period. the reform process in the euro area today is essentially a process of filling these two lacunae : improving the functioning of national economies through structural reforms ; and creating a well supervised, integrated financial market through banking union. this should provide the conditions for efficient resource allocation and hence sustainable convergence in the future. the illusion of convergence before the crisis in its simplest form, economic convergence can be understood as the process of narrowing income gaps between lower and higher income countries, achieved through faster relative growth in the catching - up economies. according to the standard neoclassical growth model, convergence should be driven by capital flows towards the lower income countries, which i would like to thank jonathan yiangou, neale kennedy and grigor stoevsky for their contributions to this speech. bis central bankers ’ speeches have low capital - to - output ratios and hence a higher marginal return on capital. an increase in labour productivity in the catching - up economies would also accelerate convergence, as capital deepening would empower production in those economies and organisational processes would gradually reach the standards of efficiency set by more mature regions. when emu was launched, the conditions for economic convergence to proceed according to this model seemed to be present. nominal interest rates between higher and lower income countries converged rapidly. capital flowed towards lower productivity economies where the marginal product of capital was higher, supported by the elimination of exchange rate risk within the euro area. for example, from 1999 to 2008 exposures from banks in higherincome economies towards those in the catching - up economies ( spain, ireland, greece and portugal ) increased more than fivefold. facilitated by these flows, capital accumulation accelerated in these countries : from 1999 to 2007 average growth in capital services in catching - up economies ranged from around 5 % to almost 9 %, compared with a range of 2 % to 3. 5 % in more productive economies. on the surface, these developments appeared to be contributing to convergence : gdp growth in catching - up economies was generally faster than in higher income economies. yet, with hindsight we know that there was no underlying convergence in labour productivity. in particular, strong capital accumulation in catching - up economies did not translate into faster total factor productivity ( tfp ) growth. tfp actually diverged between higher and lower income countries in this period. in fact, there was a positive correlation between the initial level of gdp per capita and average tfp growth rates : the highest tfp growth rates were found in germany, austria, netherlands and

develop a new consumer expectations survey. according to the announcement, a pilot survey will soon be implemented. [ 8 ] aside from serving practical purposes within central banks, additional surveys on household expectations would also help to promote research. the us is clearly ahead in this field, and an important question is whether the results obtained there would also be valid for other countries. 4 conclusion ladies and gentlemen, the discovery of the “ clever hans phenomenon ” was a major breakthrough for experimental psychology and led to further research on the effects of expectations. for example, evidence was found that teachers ’ expectations could have an impact on students ’ performance. [ 9 ] more generally, “ clever hans ” may highlight the importance of designing experiments properly in order to avoid biased results. of course, our researchers also took this lesson to heart when they devised their pilot study. by resorting to an internet - based survey, they have effectively eliminated any possible impact of face - to - face contact. to conclude, i wish you a pleasant evening and a fruitful conference. and, finally, i am very glad to open this joint event together with governor villeroy de galhau. dear francois, thank you so much for coming and please take the floor. fußnoten : 1. samhita, l. and gross, h. j. ( 2013 ). the “ clever hans phenomenon ” revisited, communicative and integrative biology, 6 ( 6 ) : e27122. 2. goodfriend, m. ( 2007 ). how the world achieved consensus on monetary policy, journal of economic perspectives, 21, pp. ( pages ) 47 - 68. 3. deutsche bundesbank ( 2016 ). the phillips curve as an instrument for analysing prices and forecasting inflation in germany, monthly report, april 2016, pp. ( pages ) 31 - 45 ; coibion, o. and gorodnichenko, y. ( 2015 ). is the phillips curve alive and well after all? inflation expectations and the missing disinflation, american economic journal : macroeconomics 7. 1, pp. ( pages ) 197 - 232. 4. cœure, b., inflation expectations and the conduct of monetary policy, speech at an event organised by the safe policy center, 11 july 2019. 5. apokoritis, n., galati, g., moessner, r., teppa, f. ( 2019 ). inflation expectations