an advertising campaign on sepa. i encourage other communities to follow these examples. let me also be clear on one related point : banks should not try “ misusing ” sepa, and blaming sepa for any unpleasant changes. in that case, we could end up with a similar debate on perceived price increases as we did after the introduction of the euro. this would help nobody – neither the industry nor the customers. second, the industry should be clearer on the timetable for the “ dual circulation ” period of its instruments. the request for clarity on the end date also comes from end - user associations. interesting in this respect is the ecb ’ s recent study in cooperation with the banking industry analysing the economic impact of sepa. 2 the study confirms that two main forces will come to play. on the one hand, cross - border competition and new market participants could affect the revenue side of banks. on the other, automation and electronic processes will enable banks to achieve efficiency gains and cost reductions. the study concludes that the dual implementation phase of sepa should be as short as possible. as initial investments and higher adaptation costs are necessary in the short run, it is for the banks to decide how they will adapt to the new environment in the medium to long term. indeed, a shorter changeover to sepa will allow banks to focus more on their offering of innovative products in the medium to long term. one of the more active sepa communities, france, has already indicated an expected end date. this is a positive example, and other communities should follow. should, however, banks need more preparation when they move to the new sepa framework, the ecb and the european commission stand ready to consider supporting measures, including regulation, if required. let me now turn to the readiness of the industry for sepa card payments. i will briefly present some of the ecb ’ s views on cards. later today the panel will provide their views on the new cards landscape in sepa and i am looking forward to an interesting discussion. readiness of sepa card payments? card payments are closely monitored by the eurosystem because they are now the most popular non - cash payment instrument in the euro area. according to our blue book statistics, more than 15 billion card payments were made in the euro area in 2006. 3 between 2000 and 2006, we also noticed that the use of cards increased more quickly than the use of other instruments. the use of cards increased at an impressive rate of

few months of 1993. those on ten - year us treasury bonds fell from 7 per cent at the beginning of 1992 to just over 5 per cent in october 1993 ; the yields on german securities fell from 8 per cent to below 6 per cent at the end of 1993. the yields on ten - year italian treasury paper fell from over 14 per cent in the autumn of 1992 to below 9 per cent in the early months of 1994, after reaching 15 per cent during the ems crisis. from february 1994 onwards, in connection with the shift in the stance of us monetary policy, interest rates rose rapidly everywhere ; securities prices fell to their level of two years earlier. after the mexican crisis, medium - term interest rates declined gradually again in all the main markets from the spring of 1995 onwards. monetary policy was tightened moderately during 1997 in all the industrial countries except italy and spain. the upward pressures on interest rates are now being neutralized by the need to facilitate the solution of the asian crisis and the expectations of slower growth in the united states. the funds that have been withdrawn from the asian economies have flowed to the financial markets of the industrial countries, above all that of the united states, providing support for share and bond prices and the exchange rate of the dollar. the yen has been constantly weak, but in general outside asia the pattern of exchange rates has remained orderly. on several occasions during the 1990s the japanese government announced plans for fiscal expansion. although they were substantial, the composition of the measures, their temporary nature and incomplete implementation meant that they produced effects of limited size and duration. the japanese economy appears to be dominated by negative expectations for the medium and long term connected with the prospective ageing of the population. the large fall in property and share prices at the beginning of the 1990s created difficulties for the banking system, which have now been aggravated by the crisis of south korea and the countries of south - east asia, which have close commercial, financial and entrepreneurial ties with japan. the way to overcome the impasse - - given the size of the japanese economy and its actual and potential strength in terms of productive capacity and saving - - appears to be to provide an effective stimulus to domestic demand. monetary policy, with interest rates close to zero, appears to have shot its bolt. the plan now under discussion, if it is approved by parliament in its entirety, appears to be on a sufficiently large scale as regards the rehabilitation of the financial system. by contrast, the stimulus for economic activity appears still to be small