samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
##emphasise the need to complement the consolidation process with structural changes in order to make our economies fitter. this involves reducing red tape to ease business creation, streamlining governance of state - owned enterprises and reallocating workers more flexibly from stagnating and declining industries to productive and expanding ones. structural reforms are not only required in the countries in the euro area, but have also been recognised by prime minister abe in his third arrow as essential to securing the japanese recovery over the long term. thank you for your attention. see, for example, tokuoka, k., “ intergenerational implications of fiscal consolidation in japan ”, imf working papers, 12 / 197, 2012. bis central bankers ’ speeches

##richt treaty. it says the executive branches in particular should not try to influence our decisions. it is a very clear wording. so it's not the ecb who defines its independence, it is the treaty, which was approved by the people of the member states, by the people of all our democracies. everybody is welcome to criticise our policy - the media, the analysts, the academics. and we are, as an independent institution, as a last resort, accountable to the people of europe. by the way it is not known that i go more often to the european parliament than our friends from the american federal reserve go to the us congress. die zeit : last week the french secretary of state for european affairs said in an interview that the eurogroup - the 13 finance ministers of the euro area - should be allowed to influence the ecb decisions. you reacted sharply. trichet : i made the point that what was said was contrary to what the treaty very explicitly says. die zeit : the french intend to strengthen the political influence of the eurogroup as a counter - weight to the ecb. that makes sense. each other currency area in the world has one central bank and one treasury. trichet : it's a cliche that france is always heading towards a loose monetary policy. since the creation of the franc after the revolution, the monetary policy had the very strong tradition of a currency keeping well its value over time. only during two periods of a little more than ten years over two centuries - after the second world war up to de gaulle became president and in the seventies - the french monetary policy has been loose, but it is not the french culture. from 1994 up to the implementation of euro in 1999, we achieved a lower inflation rate than the bundesbank. and we were supported by the french people. die zeit : but today the french government wants a co - ordination between the eurogroup and the ecb. trichet : the treaty organises the relationship between the central bank and the executive branches extremely well. every fortnight, we invite jean - claude juncker, the president of the eurogroup, and the commissioner joaquin almunia to our council. could there be a better way to understand what's going on in the central bank than to be the witness of the discussion of the governing council? i am also invited by the eurogroup each month. we are able to meet three times a month which is
monetary policy these are also the means to achieve the credibility which is so essential for a central bank to implement the chosen policy. however, this must not be allowed to overshadow the fact that the safest path to credibility is over a long period to fulfil the promises one makes, or to put it bluntly : to practise what is preached.

