samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
the coming months in the nation and the region. nevertheless, both nationally and regionally, unemployment remains stubbornly high and is likely to remain so for many months to come. thank you for your kind attention. i will now ask james orr to provide more details on regional economic conditions. bis central bankers ’ speeches

than inhibited. many steps are needed to make financial institutions and infrastructure more robust. for example, we need to strengthen bank capital requirements, improve liquidity buffers and make financial market infrastructures more resilient to shocks when individual firms get into trouble. in terms of capital requirements, many changes are needed, including global capital standards that put more emphasis on common equity, establish an overall leverage limit and better capture all of the sources of risk in the capital assessment process. improved risk capture, for example, includes the trading accounts of banks. some institutions had clearly not set aside adequate levels of capital given the risks that were embedded in their trading positions. it would also be very desirable to develop a mechanism to bolster the amount of common equity available to absorb losses in adverse economic environments. this might be done most efficiently by allowing the issuance of debt instruments that would automatically convert to common equity in stress environments, under certain pre - specified conditions. such “ contingent capital ” instruments might have proven very helpful had they been in place before and during this crisis. investors would have anticipated that common equity would be replenished automatically if a firm came under stress, and this knowledge might have tempered anxieties about counterparty risk. at a minimum, contingent capital instruments might have enabled common equity buffers at the weaker firms to be replenished earlier and automatically, thereby reducing uncertainty and the risk of failure. on the liquidity front, there are a host of initiatives underway. the basel committee on banking supervision is working on establishing international standards for liquidity requirements. there are two parts to this. the first is a requirement for a short - term liquidity buffer of sufficient size so that an institution that was shut out of the market for several weeks would still have sufficient liquidity to continue its operations unimpaired. the second is a liquidity standard that limits the degree of permissible maturity transformation – that is, the amount of short - term borrowing allowed to be used in the funding of long - term illiquid assets. under these standards, a firm ’ s holdings of illiquid long - term assets would need to be funded mainly by equity or long - term debt. with respect to financial market infrastructures, the federal reserve is working with a broad range of private - sector participants, including dealers, clearing banks and tri - party repo investors to dramatically reduce the structural instability of the tri - party repo system. similarly, over - the - counter ( otc )
2015, would have amounted to about €50 billion, or 5 per cent of all loans disbursed, close to precrisis levels. the growth of npls was strongly influenced by recovery times, which until now have been particularly long in italy ; the measures approved in the last year will shorten them significantly. as the bank of italy has emphasized in the past, reducing average recovery times even by just two years would have determined, together with a higher valuation of npls, a ratio of bad debt to total loans close to half of what it is today. most italian banks are capable of dealing with the still fragile cyclical conditions, lending to the economy and competing efficiently on the market. a number of assessments made in the last few weeks put the recapitalization needs of the entire italian banking system at somewhere in the order of tens of billions of euros, based on the assumption that the total stock of bad loans, and possibly even some of the loans that are “ unlikely to be repaid ”, must be sold at once by all banks at a price equal to approximately half the value of the bad loans recorded in banks ’ balance sheets. in italy a loan is classified as “ non - performing ” based on harmonized criteria established at the european level and published by the eba in 2013, which are largely aligned with those previously applied in italy and with international practice. for the valuation of non - performing loans in their balance sheets, italian banks must comply with international accounting and reporting standards ( ias / ifrs ). as they permit discretion we have constantly encouraged banks to adopt prudent valuation policies that take sufficient account of the degree of uncertainty in recovery times and flows. our supervisory action on provisioning in 2012 and 2013 is a clear example of this. in the approach traditionally taken in italy, npls can be divided into at least two large and very dissimilar categories based on the degree of difficulty faced by debtors : of the €360 billion worth of gross npls outstanding at the end of 2015, bad loans accounted for €210 billion ; €150 billion were in loans classified as “ unlikely to be repaid ”, past - due or in breach of overdraft ceilings. these two categories of npls obviously have different requirements in terms of coverage and write - downs. both types of loans must be booked in the balance sheets with due prudence, but not at values corresponding to their immediate liquidation. loans in the second

). conference paper altinoglu ( 2023 ). conference paper farias and suarez ( 2023 ). conclusion • i conclude by again thanking the keynote speakers, session chairs, presenters, discussants, and all the other participants for being here today. i wish you all two days of very fruitful exchange and discussion.
crockett, to deliver the fourth hkma distinguished lecture. mr crockett, please.

