hold an additional capital buffer ( g - sib buffer ) of 2 %. in addition, it will soon be clear which banks will be subject to stronger requirements in the future, as the bundesanstalt fur finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht ( bafin, the german federal financial supervisory authority ) will shortly decide which banks will be counted as other systemically important institutions ( o - siis ). moreover, bafin has for the first time set the countercyclical capital buffer. this has been 0 % since the beginning of the month. the buffer will now be reviewed every quarter. the governing council of the ecb can demand a higher buffer. at the moment, however, we agree with bafin ’ s judgement. these examples of implementation in germany bring me to the second part of my speech – the situation in the german banking market. relatively solid situation of german banks is no reason for complacency the german banking sector is, in absolute terms, the largest in the monetary union alongside the french one. in 2014 the total assets of german banks amounted to almost €6. 8 trillion ( €6, 750 billion ). that corresponds to roughly 250 % of germany ’ s gross domestic product ( gdp ) and 28 % of the total assets in the monetary union. in germany there is also a comparatively large number of banks. if we leave out the branches of foreign banks in germany, there are around 1, 700 credit institutions. that constitutes one - third of the total number of banks in the monetary union. 2 in view of the size of the german banking sector alone, it plays an important role for the ecb, which is responsible for the whole euro area. the german banking sector is not just relatively large, it also heterogeneous. small and medium - sized banks – less significant institutions ( lsis ) – which include the sparkassen ( savings banks ), account for around 35 % of the total balance sheet of the german banking ecb ( 2015 ), report on financial structures, october. bis central bankers ’ speeches sector. whereas in other euro area countries the systemically relevant banks, which are directly supervised by the ecb, contribute around 80 % - 85 % of the total assets in the respective member state, this contribution is only around 65 % in germany. you yourselves are, of course, the experts on the position of small and medium - sized banks. a survey carried out by the bundesbank

to adjust to changing economic and financial market conditions. in the european experience, examples of tension and changing conditions were the episodes of us dollar misalignment in the 1980s and 1990s and the asymmetric shock caused by german reunification in the early 1990s. in the ems / erm, flexibility was ensured through fluctuation bands around central exchange rates, which were either narrow ( + / - 2. 25 % ) or wide ( + / - 6 % ) depending on the degree of convergence of the countries concerned. the system became even more flexible when a + / - 15 % fluctuation band was introduced following the crises in 1992 and 1993. the possibility of adjusting central rates through " realignments " to be agreed by the ministers and governors of the participating member states added to the resilience of the system. second, arrangements for regular consultations among all parties to the system were used, including mechanisms for monitoring economic, monetary and financial developments and for assessing policy responses. in europe, peer reviews of domestic policies became increasingly demanding over time. as a result, the provision of mutual financial assistance was increasingly subordinated to compliance with the policy recommendations made in such reviews or in the context of " realignments ". third, the operational framework made it possible to achieve exchange rate and monetary cooperation among countries with different levels of economic development. nominal convergence proved to be consistent with real convergence, as the countries engaged in the catching - up process were committed to implementing the necessary structural reforms in addition to macroeconomic stabilisation measures and their economic weight was small compared with that of the so - called " core " countries. 4. conclusions a few conclusions of direct relevance to our asian partners may be drawn. as experience with the implementation of the asean and apec arrangements shows, asian countries are developing their own way of strengthening regional integration. this is the right avenue to follow. indeed, asian countries will succeed only if they set realistic objectives in line with their own regional conditions and the corresponding level of political commitment. this is what europeans have done over the last 50 years. at the same time, the european experience could serve as a reference point for assessing the policy requirements and operational aspects of a process of regional integration, possibly including exchange rate and monetary policy co - operation. finally, the european experience shows that a process of regional integration can and should be without prejudice to the broader process of globalisation or to multilateral co - operation within the current institutional framework of the international monetary and financial