many advanced economies suggests that supply is also a drag on stronger global growth. in the euro area in particular, private investment is not playing the accelerating role that one would expect at this stage of the business cycle, despite domestic demand gradually strengthening. one reason for that is the depressed expectations of future potential growth, which lead firms to expect permanently lower incomes and profits. 7 public investment, in particular in infrastructure and education, as the october 2014 imf world economic outlook has pointed at as an additional source of stronger growth of current as well as potential output, is also not being accorded much of a role, as advanced countries tend to see this as a preferred source for cutting high public deficits. 8 but weak investment demand in turn adds to the downward pressure on the equilibrium real rates generated by a combination of low economic growth and high external surpluses, and makes it more likely that monetary policies will repeatedly hit the zlb. another reason for weakening investment is the existence of debt overhang. high levels of corporate short - term debt in combination with increasing rollover risk can hold back real investment in the economy. 9 what all this suggests is that, if countries wait for others to move first rather than taking action to raise future income or to address high level of debt overhang, they risk trapping themselves in a low growth, low interest rate equilibrium – and holding the global economy hostage. my point here is not to disregard the complex interaction between demand and supply factors, and the possibility that hysteresis has contributed to the post - crisis slowdown in output growth. 10 and as i said, fiscal policy should contribute where it is available. but i want to stress that we need to enhance our understanding of the supply side so we can better appreciate its interactions with demand. for instance, we know too little about which policies see summers, l. ( 2015 ), “ rethinking secular stagnation after seventeen months. ” imf rethinking macro iii conference, 16 april. see cœure, b. ( 2014 ), “ structural reforms : learning the right lessons from the crisis ”, keynote speech at the economic conference, latvijas banka, riga, 17 october. for a discussion on the sources of slow productivity growth, see gordon, r. ( 2015 ), “ secular stagnation : a supply - side view. ” presentation delivered at the 2015 aea meetings, boston, january 3. on the relationship between expected earnings and investment,

if it wishes to provide clearing services in the union. this would be just one of the tools available to eu authorities under the revised emir proposal. i believe that such an approach will be justified in case eu authorities are unable to adequately control risks and fulfil their mandates through other means. ultimately, however, it will be up to the commission and the eu legislators 2 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches to decide on the specific conditions for triggering such a requirement, in the context of the forthcoming legislative discussions. the ecb and other central banks of the eu are, of course, carefully examining the commission ’ s proposal and the ecb will issue an opinion on it in the coming months. looking beyond the current political discussions, we have clear objectives, and they are shared by the entire regulatory community : namely, making sure we continue to improve the safety and resilience of the global clearing landscape, avoiding market fragmentation, and fostering cooperation between authorities. thank you for your attention. 1 see, e. g., cœure, b. ( 2017 ), central clearing : reaping the benefits, controlling the risks, financial stability review, banque de france, april 2017. 2 see, e. g., the escb report on the access of ccps to central bank liquidity facilities. see cpmi and iosco ( 2012 ), principles for financial market infrastructures ( pfmi ), april 2012 ; and cpmi and iosco ( 2014 ), recovery of financial market infrastructures, october 2014. 4 see also the 2016 esma stress test. 5 a final cpmi - iosco guidance on ccp resilience and recovery will be published in july 2017. for earlier work, see cpmi and iosco ( 2016 ), resilience and recovery of central counterparties ( ccps ) : further guidance on the pfmi – consultative report, august 2016. 6 ecb calculations based on 2016q4 data from trade repositories. 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches