architect of modern ireland ” proposed policies that bid “ farewell to the old outmoded ideas for economic and social progress … ” his policies removed barriers that closed off the country to the world. pushing ireland from being an isolated island to an international hub. as part of the process of deepening its engagement and integration with the global economy, ireland joined the international monetary fund and the world bank in 1957, joining the then eec in 1973. 5 * * * access to the single market and policies to attract inward investment enabled the economy to flourish and broaden its export markets. 6 one way of looking at key trading partners is using a value added perspective. this method examines the ultimate market for irish exports, essentially who the final consumers are. the uk accounts for one eighth of exports using this metric. 7 and this share is similar for merchandise exports to the uk, which measures goods leaving ireland. 8 an important caveat however is that smaller firms are more reliant on the uk market, with 36 % of exports from small and micro firms destined for the uk. 9 together, europe and the united states demand the bulk of irish exports, both on a value added and merchandise basis. the composition of our exports is also a far cry from the largely agrarian economy of the 1950s. today, services form the majority of our exports, while industry or manufacturing form almost a third. 10 within merchandise or goods exports, the share of food, beverages and livestock exports is relatively small compared to pharma or other manufactured goods. 11 and lest we not forget, that in our most recent crisis, our openness – whilst bringing with it vulnerabilities, was critical to our recovery. recent research by the esri discusses how “ openness to trade rescued the irish economy ”, finding that the recovery from the crisis was mainly driven by exports. 12 * * * our membership of the euro is one representation of our financial openness. another is our role as a financial centre. for example, the irish share in eu gdp, is smaller than the irish share of the value added of financial corporations in the eu. 13 much of this financial activity takes place in the international financial services centre ( ifsc ) in dublin, established in 1987. in terms of the real economy, today almost forty thousand people work in the ifsc, with a further 10, 000 employed outside dublin in over 500 firms. 14 the support services such as legal and accountancy firms that grew around the ifsc provide further

cesee region for a cross - border coordination of macroprudential policies both in the home - host and in host - host directions in order to avoid regulatory arbitrage and to create a level playing field. while bilateral coordination may be sufficient in certain home - host issues, multilateral coordination seems to be superior in most of the cases and certainly in host - host coordination. as of today, however, the institutions for such coordination are not in place. supervisory colleges may come close, but they don ’ t have a macroprudential angle. the planned cross - border stability groups seem to be better suited for this purpose, but if they are organised according to banking groups instead of geographical areas with significant exposures to each other, they will probably not turn out to be efficient macroprudential coordination fora. it remains to be seen whether the soon - toturn - operational european systemic risk board ( esrb ) can serve as an effective coordination vehicle for cesee macroprudential policies. finally, allow me to make a precautionary warning against too much reliance on macroprudential policies in facilitating financial stability. in my opinion, although they are necessary, they certainly are not sufficient in themselves for this purpose. first, without sustainable macro policies ( fiscal in particular ) and price stability the financial system may easily find itself in trouble or may intermediate insufficiently. secondly, although its aim is to reduce system - wide risk, macroprudential policy in the end is a set of particular tools targeting particular problems in particular parts of the financial system. in other words it is not as general as monetary policy, which affects virtually all economic agents. if, for example, there is a long - lasting general tendency of increased ( and excessive ) risk - taking in the economy, macroprudential policy in itself can at best slow it down but cannot offset it goodhart, c. ( 2010 ) : “ how should we regulate the financial sector ” in “ the future of finance : the lse report ”. permanently. in such situations support from monetary policy, e. g. in the form of leaningagainst - the - wind behavior, is necessary. euro entry : our ultimate safe harbor or compulsory task prior to the crisis, it seemed a safe bet to assume, that euro entry brings stability and prosperity in the region, especially in central europe. arguments in this respect were based on three main results. first, there is a deep economic integration with core