conclude that broad and material changes to the proposals are warranted. as i said, there are benefits and costs to increasing capital requirements. the changes we intend to make will bring these two important objectives into better balance, in light of the feedback we have received. the changes to the endgame proposal have been a joint effort with my counterparts at the fdic and the occ. 1 / 8 bis - central bankers'speeches i intend to recommend that the board re - propose the basel endgame and g - sib surcharge rules. this will provide the public the opportunity to fully review a number of key broad and material changes to the original proposals and provide comment. we will accept public comments on any aspect of the basel endgame and g - sib surcharge proposals. the changes in the endgame re - proposal will cover all major areas of the rule : credit risk ; operational risk ; and market risk. banks with assets between $ 100 and $ 250 billion would no longer be subject to the endgame changes, other than the requirement to recognize unrealized gains and losses of their securities in regulatory capital. 5 these changes reflect the feedback we have received from the public, improve the tiering of the proposal, and better reflect risks. i will also recommend changes to the g - sib surcharge proposal to better align the capital surcharge for a g - sib with its systemic risk profile. taken together, the re - proposals would increase aggregate common equity tier 1 capital requirements for the g - sibs, which are the largest and most complex banks, by 9 percent. for other large banks that are not g - sibs, the impact from the re - proposal would mainly result from the inclusion of unrealized gain and losses on their securities in regulatory capital, estimated to be equivalent to a 3 to 4 percent increase in capital requirements over the long run. the remainder of the re - proposal would increase capital requirements for non - gsib firms still subject to the rule by 0. 5 percent. while these proposed changes affect some of the most important aspects of the proposals, the agencies have not made final decisions on any aspect of the reproposals, including those that are not explicitly addressed in the re - proposal. the public should not view any omission of a potential change in these re - proposals as an indication that the agencies will finalize a provision as proposed. we continue to consider comments already received on the 2023 proposal, and

adjustments to limit " window dressing " by requiring banks to report indicators as average values instead of on a point - in - time basis. it would also reduce " cliff effects " by calculating a g - sib's capital surcharge in 0. 1 percent increments 5 / 8 bis - central bankers'speeches instead of 0. 5 percent increments. and the proposal would adjust how we measure some systemic indicators to better align them with risk. 6 the goal of the 2023 proposal was to improve the risk sensitivity of the g - sib surcharge. commenters provided helpful feedback regarding the proposal's potential impact on certain types of activities, such as client clearing of derivatives. we are still considering these comments, but let me speak to areas where i will recommend making changes to the original proposal. first, i'll speak to the treatment of cleared derivatives. the proposal would have increased the extent to which client - cleared derivatives contribute to a bank's g - sib surcharge, to promote consistency of the measure. however, commenters argued that the measure might result in higher costs and more volatility for derivative end users and might reduce incentives to provide clients'access to central clearing. while it is important for our capital rules to be risk - sensitive, it is also important that we consider the impact of our rules in the broader market context. central clearing of derivatives is a critical tool that can help improve transparency and reduce systemic risk. to avoid disincentives for client clearing, i intend to recommend to the board that we not adopt the proposed changes to capital requirements associated with client clearing. second, let me speak to changes in the surcharge proposal that i will recommend to keep the measures we use up - to - date. the u. s. g - sib surcharge was set nearly nine years ago, and the growth in the economy since 2015 has meant that g - sibs'measures of systemic risk have increased, even for firms whose share of domestic or global economic activity has not increased. the board noted the potential for this effect in the original 2015 g - sib rule. while it did not provide a mechanism to automatically adjust for economic growth at that time, the board stated that it would periodically reevaluate the framework. as part of the g - sib re - proposal, i intend to recommend that we improve the calculation of the capital surcharges for g - sibs by reflecting