integrated. the contours of the future eu - uk relationship in financial services are still uncertain, and the economic drivers and regulatory choices which could reshape this relationship will probably only be felt over time. the eu will need to balance the benefits of continued integration with the uk financial system against potential risks to financial stability, consumer and investor protection, the level playing field and the integrity of the single market. as i have said in the past, this path will not be easy for either side of the channel, and the risks linked to regulatory divergence and a potential race to the bottom should not be taken lightly. allow me to briefly discuss the regulatory dimension of this question. a possible scenario is that the united kingdom will not seek to remain a member of the eu single market once it leaves the eu. this means moving away from a fully - integrated relationship underpinned by the eu ’ s single rulebook and single passport for financial services, and relying instead on the eu ’ s equivalence framework for third countries. for some types of financial activities, this framework allows financial service providers from third countries to continue to serve eu clients provided a number of strict conditions are met. for example, in the area of central clearing – which i touched upon earlier – cross - border market access is widespread : 15 jurisdictions are considered equivalent by the eu and 33 third - country central counterparties ( ccps ) are recognised by the european securities and markets authority ( esma ). at the same time, given the euro area ’ s reliance on uk ccps, strong safeguards must be put in place to preserve financial stability and a level playing field. in this respect, i am very pleased that eu legislators have adopted a new supervisory framework for ccps in the european market infrastructure regulation ( emir 2 ). this framework requires third - country ccps which are critical for the eu to meet eu prudential requirements under esma ’ s supervision, with the involvement of the relevant eu central banks. if uk ccps are to continue to provide euro clearing services on a systemic scale under the equivalence framework, they should be subject to the rigorous application of these safeguards. in central clearing or other areas such as trading or listing, the extent of continued market access will depend on whether or not a decision is taken to grant equivalence to the united kingdom. these decisions are beyond the purview of the ecb, and it is not my place to comment on them. suffice to say that there is no

all affected customers will receive appropriate redress and compensation. in that regard, we will provide an update on the progress of the examination in april, based on end - march data. more broadly, the examination raises serious questions about the culture in our lending institutions and the extent to which the boards and senior management of those institutions are really living up to their promises of putting the customer at the heart of their business. in the years since the financial crisis, there have been significant misconduct issues identified at financial institutions both internationally and domestically. amid concern that such misconduct can threaten to undermine the safety of financial institutions, there is an emerging trend towards more intensive regulatory focus on governance and conduct issues. for example, the recent widespread consumer abuses and other compliance breakdowns at wells fargo prompted the then chair of the board of governors of the federal reserve to announce earlier this year she would restrict the growth of the bank until it sufficiently improves its governance and controls. in related fashion, the governor of the bank of england remarked last year that repeated episodes of misconduct have called the social licence of finance into question and recommended greater focus on improving the culture at financial services firms. we are undertaking behaviour and culture assessments of each of the five main lenders – aib, bank of ireland, ulster bank, ptsb and kbc - and will report our findings to the minister for finance in june. this assessment will be underpinned by the central bank ’ s enhanced consumer protection risk assessment model which helps us determine how financial firms identify and manage consumer risks, including the risk that a firm ’ s culture does not promote and support the protection of consumers. we are working with the dutch central bank, recognised leaders in the supervision of behaviour and culture, which will support us in the inspections. this review will shape our future supervisory and engagement strategy. depending on what we uncover, we may require certain mitigating actions at our lending institutions. these could include, for example, requiring the lenders to conduct an annual internal audit of culture ; requiring the boards of the lenders to set up ethics sub - committees ; and requiring that incentive schemes do not reward inappropriate behaviour towards customers. it is critical that regulators have a full toolkit to promote a culture of ethical compliance by firms and the people working in those firms. we have already recommended in our submission to the law reform commission the adoption of reforms that strengthen the accountability of senior personnel in regulated entities. getting the culture right is important not just for consumers but also for shareholders, who are