samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
falls national park on saturday. i will be happy to join you later this evening at the dinner which the bank of uganda will host. ladies and gentlemen, i wish you a very successful meeting. thank you for your kind attention.

the underlying strength of self - sustaining growth, economic activities in emerging and commodity - exporting countries are in part being supported by capital inflows from advanced countries, which are persisting with large - scale monetary easing. should capital inflows continue and economic conditions in emerging and commodity - exporting economies turn out to be stronger than expected, the greater exports thereby generated could represent an upside risk for japan ’ s economy. nevertheless, if the aforementioned risk concerning the u. s. economy materializes and economic activities in advanced countries are weaker than expected, growth in emerging and commodity - exporting economies might come under downward pressure, generated by a decline in trading volume and an outflow of capital. furthermore, although a growing number of countries are making adjustments to accommodative monetary policies, 4 a delay in adjusting policy appropriately could lead to economic overheating in the economies that fall behind the curve by delaying appropriate monetary policy adjustment. should this be the case, in the short run japan ’ s exports could rise even further, while at the same time the worsening in the terms of trade associated with the recently released annual revision of gdp data showed the saving rate for the april - june quarter increasing to 6. 0 percent ; the 3. 9 percent in the pre - revision data rose to 6. 2 percent in the post - revision data. this upward revision is notable as it reflects the magnitude of the pressure from balance - sheet adjustments. for reference, the average saving rate in the united states was about 2. 8 percent from the beginning of 2000 through summer 2008 – the period when overspending seemed to have continued. asian countries that have raised their benchmark interest rates include malaysia and india in march, taiwan in june, and south korea and thailand in july. in addition to the asian economies, australia and brazil have been raising their policy interest rates. a rise in commodity prices could also pose a downside risk for private domestic demand in japan. moreover, in the medium to long term, if a sharp unwinding of excessive economic and financial activity takes place in emerging and commodity - exporting economies, the risk of deep adjustments in their economic activity would demand attention. 3. risks in global financial markets caused by the situation in europe global financial markets have been unstable since the beginning of this year, due partly to growing fiscal problems in some european countries and subsequent growing concern about the financial system. as mentioned earlier, a structural factor – the use of a single currency – may
long recovery, now in its 11th year, is benefiting them and their neighbors to a degree that has not been felt for many years. employers are partnering with community colleges and nonprofit organizations to offer training. and people who have struggled to stay in the workforce in the past are getting new opportunities. once again, welcome. now it is your turn to speak. we ’ re listening. 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches

, 60431 frankfurt am main, germany, tel : + 49 ( 0 ) 69 9566 3511 or 3512, fax : + 49 ( 0 ) 69 9566 3077 presse @ bundesbank. de, www. bundesbank. de reproduction permitted only if source is stated. financial stability is at risk if systemic risks emerge. at the heart of systemic risks are externalities : systemic risk may occur, for instance, when the distress of one or more market participants jeopardises the functioning of the entire system. this may be the case when the distressed market participant is very large or closely interlinked with other market players. interconnectedness can be a channel through which unexpected adverse developments are transmitted to the financial system as a whole, thus impairing its stability. market participants can be connected directly through contractual relationship such as on the interbank market. besides this, indirect channels of contagion may exist. many market participants may conduct similar transactions or hold similar types of assets. in such a situation, investors may interpret negative news as signals that other market participants are adversely affected as well. hence, systemic risks also exist if a large number of small market participants is exposed to similar risks or risks that are closely correlated with each other. in the presence of systemic risk externalities, the optimal level of risk taken by financial institutions from a private perspective is thus higher than the socially efficient level of risk. owners of financial institutions may reap the potential benefits of their decisions in full, but bear the potential risks only partially if they can expect to be bailed out by the government bailout in the event of distress. this excessive risk taking implies costs for society : if risks materialize, governments may be pressured to bail out banks, thus imposing costs on taxpayers. regulatory reforms aimed at internalizing these externalities comprise higher lossabsorbing capacity and provisions to facilitate the orderly resolution of banks. these reforms have the potential to increase social welfare. however, they may come at a net private cost for the affected institutions : they will forgo the net private benefit ( profits ) associated with their excessive risk taking, they may incur costs related to compliance with new regulations, and their funding may be more costly as it must provide greater capacity to absorb losses. through these channels, changes in regulations affect the incentives for banks to take on risks. seite 3 von 13 deutsche bundesbank, directorate general communications wilhelm - epstein - strasse 14,
- up of financial imbalances. at the same time, monetary policy must not be overburdened. when assessing the monetary policy trade - offs, the primary objective of monetary policy must remain low and stable inflation. we will not lose sight of the inflation target. should the outlook for inflation or economic activity show a pronounced change, we still have monetary policy leeway – in both directions. bis central bankers ’ speeches

