samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
has fallen to a low level of 4 percent. 1 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches inflation is another story. the fomc defines price stability as 2 percent inflation, as measured by the personal consumption expenditures ( pce ) price index. 1 our commitment to 2 percent inflation is an important bedrock principle, providing a " north star " for policy decisions and helping to improve the public's understanding of our goals and actions. inflation reached a 40 - year high of 7 percent this past june. while it has since moderated to 5 percent, it is still well above our longer - run goal. without price stability, we cannot achieve maximum employment on a sustained basis. that is why it's so important for the fomc to use its monetary policy tools to bring inflation down. the inflation gears our most important policy tool is the setting of the target range for the federal funds rate, which influences demand for goods and services by affecting borrowing costs. to show how this is helping to reduce inflation, i've been using an analogy of a mechanism, such as a watch, that is powered by gears. the watch represents the economy, and its gears are different sectors. to keep time accurately, the gears need to turn at the right speed. but the ones that drive inflation have been spinning at different rates. the first inflation gear relates to globally traded commodities, such as lumber, steel, and grains. thanks in part to tighter monetary policy here and abroad, demand has eased, and commodity prices have moderated. the second gear, which represents goods such as cars, appliances, and furniture, is turning nearer where it needs to be, as higher interest rates have helped curb demand. supply - chain bottlenecks that plagued the economy earlier in the pandemic have receded, which is also helping bring goods price inflation down. 2 the gear that's having the most trouble turning represents non - energy services excluding housing. it's influenced by the balance of overall supply and demand for these services and labor, and it will likely take the longest to bring inflation in this sector down fully. well - anchored expectations one aspect of inflation that's important for achieving and sustaining price stability is the anchoring of inflation expectations. various measures of longer - run inflation expectations have remained well anchored at levels consistent with our 2 percent goal. 3 inflation expectations for the next few years, which increased as inflation was rising, have come down in recent months. the new york fed's

bis central bankers'speeches
caleb m fundanga : the history and experiences of the financial sector and regulatory framework in zambia address by dr caleb m fundanga, governor of the bank of zambia, at the co - operative bank capitalisation consultative forum “ the history and experiences of the financial sector and regulatory framework in zambia ”, lusaka, 3 march 2011. * * * the honourable minister of agriculture and co - operatives, hon eustarkio kazonga, m. p ; the board chairman of the co - operative bank zambia limited, mr mulilo kabesha ; members of the diplomatic corps ; distinguished invited guests ; ladies and gentlemen it is with great pleasure and privilege to speak to you at this very important consultative forum. i have been requested to speak briefly on the history and some of the experiences of the financial sector in zambia. ladies and gentlemen, as you are aware, considerable developments have been recorded in the zambia economy in general and the financial sector in particular, following the liberalization of the economy in the early 1990 ’ s. these developments include the proliferation of banks and non - bank financial institutions, which have necessitated the review of supervisory policies as well as the legal and regulatory frameworks in order re - align them to the liberalised environment. a significant development relating to the zambian financial sector was the decision to relocate the function of the registrar of banks and financial institutions to the bank of zambia from the ministry of finance and national planning where it was previously located. this decision was taken in an effort to enhance regulatory oversight of banks and financial institutions starting from the licensing stage. currently, all applicants have to be evaluated in line with relevant provisions of the banking and financial services act ( bfsa ) and international best practice such as the basel core principles on effective banking supervision. the intention is to ensure that only applicants who meet these stringent criteria enter the financial system in zambia. this is crucial for fostering confidence and stability in the financial system. mr chairman, you may be aware that in the early stages of the reforms, a number of commercial banks faced serious problems and were subsequently liquidated. the closures were in part a consequence of the reforms. the reforms also highlighted some weaknesses in corporate governance arrangements at most failed banks. however, following improvements in the regulatory and supervisory frameworks, no bank closure has been recorded since 2002 and the banking sector has recorded significant growth. the growth in the sector can also be attributed to prudent fiscal and monetary policies aimed at achieving sustainable macroeconomic stability.

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sector will be fully addressed during the plenary sessions. these include sustaining macroeconomic stability through election cycles ; infrastructural development to support the productive sector and trade ; digitisation of the economy to enhance efficiency ; scaling up human capital development which is critical for sustainable growth and development, and last but not least, sustaining financial stability after the clean - up exercise. i believe that we will have fruitful deliberations from the distinguished panellists assembled for the various sessions. thank you. page | 4

##ary policy has to last longer to fulfill the mandate. so, “ weak dominance ” is essentially about whether policies complement or compensate for each other. and what determines this is the framework – whether it is strong enough to ensure the right policies dominate, and whether comprehensive enough to achieve that along all the relevant dimensions of policy interaction. while such a framework is important in any country, it is even more important in a multicountry union. in a single country coordination and policy adjustments involve a single treasury and economics ministry. but in a monetary union there are multiple different policymakers and policies to align. a strong framework that constrains discretion is therefore indispensable. fiscal dominance though there is much that can be said about how fiscal dominance in this context, i have discussed this elsewhere. 3 the risk of “ weak ” fiscal dominance was actually recognised by lamfalussy. he noted that the lack of an appropriate aggregate fiscal stance for the euro area could lead to monetary policy having to bear too much of the adjustment burden : “ the combination of a small community budget with large …. national budgets leads to the conclusion that, in the absence of fiscal coordination, the global fiscal policy of the emu would be the accidental outcome of decisions taken by member states.... as a result, the only global macroeconomic tool available within the emu would be the common monetary policy implemented by the european central banking system. ” 4 there is much to learn from this comment. but in the remainder of my remarks i would like to focus on two other areas where we learned important lessons from the crisis for our future framework : financial policies and structural policies. financial dominance for financial policies – that is, the governance of the banking sector – we saw clearly during the crisis how a weak framework can allow weak forms of dominance to take hold. both monetary and fiscal policies can have their choices constrained by so - called “ financial dominance ”. 5 for monetary policy, the problem stems mostly from inadequate supervision. at the micro level, if supervisors show too much forbearance to undercapitalised banks, they can end up effectively shifting the burden onto monetary policy – as when those banks lose access to market funding, or have to pay higher risk premia, they turn to central bank funding see speech by cœure, b. on “ outright monetary transactions, one year on ”, berlin, 2 september 2013. lamfalussy, a. ( 1989 ), macro - coordination of fiscal
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( 3 - year - long ) refinancing operations were conducted to remove liquidity uncertainty and facilitate the function of the euro area money market. again, the final objective was to improve the transmission of the proper monetary policy. another crucial segment in the monetary policy transmission is the government bond market. partly due its size – it is the largest capital market in the euro area – it lays the foundation for price formation in other capital markets, like bank and corporate bonds. government bonds are also important repo instruments. a year ago, in spring and summer 2012, fears of a break - up of the single currency area and the associated implicit exchange rate risk led to several tensions in the euro area capital markets. as a result, the steering of monetary policy was not functioning fully, or was, in part, not functioning at all. at the same time, economic indicators pointed to a significant credit crunch and a severe decline in economic activity. as a result, there was a risk of an incipient deflationary spiral ; the primary goal of the governing council – price stability – was not ensured. against this background, the governing council set up the omt programme. there are three crucial elements in the programme. first, a necessary conditionality is to ensure that the member state remains under considerable pressure to implement reforms and maintain fiscal discipline. second, this necessary conditionality is not yet sufficient. in addition an omt transaction must be warranted from a monetary policy perspective. this decision will be made independently by the governing council of the ecb. third, the transactions will be discontinued during the quarterly efsf / esm programme evaluation period. the continuation of omt transactions requires that the programme remains on track. the omt is designed to stay strictly within the mandate of the ecb. central banks have been able to play a stabilising role first against the forces of the financial collapse and then supporting a recovery of the real economy. but the central banks cannot repair the balance sheets. they cannot consolidate the public finances. central banks cannot implement the structural reforms. everyone has to take his or her own responsibility. bis central bankers ’ speeches we need more growth. how can we achieve it? the pace of recovery in advanced economies has been disappointing. still between 2001 and 2007, they grew 2. 3 %. between 2010 and 2012 annual average was 1. 3 %. the bis report from 23 june 2013 reads : “ the only major exception is germany, which bounced back from a
