are worth noting : ( i ) first, the traditional preferences for bananas and sugar are now practically at an end and the region still finds itself unable to compete with lower - cost producers ; ( ii ) second, foreign aid flows to the region ( with the exception of haiti ) have all be dried up ; ( iii ) third, while caribbean tourism continues to be a viable brand, the region is facing stiffer competition from asian destinations and will experience even greater competitive pressure when cuba is fully opened up ( as it could in the not too distant future ) ; and ( iv ) fourth, the prospect of continued high unemployment in the us and the uk for the next 2 – 3 years will have implications for workers ’ remittances which are very important to some caribbean economies. bis central bankers ’ speeches to add to these exogenous factors, most countries in the region already have unsustainably high debt burdens, which limit the extent to which government spending could lead the recovery. one could argue that trinidad and tobago represents an exception from this theme, given our energy resources, our stronger public finances and our much lower public debt burden which gives us more room to manoeuvre. we should be careful however of pushing that argument too far since ( i ) our proven energy reserves are fast dwindling ( though some experts think that prospects for new discoveries are high ) ; and ( ii ) our fiscal space is being steadily reduced, the more the private sector activity remains subdued and government steps in to lead the recovery. while public sector indebtedness is still at a comfortable level, it too is increasing rapidly to meet the high cost of the clf / clico bailout. let me put our ( trinidad and tobago ’ s ) challenge in another context which further underscores the problem. in the period 2002 – 2006, real gdp increased at an annual rate of close to 10 per cent based on an annual growth of 16. 7 per cent in the energy sector and 5. 6 per cent per year in the non - energy sector. energy sector growth was based on higher oil production and on the expansion of the downstream production capacity – particularly atlantic lng trains 2, 3 and the m5000 methanol plant. the current prospects are for a continued decline in oil production ( until there are new finds ) and except for planned melamine plant ( the aum ), no significant increase in downstream capacity is envisaged over the next few years, this would imply

##listed renewable energy infrastructure, ie a 50 percent stake in the world ’ s next largest offshore wind farm off the dutch coast. unlisted renewable energy infrastructure is still a relatively new area for norges bank. we intend to build up the portfolio gradually, primarily through investments in wind and solar power. we will prioritise investments that contribute to improving the overall risk - return tradeoff in the gpfg. management of the gpfg is to be cost - efficient, and the executive board monitors cost developments closely. earlier this month, norges bank announced a revised strategy describing how we will fulfil the investment mandate ahead. the strategy plan expresses our ambitions and our overall aim of achieving the highest possible return after costs. our ambitions are high. as they should be. nonetheless, we still aim to be a small, flexible and cost - efficient organisation. 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches