for controlling intermediaries and those with powers over markets. the growth of asset management, where the activities typical of institutions engaged in banking, insurance and securities investment services intersect, has fostered the rise of financial conglomerates. the presence of these complex organizations creates new channels for the spread of possible crises ; their international ramification and the existence of different types of intermediaries increase the difficulty of coordinating the supervisory bodies involved. generally speaking, the emergence of a small group of very large global operators with substantial capital and highly diversified portfolios strengthens the financial system ; the emergence of such a group nonetheless faces the international community with the problem of forestalling the possibility of an insolvency and defining instruments on an adequate scale for handling such an event. the supervision of financial conglomerates is hindered by the existence of unregulated entities, but problems also arise where all the components are subject to prudential controls. in the case of capital adequacy, it is necessary to avoid double and multiple gearing, which can result in the group as a whole failing to have adequate capital even though the individual units all satisfy their respective capital requirements. the ramification and strategies of groups can reduce the effectiveness of individual supervisory authorities ’ prudential controls and make it less easy to overcome company crises. risk control in the more complex financial conglomerates is often centralized in a single operating unit ; the correspondence between company structures and lines of business ceases to exist ; group activities are no longer covered by supervisory controls, which are divided by country, type of institution and product. regulators are likely to encounter greater obstacles to the effective performance of their tasks because functions that are crucial to the sound and prudent management of the undertaking subject to supervision are carried on in a different jurisdiction. awareness of these difficulties has led to an intensification of cooperative efforts in international fora. at the beginning of 1996 the basle committee on banking supervision, the international organization of securities commissions ( iosco ) and the international association of insurance supervisors ( iais ) set up the joint forum on financial conglomerates and charged it with the task of addressing the supervisory issues raised by these complex financial organizations. in particular, the joint forum has studied the practical means of facilitating the exchange of information among supervisory authorities, at both the national and the international levels, and has examined arrangements for facilitating the coordination of control activities both in ordinary circumstances and in crises. it has also drawn up a list of principles aimed at permitting

this is not the strategy ’ s only feature. also for the first time ever, we have changed the philosophy of our relationship with individuals and institutions as clients with which we interact and for which we work every day. paraphrasing what president kennedy said in his inauguration speech over 60 years ago, i would say, “ ask not what your stakeholders can do for your central bank – ask what your central bank can do for its stakeholders. ” 1 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches the need to be client - oriented sets a new and, let ’ s be frank, a high bar for the ability of central banks to build and maintain dialogue. it goes without saying that central banks use communications as an important policy tool. but it is important to remember that transparency must be effective. it must help central bank pursue its mandate, which consists in ensuring price and financial stability. during these two days, we will discuss this aspect of central bank transparency on more than one occasion. but it ’ s time for us to admit that this passive, one - way communication, when central banks used to make everybody listen with bated breath to whatever scanty and vague words they had to offer, no longer works. ultimately, this approach undermines the effectiveness of central bank policy. “ if you don ’ t understand us, it ’ s your problem ” is the rhetoric that is outdated and obsolete. today, if you – our clients – have difficulty understanding us, it ’ s our problem. institutions that make themselves heard and understood are the only ones that get public trust. institutions that have public trust are the only ones that receive support and commitment. institutions that have public support are the only ones that can withstand the pressure of populism, fake news, manipulations, and attempts to turn these institutions into instruments for certain business interests that run counter to the interests of the people. under these circumstances, the central bank should transform taking the corporate sector as an example and begin to finally listen to clients and seek two - way communication. when communicating with clients, the central bank should take an individual approach to every client, choosing words that are intelligible and important and ones that interest the client. at the same time, the central bank must choose communication platforms that are suitable for every party. long story short, the need to be client - oriented compels banks to transition to targeted communications. we at the nbu have been moving in that direction for five years running. the groundwork for greater transparency