funds rate or range when the fomc first announces a change to its reinvestment policy : primary dealers : market participants : level of the target fed funds rate / range level of the target fed funds rate / range 25th percentile 1. 38 % 25th percentile 1. 38 % median 1. 63 % median 1. 63 % 75th percentile 1. 88 % 75th percentile 1. 63 % note : survey responses received by march 6, 2017. fomc is federal open market committee. march fomc meeting took place on march 14 – 15, 2017. source : federal reserve bank of new york, survey of primary dealers ( https : / / www. newyorkfed. org / markets / primarydealer _ survey _ questions. html ) and survey of market participants ( https : / / www. newyorkfed. org / markets / survey _ market _ participants. html ). figure 4 : march 2017 primary dealer survey and market participant survey percent chance you attach to the following outcomes for the level of the target fed funds rate or range when the fomc first announces a change in its reinvestment policy : primary dealers : average ≤ 0. 75 % 0. 76 1. 00 % 1. 01 – 1. 25 % 1. 26 – 1. 50 % 1. 51 – 1. 75 % 1. 76 – 2. 00 % ≥ 2. 01 % 0 % 2 % 13 % 25 % 28 % 20 % 12 % ≤ 0. 75 % 0. 76 1. 00 % 1. 01 – 1. 25 % 1. 26 – 1. 50 % 1. 51 – 1. 75 % 1. 76 – 2. 00 % ≥ 2. 01 % 0 % 2 % 12 % 28 % 32 % 15 % 11 % market participants : average note : survey responses received by march 6, 2017. fomc is federal open market committee. march fomc meeting took place on march 14 – 15, 2017. source : federal reserve bank of new york, survey of primary dealers ( https : / / www. newyorkfed. org / markets / primarydealer _ survey _ questions. html ) and survey of market participants ( https : / / www. newyorkfed. org / markets / survey _ market _ participants. html ). figure 5 : march 2017 primary dealer survey and market participant survey indicate the percent chance you attach to the following possible outcomes for the timing of

well - secured by the rising values of their collateral and thus paid less attention to borrowers'ability to repay. 2 however, no real or financial asset can provide an above - normal market return indefinitely, and houses are no exception. when home - price appreciation began to slow in many areas, the consequences of weak underwriting, such as little or no documentation and low required down payments, became apparent. delinquency rates for subprime mortgages – especially those with adjustable interest rates – began to climb steeply around the middle of 2006. estimates for specific metropolitan areas are based on case - shiller home price indexes. see kristopher gerardi, andreas lehnert, shane sherlund, and paul willen ( forthcoming ), " making sense of the subprime crisis ", brookings papers on economic activity ( washington : brookings institution press ). also see chris mayer, karen pence, and shane sherlund ( 2008 ), " the rise in mortgage defaults ", finance and economics discussion series 2008 - 59 ( washington : board of governors of the federal reserve system, november ). when house prices were rising, higher - risk borrowers who were struggling to make their payments could refinance into more - affordable mortgages. but refinancing became increasingly difficult as many of these households found that they had accumulated little, if any, housing equity. moreover, lenders tightened standards on higher - risk mortgages as secondary markets for those loans ceased to function. higher - risk mortgages are not the only part of the mortgage market to have experienced stress. for example, while some lenders continue to originate so - called jumbo prime mortgages and hold them on their own balance sheets, these loans have generally been available only on more restrictive terms and at much higher spreads relative to prime conforming mortgage rates than before the crisis. mortgage rates in the prime conforming market – although down somewhat from their peaks – remain high relative to yields on longer - term treasury securities, and lending terms have tightened for this segment as well. as house prices have declined, many borrowers now find themselves " under water " on their mortgages – perhaps as many as 15 to 20 percent by some estimates. in addition, as the economy has slowed and unemployment has risen, more households are finding it difficult to make their mortgage payments. about 4 - 1 / 2 percent of all first - lien mortgages are now more than 90 days past due