also expressed shortly after the end of world war ii. it was winston churchill, who in 1946 in zurich, argued in favour of “ a kind of united states of europe ”. in april of that same year, the need for a single european currency was voiced by the new post - war president of the nederlandsche bank, marius wilhelm holtrop, who wanted a strong and sound guilder which in due course would merge into one european currency. the past fifty years have shown, that the advent of a single european currency will certainly not include the “ united states of europe ” that churchill was talking about. soon after 1946, europe became politically divided into eastern and western hemispheres due to the cold war. with the foundation of the european economic community ( eec ) in 1957, western europe took the lead by starting economic cooperation. the objective of the treaty of rome, on which the eec was based, was to create a common market between france, west germany, italy and the benelux countries. this objective resulted in a customs union which became effective on 1 july 1968. however, the treaty remained vague about other aspects of economic cooperation. economic policy, for example, was considered a matter of common interest. as regards monetary cooperation, coordination was recommended, the exchange rate policy being regarded as a matter of common interest as well. the plan for economic integration designed in rome was not an objective in itself. it was based on political grounds. after all, the treaty aimed at achieving an “ ever closer union among the european peoples ” through economic integration. during the 1969 summit in the hague, representatives of the six member states agreed with the idea of the newly elected german chancellor willy brandt that this had to be realised via economic and monetary union ( emu ). the then prime minister of luxembourg, paul werner, came up with a detailed plan that was named after him. according to this plan, emu would be materialised in stages. in the final stage, monetary and budgetary competences of the national states were to be transferred to community bodies established for that purpose. and so, werner ’ s ideas were considerably more far - reaching than the agreements reached in rome thirteen years earlier. nonetheless, the philosophy of economic integration advocated in rome remained the moving spirit behind political cooperation : “ it is true that we need not achieve a european confederation or federation tomorrow. but to arrive at this ultimate goal, we must first take the step of creating an economic and monetary currency union ”, werner

. in other words, the journey from maastricht to amsterdam is free of obstacles. i hope that the same applies to the last stage of emu. the likelihood of obstacles has been reduced considerably because, as i have explained, stringent entry requirements were set in maastricht. gradually, a group of countries is emerging in europe which may be able to meet these criteria. in the spring of 1998, they will be formally appointed as emu participants. in order to give sufficient weight to this core group, the participation of france and germany forming as they do the axis of western european cooperation - is a prerequisite. but with a view to the credibility of emu, france and germany, in particular, have to strictly observe the conditions of accession. the creation of a core group gives rise to continuous speculations about the question which countries will join it. in this stage of emu, such speculations are not productive. instead of excluding countries in advance, each country should be stimulated to do its utmost to complete the budgetary consolidation process. of course, this does not call for tricks or nonrecurring measures, but requires, - as stated in the maastricht treaty - a sustainable and therefore permanent consolidation, not only in the interest of emu but also in the interest of the country involved. apart from the question which eu countries will be in the core group, participation in emu implies at any rate that the country involved transfers its monetary policy powers to an independent ecb. in that field, we will continue to see rearguard action, because the tradition of central bank independence is not equally rooted across the whole of europe. on the other hand, one should not worry about these recurring discussions too much, as the treaty is rock - solid with regard to the prohibition to exert political influence on the ecb governing council. obviously, the independence of the european central bank should not be confused with a lack of democratic legitimacy. after all, the democratic legitimacy of the ecb has been safeguarded in many ways. for example, the designated ecb - president can be questioned by the european parliament and the chairman of the council of ministers plus a member of the european commission may participate in meetings of the ecb executive board without, it is true, voting rights. but apart from this, it should be kept in mind that the masstricht treaty has been ratified by the national parliaments. in other words, the ecb ’ s