samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
and still remain unstable, due to the heightened uncertainty over the problems with the financial system and the worldwide stock market plunge triggered by russia ’ s financial crisis. meanwhile, interest rate spreads, such as the rate differential between euro - yen deposits and treasury bills, the japan premium, and the yield differential between private and government bonds, expanded against the background of intensified market concern toward credit risks of japanese financial institutions. nevertheless, both long - and short - term interest rates declined slightly as a whole, which seemingly indicates that some market participants anticipated additional monetary easing. the bank ’ s view on recent economic and financial developments, determined by the policy board at the monetary policy meeting held on september 9, as the basis of monetary policy decisions. with respect to corporate finance, some firms are moving to resume securing on - hand liquidity against the cautious lending stance of private banks, although credit demand for real economic activities remains sluggish. consequently, the issuance of corporate bonds and commercial paper continues to increase, and the private bank lending, measured by annual percent changes, has escaped further decline so far. in addition, the growth of money stock appears to hold back its recent decelerating trend. however, some firms, especially small and medium - sized ones, continue to face a severe environment in terms of both funds availability and fund - raising costs. this influence on the economy continues to warrant careful monitoring.

. i do also want to emphasize that we need to find the right balance between stricter regulation and intensified supervision. regulation alone, especially in the form of more regulatory capital, will not prevent the next crisis. the risk profiles of financial institutions vary across firms and countries, and they change over time. thus, regulation needs to be effectively combined with rigorous supervision and close monitoring. iv. closing remarks i have discussed the points to be remembered in discussing near - term economic policies at this critical juncture. but i have stopped short of showing a specific direction of policy actions. such policy actions should be mapped out by the policy authorities and people concerned with consideration of economic conditions. given that a crisis comes to the surface with a different face every time, what i can say here is that central bankers as well as executives of private financial institutions, who are all at this meeting, need to be humble enough to pay attention to various possibilities with consideration of historical lessons. thank you for your attention.
to some of the fault lines exposed by the financial crisis ; but there is still a long way to go. there will be as much to do in your 22nd year as there was in your 21st. happy birthday. references bean, c. ( 2009 ), “ the great moderation, the great panic and the great contraction ” schumpeter lecture at the annual congress of the european economic association in barcelona on 25 august 2009, available at : http : / / www. bankofengland. co. uk / publications / speeches / 2009 / speech399. pdf borio, c. ( 2010 ), “ implementing a macroprudential framework : blending boldness and realism ” http : / / www. bis. org / repofficepubl / hkimr201007. 12c. htm dale, s. ( 2009 ), “ inflation targeting : learning the lessons from the financial crisis ”, speech at the society of business economists ’ annual conference, london on 23 june 2009, available at : http : / / www. bankofengland. co. uk / publications / speeches / 2009 / speech395. pdf haldane, a. ( 2009 ), “ rethinking the financial network ”, speech delivered at the financial student association in amsterdam on 28 april 2009, available at : http : / / www. bankofengland. co. uk / publications / speeches / 2009 / speech386. pdf imf ( 2010 ), “ g - 20 mutual assessment process – imf staff assessment of g - 20 policies ” http : / / www. imf. org / external / np / g20 / pdf / 111210. pdf king, m. ( 2010 ), “ banking : from bagehot to basel, and back again ”, speech given at the second bagehot lecture buttonwood gathering, new york city on 25 october 2010, available at : http : / / www. bankofengland. co. uk / publications / speeches / 2010 / speech455. pdf mishkin, f. ( 2008 ), “ how should we respond to asset price bubbles? ” http : / / www. federalreserve. gov / newsevents / speech / mishkin20080515a. htm tucker, p. ( 2009 ), “ the debate on financial system resilience : macroprudential instruments ” at barclays annual lecture

them. one thing is for sure – you will hear a lot more about recovery and resolution plans. thank you.
in setting our aim too low, and achieving our mark. ”

. html. see also the department of finance ’ s consultation paper on bank recapitalization, at www. fin. gc. ca / activty / consult / tpbrr - rpcrb - eng. asp. the fsb ’ s progress report on resolution regimes is available at www. financialstabilityboard. org / 2014 / 11 / report - to - the - g20 - on - progress - in - reform - of - resolution - regimes - andresolution - planning - for - globally - systemically - important - financial - institutions - g - sifis. see sections 165 and 166 of the dodd - frank wall street reform and consumer protection act, at www. sec. gov / about / laws / wallstreetreform - cpa. pdf. the fed ’ s final rule on strengthening the supervision and regulation of foreign banking organizations is available at www. federalreserve. gov / newsevents / press / bcreg / 20140218a. htm. bis central bankers ’ speeches what does this mean for canadian banks? our largest banks have sizable u. s. operations. some will likely meet the size threshold and will be subject to these new requirements. these national rules will not only impose new legal and administrative costs on canadian banks, but might also constrain their ability to allocate capital and liquidity efficiently in the north american market. 13 and if a canadian bank with u. s. subsidiaries were to fail, it bears asking whether the pre - emptive actions of u. s. authorities would create obstacles for the orderly resolution of the consolidated bank by canadian authorities, led by the canada deposit insurance corporation. this “ one - size fits all ” approach overlooks the existing degree of integration between our two economies, canada ’ s impressive record for financial stability and the fact that canadian banks have long been active and well trusted in the united states. 14 that, in brief, is where we stand at the moment on cross - border bank - resolution issues. and, as you will see in a minute, the cross - border issues related to otc derivatives are equally complex. making over - the - counter derivatives markets safer otc derivatives were largely unregulated before the crisis. for example, when lehman brothers failed, it had roughly one million outstanding derivatives contracts. no one outside the company knew the full extent of lehman ’ s exposures. uncertainty rippled through the market, spreading fear
why i have chosen to focus on this issue today. i know that over the course of this conference, we'll hear some innovative ideas on how to achieve these goals. your deliberations are important. the right infrastructure can support and encourage initiatives to increase productivity. finding innovative and reliable ways to fund this country's current and future infrastructure requirements is a key element of any effort to improve canada's productivity and raise living standards for canadians. 4 / 4

cpi inflation would likely fall below core inflation in 2004. however, there are significant risks to this economic outlook. these risks relate to the timing and magnitude of global demand, price, and exchange rate adjustments to economic imbalances. in particular, there is uncertainty both about the likely changes in key global exchange rates and their effect on the canadian economy. there is also uncertainty about the sustainability of u. s. growth beyond mid - 2004. we continue to assess the implications of all these developments - both past and future - for output and inflation in canada, and what this means for monetary policy.
. here i am mainly thinking of the effects on the euro - area economy of developments in russia and ukraine. it is still too early to draw any definite conclusions with regard to the effects on growth prospects in europe. but there is a risk that developments abroad will be worse than we have previously assumed. given that international developments are in line with our forecasts, however, we envisage improved economic activity in sweden. however, the picture is divided. household consumption has so far held up relatively well in recent years, while exports have developed less well, against the backdrop of the weak developments in the euro area. in the coming when these countries are weighed together in relation to their significance for swedish foreign trade using the kix index, the euro area accounts for almost 50 per cent. bis central bankers ’ speeches period, domestic demand is expected to continue to strengthen, at the same time as the economic improvement abroad will help exports to gradually pick up. when growth in sweden accelerates, unemployment is also expected to fall. all in all, we see a fairly clear improvement in economic activity ahead of us. … but inflation is too low the swedish economy ’ s international dependence applies not only to the real economy, but also to inflation. it is clear that inflation in several of our important export regions has shown a downward trend in recent years ( see figure 1 ). given this, central banks abroad have conducted a very expansionary monetary policy. in our most recent assessment in july we also revised down our forecasts for policy rates abroad ( see figure 2 ). the low inflationary pressures abroad are one explanation why inflation in sweden has been low in recent years. when measured as the cpif, where the effects of the riksbank ’ s repo - rate changes on mortgage rates are excluded, inflation has been clearly below the target of 2 per cent since the start of 2012, and since the end of last year it has fallen further ( see figure 3 ). one indication that the low inflation is a global phenomenon is that most central banks with inflation targets experienced inflation undershooting the target last year ( see figure 4 ). however, inflation abroad is not the only explanation for the low inflation in sweden. the exchange rate is significant for how prices abroad are “ translated ” into prices for swedish import goods. during the financial crisis in autumn 2008, the krona depreciated substantially, but after that there was a fairly long period with a clear appreciation, which contributed to pushing down import

