the same way as the meter system for measuring distances. secondly, money must be able to function as ( 2 ) a store of value, with a relatively stable value over time. this is needed because saving is a means of postponing consumption until a later date. thirdly, it shall function as ( 3 ) a means of payment, that is, it shall transfer a value to the recipient, who can then use it to pay someone else. this requires that we have easy access to money when we need it and that the instruments we use as money can be comfortably transported with us. it is here that technological advances entail changes. the money we use must have the general public's confidence there is a further element that is essential for money and the entire monetary system to function : the general public's confidence. all those who have entered into agreements entailing money should rely on them holding. the money must retain its value over time and be accepted by everyone. having said this, it is easy to understand why central banks were created once upon a time and were given the central role in the monetary system that they have now. the task of the central banks was to provide the general public with money in the form of banknotes and coins that did not entail any credit risk and that inspired confidence – what was known as central bank money. this task included price stability, that is, that the central banks guaranteed the long - term value of the money. to begin with, the central banks had this task parallel to commercial banks, which issued their own banknotes. then money from different issuers could have different values, depending on how much money had been issued, and exchange rates could arise between different types of money. eventually, the central banks were also given the responsibility for creating a uniform standard. in sweden, this took place in 1904, when the riksbank was given a monopoly on issuing banknotes and commercial banks stopped issuing them. in time, the banks were able to develop payment channels that enabled the general public to use their account balances as money. in the beginning this involved cheques and gradually card payments were developed. in sweden, there were also state initiatives to make payments more effective. in the 1920s, the postgirot system was created, which enable efficient transfers of money to and from accounts in the system. just over 20 years later, the banks emulated this and created their own joint system, bankgirot. all of these systems are

above 7 are due to the netting out of country - specific effects. self - reported trust in the ecb is measured over an 11 - point scale from 0 ( no trust at all ) to 10 ( trust completely ). however, according to the eurobarometer, public trust in the ecb declined notably as of 2008, although trust in the euro remained broadly stable even at the time of the euro area sovereign debt crisis ( chart 8 ). only recently trust has started to recover from very low levels. chart 8 trust in the ecb and support for the euro ( net trust, net support ) source : eurobarometer, own calculations. notes : net support for the euro is calculated as the share answering “ for ” minus the share answering “ against ” to the question “ please tell me whether you are for or against it : a european economic and monetary union with one single currency, the euro. ” net trust is calculated as the share of respondents giving the answer “ tend to trust ” minus the share giving the answer “ tend not to trust ” to the question “ please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it? : the european central bank. ” respondents who answered “ don't know ” are excluded in both cases. latest observation : winter 2020 / 2021. heated public debates about the broader distributional and societal consequences of unconventional policy measures are testimony to the looming distrust facing central banks today. for example, since financial wealth is distributed unevenly in society, some argue that measures that are focused on boosting asset prices disproportionally favour the rich. similarly, purchases of corporate bonds have ignited a discussion whether central banks should continue to purchase bonds issued by firms with a large carbon footprint. independent central banks cannot simply turn a deaf ear to the concerns of the public. public trust is essential for the successful conduct and implementation of monetary policy. more so, independence requires a central bank to respond to the concerns of the public and to carefully evaluate whether and how it may be able, within its mandate, to respond to these concerns. a failure to do so would risk nurturing what yascha mounk once labelled “ undemocratic liberalism ” – a system in which citizens feel that their political preferences are routinely ignored by unelected authorities. in a democracy, people have the power to express their discontent with the government at the ballot box. but they cannot elect a new central bank leadership. independence therefore carries large responsibility. and central