issuance with increased demand from municipal investors, including very strong inflows to municipal bond funds, and improved secondary market conditions. ultimately, the increased availability of credit to municipal borrowers helped them maintain employment and capacity by avoiding forced cutbacks in payrolls and other critical operations. the term asset - backed securities loan facility the term asset - backed securities loan facility ( talf ) supported the issuance of securities backed by newly and recently originated student loans, auto loans, credit card loans, commercial mortgages, loans backed by the small business administration, and certain other assets. the announcement and presence of the talf substantially helped improve liquidity in the asset - backed securities markets, including those for commercial mortgage - backed securities and collateralized loan obligations, and contributed to rapid improvement in credit markets for consumers and businesses. ultimately, the talf helped promote the longer - term, market - based financing that is critical to the real economy. summary of section 13 ( 3 ) facilities using cares act funding ( billions of dollars ) peak amount of assets2 14. 1 16. 6 6. 4 4. 1 current amount of assets2 12. 8 13. 6 5. 4 1. 6 treasury equity remaining3 13. 9 16. 6 6. 3 3. 5 maximum facility announced closed capacity1 corporate credit facilities mar. 23, 2020 dec. 31, 2020 main street lending program apr. 9, 2020 jan. 8, 2021 municipal liquidity facility apr. 9, 2020 dec. 31, 2020 talf mar. 23, 2020 dec. 31, 2020 note : the data are current as of june 17, 2021. 1. the maximum authorized amount of facility asset purchases. 2. current and peak outstanding amounts of facility asset purchases. • for the corporate credit facilities ( consisting of the primary market corporate credit facility and the secondary market corporate credit facility ), includes exchange - traded funds at fair value and corporate bonds at book value. asset balances from trading activity are reported with a one - day lag after the transaction date. • for the main street lending program, includes loan participations, net of an allowance for loan losses updated as of december 31, 2020, at face value. • for the municipal liquidity facility, includes municipal notes at book value. • for the talf ( term asset - backed securities loan facility ), includes loans to holders of eligible asset - backed securities at book value. 3. the amount of the treasury contribution to the credit facilities. source : for

the amount of assets and treasury equity remaining, see federal reserve board ( 2021 ), statistical release h. 4. 1, “ factors affecting reserve balances of depository institutions and condition statement of federal reserve banks, ” june 17, https : / / www. federalreserve. gov / releases / h41 ; the peak amounts of assets for each facility are based on the h. 4. 1 from the start of the corresponding facility until june 17.
was due to default of mortgage and other consumer debt. it is hard to tell what is a sustainable level of household debt, but most estimates suggest that us households are just about a third to halfway through the deleveraging process. this means probably another 3 – 5 years of sub - par household consumption growth in the us. 12. third, deleveraging by eurozone banks. there are two factors at work here. one, the quality of eurozone bank assets has come under pressure. two, eurozone banks are required to improve their capital adequacy positions so as to buffer against shocks. in particular, european banks are required to achieve a minimum core tier 1 capital ratio of 9 % by june this year. to the extent that banks cannot achieve the target capital ratios through retained earnings and capital raising, they will have to reduce their balance sheets. they can do this by selling assets or reducing lending. both will have a dampening effect on economic activity. given the global footprint of many eurozone banks, the effects will be felt not just in europe but elsewhere in the world. bis central bankers ’ speeches impact of deleveraging on asia 13. emerging asia will not be immune to this synchronised deleveraging in the advanced western economies. fiscal consolidation and household deleveraging in the us and eu will have significant spillover effects on asia, principally through the trade channel. asia ex - japan exports about a quarter of its goods to the us and europe. already, asian export growth has decelerated from 25 % at the beginning of 2011 to 10 % in the last quarter of the year. 14. while asian economies have started to restructure their economies towards increasing domestic demand, and intra - regional trade within asia has been growing, these trends will, at best, cushion only part of the fall in demand from the west. rebalancing of demand is a long - drawn process. it is unrealistic to expect asia to become the main engine of growth for the global economy over the next few years. 15. the deleveraging of eurozone banks will impact asia mainly through the financial channel, in the form of tighter credit. euro area banks as a whole provide 36 % of global trade finance loans, and french and spanish banks together account for more than two - fifths of trade finance loans in asia. 16. to - date, the impact on asia of deleveraging by eurozone banks has been quite limited. through most

up our internal capabilities and human resources, and actively consult the industry participants in our efforts to meet the challenges in the coming year.
