a mining boom explain low wages growth in some other advanced economies. another part of the story, particularly overseas, is slower productivity growth. in the united states, for example, low growth in wages is being matched with low productivity growth. in australia, productivity https : / / www. rba. gov. au / speeches / 2017 / sp - gov - 2017 - 07 - 26. html 9 / 13 7 / 26 / 2017 the labour market and monetary policy | speeches | rba growth has also slowed somewhat. here, however, the slowing in earnings growth has been more pronounced than that in productivity. the result has been a decline in labour's share of national income. none of these reasons alone appears sufficient to explain the weakness in wage growth. this suggests that there is something else going on, and that it has a global dimension. many workers in advanced economies feel like they face more competition. a basic principle of economics is that when you face more competition, you are less inclined to put your price, or as a worker, your wage, up. this perception of greater competition is coming from two sources. the first is globalisation. one of the positives of globalisation is that it increases the size of market that a firm can tap. at the same time, though, globalisation increases the number of competitors that can tap your market ; it increases competition. the second source is changes in technology. in some industries, advances in technology have led workers to worry about the competition from robots. at the same time, advances in technology have made more areas of the economy subject to international competition ; there are fewer truly nontraded industries any more. perhaps as a consequence of this extra competition – or perhaps as a consequence of other forces within our societies – many workers in advanced economies feel that the world is less secure – less secure economically and less secure politically. this means that security is valued more highly. with a greater premium on security, it's plausible that workers are less inclined to take a risk by seeking larger wage increases. one related aspect of the current labour market is a decline in job mobility. data published by the abs suggest that the share of employed people changing employers is around the lowest in recent decades ( graph 9 ). it is likely that in an environment of less job security, fewer people are inclined to switch employers. there is also a demand - side effect, with fewer firms attempting to attract workers from other firms. this is consistent with subdued wage growth.

of the report which compares the exchange rate dynamics before and after the change in the window for a number of currency pairs including the aussie ( $ us / $ a ). the wider window has also helped to highlight the risk transfer involved between the buyside firm initiating the transaction and the sell - side firm executing it for them. this in turn was very helpful in the communication of another of our recommendations, which garnered quite a lot of attention, namely that fixing transactions should be charged for. previously, transactions were often executed for free, at least notionally. the “ free ” cost of the transaction probably increased the incentive for manipulation as trading desks sought to generate greater profitability to compensate for taking on this risk. the widening of the window in february served as a focal point for sell - side firms to start charging for these services. most sell - side respondents to the fxcs ’ surveys report that they are now charging for fixing transactions, particularly those linked to the london 4pm fixes and especially the most liquid currency pairs. that said, some respondents, who tended to be smaller banks less active in the fix, reported they were still reviewing their pricing structure for benchmark orders. moreover, while there had been good progress in terms of the london fix, there was much less progress for other fixes. however, the scope for benchmark manipulation is there for all fixes, not just the london 4pm fixes, and hence it is important to reiterate that the recommendations of our report are intended to apply to all fx benchmarks, not just the london 4pm. so how are fixes being charged for? a mix of pricing strategies is being used. some are applying a bid - offer spread, some a fixed fee, where the fee is based on an assessment of the risk transfer involved. others are pursuing a strategy which could be called “ rent my algo ”, where a firm provides access for a fee to an algorithmic trading tool to directly execute their fixing transaction in the fixing window. this in turn, leads me to another of the recommendations of the report, namely that banks should establish separate processes for handling and executing their fixing orders from other these recommendations were contained in a report published by the fsb that is available at < http : / / www. financialstabilityboard. org / wp - content / uploads / r _ 140930. pdf >. the progress report is available benchmarks - progress - report. pdf >.