ensure the robustness of new indicators vis - a - vis existing time series that can serve as a benchmark to validate those new indicators. at the bank of italy, we use big data and machine learning to support our routine economic and statistical analysis and to carry out research projects. so far, this activity has focused on three main areas : 1 ) indicators for now - casting and forecasting, 2 ) expectations of households and firms and 3 ) sentiment and confidence indicators. the main purpose has been to enrich the information set and create new real - time indicators and models to improve our analysis of the economy and the ability to anticipate future trends. some prominent examples are the following. angelico et al. 3 ( 2022 ) use social media such as twitter to measure inflation expectations for italy. using nlp techniques, the authors isolate the signal from the noise due to advertisements on tweets related to price ( s ) and inflation. they show that twitter - based a few days ago raj chetty from harvard gave a talk titled “ the economic impacts of covid - 19 : evidence from a new public database built using private sector data ” at amleds ( applied machine learning, economics, and data science ) webinar ( https : / / sites. google. com / view / amleds / home ) presenting the latest results of his work on the economic tracker https : / / opportunityinsights. org / wpcontent / uploads / 2020 / 05 / tracker _ paper. pdf. angelico c., j. marcucci, m. miccoli, e f. quarta ( 2022 ), “ can we measure inflation expectations using twitter? ”, journal of econometrics, volume 228, issue 2, 259 - 277, https : / / doi. org / 10. 1016 / j. jeconom. 2021. 12. 008. indicators of inflation expectations are not only significantly correlated with the traditional survey - based or market - based measures, but for the survey - based measures they are also informative in sample and they have predictive power even out of sample. we also use twitter to create sentiment indicators towards banks and analyze their relationship with deposit growth. indeed, accornero and moscatelli ( 2018 ) show that a twitter - based indicator of sentiment toward banks improves the predictions of a standard benchmark model of depositor discipline based on financial data. 4 astuti

in all of these questions. but on the other hand, it is obvious that the ecb, as a new institution, initially has to earn public confidence ( and thus at the same time due scope for the formulation of current monetary policy ), even though it is likely to have inherited a certain “ advance ” of confidence from the bundesbank. but the crucial issue affecting the stability of the euro will be that of how the relationship between national fiscal, economic, structural and wage policy, on the one hand, and supranational monetary policy, on the other, will evolve in the euro area. the fundamental problem is the same as in every country. a central bank can control the expansion of the money stock, at least over the medium term. but it depends on the other policy areas whether the leeway thus gained is exploited • for real economic growth at stable prices, or • for raising prices, accompanied by stagnating or even declining economic performance. thus, for preserving monetary stability, a central bank is always dependent on the cooperation of the government in power and of the parties to wage settlements ; it is only by means of a policy - mix that is compatible with stability that non - inflationary growth can ultimately be achieved. in the euro area we are now facing a special problem : a single monetary policy for eleven member states is accompanied by national responsibility for wage policy, fiscal policy and economic policy. it is true that a closer coordination of fiscal and economic policies is envisaged by articles 98, 99 and 104 of the ec treaty, and by what is known as the stability and growth pact ( i. e. above all : decisions on common features of economic policy and mutual budget surveillance ), but these coordination mechanisms still have to prove their worth in practice. a great deal will depend on policymakers behaving with sufficient discipline in the interests of the stability of the single currency. in order to shed more light on this dilemma, permit me briefly to address a particularly ticklish problem : assuming that a restrictive policy is being pursued, an increase in interest rates would have widely differing effects on the budget situations of the various member states, since the levels and maturity patterns of public debt diverge vastly. as this naturally also affects compliance with the rules of the stability and growth pact, a restrictive monetary policy also involves additional conflict potential. in this context, the important question of the durability of the internal cohesion of the euro area must not be disregarded,