samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
will be adjusted. thank you for your attention. 1 available in norwegian only. 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches

. the policy rate increase is intended to prevent a rise in pressures in the economy that would trigger an acceleration in price and wage inflation. a higher interest rate also mitigates the risk of a renewed, rapid rise in property prices and debt. high price and wage inflation and a further build - up of financial imbalances would increase the risk of a sharp economic downturn further out. the plan is to move gradually to a more normal interest rate level. our assessment in march was that capacity utilisation was slightly above a normal level. at the same time, underlying inflation was a little higher than the inflation target of 2 percent. our projections implied that the policy rate would be raised in the course of the next half - year. there were also prospects that the policy rate would rise to 1. 75 percent by the end of 2022. this means that the average residential mortgage rate could increase from 2. 6 percent in march to 3. 5 percent in the course of the same period. we therefore believe that interest rates will not be as high as in previous upturns. with that path for the policy rate, inflation is projected to be close to target in the years ahead, at the same time as unemployment remains low. more persons employed and prospects of higher wage growth will contribute to lifting income. despite higher interest rates, there are prospects that most households will experience an improvement in purchasing power in the coming years. the risk outlook is dominated by global developments. over the past year, rising protectionism and political uncertainty have weighed on global growth. the uk ’ s relations with the eu have yet to be clarified. if trade tensions deepen, growth among trading partners may be lower than we projected in march. the uncertainty surrounding global developments and the effects of monetary policy suggests a cautious approach to interest rate setting. our most recent monetary policy meeting was held yesterday, and we published the decision earlier today. since the publication of our march projections, capacity utilisation appears to be rising as expected, while inflation has been a little higher than projected. global uncertainty persists. at its monetary policy meeting, the executive board decided to keep the policy rate unchanged at 1. 0 percent. the executive board ’ s current assessment of the outlook and balance of risks suggests that the policy rate will most likely be raised in june. our mission is to deliver low and stable inflation, while contributing to high and stable output and employment. should economic developments diverge from our current projections, the policy rate path
for release on delivery 1 : 30 p. m. edt october 10, 2023 monetary policy analysis and the development of federal reserve policymaking remarks by christopher j. waller member board of governors of the federal reserve system at “ the legacy of bennett mccallum and lessons for monetary policy today, ” a conference sponsored by the mercatus center at george mason university washington, d. c. october 10, 2023 it is a pleasure to be here to honor the legacy of bennett mccallum by discussing his work on monetary policy. over the years, i was fortunate to cross paths with ben several times — from when i was a young academic economist to when i was research director at the federal reserve bank of st. louis. but, like many of you, most of my exposure to ben mccallum ’ s thinking has consisted of reading, and learning from, his writings on monetary policy. ben was an influential researcher who focused on a number of topics that are key to monetary policy, some of them highlighted in today ’ s panel sessions, including policy rules, instruments, and targets. when i was an academic, these were research interests that i shared with ben. more recently, since i became a member of the federal open market committee ( fomc ), the same issues have been at the forefront of my work, as i will explain in my remarks today. i will cover these issues in the context of discussing broad developments in u. s. monetary policy over the past quarter - century. 1 in doing so, i ’ m motivated by mccallum ’ s 1999 paper “ recent developments in monetary policy analysis : the roles of theory and evidence, ” which was a review of the previous 25 years. 2 in my remarks, i ’ ll first talk about changes that have taken place since the 1990s in the way in which the fomc has conducted policy. then i ’ ll turn to a discussion of monetary policy rules, how ben thought about them, their use as an input into policymakers ’ decisions, and the choice of instruments and targets in policy rules. the views expressed here are my own and not necessarily those of my colleagues on the fomc or the board of governors. see mccallum ( 1999b ). - 2developments in monetary policy from 1998 to 2023 mccallum ’ s review, which was largely written in 1998, contrasted monetary policy analysis in 1973 and 1998. in 1973, many economies were adjusting to the demise of the bretton woods

