others. in this regard, i would suggest that a comparison of the reconfigured financial regulatory system in the united kingdom serves as an instructive counterpoint to the u. s. system. 5 / 8 bis central bankers'speeches some thoughts on post - crisis scholarship topics and pedagogy scholarship insofar as i have succeeded in identifying questions that will be central to the further development and refinement of a regulatory system that takes account of the financial system as a whole, all of what i have already said should be fertile ground for legal and economic scholarship. however, not every important topic for research fits neatly into one of these cross - cutting issues, so let me mention some policy issues that may especially benefit from academic work. first is the issue of measures and standards for evaluating systemic risk. numerous financial economists have done very useful work in creating metrics for the systemic importance of financial institutions — a literature that has already informed regulatory efforts to designate and categorize such institutions and, as it develops further, will surely continue to do so. 5 but there are also specific legal standards, such as the financial stability factor now mandated in the review of proposed bank and holding company mergers, that could also benefit from academic work. 6 second is the set of issues associated with corporate governance in a prudentially regulated institution. john armour, lucien bebchuk, jeff gordon, jon macey, and others have already tackled some of these issues — such as incentive compensation arrangements, the appropriate duties for boards of directors in such institutions, and the appropriate scope of supervisory expectations for boards. 7 these issues remain worthy of discussion. the preceding questions and others, such as the advisability of a requirement for a non - executive chair of the board, have only grown in significance since i spoke to this topic a couple of years ago. 8 third is the subject of overseeing the regulators, which includes such matters as the advisability of publicly releasing some or all supervisory ratings and informal enforcement actions. you may recall that our decision in 2009 to release the results of our stress test — a practice that we have continued in subsequent years — was quite controversial, but has proven to be enormously helpful both for giving investors in the firms and the public a better sense for how the federal reserve is conducting its capital regulation policies. fourth is the rather broad topic of the implications of technological innovation for financial services regulation and, indeed, for the competitive position of insured depository institutions

would be the minimum margining requirements on securities financing transactions that have been agreed to at the financial stability board ( fsb ), which the federal reserve will be proposing through a rulemaking next year. of course, a particular firm may be a target under two, or possibly all three, approaches. but it is important to identify clearly why a regulation is deemed necessary and, accordingly, how it should be targeted. in the framework i have set forth, for example, institution - specific measures may be thought of as those needed to protect financial stability even though a firm is already subject to business model regulation. and a transaction - based measure may be thought of as one needed to protect financial stability regardless of whether all entities that might engage in such a transaction need to be regulated because of the risks associated with their business models. my third set of questions pertains to the scope and allocation of government authority for financial regulation. with some relatively modest exceptions, authority in the new deal regime was determined based on the distinct regulatory aims established for different kinds of financial intermediaries, the oversight of which was assigned to different agencies. the allocation basically followed the glass - steagall act ’ s separation of commercial and investment banking. but, over time, both markets and regulatory change complicated this fairly simple picture : markets complicated this as both banks and broker - dealers invented new ways of doing business that allowed each to take on risks previously reserved for the other, and regulatory changes saw shifts in the relationship of the federal reserve ’ s authority as holding company regulator and that of the sec or commodity futures trading commission as primary regulator of important nonbank holding company subsidiaries. the additional regulatory authorities and mandates in the dodd - frank act have created a quite different landscape from the pre - crisis regulatory terrain. many of these authorities and mandates are explicitly tied to financial stability goals — a sharp departure from pre - crisis circumstances. many must be exercised jointly by two or more agencies — in rulemakings, implementation, or both. and, of course, the dodd - frank act created the fsoc — an unusual entity in u. s. administrative law. appreciating this new configuration of authorities is important as a positive matter for understanding how regulation will be shaped over time and identifying possible remaining gaps in regulatory authority. it is also important as a normative matter in considering whether the allocation of authorities proves optimal over time. here one would want to look at factors of efficacy, expertise, and excessive concentrations of authority, among