are those that are competitive and offer a unique product. i view the world of payments in very much that spirit. to me, digital payments offer exciting prospects. but that does not necessarily imply the extinction of existing payment methods. it may very well actually increase the diversity of payment methods. cash offers these unique forms of independence from social and electronic networks, which suggests to me that it will continue to enjoy great popularity in the euro area. i now look forward to having fruitful discussions with all of you. thank you. footnotes : 1. deutsche bundesbank ( 2018 ), payment behaviour in germany in 2017 – fourth study of the utilisation of cash and cashless payment instruments. 2. j. l. korella and w. li ( 2018 ), retail payment behaviour and the adoption of innovative payments : a comparative study in china and germany, journal of payment systems and strategy, vol. 12, no 3, pp. 245 - 265.

##cies into account. what is a treasure trove for researchers – the host of questions surrounding the functioning of the new set of instruments – is tricky terrain for policymakers, and for central bankers in particular. shedding light on the use and effectiveness of different macroprudential instruments therefore remains an eminent task of economic research, and i am positive this conference will provide a valuable contribution. does this mean that monetary policymakers can ignore the financial stability implications of their actions? i don ’ t think so. while i am not in favour of a dual monetary policy mandate, i am convinced that monetary policy cannot stand on the sidelines when financial imbalances build up. first, we cannot be sure that macroprudential policies will eliminate financial imbalances. the experience with macroprudential instruments is still limited, and the toolkit is still incomplete. second, the crisis has vividly demonstrated how financial instability affects inflation developments and the capacity of the central bank to safeguard price stability. therefore, monetary policy would be wise to take the implications of financial imbalances for price stability into account. as a first line of defence, however, it is financial regulation that has to bear the brunt of the financial stability burden. with regard to traditional microprudential regulation, the direction for reform seems clear : realigning risk and reward in a way that sets incentives for sustainable action. privatising gains and socialising losses is not only socially corrosive : it also produces bad economic results, as financial actors are encouraged to take on excessive risks. a cornerstone of the international efforts to ensure the resolvability of systemic banks is the standard for bail - in debt, the so called total loss absorbing capacity ( tlac ). it requires those banks to hold a minimum of debt that can absorb losses in the case of a bank resolution. this shields the taxpayer from footing the bill. europe already has a bail - in standard of its own, the so called minimum requirements on eligible liabilities ( mrel ). for efficiency and financial stability purposes, one could argue that tlac and mrel should be as similar as justifiable. systemically relevant banks pose a special challenge when it comes to resolving them without creating substantial repercussions for the wider financial system. for that reason, the single resolution fund exists. when resolving a systemic bank, the single resolution board, which is the relevant european authority, can draw on the resources of this fund – but