samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
by the cdfi data project show that, for 2004, charge - off rates for cdfi portfolios were similar to those for the banking industry as a whole. 19 these studies and market data suggest that banks and other private organizations may become an increasingly significant source of competition for cdfis. that is good news, not bad news. indeed, the surest sign of a cdfi ’ s success is that private investors see viable investment opportunities in the neighborhoods in which the cdfi has been operating. the continuing relevance of cdfis although in some sense the mission of cdfis is to make themselves unnecessary, i expect that the knowledge and good will that they have accumulated in local communities will continue to make them relevant. for example, i mentioned earlier the loan pricing disadvantages faced by members of minority groups that have appeared in the hmda data. cdfis may be able to help reduce those discrepancies by using their local knowledge and financial expertise to offer alternatives to conventional subprime lending. the opportunity finance network, for instance, will be competing with subprime lenders via a mortgage - credit platform that centralizes some cdfi lending processes and directly links counseling and lending services. at the same time, cdfis continue to expand their ability to attract private investment funds, for example, through increasing transparency and developing the means of providing objective evaluations of their financial and mission - related effectiveness. these efforts demonstrate the ability of cdfis to adapt their business strategies to evolving markets, as indeed they have done throughout their thirty - year history. i expect that the local knowledge and specialized financial expertise that cdfis provide will continue to add significant economic value and complement market forces in the support of community economic development. thus, cdfis are likely to contribute to our shared goal of expanding economic opportunity for many years to come. board of governors of the federal reserve system ( 2000 ), the performance and profitability of cra - related lending, report to the congress submitted pursuant to section 713 of the gramm - leach bliley act of 1999 ( washington : board of governors, july ), www. federalreserve. gov / boarddocs / surveys / craloansurvey / default. htm. cdfi coalition, cdfi data project, 2004, www. cdfi. org / cdfiproj. asp # fy ; and elizabeth c klee and gretchen c weinbach ( 2006 ), “

roots that are broad and deep in the region. to echo comments tom hoenig made at the groundbreaking on this site three years ago, let us dedicate this bank to the service of our nation, this great city of kansas city, and the other important cities, towns, and rural regions in the heart of america that define the 10th federal reserve district.
into the pool of eligible collateral. third, the central bank is finalizing an interest rate swap tool banks can rely on to minimize interest rate risk. the tool is expected to become available in q2. the nbu will launchlong - term refinancing loans with terms of up to five years. these loans will be issued at a floating interest rate and secured with the same collateral as loans that are granted through tenders. the nbu is currently finalizing technical preparations for the introduction of this tool, and plans to hold the first auction on granting long - term refinancing loans as early as the first half of may. this tool will serve as an additional guarantee for maintaining sufficient liquidity in the banking system if the sentiment of financial market participants deteriorates due to the spread of the coronavirus infection. the nbu also expects that banks will be able to use this refinancing tool to support the economy through lending more actively to projects that require long - term investment, such as infrastructure projects. this will help restore business activity and reduce unemployment. thank you for your attention! 4 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches

##oto, who, more than 500 years ago, combined the navigation skills of his home in genoa with the commercial initiative of his bristol sponsors to make landfall in canada. his voyage marked the start of the opening of north america to global commerce. similarly today, canadian business must open new markets. the world ’ s economic centre of gravity is again shifting. with the integration of one - third of humanity into the global economy, the world is rapidly becoming multi - polar. emergingmarket economies are now the main drivers of commodity prices, they represent almost onehalf of the growth in all imports over the past decade, and they currently account for about two - thirds of global growth. in contrast, the united states is undergoing a protracted adjustment, which will subdue demand for canadian goods for the foreseeable future. canadians must respond. as a country we are under exposed to the economies that will drive global growth. the imperatives for business appear clear : new suppliers need to be sourced ; new markets opened ; and a new approach to managing for a more volatile environment developed. workers need to build skills and be prepared to shift jobs and even careers, if necessary. business in windsor - essex has started. our auto sector is undergoing a major restructuring and is emerging more competitive. there are recent signs that other sectors are beginning to follow. if business can sustain and then broaden this early momentum, all canadian workers will be fully and productively employed. appendix
has improved to some extent, even if there is considerable uncertainty about how much. in conclusion, the swedish economy appears to have undergone only some of the structural changes that the american economy has implemented. it remains to be seen whether the “ new economy ” can have any further impact in sweden.