øystein olsen : the conduct of monetary policy introductory statement by mr øystein olsen, governor of norges bank ( central bank of norway ), at the hearing before the standing committee on finance and economic affairs of the storting ( norwegian parliament ), oslo, 15 may 2014. * * * accompanying charts can be found on the central bank of norway ’ s website : charts ( pdf ). please note that the text below may differ from the actual presentation. i would like to thank the chairman of the committee for this opportunity to report on the conduct of monetary policy. my statement here today is based on norges bank ’ s annual report for 2013 and has been updated based on new information and assessments up to the monetary policy meeting last week. norges bank ’ s operational conduct of monetary policy is oriented towards low and stable inflation. the operational target is annual consumer price inflation of close to 2. 5 percent over time. monetary policy shall also contribute to smoothing fluctuations in output and employment. the key policy rate is the main instrument of monetary policy. chart : inflation and capacity utilisation in 2001, an inflation target was assigned to norges bank. the experience has been positive. over the past ten years, consumer price inflation has on average been somewhat below, but close to 2. 5 percent. the world economy has to a large extent been marked by imbalances through this period. growth in the norwegian economy slowed in the wake of the financial crisis, but has since been close to a normal level. unemployment has remained low. chart2 : norges bank ’ s key policy rate the key policy rate is lower than what can be considered to be a normal level. norway is a small, open economy. exceptionally low interest rates abroad influence the key policy rate in norway. at the same time, there is still a considerable difference between the key policy rate and the interest rates facing households and enterprises. banks ’ lending margins are not particularly low as their lending margins are high. chart3 : key rates abroad low interest rates and unconventional monetary policy internationally reflect a continued low activity levels and high unemployment. in some countries, particularly in europe, inflation has also shown a considerably decline. policy rates are still close to zero in many countries and both the european central bank ( ecb ) and sveriges riksbank cut rates last year. leading central banks have taken new steps to provide markets with forward guidance, with the aim of signalling low interest rates for a long period ahead.
of the history of “ excess ” equity returns. is it possible that responses toward risk are more akin to claustrophobia than to a learning response? no matter how many times one emerges unscathed from a claustrophobic experience, the sensitivity remains. in that case, there is no learning experience. whichever case applies, what is certain is that the question of the permanence of the decline in equity premiums is of critical importance to risk managers. they cannot be agnostic on this question because any abrupt rise in equity premiums must inevitably produce declines in the values of most private financial obligations. thus, however clearly they may be able to evaluate asset - specific risk, they must be careful not to overlook the possibilities of macro risk that could undermine the value of even a seemingly well - diversified portfolio. i have called attention to this risk - management challenge in a different context when discussing the roots of the international financial crises of the past two and a half years. my focus has been on the perils of risk management when periodic crises – read sharply rising risk premiums – undermine risk - management structures that fail to address them. during a financial crisis, risk aversion rises dramatically, and deliberate trading strategies are replaced by rising fear - induced disengagement. yield spreads on relatively risky assets widen dramatically. in the more extreme manifestation, the inability to differentiate among degrees of risk drives trading strategies to ever - more - liquid instruments that permit investors to immediately reverse decisions at minimum cost should that be required. as a consequence, even among riskless assets, such as us treasury securities, liquidity premiums rise sharply as investors seek the heavily traded “ on - the - run ” issues – a behavior that was so evident last fall. as i have indicated on previous occasions, history tells us that sharp reversals in confidence occur abruptly, most often with little advance notice. these reversals can be self - reinforcing processes that can compress sizable adjustments into a very short period. panic reactions in the market are characterized by dramatic shifts in behavior that are intended to minimize short - term losses. claims on far - distant future values are discounted to insignificance. what is so intriguing, as i noted earlier, is that this type of behavior has characterized human interaction with little appreciable change over the generations. whether dutch tulip bulbs or russian equities, the market price patterns remain much the same. we can readily describe this process, but, to date,

risk models has not made people with grey hair, or none, wholly obsolete.
156. de gregorio, j. ( 2011 ), “ price and financial stability in modern central banking ”, speech delivered at lacea - lames conference, november, santiago, chile. magud, n., c. reinhart and k. rogoff ( 2011 ), “ capital controls : myth and reality – a portfolio balance approach ”, nber working paper n°16805. ostry, j., a. ghosh, k. habermeier, m. chamon, m. qureshi and d. reinhardt ( 2010 ), “ capital inflows : the role of controls ”, imf staff position note, spn / 10 / 04. tinbergen, j. ( 1952 ), on the theory of economic policy, amsterdam : north - holland. bis central bankers ’ speeches

