operations only have a direct influence on current short - term interest rates. economic activity and thus future price developments are, however, determined primarily by the shape of the yield curve, i. e. by the expectation of future monetary actions. transparency about how we judge future inflationary pressures enables us to guide expectations about future short - term interest rates and thus also long - term interest rates. the second reason is that transparency reduces the inevitable uncertainties related to monetary policy implementation. if markets know how we judge future inflationary pressures and how we may react to these, they can better predict our future monetary policy. improved predictability of monetary policy leads to fewer painful surprises in the economy. moreover, less uncertainty about monetary policy reduces both risk premiums in financial markets, and financing costs. the third rationale for central bank transparency is public and political accountability. central banks are mandated to act in the interest of their country, usually by maintaining price stability. this can imply unpopular decisions, which is essentially the reason for central bank independence.. central banks should thus be free from public and political pressure. but it is obvious that some mechanism must be set in place to ensure accountability of independent central banks. transparency about monetary policy is essential to central bank ensure accountability. however, transparency in itself is not enough. the statements made by central bankers must be accessible to the public and must be subject to scrutiny. here, a critical press has a very important role to play. 2. communication of monetary policy by the swiss national bank in order to improve monetary policy effectiveness and enable public accountability the swiss national bank started to regularly explain its monetary policy decisions to the public already in the 1970's. our first press conference was conducted in november 1974, shortly after the collapse of the brettonwoods fixed exchange rate regime. moreover, from 1975 onwards we published yearly goals for the growth of monetary aggregates in order to guide market expectations of interest rates and inflation. with the introduction of our new monetary policy concept six years ago, we took three specific measures in order to further enhance our transparency : • first, we have defined consumer price inflation of less than 2 % as our quantitative goal for price stability. this step has enhanced the predictability of our monetary policy because market participants know exactly what we want to achieve. they can expect monetary policy to be tightened if we believe that inflation could exceed 2 %. • as a second step, we now regularly publish a medium - term inflation forecast. this forecast helps market participants to predict future

monetary policy because they not only know our goal for inflation, but also how we judge future inflationary pressures. • our third step towards more transparency has been to explicitly communicate our operational target. we announce our target as a 1 % band on short - term interest rates, that is, on the three - month libor. we thus regularly offer market participants a quantitative indicator of changes in our monetary policy stance. our experience with the systematic communication of our monetary policy during the past six years has been very positive. market predictions of monetary policy measures have been accurate, leading to lower volatility in financial markets and improving the effectiveness of our policy measures a prime example of this is the most recent increase in our operational target in march 2006. an analysis of interest rate movements shows that the increase of our operational target by 25 basis points was almost fully anticipated by financial markets prior to the announcement. contrary to what many believe, a central bank does not lose any prestige in seeing its policy correctly anticipated by the markets. it is just proof of a well - understood monetary strategy. 3. credibility - words are not enough in switzerland, the systematic communication of monetary policy has had the desired effect of getting market participants to adapt their expectations well before actual policy interventions are made. does this mean that the swiss national bank now only has to indicate its intentions in order to influence interest rates? or as some academics and practitioners have posed the question : can central bankers now replace open market operations with " open mouth " interventions? considering the recent tightening of monetary policy in switzerland, one might be tempted to agree that open mouth operations are sufficient to move interest rates. after all, short - term interest rates rose long before an increase in the operational target was announced or before we raised the actual interest rates on repo transactions. however, this interpretation of the data ignores one crucial issue. interest rates moved upwards before the swiss national bank adapted its operational target or its repo rate because financial markets trusted that we would increase interest rates. given our objectives and our previous track record, it was credible that we would hike interest rates in the given economic environment. central bank transparency can only improve monetary policy effectiveness if it increases the predictability of future monetary measures. i would like to emphasise that predictability relies not just on information and the communication of intentions, but also on whether the public trusts a central bank to realise these intentions. central bankers can thus only benefit from transparency if their statements about future monetary policy are credible. ultimately, we know