samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
the industry is fragmented across europe : similar to bank lending to smes, successful venture capital depends on a large deal flow to cover the majority of investments that will fail. as most net new job creation comes from young firms, and young firms tend to be more sensitive to changes in investment opportunities, 16 this is missing part of the single market in capital that has substantial economic ramifications. the second channel is for more established firms and relates to reviving high - quality securitisation markets in europe. a deeper asset - backed securities ( abs ) market would help smes to diversify their funding sources by tapping the funds of non - bank investors. moreover, to the extent that abs allows banks to partially remove sme credit risk from their balance sheets, smaller, less diversified originators should be better placed to enter the market. in this way, abs could mean that sme lending is less dependent on a handful of large banks in each country, which would increase the contestability of domestic markets. at present, the legal position that an account holder “ owns ” as soon as securities are booked to his account differs across euro area countries : in some jurisdictions the holder enjoys full and unshared property rights, whereas in others the holder receives a position that is in comparison “ inferior ”, i. e. a shared or indirect property interest or a mere claim against the account provider. veugelers, r. ( 2011 ), “ mind europe ’ s early - stage equity gap ”, bruegel policy contribution 2011 / 18, december 2011. adelino, m., song, m. and robinson, d. ( 2014 ), “ firm age, investment opportunities and job creation ”, nber working paper 19845, january. bis central bankers ’ speeches the ecb is working with the bank of england on the causes and roadblocks of the impaired securitisation market and will propose ways to deal with them. 17 conclusion let me conclude. the main point i have tried to illustrate today is that de - fragmentation must have an aim, and that aim goes deeper than price convergence. true financial integration implies a single market in capital, where there is efficient allocation and effective diversification. it implies sizeable cross - border holdings of debt and equity ; a european market for banking m & a ; and direct cross - border exposures from banks in one jurisdiction to firms and households in another. and as we are still some way from reaching this goal, current

play an even greater role in maturity - matched refinancing of mortgages in switzerland in the future. in addition, banks can improve their liquidity by holding portfolios of swiss mortgage bonds themselves. mortgage bonds could be converted into liquidity quickly and simply, as required, by means of repo transactions – either in the swiss franc interbank market or at the snb.
also one for institutions operating at the micro - level. we can all make a contribution towards protecting our country from falling in the debt trap of excessive borrowing by applying sound principles in the management of our debt positions.

