the role of chairman. this is a simple point, but quite often overlooked, that is during the meeting, the chairman should always try to create an atmosphere conducive for independent participation of all board members. it is also much more effective if the positions of chairman and ceo are not held by one and the same person. if one individual performs both roles simultaneously, then other board members cannot fully perform their duties of providing a check - and - balance. this is inevitable in the context of our culture which tries to avoid being disrespectful to others. moreover, if the ceo acts as chairman, he can easily influence the agenda and delay bringing certain issues to the attention of the board. eighth, on the appointment of an independent director, an independent director should not conduct any business relating to banking operations. by doing so, it may give rise to the problem of conflict of interests. an independent director should be one who is willing to stake out an independent view honestly. however, to expect a suitable individual to have no business background or business connection at all may be somewhat too ambitious. such requirement will screen out individuals with understanding of banking businesses to assume the duty of bank directors. the requirement about business affiliation is merely a broad and general guideline. all in all, i want to focus on certain qualities which are more imperative to achieving good governance. this must start from personal qualities, such as an affinity to be independent, individualistic with high moral grounds and integrity ; and a desire to express his opinion independently and honestly. ninth, is the issue i raised last year on “ the remuneration of board members ” which has been added to the principles of good directorship. i would like to propose that board remuneration not be tied to the future stock price of the bank nor solely linked to profits alone. the point is that if the bonus of board members is tied to the future stock price, it might critically affect the bank in the way that occurred in the cases of enron or world com. when management proposes any project that might raise the company ’ s stock price, although a high risk project, board member might give less weight to the risk aspect. thus, the check - and - balance of management power will automatically decline. moreover, the increased price of stock may not only result from the specific bank operation, but also attributed to general improvement in economic conditions and favourable stock market environment. if the remuneration of board members varies solely with the profits of

speeches potential for “ crowding - in ” private investment should also be encouraged. multiplier effects would provide additional lift to potential growth at no public cost, and would be the very evidence that public policy has served its function of aiding the private sector. current supply constraints are not limited to physical capital, but extend to human capital as well. in 20 years, thailand will be among the first asean countries to enter an aging - population phase, with share of senior citizens rising from 15 to 27 percent of total population. early symptoms have already been felt in some industries, whose capacity to produce and invest is stifled by the lack of qualified labour. tight labour market is also indicative of labour shortage at the lower end of the skill spectrum. market forces have failed to resolve these issues. education policy, tax incentives, minimum wage, and migration policy all have bearings on the labour market dynamics. the long - term growth implications of these policies should be incorporated into the policymakers ’ considerations. implementing a comprehensive set of economic policies to lift potential growth, while pursuing other public policy objectives, is not an easy task. it requires a close coordination among various policy authorities. it also takes immense skills to introduce the right sequencing of policies at the right time. these prerequisites must also be backstopped by strong policy credibility, the second area of priority. 2. maintaining macroeconomic policy credibility in its quest to provide public services, the policymakers must avoid being the source of harm. international experience is filled with cautionary tales of how a lack of policy discipline could lead the economy awry. over - bloated and inefficient government increases risks of unsustainable public finance, and can sow the seeds for political conflicts. lax monetary discipline is associated with hyperinflation and financial instability. maintaining macroeconomic policy credibility and discipline must be an integral part of economic reform in thailand. policy credence is not an independent choice, but is shaped by the overall institutional setup. institutions are the set of rules and norms that governs the incentives of economic agents and constrains their behaviours. political developments, strength of the legal system, property rights enforcement, quality of workforce, degree of corruption are but some aspects of the institutional environment. they all interact with the policymakers ’ ability to pursue their objectives credibly. institutions evolve via a mixture of history, will power and luck. a combination of factors at critical junctures can determine the path of institutional change