samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
substantially weaker in europe and the euro area than in the us. but still, even if we compare productivity per hour, europe's performance is much weaker than that in the united states. between the fourth quarter of 2019 and the fourth quarter of 2023, labour productivity per hour worked increased by 0. 6 % in the euro area vs. 6 % in the us. the productivity gap has widened mainly since mid - 2022, when euro area productivity growth was depressed by the energy shock. slower growth in euro area labour productivity is broad based across sectors, within manufacturing and services alike, rather than driven by sectoral re - allocation. while different labour market dynamics and different shocks – or at least a different magnitude of shocks – can explain the divergence of productivity growth in europe from that in the us in the past few years, structural factors play a significant role in explaining the underlying differences between europe and the us. this goes back to well before the pandemic. the list of structural factors behind to the euro area's poor productivity performance is, unfortunately, rather long. the euro area lags behind the united states particularly in r & d, technology adoption and innovation. ict and professional services stand out as the sectors with the weakest relative productivity growth in the past few decades. 3 / 5 bis - central bankers'speeches educational attainment is higher in the us on average, and the regulatory environment there is more conducive to business dynamism. finland has had its own challenges. productivity growth has been very slow or nonexistent for the past 10 - 15 years. this is the result of a unique combination of cyclical and structural shocks – and the finnish economy's inability to adjust sufficiently smoothly. europe needs more productivity growth, not least because its populations are ageing, green investments require funding, public debts and deficits are large and defence expenditures need to be raised. in finland, productivity growth is also being curtailed by the fact that the average level of educational attainment among younger age cohorts has not advanced recently. the question of how productivity growth can be boosted is therefore a key challenge for the economics profession. while waiting for your research let me reflect. policies aimed at improving access to finance, such as further progress with the capital markets union, and the removal of existing barriers to the provision of services across countries could have a long - lasting impact in supporting productivity growth in the euro area. giving fresh impetus to the eu's capital

finance and removing barriers services across countries. it is clear that the recent and future developments in cutting - edge research and innovations, including ai, will play a key role in the pursuit of these goals. thus, it is no time for small talk, but taking big - time action for european unity and reform – what a meaningful challenge! thank you for your kind attention! 5 / 5 bis - central bankers'speeches
reserve bank ’ s policies and guidelines. i also salute this institution on achieving its golden jubilee year of existence and for the role that it has played in fiji ’ s economic development. congratulations on this new branch and all the very best in your future endeavours. official opening i now have much pleasure in declaring the new hfc lautoka branch open. vinaka vaka levu. bis central bankers ’ speeches

barry whiteside : brief update on fiji ’ s economy address by mr barry whiteside, governor of the reserve bank of fiji, at the opening of hfc lautoka branch, suva, 20 september 2012. * * * the chairman of the hfc board, mr. tom ricketts board of directors chief executive officer, mr. isikeli tikoduadua management and staff of hfc distinguished guests ladies and gentlemen introductory comments good evening and bula vinaka to you all. i am honoured to be here this evening for the opening of hfc ’ s new lautoka branch and offer my warm congratulations on the company achieving 50 years of service to fiji. i thought to begin with a bit of history as this year marks hfc ’ s golden jubilee year. just over fifty years ago the british overseas development corporation, through its locally incorporated company, the fiji development corporation, partnered with the fijian colonial government to form home finance company limited. the institution, which was registered on 30 june 1962, was reportedly set up primarily to provide government guaranteed assistance for housing to civil servants. coincidentally, it was also in the 1960s that i spent some of my formative years in these very surroundings while my dad served as the post master, lautoka. needless to say, i have many fond memories of this city and its neighborhood areas. hfc – home finance company limited with such a rich history dating back to our colonial days, home finance can lay claim to its fair share of credit for playing a role in advancing fiji ’ s financial system and economic development. three milestones are worth mentioning in the company ’ s history to bridge the past with the present : – • 33 years ago in 1979 the fiji national provident fund first acquired a partial ownership, • 17 years ago in 1995, the government divested its partial ownership in the company and • a decade ago in 2002, home finance company limited rebranded as hfc, launching the vibrant colours we are familiar with today and also diversified markedly from its traditional objective of home loan provider. i have watched the growth of the company with interest over the years, particularly since 2004 when i headed the supervision function at the reserve bank. a decade ago, primarily as a consequence of competitive pressures, hfc rebranded, diversified and repositioned itself. invariably, as is so often seen in various facets of life, as we adapt, change and successfully address a set of challenges, new ones arise. understandably therefore
, d. and j. c. williams ( 2000 ). “ three lessons for monetary policy in a low inflation era. ” journal of money, credit and banking 32 ( 4 ), pp. 936 – 66 ; and woodford, m. ( 2013 ). “ forward guidance by inflation - targeting central banks. ” sveriges riksbank economic review 3, pp. 81 – 120. 13 / 13 bis central bankers'speeches

