studies, volume 35 ( 11 ), pp. 4859 – 4901, 2022. see p. angelini, ‘ portfolio decarbonisation strategies : questions and suggestions ’, banca d ’ italia, questioni di economia e finanza ( occasional papers ) 840, 2024 ; and f. ferriani, a. gazzani and f. natoli, ‘ flight to climatic safety : local natural disasters and global portfolio flows ’, banca d ’ italia, temi di discussione ( working papers ) 1420, 2024. see c. brunetti, b. dennis, g. kotta, c. norris, c. shin and i. zer, ‘ climate risk networks and banks ’ exposures ’, mimeo, 2024 ; and m. a. aiello, ‘ climate supervisory shocks and bank lending : empirical evidence from microdata ’, banca d ’ italia, temi di discussione ( working papers ) 1465, 2024. the markets in crypto - assets regulation ( micar ) introduced a harmonized framework across the european union for the issuance and offering to the public of crypto - assets and the provision of services involving crypto - assets. it aims to reduce regulatory uncertainty in digital assets markets and foster sustainable innovation in the financial sector by establishing a uniform regulatory environment for the following types of crypto - assets : i ) electronic money tokens ( e - money tokens - emts ), which purport to maintain a stable value by referencing the value of one official currency ; ii ) asset - referenced tokens ( arts ), which purport to maintain a stable value by referencing another value or right or a combination thereof, including one or more official currencies ; iii ) crypto - assets other than emts and arts. the rules on the issuance, public offering, and admission to trading of arts and emts have been in force since 30 june, while the remaining provisions will be fully applicable by the end of this year. operational resilience act ( dora ) 8 and the review of the alternative investment fund directive ( aifmd2 ). 9 much work remains to be done on climate risk, and more generally on esg issues, including on new forward - looking analytical tools and methodologies for designing sound climate – related stress testing models aimed at assessing the resilience of the financial system over short and very long horizons. 10

; after the outbreak of the war it was even higher, with a peak of 20 times the level of january 2020, before returning somewhat closer to the previous average in the last few days. this is particularly worrying due to the special role of gas in determining retail prices not only for heating and industrial uses, but also for electricity at large. it is consequently important to assess the effects of europe ’ s energy crisis on consumer prices, also beyond their direct effects on headline inflation. a significant share of the rise in core and food inflation, in fact, is due to higher energy prices ; in particular, we may estimate that, absent the energy shock, headline inflation in february this year would have been 3. 5 percentage points lower, at a level, therefore, only slightly above the ecb ’ s 2 per cent target. the failure of inflation forecasts in 2021 has been repeatedly highlighted : however, indirect effects stemming from the increase in the costs of production – mostly due to unpredictable geopolitical factors that are outside the realm of economics – explain almost entirely the upward surprises recorded on core inflation in the euro area in the second half of the year. the energy shock has also relevant consequences for aggregate demand in energy importing economies, where it translates into a drag on domestic resources. in the euro area, the deterioration of the terms of trade, mostly due to the rise of energy prices, has reduced the purchasing power of domestic incomes ( which includes all sectors of the economy ) by about 1 percentage point in 2021, and is expected to have an even larger impact in 2022. the repercussions of the energy shock are likely to be especially severe for households. in the euro area, should gas and oil prices remain at the exceptionally high levels currently implied by future contracts, the increase in consumer prices would cumulatively curtail their disposable income by around 4 percentage points in 2021 and 2022. these losses are asymmetrically distributed across families, hitting more heavily the less well - off who typically devote a larger portion of their incomes to energy purchases. the second key factor is related to the labour market. in the us the growth of nominal wages ( measured as average hourly earnings ) amounted to more than 4 per cent last summer, nearing 6 per cent in january 2022 ( figure 5 ). in the euro area, instead, the increase in wages ( as measured by negotiated wages, which tend to grow broadly in line with actual earnings, but are much less volatile ) still