the government and political institutions. 4. transparency and accountability the new bank of israel law will require the bank to account for its decisions, policies and achievements to the knesset, the government and the public. in this context the bank will have to explain the considerations underlying its decisions, including the relevant information available at the time, economic forecasts, and how it views expected economic developments. the reports will include inflation reports and other periodic reports, summaries of the discussions of the monetary committee, fundamental decisions by the administrative council, press releases, etc. in light of the importance of transparency and accountability, the bank of israel, even prior to the enactment of the new law, has already adopted a level of transparency and accountability that is broader than current law requires. however, this should be enshrined in new legislation. allow me to conclude. there is nothing to gain by wasting time talking about the new bank of israel law. the time has come to roll up our sleeves and get to work on completing the bill and passing it into law promptly. by so doing, we will have completed the final and most important stage in the global integration of israel ’ s economy. it will be an important achievement and a badge of maturity for israel ’ s economy.

, a parallel impact is that it has also intensified the upside risks surrounding the inflation outlook, especially in the near term. based on the same imf forecasts, euro area inflation in 2022 is expected to reach 5, 3 per cent, compared to 1, 7 per cent projected by the imf back in october 2021. core euro area inflation, as measured by hicp excluding energy and 1 / 5 bis - central bankers'speeches food rose from 2, 7 per cent in february to 3 per cent in march 2022 with an increase in the sectoral inflation rates for both non energy industrial goods and services. all - items hicp reached 7, 5 per cent in march from 5, 9 per cent in february. the rising inflation, is increasing the production costs of firms and is eroding disposable income. the war has heightened the uncertainty of future price developments and the pace with which supply bottlenecks will recede. in parallel, new pandemic restrictive measures in china, for example the closing of the city of shanghai and its port, which is considered the busiest port in the world, also accentuate supply chain difficulties. energy prices, which were driven even higher after the outbreak of the war, now stand 45 per cent above their level one year ago and continue to constitute the main reason for the high level of inflation. overall, inflation pressures are projected to remain strong in the shortterm undermining business and consumer confidence. the main challenge for monetary policy now is to control inflation without jeopardising economic recovery. this requires careful attention of all these elevated uncertainties and their implications on the evolving economic outlook. the complication is that the inflation pressures result mainly from the supply side shocks which cannot be remedied via monetary policy. higher interest rates will neither restore supply chains nor reduce energy prices. for this reason, at the ecb governing council, we have already began adjusting certain monetary policy instruments such as the pandemic emergency purchasing programme and the asset purchasing programme, reducing significantly the bonds bought by the national central banks of the euro area members states. in other words monetary tightening has already begun. there is a clear sequencing of monetary policy actions that has been set and is being followed by the governing council. we closely monitor all incoming data and adjustment of the ecb monetary policy instruments will be done gradually and flexibly to target any demand side or second - round inflationary effects or de - anchoring of inflation expectations. the volati