am repeatedly confronted with it, since my confirmation hearing in the european parliament, and have not seen signs of a full understanding of the arguments. the point that i would like to submit for a serious analysis of central bank transparency is that the latter is inextricably linked to accountability. the means and instruments for implementing transparency in any country depend on its institutional and political framework for accountability. just to point to one relevant aspect, a system in which accountability is collegial is different from one in which accountability is individual. the way in which transparency is implemented cannot be the same in the two systems. the european union, which is obviously a very peculiar entity, not comparable to a federation or a state, has a specific system of accountability for its institutions, in particular the commission, the court of justice or the european central bank, where the appointment of the decision - making bodies is partly a responsibility of the member states. such a system foresees collegial, not individual accountability. in such a system, the publication of individual decisions, votes or opinions cannot be foreseen, except for historical purposes. only the result of the collegiate decision can be made public. this is currently the case for the european commission, the court of justice and the european central bank. to be sure, the institutional and political framework underlying the european union is a complex one and maybe not easy to understand. but this framework cannot be ignored in any meaningful and realistic analysis on the way in which the ecb ensures transparency. to move to a system in which the detailed minutes and votes would be published, the ecb statutes would have to be modified to allow for individual accountability, rather than a collegial one. this would require several modifications, including the compositions of the decision - making body and its nomination procedure. it would also most likely require changes in the eu institutional and political framework. differences in the structure of economies represent another issue which is often forgotten in the assessment of central bank policies. divergences in the degree of economic flexibility, in particular, can affect the degree of intrinsic inflation persistence, namely the inertial character of inflation which cannot be reduced by the central bank despite its best efforts. 8 two central banks with similar see for example ubide ( 2005 ). see for instance ehrmann and fratschzer ( 2005 ). see erceg and levin ( 2003 ) and levin and piger ( 2004 ). 5 / 6 credibility and policy strategy might have to implement

. g. its longterm profitability or also its risk management keeping pace with expanding business? does it suffice to confront bank managers with those issues at the annual regulatory meeting? are targeted on - site inspections the best way forward? existing supervisory standards do set the right framework, but supervisors might need clearer guidance in order to exert the necessary amount of pressure on the supervised entity. 3 where do we stand? so where do we stand today? although sustainable finance is no longer an entirely new topic, it is still difficult to grasp. at the 1 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches same time, we are clearly moving beyond great political speeches. to supervisors, tackling sustainable finance means tackling environmental, social and governance ( “ esg ” ) risks ; here, we have so far mostly but not exclusively focused on climaterelated risks. much of the pioneering work at the international level is being done by the members of the network for greening the financial system ( ngfs ). compared to about one and a half years ago, when the newly founded ngfs entered into its productive phase, we have certainly made good progress. we have built a broad consensus that esg risks, in particular climate - related risks, are financial risks. and we have started analysing regulatory implications and setting supervisory expectations. but we are still in the process of developing an understanding of the channels through which these risks could materialise, from both the micro - and macroprudential perspectives. unlike other risk factors, the way climate change - related developments including policy measures will impact the macro economy is not well understood. our current activities could be considered as “ sensitivity analyses ” exploring potential vulnerabilities of the financial system under different assumptions. of course, the objective of the global efforts on the part of central banks and supervisors is to add stress tests or scenario analyses to our toolbox. therefore, the crr ii and crd v contain not only new disclosure provisions but also mandates for the european banking authority ( eba ) to examine the integration of esg risks into pillar 1 and pillar 2. work on pillar 2 has already started and is being conducted jointly by the eba and national competent authorities ( ncas ) in the eba sustainable finance network. here in germany, a guidance note on the treatment of sustainability risks by financial institutions drafted by bafin is currently up for public consultation. other countries have already published supervisory statements. but : if you were to randomly pick a local