for release on delivery 6 : 45 p. m. edt july 13, 2023 big shocks travel fast : why policy lags may be shorter than you think remarks by christopher j. waller member board of governors of the federal reserve system at the the money marketeers of new york university new york, new york july 13, 2023 thank you. whenever i get such a warm welcome, i always say to myself, “ waller, they really aren ’ t here for you or your sparkling personality. they ’ re here for your outlook. ” 1 which is fine, because accurately communicating my economic outlook is an important part of my job. tonight, in addition to providing new information about my outlook based on new data, i also want to clarify my views on how the economy has been operating over time and my view of appropriate monetary policy. doing so can help the public anticipate how i will react to new developments, not just at the next meeting of the federal open market committee ( fomc ), but further into the future. that ’ s crucial, because monetary policy works mostly by influencing the public ’ s view of financial and economic conditions well into the future, affecting spending and investment decisions. whether i say so or not, every time i speak, i am trying to better explain how and why i make policy decisions. my plan is to cover three issues. first, by looking over the past few fomc meetings, i want to describe how my outlook has been shaped by both economic data and uncertainty — what we have learned at each point and what we don ’ t yet know about the economy. second, i will discuss how i think about lags with which policy affects economic activity and inflation and the impact on the appropriate path of policy. and third, i will review the recent data and discuss how i see policy evolving over the remainder of this year. recent policy actions at the june meeting, i supported keeping the policy rate unchanged. based only on the economic data that was coming in showing a tight labor market and stubbornly the views expressed here are my own and are not necessarily those of my colleagues on the federal open market committee. - 2high inflation, i believe that raising the policy rate 25 basis points was justified. however, i had lingering doubts about when or if an abrupt tightening of credit conditions would occur. i viewed the lingering effects of the banking stresses from march as a downside risk to cause a tightening of credit conditions. although there did not

andreas dombret : introductory statement - iif international capital markets and emerging markets roundtable introductory statement by dr andreas dombret, member of the executive board of the deutsche bundesbank, at the iif international capital markets and emerging markets roundtable, washington dc, 20 april 2018. * * * ladies and gentlemen ever since the ground - breaking work of solow in the fifties most policy makers and members of academia – especially in the advanced economies – have inclined to favour free capital flows. many crises later, the view has somewhat shifted, in particular, regarding emerging markets and developing countries, which is the group of countries that i will focus my remarks on. not only can capital flow reversals and in the extreme form sudden stops create significant costs in terms of output losses, financial instability and even political instability. but from all we know today it is surprisingly difficult to find empirical evidence of capital account liberalization being beneficial in terms of output gains, investment, productivity gains, or risk sharing for countries that have not progressed sufficiently far in their institutional development. much of the work on this has been carried out by the imf and indeed by maurice obstfeld himself, so maurice should correct me if i am wrong, but essentially liberalized capital flows should go hand in hand with functioning judicial systems including well enforced property rights, developed and well regulated financial systems as well as stability - oriented macroeconomic policies. there are even longer lists, but these seem to be the minimum requirements. so, given that these conditions are not always met fully, should countries resort to capital flow measures if faced with volatile flows? by the way, i am using the imf terminology of capital flow measures. these are basically capital controls plus those macroprudential measures that aim to limit financial stability risks arising from cross - border capital flows. i think we all agree that sound domestic policies should always be the first line of defence and that capital flow measures should not substitute for warranted macroeconomic or exchange rate adjustments. but it is also useful to state an obvious but often overlooked fact : unlike restrictions on the current account, the imposition of capital flow measures is not under the jurisdiction of the imf, thus, any country can basically adopt such controls as it deems necessary to regulate capital movements. however, capital flow policies are part of the funds surveillance and as such open to an assessment of their impact on the international monetary system. objectives of capital flow measures usually are to maintain monetary independence, to mitigate exchange