is neither necessary nor desirable. it is not necessary, because we can achieve our goals if we properly implement the policies outlined above. nor is it desirable, because it would have disastrous consequences for the access of the government and of greek enterprises to international financial markets, as well as very negative effects on the assets of pension funds, banks and individuals holding greek government securities. * * * * * today, we are at the start of a long course of reconstruction of the economy, a path with many obstacles and risks, but also opportunities that we need to exploit. the mobilisation of all of the country ’ s political and social forces is imperative for this effort to succeed. the final outcome will depend on : our collective will and determination ; our foresight and long - term perspective ; the ability to work out a well - coordinated and coherent plan of the necessary actions and to implement it quickly and efficiently. all of the above presuppose strict adherence to the final goal : to transform greece into a modern european country with economic prosperity and social cohesion. bis central bankers ’ speeches

yannis stournaras : the birth of inter - war central banks - building a new monetary order welcome remarks by mr yannis stournaras, governor of the bank of greece, at the bank of greece economic history conference " the birth of inter - war central banks : building a new monetary order ", athens, 2 november 2018. * * * ladies and gentlemen, it is my great pleasure to welcome you to this international conference, devoted to the birth of inter - war central banks, organised by the bank of greece, itself one of the offspring of this institutionally fertile period. it was 1926 when the greek government first approached the financial committee of the league of nations, seeking its help to settle old debts and raise a new loan on international markets. the money was needed quite urgently. after a decade of wars, which had culminated in the abortive asia minor campaign and the forced population exchange of 1922, the greek economy needed an injection of capital to heal its wounds, settle its refugees and build up its economic infrastructure. yet its international credit standing lay in tatters ; wartime obligations remained unsettled ; expenditures far outstripped public revenues ; inflation was soaring, and the drachma had lost more than 90 % of its value. the league of nations, relying heavily on input from the bank of england and the treasury, promptly dispatched a group of experts to study the greek situation and report back to geneva. their report was published in 1927. along the inevitable admonitions about fiscal prudence and administrative reform, the foreign experts highlighted the absence of a modern central bank : an institution charged solely with the conduct of monetary policy, free from political or business interference. the sole note - issuing authority at the time was the national bank of greece ( or ethniki, as most in this audience know her ). but ethniki also happened to be the country ’ s largest commercial bank, with strong ties to business and politics. if greece were to re - join the gold standard and thus return to the fold of ‘ stable ’ countries, the national bank would have to give up its commercial operations and focus exclusively on central banking – or so the league argued, at least. the report was not well received. neither by greek politicians, who lamented foreign interference in the country ’ s domestic affairs ; nor by the national bank itself, which faced the prospect of giving up its most profitable line of business. after several months of acrimonious negotiations, a