term money market. it has also provided additional liquidity, above the benchmark allotment amount, in the context of the regular main refinancing operations ( mros ) but has continued to aim at balanced liquidity conditions at the end of the maintenance period. these operations have had stabilising effects on money market rates, by reducing the volatility of the very short - term interbank rate around the key policy rate of the ecb and by containing pressures in the interbank term money market. they have thus contributed to mitigating the effects of the turmoil on the financial system and the economy. however, tensions have persisted in the term money markets, as shown by the spreads between euro deposit rates of different maturities and eonia swap rates which have remained at elevated levels ( see the chart on the left of slide 7 ). continuing pressures have characterised the term money markets globally, including the us dollar, euro and pound sterling money markets ( as shown by the chart on the right of slide 7 ). a main reason for this is the persistence of uncertainties surrounding the financial positions and liquidity needs of financial institutions. 2. 3 lessons let me now turn to the lessons that have been learned so far from the market turmoil. although it is too early to draw definite conclusions, a number of weaknesses that have been revealed by the turmoil could be generally considered as a consequence of inadequate risk management by some institutions and insufficient market discipline. but let me be more specific and point to four broad areas of weakness in risk management which partly relate to the originate - and - distribute banking model and concern ( i ) the monitoring, assessment and management of credit risk ; ( ii ) the management and pricing of funding liquidity risk ; ( iii ) the assessment of counterparty risk and ( iv ) the role of the so - called conduits and structured investment vehicles in such a model and in the transmission of tensions from the credit and structured finance product markets to the money markets. many of these weaknesses had been previously identified. but they combined in such a way that few had anticipated the potential severity of their joint impact on the core money markets. several issues related to these risks and weaknesses require further examination, which is currently being undertaken by various fora, namely the financial stability forum and the basel committee for banking supervision. one important issue concerns the valuation of complex structured finance products. investors who had assumed that the model - based ratings for structured credit products had similar statistical properties to those for

risk on the largest payments flows – the ones most likely to threaten financial stability by bringing down the system if they failed. but that is not the only innovation that rtgs has delivered over the years. as the financial system has evolved, rtgs has been regularly updated, introducing a raft of new functions and risk mitigants to respond to changing demands. today, we are announcing that the bank has completed, or agreed steps that will complete, all the actions in response to the deloitte report 4 published in march last year following the rtgs outage in october 2014. looking forward, as we celebrate rtgs ’ twentieth birthday during 2016, it is again time to ask fundamental questions about the shape of the bank ’ s settlement operations. the way payments are made has changed dramatically in recent years, reflecting changes in the needs of households and companies, changes in technology, and an evolving regulatory landscape. the range of payment providers is growing rapidly. given the implications of these changes for the bank ’ s mission and for users, businesses and regulators, it is important that the bank consider how rtgs will need to evolve to meet and shape payments trends in the coming decades. that is why we are today announcing our plan to design a blueprint for a new heart that can support the future demands placed on the uk ’ s high - value sterling settlement system. in my remaining remarks tonight i want to do three things. first, set out some of the key drivers of change. second, explain some of the strategic questions we want to ask on the future role of rtgs. and, third, set out how we will go about developing a blueprint for a new high value payments system. either directly in the case of high - value payments made via chaps, or indirectly after netting in the case of retail payments made via the various private sector schemes. the deloitte report on the october 2014 rtgs outage can be found here : http : / / www. bankofengland. co. uk / publications / documents / news / 2015 / rtgsdeloitte. pdf. an update on the completion of the recommendations of the deloitte report can be found here : http : / / www. bankofengland. co. uk / markets / documents / paymentsystems / deliotteactions. pdf. bis central bankers ’ speeches evolution in the payments landscape much has changed in the uk payments landscape in the past twenty years. in particular, i want