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although monetary data contain information which is important for monetary policy decision - making, monetary developments alone will clearly not constitute a complete summary of all the economic information necessary to take appropriate policy decisions. the governing council recognises that it is important, in parallel with the assessment of monetary growth, to look at a wide range of financial and other economic indicators, including economic forecasts. this systematic analysis of all other relevant information about economic and financial conditions will ensure that the governing council is as well informed as possible when taking monetary policy decisions. by fulfilling the unequivocal commitment of the governing council of the ecb to maintaining price stability in the euro area, we shall ensure that the single monetary policy contributes as much as possible to economic welfare in the broadest sense. at the same time, national fiscal authorities and general economic policies also have to demonstrate their commitment to the maintenance of price stability in the euro area over the medium term. in this context, the stability and growth pact is a crucial element. its aim is to encourage the pursuit of disciplined and sustainable fiscal policies in the euro area. in so doing, it can make a significant contribution to the establishment of favourable conditions for sustained economic growth and high employment in the medium to long term. it would be counterproductive if national fiscal policymakers did not continue their efforts in the light of the achievement of monetary union and the currently positive price outlook. i am not fully convinced that consolidation efforts are currently being undertaken with sufficient determination in all participating member states. the ecb cannot commit itself to take into account, in its overall assessment, any announced, but as yet uncertain, fiscal consolidation in some of the member states. in line with its clear mandate, enshrined in the treaty, and for sound economic reasons, the ecb has to decide which monetary stance best serves the maintenance of price stability over the medium term and then act accordingly. at the same time, the treaty also emphasises the need for sound fiscal policies. this clear separation of responsibilities is both efficient and transparent. monetary policy alone – even if it is well designed and fully successful in monitoring price stability – cannot solve europe ’ s economic problems. appropriate structural reforms implemented by national governments are of the utmost importance. much progress is required in this broad area. moreover, responsible wage settlements in both the public and private sectors are necessary to reduce the unacceptably high level of unemployment in many parts of the euro area. recent wage agreements in some parts of the euro area do not