samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
situation has worsened or improved since 2009. this lack of data extends to information on the demand / supply dynamics related to new housing units. estimates from the bank ’ s research department suggest that trinidad and tobago began this decade with a housing shortage overhang of around 50, 000 units. with continued strong growth in annual housing demand and a significant slowdown in supply, the housing situation is likely to worsen in the future. conservative estimates suggest that the housing shortage overhang could reach at least 80, 000 units at the end of the next ten years. more than half of this massive, unsatisfied demand for housing will come from low - income groups who, according to the latest 2008 / 2009 household budgetary survey, earn under $ 3, 999 per month. affordability is a main explanation of the housing shortage in trinidad and tobago. the median price for a 3 - bedroom house ( with land ) increased from $ 237, 770 in 1993 ( when the economy had stabilized after almost a decade of negative growth ) to $ 721, 481 in 2003 ( just bis central bankers ’ speeches before the economy was about to experience its third energy boom ). at the end of september 2012, the median price for a 3 - bedroom house jumped to $ 1. 0 million. if this trend continues, the median price for a 3 - bedroom house could reach about $ 1. 3 million by the end of this decade. the volume of available housing finance may also limit access to homeownership. the total mortgage funding required to meet the annual demand for housing units is projected at around $ 30 billion by the end of this decade. by comparison, the total value of real estate mortgage lending currently stands at just over $ 12. 5 billion. commercial banks account for around two - thirds of outstanding mortgage loans while the ttmf holds another one - fifth of mortgages granted in the country. for these reasons, successive administrations have been grappling since 1965 to make housing more easily accessible and more affordable for citizens of trinidad and tobago. the state has entered the housing market through various means including through large scale programs for the construction of new houses ( especially on prime agricultural lands ), rent to own programs, national settlement programs such as squatter regularization, and providing highly subsidized mortgage and construction financing. ladies and gentlemen, it stands to reason that, if we are to make any meaningful dent in the acute national housing shortage, then we need to fundamentally rethink our

bank will continue to make the difficult and tough choices to help keep our economic house in order. i thank you. bis central bankers ’ speeches
conclusion, i wish to thank you for finding time from your busy schedules to attend this workshop. i urge you to ask as many questions as you could possibly can, in order to get the best out of it, as well as make the workshop more lively and interactive. with these few remarks, it is now my honour and privilege to declare the workshop officially open. i thank you!

zombie lending by under - capitalised banks. it was only after the implementation of the of financial revival program ( takenaka plan ) starting in 2003, involving more rigorous evaluation of bank assets, increasing of bank capital, and strengthening of governance for recapitalised banks, that the japanese banks finally stopped the process of ever - greening non - performing loans and started to accumulate capital through retained earnings over the next five years. in addition to the above evidence on japan which i covered in some detail in the 8th r k talwar memorial lecture, my recent joint work with sascha steffen and lea steinruecke, titled “ kicking the can down the road : government interventions in the european banking sector, ” examined all government interventions in the eurozone banking sector during the 2007 to 2009 financial crisis. in particular, we analysed the implications of these interventions in the european banking sector for the subsequent sovereign debt crisis and found that : ( i ) governments with weaker public finances were more reluctant to recapitalise distressed banks during the financial crisis ; and, ( ii ) the resulting insufficient recapitalisation of distressed banks had significant negative consequences for the efficiency of real sector lending. in particular, weak banks remained vulnerable to future shocks and increased their risk - taking. furthermore, these banks did not write down defaulted loans but instead ever - greened loans to zombie borrowers, crowding out in the process credit extension to healthier borrowers. the case for regulatory prompt corrective action how should under - capitalised banks, and more generally, banks whose asset quality and profitability make them vulnerable to further stress, be dealt with, taking cognizance of the reality that the strength of market discipline by bank creditors is blunted by the presence of explicit and implicit government guarantees? this question received significant academic and policy - maker attention in the united states following the savings & loans ( s & l ) crisis, in which by mid - 1980 ’ s, so many thrifts had to be resolved at such low levels of capitalisation that in the end a significant government bailout in the form of blanket deposit insurance had to be engineered. effectively, it had been left until too late to exercise regulatory discipline that could have substituted for the lack of adequate market discipline ; as a result, the authorities had to engage in excessive forbearance and full - scale bailout. key insight that emerged from the debate around the s & l crisis was that the banking regulator needed to adopt a
entities. the fatf considers that if implemented effectively and with respect to applicable human rights provisions by countries and the private sector, targeted financial sanctions are an important means to deprive terrorist and proliferation financiers of their funds, thereby protecting citizens from the threats of crime, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. in order to be effective, however, these measures also have to be implemented and enforced in practice. 1 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches as an international financial centre, mauritius is committed to protecting its financial services sector from abuse. as a member of the united nations, mauritius has given effect to the sanctions regime under the un security council resolutions as well as the fatf recommendations 6 and 7 though the enactment, in may 2019, of the united nations ( financial prohibitions, arms embargo and travel ban ) sanctions act 2019 – the un sanctions act as it is more commonly referred to. the un sanctions act imposes a number of obligations on financial institutions, namely – prohibition against dealing with funds and other assets ( asset freeze ) of a designated or listed party ; prohibition against making funds and other assets ( and financial services ) available to, or for the benefit of listed parties ; reporting obligations and reporting of suspicious information, amongst others. the un sanctions act further requires financial institutions to implement internal controls and other procedures to enable a financial institution to effectively comply with the un sanctions act. it is therefore imperative for financial institutions to have adequate policies and procedures, systems and controls in place to enable the financial institutions to, amongst others, – identify the existing accounts, transactions, funds or other assets of designated persons and entities ; immediately freeze any identified funds or other assets held or controlled by designated persons and entities and prevent designated persons and entities from conducting transactions with, in or through them. as the central bank of the country and the aml / cft regulator for the banking sector, the bank of mauritius must safeguard not only the financial stability and soundness but also the integrity of the banking sector. non - compliance with the aml / cft obligations, including the targeted financial sanctions, will therefore, be severely dealt with by the bank. on those notes, allow me, ladies and gentlemen, to leave the floor to our panel of distinguished speakers who will guide you on the implementation of these obligations. i thank you for your kind attention and wish you a fruitful workshop. 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches

invest in the capacity - building of their professionals. as you may be aware, ladies and gentlemen, continuous professional development programs are to the trained professional's mind what exercise is to the body. this training by the deutsche bundesbank conspicuously embraces this very spirit. with these few words, i thank you for your attention and wish you a productive training and deliberations ahead. 3 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches
william c dudley : risks of wholesale funding welcoming remarks by mr william c dudley, president and chief executive officer of the federal reserve bank of new york, at the workshop on the “ risks of wholesale funding ”, new york city, 13 august 2014. * * * michael fleming, jamie mcandrews, susan mclaughlin and joseph tracy contributed to preparing these remarks. it is a pleasure to welcome you to the new york fed today to discuss the important issue of wholesale funding. as you all know, the financial system plays an essential role in modern economies, and liquidity is in turn critical to the functioning of the financial system. because financial intermediation is critical to economic activity and intermediation is dependent on funding and liquidity, disruption to funding and liquidity can cause severe damage to the economy. the experience of recent years revealed serious flaws in the system. risk was mispriced and there was a build - up of excesses before the crisis. structural weaknesses in the financial system then amplified the effect of the sharp decline in u. s. house prices, and the result was a widespread financial crisis and a deep recession both here and abroad. the extensive use by financial firms of short - term wholesale funding was one critical factor in the crisis. not only did this reliance on short - term funding create the potential for a firm to fail in an extraordinarily rapid manner when faced with a loss of market confidence, but it also served as a channel through which the effects of those failures were widely propagated throughout the broader financial system. i will focus my brief remarks on describing the structural vulnerabilities associated with shortterm wholesale funding, laying the groundwork for our discussions at today ’ s workshop. as always, my remarks reflect my own views and not necessarily those of the federal reserve system. as this audience knows, in the two decades leading up to the financial crisis, the global financial system underwent a rapid transformation. during this period, there was a shift from bank - based financial intermediation to capital markets - based financial intermediation, and an increase in the scale and complexity of securitization activities. in the pre - crisis period, the growth of securitization was accompanied by an increasing reliance on short - term funds raised in wholesale markets to finance securities and activities essential to securitization. this ranged from the use of repo funding to finance inventories of securities held for market - making purposes to the issuance of

the dodd - frank act raised the hurdle for the federal reserve to exercise its section 13. 3 emergency lending authority, extraordinary interventions will be more difficult to undertake, perhaps causing investors to be even more skittish in the future. this is why it is essential to make the system more stable. to that end, i look forward to hearing the insights and suggestions that come out of today ’ s workshop. thank you for your attention. bis central bankers ’ speeches
and we all know that there have been cases where staff, having engaged in misconduct at one bank, may move to another one without disclosing the earlier episode to the new employer. and in that manner, the risk of misconduct is transmitted within the system. many banking supervisors around the world want to tackle this “ rolling bad apples ” phenomenon. but this matter can hardly be dealt with by individual banks working alone. instead, the banking community needs to work together. 11. for this, the banking industry has been working closely with the hkma over the past two years. and it is encouraging to see that the mrc scheme was finalised in may this year. 12. since there is a panel session to talk about this scheme later today, i won ’ t go into details here. just briefly, under the mrc scheme, all banks will share and obtain conduct - specific reference information about prospective employees using a common protocol. the protocol will cover seven years prior to the application for the position, so that the recruiting institution can make a more informed employment decision. 13. we understand that some banks may have concerns about reporting ongoing investigations, for fear of litigation risks. but we don ’ t want to create a potential loophole such that “ bad apples ” could just get around the scheme by leaving one firm to join another firm once an investigation commences. to strike a balance, the industry guidelines set out factors that banks should take into account when exercising judgement on whether or not to share information about ongoing internal investigations. to ensure transparent and fair treatment to the job applicants, they will be provided with an opportunity to be heard in case of any negative information. 14. i would like to emphasise that the mrc scheme is a very important milestone of our efforts to enhance bank culture. and this is one of the earlier efforts among major international banking centres to tackle the “ rolling bad apples ” problem. we certainly look forward to collaborating with the industry to ensure smooth implementation of the scheme. phase 1 of the scheme covering senior positions will formally start in may 2023. but i would strongly encourage banks to start sharing and reporting any misconduct information as soon as they are ready to do so. talent pool for the financial sector 15. so that ’ s the part on conduct and risk culture, or what i normally referred to as the efforts on the “ mindset ” of bank employees. let ’ s now turn to the “ skillset ” part of the equation, in terms of efforts to e

global monetary policy shocks. i would therefore like to thank you all for taking the time to join our workshop today, which brings together seasoned researchers and policymakers dedicated to understanding these vital issues. i look forward to their insights and i hope you enjoy the workshop. thank you. last revision date : 25 august 2022
in individual wage growth, " on the economy blog, december 22. 5 / 5 bis - central bankers'speeches

mr. ferguson gives his views on exercising caution and vigilance in monetary policy in the united states remarks by mr. roger w. ferguson, jr., a member of the board of governors of the us federal reserve system, on the occasion of the distinguished speaker series, held at the federal reserve bank of atlanta on 9 / 7 / 98. introduction these are fascinating times for monetary policy. as we progress through the eighth year of the current economic expansion, economic growth has continued at a robust pace with unemployment reaching a 28 - year low, while inflation has remained remarkably subdued. to be sure, not all recent developments have been altogether positive, especially considering the current situation in asia. nonetheless, the performance of the american economy in recent years has exceeded expectations in a rather extraordinary fashion. but recent developments have challenged our understanding of the workings of the macroeconomy. although the recent surprises of both low unemployment and well - behaved inflation have been quite favorable, they have been surprises nonetheless and not easily reconcilable with each other based on old relationships and our earlier assessment of the economy ’ s potential. these developments have increased the uncertainty about the economic outlook and about the appropriate response of monetary policy in general to new developments. i want to take this opportunity to discuss some implications of this increased uncertainty for the conduct of monetary policy. before starting, let me remind you that these views are personal and do not necessarily reflect the views of other members of the fomc or the board of governors. objectives and strategy for monetary policy to evaluate the proper strategy for monetary policy, we must first understand the federal reserve ’ s policy objectives and then recognize the parameters within which policy operates in attaining these objectives. the long - run goal of monetary policy is straightforward. the federal reserve act mandates that we promote price stability and maximum employment. sometimes this dual objective is misunderstood, with the misconception that these inflation and employment goals cannot be attained simultaneously - - that there is a tradeoff in the long run between one and the other. it is worthwhile repeating what i am sure all of you already understand well : the long - run goals of price stability and maximum employment are not mutually exclusive. not so long ago, mainstream macroeconomists thought that employment and growth were by and large independent of inflation in the long run. but the evidence accumulating in the 1990s seems to suggest that low inflation contributes to real economic performance in ways not fully appreciated before. if anything, our approach to price
an assumption that culture is a kind of luxury that you can only afford when the economy is booming. i think that is a wrong perception. culture and interaction between people is a necessary ingredient of our lives, independent of economic developments. draghi : i completely agree. one could even say that literature, music, performing arts and fine arts provide inspiration that helps to bring about economic prosperity. commerce and culture are dependent on one another! bis central bankers ’ speeches

influence their own policies. this is the moment when things might start to change. 8 second, experience suggests that cooperative policies, unfortunately, are not enough, and crises do play a part in producing fundamental changes in the system of policy incentives. for instance, it was not until the euro area sovereign debt crisis that emu ’ s economic governance started to be seriously enhanced – and the list of examples is of course very long. third, not only crises, but also longer - term, largely market - driven structural developments may eventually alter the system of policy incentives. one such development could be, according to some, a shift towards a truly multi - polar currency system. 9 in such an ims, it is argued, there would be credible alternatives to dollar - denominated investments, which in turn would inevitably enhance policy discipline in the united states. also, a multi - polar currency world would allow for greater monetary policy autonomy in emes such as china, which would thus be in a position to better address their imbalances and overheating pressures. i broadly share the view that a truly multi - polar ims would imply better policy incentives for stability - oriented policies. but how do we get there? and would a multi - polar currency system be stable, or would a new hegemon eventually emerge, as the united states did in the past century? to deal with possible dollar shortages, triffin preferred the issuance by a global central bank of a new supranational currency serving as “ outside fiat money ” and floating against national currencies, which countries would be obliged to accept in international transactions. wouldn ’ t this be the best pattern to follow? conclusion these questions are very relevant ones, and the responses to them are far from straightforward. let me, therefore, conclude by just offering a few final thoughts : how do we achieve a truly multi - polar ims? the role of further financial market development, capital account liberalisation and exchange rate flexibility in emes is often underestimated in this context. the more progress emes make in this direction, the lower their official capital outflows to advanced economies will be. this would progressively reduce the demand for safe debt instruments issued by advanced economies and eventually contribute to greater financial stability worldwide. 10 it would also allow a better channelling of domestic credit to investment and consumption, which in turn would promote growth driven by domestic demand, thereby reducing the incentive to pursue export - led models based on undervalue
for years and sometime in difficult circumstances brought many successful projects to the czech republic. we wish the bank much good fortune for fulfilling its mandate. thank you for your attention.

zdenek tuma : the interrelationship between monetary policy, price stability and financial stability speech by mr zdenek tuma, governor of the czech national bank, at the european banking and financial forum 2005, prague, 22 march 2005. * * * mr. president, excellencies, governors, distinguished guests, it is an honour to be opening the central bankers'forum. as the main part of the conference program concerns the financial sector challenges and opportunities in the “ new europe ”, the central bankers'panel has to necessarily reflect the close, particularly topical, issue of the financial stability and its relationship to a reasonable monetary policy conduct. while my colleagues will discuss mainly the particular issues of financial stability, i, having the privilege to be the chairman of the panel, would like to frame the discussion using a more general and historical context. bearing this perspective in mind, i would like to point to the interrelation between the ultimate goal of monetary policy, the price stability, and the financial stability. first of all, let me start with the definition of financial stability, simply assuming that price stability does not need any further explanation. to be as brief as possible, financial stability can be defined as the soundness of the financial system, that is, its resilience against various shocks. what i understand as a sound financial system can be thought of as a system that, firstly, enables individuals to do all the payments they want at the very moment they like, and, secondly, enables individuals to smooth their consumption across time by saving and borrowing. in this respect, the financial stability issue, which arose during the nineties, is not a completely new one. indeed, it has been of a significant importance since banking emerged. the long years of commodity money system ( so called “ golden standard ” ) could be characterised as years when money supply, i. e. the supply of gold, was so exogenous that it was even out of the central bank's control. consequently, monetary policy was relatively easy to do, just establishing the parity between the central bank banknotes and the gold, but the role of the central bank as a lender of last resort was relatively constrained. under those circumstances, the financial stability was naturally of a high importance, because for any commercial bank the attempt to “ run ” the bank could be deadly. moreover, this could cause stampede runs on others banks and bring the whole system to an end, as the central bank '