% category i higher than the rate for category ii category absolute value of the short ‐ term policy interest rate 0. 1 % ii category iii purchase only etfs tracking the tokyo stock price index ( topix ) financial system and bank examination dept. staff will make a briefing at the mpms when the outlook report is decided ( four times a year ). 0 % lower than the rate for category ii eligible fund ‐ provisioning measure • special operations in response to covid ‐ 19, when funds are provided against loans made by financial institutions on their own • special operations in response to covid ‐ 19, when funds are provided against loans other than those for category i and against private debt pledged as collateral • • loan support program operation to support financial institutions in disaster areas ⇒ enable the bank to cut short ‐ and long ‐ term interest rates more nimbly while considering the impact on the functioning of financial intermediation in addition, adjustments to the complementary deposit facility will be made to narrow the gap between the actual policy ‐ rate balances and the " hypothetical " policy ‐ rate balances.

sheets ( relating to off - balance sheet instruments like derivatives for instance ). energy firms for example have relied extensively on derivatives to hedge against price movements. and the rise in energy prices last year triggered margin calls on those derivatives that put some firms in immediate liquidity stress. the bank and hm treasury ’ s energy markets financing scheme was initiated to ensure that liquidity stress did not turn needlessly into insolvency. we can also see some evidence of the borrower resilience channel at play, with investment intentions distributed unevenly across firms. the bank ’ s decision maker panel ( dmp ) survey tells us that corporates above the 90th percentile of indebtedness are expecting to reduce their investment by almost 5 percentage points more over the course of this year in response to higher interest rates than firms below it. if firms cut back investment excessively, or if productive firms forego investment opportunities, the effects could be persistent. i ’ ll talk more about this later when i turn to our secondary objective, but it should be clear that scarring of this kind can affect long - run growth. how resilient is the supply of finance to uk corporates? the future resilience of lenders and borrowers will reflect not only macroeconomic developments and idiosyncratic business factors, but corporates ’ ability to access funding too. sudden or unanticipated disruptions to the supply of credit could amplify stress, particularly for highly indebted companies, or companies reliant on short - term debt. research shows that the credit crunch following the gfc caused direct damage to companies and the real economy over and above the effects of a normal downturn. back then, banks with weaker capital ratios and those more exposed to the us mortgage market constrained lending activity by more than other lenders as they focused on rebuilding their own balance sheets. this had wide - ranging consequences : as i ’ ve mentioned before, those directly affected by this credit crunch cut their investment more than unaffected companies. these same companies also experienced weaker productivity growth and were more likely to fail. and other companies exposed to these directly affected companies reduced their own employment, grew more slowly and achieved lower productivity. there is evidence this had a sizable impact in aggregate. studies show that the excessive tightening of corporate financing conditions during the gfc accounted for 33 - 50 % of the increase in sme unemployment in the united states, while contributing to 12. 5 - 30 % of the