the global economy through trade and commodity prices and via indirect contagion effects owing to higher risk aversion in international financial markets. the main issue regarding the chinese economy is not whether it slows by a fraction of a percentage point more than projected, but rather the external consequences of such a development. for example, a slowdown in growth to around 6 % of gdp, compared with 7. 3 % in 2014, is no grave cause for concern. in principle, these figures, which largely reflect the change in china ’ s production model to an economy more geared towards consumption, can be managed by the authorities. the uncertainty lies in the difficulty of evaluating the external effects of such changes, and the fact that the differing forecasts of private and public agents are reflected in greater volatility in financial markets. asian and latin american emerging economies are particularly sensitive to changes in the international arena. in latin america, gdp data for the second quarter show a significant slowdown. the brazilian economy, in particular, is worrying given its high budget deficit and significant current account shortfall ( although the latter has begun to be corrected ), along with inflation that needs to be contained and corrected as soon as possible. the imf projects brazilian gdp will fall by 3 % this year and will fall further, albeit moderately, in 2016. i would like to indicate that the impact of the downturn in the emerging economies on spanish banks, even for those with significant exposure to some of these economies, has been moderate. the geographical diversification of their businesses and the adjustments made to their management have contributed to the stability of their balance sheets. developments in the euro area as for economic developments in the euro area, growth in the second quarter was external demand - led, although internal demand continues clearly to support disposable income arising from lax monetary policy, the neutral fiscal policy stance, low energy prices and the improvement in the labour market. bis central bankers ’ speeches in september, the ecb revised downwards its growth projections for the euro area to 1. 4 % in 2015, 1. 7 % in 2016 and 1. 8 % in 2017. it should also be noted that the approval and start - up of the third bailout programme for greece has mitigated the risks in the area, a source of uncertainty for the spanish and other european economies. a characteristic of the current situation in the euro area is the trend towards disinflation. the ecb expects to end this year, 2015, with

to the anticipation of problems, minimisation of the use of public funds, reducing capacity, the conditionality of assistance, the emphasis on downsizing balance sheets and the promotion of transparency. first it is very important to anticipate problems. the primary obligation of a banking supervisor is to ensure at all times that the credit institutions operating are solvent and viable. however, good supervisors should not limit themselves to analysing the present, but should also anticipate possible scenarios of non - viability that might arise in the future and attempt to reduce problems to a minimum before they emerge. when the crisis broke, the 45 spanish savings banks then existing were all solvent and viable. however, taking into account the new economic and financial environment stemming from the crisis, it was possible to foresee that while some of them were very well - managed and unquestionably sound, many others, within a matter of years or months, might eventually be non - viable. that is why it was urgent to change the legislation on restructuring, which had been designed to resolve isolated, nonsystemic crises and which, in particular, was not appropriate for managing the restructuring of savings banks. moreover, the legislation then in force involved the use of tools that had been very useful for resolving crises in the past, but that were banned by the monetary union. consequently it was important to create instruments such as the frob to enable preventive action to be taken, before the situation worsened and required a wholesale winding up of institutions. apart from the costs of winding up, there was a risk, especially at a time of global banking crisis, that contagion might spread throughout the spanish financial system. when examining the possible formulae for financial restructuring, the authorities ruled out some that definitely might have speeded up the process of restructuring the banks. they did so on the basis of prudence, since a sudden sharp deterioration in public finances in the midst of the crisis could, as it did elsewhere in europe, have meant that the rescue of the banking system brought the country to the brink of bankruptcy and an eventual bail - out. the containment of public spending matters not only from a medium - term perspective ; given the current vulnerability of sovereign debt on the markets, its short - term effects must also be considered. it is also essential to maintain the criterion of demanding conditionality when designing public assistance, so that this is only received by institutions that adjust their capacity and manage to improve their efficiency, which is easier to do