the pre - covid level and inflation persistently below 2 percent, the economy remains far from our goals, and it will take some time to achieve substantial further progress. by taking a patient approach based on outcomes rather than a preemptive approach based on the outlook, policy will be more effective in achieving broad - based and inclusive maximum employment and inflation that averages 2 percent over time. the combination of patient monetary policy, together with accelerating progress on vaccinations and substantial fiscal stimulus, should support a strong and inclusive recovery as the economy reopens fully. for instance, even with the strongest sep inflation projection since the committee established its 2 percent inflation objective, the median projection from the current sep is not quite strong enough to generate inflation that averages 2 percent from the time the federal funds rate moved to the lower bound through the end of the forecast horizon, which is a key consideration under a temporary price level targeting framework. see ben s. bernanke, michael t. kiley, and john m. roberts ( 2019 ), “ monetary policy strategies for a low - rate environment, ” aea papers and proceedings, vol. 109 ( may ), pp. 421 – 26.

mandates for the ecb and the bank of england? under hierarchical mandates, price stability or low inflation is typically the principal objective, and other objectives can be pursued only once the inflation objective is met. second, there could be different strategies for achieving a given set of objectives. of course, the most important factor in determining monetary policy strategy is likely the nature of the objectives themselves, so any differences in strategy may be related to the first question. at any rate, is a taylor - rule type of approach – well aligned with a dual mandate and therefore a simple representation of the u. s. policy response – different in practice from the flexible inflation - targeting strategy of the bank of england and the two - pillar strategy of the ecb? if so, what are the consequences of the differences in strategy for how central banks respond to unexpected developments? third, what determines how effective a central bank is in meeting its objectives, given its strategy? this takes us into the main subjects that this program will cover. to what extent does the process followed in making monetary policy shape the details and effectiveness of the outcomes? does the nature of the governance and decision process matter? for example, does it matter whether there is a single governor or a committee ; whether there are outsiders as well as insiders on the committee ; whether there is individual or collective responsibility for the decisions of the committee ; and whether the committee is made up only of centralized members or also includes regional representatives? does the effectiveness of policy depend on the central bank's skill in communicating the intent behind its policy and the future direction of policy and, therefore, on the transparency of the process itself? does the effectiveness of the policy depend on the instrument independence of the central banks as well as the overall relationship between the central bank and the rest of government? it is interesting to try to identify differences in practice among central banks. but is the more meaningful story a convergence in practice around the world? is there any real difference between a monetary policy executed under dual mandate and under flexible inflation targeting? if central bank practices are converging, is this due to a convergence in the economic environments or to greater acceptance of a common intellectual framework regarding what central banks can and should do as well as how those goals can be achieved? the politics of monetary policy well i have finally reached my assigned topic – the politics of monetary policy. i use the term to describe the relationship between the central bank and the rest of government. in an earlier paper on this subject,