be tiering in order to gain support for such a measure? we are not the only game in town, and we should not be. let me repeat the need for structural reforms. this is necessary for sustainable growth, and would give a boost to the competitiveness of many countries in the euro area. using fiscal space is another possibility for some countries. rate cuts are part of standard monetary policy tools, so it ’ s something that you should certainly think about before you consider non - standard measures like app. but overall, we have to assess whether these instruments are needed to support the transmission channel and what kind of impact and side effects they would have. 1 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches but first, i would like to see the september data and whether additional measures are needed to maintain price stability in the medium term. i would also like to assess what kind of impact these measures could have. let us not forget that we already have a very accommodative monetary policy. lending to households and firms is still high, according to the july figures ; investments are still ongoing in spite of the uncertainties. do you have a view on how low into negative territory the ecb can go? we need more analysis on what kind of impact and costs and benefits rate cuts would have. we need to look at potential side effects, for instance when would bank customers start to keep cash at home? and you asked about tiering. well, for this we need more analysis too. what is the net burden on banks and are mitigating measures necessary? the banks always bring up the gross burden, but they also benefit from the negative interest rate. so we have to consider all aspects before taking a decision. would you support more closely linking the state - dependent leg of forward guidance to inflation expectations? to plot a more explicit rate path should certain inflation conditions be met at a given point in time. i ’ m sceptical to link forward guidance solely to inflation expectations. could you envisage circumstances in which existing tltros could be repriced, in order to make them more attractive to banks? that might be, yes. we can use different tools : a change in forward guidance, tltro, rate cuts, the mitigating measures for rate cuts, depending on whether the data shows a need for them, their impact, costs and benefits. but overall, i don ’ t see the need for a huge package. recent ecb communications have consistently stressed that

. our liquidity facilities relieved pressure on markets created by mass liquidations of assets driven by the demand for cash, as did our direct purchases of treasuries. our credit facilities satisfied the cash demand of borrowers more directly. our swap lines and repo facilities with foreign central banks alleviated the shortage of dollars to satisfy dollar - denominated cash needs abroad. the result of this quite muscular intervention has been the fairly rapid return to stable market 3 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches function despite the severe pressures i have been describing. interestingly, in many cases our facilities had their effect less by actually providing liquidity or credit, than by providing a backstop. the “ announcement effect ” of the fed ’ s willingness to step in returned confidence to market participants and function to markets, without the facilities themselves seeing large amounts of use. looking back at these events since the covid event, what have we learned about the u. s. financial system? one lesson is that several short - term funding markets proved fragile and needed support – the commercial paper market and prime and tax - exempt money market funds, as key examples. the runs on prime money funds and commercial paper were particularly disappointing, since in many ways they resembled runs that we saw in these markets during the gfc. money fund reforms implemented in 2016 were followed by investors shifting away from prime money funds and towards mmfs that hold securities backed by either the u. s. government or governmentsponsored enterprises. because they hold safer assets, government funds are less fragile. at the same time, some prime funds can still “ break the buck ” by suffering losses, or can put up “ gates ” that limit redemptions. investors worried about losses at a money fund may feel some incentive to be among the first to withdraw from the fund, before it breaks the buck or puts up redemption gates in the face of large outflows. the shortening of maturities in the commercial paper market was similarly reminiscent of the gfc. it appears that these short - term funding markets remain an unstable source of funding in times of considerable financial stress. the fed and other financial agencies have accomplished a lot in requiring or encouraging market participants to rely less on unstable short - term funding, but it is worth asking whether there may be other steps needed to secure these very important sources of liquidity. a second lesson we learned last spring is that the treasury market is not immune to the problems of short - term and dollar funding markets. in