the issues we research are based on monetary policy experience, primarily in canada, but also in other jurisdictions, and on academic and policy - related discussions and research. we also consult widely, most notably with the department of finance, as well as other central banks, policy institutions and the private sector. all our research, as well as a comprehensive background document, is published on our website. the renewal process has evolved over time as our experience and understanding of inflation targeting has broadened and deepened. although we haven ’ t made many changes to the framework, we ’ ve gotten better at operationalizing it. most notably, having a well - understood and credible inflation target has facilitated — and indeed demanded — more transparent communications, since the public can more easily hold the bank accountable for monetary policy outcomes. 13 to this end, we decided in november 2000 to announce adjustments to our policy rate on eight fixed dates throughout the year. 14 four of these announcements are accompanied by our monetary policy report, which sets out our outlook for the global and canadian economies as well as the risks to our projections. starting this year, the four other decisions will be followed by a public speech by a member of governing council. finally, let me give you a quick overview of some of the questions we addressed in previous reviews. 15 12 fundamental issues that represent changes in the primary objective of monetary policy would be included in the joint agreement. 13 beaudry and ruge - murcia ( 2017 ) argue that the adoption of the inflation target enhanced the governance of monetary policy in canada. 14 previously, interest rate decisions were announced on a more ad hoc basis, often after interest rate adjustments by the us federal reserve. 15 see renewal of the inflation - control target — background information — october 2016 and renewal of the inflation - control target — background information — november 2011. in 2011, we asked whether the 2 per cent target should be lowered, and in 2016, whether it should be raised. decisions to alter the target rate of inflation require that we balance two considerations. on one hand, higher inflation is economically costly. it distorts the price mechanism and is socially unjust because many people, especially those with lower or fixed incomes, cannot adequately hedge their financial situation against higher inflation. on the other hand, higher inflation, if it were credible ( which is a big “ if ” ), would give the central bank a higher neutral policy rate. that ’ s the interest rate consistent with the economy growing at its potential and inflation staying

, 1st ed., vol. 3. amsterdam : elsevier, pp. 369 – 442. gourio, francois, jae w. sim, and anil k. kashyap ( 2018 ). “ the trade offs in leaning against the wind, ” imf economic review, vol. 66 ( march ), pp. 70 – 115. kiley, michael t. ( 2018 ). “ unemployment risk ( pdf ), ” finance and economics discussion series 2018 – 067. washington : board of governors of the federal reserve system, september. lopez - salido, david, jeremy c. stein, and egon zakrajsek ( 2017 ). “ credit - market sentiment and the business cycle, ” quarterly journal of economics, vol. 132 ( august ), pp. 1373 – 1426. mian, atif, amir sufi, and emil verner ( 2017 ). “ household debt and business cycles worldwide, ” quarterly journal of economics, vol. 132 ( november ), pp. 1755 – 1817. schularick, moritz, and alan m. taylor ( 2012 ). “ credit booms gone bust : monetary policy, leverage cycles, and financial crises, 1870 – 2008, ” american economic review, vol. 102 ( april ), pp. 1029 – 61. svensson, lars e. o. ( 2014 ). “ inflation targeting and ‘ leaning against the wind,'” international journal of central banking, vol. 10 ( june ), pp. 103 – 114. — — — ( 2017 ). “ cost – benefit analysis of leaning against the wind, ” journal of monetary economics, vol. 90 ( october ), pp. 193 – 213. 1 these remarks represent my own views, which do not necessarily represent those of the federal reserve board or the federal open market committee. 2 for reviews of the various monetary policy transmission channels to the real economy, see bernanke and gertler ( 1995 ) and boivin, kiley, and mishkin ( 2010 ). 3 see, among others, schularick and taylor ( 2012 ) ; lopez - salido, stein, and zakrajsek ( 2017 ) ; mian, sufi, and verner ( 2017 ) ; adrian, boyarchenko, giannone ( 2019 ) ; and kiley ( 2018 ). 4 see, for instance, svensson ( 2014, 2017 ). 5 see, for