: they are wrong. monetary policy is not conducted for any one country, be it germany, france or italy. the governing council takes its decisions collectively and independently, taking into consideration the euro area as a whole. that being said, let us simply acknowledge that belonging to the monetary union has provided italy with substantial financial relief in this crisis. the ecb has worked well for europe and for italy. our governing council took note last week of the judgement by the german federal constitutional court. let me be crystal - clear : we remain undeterred, as president lagarde said ; furthermore, we are definitely dedicated to and determined to deliver on our mandate as conferred by the treaty. as the page 5 sur 10 european court of justice has said, our past actions are indeed proportionate to that mandate. more broadly, i hear debates in our two countries shedding doubt on ( i ) the independence of the central bank – that should be brought “ under political control ” – and on ( ii ) its mandate – which should go beyond price stability, to include employment or the fight against the health crisis. criticising these two pillars is not only pointless, but is also dangerous : • pointless : the ecb was able, within its institutional framework and mandate, to be active, innovative and responsive … even more than some political institutions. damage the central bank ’ s independence and you undermine its strength and agility, the very things that protect an economy in a crisis. • dangerous : these two pillars, enshrined in the treaty, are the legal and democratic foundation of our legitimacy and capacity to act – and not only in “ northerners ” eyes. furthermore, they are the foundations of european ’ s trust in their currency. to give only one example : the eurosystem cannot cancel public debt, neither legally nor “ fiduciary ” : a suspicion of fiscal dominance would give rise to monetary distrust as seen in history and more recently in some emerging market economies. independence and the price stability mandate are not an obstacle to the ecb ’ s powerful action. on the contrary, they are its two best levers. i will come back to this. ii. what european policies for the gradual exit? talking about european solidarity, arguably, europe could have done more. but let us not forget that the glass is at least half full, thanks to the major support from the eurosystem, but also the sure framework of the european commission to help preserve jobs, and the welcome

##hos, education and training : avenues toward equality and ethical behaviours in the digital era ”, catholic university of the sacred heart, milan, 31st january iii arnoud boot, elena carletti, hans ‐ helmut kotz, jan pieter krahnen, loriana pelizzon, marti subrahmanyam, “ corona and financial stability 4. 0 : implementing a european pandemic equity fund ” 25 april 2020, vox, cepr policy portal. iv european fiscal board ( 2019 ), “ assessment of eu fiscal rules with a focus on the six and two - pack legislation ”, aout, bruxelles. https : / / ec. europa. eu / info / sites / info / files / 2019 - 09 - 10 - assessment - of - eu - fiscal - rules _ en. pdf v alessandro manzoni, in proclama di rimini, 1815. i