( chart 6 ). weak income growth has focused growing attention on its distribution. inequalities which might have been tolerated during generalised prosperity are felt more acutely when economies stagnate. in recent decades, as global inequality has fallen markedly, it has edged ever higher in most advanced economies. in anglo - saxon countries, the income share of the top 1 % has risen notably since 1980. today, iv in the us, the richest 1 % of households receive 20 % of all income. th chart 6 : real wage growth slowest since mid - 19 century 10 - year moving average, per cent forecast - 1 source : thomas, r. and dimsdale, n. ( 2016 ) " three centuries of data - version 2. 3 ", bank of england, based on average weekly wages and the cpi ; and november inflation report. such high income inequalities are dwarfed by staggering wealth inequalities. the proportion of the wealth v held by the richest 1 % of americans increased from 25 % in 1990 to 40 % in 2012. globally, the share of wealth held by the richest 1 % in the world rose from one - third in 2000 to one - half in 2010. vi the picture in the uk is complex but in general suggests relatively stable but high levels of overall inequality, with sharper disparities emerging in recent times for the top 1 %. when combined with low growth of incomes and entrenched intergenerational inequity, it is no wonder that many question their prospects. all speeches are available online at www. bankofengland. co. uk / publications / pages / speeches / default. aspx for example, a common measure of the distribution of income, the gini coefficient, shows that inequality rose sharply during the 1980s and has more or less plateaued ever since ( chart 7 ). that suggests a large structural shift during the thatcher era, followed by a more modest series of adjustments thereafter. however, possibly because of the effects of globalisation, the income share of the top 1 % tripled from 5 % in the early 1980s to 15 % by 2009, though it has fallen back somewhat since the crisis ( chart 8 ). the distribution of wealth also appears to have been relatively flat since the mid - 1990s ( chart 9 ), partly vii reflecting the pattern of home ownership, though it is much less equal than for income, with the share of the richest 1 % persistently high, at

in question was initiated by the national environmental research council ( nerc ) and involved a public ballot to choose a name for the new polar royal research ship. various options were mooted as suitable candidates, including “ sir david attenborough ” ( the famous british naturalist ), “ henry worsley ” ( the famous british explorer ) and “ pingu ” ( the famous cartoon penguin ). the winner of the public ballot was none of these. with almost 80 % of the popular vote, “ boaty mcboatface ” romped home courtesy of a social media campaign. at that point, nerc jettisoned the will of the people. the ship was named instead “ sir david attenborough ” - though, in a small concession to democracy, its remotely operated sub - sea vehicle was named boaty mcboatface. this is an object lesson in the perils of public polling for policy purposes. sometimes, there is madness in crowds. that is not to say, however, that public opinion is always and everywhere mad. in his book superforecasting, philip tetlock uses evidence drawn from a variety of experimental studies to determine the ingredients of a good forecast. he finds that the key lies in diverse perspectives, drawn from amateurs as well as experts. often, he finds, there is wisdom in crowds. if harnessed, the wisdom of crowds and of amateurs can improve the forecasting performance of experts. regularly canvassing the views of the public, on the economy and on the setting of monetary policy, would be one way of harnessing that wisdom. this would allow central banks to listen to a potentially much wider and richer array of views on the setting of policy, in particular from those who might otherwise be distant, disenfranchised or distrustful of central banks and their actions. it would open central banks ’ ears ( and eyebrows ) to a wider range of societal stakeholders when setting policy. the information provided from the public could serve as another input to the policy - setting process, much as monetary policy rules ( and other data ) do today. what are the public telling us about the right setting of policy and why? clearly, neither rules nor polls should be followed slavishly - the scope for misinformation and mishap is simply too great. and the whole purpose of delegating policy to an independent third - party is to avoid the short - termism that may sometimes affect the general public. nonetheless, if crowds