larger role of nonbank financial intermediaries invite central banks to reflect on the way they give access to the safest settlement asset, central bank money. the existence of a digital form of central bank money is obviously not a prior nor a sufficient precondition for financial market efficiency and security. nevertheless, the strong demand in the ecosystem to provide innovative solutions convinced us of the interest of an experimental approach in this field. the way we experiment with cbdcs for wholesale transactions perfectly illustrates our choice to move from conceptual and academic considerations, to experiments in the field, hand in hand with market players, using a pragmatic, trial and error way of working. the goal is to determine i ) how digital central bank money may improve the efficiency and fluidity of payment and settlement systems, ii ) what are the most promising technologies and iii ) whether it makes sense to make central bank money available to beneficiaries that do not have access to it yet. in may this year, we conducted a first successful and very promising experiment with societe generale forge, that enabled us to test the three steps of a digital transaction : the tokenisation of a security, the digital representation of central bank money on a private blockchain, and the settlement of a transaction on the security on the private blockchain. this led us to interface successfully a public with a private blockchain. upcoming cbdc experiments – there will be eight of them – will help us to investigate not only the potential of technology but also to question the players in the ecosystem on what tomorrow ’ s landscape could look like, on subjects as fundamental as the methods of exchanging financial instruments for cbdcs, the improvement of the conditions for executing cross - border payments or new ways of making cbdcs available to financial sector players. in turn, these experiments will lead us to assess whether the regulatory framework currently in force needs to be adapted since we are carrying out these experiments within the current legal framework. besides, this autumn, the eurosystem has adopted a similar hands - on approach for its experiments on a digital euro for the general public, in which we are participating, alongside with the ecb and other eurosystem central banks. the experiments underway directly relate to the need for the eurosystem, should circumstances so require, to be ready to issue a cbdc in order to ensure that central bank money is accessible to the general public and to preserve their freedom of choice of means of payment and their confidence in our

carefully assessed in order to obtain a fair reciprocal treatment. the basic principle is fairly simple : a third country trade repository or clearing house could service participants or markets of other countries provided that the legal and supervisory arrangements are deemed equivalent and that international cooperation arrangements are established. but equivalence is not really easy to assess and one could understand a more conservative approach based on a systematic registration. indeed, under such a regime, a third country trade repository or clearing house servicing participants or markets of another country would have to be registered by the competent authorities of that country and, once registered, would have to be subject to regulations and to on - site inspections, in addition to the domestic ones. while, in order to decrease the risk of burdensome and inefficient regulatory overlap, the position held in the european emir regulation proposal is to support mutual recognition regimes, registration regimes do remain implemented in other major jurisdictions ; in particular, in the us as foreseen in the dodd frank act that applies to activities outside the us that have a “ direct and significant connection with activities in, or effect on, commerce of the united states. ” in practice this may mean that non - us entities would become subject to the requirement of the dfa, unless an exemption is granted. in my view, the us regulation and the subsequent registration to us authorities should not lead european entities to be subject to a redundant or a double regulation. the issue of access to the information stored in trade repositories is also particularly sensitive. one can easily understand that if the national supervisory bodies keep both full access to the locally registered tr and full control of the access granted to foreign supervisors, we will rapidly conclude that we need one tr per asset class and per country, which will clearly be sub - optimal from a supervisory point of view, since we need a consolidation of the risks, and from an industrial point of view with an increased cost for everybody. hence, it is crucial to continue our common discussions with the american authorities in order to limit redundancies and inconsistencies, of information decrease the risks of regulatory arbitrage or overlaps, whilst our common objective remains the safety and soundness of financial market infrastructures. constructive dialogue between rule making agencies is essential. 2. 2 in the field of regulatory and accounting standards, i would like to point out that convergence is highly needed in order to allow users of financial reporting, especially regulators, analysts, and market participants to draw relevant comparisons between banks. – firstly,