core transaction details of all otc derivatives are kept and stored by trade repositories all using the same high - quality data model, the reporting burden will not just cease to grow ; it will even decrease, as the trdata may then serve various regulators. and we, as fsb, will be able to ascertain precisely which transactions have taken place, and how exactly they should be aggregated, which now can still be ‘ a bit of problem ’. we can only measure the size of a global market if we use a uniform measuring method everywhere, thus ruling out the risk of double - counting owing to a lack of unique numbering or overlapping product definitions. it being a foregone conclusion that further use of bad data quality will only add to the regulatory reporting burden, we must lose no time and join forces, not only to enhance the quality of the data used in the trade reporting, but also to ensure they are globally consistent. and that is why you are here today! this is where you come in! for uti is a critical data element in making the global otc derivatives markets transparent. for this reason it is vital that you, the regulators and private sector representatives gathered in this room, are going to pay particular attention today to the governance aspects of the uti. as you will no doubt be aware, work on the governance of the uti is already underway. last month, the fsb launched a consultation on proposed governance arrangements for the uti. later this year, similar proposals for the unique product identifier will be put out for consultation. but, welcome as this development may be, i would add that the proposed arrangements should be considered with great care. for, as probably no one knows better than you, the world of hedging and related derivatives is changing continuously. governance mechanisms must therefore be designed to ensure that the reporting framework can cope with those changes in order maintain a high data quality level. i hope that with this caveat in the back of your minds, you will collaborate successfully in today ’ s workshop. and that you will do so in the knowledge that the fruit of your efforts will be for the benefit of both the private and public sectors, both authorities and counterparties, if only by helping to reduce the reporting burden. as a member of the fsb, i would like to thank you in advance for your effort to make our work easier and – possibly – more effective! thank you.

the reform of eu fiscal rules and the enactment of the budgetary instrument for convergence and competitiveness, approved in december 2019 as the embryo of an euro area common fiscal capacity, could be the next steps forward to avoid these constraints. they will reduce the risks of fragmentation, alleviating the pressure on monetary policy, and moving towards a sounder interaction between policies. 2 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches it is always important to recall that the first time the euro support among europeans increased in the context of a crisis was in 2020. and this was no coincidence, it was a clear understanding by our fellow citizens that for the first time ever in a crisis we were acting as a union. a union with a purpose, a union in which people could understand the continuity across policies, both across each country and the eu, but also across the different economic policy domains. and that includes macroprudential policy. because monetary policy effectiveness also depends on an increasingly important role of macroprudential policy. the scope for interaction between these policies is large, as they share common transmission mechanisms and can affect each other's objectives. the ecb's review of the monetary policy strategy recognized that financial stability is a precondition for price stability. macroprudential policy should be the first line of defence against financial stability risks, notably in a monetary union where financial cycles are not fully synchronized. monetary policy is too " blunt " to deal with financial stability effectively. the relevance of the interactions between monetary and macroprudential policies cannot be played down. monetary policy decisions affect the credit granted to the economy and, therefore, can spur " side effects " – positive or negative – on financial stability. on the other side, macroprudential policies, while containing financial stability risks, may reduce the length and the magnitude of economic expansions by inhibiting credit to finance productive economic activities. the arguments for using monetary policy to explicitly and automatically deal with the build - up of risks are weak. leaning against the wind may not be desirable as a general principle, even if keeping flexibility may be warranted to deal with specific situations. if monetary policy is used in a systematic way, it could lead to a general loss of its effectiveness and credibility. however, monetary policy has played a crucial role in supporting financial stability in several critical occasions. since the great financial crisis, central banks have increasingly recognised the importance of providing liquidity and making sure that the transmission mechanism operates properly. more recently, the introduction