samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
##ystem. however, challenges can also be opportunities. and by acting together, as we have done over the last two years, we will manage and take advantage of them. 1 on 9 june 2022. 2 five - year forward ils rate currently stands at 2. 3 % and three - year - ahead inflation expectations from the ecb consumer expectations survey shifted from 2. 0 % to 2. 9 % in march. 5 year 5 year forward inflation expectation | macrotrends 3 the globalisation of inflation ( europa. eu ) 5 / 5 bis - central bankers'speeches

in inflation was not unexpected, considering the low reference base in 2020, but turned out to be more significant, broader and more persistent. for slovenia, the broadening of inflationary pressures is well illustrated by the fact that the share of items in the hicp basket with more than 5 % price growth increased from around 20 % in the autumn of last year to over 60 % in april. 1 / 5 bis - central bankers'speeches however, even before the russian invasion of ukraine there were signs that it will take longer for inflation to moderate than projected last year. the war and anti - russia sanctions on top of new waves of covid infections exacerbated global supply constraints. this caused the euro area and global inflation to surge further, and accelerated the process of winding down of the historic monetary stimulus globally. in turn, the worry arose whether all these developments could tip our economies into a recession, as shown – for example – by the rising number of google searches for the word " recession ". the topic was also high on the agenda at the recent gathering in davos. within the eurosystem, we are in the process of preparing new macroeconomic projections, which we will publish next week. 1 as already revealed publicly, the recession is not part of the baseline scenario that is the most likely to materialise. while there are some clouds gathering over the economy, we do not currently see a storm. despite the increased cost of living and the devastating war at the door of europe, the economic activity in the euro area expanded further in the first quarter. the incoming high frequency and first hard data also bode quite well for the second quarter. in particular, the number of people employed in the euro area is at a record high, and the unemployment rate hit new low in may. the eurozone purchasing manager index ( pmi ) declined somewhat in may but still signals growth. consumer confidence, which deteriorated sharply after the russian invasion, broadly stabilised in may, while at the same time households have accumulated considerable savings during the pandemic. however, beyond the second quarter, the uncertainty is greater and there are considerable economic risks due to the war and geopolitical tensions. in sum, we are currently in an unusual and challenging situation. according to many economic indicators - such as employment, labour shortages, capacity utilisation in manufacturing, elevated inflation and over - valuation of housing markets - we are high in the business cycle. at the same time, our monetary policy is still
systemically important. global ccps are likely to be established – some are already up and running – that will clear different types of otc derivatives such as interest rate swaps, credit default swaps, or commodity - based swaps that are traded around the world, both solely within one country or on a cross - border basis. many regulators have important stakes in ensuring that a global ccp can meet its obligations. in addition to regulators of the country in which the ccp is headquartered, these include foreign regulators. these regulators may be interested parties for many reasons. for example, their currencies may be used in settling the obligations of the ccp, they may have counterparties to the ccp that are headquartered or do significant amounts of business in their country, or they may have fmis that are linked to the ccp. i want to emphasize that effective cooperative oversight is essential. otherwise, the risk is that the system will become overly fragmented, with a proliferation of national ccps. in this case, many of the risk - reducing benefits from ccps could be lost or severely attenuated. that is because fewer offsetting positions would likely be cleared through any particular ccp and this would reduce the scope for reducing large gross exposures into much smaller net positions. the second safeguard is to ensure fair, open and safe access to global fmis around the world. it is important, for example, that global ccps have rules that are not exclusionary or that unnecessarily entrench the position of whatever dealer, firm, or fmi is currently dominant in the market. the third safeguard is to establish rules to ensure that, if a major market participant were to fail, a ccp can liquefy its collateral quickly so that it can meet its obligations in a timely way. but this also needs to be done in a way that would not disrupt financial markets or the ccp ’ s participants. as i will discuss shortly, although there may be a potential role for central banks here, ccps, at a minimum, must have their own liquidity resources as the first line of defense. bis central bankers ’ speeches fourth, there needs to be a viable resolution regime for ccps. this is needed to ensure that the ccp either can be recapitalized and recover or, if necessary, wound down in an orderly way without disrupting the provision of essential market services. also, a resolution regime is necessary to ensure that a central bank

