the fed and the markets : a failure to communicate? ( new york : goldman sachs, september 20 ). see alan s. blinder, michael ehrmann, marcel fratzscher, jakob de haan, and david - jan jansen ( 2008 ), “ central bank communication and monetary policy : a survey of theory and evidence, ” journal of economic literature, vol. 46 ( december ), pp. 910 - 45. see ben s. bernanke ( 2004 ), “ central bank talk and monetary policy, ” speech delivered at the japan society corporate luncheon, new york, october 7, https : / / www. federalreserve. gov / boarddocs / speeches / 2004 / 200410072 / default. htm. - 6outlooks, risk assessments, and objectives. 10 the whole forward interest rate curve matters for financial conditions, not just the overnight rate. monetary policy was therefore thought to be made more effective by communication of the full expected path of policy, which could then be incorporated into private - sector expectations and longerterm interest rates. but all along, there have been other voices urging caution and asking, in effect, “ how much transparency is too much? ” as don kohn noted in 2005 remarks, “ more is not necessarily always better ” when it comes to fed communication. 11 critics have often argued that too much discussion of the likely path of policy could be taken as a commitment to a particular path and timing and could ultimately constrain the committee from pursuing what it views to be the optimal path. indeed, to the extent that the committee ’ s talk about the path of policy is given weight, that talk may leave “ too little scope for private assessments of economic developments to show through ” in market prices. 12 jon notes in his paper that communications about monetary policy generally received high marks from 2008 through early 2013, and he focuses his analysis on the challenging period since mid - 2013. i am also going to skip over the years 2013 - 14, which included the “ taper tantrum ” and the relatively uneventful taper itself. i will focus instead on the years 2015 - 16, which seem to me to be the most relevant to the challenges see ben s. bernanke ( 2004 ), “ the logic of monetary policy, ” speech delivered at the national economists club, washington, december 2, https : / / www. federalreserve. gov / boarddocs

randall s kroszner : effects of the financial crisis on small business testimony of mr randall s kroszner, member of the board of governors of the us federal reserve system, before the committee on small business, us house of representatives, washington dc, 20 november 2008. the original speech, which contains various links to the documents mentioned, can be found on the us federal reserve system ’ s website. * * * chairwoman velazquez, ranking member chabot, and members of the committee, i am pleased to appear before you on behalf of the board of governors of the federal reserve system to discuss the availability of credit to small businesses. small businesses are critical to the health of the u. s. economy. they generate more than half of nonfarm business gross domestic product, employ more than half of private - sector workers, and over the past decade have created well over half of net new jobs annually. moreover, larger firms often begin as smaller firms that prosper and grow. if small businesses are to continue to provide major benefits to the economy, their access to credit is clearly a high priority. my statement today will address how the ongoing turmoil in the financial sector and the weakening macroeconomy appear to be affecting small businesses'access to credit, while recognizing that the impressive diversity across both industry and geography of the small business sector makes it very difficult to draw too many general conclusions. in addition, i will discuss the policy actions that the federal reserve, the congress, the treasury, and other government agencies have taken in recent weeks to address the overall functioning of financial markets and deteriorating economic conditions as well as how these policies should assist small businesses going forward. recent financial market and economic developments as you know, the u. s. financial sector has been under severe stress for more than a year as a result of declining house prices, large losses on mortgages and mortgage - related instruments at financial institutions, and an abrupt pullback from risk - taking by investors. these strains intensified in late september and early october, and lending between banks and other financial institutions beyond more than a few days virtually shut down. withdrawals from money market mutual funds and fears that net asset values would fall further severely disrupted commercial paper and other short - term funding markets, and longer - term credit became much more costly as risk spreads on corporate debt instruments jumped and private interest rates rose. the problems in credit markets and concerns about the economy have caused equity prices to swing sharply and to decline significantly,