york city in the 1970s, the fiscal adjustment will be 2 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches painful, and many important decisions will undoubtedly be unpopular. while the pain has been — and will continue to be — widely shared, it is also critical to seek ways to ensure that the benefits from the restoration of growth are shared broadly. how exactly to make this work is an open question that i am certain the oversight board and its stakeholders will consider carefully over the coming months. the new york fed will continue to help in the best ways we can — by providing independent research and analysis, and by leveraging our convening authority to bring together stakeholders to share expertise, explore opportunities, and provide information to those who need it most. we recently held two events on the island — one for small business owners impacted by the storm and another for credit unions. we plan to do more in the months and years ahead, and i look forward to gaining a better understanding of conditions on the ground and how we can help when i travel to puerto rico and the u. s. virgin islands next month. now, i ’ d like to turn it over to jason bram, who will talk more about what we are starting to see in terms of the economic impact of the storms. 1 jaison abel, jason bram, gerard dages, richard deitz, suzanne elio, jack gutt, and andrew haughwout assisted in preparing these remarks. 2 see, for example, our report on the competitiveness of puerto rico ’ s economy, june 2012, and an update on the competitiveness of puerto rico ’ s economy, july 2014. 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches

paul tucker : resolution of large and complex financial institutions – the big issues remarks by mr paul tucker, deputy governor for financial stability at the bank of england, at the european commission conference “ building a crisis management framework for the internal market ”, brussels, 19 march 2010. * * * many thanks for input to mark adams, andrew bailey, peter brierley, geoffrey davies and andrew hewitt, and to financial stability board colleagues for discussions on resolution issues. for background work to michael grady and for secretarial support to sandra bannister and cheryl feeney. i am delighted to be at today ’ s conference, the first major conference under commissioner barnier. as many colleagues here will know, i chair the financial stability board ’ s working group on cross - border crisis management. but my remarks today are offered in a personal capacity, albeit drawing on the international dialogue. the conference is very well timed given the commission ’ s work on a possible eu directive on resolution regimes. an increasing number of national authorities have already established or are prospectively establishing special resolution regimes for the resolution of commercial banks, enabling the transfer of deposits and good assets to another bank, with bad assets and other creditor claims going into an insolvency process. at a high level of generality, a distressed bank is split into a continuing good bank, typically acquired by a healthy bank ; and a gone - concern bad bank, which goes into administration. insured deposits travel with the “ good bank ”. all other creditors typically travel with the “ bad bank ” and become claimants in the insolvency. we can be confident that this will help to buttress stability. encouragement from the eu to all members states to establish such regimes would be really useful. but we also know that, of itself, this is insufficient. it cannot cope with distressed lcfis ( “ large and complex financial institutions ” ) without injections of public money. in the first place, every country having its own special resolution regime does not solve the problem of resolving cross - border banking groups. second, such regimes cannot cope with investment banking, whether national or global, if a buyer cannot be found. even for a ( hypothetical ) lcfi operating entirely within a single jurisdiction, with all of its counterparties, customers and contracts domiciled there, a standard resolution regime could not effect an orderly run down of, for example, a massive, complex derivatives portfolio. putting over - the - counter derivatives though central counterparties