solidarity framework – the european stability mechanism. it can provide financial assistance to member states in difficulty, thereby reducing threats to financial stability in the euro area as a whole. but we need continuous efforts, particularly in the area of financial policies. the “ four presidents ” of the eu were mandated to provide a vision for europe. in the context of our discussion today, i would say that they were tasked with identifying and outlining the minimum conditions to ensure the full viability of the euro area – which are the same as the minimum conditions to ensure continued trust in the euro. four pillars have been identified : a banking union with a single supervision and common resolution framework ; a fiscal union to prevent and correct unsustainable fiscal paths ; an economic union that can guarantee sufficient competitiveness to sustain high employment ; and a political union that can deeply engage euro area citizens. as i discussed accountability, let me say a word on the last pillar, political union. i think that the general issue here is to clarify who does what, to establish a network of responsibilities. the notion that the euro is a currency without a state is in my view misguided. the euro is a currency with a state – but it ’ s a state whose branches of government are not yet clearly defined. the ecb is part of the construction of economic and monetary union, with a very clear but very limited mandate. the other parts – i am thinking in particular of the delineation between the commission and the council – still require clarification. the proposal put forward by jean - claude trichet of a “ euro area treasury ” would be an important step in that direction. the ecb is independent and fully accountable, but it needs clearly identifiable and fully empowered interlocutors. peter bofinger, jurgen habermas and julian nida - rumelin : “ einspruch gegen die fassadendemokratie ”, frankfurter allgemeine zeitung, 3 august 2012. dirk schoenmaker ( 2011 ) : “ the financial trilemma ”, economic letters 111 ( 2011 ) 57 – 59. bis central bankers ’ speeches we all have in mind robert schumann ’ s prediction that “ europe will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity ”. now that the euro area crisis has created de facto solidarity, there is a need for concrete achievements to complete emu. this, together with the individual commitment of each government to restore balanced growth and employment,

close many of the newly emerging opportunities were located, let me give you some comparisons : vienna is no further from bratislava, the capital of slovakia, than stamford 1 is from new york ; getting to budapest, the capital of hungary, from vienna is like getting to albany for you ; prague, the capital of the czech republic, is as far as boston ; and ljubljana, the capital of slovenia, as far as washington. the proximity together with cultural similarities and a shared history gave austrian banks some advantages on these new markets, and they did not miss their chance. their strategy for the years after 1989 clearly was : go east! the engagement of austrian banks in the central and eastern european countries has been very successful, and it has been beneficial for all parties involved – and even for some uninvolved. for austrian banks, the investments in the region proved to be highly profitable and contributed most favorably to their earnings over the past years. stamford, connecticut, is part of the new york metropolitan area and hosts a cluster of corporate headquarters, many of which moved from new york in the 1980s both to lower their tax bill and to be closer to the homes of their top executives. at the beginning of the transition in central and eastern europe the domestic financial corporations in these countries were unable to fund the elevated rates of economic growth sustainably ; in some cases, banks as we know them hardly existed. even ten years after the beginning of transition, the ratio of private credit to gdp was much lower in these countries than in the mature eu economies. therefore, foreign investors and financial intermediaries were highly welcome to fill the gap. after decades of centrally planned economic activities, domestic banks in these countries often lacked the experience or the corporate governance to support the establishment of dynamic markets. foreign banks contributed to the necessary financial deepening in the region and thereby allowed for a smoother transition process. but in many eastern european countries, access to financial intermediation is still far beyond the levels in oecd countries, and therefore the extension of financial activities in that region will offer an attractive business opportunity for austrian banks and other international intermediaries in the future. this financial strengthening of transition economies provided positive spillover effects by raising the demand for imported goods and services from the mature economies which were already members of the european union. thus, the financial integration of central and eastern europe fuelled the prosperity of the whole continent. around 20 % of all euro area exports went to the 10 new eu member states in central and