are no risks. there is currently a lot of uncertainty about the direction of the united states ’ economic policy in the coming months. we now have a good sense of how things will develop in china, but not in the united states. and it ’ s a fairly similar story with the united kingdom. it shows how a country can create severe difficulties for itself. europe offers a robust institutional framework, including for trade. the internal market works and is very important. and now the united kingdom is leaving it and heading for great uncertainty. what can the negotiations achieve? in my opinion, the british have made a huge mistake. populist forces have stirred up people ’ s fears and fear is not a good counsellor. the damage is done, the british economy is already slowing down. now it is just about minimising the negative impact. i hope there will still be a reasonably sensible solution. does us policy also concern you a lot? not many major decisions have been made there yet, unlike in the united kingdom. and i hope that, in the end, reason will prevail. in general we should not get mixed up in power politics where everyone only seeks their own advantage. ultimately, the danger is that large countries dictate deals to the others. that would be catastrophic. we need strong international institutions. and we again need a unified europe. because the weaker europe is, the more dangerous it will be for us. 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches

peter praet : interview in der spiegel interview with mr peter praet, member of the executive board of the european central bank, in der spiegel, conducted by mr stefan kaiser on 19 june 2017 and published on 22 june 2017. * * * mr praet, you are a belgian who was born in germany and who spent the first years of your childhood here. can you understand why so many people here regard the european central bank ( ecb ) as the greatest threat to their personal wealth? i think the german public is much more impartial on that point. most people understand the position we are in : we have to define the right monetary policy for a monetary union with very different countries. the press often criticises us for this, but the personal discussions i have here are much more courteous and relaxed. even the discussions within the ecb ’ s governing council are very good, even when there are critical voices. but it ’ s the germans who complain most about the ecb, isn ’ t it? of course, criticism in germany is somewhat more vocal than in other countries. that also has to do with germany ’ s role in the financial and euro crisis. because, on the one hand, it had already undertaken important reforms and was in a stronger position. and because, on the other hand, the people of germany are by tradition not so highly indebted. that ’ s a cultural thing – and i very much share it. but it ’ s also a factor that played a role in the origin of the crisis. how? it concerns the creditor - debtor relationship : before the crisis, germany was a significant lender to other countries. german savers invested, mainly via their banks, a lot of money abroad – in those countries where households and companies had bigger debts, for example spain. and the crisis came and the money flowed back – €400 billion came back from spain alone and a large part of that originated in german savings. the ecb made liquidity available to banks in exchange for collateral. that prevented a meltdown of the financial system, which otherwise would have led to strongly deflationary pressure across the euro area. so germany was also saved by the ecb? in germany, one might say that it ’ s obvious that debtors have to pay back what they owe. but the lenders also bear a responsibility. they too should be careful. the germans are complaining about the interest rates being