to base such weighting on the impact that exogenous variation in each of these variables would exert on relevant economic aggregates, such as growth or inflation. practically, however, such impact estimates are wrought with a host of complex identification issues. finally, when using fcis to track the evolution of financing conditions as an intermediate target, policy - makers have to be mindful of differences in the controllability of its individual components. in normal conditions, when monetary policy uses short - term interest rates as its dominant policy 6 / 13 bis central bankers'speeches tool and builds on a broadly predictable connection between these rates and broader financing conditions, it is relatively straightforward to steer and assess its intermediate target. however, in crisis times – when the link between short - term interest rates and broader financing conditions is weakened and monetary policy increasingly relies on more direct means to affect a broader range of financial variables – it becomes significantly more complex to assess the impacts of the various monetary policy measures. more granular model - based evidence suggests that the ecb ’ s non - standard monetary policy measures have left a clear footprint in euro area financing conditions. in particular, they have induced a broad - based easing that spread across a variety of asset classes, including to bank lending rates ( chart 4 ). as a consequence, notwithstanding the pronounced influences from abroad, the ecb has been successful in managing domestic financing conditions through its monetary policy measures. moreover, the impact of these more recent measures has been further supported by the effectiveness of our forward guidance. one potential metric for this effectiveness is the sensitivity of forward rates to macroeconomic news : in the presence of clear guidance on the policy rate path, market expectations should be less reactive to the ongoing macroeconomic news flow and instead be anchored by central bank communication. observing this metric over time, it becomes clear that the introduction of our measures – including the forward guidance on policy rates – has been followed by a pronounced decline in the sensitivity of forward rates at the shorter end of the term structure, which is most prominently driven by monetary policy expectations, while remaining anchored around their historical average at the longer end ( chart 5 ). 7 / 13 bis central bankers'speeches 8 / 13 bis central bankers'speeches my overall conclusion is that fcis offer an information basis for measuring the quantum of financial stimulus that is too fragile at times, and – more often than not – they do not provide a robust benchmark for policy. to appreciate this last point, think of the example i just
that i have outlined. i thank you all for your kind attention. 9 / 9 bis central bankers'speeches

participants adjust their risk management practices, and the structure of these markets continues to evolve. for example, if traditional providers of liquidity scale back their activity in response to changes in regulation and market structure, over time, this shift may create incentives for other providers, which are not similarly constrained, to step in. stress tests, such as those announced by the securities and exchange commission ( sec ) offer one way to help ensure that market participants are prepared for sharper spikes in market volatility. for instance, in the federal reserve board ’ s most recent stress test, the severely adverse scenario featured a large decrease in the prices of corporate bonds. we are in the early stages of data - based analysis of possible recent changes in the resilience of market liquidity. an upcoming study of the october 15 event will shine some light on the functioning of the u. s. treasury market, but there is still much we need to learn. more broadly, at the board, we will closely monitor and investigate the extent of changes in the resilience of liquidity in important markets, while deepening our understanding of different contributors and how market participants are adapting. another potentially important change in markets has been the increased prevalence of dark pools or proprietary trading sites housed inside broker - dealers, which provide no information to the public about the volume or prices of trades. it is possible this activity might be changing price discovery, although there is debate over the net effect. bis central bankers ’ speeches
later, the firm had expanded to 35, 000 employees and $ 1. 1 trillion of assets. in the mid - 1990s, the top five banks in the united states had total assets of $ 1 trillion or about 14 percent of gross domestic product ( gdp ). the top securities firms had total assets of $ 718 billion, or about 9 percent of gdp. by the end of 2007, the top five banks had assets of $ 6. 8 trillion or 49 percent of gdp. similarly, the top securities firms accounted for $ 3. 8 trillion, or about 27 percent of gdp. in addition, the firms ’ off - balance - sheet exposures rose sharply. second, the complexity and interconnectedness of the largest financial firms increased markedly. factors behind this include the adoption of a universal banking model by some commercial bank holding companies and the rapid growth of trading businesses, especially the over the counter ( otc ) derivatives market. in the early 1980s, there were no true u. s. “ universal banks ” that combined traditional commercial banking with capital markets and underwriting activities. by 2007, there were several operating in the united states, including citigroup, j. p. morgan, ubs, credit suisse and deutsche bank. also, the otc derivatives business in foreign exchange, interest rate swaps and credit default swaps had exploded from its start in the early 1980s. the total notional value of the otc derivatives outstanding for the five largest banks and securities firms currently totals about $ 200 trillion. during this period, there was inadequate attention to the risks that were building up in the system. the regulatory and supervisory framework did not keep up with the changes in size, complexity, interconnectedness and globalization that created growing systemic risk externalities and widened the wedge between private and social costs in the event of failure. let me mention just a few of the issues : • capital regulation was lax both in terms of the amount of capital required and the quality of that capital. as a result, many banks did not have the capacity to absorb large shocks and retain access to wholesale funding. • the oversight of the largest securities firms was particularly deficient in terms of ensuring that these firms had sufficient private resources to deal with shocks. the industry was also particularly exposed because in the united states, there was ( and remains ) no lender of last resort backstop for the securities industry except in extremis. 3 • although global integration brought with it a number of benefits, regulatory

. thank you for your kind attention and i would now be happy to take some questions. bis central bankers ’ speeches
gentlemen, it is now my pleasure to declare smep dtm limited officially launched. thank you. bis central bankers ’ speeches

for discussing policies and attempting to resolve disputes. in our view, formalizing the dialogue - for example, by elevating it to the principals level or expanding its mandate to include policy - setting or dispute resolution functions - would be unnecessary and may impair the dialogue ’ s utility. the federal reserve believes that u. s. banks are second to none in their ability to compete when they are given the opportunity of operating on a level playing field. providing strong supervision at home and participating in international regulatory and supervisory groups such as the dialogue helps assure that our banking organizations will continue to have such opportunities.
. rba. gov. au / speeches / 2019 / sp - gov - 2019 - 05 - 21. html 16 / 16

it was thought that an unemployment rate below 5 per cent was likely to put pressure on the supply capacity of the economy and, in turn, raise possible inflation concerns. but from today's perspective, i think we can do better than this. my judgement of the accumulating evidence is that the australian economy can support an unemployment rate of below 5 per cent without raising inflation concerns. this would be consistent with the experience overseas, with many other advanced economies sustaining lower rates of unemployment than previously thought possible without leading to a noticeable uplift in inflation. if this judgement is correct, the question is : how does our society achieve and sustain a lower rate of unemployment? it is possible that the current policy settings are sufficient to deliver lower unemployment. the labour market has surprised on the upside over recent times, and it could do so again. while we can't rule out this possibility, the recent flow of data makes it seem less likely. in the event that the unemployment rate does not move lower with current policy settings, there are a number of options. these include : further monetary easing ; additional fiscal support, including through spending on infrastructure ; and structural policies that support firms expanding, investing https : / / www. rba. gov. au / speeches / 2019 / sp - gov - 2019 - 05 - 21. html 15 / 16 5 / 21 / 2019 the economic outlook and monetary policy | speeches | rba and employing people. relying on just one type of policy has limitations, so each of these is worth thinking about. the reserve bank board recognises that monetary policy has a role to play here. earlier today, we released the minutes of the board's meeting two weeks ago. at that meeting, we discussed a scenario in which there was no further improvement in the labour market and the unemployment rate remained around the 5 per cent mark. in this scenario, we judged that inflation was likely to remain low relative to the target and that a decrease in the cash rate would likely be appropriate. a lower cash rate would support employment growth and bring forward the time when inflation is consistent with the target. given this assessment, at our meeting in two weeks'time, we will consider the case for lower interest rates. thank you for listening. i look forward to answering your questions. endnote [ * ] i would like to thank andrea brischetto for assistance in the preparation of this talk. © reserve bank of australia, 2001 – 2019. all rights reserved. https : / / www
our new strategy. gender diversity is high on the agenda of the ecb and it will stay there until we achieve our targets. bis central bankers ’ speeches

