caribbean ’ s growth strategy. these are the eccb debt, growth and development task force, the world bank ’ s caribbean growth forum, and the imf ’ s group on small states. we need champions. the uwi is one such regional champion and well positioned to drive the knowledge and innovation - based model of growth which principal sankat spoke about in his welcoming remarks. trinidad and tobago is another such champion, over the last two years, we have been actively championing the case for small states in the halls of international financial community. we are now seeing a new awakening and awareness of this issue from global policymakers, especially at the imf and the g - 20 presidency. second, we need to consider developing a regional approach to sovereign debt restructuring. with the exception of guyana and haiti, all other caribbean countries are considered either not poor enough and / or not severely indebted enough to access traditional international debt restructuring and relief mechanisms such as the enhanced heavily indebted poor country ( hipc ) initiative and the multilateral debt relief initiative ( mdri ). this leaves fiscal consolidation as the only option. however, the degree of fiscal austerity necessary to stabilize and eventually reduce the caribbean ’ s public debt overhang is neither socially nor politically feasible. while a few caribbean economies have engaged in ad hoc sovereign debt restructuring operations, sometimes more than once, these have not yielded lasting gains. further work is needed to assess under what conditions innovative, debt - based instruments can generate additional regional resources for growth and development. third, we need to seriously consider tapping into the wealth of the caribbean ’ s very own large, highly educated diaspora. the minimum size of the caribbean diaspora is estimated at around 3. 5 million people, or more than one - fifth of the region ’ s population, whose annual savings amount to over 15 per cent of the region ’ s gdp. the caribbean ’ s diaspora pool therefore represents a potential alternative source of long - term funding. diaspora bonds are viable instruments which enable the region to borrow from its diaspora community. for diaspora investors, these bonds offer the opportunity to help their country of origin while also providing an investment opportunity. finally, we need to consider a regional approach to managing risks arising from financial integration in the caribbean. growing cross - border linkages requires central banks and other regulators to strengthen arrangements for crisis management, develop mechanisms for early coordinated intervention in cross - border institutions, and review adequacy of deposit insurance schemes. in closing, ladies and

3 - 4 % 15 - that is not where we are today. as you can see, we are certainly willing to reflect critically on monetary policy. but let me add that we also need to prioritise. we have been suffering from a recession provoked chiefly by a collapse in confidence, driven by serious policy uncertainty. we have been downgraded by all the major ratings agencies, and we are barely clinging to investment grade status for our rand - denominated debt. the ratings agencies tell us that the major policy pillar that supports the south african investment case is our monetary policy framework. why then, in this environment, would you want to make the discussion about changing the monetary policy framework? as a matter of science, there are no settled questions and more research is always appropriate. as a matter of policy, this focus seems misguided. central bank accountability what about accountability? our fundamental purpose, as with the other parts of south africa [UNK] s system of government, comes from the constitution. our job is to figure out a monetary policy framework that delivers on this mandate. in line with many other countries, we use an inflation target. we identify the precise inflation target after consultation with national treasury. this is as transparent to the public as it can be. no one can give the sarb secret instructions. our mission is in plain view, and the evidence for judging us is independently produced and for details, see „ box 4, south african inflation : an international perspective [UNK] in the monetary policy review, published by the sarb in october 2016, available at http : / / www. resbank. co. za / lists / news % 20and % 20publications / attachments / 7504 / mproctober2016. p df. page 12 of 17 publicly available, in the form of the consumer price index published by statistics south africa. of course, this is not the only way in which the sarb is held accountable. our other roles and powers, such as bank supervision and financial stability, are assigned to us by laws passed by parliament and signed by the president. we submit our annual report to parliament. furthermore, the governor and the deputy governors are appointed by the president following consultation with the minister of finance and the sarb [UNK] s board of directors. 16 this system is designed to create the space for the sarb to make good decisions while maintaining democratic accountability. if you believe that the sarb is so independent that it can ignore the