goals of maximum employment and price stability. once again, thank you for this evening ’ s award. 1 1 board of governors of the federal reserve system, federal reserve issues fomc statement, march 3, 2020. 2 2 board of governors of the federal reserve system, statement regarding monetary policy implementation, october 11, 2019 ; federal reserve bank of new york, statement regarding treasury bill purchases and repurchase operations, october 11, 2019. 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches
yandraduth googoolye : renewed protectionist tendencies - some implications for macroeconomic policy in africa speech by mr yandraduth googoolye, governor of the bank of mauritius, at the continental seminar of the aacb for the year 2019, balaclava, 6 may 2019. * * * deputy governors mr papa lamine diop, executive secretary of the aacb delegates from member central banks ladies and gentlemen members of the media good morning and a warm welcome to you all in mauritius for this 2019 aacb continental seminar. this is the first time that the bank is hosting this event. we are pleased to have participation from 24 member central banks and 12 institutions. i am given to understand that we have about 70 participants. the large turn - out demonstrates the importance of the chosen theme. the bank of mauritius has participated actively in aacb meetings and activities over the past years. mr diop, who is with us today, can bear testimony to this. we hosted the governors ’ meetings of the aacb eastern africa sub - region in july 2007 and july 2008 and we also hosted the aacb annual meetings in august 2013 in our capacity as vice – chair of the association. last year, as chair of the sub - region, the bank hosted for the third time the governors ’ meeting for the eastern africa sub - region. the theme for this 2019 continental seminar : ‘ renewed protectionist tendencies : some implications for macroeconomic policy in africa ’ is highly pertinent and topical. in its latest regional economic outlook for sub - saharan africa, the imf has estimated growth to pick up from 3 percent in 2018 to 3. 5 percent in 2019. the economic recovery under way is a positive development. however, one can reasonably argue that current and expected growth levels are somewhat inadequate to lift millions of people out of poverty and provide decent jobs to an estimated 20 million new entrants to labour markets each year. the imf has also cautioned against downside risks stemming from heightened trade tensions, slower growth in china, lower commodity prices, and tighter global financial conditions, which could lower growth in sub - saharan africa by 2 percentage points this year. as expected, the impact would be more pronounced for commodity exporters and countries with stronger links to china and global markets. a review of the performance of african countries with respect to the african monetary cooperation program criteria in recent years indicates clearly that african countries are not building adequate fiscal and external buffers to cope with a range

it a success. thank you. 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches
to open a bank account. regulatory authorities in respective countries could be of help in this respect. also, albanian banks may receive albanian workers ’ remittances via “ banking correspondent institutions ” in the resident country and microcredit and microfinance albanian organizations which could serve as local agencies to handle this process. third : directing workers ’ remittances toward country ’ s development needs. usually, emigrants are out of the main focus of banking services, since this category of clients is considered to have unstable jobs. nonetheless, there exists opportunities to offer financial services to emigrants too. among others i could mention here : linking of workers ’ remittances with investments for example by channelling remittances flows toward micro - credit loans or projects ; also supporting of migrants ’ contribution and migrants societies in the development of the country. remittances could also help approaching rural areas population to the banks. if the recipient families also decide to keep remittances in their bank accounts this could assist economic development as more funds are available to be lent to private sector. microcredit programs and qualitative improvements of banking infrastructure, in concert with introduction of new financial instruments that would attract more remittances, are also important. finally, i would like to express my sincere appreciation to those involved in this conference which provides us a valuable support in our efforts to improve effectiveness of remittances utilization in our economies. i am confident that the distinguished speakers from various institutions, who are present at this conference, would share further helpful ideas and suggestions ( we already heard some very interesting ones in the previous discussions ), thus ensuring the formulation of sound measures to be incorporated in our policies on remittances. and i strongly hope this exchange of experiences and expertise will continue in the future and contribute producing adequate human, infrastructure, and institutional capacities to transform remittances from potential into real driving forces for the development of our countries. again, my highest consideration for this activity and thank you for your attention! 5 / 5

boost and encourage the macroeconomic stability of the country, the improvement of the business climate, the increase of efficiency and competitiveness, the improvement of human and institutional capacities, as well as the comprehensive development of infrastructure, is the one and only path toward a faster economic and social progress. 2 / 2 bis - central bankers'speeches
experts. i would like to wish all parties involved the very best of luck.

