risks and future crises. at the same time, banks would not compete on a level playing field, and that would weigh on efficiency. ladies and gentlemen, the reforms that followed the financial crisis of 2008 were far - reaching, and they placed a burden on the financial sector – of that there is no doubt. do the reforms offer a full insurance contract to prevent each and every risk to financial stability? well, no ; such rules do not exist. but there is no doubt that they help to make the global financial sector a safer place. they make it less likely that we will experience a second financial crisis of the same magnitude. looking ahead, we should not forget that we live in a globalised world. and any attempt to turn back time, any attempt to isolate one country from the rest of the world is not only a pipe dream ; it is a perilous dream. 2 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches that is particularly true in the case of finance and banking. so, instead of building walls, we should come together to discuss how we can deal with a global banking sector, how we can reap the benefits and keep the risks in check. that is the only way forward. walking backwards will only lead us to where we came from : another global financial crisis. thank you for your attention. 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches

“ pendulums and pitfalls on the road to resolution ” speech by klaas knot at the annual srb conference, brussels, 29 september 2017 in his address to the visitors of the annual srb conference in brussels, klaas knot touched on three issues : 1 ) linking resolution to the objectives of the ecb 2 ) the attractive but false metaphor of the so - called “ regulatory pendulum ” 3 ) funding in resolution as rightly alluded to by previous speakers, a decade has passed since many of us lost our innocence. i certainly did! ten years ago today i was feverishly working around the clock to design emergency safety nets and restore public confidence. the financial crisis fundamentally challenged how we regard the resilience of financial institutions. it also made clear that apart from stricter supervisory requirements, a solid crisis management framework was necessary. to that effect, the brrd provided the tools, and the srm regulation gave a central role to our hosts, the srb. i have been a keen supporter of the resolution framework from the outset. as a member of the fsb, i contributed to the development of the gsib framework and tlac standard. significant progress has been made since then, for instance, in establishing the rules and building institutions, as you just heard. but much remains to be done. making banks resolvable is clearly a journey. the key challenge is to stay the course. today, i would like to give you my perspective as a central banker on bank resolution. i will touch on three issues : first, i will explain why making banks resolvable is central to the objectives of the ecb. i will then counter the attractive metaphor of the regulatory pendulum, swinging towards looser regulation. finally, i will address the elephant in the room called “ fury ”, or funding in resolution. the crisis revealed that the resilience of the banking system is vital to the functioning of monetary policy. if banks are not sound and their balance sheets are impaired, they cannot fulfill their critical functions, such as lending to the economy. this affects monetary policy transmission. it means banks ’ capacity to pass on monetary impulses to the real economy is impaired. this can hinder central banks in pursuing price stability. before the crisis, the interaction between monetary policy and the banking system was well understood. during the crisis, this interaction was starkly highlighted. the banking system failed as a channel of monetary policy impulses, and instead contributed to propagating