dominate, then a monetary expansion would indeed hurt savers who derive a significant fraction of their income from deposit - like assets. 6 we probably all agree that, ceteris paribus, low interest rates and high inflation tend to help borrowers at the expense of lenders / savers. but that “ ceteris paribus ” clause, always debatable, is particularly troublesome in this context. indeed, what makes the foregoing criticism fragile, in my view, is that it relies on a short - term, partial equilibrium view of monetary policy transmission. focusing exclusively on the interests associated with deposits is mistaken : monetary policy can generate distributional effects through a number of other income - and wealth - related channels, 7 and if we are to determine how well grounded the criticisms are, we clearly need to develop a holistic view of how these channels work. first of all, monetary expansions normally raise the prices of some financial assets ; 8 there is ample evidence, in fact, that while qe has indeed compressed the yields on a range of longterm bonds, it has raised the prices of shares. 9 second, looking beyond finance, real assets like housing are likely to play a key role. research has demonstrated that monetary policy also works through real estate markets : 10 by compressing both the short and long end of the yield curve, monetary easing typically stimulates mortgage lending and, as a consequence, boosts house prices. 11 this channel might be particularly important for qe, whose express objective is to lower long - term interest rates. william ford was the eleventh president of the federal reserve bank of atlanta. “ a common europe has to be built on trust ”, borsen - zeitung, 22 march 2014. the problem could be compounded by “ segmentation ” ( a la williamson, 2008 ) : if economic agents differ in their ability to trade in financial markets, the benefits of an increase in liquidity will be reaped exclusively or primarily by those who have better access to the markets and can exploit more direct relations with the monetary authority – which is to say, “ banks ”. see e. g. coibion et al. ( 2012 ). rigobon and sack ( 2014 ). clayes et al. ( 2015 ). indeed, some studies have concluded that housing debt and real estate wealth play a crucial role in the transmission mechanism – see e. g. cloyne et al. ( 2015 ).

with national security agencies. as discussed in panel 1, those agencies have the role to protect the countries ’ critical economic sectors, including the financial sector, against cyber - attacks. financial authorities have the role to supervise the financial sector ’ s capacity to manage its risks, including cyber risks. both authorities have a mutual interest in coordination. b. three concrete areas to improve our coordination i. regulation and supervision i would like to start with the issue of regulation, which was addressed by panel 2. one difficulty with regulation is about reaching a balanced situation. regulation is needed, irrespective of the level of institutions ’ awareness and self - discipline … but, too much regulation may lead to a decrease in selfdiscipline and turn institutions ’ effort into a compliance exercise. since 2015, cybersecurity issues attract an increasing level of attention, and regulators have produced a large number of regulatory texts, both at national and international levels. this was called for to trigger the appropriate response and efforts from the industry. it helped the sector to reinforce its safeguards. nevertheless, we must ask ourselves whether the multiplication of new regulations can have a counterproductive effect. from the panelists ’ interventions, two issues need to be addressed : • first, we should avoid the possible proliferation of texts by standardsetters for banking, payments, securities services, insurance and / or financial markets. the fsb has already provided such evidence in a stock - taking exercise performed in 2017. regulators are paying attention to cyber risks, and while they share the same objectives, regulatory texts tend to differ across regulators and as a result add to firms ’ burden in terms of compliance with these various regulations, with page 3 sur 6 little marginal gain. clarity would be enhanced by reducing the multiple variations in the formulation of requirements across institutions. in turn, regulators ’ efforts would be streamlined and their experts employed more effectively. how can we better coordinate regulation? obviously, a “ principle - based ” regulation on cybersecurity is preferable, rather than increasingly prescriptive standards, too rigidly “ rules - based ”. supervision completes regulation. principle - based regulation would give supervisors some room for manoeuvre to modulate their expectations to the risk profile of the institutions. • but then, we should also pay attention to the risk of regulatory arbitrage. regulatory differences can create opportunities. if not all regulations are aligned, some private actors could ( re ) locate their it systems in less - demanding jurisdictions. this