treaty, was given to the escb on several grounds. central banks have a large body of inside knowledge which may help in the exercise of prudential supervision, and measures to counter financial market fragility may, on the other hand, have monetary aspects which should be discussed by central banks. 10 moreover, information held by the escb, for instance, in the context of its role in the oversight of payment systems may be of great use for supervisory authorities. payment systems oversight and prudential supervision focus on avoiding systemic risks and safeguarding the soundness of financial institutions. at the same time, it should be stressed that the flow of information from ( instead of to ) the supervisory authorities and a mutually fruitful cooperation between supervisory authorities and central banks are crucial, with the latter being entrusted with a contributory task in the field of macro - prudential supervision. 11 the ecb has pointed out in various opinions that see r. smits, the european central bank, institutional aspects ( kluwer international, 2000 ), p. 340. r. smits ( ibid ), p. 342. “ central bank access to prudential information and cooperation between financial supervisory authorities and central banks are essential for the conduct of macro - prudential monitoring, the oversight of payment systems and the safeguarding of other market infrastructures, which are in turn essential for the smooth conduct of monetary policy ”. if we examine closely the current eu legal framework applicable to the exchange of information between central banks and supervisory authorities, we note that the eu treaty is “ asymmetric ” since it does not contain any provisions requiring the banking supervisory authorities to contribute to the performance of the tasks under the responsibility of the ecb or the escb, in the same way that the ecb and the escb contribute to the smooth functioning of supervisory policies. this may have historical roots : the national supervisory authorities, unlike the ecb or the escb, are not community law bodies and do not have a european mandate enshrined in the treaty. however, this entails some limitation in the ability of the ecb and the escb to perform their tasks. one has to take into account a series of facts that make this problem less acute. first, a number of central banks in the euro area perform supervisory functions and therefore have easy access to supervisory information. second, european secondary legislation, namely a number of community directives applicable to the financial sector – and, for instance

, the capital requirements directive ( crd ) – addresses the issue of the cooperation and exchange of information at eu level between supervisory authorities themselves but also between banking supervisory authorities and central banks. the crd identifies a number of exceptions or “ gateways ” through which member states may authorise confidential information to be disclosed, in most cases subject to conditions of professional secrecy. this directive provides in particular that exchange of information should be authorised between supervisory authorities and central banks in their capacity as monetary authorities. third, in previous opinions on draft national laws, the ecb has observed that virtually all member states that have adopted supervisory models based on an independent financial supervisory authority have included provisions stipulating a duty of cooperation and authorising the exchange of information between central banks and supervisory authorities. 12 against this backdrop, it is essential to eliminate all legislative obstacles that prevent supervisory authorities from providing information to the ecb and eurosystem central banks on specific banking and financial institutions as well as to guarantee more generally a duty of cooperation between central banks and supervisory authorities, whose ultimate purpose is to put in place effective and practical arrangements for cooperation and information - sharing. this should be a priority in the european union. the european commission has recently launched a public consultation on possible targeted amendments to the crd 13 which includes aspects relating to cooperation and exchange of information between banking supervisory authorities and central banks. more specifically, the proposed amendments to the crd include two new provisions. first, “ in an emergency situation, member states shall allow competent authorities to communicate information to central banks in the eu when this information is relevant for the exercise of their respective statutory tasks, including the conduct of monetary policy, the oversight of payments and securities settlement systems, and the safeguarding of financial stability ”. second, the consolidating supervisor should alert the relevant central banks and communicate to them all information that is essential for the pursuance of their tasks should an emergency situation, see, for instance, the opinion of the ecb of 5 november 2007 at the request of the austrian ministry of finance on a draft law amending the law on banking, the law on savings banks, the law on the financial market supervisory authority and the law on the oesterreichische nationalbank ( con / 2007 / 33 ), paragraph 2. 4. 1 or the opinion of the ecb of 9 march 2006 at the request of the polish minister of finance on a draft law on the supervision of financial institutions ( con / 2006 / 15 ), paragraph