. this is also required in order to allow automatic stabilisers to work without exceeding the 3 % deficit ceiling in less prosperous times. e. communication policy of the eurosystem coming now to the last part of my statement, i should like to touch briefly upon some decisions related to the ecb ’ s communication policy that have been taken recently. as you might be aware, the ecb published, on 5 january 1999, a consolidated opening financial statement of the eurosystem, and subsequently, on 12 january, the first weekly financial statement, containing the assets and liabilities held by the ecb and the national central banks of the euro area vis - a - vis third parties. with a view to providing regular information, in particular on monetary policy operations and changes in foreign reserves, the ecb will continue to publish a weekly financial statement every tuesday, accompanied by an explanatory note, in all official eu languages. as already indicated, the ecb will release the first edition of its monthly bulletin tomorrow. it will contain an assessment of the current economic situation underlying the ecb ’ s monetary – 6 – policy decisions and also tables and charts covering a wide range of statistics relevant to monetary policy. in addition, the ecb will continue to release current monetary statistics on wire services. i should like to conclude by emphasising that these publications, together with the regular press conferences following the meetings of the governing council of the ecb and the numerous speeches given by the members of the executive board, demonstrate the importance which we attach to explaining the ecb ’ s monetary policy in a clear and transparent manner. * * *

upcoming legislative proposal. let me nevertheless highlight the main features that in my view such a mechanism should have. the single resolution mechanism would have a single resolution authority at its centre that would govern the resolution namely of significant banks, coordinate the application of resolution tools and reflect an organisational set - up similar to the ssm. it should have a comprehensive set of enforceable tools, powers and authority to resolve all banks in the ssm. in order for the single resolution mechanism to be perceived as credible, it should have sufficient funding. let me be very clear i am not talking about bailing - out banks with public money. resolution is about orderly resolving the situation of banks that have attained the point of non - viability and about doing it in a way that minimizes the involvement of public bis central bankers ’ speeches money. resolution is not about bailing - out banks it is about bailing - in shareholders and creditors and using a resolution fund based on banking sector contributions. resolution activity may require the temporary use of public money if the resolution fund would not have enough resources, for instance, to capitalize a bridge bank that will be sold later on to the private sector thus recovering the capital involved. in the us this is ensured by the existence of a treasury credit line that can be drawn upon by the fdic but that has to be later paid back. this implies then a third element of a complete banking union – the existence of a financial backstop that will also be involved in the direct recapitalisation of banks. finally, the fourth element of the banking union is the establishment of a common system of deposit protection. a first step in this direction will be the adoption of the legislative proposal on deposit guarantee schemes, providing a harmonised framework. this framework should ensure depositor confidence and the national deposit guarantee schemes, built on common eu standards, could interact with the srm. a european deposit guarantee scheme is therefore not essential in the short term. 2. rationale for a banking union we see the banking union as essential to sustain and strengthen the emu framework primarily because by establishing a european framework for supervision, it addresses the so - called “ financial trilemma ”. 1 the trilemma states that financial stability, financial integration and national financial supervision cannot really be made fully compatible. furthermore, the banking union is instrumental to help break the nexus between sovereigns and banks, which was a key feature in the present crisis. the process to build a banking union is the more far