of shocks – both internal and external. our economies rely too much on mineral resources and agriculture. they also face significant infrastructural gaps and have fragmented markets. regional integration is also relatively low. africa is far more dependent on overseas trade than any other economic region or global player. the fact is that africa is integrated asymmetrically in global trade. originating mainly from 1 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches resource - rich countries, african exports are concentrated in raw materials and agricultural products. these range from crude oil, gold and diamond to cocoa and timber, fruits and nuts, copper, natural gas, cotton, iron ore, uranium, just to name a few of these. imports are mainly dominated by capital goods. openness to trade brings many benefits to the supply side of the economy. that is why we cannot but welcome the african continental free trade area agreement which, once completed, will establish a market of 1. 2 billion people with a combined gdp of 2. 5 trillion dollars. the agreement could significantly boost intra - african trade whilst promoting foreign direct investment and technology transfers. this can potentially raise the competitiveness of african economies and enhance their integration into the global economy. before the global financial crisis, trade growth has been a major engine of global growth and an enhancer of living standards worldwide. the integration of economies into global trade, notably through participation in global value chains, has improved incomes. it has also moved millions of people out of poverty. since the crisis, trade has generally lagged behind output growth. some economies have borne the brunt of open trade. a number of them have been running a persistent trade deficit and have been facing intense competition. we have also witnessed scenarios of protectionism resulting in an increase in non - tariff barriers. the anti - globalisation sentiment which emerged since the crisis has been gradually cemented through what has been termed a “ trade war ", leading to a broader reversal of globalisation. some economies have even announced retaliatory measures. recourse to trade protectionism has been posited to foster recovery from economic downturns. this, by creating barriers aiming at protecting the economy from the negative impacts of open trade and improving their trade balances. ladies and gentlemen, protectionist measures impact on the free movement of goods and services and they obviously affect economic performances across the world. higher tariffs have an effect on growth and inflation whilst influencing financial conditions, expectations and confidence in the near to medium term. for us central

would like to mention three important dimensions along which i think the approach could be further improved. first, the boundary between the effects of micro and macroprudential policies is more artificial than real. the two, while different in purpose, share instruments and are directed to the same participants in the financial markets. indeed, it is the overall level of micro and macroprudential requirements that affects the ability of the financial system to finance the real economy, both in normal and stressed times. consequently, a narrow notion of the macroprudential stance should, in my opinion, be replaced with the more comprehensive one of an overall prudential stance, one that would account for how both categories of prudential measures affect the economy. let me emphasise that this is not just a question of semantics. microprudential capital requirements, for instance, have been substantially increased after the crisis. in the short run, the contractionary effects on the credit cycle associated with such an increase were, directionally and qualitatively, of the same nature as those associated with the activation of a cyclical buffer. this of course does not mean that it was wrong to do it ; an increase in the quantity and quality of bank capital was required to strengthen the banking system, in light of all the shortcomings of the old supervisory rules that the crisis had exposed. however, it was clear to all that there was a 1 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches price to pay for this, in terms of tighter credit : at least temporarily, during the transition to the new standards. an overall prudential stance measure would capture this policy tightening ; a narrower perspective misses it. had the former existed, it would have supplied valuable input, for instance, to the discussion on transitional arrangements. the discussion took place anyway, because regulators were qualitatively aware of the issue, but in a sort of informational vacuum. i would thus suggest to devote further thought to such issues of definition. the conceptual framework should also more explicitly capture the idea that one central aim of macroprudential policies is to limit the endogenous pro - cyclicality of the financial sector. risks tend to be underestimated by market participants during booms and overestimated in busts, resulting in an amplification of cycles. to lean against this procyclical pattern in risk perceptions, the framework for the macroprudential stance should have a clear cyclical perspective. one might also note that