flashing lights far ahead of the 2008 global market mayhem. in order to preserve stability of the banking system throughout the crisis, resolute action had to be taken years ahead of the global financial crisis. in the period of large capital inflows, raising interest rates to tame the cycle was not a policy option due to the risk of exacerbating capital inflows even further. therefore, already in 2003, in the early phase of the cycle, the cnb started to implement a range of measures to limit excessive lending and the increase in foreign debt, which were gradually adjusted and tightened until 2007. stringent capital and liquidity requirements, way above and beyond anything we have available in the current macroprudential setup, were necessary in order to stem excessive risk - taking and instil resilience into the system to cope with a potential fallout. such measures were at that time labelled ( by banks and some of the colleagues ) " administrative " tools, but would later be classified under macroprudential policy instruments. for example, implicit tax on credit growth ( when we asked banks to subscribe zero yielding cb bonds for any euro of credit growth over 12 % per annum ), and high marginal reserve requirement on foreign borrowing by banks, together with high capital requirements. episodes of global financial crises are an excellent illustration of how macroprudential policy measures can be activated in a counter - cyclical manner. in the upward phase of the financial cycle, they were undertaken in a timely manner, with the aim of limiting banking system's exposure to risks and strengthening its resilience by building additional reserves. after 2008, in the downward phase of the cycle, this extra liquidity was released to provide support to the financial sector and the economy. the banking system remained highly capitalized and profitable at the aggregate level. only a few smaller banks left the market, and there was no need for bank resolution, apart from one regionally significant bank. a different scenario from that in a number of european countries, which went on to bail out banks at a very high fiscal cost. still, a deep recession took place during the gfc, demonstrating the need for a macro - prudential policy to work hand - in - hand with other policies. even a very tight financial regulation may fall short of fully curtailing the buildup of macro imbalances and their eventual unwinding. capital inflows came to a halt and borrowing costs surged as risk premia increased due

of diocletian in a rather negative context because of his brutal persecution of christians. however, when it 1 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches comes to governance, he was known as a great reformer. his political, administrative and economic policies helped rome recover from the crisis the empire was going through in the third century. one of his key structural reforms, and a successful one, was the reorganization of the roman provinces. and since quite a lot of money was needed to fund this reorganization, he also introduced a new tax that was a combination of the tax on agricultural land and the tax on individuals. the tax base was determined on the basis of a gigantic land register of the wealth of the entire empire, and the tax was introduced throughout the empire, including italy which was until then free of land taxation1. so, 17 centuries ago diocletian understood the importance of maintaining a sustainable fiscal position while financing reforms, and that it required boosting tax revenues through widening the tax base while making the tax system simpler and more equitable. one of the toughest struggles diocletian faced during his reign was hyperinflation. his predecessors, like many other rulers in history, had a bright idea for having more money by minting more coins. they were doing it by adding more worthless metals to the silver coins. as a result, the roman currency was losing its value, and what followed was a period of hyperinflation. by the time diocletian came to the throne, a barter economy had become the norm in many places. so, to combat inflation, diocletian reintroduced new gold and silver coins of fixed design. however, another one of diocletian's ideas to curb inflation was to set a cap on prices and wages. in year 301, he introduced his famous " edict of maximum prices ". this was a document that attempted to list every item people bought regularly and its maximum price. the edict covered all types of commodities, as well as occupations – in total about one thousand items. here are some examples : crushed beans costed 100 denarii ; uncrushed beans, 60 denarii ; writing was 25 denarii for 100 lines of best quality writing and 20 denarii for second quality writing. 2 but although the violation was punishable by death3, this measure was widely resisted, and goods disappeared from the markets creating an even larger black market, so the edict was eventually revoked.