where banking supervision has been considerably strengthened. even though this objective is a very legitimate one as far financial stability is concerned, i would like to emphasize two ideas : ( 1 ) the first idea is that a number of pitfalls have emerged along the way. indeed, consistency should not be mistaken with uniformity of the rules. ( 2 ) and the second idea is that a “ one size fits all ” approach of shadow banking regulation could lead to unintended adverse consequences. 1. let me develop the first point : the 2008 crisis illustrated that the so called « shadow banking sector » played an important role in propagating and amplifying financial instability throughout the financial system. shedding some light on these entities and regulating them to prevent contagion and regulatory bis central bankers ’ speeches arbitrage has been therefore a key milestone of the g20 financial regulation agenda ever since. the banque de france has been involved in this policy work from the outset. a first part of the work consisted in defining what the “ shadow banking sector ” is about. it does embody a wide variety of institutions worldwide which accomplish credit intermediation along with maturity transformation outside of the “ traditional ” banking sector. as an output, it transforms illiquid assets into liquid ones. the approach of shadow banking has progressively expanded to a variety of actors and activities : money markets funds ; securitization, repos and securities financing transactions. the work dedicated to preventing the financial risks arising from the shadow banking system became intertwined with the work aiming at ending “ too big to fail ”. in the wake of the globally systemically important banks, the financial stability board started working on identifying and defining a regulatory regime applicable to globally systemically important insurers ( gsiis ), non - bank - non insurance sifis ( nbnis ), critical market infrastructures / ccps. the focus of the work also shifted from monitoring / statistical reporting to rule making. beyond the yearly shadow banking monitoring exercises, policy makers intended to make sure that no part of the financial system would be left unregulated and that a similar set of rules should apply to a similar set of risks. for the sake of a better regulation of globally systemically important institutions, some progress remains possible in the monitoring, and the need for relevant data in particular as regards the better understanding of inter - linkages among g - sii. cross - sectorial consistency was seen as a key factor to prevent any opportunity

entire economy. it is for this reason that sadc must maintain high standards of regulation for our financial markets. the chairperson, ladies and gentlemen, i note from the conference program that you will also reflect on the impact of the financial crisis on the sadc region. this is commendable as it is a subject of interest to everyone. with these remarks, it is now my pleasure and privilege to declare the conference for the committee of insurance, securities and non bank financial authorities officially open. distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen, thank you for your attention.