in place. the almost unavoidable conclusion, possibly even somewhat prophetic, is that money is liable to become extraneous when participants in an economy have access to historical documentation of all the activities carried out in the past by the other participants. that is, the use of money is not ideal, and more sophisticated “ memory substitutes ” could lead to better economic results. skipping to today, the technological advances, with an emphasis on the worlds of dlt and blockchain, enable us to consider seriously — although we are far from its possible implementation — the idea of a balance, or full “ memory ” of past transactions in digital format. dlt and blockchain make it possible to store vast quantities of knowledge, and to “ remember ” huge numbers of transactions made over time — in digital and secure format. thus they may call into question to some extent the way we think about money, and the government monopoly on owning it, and if we return to narayana, “ the government's monopoly on seignorage might be in some jeopardy as information access and storage costs decline ”. the events of recent days teach us that we are very far from fully adopting the digital system as a “ regular ” product in economics, and we are very far from the day in which money will disappear from our lives, if ever, but there is no doubt that the accelerated technological progress challenges our thinking as economists on many conventions. after this semi - philosophical opening, i want to switch and discuss the active aspect of recent technological changes : the payments market, crypto, smart contracts, virtual currencies, and cbdc. when i arrived at the bank of israel, the state of the payments market in israel was different than it is today. one of my central goals was to develop the payments market in israel and to have it among those of the leading countries. therefore, it was also one of the main anchors in the strategic plan we formulated at the bank when i took on the position. in recent years, we took a series of steps to promote innovation, efficiency, and competition in the payments market for the benefit of the overall population in israel. these steps even helped us to endure the covid - 19 crisis better, as they allowed a rapid and efficient switch to contactless payment, and they will continue to help in developing the economy even long after the crisis. the state of israel is a start - up and fintech nation, and the exhibit outside this room,

of resolution frameworks. resolution is a way for authorities to deal with a failing bank without bailing it out and without interrupting its critical economic functions – typically by imposing losses on shareholders and creditors. almost all jurisdictions that are home to g - sibs now have comprehensive bank resolution regimes that align with the global standard – the fsb key attributes. they have almost all introduced comprehensive bank resolution regimes and are now carrying out very detailed resolution planning. this gives authorities a range of options for dealing with banks in stress. the evaluation has developed a resolution reform index, which is published on the fsb website. the index ranges between 0 and 1, where 0 represents no implementation and 1 represents full implementation. it has been used in a number of analyses described in the consultation report. https : / / www. bundesbank. de / en / press / speeches / implications - of - the - too - big - to - fail - reforms - for - global - banking - 836618 4 / 10 8 / 4 / 2020 implications of the too - big - to - fail reforms for global banking | deutsche bundesbank average resolution reform index for g - sib home jurisdictions and other jurisdictions evidence from market prices and credit ratings suggest that resolution reforms are seen as credible by market participants. that is, market participants think that there is some probability that, in the event of a bank failure, losses would be imposed on shareholders and creditors rather than on taxpayers. market prices suggest that investors think that they may suffer losses in the event of a bank failure and are pricing the risks accordingly. this is likely to be affecting the behaviour of banks as a going concern – so we do not have to observe an actual “ failure ” to observe effects of the reforms changes in perceptions of the credibility of resolution are obviously hard to measure, and the evaluation has used different proxies. these include estimated g - sibs ’ funding cost advantages by looking at prices of bonds, credit default swaps and equities. inevitably, the results are not identical. generally, they show that funding cost advantages peaked during the global ﬁnancial crisis and have since fallen, although not below levels seen before the crisis. lower funding cost advantages indirectly suggest that the implicit funding subsidy has fallen. https : / / www. bundesbank. de / en / press / speeches / implications - of - the - too - big - to - fail - reforms - for - global - banking - 836618 5 / 10 8 /