%, compared with 35. 6 % in 2007. it should moreover be borne in mind that spanish credit institutions generally had, in the initial years of the crisis, high levels of provisioning and profitability, which probably contributed to generating excessive confidence in their ability to finance, through exclusively private means, the restructuring and strengthening of their capital. the preference for seeking out private solutions was naturally governed by the aim to minimise the impact for taxpayers ; but another determinant here was the objective to undertake the necessary reform of savings banks, which were by then subject to well - known problems of governance, it being considered that a strategy of widespread public aid could set back or make this reform more difficult. the question hanging in the air is whether the alternative of strong public aid to credit institutions in the initial phases of the crisis would ultimately have entailed a lower fiscal cost than the gradual approach opted for. but this question is, as economists would say, counterfactual, i. e. attempting to imagine the consequences – desired and undesired alike – of something that did not happen. whatever interest this question may have, naturally the report does not go into it, and i do not believe it is for the banco de espana to respond to it. 10 / 14 a second question is why some of the savings bank ipss did not withstand the double - dip recession and had to undertake further restructuring measures as from 2012. with hindsight, the ipss were in most cases clearly but a prior step to necessary and actual mergers, and several of these groups were evidently insufficient when faced with the second recession. yet it should be recalled that the ipss were an instrument that provided for the integration of savings banks and of credit cooperatives, which had less flexibility to undertake true mergers. the integration processes called for a voluntary agreement between the parties. in the midst of the crisis, these agreements were not easy and they required, moreover, the approval of the related regional government authorities. but in 2011 nobody, or practically nobody foresaw the double - dip recession and less still how violently it would affect the spanish economy. in april 2011 most agencies, including the imf, the oecd, the european commission and the banco de espana, were forecasting growth for our economy of around 0. 8 %, which at the end of the year turned out to be a decline in gdp of 1. 0 %, the biggest forecasting error on record in recent times for these institutions.

at the same time, one should not overlook the fact that in a country where land is scarce and substitute locations do not represent a competitive alternative, property remains a popular component of investment portfolios because of the widespread anticipation of large capital gains. developers, therefore, are willing, and indeed seem able, to hold on to vacant property in the expectation of a rebound in prices. this prevents prices from finding their true level. reference is made in your statement in the bank ’ s annual report to the independence of the institution. will this change with the entry into the euro area? if anything, the importance of the bank ’ s independence, which is already enshrined in maltese law and has been duly respected by successive governments, will be even greater once the bank becomes a member of the eurosystem. first of all, the autonomy of national central banks is mandated by the maastricht treaty. reflecting this requirement, the central bank of malta act now fully guarantees the institutional, functional, financial and personal independence of the bank and of the members of its decision - making bodies. as for the ecb, it has adopted low inflation as its overriding objective, and its independence helps to guarantee its ability to deliver on this commitment. as i said earlier, the governors who sit on the governing council of the ecb do so in a personal capacity and must be guided only by euro - area wide considerations. as members of this council, therefore, governors of national central banks must not only be persons of recognized professional competence and personal integrity, but they must also be prepared to defend their own bank ’ s as well as the ecb ’ s ability to act independently of political and other pressures.