samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
7d2a7eb68a2bcb39 / cmu + reboot + informal + ecofin + final + issues + note + 2019 – 09 – 09 _ s4. pdf ) and the next cmu high - level group ( joint initiative between finance ministers of germany, france and netherlands : minefi. hosting. augure. com / augure _ minefi / r / contenuenligne / download? id = 7aefaf36 – 7449 – 471f - b86f08e8b9e1ce71 & filename = 1470 % 20 % 20savings % 20and % 20sustainable % 20investment % 20union % 20joint % 20press % 20release % 20 ( 004 ). pdf e www. economie. gouv. fr / files / 2019 – 10 / the _ next _ cmu _ hl _ do. pdf ). 6 costa, c. ( 2010 ), address on the occasion of his taking office as governor of banco de portugal, 7 june, available at : www. bportugal. pt / en / intervencoes / address - mr - carlos - costa - occasion - his - taking - office - governorbanco - de - portugal. see www. bankingsupervision. europa. eu / ecb / pub / pdf / ssm. srep _ methodology _ booklet _ 2018 ~ b0e30ced94. en. pdf p. 9. 4 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches

the need to restore the public's faith in the foreign exchange market and the value of the global code in assisting that process and also in helping improve market functioning and confidence in the market. 1 see www. bis. org / mktc / fxwg / gc _ may16. pdf. 2 see www. bis. org / press / p150511. htm. 3 see www. bis. org / mktc / fxwg / am _ may16. pdf. see also c salmon ( 2016 ), ‘ rebuilding trust through the “ fx global code ” : reasons for optimism ’, available at www. bankofengland. co. uk / publications / documents / speeches / 2016 / speech924. pdf, speech given at the aci uk square mile debate, london, 7 september ; and s potter ( 2016 ), ‘ the role of best practices in supporting market integrity and effectiveness ’, available at www. newyorkfed. org / newsevents / speeches / 2016 / pot160907, remarks at the 2016 primary dealers meeting, federal reserve bank of new york, new york city, 7 september. 4 see afxc. rba. gov. au / news / afxc - 26052016. html. 5 see www. bis. org / press / p160526a. htm. 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches
“ the impact of sovereign credit risk on bank funding conditions ”, bis, cgfs papers, no. 43. lanotte, m., g. manzelli, a. m. rinaldi, m. taboga and p. tommasino ( 2016 ), “ easier said than done? reforming the prudential treatment of banks ’ sovereign exposures ”, banca d ’ italia, questioni di economia e finanza ( occasional papers ), 326. angelini p., g. grande and f. panetta ( 2014 ), “ the negative feedback loop between banks and sovereigns ”, questioni di economia e finanza ( occasional papers ), 213, banca d ’ italia. bis central bankers ’ speeches markets are prone to self - fulfilling crises : if investors believe a sovereign faces fiscal problems, required yields will be higher, which can exacerbate, or even create, the fiscal problems. 9 probably the clearest recent example of this pattern is the surge in “ redenomination risk ” in the euro area, connected with undue fears of a break - up of the monetary union. to the extent that banks act as contrarian investors ( selling assets when markets overheat and buying when they are excessively bearish ), purchases of sovereign debt when the sovereign experiences difficulties notwithstanding relatively solid economic fundamentals are actually beneficial to financial stability. there is clear evidence that domestic investors played such contrarian role during the eu sovereign debt crisis, buying sovereign bonds as foreign investors were fleeing ( fig. 2 again for the italian case ; similar patterns have been documented for spain ). 10 imposing risk weights or setting large exposure limits on domestic sovereign exposures would impair this shock - absorption ability. exposure limits, in particular, could act as a coordinating device for speculative attacks. since a change in banking regulation would likely herald a similar change in other parts of the financial system ( most notably the insurance sector ), the entire domestic financial sector could be affected. finally, a system which differentiates the risk weights according to the sovereign ’ s credit risk could end up relying upon ratings issued by the credit rating agencies ( cra ). even advocates of a change in the prudential treatment of sovereign exposures admit that credit ratings of sovereigns have serious shortcomings. in particular, they tend to be backwardlooking and to foster herd behaviour. as such, they could exacerbate pro - cyclic

have taken place since our meeting in lima to fruition. with these goals in mind, we recognize that negotiations have been intense and complex, and represent a valuable effort by all parties, including management. in the spirit of compromise, we are prepared to join the emerging consensus and to ensure the world bank group remain fully legitimate vis - a - vis its diverse stakeholders.
the great pleasure together with dr. farouk el okdah, governor of the central bank of egypt to host tomorrow, 27 november, in alexandria a high level euromediterranean seminar, brining together eurosystem and mediterranean central banks. i look very much forward to the seminar, which is a very useful platform for discussions and exchanges of views with our friends and colleagues from mediterranean central banks on issues of mutual interest from a central banking perspective.

