, together with all the national supervisory authorities, launched a year ago the recently completed comprehensive assessment of the 130 most significant european banks. another obstacle has thus been removed to the contribution that the ecb ’ s monetary policy can make to reviving growth. monetary policy has done and will continue to do its part but it is not enough. on the demand side, just bear in mind that since 2007 private investment in the euro area has fallen by 15 % and public investment by 12 %. let ’ s not forget that in some countries of the euro area unemployment was already high even before the crisis. at the same time there is ample evidence that a significant proportion of the current unemployment is structural. a fiscal policy which, in compliance with the existing rules, may see more investment and lower taxes, together with an accommodative monetary policy are not enough to generate a revival of strong and sustainable growth without the necessary structural reforms in product and labour markets. increased competition, the completion of europe ’ s single market, measures which would allow unemployed workers to quickly find a new job, thus reducing the period of unemployment, measures which would raise the level of specialisation and adapt it to the demand have long been on the economic policy agenda of many euro area countries : may the thought now make way for action. it is clear that both demand and supply side policies are necessary. the lesson of 2012 has taught us that the crisis of confidence in the euro was also caused by uncertainty about the future of the single currency – which turned out to be unfounded. amid this uncertainty, european leaders responded in june 2012 by creating the banking union which led to the ecb becoming the single supervisor. this was the most important act of integration that has ever been decided on since the creation of the euro. ties that endure need a solid basis of mutual trust. the euro area countries have in recent years greatly strengthened their ties and correspondingly expanded the basis of trust on which they rest : the single monetary policy, with common fiscal rules, now with a banking union and a single banking supervision and soon with a common capital market. our experience shows that sharing national sovereignty is a precondition for lasting trust in planning our shared european journey. bis central bankers ’ speeches

willem f duisenberg : what are the political consequences of the euro? introductory remarks by dr willem f duisenberg, president of the european central bank, at the karlspreis - europa - forum, aachen, 8 may 2002. * * * ladies and gentlemen, you have invited a central banker to open this round - table discussion on the political consequences of the euro. some may consider this a somewhat odd choice of speaker. as you are well aware, independent central bankers are anxious to keep a certain distance from the political process. at the same time, i will not deny that my job as a european central banker is inextricably linked to the wider historical process of building an " ever closer union " of the peoples of europe. the move to economic and monetary union was a profoundly political act – despite the fact that the underlying rationale was predominantly economic, namely that a single market requires a single currency. understood in this sense, emu itself is a " political consequence " of earlier decisions. a " product " of a functionalist approach to european integration. successfully applied by the founding fathers of the community, it has led us from a limited pooling of sovereignty in the coal and steel sectors to today's european union. with ups and downs, pauses and great advances, and through grand visions and incremental steps. but throughout the process, integration has been driven forward by the inherent dynamics of market opening, of deepening economic interdependence and of continuous political engagement in common institutions. with the euro, this network of interrelations and mutual dependencies has undoubtedly acquired a new quality. so where do we go from here? this round - table discussion will look precisely at this question. its title refers to " political consequences of the euro " and insinuates, in this way, some kind of watertight relationship between cause and effect. as a central banker and economist, i am only too aware of the danger of misinterpreting concurrent developments as causal relationships and of the risk of treating simple extrapolations from current trends as predictions of future developments. therefore, rather than talking about consequences, allow me to use the term " implications " and to distinguish between the likely " policy " implications and possible " political " implications. by policy implications, i mean further policy measures that are needed to shore up the success of the single currency, and to ensure that the benefits of complementing a single market with a single currency are reape