loss absorbency regime, which include both tlac and long - term debt requirements. i will be recommending to my colleagues that we look closely at these possibilities in the coming weeks and seek comment on ways to further improve this framework. conclusion we are committed to working with other jurisdictions to continue to build the foundation of the spoe resolution framework. in addition to finding the appropriate balance of flexibility and certainty that i have discussed, we continue to advocate for increasing the standardization in the global implementation of the regulatory capital rules, improving host supervisors ’ transparency into the global liquidity and capital positions of a g - sib on a consolidated and deconsolidated basis, and addressing impediments to a successful spoe resolution. as with all regulations, we will be open to considering adjustments that would improve transparency and - 10 efficiency and will continue to reassess our regime as we make advancements in developing the cross - border resolution framework.

. - 2most large global firms. however, a successful spoe resolution of a large global firm has not yet been attempted and will require close cooperation among a large number of stakeholders, including both home and host country regulators. this cooperation will be based on an understanding of separate and mutual interests, not on trust alone. so while spoe creates a potentially workable framework for resolution, setting the conditions for cooperation is critical. i grew up among the ranches of the american west, where we lived by the motto taught to me as a young child : trust everyone, but brand your cattle. this is a theme that will run throughout my remarks today. in addition to setting the stage for effective cooperation, i will focus specifically on the type of ring - fencing that will almost certainly undermine the successful execution of an spoe resolution - - namely the disruptive seizure of assets by host regulators in the moment of stress. as with other elements of our regime, i have been considering whether our current prepositioning requirements for domestic and foreign firms operating in the united states are both minimizing this risk and functioning in an efficient and transparent manner, and i will share some thoughts in that regard. our vantage point in the united states as a large home and host regulator would counsel that it is sensible to find a middle ground and fine tune our approach as we learn more and global conditions evolve. resolution considerations of a home and host regulator to enable cooperation and avoid a destabilizing seizure of assets by host regulators, i would submit that all jurisdictions must find a balance of flexibility for the parent bank and certainty for local stakeholders. flexibility, or the ability to allocate capital and liquidity to different parts of the group on an as - needed basis, helps to meet unexpected demands on resources and reduces the risk of misallocation and inefficient use of resources. certainty, or the - 3local prepositioning of capital and liquidity to ensure a firm can satisfy local claimants under stressful conditions, helps to promote cooperation in the context of a cross - border resolution and avoid incentives for more drastic action by host authorities. one ’ s assessment of the optimal balance, as i alluded to earlier, can depend significantly on where one sits in the regulatory constellation. the home regulator, by nature, will logically prefer flexibility in a resolution ; consolidated capital and liquidity requirements are most effective if resources can be freely allocated around the consolidated firm where and when they are needed. flexibility