credit suisse was somewhat surprising. according to the financial stability board, financial markets had priced in full resolution. however, the swiss authorities indicated that they were not sufficiently prepared for that. so the lesson from credit suisse is that both resolution authorities and banks should think even harder about life after death. about what is needed to let banks fail in an orderly way without triggering instability in the broader financial system. because that is a responsibility to which the public holds us accountable. a recent case in our own country that i also want to mention was the bankruptcy of amsterdam trade bank last year, a small bank with a foreign parent. this case is rather atypical in the sense that the cause of the bankruptcy was not bad lending decisions or governance problems, but simply the sanctions against russia. this led many service providers to stop their services to atb, forcing the bank to close down. having said that, this was a rather clearcut case of how we perform resolution of smaller banks in the netherlands, namely through bankruptcy filing and activation of the deposit guarantee system. in this case, things went very quickly and smoothly, which was important for the credibility of the deposit guarantee system. as a side note, we at the central bank were one of the creditors of atb. we are'the bank for the banks'after all, and in that capacity we had monetary policy - related financing outstanding. as you know, assets that are assumed safe can turn worthless overnight in the case of a likely default. so some of our people worked over the easter weekend to get our money back. i'm happy to say we succeeded. atb was a small bank, which made resolution relatively straightforward. at mid - sized banks, with more cross - border activities, things will likely be a bit more complicated. in any case, what's clear is that resolution of a mid - sized or large bank in the netherlands would almost certainly involve a bail - in of both creditors and shareholders. after the financial crisis of 2008, there is simply no public support in dutch society for rescuing a bank with taxpayers'money. all in all, what we have seen in europe so far is a variety of tastes in resolving failing banks, preferably outside the european resolution regime, making use of national 3 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches options. sometimes effective and efficient, sometimes involving a substantial bail - out, sometimes financed by the state. so it is a good thing that the european commission has put forward proposals for

conference will provide excellent platforms for insurers, regulators and supervisors to exchange ideas on these subjects and more, and to enhance our understanding of the key issues of the day. • this morning his excellency jeroen dijsselbloem, the minister of finance of the netherlands and president of the eurogroup, will be sharing with us his ideas on the subject of insurance and financial matters. i am very grateful for his making time, in what must be a very busy schedule, in order to speak to us today. • in closing i would like to thank everyone who contributed to making this year ’ s event possible, and i wish you all a successful and productive conference. and of course a pleasant stay with us in amsterdam. • thank you. • i will now give the floor to mr. peter braumuller, chairman of the iais, who will take you through the programme of the next two days. bis central bankers ’ speeches