samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
, but when inflation expectations over the longer - term — the next 5 to 10 years — begin to rise, it may indicate that consumers and businesses have less confidence in the fed ’ s ability to address higher inflation and return it to the federal open market committee ’ s ( fomc ) goal of 2 percent. if expectations move significantly above our 2 percent goal, it would make it more difficult to change people ’ s perceptions about the duration of high inflation and potentially more difficult to get inflation under control. as we see surveys like the michigan survey report higher longer - term inflation expectations, we need to pay close attention and continue to use our tools to address inflation before these indicators rise further or expectations of higher inflation become entrenched. as i mentioned earlier, one force driving inflation is the extremely tight labor market. the benefits from a tight labor market are easy to see — the u. s. economy continued to add jobs at a pace of 400, 000 per month for the past three months, which is remarkable considering the low number of people looking for work. today, most people who want to work can find a job, and wages and salaries have risen faster than they have in decades. even with these gains, wages have not kept pace with inflation, which has - 3made it much more difficult for many workers to make ends meet in the face of soaring housing, energy, and food costs. job creation signals strong labor market demand, particularly in the current environment, with a large number of available jobs and fewer job seekers. in addition, the tightness of the labor market is exacerbated by a labor force participation rate that remains far below the pre - pandemic benchmark, representing millions of workers sitting on the sidelines. many of these are early retirees, some incentivized to retire during the pandemic, and those with family caregiving challenges including very high costs for childcare. while the strong job market has brought some of these workers back into the workforce, it seems that many are still waiting or may not return, meaning that labor shortages will likely persist in many sectors of the economy. i ’ ve laid out many of the challenges, so now let me talk about what the federal reserve is doing to get inflation under control. in the face of inflation that continues to be much too high and in light of the recent high readings, the fomc raised the federal funds rate by 75 basis points at our most recent meeting last week. that

, “ monetary policy according to hank ”, american economic review, vol. 108 ( 3 ), march, pp. 697 – 743. 2 gabaix, x., lasry, j. - m., lions, p. - l. and moll, b. ( 2016 ), “ the dynamics of inequality ”, econometrica, vol. 84, no 6, november, pp. 2071 – 2111. 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches
mr yamaguchi discusses the role of central banks in international finance speech by mr yutaka yamaguchi, deputy governor of the bank of japan at the japan center for economic research in tokyo on 13 july 1999. introduction today, i would like to discuss the role of central banks in international finance. the reasons why i chose this subject, and not the japanese economy or its financial system, or the monetary policy of the bank of japan, are twofold. the first and foremost is that responding to the changes in the international financial markets has become a very important issue to the future of the japanese economy, as evident from the financial crises involving the emerging economies since thailand in the summer of 1997. the other reason is because we feel that the international activities of the bank of japan is not well understood, relative to the contributions the bank has made so far. in the next hour or so, i would begin with some salient features of recent international financial crises and the roles of central banks therein. this would be followed by a discussion of the activities of the bank for international settlements ( bis ) committee on the global financial system ( cgfs ), which i have had the pleasure of chairing since last may. finally, i would conclude my remarks today by briefly explaining the role of the bank of japan in international finance. the changing nature of international financial crises international financial crises in the 1990s let me begin by laying down some observations on the changes in the phenomena we call international financial crises. in the discussion of “ international financial crises, ” we can, of course, begin by arguing what is a “ crisis ” and whether a crisis becomes “ international. ” let us, however, leave such question of exact definitions aside and look at those financial crises that had international repercussions. such international financial crises are not something new. the british suffered a severe attack on the sterling in 1967. the us dollar ’ s convertibility to gold was suspended in 1971, with serious international consequences. the mounting debt borne by the developing countries was a serious concern during the 1980s. we can conclude that the international financial markets had suffered a number of shocks or crises in the past, and thus, crises have been recurrent. however, if we look back on more recent crises, the japanese bubble and its aftermath in the 1990s, the nordic banking crises in the first half of this decade, the attack on the erm in 1992, the mexican crisis of 1994 – 95, and the turmoil in the emerging

