following : if it is difficult to identify a risk - free rate in a currency union, this means that there is no risk - free asset either, besides the central bank ’ s own liabilities, the currency. whether this peculiar situation adds to the challenges facing the central bank of a monetary union, in terms of signal - extraction and analysis of expectations, i leave to you as a topic for reflection. the crisis has also proved the important role that central banks play in influencing the yield curve through both their conventional and unconventional policies ; including forward guidance, asset purchases and enhanced credit support. this raises a host of questions about the relative effectiveness of these policies, but also about conventional yield curve models and whether they adequately capture the mechanisms that explain the role of these policies, particularly given that for tractability and simplicity real - world complications like credit and liquidity premia, pricing anomalies and even the influence of the macro economy and monetary policy are often not directly considered. it is well known that during decades the fields of finance and macroeconomics dealt with interest rates, asset prices and the yield curve in a total different way and without much interaction. as diebold and rudebusch point out in their book published last year on “ yield curve modelling and forecasting ” : 3 “ in macro models, the entire financial sector is often represented by a single interest rate with no accounting for credit or liquidity risk and no role for financial intermediation or financial frictions. similarly, finance models often focus on the consistency of asset prices across markets with little regard for underlying macroeconomic fundamentals. to understand important aspects of the recent financial crisis … a joint macrofinance perspective is likely necessary ”. the macro - finance approach to the analysis of the yield curve had several developments even before the crisis. in 2006, hordahl, tristani and vestin, 4 ( the last two, ecb diebold, f. x. and g. rudebusch, ( 2013 ), “ yield curve modelling and forecasting : the dynamic nelson - siegel approach ”, princeton university press. hordahl p., o. tristani and d. vestin, ( 2006 ), “ a joint econometric model of macroeconomic and term structure dynamics ”, journal of econometrics, 131. see also by the same authors ( 2008 ), “ the yield curve and macroeconomic dynamics ”, economic journal, royal economic society, vol. 118 ( 533 ). bis

in larger numbers after sepa direct debit has also been launched in november 2009. will the migration process be quick enough by itself or does it require an extra push? research has shown that a long period of maintaining dual systems is costly for all. so what will make industry and / or customers stop using the old products and switch to sepa? you will remember that the sepa process was only taken seriously by industry in reaction to an ec regulation. 5 although supporters of a sepa migration end - date seem to be in the majority, opposition to the concept is not negligible. however, we have to realise that sepa is not just about making life easier for european citizens and companies by removing obstacles to cross - border payments. sepa is also about removing barriers to the single market, introducing more competition to the payments industry and speeding up innovation. the eurosystem will continue its efforts to foster a general understanding among stakeholders that setting a realistic but ambitious end - date for migration to sct and sdd is a necessary step in order to reap the benefits of sepa. ten years after the introduction of the euro as the single currency, it is high time to complete the introduction of the euro in the field of single payment instruments. sepa governance in connection with the migration challenge, the question arises as to the future governance of the sepa project. so let me talk about this now. in the sixth sepa progress report, we suggested that improvements may be needed to the overall governance of sepa. to be clear, i am not speaking about the governance of the epc itself. improvements in sepa governance may be needed to foster the process towards a truly integrated retail payments market in europe. these improvements are related, in particular, to stakeholder involvement, transparency and the sepa migration progress. is market self - regulation sufficient to find solutions for these issues? the eurosystem – together with the european commission – recognises that a new, overarching body, consisting of a broad range of stakeholders, could tackle and resolve issues that are slowing the realisation of sepa. but i want to repeat that this body would not replace the current arrangements. the epc would remain responsible for the design of payment services. the new body, by contrast, would focus entirely on identifying key issues of concern to public authorities and other stakeholders. moreover, it would define priorities and promote action. in addition, it would work on fostering a common understanding among users