joseph yam : fourth hong kong monetary authority distinguished lecture : opening remarks opening remarks by mr joseph yam, chief executive of the hong kong monetary authority, at the fourth hong kong monetary authority distinguished lecture on the theme of monetary policy and financial stability, hong kong, 13 february 2001. * * * it is an honour for me to welcome mr andrew crockett to deliver this fourth hong kong monetary authority distinguished lecture. i am also delighted to welcome dato ’ dr zeti akhtar aziz as the discussant. both are good friends of the hkma, and it is a special pleasure to see them here today before this large and diverse audience. i extend to all of you, on behalf of the hkma, a very warm welcome. the subject matter of this lecture – monetary policy and financial stability – is at the heart of central banking. much attention has been given to resolving the apparent conflicts between the two desirable objectives of monetary stability and financial stability, at the policy as well as the operation levels. the recent experience of a number of jurisdictions has indicated problems in achieving both simultaneously. some have gone as far as to introduce institutional changes to alleviate the tension, or the embarrassment, or the risk of policy credibility being undermined as a result of such conflicts. while the jury is still out on what institutional arrangements for delivering simultaneously monetary and financial stability are appropriate, there is doubt as to whether institutional changes, politically attractive as they may be, are the right answer. today andrew will give us his insights on the subject. he is particularly qualified to do so, being responsible for the running of the central bank of central banks. some of you may feel that this subject matter is a little arid. i am aware of the fact that those in the private sector have, particularly at this time of the year, more practical and " profitable " issues occupying their minds. but the achievement of monetary and financial stability is central to any successful economy and therefore important to the general conduct of business. it is also a burning issue in this region, where the experiences over the last few years have underlined its importance, and the consequences of failure. knowing andrew, who has an admirable ability to present technically complex issues of money and finance in the simplest of terms, i am sure you will find the subject refreshingly interesting. andrew crockett has been general manager of the bank for international settlements since 1994. to pursue the classroom metaphor that i used at the last lecture to describe how central bankers
permit the texts to be significantly improved along these lines. i believe that the citizens of europe count on the european parliament to take a broader perspective and drive these changes forward. there are also some important areas in which care should be taken not to weaken the texts. in particular, softening the stability and growth pact by introducing further exceptions or treating in a special way specific expenditure items, such as public investment, would create further room for unwarranted discretionary decisions. it is also of crucial importance that the economic governance reform is fully implemented as soon as possible and without any transition period. beyond fiscal and broader macroeconomic governance, it is important to remember that economic union comprises a third governance pillar which is equally important : the structural reforms embedded in the “ europe 2020 ” strategy and the euro plus pact. structural reforms are essential to elevate the growth potential of the euro area in the face of ongoing debt sustainability challenges and future age - related expenditures. a specific example where urgent progress is needed is the incomplete single market in services. it makes full economic sense and it is urgent to complete the single market in the sector in which a very large majority of people in europe work. when emu was first established, many people asked how monetary union could function effectively in a europe of sovereign states. the answer is simple : it can function effectively with an appropriate economic union. it is fully recognised that this economic union must be one where countries that wisely follow a virtuous economic path are rewarded, and those that pursue unsustainable policies have to internalise the costs of their actions. at the same time, economic union implies interconnectedness, and it is in all countries ’ interest not to exacerbate difficulties by creating uncertainty in financial markets. we look to an economic union where all countries face up to their individuals responsibilities, but also an economic union which remains guided by a common cause and destiny. * * * bis central bankers ’ speeches turning now to monetary policy, the challenges central banks are facing in fulfilling their role of a stable anchor are large. first, decisions have to be made in an environment marked by a very high degree of uncertainty. although operating in an uncertain environment is common business for central banks, i would argue that structural transformations of our economies, the ever - growing complexity of global finance and the overall process of globalisation are itself creating a multidimensional acceleration of change leading to increased uncertainty on the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. in addition, in crisis

of europe can rely on our strong determination to ensure a very solid anchoring of inflation expectations – something that is more important than ever in turbulent times. thank you for your attention. bis central bankers ’ speeches
the issues addressed in today ’ s contributions will provide the basis for a rewarding discussion. once again – you are all very welcome! it is my pleasure to declare this workshop officially open. thank you. bis central bankers ’ speeches

