expand, even though it has only become truly universal from the 1980s, following the total collapse in 1989 of the economic system aiming to rival it, based on the centralised planning of the economy. the bretton woods system was also able to overcome the challenge posed by the project ( or rather, the utopia, perhaps ) of the ‘ new international economic order ', put forward by the developing countries, following their political pronouncement at the bandung conference, which would gather great international prominence in the 1960s and ‘ 70s as a result of the work of the united nations conference on trade and development ( unctad ) and the political backing of the united nations general assembly. gatt faced this challenge without overlooking the importance of its central underlying theme – the specifics of the developing countries ’ situation – and was even able to adapt, as shown for example by the addition of part iv to gatt and the acceptance of the generalized system of preferences created under unctad. however, all this was done without compromising the core validity of its founding principles. while reforming the monetary system proved impossible – and the bretton woods monetary system collapsed irreversibly in 1971 – reform of international trade was nevertheless achievable, shown by the creation of the wto at the uruguay round. the creation of the wto, as i wrote about many years ago, was an ending as well as a beginning. an ending, in that it marked the completion of a long journey and the ultimate materialisation of the vision of the bretton woods ideologues, who did not manage to build the international trade organization in their time. a beginning, since the defining of a single institutional framework to administrate trade relations between members in domains as vast as those covered by the set of agreements concluded under the uruguay round in fact marked the start of a new phase. for example, the path was 2 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches cleared for the first time for financial services to be included in a multilateral trading system, through the conclusion of the general agreement on trade in services ( gats ). in turn, the strengthening of the dispute settlement system increased expectations of the prevalence of law over sheer power, also helping to depoliticise and dedramatise matters of international trade. it was a new framework, therefore, that justified high expectations, but also held significant risk of disappointment, in a context in which the great changes, at all levels, in world trade were

is the most important contribution the federal reserve can make to the global economy, and that this is precisely the focus of monetary policy in this country. 10 they have also stressed the need for effective communication to limit the risk of surprises and the possibility of abrupt market responses. i have no quarrel with these arguments, and i believe there is widespread recognition of the major efforts undertaken by the fed to increase transparency and communication in recent years. however, i see room for further action from advanced economies in at least three areas. first, unconventional monetary policies, though fundamental to overcome the global financial crisis and underpin the recovery of demand in recent years, provide only a temporary stimulus to economic activity. ensuring adequate and sustained rates of growth implies the adoption of measures focused on enhancing efficiency and productivity that go well beyond the reach of monetary policy. indeed, there is a lot that advanced economies still need to do to meet these needs. second, actions taken by major central banks have important consequences for other economies which deserve careful consideration. yet, an adequate understanding of such spillovers is still lacking. although literature on the subject is scant and definitive conclusions are difficult to arrive at, to have an idea of the challenges we are facing, it may be useful to note that recent research carried out at the bis concludes that us quantitative easing has see, among others, sahay, r. et al. ( 2014 ) : “ emerging market volatility : lessons from the taper tantrum ”, imf staff discussion note no. 14 / 09, september ; world bank ( 2015 ) : “ hoping for the best, preparing for the worst : risks around u. s. rate liftoff and policy options ”, special feature 1 in global economic prospects, june ; eichengreen, barry and poonam gupta ( 2014 ) : “ tapering talk : the impact of expectations of reduced federal reserve security purchases on emerging markets ”, policy research working paper no. 6754, the world bank, january ; and international monetary fund ( 2013 ) : “ taper talks : what to expect when the united states is tightening ”, box 1. 1 in world economic outlook, october. see for instance dudley, william, op. cit. and fischer, stanley ( 2015 ) : “ the federal reserve and the global economy ”, remarks at the conference held in honor of professor haim ben - shahar, tel aviv, israel, 26 may. bis central bankers ’ speeches had a greater impact on emerging market