has shown that, especially when leverage and the degree of maturity transformation are high, potentially systemic risks may emerge in the investment fund industry. while banking sector regulation was made significantly more stringent in the years that followed the global financial crisis, only now is the question of adapting the rules for the nonbank sector being tackled firmly. it is necessary to continue to work at international level, in particular within the financial stability board, to acquire the tools, including macroprudential ones, that can help to deal with the risks that may arise in this sector. this is an issue that italy ’ s forthcoming presidency of the g20 intends to prioritize among the financial issues. technology, finance and payments in europe, the pandemic has led to a sharp acceleration in the spread of digital payment instruments with a high technological content. according to a recent survey conducted by the ecb, some 40 per cent of the population in the euro area have decided since march to reduce the use of cash for day - to - day purchases, notwithstanding the increased demand for mediumand high - denomination notes, likely connected to the heightened uncertainty. these changes are having a significant impact on italy as well : even over the summer, when the risk of infection was low and the social distancing measures were very limited, the use of payment cards rose, especially for those with a higher technological content such as contactless cards, and the use of cash decreased. based on the experience of other european countries, the change in consumer habits towards a more and more frequent use of digital payment instruments can be expected to continue, though probably still at a gradual pace. new technologies can bring tangible benefits to the financial system and to users : they foster the efficiency of intermediaries and improve risk selection and diversification and they contribute to expanding the range of services available to households and firms, to enhancing their quality and to reducing their costs. the need for an adequate control system, however, cannot be ignored if the emergence of risks to users and to the integrity and security of the financial system is to be avoided. in the payment services market, innovation has thus far favoured the use of instruments associated with private currencies issued by banks or by operators that are in any case closely supervised. in the future, and indeed the near future, there are likely to be even more innovative instruments available, namely ‘ stablecoins ’, which are a type of crypto - assets whose value is guaranteed by adequate collateral issued by companies operating on

is not comprehensive. i would like to illustrate this by looking at three different aspects of the basel iii leverage ratio definition : the starting point is the asset side of the balance sheet, or more precisely, the total on - balance sheet assets under applicable accounting standards. first, knowing that offbalance sheet activities may constitute leverage as well, we decided to include positions such as credit commitments, too. second, recognising that derivatives may be offset if certain accounting conditions hold, we preferred to rely on regulatory netting rules instead and require banks to apply a further addon for “ potential future exposure ”. third, the accounting value of securities financing transactions such as repo agreements is replaced by a more prudent and internationally comparable measure ; it consists of gross assets, before netting, and an add - on for counterparty risk. those adjustments are perfectly justifiable and necessary from a supervisor ’ s perspective. they are clearly sensible. but remember that any of these adjustments will come at the expense of simplicity. in short, a simple accounting - equity - over - assets ratio is not comprehensive either. given these limitations, let me reiterate that it seems impossible to define a simple leverage ratio that is also comparable and comprehensive. hence, some of its claimed advantages will not materialise in reality. 3. 2 is it an advantage to be insensitive towards risk? a leverage ratio is risk - insensitive by definition. is this an advantage or a disadvantage? as we all know, there is currently an intensive debate on how much we can trust the modelbased calculation of risk - weighted assets and how we should understand the corresponding measures. tomorrow ’ s presentation by sujit kapadia on “ taking uncertainty seriously : simplicity versus complexity in financial regulation ” will undoubtedly shed some more light on this issue. for me it is quite clear that our system of risk weightings has some shortcomings ; just think of the treatment of government bonds, which allegedly carry zero risk. these shortcomings, however, do not prove that the leverage ratio is superior. the leverage ratio has its own deficiencies. it punishes low - risk business models, and it favours high - risk businesses, encouraging banks to engage in more risk - taking, for example. this is the world of basel i, which was relatively indifferent towards credit risk. let ’ s not forget that a decade ago, the basel ii framework was developed as a response to the basel i rules of 1988. 3.