that all conditions for an unlimited access have been restored. moreover, if necessary, the governing council can also impose further restrictions on the grounds of prudence, including suspending access to monetary policy credit operations for an entity with very low capital ratios. such decisions would be taken on a case - by - case basis to address the specific risk presented by the counterparty. now let me elaborate further. let us assume that following the “ failing or likely to fail ” determination, the entity is facing cash outflows. since the terms of its access to eurosystem monetary policy credit operations will have been frozen and perhaps even further restricted, it will not be able to meet its increased liquidity needs through this means. what will the bank do? it is likely to seek recourse to ela from its national central bank in order to meet these additional liquidity needs. so if the entity is assessed as “ solvent ” by the competent supervisory authority and it has sufficient clearly identified eligible collateral it will most probably receive ela from its national central bank. let me pause a moment on these two concepts. the microprudential authorities ’ assessment of “ solvency ” under the current ela agreement is based on a number of backward - looking 5 / 7 bis central bankers'speeches indicators, such as the reported common equity tier 1, tier 1 and total capital ratios with a possible grace period in the case of a credible prospect of recapitalisation within a limited timeframe. we will probably change these indicators in the future in order to take account of forward - looking elements, in line with the evolution of supervisory practices, so as to have a more accurate picture about the solvency of the bank and the appropriateness of continuing to provide ela, and in view of the fact that foltf means a handover to resolution authorities. what constitutes sufficient collateral for the purposes of ela is currently for the different national central banks ( ncbs ) to define. it is, however, essential that sufficient information on such collateral is made available to the relevant ncb and, in turn, to the eurosystem. if there isn ’ t enough information, higher haircuts will need to be applied to make up for the increased risk until the necessary details are provided. but ultimately, the provision of emergency liquidity assistance depends on each central bank ’ s national framework, since ela is carried out as a national function which national central banks may perform unless the governing council finds with a

towards a fiscal capacity will most likely be a long one. history shows that budgets have rarely been created for the general purpose of stabilisation, but rather to deliver specific goals in the public interest. in the us, it was the need to overcome the great depression that led to the expansion of the federal budget in the 1930s. perhaps, for europe, it will require an urgent cause such as mitigating climate change to bring about such collective focus. whichever path is taken, it is plain to see that now is the time for more europe, not less. i mean this not in an axiomatic way, but in the truest traditions of federalism. where results can best be delivered by national policies, let it stay that way. but where we can only deliver on the legitimate concerns of the public by working together, we need europe to be stronger. for us europeans, in a globalised world, a true sovereignty that meets people ’ s needs for security and prosperity can be achieved only by working together. 6 as chancellor merkel has said, “ we europeans have to take our destiny into our own hands if we want to survive as a community ”. 7 working together allows us to protect our interests in the world economy, to resist the pressures of foreign powers, to influence global rules to reflect our standards, and to enforce our values on global corporations. none of these can be achieved to the same degree by countries acting alone. in a globalised world, sharing sovereignty is a way to regain sovereignty. but recognising that we need to exercise what president macron has termed “ european sovereignty ” 8 to be effective does not mean that we already have the political infrastructures to do so today. awareness of their necessity is growing quickly, however. we saw this emerging in the most recent european parliament election, which was perhaps the first such election fought mainly on european questions. even those who were seeking to slow down european integration did so by contesting the eu institutions rather than rejecting their legitimacy outright. this is only a start, but it suggests our union is moving in the right direction. i am confident that it will continue to do so, because it is ultimately the self - interest of individual countries that lays out our future path towards a european sovereign. the actions of many committed europeans, at both the national and eu levels, have helped us to reach this point. there are three groups whose contributions i would like to single out. the first is the staff of the ec