contributed to this. between 2008 and 2013 the state provided some €144 billion in support to the german financial sector, in the form of capital injections ( around €64 billion ) and relief on assets ( around €80 billion ). 6 state guarantees were of a similar magnitude. roughly 40 % – or €26 billion – of the capital increase can be attributed to the landesbanken. given the large capital buffer, even if earnings decline significantly ( depending on future interest rate developments and german banks ’ willingness to adjust ), i presume that there are no noteworthy risks to financial stability in this country right now. even in a low interest rate environment, returns can be made on savings let me touch briefly on the situation of savers, as this is a theme that repeatedly receives special attention in germany. incidentally, german households hold only slightly more than 40 % of their total financial assets as deposits with banks. that ’ s roughly in line with the average euro area saver – so the german saver isn ’ t really that special. 7 i am well aware that nominal returns on savings deposits are very low right now. the public debate frequently refers to the nominal interest rate. understandably, since financial institutions usually use nominal interest rates for marketing purposes. but what is actually more important is real returns. for example, a deutsche bundesbank study shows that, in the last three years, the real return on households ’ financial assets stood at around 2 %. though below the long - term average of 3. 5 % for the 16 years prior to the financial crisis 8, that is significantly higher than 0 %. indeed, time and again, there were phases of negative real interest rates in the past, for example at the beginning of the 2000s and during the recent financial crisis, and also in the 1970s and at the start of the 1990s – but with significantly higher inflation rates then. if one takes residential property assets into account, during the last five years german households esrb ( 2014 ), “ is europe overbanked? ”, reports of the advisory scientific committee, no 4, june. bundesanstalt fur finanzmarktstabilisierung, historischer uberblick uber die maßnahmen des soffin, maßnahmestand 31. 12. 2015 ; see also the european commission ’ s state aid scoreboard 2014 – aid in the context of the financial and economic crisis. ecb ( 2013 ), “

. even if german banks are in a better position than the financial institutions of some other member states, there is no reason for complacency. on the one hand, excessive costs have until now prevented the building up of additional equity. and, on the other hand, competition in the german banking sector is likely to intensify noticeably. as a result of the financial crisis, some of the larger german banks are changing tack. they are increasingly focusing leibniz - institut fur wirtschaftsforschung halle ( iwh ) ( 2015 ), “ “ the german saver ” and the low policy rate environment ”, iwh online, no 9 / 2015. bindseil et al. ( 2015 ), “ critique of accommodating central bank policies and the ‘ expropriation of the saver ’ – a review ”, occasional paper series, no 161, ecb ; executive office of the president of the united states ( 2015 ), “ long - term interest rates : a survey ”. bean et al. ( 2015 ), “ low for long? causes and consequences of persistently low interest rates ”, geneva reports on the world economy, no 17, international center for monetary and banking studies. see the december 2015 survey conducted by the gesellschaft fur konsumforschung ( gfk ) on behalf of the bundesverband deutscher banken ( association of german banks ). 13 deutsche bundesbank ( 2016 ), “ acquisition of financial assets and external financing in germany in the third quarter of 2015 – results of the financial accounts by sector ”, press release, 15 january. grabka, m. m. and westermeier, c. ( 2015 ), “ reale nettovermogen der privathaushalte in deutschland sind von 2003 bis 2013 geschrumpft ”, diw wochenbericht, no 34 / 2015, pp. 727 – 738. bis central bankers ’ speeches on traditional corporate clients and retail business and are scaling back investment banking activities. furthermore, technological progress is making it easier for foreign banks to gain access to the german market. both the smaller and larger german banks are feeling the effects of this development. the pressure to adjust should also rise for german savings banks. even if there was hardly any need for the savings bank sector to adjust its business model in the past, its stability is not set in stone. intensified competition within an environment