criterion laid out in the committee ’ s guidance. while no decisions were made, participants generally view that, so long as the recovery remains on track, a gradual tapering of our asset purchases that concludes around the middle of next year may soon be warranted. it is important to note that any future decision the committee might make with regard to the pace of asset purchases will not be intended to carry a signal about the timing of a future decision to raise the target range for the federal funds rate, a policy decision for which we have articulated a different and substantially more stringent test. as we reaffirmed in september, we continue to expect that it will be appropriate to maintain the current 0 to 1 / 4 percent target range for the federal funds rate until labor market conditions have reached levels consistent with the committee ’ s assessment of maximum employment and inflation has risen to 2 percent and is on track to moderately exceed 2 percent for some time. at least half of the 18 fomc participants in their summary of economic projections ( sep ) submissions projected that these necessary threshold conditions for liftoff will be met by december 2022, and all participants but 1 project that these conditions will be met by december 2023. 5 these projections are entirely consistent with the new monetary policy framework adopted unanimously by the committee in august 2020. 6 in the context of our new framework, as i have noted before, while the effective lower bound ( elb ) can be a constraint on monetary policy, the elb is not a constraint on fiscal policy, and appropriate monetary policy under our new framework, to me, must — and certainly can — incorporate this reality. indeed, under present circumstances, i judge that the support to aggregate demand from fiscal policy — including the nearly $ 2 trillion in accumulated excess savings accruing from ( as yet ) unspent transfer payments — in tandem with appropriate monetary policy, can fully offset the constraint, highlighted in our statement on longer - run goals and monetary policy strategy, that the elb imposes on the ability of an inflation - targeting monetary policy, acting on its own and in the absence of sufficient fiscal support, to restore, following a recession, maximum employment and price stability while keeping inflation expectations well anchored at the 2 percent longer - run goal. 7 thank you very much for your time and attention. i look forward, as always, to my conversation with tim. references ahn, hie joo, and chad fulton ( 2020 ). " index of common inflation expectations, "

##i for assistance in preparing these remarks. return to text 2 the labor market conditions indicators can be found on the kansas city fed ’ s website at www. kansascityfed. org / data - and - trends / labor - market - conditions - indicators. return to text 3 the fed staff ’ s index of common inflation expectations — which is now updated quarterly on the board ’ s website — is a relevant indicator that this goal is being met. see ahn and fulton ( 2020, 2021 ). return to text 4 fomc statements, including those issued since the december 2020 meeting, are available on the board ’ s website at www. federalreserve. gov / monetarypolicy / fomccalendars. htm. return to text 5 the most recent sep, released following the conclusion of the september 2021 fomc meeting, is available on the board ’ s website at www. federalreserve. gov / monetarypolicy / fomccalendars. htm. return to text 6 the revised statement on longer - run goals and monetary policy strategy, unanimously approved on august 27, 2020, is available on the board ’ s website at www. federalreserve. gov / monetarypolicy / review - of - monetarypolicy - strategy - tools - and - communications - statement - on - longer - run - goals - monetary - policy - strategy. htm. for a discussion of the elements that motivated the launch of the review and a summary of the key changes that were introduced, see clarida ( 2020, 2021 ) and powell ( 2020 ). return to text 7 for a theoretical analysis of the fiscal and monetary policy mix at the elb, see woodford and xie ( 2020 ). for studies of the government expenditure multiplier at the elb, see woodford ( 2011 ) ; christiano, eichenbaum, and rebelo ( 2011 ) ; and eggertsson ( 2011 ). return to text 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches