is. no – it does of course get in all the cracks, but unfortunately, despite the ample central bank liquidity, loans in individual countries which should be granted are not being granted. the way qe works was once visualised as a marathon. how many kilometres have we run so far? we have come a long way since summer 2015. even though we have pushed back the end of the qe programme, we have already covered quite a distance. we can see the effects in lending, for instance, where figures have turned from negative to positive. but that ’ s still not enough. small and medium - sized businesses in particular no longer have financing as their primary problem, and that is very positive. the problems tend to be in other policy areas, for which we are not responsible. that ’ s why we are pushing so much for structural reforms. the ecb has a price stability objective of “ below, but close to, 2 % ”. is this objective still appropriate? the answer to this question is in two parts. does it make sense in times of crisis management to change your strategy? i don ’ t think that would foster confidence. however, it is indeed the case that it is more difficult to measure inflation today than it was 15 or 30 years ago. there are factors which we over - and underestimate when it comes to inflation. why? it is not so easy to distinguish between improvements in quality and increases in prices. that is especially true in the digital age. it has probably never been as difficult as it is today to establish how changes in consumer behaviour affect productivity and prices. we need further studies on all these issues. if you draw premature conclusions, you end up zigzagging around, which destroys confidence. confidence - building is the key precondition for us to return to a stable growth path. bis central bankers ’ speeches why, then, is the “ close to 2 % ” so important? an inflation goal of 1. 5 % would also suffice. prices are stable, so why is the ecb putting itself under pressure? we are, after all, a long way from japan - style deflation. there were deflationary risks. when these are accompanied by a recession, things get difficult. then you are permanently driving along the edge of the precipice and the risk of having an accident is greater. that ’ s why potential growth must be pushed up. but that is not a task for us ;

of gdp. as shown in ( figure 6 ), which shows these two components over time, the business balance is currently unusually high ; that is, businesses have very high cash flows relative to their investment outlays. this suggests that some of the required adjustment could occur by fostering greater investment spending as a share of gdp. for this to occur, it will be important that economic policies promote long - term growth and financial stability, and ensure that the united states is a competitive place to base production, with a well - functioning infrastructure, a skilled workforce and a reasonable tax and regulatory system. in addition, it seems desireable that some of the adjustment should take place in the trade sector. although a current account deficit of 3 percent of gdp by itself would be sustainable over time, for the household balance to remain close to current levels and the public balance to sharply narrow, then the current account may need to move further toward balance. for this to occur, there needs to be two offsetting adjustments. on one hand, the u. s. economy must be reoriented toward global demand and stronger net exports. on the other hand, there will have to be offsetting adjustments elsewhere in the world. after all, on a global basis, the current account balance – properly measured – must sum to zero. this means see " securing the recovery and building for the future. " remarks by william dudley at united states military academy at west point, new york, november 17, 2011, for a more detailed discussion of this issue. third quarter 2011, the latest period for which data are available. the federal public balance is roughly equivalent, though not identical, to the federal budget deficit ; the overall public balance numbers provided here include state and local government. bis central bankers ’ speeches that countries with significant trade surpluses will need to reorient their economies over time toward increasing domestic demand and running smaller trade surpluses. to sum up, the united states faces substantial fiscal challenges in the years ahead. and, in one important respect – net interest expense – these challenges may be more daunting than fully appreciated currently. in particular, the interest bill on the growing federal debt burden has been temporarily restrained by the low level of interest rates and high level of remittances from the federal reserve to the treasury. in addition, while significant fiscal adjustments must take place, it is important to recognize that such efforts will necessitate offsetting shifts in private domestic spending and production both here and abroad.