samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
similar to those we have so often witnessed in the last couple of decades. i have also discussed various aspects of fluctuations in asset prices. one encouraging conclusion that i think we can draw in this connection is that the present monetary policy framework in sweden, with built - in inflation targets, provides a reasonable basis for tackling any problems that may arise.

, is that this favourable development not only reflects a cyclical economic recovery, but is largely attributable to “ the new economy ”. definitions of the “ new economy ” vary, but most people seem to mean that for various reasons the growth potential of today ’ s economy is higher than before. among the reasons given for this are increased globalisation and the development and dissemination of information technology. this is an interesting hypothesis, but it must be pointed out that it is difficult to prove whether, and, if so, how much growth potential has actually changed. this obviously restricts the room for manoeuvre in monetary policy to a certain extent. what we must do here is to strike a balance between not holding the economy back more than necessary while at the same time making sure that the credibility of our inflation target policy, which has taken so much effort to build up, is not lost. however, there is another aspect of the american debate that has received much less attention than the “ new economy ”, but that i think is at least as important, and that is the role that monetary policy is assumed to have played in the favourable developments of the last twenty years. there is much talk in the us about the “ long boom ”, i. e. the period lasting from the early - 1980s to the present, which has been characterised by a high rate of growth, with only one rather mild recession in 1990 - 91. household sectors ’ saving rate and debt ratio in usa - 2 source : ecowin there are various theories about the reasons for this positive trend. however, it is often assumed that the monetary policy pursued by the american central bank ( “ the fed ” ) has played a decisive part. the fed ’ s policy during the last twenty years differ from the policy in the preceding period in their more active and determined use of monetary policy to keep inflation low and stable. as a result, it has been possible to avoid both the overheating and the recessions that often occur when an overheated economy suddenly comes to a halt. in other words, the fed is credited with succeeding in making recessions fewer, smaller and shorter, mainly by ensuring that the economy does not become overheated. it is important to point out that the favourable trend in the us economy during the last twenty years is not, as you might gather from following the swedish debate, due to the american central bank “ leaning back ” and basically letting the economy “ take care of itself ”
july 2023. 4 fsb and ngfs, " climate scenario analysis by jurisdictions : initial findings and lessons ", november 2022. 5 mckinsey & company, " the net - zero transition : what it would cost, what it could bring ", january 2022. 6 / 6 bis - central bankers'speeches

term climate - economy relationships, short - term scenarios serve three functions : they are better suited for analysing abrupt and adverse shocks that subside in the medium term. they can better capture potential non - linear impacts of climate shocks. they can provide more granular insights on the transmission channels across economic sectors. second, we will work to better understand the implications of climate change for monetary policy. we will : work on an analytical approach to bring climate considerations into monetary policymaking ; and explore what central banks are doing to protect their monetary policy operations portfolio from climate - related risks. blended finance next, the ngfs'work on blended finance. while climate finance flows have grown over the last decade, they still lag far behind what is needed to meet the paris agreement goals. we are more than 35 % short of the annual investment of us $ 9. 2 trillion5 that would be required to get to net zero by 2050. one key impediment is that many sustainability or transition projects are not quite bankable ; their return profile is not commensurate with the risks that investors face. this challenge is further exacerbated in emdes, as they face fiscal constraints and limited access to private capital. to mobilise the necessary capital for marginally bankable green and transition projects, we need blended finance. blended finance is about partnership and synergy across multiple players. governments, development finance institutions, and philanthropies could provide concessional capital – in the form of grants, limited guarantees, and debt or equity at below - market rates of return. multilateral development banks can provide technical assistance – in the form of project development expertise, capacity building, and institutional support. this combination of concessional capital and technical assistance will reduce project risk and improve bankability. 3 / 6 bis - central bankers'speeches this can in turn catalyse multiples of private commercial capital to finance these transition projects. the scaling of blended finance requires collective action from the entire ecosystem of stakeholders. we need to adopt an ecosystem of solutions approach that encompasses partnership across a diverse set of institutions. this is what motivated the ngfs'work on blended finance. the ngfs is proud to launch today a technical document on scaling up blended finance for climate mitigation and adaptation in emdes. the document sets out guiding principles and policy recommendations for scaling up blended finance, and how each key stakeholder in the ecosystem can step up. let me outline some of the key recommendations
know that the value of a strong and resilient financial system is not the ultimate goal. rather, the ultimate goal is a thriving economy. this is where a whole - of - market collaboration – from finance to fiscal to national development, entrepreneurship, industries, infrastructure, among others – is a value proposition for the general public. this is why mitigating systemic risks is all about public welfare. thank you and once again, good morning. 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches

the high penetration rate of mobile phones in the country, where even low - income earners own cell phones — the ability of fintech to accelerate financial inclusion is well recognized. while we are leveraging on fintech, a lot of work still needs to be done before the philippines becomes a truly financially inclusive economy. many filipinos still do not own bank accounts, and so are unable to access loans and other financial services from formal channels. nevertheless, we are working our way there. first, internet and mobile phone banking. banks that offer internet and mobile phone banking have increased over the years. this has allowed more people to do online transactions, not only to pay bills and purchase merchandise goods, but also to avail themselves of savings, investments, and insurance products. as of end - 2018, there were 48 banks that have already made their financial services accessible through the internet, and 26 banks that have made their services accessible through mobile phones. 2 / 6 bis central bankers'speeches second, interoperable payment systems. in the past, transferring funds from an account in one bank to another account in a different bank required physical movement of cash. now, following the launch of interoperable payments systems, funds can be transferred electronically through instapay, for low - value and real - time fund transfers, and pesonet, for bigger - value fund transfers confirmed within the same banking day. as of end - july 2019, there were 43 financial institutions participating in instapay and 51 participating in pesonet, with more to come. third, the philippine id system. following the signing into law of the philippine identification system act ( philsys ) in august last year, the country will soon have a national identification system. the objective is for all filipinos to be properly identified using a unified system that gathers basic identification and biometrics information. the bsp has assumed the task of printing the ids. we are doing this because we don ’ t want we expect the philippine id system to significantly hasten financial inclusion, as this addresses the problem of lack of formal ids — which are required to open a bank account. fourth, non - bank electronic money issuers. a recent phenomenon that is significantly boosting financial inclusion in the country is the emergence of non - bank e - money issuers. these are entities other than banks that also allow people to create electronic accounts in their platforms where people can store value in these electronic accounts, and make payments or do
the stability and growth of the korean economy. thank you.

will need to manage stakeholder expectations carefully. as the npso ’ s supervisor we will watch closely to ensure the underlying resilience of the payment systems is maintained. npa : resilience at its core as i have said on many previous occasions, resilience is key. this is true both for the current systems being run by the npso, but also as it thinks about its journey to a new payments architecture. one of the npso ’ s key priorities will be designing, developing and facilitating the safe and secure transition to this new architecture that will underpin retail payments in the uk. the npa is intended to replace the three separate systems with an integrated framework which facilitates competition, innovation and interoperability. when i last spoke to this forum i discussed the psf ’ s vision for an npa based on a simplified payments platform and highlighted several key themes from a financial stability perspective. the npso inherited this blueprint for the npa and it is now at the behest of the npso to decide how it will take these plans forward. and this responsibility becomes even more demanding in the face of rapid change. especially since the design and build of the new architecture will pose its own challenges. the npa design must be driven by a strong business case ; and resilience and security need to be built into every step of the npso ’ s process from inception to any ultimate transition from one system to another. the smooth operation of payment systems must remain a priority. any change or upgrade of capability must be managed in a way which minimises disruption or detriment to the important services provided and the wider financial system. the bank ’ s role within this journey i ’ ve talked a lot about the important work that industry is driving, and i ’ m sure hannah and melanie will also touch on this today. however, i also want to reflect on what the bank is doing to prepare for the changes we expect to see in the payments space. not in the least to ensure that we, as a regulator, are not left behind. as i have just discussed, we have a role through our supervision of bacs and fps, and now the npso, to maintain financial stability. we will continue to ensure that financial stability is at the heart of what the payment system operators do and that risks are being appropriately managed, particularly during this time of unprecedented change and innovation, and therefore heightened risk. however, we have also made wider changes to
these are mainly related to potential second - round effects on wages of the past increases in import prices, as well as to bottlenecks and shortages in labour markets. for the medium term, it remains paramount that wage developments remain moderate. in addition, it is crucial that structural adjustments continue. this requires sustained labour market reforms, continuing liberalisation of product markets and further integration in the financial services sector, all of which will expand economic activity and increase employment. it is equally important that further progress be achieved in the area of fiscal policy reform, with continuing progress in fiscal consolidation through limits in public spending growth, allowing both a reduction in remaining budget deficits and an alleviation of the fiscal burden on corporations and households without threatening or slowing the progress in fiscal consolidation. overall, the existence of the euro and the single monetary policy has provided the euro area with an institutional setting which leaves it significantly less exposed to external influences. within the euro area the maintenance of price stability over the medium term, together with further progress on structural reforms, will provide an important contribution to the achievement of sustained noninflationary economic growth and will thereby also support a further solid and sustainable expansion of the world economy. let me now give the floor to the vice - president, who will inform you about other issues decided by the governing council. the governing council has adopted a set of standards, recently endorsed by the g10 governors, as the minimum standards of the eurosystem's common oversight policy on payment systems. the eurosystem will assess all systemically important payment systems in the euro area against these " core principles " and will make the results of its assessments available to the public. concerning issues relating to euro banknotes and coins, i should also like to provide you with the following information. first, the governing council adopted an ecb guideline on the 2002 cash changeover. owing to the crucial importance of this matter, and given the responsibility of the eurosystem as a whole in achieving a smooth cash changeover, a legal framework has been established. the guideline will enable all those involved to become familiar with the basic rules to be followed in preparing for the introduction of the euro banknotes and coins. this ecb guideline will be published today on the ecb's website and shortly in the official journal of the european communities. second, yesterday evening the members of the governing council were given a presentation by publicis, the communication agency selected to assist in conducting the eurosystem '

