supervisors ’ participation in colleges, including when the case involves important branches or subsidiaries ; creating a new european system of financial supervisors ( esfs ) grouping three sectoral agencies ( the european banking authority, the european insurance and occupational pensions authority and the european securities markets authority ), for more effective supervision over the major european groups ; and forming a new european systemic risk board, in order to sharpen the macro - prudential focus of supervisory policy. a few weeks ago the commission released a consultation document setting out its projects for enhancing supervisory authorities ’ early intervention at ailing banks, and their crisis management and resolution. the idea is to revise european company and bankruptcy law, together with compulsory deposit insurance schemes, and, more generally, the financing of crisis intervention measures. the set of regulatory changes under consideration, once implemented, will have significant impact on the conduct of banking supervision over national and foreign intermediaries alike and on the roles and responsibilities of the various authorities. there will be a period of intense dialogue with intermediaries, whose organizational and business models could be affected. 6. conclusion i believe that the italian experience over the past twenty - five years has been positive on the whole. foreign banks have significantly enlarged their presence in italy and helped spread new business models, different even from those of their own home markets. these foreign intermediaries contributed substantially to the growth of the italian banking industry in terms of innovation, service quality and quantity, and stiffer competition. italian savers and investors benefited. the contribution was greater in some market segments, less noticeable in others. during the recent crisis, in italy – unlike other countries – the presence of foreign banks did not cause strains or inflict losses on italian savers and investors. however, more highly diversified lines of business and the rapidly evolving external environment have increased risk exposure, especially in some segments. the bank of italy has accordingly adjusted supervisory approaches and instruments to guarantee the continued effectiveness of its action, adapted to the evolution of risks. in recent years the chief focus has been on liquidity, operational, legal and reputational risks. the closer integration of financial markets heightens the danger of contagion. the debate on the effectiveness of supervision over the major cross - border groups, with their often overcomplex organization, is still under way. obviously, this is a question that ranges beyond national confines. if the crisis was – unquestionably – global, then the review and reinforcement of the supervisory architecture needs to be as internationally coordinated

have led to the governing council ’ s decisions since december 2005. implementation is decentralized. monetary policy decisions taken by the governing council of the ecb are implemented by the ncbs. this framework has proven its robustness and efficiency. but there are limits to what monetary policy can deliver. its main contribution to growth is to achieve price stability. ultimately, however, whether this will translate into higher growth in the longer run depends on reforms aimed at increasing the economy's potential. here european countries are making progress, although at too slow a pace. 3 ) how can eu member states increase their growth potential? in 2000, the lisbon european council designed a new strategy in order to promote competitiveness of the eu and defined ambitious goals in that respect. the lisbon agenda has introduced a multilateral surveillance of structural policies. in 2005, eu heads of government re - launched the lisbon strategy with an enhanced focus on jobs and growth and a streamlined governance regime. the key elements are the national reform programs which cover, for each country, the commitments taken over a 3 - years cycle as regards structural reforms. emu, with a single monetary policy and 13 governments responsible for budgetary policies, requires an institutional fiscal framework. it has to be simple, easy to implement, and able to ensure that fiscal policies are sound and sustainable, to avoid free - riding behaviours as well as neo - ricardian effects. the most widely - discussed surveillance process, because it is the most binding one, is the stability and growth pact ( sgp ). the pact may be defined as the “ users instructions ” for the obligation, defined in the treaty, for eu member states, to achieve a medium - term budgetary position of close to balance or in surplus, while maintaining the ratio of the annual government deficit to gross domestic product ( gdp ) at within 3 % and the ratio of gross government debt to gdp at within 60 %. member states which do not respect these ratios face an “ excessive deficit ” procedure which may lead the ecofin council to take a series of measures which range from simple recommendations to financial sanctions. in 2005, the european council agreed to reform the sgp. the important role of the sgp in terms of budgetary discipline is confirmed. the reform sets out the criteria for the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure and allows for more leeway in the timeframe for correcting excessive deficits. it does not, however, diminish the binding nature or the efficiency of the pact