( such as greece ) are dealing with problems typical of developing countries, issues including incomplete land registries and an insufficient basic ability to collect taxes. this confusion in taxonomy complicates our discussion a great deal, especially in the years of the crisis and its aftermath. the question at the beginning of the crisis was : who in europe will prove to be most vulnerable to shocks? many believed it would be central and eastern european countries. but, in contrast to that prophecy, at the end of the day the countries that did not have to bail out any of their financial institutions were, with one exception ( malta ), located typically in the cee region. so it seems to me that gdp per capita, human development and industrial tradition are not the criteria driving the market ’ s classification of “ emerging ” economies. should euro membership automatically make a country “ developed ”? in other words, does giving up independent monetary policy make a country more “ stable ”? but why, then, isn ’ t bulgaria considered a developed country, when it holds a fixed exchange rate against the euro? why not kosovo and montenegro, which have adopted the euro unilaterally? much space has been devoted to the so - called decoupling debate, in which many experts 1 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches claimed that emerging countries were less affected by the global financial crisis. but with the benefit of hindsight, we now know that the gdp declines in emerging countries were, on average, just as steep as those experienced by developed countries. a part of the explanation, once again, lies in the confusing taxonomy : we see huge differences among individual emerging countries as well, even within brics. i suggest an analogy to the decoupling debate : we are now observing a “ brics decoupling ” to the power of two : only china and india have shown robust growth since the great recession. russia, brazil and south africa have been stagnating, each for its own specific reasons. but despite these differences, a common theme arises : emerging markets dependent on the production and export of raw materials ( russia, brazil and south africa serve as good examples ) are less resilient than countries dependent on vigorous labour force and innovations ( exemplified, within brics, by china and india ). there are also differences in resilience among the “ emerging ” countries of central europe. during the great recession, poland – a big country ( by central european standards ), less open and with greater potential

miroslav singer : central bank governor of the year for emerging europe acceptance speech by mr miroslav singer, governor of the czech national bank, at the central bank governor of the year for emerging europe 2013 awards, washington dc, 12 october 2013. * * * let me start by thanking you for this award. i see it not so much as personal recognition, but more as recognition of the team of people that make up and define the czech national bank that i have the pleasure to represent here. special thanks go to those i work with directly, among others to my colleagues on the board for their unlimited patience with my generally awful manners and attempts to claim leadership. whenever i meet a group of investors or analysts, i always start by noting that any issues and questions requiring knowledge and wisdom would be better addressed by our experts, those requiring only wisdom would be better be fielded by my colleagues on the board, and those requiring neither knowledge nor wisdom can be safely left to me. so, let me share some of my knowledge - and wisdom - free observations with you. ten years ago, when i was working in restructuring, i could never have imagined that i would join the central bank in less than two years and later rise to the top job there. but the offer came, and it was one i truly could not refuse. i owe a big debt of thanks to my predecessor zdenek tuma, who steered the bank to a position where its reputation, which had been severely tarnished before his arrival, was growing steadily. he achieved this by, among other things, imposing his own highly developed sense of self - control and restraint on the bank. as the czech national bank started communicating less on general topics and more on its areas of expertise, it became recognized as an institution of true independence and authority – to such an extent that the czech political system allocated all supervisory competences to it and continues to broaden its responsibilities. i believe that the crises from which a significant part of the developed world is still emerging have – at least for smaller economies – justified a scheme in which some or all supervisory roles are allocated to the central bank, which holds responsibility for stability issues anyway. but i also have to warn against the trend where the public sees central banks gaining more and more competences and mandates and starts to overestimate their ability to deal with crises. central banks are far from omnipotent, and this trend may harm them. after all, their independence is only a product of the political