samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
spirit of my argument was expressed succinctly some 20 years ago by karl otto pohl. in his speech at the economic club he said : “ the true function of a central bank must be, however, to take a longer - term view. ” and after five years of crisis, the long term might catch up with us faster than we expect. we therefore have to think about the future now – and we have to act accordingly as well. thank you for your attention. bis central bankers ’ speeches

. the international labour organisation estimates that up to 56 million people lost their jobs in the wake of the crisis. this number equals the combined populations of california and the state of new york. or look at government debt : between 2007 and 2011, gross government debt as a share of gdp increased by more than 20 percentage points in the euro area and by about 35 percentage points in the united states. bis central bankers ’ speeches i think we all agree that the crisis was unprecedented in scale and scope. and the first thing to do was to prevent the recession turning into a depression. thanks to the efforts of policymakers and central banks across the globe, this has been achieved. following a slight setback in 2011, the world economy now seems to be recovering. in its latest world economic outlook, the imf confirms that global prospects are gradually strengthening and that the threat of sharp slowdown has receded. looking ahead, the imf projects global growth to reach 3. 5 % in 2012 and 4. 1 % in 2013. for the same years, inflation in advanced economies is expected to reach 1. 9 % and 1. 7 %. basically, i share the imf ’ s view. however, we all are aware that these estimates have to be taken with a grain of salt – probably a large one. being a central banker, i am not quite as calm about inflation. taking into account rising energy prices and robust core inflation, prices could rise faster than the imf expects. we have to be careful that inflation expectations remain well anchored and consistent with price stability. expectations getting out of line might very well turn out to be a non - linear process. if this were to happen, it would be difficult and expensive to rein in expectations again. even though the outlook for growth has improved over the past months, some risks remain – the european sovereign debt crisis being one of them. and this seems to be the one risk that is weighing most heavily on peoples ’ minds – not just in europe but here in the united states, too. the euro - area member states have responded by committing to undertake ambitious reforms and by substantially enlarging their firewalls. this notwithstanding, the sovereign debt crisis has not yet been resolved. the renewed tensions over the past two weeks are a case in point. thus, we have to keep moving, but each step we take has to be considered very carefully. as i have already said : each small step we take now will determine where we stand in the future
, suggested to us back in 2006. they showed us how a more export - led growth strategy needs to be predicated on a more competitive page 9 of 11 exchange rate achieved by running a fiscal surplus to create space for lower interest rates, and supplemented by an effective inflation - targeting framework. 4 in fact, under inflation targeting, excessive exchange rate appreciation has been rare and short - lived. these discrete periods occurred when capital flowed in as a result of high commodity prices, sustained public borrowing, and low yields in advanced economies – not because of inflation targeting. all else being equal, the inflationtargeting framework has lowered inflation and rates, reducing the pull on hot money in recent times. in fact, a fundamental objective of inflation targeting has always been to achieve a more competitive exchange rate, and the best way to achieve this is to get inflation to be permanently low. conclusion the constitution recognises and expresses the public good which is price stability because it helps societies to achieve balanced and sustainable economic growth. it is necessary but not sufficient. like the mandate, central bank independence is also not a static, ivory - tower concept. it is a living and breathing idea. it is an idea that is practical. it gives life to the mandate set out for the sarb by the constitution. this independence means that the sarb can make the case for how best to achieve that goal, in consultation with government and with full transparency to the general public. as an institution, we have worked with government to identify the inflationtargeting framework as the best way of achieving the mandate, for all the reasons i have set out today. we believe that the case for the existing framework is very strong. we have achieved a historically low rate of inflation and, as a direct consequence of this, historically low 4 for the panel ’ s recommendations, please see ricardo hausmann ’ s final recommendations of the international panel on growth, available at http : / / www. treasury. gov. za / comm _ media / press / 2008 / final % 20recommendations % 20of % 20the % 20i nternational % 20panel. pdf, especially pages 6 and 12 - 13. page 10 of 11 interest rates. of course we would like to improve on this track record and edge both inflation and interest rates lower on a sustainable basis. this is the most important contribution that monetary policy can make to full employment, economic growth and the well - being of our society. thank

and in the east african region as a whole. it is now my honour and singular pleasure to invite the honorable deputy prime minister and minister for finance hon. uhuru kenyatta to make his remarks and welcome his excellency, the president. welcome, honorable deputy prime minister. thank you and god bless you all bis central bankers ’ speeches
financial products that can meet the needs of savers throughout their life cycle. the availability of a wide range of savings instruments for savers is a necessary pre - requisite for effective mobilisation of the nation's savings. indeed, the ongoing evolution of an innovative, dynamic and diversified financial system in malaysia will not only help malaysians save, but also invest effectively for their future by facilitating the more efficient allocation of personal resources. thank you.

