it has hastened the emergence of china, brasil and india as leading engines of global economic growth. it has given them greater legitimacy to hold an important role in global policy making. there is no clear hegemon any more able to centrally steer the process. second, the 2008 global financial and economic crisis has made more visible the gap between power and politics created by globalisation. 7 as interdependences and international spillovers have steadily grown, power, i. e. the ability to address today ’ s most pressing policy challenges, such as international macroeconomic cooperation, global imbalances, financial regulatory reform or protectionism has partly evaporated from the nation - state to the global level. but politics, i. e. legitimacy in taking decisions, remains largely local and national, as it was before. we have seen a similar gap between power and politics in the european debt crisis : developments in single member states where ultimately not controllable by the sovereign nation state anymore and they created spill - over effects on other member states through a number of channels in the internal market. member states lacked the power to tackle the problems while at the same time, institutions at the european level to fill this gap were either missing or the working methods were inadequate for crisis management. we have made remarkable progress in enhancing the governance structures in europe in 2012 and in closing the gap between power and politics. the esm is fully functioning, we have improved the working methods of the eurogroup and we are working on a banking union. still much needs to be done in enhancing european governance in the next years following the four presidents ’ report. most importantly from my perspective, we have to strengthen democratic legitimacy on the european level and thus the role of the european parliament. 2. salient evolutions in global economic governance since the onset of the crisis and their limitations global economic governance has not remained immobile since the onset of the crisis. importantly, it has become more inclusive, notably through the ascent of the g20. it has been reformed to account for the growing importance of emerging market economies in the global economy. i was involved in g20 meetings of finance ministers and central bank governors since this forum first met in berlin in 1999 and i also served as the chancellor ’ s sherpa in the see z. baumann ( 1999 ), in search of politics, stanford university press. bis central bankers ’ speeches cannes summit in 2011. nobody participating in the first gathering, which took place less than

which action could be taken. second, some have argued that the g20 could establish a permanent secretariat. 14 this would ensure continuity in agenda setting. there have been recent examples since the crisis of informal structures that have been usefully formalised, such as the shift from the financial stability forum to the financial stability board. these ideas might give a sense of direction towards which to steer the g20 in the long run, but they are not easily implementable in the near term. in the near term, the ability to deliver results, the credibility, and therefore the legitimacy, of the g20 could be strengthened by improving existing processes. i see here three important avenues. first, it is important for the g20 to increase the accountability and transparency of its decision - making process. vague goals and non - measurable objectives leave too much scope for interpretation and reduce credibility. recently some progress has been made on agreeing on more concrete objectives. more recently, no later than last week in moscow, g20 finance ministers and central bank governors agreed to adopt an assessment process on the implementation of the structural reform commitments. however more efforts need to be undertaken in this regard. second, a more focused and concise and operational agenda might also be helpful. since its inception, g20 meetings ’ agendas have gradually expanded. they now encompass a wide range of global policy themes which go beyond macro policy coordination. while in some cases, this has been helpful in engaging e. g. developing countries, in a structure with an annual rotating presidency and without a permanent secretariat, it is difficult to make progress on an ever increasing number of issues in a meaningful way. finally, it has been also suggested that the g20 could enhance its legitimacy by relying more on international financial institutions and engaging current non - members on an issue - by - issue basis, rather than by expanding its membership overly, which could dilute its effectiveness. 15 greater involvement of international organisations, whose membership is universal, could significantly increase the legitimacy of decisions taken at the g20. involving countries which are currently not a member of the g20 on an issue - by - issue basis could equally improve its legitimacy. currently, the g20 presidency can invite some non - members. however, the selection process remains ad - hoc. using more objective criteria to involve certain non - member on issues for which they are of systemic relevance could be useful in this respect. to conclude, the 2008 global and financial crisis has shown the need for more global solutions. global