. 5 10. 0 5. 5 2. 7 2. 7 3. 0 3. 8 2. 9 2. 5 1. 9 1. 6 9. 4 4. 8 3. 0 3. 1 3. 1 5. 1 3. 9 2. 8 2. 9 2. 0 11. 6 5. 5 5. 6 3. 0 4. 6 5. 2 3. 8 2. 0 2. 7 2. 4 13. 0 5. 9 5. 7 3. 2 5. 0 3. 2 2. 2 1. 1 0. 9 - 0. 6 9. 0 3. 0 4. 2 1. 0 3. 0 2009 ( f ) report may'09 - 1. 2 - 2. 3 - 3. 0 - 3. 5 - 7. 2 6. 5 - 1. 9 - 2. 0 - 1. 7 - 1. 5 2010 ( f ) june ipom meeting may'09 s s s t s s s t = s - 1. 1 - 2. 2 - 2. 7 - 4. 1 - 6. 8 7. 3 - 1. 8 - 2. 6 - 1. 7 - 1. 4 2. 1 1. 4 0. 5 0. 4 0. 9 7. 5 1. 4 1. 5 0. 9 2. 0 june meeting s s s = = s s s s s 2. 3 1. 6 0. 6 0. 4 0. 9 7. 8 2. 1 1. 9 1. 3 2. 3 ( * ) regional growth are weighted average by world gpp participation in imf world economic outlook ( weo, april 2009 ) ( e ) estimated ; ( f ) forecasted. fuente : central bank of chile base on investment bank data, consensus forecast and imf. commodity prices have posted substantial increases in the past few weeks. both copper and oil have seen their prices rise more than 50 % since the end of 2008. the copper price hike reflects increased demand, especially from china. in the case of the oil price, the increase began showing in domestic prices, partly offset by the recent appreciation of the peso. little by little, dislocations in international financial markets are being fixed. interbank markets, which a few months back had to deal with serious liquidity problems, have continued to normalize thanks to the liquidity provision measures adopted by the authorities and the gradual recovery of expectations.
global trade policy developments and their implications for the inflation outlook. again, we need to bear in mind that this risk is two - sided. with that, governor poloz and i would be happy to take your questions. 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches

. so, the bank focused its efforts on refining its understanding of the linkages between interest rates, economic growth and, ultimately, inflation — in short, a macroeconomic model. in 1988, then - governor john crow announced that monetary policy should aim at “ achieving and maintaining stable prices. ” although the precise definition of price stability was left open, the anchor for monetary policy would be inflation itself, not an intermediate variable such as money. it is fair to say that the concept of directly targeting inflation was met with a fair degree of skepticism, including from the government. after all, a central bank does not control how prices are set. what made us think we could achieve an inflation target? well, we had done the research and improved our ability to use economic models, so we knew the logic was sound. in the end, the federal government was persuaded — we reached a formal agreement that said our monetary policy would be directed at controlling inflation and that gave us the operational independence to carry out policy as we saw fit. and so, in 1991, canada became an inflation - targeting pioneer. over time, the broad parameters of our approach have not changed. for the first three years, we had inflation - reduction targets, with a goal of bringing inflation down to 2 per cent. we succeeded. since 1995, we have aimed to keep inflation at the 2 per cent midpoint of a 1 to 3 per cent range. importantly, we approach the target symmetrically. given the experiences of countries who have struggled with deflation, we are just as concerned about inflation below our target as above it. we want businesses and consumers to be able to make long - term plans with certainty. reaping the rewards as it turned out, the framework worked better than we could have reasonably hoped. check the numbers. inflation averaged about 7 per cent between 1975 and 1991, including the 1983 to 1990 period when it stabilized around 4 to 5 per cent. since then, inflation has averaged almost exactly 2 per cent and become much more stable, and expectations have become solidly anchored on the target. inflation targeting has also provided economic benefits that went beyond those we were expecting. canadian businesses and households have reaped the rewards of reduced uncertainty, helping them make spending and investment decisions with more confidence. it has 2 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches also led to improved economic performance across a number of dimensions — both in terms of higher levels of activity and lower variability. the agreement, which has been renewed every five
5 while the disruption did not last long, the episode demonstrated the potential dangers of a broad - based reliance on a small number of third - party providers. these technology firms may have systemic importance and are a key element of the digital operational resilience act, an eu microprudential legislation. 6 this concentration risk is further heightened in an environment marked by geopolitical tensions and the rapid uptake of ai. hostile states could wreak havoc if they uncover just one critical weakness in our financial system. at the esrb, we expected intensified cyberattacks following russia's invasion of ukraine. 7 fortunately, the financial system has proven resilient so far, but the risk remains. the widespread adoption of ai may also have systemic implications for the financial system. for example, if ai suppliers were to remain concentrated, operational risk, market concentration and too - big - to - fail externalities may arise. moreover, an extensive uptake of ai could increase the potential for herding behaviour. 8 looking further ahead, advances in quantum computing may pose a serious threat to our encryption - based financial system. the technology may even go on to eventually break current encryption methods, although it is difficult to know when this might happen. that is why it is critical to start preparing early – and there are already efforts to do so. in august, for example, the national institute of standards and technology in the united states finalised the first post - quantum encryption standards and called for their rapid deployment. 9 efforts by individual financial institutions will not be enough, however : the shift to post - quantum encryption standards will need to be implemented across the economy to ensure sufficient resilience. the implications of technology for macroprudential policy as macroprudential policymakers, our primary role is to ensure that the financial system remains stable and resilient in the face of emerging threats. historically, macroprudential policy has focused heavily on cyclical risks. but as we look into the future, we need to pay more attention to major structural changes. technologies such as ai and quantum computing will reshape the financial landscape in ways we are only beginning to grasp. macroprudential policy must evolve to meet these new frontiers. the risks stemming from disruptive technologies will not be confined to individual institutions – they will be systemic. but the tools we have relied on in the past may no longer be sufficient. larger buffers are not always the right answer, nor are they the only answer

felt that this workshop has contributed to this objective and that it will help all of us in our efforts to promote transparent, predictable and safe derivatives markets that meet all our needs. thank you. bis central bankers ’ speeches
credit underwriting, reducing demand for certain roles such as bank tellers, while increasing demand for technical jobs such as data scientists and programmers. these trends are not confined to those in finance but across industries. however, i would caution against us falling into the turing trap – or automation bias – where technology is viewed as replacement for humans. instead, as we have seen throughout history, while technology and innovation would inevitably displace some jobs, it will also often be accompanied by creation of new and better jobs. as such, the role of policy is three - fold : one, encourage technological investments to improve overall productivity and competitiveness. two, ensure that such investments yield high - paying job opportunities. three, invest in re - skilling and up - skilling efforts so that malaysians can seize those opportunities. as the nature of work changes, so must our workforce. malaysians should be provided with opportunities to continuously retool themselves throughout their career, in response to evolving demands. while the government and academia have roles to play, i also believe that industry should take greater ownership of forward - looking reskilling initiatives. an example of this is the financial industry - driven future skills framework ( fsf ) initiative led by the asian institute of chartered bankers ( aicb ). financial sector talents are future - proofed through reskilling and upskilling interventions. as an organisation, bnm has also invested deeply in upskilling our workforce. by partnering with global 2 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches technology leaders, we bring advanced expertise to our staff, providing them hands - on experience with transformative tools. our goal is to equip our people not just to meet today's challenges but to shape the future of finance and economic policies. apart from investing in our adaptive capabilities, we must also protect those who may be vulnerable to these changes. we recognise that not everyone is equally prepared or able to keep up with the sweeping changes of technological waves. it is our duty to provide a safety net so that they do not get left too far behind. an important part of this safety net is the active labour market policies to help disadvantaged individuals re - enter the workforce on a much stronger footing. these policies are crucial to partially mitigate the inequality impacts that technological disruptions could create. the constant tension between technological progress and the nature of jobs is not new – and it is here to stay. from automotive displacing horse carriages to emails and texts displa

financial products that can meet the needs of savers throughout their life cycle. the availability of a wide range of savings instruments for savers is a necessary pre - requisite for effective mobilisation of the nation's savings. indeed, the ongoing evolution of an innovative, dynamic and diversified financial system in malaysia will not only help malaysians save, but also invest effectively for their future by facilitating the more efficient allocation of personal resources. thank you.