the same capital requirements, banking union does not mean that every banking system has the same level of capital requirements. thus, capital requirements are determined through decisions taken by microprudential supervisors with respect to pillar i and pillar ii requirements, but also through the polices implemented by macroprudential authorities with respect to the other systemically important institutions ( o - sii ) buffer and the countercyclical capital buffer ( ccyb ), for example. another aspect of banks ’ capital requirements that is relevant is the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities ( mrel ), which is decided upon by resolution authorities. supervisors must therefore cooperate and coordinate effectively with macroprudential authorities and resolution authorities – whilst respecting their differing mandates – to ensure the resilience and stability of the banking system. borrower based measures third, borrower based measures such as loan - to - income limits ( lti ) and loan - to - value limits ( ltv ) make both banks and borrowers more resilient. increased co - ordination 3 / 7 bis central bankers'speeches wider institutional fora are important when thinking about the joint responsibility ‘ authorities ’ have for financial stability. these vary in composition and mandate at national level. 9 at european level, the esrb was established in 2010 to oversee the financial system of the european union ( eu ) and prevent and mitigate systemic risk. it is an important forum which brings together representatives of eu institutions, governors of national central banks, and high level representatives of the national competent authorities. 10 for the euro area, the macroprudential forum is composed of the governing council and the supervisory board of the ecb and it is a platform for regular, high - level discussions, bringing together microprudential and macroprudential perspectives from across europe. 11 the advent of macroprudential policy has therefore coincided with and reinforced an important change in thinking about microprudential supervision. this is embedded in our framework for supervision and our tools for stress testing. effective cooperation and coordination given the multi - level and joint responsibility is critical to preserve financial stability. resolution, financial stability and prudential supervision the establishment of national resolution authorities and the single resolution board has been an important institutional development since the crisis. however, the introduction of the bank recovery and resolution directive ( brrd ) and single resolution mechanism ( srm ) goes well beyond this, and has also had a wider impact on how we supervise banks. the brrd

ministers know what measures need to be taken but do not know how they can be subsequently re - elected. ” it will not be enough to provide in the future for a greater involvement of the european parliament, however essential that may be. decisions on national budgets traditionally have been at the heart of member states ’ parliamentary democracies ; a stronger european dimension and mechanisms will have to be found by which national parliaments can be brought further into the european decision making process. the crisis, its resolution and the long term development of the emu have both a european and a domestic dimension. onto the national political system level falls the challenge of striking a new social contract, reorienting expenditure, modernising tax systems, promoting flexibility, strengthening competitiveness. in ireland we believe that if we are to stay on the path to a successful consolidation and adjustment continued efforts are needed at both national and european levels. other countries are facing or may face the same challenges. the coming years will test the ability of all our leaders to manage successfully in the interaction between the national and the european. bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches