since february 2005, the pbc organized commercial banks and the cup to hold the large - scale bankcard knowledge dissemination and education program named “ the spring of bankcard - - - the history and outlook of china ’ s bankcard industry ”. commercial banks also launched similar programs at different places. a lot of people participated in these programs, and the number and extent people involved is unprecedented. all the above efforts have helped spread bankcard knowledge, cultivate the awareness of using card in the safe way, improve users ’ environment, and create a good external environment. meanwhile, more work needs to be done, and various media such as network, tv, broadcast, and newspaper can be employed to make the bankcard knowledge more publicly available. we should also try to win social understanding and support, improve the acceptance of bankcard, mobilize different parties to be involved in bankcard ’ s development, and so promote the rapid development of the bankcard industry. comrades, china ’ s bankcard industry has achieved a lot in a short period of time, and this market, with the most potential, has witnessed the fasteor growth in the world. generally speaking, china ’ s bankcard sector is still at the initial development stage, and it ’ s an arduous job to implement the instruction of cpc central committee and the state council, and to fulfill the task and priorities set fourth by several opinions regarding promoting development of the bankcard industry. this conference is a good opportunity for us to reach consensus and to move forward in an organized and coordinated way. i believe that china ’ s bankcard industry will move to a new stage with our combined efforts, and the bankcard industry will achieve comprehensive, rapid, healthy and coordinated development.

the markets. the effect soon spread to more creditworthy securities. in the money markets, the uncertainty was reflected in a widening spread between collateralised and uncollateralised money - market loans. the confidence crisis developed in stages over the latter part of 2007 and up to september 2008. in august 2008, danmarks nationalbank with a government guarantee and the danish contingency association acquired roskilde bank on the brink of collapse. this was an important medium - sized bank, with a significant funding in foreign currencies. this should be seen in the light of a danish banking sector with a total deposit deficit of 600 billion kr. danmarks nationalbank ’ s primary reason for stepping in was to avoid a systemic crisis. in that situation we couldn ’ t accept doubts that loans to danish banks would be honoured. capital outflows from smaller areas the financial crisis intensified from mid - september 2008 after the collapse of lehman bros. risky assets such as shares and credit bonds plummeted. the heightened uncertainty prompted investors to seek safe havens. this led to portfolios shifts towards more secure assets. there was a worldwide trend for foreign exchange to flow out of small capital areas and into larger ones. in other cases, portfolios were actually closed by investors who had bought assets, financed by short - term loans in foreign currency – such as dollars – that were subject to regular renewal. investors who were unable to obtain renewed funding in early october 2008, when the international loan markets 1 froze, were compelled to sell assets immediately, regardless of the price. the interest - rate increases by danmarks nationalbank, – which i will return to – did not have any impact on investors, who were forced to sell out, when the global loan markets contracted. liquidity constraints – the need for euro and dollars initially the money - market turmoil was strongest in the dollar market, and many financial institutions outside the usa experienced a shortage of dollar funding. as the crisis escalated, the euro market was eventually also affected. in the spring of 2008, the ecb established a swap line with the fed, with a view of lending dollars to euro area banks. the majority of the danish banks did not have access to this facility. many financial institutions in europe already depended on short - term funding in both dollars and euro. as a result, most of them were on the same side of the order flow. moreover, the usual dollar funding channels dried up, to a certain extent because the suppliers themselves had an