these positive survey results should not obscure the fact that the euro ’ s second decade was rife with crises and problems : a financial crisis, an economic crisis, a european debt crisis, a banking crisis, a double recession and high levels of unemployment. several countries experienced a prolonged period of economic weakness and the necessary adjustment measures brought with them social hardship. figuratively speaking, you could say that the euro had an easy childhood but a difficult adolescence. over the last few years, the eurosystem ’ s central banks have faced unfamiliar challenges, and not just in their core area of responsibility, which is that of ensuring price stability. during the crisis, they were to some extent forced to act as crisis response units, taking them to the outer 1 / 8 bis central bankers'speeches edge of their mandate for a while. in an interview last week, otmar issing warned : “ politicians have it easy. they rely on the ecb to sort everything out. but that isn ’ t going to work in the long term. ” the dialogue between member states has also taken on a harsher tone at times. but monetary union was actually a project intended to encourage european integration and ultimately even bring about deeper international friendship. all the same, i would like to stress that, in many ways, the euro area is in better shape today than it was before the crisis. this is thanks to measures taken by its member states as well as changes to the structure of the monetary union, both of which i will now focus on briefly. 3 reforms in the euro area 3. 1 adjustment progress in the member states the crisis brought home to all of us what being part of a monetary union means and involves. and the way the countries that were hit the hardest by the crisis have tackled the roots of the problems and have regained their competitiveness, for example, is truly remarkable and receives too little recognition. in greece, portugal, ireland, spain and cyprus, for instance, average unit labour cost growth was above the euro - area average in the pre - crisis period ( 1999 – 2007 ). this was a contributing factor to these countries ’ loss of competitiveness. since the crisis, unit labour costs in all five of these countries have grown more slowly than the euro area average. this has made their economies more competitive. the structural reforms already undertaken are also beginning to bear fruit and have contributed to the upturn. take structural unemployment, for instance, which has gone down by just over one percentage point in the

the french president emmanuel macron, which have been greeted with a mix of goodwill and scepticism in germany, have provided important impetus for the european debate. furthermore – and this is, i believe, a great achievement – he has created a convincing, lively narrative for the joint european project that citizens can buy into and even be enthusiastic about. it seems clear to me that there will only be progress in this debate if germany and france work in concert and move in the same direction. the bundesbank has also been providing proposals of its own in this debate for a long time now, and it is within this debate that the agenda for the stability of the single currency is being set. from my perspective, three guidelines form the basis of these proposals. 1. the european union should focus more of its attention and spending on tasks that create added value for the citizens of europe. 2. the institutional and economic conditions of the monetary union need to be set up in such a way that the eurosystem can properly fulfil its mandate and does not have to intervene on a regular basis as a crisis response unit. 3. a stable monetary union requires both solidarity and solidity, and it is essential that the alignment of actions and liability be maintained. allow me, if you will, to delve slightly deeper into this last point in particular. the alignment of actions and liability means that the authority to make decisions needs to be linked to the responsibility for the consequences of such decisions. or, in other words, only he who has the power to influence decisions is also prepared to bear the risks that these decisions entail. when it was decided in maastricht to create an economic and monetary union, the member states agreed to pool their sovereignty in monetary matters at the european level. however, under the existing regulatory framework, responsibility for fiscal policy – as for general economic policy – lies with the individual member states, as i have already mentioned. from the outset, there have been measures in place designed to prevent unsound public finances from jeopardising the stability of the single currency. rules on debt have been laid down in the stability and growth pact ; it is prohibited to simply print more money as a way of financing the public sector ; and countries cannot take on each other ’ s liabilities – the famous no bail - out clause. in principle, though, the member states remain sovereign in fiscal matters. and indeed, this sovereignty is something that they have always confidently championed and