boom episodes that have sometimes been followed by post - boom recessions. these findings are obviously important for the role of money and credit in the monitoring and assessment of financial stability, but they are also relevant for the conduct of monetary policy. a recently expressed view is that a narrow focus of monetary policy on price stability in the short term might pose risks to price stability in the longer run, if the potential consequences of financial instability for long - term price developments are overlooked. the ecb ’ s monetary policy strategy, with its medium - term orientation and the important role it assigns to monetary analysis for assessing mediumto long - term price developments, allows us to address challenges that may arise from financial imbalances and potential instability in the financial markets. monetary analysis can help us to identify distortions and imbalances in the financial system, and the implied potential risks to long - term price stability, in a timely manner. moreover, market expectations of the monetary policy response to these long - term risks to price stability should help to contain evolving financial imbalances and thereby mitigate the vulnerability of the financial system. there is, therefore, no conflict between the conduct of a monetary policy focused on the preservation of price stability over the medium and longer term, and the safeguarding of financial stability. on the contrary, price stability and financial stability should be mutually reinforcing. and the monitoring and assessment of monetary and credit developments contribute to this, which reinforces what i said before : there is “ value in money ”. however, it is worth keeping in mind the implications of the rapidly changing global economy. its structure and functioning is affected not only by ( i ) productivity developments related to technological advances ; and ( ii ) the process of globalisation, but also by financial innovation and the increasing complexity of financial instruments. all these factors have a bearing on the dynamics of the inflationary process and the evolution and information content of monetary and credit aggregates. it is therefore essential that we continue to monitor these developments, and keep our antennas alert for monetary and financial signals that can be of use in assessing medium - to long - term trends in consumer and asset price developments and their potential interaction. needless to say, it is not easy to interpret this information in the context of the ongoing structural changes in the real economy and financial markets that are difficult to identify and measure in real - time. but we have to. i am convinced that the information value that can be provided by money will remain important, but it

for the euro area will be to demonstrate its ability to bring prosperity and security. an enormous amount of work remains to be done. to this must be added the political risks of what i call “ seeping pessimism ”. there is still considerable support for the euro but at the political level greater european integration is still rejected to some extent. that is one of the risks for the coming years. the crisis has highlighted not the weaknesses of monetary union, but the weaknesses of an incomplete monetary union. the ecb often sends out the message that it can create the conditions for stronger growth but that governments must, in turn, undertake structural reforms to make their economies more competitive. do the politicians expect too much from the ecb? yes and no. no, because everyone responsible must take action. this is not a great coordinated plan. we need a mix. a mix that includes, on the one hand, a policy of structural reforms to stimulate supply in the economy, and support for demand led by the ecb, and, on the other, fiscal bis central bankers ’ speeches policies to achieve both debt sustainability and long - term growth. cuts affecting public infrastructure should be avoided, for example ; they are not good for long - term growth. the principal challenge for governments is to regain the road to productivity, a source of prosperity. if you look back to 2000 and the outlook for growth for the following five years, an average growth rate of 2. 4 % was expected. in 2015 the growth prospects for the next five years are no higher than 1. 3 % annually. this problem also affects japan, the united states and the emerging countries. productivity gains are limited to certain technology sectors. they need to be rolled out to the rest of society, the health sector for example, or to tax collection. overall, productivity gains have slowed with respect to previous decades. the priority in structural reform must be the rapid dissemination of these technological advances throughout society. and yes, because people expect too much from the ecb, if other actors rein in their efforts whenever we take action. we are seeing less of an effort on the public finance side. the ecb made it possible to avoid an outright depression in 2012 and 2013, and even the break - up of the euro. it will pursue an accommodative monetary policy for as long as is necessary. without giving a date, this timescale is fairly long. it ’ s a long lasting endeavour. additional risks have arisen from