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is it a commitment to a policy path. rather, it shows the median, central tendency, and range of the participants ’ projections estimated using the 19 individual projections. - 6just as the pandemic itself led to unprecedented losses in the labor market, the subsequent recovery was unprecedented in many ways. as the health risk abated and the economy reopened, labor demand surged as businesses attempted to re - hire workers, but many workers remained on the sidelines. by late 2021, the labor force participation rate was still well below its pre - pandemic level. vacancies rose to record levels, while, at the same time, quits, as shown in figure 7, surged as workers sought out new job opportunities, leading some to refer to the post - pandemic recovery as the “ great resignation. ” consequently, as shown in figure 8, the gap between available jobs, the solid black line, and available workers, the dashed red line, which had been just over 1 million positions in late 2019, widened to over 6 million, the equivalent of two job openings for every unemployed worker. this was an exceptionally tight labor market, far exceeding any in recent history, including the labor market before the pandemic. the strong post - pandemic aggregate economy reversed the disparities between groups that initially widened in 2020. the aggregate unemployment rate fell to 3. 4 percent in april 2023, its lowest since 1969. that same month, the unemployment rate for african americans fell to 4. 8 percent, the lowest level on record and 1 / 2 percentage point below the previous record set in 2019, as shown in figure 9 by the red solid line, which is the difference between the unemployment rate for african americans and its own average in the year 2019. although labor force participation was initially slower to recover, the labor force participation rate among prime - age women climbed to its highest level ever in 2023, well above even pre - pandemic levels, as shown in figure 10 by the red dashed line, which is - 7the difference between the labor force participation rate for women and its own average in the year 2019. the tight labor market also led to a surge in nominal wage growth, especially for workers lower in the earnings distribution. in fact, as shown in figure 11, wage growth for low - wage workers, the solid red line, was strong enough, with a peak wage growth close to 7. 5 percent in 2022, to drive a meaningful compression in