5 bis - central bankers'speeches but as i recently said, faced with shifting geopolitics, digital transformations and the threat of a changing climate, there will be more challenges ahead which the ecb will need to address. we must continue to provide stability in a world that is anything but stable. 6 and we are also counting on other policymakers to do their part. a monetary union is not an end point – it is a constant process of uniting. each generation of leaders must continue it. union should be multifaceted – and include fiscal, financial and banking dimensions to develop a higher degree of integration, especially if the euro is to cement its international status. when wim duisenberg accepted the charlemagne prize on behalf of the euro in 2002, he portrayed the euro as a triple contract. 7 it is a contract between countries to pool their strength. a contract between the ecb and the people of europe to deliver on their needs, most of all price stability. and a contract between europeans themselves to share their common currency. but a contract does not only grant rights – it also assigns responsibilities. and now it is up to all of us – leaders, institutions and citizens – to continue to honour this contract for many years to come. 1 see eichengreen, b. and naef, a. ( 2022 ), " imported or home grown? the 1992 – 3 ems crisis ", journal of international economics, vol. 138, september ; and rey, h. ( 2015 ), " dilemma not trilemma : the global financial cycle and monetary policy independence ", nber working papers, no 21162, national bureau of economic research, may. 2 for an overview of the ecb's first 20 years, see rostagno, m. et al. ( 2021 ), monetary policy in times of crisis : a tale of two decades of the european central bank, oxford university press. 3 di sano, m., frohm, e. and gunnella, v. ( 2022 ), " how important is invoicing currency choice for the impact of exchange rate fluctuations on trade? ", the international role of the euro, ecb, june. 4 according to ecb staff estimates based on the synthetic control approach and weighting scheme outlined in gabriel, r. d. and pessoa, a. s. ( 2020 ), " adopting the euro : a synthetic control approach ", munich personal rep

order to allow the individual to compete with the global investors, maybe they should be able to borrow more money : i don ’ t really think that ’ s part of the answer. we tried that before here, and we need to keep a limit on the amount of debt that households take on. because the cost of excessive debt is so high, as we know in this country. going back, how we deal with improving affordable housing, all of these are frontline political issues, that is true across europe in different ways. for a fast - growing economy like ireland, where the workforce is growing, where there is so much pressure on housing, it ’ s obviously quite intense. but we don ’ t think tighter monetary policy from us is part of the answer. some would say that part of the answer would be to cap particularly retail interest rates charged by banks. do you see that as part of the answer? this is a long - running debate here. even though the ecb rate is quite low, when you look across europe, the mortgage lending rates in ireland are higher. the ecb has provided a legal opinion on the draft law, and it highlights, in line with the central bank of ireland analysis, that a policy that caps the interest rate runs the risk of having an unintended effect, which is that it will deter entry. the irish banking system is quite concentrated. many people would like to see more banks enter to compete and, through competition, lower the rates. if you have a legal approach, where there is a legal regulation capping the interest rate, then the incentive for foreign lenders to come in is less. we have this long - running debate about the contribution of the quite high default risk in ireland being built into those higher rates. i understand the intent : trying to make housing more affordable is a big issue. but personally, and in terms of the official advice of the ecb, we think capping interest rates is not the advisable way to go. you don ’ t even see a role for it, say, if you were to consider the housing situation to be an emergency scenario ; that it would be a temporary measure given to the central bank? well, again let me come back to the basics here. so much of the funding now in the irish property market is not coming from mortgages. you give the example of global institutional investors. what is driving the overall pricing of housing, also rental accommodation and so on, is not