2. 2. 2. european commission, ‘ public consultation on possible changes to the capital requirements directive ( crd, consisting of directives 2006 / 48 / ec and 2006 / 49 / ec ) ’ ( available at www. europa. eu ). including adverse developments in financial markets, arise within a banking group which potentially jeopardises the stability of the financial system in any of the member states where entities of the group are located. 6. conclusions in 2001 the eurosystem highlighted the importance of the role played by central banks in supervision. the experience gained by central banks during the financial market turmoil confirms the fundamental appropriateness of the eurosystem ’ s position, which is also shared across the atlantic. in the us, a discussion has already started on how to improve coordination between the various authorities and on how to put the federal reserve in a position to better contribute to financial market stability. tim geithner has recently called for more powers to be given to the federal reserve in the field of oversight. in the european union, the european commission has launched initiatives to further reinforce the legal underpinnings for the cooperation and the exchange of information between supervisory authorities and central banks, and to build a consistent institutional framework for such an exchange. these initiatives are strongly supported by the ecb and should be implemented soon. improving the institutional framework is necessary, but not sufficient. it has to be followed by an effective implementation of the provisions and the activation of the available channels of communication between supervisors and the central banks, including the ecb. a substantial amount of work is already underway. it is up to us to make sure that it is finalised in time to address any challenges that global financial markets may pose to stability. thank you for your attention. references altunbas, y., gambacorta, l. and marques, d. ( 2007 ), “ securitisation and monetary policy ”, forthcoming ecb working paper. angeloni, i., kashyap, a. n., mojon, b., eds. ( 2003 ), monetary policy transmission in the euro area, cambridge university press. berger, a. n. and udell, g. f. ( 1992 ), “ some evidence on the empirical significance of credit rationing ”, the journal of political economy, vol. 100, no 5 ( october ), 1047 - 1077. berlin, m. and mester, l. j. (

drift even further below target against the risks of exacerbating financial system imbalances. as central bankers, here in canada and globally, we are in new territory. it brings to mind the sailors of another era who were driven far off course by a nasty storm. when things calmed, they found themselves in the southern hemisphere. suddenly the navigational chart that they relied on – the night sky – was completely different. we have every reason to believe that, after the experience of the crisis is behind us, central banking will be defined very differently than it was just five years ago. we know now that economic and financial stability are intrinsically linked, and we are figuring out as we go how to better integrate the two in our analysis and research, and in our policy. on a technical level, we are actively building new models and adding new detail to our existing ones. we are spending more time talking to real people making real economic decisions, to understand better the forces we are facing. and, we are communicating differently, not just more, but with more transparency, with due regard to the uncertainty around us. i am confident that we ’ ve got it roughly right, given what we know and especially what we don ’ t. just like those sailors on the open seas, we will adapt and thrive – and find our way home. bis central bankers ’ speeches