of the renminbi ’ s role to rival some of the main ae currencies looks at this stage uncertain. on the one hand, previous experience with the us dollar during the early 20th century shows that major shifts in the international monetary system can occur rapidly. on the other hand, china is still far away from meeting all the above noted conditions to provide its currency with international status, and the road ahead does not seem to be an easy one. in this respect, barry eichengreen has noted that the race to the consolidation of the renminbi as a global currency should be seen as a marathon, and not as a sprint. 5 but irrespective of the above comments, would an international monetary system with more international currencies be stronger than the present one? in my view, with a long - term perspective in mind, the answer is affirmative. for one, the more individual economies that enjoy macroeconomic and eichengreen, barry ( 2015 ) : “ china ’ s money goes global : the how, the when and the why ”, the milken institute review, fourth quarter. financial stability, are open to trade and financial flows, and have deep and liquid capital markets, among others, the more the system as a whole is likely to be sound and efficient. in addition, a higher number of international currencies entails greater possibilities to diversify overall portfolio risk, a certainly valuable opportunity for asset managers, and especially reserve managers. a multicurrency reserve system, once established, will probably reduce the risk of a persistent overvaluation of assets, including exchange rates. to this, one may add more evenly distributed benefits among countries from their role as reserve issuers, such as seigniorage gains and lower interest rates on their debt, as well as a decreased risk of major and persistent global external imbalances. on the other hand, it is important to stress that a multicurrency reserve system, as well as the road leading to it, is not free of difficulties. take the case of renminbi internationalization. this process requires, among other things, a comprehensive opening of china ’ s financial markets to foreign transactions, as well as a floating exchange rate. as shown by recent episodes, any moves in this direction could have unintended consequences, both for the domestic economy and for the global financial system. more generally, experience demonstrates that the process of financial and exchange rate liberalization in other countries may

2021. in the central scenario, the economy will grow below its potential for several more quarters, so that the gap will continue to narrow and will turn negative beginning at the end of this year. in this scenario, gdp will post annual variations between 1. 75 % and 2. 25 % this year, between - 1. 5 % and - 0. 5 % in 2023, and between 2. 25 % and 3. 25 % in 2024. for this three - year period, our projection contemplates a fiscal spending trajectory that is consistent with that described in the last public finance report. activity outlook foresees that private consumption will continue to tighten, a result that largely stems from the expiration of the massive income - support measures adopted in 2021, as well as from the tightening of monetary policy. about investment, weak performance is anticipated through the remainder of 2022 and all of 2023, reflecting less favorable financial conditions, increased business pessimism, a higher real exchange rate, and declining, albeit slowly, uncertainty ( table 1 ). the current - account deficit will decrease in the coming quarters, in line with the continued adjustment of spending on tradables and a much more favorable savings - investment balance than in 2021. as income stimulus measures will not be repeated, both public and household savings will improve drastically compared to 2021, triggering a significant drop in the current - account deficit from the second half of this year onwards. higher interest rates, the high exchange rate, and lower international shipping costs will also contribute to this. by the end of 2022, it will be reduced by more than 2pp of gdp — accumulating 6. 3 % in the year — and by 2023 it will be between 3 % and 4 % of gdp. measured at trend prices, the deficit reduction will also be rapid and significant : from around 9 % in 2021 to around 3 % in 2023. ( figure 12 ). the external impulse to the chilean economy will be reduced mainly due to less favorable financial conditions and terms of trade, along with lower global demand. the central scenario anticipates that the fed's monetary policy will contract somewhat further, and for a longer period of time, than the fed announced in the june fed dots, which will result in long - lasting restrictive international financial conditions. this is the main factor behind the lower growth forecast for our trading partners, which will be at 2. 6 % this year and next. copper price will also