is well on track and its go - live is set in 2015. after two years of negotiations, central securities depositories ( csds ) have now been asked to sign – by june 2012 at the latest – a binding legal contract to participate in t2s. this will mark a key milestone in the project. combined with the future legislation on csds and ccps as well as mifid, t2s will provide the operational framework to stimulate competition in the post - trade environment. moving on to banking crisis management, we fully support the commission ’ s initiative to introduce an eu bank recovery and resolution framework that should contribute to address current obstacles to the effective crisis management of eu cross - border financial institutions. every member state should have a broad set of tools, such as recovery and resolution plans, bis central bankers ’ speeches asset separation and bridge banks. as regards more specifically bail - in, a right balance needs to be struck between the need to comply with international standards ( fsb key attributes for resolution ) and the need to avoid undesired negative effects on bank funding also in light of current market conditions. in this perspective any decisions about the use of “ bail - in - able ” securities should be delayed for some years. at the same time, any mandatory issuance of “ bail - in - able ” instruments should be reserved to systemically relevant institutions at the national and european levels. smaller institutions would have difficulties in placing such securities in the market and are easier to resolve without such instruments. for systemic institutions i see “ bail - in - able ” debt securities as an important tool being capable of supporting the resolution process by absorbing losses with an efficient burden sharing within the private sector thereby reducing taxpayers ’ support. another important dimension of the resolution regime refers to the desirable creation of resolution funds that would be financed by the financial sector and would play an important role, particularly in resolution of cross - border institutions. in this perspective, we said in the escb opinion, published in may last year, that : “ … the establishment of a network of national funds should not exclude the possibility of establishing, at a later stage, an european fundof - funds to address the issues which may arise in respect of cross - border banks. … it should also not be excluded to move the establishment of an european resolution fund up in the agenda. ” in view of the importance of the adoption of a clear resolution regime to banks and to eliminate uncertainty, it would be important that the commission ’ s proposals

its payments deficit, before such a limit is reached and to take corrective action. we know that this limit is very difficult to assess, because it depends on the specific domestic and international circumstances. the more sophisticated the financial markets are, the more easily a country can finance its payments deficit ; and the less urgently needed is a policy to adjust the domestic economy. i can still hear alan greenspan saying : “ it is tempting to conclude that the us current account deficit is essentially a by - product of long - term secular forces, and thus is largely benign. after all, we do seem to have been able to finance our international current account deficit with relative ease in recent years. ” 5 a key question, ultimately, is : who should decide what a sustainable payments deficit is? the answers to this question, both right and wrong, have marked the evolution of the international monetary system since the second world war. allow me a brief retrospective. under the bretton woods agreement, the availability of international liquidity, ultimately in the form of gold, was the binding criterion for fostering a country to adjust its external imbalances. the system broke up because the us did not have enough gold to finance its imbalances, and did not want to live within those constraints, as it had to finance the vietnam war. the move to a flexible exchange regime in the early 1970s was expected to solve the problem. the thinking at that time was that a country ’ s balance of payments is by definition in balance in a floating system, because the exchange rate adjusts to ensure such a balance. defining the limits of a sustainable payments deficit, beyond which financing would start to become problematic, was considered as a non - problem. the market would decide. that was the consensus at the time. not many disagreed. i still remember my surprise when robert triffin – who chaired my bachelor ’ s dissertation committee in louvain in 1978 – asked me “ should the us adjust or finance their current account deficit? ” i gave the textbook answer, but he didn ’ t look so convinced. financial markets are indeed expected to finance external deficits, until they decide not to do so any more, at least not at the prevailing price ( i. e. exchange rate ). and when such a decision is made, the adjustment can be rather violent. we had the experience of markets simply refusing to finance external imbalances in the 1980s and 1990s, producing major exchange rate adjustments leading to financial crises. however,