dynamic economic and monetary union. thank you for your attention. i shall be pleased to answer your questions. bis central bankers ’ speeches
i have no doubt that we will be looking at a “ brave new world ” in which there will be less inequity and disparity among nations. both europe and the us are at defining moments in their history. there are indeed many indicators of change that suggest that they are about to cross – or may even have crossed – watersheds in their economic history. the dollar is newton d baker was the us secretary of war during world war i the borgias, descendants of a noble line, originally from valencia, spain, that established roots in italy and became prominent in ecclesiastical and political affairs in the 1400s and 1500s. the house of the borgias produced two popes and many other political and church leaders. some members of the family became known for their treachery. bis central bankers ’ speeches steadily being eroded as the world ’ s sole or dominating reserve currency. the days are gone when 85 per cent or more of international currency reserves were held in “ greenbacks ”, a more realistic figure today would be around 60 per cent. the growing surreal indebtedness of the us is putting into question the “ safe haven ” feature of the dollar. the dream of jean monnet and robert schuman ’ s of a “ united states of europe ” is turning into a nightmare. looking beyond what is happening on the two sides of the atlantic, we see asia and latin america advancing to centre stage. and the new mantra of investors – africa ’ s success story, the rise of the economic lions of africa – speaks volumes about the “ newly discovered ” potential of africa. who would have forecast that europe would turn to china for assistance. all these changes pose innumerable challenges for policymakers – for a central banker most certainly – decision makers, and implementers of government policies as well as for providers of goods and services. but what a fantastic time to be around! as new graduates, you can bring your contribution to the making of a new world order. you decide whether you wish to be passive onlookers or proactive players in this drama. let me conclude by sharing with you some of the lessons that the crisis has taught us and which i believe will serve you well in your future career : – do not be too greedy. – do not abuse of the system. – do not take short cuts. – earn a good reputation – you cannot buy an excellent reputation, you must earn it. – always have a positive and proper mindset i again

congratulate you all for your academic achievement. the world is yours. remember that it ’ s up to you to make a difference – you have the choice to be a passive onlooker or a proactive player. remember your success, you owe it also to your parents who have given their support and for being present by your side, as you burned the midnight oil. i wish you all a very successful life. thank you. bis central bankers ’ speeches
interest rates and financial liberalization and innovation. there are, of course, other demand factors that warrant more data and analysis, including the impacts of foreign investment and possible preference shifts. third, in terms of supply, the constraints imposed by geography and regulation have decreased housing supply elasticity, especially in urban areas. this reduced supply elasticity has interacted with demand shifts toward more urbanization to push up house prices in major cities. fourth, the credible and effective macro and financial policy frameworks in place in canada and the other countries considered here have contributed to a high degree of macroeconomic and financial stability. consequently, in the face of a protracted global recovery, their countercyclical policies successfully underpinned domestic demand in the post - crisis period. the resulting strength in the housing market has increased household imbalances, but the risks stemming from these vulnerabilities have been well managed by complementary macroprudential policies. the experience in these countries therefore suggests that macroprudential policies that address structural weaknesses in the regulatory framework are best suited for mitigating such financial vulnerabilities. they reduce tail risks to financial stability and enhance the overall resilience of the financial system. thank you. enjoy these last few days of summer. other factors also influenced the growth of mortgage credit over this period. in particular, note that in late 2008 – 09 the canadian economy was in a recession. the decline in that period should not be interpreted as a result of the first wave of tightening of the mortgage rules. similar evidence on the impact of these macroprudential policies is found by i. krznar and j. morsink, “ with great power comes great responsibility : macroprudential tools at work in canada, ” imf working paper wp / 14 / 83, may 2014. bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches

about 0. 2 percentage points in 2020. in sum, the canadian economy is currently facing some headwinds, but there is good reason to believe that the economy will accelerate in the second half of this year. in this context, the bank ’ s governing council judges that an accommodative policy interest rate continues to be warranted. we will continue to evaluate the appropriate degree of monetary policy accommodation as new data arrive. in particular, we are monitoring developments in household spending, oil markets and global trade policy to gauge the extent to which the factors weighing on growth and the inflation outlook are dissipating. with that, senior deputy wilkins and i would be happy to take your questions. 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches
truly matter, then our enthusiasm for it will naturally increase. my dear colleagues! this year will be a more difficult time than ever before. we have already successfully overcome great hardships in the past, however, such as the foreign exchange crisis of 1997 and the recent global financial crisis, and in doing so i am proud to say that the bank of korea played a substantial role. if on top of your superb capabilities and talent your work attitude is also newly strengthened, then there is no doubt that we will be able to contribute greatly to helping our korean economy overcome its current difficulties and take another step forward. in welcoming the new year, i wish all of you in our bank of korea family very abundant health and happiness. thank you. bis central bankers ’ speeches

a profit of $ 15. 8 billion. • prior to that in fy2012 / 2013, recorded a loss of $ 10. 6 billion. 31. why so volatile? fluctuations in mas ’ profit figures from year to year is almost entirely due to currency translation effects, i. e. exchange rate fluctuations between s $ and major currencies. • when s $ appreciates against major currencies, there is translation loss when assets are reported in s $ • likewise, when s $ depreciates, there is translation gain • but these gains and losses mean little for international purchasing power of our ofr which is denominated in foreign currencies. 32. focusing on overall profit figure therefore misses larger point about mas ’ underlying investment performance. 33. investment gains on mas ’ foreign assets have in fact remained relatively stable for last five financial years. • holding s $ exchange rate constant to strip out translation effects, foreign investment gains amounted to s $ 10. 4 billion in fy2014 / 15, comparable to foreign investment gains of s $ 10. 6 billion in fy 2013 / 14. helping singaporeans manage their finances 34. a key area of focus for mas in last two years has been to help singaporeans better manage their finances. a multi - pronged effort : • encourage prudent borrowing • facilitate retail access to simple, low - cost investment products • spur competitive pricing for life insurance products • educate consumers on financial matters let me elaborate on each. first, mas has put in place various measures to encourage prudent borrowing 35. many safeguards already exist. bis central bankers ’ speeches • amount of unsecured credit that fi can extend is limited to four times monthly income of borrower. • limits on both loan - to - value and loan tenure for both housing and motor vehicle loans extended by fis. • individuals purchasing property are constrained on their total debt service ratio. 36. mas announced new unsecured credit rules two years ago. • fis will not be allowed to grant further unsecured credit to borrower whose aggregate unsecured debt exceeds borrowing limit for 3 consecutive months. • this limit has been set at 24 times borrower ’ s monthly income, and will be lowered to 18 times from 1 jun 2017 and 12 times from 1 jun 2019. 37. vast majority of singaporeans manage their debt well. • less than 2 % of unsecured credit users affected by industry - wide borrowing limit. • nonetheless
the independence of central banks is of key importance and should not be called into question. whatever the criticism may be, every other regime in which the central bank is closer to the finance ministry is much worse than the current system. but not everybody seems to agree. there may be populists who dream of something different. but most politicians are very conscious of the need to keep monetary and fiscal policy separate. any other approach can quickly turn dangerous. 5 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches

is performing well, they are willing to grant credit, but when it is faltering, they are not so keen. do you see such a risk at present? as far as the capital markets are concerned, credit risk premia have increased significantly over the past months – for both high and low credit - rated firms. that tightens borrowing conditions for firms on capital markets and weighs on the economy. on the other hand we have so far not seen any such tightening in bank lending conditions in the euro area. overall, in light of these developments, we consider that the probability of a recession remains low. but are you worried that that will change, that the banks will tighten conditions too? banks in the euro area now hold much more capital than before and are better able to withstand shocks. they also have larger liquidity buffers. that ’ s all good news. at the same time, bank equity prices have fallen sharply and profitability is often very low, as is also reflected in the banks ’ very low price - to - book ratio of around 50 %. in such a context there is a risk that the banks could act even more procyclically than they usually do and would amplify the cycle. to be clear, the uncertainties and the economic slowdown have so far not caused banks to tighten their lending conditions or to grant less credit. but we need to keep a very close eye on how this evolves. how will the banks behave if the economic slowdown continues? would you say that financing conditions in the euro area as a whole have already tightened significantly? financing conditions have tightened somewhat in recent months, but not significantly, thanks in part to our forward guidance on interest rates. this partly compensates for such effects. but you ’ re absolutely right, we as central bankers must always ask ourselves whether our monetary policy stance is appropriate for us to attain our objective. and what is your answer at the moment? we have revised our assessment of risks to growth downward. i would say that is a clear indication that the level of alert is higher than before. 2 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches three quarters of below - potential growth, higher risks and at least slightly tighter financing conditions – what does that signify for the inflation outlook? is the ecb ’ s governing council losing its confidence in reaching the target of 2 % over the medium term? three quarters of below - potential growth are certainly not good news. but we have a medium term perpective