the difference that we publish these statements almost immediately and other central banks only publish their minutes after a delay of at least a few weeks. in addition, our monthly bulletin contains an explanation of recent policy decisions and an extensive account of the economic developments underlying them. what we do not do is publish individual arguments and voting records, for several good reasons. the ecb conducts a single monetary policy for 11 countries and the governors of the national central banks do not represent their individual countries on the governing council, but are obliged to base their arguments on euro area - wide considerations. to publish voting records and arguments put forward by individuals would be to risk undermining their independence by exposing them to national pressure. i do not believe that maximum transparency is the same as maximum information. it would, for example, be rather confusing and not at all transparent to publish a full transcript of the meetings. this would also diminish the frankness and quality of the exchange of views which takes place. i should like to emphasise that our concept of accountability is a collective one. we are accountable for the decisions taken by the ecb ’ s governing council as a body. therefore, our external communication focuses on these decisions and the underlying reasons for them, including arguments for and against. we are convinced that accountability is better served by a clear understanding of the decisions which we take than by a public debate on who are the hawks and who are the doves. the relationship between the monetary and budgetary authorities independence should not rule out communication with politicians. on the contrary, it is important for the central bank to have a regular exchange of information and views with the budgetary authorities. according to the maastricht treaty the president of the ecb is invited to meetings of the ecofin council whenever there are issues on the agenda relevant to the tasks of the central bank. the president of the ecofin council and a member of the european commission have the right to attend meetings of the governing council of the ecb. the president of the ecofin council even has the right to submit motions for deliberation. however, neither has the right to vote. apart from these formal channels, there are also informal ways of communicating. one of these is through the so - called euro - 11, an informal meeting of the ministers of finance of the 11 member states which have introduced the euro. the president and i are invited to these meetings and attend whenever there is anything on the agenda which is relevant to our tasks and mandate

capital account ; and the strengthening of exchange rate flexibility, as envisaged by chinese authorities. the latter two are pre - conditions for further currency internationalisation to allow foreign investors to invest in china, deepen financial markets and improve the allocation of capital in the economy. what is the role of monetary and fiscal policies in this process? in those cases where unsustainable fiscal policies were at the very origin of imbalances, the priority is to restore and ensure the medium - term sustainability of public finances. another priority is to strengthen financial sector stability and avert the build - up of risks and vulnerabilities, including unsustainable lending booms, through adequate regulatory, supervisory and macro - prudential tools. as regards monetary policy, central banks in advanced economies have also been doing their part, helping to make the rebalancing process as smooth as possible. central banks acted within their particular mandates, which in the euro area is to preserve price stability over the medium term. they have taken non - standard measures, which have helped avoid an abrupt deleveraging of the banking sector, which might have had highly - damaging consequences. there have also been concerns, notably among emerging market policy - makers, that measures taken by central banks in advanced economies could foster excessive flows of capital to their economies, put upward pressure on their exchange rates and lead to bubbles in domestic financial asset prices. the relation between monetary policy in advanced economies and global financial flows is not purely mechanistic, however. financial flows to emerging economies depend on a host of factors over and beyond interest rate differentials, including the attractiveness of emerging market economies themselves in terms of growth potential or global risk aversion. moreover, the monetary policy of major advanced bis central bankers ’ speeches economies is not only beneficial to their domestic economies, but has positive externalities for the growth of the global economy as a whole, including emerging market economies. let me now conclude. the outbreak of the crisis triggered a “ great rebalancing ” process at the global level. it is a painful, but necessary, process, which is partly cyclical. each continent, america, europe and asia, must continue making every effort to ensure that this process remains durable. in recent years, particular attention has been paid to the situation and reform agenda in the euro area. however, not only euro area countries, but all other countries too, have to implement structural reforms, many of which are discussed within the g20