to stay open to contacts and interactions with countries across the world, even if we do not share their views, values and partner countries. an example includes the course participants provided by the joint vienna institute – the jvi – which is managed by the imf with financial and other support provided by the austrian ministry of finance and the oenb. the jvi offers policy classes to civil servants of member states in central, eastern and southeastern europe ( cesee ) and in central asia. should it remain open to all member states without limitations or can, and should, some limitations be imposed that make a moral point but also signal support for multilateralism? besides these down - to - earth considerations, i consider a discussion on international policy coordination eminently important at the current juncture. two weeks ago, i returned from the imf spring meetings in washington, d. c., where stress factors like fiscal legacies of the pandemic, growing geoeconomic fragmentation, military conflicts and climate change were on everybody's mind. all these things are happening at the same time and are partially reinforcing one other. this creates a situation that has been referred to as a " polycrisis. " no nation can solve a problem like climate change or 2 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches geoeconomic fragmentation on its own. therefore, the polycrisis would warrant a coordinated policy response from all nations affected. if we coordinate our political efforts, we are likely to produce positive spillovers from one country to another. but how likely is it that we will see such a coordinated response? to coordinate economic policies among sovereign nation states, we would need a reliable international policy framework, a rules - based order if you will. but in the recent past we have witnessed a decline in the general willingness to accept the rules of a multilateral order. several nation states took unilateral decisions which served their national interest, and a more power - based system has been emerging. this reflects a certain short termism. while it may be in the national self - interest to diverge from established rules at any particular moment, doing so undermines the very existence of the multilateral order that benefits us all in the long run. this is a classic example of dynamic inconsistency which has also affected monetary policy and which was the motivation for central bank independence. in the field of international policy coordination, we are also faced with a prisoner's dilemma : there may be political incentives

and growth pact ( sgp ), which provides a clear, transparent and simple framework. today ’ s discussion about making the sgp rules more flexible as a short - term remedy to the fiscal problems occurring in some member states is counterproductive and at odds with the maastrichtconsensus. in my mind, the sgp works as it is. the problem has been in its implementation. it is not the pact itself which has disadvantages or which has failed. it is the missing will of several governments to fulfil their responsibilities and obligations - they failed. thus, should the rules be made exceedingly complex and contingent on too many exceptional economic circumstances, this will clearly weak the sgp in its implementation and credibility. therefore, i would like to stress that a return onto a path of long - term sustainable public finances is necessary in order to foster the public trust in this pillar of the emu stability architecture and to cushion possible effects of the lisbon structural reform agenda as well as to moderate the challenges of ageing societies in europe. where and how does central and eastern europe enter this picture? the deepening of the european union came along with the widening of the european union. since the fall of the iron curtain 15 years ago, the central and eastern european countries have made impressive and successful, and often painful, experiences of transition to market economies ; efforts there have been crowned by their accession to the eu. membership includes the commitment to the eventual adoption of the euro. the creation of the euro area was based on the sustainable fulfilment of the maastrichtconvergence criteria, and they will be applied to future euro area entrants in the same way. these criteria form a coherent package based on a set of economic indicators that is neither negotiable nor subject to change. from a legal perspective, this ensures continuity and equal treatment, from an economic perspective, the logic of lasting convergence has not changed and is all the more important when countries are at different stages of economic development. as was pointed out in the last convergence report of the ecb, new member states still have some way to go and nominal and real convergence with the euro area differs considerably in some of the new member states. therefore, reform efforts and implementation of sound policies, especially in the fiscal field, are still required on the way to monetary union. in this light, a weakening of the stability and growth pact would certainly send a wrong signal to any new eu country.