that it is deliberations of this type that the riksbank will face at the coming monetary policy meetings. consideration will also have to be paid, of course, to the inflation risks associated with the high price of oil and the high dollar rate. these were some of the risks we highlighted in the october inflation report. this type of discussion about the direction of stabilisation policy basically deals with how, after some favourable years in the late 1990s, we should act so that growth and employment in the swedish economy can be sustainably high and stable. the riksbank ’ s assignment from the riksdag requires that we do what we can to ensure this.

tremosa i balcells to express the parliament ’ s judgement on the robustness of our accountability framework towards the parliament. from the ecb ’ s perspective, our accountability framework as defined in the treaty is working well, and has been adapted to the challenges we have faced in recent years by expanding our interactions where and when necessary. transparency transparency is crucial to the ecb ’ s work and it attaches great importance to communicating effectively with the public. transparency helps people understand the ecb ’ s monetary policy, and better public understanding, in turn, makes the ecb ’ s monetary policy more credible and effective. against this background, communication with financial market participants deserves particular attention. i see it as a double - edged sword. clear communication with financial markets enhances the implementation and transmission of monetary policy, but on the other hand it may risk central banks being captured by private interests, or worse, disclosing privileged information. and even the perception of such risks would be harmful. please allow me to present some examples. the european central bank has made significant progress on matters of transparency and good governance. this was noted by the european ombudsman, who commended the ecb for adopting the “ guiding principles for external communication by members of the executive board ” and “ encourage [ d ] it to lead the field on all aspects of good governance ”. the ombudsman more generally acknowledged, when presenting her annual report for 2015 to the european parliament, that the ecb has “ boosted its transparency ”. 7 the guiding principles provide a more concrete and very practical expression of the rules that are already binding on executive board members. they enshrine the ecb ’ s approach to ensuring that financial market - sensitive information is not disclosed to select groups and avoiding giving the impression that an event organiser has a “ prestige advantage ” allowing it to benefit financially from the perception of exclusive contacts with the members of the executive board. the guiding principles also advise the executive board members to include, as a matter of principle, an ecb staff member in bilateral meetings. these principles have also been subscribed to by the chair of the ecb ’ s supervisory board and the other ecb representatives to the supervisory board. in addition, the members of the governing council ( including the executive board members ) observe a “ quiet period ” before monetary policy meetings. this means they avoid making comments or attending meetings that could influence expectations about monetary policy decisions in the seven days before a scheduled meeting on