samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
, which has destroyed one - third of the economy. while responding to the war, the nbu had to deviate from its benchmark inflation targeting approach, but our fundamental principles remain unchanged. the nbu is committed to pursue its 2 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches mandate, an effort that has made it possible to maintain macroeconomic stability and the sustainability of the financial system even as the perfect storm rages on. the nbu's first steps after february 24, 2022 were intended to prevent panic among the population and ensure the operation of the banking system and payments. the nbu imposed harsh restrictions on capital flows and fixed the exchange rate in order to anchor inflation expectations. to maintain financial stability, the nbu changed its operational design, supplied the financial system with the necessary liquidity, and took a number of steps to support the financial sector. in addition, to ensure the continuity of critical government expenditures, the nbu purchased domestic government debt securities. the central bank's rapid response enabled the banking system to survive the earliest, panic - vulnerable stage of the war. subsequently, to overcome economic imbalances that were accumulating fast amid an unprecedented shock, the nbu launched the stabilization of its monetary policy by raising its key policy rate to 25 % and weakening the official exchange rate by 25 %. coupled with revived support from international donors, this also preserved ukraine's international reserves at a relatively convenient level. these steps have enabled the regulator to maintain macroeconomic stability. inflation will be about 30 % at the end of 2022, the nbu projects. this, of course, is much higher than our inflation target, but the experience of other countries shows that in wartime it is a rather successful outcome. the nbu pursues forward looking approach and adjusts its policy to ensure a quick and sustainable recovery after the war ends. again, the world's post - war recovery experience shows that timely stabilization policies are what make economies thrive in peacetime. we therefore stay committed to our inflation - targeting regime and declare that we will resume it as soon as ukraine's business activity returns to normal. after all, a low, stable, and predictable rate of inflation guarantees macroeconomic stability and is a solid foundation for the productive development of the economy. although ukraine is facing additional challenges today, we as policymakers face common challenges of revitalizing the transmission channel and striking a balance between fiscal and monetary policies amid varying credibility. what unites us even more is

our unwavering mandate, which is to ensure price stability. i therefore expect that in the course of today's event, we will be able to share our experience, discuss current issues, and form important practical conclusions that will help us achieve our goals. i wish everyone a peaceful sky over your heads, a meaningful discussion, and informative conclusions. 3 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches
its total transparency, has reacted as it must, smoothly and objectively. the markets too are dealing with changed circumstances and creating a context within which new zealand can be more internationally competitive. this is ‘ business as usual ’.

to the financial system can be absorbed and the damage repaired. macroprudential policy reduces the likelihood and severity of the threat, and mitigates the adverse impact on the economy. to inform our strategy for macroprudential policy, we have reviewed our operation of the lvr restrictions policy since 2013 and the growing research on macroprudential policy internationally. we found that the lvr restrictions policy has significantly improved the resilience of the banking system. we have also gained a broader understanding of the side effect of the lvr policy on other public policy areas, of ways to mitigate the potential policy tensions, and of the limitations of macroprudential policy. our experience in lvr restrictions has helped to shape our strategy for using macroprudential policy. our strategy broadly follows a three - step process of systemic risk monitoring, policy choice, and policy assessment, including evaluation after implementing the macroprudential tools. we are transparent and accountable, both in outlining how the tools will be used and in making the case for their implementation. the government is reviewing the role and powers of the reserve bank as they relate to financial stability, including whether our macroprudential framework remains fit for purpose. the principles of good governance i have touched on, and our refreshed macroprudential strategy, form an anchor, and should be compatible with a range of outcomes of the review. i hope our refreshed strategy on macroprudential policy has contributed to the understanding, accountability, and lasting legitimacy for the framework. references aikman, d., bridges, j., burgess, s., galletly, r., levina, i., o ’ neill, c., and a. varadi ( 2018 ). “ measuring risks to uk financial stability ”, bank of england staff working paper no. 738. bascand, g. ( 2019 ). “ renewing the rbnz ’ s approach to financial stability. ” borio, c., aldasoro, i., and m. drehmann ( 2018 ). “ early warning indicators of banking crises : expanding the family ”, bis quarterly review, march 2018. bridges, j., jackson, c., and d. mcgregor ( 2017 ). “ down in the slumps : the role of credit in five decades of recessions. ” bank of england staff working paper no 659. cecchetti, s.,
, 2. 4 per cent in 2009, and 3. 3 per cent in 2010. the emergence of excess supply in the economy should keep inflation below 2 per cent through 2009. both core and total inflation are projected to move up to 2 per cent in 2010 as the economy moves back into balance. there are both upside and downside risks to our new projection for inflation ; these risks appear to be balanced. in line with this outlook, some further monetary stimulus will likely be required to achieve the inflation target over the medium term. given the cumulative reduction in the target for the overnight rate of 150 basis points since december, including the 50 - basis - point reduction announced last week, the timing of any further monetary stimulus will depend on the evolution of the global economy and domestic demand, and their impact on inflation in canada. with that, paul and i would now be happy to take your questions.

