- s64. 9 mckay, a. and r. reis, ( 2016 ), “ the role of automatic stabilizers in the u. s. business cycle ”, econometrica, 84, 141 – 194. 10 mckay, a. and r. reis, ( 2016 ), “ optimal automatic stabilizers ”, nber working paper 22359, cepr discussion paper 11578. 11 hall, r. e. and r. reis, ( 2015 ), “ maintaining central - bank solvency under new - style central banking ”, nber working paper 21173, cepr discussion paper 10741, and hall, r. e. and r. reis, ( 2016 ), “ achieving price stability by manipulating the central bank ’ s payment on reserves ”, nber working paper 22761, cepr discussion paper 11578. 12 see, for example, brunnermeier, m. k., langfield, s., pagano, m., reis, r., van nieuwerburgh, s. and d. 3 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches vayanos, ( 2016 ), “ esbies : safety in the tranches ”, european systemic risk board working paper 21, reis, r., ( 2013 ), “ the portuguese slump and crash and the euro crisis ”, brookings papers on economic activity, 44, 143 – 210, and reis, r., ( 2015 ), “ looking for a success in the euro crisis adjustment programs : the case of portugal ”, brookings papers on economic activity, 46, 433 – 458. 4 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches

, the euro area and the eu as a whole have demonstrated their ability to act decisively and promptly in difficult circumstances. national measures have been coordinated in a pragmatic manner with a view to enhancing their effectiveness through mutual reinforcement. i am therefore surprised to hear voices here and there arguing that policy - makers in the euro area were – or still are – “ behind the curve ”, have done too little, too late, and ought to have learnt more in terms of responsiveness from their colleagues in other parts of the world. i do not want to talk about this issue in any detail. as a matter of fact, the epicentre of the current crisis lies outside the euro area, and the euro area has not had to deal with the failure of a major financial institution or a bank run. let me begin with the response of the eurosystem, which has fully respected – in terms of the allocation of responsibilities – the distinction between monetary policy and fiscal policy. since the very start of the tensions in the euro area money market almost two years ago, the ecb has taken forceful, timely and pre - emptive policy action to counter the adverse effects of the financial crisis. against the backdrop of rapidly receding inflationary pressures and without compromising on our mandate to maintain price stability over the medium term, we have cut the interest rate on our main refinancing operations by 325 basis points since last october. that interest rate now stands at 1. 0 %, the lowest level since the launch of the euro. in addition to these extraordinary rate cuts, the ecb has adopted a number of non - standard measures allowing it to provide banks with substantial amounts of liquidity and thereby support the flow of credit to the real economy. i would just like to remind you that in terms of financing, the banking system plays a more important role in the euro area than in other major economies. the non - standard measures we have chosen are therefore directed mainly at banks. this means that the eurosystem ’ s response to the crisis cannot be compared directly with those of other major central banks. we have our own approach. more specifically, we have provided the banking system with unlimited amounts of liquidity at the main refinancing rate against an expanded list of eligible collateral. coupled with the fact that more or less all financially sound euro area credit institutions are able to participate in the eurosystem ’ s refinancing operations, this has significantly eased banks ’ balance sheet constraints,