wu xiaoling : speeding up financial innovation and promoting development of the small and medium - sized enterprises speech by ms wu xiaoling, deputy governor of the people ’ s bank of china, at the high level seminar on development and investment of small and medium - sized enterprises ( smes ) in east asia, beijing, 27 october 2005. * * * ladies and gentlemen : i am very pleased to attend the first high level seminar on development and investment of small and medium - sized enterprises ( smes ) in east asia. the rise of smes has not only become an important force behind the rapid, sustainable and sound development of the economy, but also played an active role in structural adjustment and job creation. hence, governments have attached increasing importance to the development of smes. in recent years, the financial sector of china has taken concrete measures in accordance with the act on promoting small and medium - sized enterprises and other policies of the state. progress has been made in providing quality financial services for smes. according to the survey launched by the pbc, loans to smes have accounted for more than 50 % in total credit assets in the past few years, roughly equivalent to the contribution of smes to gdp. nevertheless, it remains hard for many smes to obtain financing and many entities expect to improve the management of loans to smes. i would like to touch upon three issues on this occasion : i. strengthen credit management and foster growth of customers most smes have incomplete corporate governance, loose management, and lack of transparency in accounting information, resulting in difficulty in obtaining financing. it is not difficult to discover that smes at various stages differ in financing needs and channels. smes at starting stage face high uncertainties in production and operation. they have little capacity to provide collateral, nor do they have credit record and transparent information. hence, it is difficult for commercial banks to accurately judge the yield and risk of the potential loans, thus impeding the lending. as a result, these smes mainly rely on internal financing, limited direct financing and private borrowing to raise funds. some high - tech smes also get money from venture capital. smes at growing period gradually foster some capacity to provide collateral and accumulate credit records as they expand their business over time. their internal information and relationship with commercial banks become increasingly transparent. usually these smes are eager to expand and strongly need credit. however, given their incomplete internal management and financial operation, it remains hard for them to meet the credit examination

ardian fullani : does central bank transparency reduce interest rates? speech by mr ardian fullani, governor of the bank of albania, at the seminar : does central bank transparency reduce interest rates?, tirana, 22 august 2007. * * * honourable ladies and gentlemen, it is a special pleasure for me to introduce mr. sylvester eijffinger, an academic that is wellknown for his research into central banking institutional and practical issues. today he is going to share with us one of the latest experiences of his work in monetary policy transparency and its effects on the economy. this activity is a follow - up of the lectures with distinguished personalities from academy and finance world, part of the program on enhancing transparency through public education. undoubtedly, we have to do with an initiative of the bank of albania to contribute to the enlivening of academic and scientific research in albania. over the last decade, there is noticed a tendency of central banks to be more and more open to the public concerning the decision - making in economic and financial policies. transparency has become an important issue of monetary policy. the important changes occurring in central banking since the beginning of ` 1990 have led to interesting and contemporary topics of academic studies in monetary policy. transparency and opening to the public became a necessary practice in the framework of adopting inflation targeting, as a good practice of communicating with the public and for meeting the final objective of monetary policy. moreover, this practice was extended in other central banks of advanced and developing economies. the rationale behind such policy stands at the belief that central bank transparency prevents the asymmetric information that exists between policy - makers and other economic agents. from this viewpoint, transparency increases clarity on monetary policy and allows the private sector and the economy to make rational decisions. central bank transparency enhancement has been reflected in the publication of monetary policy objective, often defined in numeric form ; in the publication of inflation report and the expected inflation forecasting ; in the description of monetary policy decisions, together with the analysis and assumptions leading to such decisions ; and in extreme cases, in the publication of minutes of monetary policy meetings, and the voting result in the decisionmaking process. significant examples may be found in the european central bank, the federal reserve, the bank of england, the central bank of canada, of new zealand, of sweden. these tendencies indicate that central bankers have strong reasons to believe that central bank transparency carries over the potential to increase credibility and reputation of the institution and of the monetary policy,