. 05 ‐ 0. 1 ‐ 0. 15 ethnicity pay gap ‐ 0. 2 1994 ‐ 1998 1999 ‐ 2003 2004 ‐ 2008 2009 ‐ 2013 2014 ‐ 2019 source : ons labour force survey and bank of england calculations. note : a negative ethnicity pay gap in this chart indicates that ethnic minorities earn less than their white counterparts, whereas a positive ethnicity pay gap indicates that ethnic minorities earn more than their white counterparts. the raw, unconditional pay data suggests that wage patterns may vary significantly across different ethnic minority groups, with some pay gaps negative and others positive. to see whether these effects hold true having accounted for compositional effects, we can run ( 7 ) with separate binary variables for each ethnicity group i relative to a white control group, namely : mixed / multiple ethnic groups, indian, pakistani, bangladeshi, chinese, other asian background, black / african / caribbean / black british and “ other ”. this may in part because of the rising proportion of ethnic minorities in the sample population. all speeches are available online at www. bankofengland. co. uk / speeches ( 7 ) ln where [UNK] = ∗ ∗ person does belongs to ethnic group person belongs to white ethnic group from table 3, the mixed ethnic group does not have a statistically significant pay gap. all other ethnic groups do have a significant and negative pay gap, varying from - 6 % and - 7 % for indians and chinese through to - 20 % and - 13 %, respectively, for workers from a bangladeshi and pakistani ethnic background. in other words, once we account for compositional effects, a more consistent pattern of negative ethnicity pay gaps emerges, although the size of the gap varies significantly across different ethnic minority groups. table 3 : conditional granular ethnicity pay gaps for specification ethnicity mixed ethnic indian pakistani bangladeshi chinese any other asian background black / african / caribbean / black british other ethnic group observations coefficient ( compared to coefficient for white ) pay gap, per cent number of observations for ethnic minority groups 0. 0186 2 % 3, 022 - 7 % 10, 480 - 13 % 3, 521 - 20 % 1, 235 - 6 % 1, 797 - 13 % 3, 893 - 13 % 10, 222 - 8 % 4, 623 - 0. 82 - 0. 0774 * * * ( - 10. 29 ) - 0. 144 * * * ( - 13. 19 ) - 0. 228 * * * ( - 12. 98 ) - 0. 06

introducing organizational changes, as the wide variations in the duration of foreclosure proceedings in different courts suggest. the guidelines approved last october by the superior council of the judiciary, designed to encourage the spread of best practices, could make an important contribution in this regard. additional benefits may come from the imminent launch of the electronic register for foreclosure and insolvency proceedings and crisis management tools. these projects, to which the bank of italy is contributing, are at an advanced stage. in addition, the value of extrajudicial credit recovery instruments should not be underestimated. in 2016 the marciano pact was introduced in italy, which provides for the transfer of ownership of real property serving as a guarantee to a business loan in the event of default. however, recourse to this instrument remains limited. the agreement entered into by abi and confindustria at the start of this year may encourage its use. the pact ’ s importance has been confirmed by the initiatives under way at european level as well. the european commission recently presented a draft directive which, among other things, provides for an expedited procedure for the out - of - court enforcement of real property guarantees in the context of business loans that is similar to the marciano pact. recent reforms in recent years, the difficulties faced by some small banks have been resolved through acquisitions by other banks, with italian or foreign financial intermediaries and investors participating in the capital and with the contribution of the voluntary scheme of the interbank deposit protection fund. in a market in which technological innovations make bank branch networks less attractive to potential investors, crisis resolution has become more difficult. european regulations preclude the use of the resolution tool for small banks, on the assumption that it is not in the public interest to do so. therefore, in the absence of interested purchasers, there would be no alternative but to liquidate these banks. the impact, even reputational, on the entire category of small banks would be significant. good corporate governance and access to the capital markets are indispensable for avoiding a crisis. in turn, adequate skills and rigorous monitoring of conflicts of interest are needed for high - quality governance. it is a short step from being a bank that ‘ supports local interests ’ to being a bank that is ‘ trapped by the region ’. virtuous examples of local banks are possible, but they call for high - quality organizational structures and thorough and prudent credit assessments. recent experience has shown