. a second driver expanding our need for statistics has been the expansion of our regulatory responsibilities in recent years. since 2008, the reserve bank has been given responsibility for the prudential regulation of the non - bank deposit taking sector ( nbdt ). new standards for capital, liquidity and related party exposures inevitably require more data to be collected from the industry and may prompt a further upgrading of the sector ’ s statistics in the future. in 2010, we became the prudential regulator and supervisor of the insurance sector, which up until that time had been relatively loosely regulated in new zealand. this meant that there is currently little in the way of formal statistics on the insurance sector. consequently we ’ re currently planning a data collection from the industry designed to meet our prudential and broader statistical needs. this is a major job as there are around 100 newly licensed insurers, and there are a wide range of potential risks to cover. the third driver behind the expansion in our financial collections has been growing demand from the general public, international agencies, media and financial analysts in the years following the financial crisis. there ’ s a growing appetite for more granularity and detail in financial statistics and for coverage of new areas. for example, there ’ s demand for more detail on the financial products and services offered by banks, expanded data on financial prices, and the ability to drill down into financial sub - sectors to a rather greater extent than before. and there ’ s much greater interest in understanding the capital markets – an area that to date hasn ’ t been well captured in statistics in new zealand. meeting demand for statistics in a fast moving world what statistics to produce and when poses important challenges for us as the main producer of new zealand ’ s financial statistics. we need to respond to the increasing demands for data and data transparency but we also need to manage the cost, size and complexity of our statistical function and keep respondent burden to an acceptable level. decisions to proceed with new collections must be based on a clear business case. in many respects the decision to begin a new financial data collection has the hallmarks of an investment decision to purchase a long - lived asset. we engage extensively with users in trying to identify clearly the benefits of the new data for financial analysis and policymaking in the future. some of the benefits associated with new statistics accrue several years down the track once a good time series is developed. choices made now about what ( or ) not to collect and how to

##reen argues that history shows the need for deposit insurance and a lender of last resort to contain systemic risks to the financial market. he suggests that, by analogy, there is an argument for an international lender of last resort, but muses whether the imf or any other candidate has the capacity to carry out such a role, or the ability to contain the moral hazard that results. in domestic markets, he argues that moral hazard concerns underscore the need for vigorous supervision and regulation of financial institutions covered by lender of last resort facilities. it is in this area that i have the greatest reservations about the eichengreen prescription, reflecting our own aversion to excessive reliance on banking supervision and on well - intentioned, but ultimately self - defeating, financial safety nets. but in accepting his previous point that occasional bouts of financial instability are likely to be a characteristic of deregulated financial systems, we are compelled to consider the need for some means of moderating the impact of those inevitable bouts of instability. where we differ, i think, is on the potential to push the management of those risks back to the private sector. • information and transaction costs prevent decentralised markets from quickly and efficiently resolving crises. creditors face incentives to run for the exits at the first sign of trouble and, in doing so, are likely to exacerbate any emerging problem. this makes it difficult to orchestrate outcomes that might better preserve value and facilitate its “ fairer ” distribution. at the national level, insolvency and bankruptcy codes exist which give the courts power to impose restructuring and settlement terms. in eichengreen ’ s view, the absence of an international bankruptcy court with similar powers is a problem. • economic policy is framed in a politicised environment. this is a very simple but important point. it cannot be assumed that regulators and other economic policy makers will carry out their tasks without allowing themselves to be influenced by political considerations. and mostly, national governments will not cede their sovereignty or control of domestic economic affairs to an international body. that is a reality that should influence any thinking on the list of proposals to reform the international financial architecture. pulling all of this together, eichengreen ’ s conclusions are “ … predicated on the notion that international capital mobility is now a financial fact of life, and the problem for policy is ensure that the benefits of capital mobility exceed its costs rather than pretending that it can be made to go away. they are