, “ bail - in in the new bank resolution framework : is there an issue with the middle class? ”, speech at the iadi - erc international conference “ resolution and deposit guarantee schemes in europe : incomplete processes and uncertain outcomes ”, naples, 23 march. 12 restoy, f. ( 2018 ), op. cit. 13 geithner, t. ( 2016 ), op. cit. 14 smaghi, b. ( 2018 ), financial times op - ed “ european banking union needs its final leg ”, 21 october 2017. 15 carmassi, j., dobkowitz, s., evrard, j., parisi, l., silva, a., wedow, m. ( 2018 ), “ completing the banking union with a european deposit insurance scheme : who is afraid of cross - subsidisation? ”, ecb occasional paper 208, april. 16 demetriades, p. ( 2017 ), “ a diary of the euro crisis in cyprus : lessons for bank recovery and resolution ”, palgrave macmilan : cham switzerland. 17 restoy, f. ( 2018 ), op. cit. 6 / 7 bis central bankers'speeches 18 constancio, v. ( 2018 ), “ completing the odyssean journey of the european monetary union ”, remarks at the ecb colloquium on “ the future of central banking ”, frankfurt am main 16 – 17 may. in fact, the establishment of banking union was inspired by the american fdic. however, it fell short of providing the srf or edis with the right instruments and means to guarantee financial stability. 19 bernanke, b. ( 2018 ), “ the real effects of disrupted credit : evidence from the global financial crisis ”, per jacobsson lecture, bis annual general meeting, basel, 24 june. 20 geithner, t. ( 2016 ), op. cit. 21 bernard, b., capponi, a, and stiglitz, j. ( 2017 ), “ bail - ins and bailouts : incentives, connectivity, and systemic stability ”, voxeu. org, 18 october. 7 / 7 bis central bankers'speeches

. and this means a lot! this means creating a bank from scratch. and creating a central bank from scratch is not an easy task in terms of the relationship with the political power, 3 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches in operational terms, in terms of creating credibility, in terms of bringing together a team. and i think that this point needs to be emphasised because it is a very important achievement by yves mersch. after that, yves mersch joined the board of the ecb, and he is one of the individuals we count on heavily at the ecb, for three reasons. first, because he is very important for ensuring the smooth running of the infrastructure that is critical for the working of the economy, for everything concerning currency issuance, everything concerning payments, and the major advances that have been achieved. second, he is very important because he is in charge of the legal department, a critical department for ensuring central banks ’ independence – in fact more than just independence – central banks ’ obeyance to their ultimate objective. and third, as head of the legal department he is an important ally for us in the national central banks in order to preserve our independence where there are temptations to reduce this independence. to be clear, the temptation to reduce the independence of the central banks is not only a characteristic of, i would say, the southern countries. there are nordic countries that have the same temptation. this means that wherever the treasury is, there is also the temptation to take it. and it is not only a question for the portuguese people or others : put the money somewhere and the temptation will arise, it may be sooner, it may be later, but it will arise. yves mersch is a key man for us, for our activity, because he is in charge of the department that gives us the sponsorship that is needed to continue with our activity without any risks, i. e. institutional risks. and institutional risk is a big risk that central banks are now facing : if you look to the united states or to europe, you ’ ll see that the political and monetary centres have different perspectives. to have someone in the legal department who knows very well which way is best is very comforting and reassuring. so i give the floor to yves mersch, thanking him very much for the role that he plays in ensuring the independence of the eurosystem and ensuring that central banks at national level are in line with the commitment that we undertook in the maastricht treaty.