has made, it has fewer incentives to monitor that loan. besides, in periods of extensive securitisation, when the bank knows that new loans can be securitised – which in some countries can imply that the risk will be totally borne by investors outside the bank – the ex ante incentives for screening are notably reduced. all these important changes in the banking industry have taken place against an ostensibly benign but potential dangerous macroeconomic backdrop : the so - called great moderation. indeed, the protracted period of high economic growth and low short and long - term interest rates contributed to giving the banking sector some very good years. however, that is precisely when risk builds up – and it can be excessive. 6 moreover, we should not overlook that macro fragilities emerged during the benign macroeconomic context : for example, both the current account deficit and the share of the real estate sector activity were around 10 % of gdp in 2006. all these elements contributed to a credit boom throughout the spanish economy, particularly in the real estate sector. in this context, let me add that – crucially – the bank of spain reacted very well : notably by introducing a strict regulatory system for special purpose vehicles which significantly restricted regulatory capital arbitrage, and by introducing dynamic provisions, which may have reduced the very high credit supply in the good years. without those measures the credit boom could have been even bigger. 7 moreover, the provision see also stiglitz et al. ( 2000 ) ; matutes and vives ( 2000 ), and martinez - miera and repullo ( 2010 ). see kalemli - ozcan, pappaioannou and peydro ( 2010 ). see allen and gale ( 2000 ). see brunnermeier and petersen ( 2009 ). see mian and sufi ( 2009 ) ; maddaloni and peydro ( 2011 ) ; jimenez, mian, peydro and sufi ( 2011 ), altunbas, marques and gambacorta ( 2010 ). see perez - quiros ( 2000 ) ; adrian and shin ( 2009 ) ; allen and rogoff ( 2011 ) ; rajan and diamond ( 2009 ) ; jimenez et al. ( 2011 ) ; jimenez and saurina ( 2006 ). see jimenez, ongena, peydro and saurina ( 2011 ). bis central bankers ’ speeches buffers have been vital during the crisis as they have allowed banks to continue supporting
sizable enough that i believe they may well play a role in helping these families economically. figure 12 shows that half of the top 5 percent of households by wealth reported receiving an inheritance at some time, but a considerable number of others did as well – almost 30 percent of the next 45 percent and 12 percent of the bottom 50. inheritances are concentrated at the top of the wealth distribution but less so than total wealth. just over half of the total value of inheritances went to the top 5 percent and 40 percent went to households in the next 45. seven percent of inheritances were shared among households in the bottom 50 percent, a group that together held only 1 percent of all wealth in 2013. 43 the average inheritance reported by those in the top 5 percent who had received them was $ 1. 1 million. that amount dwarfs the $ 183, 000 average among the next 45 percent and the $ 68, 000 reported among the bottom half of households. but compared with the typical wealth of these households, the additive effect of bequests of this size is significant for the millions of households below the top 5 that receive them. the average age for receiving an inheritance is 40, when many parents are trying to save for and secure the opportunities of higher education for their children, move up to a larger home or one in a better neighborhood, launch a business, switch careers, or perhaps relocate to seek more opportunity. considering the overall picture of limited resources for most families that i have described today, i think the effects of inheritances for the sizable minority below the top that receive one are likely a significant source of economic opportunity. conclusion in closing, let me say that, with these examples, i have only just touched the surface of the important topic of economic opportunity, and i look forward to learning more from the work presented at this conference. as i noted at the outset, research about the causes and implications of inequality is ongoing, and i hope that this conference helps spur further study of economic opportunity and its effects on economic mobility. using the scf and other sources, i have tried to offer some observations about how access to four specific sources of opportunity may vary across households, but i cannot offer any conclusions about how much these factors influence income and wealth inequality. i do believe that these are important questions, and i hope that further research will help answer them. this topic is discussed extensively in thomas piketty ( 2014 ), capital in the 21st century, trans. arthur goldhammer ( cambridge, mass.

