peers ( 50. 1 % vs. 46. 1 % eu average ). if one adds to this the value of collateral pledged, total risk coverage comes to 101 %, one of the highest in the eu. concluding, npls represent perhaps the most significant problem for the greek banking sector along with liquidity ( the two are of course interlinked ). the bank of greece in its capacity as supervisor together with the ssm took a set of measures over the last two years including a code of conduct for banks for the effective and flexible treatment of borrowers facing difficulties in servicing their debt obligations. moreover, the bank of greece adopted executive committee acts nos 82 / 2016 and 95 / 2016 detailing the licensing framework for credit servicing firms, striking a balance between speed, transparency and borrower protection. it also decided to set binding operational targets for all greek banks with a view to ensuring a reduction of npls over a horizon of three years. more specifically, according to the targets of the four systemic banks, npls should be reduced by 40 % or €41 billion by 2019. this reduction is expected to result from : firstly, the economic recovery envisaged in the adjustment programme and the ensuing return to profitability for a large majority of businesses and secondly, successful debt forbearance / restructuring whereby non - performing loans become performing again and a number of npls are sold to funds. c. one milestone - pending issue looking ahead, in terms of economic policy, the steps forward are clear and dictated by the memorandum between the greek authorities and our official international lenders which goes through the completion of the second review of greece ’ s adjustment programme by the end of this year, the specification of debt restructuring measures agreed - upon in the eurogroup meeting of 24 may 2016 which are the precondition for greece ’ s participation in the ecb ’ s public sector asset purchase programme ( pspp ), best - known as the “ qe programme ”. in terms of the mechanics, and applying the ecb ’ s 33 % issuer limit and subtracting the eurosystem holdings of greek government bonds, the maximum allowed purchases are €3. 8 billion. some could argue that the above amount is a mere pittance compared with the total eurosystem ’ s purchases. even in this respect, the signaling effect of greece ’ s inclusion in the 8 / 9 bis central bankers'speeches qe programme will be strong enough for ggb prices to recover, accompanied by a

financial centres. but to make the most of europe ’ s potential as a “ financial amazon ”, market - driven specialisation will also be needed as a third pillar. specialisation can help deliver economies of scale, increase the potential for innovation, and achieve excellence. in an environment of “ coopetition ” – a neologism merging the words cooperation and competition, european financial centres could cooperate, compete and, at the same time, hone their own areas of expertise. but this is a vision for the future. it ’ s a picture of the future that is also very much in our own inherent interest as a central bank, because the more that financial flows end up where our system is in force, the more we are able to promote financial and price stability as well as a strong currency. 5 conclusion ladies and gentlemen, “ brexit means brexit ” – but at the end of the day, what this means for the financial centre of europe is very much up to us. this goes for those of you who are domestic and foreign banks, for those of you who make policy at the regional, national and european level, and for us as central banks and supervisors. now a change of perspective is in order : let ’ s see brexit as an opportunity for us, not by naively whitewashing what is a regrettable development, but by planning a sober yet forward - looking 4 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches model. thank you for your attention. 5 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches