a bayesian vector autoregression ( var ) which includes variables that affect wealth – house and stock prices – and variables that affect income – the unemployment rate and wages. 13 the app shock is identified by assuming ( i ) that it affects the term - spread on impact, without leading to a change in standard monetary policy over the full sample14under analysis ( which spans three years ) and ( ii ) that it has a positive effect on the real economy, on impact. 15 the shock is scaled to a term - spread reduction by 34 basis points, which is the estimated level of the impact of the announcement of the december 2016 app package on the euro area 10 - year bond rates. this implies that the size of the impact considered in the estimates presented in the charts below is smaller than the total effect of our unconventional policies from 2014 to 2016. the analysis is nevertheless representative and conclusive regarding the distributional impact of our monetary policy. the var estimated for the four largest euro area countries shows a degree of heterogeneity across the countries that can be taken as representative of the dispersion that would be found in all other euro area countries ( see chart 4 ). 5 / 14 bis central bankers'speeches chart 5 below shows the four countries ’ average reaction to the relevant variables ( house and stock prices, unemployment and wages ), four quarters after the impact of the app shock. 16 6 / 14 bis central bankers'speeches the app purchases are estimated to increase house prices by more than 1 % and stock prices by 0. 8 %. as for the variables, which affect household income ( in the bottom two panels ) : the unemployment rate declines by roughly 0. 7 percentage points, while wages rise somewhat. 17 in the second step, these aggregate results are combined with household - level data to estimate the effects of monetary policy on individual households. the hfcs provides detailed householdlevel data on income and wealth, but so far only for two waves. however, since the bulk of the effect on wealth occurs via asset prices, we can assume that the response of individual wealth components to the app after four quarters mirrors the response of asset prices at that horizon. 18 the assumption seems acceptable given the short horizon we are considering and 7 / 14 bis central bankers'speeches given the empirical evidence on the sluggishness of adjustment of holdings of real and also financial assets in household portfolios. 19 as for net wealth, chart 6 shows that the effects of the app on

mr meyer reports on lessons from recent global financial crises remarks by mr laurence h meyer, member of the board of governors of the us federal reserve system, before the international finance conference, federal reserve bank of chicago, held on 1 october 1999. * * * on the principle that mistakes teach us as much as, if not more than, successes, i will take this opportunity to consider what can be learned to improve bank supervision and regulation from the financial crises that afflicted so many economies over the past 2½ years. i will consider two episodes – the asian financial crisis and the financial market turmoil surrounding the near - bankruptcy of the hedge fund long - term capital management ( ltcm ). because these episodes are too recent and too complicated to draw many firm conclusions that lead to concrete policy recommendations, part of my objective today is to identify some areas where i believe that further study would be particularly productive. the two crises the details of these two episodes are familiar to everyone here. the floating of the thai baht in july 1997 marked the onset of a period of market turbulence associated with the halting of new funds to and, in most cases, the flight of existing money from, many economies in southeast asia. because many entities in those nations relied on short - term funding in foreign currency for their ongoing operations, the drying up of funding from global financial markets quickly placed serious strains on them. and because the lines between the private and official sectors were often drawn imprecisely, these funding problems for firms soon became the burdens of national governments. such pressures, unfortunately, exposed numerous and substantial flaws in some of these financial systems, including lax lending policies, substantial mismatches in the maturities and foreign exchange denominations of assets and liabilities, seriously deficient standards for disclosure of basic private financial information, hedges based on erroneous presumptions about the correlations among returns, the failure to monitor ongoing loan performance, and the inadequacy of reserves against potential losses. in autumn 1998, we in the major industrial countries were reminded that emerging market economies did not have a monopoly on financial institutions that were inadequate in the task of assessing risks. the effective default of the government of russia on some of its obligations and the travails of ltcm in rebuilding its capital in the face of enormous trading losses – occurring as they did so soon after the crisis in asia – triggered a generalized reassessment of risk - taking by investors and market makers. interest rate risk spreads widened