program with clear time - frames for the implementation. it is obvious that the imf and the world bank should have a leading role with regard to monitoring the implementation of the core principles. the main argument for this structure is that the international financial institutions already send missions to almost all countries in the world. however, it is generally acknowledged that the basle committee possesses great expertise in bank regulation. i therefore plead for a model in which the basle committee, the imf and the world bank each and together assist countries in realising financial stability in their respective fields of competence. in this model, the imf and the world bank are primarily responsible for creating a sound environment for banking, which is highly dependent on viable government policies. as part of the assessment of government policies, these institutions will of course also pay attention to the quality of bank supervision. 20. the basle committee is primarily responsible for the amendment and interpretation of the principles and will review compliance with the principles at the international conference of banking supervisors in october 1998 and bi - annually thereafter. the basle committee can furthermore make a major contribution towards the implementation of the principles by offering technical assistance and courses to supervisors in emerging countries. in this respect, banking and traffic again look alike. it is all a matter of knowing your responsibility ; if you do not make a timely agreement about who drives home, you both end up drinking too much.

risks associated with participation in such systems. other directives seek to ensure that the rights of banks ’ clients to adequate information concerning retail payments are upheld by the intermediaries rendering payment services. in this way, credibility in the integrity of the infrastructure used for the settlement of payments is preserved at both wholesale and retail level. the bank ’ s role in financial stability has more recently been enhanced by membership of the european system of central banks ( escb ) from may 2004. it has started to participate in the escb the 1967 act referred to the bank ’ s role in promoting a sound financial structure and to foster an orderly capital market in malta. article 4 ( 2 ) of the revised act specifically states that it shall be one of the objective of the bank to “ ensure the stability of the financial system. ” the core principles recommended by the committee on payment and securities settlement systems of the bank for international settlements ( bis ). committee dealing with financial stability, the banking supervision committee, and at the eu level the bank also participates in the economic and finance committee and in its financial stability table. the importance of two - way cooperation with the mfsa the initiatives i have described have strengthened the bank ’ s ability to monitor and analyse developments in the financial system in a wider context. it is nevertheless becoming increasingly clear that to carry out this role effectively, the bank ’ s efforts in this area need to be supported by the activities of the overall supervisor in the financial field, that is the mfsa. it is, therefore, reassuring to note that good co - operation already exists between the bank and the authority. more specifically, the authority ’ s focus on the health of individual service providers complements the bank ’ s macroprudential analysis of the financial system as a whole and its oversight of the payment and settlement systems. in undertaking their respective tasks, both these institutions have access to information that may not be readily available to the other. thus, for example, through its involvement with payment systems and the daily monitoring of the banks ’ foreign exchange exposures, the central bank of malta has daily information on the amount of liquidity and the extent of foreign exchange risk prevalent in the inter - bank market. similar information, however, only becomes available to the authority with a delay, through the monthly statistical reports submitted by the individual financial intermediaries. furthermore, the bank ’ s macro perspective assessment of financial developments may identify general risks to the system that may not be apparent when the prude