the same 24 hours each day. what we do with it, is up to us. time is precious. you cannot take it back, if you have spent it. and you cannot recover it, if you waste it. furthermore, if you simply stand idly by, time will also just pass you by. as you prepare for 2017, i hope that the time that we just spent together this afternoon has been useful. once again, on behalf of the bangko sentral ng pilipinas, i wish rotary club of manila and the rotary club of forbes park, a prosperous, successful and hope - filled 2017! mabuhay po tayong lahat! maraming salamat po! 1 “ surreal named word of the year. ” an article in washington post dated 20 december 2016. 4 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches
advantages of risk transfer and lower encumbrance of underlying assets. we would support moves to put securitisation and covered bonds on a more level playing field. to conclude, we support the european commission ’ s current work on an eu framework for securitisation as part of the longer - term objective of growth in stable, market - based financing markets alongside bank lending. a uniform set of criteria for stc securitisation can play an essential role in de - stigmatising european securitisation, helping the market to develop on a sustainable track and attracting a broader investor base. bis central bankers ’ speeches

and liquidity prepositioning can reduce the incentives for damaging and unpredictable seizures of resources by local regulators during times of stress - - thus actually reducing the likelihood that improvised, beggar - thy - neighbor ring - fencing would frustrate completion of a successful spoe resolution in the future. as we learned long ago out west, the branding of cattle creates the possibility of trust. the second point, however, is equally important : the best prepositioning structure is not an eternal verity mathematically deducible from first principles, but it is instead a practical balance designed to promote cooperation among humans, and any such balance is likely to be improvable with experience, reflection, and debate. we are interested in views from the firms and the public on how the regimes can be improved, and we expect to invite public comment on our living will guidance for u. s. and foreign firms in the near future. in addition, we are currently weighing the costs and benefits of our current approach of directing firms to determine financial stability board, “ principles on loss - absorbing and recapitalisation of g - sibs in resolution ” and “ total loss - absorbing capacity ( tlac ) term sheet ” ( november 9, 2015 ), available at www. fsb. org / wpcontent / uploads / tlac - principles - and - term - sheet - for - publication - final. pdf. - 9the appropriate amount of prepositioned capital and liquidity. we are also considering whether formalizing resolution capital and liquidity requirements through a rulemaking process would improve the predictability and transparency of our approach. we continue to believe that the ihc and attendant requirements are appropriate for foreign banks with large u. s. operations. however, in light of our experience with these structures, i believe we should consider whether the internal tlac calibration for ihcs could be adjusted to reflect the practice of other regulators without adversely affecting resolvability and u. s. financial stability. the current calibration is at the top end of the scale set forth by the fsb, and willingness by the united states to reconsider its calibration may prompt other jurisdictions to do the same, which could better the prospects of successful resolution for both foreign g - sibs operating in the united states, and for u. s. g - sibs operating abroad. alternatively, it may be possible to streamline the elements of our resolution
be only two phases : a more limited reinsurance phase and then coinsurance. however moving to this second phase would be conditional on progress achieved in reducing risks. ” 5 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches

