, accounting for 7. 1 per cent of total exports ; in contrast, the eu is the destination for 44 per cent of uk goods. according to our studies, if the uk and the eu imposed reciprocal trade tariffs, the long - term economic cost to the british economy would be significant, particularly if productivity growth diminished at the same time ; the repercussions for the euro area would instead be small. brexit is expected to have an impact on the eu ’ s budget, to which the uk makes a positive contribution. from 2010 to 2015, even taking into account the rebate negotiated by margaret thatcher in 1984 and the rebate received by the uk for its partial participation in justice and home affairs policies, the country contributed over €13 billion a year on average while receiving less than €7 billion. moreover, the eu will no longer receive the customs duty collected in the uk ; instead it will collect the duty levied on british exports to the eu. the overall effect is still difficult to assess. discussions are still under way about the uk ’ s financial obligations to the eu when it leaves ( the brexit bill ). calculating the amount is a complex and controversial matter. one question is how the uk ’ s share of the eu total should be calculated ( it amounts to about 15 per cent of gross national income but 12 per cent in terms of contribution to the budget after rebates ) and what asset and liability items should be included. this will probably be one of the most delicate issues faced during the exit negotiations. italy – unfavourable economic developments in the uk would in any case not have any major repercussions for italy in the short term. the slowdown that the bank of england has forecast for 2018 - 20 would have a negligible impact. even if the uk experienced such a deep recession as to reduce imports by 10 per cent over a three - year period, we estimate that the effect on italy ’ s gdp would be at most 0. 25 percentage points. 3 italy ’ s trade and financial ties with the uk are not as close as those of other major euro - area countries ( table 2 ). in 2015 italian exports to the uk amounted to 1. 8 per cent of gdp, against 2. 7 for france, 3. 2 for spain and 3. 7 for germany. imports amounted to 1. 1 per cent of gdp, again less than for the other countries. italy mainly exports machinery and mechanical engineering products, agri

but are even forbidden ; it's the'api law'that regulates relationships between parties that do not know each other and that can only trust each other thanks to the digital guarantee offered by technological standards : this is also the path that will lead open banking towards open finance. these technological interdependences will be equally strong for payment solutions and financial services developed on blockchain platforms ( i am referring in particular to emoney tokens as defined in the mica regulation ). we then need to ponder the consequences of this new technological paradigm on our regulatory framework : the traditional supervisory and / or oversight approach, which postulates responsibilities that can clearly be traced back to specific entities, is no longer fit to meet the challenges posed by the new fragmented ecosystem of entities. it is therefore important to go beyond the'single entities dimension'and to consider how to factor the relationships between subjects, infrastructures, tools and services into the 2 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches new regulatory framework. one way forward is to think about a product - oriented approach, whereby all entities involved in the supply chain of payment services, such as the provision of digital wallets for payment transactions, need to comply with the core principles underpinning the oversight of payments systems, including beyond their reciprocal contractual relationship. this approach is in line with the new eurosystem oversight framework for electronic payment instruments, schemes and arrangements ( pisa ), applicable as of november 2022, which is important because it introduces two significant innovations. first of all, it goes beyond the traditional notion of a'funds transfer ', embracing instead that of a'value transfer ', thereby extending the oversight scope to digital payment tokens ( e. g. crypto - assets used within a scheme and stablecoins ). the framework also targets not only traditional payment schemes but also'arrangements ', ( e. g. the aforementioned digital wallets ) thereby bringing the complex dimensions that characterize the new digital ecosystems under the overseer's competencies. this somewhat lengthy discussion about who and what should be on the regulator's radar brings me to my second pillar, which is the need to constantly bear in mind that we are dealing with a very dynamic ecosystem. therefore, while we are looking at the current supply chains, and in particular at their single components, we also need to monitor how they evolve over time and, more importantly, whether new ones are established with the aim of providing new services or old services in an innovative