and liquidity constraints, particularly in dollars, have prompted certain groups to deleverage. it has undertaken an in - depth analysis and published studies on developments in household credit as well as the reallocation of households ’ financial investments, particularly between bank savings products and insurance savings products. ii ) 2011 – and this is my second point – was a year that saw the reinforcement of the methods used in prudential supervision. it was above all the year in which the process of merging banking and insurance supervision was completed. having been set up in the midst of the crisis that we are going through, the acp continually reviews the methods it uses to deal with new challenges. on the one hand, the traditional activities of on - and off - site inspections have been enhanced by taking the best procedures and practices from each of the two sectors, leading to improved quality and comparability in the assessment of the situation of the different institutions being inspected. during the year, the acp thus developed a more cross - functional mode of operating, thereby responding to the intention that led the government to merge the former authorities in 2010. the acp ’ s college has set out priorities for the supervision of each of the two sectors in a coordinated manner, and the acp has set up an autonomous and cross - functional research directorate. on the other hand, in line with international and european initiatives, the acp ’ s supervisory methods are complemented by the “ stress test ” approach to ever more complex scenarios and by the monitoring of the systemic nature of certain institutions. organised by the european authorities ( the eba for banks and the eiopa for insurance companies ) and the basel committee respectively and implemented concretely in france by the acp, these approaches supplement the individual supervision of banks and facilitate the macroprudential supervision of the financial system. the acp ’ s supervision methods have also fully taken on board its remit with respect to consumer protection, which is an essential condition for maintaining consumer confidence in the french financial sector. the acp ’ s mandate is to promote, in coordination with the amf – the report of our joint unit will be presented to you shortly – the sound conduct of market players ’ commercial practices bis central bankers ’ speeches without hampering responsible financial innovation that is suited to each category of customers. in 2011, the acp thus took a whole range of measures, of which i will only mention the main ones. the acp has put in place a system for monitoring

shared between paris, frankfurt and other financial centres within the zone. to answer your question about the specificities of paris, we have several assets to play an important role. first, the paris marketplace has a very strong position in equity markets within the euro area. second, in the fixed income sector, paris is by far the most important centre in two areas – the market for short term paper, where it has a share of about 36 % of the euro market, and the corporate bond market, where its share is about the same. finally, we have in paris the world ’ s second largest asset management industry after new york. we may not have the entire panoply of banking strengths, but we have a number of very strong niches which will continue to make paris a strong hub, which can and should continue to play an important role in the european financial services sector. euroweek : at the same time, would you like to see the big french banks continue to be active on the global stage, where their experience has been mixed? they didn ’ t do very well in southern europe, did they? noyer : there was a time when there was a feeling in the market that we were going to move towards a return to more national banking system, which meant that international diversification was basically a weakness. things have changed quite a lot and i don ’ t think anyone would argue that the move by bnp paribas to acquire fortis during the crisis was not a clever one. the french banks weren ’ t alone in believing that because we were supposed to have a single market in europe, it was natural for banks to expand to neighbouring countries – just as it is natural for banks originally set up in scotland to expand to england. so it was natural for french banks to see the eurozone and future euro area members in central and eastern europe as their backyard. yes, we had the greek problem, which was painful and costly for credit agricole. but this was really an extreme case and hopefully we ’ ll never see similar accidents again in our banking industry. as we move out of the financial crisis, i believe that having activities in several countries across the eurozone will soon re - establish itself as a normal diversified business model that is regarded as a strength rather than a weakness. bis central bankers ’ speeches