from public authorities, regulators and market representatives with the aim to achieve a common understanding of the following key issues : first, what are the expected benefits from requiring additional and more granular data for monitoring repo and securities lending markets and which data is essential to make such a data collection effort useful for all relevant stakeholders? second, how could these data be better collected, to inform the public authorities assessment about firm - level and systemic risks? as to the first question, addressing the lack of transparency is as a matter of fact of primary importance as it paves the way for tackling six other key issues identified by the fsb related to securities financing markets, namely the pro - cyclicality of system leverage and interconnectedness, potential financial stability issues associated with collateral re - use, gorton, gary ( 2008 ) “ the panic of 2007 ” nber wp n. 14358 : gorton, g and andrew metrick ( 2009 ) “ haircuts ” nber wp n. 15273 and gorton, g and andrew metrick ( 2010 ) “ regulating the shadow banking system ” bis central bankers ’ speeches potential risks arising from the fire - sale of collateral assets, the potential risks arising from agent lender practices, securities lending cash collateral reinvestment and insufficient rigour in collateral valuation and management practices. increased transparency can help regulators or supervisors on the one hand as well as market participants themselves on the other hand. for regulators a more detailed information set provides insights that may help them to identify trends in the build - up of risks over time, either for a specific institution, a specific asset class, or for the market overall. information availability furthermore allows regulators to monitor changes in market activity that can lead to the emergence of potential new risks. finally enhanced transparency can support the development of appropriate policy responses in times of stress. improved transparency can help market participants as well as it allows participants to observe how market activity is evolving over time with respect to pricing, liquidity and other characteristics that affect their own risk management and profitability. it additionally can provide information regarding risks that could impact market participants. increased transparency might also benefit central banks in the implementation of its monetary policy operations. more specifically, it can provide information on structural aspects of the repo market regarding asset categories eligible for monetary policy operations and the extent of their use by counterparties as well as information on risk control measures applied. such information could guide eurosystem policy decisions ( in particular in times of financial stress )

with respect to the eurosystem ’ s own collateral eligibility criteria and the calibration of its risk control framework. as the work carried out by the fsb has shown, the actual set of information to adequately gauge systemic and firm - level risks arising from securities financing transactions is as a matter of fact rather straightforward. assuming a specific home - currency for the transactions covered, six transaction specific information items are essential : ( 1 ) the counterparty of the transaction, ( 2 ) the principal amount, ( 3 ) the interest rate or lending fee, ( 4 ) information on underlying collateral ( including type, issuer, maturity, currency and valuation of the collateral ), ( 5 ) information on the applied haircut as well as ( 6 ) the tenor or maturity of the transaction. i would add to these also information about re - use of securities. the workshop today intends to assess the grounds designing an infrastructure and data collection set - up ensuring confidentiality, efficiency in the data transmission, but also looking for potential synergies, and ensuring through the publication of different levels of data aggregation to relevant stakeholders that this exercise can be beneficial to regulators or supervisors as well as market participants. the involvement of all relevant stakeholders from the very beginning should allow that synergies can be explored and benefits reaped. turning now to the second of my initial questions, how could these data be better collected? i have earlier this year, in a conference organized by the european commission, 2 launched a proposal to create a eu central database on repos, as a joint effort by public authorities and the financial industry. i am counting on this workshop to launch the practical discussion about the main issues and the challenges to be addressed and, most importantly, the possible solutions for this proposal to become reality. when i first launched my proposal last april i noted that due to its role in macro - prudential financial stability and the closeness of repo to monetary policy, the ecb would be well placed to centralise the data gathering for the euro repo market. this remains true, but today i would like to emphasise that the ecb see constancio, v ( 2012 ) “ shadow banking – the ecb perspective ” speech by vitor constancio, vice - president of the ecb, towards better regulation of the shadow banking system, european commission conference, brussels, 27 april 2012 bis central bankers ’ speeches organised this workshop by taking a wider perspective on the subject and acting just a catalyst.