##pr. this would be the trade - off for the continuity thus provided. ii. beyond brexit, building a financial eurosystem clearly, brexit is, and will remain, bad news not only for the united kingdom, but for europe as well. but to a certain extent it can also represent an opportunity to restructure the european financial system. we have an effective monetary eurosystem consisting of the ecb and the 19 national central banks ; we have the legal framework for a single financial market and – in part – a banking union ; we have an exceptional savings capacity – one of the highest in the world – with an annual flow of eur 400 billion in euro area financial savings in the second quarter of 2018. 2 however, as yet we do not have a “ financial eurosystem ”, made up of stronger and paneuropean financial institutions and shared market infrastructures. let ’ s be clear : there will not be a single city for the continent, but rather an integrated polycentric network of financial centres, with specialisations based on areas of expertise. a polycentric system of this nature can function, as illustrated by the united states : new york ’ s financial centre is favoured by corporate and investment banks, chicago ’ s financial centre handles futures, while boston specialises in asset management. paris is well qualified to become the “ market hub ” of this new european constellation. our capital hosts four of the euro area ’ s eight global systemically important banks, the top life and non - life insurance sector and asset management industry, one of the leading bond markets and the largest continental commercial paper market with neu - cp. it is also the biggest private equity investor in continental europe. in addition, the french financial authorities, including the banque de france and the acpr, are working together to facilitate the dissemination of sound and safe financial innovations and to foster the scaling up of sustainable finance. moreover, paris offers the leading source of highly qualified financial services personnel. consequently, many global banks have already decided to transfer the majority of their market activities to paris. this new system will require a single rulebook implemented in a harmonised manner. and we are close to achieving it in the banking sector, but we are not quite there in the insurance sector. it is thus necessary to further strengthen the role of the european supervisory authorities, and france supports – although it remains a little too alone in doing so – the commission ’ s proposed reform of the esa

our set - up, with a clear medium - term focus, the eurosystem does not need or have to react mechanically to short - term deviations of monetary growth from the reference value. instead, monetary developments, i. e. both the developments of the components of m3 and of its counterparts, are analysed very carefully in order to examine and extract their information content for future inflation. * * * part 2 : the achievements of the eurosystem ’ s monetary policy what preliminary assessment can we make of the first six years of the single monetary policy? i would like to underline the following points, considering successively price stability, macroeconomic stability and convergence, monetary stance and predictability. 1. the achievement of the overriding policy objective : price stability confronted with a series of adverse exogenous supply shocks ( affecting in particular oil prices, food products and services prices ) leading to a rise in the hicp of above 2 % in year - on - year terms from 2000 to 2002, the level around which the hicp has hovered since, the eurosystem has been able to achieve its main objective : since the eurosystem became responsible for monetary policy in the euro area, hicp inflation has averaged 2 %, which is near to the “ close to but below 2 % ” at which we aim over the medium term. let me remind you that hicp inflation was around 4 % in the 1980 ’ s and about 9 % in the 1970s [ see figure 1 ]. until recently, the single monetary policy also succeeded in stabilising and anchoring medium to longterm inflation expectations at around 1. 8 % to 1. 9 %, despite all the above mentioned shocks. that is to say, once again, at a level close to, but below, 2 % in accordance with our definition of price stability – whether one takes the inflation expectations derived from surveys ( for example, consensus forecast, or the ecb survey of professional forecasters – [ see figure 2 ] ) or those drawn from market data, notably index - linked government bonds. recently, the awareness of a durable higher cost of oil has pushed expectations slightly above 2 %. the last december key ecb interest rate ’ s hike has however brought these market expectations back to 2 % that is to say in line with our definition of price stability over the medium term. 2. macroeconomic stability and convergence price stability has not come at the expense of higher unemployment. moreover, there are no visible signs