conducive for fostering healthy competition. having said all this, there is an important issue, which we cannot lose sight of. one of the major comforts that a regulator seeks as part of its depositor interest centric function is the reputation and the financial strength of the promoter. from this perspective the nation ’ s sovereign as the main shareholder gives a lot of comfort to the regulator. the recent events, even if one may consider them exceptional, demonstrated that those perceived as invincible also do not have the financial muscle of the sovereign. however, the regulator should not bask under the comfort of the sovereign being the promoter nor should it let any instruments of government abuse this comfort. the punch line, if one has to sum up the whole gamut of issues relating to regulation and supervision of public sector banks, could read – feel comfortable, but don ’ t relax! thank you all for your attention.

alejandro diaz de leon : introductory remarks on regulating big tech remarks by mr alejandro diaz de leon, governor of bank of mexico, at the bank for international settlements conference “ regulating big tech : between financial regulation, anti - trust and data privacy ”, 7 october 2021. * * * i would like to thank the bis for inviting me to participate in this panel on bigtech and data in finance, and discuss what does the entry of big techs in payments mean for competitiveness and financial ecosystem and the challenges it represents for central banks. recent advances in technology and innovation have created the potential for a structural transformation in payment and financial services ( platform payments and platform finance ). the inclusion of networks with a wide customer base in the financial ecosystems, the so - called bigtechs, seeks to link customers with financial services, either provided by financial intermediaries or themselves. this raises key issues for public policy, in terms of competition, consumer protection and financial stability. an open finance ecosystem could have several benefits, better services, lower costs and deeper financial inclusion, but authorities should be careful and avoid potential suboptimal results ( concentration, vertical integration, lack of interoperability, etc. ). an open finance ecosystem without adequate regulation will not deliver the desired public goods. bigtechs providing payment and financial services are clearly part of our financial ecosystem. we must work on the necessary technological and regulatory conditions to avoid regulatory arbitrage. it must be clarified that a level - playing field is not against innovation. instead, it is a response by policymakers to avoid the “ winner takes all equilibrium in networks ” and “ too big to regulate ” problems, as conditions needed to promote competition, sound risk management and public interest. to promote a well - functioning payment systems and a more inclusive and efficient financial system and to make a good use of the opportunities offered by new technologies, we have identified seven public policy anchors to guide this process : 1. same risk / same regulation : o align incentives to achieve maximum social benefits, o addressing market failures and o promoting an environment for competition. level playing field on aml / cft requirements, legal, financial and operational risks. 2. interoperability and neutrality : need to avoid large networks using their condition as a competitive advantage to carry financial transactions exclusively through their networks. 3. no kingmakers : large networks joint - venturing with specific financial institutions could extend the former ’ s market power and concentration to financial markets. 4. ensure business continuity