development has been alarmingly poor, and its state is close to depression. moreover, japan also experiences deflation, i. e. falling prices. japan's economic problems appear very hard to solve by applying the traditional economic - policy instruments. in europe, the german economic development in particular has given grounds for concern. although remaining europe's economic locomotive for many decades, since the mid - 1990s germany has experienced moderate growth and high unemployment. the international economic slowdown has further amplified these problems. at the same time, germany faces a situation where a large budget deficit impedes an active fiscal policy to counter this development. even the automatic budget reaction in the face of a further dampening will create problems for germany's compliance with the budgetary requirements. what about denmark? do we have recession, depression or deflation? in fact we have none of them. denmark did not reach very high growth rates at the end of the 1990s. we experienced moderate economic growth, but our employment situation was extremely favourable ; in fact the labour market was under pressure. this situation has not changed significantly. the figures so far available indicate that denmark's economic situation is robust, with some economic growth. the growth has been sufficient to stabilise unemployment at a level that is very low by european standards. thus, so far the international economic slowdown has not presented noticeable problems for denmark. the economic slowdown has generated debate within the eu with regard to the stability and growth pact. it is criticised for inflexibility in view of the maximum permitted budget deficit of 3 per cent of gdp. however, this limit is just one element of the pact. in order to stay on the right side of 3 per cent, the member states are committed to respect the medium - term budgetary objective of positions close to balance or in surplus. in the years of favourable cyclical development, there must be a sound budget surplus. this lends flexibility, i. e. “ leeway ”, when the business cycle weakens, and the automatic stabilisers come into play. however, if the deficit in the good years is already high, there is no margin to draw on when the economy weakens. in this situation, the limit of 3 per cent is reached quickly. the fundamental idea behind the pact is therefore in the good years to create room for manoeuvre via a strong budgetary situation. in this case too, denmark is actually a good example. for a number of years,
ensures that price signals function as a guide for markets to function efficiently and establishes trust in the interaction among economic agents, in property rights, in society and in the future in general 1. under this framework, central banks today operate mainly with the overriding objective of price stability either explicitly or implicitly. dear guests, the establishment of the single mandate as price stability has also had significant implications in the institutional design of central banks. in fact, as is clearly seen especially in emerging market countries, price stability can only be achieved through long term and determined policy implementations. it is at this point that independence, as an assurance given to the public to ensure long - term price stability, comes to the forefront as the crucial feature of institutional design of central banks. in my view, of all the changes in the face of central banking in the last two decades, the most important one is the increasing emphasis that has been placed on central bank independence. issing, o. ( 2000 ). “ should we have faith in central banks? ”. while inflation was falling and independence was becoming an important feature of central banking around the world, turkey was unable to experience the same process. it was not until 2001 that the central bank of turkey gained independence close to global standards. in 2001, with the amendments made in its law, achieving and maintaining price stability was stated as the primary objective, and the central bank of turkey was provided with the direct authority to set monetary policy and choose instruments at its own discretion to achieve price stability. i believe this is one of the major structural reforms in the turkish economy, especially in terms of its effects on inflation. of course, independence is not a concept that can be achieved via the implementation of law alone. it is a concept that policy practices have a great influence upon. dear participants, having mentioned the two milestones in the notion of central banking, i ’ d now like to continue with the challenges of central banking in emerging economies combined with the turkish experience in terms of monetary policy implementations. although objective functions are similar in financially liberalized and well - functioning market economies, the transmission of monetary policy actions on economies certainly differs between industrialized countries and emerging market economies. accordingly, there is a wide range of views among economists on how monetary policy decisions influence economies. if we add the uncertainties faced by the internal dynamics of emerging market economies to the picture, the impact of decisions taken by central banks might differ from one country to another both in terms of the nature and the time

). “ the institutions of monetary policy ”. lecture at the american economic association annual meeting, san diego, 4 january 2004.
, the snb has a statutory mandate to pursue a monetary policy serving the interests of the country as a whole, to ensure price stability and in so doing, to take due account of the development of the economy. within this primary framework, it also has the task of contributing to the stability of the financial system. there is no contradiction between these tasks if target hierarchy is observed. as far as financial stability is concerned, the snb works closely together with the swiss financial market supervisory authority and the federal department of finance to create a regulatory environment that promotes stability. the snb concentrates on the macroeconomic and macroprudential aspects of regulation. for the macroprudential tasks, a new instrument was created this year – the countercyclical capital buffer. according to the relevant regulation, this buffer can be activated by the federal council following a proposal by the snb. the snb ’ s monetary policy remains focused on the maintenance of price stability in the medium term and, since september 2011, on the enforcement of the minimum exchange rate. consequently, possible distortions in the growth of credit aggregates that could endanger financial stability should be managed, first and foremost, with the macroprudential toolkit. 5 cf. speech by jean - pierre danthine, “ taming the financial cycle ”, 30th suerf colloquium, zurich, 5 september 2012. bis central bankers ’ speeches concluding remarks in conclusion, i would like to stress that we are living in an exceptional monetary policy situation, and not in a new world. the flexibility shown by central banks in the crisis was necessary to prevent a downward spiral. apart from the central banks, governments have also taken measures to manage the crisis. important steps have been taken in the regulation of banks, including the tightening of capital requirements. measures to bring about a longterm restructuring of public finances, however, remain unsatisfactory in many countries. monetary policy has opened up a time slot that will enable this to be done. it would be disastrous for the long - term future of the global economy if it were not used. in the countries most concerned, government budgets must be returned to a sustainable path as soon as possible. moreover, a consolidation of this kind would reduce the risk of overburdening monetary policy. as far as switzerland is concerned, the minimum exchange rate against the euro will continue to apply. the reasons behind the setting of the minimum exchange rate in september 2011 retain their validity. the

