jorg asmussen : introductory statement for the panel discussion on “ the g20 and the future of global economic governance ” statement by mr jorg asmussen, member of the executive board of the european central bank, at the iif annual membership meeting, washington dc, 12 october 2013. * * * it is a pleasure to be on this panel today to discuss the g20 ’ s future. this is a topic to which i feel close : i have been involved in g20 meetings of finance ministers and central bank governors since this forum first met in berlin in 1999. i also had the honour to serve as the german chancellor ’ s sherpa in the leaders ’ summit in cannes in 2011. the elevation of the g20 as the premier forum for international economic cooperation in the pittsburgh leaders ’ summit was a welcome development in its own right. it reflects the recognition of the growing importance of emerging economies and the need to foster a continued informal dialogue between them and advanced economies. the g20 ’ s earlier achievements, especially at the washington ( 2008 ), london and pittsburgh ( both 2009 ) to the seoul ( 2010 ) summits, were quite impressive, both as regards the content and the time frame in which they were accomplished. they included inter alia a coordinated policy response to the cyclical downturn, the launch of the imf ’ s governance reform and an increase of imf resources, as well as political impetus to a broad financial reform agenda. questions about the g20 ’ s legitimacy were raised at times by countries not represented. but the group ’ s effectiveness in pushing ahead reforms provided the necessary backing in “ leading by example ” and what one could call the “ output legitimacy ” of the g20. more recently, however, the g20 seems to have lost its earlier momentum. the case for acting in unison has diminished now that the most acute phase of the global financial crisis is behind us. what we observe is a quite common phenomenon, however. while informal formats gain importance in times of crisis, there is a clear tendency to revert back to the “ input legitimacy ” of the more formal formats and gatherings of pre - crisis times. it is interesting to note that the imf world economic outlook this time speaks about increasing heterogeneity1 in countries ’ economic performance whereas only six months ago the talk was of a 3 - speed recovery and three years ago we had a one - speed economic cycle in the global economy. against the background of this changed global environment

which i have mentioned on earlier occasions – is the creation of a permanent secretariat for the g20. this would help to stay focused and avoid proliferation of new topics, which each new g20 presidency introduces, often with limited results. it would also foster continuity on technical topics, especially on work streams which span over several years, such as financial regulation. these advantages would of course need to be weighed against the risks of increasing bureaucracy and less ownership by the countries participating in the g20, including the presidencies. but, learning from the experiences of other secretariats to international bodies or forums, i believe it should be possible to strike the right balance and reach agreement on a small, dedicated g20 office. a third idea i would like to advance is that the g20 should strive towards concrete and measurable objectives for policy action. achieving this goal would not only be helpful in order to reduce the scope for multiple interpretations and hence strengthen the consensus building, but it would also enhance the credibility of the g20 as well as its legitimacy via the channel of stronger output legitimacy to which i referred earlier. to give one obvious recent example, a more ambitious agreement at the st petersburg ’ s summit on how fiscal strategies of g20, notably advanced economies, should evolve in a post - toronto world ( which has no more deficit targets post - 2013 and hence no guideposts for medium - term public debt consolidation paths ) would have been particularly welcomed. i am aware that some of these suggestions might be difficult to implement quickly. but a discussion about their feasibility cannot come too soon. bis central bankers ’ speeches