, means that the present operators of target2 - the banque de france, the banca d ’ italia and the bundesbank – want one single technical platform for target2 securities and target2. to put it simply, in our view the creation of a second settlement platform within the eurosystem in addition to target2 would serve no economic purpose and would only make liquidity management more difficult. naturally, i would also like to mention the principle of cost recovery. fundamentally, we pursue a policy where the prices paid are sufficient to cover costs so that at the end of the day users themselves finance the services being provided. there are, however, two aspects to be considered. on the one hand, payment systems and settlement systems are infrastructures with a high share of fixed costs. it follows that in order to successfully recover costs a certain settlement volume is crucial. reasonable unit costs – also beneficial for the participants – are the consequence of economies of scale by means of corresponding volume effects. here, we share a common aim with users. the equation is simple : a 20 % rise in the volume of target2 would result in a further reduction in average costs by just over a fifth! on the other hand, infrastructures can also generate external effects with which the individual participant will not have reckoned. these might be a particularly secure gross settlement or a particularly high quality of contingency provisions. full application of the cost recovery principle could prompt banks to resort more often to less expensive private systems. as a consequence, external effects have to be considered when setting prices. however, such deviations from the general cost recovery principle would have to be well - founded because of their potential implications regarding competition. iii ladies and gentlemen, do you really think that central banks are crowding private competitors out of the market with state intervention? i believe that, with target2 and target2 securities, this statement can easily be refuted. central banks are by no means acting in an anti - competitive way. on the contrary, they are, in fact, stimulating competition by providing a neutral basis infrastructure in central bank money for csds, banks and other service providers competing in the market. take the planned single shared platform in target2 for instance. here we are breaking new ground by moving away from the networking of national markets to create an integrated single european market. the advantages of this are obvious. • firstly, the harmonisation of services and prices will create a level playing field for all banks across europe. •

sabine lautenschlager : current developments in macroprudential oversight speech by ms sabine lautenschlager, deputy president of the deutsche bundesbank, at the 14th handelsblatt annual conference “ update on banking regulation ”, mainz, 6 november 2013. * 1. * * introduction dear mr afhuppe, dear professor schulte - mattler, ladies and gentlemen the flyer advertising this event invited us to “ keep our finger on the pulse of developments in banking regulation ”. in my opinion, the heartbeat of regulation cannot be overheard ; it beats fast, almost a staccato – if you consider the wave of regulations over the past five years and the changes in the approach to supervision. today, i would like to discuss one of the three major changes that face banks and supervisors – and will possibly get your pulse going in the future. what changes am i referring to? the first major change are the completely revised rules for banks, known as “ basel iii ”. the second change is the banking union. both subjects have already been discussed at length and in great detail. i therefore propose to talk about major change number 3 today, “ macroprudential oversight ”. it is my impression that banks and market participants have, to date, paid too little attention to the ways in which this new type of supervision could affect them. however, the potential impact of the instruments available for this task should not be underestimated ; on the whole, they are directed at banks, they may affect a category of banks or a national banking industry, and may impact all of the business or just individual business areas. this raises elementary questions such as that of a level playing field. 2. macroprudential oversight : definition and background what is macroprudential oversight anyway? before the financial crisis, financial supervision dealt mainly with individual market players or individual institutions. put simply, the motto was : if all is well at the individual institutions, all will be well with the system. attention centred on the micro level ; the macro level was not monitored and evaluated systematically, at least not at the national level. macroprudential oversight is intended to do just that : its aim is to identify and assess, in a timely manner, developments that could jeopardise the financial system. we – the bundesbank – define financial stability as the ability of the financial system to fulfil its key economic functions at all times – in particular, to efficiently all