- region. i am happy to note, ladies and gentlemen, that efforts are underway to bring the whole sub - region in line. the west african monetary zone ( wamz ) concept includes a proposed central supervisory authority ( wafsi ). this requires member countries to reengineer their supervisory frameworks to conform to international best practices. in pursuit of this, an assessment of compliance with the core principles of effective banking supervision of member countries was carried out which identified the problem of member countries to include among others : lack of information sharing ; risk management ; opportunities for money laundering ; and lack of remedial measures. i am glad to note that member countries have since taken necessary steps to adopt relevant aspects of the core principles. in line with the above, a new ghana banking act was promulgated in 2004, which incorporated the requirements of the core principles. consequently, the bank of ghana has begun putting in place measures to align the country ’ s supervision methodology to a more risk - based supervisory approach beginning 2007. it is in view of this that i see this workshop to be extremely important and timely. it is expected that this workshop will offer you the opportunity to thoroughly evaluate and review the status quo and identify the necessary measures in relation to the way forward. i believe that the next few days will go a long way to strengthen the capacity of our supervisors and facilitate the application of the risk - based supervisory approach. the task ahead is challenging but i believe that with a common resolve it is not insurmountable. ladies and gentlemen, let me once again take this opportunity to thank osfi and the canadian international development association ( cida ) for supporting this workshop. i wish you a productive week and encourage you all to draw on the wealth of knowledge of the facilitators as well as the rich experience of your fellow participants. on this note i declare open the workshop on risk based supervision and wish that you all find this workshop useful and the knowledge gained would deepen our understanding of this important aspect of financial stability. thank you.

erkki liikanen : independence of monetary policy and the banking union speech by mr erkki liikanen, governor of the bank of finland, at the lamfalussy lecture conference, organised by magyar nemzeti bank ( the central bank of hungary ), budapest, 2 february 2015. * * * one of the lasting lessons we have learned from the monetary policy experience of the last decades is the value of the independence of central banks. what does this independence mean today? why should we have it? what are the current problems involved? the modern idea of central bank independence was born from the lessons learned in the fight against the high inflation of the 1970s and the 1980s. the bundesbank became the role model which has not been forgotten. the supporting theory was later developed by the great economists of the day : stanley fischer, kenneth rogoff, carl walsh and others. the fight against inflation was successful and the lessons learned from this fight inspired great reforms in the central banks. in europe, those lessons inspired the writing of the statutes of the ecb. securing central bank independence and preserving the hard - won price stability were key ingredients. today ’ s monetary problems are very different. in some respects they are almost a mirror image of the problems of the great inflation era. but i am convinced that central bank independence is equally important in today ’ s environment. still, it is interesting to think once more what exactly this independence means and what it requires in today ’ s different context. * * in research, it is usual to distinguish two types of central bank independence : goal independence and instrument independence. just a few comments on goal independence. goal independence would mean the ability of the central bank to formulate the ultimate objectives of its policy. in democratic systems, goal independence is typically quite limited, and the objectives of central bank are given by elected bodies. this is how it should be. it gives the central bank ’ s activities the necessary democratic legitimacy. the ecb has been given price stability as its primary objective. the treaty left to the governing council to give an operational definition of what price stability means. as you know, the current definition, unchanged since 2003, is that inflation should be “ below but close to two percent over the medium term ”. the words “ close to ” were added to the ecb ’ s definition of price stability in 2003, after a serious and thorough consideration. these words have now gained increasing weight, as inflation in the euro area has