##s, c., diez, f., gopinath, g. and gourinchas, p. - o. ( 2017 ), “ dominant currency paradigm : a new model for small open economies ”, imf working papers, no 17 / 264. [ 36 ] see cœure, b. ( 2017 ), “ the transmission of the ecb ’ s monetary policy in standard and non - standard times ”, speech at the workshop “ monetary policy in non - standard times ”, frankfurt am main, 11 september. it is ultimately the source of exchange rate movements that is likely to determine the degree, and at times even the direction, of pass - through to consumer prices. for the role of import shares, see campa, j. and goldberg, l. ( 2005 ), “ exchange rate passthrough into import prices ”, the review of economics and statistics, vol. 87 ( 4 ), pp. 679 – 690. [ 37 ] see european central bank ( 2016 ), “ exchange rate pass - through into euro area inflation ”, economic bulletin, july. [ 38 ] concerns about foreign influences on domestic monetary policy are of course not new. as early as the 1970s, the deutsche bundesbank was expressing misgivings about the rapid internationalisation of the deutsche mark, fearing that it could lead to heightened “ hot money ” flows that would, in turn, make monetary aggregates more volatile and difficult to interpret. [ 39 ] and to the extent that such flight - to - safety flows affect the exchange rate, the aforementioned reduced pass - through to import prices that international currencies imply also mitigate more direct effects on domestic prices. [ 40 ] see bernanke, b. ( 2005 ), “ the global saving glut and the u. s. current account deficit ”, speech at the homer jones lecture, st. louis, missouri, 14 april. on the impact and transmission channel of foreign official purchases on us treasury yields in the mid - 2000s, see also : kaminska, i. and zinna, g. ( 2014 ), “ official demand for u. s. debt ; implications for u. s. real interest rates ”, imf working papers, no 14 / 66 ; and krishnamurthy, a. and vissingjorgensen, a. ( 2012 ), “ the aggregate demand for treasury debt ”, journal of political economy, vol. 120,

the euro to assume a stronger international role. see juncker, j. c. ( 2018 ), “ the hour of european sovereignty ”, state of the union address 2018 ; european commission ( 2018 ), “ towards a stronger international role of the euro ”, european commission contribution to the european council and the euro summit, 5 december ; and european council ( 2018 ), “ statement of the euro summit ”, 14 december. the main reason that i see for these calls relates to the growing perception of a shift in global governance, from leadership built on trust and common identities – what the ancient greeks called hegemonia – to leadership based on arkhe, hard power where policies and doctrines are imposed on others. see cœure, b. ( 2018 ), “ asserting europe ’ s leadership ”, panel remarks at les rencontres economiques d ’ aix - en - provence, 8 july. in such an environment, being the issuer of a global reserve currency confers international monetary power, in particular the capacity to “ weaponise ” access to the financial and payments systems. see, for example, tooze, a. and odendahl, c. ( 2018 ), “ can the euro rival the dollar? ”, cer insight, centre for european reform, 4 december. as has been clear on a number of recent occasions, the prospect of being shut out of major financial systems makes fines or economic sanctions markedly more threatening. 2 / 18 bis central bankers'speeches this shift in global governance, in turn, has contributed to the belief that the eu may be more exposed to the risk that the monetary power of others is not used in its best interests, or is even used against it. see, for example, european commission ( 2018 ), ibid. these risks are not new, of course. as tommaso padoa - schioppa once noted, the demise of the gold standard shifted monetary management away from international constraints and towards domestic priorities. in padoa - schioppa ’ s words, this is when “ monetary nationalism took over ”. “ in the last century [ the ] history [ of monetary orders ] was marked by a fundamental shift in relations between money and the two entities to which it had been anchored from time immemorial : a commodity ( mainly gold ) and the ‘ sovereign ’ or, to put it another way, intrinsic value and political power. over the decades, the commodity anchor was relaxed