in its stages of implementation, how the institution assesses and manages risk, and relevant information for third parties to ascertain the effectiveness of the bank's risk 2 / 4 management. pillar 3 market discipline, therefore, will complement supervisory efforts to maintain adequate capital. so where do we go from here? the u. s. agencies learned some valuable information from the follow - up work pertaining to qis4 results this summer. right now we are still evaluating the results from this follow - up work, discussing the options to respond to those findings, and determining how the implementation process will proceed in the united states. obviously, we understand that the industry and others are interested in details about the next steps in the united states, and we hope to provide a public communication sometime in october. additionally, the agencies are moving forward on an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking for revisions to basel i rules, the details of which should be publicly available very soon. we expect that the timeframe to adopt revisions to current rules will overlap with the basel ii proposals, so that the industry can review them side - by - side. progress on home - host issues with such a large group of international bankers in attendance, i would be remiss in not offering a few thoughts on home - host issues relating to basel ii implementation. understandably, internationally active banks are keenly interested in cooperative arrangements among supervisors for evaluating capital adequacy under basel ii. several years ago, the accord implementation group ( aig ) was formed as a subcommittee of the basel committee for supervisors to discuss the tactical issues associated with cross - border supervision. most recently, and in cooperation with the representatives of the core principles liaison group ( non - group of ten supervisors ), a joint working group was established to consider enhancing guidelines for information sharing among home and host supervisors. this working group is looking to clarify the roles and responsibilities of home and host supervisors as well as supervisory expectations of banks with regard to communications between their head office and their foreign offices. the working group is also hoping to address communications between home and host supervisors about enterprise - wide risk models and their use in assessing capital adequacy in host jurisdictions, as well as mechanisms for supervisors to work together for consistency and to avoid duplication. obviously, whatever guidance is issued would be supplemented further as implementation plans and qualification processes become more fully developed. i do think it is also helpful to remember that a number of the home - host issues pertaining to basel ii are actually

. turkey, following the second approach, has been using mainly macroprudential measures along with a relatively low and yet quite flexible interest rate policy in face of volatile short term capital flows. 2 the central bank and the other government agencies responsible for financial stability, developed new tools and introduced new policies to avoid excessive deviations of the credit growth rates and the exchange rates from economic fundamentals. examples of macroprudential policies used in turkey are loan to value restrictions, high risk weights and provisioning requirements on credit with negative externalities, maturity based reserve requirements and leverage based reserve requirements. these policies already helped to start a rebalancing process for domestic and external demand during the rapid post lehman recovery and the more recent european sovereign debt crisis. 3 distinguished guests, the financial stability, when lost, has deep and long - term impacts on both employment and growth. 4 the cost of preventing a financial crisis is much lower than the cost of living it. the recent developments have reminded us this economic dictum once again. the primary objective of the central bank of the republic of turkey is to achieve and maintain price stability. besides price stability, contributing to financial stability within its scope of operations has been also listed among the primary duties of the bank in the central bank law. to that end, cbrt has used a combination of macroprudential tools and automatic stabilizers. we view both price stability and financial stability as two indispensable components of balanced growth. borio, c. ( 2011 ). central banking post - crisis : what compass for uncharted waters? bis working papers, no. 353. akcelik, y., bascı, e., ermisoglu, e. and oduncu, a. ( 2013 ). the turkish approach to capital flow volatility. cbrt working papers, no : 13 / 06. for sustainable debt levels, see : cecchetti, s., mohanty, m. s. and zampolli, f. ( 2011 ). the real effects of debt. bis working papers, no. 352. reinhart, carmen m., and kenneth s. rogoff. ( 2009 ). this time is different : eight centuries of financial folly. princeton, nj : princeton press. ; taylor, a. ( 2012 ). the great leveraging, nber working papers, no. 18290. bis central bankers ’ speeches distinguished guests, comprehending the