broadly under the regulatory ambit of reserve bank fall in the following categories. ( a ) public sector banks which are governed by statutes with close involvement of government though regulated by rbi. ( b ) foreign banks, which are registered as branches and private banks incorporated under companies act and regulated by rbi. ( c ) urban cooperative banks, both scheduled and non - scheduled, which are under dual regulation of rbi and the state governments / central government. ( d ) non - banking financial companies incorporated under companies act which have been recently brought legally within rbi ’ s regulatory framework. housing finance companies, however, are regulated and supervised by national housing bank. ( e ) regional rural banks and state and district central co - operative banks, which are regulated by rbi, supervised by nabard and additionally by central government and state governments ; and ( e ) development financial institutions, some of which are under statute and some under companies act, which had been under government control till recently. rbi has of late brought them to some extent within its regulatory and supervisory ambit. both the madhava rao committee and the capoor committee had addressed issues of regulation relating to co - operative banks ; but, several legislative actions are still to be initiated. within the financial sector, concerns about systemic risk tend to focus on banks particularly in view of their role in the payments and settlement system. the regulatory oversight should, therefore, duly take into account the role of the financial institutions in the payments system, which is the backbone for an efficient financial system. in addition, the regulatory regime should also recognise the functional orientation and governance structures of different types of institutions. in this context, it will be possible to categorise the financial intermediaries under rbi ’ s regulatory and supervisory umbrella into three categories. first, scheduled banks including cooperative banks that are part of the payment system. second, commercially - oriented financial intermediaries, i. e., nbfcs and dfis which have to be regulated keeping in view primarily the protection of depositors ’ interests and to some extent systemic implications in regard to larger entities. third, cooperatives which are large in number with some hierarchic structures and widely dispersed and, essentially meant to cater to local areas which need to be regulated essentially to ensure protection of members ’ / depositors ’ interests, unless they happen to be scheduled banks. it is proposed to work on a technical paper covering various aspects keeping in view the complexities indicated above and the existing arrangements. lenders obligations

in unsecured fed funds rate. 12. now consider the use of the mibor. the benchmark is used in the ois market. the mibor - ois is the only liquid interest rate derivative market in our country ( apart from mifor ) with, as i mentioned earlier, an open interest of ₹77 lakh crore in the current financial year. the mibor is also the benchmark for inr ois trades in the global markets ( nd - ois ). i don ’ t think i need to emphasize to this audience the importance of this benchmark and the need for constant vigilance in maintaining its robustness and reliability given dwindling transactions and shrinking participant base in the call money market. 13. while volumes in the call money market have been declining, the mibor benchmark continues to be determined based on actual transactions. further, its integrity is ensured given the fact that the call money rate is the target rate for monetary policy transmission and participants in the market have access to the liquidity facilities of rbi. among the other overnight benchmarks, the market repo overnight rate ( mror ) based on market repo transactions. prima facie, this benchmark being based on transactions in a more liquid market and one with a wider participant base can normally be considered to be more robust. however, the benchmark is not based on pure inter - bank market that can take the place of mibor. repo markets, while significantly larger, incorporate entities that do not have access to central bank liquidity and therefore their pricing is less robust than call rates for developing benchmark that tracks possible policy rate actions. 14. in the term money market, fbil is publishing term mibor benchmarks. in the absence of a liquid term money market, these benchmarks are based on polled submissions. the development of the term money market remains elusive notwithstanding several reforms both from a regulatory and a liquidity management perspective. most of the constraints have been addressed / removed in phases. the eligible participant base in term money markets has been expanded. however, liquidity in the term money market remains negligible and the development of a robust term money benchmark curve remains a work in progress. of course, these are issues not unique to india and are observed in peer nations as well. as libor is getting phased out these problems are faced even by developed markets. 15. the other segments of the money market – the markets for treasury bills and cds