the league shared their data for calculating the ratios under the prudential criteria. we encourage more credit unions to participate in these exercises which are a valuable means of orientation to the new regime. going forward, a key institutional support to the new regulatory framework will be the establishment of a mandatory deposit insurance system for the credit union sector. not only would the insurance system cover deposits but it must include shares which represent the vast majority of the sector ’ s savings, a situation that is unique to trinidad and tobago. in most jurisdictions, the protection fund for the credit union sector covers deposits only. we at the central bank expect the credit union movement to continue to play a critical financial inclusion role in our financial sector. we feel strongly, however, that more robust regulation and supervision are urgently needed to support further growth and development of credit unions. in closing, ladies and gentlemen, i again thank the board of telephone workers ’ credit union for inviting me to its agm, and i wish members well in their future contributions to community, the economy and national development. i thank you. bis central bankers ’ speeches

board of the riksbank make different assessments of the sustainable rate of unemployment, they can simply and clearly explain how this affects their decisions. it is of course inappropriate for the central bank itself to calculate the price index that is used to assess the attainment of the inflation target, and it is a major advantage if this index is calculated by another, independent organisation or authority, like statistics sweden in sweden ’ s case. for the same reason, it is inappropriate for the central bank to have a monopoly on calculating the normal level for the measure of resource utilisation used to evaluate target attainment. in practice it is impossible for outsiders ( and most people at the riksbank, including the members of the executive board ) to verify and assess the calculations of potential production and hours worked that are performed. it is very difficult to determine whether the measures are reasonable and reliable. compared to other measures of resource utilisation, the unemployment gap offers the best possibility for external and internal verification and assessment of the assumptions about, and the calculations of, the sustainable rate of unemployment. one may ask, however, whether the independence of the riksbank would be put at risk if external parties were involved in determining the right sustainable rate of unemployment. nor would i go so far as to propose that another authority should decide on the appropriate rate of sustainable unemployment. i do, on the other hand, think that it would be a good thing if bis central bankers ’ speeches the riksbank ’ s estimate of the sustainable rate of unemployment could be debated freely and assessed by external analysts, evaluators and authorities. this is in practice not possible with the other measures of resource utilisation. the fact that the riksbank tries to stabilise both inflation and unemployment does not mean that it disregards the fact that the inflation target takes precedence. as inflation is stabilised around the inflation target, inflation will on average be equal to the target. the riksbank fulfils in this way its mandate to maintain price stability at the same time as it can be said to be supporting the objectives of general economic policy through its endeavours to stabilise unemployment around a sustainable rate. the mean squared gap : a measure of stability a well - balanced monetary policy normally thus entails achieving a balance between the stabilisation of inflation and the stabilisation of resource utilisation. but what is meant by a lesser or greater stability of inflation and resource utilisation? determining this requires a quantitative