holders, who bear many of the risks of shareholders, but without the same control rights that a shareholder would enjoy. this means that ensuring high standards of corporate governance is even more important for islamic financial institutions than for their conventional peers and it is perhaps the single most important lesson that the crisis has for the islamic financial industry. with that thought, let me conclude by congratulating the organisers on having assembled such a distinguished team of panelists and discussants. i am sure the next two days will produce many new ideas and a lot of interesting debate and i wish every success to the 7th summit of the islamic financial services board. thank you for your attention.

). at the same time, however, surely at least a few of you here in the audience would seriously argue that a relationship such as the uncovered interest rate parity does not hold in reality and that it is a purely theoretical concept. the uncovered interest rate parity is, however, implied by the profit - seeking mechanism. indeed, it says no more than those profits must be equal across similar economies and that it is the deliberate search for the highest profit that makes them equal. of course, the criticism is more sophisticated than just saying that something is not working. the critics argue that the empirical evidence on the non - performance of the uncovered interest parity is overwhelming. yes, it is right that over recent decades much empirical testing has been done on historical data, most of it showing the poor ability of the uncovered interest rate parity to predict future exchange rate movements. it has even been shown that purely statistical models such as random walk outperform the uncovered interest parity in the short run. the question, however, is to what extent the tests were done correctly and more importantly to what extent is it at all possible to estimate a relationship that works with expectations using econometric techniques and historical data. fortunately for the proponents of economic modelling based on microfounded economic relationships such as the uncovered interest rate parity, the history of monetary policy provides many examples of exchange rate crises and speculative attacks that clearly support the functioning of the uncovered interest rate parity. however surprising it may be, the majority of currency crises and speculative attacks were in fact caused by central banks overlooking the uncovered interest rate parity relationship. usually it starts with a central bank deciding to boost its credibility by fixing its currency to a respectable one. the deutsche bundesbank and the rest of today ’ s eurozone members ( the former exchange rate mechanism members ) may serve as a useful example. by imposing the uncovered interest rate parity predicts that the pegging central bank either follows the interest rate policy of the leading central bank or faces significant pressure on its exchange rate. well, this is exactly what happened, for instance, in the 1980s when the banque de france tried to lower its interest rate below that of the deutsche bundesbank, and again at the beginning of the 1990s when the bank of england and banca d ’ italia did not want to follow the policy tightening of the deutsche bundesbank. in both cases the opening of a negative interest rate differential created depreciation pressures on the exchange rate.