report encourages us to make further progress on this front. our aim is to ensure that markets, elected representatives like yourselves, and the wider public better understand how we reach our decisions, the reasons behind these decisions, and how these decisions affect people ’ s daily lives. in other words, we need to be clear about what we call the “ three a ’ s ”. first, we must be clear about our aim. our new symmetric inflation target of two per cent over the medium term is simple, clear and easy to convey to the wider public. second, we must be clear about our assessment. we need to clearly explain how we process incoming economic and financial data, what we judge to be short - term movements, and what we 3 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches consider influential factors relevant for our medium - term horizon. third, we must be clear about our actions. our audience should be able to understand what we are trying to achieve with our measures, as well as why they are effective, efficient and remain proportionate to our aim. clearly communicating these three a ’ s to different audiences often means being more simple and straightforward. but being more simple does not mean being simplistic. it means being more inclusive when we talk. following on from our strategy review, we are using clearer, more narrative - driven language, together with visuals people can relate to. finally, in all our communication, we need to be open about what we can and cannot do as a central bank. for example, our monetary policy cannot fill pipelines with gas, clear backlogs at ports or train more lorry drivers. conclusion let me conclude. we are very aware that many people across the euro area are concerned about the rising cost of living at the moment – as you also highlight in the report. and the burden is primarily borne by those with lower incomes, who must face the day - to - day hardship of having to cope with higher prices. we remain committed to delivering on our price stability mandate – as we have done over the past 20 years. our target is an inflation rate of 2 per cent over the medium term. to achieve this, we will take action at the right time. but it is also our task to openly engage with people ’ s concerns with regards to monetary policy. as i said when i first spoke to you here two years ago, the ongoing dialogue between the ecb and the european parliament is the key channel for this. independence and accountability are two sides of the

##zone, and now to one of excess corporate leverage and deteriorating macroeconomic conditions in several regions of the emerging world. policy responses appear uncoordinated between regions, addressing some immediate problems but also fuelling imbalances and exposing policy contradictions elsewhere. looking at the mix of slowing growth and high private - sector leverage in emerging asia, in particular china, some observers wonder whether the world may face a repeat of the 1997 – 98 asian crisis. such concerns may prove excessive : in contrast to 1997, asian sovereigns are financially more solid, with stronger reserve buffers and – a point i will return to later – more flexible exchange rates, which have limited the build - up of external international monetary fund, “ where are we headed? perspectives on potential output ”, world economic outlook, washington dc : international monetary fund, april 2015. bis central bankers ’ speeches imbalances. nonetheless, the era of lofty growth rates in asia, driven by the fast expansion of china ’ s industrial sector, is most probably over – and this is a factor that african countries will have to take into account as their terms of trade weaken and export volumes decline. my second key point relates to the first, insofar as it deals with the outlook for commodity prices. when expressed in inflation - adjusted terms, the composite indices of commodity prices ( like the reuters - crb index ) are back to levels seen in the early 2000s, providing evidence – in case there was still doubt over the matter – that the commodity “ super - cycle ” of the last decade has by now truly reversed. it is likely true that other factors have exacerbated the decline in commodity prices : the rise in supply and financial factors, including the strength of the us dollar. however, a central driver of that decline has been the slowdown in demand from key marginal importers, the largest being china. it seems sensible to me to take at face value the chinese authorities ’ aim to rebalance their economy away from investment, and for that reason it would be unwise for african commodity exporters to bank on a strong price rebound in coming years. finally, i would like to emphasise the potential challenges arising from the eventual normalization of monetary policy in the us. we know the debate remains open as to when this normalization will actually start and that the forecasts are for a gradual normalization. however, i fear we have been lulled into complacency by the years of abundant liquidity and a