samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
very reluctant to take. the period after the second world war during which debt management imposed requirements upon monetary policy was marked by strains between the treasury and the fed and less than full independence for monetary policy. while current institutional arrangements may be imperfect, history suggests a need for caution before allowing these two policies to become entangled once again. thanks again, and i look forward to our conversation. bis central bankers ’ speeches

bank of canada last observation : 2022q2 against this backdrop, a lot of discussion involves what monetary policy should do to minimize the risk that inflation expectations will drift persistently above our target. this is a process known as “ de - anchoring, ” and it can be associated with the self - fulfilling wage - price spirals that i warned against in my last speech. 7 to avoid this and bring inflation sustainably back to target, some have suggested that policy - makers may need to engineer a substantial slowdown — or even a recession. 7 see p. beaudry, “ economic progress report : navigating a high inflation environment ” ( speech to gatineau chamber of commerce, gatineau, quebec, june 2, 2022 ). - 9i want to address these concerns. the best strategy for responding to high inflation — and, most importantly, for avoiding de - anchoring — depends partly on how people form their inflation expectations. so let me start with two very different theories of expectation formation and what they mean for the disinflation process. the first theory assumes that inflation expectations are backward - looking — or what economists call “ adaptive. ” this means that households and businesses base their inflation expectations on past inflation, without trying to forecast how the future might differ from the past. essentially, this theory says that people don ’ t believe anything the central bank may say about inflation until they ’ ve seen it for themselves. an adaptive - expectations view implies that when inflation is high, inflation expectations will drift up, and central banks can ’ t rely on simple communication about future policy to bring them back down. instead, policy - makers must engineer a period of sufficient economic slack so that inflation falls, and these lower inflation outcomes then feed back into lower expectations over time. researchers sometimes liken this to a process of earning credibility. this is because what eventually brings realized and expected inflation sustainably back to target is policy - makers showing that they ’ re willing to tolerate a sizable downturn to get there. the second theory is the polar opposite — that expectations are what economists call “ rational. ” this theory assumes that firms and households are forwardlooking and understand the economy and how monetary policy affects it. in particular, businesses and households are assumed to be capable of the mental gymnastics needed to process incoming data and assess their likely implications for future outcomes. under this rational - expectations view, people ’ s understanding that appropriate policy choices will eventually bring inflation back to target
change will force business and government to continuously reevaluate previously held assumptions and adapt to change. there is no static, optimum model either for financial service providers or for financial regulators, as both are engaged in a continuously evolving process. i am optimistic that recent financial reforms and continuing innovations will translate into more useful financial products and services to a broader spectrum of consumers and businesses and, in turn, fuller participation by all segments of our society in the kind of economic progress we have experienced to date.

- term standard was questioned, as it was argued that a higher level of mismatch between assets and liabilities is necessary for banks to fulfil their intermediation role in the economy. the ecb has a particular interest on the basel committee proposal on liquidity risk as it relates to the implementation of monetary policy, has an impact on the money market, as well as possible consequences on the financial integration in the euro area. clearly the proposed liquidity standards address the major shortcomings identified by the financial crisis in the area of liquidity risk by requiring banks to increase their holdings of liquid assets and to reduce their reliance on short - term volatile funding sources. furthermore, enhancing the liquidity risk management of banks could have a positive impact on market confidence, reducing thus the volatility in money and capital markets. still the calibration of the proposed liquidity standards needs to be revisited to take into account the comments received during the public consultation and their impact on the banking sector, financial markets and the overall economy. finally, the establishment of an appropriate phase - in period that will allow banks to adjust their balance sheets without an undue impact on their operations or an increase in their reliance on central bank funding is warranted. conclusions i would like to close my remarks by the rather pessimistic conclusion that, unfortunately, it appears that periods of “ irrational exuberance ” can lead us to forget well established practices on how to prudently manage risks. financial crises like the current one remind us of their importance. also central banks have learned valuable lessons in their own risk management and have made steps in solidifying their defences, while remaining faithful to their objectives of ensuring price stability while also safeguarding financial stability. thank you very much for your attention.
central bankers'speeches and finally, i'd like to congratulate the department of finance on its own centenary this year. 3 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches

patrick honohan : financial regulation – risk and reward address by mr patrick honohan, governor of the central bank of ireland, at the international financial services summit 2010, dublin, 10 november 2010. * * * the topic of this morning ’ s session fits nicely with what i want to say about the way forward for the irish banks. to the extent that the global banking and wider financial market collapse of late 2008 reflected both a sharp upward revision in market estimates of risk, combined with a sharp downward movement in risk appetite, it is not surprising that the global regulatory response has been in the direction of seeking to shift risk to where such reassessments and changing appetites can do less damage. that entails de - risking the banking sector ( as well as widening the scope of prudential regulation at least to some extent ). i like to list the main sources of social risk from banking as credit, liquidity and complexity risk, as well as the constant tension of misalignment of private incentives with social welfare. the policy responses that have been adopted and proposed, both in international fora and in national regulatory policies here in ireland and in most other jurisdictions have sought to deal with these four risk sources. for each there is a classical regulatory tool – some dating back to the great depression or before – and these tools have been intensified or ramped up where they were still in operation, dusted down and modernized where they had fallen into disuse during the long period of deregulation which accompanied the macroeconomic lull from the late 1980s known as the great moderation. thus, to meet heightened credit risk, there have for years been capital requirements ; to meet liquidity risk there were liquidity ratio requirements ; to meet complexity risk there have been restrictions on scope of activity ; and to meet incentive risk there is prudential supervision. the basel 3 and financial stability board discussions have focused on the first two of these. the greater reliance on going concern capital instruments, the higher overall risk - ratios, the counter - cyclical mechanisms and the more restrictive definitions of capital all move in the direction of better absorption of credit risk and other risks relating to asset values. the two liquidity ratios, one to lengthen the time over which short - term outflows can be reliably met and the other to reduce the scale of maturity transformation on a medium - term basis, clearly roll - back the egregious liquidity risks that were being taken four and
external imbalance, and for achieving the interim and final objective of the monetary policy, remaining prepared to futher undertake additional measures, if necessary. v. in the end, one more information. today, the council of the national bank of the republic of macedonia held its 3rd session this year. among other issues, on this session, the council has adopted the 2008 annual report of the national bank of the republic of macedonia ; the 2008 annual report on managing foreign reserves ; the 2008 internal audit report. all these documents shall be available on our web site in the following days.

will be leakages and other set - offs. but our external situation undoubtedly improves. the welcome development enhances our disposable income ( which will increase consumer demand for other goods and services ), reduce input cost of our businesses ( which will increase margins and help to enthuse investment demand ), and aid government finances by reducing the energy subsidy burden in the budget. let me conclude by quoting a participant at the inaugural session of this year ’ s vibrant gujarat global summit : “ india will be a bright spot in an otherwise mediocre global economic outlook ”. thank you, once again, for giving me the opportunity to speak at the 7th business standard best b - school project awards function. bis central bankers ’ speeches
; " the essential points of the ep consist therefore of : • maintaining the statu quo in the short term, meaning that each ncb governor has a vote ; • requesting the intergovernmental conference to create an enlarged executive board of nine members. such an enlarged board may well turn out be similar to the monetary board some academics and journalists have in mind ; • most interestingly, the ep accepts the use of a composite indicator, based partly on a financial criterion. 4. conclusion please let me finish my presentation with a few concluding remarks. one of my fellow countrymen, member of the european parliament, stated during the recent debate in this institution, less than 2 weeks ago, that the debate about the enabling clause seemed to result from the fact that larger countries suffer from a gulliver syndrome : they fear to be bound and tied up by the lilliputians who outnumber them and, by definition, act in an irresponsible manner. interestingly, this mep reminded the parliament that most blockages to european integration originated from the large, rather than from the small nations. similarly, the small nations are the ones who abide punctiliously by the growth and stability pact. nevertheless, the fear seems to exist among larger member states that the smaller ones might impose a lax monetary policy, even though it is generally accepted that ncb governors vote in the governing council on an ad personam basis and in the interest of the entire euro area. to this mep, the whole debate about the enabling clause seemed therefore somewhat artificial and taken under unnecessary time pressure. all this was two weeks ago and in the meantime the council approved the enabling clause. particularly important and heartening, in my eyes, is the fact that a handful of guiding principles which the ecb considered of particular relevance were respected such as'one member, one vote ', ad personam participation, representativeness and transparency. moreover, the ecb recommendation managed to avoid several perilous pitfalls : • as i mentioned, the'one member, one vote'principle is maintained, even though all governors do not vote all of the time. however, whenever they are entitled to vote, the votes of all governors carry the same weight and this is an important element of fairness between large and smaller countries. • there is no re - nationalisation of monetary policy, as would have been the case if the governing council had moved to a system of imf - style regional constituencies. •

similarly, the fact that no governor member of the governing council has a permanent voting right, and that they are all subject to a rotation scheme, is another important element of fairness between large and smaller countries. • finally, in the steady state, 4 new member countries are expected to become member of the second group while many of the remaining countries will gradually move from the third to the second group as real convergence, or " catching up " in plain english, progresses. in this respect, the ecb proposal also strikes a fair balance between current and new members, an important point i wish to emphasise here in prague.
francois villeroy de galhau : monitoring large and complex institutions welcome address by mr francois villeroy de galhau, governor of the bank of france and chairman of the autorite de controle prudentiel et de resolution ( acpr ), at the acpr academic conference, paris, 11 december 2017. * * * good morning, i am very pleased to welcome you to this high level academic conference jointly organised by the financial stability department of the banque de france and the french prudential supervision and resolution authority ( acpr ). this year, the conference will focus on the challenges posed by the monitoring of large and complex banking institutions. it is true that large global banks might look complex. the 2008 great financial crisis showed how highly interconnected financial institutions that were exposed to overly complex derivative products could spread and amplify domestic shocks. since then, the “ too - big - to - fail ” issue has been put high on the agenda of the financial stability board and significant progress has been made in this regard. however, there is evidence that some global banks are growing bigger and perhaps becoming even more complex than before. complexity is not in itself a drawback. after all, the globalisation of trade might require a certain dose of complexity either due to the nature of the financial products required to hedge against traditional or newly emerging risks, or due to the organisational structures that result from crossborder activities. similarly, one should not preclude the diversification benefits associated with large global financial institutions exposed to partially correlated domestic markets. the true question is how to strike the right balance between the diversification benefits that arise from multiple businesses financing the real economy and the potential weaknesses in risk management caused by this increased complexity. this morning, i will start by quickly reminding you of some key features of the complexity of the global banking system before the financial crisis. then, i will give a short overview of the strong regulatory and supervisory actions undertaken to reduce inefficient levels of complexity. lastly, i will mention two important challenges we face today in shaping the global european banking system. a – some stylised facts from the pre - financial crisis period : organisational complexities and complex activities before the great financial crisis, we observed a steady increase in the number of foreign banks, from 784 in 1995 to 1, 301 in 2007, according to claessens and van horen ( 2014 ). 1 at the same time, the number of domestic banks

empirical analysis ”, the journal of business, 78, issue econpapers. repec. org / repec : ucp : jnlbus : v : 78 : y : 2005 : i : 6 : p : 2435 – 2464. 6, pp. 2435 – 2464, 3 credit value adjustment. 4 correlation trading portfolio. 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches
a number of crises during his time at the ecb. what do you think are the most important qualities a new ecb president needs to have? as i said, definitely expertise in monetary policy and national economy, steadfastness, stamina, strategic thinking, and i think a talent for communications is extremely important. in that case, wouldn ’ t deutsche bundesbank president jens weidmann be the right candidate? i ’ m sure there are several people who possess these specific skills, but mr weidmann, president of the deutsche bundesbank, also has these skills, yes. ms lautenschlager, thank you for the interview. 6 / 6 bis central bankers'speeches

in order to be able to cope with high private debt ratios and to deleverage reasonably quickly, the strength of the insolvency framework is important. also, recent analysis from the european commission found evidence that in the presence of a high stock of private debt, the quality of insolvency frameworks is important for financial stability and for spurring entrepreneurship and thereby mitigating the impact of deleveraging on growth. in particular, it was found that a good insolvency framework is associated with speedier adjustment of non - performing loan ratios. 4 see oecd, “ economic policy reforms 2015 : going for growth ”, 2015. aiyar, s., bergthaler, w., garrido, j. m., ilyina, a., jobst, a., kang, k., kovtun, d., liu, y., monaghan, d. and moretti, m., “ a strategy for resolving europe ’ s problem loans ”, imf staff discussion note, september 2015. carcea, m. c., ciriaci. d, cuerpo, c., lorenzani, d. and pontuch. p., “ the economic impact of rescue and recovery frameworks in the eu ”, european economy discussion paper no 004, september 2015. bis central bankers ’ speeches to highlight the differences in insolvency frameworks across euro area member countries, let me mention a few country figures : in slovakia it takes on average 4 years to resolve an insolvency case, while in portugal it takes 2 years and in ireland it takes less than 5 months. when looking at international practices, one can find three types of procedures through which firms can deal with debt restructuring : 1. out - of - court procedures ; 2. hybrid preventive restructuring procedures ; and 3. formal insolvency or restructuring procedures. in the euro area countries formal insolvency procedures are very common, while out - of - court procedures have been much less used so far. however, voluntary out - of - court restructuring can provide a speedy, cost - effective and market - friendly alternative to court insolvency proceedings. this tool is particularly useful in cases where there is a lack of confidence in the institutional capacity to support the operation of the insolvency system. in the past few years insolvency laws have been amended, in particular
norman t l chan : bond connect – enhancing hong kong as an international financial centre remarks by mr norman t l chan, chief executive of the hong kong monetary authority, at the bond connect launch ceremony, hong kong, 3 july 2017. * * * the honourable carrie lam cheng yuet - ngor, deputy director huang liuquan, deputy director qiu hong, financial secretary paul chan, deputy governor pan gongsheng, mr ck chow, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, 1. good morning. 2. i am very pleased to join you today for the launch of bond connect. bond connect marks another milestone of mutual access of capital markets between the mainland and hong kong, following the shanghai - hong kong stock connect and the shenzhen - hong kong stock connect. it is also another important measure of the central government to support hong kong ’ s development as an international financial centre. 3. a key function of hong kong as an international financial centre is financial intermediation, providing efficient and safe conduits for fund flows. the establishment and smooth operation of these conduits shall be underpinned by suitable and sound financial infrastructures. over the years, the hong kong monetary authority ( hkma ) has endeavoured to build our financial infrastructures, from the real time gross settlement system to the central moneymarkets unit ( cmu ) for debt securities settlement, which have laid a solid foundation for hong kong ’ s development as an international financial centre. 4. bond connect is a new financial infrastructure established through the connection between hkma ’ s cmu and the relevant central securities depositories ( csds ) on the mainland. under bond connect, eligible overseas investors can settle and hold their mainland bonds through cmu using nominee holding arrangement. nominee holding arrangement is widely used by investors in international capital markets as it provides greater convenience and flexibility to investors and market participants. cmu also adopts nominee holding arrangement and provides nominee holding services for more than 200 local and international banks, trust companies and custodians through its linkages with euroclear, clearstream and other regional csds. the continued liberalisation of the mainland ’ s capital account and rmb internationalisation will progressively raise demand from overseas investors for rmb asset allocation, while the mainland has been proactively rolling out measures to facilitate overseas investors ’ access to its bond market. we believe that bond connect would enhance overseas investors ’ participation in the mainland bond market. 5. i wish bond connect a great success.

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##rs may not be the right solution in all circumstances. aaoifi has done a lot of immensely important work over the years in adapting international standards to the needs of the islamic financial industry. however, the need to adapt international standards to the needs of the sharia - compliant industry should not mean that the important underlying principles of transparency and comparability become neglected. recognition that international standards are relevant to the islamic financial industry, even if they should not be blindly copied, will go a long way towards ensuring that the industry has the strong foundations on which to build for the future. securing strong foundations for the industry is in the interests of everyone involved it, especially those who are just beginning their careers. this brings me to the second purpose of our meeting today. i would like to congratulate those students who have successfully completed the “ certified sharia adviser and auditor ”, and “ certified islamic professional accountant ” programmes. to have mastered these challenging courses of study has required hard work and commitment from you. it is an achievement that you can be proud of, and one that i am sure will serve you well throughout your professional career. let me end by wishing all the graduating students a long, successful, and rewarding career. i also wish all the participants a successful conference and hope that you will have many stimulating and fruitful discussions over the course of the next two days. thank you for your attention. bis central bankers ’ speeches

of launching in the low temperatures were met with contempt, and the superiors were not adequately notified of these technical concerns. therein lies the importance of governance structures and how decisions are made. governance influences decisions, and decisions shape outcomes. it is no different for financial governance. be it financial decisions at the international or national level, public or private, corporates or financial institutions, households or individuals, sound financial governance is the bedrock of stable and robust economies. the fact that a lack of good financial governance increases the likelihood of o - ring - like accidents, with potentially devastating effects on the economy, should make sound financial governance an economic and political priority. bis central bankers ’ speeches