samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
that period ( graph 9 ). 16 what about those households that rely on interest - bearing assets? their disposable incomes are lower than otherwise given the sizeable decline in interest rates. 17 accordingly, such households may be reluctant to maintain consumption by either running down their pool of liquid assets, or accessing capital gains they may have enjoyed on any housing or equities that they hold. such behaviour would contribute to the growth of aggregate consumption being less responsive to a decline in interest rates than in the past. finally, let ’ s consider those households with some spare funds to invest. the very low level of interest rates may have prompted such households to search for yield. many of these households have combined those spare funds with new debt to purchase housing for the purposes of investment. indeed, the strong growth of investor housing loans has driven the growth in household debt ( as a share of disposable incomes ) over recent years and contributed to a rise in both housing prices and dwelling construction. while this may not directly contribute to a rise in consumption of households undertaking the investment, it will support overall economic activity nonetheless. conclusions monetary policy is clearly working to support demand, although it is working against some strong headwinds. these include the significant decline in mining investment, fiscal consolidation at state and federal levels and the exchange rate, which continues to offer less assistance than would normally be expected in achieving balanced growth in the economy. model estimates that control for these and other forces provide tentative evidence that the monetary policy transmission mechanism, in aggregate, is about as effective as usual. however, it may be too early to pick up a statistically significant change using such models. as usual, dwelling construction is growing strongly in response to low interest rates, and this is making some contribution to the growth of aggregate demand and employment. it may be that in parts of the country, any further substantial increases in residential construction activity might run up against some supply constraints, putting further upward pressure on housing prices. as the bank has noted for some time now, large increases of housing prices, if accompanied by strong growth of credit and a relaxation of lending standards, are a potential risk for economic stability. accordingly, the bank is working with other regulators to assess and contain such risks that may arise from the housing market. consumption growth has picked up since 2013. but it is still a little weaker than suggested by historical experience. this may reflect a number of factors including some variation in the ways that the different channels of monetary policy

. 1 see the gfxc ’ s index of public registers at. 2 gfxc ( 2021 ) ‘ outcomes of the 3 - year review of the fx global code ’, july. available at. 3 bank of international settlements ( 2020 ) ‘ fx execution algorithms and market functioning ’, markets committee study group report, october. available at. 4 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches
pleasure of still being in office, which gives me the opportunity to speak to you today, and to wish you an interesting second day of this workshop – a workshop with, recalling the past, an aptly - chosen topic. i would almost say, a topic of capital importance. thank you. note 1 : announcement on the strategy review : the ecb's monetary policy strategy statement ( europa. eu ) 5 / 5 bis - central bankers'speeches

. and we were transparent about how we expected them to evolve. transparency should be a guiding principle for central banks. they should be prepared to discuss their monetary policy decisions and clearly explain how their decisions safeguard price stability, and also not shy away from considering any link with public finances and the real economy. equally, they should not refrain from being transparent about the potential impact of their decisions on their balance sheets and, as such, emphasise their crucial role in absorbing losses in times of crises. looking at the future – if qe would ever be needed again – and i think that next time around the ecb will be much more cautious – but if it were to happen, i think central 3 / 5 bis - central bankers'speeches banks should pursue transparency. they should clearly communicate the benefits of qe for price stability, for liquidity in the financial system, and for the economic welfare of society – and they should also proactively communicate about the impact these purchases might have on their balance sheets. to do so, to be able to proactively communicate, central banks, of course, need to have an idea of the potential risks, of the potential impact of monetary policy operations on their balance sheets. and so, they should conduct comprehensive, forward - looking risk assessments. assessments that take into account scenario analyses from their risk management departments. assessments that may result in higher provisioning ex - ante. looking at qe again – from a scenario analysis point of view – qe aimed at boosting inflation may result in losses, because assets are purchased at high prices. conversely, when asset purchases are deployed to stabilise markets, they tend to be more profitable. because in that case, assets are not necessarily acquired at peak prices. but the actual financial results of qe will depend on the actual timing and extent of the purchases, together with the actual interest rate evolution. indeed, there is a lot of uncertainty and in the end only one scenario will play out. and although my colleagues from the risk management department ran through some extreme but plausible interest rate scenarios, we did not foresee the impact a pandemic could have nor did we factor in a russian invasion of ukraine. as such we did not anticipate the recent inflationary shock and the speed and intensity of policy rate increases. and so, we did not foresee the extent of the current losses. had there been no such shock, and had policy rates risen gradually and to a lesser extent, qe
will have output back to 2019 levels by 2022. this includes 12. 9 pp expected to have net positive growth this year, 18. 3 pp which will be above 2019 levels in 2021, and 44. 1 pp expected to get there in 2022. south africa is in the remaining quarter of countries expected to recover to 2019 levels of output only after 2022.

importance here will be the absolute fully dedicated focus on education and skills development in south africa for a higher growth path. although employment creation is still at low levels, it is nonetheless encouraging to see that there has been a pick up in the numbers of people employed. according to the latest official data available in march 2004, total employment in south africa was 11 984 million, which was a marked improvement from the total of 11 652 million in september 2003. the number of unemployed people remains high in south africa despite this improvement. according to stats sa, the total unemployed was 4 611 million in march 2004 as compared to the 4 627 million in september 2003. so a lot of work still lies ahead as far as employment creation is concerned. but it is encouraging that the number of people unemployed is coming down. as we have indicated in the past, south africa introduced inflation targeting in the year 2000. the inflation target was specified as the consumer price index less mortgage cost, the co - called cpix. the numeral target was for cpix to remain on average between 6 and 3 percent. now, there has been a little change to specify that the target must be met on a twelve - month continuous basis. we are happy here at the central bank to report to you this evening that since september 2003, we have been inside the target range. this achievement has also begun to influence inflation expectations in a positive way. the expectations of business, trade unions and households are now well within the target levels. this is important for inflation outcomes going forward. in an inflation targeting monetary policy framework, it is important that we are committed to the inflation target and not target any other intermediate variable. so whilst variables such as the exchange rate, monetary aggregates, unit labour cost and oil prices play an important part in the inflation process, these should not become intermediate targets but must however be watched carefully and systematically by the central bank. the exchange rate of the rand is determined by the supply and demand developments in the foreign exchange market. the central bank does not target any level of the exchange rate but takes the rate as given by the forex market. due to the importance which attaches to the exchange rate in the inflation process, a competitively priced exchange rate is the preferred outcome for the central bank. we neither prefer a weak rand nor an overvalued exchange rate. we prefer a competitively priced exchange rate. from time to time, exchange rates have a tendency to over - or undersho
bankers'speeches

effect of solvency 2 on more “ risky ” investments, which are necessary to ensure the proper functioning of our economy : equities, whether listed or unlisted, loans to smes and mtes but also green assets or investments in innovative companies. - finally, we know that solvency ii is more volatile than the previous regime. measures have already been integrated to limit the procyclical effects of a market value - based balance sheet. it is worth mentioning the matching adjustment, 3 the volatility adjustment 4 and the symmetric adjustment for equity risk, 5 which complement a set of transitional measures to ensure a gradual entry into force of the new regime. the effectiveness of these measures should be assessed in the coming years, and if it proves inadequate, amendments should be proposed. 3 which takes account of the reality of asset - liability matching. 4 which adjusts changes in bond spreads not linked to default risk. 5 which adjusts the capital charge according to the position in the equity cycle. page 7 sur 7 * * i could also have talked about digital technology, or climate change ; i know you are already dealing with these issues. going forward, however, there is one thing we can be sure of : in a world of uncertainty, and therefore of volatility, the business of insurance, your business, will remain central to two key challenges : protecting against risks and preparing for the long term. insurance is a strength, both for france and for its economy. as the industry continues to evolve, rest assured that the acpr ’ s staff will remain fully committed to supporting you day - to - day. thank you for your attention.
policy rate will need to rise to a neutral stance to achieve our inflation target. in determining the appropriate pace of interest rate increases, we will continue to monitor the economy ’ s adjustment to higher interest rates, given the elevated level of household debt. and we will pay close attention to new developments on the international trade front. 5 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches

stephen s poloz : release of the monetary policy report opening statement by mr stephen s poloz, governor of the bank of canada, at the press conference following the release of the monetary policy report, ottawa, ontario, 18 january 2017. * * * good morning. senior deputy governor wilkins and i are happy to be here to answer your questions about today ’ s interest rate announcement and our monetary policy report ( mpr ). let me elaborate on some selected issues that were central to the governing council ’ s deliberations. the uncertainty we face as forecasters and policy - makers remains undiminished. the mpr outlines a number of risks to our projection in both directions. in our discussions, governing council was particularly concerned about the ramifications of us trade policy, because it is so fundamental to the canadian economy. but we cannot capture these in our projections because they are simply unknown at this point. we considered the possibility of not incorporating any us policy changes in our projection. however, governing council felt that some form of fiscal stimulus was likely over our projection horizon. accordingly, we have made some reasonable initial assumptions about fiscal initiatives — specifically, corporate and personal tax cuts that would raise the level of us gdp by about 0. 5 per cent in 2018. this assumption could be recalibrated in either direction, but doing the work now provides a framework for analyzing the situation as it evolves, while also giving us a better balance of risks over the projection horizon. according to our analysis, a us fiscal shock of this magnitude would probably have only small effects here in canada, boosting gdp by about 0. 1 per cent by 2018. this is because there are three important offsets that would limit the transmission of such a us fiscal shock to canada. first, a corporate tax cut in the united states could adversely affect canadian export competitiveness. this would mean lower exports and investment in canada than otherwise. although our business outlook survey ( bos ) shows stronger investment intentions, some of this may be coming from firms with cross - border operations considering new investments in the united states rather than here in canada. second, an important consequence of rising us optimism has been an increase in us bond yields, some two - thirds of which has been imported into canada — much more than in many other countries. while this reaction is consistent with past correlations, it is at odds with canada ’ s macroeconomic situation where there is material excess capacity, unlike the us economy. this divergence
shifts the balance within the system, it doesn ’ t reduce the amount of settlement balances in total. the only way that the amount of aggregate settlement balances can change is through payments to or from the crown or the reserve bank, who are outside the system. therefore, the main role of our domestic market operations team before covid - 19 was to forecast the government ’ s cash flows in and out of the csa and look to offset the impact of those flows with our open market operations ( omos ) in money markets, injecting or withdrawing liquidity. the tools we used to inject liquidity were reverse repurchase agreements ( reverse repos ) and foreign exchange swaps ( fx swaps ). these feature as assets on our balance sheet. the tools we used for a detailed description of our approach, i would recommend parekh ( 2016 ). technically, the reserve bank moved from a “ corridor ” system to a “ tiered remuneration ” system between 2007 - 2020, which was a hybrid between a “ corridor ” and a “ floor ” system. ref # 9122402 v2. 12 to withdraw liquidity were repurchase agreements ( repos ) and issuing reserve bank bills. these feature as liabilities on our balance sheet. before covid - 19, lending via fx swaps was the largest asset held by the reserve bank for liquidity management purposes, with around $ 7 billion outstanding. we also typically held around $ 3 billion of nz government bonds on our balance sheet before covid - 19. these assets gave us the capability to withdraw liquidity via our repos. they were also available to lend to banks, thereby helping to avoid settlement failures if a bond became scarce in the secondary market. in addition, when a specific nz government bond was within a year of maturity, we would typically start a repurchase programme to increase our holdings of that issue to help smooth out the impact of a large maturity on settlement balances. ii ) foreign reserve management finally, we hold foreign currency assets, made up largely of liquid us, european and japanese government bonds. around 70 percent of these foreign assets are hedged against foreign exchange risk. these provide the capability to intervene in the foreign exchange market in response to disorderly conditions. varying the size of our foreign exchange position also provide a tool to manage the level of the nz dollar exchange rate if it was deemed exceptionally high or low, unjustified, consistent with mpc ’ s

