be. this explains why almost no one is conducting a euro debate in sweden, even though it does not have a derogation and many would like to see it in the eurozone. canonically, the same goes for us : either we can continue to stabilise ourselves, in which case we don ’ t need the euro, or we will destabilise ourselves, but in that case we will potentially harm others in the euro club and eurozone membership will be a hindrance in bad times. 5. there ’ s no story in our case : the baltic states took the euro as a geopolitical and security safeguard and paid a huge economic price for permanently fixing their currencies to it. slovenia wanted to cut itself off from the western balkans. slovakia wanted to seal the reforms of former prime minister mikulas dzurinda. germany gained unification in exchange for the euro. the southern countries ( italy, france and spain ) gained the stability of the german mark because they were unable to create such a currency at home. and those who were tied to the german mark long before the euro was created ( austria and the netherlands ) simply remained bound to frankfurt after the eurozone was established, only the bundesbank building was replaced all of a sudden by the ecb building. there ’ s no basic euro story like this in the czech republic. why should we try to create one artificially? our story is one of maintaining monetary stability across regimes and governments and of keeping the koruna as the name of our currency continuously since the time of emperor franz joseph ( his monetary reform established a new currency – the crown, or koruna – throughout the austro - hungarian monarchy in 1892 ) regardless of totalitarianism and the horrors of the 20th century. neither the nazis, nor the communists had any tendency to rename the currency and kept this old monarchist name despite otherwise changing basically everything, and for the worse. our country – unlike the rest of the central europe – has never experienced hyperinflation in its modern history, and this monetary stability has always served the entrenched mentality of small czech savers well. domestic scepticism about the euro – that ’ s our authentic czech story. 6. the slovak economic miracle : it is, of course, impossible not to make comparisons with our eastern neighbour slovakia, the only member of the visegrad club to have adopted the euro, which it did in 2009. unfortunately, here more than anywhere

wonder whether the czech sitting - on - the - fence approach is heading towards the danish model. it wouldn ’ t be my choice, but it ’ s good to be prepared. 8. macro costs and micro benefits : the eurozone has so far failed to make its member states wealthier quicker ( the non - euro eu states are constantly growing faster on average ) or to make them converge structurally. rather, one could argue that the opposite is true. a truly strong measurable result of the euro is lower and less volatile inflation. this is hard to see as a bonus for our country, where we are consistently achieving the same objective with our own currency. the oft - mentioned bonus of lower interest rates due to the euro does not apply to us either. we have long known what it ’ s like to live with rates below the eurozone level. likewise, it ’ s hard to believe that the euro will deepen our trade relations with the euro countries given that we are one of the few countries enjoying not only growing trade, but also a constantly rising trade surplus with germany. the euro has micro benefits at firm level, but unfortunately they come with the aforementioned macro costs. the latter are constantly rising and their final size and structure are impossible to quantify. besides the known contribution to the stability funds, they include mandatory participation in the banking union, which is another unfinished structure. for a country of our type, currency arrangement and monetary history, joining the eurozone is generally an extremely tough question. it was ever thus, but it is currently all the more so. adopting the euro today would be like being the last to arrive at a party, one where all the food and drink has gone and the other guests are looking for someone to help pay the bill. the british journalist david marsh, one of the foremost experts on the anatomy of the establishment of the 3 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches single currency, summed it up brilliantly : “ the eurozone doesn ’ t need new members, it needs new creditors ”. 1 and when such a consistent defender of mainstream economic thinking as the american kenneth rogoff announces that it is “ fairly obvious that the euro was not necessary to the success of the eu, and instead has proved a massive impediment ” 2, even staunch supporters of the euro in our country probably took notice. the pragmatic anglo - saxon approach of “ if it ain ’ t broke, don ’ t fix it ” suits the czech republic