policy. — — — ( 1993 ). “ discretion versus policy rules in practice, ” carnegie - rochester conference series on public policy, vol. 39 ( december ), pp. 195−214. volcker, paul a. ( 1980 ). “ statement [ and testimony ] of paul a. volcker, chairman, board of governors of the federal reserve system, ” in federal reserve ’ s second monetary policy report for 1980, hearings before the committee on banking, housing, and urban affairs, u. s. senate, july 22, 1980, 96 cong. washington : government printing office, pp. 96 – 141. woodford, michael ( 2003 ). interest and prices : foundations of a theory of monetary policy. princeton, n. j. : princeton university press.
addressed about their resilience. the work of this centre, in pursuit of its mission, can contribute to understanding of that. and i look forward to collaborating in future. because markets will from time to time be stretched. it ’ s important that the economic body remains fit enough to stretch without causing strains. all speeches are available online at www. bankofengland. co. uk / speeches

glenn stevens : observations on the financial system address by mr glenn stevens, governor of the reserve bank of australia, to the australian financial review banking & wealth summit, sydney, 28 april 2015. * * * i thank elliott james for assistance in compiling these remarks. good morning and thank you to the australian financial review for inviting me to speak here today. your conference comes at an opportune time, since there are plenty of things to talk about. global financial markets are still in the grip of a pervasive search for yield. major regulatory reform proposals are still being designed and implemented at the global level. meanwhile, technological change is continuing to offer new opportunities for businesses to serve customers and disrupting established ways of doing things. and, not least, the financial system inquiry released its final report late last year. you have a very extensive list of speakers over the next two days who will no doubt cover all this territory and more. so my remarks will be fairly general only. ahead of next week ’ s meeting of the reserve bank board, i have no comments to offer today on monetary policy. perhaps i might begin with a few remarks about the financial system inquiry. the reserve bank welcomes the inquiry ’ s report. the inquiry had a distinguished committee, a capable secretariat, and an effective and robust process of discussion and engagement. the bank found its own engagement with the committee very constructive. the report is comprehensive and shows the inquiry grappling with the big issues of our time. i hope the chairman will not mind me saying that all inquiries are, inevitably, shaped to some extent by the circumstances they face. the campbell inquiry came at a time when the weight of informed opinion had already shifted quite a way towards favouring deregulation. after a long period of experience with a highly regulated system, the limitations were, by the mid 1970s, increasingly apparent. so the push was towards a financial system where market forces dictated more of the terms of engagement. that deregulatory mindset helped prepare the ground for two of the most significant – and beneficial – changes our financial system has seen in modern times. floating the exchange rate was one of them. the other was removing constraints on competition in the banking system. by the time the wallis inquiry came around in the mid 1990s the financial system had undergone significant change. there had been an influx of new banks. there had been a sharp run - up in credit, a boom in asset prices, a bust and a painful recession in the early
profitable regional trade. to date 43 % of the total kenyan exports of goods and services go to the eac region. these exports are mostly manufactured exports. there is scope for more within the eac and locational advantages. this is what we want to strive for in eac and these are the positive development agenda eac presents to kenya and east african countries. thank you for your attention.

