common model as to how supervisory authorities can work together. such a model is necessary to maintain high quality and efficiency in the supervision of complex banks with operations in several countries. an expanded cooperation can hopefully also contribute to harmonisation of the supervision that goes further than what can be achieved merely through joint regulations. the agreements that i have mentioned earlier are aimed at achieving this. but it is doubtful how well these voluntary agreements will function in an acute crisis situation. to ensure efficient supervision and crisis management the content of the agreements needs to be formalised. an important part in this is finding methods of resolving differences of opinion between authorities. thirdly, we also need to work to reduce the introduction of national special regulations in the eu ’ s member states. of course, there must still continue to be scope for countries to formulate regulations on the basis of their domestic conditions. however, this impairs the prospects of bringing about a true harmonisation. it is therefore important to constantly question the need for national solutions in the regulatory work within the eu. the aim should be to reduce national deviations as far as possible. in the long term, more in - depth structural changes will be necessary. this primarily concerns establishing joint institutions for supervision and crisis management at eu level. it may mean creating a supervisory authority for the 40 or so banks that currently conduct extensive operations in several european countries. it may also be a question of acting to create a joint european deposit guarantee scheme for cross - border banks. such a system would have several advantages. above all, it would mean that individual countries were not forced to pay large compensation amounts to depositors in other countries. i am aware that this type of suggestion is far - reaching and controversial. it would mean a transfer of power from the member states to the eu. but the suggested arrangements would only apply to the banks conducting cross - border operations of sufficiently large scope to warrant eu - wide measures. the main advantage of such a “ supranational ” arrangement is that the public frameworks for regulation, supervision and crisis management can correspond to the actual structure of the financial market. when supervision and crisis management are centralised, this also creates the conditions for reducing the administrative burdens on the banks and at the same time managing the risks where they actually arise. both the banks and the individual countries would be the winners in such a system. conclusion my main message today has been that financial integration is increasing rapidly in europe, and that this leads to better conditions for economic

, 0 % 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 nominal value ( sek bn, left scale ) value in relation to gdp ( per cent, right scale ) note : banks ’ holdings are excluded. sources : statistics sweden and sveriges riksbank. although there are many drivers explaining the move from cash to electronic payments, i would like to highlight two actions by the riksbank. one is a decision to “ not do ” and the other is decision to “ do ”. the first is the “ not do ”. we decided in the early 1990s not to implicitly subsidize cash anymore by storing it all over the country and allowing for overnight deposits. it took some time to implement this strategy. but as of a few years back, the riksbank only has one cash depot in the entire country. it is the market ’ s responsibility to store and transport cash, hence those costs are now borne by the market. the second is a “ do ”. a few years back, we engaged in a dialogue with a consortium of banks and the swedish clearing house on how a fast payment system available 24 / 7 could be created. for a payment system to be safe, you want to assure an eventual settlement over the central bank ’ s 2 books that is in central bank money. this can normally only be done when the central bank ’ s payment system is open. after some thinking, we found a way to connect the instant payment system with the riksbank ’ s system and by allowing ring - fenced overnight balances for this purpose - or to put it differently by extending a secured credit overnight - we managed to construct a scheme where the fast payments are backed by central bank money even when our system is closed. the result? today over half of the swedish population have downloaded the fast payments app ( swish ) on their smart phone and it has become a prominent feature in the retail payment landscape, providing a substitute for cash in person to person ( p2p ) payments. cards and cash are the most common payment methods among consumers source : sveriges riksbank. these two examples shows that a central bank may need to be both “ hands off ” and “ hands on ” depending on the situation to foster innovation. the trick is to find the right degree of intervention at the right time. and to perform that trick there are no short cuts. a thorough analysis of costs and benefits is needed. 3 another lesson is