efficient designs of data requirements, it systems, and feedback loops require good dialogue between central banks and data providers in the industry. at the same time, fostering the dialogue with academia can help improving analytical systems and exploit statistics to the best possible degree. references buch, c. m., and l. goldberg ( 2015 ), mini - symposium on international banking, imf economic review, vol 63, no 3, pp 375 – 376. deutsche bundesbank ( 2015a ), microdata – paradigm shift in central banks ’ statistics, annual report 2015, frankfurt a. m., pp 47 – 59. deutsche bundesbank ( 2015b ), effects of monetary policy on risk taking, monthly report, march 2015, pp 50 – 54. deutsche bundesbank ( 2015c ), micro data and macroprudential policy, financial stability review 2015, pp 80 – 81. schubert, a., ( 2015 ). data as a core central banking asset – the strategy of the ecb, presentation at the big data workshop, sveriges riksbank, 9 september 2015. the statistical value chain : traditional system bis central bankers ’ speeches

assets under management expanded by us $ 45 trillion. this growth could continue into the future. for instance, more stringent regulation of banks may cause activities to migrate to an increasing extent into shadow banking – what is referred to as regulatory arbitrage. however, it would be wrong to attribute the growth of the shadow banking system to regulatory arbitrage alone. growth is also being driven by demand for the specialised products and services offered by the system. institutional investors in particular make use of shadow banking products – such as repo trades – as an alternative to traditional bank deposits. in consequence, the effects of shadow banking on financial stability are not entirely clear. on the one hand, the system undeniably fulfils an economic role : it offers alternative sources of funding to enterprises in the real economy as well as to banks, thereby adding to diversification and specialisation. in general, that enhances both the efficiency and the resilience of the financial system. bis central bankers ’ speeches on the other hand, the shadow banking system also harbours risks. if activities are shifted into shadow banking as a result of regulatory arbitrage, then the concomitant risks are shifted too – and thus sometimes moved out of reach of the regulatory access that is actually needed. however, the shadow banking system may be a source of risks other than those deriving from regulatory arbitrage. shadow banking participants undertake maturity and liquidity transformation, they engage in the transfer of credit risk, and they operate with leverage. this means they carry out a range of bank - like functions which are associated with bank - like risks. at the same time, however, there are two key differences compared to the regular banking system. first, shadow banking participants and activities are not subject to banking regulation. second, shadow banking participants have no access to central bank liquidity, nor do they benefit from public backstops such as deposit insurance schemes. the consequence of this structure is a latent risk of runs on shadow banking participants. a run may lead to liquidity bottlenecks which can only be cleared by rapid deleveraging. that in turn may contribute to a collapse in prices on the financial markets, and thus exacerbate the problems in procyclical fashion. at the same time, the structure of many of the transactions conducted in the shadow banking system means that the participants are closely interconnected. thus, contagion effects within the system are highly likely. these systemic risks within the shadow