and would urge the participation of all financial institutions in this effort to promote the use of electronic payments in the country. thank you.
. i take this opportunity to draw your attention in terms of applying the legal requirement for the observance of international financial reporting standards, starting from 2008. this is an issue banks belonging to european union banking groups are more prepared for. however, these banks, and in particular other banks not availing of this opportunity, should co - operate with external auditing companies, in order to define the concrete measures to be taken in their activity for the observance of this legal requirement. dear participants, i believe today ’ s meeting is a good opportunity to communicate with one - another ; therefore, i invite you to keep on exchanging effective ideas and thoughts. on behalf of the institution i represent, i would like to reassure you that the bank of albania remains fully committed and accountable in fulfilling its legal mission, capable and willing to loyally co - operate with any institution or stakeholder influencing on the country ’ s economic and financial development thank you.

of banks in the republic of albania ”. according to this law, the bank of albania has been assigned as the resolution authority, whereas the albanian deposit insurance agency is responsible for the administration of the resolution fund, which encompasses investing it in accordance with the policy approved by the resolution authority. moreover, the law gives a new role to adia as an important partner in drafting resolution plans, as well as a new source of financing banks ’ resolution, therefore increasing the pool of resources available to the bank of albania for resolving failing banks. so, to conclude, once again, thank you very much for the opportunity to speak to you today. it is a pleasure to have you here and i hope you enjoy the rest of your stay in tirana. i wish you all a successful event! thank you! 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches
economic theory, vol. 146, no. 6, pp. 2169 - 2205. lazer, d, kennedy, r, king, g and vespignani, a ( 2014 ), ‘ the parable of google flu : traps in big data analysis ’, science, vol. 343, pp. 1203 - 1205. all speeches are available online at www. bankofengland. co. uk / speeches leamer, e ( 1983 ), ‘ let ’ s take the con out of econometrics ’, american economic review, vol. 73, no. 1, pp. 31 - 43. lehdonvirta, v and castronova, e ( 2014 ), virtual economies : design and analysis, mit press. levitt, s, list, j, neckermann, s and nelson, d ( 2016 ), ‘ quantity discounts on a virtual good : the results of a massive pricing experiment at kind digital entertainment ’, proceedings of the national academy of sciences of the united states of america, vol. 113, no. 27, pp. 7323 - 7328. moore, g ( 1965 ), ‘ cramming more components onto integrated circuits ’, electronics, vol. 38, no. 8. nyman, r, kapadia, s, tuckett, d, gregory, d, ormerod, p and smith, r ( 2018 ), ‘ news and narratives in financial systems : exploiting big data for systemic risk assessment ’, bank of england staff working paper, no. 704. obstfeld, m and rogoff, k ( 2001 ), ‘ the six major puzzles in international macroeconomics : is there a common cause? ’, nber macroeconomics annual, vol. 15, mit press. popper, k ( 1934 ), logik der forschung, akademie verlag. popper, k ( 1959 ), the logic of scientific discovery, routledge. rotemberg, j ( 1984 ), ‘ interpreting the statistical failures of some rational expectations models ’, american economic review, vol. 74, no. 2, pp. 188 - 193. sabouni, h ( 2018 ), ‘ the rhythm of markets ’, mimeo. schonhardt - bailey, c ( 2013 ), deliberating american monetary policy : a textual analysis, mit press. schwab, k ( 2017 ), the fourth industrial

