the market anytime soon. europe in particular suffers from a lack of a significant real - money investor base that could step in. on the supply side, concomitantly, the profit generating potential of securitisation remains insufficient, since spreads for various abs still exceed the break - even levels from the issuer ’ s perspective. at the current levels of spreads, securitisation does not make economic sense for originators in most cases. at the same time, it would appear that current yields, with some exceptions, are not attractive to compensate for the perceived risks in the view of many investors. therefore, although there are some signs of improvement, the current situation in structured finance continues to impose market funding constraints on banks and to hamper banks in see “ the euro area bank lending survey ”, april 2010, ecb. providing credit to the economy. in this sense, securitisation is still certainly unable to fulfil the objectives that i highlighted at the beginning of my speech. going forward, the key question is therefore : how do we bring back investors to the securitisation markets? this is tantamount to asking : how can investor confidence in securitisation be restored? i believe that the development of transparent, comparable and simple securitisation structures, based on high quality standards of underlying assets, and with at least some market segments characterised by high liquidity, is a sine qua non condition for a return to self - sustaining securitisation markets. indeed, investors need to be able to exercise the required due diligence and to assess the assets that are on offer, with the support of the credit rating agencies, which in turn should have the information and the analytical capacities required for this purpose. this, in turn, calls for a careful definition of the information that should be shared among market participants. the issue of liquidity is even more complex because of the cumulative nature of the conditions underpinning it. enhanced secondary market liquidity will make the entrance of new investors more likely. a more liquid market may come as a result of better price disclosure, standardisation and less complex structures. however, without institutional investors, liquidity will not reappear. there is some circularity problem here since at the same time, it is more likely that institutional investors return to the market when market liquidity is proven to be there or strongly expected to be back. finally, less sophisticated and specialised investors may also enter the market

mid - 2018. clearly, this objective cannot be achieved without a strong commitment from the greek authorities to continue implementation of the reforms necessary to bring the fiscal stance on a sustainable path and to support growth. over the past years, greece has achieved a significant adjustment in terms of reversing the twin deficit of fiscal and trade balance. greece is moving towards a more outward - oriented economy with a prudent fiscal stance. the challenges, however, remain considerable, and it is essential to maintain the momentum and persist with the reform efforts to have a sustained improvement. regaining market access needs to be also based on restoring debt sustainability. to this end, the full implementation of the programme needs to be complemented by a set of debt - mitigating measures in accordance with the eurogroup agreement of 25 may 2016. this in turn can provide the assurance that markets require for financing the future needs of the greek economy. 1 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches what will happen to greece if this programme is not successful either? is there a plan b? there are already rumours and scenarios of a fourth memorandum of understanding ( mou ). this is not an option that anyone is considering. it is vital for greece that the third programme is a success. what do you believe will be the final outcome of the discussions on greek debt? will the interventions that will be decided now be enough to ensure the much talked - about “ sustainability ”? the ecb supports the need for debt measures in line with the eurogroup agreement of 25 may 2016. the nature of the measures is for the euro area member states to decide. the international monetary fund ( imf ) argues that greek debt is not sustainable and that the primary surpluses foreseen in the july agreement will be difficult to achieve. greece ’ s eu creditors take a different view. doesn ’ t this disagreement between the institutions send mixed signals to the international markets and to investors? all the institutions have voiced concerns about the sustainability of greek debt. there are different views on the primary surplus which the measures included in the mou can deliver, but diversity of views is in itself useful : risks should be highlighted and accounted for by specific debt measures. let me say again that i consider imf participation to be a factor of credibility for the programme. do you agree with the view that the policy mix applied in greece, with successive tax increases, spending cuts and high targets for primary surpluses, is “ deadly ” for economic growth? bringing public finances back into