, in the ssm regulation with regard to the exact allocation of powers between the ecb and the ncas in the matters covered by the regulation itself. the reason for this essentially lies in the fact that the original text of the regulation proposed by the commission envisaged the exclusive competence of the ecb over all the banks in the euro area. furthermore, the specification of very delicate aspects relating to the allocation of powers, such as day - by - day supervision, had been assigned by the founding regulation ( i. e. the ssm regulation ) to the ncas as a task concerning all banks, including the significant ones, whereas under the framework regulation ( a'second - level'regulation ) it is assigned to the joint supervisory teams chaired by the ecb. thirdly, the ordinary decision - making process within the ssm has been influenced by the constraints imposed by the treaties and by the statute of the escb and of the ecb, with the additional complexity coming from the separation between monetary policy and micro - prudential supervision. the set - up of the supervisory board as a nondecision - making body that approves complete proposals for supervisory measures and submits them – through a non - objection procedure – to the governing council, entitled to raise objections especially on monetary policy issues, is the break - even point. despite several legal challenges, the ssm has been in many ways a historical achievement. not least as evidence of the hard balance reached, the text of the ssm 2 / 5 bis - central bankers'speeches regulation was not deemed as requiring any amendment at the outcome of the two periodic reviews concluded by the commission on the ssm in 2017 and 2023, pursuant to article 32 of the same regulation. there is no doubt that greater uniformity and effectiveness of prudential supervision has been achieved with regard to all the jurisdictions participating in the ssm. the room for arbitrage within the euro area, fuelled by asymmetrical supervisory approaches, has since been considerably reduced. moreover, the ssm has acted as a catalyst for a significant banking restructuring process, directed at enhancing soundness and capitalisation. the importance of resilient banks for the euro area became evident during the covid - 19 pandemic as well as in the context of the russian aggression against ukraine, but it has also been confirmed very recently in connection with the banking crises that occurred in the united states and in the switzerland. the ssm has certainly benefited from

the basic principles of a banking union were then drawn up over a very short period, especially so if compared with the time that it took to define the framework and the rules at the basis, within the economic and monetary union, of a common monetary policy and a common currency, the euro. furthermore, and also because of this, the ssm can only operate on the basis of a set of multiple ( and at times complex ) legal schemes. ten years ago, the first priority was deemed to be aligning the supervisory practices within the euro area, through a significant but not complete centralisation of administrative powers. at that time, further accelerating the process for harmonising 1 / 5 bis - central bankers'speeches substantive banking law, which had already been under way for years, was not being considered : this is also because, contrary to what the treaty ( article 140 tfeu ) envisages for access to the single currency, primary union law does not make participation in the single banking supervision conditional on legal convergence. thus, the time pressure has certainly imposed some trade - offs. i will just recall three of them. the first concerns the decision to concentrate the key administrative powers of microprudential supervision on the ecb, despite the lack of a fully harmonised substantive banking law. the application of different national laws by the ecb and the need to ensure the equality of treatment among the supervised entities has led to a rather peculiar outcome : that of a union institution required to apply the national law of each of the ( now 20 ) eu member states belonging to the euro area when implementing the ssm. accordingly, the ssm's administrative decisions must be adopted on the basis of many different domestic legal frameworks, without at the same time jeopardising the obligation to interpret them in accordance with eu law, given the goal of ensuring equality of treatment for the credit institutions concerned. at the same time, the ecb has the power to issue opinions on draft legislation, including national legislation, in the field of banking supervision. while this is only an advisory role, given that it is also aimed at ensuring harmonised rules, it is certainly significant. the second issue concerns the division of powers between the ecb and the ncas. a'political compromise'between the commission's initial proposal and the significantly divergent stances voiced by the delegations of some member states was only reached at the end of a complex negotiation. this is reflected in some uncertainty, if not ambiguity