stabilizing measures are inevitable. assure that the government will not fall short on the adjustment, as it would seriously damage its credibility and, consequently, the costs would grow exponentially. third, once a country is immersed in a crisis, governments often lack the necessary credibility, thus making it imperative to “ import ” such credibility. at the beginning of a crisis, it would be very difficult for the government in charge to have the credibility needed to make a strong economic adjustment if it failed to prevent the crisis when it had the opportunity to do so. how can this be achieved in the short term without changing the government? the answer lies in mobilizing the external financial support and accepting that this support be subject to conditionality. credibility indeed increases directly according to the amount of financial support, which is recommended to be plentiful, and to the quality of conditionality, which normally consists of corrective measures the country must adopt in any case. credibility would continue to increase to the extent that the adjustment program is implemented in a timely fashion. it is for this that it would be useful at this time to strengthen international and multilateral cooperation bodies, such as the international monetary fund, and that currently being built by europe, for the time being represented by the european financial stability fund. the strengthening of the imf ’ s lending capacity will be an issue that will be discussed in tomorrow ’ s g20 meeting. fourth, debtor countries should engage in a constructive relationship with creditors, following the “ principals for stable capital flows and fair debt restructuring ” that have been developed under the auspices of the iif. fifth, it is very important to implement various programs to mitigate, to the extent possible, the social consequences of adjustment. these programs should seek to maintain a basic support network, for instance in health and education, focusing specifically on the most vulnerable and poorly equipped population to withstand shocks and adjustments. sixth, an adjustment program without subsequent economic growth is ephemeral, especially if the country is not able to do a correction in the exchange rate regime. therefore, the adjustment program should be accompanied by quick structural reforms that generate rapid advances in productivity and foster a more rapid recovery of competitiveness. certainly, these general principles are applicable to europe today. they stem from experience, which means that they work even though each crisis has its own singularities and the political and social environment is different in each country. concluding remarks by sharing these ideas born from experience, my ultimate objective is not to teach lessons

but to convey a message of optimism and hope : the problems many european countries are facing today have a solution, if they act decisively and on time. if this is done, sooner rather bis central bankers ’ speeches than later we will see a promising future in the global economy. no one wants the crisis from dragging on indefinitely, or that every time expectations of a solution emerge they are quickly refuted by new shocks or setbacks. in order to reach as soon as possible a definite solution, the countries must first take strong, painful but necessary actions, as indeed they have been doing in many cases, and second, the international community must join these efforts, support them, and thereby facilitate the solution. it is this spirit of collaboration and cooperation in solving global problems that mexico wants to build and consolidate during its period of leadership in g - 20. these are no times to be enclosed behind borders, waiting illusory for the end of the storm. it is a time for collaboration and cooperation, for free trade, and for enhancing globalization. an essential condition for sustainable economic growth in advanced economies, mainly in the u. s. and the euro zone, is the recovery of confidence. therefore, these economies should invest their energy and political capital in pursuing macroeconomic stabilization in the short run through well designed and decisive measures. to the extent that confidence among economic agents is reestablished the negative feedback loop between low economic growth, the deterioration of fiscal accounts, and the fragility of banking systems, finally will be broken. bis central bankers ’ speeches