ecb aims to maintain inflation rates below, but close to, 2 % over the medium term. these two definitions clearly illustrate that, when it comes to financial stability, we are operating at a much more abstract level, with considerably vaguer metrics. 8 financial stability and monetary policy also differ in terms of the instruments they use to pursue their objectives. monetary policy has a fairly settled set of tools – first and foremost, at least in conventional times, the short - term interest rate. financial stability, however, has neither a primary instrument nor a standard taxonomy of instruments. instead, there are various different instruments, ranging from those from the toolbox of the supervisory regulations ( article 5 of the ssmr ), such as maximum loan - to - value limits and countercyclical capital buffers, to taxation, as well as interest rates. could this become an example of policymaking with other people ’ s instruments? some of these instruments are used at national level, while others are deployed in a certain sector or with regard to an individual financial institution. many of these instruments which have financial stability as their stated aim advance macroprudential policies. and so macroprudential policies, like financial stability, are often a concept onto which “ anyone could project their own sense of priorities ” 9 – priorities that often compete with each other. third, unlike price stability, financial stability does not fall under the exclusive competence of a single institution. instead, various actors at national, supranational and international level are given different roles and responsibilities in pursuing financial stability. finance ministries, supervisors, expert bodies ( the esrb, national macroprudential committees and / or regulators which diverge widely in terms of their powers and composition ), central banks and the baselbased financial stability board have all been ascribed a role in financial stability. thus, in all these respects, financial stability is still not a settled field of public policy in the same way that price stability is. and this is not just a matter of theoretical interest. it also has a bearing on the question of who should ultimately be responsible in this field : experts or political bodies. i will come back to this point at the end of my speech. what is the role of the ecb in the field of financial stability? let me now come to my basic question. what role does eu law, and especially primary eu law, foresee for the ecb in the field of financial stability? 2 / 7 bis central

synthetic leverage from a financial stability perspective, i. e. taking into account both on - balance - sheet and offbalance - sheet exposures. the european securities and markets authority ( esma ), which is tasked with harmonising reporting practices, can request access to supervisory data from national authorities. but for various reasons statistical data on synthetic leverage are not see “ euro area non - bank entities ” in financial stability review, ecb, may 2015. see “ synthetic leverage in the investment fund sector ” ecb financial stability review, may 2015. the methodology for measuring synthetic leverage builds on cash - equivalent portfolios, see breuer, p., “ measuring off - balance - sheet leverage ”, journal of banking and finance, vol. 26 ( 2 - 3 ), 2002, pp. 223 – 242. bis central bankers ’ speeches systematically collected at the european level. in my view this needs to be addressed. in time, i also see a need to develop dedicated instruments to address leverage in the shadow banking sector that adequately account for derivative positions. second, our framework for managing non - bank leverage needs to encompass not only intermediaries, but also securities financing transactions through haircuts or margins. 16 important work is being done here at the international level. for repurchase agreements, for example, the fsb has developed minimum haircuts for otc transactions for not centrally settled transactions. 17 i see scope however for further reflection in this area. for instance, these minima do not yet apply across the board. and as has been shown in the past, market imposed haircuts during crisis times are many times higher than any of the static haircuts that are currently discussed, which could mean that margining practices remain procyclical if they cannot be changed in a time - varying way. i see scope however for further reflection in this area. for instance, these minima do not yet apply across the board. and as has been shown in the past, market imposed haircuts during crisis times are many times higher than any of the static haircuts that are currently discussed, which could mean that margining practices remain procyclical if they cannot be changed in a time - varying way. third, liquidity stress poses an equally important source of systemic risk for the non - bank financial system and requires appropriate macroprudential tools. liquidity spirals can be triggered if funds are confronted with strong redemptions or increased margin requirements which force