macroeconomic environment on banks ’ resilience. these measures are flanked by regulatory adjustments. this year, stricter regulatory requirements for interest rate risk will enter into force in the eu. [ 30 ] in future, internal risk management will have to take greater account of risks stemming from net interest income and asset depreciation risk. in addition, marisk was revised with the aim of improving the monitoring and management of credit risk. 3. 3 evaluate financial market regulation to strengthen resilience the aims of the g20 reforms of global financial markets provide clear guide rails for regulation : resilience, protection of taxpayers, transparency, and good supervision are very universal objectives that are certainly no less relevant now. however, clear guide rails do not imply rigid regulation. regulation needs to adapt to changes in the environment without losing sight of its objectives. that is why the financial stability board ( fsb ) started evaluating the reforms in 2017. [ 32 ] the evaluation shows that the g20 reforms have largely achieved their objectives without having any relevant side effects. the recent failures of banks in the united states and switzerland have notably brought to the fore the question of how well the “ toobig - to - fail ” ( tbtf ) problem has been resolved, or whether it is actually still up to government entities to prop up weak institutions, where there is any doubt. an evaluation by the financial stability board [ 34 ] shows that we now have a much better institutional framework for dealing with major financial institutions in stress. resolution regimes have been strengthened, more funds are available to absorb losses ( total lossabsorbing capacity, or tlac ), and risks are better priced in markets. however, the financial sector continues to benefit from implicit subsidies. [ 35 ] what that means is, when large institutions run into difficulties, markets expect fiscal resources to be made available. that lowers the risk premia of the institutions in question, potentially increasing incentives to take risks. recent responses to failures in the banking sector are unlikely to have done much to change this finding ; on the contrary, they have tended to raise expectations of government intervention in the event of a crisis. plugging existing gaps in the regulatory framework is all the more important. the tbtf evaluation clearly showed where gaps remain : national systemically important banks are treated differently and there is hardly any internationally comparable information on these institutions. there is also little information about the holders of bail - inable financial instruments, which could nevertheless give rise to global contagion

re ) financing9. as is so often the case when it comes to money, the workings are more complex than they first appear. anyone wishing to make life a little easier can turn to the beatles for guidance and comfort. as they once sang, “ i don ’ t care too much for money / money can ’ t buy me love. ” 4 reforming monetary union ladies and gentlemen, not only did the beatles shape the music of their time in a way that no other group has ever managed, they also showed what makes a good band : it needs to be greater than the sum of its parts. the same is true when musicians come from different musical backgrounds and were previously solo artists. which takes us back to the present and to european monetary union. some 19 countries decided to form a band for the long haul. this band has now been gracing the stage for 20 years, 6 / 10 bis central bankers'speeches already twice as long as the beatles. with that in mind, it ’ s more like the rolling stones : there is no end in sight. and so the euro celebrated its 20th birthday on 1 january. when it was introduced, politicians made the public one promise : the euro would be just as strong as the deutsche mark before it. with an inflation rate averaging 1. 7 % over the past 20 years, inflation is converging towards price stability as defined by the eurosystem. the original promise of a stable currency has thus been kept. of course, we mustn ’ t forget that part of this period was marked by the financial and sovereign debt crisis. it put monetary union to the test on more than one occasion. it could therefore be said that the euro had an easy childhood but a difficult adolescence. if the crisis did one good thing, then, it was that it opened our eyes to the weaknesses in the institutional framework of the euro area. paul romer summed it up perfectly when he said, “ a crisis is a terrible thing to waste. ” 10 it would have been a terrible thing if we had learned nothing from the crisis. in the meantime, a great many problems have been tackled and reforms initiated. if the financial system or individual euro area countries were to once again find themselves in turmoil, we would be better prepared to deal with this today than we were back then. after 20 years, the euro is all grown up. however, it hasn ’ t yet put all of its growing pains behind it. in other words, monetary union