effect that this has in europe and sweden. after many years of exceptional growth, a rapid cooling off is now taking place in the american economy. the indicators that have been received in recent months have mainly led to successively downward adjustments of future gdp growth in the united states by most forecasters. what argues in favour of a brief downturn is the fact that the effects of the it development in spreading to the rest of the economy can hardly be regarded as exhausted. investments in the american economy have been of a record size and a lot of these investments have been related in fact to it investments. depreciation periods are also short there, which in itself reduces the risk for locking - in effects in large mistaken investments. however, it can also be noted that both households and companies have a high level of debt. they have invested and consumed more than they have produced during the period in question and the current account has therefore been in substantial deficit for a number of years. ( see diagram 1 ). the savings deficit indicates high indebtedness in both households and businesses. if optimism about the future were to be replaced by considerable uncertainty, the high indebtedness would per se reinforce the cyclical downturn and make it more prolonged. uncertainty about the future can lead to businesses and households restraining demand in order to consolidate. financial savings in different sectors in us, per cent of gdp 8, 0 % 6, 0 % private sector 4, 0 % 2, 0 % 0, 0 % current account - 2, 0 % - 4, 0 % public sector - 6, 0 % - 8, 0 % the earlier optimism about the american economy also made it attractive to invest in american assets. this resulted in the dollar appreciating greatly despite the large deficit in the current account - the strong demand for investments in american companies and shares resulted in the effects from the current account deficit being counteracted. when optimism has reduced in the past six months, interest in american investments has also been reduced and the dollar has weakened. although there is fundamentally a lot to indicate that the american economy will continue to be able to grow for a period to come at a historically high rate, there is also an evident risk that there will first be a fairly strong downturn. there is also a risk that uncertainty about the future will drastically reduce households ’ consumption and increase their low saving, that investments will drop and that the dollar will clearly weaken because other countries are no longer willing to finance the gigantic current account

##u and sander tordoir for their contributions to this article. i remain solely responsible for the opinions contained herein. 2 see standard eurobarometer 88, which was carried out by the european commission between 5 and 19 november 2017. 3 see reinhart, c. and rogoff, k. ( 2009 ), this time is different : eight centuries of financial folly, princeton university press. 4 see jaumotte, f. et al. ( 2013 ), “ rising income inequality : technology, or trade and financial globalization? ”, imf economic review, vol. 61 ( 2 ), pp. 271 - 309. 5 see oecd ( 2012 ), employment outlook 2012. 6 see devereux, m. et al. ( 2008 ), “ do countries compete over corporate tax rates? ”, journal of public economics, vol. 92 ( 5 - 6 ), pp. 1210 - 1235. 7 the former represents a textbook view of international trade, whereby gains from trade are unevenly distributed ( e. g. between skilled and unskilled workers ) but can be fully equalised by means of lump sum transfers. for an example of the latter view, see rodrik, d. ( 2017 ), “ too late to compensate free trade ’ s losers ”, project syndicate, 11 april. 8 see also bourguignon, f. ( 2016 ), “ inequality and globalization ”, foreign affairs, january / february, pp. 11 - 15. 9 see jaumotte, f. et al. ( 2013 ), op. cit. 6 / 7 bis central bankers'speeches 10 see baldwin, r. ( 2016 ), the great convergence : information technology and the new globalization, belknap press : an imprint of harvard university press. 11 see badinger, h. ( 2005 ), “ growth effects of economic integration : evidence from the eu member states ”, review of world economics, vol. 141, no 1, pp. 50 - 78. 12 see rueda - cantuche, j. m. and sousa, n. ( 2016 ), “ eu exports to the world : overview of effects on employment and income ”, dg trade chief economist notes, issue 1, european commission, february. 13 see chopin, t. ( 2017 ), “ defending europe to defend real sovereignty ”, policy paper no 194, notre europe – jacques delors institute and robert schuman foundation