adopted a regulation that requires from the banks to adhere to two liquidity ratios : ( 1 ) up to 30 days and ( 2 ) up to 180 days, in denars and foreign exchange, individually. in that way, we encompassed both, the short - term and the long - term aspect of the liquidity. the results from the application of this measure are good. at the end of 2009, we have registered the following : the volume of the liquid assets is significantly over the level registered at the end of 2008 ; all liquidity indicators improved ; the gap between the assets and liabilities from the aspect of their contractual maturity and the high percentage of stable deposits decreased. the history showed again that the financial stability is precious and it represents public good for society. let us try to learn the true lessons from the latest crisis. i wish you a successful work and pleasant stay in macedonia. references 1. blanchard olivier, giovanni dell ’ ariccia and paolo mauro ( 2010 ), “ rethinking macroeconomic policy ”, imf. 2. bis quarterly review, ( march 2010 ). 3. caruana jaime ( 2010 ), “ macroprudential policy : working towards a new consensus ” ( remarks at the high - level meeting on “ the emerging framework for financial regulation and monetary policy ”, washington dc, 23 april 2010 ). 4. caruana jaime, “ the great financial crisis : lessons for the design of central banks ” ( 2010 ), ( speech given at colloquium in honour of l. papademos, ecb, frankfurt ). 5. carosio giovanni, ( 2010 ), “ financial stability and macro - prudential supervision : challenges for central banks ” ( oenb – 38th economic conference ). 6. geraats m. petra ( 2010 ), “ price and financial stability : dual or duelling mandates? ” ( paper for the 38th economics conference of the oesterreichische nationalbank ). 7. greenspan alan ( 2010 ), “ the crisis ” ( second draft paper ). 8. hannoun herve ( 2010 ), “ towards a global financial stability framework ”, ( speech prepared for 45th seacen governors conference, siem reap province, cambodia ). 9. haldane g. andrew ( 2010 ), “ the $ 100 billion question ” bank of england. 10. krugman r. paul, the return of depression economics and crisis of

capital charges on the basis of the trading portfolio ; third, introducing of a leverage ratio for the financial institutions. fourth, improvement of risk management and disclosures, as the crisis has revealed the weaknesses of the so - called “ improved ” risk management techniques on the basis of the internal risk models. fifth, special attention should be paid to the so - called counter party credit risk from otc derivatives. it became evident that these markets bear risks both for the individual financial institutions ( microprudential ) and for the financial system ( macroprudential ). namely, otc derivatives are traded bilaterally between banks, other financial institutions and corporations. they are not traded through the stock exchange, making difficulties in discovering where the last risk is located, i. e. who bears the last risk. another set of tools should find a solution for the systemically important financial institutions, extremely complex question, extremely important for the systemic stability of the financial sector. except for the general agreement about the need of adequate harmonization of the prudential regulation, as the systemically important financial institutions are almost all “ crossborder ” by their nature, so far no higher consensus on solutions regarding this matter has been reached. in the current discussion, basically there are two distinctive approaches, starting from three key features of the systemically important financial institutions ( sifis ) : their size, complexity and inter - linkedness. according to one of the approaches, no institution is too big, complicated or linked to fail. in this sense, there are proposals to limit the size of the banks and to separate commercial from investment banking, disintegrate conglomerates by living wills, etc. some argue that “ this reasoning is controversial as the effectiveness of these measures depends on the specific features of a relatively small number of sifis ; different countries will probably come up with different solutions ”. ( carosio ) although it is possible, he says, to reach an agreement on some of these proposals, in particular on resolution mechanisms, others ( e. g. breaking up institutions according to some criterion ) would require a broad international political consensus, which seems unlikely at this stage. the second approach would be directed toward seeking additional capital requirement, or a tax, according to the measure for systemic relevance. taxation seems, according to carosio, more adequate in a burden - sharing perspective. “ the solution, in my judgment ”, says greenspan “ that has at least a reasonable chance of reversing