retain a leading role despite a strengthened profile for the esas ’ chairpersons. ever - more sophisticated technologies and products, climate change and the rise of cybercrime 3 / 8 bis central bankers'speeches increasingly require a highly coordinated european approach and a governance and accountability structure for the european securities and markets authority ( esma ) that is more consistent with its status as a fully - fledged supervisory body. consider facebook ’ s plan to launch a new global digital currency, the implications of which are now being scrutinised by a g7 working group, which i chair. such initiatives naturally require a global response, including a harmonised pan - european position. to put it simply, truly integrated european capital markets will ultimately require a single capital markets supervisor, much in the same spirit as we have a single bank supervisor today. take the role of esma in the supervision of central counterparties ( ccps ). given that the brunt of default risk in eu ccps is borne by their clearing members, most of whom are directly supervised and resolved at the european level, the principle of aligning liability and responsibility clearly implies european supervision of eu ccps. but despite significant legislative efforts, the recent revision of the european market infrastructure regulation ( emir 2 ) is a lost opportunity to advance capital market union, as the competence for ccp supervision will remain almost exclusively national. what emir 2 does do, however, is strengthen the eu regulatory framework with respect to clearing activities which are systemically important for the eu but take place in non - eu countries, including those provided from london after brexit. this debate is arguably at the heart of the current discussion on fragmentation. instead of being based only on equivalence at jurisdiction level, the new framework will also subject systemically important non - eu ccps to emir standards and supervision by esma. this will ensure a level playing field with eu ccps, limiting regulatory arbitrage, and enhance ccp resilience. one open issue is whether regulators should force swaps clearing to be relocated even if it risks increasing spatial fragmentation. emir 2 clearly states that recognition can only be denied as a last resort, and the ecb supports this approach. cooperation has, in fact, always been the ecb ’ s preferred approach to the oversight of financial market infrastructures, as per responsibility e of the cpmi - iosco principles for financial market infrastructures. in this respect, the existence of common regulatory standards for ccps has been playing a fundamental role

; and demirguc - kunt, a., feyen, e. and levine, r. ( 2013 ), “ the evolving importance of banks and securities markets ”, world bank economic review, vol. 27, no 3, pp. 476 – 490. 8 see invest europe ( 2019 ), 2018 european private equity activity. 9 see eu technical expert group on sustainable finance ( 2019 ), taxonomy technical report, june. 10 for additional information, see the ecb ’ s webpage on what is target instant payment settlement ( tips )? 11 see ecb ( 2019 ), market consultation on a potential eurosystem initiative regarding a european mechanism for the issuance and initial distribution of debt securities in the european union, 28 may. 12 see the european commission ’ s financing programmes for smes ; and kremer, m. and popov, a. ( 2018 ), “ financial development, financial structure and growth : evidence from europe ”, in financial integration in europe, ecb. 13 see hsu, p., tian, x. and xu, y. ( 2014 ), “ financial development and innovation : cross - country evidence ”, journal of financial economics, vol. 112, no 1, pp. 116 – 135 ; and de haas, r., and popov, a. ( 2018 ), “ financial development and industrial pollution, ” tilburg university discussion paper 2018 – 024. 14 such efforts need to go hand - in - hand with programmes targeted at increasing financial literacy, starting in secondary school. see cœure, b. ( 2018 ), “ central banking in times of complexity ”, panel remarks at a conference on the occasion of sveriges riksbank ’ s 350th anniversary, stockholm, 25 may. 15 see report of a ceps - ecmi task force on rebranding the capital markets union. 16 see kraemer - eis, h. ( 2017 ), “ sme securitisation in europe – a short summary ”, european investment fund. 17 see bank of england and ecb ( 2014 ), “ the case for a better functioning securitisation market in the european union ”, discussion paper, may. 18 the politically agreed amendments to the bmr will allow for the competent authority to make contributions to critical benchmarks mandatory for a maximum period of five years, in the event it considers that the representativeness of euribor is put at risk