lowering the interest rate. why is it not possible to reduce the nominal interest rate below zero? the reason is that money in the form of banknotes and coins yields a zero interest rate. if the interest rates for various accounts and securities such as treasury bills and bonds were to become negative, households, firms and authorities would prefer to retain cash in the form of banknotes instead of lending it or depositing it. with a zero interest rate, households, firms and authorities become indifferent about the choice of whether to hold securities such as treasury bills and bonds or to hold cash. 2 a so - called open market operation in which the central bank increases the monetary base and thus liquidity by buying treasury bills and bonds and paying with cash, then becomes ineffective in the sense that the interest rate is still zero and the only thing that happens is that households, firms and authorities hold more cash and fewer treasury bills and bonds. a situation with a zero interest rate is therefore also called a liquidity trap. the issue of monetary policy when the interest rate is zero has become topical again. since the autumn of last year, the outlook for the global economy has deteriorated further. at the same time as forecasts for inflation and growth have been revised downwards, policy rates for more information on these measures, see www. riksbank. se. this applies when the amount of cash held does not fall below the level needed for transaction purposes. have been lowered and are now approaching zero in several countries. in december last year, the federal reserve, for example, cut its policy rate to an interval between 0 – 0. 25 per cent, while in japan the policy rate is 0. 1 per cent and in switzerland 0. 5 per cent. inflation throughout the world is also falling rapidly. it is possible that the level of inflation can become negative and that we will thus see deflation in some countries. deflation for a short period is not a major problem. we even had this in sweden a few years ago. but if deflation is prolonged, and especially if inflation expectations fall and deflation expectations arise, the situation can become very problematic. the combination of very low policy rates, a weak real economy and the risk of deflation has thus revived the debate about how monetary policy can and should be conducted in the event of a zero interest rate bound. in the 1990s, japan experienced a long period with a zero interest rate, deflation and, compared with previous decades, weak real economic development. the experience
), “ understanding the great recession ”, american economic journal : macroeconomics, vol. 7 ( 1 ), 110 — 167. 21 see gertler, m. and p. karadi ( 2015 ), “ monetary policy surprises, credit costs, and economic activity ”, american economic journal : macroeconomics, pp. 44 – 76. 22 clerc, l., a. derviz, c. mendicino, s. moyen, k. nikolov, l. stracca, j. suarez and a. p. vardoulakis ( 2015 ), “ capital regulation in a macroeconomic model with three layers of default ”, international journal of central banking, pp. 9 - 63. 23 see : blanchard, o. ( 2016 ), “ do dsge models have a future? ”, peterson institute for international economics policy brief 16, 11 august ; blanchard, o. ( 2016 ), “ further thoughts on dsge models ”, peterson institute for international economics realtime economic issues watch, 3 october ; blanchard, o. ( 2017 ), “ the need for different classes of macroeconomic models ”, peterson institute for international economics realtime economic issues watch, 12 january. 6 / 6 bis central bankers'speeches

in a monetary model ”. 5 auerbach, a. and y. gorodnichenko ( 2017 ), “ fiscal stimulus and fiscal sustainability ”, paper presented at the federal reserve bank of kansas city economic symposium, jackson hole, wyoming. 6 see, e. g. coenen, g., r. motto, m. rostagno, s. schmidt, and f. smets ( 2017 ), “ dsge models and counterfactual analysis ”, in “ dsge models in the conduct of policy : use as intended ” ( eds. r. gurkaynak and c. tille ), voxeu. org book, cepr press. 7 see christoffel, k., g. coenen, and a. warne ( 2008 ), “ the new area - wide model of the euro area : a micro - founded open - economy model for forecasting and policy analysis ”, ecb working paper series no. 944. 8 see blanchard, o. “ the need for different classes of macroeconomic models ”, piie realtime economic issues watch, january 12, 2017. 9 brayton, f. and p. a. tinsley ( 1996 ), “ a guide to frb / us : a macroeconomic model of the united states ", finance and economics discussion series 96 – 42, board of governors of the federal reserve system ( u. s. ). 10 muellbauer, j. ( 2016 ), “ macroeconomics and consumption : why central bank models failed and how to repair them ’, ’ voxeu. see also muellbauer, j. ( 2016 ), “ consumption and macroeconomics “, cepr discussion paper no 11588. 11 see, e. g., kaplan, g., and g. l. violante ( 2014 ), “ a model of the consumption response to fiscal stimulus payments ”, econometrica, 82 ( 4 ), 1199 – 1239 ; and mian, a., k. rao, and a. sufi ( 2013 ), “ household balance sheets, consumption, and the economic slump ”, quarterly journal of economics, 128 ( 4 ) : 1687 – 1726. 12 muelbauer, j. and r. lattimore ( 1995 ), “ the consumption function : a theoretical and empirical overview, ” in handbook of applied econometrics macroeconomics, eds.
. with that summary, i would be pleased to take your questions and begin our discussion. 2 / 2 bis - central bankers'speeches

