mr. tietmeyer asks whether the euro can assume the role of a major international currency speech given by the president of the deutsche bundesbank, prof. hans tietmeyer, at a luncheon at the american express company in paris on 28 / 10 / 97. i. the “ american express company ” is not only a financial institution, but also a brandname familiar throughout the world. the “ american express credit card ” and “ american express travellers ’ cheque ” are acknowledged in most countries as safe and convenient means of payment, which facilitate not just travel. for decades past, therefore, “ american express ” has been a symbol of increasing globalisation. there are not many other enterprises that can claim that. today, however, i do not want to talk about payment instruments. even so, my reference to the travellers ’ cheque takes us straight to our topic : alongside the “ greenback ”, the travellers ’ cheque is likewise a symbol of the dollar ’ s status as the absolute number one among the currencies of the world. ii. a currency which serves at the same time as a unit of account, a medium of exchange and a store of value - - for private investors and public monetary authorities alike - - is known as an international key currency. what are the pre - requisites that a national payment medium needs, in order to assume these functions? monetary history teaches us that the international role of a currency may often develop spontaneously with the country ’ s political and economic significance. hence it is not surprising that, besides gold, the pound sterling played the overriding role in the international monetary system for many decades. a well - functioning banking system and efficient capital markets had evolved in the united kingdom at an early date. the industrial revolution began in great britain, and helped the british economy to gain an edge over all other countries. the role of sterling was primarily based on the uk ’ s position as a great power, in both economic and political terms. what is more, over a period of two centuries sterling did not depreciate against other currencies. once the significance of sterling started to decline, the dollar took the stage as the principal international currency. this was due not only to the us ’ rise to the status of a world power. another important factor was that, for a long period, the dollar was far less exposed to inflationary pressures than other currencies. by virtue of the bretton woods system, the us dollar

mr remsperger addresses the imbalances in global savings and analyses the savings process and investment structure in germany * lecture given by prof dr hermann remsperger, member of the board of the deutsche bundesbank, at the “ seminar for central banks and governmental institutions ”, held in kempfenhausen on 21 october 1999. * * * ladies and gentlemen, i would like to present my ideas in two parts. in the first part i shall address the imbalances in global savings. the second part will then focus on analysing the savings process in germany. in doing so, i shall mainly deal with the decline in the savings ratio, although i shall also go into the globalisation of german savings. global savings imbalances in the 1990s – the “ absorption effect ” of the united states let me start by reminding you that after the fall of the “ iron curtain ” the question was raised as to whether the world financial markets were at all able to provide the considerable additional funds needed both for investing in the developing and emerging market economies and for reconstructing the central and east european countries in transition along market economy lines, if major western industrial countries such as the united states1 were simultaneously requiring a significant amount of international resources as a result of their public sector budget deficits. there was talk of a risk of a global “ savings gap ”. at the imf, which at the time was undertaking an in - depth examination of the problem of savings in a growing world economy, this was put in the following words : “ with today ’ s large potential investment demands, especially in emerging market economies in the developing world and among the countries in transition from central planning, the question naturally arises whether the supply of saving will be adequate to finance worthwhile projects around the world. the question is made sharper because of growing pressures on savings. since the early 1980s, government absorption of private sector saving has increased sharply, and the retirement - age populations of some industrial countries are starting to increase rapidly. ” 2 but today, we may say that global savings have obviously grown more sharply than the total demand for funds. a major contributing factor to this has been the reduction in excessive government deficits which was prompted in europe, not least by compliance with the fiscal criteria for entry into the planned monetary union. in terms of gross domestic product, the budget deficits in the european union fell from 6 % to slightly below 2 % 3 in the period between 1993 and 1998. in the united