share with you three convictions : firstly, the traditional pillars to ensure confidence including trusted third parties, central banks and supervisors, cannot be replaced by " algorithmic " confidence, i. e. by rules of the game that would be coded once and for all and for which respect would be entrusted to algorithms, even if they are encapsulated in " smart contracts "... will the forces pushing towards tokenised and decentralised finance make unbalanced relationships disappear? as well as failing governance mechanisms, the concentration of operational risks, and cyber attacks? in my opinion, the answer is no : trusted third parties, central banks and supervisors are still needed and in my view not about to disappear... 2 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches secondly, and this is a corollary to my first point, confidence requires maintaining central bank money as the anchor of the financial system. finally, confidence requires a regulatory framework that is clear, fair ( " same business, same risk, same rule " ) and balanced, i. e. capable of both encouraging innovation, protecting adequately customers and maintaining the stability of our financial system. the upheavals experienced by the crypto ecosystem and the confidence crisis that has developed from the fallout clearly show from our financial stability authority stand point that the implementation of such confidence prone regulatory framework is urgently needed. europe has led the way in this field, defining a new regulatory framework, known as mica ( markets in crypto assets regulation ). it is important that its implementation takes place as swiftly as possible, within a broader, international effort, building on the high - level recommendations developed by the fsb. 2 / beyond supporting the development and adoption of a confidence prone regulatory framework we can also, as a central bank, play a positive operational role in revisiting the central bank money services we provide with the objective of adapting them to the digital age and the possible associated development of tokenised finance. this is the reason why in 2020, the banque de france launched a large - scale experimentation program on wholesale cbdc with a number of market participants. this program has allowed us to understand better how dlts work and the benefits that are likely to emerge for financial markets. our main motivation is to extend the existing trust in our settlement infrastructure and assets to transactions carried out on dlts. their settlement in central bank money appears essential to guarantee the players in these markets against the counterparty risks inherent with other, private tokenised settlement assets

loopholes that emerge due to financial innovation – this calls for a confident, strong supervision in the face of new developments that are not covered 1 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches by international standards. but another source of weakness of the international basel standards is insufficient implementation. i was recently discussing with my staff the implementation of basel iii in the eu. at some point, the discussion turned to the less than optimal experiences with the previous basel standards. some pointed out that the us did not implement the basel ii standard in full, despite having pushed for it in the first place. that led to the question how complete the implementation could be if other jurisdictions simply cherry - picked. but then i saw two colleagues whispering and laughing – and i asked what it was about. one of them, quite reluctantly, explained that it may be true that basel ii implementation in the us diverged from what the eu had hoped for – but that it was the eu which had been found to be materially non - compliant with the basel iii standard. the room suddenly fell silent. finally, someone asked : will it be different this time around? the purpose of this tale is not to blame and shame. my concern is rather to highlight where we are right now in terms of finalising regulatory reform after the financial crisis – and that the system of national implementation does not favour full implementation. so where are we? we are getting closer, we can already make out the finishing line. but the last leg of national implementation is a steep upward climb. without reaching the last milestone, basel iii would lose dramatically in value in terms of financial stability. what we need is complete implementation, nothing less : all internationally active banks – be they american, european, asian or from any other region – need to be subject to these minimum standards – otherwise we have failed to achieve a truly international compact. does this mean that, in future, every community bank should apply internal models to estimate its risk of credit valuation adjustment in derivative positions? of course not. international cooperation would reach beyond what is sensible. the basel rules are highly complex and call for big compliance departments – something that is beyond the reach of a community bank business model, for example. that ’ s why smaller institutions which are not internationally active should be subject to less complex rules. and that ’ s why the us and the eu have begun to reduce operationally burdensome rules for such institutions – a path that we are pursuing further, within the basel committee as well as in national implementation.