33 5. 58 - 1. 25 new zealand 2 - year fixed 6. 19 7. 79 - 1. 60 germany fixed ( > 10 years ) 4. 49 5. 33 - 0. 84 sweden variable 2. 16 4. 18 - 2. 02 * * * * sources : bloomberg ; thomson reuters ; national data * data : to april for australia, us and canada ; to march for uk and nz ; and to february for germany. * * in the uk, variable rate and 1 – 5 year fixed - rate loans account for approximately the same proportion of the market. in assessing the level of global interest rates, it is important to look not just at official rates, but at a broader spectrum of rates faced by borrowers. we don ’ t have data on housing rates going back 150 years, but it is clear that they are not at the very low levels of official rates. in most countries, including australia, they are around 1½ - 2 percentage points below their decade averages – that is, low, but not at extremes ( table 2 ). for corporate borrowers, interest rates are not unusually low. in fact, in most developed economies, interest rates faced by corporations in capital markets are, if anything, still a little above decade averages, due to the large increase in risk premiums ( table 3 ). table 3 : non - financial corporate bond yields * maturity 10 - year average current rate rate deviation from average australia 1 - 5 years 7. 29 6. 62 0. 67 united states 5 - 10 years 6. 59 6. 26 0. 34 canada 1 - 10 years 5. 37 5. 75 - 0. 38 united kingdom 5 - 10 years 7. 04 6. 43 0. 61 euro area 7 - 10 years 6. 00 5. 50 0. 50 new zealand 10 year * * 8. 66 7. 84 0. 83 * industrial corporates * * a - rated bonds sources : bloomberg ; merrill lynch other monetary measures let me now turn to the other unconventional measures central banks have undertaken. these are often grouped in the popular press under the generic title of “ quantitative easing ” or “ printing money ”, but they really fall into three distinct categories : • measures to add to banks ’ reserve balances ; • measures to reduce the term structure of interest rates ; and • measures to support specific credit markets and / or take credit risk onto central bank balance sheets. the us fed has coined the term “ credit easing ” 1 to

christopher j waller : financial stabilization and macroeconomic stabilization - two tools for two problems speech by mr christopher j waller, member of the board of governors of the federal reserve system, at the graybar national training conference, san antonio, texas, 14 april 2023. * * * thank you, kathy, it's a pleasure to be with you today. i am going to focus my remarks on the economic outlook, including how the recent turmoil in banking has affected that outlook. 1 relative to the federal open market committee's ( fomc ) economic objectives, data for the first quarter indicate that economic output and employment are continuing to grow at a solid pace while inflation remains much too high. the fomc raised its target range for the federal funds rate to 4 - 3 / 4 to 5 percent at its march meeting, and our statement noted that recent banking developments are likely to result in tighter credit conditions and to weigh on economic activity, hiring, and inflation. we didn't know then, and still don't know, the extent of these possible effects. so, perhaps even more closely than usual, i will be watching the data to evaluate the appropriate path of monetary policy. the sudden failure of silicon valley bank ( svb ) and signature bank, which contributed to stresses felt by other mid - size banks, was a classic bank run, in which the rapid withdrawal of funds by depositors created severe liquidity problems. svb was a specialty bank serving the tech sector. unlike other banks, where a substantial share of deposits is insured and verifiably safe, more than 90 percent of svb's deposits were above the $ 250, 000 - per - account limit for deposit insurance. additionally, those deposits were largely from many of the same types of businesses, resulting in additional risk. chair powell has directed vice chair for supervision barr to report by may 1 on svb's failure, including the federal reserve's supervision and regulation of the bank. based on what is already in the public record, svb seems to have done a terrible job managing its risks. a bank run that undermines confidence in other banks is the most fundamental risk to the financial system, and the fed, serving as the lender of last resort, was created in part to prevent such a development. the job of the lender of last resort is to provide sufficient funds to the banking system so that depositors can be confident they will be able to withdraw their funds on