samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
of economic recovery are increasing. at the federal reserve, we stand ready to do what is necessary to maintain financial stability, as we did on september 11, and to maintain a monetary policy stance that will foster price stability and promote maximum sustainable growth in output.

the financial system. the program or facility will not be considered to have a broad - based eligibility if fewer than five persons or entities would be eligible to participate, or if it is designed to assist a company avoid bankruptcy, resolution or insolvency ( including by removing assets from its balance sheet ) or aid a failing financial company. see regulation a, 12 cfr 201. 4 ( d ). in addition to the “ unusual and exigent ” circumstances and broad - based eligibility requirements, other conditions for making section 13 ( 3 ) emergency credit include obtaining the affirmative vote of a requisite number of federal reserve governors and the prior approval of the u. s. treasury secretary, the emergency credit is not extended to an insolvent borrower, the lending federal reserve bank is secured to its satisfaction, evidence is obtained regarding the unavailability of adequate credit accommodation from other banking institutions under prevailing circumstances to borrowers of the emergency credit, penalty interest rate is set for the emergency credit, and meeting disclosure / reporting requirements. see section 13 ( 3 ) of the federal reserve act ( 12 usc 343 ) and regulation a ( 12 cfr 201. 4 ( d ) ). bis central bankers ’ speeches in the u. s., given the restrictions on central bank lending, if a securities firm were to lose access to funding the remaining options available would be finding a means of replenishing the firm ’ s capital, selling assets, or selling all or part of the securities firm ’ s operations. while this might be manageable in the case of a firm - specific idiosyncratic shock, it might prove more difficult if a common shock was broadly hitting the securities industry. in this circumstance, the failure of one firm could increase the stress on other firms that were facing similar difficulties. if all of the requirements for section 13 ( 3 ) are met, the central bank could provide liquidity support. however, since this is not a certainty, it is worth considering possible alternatives. now that all major securities firms in the u. s. are part of bank holding companies and are subject to enhanced prudential standards as well as capital and liquidity stress tests, providing these firms with access to the discount window might be worth exploring. to me, this is a more reasonable proposition now than it was prior to the crisis when the major dealers weren ’ t subject to those safeguards. more generally, i am happy to report that the committee on the global financial system – one
a policy maker in a developing economy, i must also say that the threat of climate change may go beyond the usual welfare statistics. if left unresolved climate change and the accompanying twin crises may, in due time, put our shared vision of a free, open and democratic globe at risk. let me now end my opening remarks with an expression of confidence that discussions in bank indonesia ’ s 6th annual international seminar will certainly be prolific and enrich our understanding of the macroeconomic impact of climate change. i am looking forward to this seminar ’ s policy recommendations. lastly, enjoy your stay in bali! i do hope your stay in this warm and hospitable island of gods fashions you with lasting pleasant memories of indonesia. thank you.

a low policy rate, coupled with very loose liquidity conditions in the banking industry, have prompted lower lending rates. in the markets, the overnight interbank rate and 1 - month deposit rate have fallen 52bps and 151bps respectively since october 2020 to 2. 80 % and 3. 17 % in october 2021. in the credit market, the banking industry continues to lower prime lending rates ( plr ), accompanied by low interest rates on new loans. increasing economic activity and public mobility have improved risk perception in the banking industry, prompting lower interest rates on new loans. bank indonesia expects the banking industry to continue lowering lending rates as part of the joint efforts to revive lending to the corporate sector. financial system resilience is solid, accompanied by a gradual revival of the banking intermediation function. the capital adequacy ratio ( car ) in the banking industry remained high september 2021 at 25. 18 %, with persistently low npl ratios of 3. 22 % ( gross ) and 1. 04 % ( nett ) ( graph 30 ). boosted by growing supply and demand, the bank intermediation function expanded 3. 24 % ( yoy ) in october 2021 ( graph 31 ). demand for graph 30. bank capital and non - performing loans grafik 30. permodalan dan non performing loan perbankan graph 31. credit growth and bank deposits grafik 31. pertumbuhan kredit dan dpk perbankan % % % 4. 0 3. 5 5. 0 25. 18 4. 5 3. 0 3. 22 2. 5 2. 0 npl ( gross ) 12 4 8 9. 44 3. 24 - 5 3 6 9 12 3 6 9 12 3 6 9 12 3 6 9 12 3 6 9 12 3 6 9 12 3 6 9 12 3 6 9 12 3 6 9 12 3 6 10 car ( rhs ) credit source : bank indonesia source : ojk source : bank indonesia source : bank indonesia deposit loans is increasing in line with business activity and consumption as restrictions on public activity are relaxed. on the supply side, the banking industry loosened lending standards in line with lower risk perception. all loan types recorded positive growth, led by consumer loans and working capital loans, while housing loans ( kpr - kredit pemilikan rumah ) posted higher growth at 8. 87 % ( yoy ). meanwhile, growth of msme loans accelerated to 3. 04
transparency for banks, and the public, and it will help to ensure a level playing field. so, while it is ultimately up to the banks to deal with npls, we supervisors play a role too. it ’ s our job to address vulnerabilities in the banking sector. npls are probably the single biggest challenge – and of course they are a drag on the entire economy. and while i am convinced that the ecb has led the way with its work on npls, we are not the only ones who can and should take action. european finance ministers agreed, in july this year, on an action plan to tackle npls. also, national governments can help to resolve the npl problem by reforming their legal and judicial systems. in some countries, it can take quite a long time to recover npls in court. this is something that can only be addressed at national level by national governments. npls are a joint problem, and we need to make a joint effort to resolve it. each party has to play a role : banks, supervisors and politicians. in line with our mandate, we supervisors have done and will continue to do what is necessary. thank you for your attention. 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches

given the growing awareness among the general public that environmentally - friendly economic activities should be supported. 1 / 1 bis central bankers'speeches
remain unchanged, at 7. 5 %, until the end of 2021. given current inflationary movements, this should suffice to bring inflation back to its 5 % target in h1 2022. however, if underlying inflationary pressures rise more noticeably than currently expected, and if inflation expectations worsen, there could be the need for further monetary policy tightening. the nbu stands ready to continue raising its key policy rate to a level that will bring inflation back to its 5 % target in h1 2022. 2 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches thank you for your attention! 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches

is made in overcoming the pandemic. 1 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches factoring in losses to the economy caused by the tightening of quarantine restrictions, the nbu downgraded its gdp growth forecast for 2021 to 3. 8 %, down from 4. 2 %. the ukrainian economy will grow at a pace of around 4 % in 2022 – 2023. the current account is expected to return to a slight deficit in 2021, propelled by higher domestic demand and the gradual revival of international tourism. the current account deficit will widen noticeably in 2022 – 2023, propelled mainly by : less favorable terms of trade for exporters of agricultural and metallurgical products the expected drop in earnings from gas transit and continued growth in consumer and investment imports, fueled by the complete recovery of the global and ukrainian economies from the coronavirus crisis. under what conditions would this forecast be realized? the primary assumption of the nbu board is that ukraine will continue to cooperate with the imf. the nbu expects that ukraine will make further progress in its talks with the imf. cooperation with the imf and other international partners will enhance the government ’ s ability to support the economy during the crisis, while also helping ukraine pass through the period of debt repayments that will peak in the coming autumn. this cooperation will help maintain ukraine ’ s international reserves at a reasonably high level of usd 29 to 30 billion in 2021 – 2023. the key risk to the macroeconomic forecast is the imposition of stricter quarantine measures in ukraine and globally, and the slow pace of the vaccination campaign domestically. new waves of the pandemic forced countries to once again tighten quarantine restrictions in q1 2021. despite the partial adaptation of businesses to the new conditions, this is slowing the recovery of business activity. the slow pace of the vaccination campaign in ukraine, coupled with higher inflationary pressures arising from the rebounding global economy, poses an additional risk of future economic losses. there are other significant risks. they include : an escalation of the military conflict in eastern ukraine or on the country ’ s borders volatile global capital markets and a dramatic deterioration in the terms of trade. taking into account all of the above, the nbu board decided to raise the key policy rate to 7. 5 %. how does the nbu intend to change the key policy rate in future? the nbu ’ s forecast envisages that the key policy rate will
monetary policy must work in concert to reduce the impact of a decline in labor demand ; neither can do it alone. returning to the question posed at the beginning, this model suggests that the federal reserve is performing about as well as it can on both mandates. the federal reserve ’ s accommodative policy has offset much of the impact of product demand shocks and so has kept inflation near target. however, this policy has been unable to offset the large adverse shocks to labor demand. the model implies that, in terms of employment, there are limits to what monetary policy can achieve on its own. bis central bankers ’ speeches

