a security feature designs that represent gold medals around the necks of each player depicted on the note are revealed, as well as a set of goal posts with a try being converted. there are also play - elements that depict how two of the winning tries were master - minded and scored. in addition, there are design elements which are very sharp and lifelike and which portray an inspirational player on the front, elated and happy on his way to scoring a try, with our fiji flag in the background. i am told that this iconic image is the favourite of the player being depicted. it is a true trait of fijian rugby players that when they are happy, they play their hearts out and there ’ s no stopping them. we saw that in rio and again in hong kong just recently! there are elements of design that shows the coach and mentor in very pensive thought mode, no doubt thinking of the battles ahead. we have also broken away from the traditional watermark of an i - taukei warrior as seen on our regular circulation banknotes. instead, as a watermark we have included a player from the olympic gold medal winning team who is a warrior himself. the watermark is oval shaped to depict a rugby ball in motion. the serial numbers are also laid out in a unique manner – one set in horizontal and one set in vertical format. all serial numbers have their prefix as au, the chemical symbol for gold. there is also a 2 millimeter security thread with words dedicated to our gold olympians. the colours of the banknote are vibrant and sharp and match our noble banner blue with a hint of gold on the numerals. and then there are elements of fijian masi designs to complete the reserve bank of fiji aesthetics. such has been the level of intricate detail on this special banknote and we thank oberthur fiduciaire for the great work they did in taking our ideas and raw images and expanding on them to produce what you will see shortly. from what i have described i am sure you have painted your own picture of what will be unveiled shortly. the coins have also been engraved remarkably well considering the small surface area we had to work with. included on the obverse is the denomination, coat of arms and issuing year. the main design is that of a visionary mentor and coach in a backdrop training ground considered one of the toughest to endure. on the reverse is an image of our 7s heroes bonded as a team. the coin has been

in general. neither is it entirely clear how the optimal indicator of underlying inflation should be constructed. whichever alternative one chooses, it is essential in my opinion that the central bank be prepared to contribute to as open a discussion as possible, so that its ambition of achieving and maintaining price stability is not lost sight of and the public ’ s ability to hold the central bank responsible for the conduct of monetary policy is not weakened. another issue is the choice of a targeting horizon for the monetary policy. this relates to the trade - off between output volatility and inflation volatility. as it stands this sentence is correct but very difficult to understand. a short horizon for inflation targeting, say keeping inflation at the target level from quarter to quarter, yields a very stable inflation rate. in order to maintain this target, however, the central bank must make drastic adjustments to the instrumental rate and this causes a high degree of variability in real economic activity. a long target horizon may well imply greater variability in the inflation rate but would allow for more gradual interest rate adjustments and smaller real economic fluctuations. in our approach the normal target horizon is set at between one and two years. a third issue is the degree of transparency. it is widely agreed that transparency is not merely compatible with an inflation target regime but actually essential if the regime is to function properly. for one thing, the central bank must be accountable for its conduct of monetary policy. this is a question of monetary policy ’ s basic legitimacy, which is important not least when the central bank operates independently. for another, the actual implementation of monetary policy needs to be as predictable as possible. would maximum transparency be preferable? is there really any point at which a line should be drawn or would it be more reasonable to try to identify a certain minimum level of transparency? should the minutes of monetary policy meetings and the voting be published? would it even be right to allow the central bank ’ s monetary policy meetings to be shown on television? for my part, it seems reasonable to publish relatively detailed minutes of monetary policy meetings without revealing exactly who said what at which stage in the discussion. it is, after all, important that discussion during the meetings is open and unprejudiced, so that the participants can listen to their colleagues ’ arguments, change their minds in the course of a meeting and accept joint responsibility for the decisions that are made. at the same time, it is important that each individual is responsible for arguing for his or her position. i can also