. while the overall improvement in the economic outlook has no doubt contributed to the improvement in abs markets, it does appear that the talf helped to buoy the availability of credit to firms and households and thus supported economic activity. indeed, following the kick - start from the talf, a number of these markets are now operating without any governmental backing. another example is the reduction in pressures in u. s. dollar funding markets ( as evidenced by the sharp narrowing of spreads between libor ( london interbank offered rates ) and ois ( overnight index swap ) rates and the decline in premiums paid for u. s. dollars in foreign exchange swap markets ). these developments followed the establishment of the term auction facility ( which auctioned discount window credit to depository institutions ) and also of liquidity swaps between the federal reserve and foreign central banks, which enabled those banks to lend dollars to commercial banks in their jurisdictions. our willingness to lend in support of the commercial paper and asset - backed commercial paper markets helped to stem the runs on money market funds and other nonbank providers of short - term credit. of note, usage of these emergency liquidity facilities declined markedly as conditions in financial markets improved, indicating that they were indeed priced at a penalty to more normal market conditions. they were successfully closed, suggesting that market participants had not become overly reliant on these programs and were able to regain access to funding markets. except for the talf and the special bear stearns and aig loans, all were repaid without any losses to the federal reserve. the funding markets evidently remain somewhat vulnerable, however. just this week, with the reemergence of strains in u. s. dollar short - term funding markets in europe, the federal reserve reestablished temporary u. s. dollar liquidity swap facilities with the bank of canada, the bank of england, the european central bank, the bank of japan, and the swiss national bank. 4 lessons for handling future liquidity disruptions what lessons can be drawn from the federal reserve ’ s experience in the financial crisis when designing a toolbox for dealing with future systemic liquidity disruptions? first, the crisis has demonstrated that, in a financial system so dependent on securities markets and not just banks for the distribution of credit, our ability to preserve financial stability may be enhanced by making sure the federal reserve has authority to lend against good collateral to other classes of sound, regulated financial institutions that are central to our financial markets – not on a

addressed by service providers. ransomware one of these risks is from ransomware, which continues to be an prevalent threat to 1 / 6 bis - central bankers'speeches financial institutions. reports of these kinds of attacks have increased significantly over the past five years, with the financial crimes enforcement network ( fincen ) reporting more than 1, 400 ransomware - related bank secrecy act filings in 2021, worth nearly $ 1. 2 billion. this represents a nearly 200 percent increase over 2020 and coincides with elevated geopolitical risk. moreover, the frequency of ransomware attacks has escalated due to the emergence of ransomware - as - a - service, enabling easier deployment of these types of attacks. although ransomware impacts financial institutions of all sizes, it disproportionately impacts smaller banks that may not have sufficient resources to protect against these attacks. 2 ransomware is often delivered through phishing emails or through the unauthorized installation of malicious programs onto an organization's systems, known as " drive - bydownloads. " these tactics take advantage of those with access to a bank's internal systems, whose actions, while perhaps well - intentioned, enable the ransomware cyberattack to occur. according to the cybersecurity and infrastructure security agency, eight out of 10 organizations had at least one user fall for a phishing attempt, and one out of 10 phishing emails resulted in a user opening a malicious attachment or accessing a malicious internet link. 3 banks regularly perform exercises testing employee vulnerability to these kinds of targeted attacks. banks should continue efforts to educate those with systems access about these risks. ransomware attacks can be mitigated by bank management. by using a robust, formal risk assessment process, bank management can develop a comprehensive action plan to prevent a ransomware attack from occurring, or to reduce the impact on the bank should such an attack occur. banks that have planned ahead for a ransomware attack will be better positioned to respond when an attack occurs. use of internal and external applications software and public - facing applications are also potential targets for exploitation, requiring effective planning and implementation of patch management to address emerging and existing vulnerabilities. hackers constantly seek opportunities to exploit software holes and risks exist even with a bank's best efforts to install the most up - todate security patches. for example, often when vulnerabilities are identified, providers have not yet provided patches to address these issues, leaving the bank vulnerable to what is referred to as