ons on lcr and nsfr are enforced only occasionally. the cases of svb and credit suisse also show the importance of banks being ready to post collateral to obtain emergency liquidity assistance from the central bank. 14 in the eurozone, the in - house credit assessment systems allow several euro area national central banks to accept loans to non - financial corporations as collateral to grant banks access to refinancing. for the case in which banks do not have sufficient collateral, switzerland is currently working on legislation to make the state - backed liquidity backstop permanent, after it was introduced as an emergency measure to mitigate the banking crisis. overall, these areas seem to be promising ones for further work and for higher harmonization, leveraging on best practices where possible. finally, let me mention that in a world where deposits can take flight in a matter of hours, some sand in the gears might be necessary. this might take the form of a remuneration structure that increases the premium for illiquidity, and therefore penalizes sight deposits. 15 or, fees could be imposed on material withdrawals. the mutual funds industry has been a laboratory for measures of this class. remuneration of liabilities is an issue that might be worth investigating, by the industry as well as by authorities. let me come to the irrbb. the basel rules cover this issue within the so - called pillar 2 framework. also due to this reason, cross - jurisdictional comparison about the standard the single supervisory mechanism ( ssm ) conducts regular monitoring of liquidity positions of individual banks on a weekly or even daily or intra - daily basis, depending on circumstances. the banca d ’ italia has been routinely monitoring the liquidity position of italian banks since 2008 on a weekly basis. we are currently refining intraday indicators relying on data from large value payment systems, which are available in real time and can intercept dynamics that cannot be identified from the regular supervisory reporting ( cfr. e. rainone, identifying deposits'outflows in real - time, banca d ’ italia, temi di discussione n. 1319, 2021 ). also, liquidity stress test exercises are conducted both on significant and less significant banks. see bcbs, report on the 2023 banking turmoil, cit., p. 7 ; report of the expert group on banking stability, cit., p. 49. even if there are no rules explicitly addressing this aspect in the liquidity

jerome h powell : discussion of “ crunch time – fiscal crises and the role of monetary policy ” speech by mr jerome h powell, member of the board of governors of the federal reserve system, at the “ us monetary policy forum ” conference, sponsored by the university of chicago booth school of business, new york city, 22 february 2013. * * * the issue of fiscal sustainability and its interaction with monetary policy is certainly timely. 1 many advanced economies are in an extended period of slow growth and high deficits, and face long - term fiscal pressures from aging populations. i agree with much in this broad - ranging paper. 2 in particular, the authors join others in finding that accommodative monetary policy is often associated with successful fiscal consolidations. they conclude that a “ tough love ” alternative, which would call for the federal reserve to withhold monetary accommodation until fiscal policymakers enact legislation to reduce budget imbalances, is likely to be counterproductive. indeed, i would argue that the tough love approach also would require the fed to deviate from the dual mandate that the congress has assigned it, while assuming a role in influencing fiscal policy that the congress has not assigned it. i find myself in disagreement, however, with the paper ’ s assessment that the current fiscal policy challenges might interfere in the near - term with the conduct of monetary policy in the united states. three important propositions underlie the authors ’ argument on this issue : 1. the federal government ’ s fiscal path is unsustainable under current policies. 2. if the market concludes that a government either cannot or will not service its debt, the central bank may be forced to choose ultimately between monetization leading to inflation or standing by as the government defaults – the threat of “ fiscal dominance. ” 3. the federal reserve ’ s balance sheet is currently very large by historical standards and still growing. the process of normalizing the size and composition of the balance sheet poses significant uncertainties and challenges for monetary policymakers. i believe all of these statements to be true. they are also widely, if not universally, accepted. however, based on these points and, importantly, on their empirical findings, the authors set out to show that fiscal difficulties present a near - term threat to the conduct of monetary policy. the paper argues that rising fiscal pressures, exacerbated by federal reserve losses on asset sales and low remittances to the treasury, could lead the federal reserve to delay balance