broader perspective [ … ]. it requires a well - functioning institutional framework such as the imf, multilateral development banks ( mdbs ), and the g20. ” i these words are particularly relevant in the current context. ii. regional responses : the case of europe let me now turn to my second point : regional responses, taking europe as the example. the european union is a unique case of very advanced cooperation between countries at a regional level. the cooperation is obviously multifaceted, but today i would like to focus on three shared economic and social assets of europe : its single currency, its single market, and its unique social model. page 3 sur 6 three european assets : its single currency, its single market, and its unique social model. first, with the euro, we share a solid currency which is recognised worldwide. let me say it straight away : the monetary union can be considered as one of europe ’ s greatest successes. as you know, the single currency was officially launched with the maastricht treaty in 1992 and introduced in 1999. but maastricht and the euro are naturally part of a broader history : the history of europe, and its singular achievement of making the transition from war to peace. the euro has indeed provided us with a strong symbol of unity among european nations. it is true that there is currently some euro - scepticism and a surge of populism, but, a clear majority of euro area citizens support the euro today ( 73 % according to the latest eurobarometer ) ii [ slide ]. from 12 at the start, the number of participating countries has risen to 19 today. seven additional countries have decided to join the euro since 1999 – most recently lithuania in 2015 –, and none has wanted to leave it. the euro is not a technocratic utopia : it is a political and democratic decision, supported 25 years on, with hindsight, by a clear majority of citizens. the fact is the euro has already delivered material benefits. in line with our mandate, inflation has been kept under control. this directly benefits household purchasing power and helps build confidence in the value of the currency. let us take a historical perspective. in the 18 years preceding the introduction of the euro ( 1981 - 1998 ), inflation gradually declined but remained at 4. 6 % on average, with major disparities across countries. in the 18 years since the euro ( 1999 - 2016 ), inflation has been much more stable, averaging 1.

and tough financial supervision. it is easy to underestimate this achievement. the idea was adopted less than two years ago. the single supervisory mechanism is now up and running. there is no example in contemporary european history when so much has been achieved in so little time. 2. we have launched a tough and comprehensive aqr and subsequent stress tests that should be completed by the end of this year. for the first time, these exercises will be conducted in a fully integrated way – under the aegis of the ssm – with full accountability of the results. completion should mark a turning point where there will be no more doubts about the sustainability of our banks and credit should resume at a normal pace. 3. in the longer run, a major policy challenge for the euro area is to “ reinvent ” a new and robust financial integration model. we need sound cross - border capital flows, bis central bankers ’ speeches because we do not want the eurosystem to intermediate permanently between borrowers and lenders from different countries. developing a safe securitisation process should be a priority, despite the major technical difficulties. ii / – is europe facing the prospect of a lost decade? questions about long - term growth are not limited to europe. what we hear about our continent reflects a more general concern : the possibility of “ secular stagnation ” in advanced economies. larry has launched this crucial debate. i don ’ t know whether he was thinking specifically about europe, but, of course, this question is very relevant for us. secular stagnation rests on the assumption that the natural interest rate is negative. this may happen for two reasons : • in the short run, we may have a downward shock on demand and an increase in savings resulting from the deleveraging process. i have just explained how we are currently addressing this issue. • in the longer run, ageing and slower innovation may push up saving rates and bring down the return on capital. therefore, the ultimate response to the risk of secular stagnation is to improve the return on investment, thus pushing the natural interest rate back into positive territory. again, this is not only a european problem. but we do have difficulties in this regard. structural reforms are not easy. many, however, are currently being implemented. italy is abolishing its provinces, generating savings that will allow for a reduction in taxes and liberalising its labour market. france is on the same track and has reduced taxes on its labour costs as