very same that most demonstrate its necessity : their unsustainable fiscal policies, without the anchor of a credible central bank, would pose a threat to price stability. independence is not for the protection of central bankers ; it is for the protection of the citizens, and their collective confidence in the currency. but independence only has real value if there is a clear mandate – price stability – and accordingly a robust performance - based accountability to the country ’ s citizens and their representatives : every year the president of the ecb testifies four times a year at the european parliament and gives eight lengthy press conferences ( compared with four press conferences for the fed up to 2018 ). at the same time, the ecb must increasingly take heed of economic and social players. independence is not only secured in legislation, but also by the people [ its grandes homens ] that have embodied it for the past 20 years : wim duisenberg, jean - claude trichet, and today, mario draghi. i would go so far as to talk of threefold independence : from national governments of course, but also from short - term trends in the media or financial markets, and last from entrenched camps ( the hawks and the doves ) or schools of thought, even if all three of them had their own well - established economic background. consequently, they have been able to take a pragmatic approach to innovation : for example, when jean claude trichet addressed bank liquidity risk through the fixed rate full allotment policy in 2008 or introduced the first security purchases with the smp in 2010 ; and of course when mario draghi gave his famous “ whatever it takes ” speech in july 2012 or began expanding non - standard instruments in 2014. 3. the spirit : general european interest these three men have also upheld the european spirit, through their culture and their convictions. far from being a technocratic arrangement, initially the euro was actually a political aspiration advocated by helmut kohl, jacques delors and francois mitterrand among others in parallel with german reunification [ slide 4 ]. and it is now supported by 75 % of euro area citizens – the highest approval rating since 2003 – and as many as 77 % of portuguese and 81 % of germans. this popular support is our greatest success and our greatest asset. and it proves that the concept of europe is popular as long as it stops being abstract and takes the form 2 / 6 bis central bankers'speeches of concrete projects. however, during

holdings. with the increasing focus on real assets, individuals ’ propensity to borrow also rose temporarily in the 1990s. however, in terms of their level of indebtedness, german households remained at the lower end of the international league. as in similar earlier periods, higher external financing of private fixed asset investments was stimulated by declining interest rates and a government promotion policy which favoured borrowing. however, the peak is likely to have been passed in 1993 - 94. in the ensuing period, the shifts of emphasis in residential construction and the gradual reduction of tax privileges tended rather to support higher internal financing again. by contrast, the decline in interest rates has not significantly increased the propensity to raise consumer borrowings ; this is also supported by relevant studies. 14 implications for economic policy the long - term changes in asset formation and investor behaviour show not only that german households have a consistently strong preference for the acquisition of real estate, but also that they have become increasingly sensitive in their portfolio allocation. as far back as the early - 1970s, an increased yield awareness – not least under the impact of the inflationary pressure at that time – gave rise to a greater diversification of private financial investments. as a result, investments with insurance companies or in the bond market moved to the fore in investor ’ s preferences. in the 1990s a greater willingness to incur risks – undoubtedly encouraged by the stock market rally – and an open - minded attitude towards new developments in the capital markets has boosted the preference for securities. this benefited not only the expansion of a share - buying “ culture ” in germany, but also the professionalisation and globalisation of private portfolios. to secure a high - quality domestic supply of funds in the long term, the process of maturing among german investors should not be disturbed politically. it is equally important to encourage private savings, which in germany – unlike in the united states – has mainly been suffering since the early - 1990s from a gloomier economic situation and a variety of unresolved economic problems. a number of economic and fiscal policy considerations can be derived from this. first of all, this includes substantial and continuous progress in the labour market. i believe that a reliable moderate wage policy, a differentiation of the wage structure and a greater flexibility of labour input remain indispensable in this context. in addition, fiscal policy has to provide enterprises and households with greater planning certainty and better incentives for performance. a more equal distribution of burdens between the generations is also essential, as are