. let me conclude. if well designed and thoroughly implemented, a genuine capital markets union will deepen the single market and contribute to the development of a more prosperous union. and t2s – a tremendous achievement – will serve as the basis for these further achievements, in accordance with the process envisioned by schumann 65 years ago. thank you. bis central bankers ’ speeches
to navigate the challenging economic situations. amid rapidly rising inflation in major economies, korea's consumer price inflation also rose to as high as 6. 3 % last july. the bank of korea responded swiftly to this by raising the base rate to 3. 5 %, and, fortunately, inflation came down to 3. 3 % last month. however, since core inflation, an indicator of underlying inflation trends, has been moderating at a slower pace, it is premature for us to lower our vigilance. therefore, we should conduct our policy more elaborately in 1 / 5 bis - central bankers'speeches overall consideration of downside risks to growth, financial stability risks, and monetary policy changes in major economies, including the u. s. federal reserve, while closely monitoring the pace of slowdown in consumer price inflation going forward. 1 as you may well recall, amid the u. s. federal reserve's acceleration of its stance of monetary policy tightening in the second half of last year, the korean won to u. s. dollar exchange rate surged. and then to make matters worse, the default of a legoland developer occurred on top of that, deepening the stress in domestic financial and foreign exchange market. in response, the bank of korea, in close policy coordination with the government and supervisory authorities, actively strove to stabilize markets and played a crucial role in overcoming the crisis. 2 in the process, the sound banking sector played an important part as the bedrock of support. although the sluggish housing market has shown signs of an easing recently, it is still necessary to remain attentive to risks in the financial sector, as the delinquency rates of real estate loans rose. over the medium - to long - term horizon, we will have to explore avenues to carry out modest deleveraging of household debt through cooperation with relevant government agencies to prevent further buildup of financial imbalances. we have witnessed considerable changes in internal management as well. we swiftly implemented a plan to innovate our organization and hr management, which had been drawn up through a series of discussions. we also began to make efforts to improve our organizational culture, by, for example, spreading a culture of debate and expanding the sharing of information. thanks to everyone's participation, i believe that, we are seeing positive changes in becoming the " vibrant bank of korea ", from the image of us being the " temple - like bank of korea ". i am grateful that more reports