j., 1972. gifts and exchanges. philosophy & public affairs, pp. 343 - 362. 18see the museu do dinheiro website for further detail. angino, s., ferrara, f. m. and secola, s., 2021. the cultural origins of institutional trust : the case of the european central bank. european union politics. 20ehrmann, m. and fratzscher, m., 2011. politics and monetary policy. review of economics and statistics, 93 ( 3 ), pp. 941 - 960. 21donnery, sharon. high priests and politics : building public understanding through changing central bank communications. address to the european central bank communications conference ( 15 november 2017 ). 22makhlouf, gabriel. the end of mumbling incoherence : enhancing credibility, effectiveness and trust through better central bank communication. address to the 6th diw lecture on money and finance ( 26 february 2020 ). donnery, sharon. high priests and politics : building public understanding through changing central bank communications. address to the european central bank communications conference ( 15 november 2017 ). 24see the european central bank website for further detail. 25makhlouf, gabriel. resilience through transitions : facing the tumult. address to waterford institute of technology ( 20 november 2019 ). makhlouf, gabriel. intergenerational macroeconomics. governor ’ s blog, may 2021. 27makhlouf, g. 2021. climate change : towards action. governor ’ s blog, central bank of ireland. 28schnabel, isabel. monetary policy and inequality. address to virtual conference on diversity and inclusion in economics, finance, and central banking ( 9 november 2021 ). 29elderson, frank. proportioning policy action to the evidence : making the monetary policy strategy of the ecb concrete. address to the institute of international & european affairs ( 24 march 2022 ). 30makhlouf, gabriel. growing our economic capital : investing in sustainable improvement in our wellbeing. speech delivered at victoria university of wellington ( 3 november 2016 ). 31keynes, j. m., 1936. the general theory of employment, interest and money. 32saramago, j. 1984. the year of the death of ricardo reis.
bundesbank for his service. i would also like to take the opportunity to welcome his successor, ms julia becker. she is an expert from the bundesbank ’ s financial stability department and has considerable experience in market infrastructures and related regulatory issues. some of you have already met her, and i am certain that she will be a worthy successor to mr orthacker. thank you. bis central bankers ’ speeches

