medium term, rather than in reaction to very short - term developments, security of tenure for a relatively long time – in the case of the ecb ’ s executive board, for instance, the nonrenewable term is eight years – is quite relevant. it helps the decision - makers to set monetary policy independently of the political cycle. 1 in theory, central bank independence tends to be taken for granted. in practice, as the european experience shows, it may be challenged even when the statutes of the central bank are enshrined in a constitutional framework. the support of the people for the independence of the central bank and for the objective of price stability is additional protection against any attempt to undermine independence. in all the countries of the euro area, the support of public opinion for these two things is very strong. the fourth lesson is that clarity about the role of monetary policy also helps to clarify the role of other policies, in particular fiscal and structural policy. with respect to fiscal policy, there is now a consensus that fiscal discipline is essential, not only in a monetary union but also in individual countries, to ensure room for manoeuvre for an anticyclical budget, be it discretionary or automatic. the stability and growth pact and the 3 % and 60 % limits on a country ’ s deficit and debt in the treaty establishing the european community have now also found a broad application in macroeconomic surveillance in other continents. experience shows that countries that have complied with the requirements of the pact, in particular by maintaining a sound budgetary position in good times, have a wider margin to absorb the negative effects of an economic slowdown. those countries which instead delay the adjustment are certain to face the next slowdown with much greater anxiety, with negative effects on consumer and investor confidence. the main instrument for enhancing long - term economic growth and employment is structural policy. this has become universally recognised in the eu. the lisbon process enables structural policies and their results across countries to be compared, on the basis of a simple set of indicators. this has the advantage of focusing discussions within the individual countries on policies that are necessary for growth. some results have been achieved. for instance, the structural rate of unemployment has decreased substantially in most countries, following labour market reforms. overall, some 13 see l. bini smaghi ( 2008 ) : “ central bank independence in the eu : from theory to practice ”, european law journal, forthcoming. million jobs have been created since the introduction of the

encourage financial institutions to use scenario analysis. we also hope a common set of scenarios will make the results more comparable. more fundamentally, we hope that scenario analysis will help financial institutions better understand their exposures to transition risks, and this will increase their confidence in their ability to disclose them. in summary, we are committed to working with the financial sector to promote resilience to climate change and a smooth transition to low - carbon growth. last month, the task force for climate - related financial disclosures released its third status report. it had good things to say about canada and our country ’ s support for implementing its recommendations. but, to be frank, we all need to pick up the pace. so, here ’ s the message i want to leave with you : our financial system proved to be resilient during the global financial crisis and has been a key shock absorber so far through the covid - 19 pandemic. we need to ensure the financial system is just as resilient in the face of climate change. and in doing so, we need to position canada to seize the climate - smart opportunities that consumers, workers and investors are looking for. but to mitigate the threat and capitalize on the opportunity, we all need to mobilize. and we need to do it quickly. 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches