the single currency project. second, common supervision and a centralized resolution authority lay the basis for financial stability. banking union, together with other national and european policies – in particular, the monetary policy measures recently decided by the governing council of the ecb – is already contributing to the normalization in credit conditions for firms and households. the comprehensive assessment of the balance sheets of the largest euro area banks, which preceded the launch of the ( ssm ), enhanced transparency and dispelled doubts about the banks ’ resilience. further progress is expected as the ssm brings harmonization of supervisory and business practices, reducing investors ’ perception of risks. although complete normalization in credit conditions will likely require definitive exit from the crisis and a return to stable economic growth, signs of gradual improvement can already be discerned in the surveys conducted by the eurosystem and in other indicators. bis central bankers ’ speeches banking union has imparted a strong impulse to the efficiency of the financial system by fostering competition across euro area countries. consider for example the recent decree on the governance of the cooperative banks in italy. the initiative is the product of a good many years of reflection on the shortcomings of the cooperative structure for listed or very large banks ; at the same time, it can be read as part of a broader reform effort to bring the italian economy up to the best european standards of efficiency. 3. how to consolidate a promising start the important steps already taken need to be followed by further progress, on several fronts. since the list would be long, i shall mention just one general issue and two specific ones. the overarching issue : further progress towards european integration is essential. we should not forget that the current crisis was provoked, in part, precisely by lack of progress in european integration following the adoption of the single monetary policy. the bu project has gotten the process started again, helping to defuse the crisis. but we must not make the same mistake twice ; the integration process cannot be allowed to stall again. progress in this direction is particularly difficult at present, because national centrifugal forces seem strong. they are visible in various forms : growing support for anti - euro or euro - skeptical political parties in several countries, for one, and the difficulties encountered by european and eurozone institutions in discussing issues from an area - wide perspective, for another. national interests and perspectives are strong. take, for instance, the distinction between core and periphery, which has become standard in many

by the future government. recently, prof sampie terreblanche, of the university of stellenbosch has said in a book entitled : a history of lnequality in south africa, 1652 - 2002, that “ in 1993 the corporate sector and some anc leaders reached a hugely important elite compromise. this happened before the transitional executive council ( tec ) accepted a secret $ 850 million loan from the imf to help tide the country over balance of payments difficulties in november 1993 ” ( p96 ). he continues to say that “ before the tec signed the loan agreement, the corporate sector and the np government on the one hand and anc leaders on the other signed a secret protocol on economic policy … ( they ) agreed with the imf, the tec committed itself to a neo - liberal, export - oriented economic policy and a ‘ redistribution through growth ’ strategy ”. i was one of the people involved and i can say with confidence that prof sampie terreblanche is totally and completely wrong. there was no secret meeting of the corporate sector and the core leaders of the anc that i am aware of to agree on a secret document. this was a tec matter handled through the sub - council on finance. naturally, the delegates to the subcouncil consulted their principals. but i emphasize that any careful reading of the statement will find no contradiction with ready to govern. but that is a matter for political economists to sort out in due course. it is fair to say that the balance of payments constraint that we grappled with at the tec was only the tip of a large iceberg. here are some of the indicators of an economic crisis that we went through. the pre - 1994 period is contrasted below with what has happened in ten years. firstly, in 1985, on the back of the sanctions campaign, the government of the day declared a partial debt standstill. the affected debt was $ 13, 6 billion and the total debt was $ 23, 7 billion. from 1985 to 1993, the net financial outflow adapted from the chapter appearing under my name in a book by the world economic forum entitled south africa : the miracle continues. june 2004. from south africa was some r45 billion or 11 per cent of gross domestic fixed investment. that forced the authorities at the time to implement stringent policies to generate current account surpluses. the cost to the economy was immense. in august 2001 the final repayment was made. the