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the minimum requirement for tier 1 capital is only 4 per cent of the total riskweighted assets. however, this comparison is not entirely valid, for two reasons. firstly, the new regulations entail much stricter requirements regarding what is accepted as tier 1 capital. in future a much larger share of this capital must be of the highest possible quality. this “ common equity tier 1 capital ” is made up of equity capital and withheld profits ( the red part of the columns in the figure below ). this capital can immediately and without complication be used to cover losses. in addition, one must have additional capital – what is known as other tier 1 capital – of good quality, which can also be used to meet losses in going concern ( orange colour in the figure ). one must also have further capital in the form of, for instance, subordinated loans ( yellow colour in the figure ). this part of the capital differs from the other two in that it can only be used once the bank has gone bankrupt. secondly, one will to a greater extent assume that the asset values are overestimated. so the risk adjustments in the value of the assets that i mentioned will be much tougher. quite simply, one will now assume that the values of many asset classes are more inflated than was previously assumed. so despite the increase in sweden being only around 2 percentage points for tier 1 capital, it actually entails a much tougher minimum requirement. but above all, it means that the global minimum level is raised substantially. especially with regard to common equity tier 1 capital. but not only that. the banks should also hold buffers over and above the minimum requirements. one such buffer is what is known as the capital conservation buffer. the further a bank is from meeting the capital conservation buffer requirement, the more limited its capacity to pay dividends to shareholders. the reason is that one wants to prevent the banks from showering its owners with riches in the good times, and then being caught unprepared when the economic climate changes. if one adds this buffer, the requirements for common equity tier 1 capital is 7 per cent. moreover, national authorities will have the opportunity to force the banks to build up extra buffers during economic upturns, so that they can more easily weather difficulties when there are downturns. the swedish banks already comply with the capital requirements stipulated in the new basel regulations. and this is an important condition for them to be able to fund themselves on the