resolve cases of misselling. subsequently ( table 3. 4, p. 194 ), the amount of the instruments issued by bankia, caixa catalunya and novacaixagalicia is given, along with the arbitration requests received and the awards favourable to customers : overall, arbitration with a favourable award amounted to €3, 125m, relating to almost 300, 000 customers. bearing in mind the doubts over the viability of the euro and over spain continuing in the single currency, and given the serious crisis facing our financial system, i believe that the restructuring strategy and its financing as set out in the 2012 memorandum of understanding was proportionate and has managed to achieve the normalisation of our financial system, as explained in chapter iv of the report. options in the restructuring process allow me now to turn to two questions : the options other than the strategy that was adopted ; and why the reform and restructuring process under way since 2009 had to be reinforced, through the 2012 memorandum of understanding. as regards the options, i believe the debate mainly focuses on the early years of the crisis, between 2009 and 2011. the two scenarios usually mentioned are, first, not having bailed out non - solvent banks, facilitating their winding up ; and second, as opposed to the gradual strategy launched, to have acted more aggressively from the outset, with an injection of public funds in the form of capital and the segregation of impaired assets into purpose - built companies, such as that which was finally created, namely sareb. with respect to the first scenario, and irrespective of political considerations, letting ailing banks go bankrupt was not a reasonable option in economic terms. the winding up of banks would have meant the paralysis of banking services and losses for depositors in the institutions concerned of that portion not covered by the dgs ( a portion that could be very high ), accentuating the risk of contagion to other institutions. this type of strategy would have had a devastating impact on confidence and the stability of the financial system, on the real economy and on employment, and it would very likely have meant a higher cost for taxpayers insofar as the dgs would almost certainly not have been able to meet the coverage of deposits without further public aid. indeed, leaving aside the case of lehman brothers, which was not a commercial bank but an investment bank without retail depositors, and the most particular case of cyprus in 2013, i know of no other instance during the crisis that began in

jaime caruana : the impact of geopolitical events on the world economy speech by mr jaime caruana, governor of the bank of spain and chairman of the basel committee on banking supervision, at the international securities market association annual general meeting, madrid, 27 june 2003. * * * it is a great pleasure for me to participate today in this international securities market association annual general meeting. i would like to thank the organisers for their kind invitation to open this meeting and also to welcome you all to madrid. the matters to be addressed in the conference are not only highly topical, but are of crucial importance for all of us. given the prestige of those who will be offering their opinions, i believe it will be a great opportunity to draw conclusions of enormous interest. the broad theme for this conference is the impact of geopolitical events on the world economy. by way of introduction, let me briefly share with you some thoughts on this topic. the world economy has been through a complicated period in recent years. the expected recovery has been slow, hesitant and disappointing. several factors have come into play in this connection. on one hand, the persistent impact of the bursting of the it and stock exchange bubbles has had a negative effect on business and consumer confidence as well as on investment. on the other hand, several shocks have further undermined confidence, among which i would highlight september 11, geopolitical tensions - in particular the conflicts in afghanistan and iraq - and corporate scandals. all this has created an environment of uncertainty over world economic prospects and has led to heightened risk aversion. finally, crises have continued to beset certain emerging market economies, such as argentina and turkey. both the real sector and certain segments of the financial sector have been affected by this series of shocks. equity markets have suffered a protracted depression worldwide. the fall in stock prices has fed back into aggregate demand, although in many countries this negative wealth effect has been offset, at least partially, by a buoyant home market. as usual, one can see the bottle as being half - empty or half - full : admittedly, the recovery is proving mild, but it is also true that this is partly a result of the mildness of the previous recession and that a deep recession has been avoided. conditions for higher global growth in the second half of this year seem to be in place and prospects for 2003 point to world gdp growth of between 3 % and 3. 5 %, slightly above that for 2002