is that while the adjustment by deficit and surplus economies has to be symmetric, the incentives they face are asymmetric. managing currency tensions will require a shared understanding on keeping exchange rates aligned to economic fundamentals, and an agreement that currency interventions should be resorted to not as an instrument of trade policy but only to manage disruptions to macroeconomic stability. that takes me to the second facet of global imbalances – capital flows. the problem of capital flows came centre stage in the aftermath of the quantitative easing by advanced economy central banks when the excess liquidity in the global system found its way into faster growing emes. the most high profile problems thrown up by capital flows, in excess of a country ’ s absorptive capacity, are erosion of monetary policy effectiveness, currency appreciation and loss of competitiveness. speculative capital flows could also lead to asset and commodity bubbles potentially threatening both financial and economic stability. in the g 20 debate on capital flows, popularly but mistakenly referred to as “ currency wars ”, emes agitated mainly two points. first, that in as much as lumpy and volatile capital flows are a spillover from the quantitative easing of advanced economies, the burden of adjustment has to be shared. second, that capital controls should be understood as legitimate and acceptable defence against speculative capital flows. global imbalances and their correction were the main concern in the g20 framework and mutual assessment process ( map ) exercise. the map exercise is aimed at making countries commit to external sector policies that lead to strong, sustained and balanced growth at the global level. the understanding is that global imbalances, especially imbalances built on the strength of undervalued exchange rates accompanied by a build - up of reserves, threaten the stability of the global economy due to the possibility of disorderly unwinding. china ’ s exchange rate policies were at the centre of the debate in the g 20. as on date, china ’ s current account surplus ( in relation to its gdp ) has declined from the pre - crisis peak, and china ’ s real effective exchange rate has also appreciated since 2005, even though it is widely believed that it needs to appreciate further. in the meanwhile, however, the cumulative surpluses of oil producing countries ( mostly opec, russia and norway ) have increased and now account for the lion ’ s share of global current account surpluses. while global imbalances bis central bankers ’ speeches have declined in the post - crisis period, their nature and composition

to adapt to our rapidly changing societies. the central banking community therefore actively supports the ongoing revision of these standards, not least to develop adequate methodologies for measuring new phenomena that constantly emerge. lastly, it is also important to reflect on our past while we grapple with current and future problems. an important development in this context was the recent ifc decision to host the historical monetary and financial statistics ( hmfs ) central bank network. this network brings together statisticians and academic experts to exchange approaches to compile historic data and to facilitate learning from each other. noteworthy advancements have already been made in the dissemination of long - term statistics concerning credit, interest rates, housing prices and, more recently, central banks'balance sheets. i am confident that the insights shared and the discussions held during this conference will facilitate our understanding of how data governance, it advancements, and practical applications of data science are shaping modern statistical analyses and in turn supporting central banks'public mandates. it is through such gatherings that we can learn from one another, exchange ideas, and build bridges that transcend borders. i am confident that, by working together, we can better harness the power of data to strengthen the resilience and effectiveness of policy actions. i wish you all fruitful and engaging discussions. 3 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches