they? i have not said anything about which banks from which countries might possibly not pass the test! and you won ’ t get me to do so either! okay. no, in germany we have a bank restructuring act. many other countries also have bank restructuring laws. some countries don ’ t, and then the national insolvency law applies. so, a bank can indeed be wound up. however, it is our aim that a bank should be wound up in an orderly fashion, without affecting financial stability. that is, of course, the point of the european bank restructuring law that you, i believe, were alluding to. that will not in fact be in place until 2016. nonetheless, for me it is very important to make it clear that individual banks must be able to leave the market. otherwise, we would not have a proper market, because we would never ultimately remove banks from the market that do not have a sound business model. however, you asked me whether we were more secure overall. i would, of course, like to answer that. i believe that we will provide better supervision. that means that we will, of course, make our contribution to ensuring financial stability. however, that does not mean that one bank or another will not leave the market. generally speaking, have the banks become more humble? at the moment, they ( the banks ) have a lot on their plates with stress tests, penalties, regulation. you have been involved with banks for the whole of your professional career – has anything changed? i would not equate it with humility, but i would perhaps mention the word “ cautiousness ” or a greater awareness of the lack of understanding in the society. there is quite clearly also greater awareness that the rules have become very much tighter, that countries, regulators and supervisors have finally become much more critical, and that the framework overall has bis central bankers ’ speeches been found to be too loose, too soft, and that we are now tightening all the reins – and rightly so. the ecb is now the supervisor and, at the same time, the central bank. is there not a danger that this will somehow become mixed up? on one hand, there are synergies to be gained. it is good as a supervisor to also have the knowledge that a central bank has, for example, about an economic environment, about the markets, about infrastructures such as payment services. in this area, therefore, there are syner

axel a weber : how to implement efficiently the eu regulatory and supervisory package proposed by the de larosiere group in the eu and global context? introductory statement by professor axel a weber, president of the deutsche bundesbank, at the financial forum 2009, gothenburg, 30 september 2009. * * * introduction ladies and gentlemen, mr solbes thank you for allowing me the opportunity to elaborate on some aspects of the implementation of the de larosiere recommendations. coming from germany, where the bundesbank is not the supervisory authority but is involved in the supervisory process, i would first like to focus on cooperation between national central banks and supervisors before turning to the role of the new eu authorities. how to ensure appropriate cooperation between national central banks and supervisors in the eu countries where these functions are segregated? the question correctly implies that close cooperation between central banks and supervisors is essential. central banks have an undisputed responsibility in the field of financial stability. they can benefit from their traditional focus on systemic risk and, especially, from their knowledge of area - wide developments in the money and securities markets and in payment and market infrastructures. establishing close cooperation with supervisors ensures that synergies between these central bank and supervisory activities can be exploited. in addition, close cooperation enhances the efficiency of the supervisory system by reducing overlaps of work. in fact, one lesson from the current crisis is the need for a close interaction between micro - and macroprudential analysis. practical cooperation can be organised fairly informally with regular high - level discussions on how to deal with strategic issues and problems as well as by the creation of working groups to deal with specific topics. on a more formal basis, cooperation between central banks and supervisors could be organised via “ domestic standing groups ” in which the ministry of finance may also take part, ensuring the participation of all parties with a role in safeguarding or restoring stability. in germany, bafin, the bundesbank and the ministry of finance have held regular meetings in such a format since 2002. as is the case in germany, cooperation between national central banks and supervisory authorities could be even more formalised. the central banks could be substantially involved in the supervisory process. in germany, the bundesbank – in close cooperation with the supervisory authority bafin – is entrusted with the ongoing supervision of institutions, whereas the sovereign functions rest with the supervisor. needless to say, the division of labour has to be clearly defined to avoid overlaps. naturally, this requires statutory definitions of tasks