have to help promote a culture which breeds probity and integrity. 32. as a concluding thought, my advice to people in vigilance administration is : • know the essence of the vigilance function – what is expected of you? • evaluate decisions against two tests – was it for the good of the organisation? was it done at the cost of the public / common good? • have an open and inquisitive mind – be aware of things that may affect the interests and good governance in your respective organizations • when the rest of the organisation is looking to push business interests, focus on ensuring that ethics and values are not lost sight of 33. if you bear the above thoughts in mind while attending to your call of duty, i am sure the objective of vigilance function would have been well served. i once again thank cigva and mr. handa for inviting me to this seminar and giving me an opportunity to interact with the participants representing a wide cross - section of the public sector. i observe that cigva has assembled an impressive set of speakers with vast practical experience and i, therefore, hope that you would have two very interesting days of deliberations. i hope some of the issues that i have raised this morning would be debated during the course of the seminar and some actionable ideas on improving the governance process in public sector enterprises would emerge from these deliberations. i wish you the very best in all your future endevaours. thank you! bis central bankers ’ speeches annex 1 annex 2 bis central bankers ’ speeches annex 3 bis central bankers ’ speeches

– a kind of paradox of success. at the same time, the self - stabilizing dynamics of prices in a low - inflation regime endows central banks with considerable flexibility, generating potentially greater leeway for monetary policy to look - through moderate fluctuations in inflation – having succeeded in bringing inflation under control, central banks can enjoy the fruits of their hard - earned credibility. it can thus be argued that the greater role of relative price fluctuations in driving overall inflation create a need for increased flexibility both in terms of greater tolerance for the size of deviations from inflation targets, as well as the time horizon over which inflation is brought back to target. we need to recognize clearly the risks associated with overly active and excessive fine - tuning of policy to hit narrowly defined inflation targets. at a minimum, such efforts are unlikely to work. at worst, they could well be counterproductive. a key challenge in moving in the direction of more flexibility would be in communicating and explaining deviations from inflation targets that may be larger and more persistent. in certain situations, it may be the case that attaching heavy emphasis on a precise numerical target and tying central bank's performance too closely to that target could be counterproductive. the essence of inflation targeting is to anchor expected and actual inflation to a low and stable regime, underpinned by transparent and predictable conduct of policy. the actual average level of inflation within that low and stable regime is second order. indeed, when inflation is low, the welfare costs of fluctuations away from narrowly defined 3 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches targets tend to be limited. a key reason is that when inflation is low, it no longer exerts a significant influence on behaviour and agents no longer need to spend resources to acquire information about it – they become " rationally inattentive ". importantly, low or even slightly negative inflation rates are not associated with bad outcomes for the economy. empirical evidence suggests that there is no systematic link between mild deflations and output weakness, even if the price declines are persistent. i think as a profession, economists should get over the knee - jerk fear of deflation : the view that deflation is always everywhere associated with some self - reinforcing downward spiral in economic activity. much of that view derives from the great depression which is very much an exception and reflected a unique set of forces that should not be generalized. thus the key adjustment going forward would be greater tolerance for moderate, even if persistent, shortfalls of inflation from