samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
of the esfs. this is, after all, the most significant development in financial supervision in the history of the european union. however, i am confident that the changes brought by the ssm will strengthen the esfs, and will overall enhance the quality and consistency of supervisory and regulatory practices across europe. the more member states that are involved in banking union, the greater these positive effects will be. thank you for your attention. bis central bankers ’ speeches

vitor constancio : implications of the single supervisory mechanism ( ssm ) on the european system of financial supervision ( esfs ) speech by mr vitor constancio, vice - president of the european central bank, at a public hearing on financial supervision in the eu, brussels, 24 may 2013. * * * ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much for inviting me to open this session on the implications of the single supervisory mechanism ( ssm ) on the european system of financial supervision ( esfs ). at present, the only answer that can really be given on this issue is, “ it depends ”. while the ssm will in principle be just another supervisor around the table, its impact on the esfs will clearly depend on how many member states eventually decide to join. in our view, the more member states take part, the better it will be for the functioning of the esfs and the single market more generally. first, having as many as possible countries in the ssm will reduce the scope for coordination failures. this will in turn facilitate the coordination function of the european banking authority. second, a larger ssm is the best way to safeguard the single market in financial services. the more membership overlaps between the eu and the ssm, the more consistent will be the application of supervisory and regulatory practices. third, broad ssm membership could diminish the distortions to the single financial market caused by the divergent fiscal positions of sovereigns, as member states that are part of the ssm will also have access to the single resolution mechanism ( srm ). this presupposes, however, that the srm is set up with strong powers, which i consider essential. at this stage, we expect several non - euro area member states to join the ssm. the negotiations on the ssm regulation have satisfactorily addressed most of their concerns. however, some countries seem to require that more clarity on the functioning of the srm is provided before they reach their final decision, in particular on the issue of a common fiscal backstop and how “ out ” member states could contribute to or benefit from it. in my view, this should not be an obstacle to a positive decision because any participant country in the ssm will also participate in the srm and benefit from it. from the ecb ’ s perspective, it is essential that the srm comprises a single resolution authority and single fund financed by ex - ante and risk
offer an explanation for this puzzle and apply it to two of the ongoing debates on how to resolve the crisis. 2. the fault line : equity versus efficiency my starting point is one of the classic fault lines in economic theory : the fault line between equity and efficiency. equity is mostly about redistributing resources among members of society ; efficiency is mostly about allocating resources to their most productive use. together, equity and efficiency are the yin and yang of economics. and as in chinese philosophy, the economic versions of yin and yang are not opposing forces but interrelated concepts. in the end, it is not a matter of “ either / or ” but a matter of degree. and this is at the core of the debate on how to resolve the sovereign debt crisis. some analysts tend more towards equity or, more specifically, towards burden sharing. other analysts tend more towards efficiency, that is, towards setting the right incentives to ensure a stable monetary union in the future. bis central bankers ’ speeches this tug of war between burden sharing and efficiency defines nearly all debates on how to resolve the european sovereign debt crisis. it is present in the debate on how the rescue mechanisms should be constructed ; it is present in the debate on a banking union, it is present in the debate on a fiscal union, in the debate on monetary policy, in the debate on how to rebalance current accounts and in the debate on the introduction of eurobonds. in order to illustrate my point, i would like to address the last two issues. let us begin with the debate on how to rebalance current accounts in the euro area. 3. the case of current account imbalances 3. 1 the problem before the crisis, there were large imbalances in the current accounts of euro - area countries. some countries, such as germany, the netherlands and austria, ran persistent current account surpluses. other countries, such as greece, ireland and spain, ran persistent current account deficits. in principle, current account surpluses or deficits are not a problem in themselves. however, those we observed prior to the crisis were an expression of underlying barriers to sustainable growth. at the same time, they added an element of instability to monetary union. hence the need to “ rebalance europe ”. one channel through which unsustainable current account positions can be rebalanced is the exchange rate. in a monetary union, however, using the exchange rate is obviously no longer an option. the only option

ecb governing council meeting reveals a few interesting details. the governing council considers that risks to the growth outlook are now broadly balanced. it also removed the easing bias on rates for now. some observers interpreted this statement as a further step towards monetary policy normalisation – and market participants should be prepared for these new challenges. thank you for your attention. 7 / 7 bis central bankers'speeches
services industry in austria. by way of conclusion, however, let me say that i am convinced that, based on its solid background, the austrian financial sector is in an excellent position to meet both current and future challenges. thank you very much for your attention.

the major question in this context is about the optimal level of capital banks need to hold. so what is a sufficient capital basis for banks in the long run? i would like to see that from a functional perspective : a bank is sufficiently capitalized, when – even after a major external shock has materialized – the bank is still able to refinance itself on the market at reasonable spreads. banks on their own define what reasonable spreads are from their perspective as spreads differ depending on size, business model and region. hence, investors that fund european banks rather than regulators or supervisors define the longterm optimal level of capitalization. this means also that there is an upper limit for bank capitalization. above a certain level you will not find anybody to invest in bank shares. similar and connected to the issue of optimal capital level is the introduction of mrel ( the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities ) and therefore the question on how much mrel is needed? the mrel requirement is designed to ensure a ‘ bail - in ’ of shareholders and creditors in the case of a failing bank. it safeguards that a bank has sufficient shares and debt instruments issued to absorb losses or to convert into new shares to recapitalize systemic functions. in particular, it is questionable how capital buffers are linked to the amount of mrel needed. in my opinion, it strongly depends on the bank ‘ s individual resolution strategy. if a bank is not recapitalized in a resolution it does not need to mirror its capital buffers in the mrel amount. moreover, if a bank in resolution is fully or close to 100 % recapitalized it will also not need to include its capital buffers fully in the mrel amount as capital buffers shall absorb losses in times of stressed periods. however, the right balance of mrel has to be found to ensure that the recapitalized institute has sufficient capital to access funding markets. let me come to another often quoted assumption in the context of financial regulation : higher capital requirements restrict bank credit supply. what do we observe? higher capital requirements cause deleveraging but without hampering credit to private sector7 : capital has contributed the lion ’ s share to the leverage reduction in the euro area ( 88 % ) and austria ( 73 % ) between oct. 2008 and feb. 2014. contrary to popular opinion, bank funding for the real economy and for governments has increased even after the crisis, despite substantial deleveraging both in
at the centre of the irish pharmaceuticals industry and has a vibrant it sector, as well as having significant indigenous business and tourism sectors. given its diversified economic structure, it is likely that the outlook for the region will be subject to the same risk factors as for the rest of the country. external risk factors looking ahead, the central forecast is for economic activity to continue to grow at a healthy pace, with the main impetus to growth expected to come from domestic factors. however, the outlook is characterised by uncertainty about the external environment such that risks to economic forecasts are to the downside. one obvious risk factor relates to brexit. looking at the wider international picture, given the strong presence of multinationals in the economy, there are also risks related to the potential for changes to broader international taxation and trade arrangements. 1 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches both in the short term and the longer term, the economic impact of brexit on ireland is set to be negative. reflecting this, the central bank revised down its economic forecasts in the wake of the uk referendum. to date, in the absence of any weakening in the uk economy, the impact of brexit has mainly been experienced through the sizeable depreciation of sterling against the euro. in addition, however, those sectors with a high dependency on exports to the uk remain exposed to any future adverse uk economic developments and also the threat of new barriers to trade. even for those parts of the economy not directly dependent on the uk market, there are potential indirect effects via competition from uk imports, supply - chain linkages and increased crossborder shopping. while exporters selling to the uk are most immediately affected, there are additional channels by which shifts in the sterling - euro exchange rate affects the economy. first, in many domestic sectors, the market share of domestic firms will be affected by import competition from the uk. second, many domestically - orientated firms are suppliers to exporters or rely on employees in exporting firms as customers. third, sterling depreciation is associated with an increase in cross - border shopping, including a greater volume of online purchases from uk websites. while these are adverse forces, it is also important to point out that a weaker sterling may benefit some firms that rely on imported inputs from the uk and that real income gains to households due to cheaper imports from the uk may in part be recycled into higher spending on domestically - produced goods and services. over the longer term, irish firms will have to

more. i thank you. 4 / 5 bis - central bankers'speeches 5 / 5 bis - central bankers'speeches
central bankers'speeches and once again, thank you everyone for participating in this forum. let's also give ourselves a round of applause. maraming salamat po! see you all in 2024. 2 / 2 bis - central bankers'speeches

eli m remolona : closing remarks - 2023 alliance for financial inclusion global policy forum closing remarks by mr eli m remolona, jr, governor of bangko sentral ng pilipinas ( bsp, the central bank of the philippines ), at the 2023 alliance for financial inclusion global policy forum " stability, sustainability, and inclusivity for shared prosperity ", manila, 15 september 2023. * * * fellow members of the alliance for financial inclusion ( afi ), esteemed colleagues, special guests, ladies and gentlemen. good afternoon. we have come to the conclusion of the 2023 afi global policy forum. the active participation of the delegates and resource persons in this event has made our forum a roaring success. on behalf of the bangko sentral ng pilipinas, i thank you all for your contributions to our common goal of financial inclusion toward shared prosperity. over the last two days, we had the opportunity to exchange knowledge, insights, and experiences. we examined how the twin goals of financial inclusion and sustainable development are vital to stability. we recognized how the continued introduction of new technology, such as artificial intelligence, presents both opportunities and risks. and how we must prioritize responsible innovation. we have identified the hurdles to driving financial inclusion in a dynamic environment. we have also taken a closer look at the unique challenges in serving various sectors. this entails a nuanced approach to adequately serve displaced persons, women, the youth, and small enterprises. the insights we have gained from fellow regulators and partners in the academe, government, and industry will inform us on how to address these challenges. the initiatives and commitments shared in the last few days will help us sharpen our tools and strengthen our resolve in building a global financial ecosystem that is stable, sustainable, and inclusive. the afi research initiative that was presented this morning reminds us of the importance of evidence - based policymaking. the manila manifesto urges us to apply global regulatory standards without hindering financial inclusion. may the collective commitment serve as a powerful impetus for regulations that are responsive and relevant to our country contexts and shared goals. all these will build on our maya declaration commitments. ladies and gentlemen. we have come so far, and farther, we will go. let us work together to focus on building a more inclusive world where no one is left behind. once again, the bsp thanks afi for this opportunity to host this forum. thank you, afi. 1 / 2 bis -
for proper credit assessment and monitoring are in place. this is particularly important for those countries with huge quantities of domestic savings ; if appropriate measures are not implemented, such countries may face further financial crises in coming years. finally, probably the major factor generating the sharp economic decline in asia was the dramatic reassessment of prospects for the region, largely reflecting a “ wake - up call ” regarding the financial sector ’ s level of performance. of necessity, investors will punish such downside surprises severely. to limit the magnitude of such downside surprises, policymakers should take action to maximize financial sector transparency and ensure appropriate disclosure of information.

pressure is expected to ease in the long term, there is no need to take a further step toward a normalisation of interest rates at this point in time. in addition, the stronger franc has already resulted in more restrictive monetary conditions. with our decision to keep the three - month libor rate on hold, we are adhering to our current monetary policy course : we are making use of our monetary policy leeway to support growth without jeopardising long - term price stability. every forecast and every decision is fraught with uncertainty. should unexpected events delay economic recovery or push up the swiss franc sharply, we shall take appropriate action. for such cases, the swiss national bank keeps all its options open. 2 / 3 observed inflation december 2004 inflation forecast on september 2004 with libor at 0. 75 % and of december 2004 with libor at 0. 75 % 3 / 3
in the federal funds market and global financial market developments, and present to the president their plans for open - market operations for his or her comment. open - market operations will be arranged shortly after this " call, " and the results are disclosed to the public generally within a few minutes. the desk is in the market on most business days, adding from $ 2 billion to $ 10 billion in reserves to keep the funds rate near the fomc's target. as an additional means for managing the fed funds, the federal reserve stands ready to lend reserves to depository institutions that request them. financially sound banks are eligible to borrow from the fed at what is called the primary credit rate, which to date has been set at 100 basis points ( 1 percentage point ) above the target funds rate. historically, reserve shortages occasionally caused the funds rate to " spike " well above its target, once even hitting 100 percent ( in 1991 ). the primary credit facility is designed to avoid such spikes by providing an elastic supply of reserves at a rate not far above the funds rate target. since the introduction of the primary credit facility, the rate has exceeded the primary credit rate only in a few unusual circumstances, such as the power outage in the eastern united states in august 2003. the federal reserve's multiple means of injecting reserves into the banking system - a belt - and - suspenders approach - was shown in its best light following the september 11 terrorist attacks. with a significant part of the financial system inoperative and with many payments not being made as scheduled, the banking system's demand for reserve balances rose sharply. those reserve needs were met initially through large amounts of direct borrowing from the fed. as market functioning improved, needed reserves were provided by means of open - market operations. the increase in the supply of reserves topped $ 80 billion by the end of the week. the funds rate and other market rates i have discussed at some length how the federal reserve manages the federal funds rate, the most direct instrument of monetary policy. as i have already hinted, however, monetary policy is effective only to the extent that federal reserve actions can affect a wide range of interest rates and asset prices. what is the link between the funds rate and these key financial variables? the interest rates most closely linked to the funds rate are those prevailing in short - term money markets. financial market participants are able to trade short - term liquid funds in a number of markets, including, for example, the market

governors, may 2022 ), https : / / www. federalreserve. gov / publications / files / financial - stability - report - 20220509. pdf. better or worse, you can ’ t program confidence. that question doesn ’ t always have a clear answer, and it involves real and difficult tradeoffs. but it ’ s a question that every new and fastgrowing financial product must address if it wants to last very long. thank you.
pay homage to the role of pioneers like dr pylee whose vision for establishing a business school in kochi enabled several of us to partake of these critical skills which have enriched our lives and hopefully the effectiveness of organisations that we serve. thank you for your attention. namaskaar!! inputs provided by pradeep kumar and saurabh pratap singh are gratefully acknowledged. 5 / 5 bis - central bankers'speeches

g padmanabhan : international seminar on principles of financial market infrastructures and innovations in retail payments valedictory address by mr g padmanabhan, executive director of the reserve bank of india, at the international seminar on principles of financial market infrastructures and innovations in retail payment organised by the reserve bank of india, new delhi, 15 february 2013. * * * assistance provided by shri saswat mahapatra and smt radha somakumar is gratefully acknowledged. distinguished speakers, participants, other guests, ladies and gentlemen. it is a pleasure to be amidst you and speak to you all as we conclude this international seminar on “ principles of financial market infrastructures and innovations in retail payments ” organized by the reserve bank. the theme of the seminar, which was chosen after considerable deliberations, is quite apt, given the markets around us. as you know, the term fmi refers to systemically important payment systems, csds, ssss, ccps, and trs which facilitate the clearing, settlement, and recording of monetary and other financial transactions, such as, payments, securities, and derivatives contracts ( including derivatives contracts for commodities ). the role and importance of fmis in the global financial system came to fore during the crisis which has been succinctly captured in the imf report “ central banking lessons from the crisis ” ( may 27, 2010 ). the report mentions “ the crisis would have been much more severe had central banks not taken efforts to introduce robust payment and settlement systems, including for foreign exchange, over the two decades ahead of the crisis. the systemic impact of failure of a financial institution depends critically on the robustness of the infrastructure underpinning those markets in which it is active ”. the fmis which act as plumbers in the financial system helped in maintaining the market confidence during the crisis for two reasons. first, fmis like the ccps shift the counterparty risk from participants to themselves thereby ensuring trust in an environment where participants distrust each other and thus provide the market confidence to carry on transacting. second, their ability to settle when transactions are due for settlement on account of their risk management practices helps in retaining the sanity in the market. many studies had been undertaken analyzing the role of fmis during the crisis. the common findings of such studies are that fmis were successful in ensuring reliability and mitigating risks despite unprecedented volatility and shaken market confidence. fmis like cls, rtgs systems and cc