eddie yue : global loan market summit keynote speech by mr eddie yue, chief executive of the hong kong monetary authority, at the asia pacific loan market association ( aplma ) global loan market summit, hong kong, 1 march 2023. * * * pedro, andrew, distinguished guests, ladies, and gentlemen, good afternoon. it is a great pleasure to be here. 1. first, i'd like to congratulate the association on its 25thanniversary this year. a quarter century of valuable work in promoting growth, liquidity and best practice in syndicated loan markets in the asia pacific region is truly a significant milestone. we are all grateful for your invaluable contribution. 2. i am glad to see this event returning to hong kong in physical format after three years of virtual meetings. alongside other recent large - scale events such as the global financial leaders'investment summit and the many more that are planned, it is a strong vote of confidence in hong kong as an international finance centre. in recent months, as travel has largely returned normal, i have been meeting lots of overseas and mainland friends, and from my face - to - face interaction with them, i sensed great excitement and faith in hong kong's comeback. 3. 2022 was a difficult year for the global and local loan markets. geopolitical conflicts, rising inflation and interest rates have put pressure on the performance of almost all asset classes. bond and equity markets both fell sharply, and new bond issuance collapsed. notwithstanding all these challenges, we saw continued strength in the loans market. in asia in particular, while new bond issuance fell more than 40 % compared to 2021, syndicated lending saw modest growth. quite remarkably, the green and sustainable segment grew by around 50 % in 2022. 4. it's worth asking why we continued to see growth and innovation in hong kong during the challenging 2022 : i believe it's because we benefit from some unique fundamental strengths, as well as some supportive policy measures. 5. so, what are these strengths? first, hong kong has a strong banking network. we are home to over three quarters of the world's top 100 banks. with a robust capital adequacy ratio of around 20 %, a liquidity coverage ratio of over 160 % and a low classified loan ratio of about 1. 4 %, our banks are always looking for new business. they give hong kong the liquidity and expertise needed to handle transactions of any

jose de gregorio : the international financial crisis and its impact on the chilean economy speech by mr jose de gregorio, governor of the central bank of chile, presented before the honorable senate of the republic, santiago de chile, 8 october 2008. * * * mr. president of the senate, in response to your invitation to participate in this special session of the honorable senate, i would like to share with this audience our vision on the severe financial crisis the world economy is enduring, as well as its implications on our country. the world financial crisis and international growth the financial crisis being experienced by developed countries is the outcome of a period of stability, with abundant liquidity, fast economic growth and an asset price bubble. this combination of aggregate factors yields, as it frequently happens, to a cycle of high credit growth. the problem is that this occurred during an extremely accelerated process of financial innovation in market segments that were poorly or ambiguously regulated – mainly in the us. low interest rates prompted an intense search for higher returns. individuals with little or no ability to repay were lent for housing and, to reduce risks, credits were securitized and often taken out of the banks ’ balance sheets ( i. e. structured investment vehicles and conduits ). money was lent on the assumption that housing prices would continue on the rise, so the mortgage was all that was needed to relax lending standards. also, the real - estate bubble encouraged the demand for homes to be used as financial assets. these credits were sold to agencies that did not do a diligent risk assessment, and that triggered contamination not only throughout the us financial system at large, but also to other developed economies. risk - rating agencies were unable to give the proper ratings to complex instruments. in addition, there was a severe conflict of interests in the risk - rating system. the executive compensation structure also encouraged the search for returns with little attention to the risks involved. that it is costly to lend to bad debtors that will not repay goes without question, but this can hardly spark off a crisis of the proportions we are seeing today. the problem worsened because of the way banks decided to get rid of these loans, the way they were rated, and the financial instruments that were devised to reduce risks and make it appear as they had vanished when they had only shifted. there are also doubts whether the operations of derivatives markets have been as transparent as they should have been or if they have been manipulated. the paradox here is that in the banking