important as a systemic shock absorber, ccp ’ s management and boards will need to continue to up their game. and we will continue to hold them to account in doing so. regulators and supervisors regulators and supervisors will need to up their game also as the importance of this infrastructure grows. as i noted at the outset, the international standards – the cpmi - iosco principles for financial market infrastructure - were developed by central banks and regulators in 2012. in the light of experience and of the growing importance of cross border financial market infrastructure, particularly ccps, these standards are now being reinforced in two main areas. first, cpmi - iosco has consulted on more granular standards for ccp resilience covering governance, stress testing, coverage and margin, as well as ccp recovery actions. the aim is to ensure both higher standards and greater consistency between jurisdictions. second, as part of its work to address the problem of ‘ too big to fail ’, the financial stability board is developing standards for the resolution of ccps, to ensure that a failure of a ccp could be resolved in an orderly way. given their role, ccps are by design systemic and need to ensure they handle risk very prudently, particularly the risks from the disorderly failure of their key counterparties – which typically consist of the systemically important global banks. ensuring that these banks are themselves able to fail safely will reduce the risks to the ccps of which they are members. but in the event of such failure, the authorities need to ensure that the ccp ’ s own recovery actions do not further amplify the stresses already in the system and that losses are apportioned and addressed in the most orderly way. all speeches are available online at www. bankofengland. co. uk / speeches this month the fsb published draft guidance on ccp resolution and resolution planning. this guidance will be finalised by the g20 meeting this july, with further work on the potential requirements for additional resources in resolution, in 2018. supervisors, too, will need to keep pace with the growing importance of financial market infrastructure given its importance to both domestic and international financial stability. the bank of england is the supervisor for financial market infrastructure firms incorporated in the uk – including those that provide truly global infrastructure. the bank supervises eleven fmis including some of the largest ccps in the world ( lch and ice clear europe respectively, by initial margin ). as the world ’ s leading international

heng swee keat : how the monetary authority of singapore had responded to the crisis and its challenges ahead acceptance speech by mr heng swee keat, managing director of the monetary authority of singapore, on receiving the banker ’ s “ central bank governor of the year in asia - pacific ” award, singapore, 11 february 2011. * * * on receiving the award and paying tribute to mas ’ staff 1. i am deeply honoured and humbled to receive the “ central bank governor of the year in asia - pacific ” award by the banker. 2. this award is a tribute to the collective contribution of the staff of the monetary authority of singapore ( mas ) who had worked hard to ensure that our monetary policy stance was appropriate for the economy during the downturn and the eventual recovery ; and to foster a sound and progressive financial system, which overall stood well under stress during the global financial crisis. several of our key management team members are here : edward robinson, andrew khoo and ng nam sin. this is also a testament to the collaborative efforts with the industry to build a resilient financial sector. i thank members present here for the roundtable, and in particular mr j y pillay, who as former md of mas, laid a strong foundation of sound central banking and regulation. how mas had responded to the crisis 3. as a small and open economy with strong linkages with the rest of the world, singapore was severely affected by the financial crisis through a sharp falloff in global trade. we experienced four consecutive quarters of sequential contraction with a cumulative output loss of 9 % – our deepest recession since independence. conversely, with the subsequent recovery in the global economy, singapore ’ s gdp rose sharply and now exceeds the level before the crisis. last year, the economy grew by an estimated 14. 7 %. 4. over the course of the crisis in 2008 / 2009, mas ’ monetary policy responses were deliberately graduated, underpinned by the objective of promoting price stability in the medium term. we did not react to every single development in the economy or the financial markets as this would have introduced unnecessary volatility and uncertainty. following the significant deterioration in external demand in late 2008, mas eased policy in october 2008 and april 2009 to provide support to the domestic economy. in early 2010, taking into account the strong recovery path of the economy and rising domestic cost pressures amidst high rates of resource utilisation, mas shifted to a modest and gradual appreciation of the s $ nee