indeed, central bank money is a public good. euro banknotes fulfil the core function of providing people with risk - free central bank money. it is crucial to ensure that, as a form of public money, a digital euro enjoys universal reach and acceptance, as the legal tender status provides. the introduction of a digital euro also raises technical challenges. some are related to information technology and cyber risks, which will need to be managed effectively. others are related to design choices. in this respect, we can leverage the experience gained in past projects that have put us at the frontier of payments. 13 finally, the design of a digital euro would have to be consistent with key policy objectives. in particular, its design should address the possibility that investors could rapidly move significant amounts of bank deposits into a digital euro, with potential adverse effects on the banking sector and financial stability. we are exploring design strategies to address this and other challenges, and we will assess them in depth. for instance, we could set the necessary incentives through the remuneration of digital euro holdings, to make sure the digital euro is an attractive means of payment, not a form of investment. 14 what next? exploring design options, consulting the public and working together our report also describes the design options we are considering. we will explore all aspects of different options : whether they are technically feasible, whether they comply with the principles and policy objectives of the eurosystem, and whether they satisfy the needs of prospective users. but introducing a digital euro is more than a technical question. the value of money – in both physical and digital forms – is rooted in citizens ’ trust. acceptance by the public is crucial. for this reason, today we are launching our public consultation. we are seeking feedback on the design and on the financial and social issues surrounding the possible introduction of a digital euro. we welcome everyone ’ s views : citizens, merchants, the non - financial sector, professionals from the financial industry, technology companies, and academics. we encourage everyone to take part. after the public consultation and a period of preparatory work, the ecb ’ s governing council will decide – towards the middle of 2021 – whether to initiate a fully - fledged project that should lead us to define the specific characteristics of a digital euro and get ready for a possible launch. this journey will require prudence and perseverance. conclusion let me conclude. since the introduction of the euro, the ecb has been responsible for preserving citizens ’ trust in our currency.

easily understood, they are not as alert to the need to strengthen their corporate governance arrangements against risks arising from outsourcing their assessment activities. safeguards should also be strengthened to ensure that individual rights are adequately protected and that the methodologies used do not result in discriminatory practices. the provision of online credit is increasing. at the end of last year, the share of banks offering loans to households and firms via digital channels was 44 and 25 per cent respectively. the capacity to lend remotely and the use of digital tools to assess customers ’ creditworthiness allowed banks with a higher rate of technological innovation to increase their market share during the pandemic crisis. however, the recent acceleration in the use of new technologies has exposed us to greater risks, as witnessed in some major cyber incidents. with the outbreak of the conflict in ukraine, risks are increasing again and so, together with consob, ivass and italy ’ s financial intelligence unit ( uif ), we promptly warned the banks that they needed to raise their guard against potential attacks. against this backdrop, we have also urged banks and the main technology service providers to conduct a risk assessment linked to the use of software from russia. so far, there has been no evidence of any successful cyber attacks on the financial market that can be directly related to the conflict. of the 12 incidents reported in 2021, eight were reported in the first six months, of which 5 were associated with a single attack on an external service provider. that episode highlights the risks involved when outsourcing is concentrated around a small number of operators. in 2020, banca d ’ italia intensified its controls in this context, making specific and repeated surveys and on - site inspections of its suppliers. the bank also undertook target investigations of the financial market ’ s payment systems and infrastructures. as i recalled in the last concluding remarks, some crypto - assets are not backed by any real or financial assets. they have no intrinsic value and are subject to very high volatility, as the episodes we have recently observed have indeed shown. other crypto - assets are, instead, backed by real or financial assets. if these assets are duly regulated and issued by clearly identifiable entities, they could also potentially be useful, under specific conditions, as a means of payment. they can also be distinguished by differing levels of transparency, liquidity of reserves, and disclosure of their valuation processes. they are, however, suitable for regulation within a system similar to that applied to more traditional