prices has also caused credit risk to increase further in the past few months. furthermore, the results of our mortgage lending surveys suggest a high risk appetite on the part of individual banks. in this regard, the federal department of finance ( fdf ) submitted two important measures for consultation which should counter potential imbalances in the real estate and mortgage markets : more risk - sensitive capital requirements for mortgage lending and a countercyclical capital buffer. with more risk - sensitive capital requirements, incentives for mortgage lending should be structurally improved. the countercyclical buffer is a component of the basel iii framework and represents a variable capital requirement which is only activated in the event of excessive credit growth. as soon as credit growth weakens again, the buffer can be deactivated. it is thus not a permanent instrument for boosting capital, but rather a temporary requirement to be employed in exceptional circumstances. the countercyclical buffer is an important element in the macroprudential toolkit. i would therefore now like to take a brief look at the progress made in the area of macroprudential policy in switzerland from the snb ’ s perspective. progress in structuring the macroprudential policy framework at its news conference one year ago, the snb drew attention to the absence of an adequate set of instruments in the area of macroprudential policy. this was in response to a request by the parliament ’ s control committees to evaluate our mandate and set of instruments relating to financial stability. so what are the key milestones that have been achieved this year in establishing a framework for macroprudential oversight in switzerland, in relation both to instruments and to the division of responsibilities? firstly, with regard to the above - mentioned countercyclical buffer, the financial stability task force led by the fdf has taken concrete steps towards implementing an important bis central bankers ’ speeches macroprudential instrument. in addition, the proposed structure of this buffer provides for a clear division of responsibilities : after consulting with finma, the snb submits a request to the federal council regarding the activation and the level of the buffer. the federal council then makes the final decision. secondly, in the context of the implementation of the “ too big to fail ” regulations, the decision - making authority with regard to systemic importance was clearly defined. the proposed legislation gives the snb the authority to determine which banks and which bank functions are systemically important. thirdly, the snb should be given improved

in this regard. the reason we do not disclose the currency composition is because, as the forex reserves manager, we are like any other commercial entity in the market. the information is market sensitive and disclosure could potentially impact our commercial interests adversely. disclosure also has wider implications for our international relations. furthermore, market efficiency is in no way affected by our nondisclosure. indeed non - disclosure is the norm around the world ; a majority of the countries, particularly the large reserve holders, do not disclose the composition of their foreign exchange reserves. bis central bankers ’ speeches