policymakers to reaffirm their commitment to work toward the common goal of strengthening global demand. similarly, with anemic global demand and interest rates near zero, in some economies there is scope for monetary policy to be more effective with fiscal policy working in the same direction. with potential growth and nominal borrowing rates both low, public investment that increases potential in the longer run and demand in the shorter run could make an important contribution. a joint determination by policymakers across major economies to better deploy policy tools to provide support for global demand could be beneficial. references blanchard, olivier ( 2016 ). “ the u. s. phillips curve : back to the 60s? ( pdf ) “ policy brief pb16 – 1. washington : peterson institute of international economics, january. blanchard, olivier, eugenio cerutti, and lawrence summers ( 2015 ). “ inflation and activity – two explorations and their monetary policy implications, “ nber working paper series 21726. cambridge, mass. : national bureau of economic research, november. board of governors of the federal reserve system ( 2016 ). monetary policy report. washington : board of governors, february, www. federalreserve. gov / monetarypolicy / files / 20160210 _ mprfullreport. pdf. brainard, lael ( 2015a ). “ unconventional monetary policy and cross - border spillovers, ” speech delivered at “ unconventional monetary and exchange rate policies, ” the 16th international monetary fund jacques polak research conference, sponsored by the international monetary fund, washington, november 6. — — — — - ( 2015b ). “ normalizing monetary policy when the neutral interest rate is low, ” speech delivered at stanford institute for economic policy research, stanford, calif., december 1. caballero, ricardo j., emmanuel farhi, and pierre - olivier gourinchas ( 2015 ). “ global imbalances and currency wars at the zlb, ” nber working paper series 21670. cambridge, mass. : national bureau of economic research, october. del negro, marco, marc giannoni, matthew cocci, sara shahanaghi, and micah smith ( 2015 ). “ why are interest rates so low? ” federal reserve bank of new york, liberty street economics ( blog ), may 20. gruber, joseph, andrew mccallum, and robert vigfusson ( 2016 ). “ the dollar in the u. s. international

that investment banks based in the united states and financial institutions based in the united kingdom have been among the top non - euro - area issuers of euro - denominated bonds ; it also said that banks in europe and some firms located mainly in the united kingdom with business concentrated in the securitization of residential mortgages have been among the top non - u. s. issuers of dollar - denominated bonds. the central banks include those in australia, brazil, canada, denmark, the euro area, korea, japan, new zealand, mexico, norway, singapore, sweden, switzerland, and the united kingdom. institutions within their borders. 3 although funding needs during the current turmoil have been the most pronounced for dollars, they have arisen for other currencies as well. for example, the ecb has set up swap lines and repo facilities with the central banks of denmark and hungary to provide euro liquidity in those countries. the terms of many swap agreements have been adjusted with the changing needs for liquidity : the sizes of the swaps have increased, the types of collateral accepted by these central banks from financial institutions in their economies have been expanded, and the maturities at which these funds have been made available have been tailored to meeting the prevailing needs. notably, in mid - october, the federal reserve eliminated limits on the sizes of its swap lines with the ecb, the bank of england, the snb, and the bank of japan so as to accommodate demands for u. s. dollar funding of any scale. taken together, these actions have helped improve the distribution of liquidity around the globe. this collaborative approach to the injection of liquidity reflects more than the global, multicurrency nature of funding difficulties. it also reflects the importance of relationships between central banks and the institutions they serve. under swap agreements, the responsibility for allocating foreign - currency liquidity within a jurisdiction lies with the domestic central bank. this arrangement makes use of the fact that the domestic central bank is best positioned to understand the mechanics and special features of its own country ’ s financial and payments systems and, because of its existing relationships with domestic financial institutions, can best assess the strength of each institution and its needs for foreign - currency liquidity. the domestic central bank is also typically best informed about the quality of the collateral offered by potential borrowers. the efforts by central banks around the world to increase the availability of liquidity, along with other steps taken by central banks and