in placing sale and buy trade orders. iv. cash settlement of all trades through this system will take place through the kenya electronic payment and settlement system ( kepss ) also known as real time gross settlement ( rtgs ) domiciled at the central bank of kenya. v. the trading process will be premised on a delivery versus payment ( dvp ) arrangement. vi. transactions settlement cycle will be at t + 3, but parties can opt to shorten this period. it is our sincere hope and expectation that the roll out of automated trading for treasury bonds, together with the recent automation of corporate bond trading, will mark the turning point for trading of fixed income securities at the bourse. this also comes at a time when re - opening of benchmark bonds has been very successful, creating adequate liquidity around each bond. this fits in very well with the roadmap for capital markets development as envisaged in vision 2030. 4. recent trading developments i am pleased to note that since the roll out of this new system on 27th november, 2009, the market has witnessed renewed interest and enthusiasm from bond traders. as of today, we have recorded 11 completed trades totaling kes. 1. 72 billion and 16 trades totaling to kes. 2. 235 billion are at various stages of processing. as we successfully move away from the manual / open outcry method of trading in treasury bonds to the new system, we expect to see more activity in this segment of the market. we trust that market players will carry out their functions professionally, observing the highest standards of integrity and transparency so that the investing public can reap full benefits arising from the same. we at the central bank will continue to review the operations of the system and related processes to ensure that it meets the expectations of investors and conforms to best practice in the market. 5. appreciation finally, may i take this opportunity to thank all stakeholders and members of the ats technical committee for working tirelessly to ensure that the project succeeds. thank you all for your attention.

tonnes of gold on its balance sheet. at that time, the snb ’ s gold stock represented 30 % of u. s. gold reserves. in relative terms, switzerland ’ s position was extreme among the g10 countries. as you can see in figures 1 and 2, switzerland held more than five times the amount of gold on a per capita basis than the second - ranked netherlands. similarly, its gold holdings as a proportion to imports also far exceeded those of any other g10 country. in light of this extreme position, it is legitimate to ask why the issue of gold sales did not arise much earlier in switzerland. for one thing, public opinion in switzerland generally held gold in high esteem as a symbol of monetary stability. more importantly, however, a reduction in the gold stock required a fundamental reform of the legal framework of the swiss monetary system. the process leading up to this reform was lengthy and complex. as you know, switzerland is proud of its political system of direct democracy and consensual government. on the whole, these traditions have served the country well. comprehensive legal reforms, however, often require substantially more time than in other democratic traditions. despite the fact that switzerland had been under a flexible exchange rate regime since the breakdown of bretton woods, the swiss franc remained legally linked to gold. for practical reasons, this legal link of the swiss franc to gold had lost its monetary policy relevance. nonetheless, it prevented the swiss national bank from buying or selling gold at any other price than the official parity of chf 4 ’ 595 per kg. in the late 1990s, this parity was three times lower than the price of gold in the open market. the official parity also determined the valuation of the gold stock on the snb ’ s balance sheet. in order to eliminate these residual relics of the gold standard and enable a change in the snb ’ s gold policy, the swiss constitution as well as the coinage act needed to be amended first. whereas during the 1980s and the early 1990s, the political climate did not permit such constitutional and legal amendments, the situation finally evolved in the late 1990s. the deterioration of switzerland ’ s public finances led to a growing awareness of the opportunity costs of maintaining the existing structure of the snb ’ s assets. the vast gold holdings increasingly gave rise to concern in the context of bearish market sentiments and of gold sales by other central banks. in november 1997, a partial revision of the swiss national bank law increased the