and usage, combined with high - quality user support, will reduce learning costs for users, lighten the question - and - answer workload for data providers, and promote the efficient allocation of resources. adequate documentation of data quality and the tracking of known data issues will help ensure that the data are properly used and will reduce the likelihood of user misunderstanding of the data, a risk that can lead to inappropriate data usage and erroneous results. our limited experience to date with data stewards who have been explicitly hired or assigned to this role has been very positive. this investment has helped accelerate data usage, ensure analytical quality, and maintain vendor contract compliance. importantly, it has significantly reduced the burden on senior staff in responding to data questions and requests for data or analyses. successful implementation of this model requires not only a formal recognition of the data steward role, but an appropriate level of resources to support data stewardship, including some training in the foundational disciplines of data management. incentives may be required to induce subject matter experts to take a formal data steward role. to provide these incentives requires thinking through career concerns of people, and may require a whole new career track for data stewardship, one that provides sufficient autonomy to provide the steward time and incentives to conduct data analysis and research. these investments are very worthwhile, because they unlock the potential in innovative datasets and make progress possible in answering crucial policy questions. learning from others before i close, i ’ d like to note that data innovation is challenging, but there is an effective and widely available way to achieve it, and that is to learn from others. over the past few years we at the new york fed have hosted and visited colleagues at the bank of england, bank of korea, bank of japan, and the bank of mexico to exchange ideas and discuss some of our data projects. much can be learned from sharing experiences in creating and managing new data products. the information uncovered in some countries ’ well - designed data collections can help other countries to direct their own data - gathering efforts. for example, other countries are very interested in what can be learned about the household sector from credit bureau data like the ccp. we have taken suggestions for particular questions from other countries ’ surveys. we can also benefit tremendously from learning through direct collaboration. in a new research project with the dutch central bank, we are investigating how the interview mode affects the survey response rate and response accuracy when asking people about financial issues. more specifically, we are evaluating whether sol

william c dudley : panel remarks at bank indonesia - federal reserve bank of new york joint international seminar remarks by mr william c dudley, president and chief executive officer of the federal reserve bank of new york, at the bank indonesia - federal reserve bank of new york joint international seminar, bali, 31 july 2016. * * * linda goldberg, jonathan mccarthy and joseph tracy assisted in preparing these remarks. in my remarks today, i will focus on why global growth has been so anemic following the financial crisis and what we can do about it. i think it is fair to say that the global recovery following the financial crisis has been disappointing. growth is below pre - crisis levels for the united states, europe, japan and china. for example, in the u. s., real gdp growth has averaged only about 2. 2 percent per year over the period from 2010 to 2015, below the pre - crisis average of 2. 4 percent from 2003 to 2008. this slower growth performance has been accompanied by relatively low inflation rates – persistently below the objectives of the monetary policy authorities in the united states, europe and japan. as i see it, there are many causes for these persistent shortfalls in growth, and they vary across regions and countries. let me focus on the reasons for the united states in the post crisis period. growth has been weaker than expected for many reasons. the financial crisis was a searing experience that damaged household and business confidence in a profound way – with a more lasting effect than the typical economic downturn. the housing bust created both a large housing supply overhang and a large number of households that were underwater on their mortgages. households needed to repair their balance sheets and bring down their debt service burdens to more manageable levels. higher levels of unemployment further depressed demand. credit availability contracted. the tightening of credit standards occurred quite broadly – in housing credit, consumer credit cards and business lending. some of the credit supply restrictions were imposed by banks that needed to repair their balance sheets, deleveraging by building up capital and working down their bad assets. fiscal outlays were not high enough to compensate for the contractionary impulse from these first three sources. the crisis led to a significant deterioration in the u. s. federal budget deficit and put pressure on state and local budgets. after the federal budget deficit reached around 10 percent of gdp at the peak, fiscal consolidation occurred at the federal level, as well as at state and local levels, restraining economic activity instead of supporting growth