considerable impact on the monetary policy transmission process, and monetary policymakers ’ ability to guarantee price stability and price developments as such. financial crises almost always originate in excessively loose bank lending. 3 the last crisis was no exception. confining monetary policy to mopping up when the milk is already spilled creates an asymmetry. in my opinion, a symmetrical monetary policy that takes into account money and credit growth and that is oriented towards the medium term seems most conducive to price stability. just to be clear : i am not arguing in favour of a monetary policy that strictly targets money growth. but i do suggest that money and credit developments provide valuable information to monetary policymakers. in principle, this is already the basis of the eurosystem ’ s two - pillar strategy. 4 e - krona finally, a project where the riksbank seems to be even more ahead of the pack is digital central bank money. developments in this field have been dizzying. we have had to familiarise ourselves with new concepts, including at least the basic intuition of the blockchain, and, not to forget, a host of buzzwords. and whereas minting coins in the 17th century required quite a bit of metal, as i pointed out at the beginning, mining crypto token can require quite a bit of energy — a single bitcoin transaction, for example, uses up to 900 kilowatt hours of electricity ( in april 2018 ), enough to power a four - person household for two months. separating hidden potentials of new technologies from the hype and excesses is challenging, often arduous. the effects of digital central bank money on the payment system will not be the only consideration for central banks, however. depending on its concrete design, digital central bank money would provide non - financial corporations and even households with access to the central bank balance sheet. evidently, cash allows this, too. but unlike cash, digital balances have no noteworthy storage costs. 3 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches allowing the public to hold claims on the central bank might make their liquid assets safer, because a central bank cannot become insolvent. this is a feature which will become relevant especially in times of crisis – when there will be a strong incentive for money holders to switch bank deposits into the official digital currency simply at the push of a button. but what might be a boon for savers in search of safety might be a bane for banks, as this makes a bank

need a licensed entity inside the european economic area to gain access to the whole area – this is known as “ passporting ". thecityuk, a banking lobby group, have already dropped their demands for continued passporting rights. many are now hoping for an equivalence decision to fill the gap left by passporting rights. if the european commission deems the regulatory and supervisory regime in the uk to be equivalent to that in the eu, market access would be partly retained. and the chances for equivalence seem 1 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches to be good at first sight. directly before brexit, the uk regime will be equivalent to that of the eu. however, i am very sceptical about whether equivalence decisions offer a sound footing for banks ’ long - term location decisions. equivalence is miles away from single market access. there are three major drawbacks to equivalence decisions. first, they only cover banks ’ wholesale business. second, given the fact that banks need time to build up a new entity elsewhere, an equivalence decision would have to be taken quite soon to actually have a bearing on banks ’ location decisions. third, equivalence decisions are reversible, so banks would be forced to adjust to a new environment in the event that supervisory frameworks are no longer deemed equivalent. these lead to the overall conclusion that equivalence decisions are no ideal substitute for passporting. but let ’ s not forget about european banks ’ access to the uk. for german banks, for example, the uk is the second - most important foreign market, right after the us. it will be up to the uk prudential regulation authority to decide under what circumstances european banks can retain access to the uk. one possibility here is asymmetric equivalence. that is, the uk could unilaterally grant access for eu financial institutions in order to retain london ’ s attractiveness as financial centre. a transition period could ease the pressure on financial institutions. it would reduce earnings risks for banks, which would be economically beneficial. furthermore, it could support a smooth relocation process by taking pressure off both supervisors and banks, for example by preventing “ first - mover advantages ". however, transition periods would be a politically sensitive topic in the negotiations, and it is unclear how likely such an agreement might be. let me summarise the prospects for market access. continued passporting rights are highly unlikely, and an equivalence decision would be an imperfect substitute. a transition period could ease some of the pressure, but it is