no longer be at the center and become local banks as a result of globalization. in order for central banks to continue making their contributions to the stability of the economy and the financial system, they must review their policies and operations in accordance with the ongoing globalization. the bank of japan is also determined to tackle such challenges ahead.
both fiscal policy and monetary policy would be forced to make substantial departures from the normal principles. these would be extremely unusual circumstances, however, and do not provide any argument for setting up a permanent stabilisation policy committee. so, my answer to the question on whether monetary and fiscal policy should be developed is yes, but not in the direction lo appears to have in mind. with regard to monetary policy, this means continued improvement of analysis and forecasting methods and to find ways to clarify the balance between the inflation target and the real economy. for fiscal policy it could mean finding ways to make the automatic stabilisers even more effective, but primarily it entails designing preventive systems to enable smoother structural adjustments in the economy when various shocks unavoidably occur. it does not entail any changes in the fundamental role allocation as regards stabilisation policy. summary let me briefly summarise my responses to the three questions. stabilisation policy is important, but one should not overestimate what it can achieve. other economic policy measures are much more important to long - term growth in prosperity. a smoother adjustment process when the economy suffers shocks could benefit employment more than an active stabilisation policy. the allocation of roles between fiscal policy and monetary policy with regard to stabilising the macro economy has functioned well in the new regime and i see no good reason to change it. both fiscal policy and monetary policy can and should develop, but this should occur within the framework of the present allocation of roles regarding stabilisation policy. for monetary policy this is a question of analysing and describing the considerations made between the inflation target and developments in the real economy. the most important issue regarding fiscal policy is not measures aimed at stabilisation, but providing a good general foundation for prosperity growth. thank you!

noted that ] we, [ the philippines ], are not having general cuts in taxes. i was told by the central bank governor of thailand that they had a " temporary " cut in vat [ value - added tax ], and after 30 years, the temporary cut is still there. i think temporary things tend to be not temporary. the analysts are saying, " well, macroeconomic policymaking and fiscal policymaking in the philippines are actually quite well - disciplined. " as [ finance sec. ] ben and i would tell them, " do not look at what we have done. look at what we have not done, which is take these easy responses that could later be hard to reverse. " therefore, the key is addressing the problem at the root and having more targeted assistance. thank you very much. 4 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches
– the unemployment rate has fallen sharply in the euro area, to stand at 9. 1 % in august 2017, but it is still too high ; second, backward - looking wage bargaining, which means that low past inflation is feeding through to wages today. the influence of these two causes should nevertheless diminish with the recovery in economic growth and inflation. structurally, many studies iii suggest that the phillips curve, that is the relationship between inflation and fluctuations in economic activity or unemployment, appears to have flattened since the 1980s [ slide ]. inflation seems less responsive to changes in economic activity in advanced countries, notably because of globalisation, iv which appears to exert downward pressure on inflation via the decline in imported goods prices and competition from lowwage countries. but a flatter phillips curve does not call into question this relationship : we are in no doubt about the way we are heading : the recovery and job creations will lead to higher wages and, ultimately, more inflation. but we remain, nevertheless, less certain as to the speed of this adjustment. we are both confident about the effectiveness of our monetary policy and willing to be patient regarding the time it will take. ii. the prospects : an adequate reduction of asset purchases, within an overall substantially accommodative monetary policy let me now turn to the implications of this for our monetary policy. you are well aware that we at the ecb ’ s governing council will decide this autumn on the re - calibration of our policy instruments beyond the end of the year – and, to quote mario draghi, “ probably the bulk of these decisions will be taken in october ”. we are now faced with a simple requirement, in line with our mandate to maintain price stability, and the progress towards our inflation page 4 sur 8 target : we have to reduce the intensity of our net asset purchases, while maintaining overall a substantially accommodative monetary policy. as regards our asset purchases, we have to reduce their intensity in a pragmatic manner, as we already decided successfully in december 2016. “ pragmatic ” because, while keeping the current rules – we shouldn ’ t change any of the parameters, including the issuer and issue limits –, we can on the one hand exploit the margins of flexibility of the programme and we must on the other hand hold in reserve an additional purchasing capacity – if needed. so, there is no reason to be worried by the prospect of an adequate reduction of our net purchases, which would be

improvements in the measure and management of risks, providing a sounder basis for the next wave of financial innovation. cf. “ special report on central banks and the world economy : only human ”, the economist, october 20th - 26th 2007.
leading to better - than - expected performance in budget revenues. using this fiscal space mostly to reduce government debt would facilitate demand management and reduce any need for indirect tax hikes, therefore providing more flexibility regarding the conduct of countercyclical monetary policy. in this respect, should fiscal discipline be implemented through institutional and structural improvements, such as enacting and establishing the fiscal rule, it would be possible to keep policy rates at singledigit levels over the medium term. since the last quarter of 2008, the cbt has focused on containing the adverse effects of the global crisis on the domestic economy without conflicting with its primary objective of maintaining price stability and this has to a large extent been achieved. monetary policy will continue to focus on price stability in the period ahead. strengthening the commitment to fiscal discipline and the structural reform agenda would support the improvement of turkey ’ s sovereign risk, and thus facilitate macroeconomic and price stability. before concluding my speech, i would like to reiterate that timely implementation of the structural reforms envisaged by the medium term program and the eu accession process remains to be of utmost importance. thank you very much for your attention.

the governors of the central banks of the comcec countries will be very important in terms of catching up with the world ’ s agenda and following the recent developments. economic activities of the related countries will be supported the most by increasing the cooperation between the central banks of the comcec countries, enhancing the functioning of the active mechanisms of communication in international platforms and sharing the experiences. the recovery of the economies of the islamic countries will be fastened by increasing the exchange of information in the fields of economy, finance and banking among the member and observer countries ’ central banks and financial authorities. sharing the experiences of related countries that spread in a vast geography on financial policies and central banking is invaluable for all of us. in conclusion, i would like to thank once again the staff of the sesric and the central bank of turkey for their efforts during the preparation of the meeting, and all the participants who have contributed to the meeting with their scientific works and valuable experiences. hoping for a successful meeting, i once again would like to say welcome.
richard byles : jamaica's experience with the transmission mechanism during the tightening cycle following the inflation shock presentation by mr richard byles, governor of the bank of jamaica, to the panel discussion by central bank presidents during the inter - american development bank's 59th meeting of the network of central banks and finance ministries, washington dc, 17 april 2024. * * * overview my brief remarks will be focussed on jamaica's experience with the transmission mechanism during the tightening cycle following the inflation shock. in this regard, i will be spending a moment discussing the challenges with the credit channel and the relative dominance of the exchange rate channel. this will provide insights on the bank of jamaica's policy response which continues to be geared at ensuring price and financial system stability. i will close by highlighting the actions the bank is undertaking to improve the weak transmission mechanism. to address rising inflation and heightened inflation expectations associated with the pandemic, bank of jamaica started tightening monetary policy in october 2021 ( before most advanced economies ). the bank employed a three - pronged approach : i. gradually increasing the policy interest rate by 650 basis points ( bps ) since october 2021, from 0. 5 % to its current level of 7. 0 % ; ii. deploying open market operations more aggressively to maintain tight jamaica dollar liquidity conditions ; ( this also involved increases to the domestic and the foreign currency cash reserve requirements applicable to deposit - taking institutions ( dtis ) and a widening of the interest rate corridor ) ; and iii. engendering greater stability in the foreign exchange market through foreign exchange intervention and adjustments to the net open position limits. in jamaica, we have found that the credit channel, which is the main channel targeted by the bank's monetary policy actions, has been quite weak. as such, we have observed that our policy actions geared at managing inflation expectations and the exchange rate channel have generally been more effective. as a small open economy, that is dependent on imports with approximately 50 % of consumption being imported, one can understand the imported inflation challenges for jamaica in recent years, arising from the global macroeconomic environment. since october 2021, while maintaining a flexible exchange rate, the bank has therefore taken decisive actions in the foreign exchange market, primarily selling foreign exchange when necessary. without these actions, imported inflation, and hence the final prices faced by consumers would have been higher. 1 / 2 bis - central bankers'speeches a major issue during the tightening cycle was the weakness in the monetary transmission

