steps toward increased data and transparency in the u. s. treasury market. earlier this year, finra began releasing daily aggregate data on treasury market transactions, and at this conference last year, the u. s. department of the treasury announced plans to release trace transaction 1 / 2 bis - central bankers'speeches data for on - the - run nominal coupons. however, even with this progress, gaps in transparency remain. in march, the treasury markets practices group ( tmpg ), which is sponsored by the new york fed, put out a white paper on data availability and transparency in the u. s. treasury market that identified several gaps, particularly in the dealer - to - client cash market and the repo market. looking at the gap in the cash market specifically, there appears to be opportunity for improvement in providing transparency around transaction - level data. i am looking forward to the increased transparency in on - the - run transaction data that i mentioned earlier. looking further ahead, we should consider whether to take additional steps toward increased transaction transparency across the treasury universe, especially for the less liquid segments of the treasury market, such as the off - the - run market, where transparency is currently limited. the off - the - run market was the center of much of the dash - for - cash selling of treasuries that occurred in march 2020, yet there is little data on off - the - run trading available to the public, making it challenging for academics and others to study such stress events in detail. as we think about increasing transparency, it is important to exercise continued prudence, as there can be reasonable concerns about public transaction data, such as potential challenges that data may create around intermediating certain large trades. however, the success of public trace data transparency in the mortgage - backed securities and corporate bond markets provides guidance on how data can be shared without negatively impacting the market, such as displaying data with appropriate mitigation measures like time delays and capped trade sizes. in fact, academic research has generally found that the introduction of trace data transparency in these markets resulted in increased competition and reduced transaction costs. additionally, we can learn more about how to structure public releases of data on less - liquid securities by studying the future release of on - the - run transaction data. greater transparency into treasury market activity can support the market's many important roles : as a risk - free benchmark for financial instruments ; as a liquid investment and source of safe collateral ; as a channel

variety of private sector contracts, including in interest rate futures and swaps. many bank loans are priced to the wall street journal ’ s prime rate, which since the mid1990s has been set by convention to 300 basis points above the fomc ’ s target rate or range. 9 see dudley, “ the importance of financial conditions in the conduct of monetary policy, ” march 30, 2017. 10 when i refer to repo rates, i mean those on repo backed by treasury securities generally, rather than specific treasury issues – that is, “ general collateral ” repo.. see copeland, davis, lesueur and martin, “ mapping and sizing the u. s. repo market, ” june 25, 2012. 11 these new floating net asset value, liquidity fee and gating rules apply to municipal ( tax - exempt ) money market funds as well. municipal ( tax - exempt ) money markets are beyond the scope of my remarks. 12 competition could have suffered, for example, if too few prime funds continued lending to banks, giving the remaining funds some market power. similarly, if the supply of funds in the secured market were to become overly large relative to banks ’ balance sheet capacity, those banks willing to accept these funds could potentially obtain some market power. 13 other money market investors have similar broad mandates and play a role in promoting relative value between the secured and unsecured markets. however, some such investors, such as nonfinancial corporations and foreign official institutions, appear to have limited ability to dynamically reallocate funds among asset classes, perhaps because of limited information or investment mandate restrictions. further research to explore mechanisms by which money market lenders substitute between secured and unsecured investments may prove helpful. 14 chen, cipriani, la spada, mulder and shah. “ money market funds and the new sec regulation, ” march 20, 2017. 15 for a broad perspective on how financial regulation changed after the crisis, see tarullo, “ departing remarks, ” april 4, 2017. 16 the u. s. regulatory capital rules include two leverage ratios : the tier 1 leverage ratio and the supplementary leverage ratio ( slr ). the tier 1 leverage ratio applies to all banking organizations subject to the regulatory capital rules. it is measured as tier 1 capital divided by weekly or daily average total consolidated assets. the minimum tier 1 leverage ratio requirement is 4 percent and is currently in effect. the slr is effective january 1