23. 05. 2018 “ strengthening the economic governance of the euro : short - term priorities and the long - term view ” high level seminar. banco de espana luis m. linde governor ladies and gentlemen, let me first extend a warm welcome to you all to the banco de espana. thank you for joining us today in this seminar that addresses the pressing and very important topic of the economic governance of the euro : short - term priorities and the long - term view. i would like to thank the panelists who have been so kind to accept our invitation ; we are very pleased to have among us a long list of distinguished participants that would certainly throw much welcomed light on the discussion. the timing of this conference is particularly relevant. after years of low growth, europe is now experiencing a robust recovery which opens up a window of opportunity to make progress in the governance reform agenda before the next economic downturn unfolds. supported by expansionary monetary policy, real gdp in the euro area has expanded for 19 quarters in a row. stronger price dynamics are yet to materialize, but we are confident that if we are prudent, patient and persistent, our monetary policy measures will be effective in achieving the medium - term goals. price stability is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for achieving sustained and balanced growth. in fact, one important lesson we can draw from the first twenty years of the emu is the need to improve the area ’ s resilience to large macroeconomic shocks and to increase its stabilization capacity. in this context, we currently find ourselves at a crossroads in what refers to the pace of the governance reform agenda. despite evident progress since the peak of the crisis, the building of a more cohesive monetary union, as proposed in the van rompuy ’ s report of june 2012 ( the so - called four presidents ’ report ) and in the juncker ’ s report of june 2015 ( the so - called five presidents ’ report ), is, we all know that, a very difficult task. as a matter of fact, there has been no significant step forward since the establishment of the single resolution fund in june 2014. recently, several initiatives have attempted to re - launch the debate on the future of euro area ’ s governance, including, in december 2017, the european commission ’ s report on “ further steps towards completing europe's economic and monetary union : a roadmap ”, or, in january of the present year, the center for economic policy research

03. 12. 2021 a complete institutional architecture for a stronger policy mix “ a stronger policy mix for the euro area? ” – european commission webinar organised by dg ecfin directorate for macroeconomic policies pablo hernandez de cos governor the covid crisis has tested the european project in unprecedented ways. the policy response, a successful monetary and fiscal policy reaction, informed by a euro area ( and eu - wide ) perspective, has been unprecedented too. given the exogenous roots of the crisis, the need to respond with a balanced fiscal - monetary policy mix was clear. and its depth facilitated the adoption of far - reaching political agreements that allowed the incomplete institutional nature of the economic and monetary union ( emu ) to be temporarily overcome, in particular through the deployment of some significant pan - european fiscal instruments. to mention the most important, let me highlight the ngeu programme, and also the unemployment scheme sure. the need for a policy reaction from the aggregate angle was quite clear on this occasion. this is a novelty when comparing with the two previous crises, the gfc and the european sovereign debt crisis, when the endogenous roots of the shock showed a fundamental need for reform and action at the national level, that was only subsequently reinforced by some important steps aimed at pushing forward the overall euro area ( and eu ) architecture. let me start by reminding us how we got here. under the maastricht treaty, the design of emu had two core elements : an independent common central bank targeting price stability, and a framework to coordinate national fiscal policies. the former was entrusted with monetary policy, while the latter was based on a set of fiscal rules geared towards ensuring that national fiscal policies did not endanger the price stability mandate. this meant that member states could no longer rely on monetary policy to stabilise asymmetric economic shocks ( domestic, or common with highly uneven domestic effects ), while the exchange rate could not act as an adjustment mechanism between countries. instead, they had to rely on additional adjustment channels, such as capital and labour mobility, and, especially, countercyclical fiscal policy. in addition, the set of fiscal rules included in the treaty acknowledged that the fiscal behaviour of one country would affect the rest of the members and the monetary union as a whole. in particular, unsustainable fiscal policies in one country could generate economic and financial instability across the monetary union and influence the single monetary policy. thus, the treaty stipulates that member states