should have control over suitable tools to attain its objectives. this is to establish a clear responsibility. moreover, they recommend that the central banks should play a leading role in macroprudential policy and that the macroprudential supervisory body should have operational independence. it is now time for me to return to the financial crisis committee ’ s proposal, and how this relates to the demands i consider should be made regarding a framework for macroprudential policy – demands that are also expressed in the esrb ’ s recommendation. … but the financial crisis committee ’ s proposal does not go very far … two days ago, 23 january, the financial crisis committee published its proposal as to how we should organise macroprudential policy in sweden. 13 in principle, the proposal is that the current council for cooperation on macroprudential policy between the riksbank and finansinspektionen is confirmed by law and supplemented with independent experts and an observer from the ministry of finance. the council shall work to promote greater knowledge of systemic risks and to develop macroprudential tools. moreover, it shall analyse risks and discuss suitable measures. a secretariat for the council will be established at the riksbank. however, the council will not have any powers of authority ; its work will consist of exchanging information and discussion. decisions on the application of macroprudential tools will lie with finansinspektionen or the riksbank, with both being given responsibility for macroprudential policy. they are also to consult with one another prior to decisions on applying macroprudential tools. the committee does not offer any suggestions as to which macroprudential tools are needed or how they should be divided between the authorities. my assessment is therefore that the financial crisis committee ’ s proposal, which means that both the riksbank and finansinspektionen will become macroprudential bodies, does not fulfil the important criteria regarding decision - making powers, independence and accountability. and nor does the proposal appear to be in line with the esrb ’ s recommendation. … and differs from the practice that is emerging in europe moreover, the financial crisis committee ’ s proposals differ from the structures emerging in other eu countries. two models are predominant in this context, and both of them are in line with the esrb ’ s recommendation. either the responsibility for macroprudential policy is given to the central bank, as in the united kingdom, or it is

our credibility. the eurosystem clearly stands in the tradition of best practice in central banking – as exemplified by the bundesbank prior to the introduction of the euro. the eurosystem ’ s twopillar monetary policy strategy inherited the concept of the bundesbank monetary pillar – which my own previous institution, the banque de france had also chosen in january 1994 as soon as it became independent. the eurosystem ’ s two pillar strategy is built on the conviction that, in the medium to long term, inflation is a monetary phenomenon and that independent central banks have the strategy and the instruments to achieve price stability. the eurosystem ’ s track record proves that this important insight translates one for one to the monetary union context. i would like to take this opportunity to also express my gratitude, not only to axel weber but also to all bundesbank staff, for the commitment shown on a daily basis during the past twelve years and in particular during the financial crisis. the governing council of the ecb knows and highly appreciates the crucial contribution of national central banks to the smooth functioning of monetary union. the financial crisis has made more visible to a broader public the essential tasks that national central banks carry out day by day within the eurosystem. for the sake of brevity allow me to focus here on two such activities, and i am fully aware that there are many other tasks that equally deserve our full recognition. on both bis central bankers ’ speeches dimensions, the eurosystem benefited enormously from the bundesbank ’ s dedication to our common cause, and on both dimensions the bundesbank contribution found in axel its voice. the first task is financial supervision, the importance of which cannot be underestimated. for one thing, the information gathered in supervision has been particularly useful in the preparation of monetary policy decisions during the financial crisis. this has been especially true when and since the governing council of the ecb decided to introduce non - standard monetary policy measures to ensure the proper transmission of the monetary policy stance. the information also helps the governing council of the ecb assess the interconnectedness of national financial systems and vulnerabilities threatening financial stability in the euro area as a whole. in this context the bundesbank has done a crucial job in containing the fallout from the financial crisis. after the collapse of lehman brothers immediate and determined action was crucial to avoid a meltdown of the financial system in germany and the other euro area countries. the bundesbank under