the capital shortfall, meaning the banks that came below the threshold of 5. 5 %. but this is a measure of the strictness of the exercise that it had such an impact on the balance sheet of the banks, and it ’ s a usual measure of the impact of such types of exercises. but it ’ s also a measure of the resilience of the system because, in spite of this drop of €263 billion, the vast majority of banks stayed above 5. 5 % and were able to support such a shock, and still have a capital ratio above the threshold. and let me underline that the threshold of 5. 5 % is well above the regulatory minimum, because as you know the regulatory minimum for common equity capital ratio will be in 2018 4. 5 %, so we have chosen a more demanding threshold. and most of the banks were able to resist such a drop in their capital and stay above the threshold. that ’ s proof of the resilience of the system, and at the same time proof of the strictness of the exercise. the distribution of this drop in the capital ratio you have in this slide. i ’ m not going to comment in detail. just to underline that 75 % of the participating banks experienced a 0 to 6 percentage points impact on common equity tier 1 under the adverse scenario. now the capital shortfall itself, as i said, comes both from the aqr and from the stress test. and the distribution you have in this slide, 11. 2 % from the stress test and 10. 7 % from the aqr. this is the capital shortfall from the stress test, 11. 2 %, but in the previous slide you have seen that the drop in capital coming from the stress test corresponded to €182 billion, which is a component of the €263 billion that i highlighted just now. so this is then the composition. and what i said about the front - loading that the banks have done since july last year is disaggregated in this table. and you see that the overall amount of measures of different kinds, they are not just capital measures, but are measures that strengthen the balance sheet and help to clean and prepare the balance sheet for the exercise. gross equity issuances since then amount to €60 billion. cocos or contingent capital issuance instruments that count as additional tier 1 and satisfy our conditions amounted to another €32 billion. internal capital generation, either by

capital. and you have then there, for instance, the shocks admitted on sovereign bonds imply a loss of €28 billion for the banks in the exercise that administrative costs and other expenses imply a drop in profits and in capital of €865 billion. and that loan losses coming from the assumptions of the stress test on the probabilities of default and the loss given default of the credit portfolio of the banks imply a loss of €378 billion. and that ’ s how you reach €181 billion. and the difference with €182 billion that i showed before is just a matter of approximation – it ’ s the same figure. and this is the disaggregation of the figure. so this really shows that the exercise was indeed quite strict. it was implemented by officials and private experts. and the results, as i said, guarantee that going forward the economic recovery will not be hampered by credit supply restrictions. bis central bankers ’ speeches