( ii ) introduce a regime of macro - prudential indicators and a framework to be used as an early warning system for an emerging crisis ; and ( iii ) formulate agreed strategies for the timely and orderly intervention into the affected institutions so as to limit the impact on the regional financial system. while we can never rule out another regional financial crisis we can certainly be more prepared than we were, when it happens again. let me end where i started with reference to the movement – occupy wall street – i think there is a message there for us ( and i think that public reaction to the clico crisis underscores this message ). the message is that banks and other financial service industries have a responsibility to the country ’ s development and a sacred obligation to consumer wellbeing, even as they keep an eye on their bottom line. i think that regional regulators need to listen to and be responsive to the voices of consumers of financial services if trust in the regional financial system is to be maintained and strengthened. thank you. bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches

bruno gehrig : review of the swiss economy introductory remarks by prof bruno gehrig, vice - chairman of the governing board of the swiss national bank, at the end - of - year media news conference, zurich, 13 december 2002. * * * the past year was an eventful one for the international financial markets. the global deterioration in economic prospects and eroded investor confidence deepened the stock market slump as from the middle of the year. parallel to this development, the interest rate level continued to fall. the central banks contributed to the interest rate reduction. however, with risk premiums increasing at the same time, financing conditions failed to improve for many companies but actually often deteriorated. foreign exchange following the steep slide of the us dollar, exchange rates stabilised again from mid - year onward once it had become clear that the growth slump was affecting all major economic regions equally. the swiss franc fluctuated within a relatively narrow margin to the euro this year. the geopolitical uncertainty premium applied to the swiss franc after the shock of 11 september 2001 is still being paid ( see graph ). in the current year, we again recorded phases of heightened upward pressure on the swiss currency. we tried to counteract the negative consequences of the strong swiss franc and the risk of further upward movements by lowering the interest rate several times. since the beginning of september 2001, the key interest rate differential between the euro and the swiss franc has widened from one to two percentage points. the yield on long - term bonds in swiss francs is also around two percentage points below that on corresponding euro paper. this has lowered the attractiveness of the swiss franc somewhat compared with the euro. the stabilisation of the euro / swiss franc relationship – albeit at a relatively high rate for the swiss franc – is a positive development. experience has shown that the exchange rate development has a significant influence on business activity in switzerland. we are still determined to counteract any additional upward trend of the swiss franc that might jeopardise the economic recovery. bonds in the capital markets around the world, nominal yields dropped considerably ( see graph ). however, borrowers with medium and low credit ratings did not benefit much from this development as credit risk premiums rose during the year. this also limits the macroeconomic stimulus effect of the yield decline. in addition, real interest rates did not decrease to the same extent because simultaneously inflation expectations again subsided markedly. particularly in the euro's core countries – first and