two - thirds ( 69 per cent ) say they have made changes to their consumer behaviour out of concern over climate change : 17 per cent made a lot of changes and the other 52 per cent made a few changes. https : / / www. ipsos. com / sites / default / files / ct / news / documents / 2020 - 01 / global - advisor - climate - changeconsumer - behavior. pdf. bloomberg nef ( 2020 ). financial times ( 2020 ), ‘ record sums deployed into sustainable investment funds ’. un pri ( 2020 ), ‘ a blueprint for responsible investment ’. ftse russell ( 2020 ), ‘ ftse climate risk - adjusted emu government bond index ’. the ftse climate emu government bond index ( egbi ) integrates the performance of fixed - rate, investment - grade sovereign bonds, adjusting the egbi weights according to each country ’ s relative exposure to climate risks. european environment agency ( 2019 ), ‘ trends and projections in europe 2019. tracking progress towards europe's climate and energy targets ’. ignazio visco ( 2019 ), cit. ecb board member isabel schnabel recently argued that ‘ mispricing ’ in climaterelated market outcomes exists ‘ as a result of informational market failures that stem primarily from the absence of a clear, consistent and transparent globally agreed taxonomy accompanied by disclosure requirements ’. 19 considering the vast amount of investment at stake, there is also the risk of ‘ greenwashing ’. ( not to mention the bubbles based on fads or misleading labels, which may emerge in green finance as easily as in many other markets ; but better information can only do so much about this ). several initiatives may improve the situation. a dedicated task force created in 2015 by the financial stability board has been promoting voluntary climate - related disclosure by companies ; it has seen progress, though its own assessment is that results remain disappointing. more recently, the network for greening the financial system, a voluntary gathering of central banks and financial supervisors, has been active in promoting ways to bridge data gaps. as is well known, in europe the main initiative to improve climaterelated information is the eu taxonomy, which sets out detailed criteria for identifying economic activities that contribute to the eu ’ s climate ( and other sustainable ) objectives. 20 how data are used to assess risk is also a matter for concern. the characteristics of conventional models ( e. g. widespread assumptions about the distribution

66 % and 92 % respectively in the aggregate government sector. bis central bankers ’ speeches however, the ecb alone cannot eliminate the risks of a prolonged stagnation. these exist primarily because, in most respects, the current construction of the euro area is unfinished. 16 with limited cross - border banking in the euro area, savings don ’ t flow to potential investments. euro - area corporates ’ cash balances have risen to the tune of €420 billion, or 3 % of gdp, since the crisis, for example. modest cross - border equity flows mean inadequate risk sharing. moreover, by design, there are virtually no cross - border fiscal flows so fiscal space is separated from fiscal needs. the burden of adjustment has been concentrated on efforts to improve competitiveness. some of these efforts are entirely worthy. boosting productivity reduces the burden of a debt overhang as extra supply creates extra demand and incomes. but that takes time, during which debt dynamics may become oppressive. improved competitiveness will also support exports to the rest of the world, but it is unlikely to be decisive in a listless world economy. more important for a given country in the euro area is to improve competitiveness against other members via internal devaluation. as you know, this is not easy. 17, 18 irish workers and citizens deserve great credit for the flexibility they have shown. wages in ireland fell by almost 9 %. in spain they rose by 3 %. even though irish unemployment rose to painfully high rates, it peaked at only a little over half the rate reached in spain. that flexibility, by keeping unemployment lower than otherwise, has undoubtedly helped to reduce the risk that high unemployment becomes entrenched and destroys future economic capacity. for three reasons it is no panacea, however. first, internal devaluations simply reallocate demand within the currency union. they do not boost aggregate demand in the euro area as a whole. put another way, since competitiveness is relative, a solution for some cannot be a solution for all. second, the degree of flexibility is not just an abstract economic choice ; it is also a political one that determines the burden of risk sharing between labour, firms, and the state. 19 third, internal devaluation always forces down nominal incomes for a time, regardless of the degree of price and wage flexibility. 20 in more flexible economies, these reductions are concentrated in wages ; in less flexible ones, unemployment. cumulative nominal gdp growth since the crisis has been