reassess regularly such equivalences - the second lever is the use of forum for information sharing and cooperation among supervisors. significant progress has been made in that direction that should bear fruit. in europe, the introduction of resolution and aml colleges for banks and of oversight colleges for ccps have been helpful to increase the involvement of home and host countries in the supervision of cross - border groups or entities. however, we should also recognize that convergence of regulation and cooperation between supervisors may also have their limits in some circumstances. this is certainly the case when considering the regulation and supervision of central clearing activities, given their systemicity and their natural trend to concentrate and eliminate substitutes. in such market we indeed observe the emergence of monopolistic situations and systemic risk is associated to the possibility of the default of such market infrastructures. we should therefore make sure that we – all collectively - are shielded from a too strong market concentration in terms of clearing, which create risks that can ’ t be addressed by cooperation among their supervisors and overseers. conflicting interests may indeed arise between ( i ) the authorities in charge of the oversight of the ccp, and its financial resilience, and ( ii ) the authorities in charge of the financial stability of the offshore markets served, especially in times of crisis, as we have seen in europe during the sovereign debt crisis. to prevent such situation levers to be used include in my view a location policy of clearing activities and direct oversight by authorities in charge with the financial stability of the markets served. 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches

and an adequate timing, in order to avoid possible cliff - effects and to address level playing field concerns. regarding the prevention of crisis, i would be more prudent because, from my perspective, the jury is still out in terms of appropriate coordination across regulators and supervisors. indeed, with structural changes underway brought by, among important drivers, technological innovation, financial regulators and supervisors face important coordination challenges among themselves, and with others, going forward. i would like to highlight two of them. the first one relates to the banking sector and has to do with the implementation of the basel 3 agreement. this is paramount to promote financial stability and avoid market fragmentation. the reforms of the regulatory framework for credit institutions after the gfc has been instrumental in making the banking sector more resilient and part of the solution and not part of the problem in managing the covid - 19 crisis. it is very important to complete the job and that a full implementation of basel iii is achieved, with the new timelines agreed in 2020. 1 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches the second challenge is the coordination across regulators and supervisors required to bridge the gap from banking sector resilience to overall financial stability. indeed, this crisis has shown that we notably need to define a common approach in order to address vulnerabilities stemming from nbfi entities and from their strong and diverse interconnections with the banking system. those reforms should include in my view a macroprudential approach. it is appropriate that this topic is at the forefront of the fsb agenda. in addition, coordination challenges, across sectors and across borders, are emerging from areas that are not the traditional focus of financial authorities, but that already have major impact on the financial system. i am referring to the development of fintechs and the growing role of big - techs in the financial scape as they ride the digital revolution underway, and to the fight against climate change. on the former, regulators have become far more active in order to understand the risks and concerns associated with this ever expanding industry. at this stage, we need to consider consistent regulation across the board, with an extension of the coordination perimeter beyond financial authorities to competition authorities, aml - cft ones, data and cybersecurity agencies. this would be useful to ensure adequate surveillance, an even level playing field and to limit the potential risks for financial stability including the ones stemming from cyber - incidents and crypto - assets with network effects of potentially international magnitude