to prevent potential risks from building up in the payment system and to moderate effects of problems that have already arisen. departures of this type from the rule of action should, however, be made restrictively. when the clarification was presented at the beginning of 1999, the executive board made a point of the fact that deviations from the normal rule are to be stated clearly and justified. the riksbank ’ s rule of action and some of the aspects i have mentioned have direct counterparts in current laws and their prefatory documents. the riksbank act states that " the objective of the riksbank ’ s operations shall be to maintain price stability. in addition, the riksbank shall promote a safe and efficient payment system. " moreover, the government bill ( 1997 / 98 : 40 ) lays down that in order to increase the possibility of democratic control, the statutory objective should be given its specific content by the riksbank. furthermore, in the prefatory documents it is said that as an authority under parliament, the riksbank shall self - evidently support the general goals of economic policy, for example sustainable growth and full employment, in so far as they do not conflict with the objective of price stability. it was not considered necessary to legislate these obligations. 2. the inflation target and price effects of deregulations market deregulation can have considerable effects on price formation. the immediate effect of a deregulation is often that the price falls, sometimes almost at once, so that the rate of inflation is lowered for the time being. all else equal, the rate of inflation then returns to the initial level as the months on which the statistical comparison is based move forward. normally, however, deregulations also affect the conditions for competition and price formation in the longer run. i should add here that rising competitive pressure can also affect productivity but the economic effect of productivity growth is something i shall be considering later. a particular, limited deregulation need not call for measures of monetary policy. if a deregulation stems from political decisions that could not be predicted, or its effects on inflation are calculated to disappear in less than one to two years, it will not elicit a reaction from the riksbank as long as the rule of action is adhered to. the situation is different, however, if the economy goes through a series of deregulations or the price effects of a single deregulation continue for several years.

case of the emerge of a need to issue liquidity bills, information on auctions will be announced at reuters ’ “ cbtl ” page at 10 : 00 one working day prior to the auction rather than on the same day, to provide investors a longer time for evaluation. information on auctions will continue to be announced to banks and financial intermediaries by electronic fund transfer ( eft ) system. liquidity bill auctions will be held at 11 : 00 with the value date of the following working day, and the results will be announced until 11 : 30 at reuters ’ “ cbtm ” page. auctions will be held by the traditional method. x ) information on new turkish lira deposit buying auctions will be announced at reuters ’ “ cbty ” page ; while information on reverse repo auctions will be announced at “ cbtf ” page at 10 : 00 on the same day. in case of an accelerated credit expansion in the banking system in such an extent that would create inflationary pressure despite the active use of the said open market operations to drain the excess liquidity in the market, required reserves may also be used effectively to support liquidity management. the central bank, the primary goal of which, entrusted to it by law, is to achieve and maintain price stability, will continue its practices to enhance the effectiveness of the monetary policy and liquidity management, also in 2008. accordingly, the central bank may change not only its liquidity management strategy, but also the borrowing and lending interest rate margins in cases of unpredictable changes in market conditions and emergence of needs that may arise. as always pointed out, the central bank deems the stability and development of financial markets as a supportive objective for the efficient implementation of the policies pertaining to price stability. obviously, under the floating exchange rate regime, the central bank is able to implement the ytl liquidity policy in a more flexible manner than it can under a fixed currency peg regime and can act more promptly and flexibly to meet the ytl liquidity needs of the banking system. also, the central bank can prevent excessive fluctuations in money market interest rates as long as they are consistent with the inflation target. furthermore, the central bank provides the banking system with foreign exchange liquidity via short - term foreign exchange deposit auctions, albeit at limited amounts. however, it is worth mentioning once more that the banking system should not slacken risk management principles by simply relying on the more flexible and effective new turkish lira liquidity management