leave behind things whose time has passed. this will enable us to rely on a framework that is transparent and robust, but also flexible enough to deal with the challenges of the future. 1 ecb ( 2015 ), “ the financial risk management of the eurosystem ’ s monetary policy operations ”. 2 in 2010, the governing council approved a set of “ principles of the risk control framework for the eurosystem ’ s credit operations ”. 3 the ecb ’ s governing council also decided in december 2011 to enable national central banks to accept as collateral performing additional credit claims ( accs ) that satisfy specific eligibility criteria. such assets do not belong to the single list and they are also subject to a separate ecb guideline : guideline of the ecb of 9 july 2014 on additional temporary measures relating to eurosystem refinancing operations and eligibility of collateral and amending guideline ecb / 2007 / 9 ( recast ) ( ecb / 2014 / 31 ). 4 this expansion included certain short - term debt instruments and derogations for own - use of government - guaranteed bank bonds. non - euro denominated eligible assets included those denominated in pound sterling, us dollars or yen. 4 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches

during the asian crisis, rating agencies can get it wrong, in some instances confirming only the new direction the market itself has already taken. while the primary responsibility for the overall soundness of the financial system lies with policy, market forces should be used as an indispensible complementary tool to exert discipline. this requires policymakers to be aware of the mechanisms according to which markets work, and sometimes fail to work. eventually, behind the seemingly anonymous markets there are human beings trying to maximize their individual well - being according to the incentives which they are given. by contrast, public policy needs to have in mind what is optimal for society as a whole. 4. i would like to point out three broad avenues that public policy should take in the future. first, make the market function more efficiently so that risk is priced correctly. if market failures occur and consequently the price mechanism doesn ’ t work, public policy should look into the incentives existing for financial market participants and - if need may be - adapt the framework. too big an appetite for risk is at the heart of subsequent financial crises. it is encouraged by explicit or implicit guarantees which weaken the hard budget constraint that ought to characterize any efficient economic system. to avoid moral hazard, public policy should dissipate a false sense of security which might arise because financial markets feel the “ too big to fail ” doctrine or the “ too complex to fail ” doctrine will be applied anyway. constructive ambiguity - based on knowledge of the facts and the risks - might help to make operators more cautious. what we have learned during the asian crisis is that “ ambiguity ” sometimes is not only appropriate when dealing with possible financial support but also in exchange rate policies. when there is a lack of fundamental convergence in the medium term, exchange rate pegs can invite short - term speculative capital movements and unsustainable investment and consumption patterns. this brings me to macroeconomic policies in general, the second big avenue, the importance of which i would like to stress. the globalization of finance has put a premium on good policies. public authorities are thus well advised to pursue policies which do not lead to macroeconomic imbalances that threaten price stability and long - term growth. furthermore, if such imbalances arise policies must adjust quickly. finally, countries need to be transparent so that there will be an additional incentive to identify the build - up of macroeconomic imbalances at an early stage and to take adequate action. the highly valuable ongoing efforts to increase the functioning of