— including early childhood learning, youth programs, housing, reservation schools, higher education, workforce development, children and family services, and elder programs. 38 center for indian country development a pervasive lack of data makes it difficult to evaluate how economic developments are impacting indian country. the limitations of the data available on indian country are due to data collection and reporting issues, such as small sample size or large margins of error. 39 at the federal reserve bank of minneapolis, the center for indian country development collects data and conducts economic research and analysis to help resolve the critical need for accurate and timely data. one of the steps they have taken includes publishing a labor market data tool, which presents estimates of the labor force participation rate, employment - to - population ratio, and unemployment rate for the ai / an population in the u. s. 40 the center for indian country development also focuses on applied research and engagement in indian country to support long term economic prosperity and inclusion. recent research has centered on the role tribal enterprises play in economic opportunity and how tax revenues in indian country can help improve the economic infrastructure and financial inclusion for tribal communities. through policy webinars and its upcoming inaugural research summit, see “ an economic education partnership with indian country, ” federal reserve bank of st. louis, november 19, 2020, https : / / www. stlouisfed. org / open - vault / 2020 / november / economic - education - partnership - indian - country. see “ data disaggregation : the asterisk nation, ” national congress of american indians ( ncai ) policy research center, https : / / www. ncai. org / policy - research - center / research - data / data. see center for indian country development, “ native american labor market dashboard, ” federal reserve bank of minneapolis, https : / / www. minneapolisfed. org / indiancountry / resources / native - american - labor - market - dashboard. the center is working alongside tribal leaders to leverage data and research to improve the economic well - being of indian country. the reserve banks play a unique and important role in increasing our understanding of local needs and regional issues, and in the federal reserve districts with large native american populations and stakeholders, our banks are very engaged with indian country activities. we welcome the diverse perspectives of native americans, from serving on our boards and advisory councils to joining us as full - time employees, to better inform our decisionmaking. tawney brunsch

we know it is a product of the great depression, and that economic disaster was the result of a combination of events unlikely to recur. in addition, the moral - hazard costs of the safety net are significant. nonetheless, the safety net, by providing ongoing access to real resources, has become capitalized into a broad spectrum of asset values. it is now an embedded part of our social and economic framework, for good or ill. viewed in its most favorable light, the safety net does guard against those once - in - a - century or so breakdowns in market forces, however induced. the long absence of a fire, or of an economic and financial conflagration, does not suggest that we should cancel the fire insurance policy or the safety net. but, i do think that as a society we ought to explore what we can do at the margin to retain the economic benefits and lower the economic costs of the safety net. we ought to be careful that we do not, through safety net expansion, increase the marginal costs more than the marginal benefits. a look back to the pre - safety - net era might be helpful as part of that exploration. i have in the past suggested that to lessen the moral hazard of the safety net and to improve supervision and regulation, public policy should attempt to simulate, in so far as possible, what markets alone might do, or at least to create market - type incentives. to do so would, of course, move us closer to the period of pre - safety - net incentives while avoiding, one hopes, the distortions of that regime. for example, solvent banks must remain assured that they will be able to liquefy their sound assets at times of liquidity distress, but ideally, we would otherwise like banks to be managed as if there were no safety net. that is, if we retain the safety net, we ought to price and otherwise manage it so that the banking system is as close as possible to the one the market alone would provide. clearly one of those steps would be better pricing of safety - net access. the federal deposit insurance corporation has proposed some useful initiatives to move in that direction. the usual suggested premiums for deposit insurance are, of course, far from those that would fully eliminate the subsidy that insurance provides to depository institutions and their borrowers and depositors, especially at times of financial crisis. indeed, to eliminate the subsidy in deposit insurance, the fdic insurance premium would have to be set high enough