world, but to the much more central role they play in many markets. particularly for those institutions whose size and scope make them systemically important, capital, liquidity, and the overall risk management and control architecture need to be exceptionally strong, stronger than would be necessary and appropriate for smaller institutions. the consequence of size is not just that failure or the perceived risk of failure at one of these institutions has larger negative implications for the financial system today than would be the case in a less consolidated world. it is also the case that their greater relative size limits their ability to take actions that would reduce their exposure in the event of a shock without creating the risk of magnifying the shock. let me conclude by noting the overwhelming significance of the economic policy decisions we make here in the united states to the world ’ s capacity to deal with these broader challenges. our impact on global economic activity and on international financial stability is greater than simple measures of our share of gdp. when we are strong economically, the world can more easily tolerate economic weakness outside the united states. when we are less strong, the impact on the world economy is powerful. this has been true for some time. what ’ s new is that we are significantly more dependent today on the confidence of the rest of the world in u. s. economic policy and the safety and stability of our financial markets. this gives us, along with the rest of the world, a compelling interest in sustaining credibility and confidence in u. s. financial management and the strength of our financial system. thank you.

risk premia, leaving the price of insurance unusually low against a less favorable or more volatile environment. these developments imply a view among market participants that future macroeconomic shocks will be more moderate than in the past and more likely to be absorbed without broader damage to economic performance or the financial system. they reflect a general increase in confidence that monetary authorities here and in other countries can keep inflation stable at appropriately moderate levels. they reflect diminished uncertainty about the expected path of monetary policy in the united states. and they imply that the imbalances in the global economy will be diffused smoothly. of course, not much is certain in economics and finance. one cannot know with confidence whether future economic policies and outcomes will justify the confidence in the benign outlook now reflected in risk premia. what are the broader challenges and forces that will dominate the policy agenda and affect economic outcomes? i want to touch on four, though this is a selective list. first, all of the major economies face difficult fiscal sustainability issues, and these will be exacerbated by the approaching demographic cliff. fiscal policy in most of the major economies is on a path that will lead to increasing, rather than stable or falling debt - to - gdp ratios. in virtually all the major economies, the cost of committed benefits substantially exceeds the stream of tax resources available under current policies. if one were to produce a ten year forecast of the u. s. fiscal position using the fan charts to illustrate uncertainty that are a feature of the inflation reports of many central banks, the size of the fan would be very wide, indicating a substantial probability of deficits significantly worse than the already troubling central path for the deficit predicted given current policies. alongside these fiscal challenges, the size and concentration of external imbalances in the system are at an unprecedented scale, between five to six percent of gdp in the case of the u. s. current account deficit. this imbalance is the result of a combination of a sharp decline in u. s. net national savings, driven by increased public sector borrowing and a large rise in household debt, and a sustained increase in the relative strength of u. s. demand growth compared with europe and japan. the counterpart of this deficit is a large inflow of capital from the world ’ s private savers and foreign central banks. the expected trajectory for this imbalance produces a dramatic deterioration in our net international position and cannot be sustained indefinitely. these two broad forces coincide with the increasingly rapid integration of china and india