minimum standards that the bank of zambia expects banks and non - bank financial institutions to adhere to. therefore, banks and nonbank financial institutions alike are expected to strive for the highest standards possible at all times. ladies and gentlemen, it should also be stressed that these guidelines are to be treated as a living document and thus subject to review to incorporate new developments as they emerge. to this end, the bank of zambia will ensure that the committee that has been spearheading the development of these guidelines become a permanent one and meet every so often to make the necessary changes in an inclusive manner. accordingly, you are all urged to forward any contributions you wish to make on an ongoing basis. ladies and gentlemen, allow me now to welcome and thank mr mervin king for graciously agreeing to officially launch the guidelines. mr. king is internationally renowned for his work on corporate governance, and in particular for his work on the king committee of south africa which issued its first report in 1994. the king report, along with the cadbury report of the united kingdom and the sarbanes - oxley act of the united states have become key references on the subject and it is for this reason that we feel both proud and honoured to have mr. king with us today. it is now my honour and privilege to call upon mr. king to launch the corporate governance guidelines. mr. king!

on the other hleg proposals now let me continue with a few words on the rest of our proposals. [ page 11 : the five proposals of the high - level expert group ] gambacorta and van rixtel ( 2013 ), structural bank regulation initiatives : approaches and implications. bis working paper 412. vinals et al. ( 2013 ), act local but think global : can the volcker, vickers, and liikanen structural measures create a safer financial system? imf staff discussion note 13 / 4. european commission ( 2013 ) consultation by the commission on the structural reform of the banking sector ( http : / / ec. europa. eu / internal _ market / consultations / 2013 / banking - structural - reform ) ; see also european financial stability and integration report 2012, april 2013, for further detail on the background to the impact assessment done by the commission. bis central bankers ’ speeches the proposal for an additional separation requirement supports the goal that supervisors should have effective tools to make sure that banks ’ recovery and resolution plans can actually work. if supervisors see that banks try to test the separating line, say, between proprietary trading and the permitted parts of market making, hence also endangering the resolution and recovery plans, a more far - reaching separation of trading activities could be imposed on such banks. in the group we highlighted the importance of the european banking authority ’ s ( eba ) role in ensuring that the recovery and resolution plans and the integral resolvability assessments are applied uniformly across member states. our analysis of capital requirements was also reflected in our final recommendations. here we acknowledged the important work done by the basel committee on banking supervision in reviewing the trading book capital requirements. moreover, we highlighted the importance of the evaluation of the capital requirements on real estate related lending, an issue which is currently on the agenda of for example eba. investor bail - in lies at the core of tackling the too - big - to - fail problem as it improves the loss absorbency of banks, ensures that investors rather than taxpayers take on the responsibility for losses in the face of resolution, and further enhances creditors ’ incentives to monitor banks. in the high - level expert group we foresaw a two tier system for the bailing in of investors in bank debt. the bail - in process which was outlined by the commission in the proposed bank recovery and resolution directive plays a key role in facilitating orderly restructuring or winding - up of banks without the prolonged bankruptcy proceedings. we