reach. on the basis of this experience we do not believe that a network of resolution authorities and funds can cater for swift, effective, and impartial decision - making, which is so much needed in case of resolution. in the recent discussions surrounding bank resolution, a lot has been said on bail - in versus bail - out. allow me to take the opportunity of being here in stockholm, at an event organised by a danish bank, to make a few points on the danish and swedish experience with banking crises, and draw lessons for the future. the danish case the danish government ’ s first reaction to the financial sector woes in 2008 was in many ways similar to those of other european states : ample recourse was made to bailouts, loans, guarantees etc. however, at the peak of the banking crisis in 2010, denmark chose to take a tougher stance than its european counterparts. with its third bank package, it was the first european state to force senior creditors to take a hit when banks failed. haircuts of 16 % and 14 % were imposed on senior creditors of amagerbanken and fjordbank mors respectively. as danish banks were deemed to be benefiting less from an implicit government guarantee than their competitors, they were penalised by rating downgrades and a hike in funding costs. the danish experience illustrates the need for a harmonised approach across the eu to ensure a level - playing - field. whereas the rationale may have been sound, market effects can be negative and even volatile when member states implement such policies alone and unexpectedly, particularly in times of market stress. it is important to allow banks as well as investors adequate lead - time to anticipate for such regime shifts. with this in mind, the ecb is of the view that the envisaged bail - in rules should be introduced at the same time across the eu and that this should be done by 2015, thereby providing the required certainty for market actors and ensuring a level playing field. the danish example also teaches us another lesson : the debate on resolution should not be reduced to a mere question of bail - in versus bail - out. there are other tools in the resolution toolkit – apart from bail - in – that can be used to deal with troubled banks and be equally effective in shielding taxpayers. while reviewing their response to the crisis, the danish authorities decided that facilitating bank consolidation was the primary path towards a healthier sector. they decided to push for private sector buy - outs of

systemic risks are identified, policy actions are taken in a timely and effective way, taking into consideration in particular that risks are evolving over time and across institutions and markets. furthermore, i expect an interesting discussion on the macro - prudential aspects of the new capital and liquidity framework ( basel iii ). this topic is of paramount importance from a policy perspective, given the on - going implementation process of basel iii around the globe. in europe, the capital requirements directive iv and related regulation are expected to substantially reshape the macro - prudential policy framework, and i hope in this regard that our panellists will help us better understand the policy implications of this new framework and to find answers to the question how we can strike the right balance between policy measures taken at the national and at the european level. conclusion with these words, i open this conference on “ financial stability : methodological advances and policy issues ”, and look forward to the keynote addresses, presentations, and the discussions that, i am sure, will help us in carrying out our task of contributing to ensure financial stability. bis central bankers ’ speeches