be implemented as soon as possible. moreover, in the interests of financial stability, we should consider extending the maturities on the credit lines and reach a definitive agreement on how to make emergency decisions. unfortunately, there was almost no progress at all on the capital markets union in the 4 december agreement. it is more important than ever that we make concrete headway, notably on harmonising bankruptcy regimes and strengthening the role of esma as a supervisory authority. more broadly, i can only express my regret that the reinforcement of the esas proposed by the commission has been blocked by the council. the banking union and capital markets union are the key components for a genuine “ financing union for investment and innovation ” : i have put forward this idea as a way of better channelling our abundant resources – our eur 350 billion private savings surplus – towards the concrete needs of the economy : the energy transition, smes or digital innovation. jean - claude juncker ’ s investment plan was a first successful step towards this. with regard to the esm, it ’ s not just about managing crises ex post, but about preventing them from happening in the first place by reinforcing our precautionary tools : the principle of ex ante criteria and the absence of an assistance programme are both welcome elements. however, we need to avoid having ex ante criteria that are so strict that in practice they prevent the esm from being used preventively, as is the case today. beyond these institutional reforms, and with the united states and china increasingly asserting their dominance, it is vital that the european union be given genuine strategic autonomy. our currency, the euro, already plays a significant role at the international level, and this could be expanded even further [ slide 6 ]. despite being the world ’ s second most important currency, it is still used to a far lesser extent than the dollar. it accounts for 20 % of global currency reserves compared with 63 % for the dollar ; by contrast, 36 % of the total value of payments ( including intraeuro area payments ) is settled in euro, compared with 40 % for the dollar. this is why the european commission ’ s communique in december was particularly opportune. the initiatives promoting the role of the euro, notably in the energy sector, need to be examined carefully. europe has built its monetary sovereignty thanks to the euro ; it needs to preserve its sovereignty with regard to trade ; and we still have a long way to go to build our economic

inflation and growth or full employment, as is the case with the us federal reserve ( the fed ), for example. however, this would be politically unattainable given german culture and not particularly different in economic practice. in 1998, the ecb established a quantitative definition of price stability that it went on to clarify in 2003 : to maintain inflation rates below, but close to, 2 % over the medium term. other major central banks such as the fed and the bank of japan followed the example of the ecb, in 2012 and 2013 respectively, and also adopted the same 2 % inflation target. this “ conceptual convergence ” 2 is remarkable. incidentally, even though exchange rates are not a monetary policy target, we should note that the euro traded at usd 1. 17 on 1 january 1999 and at usd 1. 14 at the end of december 2018, with an average rate of usd 1. 21 between 1999 and 2018. 1 / 6 bis central bankers'speeches with regard to our mandate, the results are tangible [ slide 1 ]. during the 20 year period prior to the introduction of the euro ( 1979 - 98 ), average inflation in the euro area was at 4. 9 %, compared with only 1. 7 % during the 20 years that have followed. what ’ s more, better controlled inflation means lower financing costs as risk premiums are reduced. interest rate differentials and sovereign spreads have consequently narrowed significantly [ slide 2 ]. the france - germany spread fell from an average of 1. 9 % between 1986 and 1992 – the period of the single market without a single currency, between the single european act and maastricht – to 0. 4 % in 2017 - 18. the italy - germany spread has narrowed by 3 percentage points. if, theoretically, one of these countries wished to leave the euro, it would in all likelihood experience an immediate at - leastequivalent increase in its public financing costs as well as its private financing costs to households and businesses. furthermore, in terms of growth [ slide 3 ], euro area per capita gdp has improved almost as rapidly as in the united states since the euro was introduced ( an annual average of 1. 1 % in the euro area between 1999 and 2017, compared with 1. 2 % in the united states ), with the gap between the two only widening slightly during the 2011 - 12 european crisis. b - the means : independence the means employed to carry out this mandate is the independence of eurosystem central