bondholders'meeting. in particular, for the cross - industry committee on japanese yen interest rate benchmarks ( 2020 ), " final report on the results of the second public consultation on the appropriate choice and usage of japanese yen interest rate benchmarks. " in the report, the first priority for the fallback rates to be used in the fallback provision is indicated as a term reference rate. but, currently, torf is the only term riskfree rate with their production rates available. latter case requiring consents of all the bondholders, active participation of those bondholders in the discussions and negotiations is essential for the success of the amendment. in the libor transition for bonds referencing yen libor, the roles and responsibilities of issuers are always visible ; however, bondholders also bear important roles. in the limited time left before the permanent cessation of yen libor, it is extremely important for both issuers and bondholders to recognize their own roles in the transition activities concerning legacy contracts, including the incorporation of the fallback provision. c. transition from yen libor swaps to ois the last point that i will touch upon in my speech today concerns derivatives, not loans and bonds. specifically, let me talk about the need to cease new transactions of yen libor swaps and thereby to transition to those of ois ( chart 5 ). the committee published a statement entitled " preparations for the discontinuation of libor in the jpy interest rate swaps market " in late march this year. 7 it requested that market participants should cease the initiation of new transactions of yen libor swaps by no later than the end of this september, and they should do so as early as possible, if practicable. it also clarified that ois should be the dominant option which would replace yen libor swaps. the statement by the committee is well in line with the global standard concerning the libor transition in derivatives, as proposed by the financial stability board ( fsb ). it is therefore important for market participants in the yen interest rate swap markets to make transition to ois as early as possible, in accordance with the statement. that will also lead to an enhancement of the liquidity of ois, thereby resulting in more robustness of torf referenced in loans and bonds. cross - industry committee on japanese yen interest rate benchmarks ( 2021 ), " preparations for the discontinuation of libor in the jpy interest rate swaps market

##st, authoritarian parties are in government or in a ruling coalition in nine ( 9 ) countries of the eu. this is an alarming figure. referendums in italy and hungary, and national elections next year in the netherlands, the czech republic, france and germany, are expected to reinforce this eurosceptic mood. beyond the obvious economic concerns which triggered the uk vote to leave the eu, everyone agrees that the eu needs to address the issue of its democratic deficit and accountability. in addition, it has long been argued that the european union remains a ‘ market without a state ’. this quote perhaps summarises the debate on european integration over the last 40 years at least. the most frequent complaint regarding the way the eu works is that it is governed by an elite of unelected technocrats through several independent european institutions and bodies ( including the ecb ). in light of the above issues of democratic deficit and accountability, europeans are increasingly disenchanted with the eu, as shown by the rise of populist, authoritarian parties. support for populist political parties with eurosceptic credentials has been rising, that is, parties which are by nature more eurosceptic and less oriented towards reforms, which of course the south badly needs. as a result, this is a major downside risk to debt sustainability in this part of the euro area. for continental europe, brexit represents a shock to the institutions and norms that underpin markets, albeit different from the euro break - up fears of 2012, the global financial crisis of 2008 or the bursting of the high - tech bubble of 2001. the origins of previous financial crises can be located in multiple factors that are linked with the financial system and the economic cycle, respectively. the risk today is not financial contagion, like in 2008. instead, it represents a contagious political development. no matter whether we have a full - blown or a light brexit, the political risk for the continent is that referendums may mushroom across europe in a tug - of - war between populist forces and the political establishment and elites. brexit has the potential to unleash centrifugal forces, leading perhaps to a breakup of the euro, especially if such a referendum were to be held this time in a major eurozone country. perhaps such a referendum is more likely in a southern eurozone country. thank you very much for your attention. 1 for a more detailed account, see my speech ( september