sabine lautenschlager : supervising banks - four priorities statement by ms sabine lautenschlager, member of the executive board of the european central bank and vice - chair of the supervisory board of the single supervisory mechanism, at the international monetary conference, london, 13 june 2017. * * * many thanks for your question, howard. so what priorities do i see at the moment? in respect of banking supervision there are four things that come to mind. most importantly, regulation has to remain a global issue ; the banking system is global in scope and we need to take a global approach to regulating it. reforms of banking regulation have now been under way for almost a decade ; it is time to finalise them, implement them and see how they work. but it is not only about the rules themselves ; it is also about their application. supervisors around the world apply the rules very differently. globally we should focus on how supervision is carried out and how we can learn from each other. what approaches are used? what are the best tools and methods? what are the best structures in terms of budget and independence, for instance? these are things we should discuss at global level – also with respect to brexit. that, in fact, is the second thing on my list of priorities. we all know that, in the event of a “ hard ” brexit, uk banks would have to seek a licence in the eu to do business on the continent. and here, i get the feeling that many banks are a bit too relaxed about this. so my message today to the banks is quite simple : the clock is ticking. obtaining a licence takes some time, so don ’ t put off applying for one for too long. but it is not just about banks. in the wake of brexit, we might also see entities, such as brokerdealers or third - country branches, setting up shop in the euro area. these entities would probably be supervised at national level. the market would become more fragmented and all the conditions for a race to the bottom would be present. it might thus be appropriate to have such entities supervised at european level. the current review of the european rulebook offers a chance to adapt the relevant rules. non - performing loans, or npls, are the third item on my list. in some parts of the euro area, banks still have large exposures to npls on their balance sheets – a legacy of the economic crisis. npls

glenn stevens : some longer - run consequences of the financial crisis address by mr glenn stevens, governor of the reserve bank of australia, to the anika foundation luncheon, supported by australian business economists and macquarie bank, sydney, 20 july 2010. * * * i thank george gardner for assistance in preparing this address. thank you for coming along today in support of the anika foundation ’ s work supporting research into adolescent depression. this is the fifth such occasion and it is very gratifying indeed to see such a strong response from the financial community. i want also to record my thanks to the australian business economists for their support and to macquarie bank for their sponsorship of today ’ s event. my subject is the consequences of the financial crisis. we are all aware of the immediate and short - term impacts the crisis had on the international financial system and the world economy. i won ’ t repeat them. the initial phase of the recovery has been underway for over a year now. global gdp started rising in mid 2009. when all the figures are in we will probably find that it rose by close to 5 per cent over the year to june 2010, though the pace has been uneven between regions and with some of the leading asian economies seeking to slow down to a more sustainable pace, and european nations tightening fiscal policy, there is a bit more uncertainty just now about prospects for 2011. the bulk of financial institutions most affected by the crisis have returned to profit, while estimates of the total losses to be absorbed from the whole episode have tended to decline somewhat lately ( though they are still very large ). financial market dislocation has gradually eased, albeit with sporadic episodes of renewed doubts and instability. but what of the longer - run consequences of the crisis? i want to offer some remarks under three headings, though with no claim this is an exhaustive list. these remarks are about the general international situation, not australia in particular, unless otherwise noted. fiscal issues the first lasting consequence is the fiscal burden taken on by countries at the centre of, or close to, the crisis. there are three components to this. first, some governments took on bank ownership in order to ensure the replenishment of capital that had been too thin to start with and that was depleted by the losses on securities and loans. table 1 shows public capital injections to the financial sector for several key economies. the amounts in mainland europe could quite possibly grow soon as a result of the forthcoming stress tests. note that this is not