years. however, the euro area repo market can be affected by collateral scarcity and seasonality, especially at the end of the year, considering also the important share of hold - to - maturity investors. in this regard, eurosystem has made available government bond holdings for securities lending since april 2015. the eurosystem securities lending programme has been successfull in helping to normalize market rates and in acting as a backstop facility for market participants. for instance, in april 2021, eur 71. 5 billion of public sector bonds were lent out on average with a breakdown of eur 59. 5 billion against securities and eur 12. 0 billion against cash collateral. another key feature, which has helped to support the liquidity of the euro area repo market, is the dominant share, two - third, of repo market trading cleared via central clearing counterparties ( ccp ), despite the absence of any mandatory clearing on these instruments. consequently, ccps registered record volumes, in march 2020, in some case for more than 15 trillions of euros, reflecting both cash raising transactions but also special collateral borrowing transactions ( notably for french and german securities ), leading for the former to temporary wider rates and for the latter to tighter repo rates. of note also, despite increase in margins demands ( associated with higher volumes ), breaches and fails have also remained very low. the structure of repo clearing in europe, significantly changed since the migration in 2018 – 2019 of all euro - denominated sovereign debt transactions from ccp lch ltd to the paris - based lch sa. with this migration, around 700 billion euros have been transferred to lch sa and hence to an eu - based ccp. today, the european repo clearing sector is largely conducted in two european ccps, lch sa which has a dominant market share and eurex clearing. from a financial stability perspective, this relocation of euro - denominated repos within the euro zone is welcome, in particular given the key role of these instruments, essential for government funding. it ensures that this activity is subject to the stringent requirements set by emir, under the close and integrated supervision of national and european authorities through emir colleges, and shields this important funding market from any potential regulatory divergence or supervisory conflicting interest between uk and eu competent authorities. this successful migration of repo activity could serve as a reference to shape future evolutions on other clearing segments that are systemic to eu ’

use of the initial margins will come into force in 2022 in application of the emir regulation, and should help contain such developments. and the esrb issued in june 2020 recommendations to address liquidity risks arising from margin calls. nevertheless, we should remain alert and critical in terms of supervisory actions and regulatory requirements to ensure that best practices are enforced. b ) the second issue is the sovereign - bank - corporate nexus european banks ’ ownership of sovereign debt has increased in the course of the year 2020. these developments, coupled with the massive public support targeting nfcs at the apex of the pandemic, and possibly the room for carry - trade offered by the current design of liquidity provided by the eurosystem through tltros, have raised some concerns about the sovereign - bankcorporate nexus. it is clear that in the future this nexus could give rise to vulnerabilities from a financial stability standpoint and we should remain vigilant about the negative feedback loop that it may facilitate. however these concerns should not be overstated. let me observe first that in the eurozone, these linkages between banks, sovereigns and corporates have been crucial for absorbing the economic and financial shocks created by the pandemic. second, the growth in the intensity of these interlinkages must be put into perspective. for 3 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches instance, relative to their total assets, banks ’ exposure to their domestic sovereign have only increased modestly and has remained well below their historical peak. and third, if the so - called bank sovereign “ doom loop ” was a significant threat for the eurozone after the great financial crisis, we must reckon that this time is different, and that this threat has been weakened. indeed, the pandemic crisis does not originate from banks, and banks are materially more resilient compared to what they were in 2008 thanks to the implementation of basel iii. and thanks to the implementation of the banking union in its various dimensions, spillover risks have been reduced. bail - in capacities of french banks for instance have significantly improved over the last decade, reducing the likelihood of a bail out – which would in any case be subject to the rules of the banking union ’ s resolution pillar. and finally, the possible negative impact on the financial stability outlook will crucially depend on the strength and sustainability of the recovery underway and the policies which will be implemented to preserve public debt sustainability. so let me stop there for these initial remarks. thank