yves mersch : shaping the future of europe ’ s financial market infrastructure opening remarks by mr yves mersch, member of the executive board of the european central bank, at the information session on the consultative report on rtgs services, frankfurt am main, 22 march 2016. * * * introduction in my opening remarks i want to address three issues. first, i will set out the main drivers of change that have been shaping europe ’ s financial market infrastructure in general and the rtgs system in particular. second, i will address the consequences of these drivers for change that the eurosystem will have to tackle in its roles as operator, overseer and catalyst. and third, i will present the eurosystem ’ s concept for evolving its market infrastructure beyond 2020. 1. key drivers of change in europe ’ s financial market infrastructure change in europe ’ s financial market infrastructure landscape has been driven by two big objectives : integration and increasing efficiency. with the advent of the euro as a common currency, integration was at the heart of the eurosystem ’ s strategy for building its rtgs system and the correspondent central banking model ( ccbm ) in the 1990s. the elimination of differences between national and cross - border retail payments in euro was a key ambition behind the creation of the single euro payments area ( sepa ). last but not least, t2s, the single pan - european platform for securities settlement in central bank money, has consolidated the most fundamental part of the securities value chain : settlement. we are now seeing market consolidation in trading and clearing as well. in parallel to the efforts to move towards an integrated market infrastructure, the eurosystem has taken steps to increase the efficiency of its market infrastructure. this has been facilitated by technological progress and innovation. at the same time, we have to take into account that digitalisation and the social diffusion of real - time information and communication has fundamentally changed end user expectations. access to and use of financial services anytime, anywhere, via multiple devices / access channels is taken for granted now. this not only has consequences for the service layer, but also for the underlying clearing and settlement layers. a further impact on certain functionalities within the market infrastructure may be expected from distributed ledger technologies ( dlts ). we are committed to analysing whether these technologies could lead to lower costs and a more resilient market infrastructure. but we also have to consider how they may affect financial intermediation in general, the role of banks and other market participants

in parallel to the institutional debate and the positions taken by academics, commentators and politicians, all the official documentation drawn up during that time, from the constitution to the treaty of lisbon, underlines the political will to grant a strong independent status to the ecb and the national central banks ( ncbs ). the points of view expressed are solely those of the author. i would like to thank nicola de giorgi, fabio recine, inigo arruga oleaga and livio stracca for their comments. see louis ( 1995 ), banking supervision in the european community : institutional aspects, editions de l ’ universite de bruxelles ( brussels ) ; and t. padoa schioppa ( 2004 ), regulating finance : balancing freedom and risk, oxford, p. 75. the treaty of lisbon strengthens the ecb ’ s position in several ways : i ) it establishes the principle according to which the ecb is independent in the exercise of its powers ; ii ) explicit reference is made to the financial independence of the ecb ; iii ) the primacy of the objective of price stability for the eurosystem, which is included as one of the union ’ s objectives, is confirmed, together with the ( new ) objective for an “ economic and monetary union, whose currency is the euro ” ; iv ) the ecb is recognised as an institution of the european union, joining the council of the european union, the european commission and the european parliament, even though it has legal personality. it can sometimes seem as through central banks are obsessed with the question of independence, which, now that it has been laid down in the treaty, would appear to have been achieved. yet, it is surprising how often, ten years after the start of economic and monetary union, measures continue to be proposed at national level that in some way or another threaten the independence of the central banks, in particular, with respect to their functional, institutional, personal and financial independence. 3 i refer to two very recent examples, concerning two countries – italy and germany – where draft legislation introduces measures that risk contravening the principle of independence established in the treaty. in italy, the 2008 financial law, which was approved by the parliament on 24 december 2007, provides for measures to reform the banca d ’ italia aimed at reviewing “ in a general manner [ its ] means of financing, expenditure control, and payment of salaries and emoluments ”. these provisions do not take into account