yves mersch : legal aspects of the european central bank ’ s response to the coronavirus ( covid - 19 ) pandemic – an exclusive but narrow competence keynote speech by mr yves mersch, member of the executive board of the european central bank and vice - chair of the supervisory board of the european central bank, at the escb legal conference, frankfurt am main, 2 november 2020. * * * exploring the legal framework governing the ecb ’ s actions – scope and general legal principles when exploring the scope of our actions we are cognisant that the ecb has exclusive but narrow competence to define the european union monetary policy for the purpose of maintaining price stability. moreover, the european court of justice has consistently held that the ecb enjoys broad discretion in defining monetary policy within its mandate to pursue the objective of price stability. discretion without limits increases the risk of arbitrariness. therefore the court has insisted on being able to control this discretion on the basis of the criteria that some refer to as the self - imposed constraints. furthermore, we are bound to respect certain established legal principles. our measures must be proportionate to the ecb ’ s legitimate objectives. they must not undermine the spirit of the “ no bailout clause ” and must also comply with the prohibition of monetary financing, which is its monetary policy counterpart. last of all, the principle of an open market economy in which resources are allocated efficiently must also be respected. these are the constitutional red lines for our actions. our bold monetary policy response to the pandemic provides ample liquidity and acts as a backstop : the liquidity provided via the targeted longer - term refinancing operations ( tltros ) and the pandemic emergency longer - term refinancing operations ( peltros ) both of which are supported by collateral easing measures, in addition to asset purchases through the continuation of our asset purchase programme ( app ) and the launch of our pandemic emergency purchase programme ( pepp ). these measures endeavour to respect the principles i have just mentioned in order to be legally sound. first, all the instruments deployed in response to the pandemic are provided for in primary eu law ( article 18. 1 of the statute of the escb ) : to achieve its objectives, the ecb may operate in the financial markets by buying and selling marketable instruments outright, and may conduct credit operations based on adequate collateral. second, the crisis measures taken pursue monetary policy objectives with due respect

david dodge : adjusting to a changing economic world remarks by mr david dodge, governor of the bank of canada, to the board of trade of metropolitan montreal, montreal, 11 february 2004. * * * good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. it ’ s a pleasure to be with you here in montreal today. these are turbulent times, not just for business people, but for all canadians. we have come through a very difficult year, a year filled with surprises that have challenged us all. at times like these, it is easy to focus on the near - term issues and problems. but by doing that, we risk losing sight of the big picture. the bank of canada had plenty to say about the near - term outlook in its monetary policy report update a few weeks ago. so today, i want to talk about the longer - term trends at work in the economy. in doing so, i want to take a quick look back at some of the major economic events of recent decades, and examine how we approached the issues of adjustment at the time. then, i will discuss the adjustments that are needed now and in the future. in this way, i hope to draw on the lessons learned from the past. i will frame this discussion in terms of structural economic policies, macroeconomic policies, and the role of the exchange rate in facilitating adjustments. previous adjustment policies i will start by going back to the 1970s. there were at least two forces at play that highlighted the need for economic adjustments. the first was a significant drop in the rate of productivity growth. canada, like the united states, had become accustomed to productivity rising at a rapid pace during the 1950s and 1960s. with this growth in productivity came steady advances in real incomes. but the trend towards higher productivity slowed abruptly in the early 1970s. at the time, policy - makers, business, and labour assumed that the slowdown was cyclical. it wasn ’ t. economists still don ’ t have a complete explanation for it. but what we now understand more clearly is that the productivity increases of the 1950s and 1960s had a lot to do with the application throughout the economy of earlier advances in general - purpose technology. businesses took advantage of various technological advances in many diverse fields, enabling them to realize significant productivity gains. when productivity growth slowed in the 1970s, many people assumed that the slowdown was temporary and that rapid growth would resume on its own. this was a mistake. without solid productivity gains, the economy was unable to deliver the increases in