other purpose. lps should apply the price and validity check without delay. anything else that prolongs the last look window is contrary to the intent of the code. at the end of the guidance paper, it outlines some areas that liquidity consumers should monitor to assess whether last look is being applied appropriately. we did consider whether to state what some of those other purposes might be that you should not use last look for. we have not done so for a number of reasons. first is that the code is principles - based, not regulation, and the principle underlying last look makes it clear that there is no other legitimate purpose beyond price and validity checks. second, if we had a description of some activities that we don ’ t regard as acceptable, then unless we had a completely exhaustive list, which is close to impossible, we run the risk of providing a safe harbour for anything that wasn ’ t on the list. in that regard, some have said we should be more prescriptive about last look. but again, i would remind you that the code is principles - based. it is not regulation. another area of debate was around the word ‘ promptly ’. neill penney, the co - vice chair of the gfxc, makes the point that the use of the word ‘ immediate ’ could be interpreted by the market as the gfxc indicating that all liquidity providers needed to upgrade their technology to move to a zero hold time. that ’ s not an outcome we are after. the disclosure cover sheets ask about the length of last look window. because the technology has not yet been invented to run processes without taking any time at all, requiring that length to be zero would ban last look. some people in the market use the term ‘ hold time ’ to mean length of last look window. in that sense a non - zero hold time is clearly consistent with the code. decisions should be prompt and may well be within small fractions of a second in many cases, but cannot truly be immediate. others use hold time or additional hold time to mean a deliberate delay before starting the price and validity check. such a delay is not consistent with the code ; the guidance paper makes clear lps should apply the price and validity check without delay. because of the inconsistent use of hold time, the guidance paper and cover sheets have deliberately avoided relying on market participants having a single definition of it. if someone in the market talks to you about hold time, ask them to confirm

the domestic market per year, with just a few more being issued in the offshore market. in terms of size, offshore issues tend to be substantially larger and they also tend to have longer maturities. 2. during the global financial crisis, issuance of bonds in the domestic market all but ceased, with only a handful of companies going to the market in 2008 and 2009. during this period, there was some issuance in the offshore market although the number of bonds issued was substantially lower than in the years both before, and after, the crisis. 2 this partly reflected the very high spreads being demanded by investors at the time. 3. there was significant issuance of aaa securities in the domestic market prior to the financial crisis, although these securities were credit wrapped by bond insurers. during the crisis most of these insurers were wound down following large ratings downgrades, and this segment of the market has subsequently disappeared. 4. the publically available information indicates that not a single corporate bond with a credit rating below bbb - has been issued in the domestic market. in contrast, since 2000, around 30 bonds rated below bbb - have been issued in the offshore market by australian corporations. 5. recently, there has been a pick - up in both the number ( and value ) of bbb - rated issuers in the domestic market. last year, a total of 16 bbb - rated bonds were issued, the highest number on record. in another positive sign, the average maturity of these bonds was noticeably longer than in previous years. putting all this together, the australian corporate bond market is relatively small in size and is less well developed than corporate bond markets in a number of other countries. total outstandings in the domestic market amount to around $ 50 billion compared with total corporate debt outstanding of a much larger $ 920 billion. notwithstanding this, regular activity is occurring in the market across much, although not all, of the credit spectrum. and over recent times, issuance appears to have picked up a little, particularly by lower - rated companies. the role of superannuation i would now like to turn to the issue of superannuation funds and their role in the provision of market based finance. this is obviously an important issue given the rising share of national savings being managed by these funds ( graph 4 ). in the late 1980s / early 1990s, a little less than 20 per cent of the flow of new national savings was being directed into superannuation.