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to have started to overvalue property in order to lower ltv figures on loan applications. 14 completing the legal toolkit the current legal framework harmonises capital - based macroprudential measures. it establishes definitions and parameters, as well as rules and procedures for the allocation of responsibilities between national and european authorities. such measures are subject to a system of eu - level surveillance and, in some cases, authorisations. that system was set up at the very beginning of the european macroprudential experience. national authorities initiate the procedure for national measures. within the euro area, the ecb reviews them and may ‘ top them up ’ ( i. e. make them more restrictive ), while it has no power to ‘ level them down ’. 15 the ecb has defined and published the procedure that it follows when reviewing the national measures. 16 a differentiated impact was observed in israel ( tzur - ilan, 2017 ) for the segment of the population investing in housing ( but not for primary residence ), with a sharp reduction in the value of houses bought after different ltv limits were imposed on different categories of buyers ( first - time buyers, non - first - time buyers and investors who own two or more homes ). similarly, in ireland ( kinghan et al., 2016a and 2016b ), the introduction of differentiated ltv caps had heterogeneous effects based on borrower income. see for instance cerutti et al., 2017 ; ahuja and nabar, 2011. tzur - ilan, 2017. bentzen et al., 2018. acharya et al., 2018. montalvo and raya, 2018. article 5 ( 2 ) ssm regulation ( council regulation ( eu ) no 1024 / 2013 of 15 october 2013 conferring specific tasks on the european central bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, oj l 287, 29. 10. 2013, p. 63 ). regulation of the european central bank of 16 april 2014 establishing the framework for cooperation within the single supervisory mechanism between the european central bank and national competent authorities and with national designated authorities ( ssm framework regulation ) ( ecb / 2014 / 17 ), articles 101 - 105 ( oj, l 141, 14 may 2014, p. 1 ). in contrast, bbms are not harmonised in the relevant legislation. they are thus left to national discretion, in terms of both