intensity more explicitly on the individual bank ’ s risk profile, including its consumer compliance culture and how effectively it identifies bis central bankers ’ speeches and manages consumer compliance risk. we plan to launch this new consumer compliance supervision program for community banks in 2014. we will begin training for our examiners and outreach to our member community banks later this year. while this conference has presented much valuable research of direct relevance to community bankers, i ’ d like to recommend a few areas where further work could be of value. first, it would be interesting to explore the effects of risk - retention policies on community banks. to what extent do community banks currently retain a percentage of their loans, and how do small banks compare to money - center banks when it comes to utilizing the secondary markets for loans? would risk - retention policies be a non - issue for community banks, or would some banks be seriously constrained by such policies? even if such policies do not constrain community bank activities, would new reporting requirements related to such policies increase the reporting burden faced by small banks? these questions point to a more general area in which more research could be useful, namely a detailed examination of the compliance costs for community banks that can highlight the most beneficial areas for regulatory relief. the dodd - frank act has spawned a variety of new regulatory initiatives that add to the already - substantial regulatory burden faced by community banks. which regulations – whether new or existing – impose the greatest regulatory burden compared to their benefits? can regulatory agencies modify or provide exemptions to these regulations so as to make life a bit easier and more profitable for community banks, without adversely affecting bank safety and soundness or financial stability? to give just one example, one area in which new regulations are being developed involves incentive compensation. this area seems to me to be of much more concern when we consider a money - center bank with thousands of shareholders, none of whom has a major stake, than when we consider a community bank in which management has a large or even majority ownership share. before imposing more regulatory burden on smaller banks in this area, i would like to understand whether there is any evidence that incentive compensation has caused excessive risk taking in such institutions. we are nearing the end of the rulemaking phase of dodd - frank and our changes on capital standards, at least those regulations that most directly affect community banks. while we have tried to tailor rules to the size and complexity of institutions, we may not have gotten the balance right in every instance. thus we will continue to

policy. — — — ( 1993 ). “ discretion versus policy rules in practice, ” carnegie - rochester conference series on public policy, vol. 39 ( december ), pp. 195−214. volcker, paul a. ( 1980 ). “ statement [ and testimony ] of paul a. volcker, chairman, board of governors of the federal reserve system, ” in federal reserve ’ s second monetary policy report for 1980, hearings before the committee on banking, housing, and urban affairs, u. s. senate, july 22, 1980, 96 cong. washington : government printing office, pp. 96 – 141. woodford, michael ( 2003 ). interest and prices : foundations of a theory of monetary policy. princeton, n. j. : princeton university press.