regularity means not only that the decision - making body should meet on a regular basis, but in particular that the decision - making process should be taken in a standard framework and should be based on a standard set of policy documents. all the more, ad hoc policy meetings based on ad hoc policy documents should be minimized. this not only helps the central bank in its communication with the public, but also helps the decision - making body to maintain internal discipline. separateness emphasizes that special attention should be paid to monetary policy in the central bank ’ s agenda. in order to avoid any attempt to displace the policy agenda by any other ‘ extremely for further details see lombardelli, proudman and talbot ’ s article ‘ committees versus individuals : an experimental analysis of monetary policy decision making ’, published in international journal of central banking, vol. 1, no. 1, may 2005. important ’ issue, separate meetings should be established for policy discussions. indeed, a policy decision is worth a special ‘ policy day ’, split into : ( i ) a staff presentation, when staff present the outcome of their analysis ( based on a standard set of policy documents ) ( ii ) a discussion of the analysis ( iii ) the policy decision ( iv ) communication of the decision to the public staff independence should protect the members of the decision - making body from the filtering of undesirable information which can occur whenever a particular decision maker directly manages the ‘ economic department ’. although such behaviour is, with high probability, not intentional, this member can influence the interpretation of the ‘ staff ’ analysis in a way convenient to his own opinions. it could happen that the rest of the decision - making body members receive a biased analysis. moving the role of ‘ chief economist ’ towards the director of the ‘ economic department ’, and letting him be more independent of any particular body member ( making him responsible to the decision - making body as a whole ), can help to solve this problem of information filtering. openness is a consequence of ‘ staff independence ’. allowing staff to be more independent at the same time requires the decision - making body members to take an active approach towards the analysis produced by the staff. since a perfect understanding of the message contained in the ‘ policy documents ’ is a prerequisite for proper policy conduct, interaction between the decision - making body members and the staff should be assured at different levels. and finally, a need to deal with uncertainty properly arises as a consequence of the uncertainty surrounding

monetary policy practice. therefore, it is highly desirable to discuss the implied risks at different levels : ( i ) first, the risks should be discussed by the staff. ( ii ) second, an evaluation of the risks should be performed interactively by the decision - making body members and the staff ( alternative scenarios can be produced on the basis of these discussions ). ( iii ) third, the risk and the alternative scenarios should be discussed by the decision - making body members during the policy meeting. it is clear that all the above - mentioned properties can be satisfied when either a bank board or a policy committee are making the decisions. over the years it has been proven that both systems can work well. on the one hand, a policy committee automatically encompasses the property of separateness and the full devotion of its members towards monetary policy. on the other hand, bank board members are probably identified more closely with the institution and offer a more diversified view of policy conduct. indeed, it is really difficult to distinguish which system is superior ; the prevailing solutions are determined by tradition and other local conditions. nevertheless, what is, in fact, of critical importance is the legal framework that is used as the background for the decision making. the decision - making body ’ s mandate should arise directly from the central bank law, or even the constitution, and should be sufficiently ‘ clear ’. any internal agreement shifting policy responsibility towards somebody who is not explicitly referred to in the central bank law, and thus assumed to be policy responsible, could be highly vulnerable and unstable. this could become apparent as soon as a period of tough decisions arrives. the implications of all this can be split in two groups. the first group covers a rather general implication that can be summarized as : the policy decision - making role should be performed by a body that is well defined in the central bank law. in addition, regardless of whether the decision - making body is a bank board or a policy committee, it should fulfil the properties of diversity of opinions, regularity, separateness, staff independence, openness, and dealing with uncertainty. the second group of implications then offers more a practical view which can be summarized as follows : a ) the ‘ policy decision - making ’ body should have a strong background in law, b ) the meeting devoted to monetary policy should not deal with any other issue, c ) the forecast and economic analysis should be submitted by the staff so as to constrain ‘ information filtering ’, d ) the decision makers should