samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
early november. even so, historical relationships with commodity prices would have implied a much larger appreciation of the australian dollar than what's actually occurred. while history only provides a rough guide, this difference suggests that the bank's policy measures have contributed to the australian dollar being as much as 5 per cent lower than otherwise ( in trade - weighted terms ). the reserve bank's use of foreign exchange swaps i'll conclude with some news on the ways in which the bank will be making use of foreign exchange swap markets to manage our operations. for over 30 years, the reserve bank has made use of foreign exchange swaps to manage domestic liquidity. [ 3 ] these are short - term transactions ( of 3 months or less ) that alter the extent of australian dollar liquidity in the banking system. because the australian dollar flows in the near and far legs of the swaps are offsetting, they have no impact on the exchange rate. when foreign currency is acquired in this way it adds to the bank's stock of foreign exchange assets. however, because the swaps are due to be unwound within a few months at most, they are not considered to be part of the bank's foreign exchange reserves available for policy purposes. up till now, the bank has held foreign currency reserves on an outright basis to satisfy its policy needs. this includes the capacity for intervention in the spot foreign exchange market. we also need foreign exchange to assist the australian government in meeting its foreign currency commitments to the imf ( which in turn supports the fund's lending activities ). to meet this specific need we have decided to start acquiring foreign currency via swaps over longer terms. by using sufficiently long - term swaps – with initial durations of 2 years or more – the bank will be able to minimise any rollover risks and hence can treat the foreign exchange acquired in this way as part of its foreign currency liquidity. [ 5 ] and in contrast to outright holdings, foreign exchange swaps do not entail any foreign exchange risk and therefore do not require capital to be held against these positions. [ 6 ] many other central banks and finance ministries use long - term swaps in the management of their foreign exchange reserves. for the reserve bank, outright holdings will continue to represent the vast majority of the bank's foreign currency liquidity. currently, outright holdings are worth around us $ 35 billion. foreign currency will be obtained through long - term swaps over a period of

##laimer notice. © reserve bank of australia, 2001 – 2021. all rights reserved. the reserve bank of australia acknowledges the aboriginal and torres strait islander peoples of australia as the traditional custodians of this land, and recognises their continuing connection to country. we pay our respects to their elders, past, present and emerging.
bank continuing success. thank you, mr. chairman.

risks reflecting the global macroeconomic situation – moderate growth, high unemployment, and low indices reflecting consumer confidence and business confidence. these, of course, also have an effect on the domestic macroeconomic risk, which reflects moderate growth. in contrast, the market risk indices, both in israel and globally, are at low levels, which creates a gap – both in israel and abroad – between the real situation and the investors ’ risk philosophy. this gap is apparently affected by the search for yields in a low interest - rate environment, but it is possible that expectations of an increase in corporate profits that will accompany the recovery also have an effect. bis central bankers ’ speeches a view of the business sector ’ s sources of financing indicates that the trend of a decline in the weight of bank credit and an increase in the weight of domestic nonbank credit – through corporate bonds and recently through direct loans from institutional investors as well – that we witnessed since the beginning of the century continues even after the global crisis of 2008 – 9 ( slide 12 ). this is obviously a positive process, in that it increases and variegates the sources of financing to the business sector, creates competition for the banks and acts to reduce the cost of financing, thereby supporting growth. however, the process is also accompanied by the creation of risks that must be addressed. among other things, these reflect the fact that the nonbank credit market has developed rapidly, while its regulation is developing gradually. during the global crisis, most of the negative impact to the financial system in israel was reflected in this market : yields in the market skyrocketed and issuances froze. in total, more than 100 companies have entered debt restructuring proceedings thus far – representing bonds totaling about nis 40 billion. it is important to emphasize that this number does not represent the scope of the loss absorbed by investors, which will naturally be lower ( slide 13 ). since the global crisis, as a lesson from global developments as well as developments in israel, in order to reduce the risks of a crisis and to reduce the damage of a crisis should one take place, many measures are being taken in the field of regulation that are intended to reinforce the durability of the financial institutions and system. regulations have been updated in the field of corporate governance and risk management at the banks ; the basel iii guidelines have been adopted in the area of capital requirements, and rules in the area of liquidity and leverage will be adopted ; the use of stress tests to identify risks in institutions
r basant roi : present challenges of monetary policy in mauritius address by mr r basant roi, governor of the bank of mauritius, at the annual dinner with major economic stakeholders, sugar beach resort, 28 november 2003. * * * ladies and gentlemen good evening i am pleased to welcome you to the bank of mauritius annual dinner. right from the year i set the tradition of holding an annual dinner with the major economic stakeholders in the country i focused mostly on regulatory and supervisory issues in my addresses. intentionally, i chose certain regulatory and supervisory issues as the leading themes of my addresses for reasons that i strongly believe should be clearer by now. tonight i shall briefly outline the present challenges of our monetary policy in the context of an external environment characterized by uncertainties. before i proceed with the main theme of my address let me reiterate a few remarks i made in the post february 2003 months this year. the perceptions that emerged in the wake of the discovery of a fraud at the mauritius commercial bank ( mcb ) inevitably make it compelling that i should re - emphasize some of the remarks. the guiding principle of any regulatory and supervisory authority in any economic and financial system is to first and foremost attempt to save troubled financial institutions. the legal frameworks of regulatory and supervisory authorities are designed to promote financial stability rather than to jeopardize financial stability. this is what is envisioned in the bank of mauritius and the banking acts. the acts are an instrument that empowers the bank of mauritius to promote and sustain monetary and financial stability. regulatory and supervisory authorities the world over do not use any of the provisions of their laws to defeat the very objective of the laws. arbitrary decisions motivated by emotional or even personal considerations should be set aside in favour of a genuinely professional approach of sustaining the soundness of banks in situations similar to the one the mauritius commercial bank found itself in. the regulatory and supervisory authority cannot but exercise its independence of mind. without being presumptuous the mcb / npf case was handled by the bank of mauritius in a manner that best serves the interests of our financial sector and of our economy. i should like to re - underline that supervision of banks is control and procedure oriented and not transaction oriented. viewed in the light of determined steps taken by the mcb in the realm of risk management along with a number of other prudential measures taken in the months after the discovery of the fraud, the mcb / npf case is expected to be over soon as far as

the years ahead. in an uncertain external environment the bank has so far charted the best possible course to support non - inflationary growth. the bank will pursue the course in the same spirit. may i on behalf of the board of directors of the bank of mauritius and on my own behalf wish you and your family merry xmas and a happy new year.
can rely on the enormous strengths of this institution : excellent leadership on the board and in the reserve banks and unmatched expertise and experience in the staff. mr. president, as you know, on september 11, 2001, and the days that followed, vice chairman roger w. ferguson, jr., who just swore me in, and many members of the federal reserve staff - - here, in new york and around the country - - worked inexhaustibly to ensure the continued functioning and recovery of the american financial system. the dedication and knowledge demonstrated that day by so many people exemplifies why the federal reserve as an institution is far more than any single individual. to my board colleagues and to the staff here today, i would like to say thank you for your service to your country and to the world. i am happy to be back among you and look forward to working with you in the days and years ahead. together i am confident that we will meet whatever challenges the future may bring. thank you all for coming.

challenges. assessments of the appropriateness of a transaction for a client traditionally have required firms to determine if the transaction is consistent with the financial sophistication, financial condition, and investment policies of the customer. given recent events, it is appropriate to raise the bar on appropriateness assessments in the approval process for complex structured transactions by taking into account the business purpose and economic substance of the transaction. when firms provide advice on, arrange, or actively participate in a complex structured finance transaction, they may assume legal and reputational risks if the end - user enters into the transaction for improper purposes. firms should have effective and consistent policies and procedures that require a thorough review of the business purposes and economic substance of the transaction by all relevant functional areas and an assessment of any legal or reputational risks posed by the transaction. in instances that present heightened legal or reputational risk, the policies and procedures should require a review, by appropriate senior management, of the customer ’ s business relationship with the firm. of course, these policies and procedures need to be supported and enforced by a strong tone at the top and a firm - wide culture of compliance. conclusion the evolution of the financial markets and the number of significant governance issues recently faced by complex financial firms clearly underscore the need to view risk management on an enterprise - wide basis. an integral part of a robust legal and reputational risk - management function is a strong compliance program. for such programs to be effective in complex financial institutions, compliance must be addressed on an enterprise - wide basis.
reserve bank not to overreact to exchange rate weakness. too quick a tightening of monetary policy could endanger the growth prospects of south africa and encourage an outflow of capital. this would put greater and more lasting pressure on the exchange rate of the rand with important consequences for inflation. besides, if the factors responsible for the weakness in the exchange rate are taken into consideration it seems unlikely that a tightening of monetary policy would have the desired effect of more stability in the foreign exchange market. the policy stance adopted by the authorities does not imply that the value of the exchange rate is regarded as unimportant when setting monetary policy. on the contrary, the impact of exchange rate changes on inflation is carefully taken into account when managing domestic liquidity and determining the repo rate. if signs do emerge of increased inflationary pressures arising from a depreciation of the exchange rate of the rand, the reserve bank will not hesitate to take appropriate measures. 6. conclusion the domestic financial markets have adjusted in a mature manner to the rise in oil prices, adverse developments in other parts of sub - saharan africa, the strength of the dollar and heightened volatility in international financial markets during the first four months of 2000. had the reserve bank attempted to intervene in the currency market in order to slow the process of adjustment to these events, the success of the intervention would have probably been thwarted if only by the strength of the dollar. moreover, such intervention may well have exacerbated the downward pressure on the value of the rand. the bank accordingly has rather attempted to maintain stability in the domestic money market. in view of the sound underlying economic conditions in the country, we are of the opinion that this is the correct approach to follow and should eventually lead to stable market conditions at the least cost to the country. the bank will nevertheless carefully monitor any further developments in the financial markets. “ we are indeed living in challenging times! ”

continue to firmly support economic activity. if the outlook presented in the july outlook report will be realized, the bank will accordingly continue to raise the policy interest rate and adjust the degree of monetary accommodation.
situations, especially liquidity provision and the supportive legal framework. these four pillars, in my view, are the key minimums for implementing an effective financial - stability orientation policy. thank you.

the role of chairman. this is a simple point, but quite often overlooked, that is during the meeting, the chairman should always try to create an atmosphere conducive for independent participation of all board members. it is also much more effective if the positions of chairman and ceo are not held by one and the same person. if one individual performs both roles simultaneously, then other board members cannot fully perform their duties of providing a check - and - balance. this is inevitable in the context of our culture which tries to avoid being disrespectful to others. moreover, if the ceo acts as chairman, he can easily influence the agenda and delay bringing certain issues to the attention of the board. eighth, on the appointment of an independent director, an independent director should not conduct any business relating to banking operations. by doing so, it may give rise to the problem of conflict of interests. an independent director should be one who is willing to stake out an independent view honestly. however, to expect a suitable individual to have no business background or business connection at all may be somewhat too ambitious. such requirement will screen out individuals with understanding of banking businesses to assume the duty of bank directors. the requirement about business affiliation is merely a broad and general guideline. all in all, i want to focus on certain qualities which are more imperative to achieving good governance. this must start from personal qualities, such as an affinity to be independent, individualistic with high moral grounds and integrity ; and a desire to express his opinion independently and honestly. ninth, is the issue i raised last year on “ the remuneration of board members ” which has been added to the principles of good directorship. i would like to propose that board remuneration not be tied to the future stock price of the bank nor solely linked to profits alone. the point is that if the bonus of board members is tied to the future stock price, it might critically affect the bank in the way that occurred in the cases of enron or world com. when management proposes any project that might raise the company ’ s stock price, although a high risk project, board member might give less weight to the risk aspect. thus, the check - and - balance of management power will automatically decline. moreover, the increased price of stock may not only result from the specific bank operation, but also attributed to general improvement in economic conditions and favourable stock market environment. if the remuneration of board members varies solely with the profits of
protecting consumers while ensuring that creditors continue to provide credit responsibly. an important part of my research as an economics professor at the university of chicago, and my practical policy work as a member of the council of economic advisers, was devoted to banking and financial regulation as well as banking and financial crises. the safety and soundness of the u. s. banking and payments systems is critical to achieving economic growth, maximum employment, and general economic stability, and the federal reserve works closely with other regulators to achieve this goal. the federal reserve also has an important role to play in responding to and mitigating the impact of financial crises and shocks. if confirmed, i would continue to work vigorously to protect and promote the safety and soundness of the system. thank you once again for holding this hearing, and i look forward to your questions.

, the 3 % maastricht level. for example, the target in the czech republic is not to exceed 4 % of gdp in 2006. nonetheless, it has not yet been fully appreciated that upon eu accession, the stability and growth pact will become relevant to the new member states. admittedly, the application of sanctions will be postponed until a country becomes a member of the eurozone. but even if a country is not a subject to sanctions, as a member of the eu club it should have in place at least a credible programme towards achieving its objectives. moreover, if a country targets relatively early eurozone entry, it should first create a sufficient safety margin above the 3 % deficit limit to be insured against distress - i. e. it should avoid the mistake that has been made by some of the current eurozone members concerning the s & g pact. i hope that the uncertainty surrounding the pact ’ s future would not be viewed as an excuse for delaying necessary fiscal and structural adjustments. even if redefined in a more flexible way, it is quite clear that the structural deficits currently observed in many of the cecs will not be tolerable under the pact, as they will not pass the sustainability and policy mix tests. therefore, the existence of the s & g pact makes the case for fiscal consolidation even more appealing than it might look at first sight. to conclude, let me wish you a very fruitful discussion during this conference, as well as a very pleasant stay in prague. thank you for your attention.
entire financial system. we definitely cannot afford to find ourselves in a situation like 2008 again. with your question, you seem to doubt that there is the political will. it is the task of independent institutions, such as the ecb, to tell politicians that they have to adopt a responsible financial policy. i do not underestimate the difficulties that democracies face in taking painful decisions. but it is obvious that several industrialised countries have been living on credit. the richest countries in the world have made the less rich and poorer ones finance them, which is not sustainable and, in the end, will not be sustained! that applies to a number of industrialised countries on both sides of the atlantic.

jean - claude trichet : interview in frankfurter allgemeine zeitung ( faz ) interview with mr jean - claude trichet, president of the european central bank, in frankfurter allgemeine zeitung, germany, conducted by messrs gerald braunberger and stefan ruhkamp on 19 may 2010 and published on 21 may 2010. * * * faz : mr president, many germans are asking themselves whether our money is still safe. what do you have to say to them? trichet : the european central bank has a track record of successfully meeting its objective of keeping inflation below, but close to, 2 % over the medium term. for over 11 years since its establishment – including the current period – the ecb has succeeded in doing just that. over this entire period, we have achieved an average annual inflation rate of less than 2 %, but close to 2 %, in the euro area. and in germany it is even significantly lower. the facts speak for themselves. no central bank in europe – not even the deutsche bundesbank – has achieved such a low rate of inflation over such a long period of time. faz : but the fear is that the ecb is getting itself into a situation where it no longer has complete freedom to act. trichet : we have full freedom to act, and we will never shy away from our responsibility for delivering medium - term price stability, also in difficult circumstances. in france i was at times called the “ ayatollah of franc fort ” ( a play on words on “ strong franc ” ) or a “ clone ” of the president of the deutsche bundesbank at the time, hans tietmeyer. in 2004 the german and french governments tried to pressure us into cutting interest rates. i said on behalf of the governing council that the ecb refused to do this. in december 2005 we increased rates against the publicly expressed sentiment of ten governments! in 2008 we did not hesitate to raise interest rates, even in a period of financial turbulence. we don ’ t allow ourselves to be influenced by any government, any social partner or any kind of pressure group. we act always fully in line with our own responsibilities. and that is the reason why we have delivered price stability. faz : but by purchasing government bonds, you ’ ve crossed a red line. has the credibility of the ecb suffered as a result? trichet : there has been no crossing of any line. our line