the bank ’ s case, we will be engaging bilaterally with relevant counterparties over the coming months, asking questions and seeking greater clarity. i ’ d strongly encourage others users of fx markets to do something similar. work together too. it is good to see the uk ’ s investment association, for example, pushing for the standardisation of reject codes. but given the amount at stake, the buyside ought to be exerting more concerted pressure for better disclosures across the board. the gfxc ’ s upcoming three - yearly review of the code provides an ideal opportunity to look again at the scope for stronger see box 4 in https : / / www. bankofengland. co. uk / - / media / boe / files / report / 2015 / fair - and - effective - markets - review - final - report https : / / www. globalfxc. org / docs / fx _ global. pdf https : / / www. globalfxc. org / docs / the _ role _ of _ disclosure _ and _ transparency. pdf https : / / www. risk. net / derivatives / 6888556 / how - the - top - 50 - liquidity - providers - tackle - forex - last - look all speeches are available online at www. bankofengland. co. uk / news / speeches market - wide standards, including on anonymous platforms. please make sure your local fx committee hears your views as this work progresses. a second response to the challenges of greater fragmentation comes from seeking more effective, robust and independent aggregation, analytical and execution tools – using technology to beat technology at its own game. this isn ’ t a free lunch : but putting liquidity providers into competition through robust aggregation and execution tools makes good business sense. of course, you need to be alert to the potential for services offering lower spreads to claw back that gain through greater price slippage. to evaluate that, you need an effective tca tool that goes beyond measuring just the observed spread to include market impact, price variation, hold times and fill ratios, and can give you guidance pre - trade, as well as post - trade analysis. tca is already well established in equity markets, reflecting amongst other things the european regulatory obligation to show best execution under mifid ii. but fx poses different challenges. there is no mifid obligation for most spot fx business. and effective data are harder to come by, given the

or addressed a particular issue. and, of course, the courts would thereby be available as another route for managing the divergence between private and social interests in risk - taking. as i noted at the outset, there is a long history of actual or considered measures to alter the duties or liabilities of those with decisionmaking authority in the corporate governance of banks. a more contemporary variant on these ideas was offered a little over a decade ago by jon macey and maureen o ’ hara, who proposed expanded fiduciary duties for directors of insured banks, including giving bank creditors the right to sue for violations of these duties. 17 in a provocative recent paper, john armour and jeff gordon suggest that the duties of directors of systemically important financial institutions should be modified precisely because diversified shareholders have a strong interest in avoiding risk decisions by these institutions that increase systemic risk. 18 their analysis implies that the customary tension between regulatory and diversified shareholders ’ interests may be considerably mitigated in the case of systemically important firms whose failure could result in financial turbulence and consequent economic loss for the entire economy. a consideration of the merits of these or other such proposals is beyond the scope of my remarks today. obviously, any such changes in corporate law are beyond the authority of the federal reserve. i mention them in the hope and anticipation that corporate law scholars will continue to evaluate such ideas, since whatever one ’ s eventual conclusions on their desirability, the analytic process is sure to yield further insights into the key question of how best to respond to the points of divergence between shareholder and regulatory interests in risk - taking by large financial firms. conclusion in the wake of the financial crisis, the changes in finance, in financial regulation, and in the relationship among government agencies that carry out prudential regulation have created any number of opportunities for financial law scholars to collaborate with their colleagues in other disciplines – from administrative law to constitutional law to bankruptcy law. this collaboration is perhaps natural, since major shocks to the economy, and thus the country, have in the past occasioned legal changes whose implications reached far beyond the original area of reform. as i hope you can tell from my remarks today, i have already found the interaction between corporate and financial law scholarship to have been helpful in thinking through the policies that will shape a safer financial system. i look forward to the fruits of the collaborations encouraged by the event sponsored today. jonathan r. macey and maureen o ’ hara ( 2003 ), “ the corporate governance of