2. 5 per cent over time. in the conduct of monetary policy, emphasis is also placed on curbing fluctuations in output and employment. the objective of stabilising developments in output and employment implies, in isolation, a higher interest rate. this will reduce the risk that capacity utilisation in the norwegian economy will become too high. high capacity utilisation could give rise to bottlenecks in some sectors of the economy and lead to a higher rise in property prices and household borrowing. this could be a source of instability in demand and output in the somewhat longer run. the objective of bringing inflation back to target and anchoring inflation expectations nevertheless implies a continued expansionary monetary policy. international interest rates are rising, albeit slowly and from a low level. there are prospects of continued low inflation for a period ahead. even if capacity utilisation in the norwegian economy rises, there appears to be little risk that inflation will rapidly move up to a level that is too high. inflation was unexpectedly low in the first months of this year, but in the light of our highly open economy we must perhaps expect somewhat wider variations in inflation than some other countries. the projections and assessments presented in inflation report 1 / 05 may as a whole imply that the key rate can after a period, and then gradually, be brought up to a more normal level. at its monetary policy meeting on 16 march, norges bank ’ s executive board decided to leave the key rate, the sight deposit rate, unchanged at 1. 75 per cent. the executive board weighed the objective of bringing inflation back to target and stable inflation expectations against the risk that output growth may eventually be too high.
trust takes years to build, seconds to break and forever to repair ”. so it ’ s now our duty to nurture and sustain this trust – by ensuring that banknotes are secure, payments systems are robust, and the value of the euro is stable. thank you. 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches

no longer allowed the ecb, under its rules, to waive its minimum credit requirements and accept greek governmentlinked securities as collateral in its monetary policy operations. nevertheless, the eurosystem provided all the liquidity necessary for the greek economy to function, with adequate safeguards against monetary financing of the government. as a result, central bank funding rose from €56 billion to over €125 billion, more than two - thirds of greece ’ s gross domestic product, demonstrating our commitment to the greek economy. by the end of june, uncertainty and concerns about the economic policies of the government were mounting, culminating in the announcement of the referendum on 5 july 2016. the introduction of bank holidays and capital controls in late june had eased immediate liquidity pressures, but further impaired economic activity. 1 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches in such an environment, once the third programme had been agreed by the greek authorities and their euro area partners, one of the immediate priorities was to regain depositor and market confidence in the greek banking system. to this end, a comprehensive assessment was conducted of the four significant greek banks between august and october 2015 by the supervisory arm of the ecb. it was followed by a successful recapitalisation exercise. the identified capital shortfall was largely covered by private funds, while the reliance on public funds was limited to €4. 5 billion. measuring progress so far the conclusion of the programme negotiations and the successful recapitalisation of the banking system led to a stabilisation of economic conditions. real gdp in 2015 turned out to be only slightly negative, but more than one percentage point better than expected after the imposition of capital controls. the stabilisation of output was supported by the resilience of private consumption, positive net exports and an acceleration of public investment at the end of the year. the achievement of the primary budget balance target for end - 2015 was supported by a series of important policy actions, especially on the revenue side. supporting and at the same time benefiting from the macroeconomic stabilisation, the situation in the greek banking sector has also gradually improved during the first year of the programme, although it has not yet regained the ground lost in the first half of 2015. following the recapitalisation in october 2015, the aggregated cet1 ratio for the four significant greek institutions increased from 11. 2 % in september 2015 to 17. 9 % in june 2016. while the ratios may appear high compared with the european banking sector