provision of precautionary lending create moral hazard and counteract the original purpose of advancing financial stability. furthermore, they have already left the fund with a very high risk concentration. as liabilities to the international financial institutions now account for a large share of some debtors ’ foreign borrowing, conflicts of interest between the borrowers, imf shareholders and private creditors could put the imf financing mechanism at risk. ultimately, the entire concept of imf lending may end up in danger of being undermined. the bundesbank therefore welcomes a return to a lending policy more in line with the catalytic role of imf financing, a policy which the imf generally endorsed last year. establishing credible ex - ante clarity about financial assistance is crucial in this respect. the single most important element in a revised lending strategy would be a restrictive exceptional access policy stringently conditioned on acute needs and debt sustainability. exceptional access must be reserved for only a few true emergency cases. lending criteria need to be applied without exception. care must also be taken to ensure that prolonged use of fund resources does not intrude upon the world bank ’ s territory of catering to longer - term financing needs for development purposes. over the years the imf has repeatedly expanded its policy of lending to debtors that are in arrears to the private sector ( lia policy ). the bundesbank advocates the establishment and application of transparent and operational lia criteria and recommends that the regular access limits be respected. considerations to install a new precautionary lending facility after the expiration of the contingent credit line should not be pursued any further. uncapped precautionary lending without acute needs would push the imf towards the role of a general risk insurer. this would distort creditors ’ risk assessment, ie invite moral hazard and undermine debtors ’ incentives to build strong institutions and to implement sound policies. the international financial architecture will have to be constantly evolved through formal and informal international cooperation, with a special view to building strong institutions and to creating incentives that propagate stability.

economy at large. for the financial sector, in particular, it is therefore becoming increasingly important to press ahead with measures in order to defend against cyber risk such as : optimise centralised and decentralised protective measures on an ongoing basis. foster a culture of cybersecurity. bolster the resilience of financial market infrastructures. 3. cybersecurity as a quantifiable metric is feasible looking at the examples that i have cited, it would be fitting to find that financial market participants were complying with a uniform security standard. but this is not the case. what difference would such a “ uniform security standard ” make? first of all, as we draw up our defensive measures, it is vital that we all borrow from established standards such as the international code of practice for information security management ( iso / iec 27002 ), the us nist cybersecurity framework or the german it baseline protection catalogues of the federal office for information security. compliance with these standards is important and guarantees a middling level of protection. generally speaking, however, attackers are not interested in firewalls – they are interested in their weak points. it is therefore important that enterprises identify their own vulnerabilities and rectify these using standardised procedures. let ’ s take a look at the top 20 critical security controls. these standards were put together by a large number of government and industry experts in cybersecurity and represent a prioritised, risk - based recommendation for implementation. such procedures would help us increase awareness of existing weaknesses. in addition, they would serve as a guideline for implementing effective processes and tools to appropriately secure our systems. 3 / 7 bis central bankers'speeches in this context, constant monitoring, automating processes, providing uniform evaluation metrics, and acquiring knowledge of real attacks are all crucially important with respect to developing effective defence systems. this is what we can do, and i appeal enterprises to follow these procedures. this is because we need to first reach a point where we can identify the current state of cybersecurity using established risk management procedures before going on to 1. find room for improvement and 2. continually improve quality standards ( “ majority level ” ). effectively searching for and finding weak points is therefore one of our main tasks, especially since our capabilities in this regard pale in comparison to those of the attackers. liability for manufacturers besides the enterprise itself, what can others do? just like federal minister of the