gross allotment in the june and september tltros of nearly €1. 5 trillion. in net terms, the liquidity injected by these operations amounted to €706 billion. 2 tltro funding has also been effective in easing the terms and conditions for loans to households and firms. euro area lending rates to businesses are near all - time lows. our estimates, as well as responses by banks to our bank lending survey, indicate that the tltros have helped compress these lending rates, which means that banks are passing on the favourable conditions of our lending operations to their customers. another key policy tool during this unprecedented shock has been the pandemic emergency purchase programme ( pepp ). the pepp was launched with an initial envelope of €750 billion in march and was increased by €600 billion in june. it has a dual goal : to stabilise markets and thus ensure the smooth transmission of our monetary policy, and to help counter the substantial downgrade to our inflation outlook caused by the pandemic and thus help return inflation closer to our definition of price stability in a timely fashion. the pepp has countered, for example, a rise in sovereign bond yields and has thereby averted a tightening of funding conditions for households, corporates and banks during the pandemic. with markets stabilising and the risk of fragmentation subsiding, the role of the pepp in easing our monetary policy stance and supporting the inflation outlook has now become more important, even though it is an exceptional pandemic - related tool unlike our other unconventional monetary instruments. without these mutually reinforcing policy measures, the outlook for inflation and growth would be much worse. staff estimates show that our policy decisions on asset purchases and tltros will cumulatively contribute around 0. 8 percentage points to the annual headline inflation rate and 1. 3 percentage points to real gdp growth between 2020 and 2022. these estimates might even be conservative, as they do not account for the benefit of preventing adverse nonlinear dynamics that could translate into a de - anchoring of inflation expectations and cause large contractionary effects. finally, i want to stress that fiscal support measures have been a crucial complement to the ecb ’ s crisis response. without countercyclical fiscal policy measures, such as loan guarantees, moratoria and job retention schemes, the adverse economic impact of the pandemic would have been much more substantial. european leaders have also sent an important signal with their landmark agreement

suffer a recession, but the size of the initial impact and the speed of the recovery were quite different from previous episodes. in the second half of 1998, affected by the asian crisis, chilean gdp fell by 4. 3 % quarter to quarter. returning to the initial gdp level took us one year. but, comparatively, the unemployment rate more than doubled between the beginning of 1998 and mid - 1999, reaching almost 12 % and staying high, around 9. 5 %, until 2005. the effects of the 2008 – 2009 crisis were very different. economic activity fell, but less than in the previous episode, by 3 % between the end of 2008 and mid - 2009. the recovery was much faster and only two quarters after the downturn, by the end of 2009, gdp was comparable to the precrisis level. the growth rate after having recovered the initial output level was also different. considering the first six quarters after having reached this point, in the beginning of 2000, the economy grew at an average annual rate of 4. 4 %, whereas between the first quarter of 2010 and mid - 2011 the economy grew an average annual rate of 6. 3 %. the behavior of the unemployment rate was totally different as well. after having risen from around 7. 5 % in mid - 2008 to levels close to 11 % in mid - 2009, it began a period of fast decrease, returning to levels around 7 % to 7. 5 % at the beginning of this year. the policy regime was crucial in this result. fiscal policy implemented a sizeable economic stimulus package. monetary policy also added a significant impulse to the economy, as the bank took the monetary policy interest rate to its minimum and implemented additional measures to ensure the effectiveness of its actions. the effects of the 2008 – 2009 crisis were very significant, but the resilience of the chilean economy and the effectiveness of its macroeconomic policies were even stronger. over time, inflation targeting regimes have evolved to what is now known as flexible inflation target ( fit ). in this scheme, the central bank sets an inflation target, which is intended to be achieved in a given time horizon. as shown by svensson ( 1997 ), inflation targeting implies inflation forecast targeting. thus, the central bank ’ s inflation forecast at the policy horizon becomes the intermediate target. 2 in the case of chile, our inflation target is three percent, and the time horizon is two years. as long as this target is credible, monetary policy will not only achieve inflation stability