public debt in 2060 would total around 247 per cent of aggregate output unless changes were made to the status quo. by way of comparison : at the end of 2013, it was estimated at just under 77 %, however, to continue building up new debt would be, as kurt beidenkopf, the former minister president of saxony, once put it, “ tantamount to issuing bills of exchange which my grandchildren will pay off ”. it is therefore evident that there is no way around a more stringent fiscal policy and corresponding reforms to ensure that public finances remain on a sound footing. against this backdrop, the retirement age should not be lowered, but ought gradually to be lifted. in fact, it would be worth considering carrying out such a measure in future subject to certain rules, for example by adjusting the retirement age according to further life expectancy. demographic trends, the independence of monetary policy and the culture of stability ladies and gentlemen, faced with the far - reaching economic repercussions of demographic change, we must assume that it will have implications for monetary policy, too. although the bis central bankers ’ speeches ecb governing council defines the monetary policy for the entire euro area, meaning that country - specific developments only have an indirect influence, i would like to say a few brief words about potential monetary policy problems. there is justification in that because all the large euro - area countries will be affected by an ageing society. given the growing strain on public finances that i spoke of a few minutes ago, there is a danger that monetary policy will also experience greater political pressure to safeguard the government ’ s solvency. what i mean is that the central bank could be pressured into pursuing a laxer monetary policy, primarily one of low interest rates, to keep government financing costs as low as possible. in this way, an increase in the real debt burden would at least be curbed via higher inflation. in an extreme scenario, this could even lead to a situation known as “ fiscal dominance ”, whereby monetary policy is harnessed to the service of fiscal policy and made to subordinate its policy to the interests of government financing. price stability could suffer as a result. both theory and practice teach us that in a stability - oriented economic order, the distribution of roles should be quite the opposite. this means that the task of fiscal policy - makers is to see to sound public finances, leaving the central bank free to focus its monetary policy, with as few restrictions as possible, on its own primary

framework is needed, and how can it be achieved? that is the question as to the political foundation. at the time, the werner group recommended, in answer to those questions and after a heated debate, that economic, political and monetary integration should be implemented in parallel, in various stages. at the end of each stage, the progress made in all three areas should be scrutinised with a view to deciding, in the light of the result of that scrutiny, whether the next stage could be inaugurated. in the final stage, not only the monetary policy responsibilities but also, in particular, key economic and fiscal policy powers should be transferred to the community. but it soon turned out in the ensuing negotiations that, above all, the political leadership in france at that time was not prepared to make any such a conceptual commitment. hence virtually all that was achieved was exchange - rate cooperation in the context of what later came to be known as the “ currency snake ”. the more far - reaching plans for a monetary union were largely shelved again. after a number of upheavals, the bretton woods system finally collapsed at the beginning of the seventies. that collapse was accompanied by the first sharp oil - price hike. after that, some considerable differences emerged in europe between the ways individual countries weighted their economic and monetary policy objectives. one group of countries relied on an expansionary monetary policy. they hoped that such a policy would help the economy to adjust quickly to the changed conditions. another group, by contrast, took advantage of the latitude that had been gained by the ending of the linkage to the dollar to regain monetary stability relatively swiftly. thus, france, italy and the united kingdom left what was known as the “ snake ” in the mid - seventies. only the “ little snake ” ( comprising the benelux currencies, the danish krone and the d - mark ) was left as a community of stability. it was not until 1978, on the joint initiative of french president giscard d ’ estaing and german chancellor helmut schmidt, that the subject of wider - ranging monetary cooperation in europe was taken up again. after long discussions in the countries themselves – some of them controversial – the european monetary system ( ems ) was set up in 1979, once more with the participation of france and italy. the crucial question in the negotiations had been, in particular, whether this ems would tend to gear itself to the best stability standard or only to the average level. in the