of the « originate to distribute » model. once could argue that in case central banks had access to more detailed supervisory information on banks ’ involvement in securitisation operations they would have found it easier to assess the implications of this development for the financial system as a whole. when a situation of financial stress actually emerges and risks developing into a financial crisis, supervisory information remains again crucial for central banks ’ financial stability assessment. but in this case, the need for information will be very much driven by the nature of the stress. in the present market conditions, central banks are of course very much interested in banks ’ exposures to the us sub - prime sector and to structured financial products, as well as the effect of the price corrections on banks ’ solvency position. a second area of cooperation i want to mention is liquidity, which is again at the cross - roads of central banking and banking supervision. much of the work that central banks and supervisors are undertaking to render financial institutions and markets more resilient to liquidity shocks is interrelated and offers therefore scope for mutual cooperation. i will give just one example referring to a topic i mentioned already earlier, namely banks ’ contingency funding plans. while normally supervisors require banks to set up these plans, central banks should also have access to them as an element to be considered in the context of deciding on liquidity provision. the final area i would mention is crisis management. in this field, the fsf report makes also a number of recommendations that pertain to the cooperation between central banks and supervisors. more specifically, the report recommends that for the largest cross - border financial firms, the most directly involved supervisors and central banks should establish a small group to address specific cross - border crisis management planning issues. i believe that in europe, the right principles have been agreed to meet this recommendation. the memorandum of understanding ( mou ) on cooperation on cross - border financial stability includes appropriate provisions on the cooperation between central banks and banking supervisors, for example when assessing the potential systemic implications of a financial crisis or when emergency liquidity assistance will be provided to a cross - border financial group. a second important reinforcement will come from the scheduled changes to the capital requirements directive, which include several aspects relating to the cooperation and exchange of information between central banks and banking supervisory authorities also in crisis situations. concluding remarks ladies and gentlemen, let me conclude. the financial market correction has revealed areas in the regulatory and supervisory framework which need to be promptly addressed by public authorities

zeti akhtar aziz : establishment of the financial services professional board in malaysia speech by dr zeti akhtar aziz, governor of the central bank of malaysia ( bank negara malaysia ), at the official launch of financial services professional board, kuala lumpur, 24 september 2014. * * * it is my great pleasure to welcome you to this occasion of the official launch of the financial services professional board. among the key challenges emerging from the global financial crisis and the recent episodes of financial market manipulation is for the need to have a strong culture of professionalism, integrity and ethics permeating throughout the financial services industry to restore public trust in the financial system and to secure long - term sustainability of the industry. the 2008 financial crisis highlighted how business decisions that were predominantly driven by short - term incentives critically undermined the health of some of the largest global companies. this in turn had enormous consequences on entire economies. not only has public confidence in the financial services industry been shaken, but the prevailing business models of financial institutions have been questioned with calls being made for changes that are more aligned with long - term sustainability. these changes relate to both the general structure and activities of financial institutions, and to the governance and culture within the institutions. while financial institutions have to create value for shareholders, of fundamental significance is also the need to serve the public interest given the importance of a well - functioning financial system in the economy. additionally, in a highly interconnected global economy with greater international financial inter linkages, financial turmoil and stress in national financial systems will have ramifications that transcend borders. given the high stakes involved, there has been increasing scrutiny of the values, professional norms, educational standards and incentives that drive and shape the behaviour of financial institutions. much of this scrutiny has aimed at reinforcing the responsibility that financial institutions have to the broader society. the establishment of the financial services professional board ( fspb ), thus marks a significant development towards achieving the highest standards of professional conduct including fair business dealings and ethics in the financial services industry that will be consistent with the long - term growth, stability and integrity of the financial system. it is envisaged that the financial services professional board will act as an industry - led independent board that will drive the development as well as the advocacy of professional standards, ethics and continuous professional development across the financial services industry. central to this aim is the development of a culture within the financial services industry which places an unequivocal commitment to professionalism and