regulatory framework. for example, the g - sib framework currently penalises cross - border transactions within the banking union by attaching a higher systemic risk score to banks with more of such transactions. this goes against the very rationale of the banking union, as it reduces the incentives for cross - border transactions and risk diversification. the international regulatory framework should recognise the progress that has been made in the banking union and exclude intra banking union positions from the cross - jurisdictional indicators in the g - sib methodology. fourth, there are also some resolution related aspects that warrant further consideration. in particular, the allocation of internal mrel has turned out to be an area of tension between national jurisdictions. jurisdictions with a foreign bank subsidiary prefer to have a high pre - positioning of internal mrel to ensure an orderly resolution of its local subsidiary. however, this implies a certain degree of ring - fencing to the detriment of the foreign parent bank. the compromise reached by member states in the council only allows that internal mrel is 1 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches waived if the resolution entity and the subsidiary are located in the same member state, neglecting the fact that we have achieved so much in terms of joint supervision and resolution among euro area countries. to account for this progress, internal mrel waivers on a crossborder basis in the banking union should be allowed as this would contribute to continuous cross - border banking, e. g. by generating efficiency gains and promoting further integration. therefore, it should also be possible to use guarantees to replace internal mrel and allow for more flexibility in the allocation of resources within the banking union. of course, to install confidence it will be important to have adequate safeguards in place, including that there is no legal or practical impediments to the provision of support by the parent to the subsidiary, in particular when the resolution action is taken. 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches

everyone in the euro area should be able to have confidence that the money in their bank account enjoys the same level of protection, regardless of where the account is held within the euro area. conclusion let me conclude. we pay close attention to the european parliament ’ s resolution on our annual report. and we will respond in detail to the issues you raise there when we publish our ecb annual report for 2017. the strong relationship between the ecb and the parliament not only demonstrates the importance of accountability, but it also bears possible lessons for the reflection on the future of emu whose strengthening should remain a priority. a well - designed and effective policy framework requires a clear institutional architecture, measurable objectives and the tools to achieve them. and it needs to be accompanied by strong accountability. this is essential not only to ensure that policies are effective. it is also crucial if the public is to understand those policies and play an active role, in particular via their 4 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches representatives in parliament. thank you for your attention. i am at your disposal for questions. 1 the difference between interest rates for loans to non - financial corporations of above and below €1 million also continued to decline, indicating easier access to finance for smes, in particular in the countries that were most affected by the financial crisis. 2 the publication is accessible on the ecb ’ s website at : www. ecb. europa. eu / pub / fsr / html / index. en. html 5 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches