change for monetary policy transmission and price stability. second, the ecb will introduce environmental sustainability disclosure requirements for eligibility for collateral and asset purchases. third, we will adapt our risk assessment framework, our corporate sector asset purchases and the collateral framework for climate - related risks. during our review, we also addressed the communication of our monetary policy. we heard directly how our policies affect the lives of european citizens and their desire to better understand those policies. our last review took place well before smartphones were around, so there was a strong case for enhancing our communication with the outside world. you will notice some changes in the coming weeks relating to our regular communication. for example, a new, 2 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches more narrative - based, and more concise monetary policy statement will replace the introductory statement at our monetary policy press conferences. but also, our monetary policy communication geared towards the wider public will be adapted through a more visualised and more accessible approach. and, reflecting the successful experience with the listening events, the governing council intends to continue to interact on a regular basis with the public via eurosystem outreach events. the review of our strategy that we have just completed took place 18 years after the previous one. looking ahead, the rapidly changing world that we live in means that we cannot wait for another 18 years before undertaking the next review. a regular review cycle, with the governing council periodically reassessing the appropriateness of its monetary policy strategy, will ensure that the strategy remains fit for purpose. it will also further enhance the ecb ’ s transparency and accountability to european citizens. we intend to carry out the next assessment in 2025. the governing council yesterday also endorsed a longer explanatory overview note on the ecb ’ s monetary policy strategy, which will be published after the press conference. we are now ready to take your questions. 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches

growth - model based on over - savings, was, in conjunction with accumulating deficits in a number of consumption - driven economies, a major source of concern in the years which preceded the global financial crisis. such imbalances were coupled with “ twin gluts ” in global liquidity and planned savings which led to historically low risk premia – the main symptom that systemic risk was escalating in the presence of easy finance accommodating complacent borrowers. even the global financial crisis and the policy responses have reduced the imbalances only partly and temporarily over the most recent years. the fact that these imbalances have persisted for so long exposes a key weakness of the system, namely the inadequacy of the adjustment mechanisms. let me explain this in more detail by looking at the various stakeholders : national authorities in deficit and surplus countries had little incentives to depart from their growth model and policy course. indeed, prior to the crisis the economies with the largest external imbalances were often outperforming their peers in terms of gdp growth : the larger the imbalance, the higher was the growth rate over the short run. moreover, the deficit and surplus countries, rather than exerting policy discipline on each other, in fact accommodated the other in the pursuit of their respective growth models ( see dooley et al. 2003 ). market discipline also proved partly unreliable for a number of reasons. firstly, markets frequently do not function in line with fundamentals as expected, leading to mispricing and undue volatility in, for example, exchange rates and credit risk premia. this may be explained in part by factors such as herding behaviour, but also the lack of a shared view on the relevant fundamentals. secondly, market behaviour has also been constrained by structural factors and policy regimes. on the deficit side, the fact that the united states provides the deepest and most liquid financial market – and issues the dominant reserve currency – provides it with an unparalleled platform to offer “ safe ” debt instruments. the insatiable demand for such debt instruments puts strong pressure on the us financial system and its incentives ( caballero 2009 ). at the same time, the us derives its “ exorbitant privilege ” from this situation. the demand for us assets constrains the growth in credit and exchange rate risk premia charged by markets on rising us debt. this effectively limits the increase in external borrowing costs