of the eurosystem at 3. 25 %. these actions have helped to keep inflation expectations solidly anchored at levels consistent with price stability. such anchoring is a prerequisite for monetary policy to make an ongoing contribution towards supporting sustainable economic growth and job creation in the euro area. notwithstanding recent increases in key ecb interest rates, our monetary policy in the euro area remains accommodative. if the governing council ’ s assumptions and baseline scenario are confirmed, it will remain warranted to further withdraw monetary accommodation. the governing council will therefore continue to monitor very closely all developments so as to ensure price stability over the medium and longer term. structural reforms fiscal consolidation – which is absolutely of the essence in the euro area – is likely to be most successful when coupled with comprehensive structural reforms. these are urgently needed not only to cope with the challenges posed by technological change and accelerating globalisation but in particular also to help to cushion the adverse economic effects of the projected demographic change in the euro area. for europe ’ s future in the face of these challenges, and for the prosperity of its citizens, it is essential to ensure that a fully operational internal market is up and running. this necessitates the fully free flow of labour and capital and free trade in goods and services. it also calls for continuing to fully implement the single market and removing the remaining barriers to it within the eu ; this will provide a powerful means to promoting the efficient allocation of factors of production as well as deeper economic and financial integration. it will also allow europe to better realise its potential for stronger output and employment growth and increase its resilience to shocks. for those member states that have fulfilled the convergence criteria laid down by the treaty and participate in the euro area, the considerable benefits of the internal market are further enhanced by the single currency. i welcome the enlargement of the euro area on 1 january 2007 with the entry of slovenia. in order to fully reap the advantages of the euro and to allow adjustment mechanisms to operate efficiently within the enlarged currency area, it will be necessary to fully integrate slovenia into economic and monetary union, including the free circulation of labour inside the euro area. as regards the projected demographic dynamics for the euro area, the decline in the working age population and steadily increasing proportion of older people in the population will place further pressure on pension and health care systems, and may have wide - ranging economic consequences. in particular, without effective measures to raise labour supply and labour productivity growth, the
klaas knot : on payment trends - opportunities and risks speech by mr klaas knot, president of the netherlands bank, at the 13th conference on payments and market infrastructure, jointly organised by the national bank of north macedonia and the netherlands bank, ohrid ( digitally ), 9 december 2021. * * * good morning everyone. it is a pleasure to be here at this conference, jointly organised by the national bank of north macedonia and de nederlandsche bank. i am glad to see that, after a one year hiatus, this thirteenth conference gets to take place again – even though only virtually. before continuing, i would like to express my shock and sadness at the terrible bus accident that happened two weeks ago – two days before we were originally going to meet. my deepest condolences to the people who have lost family members and beloved ones. coming back to this conference – today and tomorrow, you will be discussing payments in the digital era, with an inside out perspective. and that perspective is, truly, the perspective of a modern central banker. a central banker who keeps his finger on the pulse of what happens in our society. a central banker who is aware of recent payment trends. a central banker who looks at what is happening nationally, but also globally. trends regarding, for instance, the use of cash. in the netherlands, the use of cash has declined steadily. ten years ago, about 60 percent of all shopping was paid for in cash. before the pandemic, that number had already dropped to 32 percent. today, the number of retail cash payments has declined even further – to a little over 20 percent. like in many countries across the world, also in the netherlands and in north macedonia we see an ongoing digitalisation of our societies and payment structures. this global trend has created a lot of opportunities for organisations and their customers. unfortunately, it has also, among other things, contributed to an increase in cybercrime. both financial institutions, like banks, and their customers are being targeted by criminals. a compelling example is the rise in ransomware attacks over the last couple of years. another trend today, is the development of cryptos. cryptos are issued independently of commercial or central banks, but there are increasing links between cryptos and the mainstream financial system. a serious drawback is the fact that the value of most cryptos is very volatile. this makes them unsuitable as a means of payment, store of value and unit of account. and the accessibility

conference has only further matured. it has grown both in audience and in breadth of topics. and this year ’ s program is, once again, testimony to that. i wish you all an inspiring two days. 1 national bank of the republic of north macedonia, accessed on 7 december 2021, rnm fintech survey final report clean 211220. pdf ( nbrm. mk ) 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches
delivers real benefits to be shared. one needs to present a convincing enough a case – in both the major deficit and surplus economies – that the spillovers from globally inconsistent policies, are not in the interest of any country. this is certainly not an easy feat and will be a major challenge in the discussions going forward. the challenge is even larger because the solution involves so deep adjustments, not only in macroeconomic policies, but in the very economic structures of the countries involved.

