street reform and consumer protection act of 2010 ( dodd - frank act ) are specifically targeted at these firms. it would be counterproductive to apply those same expectations to small banks. accordingly, we think it is important to tailor rules whenever possible to clearly differentiate expectations for different portfolios of banks and reduce undue burden on community banks. tailoring regulations may be more challenging in some areas, such as rules that provide transparency and fairness in consumer transactions. those are standards that apply throughout the financial system. i should note that the dodd - frank act transferred rule - writing authority for many of the consumer laws and regulations to the consumer financial protection bureau, or cfpb. the review of those regulations must be undertaken by the cfpb under procedures incorporated in the dodd - frank act rather than egrpra. however, the federal reserve board, the office of the comptroller of the currency, and the federal deposit insurance corporation retained rule - writing authority for the community reinvestment act, and we are interested in your comments regarding ways we can improve the regulation. bis central bankers ’ speeches in addition to changes in the regulatory and supervisory landscape, the banking industry itself has also undergone major changes. advances in technology and shifts in industry composition between depository institutions and nondepository companies have changed the types of financial services and products that are offered, as well as how those services and products are accessed. we will be very interested in your feedback regarding how these types of industry changes have impacted the effectiveness of our regulations. let me conclude by saying that we will consider your comments carefully as the agencies coordinate to discuss and consider the appropriate action that is likely to best serve our financial system and the interests of institutions and consumers. the result will be contained in the agencies ’ report to the congress summarizing the issues raised and the agencies ’ conclusions about the need for regulatory or legislative changes. thank you for joining us today. bis central bankers ’ speeches

aig to avoid panic and financial ruin then turned out to be much more expensive for taxpayers. fortunately we avoided this in europe. let me move on to my third and last thought. it concerns the post - crisis period. the industrialised countries are emerging from the crisis poorer, more indebted and with lower prospects for growth. the process of fiscal consolidation must remain the cornerstone of economic policy and form the basis for a radical overhaul of the economies in order to create more growth. but in the current environment i see two risks facing our democracies in the coming years. the first one is the illusion that this crisis is cyclical rather than structural, that it has no impact on the long - term growth potential of our economies. we may, in this case, be deluding ourselves that traditional macroeconomic policies ( monetary and fiscal ) are per se able to restore growth to pre - crisis levels. thus there is a risk of triggering again unsustainable policies which in turn create new imbalances that sooner or later implode. the second risk is an attitude of resignation, of being resigned to not having the capacity and strength to untie the knots that restrict our growth potential, or of being resigned to economic stagnation. this state of mind is associated with the politician ’ s dilemma neatly articulated by the president of the eurogroup, jean - claude juncker : “ we all know what to do, but we don ’ t know how to get re - elected once we have done it ”. this type of reasoning occasionally leads some people to argue that democratic systems are not up to making our societies swallow the medicine needed in order to grow again. structural reforms in fact involve a redistribution of income to the detriment of the less efficient sectors, which are characterised by monopolistic rents and are strongly opposed to change. the idea is often floated that some emerging countries are better able to manage the current crisis because they have “ stronger ” regimes, which do not need to justify their actions vis - a - vis their electorates very often. these are dangerous positions in my view and are not justified by empirical evidence. juncker ’ s provocative remark is not in fact substantiated by the facts. he himself is one of europe ’ s veteran political leaders, who has brought rigour and development to his country and was re - elected three times in a row. an analysis of the correlation between economic variables and political popularity in europe reveals that, contrary to what