samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
tensions or potential crises and to prevent italy ’ s future generations from inheriting higher debt and lower income. designed and printed by the printing and publishing division of the bank of italy

encouraged to prudently leverage on technology to reinforce their controls against fraud or financial crimes. criminals and money launderers never “ sleep. ” they are unfazed by the virus. the bangko sentral ng pilipinas therefore continues to be pro - active, alert, and determined to keep watch against financial crimes and money laundering activities. as bsp governor and chairman of the anti - money laundering council, i assure you that we will 1 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches continue to work for an internationally compliant and effective anti - money laundering regime, which will provide the filipino people with a sound, dynamic, and strong financial system in an environment that is conducive to the promotion of social justice, political stability, and sustainable economic growth. in closing, let me thank our speakers from the international monetary fund, bank de france, and the anti - money laundering council secretariat who have graciously shared their time and expertise to be with us in this webinar. they have been carefully chosen to help webinar participants learn how international institutions have developed a protective and responsive infrastructure against money laundering activities. thank you very much and stay safe always! 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches
central bankers ’ speeches

gent sejko : prospects and challenges facing albania statement by mr gent sejko, governor of the bank of albania, at the conclusion of discussions on the eighth review of the arrangement with the international monetary fund, tirana, 28 june 2016. * * * in the last two weeks we have been engaged in intensive discussions with imf mission representatives, in the framework of the review of the imf arrangement. the discussions focused on : the analysis of the current situation of the albanian economy and financial system ; identification of development prospects and challenges facing albania ; and the policies to be implemented with a view to supporting the country's development. the conclusions of our discussions may be summarised in three main points : ( i ) economic activity appears upward and the development outlook remains positive. ( ii ) yet, the external environment is unfavourable and the albanian economy continues to face structural weaknesses, which decelerate the pace of growth. ( iii ) therefore, the monetary and fiscal policies should continue to generate a prudent economic stimulus, whereas structural reforms should accelerate their pace. in this context, the bank of albania deems that the arrangement with the imf and the measures envisaged as part of the eighth review provide a consistent framework for drafting and implementing a programme for the country ’ s development. let me now present in greater detail the opinion of the bank of albania. the growth pace of the albanian economy continues to show progressive improvement. the improvement reflects the expansion of domestic demand - that is increase in consumption and private investments - whereas foreign demand appears weak and fiscal policy continues the consolidating trend. the new information obtained in the first half of the year is in line with this judgement. the intensity of supply shocks, which led to the rapid decline in inflation over the first half of the year, seems to decrease. inflation recorded a slight increase in may, reaching at 0. 7 %. this performance confirms our judgement about the transitory nature of the abovementioned shocks. however, our analyses confirm that the balance of inflationary pressures is still weak. economic activity remains below potential, suggesting that the return of inflation to target will be a gradual and medium - term phenomenon. our monetary policy has assumed a stronger stimulating stance over 2016. after two consecutive cuts in april and may, the key interest rate currently stands at 1. 25 %. the strengthening of the monetary stimulus has led to lowering the interest rates across all segments of the financial market, thus stimulating the
, i would be pleased to take your questions and begin our discussion. 2 / 2 bis - central bankers'speeches

target will be slow, and risks remain. overall, our outlook for both growth and inflation is largely unchanged from when we were here in october. economic growth is expected to be modest in 2024 - weak in the first half before picking up around the middle of the year and rising to about 2½ % in 2025. with downward and upward forces largely offsetting in the near term, cpi inflation is expected to remain close to 3 % over the first half of this year. it is then expected to ease to about 2½ % by year end and return to target in 2025. let me give you a sense of governing council's monetary policy deliberations. at our decision last week, there was a clear consensus to maintain our policy rate at 5 %. we also discussed where we see the economy and inflation going and what that could mean for monetary policy going forward. what came through in the deliberations is that governing council's discussion about future policy is shifting from whether monetary policy is restrictive enough to how long to maintain the current restrictive stance. that doesn't mean we have ruled out further policy rate increases. if new developments push inflation higher, we may still need to raise rates. but what it does mean is that if the economy evolves broadly in line with the projection we published last week, i expect future discussions will be about how long we maintain the policy rate at 5 %. governing council is concerned about the persistence of underlying inflation. we want to see inflationary pressures continue to ease and clear downward momentum in underlying inflation. we also discussed the risks to the economy and inflation. we are trying to balance the risks of over - and under - tightening. we don't want to cool the economy more than necessary. but we don't want canadians to have to continue to live with elevated inflation either. we remain focused on a number of indicators of underlying inflationary pressures. we need to see further and sustained easing of core inflation. with the economy now looking to be in modest excess supply, demand pressures have abated. corporate pricing behaviour has continued to normalize. at the same time, measures of near - term inflation expectations and wage growth suggest that underlying inflationary pressures remain. let me conclude. we've come a long way from the inflation peak in 2022. monetary policy is working, and we need to continue to let it work. we remain resolute in our commitment to return inflation to the 2 % target. with that summary
a depreciation of about 15 per cent. an ex post analysis of the composition of the capital in - and outflows of last year provides interesting information for a better understanding of the changes that took place. initially, it was mainly a sudden reversal in the inflow of short - term capital in the form of inter - bank and trade related financing arrangements that triggered the shortages in the market for foreign exchange. as the exchange rate depreciated and south african residents became more concerned about possible losses on foreign currency exposures, long - term foreign loans were repaid without replacement or extensions. south africans with existing short - and long - term foreign currency commitments covered their positions forward, and the reserve bank ’ s forward exchange book showed a sharp increase of the net oversold position. in the fourth quarter of last year, when short - term capital began to flow back again, there was a net outflow from the private sector of r6 billion in the form of longer - term capital, mostly for the repayment of maturing loans. another interesting feature of the international capital flows last year was that foreigners remained important net portfolio investors in south african securities. non - residents increased their holdings of south african equities listed on the johannesburg stock exchange by r5. 3 billion, and added a net amount of r3. 4 billion to their holdings of south african bonds acquired through the south african bond market. this ostensibly “ volatile ” element of the capital flows was therefore not responsible for the problems that developed in the south african balance of payments last year. 2. monetary policy faced with new challenges in a situation of a deteriorating balance of payments the abrupt decline in the capital inflows from abroad in the first quarter of 1996 confronted the monetary policy authorities with an unexpected new challenge. since 1994, the reserve bank ’ s policy on international financial relations was to rebuild the country ’ s depleted official foreign reserves gradually, to relax the exchange controls on a step - by - step basis, and to restructure the market in foreign exchange gradually with the objective of enabling a more efficient market to determine not only the spot foreign exchange rate of the rand, but also the forward rate. good progress was made on this road during 1994 and 1995, but the country was surely not yet in a position to withstand the adverse developments of early 1996, or to protect the exchange rate of the rand against a series of determined attacks in a rather vulnerable situation. the reserve bank realised that it was not in a position

support strong sustainable balanced growth around the world. bis central bankers ’ speeches
than before the crisis. as for the european system of central banks, i can assure you that we stand ready to act as forcefully as necessary to ensure price stability and preserve the integrity of the euro, which is, today, our most precious common good. bis central bankers ’ speeches

quarter more than the labour costs. as the third row in figure 10 suggests, if volunteering activities are similar in nature, there is a case for scaling - up our estimates of output by a similar amount. • the final issue, outlined on the fourth row of figure 10, is about comparing volunteers with paid workers. in carrying out the same activity as a paid employee, volunteers may be more enthusiastic, but also less capable. i am more enthusiastic about painting a shed than my local decorator, but also less competent. so it is not altogether clear whether the wages of paid workers are good proxies for volunteering value or not, with uncertainties on both sides. the final row in figure 10 offers estimates of the overall contribution of volunteering to the uk economy. it suggests this could exceed £50 billion per year, or around 3. 5 % of annual uk gdp. this would place the volunteering sector on a level pegging with the uk energy sector ( both extraction and utilities ). very few sectors add more value. clearly, the inner layer of the volunteering onion – economic value – is a very significant one. these new estimates can be found at http : / / www. ons. gov. uk / ons / about - ons / business - transparency / freedomof - information / what - can - i - request / published - ad - hoc - data / econ / august - 2014 / hhsa - consistent - estimates - of - thevalue - of - informal - voluntary - activity - in - 2012 - 13. xls. this calculation uses the following industries : professional and support services ; distribution, transport, hotels and restaurants ; government, health and education ; and other services. the calculation also includes an adjustment for “ mixed income ” – that is, the income of the self - employed that is classified separately in the national accounts but which arguably reflects a return to labour rather than capital. bis central bankers ’ speeches private value of volunteering the second layer of the onion is the private benefit from volunteering. this might sound fluffier than a gdp - equivalent measure. yet even the hardest - nosed economist would recognise the existence of those private benefits. why else would anyone volunteer in the first place! volunteering is a prime example of revealed preference theory in practice. surveys of individuals overwhelmingly support this conjecture. the 2006 / 07 helping out survey of volunteers found a range of benefits including enjoyment, satisfaction and achievement, meeting people and
should be taken to mitigate moral hazard, avoid adverse selection, and ensure that the financial interests of the taxpayer are adequately safeguarded.

##igation arrangement between the lender or servicer and the distressed borrower. the federal reserve, in conjunction with the other federal banking agencies ( which include the office of the comptroller of the currency, the federal deposit insurance corporation, and the office of thrift supervision ), the conference of state bank supervisors and the national credit union administration, has issued guidance urging lenders and servicers to pursue such arrangements, when feasible and prudent, as an alternative to foreclosure. for the lender, servicer, and investor, working out a distressed loan with a struggling borrower makes economic sense if the net present value ( npv ) of the payments under a loss - mitigation strategy exceeds the npv of proceeds that would be received in foreclosure. loss mitigation can be advantageous to both the borrower and the lender because the costs associated with foreclosure can be very substantial. historically, the foreclosure process has usually taken from a few months up to a year and a half, depending on state law and whether the borrower files for bankruptcy. anecdotal evidence suggests that the time to complete a foreclosure has been increasing recently, as the number of foreclosures has risen and the average time that properties remain on the market has lengthened. the losses to lenders and investors from foreclosures include not only the missed mortgage payments during that period, but also the costs of taxes, legal and administrative fees, real estate owned sales commissions, and maintenance expenses. additional losses arise from the often significant reduction in value when a property is repossessed even in stable housing markets, particularly if the property is unoccupied for some period. in fact, a recent estimate based on subprime mortgages foreclosed in the fourth quarter of 2007 indicated that total losses exceeded 50 percent of the principal balance. whether the losses are that large in all cases is difficult to know, but what is known is that the foreclosure process itself destroys considerable value. the existence of such costs raises the real prospect that, by restructuring distressed loans in those cases in which the borrower wants to stay in the home, borrowers, lenders, servicers, and investors may all be able to achieve a better outcome than is attainable if the foreclosure process is allowed to run its course. lenders, servicers, and investors have historically relied on repayment
the monetary policy stance and will re - calibrate its instruments accordingly, with a view to delivering the monetary policy impulse that is still necessary to secure a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation in a way that is consistent with our monetary policy aim. 1 for additional detail, see my remarks at the belgian financial forum colloquium on “ the low interest rate 5 / 6 bis central bankers'speeches environment ”, in brussels, on 4 may 2017. 2 for further detail on this mechanism, see my speeches at the ecb and its watchers xviii conference in frankfurt am main, on 6 april 2017 ; as well as my remarks at the fixed income market colloquium in rome on 4 july 2017. 6 / 6 bis central bankers'speeches

other hand, the further decline of capital and money market interest rates observed since january 2015 carries the risk of a renewed increase in imbalances on the swiss mortgage and residential real estate markets over the medium term. first, compared to alternative assets, investments in real estate appear to have become more attractive for banks, commercial investors and households. in the residential investment property segment in particular, additional demand from investors searching for yield might push prices up further. second, the unprecedented interest rate environment creates additional incentives for banks to incur higher interest rate and credit risks. they might be tempted to increase both maturity transformation and lending to compensate for the additional pressure on margins and to stabilise short - term profitability. such strategies would further increase banks ’ exposure to large interest rate shocks and to a correction on the mortgage and real estate markets. given these risks to financial stability, banks and authorities should remain alert and, if necessary, take measures to contain such risks. in particular, should momentum on the mortgage and residential real estate markets pick up again, additional measures might become necessary. in this regard, particular attention should be paid to the investment property segment. this segment is more likely to be materially affected by the additional demand from investors searching for yield in the current environment. furthermore, the measures taken so far have predominantly addressed the segment of owner - occupied residential real estate. for its part, the snb will continue to monitor developments on the mortgage and real estate markets closely, and will reassess the need for an adjustment to the countercyclical capital buffer on a regular basis. bis central bankers ’ speeches
better : how big are green spending multipliers? ”, imf working paper no 2021 / 087. 8 / 9 bis central bankers'speeches 9 see, for example, acemoglu, d. and autor, d. h. ( 2011 ), “ skills, tasks and technologies : implications for employment and earnings ”, in ashenfelter, o. and card, d., editors, handbook of labor economics, vol. 4, chapter 12, pp. 1043 – 1171, elsevier. 9 / 9 bis central bankers'speeches

concern, and should be addressed using the macro - prudential instruments available. what are the priorities to restore strong and sustainable growth? governments should not view the current period of low interest rates and favourable market sentiment as an invitation to abandon the path of fiscal prudence, but rather to accelerate reforms aimed at freeing up growth opportunities. first, the crisis has shown that fiscal credibility needs to be earned. delivering on past commitments under the eu framework is essential for this. this means that governments have to continue on their path towards resilient public finances. they should stick to the rules they have agreed under the new eu fiscal framework and not stretch them to the point where the credibility of this framework would be harmed. in the long term, there is no trade - off between growth and sound public finances. lower levels of public debt are needed to support a sustainable recovery. there is such a trade - off in the short term but, in order to mitigate negative growth effects, consolidation efforts should focus on those budget items that do not add to, or perhaps even stand in the way of, dynamic and inclusive growth. second, structural reforms should focus on those areas that may hinder productive potential. this means overturning excessive regulations that protect vested interests and harm the common good ; and creating a stable institutional landscape that enhances productivity and allows private operators to focus on innovation, growth and job creation. the euro area faces a major investment shortfall, with real capital expenditures being almost 20 % lower than their pre - crisis level, and as much as over 50 % lower in some euro area countries. bridging the investment gap is a priority to secure our economic future. contrary to what is sometimes argued, however, this should not imply spending more taxpayers ’ money, but prioritising material and immaterial investment in budgetary plans and creating an environment that unleashes entrepreneurship. bis central bankers ’ speeches third, the crisis has triggered institutional reforms at the european level that will ensure a more robust union. the banking union is a critical component in this enhanced institutional framework with its single supervisory and single resolution mechanisms and new rules for european banks, including bail - in rules that will shield taxpayers from the errors committed by banks. currently, we are in the middle of our comprehensive assessment of the most important banks in the euro area. even before we began this exercise, banks started cleaning up their balance sheets and building capital buffers. i am confident that these and further measures will result in a
markets. i wish you continued success as we build together on our strong foundations. with this, i wish all participants at this conference a fruitful exchange of ideas and discussion.

is that this is an area which is deserving of greater discourse. evaluating the effects of the banking reforms will be a key exercise. one set of issues revolve around whether the reforms are having the intended outcomes or, on the other hand, whether there are unforeseen and undesirable effects. this will involve an assessment of banks ’ behavioural responses, whether there are new forms of arbitrage strategies, and the spillover effects on the broader economy. cross - border lending to developing economies one example relates to the impact on cross - border lending to developing economies. there are studies that indicate that some global banks have reduced their presence and activities in developing economies as part of their business review, and some have attributed this to the banking reforms. establishing a clear, causal link between the declining trend in crossborder bank loans to developing economies and the post - crisis reforms will be helpful, if possible. such investigations can support the basel committee ’ s work on a full, timely and consistent implementation of the reforms globally. the increasing role of market - based finance in credit provision the decline in bank inflows to developing economies has been partially offset by these 2 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches economies relying more on market - based finance, or non - bank financial intermediation. in my view, this is a positive development since a more diverse funding system comprising bank - based finance and market - based finance can possibly better meet the changing needs of the real economy. 17 but the increased prominence of market - based finance has also led to some concerns that large redemptions from open - ended funds can potentially pose liquidity risks and hence destabilise financial markets. international organisations and standard - setting bodies such as the financial stability board ( fsb ), international organisation of securities commissions ( iosco ) and basel committee have sought to assess the potential financial stability risks posed by market - based finance. the fsb, for example, developed a set of policy recommendations to address structural vulnerabilities of open - ended funds, and iosco is reviewing these recommendations. 19 there can be other related areas that merit further investigation, including from academia. for example, the interaction between market - based finance and traditional asset management activities, and the effect on underlying markets in which these are invested. evaluating the impact of macroprudential policies a key element of the basel iii reforms is its macroprudential framework to assess new system - wide risks and the use of a counter