jean - claude trichet : interview with al - ahram interview with mr jean - claude trichet, president of the european central bank. questions answered in writing in response to ms inas nour of the egyptian newspaper, al - ahram, on 24 november 2008. * * * question : ten years have passed since the establishment of the european central bank and next january, we will celebrate a decade since the launch of the euro. how do you evaluate both experiences? are they factors of stability within the european union market? trichet : indeed, the european central bank – the ecb – as well as the european system of central banks, which comprises the ecb and the central banks of all the eu's member states, were established on 1 june 1998. the euro was introduced first on 1 january 1999, while the euro banknotes and coins were put into circulation on 1 january 2002. as you may remember, the euro area first comprised 11 member states, then 12, 13, and currently 15. it will comprise 16 countries as of 1st january 2009, when slovakia will join the euro area. the ecb ’ s governing council is presently taking monetary policy decisions for 320 million fellow citizens and as of next year for 325. 5 million. the primary objective of the ecb and the national central banks of the euro area, which together form the eurosystem, is to maintain price stability in the euro area over the mediumterm. concretely, the ecb aims at maintaining inflation rates below, but close to, 2 % over the medium term. we have been able to broadly achieve this objective since the creation of the euro. this record compares favourably with the average inflation rate of 3 % that was achieved in the member countries during the nine years preceding the introduction of the euro. therefore, the euro enjoys that same level of stability and credibility as the most successful legacy currencies that it replaced. nevertheless, there is no place for complacency. the success achieved so far needs to be complemented and consolidated. question : do you think that the euro pays a stability factor in the world economy? trichet : the euro which will be ten years old next january, has rapidly achieved a wellrecognised status worldwide as a stable anchor also in turbulent times. this certainly is of utmost importance in the current circumstances. question : do you see a united european role in the global financial crisis, especially between members of the euro zone and non - members
gov. rafael buenaventura. but it was during gov. amando tetangco's 12 - year term, from 2005a€ “ 2017, that key reforms to the central bank's inflation - targeting regime were implemented and put in place. 2 mbm bruce tolentino was not present during the event. 4 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches

also in the light of the recent financial turbulence : deposit insurance and management of liquidity risk. banks are typically among the financial intermediaries which, on the one hand, have liquid liabilities and, on the other hand, illiquid assets. transformation of liquidity is part of their raison d ’ etre. however, it is also the basis of their vulnerability. doubts felt by creditors, particularly by depositors, about the quality of the bank ’ s assets ( whether justified or not ), can lead to a hasty withdrawal of the liquid liabilities of the bank and therefore to its insolvency ( bank run ). in order to prevent this scenario, the authorities have provided for liquidity requirements ( ex ante ) and deposit insurance schemes ( ex post ). the latter also have, if not above all, a consumer protection function. in europe deposit insurance schemes are still very diverse. the relevant directive only calls for minimal harmonisation. 9 such diversity can complicate the resolution of crises. it has to be noted, however, that there are no harmonised procedures to follow in the case of a banking crisis. in some countries the general law is applied to insolvency and there are no specific procedures for the failure of a banking enterprise as such ; while in others countries ( such as ours ) there are appropriate procedures. the european commission is studying a review of the directive on the reorganisation and winding up of credit institutions. 10 it is interesting to note how the funding difficulties of the british bank northern rock have forced the uk treasury, the bank of england and the financial services authority to review some fundamental aspects of the regulatory framework for managing banking crises. as mervyn king, governor of the bank of england, has also observed, the northern rock crisis has highlighted the need to reform the system of banking supervision in order to include ( i ) a special insolvency regime for banks, ( ii ) a credible deposit insurance scheme with sufficient cover able to refund depositors quickly. these remarks may be useful for reflection at community level. another example of the impact of the legislative divergence on financial stability concerns legislation on liquidity risks, which is not harmonised at european level and is applied nonuniformly to cross - border bank groups internally, at the very time when banking activity, in terms of stability and profitability, depends increasingly on the flow of liquid financial instruments between the various countries. the legislative discrepancy prevents an efficient cross
johannes beermann : cash in times of turmoil welcome remarks by dr johannes beermann, member of the executive board of the deutsche bundesbank, at the fifth international cash conference 2021, virtual, 15 june 2021. * * * 1 introduction ladies and gentlemen, it is a great pleasure to welcome you all to this year ’ s international cash conference. connecting speakers across time zones and locations to discuss the future of cash via webcam – i believe that, in the eyes of some observers, this already reflects the “ new normal ” in a postcovid world. that said, i am sure many of us also have a sense that something is lacking today. deep dives between conference sessions, or even just random encounters – which can be especially important for young researchers eager to network –, are not quite the same when events like this take place digitally. however, there is light at the end of the tunnel, and it is getting brighter. current infection rates in germany allow for some limited face - to - face interaction. that is why i am particularly looking forward to debating the future of cash later this afternoon in person, and i would like to take this opportunity to welcome my fellow panellists, peter bofinger and franz seitz here in frankfurt. please also allow me to thank all my colleagues from cash management and communications who have helped organise this event. it is particularly encouraging to see that it has also been possible to include these “ hybrid elements ” at this year ’ s conference. i say “ hybrid ” because the majority of the sessions in the coming days will of course be held online. let me say a big thank you to all the speakers for their flexibility in connecting from various locations to make this year ’ s conference as fruitful as possible. and may i extend a particularly warm welcome to our keynote speakers over the coming days : fabio panetta, viviana zelizer and brett scott. i am impressed by the range of contributions that form the backbone of this year ’ s conference. research on aspects such as cash usage, the drivers of cash demand, and the implications for the cash cycle is arguably becoming increasingly relevant. as the title of this year ’ s conference suggests, cash is going through times of turmoil. what role can cash play in the post - covid world? to kick off the debate, i would like to share a few brief reflections upfront. first, i would like to look at the role of cash in the ongoing crisis. second, looking ahead, i

