should avoid unnecessary destruction of value. 1 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches in view of these considerations, the post - crisis resolution frameworks seek to combine the preservation of systemic stability and the continuity of financial services with market discipline and the avoidance of taxpayer - funded bailouts of failed banks. this is also the main idea behind the bank recovery and resolution directive. in europe, the adoption of the bank recovery and resolution directive, which introduced a harmonised set of rules for the resolution of banks across the union, was followed two months later by the adoption of a very closely related instrument specifically aimed at the euro area, namely, a regulation establishing the second pillar of the euro area banking union, the single resolution mechanism. the first pillar of the banking union, the single supervisory mechanism, contributes significantly to enhancing bank resilience by applying very high prudential standards in a consistent manner to all supervised institutions operating in the euro area and by reducing risks to the system. however, despite enhanced regulation and supervision, bank failures will inevitably occur. the responsibility for preparing for and dealing with this eventuality lies with the second pillar, the single resolution mechanism. as we all know, this is an integrated, multi - level administrative mechanism, comprising a central component, the single resolution board based in brussels, and the national resolution authorities of the member states of the banking union ( including, by the way, the bank of greece ). the single resolution mechanism is responsible for both resolution planning and the actual implementation of resolution measures once a bank is deemed to be failing or likely to fail. to finance its resolution actions, it has access to a single resolution fund, which is pre - funded with contributions from the banking industry. the creation of the single resolution mechanism was a bold and decisive step towards the integration of european banking markets. subsequent events, including the handling of the failures of banco popular and sberbank, have confirmed its value. at the same time, through the efforts of the single resolution mechanism, banks in the union have become more resolvable and thus safer. not only have they built up their loss - absorbing capacity, but they have also developed their skills in all aspects of resolvability. moreover, the single resolution fund is now fully funded and mutualised, having reached its target amount. but this does not mean that all is well and that we should rest on our laurels. as last year's unfortunate events in the us, the uk and switzerland have shown, there is

nicholas c garganas : exchange - rate regimes on the road to emu : lessons from greece ’ s experience luncheon address by mr nicholas c garganas, governor of the bank of greece, at the seminar on “ monetary strategies for accession countries ”, hungarian academy of sciences, budapest, 28 february 2003. the references for the speech can be found on the bank of greece ’ s website. * * * ladies and gentlemen, i would like to thank magyar national bank, the institute of world economics of the hungarian academy of sciences, and the center of european integration studies of the university of bonn for inviting me to speak to you today. in contemplating the subject of this seminar, one is struck by how dramatically things have changed in the course of a decade. in 1992 and 1993, when the exchange rate mechanism - or erm underwent a series of speculative attacks, the prospects of a european monetary union were viewed, by many observers, with considerable skepticism. this skepticism was not without foundation. after all, hadn ’ t there been previous false starts on the road to emu? hadn ’ t the werner report prescribed a european monetary union by the end of 1970s? yet, here we are today, having fulfilled the dreams of pierre werner and his colleagues and having celebrated the fourth birthday of emu. today, i would like to address some lessons from the experience of greece, the newest member of the euro area, in its quest for emu membership. i will confront what appears to be a dilemma. as we have heard this morning, much of the economics profession appears to have been converted to the “ hypothesis of the vanishing middle ” ; for economies well integrated into world capital markets, there is little, if any, middle ground between floating exchange rates and monetary unification. effectively, this hypothesis rules out intermediate regimes. yet, a requirement for entering the euro area is participation in erm ii, which is, after all, an intermediate regime. how can this dilemma be resolved? the retreat from intermediate regimes before i discuss greece ’ s experience, let me address the reasons underlying the retreat from intermediate regimes. what has caused this retreat? first, an explosive increase in capital flows during the 1990s has made the operation of intermediate regimes problematic. as has already been discussed at this seminar by jorge braga de macedo and helmut reisen, according to the thesis of the impossible trinity, developed in the 1980s, under a system of pegged exchange rates and free capital mobility, it is not