compensation for risk became very modest. 3 there was, of course, a nagging problem of periodic financial panics. but several of these seemed to be managed without serious lasting damage. the asian financial crisis was devastating for the asian countries involved, but the global economy was not badly affected. the russian crisis of 1998 – described, remarkably, by one experienced observer at the time as the worst since the 1940s – was similarly handled without serious fall - out. the bust of the dot - com bubble was associated with an economic downturn in the early 2000s but this too was, by historical standards, quite mild. perhaps people began really to believe that major downturns were always avoidable and that higher leverage therefore was safe. if so, they had a major fright from 2007 onwards. bis central bankers ’ speeches this “ moderation ” came to an end with the crisis beginning in 2007. and with a few years of perspective, it is increasingly clear that australian households began to change their behaviour at that time, or even a little before. the rate of saving from current income stopped falling probably around 2003 or 2004, and began to increase ( we now know ), slowly at first as the income gains from the first phase of the resources boom started in about 2005 or 2006, and then more quickly in 2008 and 2009. real consumption spending per head initially remained pretty strong in this period, reaching a peak in 2008. it then declined for a year or so, before resuming growth in the second half of 2009. that growth has, however, been much slower than had been observed previously. in the nearly three years from mid - 2009 through to the march quarter 2012, real consumption per head rose at an annual pace of about 1½ per cent. this is more than a full percentage point lower than the growth rate from 1995 to 2005. but this sort of growth is in fact quite comparable with the kind of growth seen in the couple of decades leading up to 1995. it is line with the quite respectable growth in income. but the gap between the current level of consumption and where it would have been had the previous trend continued is quite significant. if we then consider the growth of foreign online sales and so on, and the fact that consumers seem more inclined to consume services – experiences, as opposed to goods – we can see this is a significant change for the retail sector. no doubt reinforcing this trend towards more circumspect, but more typical, behaviour is that the earlier strong

what information can be conveyed to counterparties and other market participants. while it is clear ( or at least should be ) that disclosing the details of a client ’ s order book to a counterparty is not acceptable, market participants have noted that there is much less clarity around what level of aggregation, say, is necessary in order to convey market colour appropriately. 2 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches as a result, it appears some market participants are being very conservative in sharing information, which can have implications for the effective functioning of the market. this is notwithstanding the guidance provided in this area in the global preamble put out by the global fxcs, in march 2015. 5 the global code takes the material in the global preamble and fleshes it out a bit more, including with some examples of what is, and isn ’ t, appropriate communication, and why. similarly, there have been diverse opinions around what is appropriate behaviour in terms of order handling. there have been some very public instances of inappropriate behaviour around order handling that have come to light in recent years. the market is seeking greater guidance as to what principles should be followed, including the different standards that may apply depending on whether an intermediary is functioning as principal or agent. this is one area that was not adequately covered in the pre - existing codes that the various fxcs had endorsed for the fx market. it is an area where we have provided the sought - after guidance. but we are not writing a procedures manual for order handling. rather we are articulating principles that need to be taken into account. individual firms may then take these principles and reflect them in their own procedures manual. our aim in articulating these principles is to provide market participants with the framework in which to think about how they handle stop - loss orders. the emphasis here is very much on the word ‘ think ’. the global code will not provide the answers to all your questions, but it should help you ask the right questions. adherence to the code alongside drafting the code, we have also been devoting considerable time and effort to thinking about how to ensure widespread adoption of the code by market participants. clearly, that has been an issue with the various existing codes that have been in place in a number of markets over many years. it is evident that they were ignored on occasion, wilfully or otherwise. one of our central aims in drafting the code is for it to be principles - based rather than rulesbased.