come to interesting conclusions, but the most important is policy coordination. why is policy coordination important? • monetary policy is about short - run decisions on the direction of prices, and affects nominal variables ; while fiscal policy affects real variables. • it makes it easier for policy makers to achieve their stated policy objectives in a coherent and efficient manner. bis central bankers ’ speeches • ensures commitment to mutually agreed upon objectives, thus helping to eliminate the problem of time inconsistency in the design of policy. • it enhances the credibility, anchors public expectations, ensures sustainability of fiscal and monetary policies, thus promoting macroeconomic stability. ladies and gentlemen, to ensure success of policy coordination we need either of the following : • a continuous interaction between the fiscal and monetary authorities to decide jointly on aspects relating to policy design and implementation, or ; • a set of rules and procedures that minimize the need for frequent interaction. but we know all these, why was the eu zone not successful? as noted by sargent and wallace in their famous article “ some unpleasant monetarist arithmetic ”, “ tighter money today leads to higher inflation not only eventually but starting today ”. the paradox for tight monetary policy and heavy debt expansion will lead to economic stagnation, eddie buffie has demonstrated this for a number of countries in this region. moreover, ladies and gentlemen, the lack of credibility of the overall policy framework caused by the long - term inconsistency of such mix in signals diminishes the effectiveness of monetary policy. our experience with fighting inflation in kenya suggests that inflation may be occasioned by demand side as well as supply side factors. monetary policy uses interest rate as an instrument to fight inflation and anchor inflationary expectations. fiscal policy on the other hand raising debt domestically and using a mix of debt instruments drives the domestic interest rate structure. how policy makers coordinate and consolidate their efforts not only affects expectations concerning future policies and outcomes but can also affect the outcome of economic activity. ladies and gentlemen, several papers that link fiscal policy, monetary policy and inflation have been lined up for presentation today. as you listen to the presentations and the discussions, it is important that we filter the conclusions first to reach to the frontier of this subject matter and provide renewed thinking in the policy arena. the recommendations of these papers should fit in the policy dialogue and policy making process to support growth and employment as envisaged in vision 2030 in kenya. as i conclude, i would like to thank all the participants present. i hope
a public debate and consultation process is now under way. second, an effort to co - ordinate action on the remaining barriers to the development of the bond market is in motion. a very important motivation for this is the sharp rise in infrastructure spending and the need to ensure that this is not hindered by financial constraints. third, a process of consultation with individual banks with the objective of developing realistic financial inclusion plans is going on. i will conclude by highlighting three balancing acts that our financial sector development strategy needs to perform : 1. between the drivers of financial sector growth and the requirements of the larger growth and development agenda 2. between the benefits and risks of greater global integration 3. between the advantages of scale and the compulsions of diversity i trust that these thoughts will be a useful input into the discussions that follow and i thank the organizers of this panel for the opportunity to share them with you.

