dynamics. in some instances, in fact, circumvention of the prudential intervention through direct cross - border financing and / or lending from unregulated, non - bank financial intermediaries proved to be a major issue ; this was the case with direct limits on credit growth. a more effective role in containing systemic financial risks was played by measures specifically devised to build liquidity and loss - absorbing capital buffers, such as reserve and capital requirements. and when they were appropriately formulated, prudential regulations helped to curb the growth of foreign exchange loans and to keep default rates lower during the crisis. lessons learnt from the global crisis : in search of better regulation global financial deepening and international integration have resulted in greater risk sharing and made finance accessible to more countries, households and firms, thus proving instrumental in broadening economic development. but an interlinked and more closely connected financial system heightens the risks of contagion. most importantly, the crisis has shown that market participants were not capable of mastering the inherent complexity of the system that they themselves had developed. and it has highlighted the shortcomings of the idea that self - regulation and market discipline are sufficient to ensure stable financial systems. in this regard, accepting the concept of benign neglect was a critical mistake on the part of regulators. rather, financial regulation and supervision have to keep pace with developments in the financial industry. moreover, national authorities need to be aware of the risk that their powers may become narrow compared to the sphere of influence of the global financial players. the coordination of financial supervision across countries and across sectors is a key condition for the stability of the global financial system. 7 a major effort is required at the national but especially at the international level to strengthen the regulatory and supervisory framework. at the international level, under the political impulse of the g - 20, the financial stability board ( fsb ) and the basel committee on banking supervision have introduced substantial regulatory changes to prevent new financial crises and enhance the resilience of economic systems. much has been already achieved. the quantity of capital that banks need to hold has been significantly increased and the quality enhanced, in order to ensure that they operate on a safe and sound basis. international standards for bank liquidity and funding have also been instituted to promote the resilience of banks to liquidity shocks. initiatives have been taken to strengthen the for an analysis, see my lecture : “ the financial sector after the crisis ”, imperial business insights - imperial college,

000 people per year, more than double that of the past ten years, after averaging more than 300, 000 in the previous decade ). managing migration flows will require well - designed training and integration policies, which are indispensable for absorbing migrants into the social fabric and production system. a recovery in birth rates, from the particularly low levels of 2021, albeit desirable, would strengthen labour supply only in the very long term. italy ’ s outlook for economic growth, however, will to a large extent depend on its ability to return to levels of labour productivity that increase at a much faster pace than that observed over the past twenty - five years, and are at least equal to the average levels recorded in the other euro - area countries. since 2015, clear progress has been made : despite the contribution from investment being nil, gdp per hour worked in the private sector is growing at a rate not far from the euro - area average. bolstering this trend requires firms to continue to make investments in production to buoy the recent recovery and support technological innovation. banca d ’ italia the governor ’ s concluding remarks annual report 2022 even if corporate restructuring has helped in strengthening the economy, some unusual features, which we have discussed on several occasions in the past, continue to affect its development. the size distribution of firms is still skewed towards small or very small family - run businesses. this problem is greater still in the construction industry and in some branches of the service sector, such as the professional and the hospitality segments which, since the second half of the 1990s, have recorded very low or even negative rates of productivity growth. important regulatory changes such as the reduction of entry barriers and simpler procedures for starting up new businesses have stimulated competition and raised firms ’ efficiency levels. this confirms the fact that it is necessary to persevere with the reform agenda and overcome the obstacles and disincentives to growing in size that still exist and are often embedded in the administrative and tax regulations. tax evasion and the spread of the shadow economy continue to distort competition to the detriment of those companies with the highest potential. an innovative economy needs a well - qualified labour force, whose workers have adequate and continuously updated skills. the share of university graduates among people aged 25 - 34 years is still below 30 per cent, against the european average of over 40 per cent ( figure 11 ). the level of skills acquired is also often unsatisfactory, as shown by the surveys conducted