results. finally, another interesting finding is that the issue was not only one of quantity but also about prices. banks ’ proximity to buffers appears to have affected the cost of lending. the reasons behind this problem are unclear. it may have occurred because the level of uncertainty was very high for banks, and they were foreseeing that there might be losses in the future, and thus wanted to keep these buffers so they could be used to cover those losses. that is one possibility. the lack of formal guidance by supervisors on the rebuilding of these buffers might be another issue. low profitability may also be a reason for this result or market stigma. we are now in the process of trying to understand precisely the origin of this problem. closely related to this and a very important issue is the question of releasable buffers. in the basel framework there are some buffers, in particular the countercyclical buffer, that are intended to be activated in boom periods, precisely in order to make banks more resilient, and to be deactivated during recessions. here the analysis of the basel committee suggests that the release of such buffers had a positive effect on lending during the pandemic. the results, for example, specifically for the euro area, for which we had more microdata, suggest that banks are adjusting internal capital targets cyclically : in boom periods banks reduce their own internal capital targets, and they do the opposite when there is a recession. the evidence also points to the fact that macroprudential authorities have the ability to influence these internal capital targets by releasing or activating the ccyb ( countercyclical capital buffer ). this is precisely why the evidence points to the fact that the release of the capital buffer also generated a reduction in banks ’ internal capital targets and this ultimately allowed them to provide more credit to the economy. if i combine all this information, the one thing that is clear to me now, which i think we need to think more about it in the next stage, is that we need to consider whether there is sufficient releasable capital in the system. let me give two very concrete examples of why i think this is necessary. the best example is the covid - 19 crisis. in many jurisdictions,, we were observing the emergence of systemic risk in the economy before the crisis, and that is why many public macroprudential authorities decided to activate the ccyb. then a completely exogenous

##rkfed. org / newsevents / speeches / 2020 / sin201020 2 / 5 20 / 10 / 2020 the federal reserve ’ s corporate credit facilities : why, how, and for whom - federal reserve bank of new york that in making an assessment of credit eligibility, we broadened our use of ratings to include perspectives from all nationally recognized statistical rating organizations. providing broad access also applies to the service providers that support the facilities. in early september, we announced the expansion of counterparties to the smccf, including several smaller and minority - owned broker - dealers. 13 in early october, we announced the launch of our process to re - bid our engagement with the facility ’ s investment manager. this process has begun with the ccf cash management role, and in the coming weeks and months we will re - bid the remainder of the role. together, these efforts allow us to expand the reach of our operations while making tangible progress on our commitments to diversity and inclusion, including to minority -, women -, and veteran - owned firms. let me now turn to transparency and accountability. in the spirit of these principles, we have reported to the public in near real - time our market activity, including the details of every smccf transaction. our holdings are publicly reported on a weekly basis through the fed ’ s h. 4. 1 release. every month the fed publishes the full holdings in a detailed congressional report. we also provide the attributes of the broad market index, including detailed issuer - level weights. aside from portfolio activity, we have also disclosed the ccf ’ s legal agreements. on the new york fed ’ s website, you can find all documentation with the department of treasury that governs the operation of the facilities, as well as all contracts with external vendors. on the latter, we remain committed to disclosing all fees to service providers as they are paid. impact on credit conditions as you all know, corporate credit conditions have recovered substantially from the worst strains of march. research from the new york fed estimates that, within the first three months following the ccf announcement, credit spreads retraced about 90 percent toward pre - pandemic levels, with two - thirds of the improvement occurring on facility announcement dates ( i. e., before purchases even began ), and that half of the improvement in bid - ask spreads since the peak in march occurred on the initial announcement date itself. 14 this provides strong evidence that the market found credible the design