in the “ quiet period ” before the meeting of the governing council on 20 and 21 january. page 2 of 4 ii. the challenges for 2021 after a few more difficult months at the start of the year, 2021 should see the end of the pandemic and the beginning of the reconstruction. and in the financial industry itself, we will need to capitalise on 2020 ’ s resilience to meet four challenges that i shall sum up using the four cardinal points of the compass. 1 / the first, of course, is brexit, so in the north. on 1 january this year, the united kingdom lost its financial passport. we had actively prepared for this, and fortunately the continuity of financial services has been maintained. despite the pandemic, by end - 2020, more than close to 2, 500 jobs had already been transferred and around 50 british entities authorised, with the relocation to france of at least eur 170 billion of assets. more relocations are expected and should be speeded up over 2021. on a more structural level, brexit means that europe has to develop its own financial autonomy. we need to reinforce our market infrastructures, especially for the clearing of interest rate instruments, with the strengths of the paris marketplace. we also need a genuine “ financing union ” to channel europe ’ s savings surplus – close to eur 220 billion – more efficiently into productive investment. it is now – otherwise it will never happen – that we need to seize the dual opportunity offered by brexit and the reconstruction to truly build a capital markets union : i stand alongside the amf and its chairman in saying this. 2 / it is precisely this private investment that will prove decisive in supporting the economic reconstruction. in this reconstruction, we europeans will have to be schumpeterians while also remaining keynesian : in 2020, the us economy, so to our west, proved twice as resilient as europe ’ s. the post - crisis period should not be about restarting things exactly as they were before ; it should be a transformation towards an economy that is more productive and “ better ” in three respects : more digital, more environmentally - conscious, more qualified – we must never forget the battle of skills, which is the most important one, albeit the least frequently discussed. page 3 of 4 support for businesses should also shift from the widespread provision of liquidity to a more selective solvency - based phase that targets those firms that are economically viable but have been financially

what are the sources of the divergence in inflation expectations between financial markets and households? iii. firms ’ inflation expectations are also of primary interest for central banks while this conference is mostly about households ’ expectations, i would like to stress that monitoring firms ’ inflation expectation is also of primary interest from a monetary policy perspective. compared to households, information on inflation expectations within firms is even scarcer. this scarcity of information is in sharp contrast with the relevance of such information for the conduct of monetary policy : at the end, firms are the price setters in the economy and also take part in the wage setting process. besides, there is evidence that their expectations affect their economic decisions like employment or investment. one of the most comprehensive evidence has been produced for new zealand ’ s firms, showing that inflation expectations among business leaders are not so different from household expectations. in europe, banca d ’ italia has also developed a very rich and informative firms ’ expectations survey since 1999. the bundesbank has also conducted a very interesting survey asking tradeunions and employers what was the relevant inflation underlying the last collective wage agreement. comparative information on such issues across the euro area would be very useful. i am convinced that more analysis on firms ’ expectations would produce very valuable and relevant information for our monetary policy. conclusion let me now conclude by saying that we need to better measure consumer and firm inflation expectations. this lack of information prevents our communication policies from being fully efficient. one important question for monetary policy is what kind of communication tools can be used to better communicate with the general public and influence their inflation expectations. this conference is a unique opportunity to benefit from the analyses of the most distinguished experts on the various exciting issues that are related to household expectations. i wish you very fruitful discussions. thank you for your attention. figure 1. long term inflation expectations for the euro area source : bis report “ recent developments in the global economy ” ( august 2019 ) - figure 2. households perceive quite well the overall evolution of inflation source : b. coeure ( 2019 ). inflation expectations and the conduct of monetary policy, speech at an event organised by the safe policy center, 11 july 2019 figure 3. recent divergence between the evolution of household inflation expectations and market based - measures sources : ecb, european commission