those for the banks. this is important not only for financial stability, but also for ensuring a solid basis for the saving and investment union. let me underline the critical importance of data – access to data, better use of data – in the analysis of non - banks. to understand the systemic risks related to nbfis, we simply need better data to be able to identify and map the vulnerabilities and interconnections. only once that's done, we will be able to capitalize on more advanced methods, such as system wide stress - testing, to locate the vulnerabilities in the system. our future challenges include not only the complexity of the evolving financial system, but also the increased speed of its operations. due to digitalisation, financial operations are becoming ever faster. it will be even more important that the esrb is able to perform risk analysis and policy evaluations in a timely manner. dear friends, slide 6 : three priorities in the way we work before concluding, i'd like to highlight three priorities for the way we work in the coming years that i find critical for the esrb. we should : 1. enhance our analytical capacity by making better use of data and research. 2. bring into use new analysis methods and technologies. 3. 4 / 6 bis - central bankers'speeches 3. focus on our core activities. let me just elaborate on these a little more. slide 7 : analysis based on data and research – a key priority 1. active development of data analytics and research - driven analysis is nothing new at the esrb as such. but i firmly believe that the importance of analysis which is based on data and research cannot be overemphasized in our times, where disinformation is being used as a weapon. in today's world, there is a great risk that genuine information will be crowded out. data is the gold or oil of our digital world today – it is a valuable resource and a necessary basis for high - level analysis. following the global financial crisis, the reporting requirements for financial operators were increased. financial supervisors and central banks consequently also have a duty to use the new data effectively and efficiently. the challenge for the esrb is that not all relevant data are readily available to it. the rules governing the esrb's access to data can be broadly divided into two types : ex ante access, whereby the esrb has access to data on a regular, ongoing basis, as soon

issue of the bail - in of bank debt, the ingredients of the fiscal adjustment actually adopted were already in the priority list prepared by irish officials and part of the national economic debate long before the arrival of the troika ; as such they cannot be thought of as wholly external impositions. emblematic here is the rapid reversal of the troika ’ s proposal for a cut in the minimum wage : although actually included in the government ’ s four year plan announced pre - programme, this cut had not really been an accepted national policy priority and did not stick. so yes, a tight budget constraint was suddenly imposed by the crisis and national politicians had much less room for manoeuvre during the programme ’ s disbursement period, but in ireland this did not result in a violation of the political system ’ s capacity to choose between viable alternatives within the available budgetary resources. conclusion what has struck me about the irish bailout and others is not so much the loss of national sovereignty as the extent to which the shared sovereignty of the european union and the eurosystem was strained by the scale of the financial commitments involved and the loss of trust that was generated by the rapid emergence of these commitments. yes the ecb extended sums totalling well over 100 per cent of ireland ’ s gdp to the irish banking system – the bulk of which has now already been repaid – but having done so it seemed to suffer a transitory lack of confidence that, despite early fiscal and regulatory action, the national authorities would bring things under control. in addition, some steps were taken for the sake of avoiding spillovers, and not specifically in the interest of ireland. on the whole, though, it is now beyond doubt that the interest and maturity terms that were ultimately arrived at for covering the financial commitments are such as to have made the whole operation a very good net success for the irish people – and for europe. but i also think that the experience highlights remaining gaps in the institutional structure of europe ( even after creation of the banking union which takes bank supervision and bis central bankers ’ speeches resolution out of domestic hands ) : less than a fiscal union, more than a currency union, it has survived a severe and divisive asymmetric shock which has highlighted the importance of further institutional development. bis central bankers ’ speeches