cyber defence that allows different authorities to work together effectively. in this context, governments have a natural role as coordinators. attacks are getting more sophisticated. some involve resourceful actors, such as nation - states and terrorist organisations. the financial sector remains a prime target, and we cannot effectively mitigate the risk by simply mandating supervised entities to follow good practices. complex attacks can be deployed via obscure tools. even large financial institutions with excellent ( and expensive ) defence systems can be lost in the face of cutting - edge threats ; they can, of course, work out some of the technical details, but they might miss some of the broader, systemic elements, simply because they ignore relevant information : precedents that affected other sectors ; attacker tactics ; and effective defences adopted elsewhere. this kind of information is generally available only to intelligence agencies and the military. cross - sector, nationwide as well as international cooperation is therefore essential. 1 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches there needs to be a mechanism within each country that allows appropriate public bodies to coordinate and jointly support, each within its own mandate, the victims of a cyber campaign. in the european union, the network and information security ( nis ) directive takes this course. second, cooperation must extend beyond borders given the nature of many of the attacks and the interconnectedness of the financial system. this will always be a challenge because disclosing vulnerabilities to entities from another jurisdiction might endanger national security. nonetheless, we need to find feasible solutions to this problem, since this kind of infosharing might prove crucial in order to respond to some attacks. the g7, as a group of like - minded countries, remains the most favourable context for international cooperation – the many achievements of the g7 cyber expert group ( ceg ) provide a good example of what can be done. the ceg was established in 2015 under the german presidency, and it went on to deliver results during the presidencies of four other countries – japan, italy, canada, and now france. we need to persevere on this route. one area that is ripe for more cooperation is the establishment of common security standards for hardware and software, which also covers the growing market for financial technology apps. in the european union, we have a tradition of very strict safety, physical health and environmental protection standards. we require a conformite europeenne certification – the ce mark that you see on labels – for any product in certain commodity sectors that enters our markets.

toolkit remains incomplete in some areas. for example, we have imposed higher risk weights for mortgage portfolios of banks, but we don ’ t have instruments of ltv / lti limits to curb excessive lending in the housing market. also, we don ’ t have many macroprudential tools in the non - bank financial sector. so there is still a lot of work to be done. for the final part of my introduction, let me now look forward to the upcoming two days of this conference. i am happy to see such a wide - range of topics on the agenda that will be discussed in the different sessions. let me provide you with three examples of different sessions where you have a great opportunity to think about how the macroprudential framework could be further developed. first, the systemic risks of climate change are becoming increasingly prominent. international regulators and supervisors are working towards better data and enhanced disclosures. you will discuss a paper on how technical developments will allow a more precise monitoring of financial risks of climate change. for example, how we could better analyze the degree of concentration in the portfolios of financial institutions and investors and how it affects financial stability. second, another important trend is that financial institutions are crucially vulnerable to cyber risks. in addition to institution - specific risks, we should better explore how these risks are interconnected in the financial system. this is something that we are currently also working on at dnb to develop a macroprudential perspective on cyber risks. at this conference, there is interesting research on which transmission channels can amplify or dampen shocks. it shows that the financial impact will depend on the objective of a cyberattack and the fragility, adaptability and complexity of the system. these are interesting findings which could help us to better mitigate these risks. third, you will discuss the critical relationship between competition, regulation, and stability. in economics, there has been a long and fundamental debate between the two extreme outcomes to strictly regulate markets or take a more liberal approach. research shows that there is no single answer. the challenge is how to balance these aspects by maintaining financial stability, while also promoting competition and innovation in the financial sector. there is also an interesting policy panel on the agenda. these different studies inspire some interesting questions. for example : first, which data do we need to integrate climate change within our financial stability assessment and what supervisory practices can we apply to address the macroprudential aspects of these risks? second,