##ly they ’ re exactly the same. all speeches are available online at www. bankofengland. co. uk / publications / pages / speeches / default. aspx the cost of capital and employment the underlying point through all of this – that downside risks have particularly marked effects on decisions that are costly to reverse – is, i think, perfectly intuitive. one ’ s naturally wary about decisions that involve a degree of commitment but uncertain outcomes. buying a house, taking a particular job, even getting married9 : these are all decisions that are costly to reverse, to one degree or another, and that therefore require an extra degree of surety to be taken. you can also find examples of the same phenomenon within the economic sphere but unrelated to investment. chart 8, for example, plots changes in our series on uncertainty against the ratio of two particular indices for hiring intentions – one for temporary posts, the other permanent – taken from the kpmg / rec employment survey. as you might expect, firms ’ hiring intentions lean more towards temporary rather than permanent jobs, because the former involve less of a commitment, when they ’ re more uncertain about the future. chart 8 : employment growth skews towards chart 9 : more uncertainty boosts employment temporary jobs when uncertainty rises relative to investment sources : kpmg, rec, ihs markit, bloomberg finance l. p., cbi, consensus economics, dow jones factiva, eikon from refinitiv, gfk ( research on behalf of the european commission ) and bank calculations. sources : ons, bloomberg finance l. p., cbi, consensus economics, dow jones factiva, eikon from refinitiv, gfk ( research on behalf of the european commission ) and bank calculations. but the degree of commitment is bound to be greater, compared with job creation of any kind, for new capital investment. and it ’ s clear in the data that it ’ s investment that ’ s particularly susceptible to uncertainty, much more so than employment. one way of demonstrating that is chart 9. the blue line in this graph is the difference between the growth rates of employment and investment. the spread between the two is clearly correlated with uncertainty and, in that context, the fact that employment growth has held up much better than investment in the past year or so is less surprising. what the generic relationship in [ 1 ] tells you ( as even the dictum that one “ marries in haste [ only to

in the real equilibrium of the economy. i do not believe that the present problems in the united kingdom stem only from a large negative shock to aggregate demand. in common with many other countries, our problems also reflect the underlying need to rebalance our economy, requiring a reallocation of resources both within and between nations. it is not simply a question of boosting aggregate demand, but of helping to bring about a shift to a new equilibrium. that in turn implies the need for both large changes in relative prices, especially between tradable and non - tradable goods and services, and a shift in the relative levels of domestic demand at home and overseas. there are, therefore, limits on what any one country ’ s domestic monetary policies can achieve without the support of others. despite these limits, circumstances have demanded that central banks take extraordinary measures. such measures can risk moving into territory more normally associated with fiscal policy and, in doing so, put at risk their hard - won independence. there are, it seems to me, three threats to central bank independence. first, there is the risk of appearing to promise too much or allowing too much to be expected of us. with constraints on other policy instruments, central banks are seen as “ the only game facilities introduced by the bank of england have included the discount window facility, the special liquidity scheme, extended collateral term repos, extended collateral long term repos, and the funding for lending scheme. the ecb initiated its long term repo operations. and federal reserve facilities include the term auction facility, the term assert backed securities loan facility, the primary dealer credit facility, the commercial paper funding facility, the term securities lending facility, the abcp money market fund liquidity facility, the money market investing funding facility, and the term discount window program. bis central bankers ’ speeches in town ”. but failure to make clear the limits to monetary policy risks disillusionment with central banks and the inevitable political pressure on them that would follow. second, at the zero lower bound there is no clear distinction between monetary and fiscal policy. but it is still important to ensure that central banks do not take on to their balance sheets risks to the taxpayer that are properly matters that should be decided by elected politicians. to ensure price stability in the long run it is vital to maintain the operational independence of a central bank. any decisions that put taxpayers ’ money at risk must be made by finance ministries, and central banks must protect their balance sheets by imposing