##3 ). 3 for details, see ". future policy directions " in the payment and settlement systems report 2022 ( bank of korea, april 2023 ). 5 / 5 bis - central bankers'speeches
risk than the traditional banks and their cost of funds has also been higher. they have to work hard to keep their customers over the longer term as many tend to graduate to the banks as they become more successful. indeed competition across the whole banking system has noticeably stepped up in the last five years and customer bis central bankers ’ speeches allegiance is almost a thing of the past. no doubt each bank and credit institution is now being judged by its level of service. despite the intense competition, i think it is fair to say that our credit institutions have persevered in their niche areas and continue to perform well, backed by strong capital positions and satisfactory earnings performances. the combined balance sheet of the credit institutions recorded an annual growth of 33 percent over 2015, to reach $ 335million, with merchant finance limited contributing almost half. at the end of last year, combined credit institutions ’ net profit before tax stood at $ 18 million with capital and reserves growing 13 percent to $ 72 million. merchant finance limited please allow me to share a brief history of merchant finance limited. officially established in 1986 as the merchant bank of fiji, this institution initially operated as a finance company and since it did not take deposits from the public it did not come under the supervision of the reserve bank. this all changed in 1992 when we granted the company a licence to operate as a credit institution, enabling it to access public deposits. in 2002 the merchant bank of fiji changed its name to merchant finance & investment limited. further approval was granted in late 2014 to make another name change. this is the name we are actually launching tonight – merchant finance limited. so this year merchant finance limited actually enters its 24th year of serving the people of fiji as a licensed credit institution. the company has grown significantly, with an asset book of $ 21 million in 1992 to a publically reported $ 134 million in june 2015. the profitability of the institution has also increased over the years noting an ‘ all time high ’ of just over $ 8 million in its last financial year. ladies and gentlemen, as the supervisor of the banking industry, the reserve bank closely observes the relationships of our licensed financial institutions with the other sectors of the economy. as i alluded to earlier, credit institutions like merchant finance limited play the unique yet important role of servicing customers and sectors which the banks may consider as high - risk. it is pleasing to see that merchant finance limited ’ s reach as a lender has extended to many key sectors in the economy, such as transport

, jackson hole conference proceedings. r. g. rajan ( 2006 ) : “ monetary policy and incentives ”, speech given at the bank of spain conference on central banks in the 21st century, 8 june 2006. c. m. reinhart and k. s. rogoff ( 2009 ), “ the aftermath of financial crises ”, american economic review, 99 ( 2 ), 466 - 472. taylor ( 2009 ), “ the financial crisis and the policy responses : an empirical analysis of what went wrong ”, nber working paper no 14631.
. rozkrut m., rybinski k., sztaba l., szwaja r. „ quest for central bank communication. does it pay to be “ talkative? ” ”, mimeo, april 2006. “ according to debelle ( 1997 ) and mason et al. ( 1997 ), one of the key prerequisites for the successful adoption of inflation targeting is that the central bank must have an adequate ability to produce inflation forecasts and to assess the impact of changes in monetary instruments on inflation ( the magnitude of the effects, their lags etc. ). ” in poland until 1998 ( it was introduced in 1999 ) there was no clear statistical linkage between changes in the short - term policy interest rates and changes in inflation - christoffersen p., wescott r. ” is poland ready for inflation targeting? ”, imf working paper, 1999. imf, op. cit. thank you.

##za n., soto r. ( ed. ) “ inflation targeting : design, performance, challenges ”, central bank of chile, 2002. gurkaynak r. s., levin a. t., marder a. n., swanson e. t. “ inflation targeting and the anchoring of inflation expectations in the western hemisphere ”, forthcoming in mishkin f., schmidt - hebbel k. ( ed. ), series on central banking, analysis and economic policies x : monetary policy under inflation targeting ( santiago, chile : banco central de chile ), 2006 and gurkaynak r. s., levin a. t. swanson e. t. “ does inflation targeting anchor long - run inflation expectations? evidence from long - term bond yields in the u. s., u. k., and sweden ”, federal reserve bank of san francisco working paper 200609, march 2006. king m. “ what has inflation targeting achieved? ” in bernanke b. s., woodford m. ( ed. ) : the inflation - targeting debate, nber, 2005. strict inflation targeting implies monetary policy focused only on price stability. in contrast, “ flexible inflation targeting implies that the central bank is not exclusively concerned about stabilizing inflation around the inflation target but is also concerned with the stability of the real economy, as represented by the output gap, the employment gap, or the unemployment gap. ” – svensson l. “ optimal inflation targeting : further developments of inflation targeting ”, october 2005. “ although inflation - targeting central banks normally acknowledge that they are flexible inflation targeters, they are normally not very explicit and transparent and probably not very consistent about the relative weight they attach to stability of other variables than inflation. ” – svensson l., op. cit. “ norges bank operates a flexible inflation targeting regime and seeks to achieve an interest rate path that provides a reasonable balance between the objective of bringing inflation up towards 2. 5 % over time and stabilising developments in output and employment. ” - norgesbank, inflation report, march 2006. according to the federal reserve act, the board of governors and the federal open market committee should seek “ to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long - term interest rates. ” cukierman a. “ central bank independence and policy results : theory and evidence ”, lecture prepared for the international conference on : “