the 12 - month euribor, 18 the main interest rate to which the stock of mortgages in spain is linked ) will lead to a rise of almost 2 pp in the proportion of households with a high net interest burden. 19 this effect would be most pronounced among indebted households between the 20th and 40th percentiles of the income distribution. 20 this exercise was conducted drawing on information from the 2017 spanish survey of household finances ( eff by its spanish abbreviation ). the latest financial stability report includes the results of the exercise for various interest rate hike scenarios. it was found that the proportion of households with a high net interest burden would rise by 1. 2 pp, 2. 3 pp and 3. 9 pp, respectively, if interest rates were raised by 100 bp, 200 bp and 300 bp. the 12 - month euribor has risen from - 0. 501 % at 31 december 2021 to 1. 091 % at 20 june 2022. the net interest burden is considered to be high when the ratio of ( debt service expenses - interest income from deposits ) to household income is over 40 %. these percentages should be considered as the lower bound of the total impact of the interest rate rise, as this would also reduce agents ’ income, through its negative impact on economic activity, and would curb the accumulation of wealth on account of the higher net interest burden. as far as general government is concerned, the steep rise in the public debt - to - gdp ratio seen since 2007 also means that public finances are more sensitive to interest rate movements. however, the fall in interest rates of recent years has led to a continuous decline in the interest burden as a percentage of gdp, while at the same time, longer average debt maturities ( currently standing at more than eight years ) limit the short - term impact of higher issuance costs. specifically, incorporating the current market expectations for rising interest rates into the banco de espana ’ s latest macroeconomic projections, the public debt burden would increase from 2. 2 % of gdp at end - 2021 to 2. 5 % in 2024. under this updated scenario, an additional 100 bp increase in short and long - term interest rates, with all other variables remaining constant, will further drive up interest payments by around 0. 4 pp of gdp by 2024. as regards the impact of rising energy prices, variations similar to those observed between the banco de espana ’ s december 2021 and march 2022 projections21 would have moderate average effects on

not mean never committing errors but rather recognising such errors in time. the consequences of the other example of the mishandling of moral hazard were worse. i refer here to the initial reaction to the euro area sovereign debt crisis. as we have often repeated at the european central bank, the negative consequences of openly admitting the possibility of sovereign debt default by one of the euro area countries, and even of demanding default as a centrepiece of any bail - out programme, were perhaps not taken sufficiently into account. and these factors have no doubt contributed significantly to the crisis attaining its current scale. but let us be clear : avoiding the costs associated with the potential bankruptcy of or default by banks and countries is perfectly compatible with laying down rigorous conditionality criteria when extending aid to resolve crises. averting bankruptcies in specific cases does not mean going “ soft ” on banks or countries which took on too many risks or incurred excessive debt. countries or credit institutions should be helped only in exchange for strict conditions. and not only for moral reasons ( never helping those who do not help themselves ), but essentially because to be able to stand on one ’ s own two feet it is necessary to enact far - reaching restructuring and reforms. the experience of the imf is most illustrative as regards the importance of demanding strict conditionality criteria so that aid programmes may be successful. another fairly common mistake is to believe that crisis - management solutions should always and everywhere be the same. before applying uniform measures, it should be borne in mind that countries may differ in respect of their problems, their legislation and their institutional structure. likewise, learning from the past may prove of limited use when it comes to teaching us how to act in the face of a crisis such as the present one. as i have illustrated when talking about the spanish case, the current crises may generate a very different pathology from those in the past, which means new solutions tailored to the present - day problems must be sought. in this respect, a consistent and internationally coordinated response to the crisis must be made compatible with a reasonable adaptation to the specific circumstances of each country. for example, it is one thing handling a bank crisis in a country where the major systemic institutions have been seriously affected and where, therefore, a rapid response is called for, providing all the public aid needed to avoid the harmful consequences that a bank failure might have on the banking sector and on the economy as a whole. it is quite different in another country where the problems are confined