first g20 finance ministers and central bank governors meeting session ii 26 february 2021 session ii press conference remarks by governor visco good afternoon, today we had a very productive session on financial stability and financial inclusion. all delegates provided valuable contributions to the discussion and expressed broad support for the italian g20 presidency ’ s priorities in these areas. we had a more in - depth discussion on the lessons learned during the pandemic from a financial stability perspective. this is the first initiative of the work programme agreed with the financial stability board for 2021. we focused on the main areas that will be covered in its assessment, namely financial institutions ’ use of capital and liquidity buffers, the impact of pro - cyclicality on financial and prudential standards, and the functioning of operational resilience arrangements and crisis management frameworks under the strain of the pandemic. with the pandemic still ongoing, we acknowledge that any assessment of lessons learned will inevitably be preliminary and tentative. but it is important to start this work now, in order to understand whether the regulatory reforms introduced after the global financial crisis are working as intended, and whether they have contributed to enhancing the resilience of the session ii - first g20 fmcbg meeting page 2 of 5 banking sector under the first major test presented by the pandemic. the analysis will help to identify policy issues of international relevance and assess whether some adjustments to the existing framework may be necessary. the initial findings will be discussed by finance ministers and central bank governors ( fmcbg ) in july and the final report will be delivered to the g20 summit in october. the italian presidency ’ s finance agenda for 2021 includes a number of other key priorities, among which an initiative to strengthen the resilience of nonbank financial intermediaries and work to implement the g20 roadmap on enhancing cross - border payments. these issues were not discussed today. we will provide you with more detailed information on these items as they are taken up in future g20 fmcbg meetings. today we also focused on financial inclusion. the outbreak of the covid - 19 pandemic appears to have disproportionately affected the most vulnerable individuals and firms across the globe, with many of them experiencing severe losses of income and proving unable to withstand the financial distress because of low or inexistent liquid reserves. we shared the need to analyse and address the gaps that emerged during the crisis, also in relation session ii - first g20

official roadmap, could be detrimental to that country and possibly the euro area. because 1. a sustainable convergence that is conducive to the maintenance of price stability and the coherence of the euro area may not have been achieved. 2. it would breach the principle of equal treatment. 3. it would not ensure that the country in question pursues the right policies to thrive under the euro. this raises the question of the approach to be taken towards countries, which would in principle qualify for eu membership ( art 49 teu ) but do not formally aspire to join the eu and are thus not candidate countries. this is the category of countries like iceland. here, both the rule of law and the principle of equal treatment provide answers. 1. the treaty does not provide a framework for euro adoption by non - candidate countries. explicit exceptions are only made for a limited number of countries which legally used a legacy currency before the euro was introduced, and whose economic and financial structures were closely intertwined with a euro area member state. 2. from the point of view of equal treatment, it would be difficult to conceive that the eu would be more open towards euroisation by non - candidate countries than by candidate countries or member states with a derogation. this is also the line followed by the ecb. this brings me to another question : what would happen if a country nonetheless adopts the euro? i am aware that unilateral euroisation is being discussed in iceland as a possible option. i would like to emphasise that the ecb, in line with the official position outlined above and consistent with our mandate, would neither encourage nor facilitate such a move. countries which unilaterally introduce the euro would do so in their responsibility and at their own risk, without committing the eu or the ecb. the ecb would thus pursue a policy of nonengagement and non - support towards these countries. vi economic costs and benefits of unilateral euroisation let me take a closer look at the economic costs and benefits of unilateral euroisation. i will focus my remarks on euroisation in general, and will not look specifically at the case of iceland. admittedly, euroisation could bring some potential benefits for the country concerned. • most notably, the country would import the ecb ’ s credibility, which could possibly lead to a lower inflation rate. • euroisation would also eliminate exchange rate risk. in turn, the country