up house prices even further, with mortgage interest tax relief the clearest example of this. schemes that were introduced to give first - time buyers greater opportunities in the housing market are unfortunately mainly having an adverse effect. altogether, this causes spiralling higher house prices and increasing debt levels. lending behaviour developments are generating risks for households and financial institutions. banks, however, do not yet take sufficient account of the systemic risk inherent in the housing market. they are vulnerable to the impact that a price correction on the housing market would have on economic activity, and thus on the quality of their loan portfolios. in order to increase their resilience, we will introduce the previously announced floor for risk weighting of mortgages on 1 january 2022. final remarks now the recovery of the dutch economy is gaining traction, it is important to refocus on structural vulnerabilities. on the housing market, but of course also when it comes to the energy transition and the problem. the formation of a new coalition government offers the perfect opportunity to set out appropriate policies in these areas. this concludes my introductory statement. i would be happy to answer any questions you may have. 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches

klaas knot : banks going bankrupt speech by mr klaas knot, president of the netherlands bank, at the flairs conference, amsterdam, 29 september 2023. * * * thank you. and what an uplifting topic you have asked me to talk about! as president of an organisation that is responsible for banking supervision, having to talk about banks going bankrupt feels a bit like giving a speech about your most spectacular failures. but the sober fact is that we can never rule out the possibility of banks going bankrupt. in fact, the very words bank and bankruptcy are closely related. the word bankruptcy is derived from the italian'banca rotta ', literally meaning'broken bank '. the story goes that in renaissance italy there was a tradition of smashing a banker's bench if he defaulted on payment. so that the public could see that the banker, the owner of the bench, was no longer in a position to continue his business. despite strong buffers, despite supervision, banks can go bankrupt. that's all part of a healthy, dynamic, competitive banking sector. and in fact, at the current juncture, with interest rates having gone up – while justified to keep inflation in check – the risk of accidents is increasing. as the americans say'whenever the fed hits the brakes, someone goes through the windshield.'the problem is of course that a bank failure may threaten financial stability. because of contagion, because banks are interconnected, and because of the vital role banks play in the economy. so one of the lessons from the global financial crisis is that we – that is central banks, supervisors and the banks themselves – should be thoroughly prepared for a failure, if one happens. so that the bank can be laid to rest in an orderly way, and essential public functions can continue. to illustrate what happens when you are insufficiently prepared, let me tell you one or two stories about fortis, the former belgian - dutch financial conglomerate. in september and october 2008, i participated, as senior aide to the previous governor, in the crisis management meetings in brussels to prevent the imminent collapse of fortis. at the time, we still had to rely on general bankruptcy laws and insolvency liquidation that were completely unsuitable for financial institutions. particularly for those institutions that provide critical economic functions. functions that need to be maintained. so we had to improvise a lot. for example, we did not have the legal instruments to impose losses on shareholders while