low inflationary growth in the new zealand economy. bis central bankers ’ speeches
the reasons for this development, as i mentioned earlier, these factors per se may fall short of explaining the price increases in some products. in particular, we see higher rates of price increases in sectors that were adversely affected by the pandemic and registered brisk demand after the pandemic. however, we assess that such pricing behavior will converge back to its pre - pandemic state in the upcoming period as the economic and social normalization gains pace. we have witnessed a global trend of increasing food prices, which is yet to be normalized. many food products surged in price during the exit from the pandemic. the persisting drought also has an adverse impact on production conditions and prices in this area. on the other hand, weight of food items in the global consumption basket and domestic food inflation may differ between countries. hence, this increase in food prices can affect inflation at different rates in different countries. a cross - country comparison reveals that turkey is among the countries in which the prices are the most adversely affected. in the table, we see that food inflation in august was considerably higher than the average of the last three years. finally, i would like to talk about our foreign exchange reserves while evaluating our economy. the improvement in reserves is in line with our projections. our reserves, which were usd 85 - 90 billion, increased by approximately usd 30 billion and exceeded usd 120 billion. swap agreements, rediscount credits, gold ore purchases and arrangements in required reserves were the main factors contributing to this increase. before concluding my speech, i would like to talk about the central bank ’ s views on the future of the normalization process. although significant progress has been made in the struggle with the pandemic, virus variants have caused case numbers to rise again, which adds to uncertainty over the course of the pandemic. as you can see on the slide, many countries are now facing a new wave of infection. it is clear that mortality rates do not increase in parallel to the surging number of cases in countries with relatively high vaccination rates. accelerating the global vaccination program is also critical to economic normalization. a second important factor for the future is that the post - pandemic economic recovery reveals a considerable variation among countries for reasons such as vaccination and policies implemented. this was also emphasized in the publications of many international institutions and central banks, and it contributes to the supply - demand mismatches and the rise in inflation i highlighted

crisis recipe described above. of course we have high inflation, a high nominal budget deficit, and high short - term domestic debt, but on the other hand turkey ’ s exchange rate policy, current account situation, the nature of its short - term external debt, and other fundamentals do not indicate an alarming situation. the east asian crisis should have greatly improved the ability of economists to predict an episode. i would be glad to see some evidence of this improvement.
do this, we need the best and the brightest from all kinds of disciplines. we need people that see the bigger picture. 4 / 5 bis - central bankers'speeches and with this not so subtle hint, i am closing my remarks, and i am happy to answer any questions you may have. 5 / 5 bis - central bankers'speeches

, with healthy pension funds, which flourish in a dynamic environment characterised by lasting expertise in managing pension risks. legislator, regulator and the sector have a common interest in maintaining and propagating the comparative advantages of the netherlands in terms of pension provisions. these comparative advantages are considerable. the netherlands not only has one of the best capitalised pension sectors in the world, it also has much experience of pension insurance. this country harbours much knowledge and skills in the areas of asset - liability management, portfolio management, actuarial expertise, information technology, tax and pension legislation and administrative processes. here, major advantages of scale can be had. where asset pooling is concerned, too, the netherlands offers a surprising potential investment alternative, a restricted fund for mutual account, comparable to much - praised luxemburg and irish constructions. finally, the netherlands has an edge in that both pension funds and regulators have wide experience with the implementation of the prudent person rule ( which entails : ( i ) expert portfolio management, ( ii ) the investment of assets in the interest of ( former ) participants so that ( iii ) the safety, quality, liquidity and return on the portfolio as a whole is guaranteed, ( iv ) alignment of the risk and return profile of the entire portfolio to the fund ’ s liability structure and ( v ) sufficient diversification of investments. ) in short, even though it is rarely mentioned in the media, the netherlands has as much to offer as other countries, and even more. but there is no cause for complacency. maintaining a sound starting position is not a matter of course. where possible, we must continue our efforts to capitalise on national and especially international developments. take, for example, the eu pension directive which entered into force in september 2005. this directive allows european employers to place pension commitments with pension funds in another eu member state. given its comparative advantages and its avant - garde position in the development of risk - based capital requirements for pension funds, the netherlands is an attractive domicile for such institutions. here lie opportunities for the dutch pension industry. in conjunction with the ministries of social affairs & employment and of finance, a working group of the nederlandsche bank are currently investigating how the netherlands could become even more attractive as a domicile for pension funds. the working group are putting out their feelers within the sector, but welcome suggestions. i hereby invite you all to submit ideas on the bank ’ s website, info @ d