leading the changes needed and in having a sense of your responsibility to the wider economy. yours is a model of engagement for others to emulate. and i look forward to continuing to work together. thank you. bis central bankers ’ speeches
disruption could be passed on to other ones through their interdependence in financial transactions and settlement. if a computer failure due to a lack of year 2000 readiness materializes in a settlement system, not only financial institutions but also end - users or customers will be affected because they may not be able to withdraw or transfer funds through cash dispenser ( cd ) and automated teller machine ( atm ) networks. the year 2000 problem could seriously affect the business of individual financial institutions as well as the stability of payment and settlement systems. the bank of japan, with the cooperation of market participants, is therefore promoting year 2000 readiness of individual financial institutions and payment and settlement systems. this paper discusses how japan ’ s financial sector is addressing key issues of the year 2000 problem and provides information on its progress in achieving year 2000 readiness. 16 after an overview of the results of the year 2000 problem survey of financial institutions conducted by the bank of japan in june 1998, the paper presents ( 1 ) plans for external tests of payment and settlement systems ; ( 2 ) global initiatives taken by international organizations including the bank for international settlements ( bis ) ; and ( 3 ) an upcoming issue. the paper focuses exclusively on the preparations being made by financial institutions and payment and settlement systems for the year 2000 problem. it does not deal with preparations made by social infrastructures, such as telecommunications or utilities that support computer system operations, nor does it cover year 2000 preparations of companies supplying host computers and software, although these deserve careful attention of financial institutions. * * * this paper was originally published in the form of a brochure on august 14, 1998. for inquiries regarding the brochure, please contact the financial and payment system office ( tel : + 81 - 3 - 3279 - 1111 [ x2954 ], fax : + 81 - 3 - 5255 - 6752 ) or the bank supervision department ( tel : + 81 - 3 - 3279 - 1111 [ x6442 ], fax : + 81 - 3 - 5255 - 6755 ), bank of japan, at 2 - 1 - 1, hongoku - cho, nihonbashi, chuo - ku, tokyo 103 - 8660, japan.

since the end of last year. with respect to monetary aggregates, growth in m2 + cds has been slowing and private bank lending remains sluggish. this reveals the fall in credit demand following stagnant economic conditions as well as the continued cautious lending attitudes of private banks. the bank ’ s view on recent economic and financial developments, determined by the policy board at the monetary policy meeting held on june 12, as the basis of monetary policy decisions. meanwhile, some firms, especially small and medium - sized firms, have been facing difficult financing conditions in terms of both funds availability and fund - raising costs. this influence on the overall economy continues to warrant a careful monitoring.
##ogenous risk ”, london school of economics, september 2002. • federal reserve bank of new york : “ new directions for understanding systemic risk ”, economic policy review, november 2007. • mandelbrot ( benoit ) and hudson ( richard ) : “ the ( mis ) behaviour of markets ”, basic books, 2004. • ubide ( angel ). “ anatomy of a modern financial crisis ”, bank of spain : financial stability review, no 14, april 2008.

##raged by economic agents so that they incorporate the same information about the real interest rate, then the difference between the conventional nominal rate and the real rate would provide, by factoring in an inflation risk premium, a measure of the expected inflation rate over the same period, known as the “ break - even inflation rate ”. now, if we had both nominal and indexed bonds across the whole maturity spectrum, up to, say, 30 years which is the maximum maturity at which inflation - indexed bonds are currently issued, then we would be able to pin down market expectations of inflation for all the forecast horizons, up to 30 years, as well as forecasts of inflation for each year up to the maximum maturity. so you can easily imagine the importance of such information for central banks, information which is, moreover, updated on a daily basis. our staff and also private forecasters are unable to routinely produce inflation forecasts in such a detail, at such a frequency and for such horizons! as far as the euro area is concerned, the reliability of both the inflation - indexed yield and the break - even inflation rate is strengthened by the significant development of the market for indexed bonds over the recent years, which accelerated further in 2003 with the arrival of two new government issuers : greece in march and italy in september. if we take into account the overall euro area inflation market, it is now the third biggest market in terms of market capitalisation, just behind the united states and the united kingdom. however, in 2003, it was not only the fastest growing market in terms see barr, d. g. and j. y. campbell ( 1996 ) : “ inflation, real interest rates and the bond market : a study of uk nominal and index - linket government bond prices ”, nber working paper, # 5821, november. of issuance but also the largest and most liquid inflation derivatives market, characterised by both the broadest range of products ( government bonds, agency bonds, inflation swaps, etc. ) and the largest number of frequent issuers ( france, italy, greece, cades, cna, etc. ). what has the eurosystem learned to date from inflation - indexed securities? first, since the inception of the euro, long - term expected inflation, i. e. the break - even inflation rate, as derived from the french oat indexed bond and the french oatei - indexed on the euro area hicp - has been broadly stable in a
policies in financial stability must be kept within realistic boundaries. while it is true that these instruments may have many possible advantages, we should not lose sight of the limitations that we still face. with more experience, additional empirical evidence and a better analytical foundation, we will be in a better position to evaluate their real potential. bis central bankers ’ speeches

