, too. when you talk and discuss things with somebody 4 / 11 bis central bankers'speeches on a regular basis, you just do not lose touch. what ’ s your view about whether equivalence is a way forward for, again, outgoing institutions going, if possible, into the uk and institutions from the uk coming into europe? do you think equivalence holds the answers, or are you sceptical? well, this is not in the remit of the ecb. the equivalence question has to be discussed in the negotiations. it has to be looked at with regard to the regulatory topics in the capital requirements regulation and the capital requirements directive iv ; we do not have a foot in that door, except when we will be asked for our legal opinion, but that hasn ’ t happened yet. where we really look into equivalence is with regard to negotiating a memorandum of understanding, but this is at the end of the process with the pra and concerns confidentiality requirements which have to be equivalent in order to be able to exchange information from one supervisor to the other. but this is far from what you are talking about here. you are talking about regulatory equivalence. yes. so, this is something that needs to be done on the political side. mark carney has floated the idea of super equivalence, perhaps at a level determined by the basel committee or financial stability board where whole regions would think about equivalence. do you think that ’ s a good idea that could be pursued in the future, not just about brexit, but more generally? in order to really give an opinion about that i would need to have a little bit more detail around what this super equivalence means. i ’ m not so sure whether this kind of super equivalence really fits into the brexit topic. for brexit, we are talking on the one hand about what kind of rights and what kind of obligations does a country have within the eu where it has all kinds of rights and obligations, and on the other what kind of rights does a country have when it is not within the eu anymore, and does not wish to fulfil obligations linked to these rights. we wanted to ask about euro clearing as well because, obviously, that was a big subject, particularly two weeks ago when the commission put out its paper. would it be the ssm, potentially, that would have oversight of clearing as well, which would be adding to your remit there? no, we are supervising banks, so if a central

a decade after japan ’ s bubble burst, the u. s. housing bubble burst. this exposed extensive vulnerabilities in our financial system and triggered a global financial crisis. 6 unlike japan, we had the advantage of being able to learn from another nation ’ s recent experience. we applied what we understood to be the lessons from japan, though with hindsight, perhaps not in every respect as completely as we could have. in particular, japan ’ s experience reinforced the lessons of the great depression here in the u. s. and made us sensitive to the disinflationary force of an asset price bust and financial however, research suggests that the purchases did reinforce the forward commitment. see, for example, “ policy commitment and expectation formation : japan ’ s experience under zero interest rates ” kunio okina and shigenori shiratsuka north american journal of economics and finance, vol 15, no 1, pp 75 – 100. see, for example, “ deleveraging and monetary policy : japan since the 1990s and the united states since 2007 ”, kazuo ueda, journal of economic perspectives, vol 26, no 3, summer 2012, pp 177 – 202. some commentators prefer the term “ north atlantic financial crisis ” as the failure and near - failure of financial institutions was concentrated in the u. s. and europe. however, the crisis was global in the sense that financial markets transmitted the shock throughout the world and this resulted in a severe global economic downturn. bis central bankers ’ speeches crisis. we recognized that we had to be very aggressive to prevent deflation and deflation expectations from becoming well entrenched. the federal reserve reduced short - term interest rates to nearly zero by late 2008 – a little over a year and a half after the initial shock hit in august 2007. immediately upon reaching the zero bound, we provided additional stimulus by expanding our balance sheet and deploying forward guidance on the policy rate. these actions, in the context of a strong commitment to both our inflation and employment mandates, succeeded in preventing deflation expectations from taking hold, even though real outcomes were disappointing. we also took steps to formalize our 2 percent inflation objective. 7 the fed ’ s large - scale asset purchase programs differed from those originally undertaken in japan both in theory and in practice. they were concentrated in longer - term securities – treasuries and agency mortgage - backed securities. this reflected a different perspective on how purchases affect financial conditions and the economy, as