of the « originate to distribute » model. once could argue that in case central banks had access to more detailed supervisory information on banks ’ involvement in securitisation operations they would have found it easier to assess the implications of this development for the financial system as a whole. when a situation of financial stress actually emerges and risks developing into a financial crisis, supervisory information remains again crucial for central banks ’ financial stability assessment. but in this case, the need for information will be very much driven by the nature of the stress. in the present market conditions, central banks are of course very much interested in banks ’ exposures to the us sub - prime sector and to structured financial products, as well as the effect of the price corrections on banks ’ solvency position. a second area of cooperation i want to mention is liquidity, which is again at the cross - roads of central banking and banking supervision. much of the work that central banks and supervisors are undertaking to render financial institutions and markets more resilient to liquidity shocks is interrelated and offers therefore scope for mutual cooperation. i will give just one example referring to a topic i mentioned already earlier, namely banks ’ contingency funding plans. while normally supervisors require banks to set up these plans, central banks should also have access to them as an element to be considered in the context of deciding on liquidity provision. the final area i would mention is crisis management. in this field, the fsf report makes also a number of recommendations that pertain to the cooperation between central banks and supervisors. more specifically, the report recommends that for the largest cross - border financial firms, the most directly involved supervisors and central banks should establish a small group to address specific cross - border crisis management planning issues. i believe that in europe, the right principles have been agreed to meet this recommendation. the memorandum of understanding ( mou ) on cooperation on cross - border financial stability includes appropriate provisions on the cooperation between central banks and banking supervisors, for example when assessing the potential systemic implications of a financial crisis or when emergency liquidity assistance will be provided to a cross - border financial group. a second important reinforcement will come from the scheduled changes to the capital requirements directive, which include several aspects relating to the cooperation and exchange of information between central banks and banking supervisory authorities also in crisis situations. concluding remarks ladies and gentlemen, let me conclude. the financial market correction has revealed areas in the regulatory and supervisory framework which need to be promptly addressed by public authorities

in some circumstances have to be bold and fast, but they also have to do things in a politically and legally acceptable manner. that ’ s what they ’ ve done, and that is also something to remember for the future. can central bankers push politicians to act if they are slow to act or make reforms? central bankers have no mandate and no legitimacy to push politicians. at the same time, they have a duty to speak their mind and publicly state what they think is necessary for economic policy. iii. china governor zhou of the pboc is also to retire ( soon )? looking from the outside, how do you see him? what i particularly notice is governor zhou ’ s international role. i ’ ve listened to him many times in basel, washington and other places. he ’ s one of the most respected governors around the table. when he takes the floor, everyone stops to listen to him, which is not always the case in international meetings. what has always struck me is that he expresses china ’ s position in a very clear way but he also aims to move the discussion on, seeking a consensus. that ’ s extremely valuable in an international discussion. for me, the very thoughtful and analytical way he has of addressing issues is a very important contribution. he always takes the time to explain complex issues, including for instance recent developments in china ’ s financial system, which can be quite complex for outsiders to understand. he has a very clear and concise way of explaining things, making discussions more constructive. how does the global central banking community view the pboc ’ s role in recent years? over the last ten years or so, there has been a clear evolution. the pboc has been engaging more and more with the international community and its central bank counterparts, in line with the changing role of china in the global economy. from an ecb perspective, i can say that we now have a relationship with the pboc that is as broad and deep as it is with a core group of other central banks, such as the federal reserve, the bank of japan, the bank of england and maybe a few others. this includes discussions on financial markets, monetary policy, payment systems, to name just a few. the pboc is part of that core group. the ecb in june invested a small amount of foreign reserves in the renminbi. why? any plans ahead? the amount is equivalent to €500 million, roughly 1 % of the ecb