considered by central banks and governments across the globe. no decisions have been made in the uk and we continue to work closely with a wide range of stakeholders to develop a clear understanding of the potential implications : positive and negative. the bank of england and hm treasury will consult later this year on the assessment of the case for a retail cbdc in the uk, including scope for further work. the central banking spring meetings have included a number of enlightening debates on cbdc. i won ’ t seek to synthesise that, but instead i will focus on how we can make existing forms of digital money work better for businesses and consumers. and by “ we ” i mean not just central banks but the payments ecosystem as a whole. discussions of innovation in payments often focus on retail payments and the whizzy frontends. but i believe that wholesale and high - value payments are at least as important to the global economy, and certainly to central banks in maintaining monetary and financial stability. they are used for example by financial institutions to trade in money markets, by businesses to pay their suppliers and source foreign currency and by the government to issue bonds. high - value 1 / 6 bis central bankers'speeches payments form more than 90 % of the value of electronic payments transmitted in the uk. 2 due to their value and their importance to financial stability, these payments often settle directly at central banks – over £700bn settle in the uk rtgs every working day. this means that central banks can have a strong impact on how these wholesale payments perform and evolve. and there is scope for further evolution. for many types of wholesale payments, inefficiencies continue to exist as an inherent part of the process. market convention for settlement of equity trades still sees them transferred two days after the trade ( t + 2 ). forty percent of foreign exchange transactions worldwide – worth nearly $ 9 trillion every day – are not subject to netting, creating exposures and settlement risk for the market participants. 3 cross - border payments between businesses can take several days, with six out of ten such payments requiring manual intervention to process. new approaches in high - value payments how can we remove the frictions to make more payments more effective? the market is actively innovating to build improved services for consumers. investment in fintech solutions is soaring, with $ 210 billion invested in 2021 globally. payments were the most active area of fintech investment, making up a quarter of the total. 4 new entrants are

, the committee's proposals here represent a considered and careful balance. on the one hand, the objective has been to provide in the new accord a significant expansion, within a menu approach, to the recognition of collateral, credit derivatives and guarantees. but this is balanced on the other hand by specifying legal and operational standards that must be met before relief is granted and setting capital requirements against residual risks. this may - indeed is intended to - lead to much greater incentives to acquire good quality collateral and other credit insurance. this will be positive, provided the necessary operational standards including legal robustness are observed, and provided, as i said on another recent occasion, that the processes, volumes, and end results of transfers of credit risk are reasonably transparent. i am aware, however, that some initial comment from the banking industry is that the committee has not afforded enough recognition to physical collateral, particularly under the standard and'foundation irb'approaches. in this respect they think the committee achieved too little risk sensitivity. the idea of a consultation paper is to elicit comment, but there are problems with the recognition of physical collateral that need to be considered. one is the difficulty of pinpointing accurate valuations for such collateral - much of it does not have anything by way of a valuation history. and values for physical collateral are also likely to be cyclical. when manufacturing companies are in recession, the values of related assets - plant and machinery or inventories - are likely to suffer too. before regulators recognise more physical collateral, the banking industry needs to come forward with ideas on how to solve this problem. procyclicality of capital requirements i want now to turn to my second question ; whether we might in some sense be introducing too much risk sensitivity. under this heading the issue i want to discuss is the danger of'procyclicality ', that is the possibility that regulatory capital requirements will reinforce cyclical movements in the macroeconomy. there was some element of that in the original accord - because in a downturn specific provisions and write - offs increase, which reduces banks'capital, and may diminish their appetite to make new loans. however, under the new accord this will be reinforced by the possibility that, as the condition of borrowers deteriorates during an economic downturn, they will be downgraded by banks with the consequence that extra capital has to be set aside. on some estimates, bank capital requirements could as much as double during a cyclical