g., serving on a board of a civic institution ) that may not have a primary purpose of community development. in rural areas, bank participation in these kinds of activities can make a difference in supporting economic development. the anpr also seeks feedback on providing cra credit for bank volunteer activities in rural areas that do not involve the provision of financial or related services but have a clear community development purpose and greatly impact local communities, like helping to build affordable housing. our final major goal of the anpr is to provide a foundation for the agencies to converge on a consistent approach that has broad support among stakeholders. stakeholders such as the icba have expressed strong support for the agencies to work together to modernize cra. by reflecting stakeholder views and providing an appropriately long period for public comment, we hope the anpr advances the goal of building a foundation for the banking agencies to converge on a consistent approach that has the broad support of stakeholders. all three regulators have benefited from stakeholder input provided through comment letters, roundtables, and meetings. there is significant interagency agreement on the objectives of cra reform, and many of the ideas in the anpr reflect interagency discussions and regulatory proposals. in closing, we look forward to modernizing the cra in a way that strengthens the regulations to advance the core purposes of the statute, while providing greater certainty, tailoring regulations, and minimizing burden. we have appreciated the icba ’ s strong engagement throughout this process, and we look forward to your continued engagement as we seek to converge on a consistent approach that has broad stakeholder support. thank you. 1 i am grateful to amanda roberts, nancy riley, and joseph firschein of the federal reserve board for their assistance in preparing this text. these remarks represent my own views, which do not necessarily represent those of the federal reserve board or the federal open market committee. return to text 2 see independent community bankers of america, “ data show community banks lead economic recovery, ” news release, august 19, 2020. also see, michelle w. bowman, “ community banks rise to the challenge ” ( speech at the “ community banking in the 21st century ” research conference, st. louis, mo, september 30, 2020 ). return to text 3 see federal reserve board, “ advance notice of proposed rulemaking : the community reinvestment act ( pdf ), ” ( september 21, 2020 ). return to text 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches

confidence and sentiment were weak. international predators, with meticulous preparation and organisation, launched an attack on the hong kong dollar and our financial markets. they first discreetly borrowed hong kong dollars and waited for the right moment to profit by short selling the currency and attacking our linked exchange rate system. at the same time, they built up substantial short positions in the stock and futures markets. these global predators also spread doomsaying through the hong kong media to stoke panic among hong kong people, creating an environment ripe for their short selling activities. the hang seng index ( hsi ) dived 50 % to 8, 000 in august 1998 from 16, 000 a year earlier and the predators boasted they would push down the hsi by another 50 % to 4, 000, which was an extremely low level. aggregating the earnings of all listed companies, when the hsi was at 8, 000, the price - earnings ratio was eight, and if the index fell another 50 %, the ratio would drop to just four. the hong kong sar government was facing a “ double - play ” by the predators – manipulation and profiteering in the money market and stock market through massive short - selling. it was a critical situation – not only were we confronted with a sharp fall in the stock market and great losses to shareholders, there were also systemic risks to our monetary system and financial markets. classical economics does not differentiate between big and small markets and assumes that market prices will not be manipulated by just a few players. reality, however, is different from theory. at that time, the market capitalisation of the hong kong stock market was only us $ 340 billion, a mere 3 % of the new york stock exchange ’ s us $ 10. 3 trillion. the predators were unable and hence did not choose to make their move on the big us markets, but were able to plunder hong kong ’ s mid - sized and open market with impunity. 5. however, on 14 august 1998, with the authorisation of the hong kong sar government and backed by the war chest of the exchange fund, the hkma intervened in the stock and futures markets through market operation to counteract the double - play by international predators. when the market operation was completed by the end of august, the hkma had used about hk $ 120 billion to acquire a vast amount of hong kong stocks, propelling the hsi from the pre - operation level of 6, 700 points to 7, 800 points