task is an arduous one but not impossible if we believe that, though it is very difficult, we are capable of changing and reforming. this is why i shall begin my speech with an optimistic message, offering you some examples showing how spain has already progressed with some adjustments and has undertaken major reforms during the difficult times we have faced during these years of crisis. i ’ m aware of the risk being run in showing optimism amid the crisis, in the same way that during the bubble whoever dared denounce the imbalances being built up was called a killjoy. but i hope my optimism is qualified by my reminder that complacency, that is to say believing that we have already done everything that has to be done and that nobody can teach us any lessons, is the arch - enemy in the battle to exit the crisis. to earn the confidence provided by the knowledge that spain has been capable of adjusting and reforming during these years of crisis, i have chosen two examples. first, the rapid improvement in our current - account balance ; and second, the headway during these years in restructuring our banking system. bis central bankers ’ speeches as is well known, under normal conditions the current - account balance is very easy to finance in a monetary union, but its size is a good indicator of two of the deepest imbalances that came about in spain during the expansionary phase : the explosion in debt and the loss of competitiveness. indeed, from 1996 credit began to outpace gross domestic product, doing so systematically until 2006, when its annual growth peaked : at a rate of over 25 % for total credit, and more than 40 % for credit extended to real estate development activities. over the same period, spanish cpi growth was systematically higher than that of the euro area. although the growth rate of credit began to fall as from 2006, growing debt and the loss of competitiveness over the 12 years to 2008 led the external imbalance to an unsustainable position, with a current - account deficit of 10 % of gdp and a strong increase in spain ’ s external debt. but what counts is that spain has since adjusted its current - account deficit at a spectacular pace. from almost 10 % in 2008, the deficit fell at the end of last year to 3. 7 % – an adjustment of more than 6 pp of gdp in three years – and at the end of 2012 we might already be in balance. the climate of pessimism accompanying the crises leads some to under

a year or with an interest rate fixation period of up to one year declined from 70 % to 59 %. 18 a second factor could be related to a slower pass - through of market rates to retail deposit rates than in previous episodes, which could weaken the standard intertemporal channel through which rising interest rates discourage savers from spending. 19 this slower pass - through could come from the fact that, during the period with negative rates, the these results, however, mask a significant degree of heterogeneity across countries : the share of household debt with interest rates that reset within a year stands at 63 % in spain and 59 % in italy, but just 6 % in france and germany. in the case of firms, the share of bank debt either maturing or with interest rates that reset within a year stands at 93 % in italy, 70 % in spain, 48 % in france and 41 % in germany. it should be noted, however, that a slower pass - through to deposit rates may also have dampening effects on household spending, by slowing down the increase in savers ’ financial income. remuneration of retail deposits was above market interest rates, as banks were unwilling to reduce it below zero. additionally, the current ample liquidity available to commercial banks reduces the pressure on them to increase the remuneration of retail deposits. other factors point to a potentially faster monetary policy transmission compared to past episodes. first, the current hiking cycle comes after the strong negative shock prompted by the pandemic, which adversely impacted firms ’ financial situation by increasing their debt levels. this leaves them more vulnerable to interest rate hikes, and their expenditure decisions may be more sensitive to monetary policy changes. conversely, however, households still have around €900 billion in excess savings built up during the pandemic and they are benefiting from sizeable fiscal policy support. second, there has been a shift from bank to bond funding over the last decade, with bond debt increasing from 16 % to 24 % of non - financial corporations ’ total debt. 20 this, together with the faster monetary policy pass - through to bond rates than to bank rates, implies faster transmission than in the past. third, the residential real estate market is a key area to monitor, in particular given that some euro area countries have experienced a significant increase in house prices over the last decade, with signs of overvaluation. 21 housing represents a major part of household wealth and bank assets. thus,