assess how our earlier decisions have been influencing monetary conditions, aggregate demand, and inflation. we will also consider how quickly supply - side constraints have been weakening and, accordingly, what level of the key rate is needed to bring inflation back to the target. according to our revised forecast, the average key rate next year will equal 6. 0 – 7. 0 % per annum. further on, as inflation expectations go down and inflation decelerates, the key rate will return to its long - term neutral range. we still estimate this neutral range to be at 5 – 6 %, provided that inflation is close to the bank of russia ’ s target of 4 %. thank you all for your attention. 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches

a series of steps, totalling 1. 75 percentage points, to 6. 5 per cent. the setbacks were not long in coming. last year the value of the nasdaq exchange was virtually halved. profit warnings have been pouring in, firms are shedding labour, banks have tightened their lending, consumer confidence is weakening and unemployment is tending to rise. manufacturing output has virtually stopped growing. in the course of a month the federal reserve has lowered the interest rate 1 percentage point to 5. 5 per cent and market agents are counting on further cuts this spring. we now have to consider what is actually happening. is this just a temporary correction after a period of undue optimism that has led, for example, to surplus investment and will now be followed by a fairly mild and gradual slowdown? or has the major long - term and painful correction of the imbalances in the u. s. economy now begun in earnest? after some months of unpredictable data, even the most experienced and qualified observers find it difficult to say anything definite. so let me outline three conceivable paths — one optimistic, another less so, a third pessimistic — and then discuss them. three scenarios the optimistic scenario — the v the alternative most observers, particularly in the united states, believe in just now is that the fall in the united states is an unpleasant but innocuous ‘ air pocket ’ in the flight path of the american economy ’ s soft - landing to lower growth rates. the air pocket is attributed to a temporary output surplus, so that unduly large stocks and rather too much it investment have to be adjusted downwards during one or, at most, two quarters. the profile of this development is commonly described as a capital v ; consumption and investment slacken initially and then pick up again, bringing growth back up to its presumed potential rate of around 3 to 4 per cent. underlying this version is the recent years ’ exceptional technology - driven improvement in productivity, which helps to inject new life into the optimistic mood. the concern generated by the correction is brushed away by the active monetary policy and the promise of massive tax cuts in the coming years. the optimists set great store by it ’ s impact on growth and productivity, as well as by a quick improvement in expected profits. the less optimistic scenario — the u some observers see a risk of the upturn occurring more slowly than the v scenario assumes. they see a path that instead resembles a capital u,