policy decisions the fomc releases a statement concerning the decision made at the meeting on the same day. the statement contains the committee's basic view of the u. s. economy, the committee's decision regarding monetary policy, and the result of members'vote on fomc monetary policy action. the minutes of fomc meetings are released three weeks after the date of the policy decision, and transcripts of meetings are released with a five - year lag. the governing council does not release its minutes, transcripts, or details of members'votes. after the governing council meeting, the president, assisted by the vice - president, holds a press conference. the president makes an introductory statement, explaining the decision as well as the economic and monetary analysis, and this is then followed by a question - and - answer session. the mpc announces its interest rate decision immediately following the mpc meeting. the minutes of the mpc meetings are published two weeks after the interest rate decision. the record of the votes of the individual members of the committee is released in the minutes. as for the bank of japan, the policy board announces, immediately after the mpm, the decision on its guideline for money market operations for the intermeeting period ahead. since the mpm in february 2007, the record of the votes of the individual policy board members has also been released in the announcement of mpm decisions. shortly afterward on the same day, the bank publishes " the bank's view " in the monthly report of recent economic and financial developments, and the governor holds a press conference. the minutes of mpms are released around one month after the meeting concerned, and the transcripts of mpms are to be published ten years later. the bank also releases the outlook for economic activity and prices semiannually ( the april 2007 issue was released recently ). in addition, the governor reports to and attends the diet, and policy board members frequently give speeches and accept interviews. b. central bank communication with the market another important issue is how central banks adopting the committee structure should communicate with the market. given that the effects of monetary policy are transmitted via financial markets, enhancing transparency not only ensures the central bank's accountability to the public but also improves the effectiveness of monetary policy. however, enhancing the transparency of policy decisionmaking by committee involves difficult issues, unlike the case of individual decisionmaking where only one individual needs to be accountable for his / her decisions. central banks that

of risk managers, even supervisors, calling for caution were likely to carry less weight. during recessions, with losses clear and write - offs rising, caution would come to the forefront, and more - restrictive attitudes toward lending would be reinforced by the arguments of risk managers and supervisors who could point to the losses. one can, i think, begin to notice a change in recent years in this typical pro - cyclical behavior in bank credit availability in the united states. the change first became apparent in the minimal credit losses at the large u. s. banks during the asian debt crisis and russian debt default in the late 1990s. it was also noticeable when these same entities began to tighten lending standards during the later years of the last expansion, in contrast to typical patterns, in which tightening occurred near or after the peak. the moderation of pro - cyclical behavior is also apparent in the continued strength in the portfolios of these organizations and in the modest spreads on their subordinated debt during the recession. to be sure, part of the explanation is new techniques and instruments for shifting and sharing risks. but at bottom, i would argue, we are beginning to see the payoff from more - formal and rigorous quantitative risk - management techniques for credit decisionmaking, techniques that have also been central to the development of new instruments for hedging, mitigating, and managing credit risk. basel ii builds on and formalizes these developments in bank credit risk management. such a regime of greater formal attention to risk exposures, as under basel ii, offers the hope of a more stable pattern of credit availability. quantitative risk management should reduce the buildup of excessive unintended credit risks that have been assumed in expansions and thereby minimize the losses and associated tighter lending standards during recessions. such lending behavior, in turn, might well reduce the cyclical pattern in minimum capital requirements that would occur without the better riskmanagement techniques required under the proposed basel ii. the response to more - formal risk management thus creates the reasonable prospect of a reduction in concerns about the pro - cyclicality of capital ratios under basel ii. in the past, problems have arisen when banks have been too complacent in their judgments of risks during good times, too slow to react when the situation turns, and too risk - adverse once their losses have turned out larger than anticipated. a process that encourages banks to think more carefully and more pro - actively about all of these possibilities offers the hope of a significant improvement in