in helping to stabilize financial markets, thus strengthening the economy. overall, the operational effectiveness of the programs was recently supported as part of a comprehensive review of six lending facilities by the board ’ s independent office of inspector general. 8 in addition, we have been working closely with the government accountability office, the office of the special inspector general for the troubled asset relief program, the congressional oversight panel, the congress, and private - sector auditors on reviews of these facilities as well as a range of matters relating to the federal reserve ’ s operations and governance. we will continue to seek ways of enhancing our transparency without compromising our ability to conduct policy in the public interest. thank you. i would be pleased to take your questions. see, for example, alberto alesina and lawrence h. summers ( 1993 ), “ central bank independence and macroeconomic performance : some comparative evidence, ” journal of money, credit and banking, vol. 25 ( may ), pp. 151 – 62 ; or, more recently, christopher crowe and ellen e. meade ( 2008 ), “ central bank independence and transparency : evolution and effectiveness, ” european journal of political economy, vol. 24 ( december ), pp. 763 – 77. see ben s. bernanke ( 2010 ), “ central bank independence, transparency, and accountability, ” at the institute for monetary and economic studies international conference, bank of japan, tokyo ( may 25 ), for further discussion and references. see the reports available on the board ’ s webpage, “ credit and liquidity programs and the balance sheet. ” see board of governors of the federal reserve system, office of inspector general ( 2010 ), the federal reserve ’ s section 13 ( 3 ) lending facilities to support overall market liquidity : function, status, and risk management ( 1. 5 mb pdf ) ( washington : board of governors oig, november ). bis central bankers ’ speeches

our economy. therefore, at our last meeting in january we judged that it will be necessary to review and possibly reconsider our monetary policy stance at our next monetary policy meeting in early march, when the new staff macroeconomic projections become available. strengthening the euro area recovery our monetary policy is working ; and the ecb is willing to contribute its share to ensuring that the recovery remains firmly on track. but there are risks that – if they were to materialise – could undermine its course. the policy challenges we face are fourfold. they relate to : the global environment ; the situation of the financial system ; the economic and fiscal policies of member states ; and the political uncertainty surrounding the european project. first, as regards the global environment : growth prospects are slowly improving in advanced economies, but the outlook in emerging markets is more subdued. overall, growth is low by historical standards. moreover, emerging markets are facing economic and financial risks : some are suffering from structural impediments and macroeconomic imbalances ; others have to adjust to lower commodity prices. they remain vulnerable to an abrupt shift in risk sentiment that could tighten financing conditions. a key issue is how emerging markets will be impacted by tighter financing conditions ( and the ensuing capital outflows ) and to what extent this will have repercussions for euro area foreign demand. against this background, ensuring the continued resilience of the euro area economy is paramount. second, there are policy challenges related to our financial markets. the euro area financial system weathered several episodes of stress in the second half of last year. this is a sign that a lot has already been achieved with the establishment of banking union, which, however, is not complete yet. to make our financial system truly safe and sound we need to progress in two main domains, which complement each other. on the one hand, we need to finalise and implement the work we started when establishing the single supervisory mechanism and single resolution mechanism as the initial pillars of banking union. this includes further regulatory work to harmonise our rules for supervisory action and ensure a consistent application of the bank recovery and resolution directive ’ s bail - in provisions. on the other hand, we need a common public backstop for the single resolution fund to strengthen its credibility and we need to ensure that confidence in the safety of deposits is equally high in all bis central bankers ’ speeches euro area member states by establishing a european deposit insurance scheme. “ riskreduction ” and “ risk - sharing ” measures