operational risk supervision. second, various specific assessments have been made, such as the 2015 thematic review of cyber security risks or targeted onsite inspections. last but not least, the ecb has initiated a reporting framework for significant cyber incidents that was implemented as a pilot scheme in 2016 and will be rolled out to all significant institutions in 2017. 4 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches

mario draghi : hearing of the committee on economic and monetary affairs of the european parliament introductory statement by mr mario draghi, president of the european central bank, at the econ committee of the european parliament, brussels, 29 may 2017. * * * mr chairman, honourable members of the economic and monetary affairs committee, ladies and gentlemen, it is a pleasure to be back speaking to your committee for the second regular hearing of this year. i am also pleased that you have chosen as the topic for today ’ s hearing the role of financial innovation. this is only one element in the broader process of innovation which is taking place in the economy. but it is a decisive one, given the essential role played by financial markets in resource allocation. before addressing this topic, let me first review the economic outlook and discuss the monetary policy stance. the economic outlook the economic upswing is becoming increasingly solid and continues to broaden across sectors and countries. real gdp in the euro area has expanded for 16 consecutive quarters, growing by 1. 7 % year - on - year during the first quarter of 2017. unemployment has fallen to its lowest level since 2009. consumer and business sentiment has risen to a six - year high, supporting expectations of a further strengthening of growth in the coming months. downside risks to the growth outlook are further diminishing, and some of the tail risks we were facing at the end of last year have receded measurably. the fact that domestic consumption and investment are the main engines driving the recovery makes it more robust and resilient to downside risks, which relate predominantly to global factors. despite a firmer recovery, and looking through the volatile readings in hicp inflation over recent months, underlying inflation pressures have remained subdued. domestic cost pressures, notably from wages, are still insufficient to support a durable and self - sustaining convergence of inflation toward our medium - term objective. for domestic price pressures to strengthen, we still need very accommodative financing conditions, which are themselves dependent on a fairly substantial amount of monetary accommodation. at its june monetary policy meeting the governing council will receive an update of the staff projections and a more complete information set on which it will be able to formulate its judgement on the distribution of risks around the most likely outlook for growth and inflation overall, we remain firmly convinced that an extraordinary amount of monetary policy support, including through our forward guidance, is still necessary for the present level of underutilised resources to be re - absorbed
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2025. 1 / 2 bis - central bankers'speeches what does all of that mean for inflation? we've come a long way from the 8. 1 % inflation we saw last summer. as i mentioned, annual cpi inflation was down to 4. 3 % in march, led by falling goods price inflation, and we see further declines ahead. that's good news. but many canadians are still struggling to manage the rising cost of living, and prices of many things that people need to buy are still rising too quickly. food price inflation is just under 10 %. we expect food price inflation to come down in the months ahead, but services price inflation will take longer. continued strong demand and the tight labour market are putting upward pressure on many services prices, and those are expected to decline only gradually. we expect it will take until the end of 2024 to get inflation all the way back to the 2 % target. when we met last week, the bank's governing council discussed whether we've raised rates enough, and we considered the likelihood that the policy rate may need to remain restrictive for longer to return inflation to the 2 % target. governing council also discussed the risks around our projection. the biggest upside risk is one i just mentioned - that services price inflation could be stickier than projected. the key downside risk is a global recession. if global banking stress re - emerges, we could be facing a more severe global slowdown and much lower commodity prices. overall, we view the risks around our inflation forecast to be roughly balanced, but with inflation still well above our target, we continue to be more concerned about the upside risks. let me conclude. our job at the bank of canada is to get inflation all the way back to the 2 % target. we are encouraged with the progress so far. and seeing inflation get down to 3 % this summer will be welcome relief for canadians. but let me assure canadians that we know our job is not done until we restore price stability. price stability is important because it restores the competitive forces in the economy and allows canadians to plan and invest with the confidence that their money will hold its value. that's the destination - we are on our way and we will stay the course. with that summary, the senior deputy governor and i would be pleased to take your questions. 2 / 2 bis - central bankers'speeches