vitor constancio : economic recovery and the new phase of monetary policy keynote speech by mr vitor constancio, vice - president of the european central bank, at the opening conference of the 20th euro finance week, frankfurt am main, 13 november 2017. * * * ladies and gentlemen, i am grateful for the opportunity to address you today at this event that opens the 20th euro finance week, addressing economic and monetary policy developments in the euro area. at its last meeting on 26 october, the ecb governing council decided to substantially reduce its asset purchases. however, an ample degree of monetary stimulus remains necessary in order for underlying inflation pressures to continue to build - up and support headline inflation over the medium - term. the recalibration of our asset purchases reflects growing hope in the gradual convergence of inflation towards our inflation objective, on account of the increasingly robust and broad - based economic expansion, an uptick in measures of underlying inflation and the continued effective pass - through of our policy measures to the financing conditions and the real economy. in my remarks today, i will reflect on the broad - based improvement in the general economic and financial situation that has allowed such significant recalibration. i will argue that this improvement illustrates, among other things, the appropriateness of the monetary policy that we have undertaken in the past years. in this perspective, i will focus on the euro area as a whole as well as more disaggregate developments in some countries. finally, you certainly cannot expect a central banker to end without a note of caution. in the last part of my speech i will therefore focus on the challenges we are still facing. let me start with a description of the current economic developments. the euro area economy is experiencing a broad - based, robust and resilient recovery, and this recovery is underpinned by the monetary policy measures introduced by the ecb since june 2014. however, despite these favourable growth dynamics, inflation developments have been subdued. at the same time, financial stability risks seem contained. sustained recovery the euro area has been expanding for the past four years and the recovery has gained momentum. the gdp in the euro area has finally reached a level above that in 2007, 10 years after the crisis. robust economic activity is further being translated into a substantial amount of job creation. despite the unemployment rate still being too high, almost 7 million more people are now employed in the euro area than in mid - 2013, which implies that the employment losses recorded during
and economic output. moreover, we need to understand that we continue to live in an economic environment with downside risks. in such circumstances, we cannot afford to continue to operate with such thin minimum regulatory capital and liquidity requirements. the system does not have the capacity for another round of bail outs, nor does the public have the tolerance for it.

crisis resolution tools. fiscal governance reforms. as i mentioned earlier, one of the major weaknesses of the original institutional setting of emu was that eu fiscal rules were not sufficiently binding and in particular that sanctions were not credible. this has been addressed in a series of reforms, starting with what we call “ six pack ”, a group of six regulations which entered into force in december 2011. without going into the details of the regulations, let me only mention that their effect is to strengthen the stability and growth pact and to make sanctions a more credible threat. see m. salines, g. glockler, z. truchlewski and p. del favero ( 2011 ) : “ beyond the economics of the euro. analysing the institutional evolution of emu 1999 – 2010 ”, ecb occasional paper no. 127. bis central bankers ’ speeches another important innovation has been the treaty on stability, coordination and governance in the economic and monetary union, known as “ fiscal compact ”, which entered into force in january 2013. this is an intergovernmental treaty which establishes, among other things, that member states must enact laws ( preferably at constitutional level ) requiring their national budgets to be in balance or in surplus within the treaty ’ s definition. the laws must also contain a self - correcting mechanism to prevent any breach. the treaty defines a balanced budget as a general budget deficit less than 3. 0 % of the gross domestic product ( gdp ), and a structural deficit of less than 1. 0 % of gdp if the debt level is below 60 % – otherwise it shall be below 0. 5 % of gdp. finally, the so - called “ two - pack ” regulations entered only very recently into force, subject euro area countries to the obligation of ex ante notification of budgetary plans to the european commission. should countries be subject to an excessive deficit procedure ( edp ) or be involved in a financial assistance program by the european stabilisation mechanism ( on which i will touch on shortly ), they will also be subject to an enhanced monitoring by the european commission. overall, the cumulative effect of these reforms will be a significant enhancement of fiscal governance in the euro area and it is important that the reforms are now implemented fully. macroeconomic imbalances procedure. another important innovation of the “ six pack ” regulations is the introduction of the macroeconomic imbalances procedure ( mip ), which is designed to prevent and correct phenomena such as high
erkki liikanen : the future of central banking – proposed bank structures speech by mr erkki liikanen, governor of the bank of finland and chairman of the highlevel expert group on the structure of the eu banking sector, at a conference on “ the future of central banking ”, copenhagen, 30 january 2013. * * * introduction in the process of reaching the final proposal, our group considered two avenues as a possible way forward. in the first avenue, the main instruments were additional, non - risk - weighted capital requirements on trading activities and banks ’ credible recovery and resolution plans, subject to supervisory approval. such measures would be in line with the ideas of academic researchers who have suggested that a review of capital requirements is the best way to tackle risks in trading, and who have emphasized the need to develop bank resolution and recovery mechanisms. the possibility of conditional structural measures entered this avenue in the following way : if the bank were not able to prove that its required recovery and resolution plan was credible, separation of certain activities could be imposed. in the second avenue, immediate separation of retail and certain trading - related activities would be imposed. separation would be consistent with research which emphasizes that capital requirements are not sufficient to limit excessive risk - taking incentives induced by deposit insurance if the risks are difficult to quantify and risk profiles can change rapidly, as in trading. a sufficiently wide separation of trading activities would also avoid definitional problems that arise, for example, when pursuing the dividing line between proprietary trading and market making. eventually, our group converged to propose mandatory separation, an outcome based on avenue 2. the rationale for mandatory separation to sum up the rationale for separation as a regulatory measure, i would emphasize the following four points. firstly, as i have already suggested, separation is a way of preventing banks with insured deposits from engaging in activities whose risks are potentially high and difficult to quantify precisely, and which are not essential to deposit banking. moreover, as the separated trading entity is not allowed to finance itself with insured deposits, the price of its funding will better reflect its true risks and hence curb incentives to excessive risk - taking. secondly, separation of activities is the most direct instrument for tackling banks ’ complexity and interconnectedness. as banks will become simpler in structure, recovery and resolution will also be easier. moreover, as intra - group financing and subsidies between the deposit bank and the trading entity will be strictly limited, there will be fewer channels of contagion