if the economy overheats. speed limits should therefore not only be observed on the roads, but also in economic policy. economic speeding has far more serious implications than an endorsement on a driving licence. currently, this means that there is no scope for any relaxation on either the revenue or expenditure sides – on the contrary in fact. central and local government must observe the expenditure targets, and the cyclical position does not warrant unfinanced tax cuts. the lesson to be learned from the netherlands is clear : in an upswing the economic policy must not contribute to further accelerating developments. * * * many of the large euroarea member states are struggling with economic difficulties. large - scale unemployment leads to uncertainty. there is increasing awareness of the need for greater labour market flexibily. yet so far the reforms have been small. a key problem in italy, france and germany is that companies are not investing sufficiently in their home countries, and since households are reluctant to spend, the only option is to wait for an exportdriven upswing. a consumption - driven upswing in europe would be desirable. to this end households must be willing and able to spend more. however, in many member states the financial sector is not geared to financing the households'consumption or housing requirements. the banking structure is based on household savings financing corporate investments, not on lending to households. in denmark, lending by banks and mortgage - credit institutes to households matches the level of output. at the other extremity within the eu, italian households have only borrowed one quarter via these market channels, but the figure is presumably higher if loans from relatives are included. yet market channels are important if family relations are not to be the central factor when young people buy a home or a car, or spread consumption rationally over their lifetimes. the very high level of borrowing by danish households reflects especially that homeowners can borrow from the capital market via the mortgage credit system. this is an advantage, but also has its drawbacks. new loan types, also from the banks, have probably contributed to the very strong increases in house prices. however, most of the increases must be attributed to the low interest rates, growth in real incomes and the freeze on property taxes. this is therefore not an inexplicable price bubble, yet prices may fall when interest rates go up. times are good for the banks, and lending is growing. good times are also when losses are seen as a thing of the past,
first year. however, since the start of the year an apparent progress in the us - china negotiations has been made as the rhetoric around them has appeared to soften, but the outcome is still hard to predict. 2. 2 uncertainty over global monetary policies last year global monetary policy stances diverged. at one end of the spectrum was the us federal reserve which raised its key interest rates 4 times from 1. 50 % to 2. 50 % confirming its gradual approach to monetary tightening. at the other end, the people ’ s bank of china, and the bank of japan continued their ultra - loose monetary policies, while european central bank concluded its quantitative easing via pspp. 2019 seems to be a different story from a central bank perspective as a “ risk management ” approach seems to prevail. let me give you briefly my own insights on the global policy outlook : starting with the fed : after the dovish speech by the fed chair jerome powell earlier this month at the economic club of washington d. c., which set the record for a data - dependent monetary policy, following the fed ’ s projection for a gdp growth rate of 2. 3 % in 2019, the market participants no longer price in any hike in the fed funds rate this year. most likely though, we might have one rate hike until the end of the 1st half of 2019. turning to the ecb, the ecb will continue reinvesting the principal payments from maturing securities purchased for an extended period of time, contributing to accommodative monetary policy and favourable liquidity conditions. moreover, markets expect the ecb to extend its long - term loan programme to the banking sector ( tltro ). at yesterday ’ s gc meeting, the ecb left its key interest rates unchanged, while it said it intends to continue reinvesting maturing securities under its asset purchase programme for an extended period of time past the date when it starts raising the key interest rates. the ecb also left its forward guidance unchanged, but moved to describing growth risks “ on the downside ” and did not take any decision on tltros. regarding the boe, monetary policy remains subject to the outcome of brexit. the high level of uncertainty forces the status quo to prevail in the short run. hence, the basis for the bank ’ s ‘ hawkish ’ policy signalling seems more doubtful. in japan, the boj maintained its deposit rate at - 0. 10 % and

to the future prosperity of australians. so, again, it is important that time be taken to get the details right. i will finish there. my colleagues and i look forward to answering your questions. thank you. 5 / 5 bis - central bankers'speeches
press release, january 31, www. federalreserve. gov / newsevents / pressreleases / monetary20180131a. htm. 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches

upward, true price stability will be achieved at some positive rate for measured inflation. second, there are considerations that favor allowing some small positive rate of true inflation, rather than true price stability. in 1995, the boskin commission estimated that the measurement bias for the cpi was between 0. 8 and 1. 6 percentage points. since then, the bureau of labor statistics has made a series of methodological improvements in the cpi, lowering the bias. in 1999, the congressional budget office estimated that the cumulative effects of these improvements had been to reduce the measurement error to a point estimate of 0. 8 percent. therefore, in terms of the cpi, if this were the only consideration, the target could be set at 1 percent to allow for measurement error ( and also a round number ). this also suggests that the target should not be fixed in time, but should be adjusted over time to take into account changes in the estimated bias. there are a couple of reasons to consider setting an inflation target above the level consistent with true price stability. if there is resistance to declines in nominal wages, a small amount of wage inflation may enhance the flexibility of real wages and facilitate the movement to equilibrium in the labor market. whether this requires positive price inflation will depend on the variance of the wage changes, the degree of nominal wage rigidity, and the rate of growth of labor productivity. in addition, a positive rate of inflation increases the flexibility of monetary policy by allowing policymakers to drive real interest rates below zero. particularly in light of the latter consideration, i would set the inflation target at what i refer to as true price stability plus a small cushion. specifically, for the cpi, i would set it at 2 percent, 1 percentage point for the measurement error and 1 percentage point for the cushion. this would correspond roughly to a 1½ percent inflation rate for the price index for personal consumption expenditures, based on recent differentials of this measure relative to the inflation rate for the cpi. the precise magnitude of the cushion should also be subject to adjustment over time to reflect ongoing research about its optimal size. time horizon there should be no fixed time horizon for returning inflation to its target when deviations occur. such a horizon would be arbitrary, in some cases might not be credible, and potentially would constrain the ability of the fomc to pursue the dual mandate. on the other hand, it would be useful to use a measure for inflation that smoothes over transient shocks and that is not subject to potential problems
that also minimise the burden on reporting institutions are essential. i hope you will be able to rise to the many challenges that lie ahead and ensure that these data are fit for the high purposes for which they are needed. i wish you a pleasant stay in madrid and a very fruitful conference. 6 / 6 bis - central bankers'speeches

