mumbai interbank outright rate ( mibor ), first introduced by the national stock exchange ( nse ) in 1998 and computed through a polling process, is now based on actual transactions. the mumbai interbank forward outright rate ( mifor ) has been transformed into the modified mifor using the alternate reference rate, secured overnight financing rate ( sofr ) instead of libor in line with the global transition away from the libor. modified mifor is now being used for all new contracts. new benchmarks have also been introduced in various market segments viz., market repo overnight rate ( mror ), t - bill rate and certificate of deposit ( cd ) rate. 8. indian financial markets have witnessed substantial growth in the last few years, facilitated, in part, by the availability of robust benchmarks. the mibor benchmark is the underlying reference rate for mibor overnight indexed swap ( ois ) contracts. the open interest has increased from ₹19 lakh crore in fy 2017 to ₹77 lakh crore in current fy 2023. there is also a growing offshore market for mibor based ois ( nd - ois ). in the currency market, the usd - inr reference rate is used by many domestic users, including corporates. the reference rate is used for settlement of non - deliverable forwards ( ndfs ) and exchange - traded futures as well. the average daily turnover in inr ndfs has increased from around us $ 16. 4 billion in 2016 to us $ 46. 4 billion in 2022. during the same period, the average daily turnover in exchange traded currency futures in india increased from us $ 2. 8 billion to us $ 6. 6 billion. as markets have grown, the pool of assets using fbil benchmark rates for valuation has also grown. 9. an ideal benchmark is one which is anchored in observable transactions in a liquid market with a diverse set of participants and which remains robust in the face or market disruption and minimises scope for market manipulation. but the realities of many markets – globally and in india – are far from this utopian world. the reforms associated with benchmarks over the last several years have, therefore, focussed on effectively addressing the shortcomings in benchmark design and the absence of robust governance processes that contributed to past abuses and in instilling confidence in financial benchmarks through reforms in benchmark governance, design, quality and accountability mechanisms. challenges

, published a new vision and strategy document ( vision 2010 ) for the nps in april this year. the purpose of this document was to provide high - level strategic guidance for the payment system up to 2010. finally, there appears to be a general misunderstanding that the bank has a " hands off " approach to the oversight and regulation of the nps. i would remind all nps stakeholders that section 10 ( i ) ( c ) of the south african reserve bank act states clearly that the bank, " perform such functions, implement such rules and procedures and, in general take such steps as may be necessary to establish, conduct, monitor, regulate and supervise payment, clearing or settlement systems ”. furthermore, as i noted earlier, the 2004 amendment to the nps act makes provision for the bank to issue directives pertaining to the nps. we raise this issue as the bank will soon be issuing directives in terms of the nps act which will regulate non - bank participants in the nps for the first time. we have noticed that the number of nonbank participants has increased to the extent that the risk associated with their operations and the risk that they bring to the clearing and settlement environment requires some formalisation. of particular relevance in this regard are system operators and third party service providers, who mostly operate in or on behalf of the retail sector. we want to make it clear, particularly to the banking sector, that strict regulation will be applied as far as the nps is concerned. this should not be perceived negatively, nor do we wish to stifle innovation or competition in the industry. however we need to apply strict supervision and regulation to both bank and non - bank participants in the critical area of the nps and avoid the risk of turbulence that may emanate from a hands - off approach to regulation. this may require some adjustment to current structures in the nps and the bank will have to start playing a far more prominent role in areas such as supervision, regulation and licensing of participants. we also need to ensure that these newly regulated entities have channels to engage with the bank and other stakeholders, including pasa, in a fair and transparent way. the bank has already initiated discussions with various international central banks and consulted with nps stakeholders with a view to adopting a model which will facilitate such engagement. this may take some time but i can assure you that the bank will continue with the collaborative approach it has used for nps matters in the past before making any final decisions in