, time - consuming task, a strain on limited resources and detracts the office from carrying out its assigned tasks. there are quite a few individuals who routinely forward applications, very often repeating the same queries in different forms, which have already been answered. in one of our departments we had to have a dedicated desk to process applications pouring in from a certain applicant. quite often aggrieved staff members use them more to settle scores than for genuinely obtaining information. in a recent judgment, the supreme court has cautioned : indiscriminate and impractical demands or directions under the rti act for disclosure of all and sundry information ( unrelated to transparency and accountability in the functioning of public authorities and eradication of corruption ) would be counter - productive as it will adversely affect the efficiency of the administration and result in the executive ( government ) getting bogged down with the non - productive work of collecting and furnishing information. the ( right to information ) act should not be allowed to be misused or abused, to become a tool to obstruct the national development and integration, or to destroy the peace, tranquility and harmony among its citizens. nor should it be converted into a tool of oppression or intimidation of honest officials striving to do their duty. bis central bankers ’ speeches ms. sucheta dalal ’ s brief to me said that i should set the tone for the workshop and that is what i have attempted. this is an excellent forum for users of rti and the providers of information to interact with each other without acrimony and try to understand and appreciate each other ’ s points of view. i wish the deliberations all success. thank you very much for your patient hearing. bis central bankers ’ speeches
financing is getting harder and more expensive. the economies'growth decreases. also the so - called emerging economies started to feel decline in the growth. it seems that we are entering into recession. the central banks of the developed economies transfer the focus of their measures from the inflation control to recession prevention. what conclusions can be derived from this crisis? 1. nout wellink, president of the basel committee on banking supervision and governor of the central bank of the netherlands, quotes charles kindleberger, saying in his famous book " manias, panics and crashes ", that the " financial crises are typically a result of extended accumulation of imbalances preceded by certain exogenous shock, or structural changes in the financial system. the examples are in the changes in the political environment, new regulations and financial innovations. these changes create new possibilities, but also, uncertainties and lack of awareness of potential risks from the so - called unknown - unknowns ". in such environment, says wellink, " the traditional checks and balances can become inappropriate and can easily result in excessive risk ". really, we have faced : 2. • fiscal and balance of payments deficits, which failed to be treated because there was no enough good will for that in the globalized world, and accordingly to discuss about the foreign exchange rates. • huge imbalances in the financial sector, the dimensions of which grew to explosion. while the savings rates were decreasing with a limited rise in the households'deposits being registered, the banks were filling in the gap between the retail deposits and the credit growth by using sources from the wholesale markets. for example, in england, the gap between the lending to clients and the deposits climbed from zero, in the beginning of the century, to over british pounds 700 billion in the first half of 2008, says sir john gieve, deputy governor of the bank of england. • the expansion of the banks'aggregate balances, which became too padded out, exceeded the increase in the real economy. • the structure of the liabilities excessively relied on the maintained availability of the so - called wholesale funding, the maturity of which was on a short - term basis. • the discrepancy between the capital and liquidity on one hand and the risks on the part of liabilities, was constantly increasing. • the financial innovations brought a lot of unknown - unknowns, together with the fast trend of globalization. it means that structural changes through financial innovations occurred. the best

one can already see that 2014 will be yet another challenging year for the thai economy. however, with cooperation from all sides, i hope we shall be able to weather the upcoming storms with a common vision and readiness, and that a clear blue sky is beckoning in the distance. thank you. bis central bankers ’ speeches
demand pressures have abated. corporate pricing behaviour has continued to normalize. at the same time, measures of near - term inflation expectations and wage growth suggest that underlying inflationary pressures remain. let me conclude. we've come a long way from the inflation peak in 2022. monetary policy is working, and we need to continue to let it work. we remain resolute in our commitment to return inflation to the 2 % target. 2 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches with that summary, the senior deputy governor and i would be pleased to take your questions. 3 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches

about 5 %. 1 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches finally, inflation in services excluding shelter has improved, but there are signs that price pressures remain. all this push and pull on inflation means that further declines in inflation are likely to be gradual and uneven. that suggests the path back to our 2 % target will be slow, and risks remain. overall, our outlook for both growth and inflation is largely unchanged from the october report. economic growth is expected to be modest in 2024 - weak in the first half before picking up around the middle of the year and rising to about 2½ % in 2025. with downward and upward forces largely offsetting in the near term, cpi inflation is expected to remain close to 3 % over the first half of this year. it is then expected to ease to about 2½ % by year end and return to target in 2025. in two weeks, we will release our summary of deliberations, which provides more detail about our deliberations. but let me give you a sense of our discussion. as always, governing council focused on the decision at hand - the current policy rate. and there was a clear consensus to maintain our policy rate at 5 %. we did, of course, discuss where we see the economy and inflation going and what that could mean for monetary policy going forward. what came through in the deliberations is that governing council's discussion about future policy is shifting from whether monetary policy is restrictive enough to how long to maintain the current restrictive stance. that doesn't mean we have ruled out further policy rate increases. if new developments push inflation higher, we may still need to raise rates. but what it does mean is that if the economy evolves broadly in line with the projection we published today, i expect future discussions will be about how long we maintain the policy rate at 5 %. governing council is concerned about the persistence of underlying inflation. we want to see inflationary pressures continue to ease and clear downward momentum in underlying inflation. we also discussed the risks to the economy and inflation. we are trying to balance the risks of over - and under - tightening. we don't want to cool the economy more than necessary. but we don't want canadians to have to continue to live with elevated inflation either. we remain focused on a number of indicators of underlying inflationary pressures. we need to see further and sustained easing of core inflation. with the economy now looking to be in modest excess supply,
bis central bankers ’ speeches