, and i look forward to your questions. 4 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches
. 2 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches 1 source : unlocking sdg financing : findings from early adopters 2 source : aibim, value - based intermediation ( vbi ) preview report 2017 - 2020 3 source : world economic forum, shaping the future of digital economy and value creation 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches

randal k quarles : disclosures and data - building strong foundations for addressing climate - related financial risks speech by mr randal k quarles, vice chairman for supervision of the board of governors of the federal reserve system, at the venice international conference on climate change, venice, italy, 11 june 2021. * * * introduction thank you for inviting me today. it is an honor to be here and, after more than a year of remote conversations, it is truly wonderful to see so many people in person. as chair of the financial stability board ( fsb ), i have the privilege of collaborating with the italian g20 presidency, the g20 finance ministers and central bank governors, and with the fsb membership on the most pressing issues affecting financial stability. 1 among those issues, one of increasing focus is understanding and monitoring climate - related financial risks. given the global nature of climate change, this demands a coordinated international effort. the fsb published last wednesday a climate roadmap that presents a comprehensive and coordinated plan to address climate - related financial risks. the fsb's roadmap dovetails with the ongoing work of the g20 sustainable finance working group ( sfw g ) to develop a broader sustainable finance roadmap. today, in my role as chair of the fsb, i would like to focus on the two foundational components of the fsb roadmap : disclosures and data. globally consistent, comparable, and reliable disclosures, as well as a broader set of high - quality, relevant data, together, can provide the basis to assess climate - related financial risks and the impact on financial stability. disclosure the fsb was an early leader in bringing attention to the importance of reliable, entity - level disclosures to assess and manage climate - related financial risks and opportunities. in 2015, the fsb submitted a proposal to the g20 to create an industry - led disclosure task force on climaterelated risks. 2 the work of this fsb - sponsored task force on climate - related financial disclosures, or tcfd, has led to greater recognition of the importance of climate - related financial risk and of comparable and reliable disclosure. the early development of industry - led recommendations and a usable framework by users and producers of this information was critical. the four core elements of the tcfd recommendations have provided a widely accepted framework for disclosures — covering governance, strategy, risk management, and metrics and targets. the task force has continued