resolve cases of misselling. subsequently ( table 3. 4, p. 194 ), the amount of the instruments issued by bankia, caixa catalunya and novacaixagalicia is given, along with the arbitration requests received and the awards favourable to customers : overall, arbitration with a favourable award amounted to €3, 125m, relating to almost 300, 000 customers. bearing in mind the doubts over the viability of the euro and over spain continuing in the single currency, and given the serious crisis facing our financial system, i believe that the restructuring strategy and its financing as set out in the 2012 memorandum of understanding was proportionate and has managed to achieve the normalisation of our financial system, as explained in chapter iv of the report. options in the restructuring process allow me now to turn to two questions : the options other than the strategy that was adopted ; and why the reform and restructuring process under way since 2009 had to be reinforced, through the 2012 memorandum of understanding. as regards the options, i believe the debate mainly focuses on the early years of the crisis, between 2009 and 2011. the two scenarios usually mentioned are, first, not having bailed out non - solvent banks, facilitating their winding up ; and second, as opposed to the gradual strategy launched, to have acted more aggressively from the outset, with an injection of public funds in the form of capital and the segregation of impaired assets into purpose - built companies, such as that which was finally created, namely sareb. with respect to the first scenario, and irrespective of political considerations, letting ailing banks go bankrupt was not a reasonable option in economic terms. the winding up of banks would have meant the paralysis of banking services and losses for depositors in the institutions concerned of that portion not covered by the dgs ( a portion that could be very high ), accentuating the risk of contagion to other institutions. this type of strategy would have had a devastating impact on confidence and the stability of the financial system, on the real economy and on employment, and it would very likely have meant a higher cost for taxpayers insofar as the dgs would almost certainly not have been able to meet the coverage of deposits without further public aid. indeed, leaving aside the case of lehman brothers, which was not a commercial bank but an investment bank without retail depositors, and the most particular case of cyprus in 2013, i know of no other instance during the crisis that began in

follows : set against nominal gdp growth of 67 %, credit to the private sector increased by 221 %, concentrated especially in the real estate sector, where growth of 250 % in house purchase loans and of 513 % in the case of credit to construction and real estate services companies was recorded. peak growth in credit was in 2005 and 2006. in those two years, credit to the private sector grew by 60 %, that earmarked for house purchases by 65 % and that to construction and real estate services firms by almost 100 %, i. e. it practically doubled in two years. over the same period 2001 - 2007, 570, 000 new houses per year on average were built, house prices increased twofold in real terms, and by 2. 5 times in nominal terms. as the report notes, this process adjusted to a dynamic consistent with what may be considered to be a speculative real estate bubble, meaning that the attendant prices stood far above what the fundamentals in the respective markets – and naturally the housing market – would have warranted. 4 / 14 the increase in credit and its concentration in the real estate sector came about at a time at which the spanish economy was undergoing deep - seated changes, on two fronts in particular : the adoption of the euro and rapid demographic growth, which made it difficult to assess the scale of the imbalances. the adoption of the euro as from 1999 entailed the disappearance of the adjustment mechanism for the exchange rate against the rest of the euro area countries and the adoption of the common monetary policy, which maintained an expansionary stance during those years, with an appreciable reduction in the interest rates prevailing for the spanish economy. the monetary policy stance was appropriate for the area as a whole, but was no doubt overly expansionary for spain. the build - up of imbalances also occurred in other euro area countries, in a setting in which different institutions, analysts and economic policymakers confided excessively in the stabilising effect of the euro. this meant that, for example, the differences in the risk premia applied to the various issuers of government debt disappeared. it was thought – and this was a widely held viewpoint – that membership of the monetary union would reduce the risk linked to current account deficits, because they could be financed within the union in light of the free movement of capital. this approach, which would be proven to be mistaken with the crisis, led, among other things, to the risk associated with