yaseen anwar : monetary policy framework in the saarc region address by mr yaseen anwar, governor of the state bank of pakistan, at the saarcfinance seminar on “ monetary policy framework in the saarc ( south asian association for regional cooperation ) region ”, islamabad, 14 – 16 june 2012. * * * distinguished speakers, honored guests and fellow colleagues, allow me to welcome you, on behalf of the state bank of pakistan, to islamabad for the seminar on “ monetary policy frameworks in the saarc region ”. the seminar, as you all know, has been organized under the auspices of the saarcfinance banner. the saarcfinance initiative, now more than 14 years old, has been instrumental in providing a platform that enables knowledge - sharing across the saarc region and allows for discussion and debate amongst the region ’ s premier economic decision makers. let ’ s move on to the subject of the seminar now. central banks are often synonymous with monetary policy. and why shouldn ’ t they be? after all, monetary policy is any central bank ’ s premier policy tool to achieve its objectives. strictly academically, the monetary policy framework consists of an institutional arrangement, which provides an anchor to identify monetary policy objectives and describes how the policy is implemented through a set of instruments and their intermediate and operating targets. wow, that was quite a mouthful! let ’ s make it simple. in essence, monetary policy has its means ( i. e. the framework ) and its ends ( i. e. macroeconomic objectives ). when those two are congruent, the monetary policy framework is considered well - defined. let ’ s go backwards here and have a look at the ends first. the universal aim of monetary policy is achieving price stability ; a secondary aim of monetary policy may be growth. for instance, the preamble to the state bank act states that the bank is supposed to “ regulate the monetary and credit system of pakistan … with a view to securing monetary stability and fuller utilization of the country ’ s productive resources ”. therefore, sbp is concerned with not just inflation and price stability, but also with economic growth. that was the easy part. the tough part is actually finding and calibrating the tools that are required to achieve these ends. broadly speaking, central banks tend to target one or more of monetary aggregates, inflation or exchange rates. all three of these have an impact on the real economy

louis kasekende : financial stability – restructuring and resolution of financial institutions speech by dr louis kasekende, deputy governor of the bank of uganda, at the bank of uganda – deutsche bundesbank seminar on “ financial stability – restructuring and resolution of financial institutions ”, kampala, 3 july 2013. * * * distinguished guests good morning ladies and gentlemen. on behalf of bank of uganda, i wish to formally welcome you all to this seminar with the underlying theme “ financial stability – restructuring and resolution of financial institutions ”. this seminar is occurring under the bank of uganda and the deutsche bundesbank technical cooperation. the main objective is to strengthen the resolution framework for dealing with banks and financial conglomerates. this initiative emerged from the recommendations of the imf regional crisis preparedness mission of february 2011 and the fsap mission of august 2011. both these missions recommended that bank of uganda reviews the bank resolution framework and in addition, ensure that it conforms to the financial stability board ’ s ( fsb ) guideline on key attributes of effective resolution regimes for financial institutions. at the seoul summit on 11 – 12 november 2010, the g20 leaders endorsed the fsb policy framework for reducing the moral hazard of systemically important financial institutions ( sifis ). this framework called for action in five areas, of which a key area was to make improvements to resolution regimes so that any financial institution, whatever its size and complexity, can be resolved without disruption to the financial system. the key attributes of effective resolution regimes for financial institutions outline the policy framework to meet this objective. these key attributes have been identified by the financial stability board ( fsb ) jointly with its members including the imf, world bank and the standard - setting bodies. the purpose of an effective resolution regime is to make possible the resolution of financial institutions without severe system - wide disruption. such a resolution regime needs to take into account the taxpayers, and minimize the losses to them, while protecting vital economic functions. it should employ mechanisms which make it possible for shareholders and unsecured and uninsured creditors to absorb losses in a manner that respects the hierarchy of claims in liquidation. finally, the resolution regime should provide for timely and early entry into resolution before a firm is balance - sheet insolvent and before all equity has been fully depleted. these attributes set out the responsibilities, instruments and powers that national regimes should have to resolve failing financial institutions, some of which may be systemically important financial institutions ( sifis