richard h clarida : us economic outlook and monetary policy speech by mr richard h clarida, vice chair of the board of governors of the federal reserve system, at the 36th annual nabe economic policy conference “ 2020 vision : examining policy prescriptions in an election year ”, washington dc, 25 february 2020. * * * thank you for the opportunity to participate again this year in the annual economic policy conference of the national association for business economics. i am really looking forward to this conversation. but first, i would like to share with you some thoughts about the outlook for the u. s. economy and monetary policy. 1 in its 11th year of a record expansion, the u. s. economy is in a good place. the labor market remains strong, economic activity is increasing at a moderate pace, and the federal open market committee's ( fomc ) baseline outlook is for a continuation of this performance in 2020. 2 at present, personal consumption expenditures, or pce, price inflation is running somewhat below the committee's 2 percent objective, but we project that, under appropriate monetary policy, inflation will rise gradually to our symmetric 2 percent objective. although the unemployment rate is around a 50 - year low, wages are rising broadly in line with productivity growth and underlying inflation. we are not seeing any evidence to date that a strong labor market is putting excessive cost - push pressure on price inflation. although the fundamentals supporting household consumption remain solid, over 2019, sluggish growth abroad and global developments weighed on investment, exports, and manufacturing in the united states. coming into this year, indications suggested that headwinds to global growth had begun to abate, and uncertainties around trade policy had diminished. however, risks to the outlook remain. in particular, we are closely monitoring the emergence of the coronavirus, which is likely to have a noticeable impact on chinese growth, at least in the first quarter of this year. the disruption there could spill over to the rest of the global economy. but it is still too soon to even speculate about either the size or the persistence of these effects, or whether they will lead to a material change in the outlook. in addition, u. s. inflation remains muted. and inflation expectations — those measured by surveys, market prices, and econometric models — reside at the low end of a range i consider consistent with our price - stability mandate. over the course of 2019, the fomc undertook a shift in

andreas dombret : what is “ good ” regulation? speech by dr andreas dombret, member of the executive board of the deutsche bundesbank, at the 16th euro finance week, frankfurt am main, 19 november 2013. * 1. * * what is “ good regulation ”? i would like to thank the hosts of the euro finance week for raising this important topic of “ good regulation ” – even though fifteen minutes is not very much time to give a comprehensive report on the topic. the first question that occurs to me in this context is : who is regulation supposed to benefit in the first place? regulated parties are likely to have a different take on the matter to supervisors and society at large. instead of focusing on the theory, i therefore want to take a pragmatic approach to the topic, and to explain three key aspects from the regulators ’ point of view – although i cannot, of course, give an exhaustive account in this speech. first, “ good regulation ” of financial markets pursues a clear objective, in my opinion : to create a sound framework for the financial system and thus ensure its stability. a stable financial system ought to be able at all times to fulfil its core task of allocating capital efficiently. in other words : efficient funding of the real economy should be constantly assured. that is the main yardstick we should use to measure regulation. to keep the financial system stable, it is therefore important to apply a fundamental principle of market economies – incentive and punishment mechanisms – to regulation : risk - taking and liability have to be consistent with one another. this means that those who take risks in order to make profits also have to shoulder the risks involved – irrespective of their institutional form or size. 2. put an end to “ too - big - to - fail ” this principle, however, was nullified during the crisis. several banks facing the threat of bankruptcy had to be bailed out by governments with taxpayer funds. these banks were regarded as too complex, too interconnected or simply “ too big ” to fail. there were fears that their failure would have a dramatic effect on the financial system and the real economy. regulatory policy considerations took a back seat, and taxpayers were ultimately on the hook for risks on banks ’ balance sheets. the implied government guarantees for such institutions, which were already thought to exist before the financial crisis, were thus de facto confirmed. that goes against the principles of a market economy. private funds should be used