term scarring effects of the pandemic and ensure a robust growth 3 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches trajectory for the economy. thank you for your attention. 4 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches
co - operation and operational involvement of central banks in order to allow the potential synergies between central banking and prudential supervision to be exploited. central banks ’ knowledge of the overall economy and financial system, and their information from payment and settlement systems and monetary policy operations, are valuable for the performance of the supervisory tasks. conversely, for central banks, supervisory information can play an important role in the oversight of payment and settlement systems and of market infrastructures, and in managing liquidity crises. strong comments have been made against this view. the most often used arguments against central bank involvement in supervision have been the increasing importance of financial conglomerates and the blurring of the distinction between the three segments of the financial sector. these developments would call for the establishment of a single financial supervisor which should not be the central bank – the argument runs – since this would worsen conflicts - of - interest between central banking and prudential supervision and would lead to a concentration of power. in my view, one should not be too dogmatic about these arguments. situations in which such conflicts of interest would arise are very rare in practice and central banks, like all other public bodies, are subject to accountability procedures. in any case, these concerns are dispelled in the euro area setting by the fact that decision - making takes place at different levels : euro area - wide for monetary policy, national for prudential supervision. the arguments for keeping central banks closely involved in prudential supervision are even reinforced in the context of monetary union. more integrated financial markets can absorb shocks more easily than in the past, which is a very beneficial outcome. however, if shocks do occur, they are likely to have a wider impact across borders through wholesale banking and capital market links – or through payment and settlement systems. thus, the contribution of the eurosystem to monitoring vulnerabilities in the financial system on a euro area - wide basis will be greater if the central banks are extensively involved in prudential supervision. let me move on to the european debate. the economic and financial committee has already assessed the adequacy of the existing arrangements for prudential supervision and the safeguarding of financial stability in the european union in the two reports produced under the chairmanship of henk brouwer from de nederlandsche bank. i wish to congratulate him on these important achievements. the outcome of this analysis was that the current institutional system based on national responsibility is appropriate, but there is a need

least temporarily. however, if we are able to boost our investment in people, ideas, and processes, as well as in machines, the economy can readily adapt to change and support everrising standards of living for all americans.
impact on the rest of the world. and it means that asia will need to prepare for a future in which it relies more on the strength of growth at home rather than on the strength of growth in the rest of the world. as asia makes further progress in financial reform and toward more flexible exchange rate regimes, it will be in a better position both to deal with the inevitable challenges that come with economic and financial integration, and to make the necessary transition to stronger domestic demand led - growth, which will prove a more sustainable foundation for future improvements in living standards. thank you.

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, 20 january 2022. 9. goldfayn - frank, o. and j. wohlfart ( 2020 ), expectation formation in a new environment : evidence from the german reunification, journal of monetary economics, vol. 115, pp. 301 - 320. 10. d ’ acunto, f., u. malmendier and m. weber, what do the data tell us about inflation expectations?, nber ( national bureau of economic research ) working papers, no. 29825, march 2022. 11. rogoff, k. s., the age of inflation, foreign affairs, november / december 2022. 12. schnabel, i., monetary policy and the great volatility, speech at the jackson hole economic policy symposium organised by the federal reserve bank of kansas city, 27 august 2022. 13. blinder, a. s. ( 2000 ), central bank credibility : why do we care? how do we build it?, american economic review, vol. 90 ( 5 ), pp. 1421 - 1431.

short, you are bringing with you the skills needed at the helm of the bundesbank. you are, without doubt, the right person to take on the challenges facing the president of the bundesbank. i wish you and the bundesbank all the very best! thank you very much for your attention. 1 weidmann, j., ansprache zur offiziellen einfuhrung in das amt des bundesbankprasidenten, speech of 2 may 2011. 2 weidmann, j., crises as a catalyst for change – lessons from the past, challenges for the future, speech delivered on 19 november 2021. 3 schlesinger, h., eine europaische wahrung muß genauso stabil sein wie die d - mark, handelsblatt, 31 december 1991. 4 issing, o., central banks – independent or almighty?, safe policy letter no 92, november 2021. 4 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches 5 barro, r. j., a matter of demeanor, wall street journal, 20 may 1994. 5 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches
host of not only the first ever conference on climate risks and supervision, but also the first ever conference of the central banks and supervisors network for greening the financial system. we hope and are convinced it won ’ t be the last.

core transaction details of all otc derivatives are kept and stored by trade repositories all using the same high - quality data model, the reporting burden will not just cease to grow ; it will even decrease, as the trdata may then serve various regulators. and we, as fsb, will be able to ascertain precisely which transactions have taken place, and how exactly they should be aggregated, which now can still be ‘ a bit of problem ’. we can only measure the size of a global market if we use a uniform measuring method everywhere, thus ruling out the risk of double - counting owing to a lack of unique numbering or overlapping product definitions. it being a foregone conclusion that further use of bad data quality will only add to the regulatory reporting burden, we must lose no time and join forces, not only to enhance the quality of the data used in the trade reporting, but also to ensure they are globally consistent. and that is why you are here today! this is where you come in! for uti is a critical data element in making the global otc derivatives markets transparent. for this reason it is vital that you, the regulators and private sector representatives gathered in this room, are going to pay particular attention today to the governance aspects of the uti. as you will no doubt be aware, work on the governance of the uti is already underway. last month, the fsb launched a consultation on proposed governance arrangements for the uti. later this year, similar proposals for the unique product identifier will be put out for consultation. but, welcome as this development may be, i would add that the proposed arrangements should be considered with great care. for, as probably no one knows better than you, the world of hedging and related derivatives is changing continuously. governance mechanisms must therefore be designed to ensure that the reporting framework can cope with those changes in order maintain a high data quality level. i hope that with this caveat in the back of your minds, you will collaborate successfully in today ’ s workshop. and that you will do so in the knowledge that the fruit of your efforts will be for the benefit of both the private and public sectors, both authorities and counterparties, if only by helping to reduce the reporting burden. as a member of the fsb, i would like to thank you in advance for your effort to make our work easier and – possibly – more effective! thank you.
area as a whole from 2012, or for the larger member countries. this is particularly surprising because forecasters did take into account the fall in economic activity in most euro area countries after 2011, which generated significant gaps between actual and potential output. the ecb has not been alone in over - predicting euro area inflation. the imf, ecb survey of professional forecasters ( spf ), consensus economics, euro zone barometer, oecd and european commission have also systematically overpredicted both headline and core inflation at all horizons, especially since the second quarter of 2012. bis central bankers ’ speeches figure 3 however, as policy makers we need more than just good inflation forecasts : we also need to understand the inflation process in order to better assess the role of monetary policy. we also need to be able to explain our reasoning to the public, as the management of expectations has become such an important monetary policy instrument. this is one more reason for continuing to use the phillips curve as a tool to discuss inflation dynamics. the current attention to the relationship between inflation and economic slack has led to an intense debate on the stability of the phillips curve and its power to explain the twin puzzle. empirical research, especially in the united states, shows that the slope of the phillips curve has varied over time, with a clear tendency to flatten over the years. for the euro area, the evidence from several recent papers points to a steepening in recent years ( see e. g. oinonen and paloviita ( 2014 ), riggi and venditti ( 2015 ) and foroni and porqueddu ( 2015 ) ). this development is especially marked in those countries which experienced deeper and longer recessions and made greater efforts to reform their product and labour markets, with an impact on nominal rigidities ( see, for italy, riggi and santoro ( 2015 ) and, to a lesser extent, for spain, banco de espana ( 2013 and 2015 ). when analysing the excessive disinflation in the euro area since 2012, natural questions arise as to whether we are facing a new regime of low inflation ( e. g. due to demographics, integration of low - cost countries in global trade, less powerful trade unions, dominance of a service economy ), and whether the phillips curve ( and “ which ” phillips curve ) is still an appropriate framework of analysis. a number of technical issues pertaining to the phillips curve have not yet been settled in the literature.

is a source of vulnerability for europe's banking sector. if the banking union had been complete, the recent contagion from the united states and switzerland to the eu financial system would have been far more muted. the lack of a complete banking union is still a very wide gap in the eu's institutional framework. thank you for your attention. 4 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches