. in particular, it could raise concerns of potential conflicts between the prudential supervision of european banks and the primary goal of price stability. this was foreseen in the institutional design of european supervision, assigning to the supervisory board – a new body within the european central bank – the planning and execution of the supervisory tasks. in consequence, separation between monetary policy and supervision was a key pillar for the conferral of supervisory tasks on the european central bank. regarding macro - prudential supervision, the european institutional setting promotes its independence as the european systemic risk board recommends central banks have a prominent role in national macro - prudential authorities. 9 10 in the spanish set - up, the banco de espana is entrusted with deciding independently when macro - prudential tools regarding see core principles for effective banking supervision – basel committee on banking supervision ( september 2012 ) https : / / www. bis. org / publ / bcbs230. pdf for more information about the key standards for sound financial systems, see the fsb website : https : / / www. fsb. org / work - of - the - fsb / about - the - compendium - of - standards / key _ standards / for more information about fsaps, see the world bank website : https : / / www. worldbank. org / en / programs / financial - sector - assessment - program see article 19 of council regulation ( eu ) no 1024 / 2013 of 15 october 2013 conferring specific tasks on the european central bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions : 1. when carrying out the tasks conferred on it by this regulation, the ecb and the national competent authorities acting within the ssm shall act independently. the members of the supervisory board and the steering committee shall act independently and objectively in the interest of the union as a whole and shall neither seek nor take instructions from the institutions or bodies of the union, from any government of a member state or from any other public or private body. 2. the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the union and the governments of the member states and any other bodies shall respect that independence. https : / / eur - lex. europa. eu / legal - content / en / txt / pdf /? uri = celex : 32013r1024 & from = en see recitals 7 and 12 and sub - recommendation b3 of “ recommendation of the erb

of 22 december 2011 on the macro - prudential mandate of national authorities ” ( esrb / 2011 / 3 ) : https : / / www. esrb. europa. eu / pub / pdf / recommendations / esrb _ 2011 _ 3. en. pdf see recital 24 of regulation no 1092 / 2010 of the european parliament and of the council on european union macroprudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a european systemic risk board : the ecb and the national central banks should have a leading role in macro - prudential oversight because of their expertise and their existing responsibilities in the area of financial stability. national supervisors should be involved in providing their specific expertise. the participation of micro - prudential supervisors in the work of the esrb is essential to ensure that the assessment of macro - prudential risk is based on complete and accurate information about developments in the financial system. accordingly, the chairpersons of the esas should be members with voting rights. one representative of the competent national supervisory authorities of each member state should attend meetings of the general board, without voting rights. in a spirit of openness, 15 independent persons should provide the esrb with external expertise through the advisory scientific committee. https : / / eur - lex. europa. eu / legal - content / en / txt / html /? uri = oj : c : 2016 : 202 : full & from = en 5 / 9 the banking sector should be activated or deactivated. accordingly, other sectoral financial regulators are given responsibilities for activating their own tools. in particular, the banco de espana is now empowered to require that banking institutions establish countercyclical capital buffers by credit segment, limits on concentration in relation to economic activity sectors, and limits and conditions when underwriting new loans ( in terms of loan - to - value, loan - to - income and debt service - to - income ratios, and also the maturity, the currency in which the operation is denominated and whether the interest rate is fixed or variable, among others ). these new instruments complement those previously available to the banco de espana and included in the european legislation : 11 the countercyclical capital buffer, the systemic risk buffer and the buffer for systemic banks, among others. in addition, this year saw the creation of the macroprudential authority financial stability council, whose main goal is to contribute to the promotion of coordination and the exchange of information on financial stability issues among