institutions seeking to pursue islamic banking services. in the past decade the sector has grown strongly along with the number of licensees. total assets jumped from us $ 1. 9 billion in 2000 to us $ 26. 3 billion by june 2009, an increase of over 12 times. the market share of islamic banks correspondingly increased from 1. 8 % of total banking assets in 2000 to 11. 1 % in june 2009. there are now 26 islamic banks and 19 islamic insurance companies ( takaful ) operating in the kingdom. given the large regional share of islamic financial institutions which are based in the kingdom of bahrain, it is clearly essential to create an appropriate framework for regulating and supervising the islamic banking sector. this is an important function of the cbb. the cbb is the single regulator for the financial services sector in bahrain. we are the only central bank in the region with responsibility for regulating all banking, capital markets, fund management and insurance business under one roof. we have a policy of following international standards very closely, and in the area of islamic finance, we have been a pioneer in developing prudential standards. we apply the same principles of sound regulation and supervision to islamic banks as are applied to conventional banking. we pursue a duel banking system, where islamic banks operate side by side with their conventional counterparts. in fact, the emergence of islamic banks in bahrain drew on the same environment that led to the development of bahrain as an international financial centre. the cbb affords equal opportunities and treatment for islamic banks as for conventional banks. the cbb prides itself, in fulfilling its regulatory responsibilities, on the innovative approach it has taken, applying international best practices and ensuring transparency throughout the whole regulatory process. the cbb has introduced the first comprehensive prudential and reporting framework that is industry - specific to the concept of islamic banking and finance. in addition to the application of rigorous regulatory standards, the cbb has also pioneered a range of innovations designed to broaden the depth of the islamic financial market and to provide islamic institutions with wider opportunities to manage their liquidity. to ensure that these objectives are achieved, bahrain hosts the recently created liquidity management centre ( lmc ) and the international islamic financial market ( iifm ). the cbb also acts as the agent of the government of the kingdom of bahrain in implementing a regular issuance programme of shari ’ a compliant short - term government securities. a series of government long - term leasing sukuk have also recently been launched.
in prices on the financial markets, and thus exacerbate the problems in a procyclical fashion. in addition, the structure of many of the transactions conducted in the shadow banking system means that the participants are closely interconnected. thus, contagion effects within the system are highly likely. these systemic risks within the shadow banking system may then spill over into the regular banking system, which is often directly or indirectly linked to the shadow banking system. thus, the shadow banking system may well be a source of systemic risk. accordingly, it is very high up on the g20 reform agenda. in this context, let me make one thing absolutely clear : the purpose of regulation is not to proscribe shadow banking activities or to drive participants out of the market when such activities and participants engender no systemic risk. the sole aim of regulation is to put a brake on systemic risk. we have certainly made some progress on this issue but we still have further to go. because the growth of the shadow banking sector is a global issue, further cooperation is needed to make the financial system a safer place. and international cooperation always starts at the personal level, with personal relations forming the root of successful cooperation. this is where our representatives here in beijing come into play. their task is to build networks, to share information and ideas, to explain the bundesbank ’ s positions and to facilitate cooperation. for the past three years, winfried liedtke has served as the bundesbank ’ s representative in beijing. and judging from the distinguished crowd gathered here today, he has done an excellent job. i would therefore like to thank him personally and in the name of the bundesbank for his service. i would also like to take the opportunity to welcome our new representative, thomas notheis. for the past four years, thomas notheis has served as the bundesbank ’ s representative in mumbai, meaning that he is not new to either the world of economic diplomacy or to asia. some of you have already met him, and i am certain that he will be a worthy successor to winfried liedtke. having a representative here in beijing shows that the deutsche bundesbank acknowledges the global importance of the chinese economy and its role in global financial markets. i strongly believe that our presence here in beijing will deepen friendship and cooperation, not only between thomas notheis and his peers but also between the deutsche bundesbank and the central bank of china,

and eventually between germany and china. thank you! bis central bankers ’ speeches
fostering interaction among researchers is important at all times : it is all the more important in unusual times such as the ones we are living in. i wish you two fruitful days of discussions and exchanges.

proper functioning of the eu and its very existence. earlier this year, it was indeed conceivable that a debt crisis in a euro - area country could trigger a wider crisis involving other countries. should a balance - of - payments crisis hit a member state, article 143 of the treaty governs mutual assistance. hungary received support on this basis. a similar mechanism was missing in the context of economic and financial crises with impact on sovereign debt. the european financial stability facility ( efsf ), established in june by the ecofin, fills the gap. the crisis has shown that the costs for the economy can mount quickly if crisis management is slow and if it is conditioned by political pressure in both the countries receiving and those providing financial assistance. it is now clearer than before that well - defined procedures need to be established to provide temporary financial assistance under clear and enforceable conditionality. the efsf is an important step in this direction. in order to guarantee an incentive - compatible scheme, the efsf has been associated with efforts in strengthening policy coordination in the eu. the crisis has confirmed that the reasons underlying the introduction of emu fiscal rules ( externalities of deficits and debts, pressure for bail out, moral hazard in fiscal policy ) are still very relevant, as national rules and financial market discipline do not necessarily deliver sound policies. eu fiscal rules are warranted and should be strengthened. under the european commission proposal put forward at the end of september, compliance with rules and principles of the sgp is going to be reinforced by speeding up the excessive deficit procedure and giving more prominence to public debt and sustainability criteria. the broader surveillance of euro - area macroeconomic and competitiveness developments makes it possible to focus on structural issues. the involvement of the eu in developing the ex ante dimension of budgetary and economic surveillance is based on the assumption that prevention can be more effective than correction. sanctions can play a role in dampening the relative convenience of profligate fiscal policies, but a system of early peer - review of national budgets could detect inconsistencies and emerging imbalances at an early stage. the van rompuy task force too will soon publish detailed proposals. it is important that the european council rapidly evaluate these proposals, jointly with those of the commission, and come up with an effective decision that tackles the two main weak points of the sgp ( in both the 1997 version and the 2005 revision ) : ( i ) the absence of incentives and sanctions for fiscal behaviour