mid - 1990s to 2006, real housing prices increased unusually rapidly, by approximately 80 per cent, after having been relatively stable from the early 1950s to the mid - 1990s ( see figure 2 ). housing prices increased dramatically in some parts of europe too, for example in ireland and spain, while they remained largely stable in other countries, for example germany. however, for the euro area as a whole the increase in prices was not as large as in the united states. the expansionary monetary policy contributed to the very high level of growth in the world in the period 2004 – 2007. gdp growth was between 4. 5 and 5 per cent per year. such a long period with such rapid growth around the world had not occurred since the early 1970s ( see figure 3 ). bis central bankers ’ speeches the high level of global growth led in turn to a substantial increase in the price of oil between 2004 and 2008 and to rising inflation in many countries towards the end of the period. the similarities to the years preceding the oil - price shocks of the 1970 are striking. in these years too, monetary policy was expansionary, gdp growth was high and oil prices were increasing. the price of crude oil increased rapidly in 1973 and 1979, which led to higher inflation ( see figure 4 ). it was, however, not just an expansionary monetary policy that caused the credit expansion and housing price bubble in the united states. there were a number of other causes, for example the new financial products that spread risks from the banks to investors who did not understand the risks. the aim of housing policy in the united states had also long been to increase home ownership by providing support from the semi - nationalised mortgage companies fannie mae and freddie mac. there were also several other problems, for example the fact that regulation and supervision of the financial markets were too weak. in europe, the common currency was introduced in 1999. this meant that interest rates in several countries that had previously had a higher interest rate than germany were reduced to a common euro level. in these countries, this contributed to a dramatic expansion of credit, rapid growth and a high level of inflation. in addition, regulation and supervision of the financial markets were national processes, despite that fact that the operations concerned were crossborder. however, it did not become apparent that this situation was untenable until the spring of 2010 in connection with the crisis in public finances in europe. each country certainly believed that they had good reasons for conducting their particular choice of monetary

to the pandemic were part of the expansionary monetary policy that would safeguard the credibility of the inflation target. in addition, during the pandemic, the intention was to support the real economy by ensuring that credit provision continued to function. an evaluation of our asset purchases cannot therefore be based solely on the financial gains or losses that have arisen on the riksbank's balance sheet. one needs to examine, among other things, how government finances were affected. 32 until the end of last year, the government bonds we purchased in phase 1 had increased in value. unrealised value increases of sek 9 billion were therefore recorded in revaluation accounts, see table 4. 33 these calculations are based on the cash flows that have so far been generated for each bond purchased, combined with a market valuation at current prices of the bonds that have not yet matured. the calculation can therefore be seen as the final result of the purchases, assuming that the remaining holding is sold today. 18 two examples of questions that need to be answered are : did the government's borrowing costs fall? did growth and employment in the economy rise, so that state tax revenues increased? in addition, it is also necessary, of course, to examine whether the economy has been positively affected in the broader sense. the country benefits in many ways – not just through its public finances – from high employment and economic growth. it is also valuable for the economy to have a credible inflation target that will ensure that price - setting and wage formation function well. the evaluation should also weigh such positive effects against other problems that may have arisen as a result of the riksbank's purchases. i am thinking in particular of whether the purchases affect how the market functions and of the risk that expectations build up that the riksbank will regularly influence prices and step in when problems arise ( so - called moral hazard ). the purchases at the start of the pandemic contributed to a rapid recovery it is difficult, or perhaps impossible, to quantify the broad effects of our purchases over the years. i shall therefore confine myself to repeating that the purchases we decided during the most urgent phase of the pandemic, in combination with other swedish and foreign support measures, had a great impact. they contributed to the economy recovering very quickly and to the avoidance of a prolonged recession. the value of this was considerable. i also repeat that our purchases seem to have had some – largely expected – negative effects on the