for the euro area will be to demonstrate its ability to bring prosperity and security. an enormous amount of work remains to be done. to this must be added the political risks of what i call “ seeping pessimism ”. there is still considerable support for the euro but at the political level greater european integration is still rejected to some extent. that is one of the risks for the coming years. the crisis has highlighted not the weaknesses of monetary union, but the weaknesses of an incomplete monetary union. the ecb often sends out the message that it can create the conditions for stronger growth but that governments must, in turn, undertake structural reforms to make their economies more competitive. do the politicians expect too much from the ecb? yes and no. no, because everyone responsible must take action. this is not a great coordinated plan. we need a mix. a mix that includes, on the one hand, a policy of structural reforms to stimulate supply in the economy, and support for demand led by the ecb, and, on the other, fiscal bis central bankers ’ speeches policies to achieve both debt sustainability and long - term growth. cuts affecting public infrastructure should be avoided, for example ; they are not good for long - term growth. the principal challenge for governments is to regain the road to productivity, a source of prosperity. if you look back to 2000 and the outlook for growth for the following five years, an average growth rate of 2. 4 % was expected. in 2015 the growth prospects for the next five years are no higher than 1. 3 % annually. this problem also affects japan, the united states and the emerging countries. productivity gains are limited to certain technology sectors. they need to be rolled out to the rest of society, the health sector for example, or to tax collection. overall, productivity gains have slowed with respect to previous decades. the priority in structural reform must be the rapid dissemination of these technological advances throughout society. and yes, because people expect too much from the ecb, if other actors rein in their efforts whenever we take action. we are seeing less of an effort on the public finance side. the ecb made it possible to avoid an outright depression in 2012 and 2013, and even the break - up of the euro. it will pursue an accommodative monetary policy for as long as is necessary. without giving a date, this timescale is fairly long. it ’ s a long lasting endeavour. additional risks have arisen from

big sell orders is placed for execution in a short period of time. and almost always the banks, when asked, say that they are executing those orders on behalf of their customers, whose identity and purpose cannot be disclosed because client secrecy is sacrosanct. and all this is supported with an immaculately timed commentary of gloom and doom. some are more objective than others, but regrettably the impression one gets, particularly as a regulator, is that they are aimed at generating undue pessimism and panic, and consequent sharp and widespread movements across the currency and other related financial markets in favour of those behind the attacks. most of the activities of the highly leveraged institutions are carried out through the otc markets, which are very opaque. unlike organised exchanges, otc markets are subject to little, if any, transparency or regulatory requirements, raising the risk of price ramping, collusion and other misconduct. international financial architecture : international co - operation for reform so what can be done about all this? following the outbreak of the financial crisis, various international forums and multilateral financial institutions have devoted a great deal of effort to improving the stability and functioning of financial markets. working group after working group has been formed to look into specific issues. there were the three g - 22 working groups, the working group under the basle committee on banking supervision, the two transparency and disclosure working groups under the committee on global financial systems, and now the three working groups of the g - 7 financial stability forum to be formed. and i should not forget the very useful work done by the iif, and by other forums in this region. many helpful reports have been prepared, including the two reports by the iif released in march this year on risk management and on transparency in emerging markets finance, all of them produced in a highly co - operative atmosphere. i welcome in particular the institute ’ s readiness to work with relevant public sector bodies on appropriate disclosure for private financial institutions active in the international capital markets. i am sure this international co - operative spirit, not only among international financial institutions, national finance ministries and central banks, but also with the private sector, will in the end produce helpful blueprints for action. but this process can take too long. there is always the risk that when the dust has settled the initiative and enthusiasm, dare i say, on the part of those less affected by the crisis, may be stifled. there is also the risk that the plight of those who