iii riskbased capital rules require banking organizations to hold relatively little capital against sft see board of governors of the federal reserve system, federal deposit insurance corporation, office of the comptroller of the currency, and office of thrift supervision ( 2010 ), “ agencies issue final rule for regulatory capital standards related to statements of financial accounting standards nos. 166 and 167, ” press release, january 21. bis central bankers ’ speeches assets, which are assumed to pose little microprudential risk. because leverage requirements do not take into account the fact that sfts are collateralized transactions, leverage requirements have the potential to impose higher charges on sft assets. but leverage requirements have traditionally been calibrated at non - binding levels and, to the extent they do bind in the future, are unlikely to bind evenly across firms. as a result, the leverage ratio may simply cause sft assets and liabilities to migrate to those firms with stronger leverage ratios. similarly, the lcr and, at least at this stage of its development, the net stable funding ratio ( nsfr ), both assume that a firm with a perfectly matched book is in a stable position. the lcr assumes a bank can call in reverse repos and other sft assets that mature in less than 30 days or reuse the collateral that secures those assets for purposes of its own borrowing. thus, reverse repos and other sft assets generally are treated as completely liquid instruments. under the initial version of the nsfr, firms would not need to hold any stable funding against reverse repos, securities borrowing receivables, or other loans to financial entities that mature in less than one year. again, this may be a reasonable position from a microprudential perspective, geared toward more or less normal times. but here is where we need an explicitly macroprudential perspective that forces firms to internalize the tail - event financial stability risks associated with sft matched books. policy options there are two kinds of policy options that can be considered, individually or together, in responding to the financial stability vulnerabilities inherent in firms with large amounts of short - term wholesale funding – whether loaned, borrowed, or both. the first would impose a regulatory charge calculated by reference to reliance on sfts and other forms of short - term wholesale funding, whether the firm uses that funding to finance inventory or an sft matched book. the second would directly increase the very low charges under current and pending regulatory standards attracted

, in the coming years there is even greater need for responsible fiscal policies. and the benefits from fiscal responsibility are not limited to each country separately, but they are shared globally. in designing future economic policies, we need to remember at least three things. first, we need mechanisms to prevent over - borrowing, both in the private and public sector. second, risks need to be priced correctly. too low risk premia will lead to over - borrowing. last, resolving modern financial and economic crises demands international and regional cooperation. achieving all this will require new approaches and new attitudes both in the public and private sector, and this will – of course – be hard. however, failure to achieve these goals would increase the risks of more crises in the future, and this is unacceptable. * * * we are celebrating now the anniversary of one of the world ’ s great central banks, a bank with long traditions and a turbulent past. i think that this jubilee is especially significant for us finns. this is so because the russian and finnish monetary systems share a lot of common history, in particular from the 19th century, when the grand duchy of finland was established as a part of the russian empire. 1860, the birth - year of the central bank of russia, was an important turning point also in the monetary history of finland. in march 23, 1860 ( old style ), emperor alexander ii issued a decree which gave finland a monetary unit of its own, the finnish markka. before that, the bank of finland had issued banknotes denominated in rubles and kopecks. in june, at about the same time when the central bank of the russian empire was established, the first markka banknotes were circulated. both the bank of russia and the national monetary system of finland were born as a result of a crisis which hit the rouble in the latter half of the 1850 ’ s. in 1860, the imperial government of finland sought ways to stabilize the currency with the aim of linking it with silver, even ahead of russia, if necessary. this was the background to the creation of a national monetary unit for finland. at the same time, the russian government carried out a more comprehensive institutional reform by founding a new central bank to replace the old state banks. this was also made as a step towards a stable and market - based financial system. circumstances are completely different now, of course, but one thing remains at least : financial and monetary stability are still the main objectives of today ’