board, european commission, single supervisory mechanism, and ecb in its monetary policy function : that cooperation has worked very well, in a very swift way, which is what you want to see in the case of resolution. would that be the case for any other bank? i don ’ t know. all banks are different, and, well, you know that quote from leo tolstoy, who said that all happy families are alike, and every unhappy family is different. so every failed bank is different. very diplomatic. one very last question, because we haven ’ t talked about china at all : when it comes to external factors, how should we look at china? 4 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches china remains a major area of interest for us. i would not say of concern, or risk, because so far the chinese authorities have been able to steer the transition in the chinese system very well, and to provide stability to the world economy. that said, there are issues to be addressed : shadow banking, corporate debt, transition towards domestic demand, transition towards a decarbonised economy. these are daunting challenges that will stay with us in the years to come, but so far the chinese authorities have been very successful in steering the economy and not making china become an issue for the global economy. we ’ ve got enough issues, so we don ’ t want china to become one of them. 5 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches

to make up the difference and are therefore self - defeating. but that ’ s also not quite right. the bundesbank study i just mentioned shows that just 1 % of german households are saving more because of low interest rates. for the vast majority – 77 % – those rates have not caused them to adjust their savings behaviour. what low interest rates are doing, however, is stimulating the economy and especially the demand for durable goods, like cars. that supports the recovery, boosts incomes and will ultimately lead us back to normalisation more quickly. if, on the other hand, we were to raise rates today, the opposite would happen. it would simply push us back into recession and rates would stay lower for longer. the second concern about our policy is that it threatens financial stability. low interest rates, it ’ s said, discourage balance sheet repair and create “ zombie banks ”. it ’ s also claimed that they encourage excessive risk - taking, leading to bubbles. and the longer they last, the worse the risks get. these are doubtless important issues – but is it really the task of monetary policy to react to them? after all, as far as policymaking is concerned, what matters for the health of banks is not the level of interest rates, but the quality of supervision. and thanks to the creation of the single supervisory mechanism ( ssm ) and the comprehensive assessment of banks ’ balance sheets, banks are actually stronger now than they were a few years ago. capital ratios for euro area banks have risen from around 8 % in 2007 to close to 14 % today. in other words, the risks are currently falling, not rising. what ’ s more, though low interest rates can encourage risk - taking, there are no warning signs of serious financial instability. financial crises are typically associated with strong credit growth and rising leverage in the banking system. what we see at the moment, however, is a nascent credit recovery and deleveraging among banks. in fact, coming out of a deep banking crisis, rapid credit growth would really be a “ luxury problem ”! that ’ s not to say we don ’ t see pockets of exuberance, for example in some housing markets. but euro area interest rates are set to achieve macroeconomic objectives, not to prick local bubbles. in fact, we ’ ve established a whole new macroprudential toolkit since the crisis precisely for that purpose, and if necessary countries should use it. and let me also add that if