the euro area, and well within the range observed during previous soft landings across major economies. the resilience of the labour market is itself a reflection of the unusual mix of shocks that have hit the euro area, with labour shortages leading firms to hoard more labour, and higher profits and lower real wages making it easier for them to do so. 10 4 / 6 bis - central bankers'speeches as a result, the usual propagation from slower growth to heightened unemployment risks and lower demand did not happen to the same extent. now, we are still facing several uncertainties regarding future inflation, especially in terms of how the nexus of profits, wages and productivity will evolve and whether the economy will be hit by new supply - side shocks. and it will take time for us to gather sufficient data to be certain that the risks of above - target inflation have passed. the strong labour market means that we can take time to gather new information, but we also need to be mindful of the fact that the growth outlook remains uncertain. all of this underpins our determination to be data dependent and to take our policy decisions meeting by meeting. conclusion let me conclude. our policy decisions have successfully kept inflation expectations anchored, and inflation is projected to return to 2 % in the latter part of next year. considering the size of the inflation shock, this unwinding is remarkable in many ways. even though millions of businesses and workers have been independently striving to protect their profits and incomes, our 2 % inflation target has remained credible and has continued to anchor the inflation process. this speaks to the value of the policy frameworks that central banks have built up over the last 30 years, focusing on price stability and central bank independence. and it is why we will not waver from our commitment to bring inflation back down to our target for the benefit of all europeans. as the late footballer and manager sir bobby robson said, " the first 90 minutes are the most important ". similarly, we will not rest until the match is won and inflation is back at 2 %. 1 for a complementary discussion about how monetary policy cycles have evolved during the last half century in many advanced economies and how the current cycle in those countries differs from the past, see forbes, k., ha, j. and kose, m. a. ( 2024 ), " rate cycles ", paper presented at the ecb forum on central banking, sintra. 2 babura, m. et al. ( 2023

), " what drives core inflation? the role of supply shocks ", working paper series, no 2875, ecb. 3 giannone, d. and primiceri, g. ( 2024 ), " the drivers of post - pandemic inflation ", paper presented at the ecb forum on central banking, sintra. 5 / 6 bis - central bankers'speeches 4 d'acunto, f., charalambakis, e., georgarakos, d., kenny, g., meyer, j. and weber, m. ( 2024 ), " household inflation expectations : an overview of recent insights for monetary policy ", discussion paper series, no 24, ecb. 5 gornicka, l. and koester, g. ( eds ) ( 2024 ), " a forward - looking tracker of negotiated wages in the euro area ", occasional paper series, no 338, ecb. 6 ecb ( 2022 ), " inflation perceptions and expectations ", 7 december ; and ecb ( 2022 ), " the ecb survey of professional forecasters – fourth quarter of 2022 ", october. 7 christoffel, k. and farkas, m. ( 2024 ), " monetary policy and the risks of de - anchoring of inflation expectations ", imf working papers, forthcoming. 8 lagarde, c. ( 2024 ), " policymaking in a new risk environment ", speech at the 30th dubrovnik economic conference, 14 june. 9 according to ecb analysis based on a sample of 48 monetary policy cycles across nine inflation - targeting central banks covering the period 1970 - 2022. see the forthcoming post on the ecb blog entitled " navigating inflation : a historical perspective of monetary policy cycles ". 10 arce, o. and sondermann, d. ( 2024 ), " low for long? reasons for the recent decline in productivity ", the ecb blog, 6 may. 6 / 6 bis - central bankers'speeches