the riksbank ’ s target. inflation expectations, moreover, were tending to move up, having previously stabilised after a falling trend for a number of years. in the december report it was judged that inflation would exceed the target in 1999. the riksbank raised the repo rate 0. 25 percentage points. at the same time, the riksbank underscored that, due to uncertainties in the assessment, the outcome might differ from the main scenario. on the one hand, an exacerbation of the crisis in asia could result in weaker inflationary pressure ; on the other, there were risks that high wage increases and weak productivity growth would fuel the rate of inflation. these two alternative scenarios were judged to be equally probable. • during the spring the picture of inflation changed by degrees. in the march report, inflation prospects had altered somewhat in connection with the mounting crisis in asia and low import prices. subdued inflation expectations and restrained wage demands pointed in the same direction. in view of a weak development of international activity, it was foreseen that full capacity utilisation in the swedish economy would not be reached until the end of the forecast period, when inflation was assumed to be marginally above the target. this called for a readiness to undertake some cautious tightening of the monetary stance later in the year. at the same time, the spectrum of risks had shifted, with less risk of inflation exceeding its expected path but a continued risk of development being weaker than in the main scenario. in view of the uncertainty, the riksbank chose to await future developments. • at the beginning of the summer we observed that inflation was following a lower path than we had assumed in the main scenario in march. weaker import prices were contributing to this but so were other factors. transitory effects - lower interest rates and changes in indirect taxes and subsidies - were particularly prominent. moreover, on account of lower wage increases and stronger productivity growth than expected earlier, it seemed that inflation in the longer run would be somewhat lower than the riksbank had predicted. with the outlook for productivity, it was likely that some surplus capacity would continue to exist during the whole period. - 3all in all, inflation prospects one to two years ahead were accordingly more subdued than before and predicted inflation was below the target throughout the forecast period. in addition, there was judged to be a large risk of inflation being below the path in the main scenario. under these circumstances the repo rate was lowered 0. 25

my role, i shall concentrate on the role a well - regulated insurance industry can play. it is not a minor role. compensation can be very costly for the public finances when an event occurs. it is also difficult for the private insurance market to provide adequate cover for rare but catastrophic events. ex - ante risk mitigation and damage prevention and limitation are therefore desirable. moreover, the nature of catastrophe risk appears to require an appropriate interaction between public relief intervention and private insurance schemes. certain valuable principles for policy - makers have recently been summarised in a ‘ decalogue ’ for natural - disaster management, 3 drawn up by the oecd and the iais, the international association of insurance supervisors, under the auspices of the italian g7 presidency – the ‘ high - level framework ’ that has been repeatedly mentioned this morning. ivass has actively contributed to this document with technical input. the oecd - iais framework states that an effective mechanism for protection against natural catastrophes requires the cooperation of many stakeholders, both public and private. on this point, last year i mentioned the pros and cons of two ways of sharing the costs of a catastrophic event : public intervention and private insurance. i also claimed that an adequate diffusion of insurance cover is not just a question of individual choice, but has elements of a collective issue. let me add that another factor is the action of charities and volunteers, for whose work we should be deeply grateful. allow me to recapitulate very briefly the main points i made on that occasion. public intervention will always be necessary to some extent, because not all risks are effectively insurable and because, in the case of truly catastrophic events, some form of coordination of the reconstruction and its financing is indispensable. its drawbacks however are, first, that when an event occurs, there is uncertainty about whether compensation will be provided and to what extent, who will be eligible and under what conditions ; second, that experience tells us that the implementation of relief measures often comes very late after the event ; third, that the distribution of the tax burden being naturally based on pure, discretionary ex - post mutualisation, it can hardly be designed in a way to create the right incentives for ex - ante risk prevention or mitigation. see radu d., ‘ approaching disaster risk financing in a structured way ’, european commission, dg - ecfin, may 2024 ; ‘ policy options to reduce the climate insurance protection