, 32 ( bse ), and 63 ( zse ). the mse is also the least liquid with 1, 223 trades in 2015, compared with 3216 ( luse ), 8692 ( zse ) and 10863 ( bse ). as a result, the mse continues to require central bank support to this day. the tanzania stock exchange, which commenced operations in 1998, boasts of 18 domestic listed companies and 7 cross listed companies ; over 40 treasury bonds and 3 corporate bonds. that brings me to my second point. why has the mse grown relatively, slowly. your guess is as good as mine. first, macroeconomic stability has been sporadic and unsustained over the period, contrary to our expectations at the time the mse got established. second, reflecting the macroeconomic instability, the deterioration in economic infrastructure, and stagnation in economic diversification, the economy has been slow in creating wealth. as of last year, malawi ’ s gdp was only $ 4. 4 billion when that of zimbabwe, zambia and botswana reached $ 14. 2 billion, $ 27. 1 billion and $ 17. 2 billion, respectively. it should not be surprising, therefore, that the mse still requires central bank support after 20 years in operations. with the benefit of hindsight, therefore, the exchange has been one of the most expensive to the general public, not because of mismanagement or lack of vision, but because of macroeconomic instability. but the other basic foundations for a successful exchange are in place. government support remains strong. the regulatory framework has been strengthened with the enactment of the financial services act, 2010 and the securities act, 2010. the sme ’ s governance structure is as good as any. the registrar of financial institutions has an oversight role but day - to - day operational oversight is vested in the board of the exchange and market participants. i now come to my third and final point, what does the future hold. first, as a country we cannot continue with our past history of inconsistent macroeconomic policies. with the kwacha now established as a free float, the policy choices for achieving sustained macroeconomic stability as a precondition for investment growth are now well known and entrenched in policy - making processes. in terms of the financial sustainability of the exchange itself, tremendous progress has been achieved. in the past, the central bank covered all operational costs of the exchange, but currently that support finances infrastructure development only.

i am going with this. in the aftermath of the great financial crisis, the federal reserve, the international regulatory community, and the banking industry took action to radically improve the safety of the banking system : new capital and liquidity rules, new stress testing requirements, a new resolution framework. together, these have greatly strengthened the safety of the financial system. actual common equity capital ratios for large banks have roughly doubled since the crisis ( and are at least six times as great as the pre - crisis requirements ). but in implementing these safety requirements, we did not pay as close attention to efficiency. yet the public interest in efficiency is also strong, so over the last four years we have comprehensively sought ways to improve the efficiency of the system while maintaining its safety — which is every bit as possible in the financial system as it has been for the airlines. while this has been a broad project, today i want to focus on four examples of measures that illustrate this phenomenon. these measures have enjoyed support across the political spectrum because they have brought measurable benefits to the american people. tailoring regulation the first that i would cite is our broad work since 2018 on tailoring our bank regulatory framework. that year, a bipartisan majority in congress passed the economic growth, regulatory relief, and consumer protection act ( egrrcpa ), which made modifications to the dodd - frank act and called on the banking agencies to further tailor regulation to better reflect the business models and activities of the different banking firms that we supervise. the legislation 1 / 6 bis central bankers'speeches recognized that it is possible to keep the system just as safe while allowing the financial system more capacity to support the real economy and more flexibility in doing so. as i have said before, one of my goals as vice chair for supervision has been to make our regulatory framework as simple, transparent, and efficient as possible. in particular, we must always ask whether the cost of regulation — whether in reduced economic growth or in increased frictions in the financial system — is outweighed by the benefits of the regulation. if we have a choice between two methods of equal effectiveness in achieving a goal, we should choose the one that is less burdensome for the system. this principle guided our activity in differentiating among firms based on their risk profile and applying tailored standards accordingly. in keeping with the intent of egrrcpa, the fed adopted a revised tailoring framework for the application of our enhanced standards to large firms. that framework rightly differentiates