standard measures – which we are ready to use to achieve our price stability mandate. non - standard measures are complex and so are the policy considerations that feed into the decisions on whether or not to adopt them. therefore, providing more information on these considerations through published accounts adds complexity to the message. but this complexity is not “ noise ” but “ signal ”, as it reflects changed underlying realities. in a situation of fragmentation where non - standard measures play an important role, the analysis and considerations leading to policy decisions are by necessity much more complex than in normal times. furthermore, by their very nature, unconventional measures can be, i don ’ t hesitate to admit, controversial – both inside and outside our institution. so it is important for us to provide the public with a fuller picture of the internal debate : we need to explain ourselves better. ultimately, we strive to be accountable because, in the words of otmar issing, this “ reflects the conviction that in democratic society accountability is the “ reverse side ’ ” of central bank independence ”. 6 having established our credibility over the years, we now have the selfconfidence to make another step that will enhance our institution ’ s transparency even further. having agreed that there is a case for the publication of accounts, we then need to ask : what should these accounts of our policy deliberations actually contain? what ’ s more, we need to strike a balance between the amount of information that we disclose, and the effectiveness of our message. how do we strike that balance? again, we should be guided by our principle of clarity. we want to avoid creating what alan blinder calls a “ cacophony problem ”, with many voices tending to obscure the message, rather than elucidating it7. i would favour to convey the content of the debate and the balance of views of governing council members. another important aspect to consider when framing our communication is the implications of the specific euro area context. it consists of different countries and nationalities, so it is not like the united states, the united kingdom or japan. we are a monetary union with 18 countries. it is crucial that the governors continue to act in a personal capacity and remain independent in their decision - making. op. cit., p. 7. blinder, alan s. ( 2004 ) : “ the quiet revolution : central banking goes modern. ” yale university press. bis central bankers ’ speeches to sum up, the value of clarity in central bank communication

, and thus of reconstituting savings, was pursued with courageous determination, in the belief that the defence of the currency would create a solid basis for the country ’ s economic recovery. the path of international integration was followed by joining the bretton woods monetary system. in the 1950s italy enjoyed a period of unprecedented monetary stability and economic growth. the exchange rate with the dollar was stable, and remained so until 1971 ; for the first time the rate of inflation in italy was in line with, if not lower than, that of the other leading european countries. the end of the bretton woods system at the beginning of the 1970s concluded the transition from commodity money to fiat money. troubled times ensued : international economic relations were affected by deep shocks, such as the oil crises. during this passage italy paid a high price in terms of loss of value of the lira : double - figure inflation eroded households ’ purchasing power and periodical devaluations gave only temporary relief to a productive system labouring to restore its efficiency and competitiveness. in the following decade the decision was taken to advance the construction of the european community through the completion of the single market and, eventually, the economic and monetary union and the euro. italy took a leading role, responding to the widespread aspiration of the nation. these prophetic words were pronounced by carli at the beginning of the 1970s : “ during italy ’ s risorgimento the european ideal was deeply engrained in the effort to achieve national unity, so that the two ideals were not seen as contradictory but as phases of a single process moving towards the expression of a culturally homogeneous community. events in the last decades have given a sense of urgency to what might have seemed a utopian vision during the last century, so that the accomplishment of european unification is considered an indispensable development for the very survival of the values embodied in national ideals. ” 5 carlo cattaneo ( 1839 ), “ delle crisi finanziarie e della riforma del sistema monetario ”, il politecnico, 1, june, 548. marco fanno ( 1912 ), le banche e il mercato monetario, athenaeum, roma, 131 and 147. banca d ’ italia ( 1947 ), annual report of the governor to the general meeting of shareholders, “ final considerations ”, 51. bank of italy ( 1973 ), abridged version of the report for the year 1972, “