the central bank. stabilizing inflation should be something that central bankers may be proud of, something that we should cherish and continue to strive for. but we must recognize that financial stability issues and related macro - prudential measures have to gain significantly more grounds in central bank discussions and decisions. clearly, the course of the monetary policy will continue to be extensively discussed in the future, based on our improved understanding of the role of asset prices and financial frictions. incorporating financial stability objectives with the inflation targeting regime we have considered in albania as an opportunity to understand and address economic developments and potential macrofinancial risks, in order to preserve long - run economic stability. while the mandate on macro - prudential policy and its tools must be clear, one has to recognize that it can have wider effects in financial system and the real economy. for this reason, discussions on macro - prudential policy and measures must involve other authorities, including the fiscal one. many countries have now established an inter - institutional entity with soft or hard powers in designing and implementing macro - prudential policy to mitigate systemic risk. the role of the central bank in these inter - institutional entities will reflect their legislation and tradition, and independence objective. although central banks may not always chair such entities, central banks play a critical role in underpinning their functioning given the information and expertise they provide. how have such policies developed in the south eastern europe ( see ) region? in spite of solid growth in the run up to it, the global crisis found see in a vulnerable position. to a large extent, its growth model was based on encouraging domestic absorption which in turn was partly financed through external borrowing. financial inflows were channeled in see economies largely through eu bank subsidiaries. in see, they encouraged investment in real estate and services sectors and were reflected in large current account deficits. external competitiveness and structural reforms slipped gradually through the policymaker ’ s agenda, while fiscal positions were allowed to deteriorate and financial safety nets were weak. bis central bankers ’ speeches as a result, when the crisis hit see faced both a structural and a cyclical problem. the overall economic structure was not competitive while growth declined as external demand collapsed and domestic demand suffered from higher uncertainties, higher risk premium and lack of funding. on the financial side, our economies suffered as foreign banks deleveraged and reduced their exposure to see. on top of this, several countries faced high vulnerabilities in the

the prolonging of this program or the one that says that the government ’ s responsibilities should increase, by the imf leaving now? presently there are no camps ; actually there has not been any camp ever. personally i believe that the imf is the best certifier of our national balances and statistics and the guarantor of our macroeconomic policies ; unquestionably, the best guarantor to associate albania towards european membership.