and more drastic, given that the sovereign has lost access to financial markets. so the programme is actually helping support the greek people ’ s standard of living. the same is true of the reforms to improve competitiveness. greece ’ s competitiveness gap vis - a - vis its main trading partners is still at least 15 %. the programme aims at closing this gap through reforms to enhance the downward flexibility of prices – in the labour market and in product and services markets. implementing these reforms would create the basis for more export - oriented growth and job creation. without them, the economy would adjust primarily through lower production and employment, with disastrous effects for social cohesion bis central bankers ’ speeches moreover, many of the reforms in the programme have been demanded for years by the greek people themselves. there is a silent majority that wants to see a well - functioning public administration that serves citizens, enforces tax compliance, and creates the conditions for private sector growth. and had the public administration reform proceeded as programmed, it would have offset some of the contractionary effects of fiscal consolidation, as has happened in other programme countries. avoiding illusory alternatives people, and especially politicians, do not like the notion that there are no alternatives. true enough, there always are alternatives. but they may not be realistic or acceptable ones. some commentators would like us to believe that exit and devaluation could solve greece ’ s problems. i do not wish to go into details of such assessments. let me only say that much of what is published represents dangerously short - sighted and partial analysis. we must also be realistic about the prospects for a so - called “ marshall plan for greece ”. i fully support a re - direction of eu funds to maximise growth and competitiveness. but it takes time to programme and absorb these funds. greece has so far absorbed only around 35 % of the cohesion funds available for 2007 – 2013 period, a level that in fact exceeds the eu average already. so any measures we take today will not be felt in the short run. what about relaxing the fiscal targets to support growth in the short run? again, we need a full analysis of what this implies. delaying adjustment is risky : it would increase the debt - togdp ratio in 2020 above the 120 % targeted under debt exchange. this is the upper bound of what could still be considered sustainable. and it is also not free : it requires additional funding from the creditor countries, because the country still runs a primary deficit. in

m r chatu mongol sonakul : some ideas for the new government in thailand statement by mr m r chatu mongol sonakul, governor of the bank of thailand, at the british chamber of commerce, bangkok, on 23 november 2000. * * * chairman of the british chamber of commerce and all the chambers here today, distinguished guests, and ladies and gentlemen. good afternoon. let me begin by saying that it behoves me, and i have to use that word as a career civil servant who has taken his duty righteously for the last 35 years, not to comment on the work of the present government especially during an election period. in any case what they have done is fast becoming history and we have to take it as facts. a datum from which we will have to operate. in my career, i have been unenthusiastic in commenting about history, and only study it with a view to creating the future rather than commenting on it. if i wanted to comment on history, i guess i would have continued my dual career as a university lecturer which ended abruptly after the first year of my working life, since i found the responsibility of turning up regularly on time every week for anything quite unbearable as well as preferring to be on the implementation side rather than a commentator or analyst. i shall keep my comments mainly therefore to what the new government should do, be it really a new government or just the old one in a new bottle, and i shall refer only to the present or historical developments only in so far as it is necessary to understand future recommendations. as this is an after lunch speech, i shall also keep it short and not try to be comprehensive, but only comment on things that interest me or i think might be useful to the audience. let ’ s start with a simple concept, the credit bureau. one of the reasons the npl could become so high, and banks with high npls could remain supported by the public, is because in the present law the concept is that financial transactions are secret and banks are secret places, looked after and owned and supervised by responsible people. it would be nice if it were true, but the banking industry is leveraged by a ratio of 12 : 1 and the temptation is rather great for the owner to take advantage of other people ’ s money, people who have no right to know what is going on with their money even once a year because they are not shareholders but just depositors. the temptation of the supervisors