inflation goals as being roughly in balance, and i am attentive to the risks to both sides of our mandate. that better balanced position is partly a result of the monetary policy actions over the past few years, which i will review briefly. as you can see in figure 8, the fomc responded to elevated inflation by raising the policy rate 5 - 1 / 4 percentage points over about 15 months, starting in march 2022, and then holding the rate at that restrictive level for more than a year. this contributed to inflation easing from a 40 - year high to near current levels while maintaining a solid labor market. that outcome was historically unusual but greatly welcomed. by september of last year, i had growing confidence that with an appropriate recalibration of our policy stance, strength in the labor market could be maintained in a context of moderate economic growth and inflation moving sustainably down to 2 percent. the fomc reduced the federal funds rate by a full percentage point over the course of our final three meetings last year. as a result of those actions, our policy stance is now significantly less restrictive than it was when we began lowering the federal funds rate. given current economic conditions — specifically, inflation that remains modestly above our target and a labor market that is solid — and my projections of future economic conditions, i voted last week to maintain our current policy stance. as long as the economy and labor - 8market remain strong, i see it as appropriate for the committee to be cautious in making further adjustments. over the medium term, i continue to see a gradual reduction in the level of monetary policy restraint placed on the economy as we move toward a more neutral stance as the most likely outcome. that said, i do not think we need to be in a hurry to change our stance. in considering additional adjustments to the federal funds rate, i will carefully assess incoming data, the evolving outlook, and the balance of risks. as is always the case, monetary policy is not on a preset course. to that end, i could envision a range of scenarios for future policy. for example, if the economy remains strong and inflation does not continue to move sustainably toward 2 percent, we can maintain policy restraint for longer. alternatively, if the labor market were to weaken unexpectedly or inflation were to fall more quickly than anticipated, it may be appropriate to reduce the policy rate more quickly. our current stance of policy is well positioned to deal with the risks and uncertainties that we face

monetary policy, ” a symposium sponsored by the federal reserve bank of kansas city, held in jackson hole, wyo. ( via webcast ), august 27. 7 see richard h. clarida ( 2020 ), “ the federal reserve ’ s new monetary policy framework : a robust evolution, ” speech delivered at the peterson institute for international economics, washington ( via webcast ), august 31 ; and richard h. clarida ( 2020 ), “ the federal reserve ’ s new framework : context and consequences, ” speech delivered at “ the economy and monetary policy, ” an event hosted by the hutchins center on fiscal and monetary policy at the brookings institution, washington ( via webcast ), november 16. 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches