benjamin e diokno : signing of the amendment agreement enhancing the innovation function co - operation agreement opening message by mr benjamin e diokno, governor of bangko sentral ng pilipinas ( bsp, the central bank of the philippines ), for the bangko sentral ng pilipinas and monetary authority of singapore virtual signing of the amendment agreement enhancing the innovation function cooperation agreement, 4 november 2021. * * * to the monetary authority of singapore managing director ravi menon, senior officers of the monetary authority of singapore and the bangko sentral ng pilipinas, ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon. when i took the helm at the bsp, i clearly laid out my priority agenda — that is — to enable universal access to secure, affordable, and convenient digital services to more financial consumers as a way of bringing the central bank closer to the filipino people. to accomplish this goal, we intensified our efforts to undertake digital transformation on a nationwide scale. we even expanded bsp ’ s capability by creating an entirely new sector that ’ s focused on digital payments. gradually, we expanded use of digital payments in the country from only 1 % in 2013 to 20 % by the end of 2020. this development affirms that we ’ ve done significant progress in the domestic sphere. now, we are ready to extend the reach of the enhanced retail payments of the philippines beyond our borders. a seamless cross - border payment system can facilitate remittances, tourism, trade and investments. all of these activities have fueled our country ’ s development before the pandemic. and they would also be vital for our post - pandemic recovery. we chose singapore to take the next step with us given our strong economic and social ties. other than hosting many filipino workers, singapore is one of our top trading and tourism partners. four years ago, the bsp and the mas signed the innovation function co - operation agreement to provide a venue for collaboration in the fintech arena. today, we are enhancing the agreement to include joint undertakings in payment innovation and formally commence the work on the possible linkage of our fast payment systems, between the philippines ’ instapay and singapore ’ s paynow. i ’ m confident, that this collaboration would further strengthen the ties between our two nations. so, let me take this opportunity to thank the monetary authority of singapore for our continued engagement for the shared vision of an integrated, multilateral, and interoperable cross - border payment system

for release on delivery 9 : 00 a. m. est ( 3 : 00 p. m. local time ) january 10, 2023 panel on “ central bank independence and the mandate — evolving views ” remarks by jerome h. powell chair board of governors of the federal reserve system at symposium on central bank independence sveriges riksbank stockholm, sweden january 10, 2023 i will address three main points. first, the federal reserve ’ s monetary policy independence is an important and broadly supported institutional arrangement that has served the american public well. second, the fed must continuously earn that independence by using our tools to achieve our assigned goals of maximum employment and price stability, and by providing transparency to facilitate understanding and effective oversight by the public and their elected representatives in congress. third, we should “ stick to our knitting ” and not wander off to pursue perceived social benefits that are not tightly linked to our statutory goals and authorities. central bank independence and transparency on the first point, the case for monetary policy independence lies in the benefits of insulating monetary policy decisions from short - term political considerations. 1 price stability is the bedrock of a healthy economy and provides the public with immeasurable benefits over time. but restoring price stability when inflation is high can require measures that are not popular in the short term as we raise interest rates to slow the economy. the absence of direct political control over our decisions allows us to take these necessary measures without considering short - term political factors. i believe that the benefits of independent monetary policy in the u. s. context are well understood and broadly accepted. 2 in the past several decades, support for arrangements in which central banks made monetary policy decisions in pursuit of legislated goals of economic and price stability has been buttressed by theoretical and empirical research contributions, including by kenneth rogoff, on the benefits of central bank independence. see rogoff ( 1985 ) as well as the discussion below of the distinction between goal independence and instrument independence. with regard to empirical evidence on the matter, see alesina and summers ( 1993 ) as well as the subsequent research literature of the past three decades, including crowe and meade ( 2008 ). bernanke ( 2010 ) and tucker ( 2018 ) provide overviews of the development of central bank independence. our situation is different from that of the european central bank, whose independence is enumerated in article 130 of the treaty on the functioning of the european union, which is available from the european union at https : / /