##ve to prolonged non - inflationary economic growth. in this way we can exert a positive influence on the overall external environment. but it is also true that the nature of our tasks is heavily influenced by economic and political events, and not least at present, the ongoing integration and enlargement process. i shall return to this point in a short while. before doing so, however, i should like to point out that there is a third factor which is not entirely political or economic, but which has nevertheless tended to reinforce the seemingly unstoppable momentum towards ever closer european integration and, more recently, enlargement. this third force stems from our common european identity, which has developed out of many centuries of shared history and cultural heritage. here in greece one only has to look, as it were, outside the window to see and understand this. until a decade ago, one might have been fooled into thinking that there were in fact two separate european identities supported by two distinct economic systems. however, this would be to deny the close ties which still existed, even under the difficult circumstances of the time, between countries both east and west of the iron curtain. events since the fall of the berlin wall have now shown that this difficult period did not destroy but merely delayed a process of further european integration – including both east and west – which is a natural consequence of our shared political and economic interests and our common cultural heritage. ever since the velvet revolutions which swept across central and eastern europe a decade ago, it has been apparent that, as part of their difficult transition to properly functioning market economies, these countries would become increasingly integrated with the economies of western europe. moreover, it was clear that this process, with its ultimate objective of accession to the european union, could not be achieved instantaneously, but would have to be extended over a period of time, in some cases a considerable period of time. no other scenario could be foreseen, given the largely uncharted path which these countries had to tread in dismantling the old system of central planning and replacing it with the structures necessary to support a properly functioning market economy. it goes without saying that, at the beginning of the 1990s, neither an immediate nor rapid accession of these countries to the eu would have been feasible. nor would it have been in the interests of the transition countries themselves, in particular since their economies would not have been able to survive in a competitive single european market. nevertheless, there was an obvious need,

adopt the euro in a single wave. however, irrespective of the individual time frames pursued, what is clear is that the accession process requires a significant amount of preparatory work on the part of all involved. conclusion it is probably unnecessary for me to remind you that, whatever the eurosystem ’ s involvement in the enlargement process, our primary objective is and will continue to be the maintenance of price stability in the euro area. hence, any arrangements or other forms of cooperation with accession countries must be without prejudice to the eurosystem ’ s independence and its primary objective. nonetheless, i hope that i have conveyed the message that we at the ecb and the eurosystem at large are also aware of how the wider economic and political environment can have implications for the fulfilment of our tasks and objectives. as central bankers we do not operate in a vacuum and this is certainly the case with regard to the eurosystem and the prospect of eu enlargement. as the eurosystem, we stand ready to take part in initiatives on issues falling within our fields of competence. i should like to end my remarks here. however, before i do, let me once again express my gratitude for being invited to give this lecture today. it has indeed been a great honour, in particular in view of governor zolotas ’ long and distinguished career at the bank of greece.