analyses estimate that svb's interest rate risk sensitivity was around 35 % before the crisis, well above the 15 % alert threshold set out in the international rules and supposed to trigger supervisory action. - monitoring compliance with regulations calls for strict, intrusive and reactive supervision, which, according to the fed, was not the case. let me reassure you on one point : the european situation is radically different. the basel committee's rules are applied in europe in their entirety and to all banks. by the way, i would like to add that europe is in the process of finalising the transposition into european law of the latest reinforcements of the basel iii agreements, ahead of the other major jurisdictions. as regards supervision, the euro area has a single supervisor, the european central bank, which has intrusive supervisory powers and regularly mobilises sophisticated tools such as stress tests and on - site inspections. 1. 2. … but it must be deployed and applied in a consistent manner go to slide 4 ] while the case of svb illustrates the consequences of poor implementation rather than an ineffective regulatory and supervisory framework, this does not mean that it would not be appropriate to amend this framework in the light of experience. hence the " but " after my " no " to the question i asked about the relevance of regulation and supervision. there are indeed several issues that deserve to be addressed, and will undoubtedly be the subject of intense discussions among supervisors in the months to come. i would simply like to mention three of them here. the first issue concerns the supervision of interest rate risk : should the current framework for supervising interest rate risk evolve towards a more systematic and mechanical application of rules? at the acpr we believe not. the heterogeneous nature of interest rate risk requires fine - tuned supervision. this is what the current " enhanced supervision " approach is about : it imposes standardised risk measurement tools, while recognising the specificities of the financing models of the different jurisdictions, such as the granting of long - term fixed - rate loans, or regulated savings, in france. the second issue concerns the treatment of unrealised losses on debt securities carried at amortised cost - i am referring to the unrealised losses that materialised when svb had to sell part of its government bonds portfolio : should these unrealised losses be recognised in the current prudential framework, beyond their simple disclosure in the financial statements? more precisely, should these unrealised losses

and account for 12 percent of gdp, anticipating a considerable potential for growth in years to come. consumer loans and credit card financing show annual growth rates of around 35 percent, which places them among the most dynamic lines. funding to businesses is still increasing in all productive sectors. loans to trade, industry and services sectors grew above average, with a higher share in overall funding. policies implemented by the central bank to favor lending, combined with a favorable macroeconomic framework, have taken household and corporate financing to around 40 percent of total assets in 2008, almost 4 percentage points higher in y. o. y. terms. this took place against a backdrop of a historically low nonperforming loan portfolio ( 2. 8 percent of loans to the private sector ). nonperforming loans fell more than half a percentage point during the past 12 months due to corporate sector financing. the counterpart of the increase in funding to the private sector has been the trend of the system exposure to the public sector, which dropped by 3. 3 percentage points of assets in 2008. it has already accumulated a 27. 5 percentage point drop since late 2004, and is now 14 percent below total assets. these figures – which represent a third of total loans to the private sector – are in line with those for other countries in the region. setting a general ceiling of 35 percent of assets and a maximum limit based on financial institutions ’ capital and for different jurisdiction, and unbiasing minimum capital requirements, among other actions, allowed us to reverse the crowding - out of loans to businesses and households. furthermore, if we take both deposits and loans into account, the government has now become a net creditor of the banking system. one of the main structural reforms of recent years has been the establishment of a regulatory framework preventing currency mismatches ( with peso - denominated assets and liabilities and a lender of last resort that lends in pesos as well ) and maintaining prudence when introducing financial innovations. only 12 percent of deposits are currently denominated in foreign currency, and funding is limited to those who can prove repayment capability in the same currency. our system is not funded with foreign resources ( these only amount to 4 percent of liabilities ) : peso - denominated deposits are the main source of funds for local banks in times when the international financial conditions prevent them from getting resources through the capital markets. after growing at a 22 percent annual rate in the past four years, private sector placement