: belknap press ). reported inheritances can have been received at any point in the respondent ’ s life. as with other forms of wealth cited in these remarks, inheritances have been adjusted for inflation and are expressed in 2013 dollars. bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches
want finance that is not only safe but also purposeful. regulation must not seek to eliminate all risk and must be impact - sensitive. let us not lose sight of the bigger picture : a sound financial system that is able to play its vital role of intermediation, to support sustained economic growth and help create opportunities for individuals and enterprises. thank you. bis central bankers ’ speeches

there are concerns that the various regulatory reforms taken together may lead to a pullback in trade finance and long - term investment financing. the global regulatory community and national governments have become increasingly sensitised to these concerns. in the area of trade finance, the basel committee consulted the world bank, the world trade organisation, and other relevant bodies. a number of adjustments were made to the capital and liquidity rules to facilitate trade finance. • in the area of capital rules, the basel committee waived the one year maturity floor for certain trade finance instruments under the advanced internal ratings - based approach for credit risk. it also waived the sovereign risk - weight floor for certain trade finance - related claims using the standardised approach for credit risk. • in the area of liquidity, the basel committee issued guidance for national supervisors to apply relatively low run - off rates for trade finance commitments. preliminary data suggests that the availability and cost of trade finance has not been greatly impacted to - date by the implementation of basel iii. spreads have normalised post - crisis and pricing appears to be influenced more by broader macro factors and competition. further, there are many well - capitalised banks, especially in asia, that are well - placed to operate in the new regulatory regime ; and many of them have stepped up. we should continue to monitor closely the impact of regulatory changes on trade finance. trade is the lifeblood of asian economies. but we have a bigger challenge in long - term financing, especially for infrastructure. it may be the case that the post - crisis financial system may not be adequately structured to provide certain types of long - term financing. • first, longer - term corporate and project finance loans already attract a higher capital charge compared to short term loans. coupled with the increased overall capital requirements under basel iii, this may create a disincentive for long - term loans. • second, to meet liquidity requirements, banks may substitute long - term lending activities with short - term lending. in calculating the net stable funding ratio, lower weights are assigned to loans with maturities of less than a year. • third, solvency ii, which will impose higher risk charges on longer - dated assets, may result in insurers de - risking by taking on shorter - dated assets. • fourth, the interaction between central clearing, margining and capital requirements may impact the variety and liquidity of some derivatives such as long - dated interest rate swaps used to hedge risks associated with long - term financing. bis central
gdp and employment, but in the long run, we risk instability, damaging inflation and lost jobs, which is a dear price for middle and lower income citizens to pay. however, the long run is not yet here. we have opportunities to assure greater long - term stability. moving policy from highly accommodative to merely accommodative would be a step in the right direction. in this way, we can achieve a better long - run outcome than if we delay normalization. bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches

policy interest rates remain zero, and the federal reserve ’ s balance sheet continues to expand even as the economy improves. with these actions, the fomc ’ s objectives have shifted from that of containing a global crisis to that of more quickly accelerating economic growth. its components focus on raising inflation expectations, increasing asset values and pushing up growth in aggregate demand, and, as stated in its september 2010 press release, employment. while i agree these are worthy goals, i am concerned that maintaining a crisisoriented policy as the tool to achieve them significantly changes the economic risks. past success in pursuing this form of policy is mixed at best. central banks and the long run a swiss central banker once advised me that the duty of a central banker is to take care of the long run so the short run can take care of itself. in the united states, this simple expression has been codified in its laws. the federal reserve act requires that, “ the … federal open market committee shall maintain long - run growth of the monetary and credit aggregates commensurate with the economy ’ s long - run potential to increase production, so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long - term interest rates. ” these mandates recognize that the factors of production come together in a systematic fashion across economies, sectors within economies and resource availability to create growth. the process is not simple nor does it occur quickly – which is the purpose of putting policy in the context of the long run. it is within this context that policy should acknowledge the improving economic trends and begin to withdraw some degree of accommodation. if this is not done, then the risk of introducing new imbalances and long - term inflationary pressures into an already fragile recovery increase significantly. short - run actions have consequences in the spring of 2003 there was worldwide concern that the u. s. economy was falling into a “ japanese - like ” malaise ; the recovery was stalling, deflation was likely to occur and unemployment was too high. this was the prevailing view despite the fact that the u. s. economy was growing at a 3. 2 percent annual rate and the global economy ’ s average growth was nearly 3. 6 percent. in addition, the fed funds policy rate was 1 ¼ percent. although most bis central bankers ’ speeches knew that such a low rate would support an expanding economy, in june 2003 it was lowered further to 1 percent and was left at that rate for nearly a year, as insurance