the current problem is lack of global demand. and as regards their delivery by governments, we should recall the embarrassing results of the g20 plan agreed in brisbane to generate an additional 2 % in world growth via a long concrete list of reforms put forward by the imf and the oecd. in fact, the world economy now risks not even attaining what was then considered the baseline scenario. so if these other policies either can ’ t or won ’ t contribute to a significant degree, then not only is it wrong to start talking down monetary policy – it ’ s actually dangerous. the second criticism of monetary policy is mostly based on a crude comparison between where inflation ( or growth ) is now and where it was at the beginning