the demand for a particular type of loan may have disappeared, the fact that there is still a possibility to borrow may have a stabilising effect. we will not be in too much of a hurry. and there are at least two items we need to be able to cross off the list before we begin phasing out the measures. we must be able to say with a good degree of certainty that the situation in the financial sector is stable and that it can function normally without support. we must also be in a situation where we expect to be able to attain the inflation target and stimulate the economy sufficiently without the unconventional measures. there are other measures that require more active decisions by the riksbank to be phased out. for instance, the number of counterparties allowed to participate in fine - tuning operations and the list of securities accepted as eligible collateral for credit from the riksbank. however, it is not self - evident that these measures will actually be phased out. these are questions of a more technical nature that we will examine further before it is time to make a decision. have the extraordinary measures had an effect? so have the extraordinary measures had an effect? it is difficult to say exactly what has affected the economy and in what way during a period when so much has happened, and so quickly. but certainly there are signs that the situation has improved. a more general observation is that lending in the swedish economy does not seem to have been tightened more than can be expected in a recession. the fact that confidence between different participants in the financial markets more or less completely drained away at the beginning of the crisis raised concern over a potential credit crunch. if the banks themselves experience funding problems, this could ultimately lead to a much more severe contraction in the supply of loans to households and companies than would normally occur in an economic downturn. this could in turn further worsen the economic situation, which we neither wished nor wish to see. but it appears as though the measures taken to restore confidence in the financial markets, together with the substantial cuts in the repo rate, have had the right effect. the opportunities to borrow in the market are relatively good, both for large companies and for banks. the riksbank ’ s company surveys and the national institute of economic research ’ s business tendency survey also indicate that the funding situation has improved. financial market statistics show that lending to households via banks and credit institutions is increasing, but at a slower rate than before ( figure 8 ). lending to companies

which funding currency the rates refer to. since the number of transactions in swedish kronor between panel banks has decreased, the stibor framework states that the banks'submissions can be based on judgements of their borrowing costs in foreign currency. the riksbank considers this unfortunate and that a reference rate in swedish kronor should be anchored in transactions in swedish kronor only. the definition of swestr is similar to those in euro, british pounds and danish kronor. like the ecb, the bank of england and nationalbanken in denmark, the riksbank has chosen to use deposit transactions with overnight maturity, and with a counterparty group that is wider than just the panel banks. the main reason is that this part of the money market tends to exhibit good and relatively stable transaction volumes, even in difficult times. the transition to swestr should begin now – it is a process that will take several years and some adjustments are required as swestr is now available, there is an alternative to stibor. we therefore call on market participants to step up their efforts for a transition to swestr. 5 however, in order for us to reach a point where transaction - based reference rates dominate in the market in sweden and internationally, certain adjustments are required in the financial markets. this process needs to run over several years. the greatest need for adjustment probably concerns maturities. the traditional interbank rates are available at several different maturities, for example three and six months. however, swestr and its international equivalents are only calculated at the shortest maturity, overnight. the reason for this, as i said, is that in sweden and abroad, it is at this maturity that a sufficient number of transactions are carried out. for the rate to be credible and representative, there needs to be a steady flow of enough transactions on which to base the calculation. the interbank rates can be developed at longer maturities even with a very limited transaction base, precisely because there is scope for the banks'own judgements – but this is also what makes them lacking in objectivity and easier to manipulate. alternatives to longer - term interbank rates being developed in order to address this problem, central banks in several countries are now working to ensure that the new reference rates can also replace interbank rates in contracts with longer maturities. in principle, it is possible to create forward - looking rates based on traded derivative instruments with the new rates as a base. however