benoit cœure : interview with radio classique interview with mr benoit cœure, member of the executive board of the european central bank, and radio classique, conducted by mr nicolas pierron on 23 january 2017. * * * mario draghi, president of the european central bank, is to be investigated by the ombudsman of the european union, following a complaint from an ngo. he is suspected of entrusting the private sector with insider information in the context of a group called the g30. how do you respond to these allegations? the mere fact that those questions are being asked shows that we are transparent, since all meetings of the members of the executive board of the ecb with representatives of the private sector, whether bankers or not, are made public. as a matter of fact, my calendar, my diary, is published every month on the ecb ’ s website. as for the substance of your question, for us to be able to understand what is happening in the economy we have to meet private sector actors, including bankers. and yet, this has to be done in a transparent way, which is the case with the g30. so this won ’ t go any further? the ombudsman of the european union is pursuing the matter, she ’ s doing her job and we shall see what she has to say. but the same ombudsman, ms o ’ reilly, acknowledged that the ecb had made significant progress in its transparency and its communication policy, notably with the publication of the minutes of governing council decisions and also, as i said, with the publication of our calendars. so the ecb has made great efforts to be more transparent and to make its contacts with the private sector public. this is not a matter of pride, it ’ s completely normal. donald trump was sworn in on friday in the united states. his programme includes a sizeable fiscal stimulus, which is already pushing up interest rates in the us, bond rates. will this have an impact on europe? it is undoubtedly too early to judge the decisions of the new administration as it is only just beginning, but i would draw two conclusions. the first is that it is very important for us that financial conditions in the euro area remain appropriate for the euro area economy, i. e. that the euro area is protected from external financial shocks. for example, the rise in long - term interest rates observed since the end of last year has had a fairly

. beyond all these aspects that are usual in respect to supervisory authorities, there are two other points i would like to underline. the first refers to the so - called early intervention powers as they are foreseen in the draft directive about bank resolution that should be approved in the near future and long before the ssm will start operating. these early intervention are vast in what concerns the governance and scope of activity of institutions bis central bankers ’ speeches that start to have problems that can lead them to a point of non - viability. as such, these powers are related to what is usually called “ prompt corrective action ” regarding problematic banks and can be applied before the bank is delivered to the resolution authority. another important competence conferred upon the ecb as the centre of the ssm concern the macro - prudential instruments to be possibly applied both to the euro - area financial system as a whole or to individual countries. these powers are shared with national authorities that can also take measures in this field but it is nevertheless another essential element of the proposal. the crisis has shown that supervising the micro - prudential risks at individual banks separately is not sufficient and that macro - and micro - risks can actually be mutually reinforcing. involvement of non - euro area member states a third important feature of the ssm relates to the preservation and deepening of the single market, particularly the fact that national competent authorities of non - euro area member states have an option to participate in the ssm. they can participate through establishing a close cooperation with the ecb. by giving non - euro area member states full membership and voting rights in the supervisory body, the body responsible for the preparation of decisions on supervisory matters, they are placed on an equal footing with euro - area member states. however, as the ecb governing council is the ultimate the decision - making body of the ecb, its role in the ssm is reduced to the possibility of accepting of accepting or rejecting the decisions of the supervisory board. at the same time, a system integrating a mediation panel is foreseen in the regulation in case of divergences that may involve a noneuro area member state. all these mechanisms were accepted at the level of the council by all governments which seems to indicate that we might see an extension of the ssm well beyond the euro area. separation of monetary and supervisory functions, while benefiting from synergies a final feature of the ssm regulation i would like to highlight relates to the principle