the fact that inflation dynamics have been tepid indicates that historical averages may not be an appropriate benchmark for today ’ s policy stance and that corresponding benchmark levels must have fallen. policymakers need to be wary of these trends. they are probably rooted in receding growth rates in potential output and the legacy of financial factors that have emerged in the wake of the financial crisis ( like risk aversion and deleveraging pressures ). the degree of monetary policy accommodation, based on various real return measures, needs to be assessed relative to these benchmark trends in real yields. certainly, if these slow - moving trends in real yields are also taken into account, the current level of real interest rates provides an ample degree of policy accommodation. but interpreting their present levels against the background of their protracted downtrend and persistently subdued inflation underpins our stance that we have to be prudent, patient and persistent in calibrating our policy, as inflation will probably converge only gradually towards our objective. looking ahead, monetary policy will evolve in a data - dependent and time - consistent manner. once the governing council judges that the three criteria for sustained adjustment – convergence, confidence and resilience – have been met, net asset purchases will expire, in line with our guidance. from that point in time, inflation developments will remain conditional on reinvestments continuing for an extended period of time and on policy rates remaining at their 3 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches present levels well past the end of our net asset purchases. the stock of long - duration assets held in our portfolio will continue to put downward pressure on longer - term interest rates well beyond the end of our net purchases. policy rates remaining at their present levels well past the end of our net purchases will contribute to holding the short to intermediate portions of the yield curve in check for as long as necessary, thereby ensuring that financial conditions remain consistent with a sustained adjustment of inflation. see, for example, the european commission ’ s “ european economic forecast – autumn 2017 ”. potential growth was estimated at 1. 4 % for 2017 and 1. 5 % for 2018 and 2019. 2 for more details, see the box entitled “ the targeted longer - term refinancing operations : an overview of the take - up and their impact on bank intermediation ”, economic bulletin, issue 3, ecb, 2017. 3 see the ecb ’ s euro area bank lending survey, january 2018, and the ecb ’ s

be borne in mind that, during the expansionary phase prior to the crisis, the loss of competitiveness in terms of the surplus per unit of output was on a similar scale to that mentioned for ulcs. however, the subsequent correction has been much smaller, which explains why the current level of the value - added deflator has grown 10 pp more in spain than in the euro area as a whole in cumulative terms since the monetary union began functioning. the design of a regulatory framework more conducive to competition should allow for a greater contribution of business margins to gains in competitiveness visa - vis the euro area. in this connection, competition and the contained growth of relative prices are also needed for sectors that are not externally open, given that the sectors that produce tradable goods incorporate a high proportion of non - tradable goods and services. to differing degrees, the factors mentioned are contributing to a situation where spanish exports tend to be skewed towards goods of medium and medium - high technological intensity, with a low share of high - technological - content products, below 10 % of the total. as a result, the sensitivity of exports to price - based competition is high. 5 / 6 further, redressing public finances should also contribute to a firm and sustained path of external surpluses. the sectoral breakdown of the net iip shows how the reduction in our economy ’ s debtor position has been concentrated in the private sector. meantime, since the start of the crisis, general government external debt has increased notably, by 26 pp of gdp since 2009, to slightly over 50 % of gdp. admittedly, from its peak of 11 % of gdp in 2009, the budget deficit has fallen substantially, to around 2. 5 % of gdp. however, the structural deficit remains high and public debt has only fallen modestly from its peak, standing currently at 98 % of gdp. conclusion in conclusion, i would stress that in order to give continuity to the current growth phase, reduce external vulnerability and strengthen the spanish economy ’ s potential, two vitally important courses of action should be followed. the first is the need to further redress public finances, so as to afford budgetary policy room for manoeuvre ahead of any future negative shocks. moreover, the fiscal consolidation process should be compatible with an improvement to the quality of public finances that helps contribute more to the potential growth of the economy. the second is the resumption of the structural reforms in the factor