jean - paul redouin : risks may be transferred, but they do not disappear! address by mr jean - paul redouin, deputy governor of the bank of france, at the paris europlace, financial forum, stockholm, 29 march 2007. * * * the international financial system is going through an extraordinarily benign phase. the world is enjoying stable inflation and strong and broad - based gdp growth. at the macrofinancial level, corporate profits have been sustained, risk premia have been very thin for a broad set of asset classes, and volatilities remain unusually low. based on these market signals, risks appear very low. do risk premia correctly reflect the risks currently facing the financial system? or is their low level the result of excessive risk appetite on financial markets? indeed, some recent warning signals have reminded us how fragile the current pricing of risk is, and how much it relies on the expectation that an “ ideal scenario ” of strong growth and contained inflation will prevail. in this context, i would like to focus my remarks on a very important structural development : credit risk transfer. basically, the transfer of risks helps to spread them, according to a process i shall call the “ atomisation of risk " ( namely risk being split into elementary particles and then re - packaged ). but do these techniques mean that risks disappear? the breakthrough of crt has gone hand in hand with constant innovation and the emergence of powerful non - bank players. the financial markets are therefore in a state of permanent revolution in which globalisation and disintermediation have made the channels risk can take more complex and affected its traceability. this evolution can bring stability and resilience to the system only under certain conditions. the role of a central banker and supervisor is to list them, to inform the financial community of the systemic aspects of their development and to implement certain key policy measures. 1. crt can improve distribution of risk and stronger resilience to shocks. how? the first benefit is linked to a process of “ atomisation ” of risk. greater risk dispersion among investors may increase the resilience of the financial system in the event of shocks. financial engineering has enabled credit risk to be extracted from banks ’ balance sheets and broken down into portions of risk that are repackaged into portfolio products. this is the essence of securitisation mechanisms : the default of a large issuer has less chance of resulting in the default of its
which is one reason why, alongside banking union, the capital markets union, championed by commissioner hill, also needs to be implemented fully and as quickly as practical. i am not saying “ as quickly as practical ” for no reason. if we want to restore in europe the stability that is the premise for a return to prosperity, we need to consider the economic costs entailed by recurrent uncertainty over the operating environment of european firms. not only does it cause a loss of growth today, but by impeding investment, it may also weaken our potential in a more lasting way. increasing the horizon of visibility is desirable generally, but it is true that an apparently never ending train of reform is not greatly conducive to reducing uncertainty. there is a simple solution to that : specify what we want to change, clarify the calendar to do it, and then just do it. this is exactly how the ssm was established. and that is perhaps the last area of significance of the ssm that i have not yet mentioned : it is the yardstick against which we can now judge other achievements. bis central bankers ’ speeches

they are no substitute for structural adjustment. for the banking system, the upcoming asset quality review and stress test will be a crucial catalyst in this regard. first, the aqr will foster transparency by providing a realistic assessment of the balance sheet situation in euro area banks. second, in the specific cases deemed necessary, the aqr will induce balance sheets repair by prescribing certain adjustment measures to individual banks. and third, as a result of the first two, the aqr will foster confidence in the banks among all the major stakeholders. overall, these measures will help to restore confidence, contribute to integration and stability and therefore support a normal functioning of the banking system and monetary policy transmission. the goals of single supervisory mechanism will, therefore, crucially complement our monetary policy objectives. bis central bankers ’ speeches
in point is a surge in cross - border lending. cross - border lending by banks in industrial countries toward emerging economies continued to increase over time, and has accelerated since 2003. lending toward central and eastern europe by euro area banks was more conspicuous. that process inevitably involved the expansion of a dual mismatch, that is, a currency and maturity mismatch, which was supported by a sense of abundant liquidity in both domestic and foreign currencies. in the wake of the crisis, fragility stemming from the dual mismatch abruptly exerted severe funding pressures, further deepening the crisis in many countries, including emerging economies. by contrast, during japan ’ s bubble era in the late 1980s, the increase in cross - border lending was not globally observed and mostly limited to japanese financial institutions. as a related issue, “ the global savings glut ” is often pointed as one of the causes for the global credit bubble, but i am a little skeptical about that line of argument. it is true that savings by emerging economies are one of its determinants, since global real interest rates are determined so as to equate the savings and investment in the global economy. to understand the phenomenon of the global credit bubble, however, gross capital flows are far more important than net capital flows. the gross capital flows do not necessarily correspond to the savings - investment balances at a national and regional level. in fact, it was euro area banks that strikingly expanded cross - border lending, while the euro area as a whole did not register a current account surplus. international coordination : assessment on the current crisis responses to the extent that a crisis becomes increasingly globalized, greater cooperation among policymakers will be called for. how should policy responses so far be assessed from the viewpoint of international coordination? i will start with positive developments. first, governments and central banks in many countries have carried out aggressive macroeconomic policy responses to stave off a significant deterioration in economic activity. second, many countries have provided public capital to financial institutions and instituted government guarantees on their liabilities. third, coordination between central banks in conducting money market operations has advanced significantly. a case in point is the u. s. dollar funds - supplying operations at many central banks, backed by the u. s. dollar swap arrangements with the u. s. federal reserve. fourth, the prior collaborative efforts by central banks and private financial institutions in reducing settlement risk have proven effective. the functioning of currency swap markets, which

