the second premise underlying the eurosystem ’ s position relates to the choice of an adequate institutional vehicle to foster the heightened degree of supervisory convergence and cooperation. the eurosystem remains convinced that the lamfalussy framework provides an appropriate setting in this respect. one of the key advantages of the lamfalussy approach is the combination of a decentralised set - up with cross - border coordination at eu level. a decentralised approach is in line with the national responsibilities for safeguarding financial stability – relating not only to prudential supervision, but also to financial stability monitoring and assessment, crisis management, and deposit insurance – while also allowing to reap the benefits of geographical proximity and of the established experience and knowledge of local supervisors. however, the accompanying coordinating mechanisms need to be sufficiently strong so as to achieve the required high level of cross - border convergence and cooperation and to ensure a level playing field. we consider that the eu regulatory and supervisory policy process has not yet been sufficiently strengthened in this respect. to this avail, further measures will be necessary at all levels of the policy process, pertaining to ( i ) the overall institutional setting and political guidance for the pursuit of cross - border convergence and cooperation ; ( ii ) the eu regulatory framework, as laid down at levels 1 and 2 of the lamfalussy process, ( iii ) closely convergent supervisory requirements, as developed at level 3 of the lamfalussy process and ( iv ) streamlined and consistent supervisory processes, as implemented by national supervisors on a day - to - day basis with the support of the level 3 committees. three key issues for enhancement the eurosystem ’ s views on the required measures within these four broad areas are broadly in line with the respective recommendations of other eu institutions and fora, such as the european commission, the inter - institutional monitoring group, the financial services committee, and the committee of european banking supervisors ( cebs ). i would like now to briefly highlight three key issues on which we place particular importance. first, one priority in the coming period will be to reinforce the role and operating mechanisms of the cebs. the current status of the cebs – a private network of national supervisors with a limited formal recognition at either eu or national level – is simply not commensurate with the important tasks entrusted to this committee. the institutional standing of the cebs should therefore be enhanced significantly. against this background we very much support the commission ’ s plans to assess possible options for strengthening the

thomas jordan : does the swiss national bank need equity? summary of a speech by mr thomas jordan, vice - chairman of the governing board of the swiss national bank, to the statistisch - volkswirtschaftliche gesellschaft, basel, 28 september 2011. * * * the complete speech can be found in german on the swiss national bank ’ s website ( www. snb. ch ). the swiss national bank ( snb ) had to report heavy losses for 2010 and the first half of 2011 due to the strength of the swiss franc – or, more precisely, due to valuation changes on its foreign currency reserves. consequently, it suffered a substantial reduction in its equity. understandably in such a situation, concerns began to be voiced in public. questions often posed in this context include : might the snb lose its capacity to act as a result of a negative equity level? and, if its equity were negative, would the snb have to be recapitalised, or might it even have to go into administration? the short answer to these questions is “ no ”, because the snb cannot be compared with commercial banks or other private enterprises. for one thing, a central bank cannot become illiquid. this means that a central bank ’ s capacity to act is not constrained if its equity turns negative. moreover, unlike other enterprises, it is not forced to implement recovery measures or go into administration. for another, central banks enjoy a funding advantage over private companies, owing to their banknote - issuing privilege. moreover, they generate surplus income over the long term. thus, over time, a central bank like the snb can usually rebuild its equity level all on its own after a loss. nevertheless, even for a central bank, a long period of negative equity is not without its problems, as it can undermine the bank ’ s credibility and its independence in the longer term. for these reasons, it is important for the snb to maintain a sufficient level of equity. to ensure that the snb can carry out its monetary policy mandate without restriction, also in the long term, in the interests of the country as a whole it is essential that its capital base be adequately rebuilt. this means that the necessary profits must be earned, and retained. in the long run, the entire economy will benefit. bis central bankers ’ speeches