ben s bernanke : semiannual monetary policy report to the congress speech by mr ben s bernanke, chairman of the board of governors of the federal reserve system, before the committee on banking, housing, and urban affairs, us senate, washington dc, 26 february 2013. * * * chairman johnson, ranking member crapo, and other members of the committee, i am pleased to present the federal reserve ’ s semiannual monetary policy report. i will begin with a short summary of current economic conditions and then discuss aspects of monetary and fiscal policy. current economic conditions since i last reported to this committee in mid - 2012, economic activity in the united states has continued to expand at a moderate if somewhat uneven pace. in particular, real gross domestic product ( gdp ) is estimated to have risen at an annual rate of about 3 percent in the third quarter but to have been essentially flat in the fourth quarter. 1 the pause in real gdp growth last quarter does not appear to reflect a stalling - out of the recovery. rather, economic activity was temporarily restrained by weather - related disruptions and by transitory declines in a few volatile categories of spending, even as demand by u. s. households and businesses continued to expand. available information suggests that economic growth has picked up again this year. consistent with the moderate pace of economic growth, conditions in the labor market have been improving gradually. since july, nonfarm payroll employment has increased by 175, 000 jobs per month on average, and the unemployment rate declined 0. 3 percentage point to 7. 9 percent over the same period. cumulatively, private - sector payrolls have now grown by about 6. 1 million jobs since their low point in early 2010, and the unemployment rate has fallen a bit more than 2 percentage points since its cyclical peak in late 2009. despite these gains, however, the job market remains generally weak, with the unemployment rate well above its longer - run normal level. about 4. 7 million of the unemployed have been without a job for six months or more, and millions more would like full - time employment but are able to find only part - time work. high unemployment has substantial costs, including not only the hardship faced by the unemployed and their families, but also the harm done to the vitality and productive potential of our economy as a whole. lengthy periods of unemployment and underemployment can erode workers'skills and attachment to the labor force or prevent young people from gaining
currency. it will pave the way for the long future of the euro.

normally, to allow our monetary policy to be effective throughout the euro area. otherwise, there would be instability, and that would have a negative effect on all member countries. all governments have committed themselves to being ready to accelerate fiscal consolidation. we are following this very closely in liaison with the commission. faz : what happens if, for example, the greek people refuse and the government breaks its austerity promise? do you not need a plan b? trichet : let us look back. since the euro was launched, the ecb has been preaching that the stability and growth pact is a cornerstone of emu. i repeat this at least once a month. the governments of germany and france in particular wanted to get rid of its rigour in 2004 and 2005. we rigorously defended the pact and avoided its de jure dismantling, against the wishes of the heads of state and government of large euro area countries. now, the ecb has demanded a very serious adjustment programme from greece, an adjustment programme that is very much in the country ’ s own interests. faz : however, there is a risk that one of the countries whose bonds you are buying will not be able to service its debts. what then? trichet : we are in the field of governments. there are three levels of government responsibility. first, accelerate the necessary and indispensable fiscal consolidation. second, exert strict surveillance of peers within the eurogroup – i. e. euro area governments. third, if tensions emerge despite the first two levels of responsibility, stand ready to intervene through the financial stability mechanism. faz : if that is the case, why is the ecb propping up the bond markets? would it not be better for an institution to be created which the governments finance and are responsible for? trichet : we are not propping up the bond markets. that is not our objective. we are ensuring the effectiveness of monetary policy. on 6 and 7 may, the days immediately prior to the decision to purchase bonds, the markets were massively disrupted, and market participants all over the euro area and the rest of the world observed this situation, which was deteriorating extremely rapidly. this was a very serious situation, in which we had to intervene in order to preserve, as i said, the integrity of the monetary policy transmission mechanism. faz : so why has the president of the bundesbank, axel weber, distanced himself from the purchase programme and voted with other members