should have control over suitable tools to attain its objectives. this is to establish a clear responsibility. moreover, they recommend that the central banks should play a leading role in macroprudential policy and that the macroprudential supervisory body should have operational independence. it is now time for me to return to the financial crisis committee ’ s proposal, and how this relates to the demands i consider should be made regarding a framework for macroprudential policy – demands that are also expressed in the esrb ’ s recommendation. … but the financial crisis committee ’ s proposal does not go very far … two days ago, 23 january, the financial crisis committee published its proposal as to how we should organise macroprudential policy in sweden. 13 in principle, the proposal is that the current council for cooperation on macroprudential policy between the riksbank and finansinspektionen is confirmed by law and supplemented with independent experts and an observer from the ministry of finance. the council shall work to promote greater knowledge of systemic risks and to develop macroprudential tools. moreover, it shall analyse risks and discuss suitable measures. a secretariat for the council will be established at the riksbank. however, the council will not have any powers of authority ; its work will consist of exchanging information and discussion. decisions on the application of macroprudential tools will lie with finansinspektionen or the riksbank, with both being given responsibility for macroprudential policy. they are also to consult with one another prior to decisions on applying macroprudential tools. the committee does not offer any suggestions as to which macroprudential tools are needed or how they should be divided between the authorities. my assessment is therefore that the financial crisis committee ’ s proposal, which means that both the riksbank and finansinspektionen will become macroprudential bodies, does not fulfil the important criteria regarding decision - making powers, independence and accountability. and nor does the proposal appear to be in line with the esrb ’ s recommendation. … and differs from the practice that is emerging in europe moreover, the financial crisis committee ’ s proposals differ from the structures emerging in other eu countries. two models are predominant in this context, and both of them are in line with the esrb ’ s recommendation. either the responsibility for macroprudential policy is given to the central bank, as in the united kingdom, or it is

a framework in place, with a clear division of responsibility and which clarifies how the various instruments should be used. one reason why monetary policy in sweden has needed to give consideration to financial imbalances is because there has been no framework for macroprudential policy. while awaiting a permanent framework in sweden, the riksbank and finansinspektionen started a joint council for cooperation on macroprudential policy at the beginning of 2012. but even if this council offers an important forum for analysis and discussion, it has no powers of decision - making and no tools of its own at its disposal. two days ago, however, the financial crisis committee produced a proposal for macroprudential policy in sweden – which i will return to later on. central banks should play an important role in macroprudential policy when drawing up a framework for macroprudential policy in sweden, i think there are good reasons for giving the riksbank a central role. one important reason is that the riksbank has long been conducting extensive analysis of macroprudential policy issues. ever since the swedish bank crisis in the early 1990s, the riksbank has gradually built up substantial knowledge and experience of analysing the risks that can threaten the stability of the financial system. the basis for this was the bank ’ s task of promoting a safe and efficient payment system – what we in practice define as financial stability. 10 in 1997 the riksbank began publishing its assessment of the stability of the financial system, in the form of the financial stability report, published twice a year. it was one of the first central banks in the world to do this. the special macroprudential policy division at the riksbank ’ s financial stability department has as one of its tasks to assess the need for specific macroprudential policy measures. the riksbank ’ s monetary policy department has long conducted macroeconomic analysis to provide a good guidance for interest - rate decisions, which are based on macroeconomic analyses and forecasts. the analysis of financial stability, combined with the monetary policy analysis, provides good grounds for understanding the repercussions between the financial and real economy, which is essential for successful macroprudential policy. in recent years the cooperation between the financial stability and monetary policy departments at the riksbank has intensified. there are also clear links between monetary policy and macroprudential policy. both policy areas ultimately aim for a stable macroeconomic development – macro