of debt dynamics. let me say upfront that the commission's proposal is a step in the right direction. that said, the " fiscal rules trilemma " iv provides a useful matrix to analyse its merits relative to current rules. the trilemma states that it is impossible to fulfil simultaneously the following three objectives : i simplicity, which can also be understood as political intelligibility and ownership ii flexibility, i. e. the ability to adapt to specific economic situations or unforeseen developments, and iii enforcement, i. e. the extent to which the rule is binding. in practice, the current stability and growth pact includes too many – and too complex – flexibility provisions and escape clauses to compensate for the " one size fits all principle ", while efforts to improve its enforceability proved ineffective. the reform must strike a better balance between these three features – simplicity, flexibility and enforcement – in order to make the fiscal framework more effective and operational. as regards simplicity, the fact that the new framework is built around a single operational indicator, i. e. a net primary public expenditure aggregate, is a major improvement compared to structural deficits. in principle, this new indicator should be easier for governments to measure and oversee, and would entirely fall within their control. it is also simpler to use as a communication tool in the public debate, which would help to make the new rules politically intelligible and acceptable. on flexibility, the proposal goes a long way towards better tailoring the efforts required to country - specific circumstances. the expenditure path would be defined in a pragmatic process, based on a debt sustainability analysis and after a thorough discussion between the commission and member states. each country would commit to a national medium - term plan including structural reforms and public investment programmes. this process acknowledges that debt heterogeneity is too high between 2 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches member states to dictate a single debt reduction rule – 66 % of gdp in germany vs 144 % in italy in 2022 – while enhanced dialogue with national authorities should improve political ownership and hopefully compliance with the framework. but this brings me to enforcement. we should nevertheless seek to ensure that the national plans do not turn into political negotiations and result in insufficiently ambitious fiscal adjustments. i must admit that i do not 100 % believe in the wisdom of institutional processes or in enlightened economic debates for sufficiently steering national cycles. they must be complemented with common rules and anchors

with commercial bank money or central bank money means that they cannot be used to create reliable stores of value. in addition, as pointed out in the g7 report on stablecoins issued last year, stablecoin schemes are significantly exposed to risks of various nature, including legal, financial, operational and compliance risk concerning money laundering and terrorist financing, competition law, consumer and investor protection. the risks identified must be seriously addressed if stablecoins are not to become the « weak links » undermining the safety of our payment systems. this is all the more important as some of these risks would be amplified and new risks might arise if stablecoins are adopted at a global level. stablecoins of potentially large size and reach – so - called global stablecoins – may indeed pose additional challenges of system - wide importance both domestically and internationally, for the transmission of monetary policy, as well as for financial stability. they could also have implications for the international monetary system more generally, including currency substitution, and could therefore pose challenges to monetary sovereignty. 2 – what role for regulatory and oversight authorities? in this context, it is first and foremost the responsibility of the private sector to design stablecoin schemes that do not bring undue risks to our payment systems. for that purpose, regulatory and oversight authorities have an important role to play in order to ensure that the risk management requirements to be met are clear, comprehensive and complied with, while preserving the potential for technological innovation offered by crypto - assets. to that end, they should in my view focus on three main tasks : - firstly, working on a regulatory response that preserves the positive potential impact stablecoins might have on the efficiency of our payment systems. given the rapid pace of innovation, which is also characteristic of stablecoin initiatives, this pleads for developing an agile, pragmatic and proportionate regulatory response rather than setting up an ad - hoc, unique and comprehensive framework. this would be simpler, faster to implement and to adjust, and be more likely to achieve level - playing field conditions. in the european context, this is an encouragement for building on and adapting the functional coverage of existing regulatory frameworks and, in some cases extending their geographical coverage. what comes to mind in particular is the framework for crypto - assets service providers created in france with the 2 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches pacte bill, and the european framework for e - money issuers, investment funds and financial market infrastructures. this also