emmanuel tumusiime - mutebile : overview of uganda ’ s growth and stability in 2013 / 2014 statement by mr emmanuel tumusiime - mutebile, governor of the bank of uganda, at the ministry of finance planning and economic development press conference, kampala, 15 january 2015. * * * i would like to say something about the significance of fiscal discipline in the country ’ s growth and stability. prudent management of public financing is very critical to macroeconomic stability. the government has a medium term fiscal program which sets out clearly the path of revenues, expenditures and government borrowing for the next five years. the fiscal program is absolutely consistent with ensuring that public debt remains sustainable and that domestic borrowing will remain within levels which will not threaten to crowd out private sector borrowing. we will ensure that all government borrowing is fully funded from the market by issuance of government securities through primary auctions. therefore i want to state clearly that the bank of uganda fully endorses the government ’ s fiscal stance and absolutely has no problem with fiscal management. central bank rate as you all know the central bank raised its central bank rate ( cbr ) in september 2013 to 12 % to avert the second effects of food prices but also to counter any rise in inflation expectations. consequent upon the threat of high inflation being reduced, bou reduced cbr 11. 5 in december 2013 and further to 11 percent in june 2014. the annual core inflation rate has fallen in 2014 but is forecast to edge over 5 percent over the next 12 months due to exchange rate depreciation which has occurred in 2014 and early 2015 due to domestic demand. as a result of this, we have retained the cbr at 11 percent and we will watch carefully the next few weeks to see where things move. developments in the foreign exchange market the shilling has been depreciating against the us dollar over the last few weeks. since february 2014, the shilling has depreciated by about 14 percent against the us dollar. this followed sustained appreciation during 2013 and the first months of 2014. the depreciation of the exchange rate since february 2014 reflects several factors. first, there has been a correction of the exchange rate which had become over valued in 2013. secondly there has been strong demand for foreign exchange from the real sectors of the economy especially manufacturing and oil sectors. thirdly, there has been weakening of global sentiment towards emerging markets with the currencies of these markets coming under persistent

speech international trends in central bank independence : the ecb ’ s perspective remarks by yves mersch, member of the executive board of the ecb and vice - chair of the supervisory board of the ecb, roundtable discussion on central bank independence frankfurt am main, 12 november 2019 ladies and gentlemen, the topic of central bank independence has received renewed attention in recent years. today, i will present the institutional set - up that underpins central bank independence in europe, as well as accountability and transparency, since these things go hand in hand. central bank independence in the european system of central banks i will start with the principles of independence and accountability that apply in the central banking context – which we have to differentiate from the supervisory one. the legal foundation of central bank independence, which applies to both the ecb and the national central banks ( ncbs ), is established at the highest possible level in european law. it is enshrined in primary law, in the form of the treaty on the functioning of the european union and the statute of the european system of central banks ( escb ) and of the ecb. since primary eu law can only be modified with the agreement of all ( currently 28 ) member states, this independence enjoys quasi - constitutional status. ecb independence consists of four important pillars – institutional, functional, personal and financial independence. article 130 of the treaty is the most important provision from the perspective of independence, guaranteeing institutional independence. it works in two ways. first, it prohibits the ecb, the ncbs and the members of their decision - making bodies from seeking or taking instructions from eu institutions or bodies, from any member state government or from any other body when exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon them by the treaties. second, it stipulates that eu and national authorities must respect this independence and not seek to influence the members of the ecb ’ s or the ncbs ’ decision - making bodies in the performance of their tasks. the second pillar of independence is functional independence. the ecb has been given the autonomy to determine which policy tools to use to achieve its primary objective of price stability. it has sole competence to decide which means and instruments are most appropriate to help it achieve its aims – such as outright purchases, the establishment of the collateral framework, and the designation of its counterparties. as part of this functional independence, ncbs must have the necessary means and instruments to achieve the escb ’ s objectives independently of