support economic recovery, while at the same time responding to mounting uncertainties in the financial markets stemming from external shocks. so with this background in mind, allow me to share my views on the policy tasks small open economies have to deal with. first, in our conduct of monetary policy we should pay special attention to financial stability risks, while supporting the recovery of economic growth. we should maintain our accommodative monetary policy stances to ensure that the trend of low growth does not become entrenched. yet at the same time, we must ensure that this does not undermine financial stability. especially in the case of small open economies, we need to bear in mind that, if the degree of monetary easing is excessive, the risk that external shocks would trigger sudden capital outflows and currency depreciation is relatively higher. second, we should strengthen our efforts to reduce the negative impacts of overseas factors on domestic financial stability and economic growth. since the global financial crisis, many bis central bankers ’ speeches countries have taken various steps to enhance their capacities to cope with external risks, for example by strengthening macroprudential policies, improving exchange rate flexibility and increasing their foreign reserves. at an international level, they have implemented the basel iii framework and strengthened regulations on g - sifis, in an effort to heighten the resilience of financial institutions to external shocks and improve the shock absorption capacities of their financial systems. through this conference, i hope that we can share what we have achieved with these policies and what we have learned from them. i also hope that we can come up with new supplementary measures. third, we need to continue to pursue international cooperation to expand financial safety nets. they have been steadily improved at both the global and regional levels, with the establishment of the imf ’ s new arrangements to borrow, the conclusion of us dollar currency swap arrangements between major countries, and the increase in the chiang mai initiative multilateralisation ( cmim ) fund. going forward, we should continue our efforts on international cooperation for stronger global financial safety nets. to this end, we need to promote cooperation between the imf and regional financial arrangements such as the european stability mechanism and cmim, and expand international currency swap arrangements. finally, i would like to emphasize the necessity of structural reform. during the global financial crisis, and even after the crisis, we have witnessed numerous instances in which countries with strong economic fundamentals rapidly overcame external shocks. a great deal of research shows that structural reform involves

. on the latter, the fight against climate change, disclosure and standardization are key elements to close the data gaps and ensure adequate incentives for corporates. i therefore consider that disclosure should become mandatory, at least as a first step for financial institutions, as it is already in france, and for large corporates. ensuring consistency and comparability of disclosure around the world is essential, and relevant authorities, including sometimes the ones we are not so used to talk to as central bankers or supervisors, need to converge on these new challenges. in that context of extended need for cooperation and coordination among regulators and supervisors, my last comment is related to the levers at hand to promote trust and reliance on foreign supervisors to prevent the development of a trend towards ring fencing and the risk of market fragmentation. let me say first that i don ’ t think that promoting mutual trust and reliance among supervisors can move us to a world free of ring fencing. this is because it has its root and it is the result of the trade - off each regulator and supervisor has to face, in normal time and during crisis, between the need to preserve the stability of financial intermediaries or the financial system as a whole for which it is accountable and the need to preserve their competitiveness through their integration to the global financial system. for instance, for banks with cross - border activities, regulators and supervisors need to balance requirements for pre - positioning of capital and liquidity in their jurisdiction and the need to leave to those banks enough flexibility in the management of those resources at group level. and this without mentioning the development of idiosyncratic financial stability risk which might call for macroprudential approach and specific additional capital requirements at a country level, and might add to the complexity to maintain this delicate balance. what we can do rather is to better use the levers we have at hand to facilitate convergence among regulators and supervisors in the way to address this trade - off, so as to limit ring fencing and prevent a race to the bottom in that area and the resulting market fragmentation : - the first lever is the agreement to and implementation of internationally agreed regulatory standards. hence the importance for instance at the current juncture of the fair and complete 2 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches implementation of basel 3. hence also the importance of ensuring that national regulatory frameworks do not diverge unduly beyond internationally agreed standards and remain equivalent, the importance of the commitment of regulators and supervisors to such convergence, and also the importance of efficient processes to