e - kyc database for the sharing of customers'transactional and nontransactional data. the government of jamaica is also in the process of developing a national identification system ( nids ) which will provide a quicker method of identity assurance and verification thus making it easier for banks to onboard customers. 2 / 2 bis - central bankers'speeches
% for 2024 ). so years. 7 together with increased alternative energy imports, this means that our terms of trade will deteriorate further. following the robust growth rate of 4. 9 % recorded in 2021, the domestic economy slowed sharply to 2. 0 % in 2022. the sarb now forecasts growth of 0. 2 % this year, and to average 1. 0 % in the following two years – this is barely an expansion. in fact, this is a reflection of the headwinds that the domestic economy continues to face. the ongoing infrastructure challenges, especially for electricity, continue to impose a hard constraint on growth. the sarb estimates that load - shedding alone will reduce gdp growth by 2 % this year, after knocking off 0. 7 percentage from growth in the previous year. we trust that the government will remain committed to implementing structural reform measures, especially with regard to logistics and electricity. we believe that the implementation of much - needed structural reforms will unlock south africa ’ s growth potential and, in turn, address the long - standing unemployment challenges of the country. concluding remarks in conclusion, it is safe to say that the past few years have presented a new set of challenges for macroeconomic policymakers across the globe. although the demand and supply mismatches we witnessed at the peak of the pandemic and when the russia - ukraine war broke out last year have eased significantly, imbalances continue to linger, and risks remain elevated. despite the decelerating inflation trend over recent months, inflation remains above target in many jurisdictions, with core inflation showing signs of persistence ‒ this is despite sharp policy tightening by monetary policy authorities across the globe. south africa ’ s experience has paralleled that of the global economy, with high inflation and slowing growth. however, domestic idiosyncrasies have played an elevated commodity prices had also supported the rand which helped to keep imported inflation at bay through the early stages of the domestic economic recovery. outsized role in these developments over the past year, suggesting that we could have had somewhat lower inflation and stronger growth had structural policy settings been more favourable. put differently, we are suffering from largely selfinflicted wounds. with headline inflation having remained above the target midpoint for an extended period, the sarb ’ s monetary policy committee has had to act decisively to prevent inflation expectations from de - anchoring more permanently. over the past 18 months, the repo rate has been raised by a cumulative 425

controls for residents will not lead to an overall net outflow of capital from the country. new investments by non - residents should continue to exceed the outward investment by residents.
reduction of the labor force dedicated to this activity. average productivity growth in manufacturing was 0. 2 percent per year, surprisingly low given the undeniable efficiency levels of some subsectors such as automobiles and electronics exposed to competition in international markets. nonmanufacturing exhibited the sharpest contraction in productivity, at negative 1. 7 percent. this dismal result is driven mainly by utilities in the hands of state monopolies, and construction, of which a large fraction is self - construction suffering from low scale and lagging technology. labor productivity in services also declined, at 1. 1 percent, explained, to some extent, by absorption of low - skilled labor from rural areas and widespread levels of informality in some branches of economic activity. finally, during the last two years, mexico has undertaken a program of structural reforms of various areas of the economy. the aim is to tackle some of the evident problems of low efficiency briefly described, by allowing or increasing competition as well as facilitating investment and market operations. results from these measures depend on the depth of their actual implementation and, in any case, should be viewed as steps along a road that needs to be paved with further changes. concluding remarks productivity is a central subject for researchers and policy makers, as it bears on the core issues of the potential for sustained economic improvement. this conference has contributed own calculations of growth decomposition based on kehoe, t. j. and f. meza, ( 2011 ), “ catch - up growth followed by stagnation : mexico, 1950 – 2010, ” latin american journal of economics, 48 ( 2 ) ; and data from world development indicators, international financial statistics and conference board total economy database. own calculations of average annual changes based on data from inegi and the groningen growth and development centre 10 - sector database, july 2014. bis central bankers ’ speeches greatly to the efforts of both scholars and practitioners in putting pieces of the productivity puzzle together. many factors impinge on a country ’ s productivity dynamics, making it necessary for any explanation to consider the issue in a multifaceted way. the pursuit of higher productivity growth is challenging. policy makers should avoid looking for a nonexistent panacea, while at the same time recognizing the need for continuous progress. in mexico, the bar is also high. productivity performance has been underwhelming, but a recent program of structural change could yield benefits along the path to greater modernization, if essential building blocks such as the rule

( ifs ) and trustee of imperial college london. now, let me give the floor to our keynote speaker, ms. rachel lomax. after her speech we will proceed with the first panel – global markets volatility and potential risks for romania. thank you! 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches