the 12 dimensions included in the report. but we know we must do even better. we therefore aim to : • accelerate the growth of worker productivity ; • upgrade the quality of services offered ; • enrich our product offerings and exploit market niches ; • selectively penetrate promising new markets, and sharpen our focus within well established markets. the main thing we need from the international community is a better understanding of our reality, and support for these policies. instead, the imf, the rating agencies, the basel bis central bankers ’ speeches committee and the oecd have all taken well - meaning initiatives which have in some way threatened the success of our adjustment and growth strategy. we are engaging with these bodies with a view to gaining greater voice to express the realities of economic policy making in svoes. we welcome the establishment of small states fora at the imf and world bank, the regional consultative groups of the financial stability board, and the peer reviews of the global forum. these are all fora we may use to get our message across. this regional network of central banks and finance ministries is a further opportunity to get the message across, and we express our sincere thanks for the invitation to share these thoughts with you. bis central bankers ’ speeches

for release on delivery 9 : 10 a. m. est february 16, 2024 supervision with speed, force, and agility remarks by michael s. barr vice chair for supervision board of governors of the federal reserve system at the annual columbia law school banking conference new york, new york february 16, 2024 thank you to columbia university and the organizers for the opportunity to speak today. 1 it has been nearly a year since the sudden failure of silicon valley bank ( svb ) and ensuing turmoil in the banking system, events which prompted important questions about how banks manage risks and how we at the federal reserve supervise that risktaking. it is a fitting time to share some reflections on the importance of the day - to - day work of bank supervision and the steps we are taking to improve the speed, force, and agility of supervision. review of silicon valley bank let me begin by summarizing my review of the failure of silicon valley bank. this was the first major bank failure since the global financial crisis, and it necessitated a deep, unflinching review of what went wrong. so, following the failure, chair powell and i determined that it would be appropriate for me to lead a review on the conditions that led to svb ’ s failure. experienced and well - respected staff from around the federal reserve system who were not involved in svb ’ s supervision conducted the review. the review found that, first and foremost, the bank ’ s management failed to manage the bank ’ s risks, and its board failed to oversee management. 2 but the review also found that federal reserve supervisors did not identify issues quickly enough, and when we did identify risks, we were too slow to act with sufficient force to change management behavior. the views expressed here are my own and are not necessarily those of my colleagues on the federal reserve board. board of governors of the federal reserve system, review of the federal reserve ’ s supervision and regulation of silicon valley bank ( washington : board of governors, april 2023 ), https : / / www. federalreserve. gov / publications / files / svb - review - 20230428. pdf. - 2the svb report identified the need to improve the speed, force, and agility of supervision to align with the risks, size, and complexity of supervised banks. to do this, the report identified several areas of focus, including intensifying supervision at the right pace, encouraging timely supervisory action and escalation, and