) and a spatial dimension ( across participating countries ). and they see oecd, 2013. “ crisis squeezes income and puts pressure on inequality and poverty ”, new results from the oecd income distribution database, 15 may 2013. it includes the comment : “ in spain and italy, while the income of the top 10 % remained broadly stable, the average income of the poorest 10 % in 2010 was much lower than in 2007 ”. see t. padoa - schioppa : “ efficiency, stability, and equity : strategy for the evolution of the economic system of the european community ”, oxford university press, 1987. there are two main reasons why central banks should be shielded from distributive politics. the first one is legitimacy : the degree of fairness in society should be decided by society itself through the mechanisms of representative democracy. although it is generally not the case, distributive policies can, however, be delegated to unelected bureaucrats if they can be instructed to be fair behind the veil of ignorance. the second reason is efficiency. central banks'limited number of instruments should be directed at a limited number of objectives, with a clear priority. for an assessment of why distributive policies are usually not delegated to bureaucrats, see a. alesina and g. tabellini, 2007. “ bureaucrats or politicians? part i : a single policy task ”, american economic review, march, p. 169 – 179. bis central bankers ’ speeches have significantly impaired the potency of our standard monetary policy actions. the crisis measures of the ecb have accordingly acted on the horizontal, vertical and spatial transmission impairments of monetary policy. most importantly, our measures have prevented catastrophic outcomes for the euro area economy. and these outcomes would have had the biggest impact on the weakest in society. does all this – as the conference title asks – imply a changing role for central banks in macroeconomic stabilisation? the answer is no. monetary policy should aim at preserving price stability, the primary mandate given to us by the eu treaty. with regard to the objective, there are no differences between monetary policy in normal and crisis times. only the intensity and the choice of instruments might require an adjustment. affecting intra - temporal and spatial allocations should remain the responsibility of governments and other authorities. rather than being redistributive, central banks in a fragmented world should aim at repairing monetary policy transmission,

lehman brothers which threatened to produce very adverse economic outcomes with strong reductions in output, deflationary spirals and high unemployment, we made a series of policy rate cuts. these limited the consequences the downturn could have had on the income of households and firms across the euro area. our more recent rate cuts have narrowed the interest rate corridor between the deposit rate and our main policy rate to 50 basis points. these rate cuts have further eased the financing conditions of borrowers in the euro area and they have contributed to a decline in the crosscountry heterogeneity in funding costs. banks from stressed countries which participate most in eurosystem liquidity - providing operations will benefit from the lower interest rate charged for these operations. this will, over time, translate into reduced financing costs and improved access to credit for households and firms in stressed countries. second, apart from standard monetary policy, the ecb has also resorted to a number of nonstandard measures. by re - directing credit to those segments where financial intermediation ceased to function, the non - standard measures supported those areas most in need and thereby countered the increasing heterogeneity. the announcement of outright monetary transactions ( omts ) in particular has played a crucial role : it has improved the transmission of monetary policy by removing the “ tail risk ” arising from redenomination concerns in certain euro area countries. see m. brunnermeier, and y. sannikov, 2012. “ redistributive monetary policy ”, paper prepared for the 2012 jackson hole symposium, princeton university. see b. coeure, 2012. “ central banking, insurance and incentives ”, speech at the ecb conference on “ debt, growth and macroeconomic policies ” frankfurt, 6 december. bis central bankers ’ speeches overall, while our non - standard measures were designed for the euro area as a whole, their use has varied among counterparties and across countries. in this regard, our non - standard measures restored the distributional neutrality of our monetary policy by mitigating distortions in certain stressed asset classes or sectors. their impact has prevented very adverse economic outcomes for certain sectors and countries, and because of the effect this would have had on the rest of the euro area, it has thereby also supported medium - term price stability in the euro area as a whole. today we are clearly seeing signs of improvement in financial conditions. spreads in sovereign and corporate debt markets have fallen substantially. deposits placed by the euro