the fss ’ s on - site examination. under the present joint examination system, the fss examines general matters regarding financial institutions ’ managerial soundness. for its part, the bok examines only limited areas related to monetary policy and the payment and settlement system. the two institutions, meanwhile, pool the information that they gather in the course of on - site examination, and draw on it for their respective operations. there is one more issue concerning financial stability and efficiency, although it is not directly related to banking supervision. that is the need for strengthening the central bank ’ s oversight of the national payment and settlement system. the case for this is constantly advocated by multilateral financial institutions such as bis and imf. in this regard, the bok was given the authority to oversee the various payment and settlement systems in korea under the most recent revision of the bank of korea act in september 2003. under the revised legislation, the bok may demand relevant materials from both banks and non - bank financial institutions that take part in bok - wire, the real time gross settlement system operated by the bok. it may also request the improvement of payment and settlement systems operated by other entities. all this means that the bok has come to play many roles in order to secure financial market stability in spite of its limited official powers of financial supervision. 5. concluding remarks let me now indicate a few points that central bankers may wish to bear in mind from our experience following the integration of financial supervisory agencies in contemplating the reorganization of their own national financial supervisory framework. firstly, in the light of other countries ’ example and korea ’ s experience, i do not think there is any one - size - fits - all supervisory system that is the optimal for every country. in particular, i think there are various alternative options regarding the issue of the central bank ’ s supervisory function. these will depend on the degree of financial market development and a nation ’ s traditions related to the division of roles between government and central bank. and i think that it rests with the financial system characteristics of a particular country whether it should go for an integrated financial supervisory body or multiple supervisory agencies for the various types of financial institution. secondly, it is absolutely essential for central banks to obtain a wide range of information on financial markets and the management status of financial institutions whether or not they are responsible for bank supervision. where a separate bank supervisory agency exists, a system of co - operation with it must be built up so that necessary information can be collected

promptly. it is also desirable for the central bank to have the authority to conduct the on - site examination of financial institutions independently so that it may obtain the necessary information when there is a high degree of market instability. thirdly, it is vital to set up a system for policy coordination so that the opinions of the central bank are reflected in the supervisory policies of the financial supervisory agency. prudential supervision is closely related to monetary policy. if the financial supervisory agency strengthens prudential supervision, this may bring about similar effects to the tightening of monetary policy. therefore i think it is crucial that the supervisory agency be required to consult with the central bank before the revision of prudential regulations. what is more, the central bank should, where necessary, have the right to ask the supervisory agency to adjust its prudential regulations. korea ’ s current supervisory system was introduced in some haste under the extraordinary situation prevailing in the aftermath of the currency crisis six years ago. therefore, there have been some frictions between the institutions concerned with financial supervision. in the course of time, its shortcomings have been made good to a considerable extent, but to my mind a number of areas still call for improvement. drawing my remarks to a close, i venture the hope that korea ’ s experience may serve as a useful reference for member countries in discussing the reorganization of financial supervisory systems. thank you very much for listening so attentively.