premia from agents ’ expectations continues to be a top priority in the research agendas of central banks. for example, we constantly monitor inflation swaps and other inflation - linked instruments to check the anchoring of expectations to the ecb ’ s medium - term target. 21 but the prices of these instruments are significantly affected by timevarying risk premia, which need to be accurately estimated in order to draw policy conclusions. this kind of exercise is more important than ever in the current environment of elevated inflation pressures. i am confident that this workshop will yield new insights on several topics that are highly relevant for investments and for policy - making. i want to thank lti, the organizers, the keynote speaker, the panelists, presenters, discussants, and all of you in advance. i wish you a pleasant and constructive day of discussion. notes 1. ignazio visco ( 2021 ) “ the g20 presidency programme on sustainable finance ”. remarks by ignazio visco governor of the bank of italy, omfif sustainable policy institute symposium webinar, 30 september 2021. 2. during the italian presidency, the imf and the interagency group on economic and financial statistics were asked to consider climate - related data needs in preparing a new data gap initiative. the financial stability board was requested to make recommendations on how to improve climate - related financial risk disclosures and close data gaps. the g20 sustainable finance study group ( g20 sustainable finance working group, 2021 synthesis report ), co - chaired by china and the us, was re - established. the study group quickly gathered inputs provided by international organizations and delivered a synthesis report, which proposes a set of recommendations to make progress in three main areas : 1 ) improving the comparability and interoperability of approaches to align investments to sustainability goals ; 2 ) overcoming information challenges by improving sustainability reporting and disclosure ; 3 ) enhancing the role of international financial institutions in supporting the goals of the paris agreement. 3. our work covers the sustainability - related aspects of monetary policy, supervision, regulation, financial stability, financial education, market operations and payment systems. we also actively contribute to the analysis of these issues ongoing at the european and international level. 4. for a broader perspective see ignazio visco, op. cit. ; luigi federico signorini ( 2022 ), “ sustainable investment choices : emergencies and transition ”, speech by luigi federico signorini senior deputy governor of the bank of italy,

is also feared that an active use of central banks ’ balance sheets would blur the boundaries between monetary and fiscal policies. the new challenges to central bank independence arise as a consequence of prolonged monetary policy accommodation : at the current juncture central banks could be unduly constrained in their choices about the timing and pace of policy normalization by pressure arising both from financial markets that have become overly dependent on their support and from unrealistic expectations about what central banks can deliver. on these issues, the jury is still out. more in general, the crisis has raised the question of whether central banks should revise their objectives or strategies. in my view there is no need to question the current objectives of monetary policy ; in the case of the eurosystem, that of preserving ( medium term ) price stability. i do not believe that there is a particular need for financial stability to become an explicit objective of monetary policy on a par with price stability. indeed, the benefits of our monetary framework have become more, not less, evident during the crisis, with inflation expectations remaining well - anchored throughout. also, assigning financial stability as an explicit additional objective to monetary policy could risk blurring responsibilities and creating potential conflicts. however, i believe that there is no question that preserving financial stability is a crucial albeit not exclusive responsibility of central banks. indeed, the crisis has not put into question the idea that over longer horizons there is no trade - off between price stability and financial stability objectives – rather, there are synergies. °°° the crisis has thus rekindled the long - standing debate on whether central banks should act pre - emptively against signs of financial instability that can morph into systemic risks. a broad consensus has indeed emerged on the idea that macro - prudential policies should be adopted to limit these risks. these policies would address both the cross - sectional dimension of the financial system, with the aim of strengthening its resilience to adverse real or financial shocks, and its temporal dimension, to contain the accumulation of risk over the business or financial cycle. furthermore, countercyclical macro - prudential policies moderating the financial cycle would support monetary policy in the stabilisation of the economy and, by adding a systemic perspective, they would complement micro - prudential policies directed at preserving the stability of individual financial intermediaries. however, a potential for conflicts, or what economists usually refer to as tradeoffs, may arise between monetary, macro - and micro - pr