0 2. 5 2. 5 2. 0 2. 0 1. 5 1. 5 1. 0 1. 0 0. 5 0. 5 0. 0 0. 0 - 0. 5 - 0. 5 - 1. 0 cy 14 y / y % chg. - 1. 0 jan. apr. notes : 1. in the left panel, q1 = march - may, q2 = june - august, q3 = september - november, q4 = december - february. 2. figures from fiscal 2016 onward are based on continuing observations following the sample revisions. source : ministry of health, labour and welfare. july chart 14 household disposable income united states japan tril. yen tril. usd disposable income employee compensation interest income dividend income cy 90 cy 90 note : figures for japan before 1994 are calculated using year - on - year changes in each item based on the benchmark year of 2000. sources : cabinet office ; u. s. bureau of economic analysis ( bea ). chart 15 household financial assets japan 2, 200 international comparisons tril. yen financial assets ( total ) cash and deposits equity investment trusts 2, 000 1, 800 1, 600 1, 400 1, 200 1, 000 % 3. 5 ( 0. 5 ) 24. 8 ( - 1. 2 ) 2. 0 other 2. 7 27. 7 28. 7 insurance, pension, and standardized guarantees 21. 5 equity 13. 7 ( 2. 3 ) 5. 5 ( 1. 0 ) 40. 5 1. 3 ( 0. 0 ) investment trusts 10. 6 3. 1 debt securities 51. 2 ( - 2. 7 ) 12. 8 4. 6 34. 1 11. 7 japan fy 90 united states euro area note : in the right panel, figures are as of end - march 2024. figures for the united states and the euro area are based on " flow of funds : overview of japan, the united states, and the euro area, " released by the bank's research and statistics department on august 30, 2024. figures for japan in parentheses indicate changes from the previous fiscal year ( % points ). source : bank of japan. cash and deposits chart 16 dynamism of households growth of the firms where people work household expenditure expansion in consumption improving skills through reskilling, etc. changing jobs to growing firms higher wages labor income expansion in sources of income pensions, etc.

/ banking / riskreduction _ 020113. gif bis central bankers ’ speeches meanwhile, in 2010, the securities exchange commission ( sec ) tightened the liquidity requirements and concentration limit rules for 2a - 7 money market mutual funds and increased the fund manager disclosure requirements. these changes, which were intended as a first step, make money funds somewhat less risky. but, they do little to reduce investors ’ incentives to run at the first sign of trouble. worthwhile as the steps taken thus far are, we have not come close to fixing all the institutional flaws in our wholesale funding markets. the tri - party repo system and the money fund industry that plays a crucial role financing collateral through it are both still exposed to runs. in fact, in each of these areas, one could argue that the risks have increased compared to prior to the crisis. that is because the dodd - frank act raised the hurdle for the federal reserve to exercise its section 13. 3 emergency lending authority and because congress has explicitly precluded the u. s. treasury from guaranteeing money market mutual fund assets in the future. with extraordinary interventions ruled out or made much more difficult, this may cause investors to be even more skittish in the future. this is why it is essential to make the system more stable. turning first to the issue of tri - party repo reform, there is still considerable work to do. in particular, the risk that investors will run at the first sign of trouble persists. that is because the costs of running are very low relative to the potential costs of staying put. the potential costs of staying are elevated in part because investors often don ’ t have the capacity to take possession of the collateral or liquidate the collateral in an orderly way should a large dealer fail. both aspects result in run risk, fire sale risk and potential financial instability. let me be clear. we must deal with the fire sale issue in tri - party repo and the heightened run risk it creates. i believe there are three potential ways forward, all of which are superior to the status quo. first, tri - party repo transactions could be restricted to open market operations ( omo ) eligible collateral. 11 such collateral would likely remain quite liquid during a time of crisis. 12 in addition, such collateral could, in a crisis, potentially be passed directly by a broker - dealer to the discount window under section 13. 13 authority, or, because of beneficial treatment under section 23a of the