even though the situation appears to be stable, the creation of systemic risk through moral hazard can jeopardise financial stability. that ’ s why reducing misguided incentives and increasing the size of risk buffers in the system are key to maximising financial system stability. from this general definition, indicators – such as property prices, risk premiums or credit growth – are derived in the policymaking process and used to assess financial stability. 2. macroprudential policy in germany main responsibility for financial stability in europe rests at the national level. in germany, the financial stability committee ( fsc ) was created in 2013 as a national macroprudential body. it comprises representatives of the federal ministry of finance, the federal financial supervisory authority ( bafin ), the bundesbank and the financial market stabilisation agency ( fmsa ), which has observer status. the bundesbank plays a special role in the fsc, by injecting its experience of macroeconomic analyses and of banking supervision. in a nutshell, the bundesbank is the fsc ’ s “ analytical arm ”. what is more, besides preparing the committee ’ s annual report to the german bundestag on the status of financial stability in germany, the bundesbank also drafts warnings and recommendations by the fsc and assesses their implementation. of course, merely establishing macroprudential institutions does nothing to boost financial stability – rather, what are needed are a strategy for macroprudential policy and the appropriate instruments. the internationally agreed basel iii regime that is currently in force already contains a number of instruments designed with macroprudential matters in mind. for instance, systemically important banks have to hold more capital than other institutions, primarily as a way of countering the moral hazard ( “ too big to fail ” ) caused by their size. another instrument is the countercyclical capital buffer, or ccb, which is designed to boost financial system resilience by tightening capital requirements in times of increased lending. the ccb is scheduled to become legally effective in germany on 1 january 2016, though no decision has been taken hitherto as to its exact level. however, these instruments are no more than a rudimentary toolkit for combatting systemic risk emanating from real estate markets. and yet the recent financial crisis clearly demonstrated just how important the residential property market is for financial stability. a bis central bankers ’ speeches number of other countries are already using dedicated macropr

andreas dombret : macroprudential surveillance and statistical challenges speech by dr andreas dombret, member of the executive board of the deutsche bundesbank, at the sixth ecb statistics conference, frankfurt am main, 17 april 2012. * * * introduction ladies and gentlemen thank you for inviting me to speak to you tonight. many of the statistical challenges that are related to macroprudential surveillance have already been addressed this afternoon. allow me to offer some thoughts from the point of view of a macroprudential practitioner, who is also involved in statistics. it is a crucial aspect of macroprudential surveillance, as we see it in europe, that the macrofinancial analysts receive all the information relevant for them to do their job. from my point of view, four aspects stand out : 1. data requests must be analytically driven. 2. micro and macro - views should be reconcilable. 3. single entity and consolidated data are equally important. 4. the data gaps issue needs to stay on top of the agenda. the significance of macroprudential surveillance there is, more than ever, a strong case for mutual understanding and close ex ante coordination, because in recent years we have witnessed nothing less than a significant change in the paradigm of macroprudential surveillance. three steps can be distinguished. as a first step, in spring of 2009, an international reform agenda has been agreed upon, and the financial stability board has been assigned a key function. then, at the beginning of 2011, the european systemic risk board has taken up its work. and, as a last step, we are in the process of national macroprudential mandates being drafted in several european countries. actually, at the end of last year, the esrb released an explicit recommendation on the macro - prudential mandate of national authorities. macroprudential surveillance, at the european level, can be characterized by a threepronged approach. – firstly : a legal mandate exists for safeguarding financial stability. europe is setting standards with respect to macroprudential policy. – secondly : macroprudential surveillance pursues an indirect approach to surveillance. this means that macrofinancial analysts are entitled to receive the totality of relevant information in order to be able to deliver early warnings and clear recommendations. meanwhile, all operative, microprudential instruments remain in the hands of the relevant supervisory agencies. – thirdly : central banks are to take on additional