increasing awareness that the rules of the game are changing. take fintech as an example. this “ fourth industrial revolution ” has transformed and is transforming the way people think and do things. technological advances are changing our needs and wants. disruptions to the economic and financial landscape brought by innovation and technology are the new normal. these disruptions may aggravate inequalities among nations, putting inclusive growth in peril. will we be able to cope and compete? with the earlier discussions, i believe we are convinced that we will. in the philippines, we nurture a regulatory environment that will foster innovation while ensuring risks are effectively managed. we continuously monitor fintech developments. we espouse proportionate regulation, multi - stakeholder collaboration and consumer protection. we do this because we believe that the democratization of technology enables efficiencies. 1 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches this phenomenon of fintech, while new and exciting, shares commonalities with the silk road. both are powerfully transformative. but like the silk road, fintech ’ s positive impact can only be sustained if its further development and use are done in an inclusive manner. technology is our now and our future. to harness its benefits, we must collaborate and leverage on each other ’ s strengths. only then will we be able to enjoy sustained economic growth over the long term. i would like to end with this thought. this meeting is one of those opportunities to do just that. the philippines is honored to have hosted this event and i am privileged to be able to close it. we thank everyone for your commitment that has made this event a success. i look forward to more collaboration and the pursuit of deeper and more meaningful relationships as we move from ancient to modern networks and as we move forward, thriving as co - participants in the journey of digital transformation. thank you and mabuhay! 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches

than their asset management equivalents. on the face of it, then, the structure of banking and asset management is not too dissimilar. but the risks to these balance sheets are also quite different. as an agency function, asset managers do not bear credit, market and liquidity risk on their portfolios. currently, blackrock has over $ 4 trillion of assets under management, but has only $ 9 billion of assets of its own. 5 fluctuations in asset values do not threaten the insolvency of an asset manager as they would a bank. asset managers are, to a large extent, insolvency - remote. they are not, however, insolvency - immune. an individual manager or fund does face operational and reputational risk – for example, arising from a maxwell pensioners - sized fraud or an arthur andersen - shaped reputational hit. we have seen examples of this in the past – the large outflows from gartmore ’ s funds following the departure of key staff prior to its acquisition by henderson ; or the outflows from axa rosenberg in 2011 following an alleged fraud. nonetheless, if these are the sources of insolvency, then failure of an asset manager is likely to be different than for banks. fraud and reputational risk tend be idiosyncratic. keynes said of sound bankers that they were ruined in a conventional way along with their fellows so that no - one could be blamed ( keynes ( 1932 ) ). if keynes was right, then asset managers may be a different breed. yet even if the “ fail ” element of too - big - to - fail is a red - herring, the “ big ” is not. distress at an asset manager may aggravate frictions in financial markets, in particular frictions in market liquidity. one example would be an asset fire - sale. this might arise if assets from a failing fund were offloaded at a pace and scale that caused indigestion in the underlying market ( office of financial research ( 2013 ), hau and lai ( 2012 ) ). if so, asset prices would be driven south, possibly to well below their long - term or fundamental value. put differently, illiquidity risk premia in those markets could be driven to sub - optimally high levels. this fire - sale friction might be fanned by the actions of investors or counterparties. falling asset prices may be the prompt for withdrawal ( in the case of