these countries, notably for prevention. this is even more pressing in a context of unstable geopolitics, looming food crisis, commodities price volatility and more frequent natural disasters linked to climate change. i therefore welcome the recent proposal of a new food shock window. however, our efforts should not stop there. * * * as sophocles wrote, “ trust dies but mistrust blossoms ”. let me conclude by stressing that trust as a shared treasure also has a key human foundation, which page 10 sur 10 we have patiently built over time. international meetings in basel at the bank for international settlements – which i have the honour to chair –, or here in washington at the imf, are not places for mundane agreement, but forums for true dialogue, by building on a common diagnosis, and sharing openly our concerns : we know that we won ’ t be leaked, instrumentalised or distorted. this is the only way for trust to prosper, and this is how we will progress together. michel camdessus himself has symbolised this value of humanity like none other in his behaviour and relationships. i thank you for your attention. i aristotle, nicomachean ethics, 4th century b. c. nicholas oresme, treatise on the origin, nature, law, and alterations of money, circa 1355 iii bis, inequality hysteresis and the effects of macroeconomic stabilisation policies, luiz awazu pereira da silva, enisse kharroubi, emanuel kohlscheen, marco lombardi and benoit mojon, may 2022 iv istrefi, k. and piloiu, a., 2014. economic policy uncertainty and inflation expectations, banque de france working papers 511 ; istrefi, k. and piloiu, a., 2020, public opinion on central banks when economic policy is uncertain, revue d ’ economie politique v francois villeroy de galhau, monetary policy post - pandemic : balancing between science and art, predictability and reactivity, speech, jackson hole, 27 august 2022 ii
– 2022 shock ", working paper series, no 2877, ecb. 3 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches 3 ecb analysis suggests that energy shocks and supply chain disruptions were responsible for nearly half of the upward deviation of core inflation from its long - term mean in the first half of this year. see babura, m., bobeica, e. and martinez hernandez, c. ( 2023 ), " what drives core inflation? the role of supply shocks ", working paper series, no 2875, ecb. 4 three - month average. 5 in 2022, unit profits accounted for around two - thirds of the increase in domestic inflation in the euro area, well above the historical average of around one - third. 4 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches

of 2022. 2 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches for now, our assessment is that strong wage growth mainly reflects " catch - up " effects related to past inflation, rather than a self - fulfilling dynamic where people expect higher inflation in the future. but to assess how wages are evolving and whether they pose a risk to price stability, we will be closely monitoring a number of developments. first, whether firms absorb rising wages in their profit margins5, which would allow real wages to recover some of their past losses without the increase being fully passed through to inflation. second, whether there is some easing of labour market tightness, which would prevent excess demand for labour from becoming a driver of persistently high wage demands. and third, that inflation expectations remain anchored, which ensures that, when the current shock passes, wage and price - setting will be guided by our 2 % inflation target. in other words, we will need to remain attentive until we have firm evidence that the conditions are in place for inflation to return sustainably to our goal. that is why we have said our future decisions will ensure that our policy rates will be set at sufficiently restrictive levels for as long as necessary. and we have made those future decisions conditional on the incoming data, meaning that we can act again if we see rising risks of missing our inflation target. conclusion let me conclude. we have faced a major inflation shock and we have made a major policy adjustment in response. the effects of that adjustment are increasingly being felt and inflation pressures are easing. but there is still a journey ahead of us. our monetary policy is in a phase where we need to be attentive to the different forces affecting inflation – but always firmly focused on our mandate of price stability. 1 feldman, g. ( 1993 ), the great disorder : politics, economics, and society in the german inflation, 1914 - 1924, oxford university press. 2 bobasu, a., di nino, v. and osbat, c. ( 2023 ), " the impact of the recent inflation surge across households ", economic bulletin, issue 3, ecb. another study by ecb staff looks at the effects of fiscal measures on low - income households. see pallotti, f. paz - pardo, g., slacalek, j., tristani, o., violante, g. ( 2023 ), " who bears the costs of inflation? euro area households and the 2021