sufficiently. it ’ s a lack of collective vigilance, but also of solidarity, because warning a neighbour that their internal imbalances risk doing them no good, that ’ s what solidarity is. in the same way, governments can be inspired by reforms which have proven successful in other countries : why not benefit from that collective richness? have the member states, notably france, gone far enough in respect of structural reforms? the efforts undertaken are going in the right direction, but it ’ s no easy task. the countries of the euro area are facing a double challenge : preparing for the future by investing particularly in the digital economy, big data and the environmental transition, while managing the burden of the past, namely, public and private debts. their room for manoeuvre is therefore limited, and the factors supporting growth in the euro area today, the favourable financing conditions, cheap energy and the weakness of the euro, are by nature temporary. to secure the future, the measures that are likely to increase productivity and labour market participation have to be emphasised from now on. the ecb started its programme for purchasing public and private debt ( quantitative easing ) in march. is it working? the first months have been encouraging : contrary to what some were saying, we have had no difficulty finding assets to buy, indicators of the inflation expectations are showing signs of recovery, lending to non - financial corporations is trending upwards, the recovery trajectory is there to be seen and we expect inflation to move back towards 2 %. but we are only at the start of these asset purchases, which we plan to maintain until september 2016, and in any case until we see a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation, in line with our objective. it would be quite premature to start talking about the end of this programme. bis central bankers ’ speeches

##130 billion. we have taken care that our actions are never a replacement for the political decision - making process. that people are turning to the central bank on issues that demand a political rather than technical response reveals a serious weakness in the institutional functioning of the euro area. this weakness fuels excessive expectations concerning the ecb. what is the nature of this dysfunction? if proof were needed, the summit of 12 july provided an example : the 19 government leaders of the euro area were shut away for 17 hours to discuss the details of measures expected of a country that makes up less than 2 % of the region ’ s gdp. the decision - making mechanism at the heart of the monetary union does not work well. it is based on an intergovernmental principle that is no longer appropriate. each of the leaders considers public opinion in his or bis central bankers ’ speeches her own country, and his or her own country alone. as a result, the compromises reached are unlikely to be the best outcome for the euro area as a whole, but instead represent the greatest common denominator between the member countries. further, they are the result of never - ending negotiations that increase uncertainty. the five months of negotiation on greece have come at a significant economic and financial cost. there is an urgent need to abandon this intergovernmental process in favour of a process of shared decision - making based on votes and democratic legitimacy. so, in short, you are calling for a form of economic governance at the heart of the euro area, which implies further transfers of sovereignty. do member countries really want this? one thing is certain : if this issue is not addressed, starting today, the monetary union will face the same type of crisis again and again. the greek crisis has let the genie out of the bottle regarding countries leaving the euro area, and it will not be easy to put it back in again. how to proceed? by understanding that replacing the intergovernmental process with shared decision - making will not diminish the sovereignty of member countries. on the contrary, it will provide more room for the political dimension by ensuring shared responsibility that will enhance mutual trust. today the ecb functions on the following principle : the governing council has a discussion, it then votes if necessary, before moving on to something else. and that works! take as an example the implementation of the european fiscal framework, which has become complex and opaque. if there were european fiscal instruments that were discussed within a “ ministry of finance