orientations and decisions. from that standpoint, i consider the financial stability forum as a global conceptual clearing house, whose role is likely to be more and more important to the extent that the global financial system itself - driven by technology and globalisation - is more and more complex, universal and integrated. the third shortcoming that was detected in the international financial architecture during the asian crisis was the inadequate involvement of emerging countries in international fora. during the development of the asian crisis, emerging market participation was addressed by the setting up of the g20, which saw its inaugural meeting here in berlin in december 1999. the g20 was established in order to fully reflect the new nature of the global economy, an economy in which emerging economies were playing a very important role from a systemic standpoint. the g20 is a truly global forum. it enhances the dissemination of information by bringing together key industrial and emerging countries in an informal setting with the aim of reaching a consensus on a number of topical issues related to the international financial architecture. since its establishment in 1999, the g20 has been instrumental in implementing standards and codes that are applied at the global level, as it has led by an example by carrying out the imf ’ s financial sector assessment programs and reports on the observance of standards and codes at an early stage. by now, two thirds of the imf membership has participated in these reports, assessing their compliance with internationally recognised standards and codes. the g20 also contributed to the identification of 12 major standards, on which global efforts are now concentrating. these major standards include banking supervision, corporate governance, fiscal transparency, monetary and financial policy transparency, and securities regulation. without the kind of global ownership of new concepts of the best practices, without reinforced transparency and voluntary implementation of the principles for stable capital flows and fair debt restructuring in emerging markets that the g20 has delivered, our present financial architecture would not be as strong as it is today. see the institute of international finance ( iif ) et al., principles for stable capital flows and fair debt restructuring in emerging markets, november 2004. these three major improvements - namely fostering transparency as a major strategic driver, focusing on a more systemic conceptual approach, in particular, through the financial stability forum, and developing improved global ownership, in particular, through the establishment of the g20 - have contributed to an international financial system which is more resilient than before. the international financial system is today better equipped to detect vulnerabilities

, changes are bigger, because we estimate that the adjustment in spending will be greater for tradables given the evolution of the exchange rate. thus, the current account deficit should reach 2. 5 percent of gdp in 2016. this correction reflects both price and volume adjustments. in 2017, the deficit will be reduced to 2 percent of gdp, considering increased exports of copper resulting from the entry into production of some deposits and improved terms of trade. measured at trend prices the current account deficit will have a similar evolution. given these developments, the baseline scenario in this report assumes that gdp will grow between 1. 25 and 2. 25 percent in 2016, less than was expected in december, and in 2017 it will grow between 2 and 3 percent ( table 2 ). this implies that the economy will keep growing below its potential for the better part of the forecast horizon, so that a further increase in the output gap is projected. just for refreshment, let me remind you that in the monetary policy report of september last year we included several boxes that reflected our new estimate for trend growth ( i. e. the medium - term growth rate ) and potential growth – the non - acceleratinginflation rate of growth. estimates remain as we communicated then : about 3. 5 percent for trend growth and around 3 percent for potential growth. the labor market has been strikingly resilient, with persistently low unemployment rates and strong growth in salaried employment in most of 2015. most recently, however, the latter has tended to decelerate, which along with other indicators in the same direction suggests that this market could be weakening ( figure 4 ). about inflation, no big changes are foreseen from december. incoming data confirm that it will gradually converge to 3 percent, after remaining above 4 percent during the first half of 2016. the better behavior of some components not included in the cpiefe will help speed up this convergence. thus, by december this year we expect inflation to be at 3. 6 percent, two tenths of a point less than what we thought in december. we also project that during the first half of 2017 inflation will hit 3 percent and will remain in the neighborhood from then onwards ( figure 5 ). it should be noted that private inflation expectations are consistent with this scenario, assuming that it will stand somewhat above 3 percent in one year and at 3 percent in two years. one important thing that distinguishes chile from other economies, is that this process bis central bankers ’ speeches