##fm directive for alternative funds, ucits directives for funds, solvency 2 for insurance, emir for ccps ) and replicating some rules stemming from banking supervision to these entities would simply be irrelevant. more generally, it is up to the policy makers to act consistently and try to anticipate and mitigate any possible unintended effects of their policy decisions. for instance it might seem contradictory to encourage central clearing of derivatives or trading on organized trading platform as a means to reduce systemic risks on the one hand, while on the other hand levying a financial transaction tax on these operations if they are deemed safer. policy makers should make sure their actions will not be a factor of market instability which could spread to the market and create another crisis. conclusion as we can see, policy makers have still a lot of work on their plate as regards the design of an adequate regulatory framework for the “ shadow banking sector ” and for it to be sufficiently sound to be providing a sustainable “ market based financing ”. the capital market union ’ s project launched by the european commission is aiming at achieving to achieve a sound regulatory framework. to this end, for instance, the european commission with the help of the european banking association ( eba ) has recently defined criteria for simple, transparent and standardized ( sts ) securitization. the idea is both to regain investors ’ confidence in securitization assets, which we must admit still suffers from the us subprime crisis, and to encourage banks to deleverage loans portfolio from their balance sheet to refinance the real economy. by encouraging this new type of securitization, the european commission is mindful to avoid another subprime crisis. indeed, rebalancing the financing mix of the eu economy as promoted in the cmu initiative is a valuable objective provided a rightly calibrated regulatory and risk framework is in place. these are some of the challenges to tackle in the years to come. and let me wish you a fruitful conference. i now leave the floor to jean tirole. bis central bankers ’ speeches

where banking supervision has been considerably strengthened. even though this objective is a very legitimate one as far financial stability is concerned, i would like to emphasize two ideas : ( 1 ) the first idea is that a number of pitfalls have emerged along the way. indeed, consistency should not be mistaken with uniformity of the rules. ( 2 ) and the second idea is that a “ one size fits all ” approach of shadow banking regulation could lead to unintended adverse consequences. 1. let me develop the first point : the 2008 crisis illustrated that the so called « shadow banking sector » played an important role in propagating and amplifying financial instability throughout the financial system. shedding some light on these entities and regulating them to prevent contagion and regulatory bis central bankers ’ speeches arbitrage has been therefore a key milestone of the g20 financial regulation agenda ever since. the banque de france has been involved in this policy work from the outset. a first part of the work consisted in defining what the “ shadow banking sector ” is about. it does embody a wide variety of institutions worldwide which accomplish credit intermediation along with maturity transformation outside of the “ traditional ” banking sector. as an output, it transforms illiquid assets into liquid ones. the approach of shadow banking has progressively expanded to a variety of actors and activities : money markets funds ; securitization, repos and securities financing transactions. the work dedicated to preventing the financial risks arising from the shadow banking system became intertwined with the work aiming at ending “ too big to fail ”. in the wake of the globally systemically important banks, the financial stability board started working on identifying and defining a regulatory regime applicable to globally systemically important insurers ( gsiis ), non - bank - non insurance sifis ( nbnis ), critical market infrastructures / ccps. the focus of the work also shifted from monitoring / statistical reporting to rule making. beyond the yearly shadow banking monitoring exercises, policy makers intended to make sure that no part of the financial system would be left unregulated and that a similar set of rules should apply to a similar set of risks. for the sake of a better regulation of globally systemically important institutions, some progress remains possible in the monitoring, and the need for relevant data in particular as regards the better understanding of inter - linkages among g - sii. cross - sectorial consistency was seen as a key factor to prevent any opportunity