masaaki shirakawa : evolution of the bank of japan ’ s policies and operations – looking back on fifty years of history remarks by mr masaaki shirakawa, governor of the bank of japan, at the introductory program on bank of japan policies and operations on the occasion of 2012 annual meetings of the imf / world bank group, tokyo, 9 october 2012. * * * good morning, honorable ministers, honorable governors, and distinguished delegates to the 2012 annual meetings of the imf / world bank group. i am truly delighted to welcome you to the bank of japan today. before i begin my remarks, please allow me to take this opportunity to express my sincere gratitude for the warm support we received from you and many other friends around the world when we were hit by the devastating tremor of the great east japan earthquake last year. this is the second time tokyo has hosted the annual meetings of the imf / world bank group. the last time was in 1964 when japan was at the zenith of a high - growth period and still one of the “ emerging market economies ”. comparing the size of economy at that time to that of the united states, nominal gdp was 12 % and per capita nominal gdp was 24 % of that of the u. s. that roughly corresponds to russia or brazil today. japan went through a reconstruction period after world war ii, and from the mid - 1950s to early 1970s, it enjoyed high economic growth that marked an annual rate of 10 %. among the conditions that contributed to this high growth, i believe the most important ones were, first, the migration of the labor force from rural areas to the cities and from the agricultural to the manufacturing sector, which resulted in higher productivity, second, the high level of education, and third, the benefits of the free trade system. however, no economy can maintain high growth indefinitely. from a certain point, the potential growth rate starts to decline gradually. the most important task for policy makers is to achieve a smooth transition from high growth to stable growth. yet, it is by no means easy to identify in real - time the change in potential growth rate. the attempt to maintain high growth beyond its potential may cause various imbalances. let me take the case of japan as an example. japan suffered from high inflation in the first half of the 1970s, amplified by the first oil shock. later, the country tried hard to make its industrial structure energy efficient, and monetary policy was focused on price stability. against

jean - claude trichet : preventing spillovers on the global economy speech by mr jean - claude trichet, president of the european central bank, at the bretton woods committee, international council meeting 2011, washington dc, 23 september 2011. * * * ladies and gentlemen, it is now four years after the outbreak of the global financial crisis, and three years after the collapse of lehman brothers, which were stark reminders of how much financial integration and globalisation made all economies interdependent. this interdependence creates benefits but also adverse spillovers which may arise in all domains, from inadequate macro policy choices to private market imperfections. i will focus today on two key areas of policy interest to address spillovers in the global economy : ( 1 ) reforming global finance, and ( 2 ) strengthening policy discipline at the domestic and global level, before turning to how the euro area can contribute to global stability. 1. reforming global finance at the pittsburgh summit in 2009, g20 leaders agreed “ to do everything needed to repair our financial system and to maintain the global flow of capital ”. the november 2011 g20 cannes summit will take stock of where we stand in terms of implementation of this important reform agenda. in a number of areas, important decision have already been taken, notably as regards the improvement of bank capital with the agreement on basel iii, and the development of macroprudential frameworks. in other areas, we are close to concluding our work, in particular as regards a new global framework on systemically important financial institutions ( sifis ). in those areas where decisions have already been taken by the international community, implementation is now key. the g20 yesterday committed to full implementation of basel iii along the agreed timelines. the eu has already started this process early with the european commission putting its proposals on the table for the so - called capital requirements directive iv, which will translate basel iii into the legal framework of the eu member states. in terms of macro - prudential framework, the european systemic risk board has started its operation this year. all jurisdictions must ensure timely implementation so that we can ensure that we have done everything to make a difference as regards the resilience of the global, regional and national financial systems. let me briefly highlight three key areas on which we need to stay committed and where swift progress is of the essence. the first challenge may come from the shadow banking sector. the introduction of more stringent capital requirements may provide incentives for banks