. not least because many of the challenges we face cannot be fixed within national borders. we may end 3 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches up with shallow multilateralism, and that may or may not be a helpful outcome. what we can't do is give up in the face of a more difficult environment. this brings me, finally, back to the point about speaking truth to national power. clearly the context matters a lot. global co - operation has a greater chance of success when economic benefits are widely shared, as are the risks perceived to be – i. e. we are all in this together, and know that we are so – and we exist in conditions of broad economic stability. we can hope, but hope is not a winning strategy. a world where there is greater actual and perceived risk of unequal outcomes and instability is one where collective action is harder and less likely to succeed. at least up to a point, because i think the lesson of bretton woods as it played out is that the influence of collective action is non - linear. in other words, when the situation gets really bad, take the financial crisis, the call for international collective action and the willingness to submit to it, grows almost exponentially. it takes a good crisis as they say. but this is not a basis on which to run good policy. and this is the risk we face today – the vulnerabilities are growing, and the necessary solutions are global, but they are not sufficiently great to tip into crisis multilateralism. and we don't want that to happen. as so we come back to the issue of how to influence by speaking truth to national power successfully, in a world of hostility to institutions. i will end with one thought on this, which i recognise may come across as too pious by half. we have to speak with humility and humanity. we don't know all the answers, and that is not a failing. the world is highly uncertain – and shock prone – and that is reality. by building its surveillance offer and working with members on how to build ex ante resilience, the fund can be seen as a trusted problem solver which can be turned to in moments of crisis, rather than an institution which calls out where things went wrong and mops up after the crisis occurs. we serve the people as a whole at all times. i say this because when we look back at the last 80 years, it has not always

broader, real money investor base. the market also needs to be based on genuine risk transfer not regulatory arbitrage, such as synthetic sales of thin mezzanine tranches intended to maximise the reduction in regulatory capital at minimum cost. i hope the future will be transactions in which banks look to sell down the capital structure, subject to meeting risk retention requirements. transferring the entire risk on a portfolio will be the only way to achieve a reduction in the exposure measure used for the leverage ratio. and the new basel risk - weighted capital requirements announced in december also move in the direction of incentivising transfer of senior as well as mezzanine tranches of portfolios. i said i would come back to simple, transparent and comparable ( stc ) securitisation. unfortunately, we have done our best to confuse people by using a bewildering range of acronyms and terms for this project – stc, sst, sts, qualifying, high quality etc. today i the case for a better functioning securitisation market in the european union : a discussion paper, european central bank and bank of england, may 2014. joint response from the bank of england and the european central bank to the consultation document of the european commission : ‘ an eu framework for simple, transparent and standardised securitisation ’, march 2015. bis central bankers ’ speeches am using the stc term developed by the taskforce of global banking and securities regulators that i co - chair. but i can reassure you that these will be brought together into a single set of criteria in european legislation. i believe the intention is that they will then be applied consistently across different sectors – for example, banks, insurers and funds – and different regulations – for example capital and liquidity. i see the aims of the stc criteria as threefold. first, to help investors. an stc securitisation should meet the “ what you see is what you get ” principle. the structure should not have hidden traps or complications, allowing investors to focus on analysing the credit quality of the underlying assets. but, importantly, the stc criteria are not a credit opinion on those assets and stc will certainly not mean “ risk free ”. second, to help issuers. as well as potentially helping to broaden the range of investors, the stc criteria should make risk transfer more robust. and third, to help regulators. setting risk sensitive capital requirements for securitis