need a banking licence. when you keep the money of the public in account, you are a financial entity taking deposits and you must be public trustworthy and so be regulated as a deposit taking financial entity. just because one country in the world failed to recognise such an entity as a bank and allowed it to function as a nonbank, we cannot follow such a wrong model. 41. another criticism is that the reserve bank is too conservative in granting licences or registrations for payment systems and payment entities. it is said that this sector needs to be freed of licensing mechanism and once a set of criteria are fixed, any number of entities meeting those criteria should be allowed to function. we differ from this idea. such a free entry may be appropriate for any other segment of goods and services, not for ‘ banking ’. every other good or service is primarily a one - off transaction, whereas banking is a continuing relationship, and 6 / 7 bis central bankers'speeches therefore “ fit and proper ” criterion is of utmost importance and consequently, “ free entry ” based on tick - box exercise is totally anti public safety. conclusion 42. to conclude, india has been enjoying a very healthy evolution of payment systems over the past thirty years. in looking back, we can easily admit that it had been a revolution, without being so realising. this has been the result of the measured road maps periodically adopted by the reserve bank, in the initial years as a developer and in later years as a catalyst and facilitator. today our systems are not only comparable to any systems, anywhere in the world, our systems also do set standards and good practices for the world to follow. we remain vigilant for ensuring safety and soundness of the payment systems and are committed to customer safety and convenience. 43. thank you for your patient attention. 7 / 7 bis central bankers'speeches
itself, by way of background. as i mentioned earlier, at a conceptual level everything seems relatively simple. monetary policy in canada has one objective – achieving and maintaining a low, stable and predictable level of inflation. this objective was formalized in 1991 in an inflation - control agreement between the federal government and the bank. it identifies a specific target for the rate of this presentation updates and extends t. macklem, “ information and analysis for monetary policy : coming to a decision, ” bank of canada review ( summer 2002 ) : 11 – 18. bis central bankers ’ speeches inflation – the midpoint of an inflation - control range – as well as the price index that is to be used to measure inflation. since 1995, the target level for the inflation rate has been 2 per cent ( within a control range of 1 to 3 per cent ), as measured by the 12 - month rate of change of the total consumer price index ( cpi ). this may seem like a rather narrow objective – a topic that we will return to later in the presentation – but experience has shown that this is the best contribution that the bank can make to the economic well - being of canadians. the greater certainty that it provides with regard to the future path of prices allows households and businesses to make more informed spending and investment decisions, and minimizes the inequity associated with unexpected movements in prices. keeping inflation low, stable and predictable is a means to an end, not an end in itself. under normal circumstances, this single objective is pursued using a single policy instrument or tool – changes to the overnight rate of interest. 2 the overnight rate is set by the bank of canada and determines the rates at which banks and other selected agents are able to borrow and lend at the shortest end of the yield curve. but the story does not end there. movements in the overnight rate set in train a number of other changes throughout the economy that ultimately affect the rate of inflation. the transmission mechanism this monetary policy transmission mechanism can be described as follows ( figure 1 ). changes in the overnight interest rate influence the interest rates that the market sets on securities further out the yield curve and with different risk and liquidity characteristics ( for example, mortgage rates ). they also influence the exchange rate – the external value of the canadian dollar. movements in these asset prices, in turn, affect aggregate demand in the canadian economy by influencing the spending and investment decisions of both canadians and foreigners. if strong aggregate demand pressures appeared likely to push output above

answer your questions. bis central bankers ’ speeches
arrangements, changed business models, and distinguished by new behaviors. and for the authorities, it also means adjusting our lens to account for systemic risks when we oversee the functioning market. 1 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches the details of all these are in the fsr and i invite everyone to download a copy. our goal is to reduce the uncertainties so that all stakeholders can make well - informed decisions. systemic risk is a complex topic to decipher and discuss but i am confident that you will find this fsr edition useful. thank you. 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches

benjamin e diokno : 2nd semester 2020 financial stability report speech by mr benjamin e diokno, governor of bangko sentral ng pilipinas ( bsp, the central bank of the philippines ), at the presentation of the 2nd semester 2020 financial stability report, manila, 17 november 2020. * * * ladies and gentlemen, friends from the media, good morning. your financial stability coordination council is proud to release today the 2nd semester 2020 financial stability report or the fsr. as you know, we made the decision early this year to shift from an annual publication to a twicea - year release, despite the difficulties to produce such a report. in fact, if i may just share with you a bit of trivia, we were about to release the fsr in late february only to completely re - do everything to put covid - 19 as the centerpiece. five months removed from our first semestral release in june, we thank you for joining us for our 2nd semester report. we all recognize the complications that covid - 19 has brought upon the philippine economy, and more so to our households, friends, and loved ones. but while our daily lives have changed since the pandemic, we should look beyond our current circumstances and prepare for tomorrow. doing so will give us direction and purpose, understanding the recent past but be better for the future. this is a central theme of the fsr that we issue today — that businesses and households are in a different situation than in 2019. nevertheless, the fsr offers a distinct vision of tomorrow, which we have crafted after considerable reflection. we believe that the future will continue to carry a premium on physical space and the trend towards digitization is irreversible. we also believe that there will be more granular changes in risk behaviors and consumer preferences. as simple as this sounds, this has significant effects on how products and services are produced and consumed. changes will be nuanced across different economic activities. this is because it is the distribution of purchasing power that matters. what can be bought, how and where things are consumed, the immediate preferences for investments, all these are likely affected by the income and risk aversion shocks which we outline in the fsr. we offer our vision for the new economy to serve as an anchor towards which stakeholders may transition. this new economy is not just a “ post - covid ” world. rather, we expect it to be defined by a different set of market