financial problems in many countries continue to provide a basis for potential safe haven capital flows. in addition, at its current rate, the swiss franc remains high and is weighing on the swiss economy. consequently, at its most recent monetary policy assessment in september, the snb confirmed that it would leave the minimum exchange rate unchanged and continue to enforce it with the utmost determination. bis central bankers ’ speeches
sabine lautenschlager : european banking supervision – much achieved, but still much to do speech by ms sabine lautenschlager, member of the executive board of the european central bank and vice - chair of the supervisory board of the single supervisory mechanism, at the bundesbanksymposium “ dialogue on banking supervision ”, frankfurt am main, 1 june 2016. * * * ladies and gentlemen, in 1863 the freemasons ’ tavern in london was the scene of a lively discussion. it concerned the adoption of a set of rules which was initially only valid in england and a good 20 years later was to become very important for the whole world. the rules i ’ m referring to govern the world ’ s nicest trivial pursuit – and for once i ’ m not talking about banking – i ’ m talking about football. football is played the world over according to the same set of rules. whether in south america or europe, whether it ’ s the world cup or at regional league level, the rules are the same worldwide. incidentally, at the outset it was the players themselves who policed the game. referees, as we know them today, didn ’ t appear until the end of the 19th century – the players ’ selfregulation didn ’ t work out particularly well. banking is perhaps not the world ’ s nicest trivial pursuit, but in some respects it is not unlike football. banks also compete with each other and have to stick to certain rules. and these rules, too, are now largely harmonised. the basel framework takes care of that at global level and the single rulebook at european level. and, of course, also in the banking sector there has to be someone who makes sure that everyone follows the rules – banks need a supervisor just as footballers need a referee, for self - regulation is a sub - optimal solution here too. we have had single european banking supervision in the euro area for over one - and - a - half years – here too there ’ s been a harmonisation. this process aims to regulate and supervise banks across the euro area according to uniformly high standards – and to prevent regulatory and supervisory arbitrage. that, in turn, is an essential basis for a stable banking sector that promotes growth and prosperity in the monetary union. much achieved... it was in this context that european banking supervision was established. since november 2014 the ecb has supervised the now 129 biggest banking groups in the euro area. however,

become more challenging. so, this calls for a time of greater caution as we move forward. also, this means the ability of the banking sector to withstand shocks will be an important prerequisite for any economy in managing the spillovers from the slowing global economy and volatile financial markets. in the thai case, the strength and the resiliency of the banking sector is with us, and thus they should be well placed to weather the turmoil, without adverse effects on their roles in supporting the economy and in maintaining financial stability. thank you for your attention.
2015 ; reform efforts thus need to be stepped up in the majority of euro area countries. fiscal policies should support the economic recovery, while remaining in compliance with the fiscal rules of the european union. full and consistent implementation of the stability and growth pact is crucial to maintain confidence in the fiscal framework. at the same time, all countries should strive for a more growth - friendly composition of fiscal policies. we are now at your disposal for questions. bis central bankers ’ speeches

of inflation dynamics and the general economic outlook, including through the impact of the very significant terms of trade deterioration. in particular, the inflation dynamics associated with the energy shock component, to which the euro area is particularly exposed, are of a different nature compared to demand - driven overheating dynamics. the transmission of interest rate changes in the money market the money market is key for the implementation and transmission of monetary policy : it acts as a seismograph for liquidity conditions and market expectations of future policy, while money market rates are central to the transmission of monetary policy through their impact on economy - wide financing conditions. it follows that it is important that money market rates adjust in line with changes in key ecb interest rates. this applies in particular to changes in the deposit facility rate ( dfr ), which represents the relevant policy rate in conditions of excess liquidity. the available evidence suggests that our july rate hike of 50 basis points, which increased the dfr from - 0. 5 per cent to zero, has been well transmitted to money market rates overall. in particular, the euro short - term rate ( €str ) moved up by the full size of the change in policy rates ( chart 1 ). this is especially important, since the €str is the basis for the overnight interest rate swap curve, along which the market prices expectations of future policy. the reaction was similar across deposits by banks and by the different types of non - bank financial institutions that are active in the money market. the near - complete adjustment of repo rates for transactions based on a broad collateral pool – which are predominantly driven by a motivation to borrow or lend cash – was immediate. chart 1 the july 2022 rate hike by 50 basis points and rate changes across money market rates segments ( basis points ) sources : bloomberg, mmsr, brokertec / mts and ecb calculations. notes : general collateral ( gc ) and refers to cash - driven repo transactions and non - general ( non - gc ) refers to collateral - driven repo transactions. the bars show the difference between the average rate of the period 1 - 26 july ( before the hike ) and the period 27 july - 19 august ( after the hike ). for 1 - month government bills, the bars show the difference in the respective rate between the average rate of the period 10 – 27 june ( before the hike ) and the period 27 july – 11 august ( after the hike ). at the same time,
##bilities, we still can squeeze a lot more of shared positions out of our relative societal frameworks, both inside the eu and between the eu and the united states. this is what we should concentrate on.

on a global level, some eu countries resorted to financing deficits thinking this situation was temporary, while other countries resorted to a structural adjustment. the consequence of this was the implosion of the first attempt to create a monetary union in europe. the werner plan ( 1970 ) failed largely, among other reasons, because of this difference in economic thinking. and in 1982, the beginning of the mitterrand years, there was even a plan by a nationalist and socialist element within the french government to resort to competitive devaluation, to control capital and goods at borders, and to resort to protectionism vis - a - vis other european countries, the end of the union. fortunately mitterrand sided with delors, and the union continued, but the germans were deeply distrustful of the ability of france to abide by a social market economy. and it was not until several years later, in 1989, that the first study to embark on an economic and monetary union was completed, because since the middle of the eighties, a true " pensee unique " in economic terms, a true belief in the same economic values, namely a social market economy had developed, that allowed the establishment of a single currency. in order to proceed you need agreement on the underlying objectives. do we see a market economy as an instrument to achieve the individual ’ s quest to maximize his happiness expressed by his financial balance? or is, alternatively, the market economy a way to improve collective happiness measured by the gini factor ( wealth distribution ), peace, culture and quality and quantity of common goods available to the largest number? the answer will hugely influence your tax system, your social security system, your accounting system and so on. in the us the democratic debate is not about socialism or a market economy, not even a social market economy, at most about the size of deficits or jobs. what decides elections is abortion, gay marriages, god. do you recognize there the roots of us history? in europe however, religion and its issues are a non - event as electoral movers. what is moving europeans is war, and what is moving europeans, is welfare. that is the agenda of europe. if you use this grid of an explanation, it explains many of the gridlocks that are depicted with great pleasure in some newspapers. but it also explains some of the difficult moments of the transatlantic dialogue. however, i am not pessimistic. by being aware of our diversities and sensi
will come into operation in 2015. the handling of banking crises will involve numerous national and european institutions participating in the context of a single resolution board. provision is made for recourse to a fund made up of contributions paid in by the banks themselves. even though the decision - making process appears complex and the pooled resources limited, the compromise reached is a further step towards the completion of banking union. together with the ecb and the other national supervisory authorities, we are now conducting the comprehensive assessment of the most important euro - area banks. the aim of the exercise is to increase the transparency and reliability of banks ’ balance sheets and increase the market ’ s confidence in the soundness of the european banking system, thereby contributing to the recovery of lending to the economy. the key aspects of the comprehensive assessment are an asset quality review and a stress test of the banks ’ balance sheets. the exercise under way is of unprecedented complexity, both in terms of the volume of activities to be carried out and for their concentration in time. it considers a wide range of bank assets, going from loans to households and firms, to government securities and complex financial instruments, so - called third - level assets. in the cases where the assessment shows that a bank needs to raise its capital ratios, this can be done in several ways, ranging from not distributing profits to the disposal of nonstrategic assets, the cutting of costs and the issue of new equity. the manner of carrying out these interventions and their timing will be determined in relation to the nature of the capital weakness and according to whether it derived from value adjustments to balance - sheet items or from the results of stress tests. capital - raising measures will have to be agreed with the national supervisory authorities. the credibility of the exercise and its success in restoring confidence in the soundness of the european banking system require that instruments of public intervention be available to act as financial backstops, as established by the european council in june 2013 and reaffirmed by the ecofin council in november. they will have to conform with the basic principles of national and european law, with the ultimate objective of ensuring financial stability. the results of the comprehensive assessment of banks ’ balance sheets will be published in october. the exercise is already making a contribution to the strengthening of banks ’ capital bases. the effects on the supply of credit in the short term will need to be carefully monitored. in the longer run, the positive relationship between banks ’ capital and growth in lending will be reinforced. the challenges

us realise how essential europe really is. bis central bankers ’ speeches