by the financial services professional board. going forward, the association may consider refining this code of 2 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches ethics to better reflect the specificities of the financial advisory industry. for improved efficacy, the code should also be complemented, if i may suggest, by rigorous monitoring and strong enforcement. to this end, i would like to suggest the association spearhead the development of an oversight programme aimed at identifying and responding to misconduct risks in a timely manner. perspectives from members could contribute towards crafting more creative, practical and effective monitoring mechanisms, such as members ’ compliance report cards. to further elevate the professionalism of financial advisers, bank negara malaysia is currently reviewing the fit and proper requirements. these requirements will specify, among others, the factors to be observed in the assessment and appointment of key responsible persons, such as members of the board and ceos of the financial advisers, and financial advisers ’ representatives. adoption of these standards we hope will help to strengthen the credibility of the profession. another aspect that is closely linked to professionalism is transparency. it is for this reason that the bank has introduced additional disclosure requirements through the life framework. these disclosures are intended to ensure that appropriate and fair advice is given to consumers who purchase insurance. mandatory sales illustrations have also been enhanced. additionally, all intermediaries now have to provide a service guide to help insurance buyers better understand the advice and services to which they are entitled. instead of viewing these as requirements to be complied with, i would like to encourage financial advisers to take advantage of these disclosure tools to help customers fully understand what they are paying for. this will go a long way in establishing yourselves as trusted advisers. upholding independence the second feature of a trusted adviser is independence. when consumers seek financial advice, they expect to get an objective point of view that places their best interest above all else. and rightly so – the individual ’ s hard - earned savings are at stake. yet, the reality today is that the practice of commission - based compensation for financial advisers may not be fully aligned with the principle of rewarding quality advice to customers. certainly, commission - based compensation has its advantages. it is effective in ensuring that products are actually bought. it is also appealing to consumers who may not be able to afford to pay for advice. but there is a world of difference between sales and advisory. while sales seeks to maximise transaction volume, advisory seeks to maximise the consumer ’ s welfare. with the

##tech firms who may be tech - savvy start - ups with limited compliance know - how or competencies. access to regulators, and know - how of which authorities to connect with for particular types of queries, is important. our regulatory architecture can be complex, with multiple financial services authorities, ranging from prudential and conduct - focused, through credit - related, to financial intelligence - related regulators. access to this network is important in order to reduce any potential barriers to entry from a legal, regulatory and compliance perspective. this is why we have seen a rapid emergence of innovation centres, hubs and guidance units across the globe : in recognition of the importance of increasing access to regulators, by fintech firms in particular. access to rule - making rule - making in financial services can be complex. the ‘ rules of the game ’ can be embedded in legislation and regulations, and through related instruments such as directives, position papers and standards. a good example of this complexity can be seen in the regulation of payment systems. often, primary regulations set the conditions or criteria based on which stakeholders page 4 of 9 can have access to clearing and settlement systems. such primary regulations position the overarching principles and objectives of providing legal certainty, deepening financial inclusion, and ensuring the general safety and efficiency of payment systems. however, at a ‘ lower level ’, rules related to how payment schemes operate are equally important in setting specific conditions or criteria related to a payment system. as an example : direct credit systems will define clearing time - frames, and debit systems will define charge - back rules or conditions. these types of rules are often called the ‘ rule books ’ in jurisdictions like canada and the united kingdom ( uk ). there are ‘ rule books ’ publically available for schemes such as the single european payments area ( sepa ) credits in europe or, in the uk, the faster payments scheme. in south africa, we have found that, due to legacy reasons, some of the rule - making processes, especially in the payment system space, have traditionally been the domain of incumbents. based on some of the cases reviewed, our sense is that broader input into the rule - making processes by those impacted across the value chain would benefit from obtaining a variety of competing perspectives. the voice of fintech firms in this process is important. this kind of ever - increasing access to influence rulemaking is vital to ensuring that the best policy and regulatory stances are adopted. even more importantly, the