changes in the payment page 3 / 4 zurich, 17 december 2020 fritz zurbrugg news conference habits of households in switzerland. the survey also asked specific questions regarding the impact of the coronavirus pandemic on cash use. the snb will communicate the detailed survey results in mid - 2021. page 4 / 4
third quarter of last year. developments in the united kingdom over this same period are consistent with the u. s. experience. british households'equity wealth increased more than ¢g880 billion ( thousand million ) between 1995 and 2000 - - a gain in excess of 50 percent - - while their housing wealth rose by more than ¢g650 billion. at the same time, household saving fell from 10 percent of income in 1995 to around 4 percent in early 2000. as in the united states, equity prices in the united kingdom have fallen sharply since 2000. the ftse 350 index now stands almost 25 percent below its peak in september 2000, and the techmark 100 index has fallen around 75 percent since its peak. the saving rate appears not to have increased much over this period, in part because house prices have continued to rise at double - digit annual rates and in part because of lagged effects of past wealth increases. these explanations, if correct, could be similar to those for the united states. karen e. dynan and dean m. maki, " does stock market wealth matter for consumption? " finance and economics discussion series, 2001 - 23 ( board of governors of the federal reserve system, may 2001 ). dean m. maki and michael g. palumbo, " disentangling the wealth effect : a cohort analysis of household saving in the 1990s, " finance and economics discussion series, 2001 - 21 ( board of governors of the federal reserve system, april 2001 ). to be sure, not every analysis of the link between household wealth and spending comes to the same conclusions as in the studies i mentioned. on balance, however, the link between aggregate household wealth and spending has remained one of the sturdier empirical relationships in macroeconomics. the link between stock - market wealth and consumption given the sturdiness of the empirical relationship, it may be bad form to question its theoretical basis ; but let me do so anyway. first, on the equity side, the value of equities can change for two reasons : because market participants adopt a new view of future profits or because market participants apply a different set of discount factors to those expected profits, where the discount factors incorporate both risk - free interest rates and equity premiums. barry bosworth, robert hall, and others have pointed out that, from a theoretical standpoint, stock - price movements should have different effects on household spending depending on whether they derive from changes in expected profits or from

consumer confidence, economic growth abroad, the foreign exchange value of the dollar, fiscal policy, and so on. the experience of the past few years - - in the united states and the united kingdom - - has emphasized that the effect of wealth on consumption has an important place on that list.
important in market - based finance, or by types of activity or assets. it is worth pausing here to review in a little more detail the two key functions performed by a lender of last resort. the first function is to provide a precautionary backstop : to reduce the risk of a financial panic beginning in the first place by ensuring that collateral can always be financed. 18 the first function is important because it makes it less likely that investors will back away from firms because they think others perceive an elevated risk of insolvency, even if they themselves do not share this view. thus, a lender of last resort facility can reduce the risk of financial instability due to coordination problems even if the lender of last resort is not utilized. 19 in contrast, an emergency facility is unlikely to be as effective. there will be uncertainty around whether it will be deployed, whether it will arrive in time, and how broad it will be. the second function of a lender of last resort is to prevent the fire sale of assets by firms facing a sudden loss of funding from spreading contagion across the system and disrupting the provision of credit to the economy. this is particularly important during a financial panic, when the demand for liquidity increases sharply. only the central bank has the ability to meet this increased demand under any potential circumstances. we have banking activity – maturity transformation – taking place today outside commercial banks. if we believe these activities provide essential credit intermediation services to the real economy that could not be easily replaced by other forms of intermediation, then the same logic that leads us to backstop commercial banking with a lender of last resort might lead us to backstop the banking activity taking place in the markets in a similar way. however, any expansion of access to a lender of last resort would require legislation and it would be essential to have the right quid pro quo – the commensurate expansion in the scope of prudential oversight. substantial prudential regulation of entities – such as broker - dealers20 – that might gain access to an expanded lender of last resort would be required to mitigate moral hazard problems. for example, firms might take less care in managing liquidity and capital if they know they have a lender of last resort backstop and be subject to less counterparty and creditor discipline. in addition, the fact that an institution has access to a lender of last resort facility has value to the institution, even if

process for selecting banknote characters with much more public input, we have reinforced the commitment to openness and transparency which lies at the heart of the bank of england ’ s commitment to accountability. together, these announcements ensure that our banknotes will remain both a national symbol and a source of national pride. bis central bankers ’ speeches