javier guzman calafell : challenges for macroprudential policy and the mexican case remarks by mr javier guzman calafell, deputy governor of the bank of mexico, at the panel on “ macroprudential policies for securing financial stability in a volatile external liquidity environment ”, fifth summit meeting of central banks on inflation targeting, santiago de chile, 15 – 16 november 2013. * * * the views expressed in this document are strictly personal and do not necessarily coincide with those of banco de mexico. i wish to start by thanking governor vergara for his kind invitation to participate in this interesting conference. i will focus my remarks on some of the challenges faced by macroprudential policies at this stage, and on the mexican experience with these instruments, and more generally with policies aimed at preserving financial stability. 1. challenges for macroprudential policy financial stability has been at the center of policy makers ’ attention during the last five years. this is explained not only by the nature of the global financial crisis itself, but also by the side effects of the measures that have been put in place to overcome it. indeed, the unconventional monetary policies that were set in motion to face the crisis have allowed us to prevent a collapse of the world financial system and have rendered other beneficial effects. nevertheless, they have also given rise to a number of financial stability risks for the world economy, deriving to a large extent from the potential consequences of a prolonged period of extremely low interest rates in the advanced countries, and subsequently from the return to more normal monetary policies and interest rates in these nations. initially, one of the main concerns in emerging markets were related to the strong capital inflows to their economies fostered by these policies. more recently, with the expectation that the federal reserve of the united states may begin to reduce its monetary stimulus, anxiety has shifted to the implications of an increase in long - term interest rates in that country for emerging economies ’ exchange rates, domestic financial markets, and access to external financing. in any event, it is clear that the need to look for adequate instruments to preserve financial stability has become imperative after the crisis. one of the important lessons of the crisis is that price stability is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for maintaining financial stability. given the limitations that monetary policy faces in this respect, there is overall agreement that it is indispensable to complement available instruments with others which are more direct, and with a systemic perspective on the financial system. thus, macro
weakness largely reflects anemic foreign demand – this is the weakest post - war u. s. recovery. but it is being compounded by a longer - term trend : our share of world exports has been in decline for more than a decade. since 2000, canada ’ s share has fallen from about 4. 5 per cent to about 2. 5 per cent. 1 part of this decline is the inevitable consequence of the entry of china into global markets. but even allowing for this, canada has fared poorly. our loss of global trade share has been the second largest in the g - 20. d. de munnik, j. jacob, and w. sze, “ the evolution of canada ’ s global export market share, ” working paper no. 2012 - 31, bank of canada, october 2012. bis central bankers ’ speeches following the financial crisis, the bank ’ s strategy for monetary policy was to support domestic demand while the recovery in exports took hold. the first part of the strategy worked. final domestic demand recovered quickly in canada. but a side effect has been the emergence of imbalances in the household sector, reflected in rising household leverage, stretched valuations in a number of housing markets, and an increase in the incidence of highly indebted households. today, there is a more constructive evolution of those household imbalances. this is good news. it reduces the risk of an abrupt and painful correction down the road. but this new - found and welcome household prudence is dampening growth. to replace this growth, we need a rotation in demand toward exports and business investment. unfortunately, this rotation has proven elusive. this is consequential – growth in canada has slowed. in the year leading up to this past june, growth averaged only 1. 4 per cent, compared to 2. 6 per cent the year before. with canada ’ s potential output estimated to be growing at about 2 per cent, growth in demand has not kept pace with the expansion in production capacity, and economic slack has increased. to absorb the current material degree of slack in the economy, demand needs to grow measurably faster than supply. that means growth of at least 2½ per cent. the bank is currently revising its forecast, and we will publish our latest outlook in our october monetary policy report. but in broad strokes, we expect household and government spending together to contribute about 1½ percentage points of growth. so to reach at least 2½

have experienced plunges in the markets for our goods. we recovered by developing new goods and services and entering new markets. there can be no doubt that we have the entrepreneurial spirit, the skills, the educated work force and the expertise to compete successfully in the global marketplace. but that does not make it easy. bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches