, for hedge funds − have proven to be difficult to agree on, and, therefore, bis central bankers ’ speeches the issue of classification has been left to the discretion of reporters. this is far from being an optimal solution. the bundesbank therefore is calling for the development of an international business register. 4. 2 insurance sector insurance companies are in the focus of macroprudential surveillance because of their function as risk brokers and their role as financial intermediaries. however, there is a striking contrast between the economic and financial relevance of insurance companies and the relatively scarce amount of statistical data at hand. this has prompted the eurosystem to launch an initiative geared to setting up new statistics on insurance companies and pension funds at the european level. actually, initial sets of data have been produced, but, as many central banks lack their own data collection systems for insurance data, much of the information has to be imported, on an aggregated basis, from supervisory sources. this necessitates the data having to be heavily supported, for analytical purposes, by in - house estimates. but, to be clear on this point : statisticians have to abstain from becoming “ nowcasters ” or “ forecasters ”. even after the implementation of solvency ii blind spots will continue to exist. for instance, there will be no new data on pension funds. moreover, data timeliness and data frequency will have to be significantly improved. this means that there is still need for an additional ecb regulation on insurance statistics. a strong case for statistical cooperation the days when statistics was just about number crunching clearly are history. i regard a statistician as someone who is confident of his skills, well trained in economic analysis, and closely integrated in an institutional network ruled by proven, time - honored principles. moreover, a cooperative spirit is called for, paired with a sense of accountability and responsibility. and these are the same construction principles to be followed when it comes to building stable bridges between the various statistical fora and systems. seen against the background of the current debate on the future of the committee on monetary, financial and balance of payments statistics ( cmfb ), let me express my hope that everyone in europe fully appreciates the high value of good partnership. in that respect, the cmfb is not only a body, but rather a concept. i am sure that no one in europe would understand why it should be a good idea to abolish the cmfb, especially in

will emphasize the nordic perspective, but with finnish twist : finland being the only country in the nordic region which is also a member of the euro area, and thus by definition a full participant to the banking union project. why a banking union? [ slide 2 ] the crisis since 2008 has made it clear that a highly interconnected and integrated financial sector requires a stronger institutional framework than what we currently have. • a problem at one bank can quickly spread to other banks both at home and beyond national borders with devastating effects on the real economy and taxpayers. • the crisis led to a sudden stop of capital flows within europe, as banks withdrew from foreign operations and financial integration took serious setbacks. bis central bankers ’ speeches • in 2010 it became desperately evident that the bank and sovereign risks are tightly interconnected with two - way causality. all in all, the mismatch between the scope of bank operations and the institutional supervisory framework made the situation extremely challenging. as lord mervyn king so tellingly put it, “ ( global ) banks are international in life but national in death ”. credibility of national supervision has suffered because of three reasons. • first, national mandates of the supervisors led to inability to handle cross - border challenges. • second, the so called regulatory capture i. e. close relationships between banks and the supervisor led to excessive forbearance on the part of supervisors. • third, the large “ publicly influenced ” financial sector in europe weakened the credibility of public authorities. regaining of confidence in the banking sector is a necessary condition for reversing the recent financial fragmentation in the eu, and for restoring a normal interbank market with capital mobility. • confidence and capital mobility are also important for restoring economic growth in the area and putting the single market programme back on track. • let me emphasize that public authorities play only a part in this work. financial institutions and their stakeholders also have a very important role, in redefining business strategies, governance and risk management procedures, and strengthening their capital positions. key elements of the banking union [ slide 3 ] the first main element of the banking union is the single rule book for supervision. • this is based on the idea of identical regulatory requirements ( such as capital adequacy rules ) for banks. these are achieved through european regulations or binding standards issued by the european banking authority ( eba ), while leaving leeway for national authorities to impose stricter requirements nationally for macroprudential reasons – e. g. in order