do these events seem to erupt without some readily evident precursor? certainly, the more extended the risk - taking, or more generally, the lower the discount factors applied to future outcomes, the more vulnerable are markets to a shock that abruptly triggers a revision in expectations and sets off a vicious cycle of contraction. episodes of vicious cycles cannot be easily forecast, as our recent experience with asia has demonstrated. the causes of such episodes are complex and often subtle. in the case of asia, we can now say with some confidence that the economies affected by this crisis faced a critical mass of vulnerabilities ; ex ante, some were more apparent than others, but the combination was not generally recognized as critical. once the recent crisis was triggered in early july with thailand ’ s forced abandonment of its exchange rate peg, it was apparently the lethal combination of pegged exchange rates, high leverage, weak banking and financial systems, and declining demand in thailand and elsewhere that transformed a correction into a collapse. normally the presence of these factors would have produced a modest retrenchment, not the kind of discontinuous fall in confidence that leads to a vicious cycle of decline. but with a significant part of short - term liabilities, bank and nonbank, denominated in foreign currencies ( predominantly dollars ), unhedged, the initial pressure on domestic currencies led to a sharp crack in the fixed exchange rate structure of many east asian economies. the belief that local currencies could, virtually without risk of loss, be converted into dollars at any time was shattered. investors, both domestic and foreign, endeavored en masse to convert to dollars, as confidence in the ability of the local economy to earn dollars to meet their fixed obligations diminished. local exchange rates fell against the dollar, inducing still further declines. the weakening of growth also led to lowered profit expectations and contracting net capital inflows of dollars. this was an abrupt change from the pronounced acceleration through 1996 and the first half of 1997. the combination of continued strong demand for dollars to meet debt service obligations and the slowed new supply, destabilized the previously fixed exchange rate regime. this created a marked increase in uncertainty and retrenchment, further reducing capital inflows, still further weakening local currency exchange rates. this vicious cycle will continue until either defaults or restructuring lowers debt service obligations, or the low local exchange rates finally induce a pickup in the supply of dollars. these virulent episodes

to cargo planes but the shipping and logistics industries can use digital technologies to improve coordination of supply chains, have more timely notifications of shipment delays, and enhance fleet management and route optimisation. integrated supply chains are more resilient – with more seamless solutions and end - to - end connectivity across online and offline logistics activities. the rise of e - commerce platforms has launched a move towards end - to - end supply chain integration. alibaba and amazon are challenging traditional logistics players by developing their own warehouses and fulfilment centres. of course, digital connectivity cannot fully replace physical connectivity because goods still have to be moved. businesses are therefore adopting omni - channel marketing and distribution approaches, connecting with suppliers and customers both online and offline. integrated supply chains also mean strong inter - linkages across adjacent sectors – maritime, aviation, rail and road transport, with trading, logistics, and finance. let me highlight a singaporean initiative in this space. the monetary authority of singapore ( mas ) and infocomm media development authority ( imda ) have jointly launched a digital platform called business sans borders ( or bsb ). b s b aims to link multiple platforms domestically and internationally, connecting buyers, suppliers, marketplaces, and service providers across economies if successful, the bsb experiment will demonstrate that the key to supply chain resilience is not to isolate and retreat behind borders, but to strengthen connectivity across borders even more. resilient industry the second dimension is a resilient industry – one that can continue to function in the face of disruptions and movement restrictions. digitalisation is one of the ways in which an industry can build resilience. we have seen, amid the covid - 19 lockdowns, how firms which have gone digital earlier have managed to ensure business continuity, with the transition to working remotely and serving customers online. to ensure resilience, digitalisation needs to be end - to - end. if every part of a process is digitalised except one step which requires an in - person interaction, or a wet ink signature, or a payment in physical cash, then the “ digital chain ” is broken and resilience compromised. in financial services, this is what we have been aiming for : to be digital to the core. 3 / 7 bis central bankers'speeches digital trade finance solutions are trying to achieve seamlessness, to help facilitate trade flows. at the singapore fintech festival last year, a trade finance application portal