responses, even when successful in combating financial instability, may not be enough to support the resumption of trend economic growth over the medium term. why is government action aimed at financial stability not sufficient to usher in a new era of prosperity? because the broader financial architecture remains in substantial flux, as is sometimes unavoidable. confidence in markets and institutions cannot be demanded or forced by edict. confidence in a new architecture cannot be jury - rigged, even by welldesigned government actions. nor can confidence be rushed. comprehensive policy prescriptions to address financial instability are now being delivered to the ailing patient. but a dose of patience itself may be equally important to help the recuperative process. time is required for the medicines to be administered and their efficacy to be judged. new prescriptions, however well intentioned, can prove unsettling to a patient who is searching to find his footing. of course, policy must respond to serious situations as they arise ; and, during the past 15 months, these developments have been difficult to anticipate with precision. but, if the framework for policy decisions is not viewed as clear, consistent, and predictable by market participants, the resulting actions run the risk of contributing to, rather than reducing, market volatility – at the most inauspicious of times. see kevin warsh ( 2007 ), " financial stability and the federal reserve, " speech delivered at the new york state economics association 60th annual conference, loudonville, new york, october 5. finally, actions intended to help achieve financial stability should not be allowed to interfere with the establishment of a sturdy, new financial architecture. concluding remarks i am reminded of a certain omaha - based investor who says that his investment style is to be greedy when other investors are fearful, and be fearful when others are greedy. 11 i would modify the advice somewhat to make it applicable to policymakers : we should be steady when financial market participants are fearful, and fearful when markets appear steady. this call for steadiness is not some nostrum, implying that the government should be passive during times of significant economic turmoil. quite the contrary. but comprehensive policy prescriptions are most effective when they establish new rules of engagement that are clear in intent, consistent in application, and reasonably predictable in effect. this policy formulation should allow financial firms to regain their footing and market participants, more broadly, to take new, constructive actions to facilitate the availability of credit. perhaps in this way, policy

jean - claude trichet : interception of bank transfer data from the swift system by the us secret services statement by mr jean - claude trichet, president of the european central bank, at the public hearing at the european parliament on the interception of bank transfer data from the swift system by the us secret services, brussels, 4 october 2006. * * * madame la presidente, monsieur le president, mesdames et messieurs les membres de la commission des libertes civiles, de la justice et des affaires interieures, mesdames et messieurs les membres de la commission des affaires economiques et monetaires, je suis ici aujourd ’ hui pour vous expliquer plus en detail le role de la bce dans la surveillance de swift apres que swift a repondu aux citations a comparaitre emises par le tresor americain en vertu de son programme de traque du financement du terrorisme ( terrorist finance tracking programme ). comme je l ’ ai deja explique dans ma lettre du 3 aout 2006 en reponse a m. le parlementaire klinz, la bce est membre du groupe de surveillance de swift ( swift ’ s co - operative oversight group - og ). par consequent, je voudrais, dans la premiere partie de ma declaration, preciser les objectifs et le mandat de ce groupe de surveillance. dans un deuxieme temps, j ’ exposerai les contraintes juridiques decoulant des statuts du systeme europeen de banques centrales et de la banque centrale europeenne dans ce domaine, y compris le regime de confidentialite en vigueur. a la suite de la declaration de m. praet, je serai a votre disposition pour repondre a toutes vos questions. 1. umfang der aufsichtstatigkeit zunachst einmal mochte ich darauf eingehen, was die aufsichtstatigkeiten der zentralbanken umfassen und wie dies im fall von swift in der praxis umgesetzt wird. wie ihnen bekannt sein durfte, sind die zahlungs