samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
dealing with the situation of developing countries. our compatriots are concerned about the solidity of european banks in general and that of french banks in particular. many readers are wondering if their savings are safe? are they safe? european banks are much stronger than they were in 2008. their capital ratios have practically doubled. their regulatory framework has been strengthened and their supervisors are far more vigilant and scrupulous than they were back then. the banking sector is as strong as one could wish for. savers can rest assured. 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches

union is key to halt it, and i welcome eu leaders ’ resolve to swiftly agree on a single resolution mechanism. finally, europe should remain open to the world. further progress on bilateral or regional free trade agreements, and cooperation in implementing the new financial regulatory standards, are the best signal in this respect. conclusion let me draw to a close by re - emphasising that crises, despite their negative consequences, can have positive effects. they can galvanise efforts and focus minds. they can drive change and bring about progress. they can pave the way for innovative solutions. but to secure these gains, cooperation across national borders is crucial, in other words, there must be a willingness to work towards common goals and to learn from each other and resist protectionism. this spirit will be essential to tackle the challenges still ahead of us, not only in the euro area but also at a global level. it is often claimed that the chinese and japanese word for crisis, weiji or kiki ( [UNK] [UNK] or [UNK] [UNK] ), is made of the two characters meaning “ danger ” and “ opportunity ”. while there can be no doubt that wei means “ danger ”, i would rather understand ji as meaning the critical moment when things have to change – the ancient greeks ’ kairos. this critical moment has now arrived for europe. europe has emerged from the danger zone. it ’ s time for us to get our act together, to reform, and to grow. thank you very much for your attention. bis central bankers ’ speeches chart 1 credit growth to the private sector in east asia and the euro area ( in percentage changes, year to year ) sources : imf weo and haver analytics. bis central bankers ’ speeches chart 2 current account balances in east asia and the euro area ( in % of gdp, east asia in 1996, euro area in 2008 ) sources : imf weo and haver analytics. bis central bankers ’ speeches chart 3 real gdp growth in east asia and japan before, during and after their crises ( in percentage, year to year ) source : haver analytics. bis central bankers ’ speeches chart 4 export and import volumes of goods and services in east asia ( in percentage changes, year to year ) sources : imf weo and haver analytics. bis central bankers ’ speeches
appropriate wage - setting and sufficient flexibility to get the unemployed back into work are crucial to prevent the crisis from having a lasting negative impact on labour markets. it is therefore essential to create appropriate incentives to work. at the same time, policies to speed up restructuring and investment, in line with the principle of an open market economy and free competition, will create the business opportunities and productivity gains needed to spark a sustained recovery. we are now at your disposal for questions.

##collateralisation has become all the more important. an obvious reason is that the share of riskier commercial mortgage loans in cover pools has increased steadily to surpass the share of residential mortgage loans. only recently did this trend appear to reverse again. this reversal is probably linked to individual banks having reconsidered their commercial real estate lending activities outside germany. all in all, it seems fair to say that the crisis lead to a renaissance of the pfandbrief. in 2010, a german newspaper described it as the “ comeback of a bore ” while forbes magazine asserted “ covered bonds can rebuild america ”. it seems that the pfandbrief is a winner of the crisis. looking to the future, the pfandbrief might benefit further from crisis - driven regulation. basel iii sees the introduction of global liquidity standards for banks for the first time ever. these new standards will increase the need for secure collateral in the financial system. and pfandbriefe are eligible assets for the envisaged liquidity coverage ratio and will in all likelihood count as “ stable funding ” for the net stable funding ratio. likewise, stricter standards for margin requirements on otc derivative transactions will probably increase collateral usage. furthermore, the prevalent use of central bank lending against secure collateral underpins demand for collateral in the euro area – at least for the time being. as a consequence, pfandbriefe, along with other secure collateral, might be increasingly sought after. for participants in the pfandbrief market, these are certainly positive developments. as a central banker in charge of financial stability, however, i have to take them with a pinch of salt. this is mainly because an increasing amount of assets in banks ’ balance sheets may get tied up as collateral – a development that has been coined “ asset encumbrance ”. increasing asset encumbrance tends to increase expected losses for unsecured investors should a bank fail. consequently, unsecured investors are inclined to demand compensation for their more junior position in the debt hierarchy – in effect driving a bigger wedge between secured and unsecured funding costs. as a result, some banks may find it more challenging to meet their overall refinancing needs. potential problems could also arise in conjunction with policies aimed at bail - ins. if the ratio of encumbered assets rises, bail - in policies could be less effective, as losses would have to be distributed between fewer and fewer unsecured
for major reforms and motivate us to work tirelessly for a better europe. the european union is an anchor in rough seas. for more than 70 years, peace and stability have reigned over our european continent. let us never succumb to the temptation to take this for granted. thank you for your attention. 4 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches

despite some remaining volatility and fragility. against this background, it is necessary, from a monetary policy point of view, not to postpone the exit from non - standard measures for too long, in particular since we always emphasized it would be a state - contingent process. before i discuss the challenges of the phasing - out in more detail, let me briefly recall some key aspects of our monetary policy implementation. in the euro area, the bulk of liquidity is provided via revolving refinancing operations ( collateralized lending ) of different maturities, with the main refinancing operation, that is the one week operation, being the most important. prior to october 2008, refinancing operations were conducted as variable rate tenders, with allotment amounts closely aligned with the aggregate liquidity needs of the banking system ( often referred to as “ benchmark allotment ” ). conceptually, the liquidity needs of the banking system mainly result from non - banks ’ demand for banknotes and substantial remunerated reserve requirements. the particular tender procedure means that average short - term money market rates are normally just slightly above the minimum bid rate in the weekly main refinancing operation, which serves as the key policy rate. however, in october 2008, the variable rate tender procedure with benchmark allotment was replaced by a fixed rate full - allotment procedure, in order to ensure banks ’ liquidity despite the drying up of the interbank money market following the lehman collapse. the full allotment policy allowed banks to accumulate substantial amounts of surplus liquidity ( or excess reserves to use u. s. terminology ), which could be lent to other banks or placed in the eurosystem ’ s deposit facility – an overnight facility to deposit excess reserves. as a result, short - term money market rates usually traded only a couple of basis points above the eurosystem deposit rate throughout most of 2009 and 2010. this was by design. meanwhile, given an ongoing normalization in financial markets, money market rates have increased significantly but smoothly without any monetary policy tightening signals and the corresponding headlines. despite the overall improvements in financial market and money market conditions, some financial institutions, however, continue to rely strongly on the liquidity support measures provided by the eurosystem. in principle, the strong demand for central bank liquidity from these eurosystem counterparties could lead to elevated tender spreads after the return to a variable rate tender procedure.
to endangered positions and their valuation, increasing the capital base, and improving risk management and control systems.

thomas jordan : monetary policy in the financial markets crisis summary of a speech by mr thomas jordan, member of the governing board of the swiss national bank, at an event for banks and pension funds, berne, 2 april 2008. the complete speech can be found in german on the swiss national banka€™s website ( www. snb. ch ). * * * the origin of the turbulence on the international financial markets which has persisted since august 2007 is mainly to be found in the us housing market. on the one hand, a long period of low usd interest rates had boosted the demand for residential real estate in the us. on the other hand, the structure of the us mortgage market with the associated rapid increase in mortgage debtors with poor credit ratings, and the subsequent securitisation of their mortgages, had proved to be problematic. between 2001 and 2006, residential real estate prices in the us doubled. at the end of 2006, there was a reversal in the price trend which triggered crises in both the real estate and mortgage markets. the substantial expansion in sub - prime and alt - a mortgages, and a deterioration in the credit ratings of debtors within these segments, led to a rise in the level of overdue payments and defaults. as a result, even securities that gave the appearance of being gilt - edged, but were backed by us sub - prime mortgages, lost considerable ground. since the banks themselves have massive investments in this market, they were obliged to make writedowns which, in some cases, were hefty. there is still uncertainty about the volume of additional bank writedowns that will be needed, so that the situation on the international money markets remains tense. in this crisis, central banks have reacted fast and flexibly in order to secure the supply of liquidity to banks and counter distortions on the money market. by means of various measures, the swiss national bank was able to stabilise the three - month libor within the target range, thereby keeping fluctuations in the relative restrictiveness of monetary policy low by comparison with other countries. however, it is not possible to solve the fundamental problems in the banking sector through the flexible deployment of an expanded range of monetary policy instruments ; neither can they be resolved by means of coordinated actions on the part of central banks alone. the banks themselves must make a substantial contribution to solving the problems which triggered the current crisis. in this respect, the most urgent matters are transparency with regard
european countries, inflation was above our inflation target because of oil and food prices and the european central bank raised its interest rate only month before. although it is certain that the, at that time actual, forecast did not match the data perfectly, with no doubt it identified the break point and by that served very well its purpose. naturally, the forecast accuracy, i. e. the ability to identify breaking points reasonably well, has not come out of the blue sky. the actual way in which forecasts are produced and used in central banks has changed substantially over the past two decades. these changes have reflected developments both in the economic ( and econometric ) theory and in monetary policy regimes. bearing in mind the failure of large - scale models in 1970s, the profession has started to prefer smaller - scale models with a sounder microeconomic background, built in recent decades usually along the lines of new keynesian economics. well, maybe we are still not able to match all the statistical numbers perfectly, but i hope that we are more skilled in recognising important breaks in the development of our economies than we were 10 years ago. indeed, the use of general equilibrium models forces us to think about the economy in a consistent way and the use of multivariate filters has improved our knowledge about the current position of the economy in the business cycle. you probably all remember that inflation targeting was in our case introduced in a challenging situation, after a period of currency turmoil in may 1997, which ended the fixed exchange rate period and resulted in higher inflation and rising inflation expectations. the economy needed a new nominal anchor in order to return to a disinflation path. inflation targeting was chosen as “ the best of all bad ” alternatives at the time. such a sudden switch from a fixed exchange rate system to inflation targeting required a radical and fast change in the central bank ’ s mentality. this was perhaps the biggest challenge that the cnb had to face. over the past five years it has involved much work on improving our forecasting tools, leading to substantial development in our internal analytical processes. at the beginning of 2002, the cnb settled on a new forecasting process. this integrates expert judgment and short - term analyses – which were the key pillars of the cnb ’ s forecasting tool - kit in the first years of inflation targeting – with a macroeconomic model that provides a consistent framework for the policy analysis. an important element of this step was a switch from a forecast with a

generally, and especially on this point. in the case of the euro, it holds true here more than anywhere else that we are not rich enough to afford to repeat the potential mistakes of others. we make enough of our own. thank you for your attention. 1 marsh, d. : “ recko se zbavi eura, doufejme ze kultivovane, ” lidove noviny, 19 october 2011. 2 rogoff, k. : “ the eurozone must reform or die, ” project syndicate, 14 june 2017. 4 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches
emmanuel tumusiime - mutebile : banking issues in uganda speech by prof. emmanuel tumusiime - mutebile, governor, bank of uganda, on the occasion of eid - el - fitri celebrations at bou western gardens, kampala, 25 september 2009. * * * your eminence the mufti of uganda distinguished guests ladies and gentlemen asalaam aleikum, eid el - fitr, al - mubarak. it gives me great pleasure to welcome you to this annual auspicious occasion when we at the bank mark the end of the holy month of ramadthan and the celebration of eid el fitr. let me take this opportunity to congratulate your eminence and all muslims in uganda for having been steadfast in observing the fast throughout the holy month of ramadthan. to the bank muslim staff who observed the fast, i highly commend you and urge you to maintain this noble act of worship. the virtues of fasting should be upheld throughout your daily life both at work and elsewhere. the bank of uganda as a public institution upholds the freedom of worship for every member of staff. it is our conviction that religion plays a great role in enhancing morality in the society leading to ethical conduct, discipline in the work place and invaluably contribute to better outcomes. our commitment is demonstrated by the bank values which each staff is required to uphold. this blends very well with the requirements of fasting in the holy month of ramadthan. fasting brings a reminder to all of us to go back to god, to do the right things and shun evil. let me take this opportunity to address you on the health of the uganda's financial sector. first of all there was a baseless rumour in the red pepper of september 14, 2009 that a “ top bank faces closure over gadaffi cash ” that the workers of " an islamic founded bank " were about to become jobless and that the top management faced arrest because the bank was being used as a conduit for money " to some officials at mengo " from foreign sources. let me reiterate the statement in the press release i issued on september 15, 2009 – “ i assure everyone that no bank in uganda is under any threat of closure whatsoever ”. the general public should continue to ignore these completely baseless allegations. all banks and other supervised financial institutions are well managed, well capitalized

the eac monetary union. a durable monetary union depends on a high degree of sustainable convergence regarding price stability, sound fiscal and monetary policies, exchange rate stability and convergence of long - term interest rates in the region. ultimately, the strategic framework should stress the application of the convergence criteria, institutional arrangements for eac monetary union and a clear timetable for the preparations necessary to ensure successful establishment of a unified regional currency and central bank. governors and colleagues, the fast tracking of eac monetary union is upon us, and we must rise to the occasion and meet the challenge head on. we must be strong advocates of this noble cause and convert the sceptics. we must seize the day or as they say in latin, carpe diem! thank you.
commitment to support socioeconomic progress and sustainable economic development in namibia. as the bank of namibia, we remain committed to leading with vision and integrity. we vow to serve and grow this jewel called namibia. 7. the good book states in proverbs 12 : 15 states that " he who is wise listens ". in this regard, i will keep my remarks today very brief as i know everyone in this auditorium today as well as those that have joined us online are eager to listen and tap from the well of wisdom of our head of state. therefore, without any delay, i would like to call upon his excellency the president, dr. hage geingob to share his thoughts with us. i thank you. 3 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches

johannes! gawaxab : talking points a€ “ presidential visit to the bank of namibia talking points by mr johannes! gawaxab, governor of the bank of namibia, at the presidential visit to the bank of namiba, windhoek, 19 october 2022. * * * director of ceremonies, your excellency, the president of the republic of namibia, dr hage geingob, deputy governors of the bank, the entire management and staff of the bank of namibia, members of the media, ladies and gentlemen, good morning, 1. on behalf of the board, management and staff, it gives me great pleasure to welcome you, your excellency most cordially to the bank of namibia this morning. it is indeed an immense honour to host you at the bank today. your excellency, ladies & gentlemen, 2. your presence here today, signifies a day of celebration to honour our history as a central bank and as a nation. this is an opportunity to reflect on how far we have come as a bank of the namibian people, whilst at the same time glimpsing into the future with confidence and hope. it is a day of celebrating great leaders such as yourself, that have brought us to this point. indeed, we are standing on the shoulders of giants. 3. i would like to emphasise that since the dawn of independence, the government of namibia, in recognition of the important role of the central bank, has been committed to providing an enabling environment within which the bank of namibia could operate independently. in doing so, the bank has been able to successfully discharge its mandate and has been committed to taking decisions in the best interest of the namibian people and the economic prosperity of this country. government in general and the ministry of finance in particular have embraced sound, stability - oriented policies, thereby providing a solid foundation that facilitates the bank's operations. your excellency, 4. the world economy has taken a major hit with the devastating impact of the covid - 19 pandemic and now the russia - ukraine conflict, and likewise namibia has not been spared. despite this very difficult global situation, i do believe that there is a lot of promise and opportunity, and that our stars are aligning. the economy recorded positive growth in 2021 after almost five years of contraction, and the first two 1 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches quarters of 2022 have also delivered neat positive growth rates and opportunities in the
the early to mid - 1970s and the early 1980s, inflation was in double digits, partly as a result of a surge in wages. in the late 1980s, asset prices and credit growth were rising to unsustainably high levels, and consumer price inflation was still excessive. both the dynamics of the business cycle itself, and the need for tough anti - inflationary monetary policy, pointed to an abrupt end of the expansion. on this occasion, the picture is different and no one is expecting an abrupt end. 4. why has the expansion been steadier and longer this time? i would now like to make a few comments on why the expansion of the 1990s has been steadier and longer than its two predecessors. here i think we have to look for essentially macroeconomic explanations. the first explanation is to be found in a comparison of the rates of inflation this time compared with the two previous expansions. it is curious now to look back to some of the economic debates of the 1960s and 1970s. in those times, there were many people who thought that you had to tolerate “ a little bit of extra inflation ” to make sure the economy would grow. many, if not the majority, thought that getting inflation down again would not be worth the price, because it would result in permanently lower growth. the short - term trade - off ( the phillips curve ) was incorrectly interpreted as being a summary of our medium - term choices. now when we look back ( table 4 ), nothing could be further from the truth. the low inflation decades - 1950s, 1960s and now the 1990s - are the ones where we did well on growth in absolute terms, or in relative terms. the high inflation decades - the 1970s and 1980s - were the ones where our growth performance was at its poorest. table 4 consumer prices - average annual rate of increase australia oecd 1950s * 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 6. 1 2. 9 2. 5 3. 2 10. 1 8. 0 8. 3 5. 1 2. 2 2. 7 * if the short - lived korean war boom is excluded, the average inflation rates in the 1950s would be 2. 5 % for australia and 1. 7 % for oecd. the most reasonable explanation for the lower inflation and hence steadier and longer expansion in the 1990s is the improvement in macroeconomic policies. by this i mean monetary and fiscal policies, or what used to be known as demand management policies. i j macfarlane, statement

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