, from an average of 0. 3 % in 2020, to an average of 1. 0 % in 2021 and 1. 3 % in 2022. the ecb ’ s monetary policy the monetary policy measures that we have taken since early march are providing crucial support to the economic recovery and are helping to safeguard medium - term price stability. without our measures, we would be facing a deeper economic contraction and more severe 1 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches disinflation. our policy support during the crisis has been structured along two main axes : liquidity operations and asset purchases. first, we have provided access to central bank liquidity at very favourable terms and over long tenors to help maintain the supply of credit from the banking sector. to this end, we have adjusted the terms and conditions of our targeted longer - term refinancing operations ( tltro iii ), which strengthen the incentives for banks to lend to the real economy. for a year, banks will be able to borrow at negative rates, which can be as low as – 1 % on the condition that they lend to the economy. largely in response to this recalibration, we have seen a very high take - up by banks. and second, we have launched the pandemic emergency purchase programme ( pepp ) to ensure the smooth transmission of our monetary policy and to ease the overall monetary policy stance thereby helping to offset the downward impact of the pandemic on the projected path of inflation. the pepp, launched with an initial envelope of €750 billion in march, was increased by €600 billion in june to a total of €1, 350 billion. we will conduct net asset purchases under the pepp until at least the end of june 2021 and, in any case, until the governing council judges that the coronavirus crisis phase is over. in the current environment of elevated uncertainty, the governing council will carefully assess all incoming information, including developments in the exchange rate, with regard to its implications for the medium - term inflation outlook. it continues to stand ready to adjust all of its instruments, as appropriate, to ensure that inflation moves towards its aim in a sustained manner, in line with its commitment to symmetry. the ecb ’ s accountability arrangements the ecb has been able to deliver a strong policy response during the crisis thanks in part to its ability to act in full independence, as set out in the treaty. this independence in turn relies on effective accountability mechanisms to ensure that

the ecb fully pursues its mandate, as also enshrined in the treaty. delivering on the ecb ’ s treaty obligations is a shared challenge for both the ecb and the european parliament. while requiring effort and commitment from both sides, it is in both our institutions ’ interest. to be effective in assessing the ecb ’ s actions and relaying people ’ s concerns, accountability practices need to meet three criteria. first, they need to be commensurate with the ecb ’ s tasks and responsibilities, implying that they have to evolve in line with the complexity and scale of the ecb ’ s measures. second, they need to be underpinned by timely and adequate information and transparency arrangements. and third, they need to be based on mutual trust to ensure constructive discussions on critical and difficult issues. over the years, our two institutions have worked together to build and strengthen their accountability relationship, well beyond the requirements of the treaty. indeed, i would argue that this relationship meets the three criteria i have just spelled out. first of all, the ecb ’ s accountability practices have evolved over time. 3 with the launch of european banking supervision in 2014, specific accountability arrangements were established for the ecb ’ s supervisory arm. we also strengthened our relationship to reflect the greater complexity of the ecb ’ s monetary policy measures. for example, when the ecb was taking unprecedented action during the exceptional circumstances caused by the pandemic, i held an ad hoc exchange of views with the political group coordinators of this committee. moreover, we have agreed to interact more closely in the context of the ecb ’ s strategy review and ensure that our regular dialogues play a key role in how we inform about the exercise. the outcome of the review will also provide an opportunity for us to consider the ecb ’ s accountability practices. the ecb ’ s accountability has also been enhanced by a better flow of information between our 2 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches two institutions. as we discussed last february4, this requires us to continuously aspire to communicate as clearly and as openly as possible. as part of this endeavour and also in response to parliamentary and public demands, the ecb has already started providing more detailed information about its asset purchases and current holdings on its website. today i can announce an additional transparency measure. from now on, we will publish on our website the opinions of the ecb ethics committee for cases of conflict of interest and postmandate gainful