, we need to better understand and address global imbalances. at 40 percent of world gdp, global external imbalances – measured by the sum of the absolute values of net creditor and net debtor international investment positions – are now at a historical peak and four times larger than in the early 1990s. and finally, we must take account of new public goods in international agreements. ii. global public goods and development global public goods – notably climate and social inclusiveness – are a matter of concern for all : politically they create rising expectations, and economically they generate externalities. deficient provision of these goods can have huge disruptive effects on economic, financial, and social systems, with large welfare costs, still more in developing countries. the simple truth is that we have underestimated these expectations, for too long. the so called “ washington consensus ” was economically sound, but socially too weak. nothing sustainable is achieved without a strong economy, so let ’ s stick to that mandate. but globalisation has often been viewed as having mainly benefited large corporates – and their tax avoidance – as the prosperous, globally mobile class – and the rapid growth of their income. inequalities between countries – in particular between the north and the south – have fortunately decreased, those within countries have increased. and younger generations are demanding that we ensure the protection of the planet. a lot has been achieved in recent years. for instance, the bwi have contributed to the significant reduction of poverty at the global level : since 1990, the number of people living in extreme poverty worldwide has dropped by 1. 1 billion. but much remains to be done. in this respect, the bwi can play a key role by focusing on their core competencies, – namely surveillance, technical assistance and lending –, and by developing new tools for the analysis of macro - critical issues such as climate change, digitalisation, and inequalities. we should aim at a better coordination between the bwi and other international organisations including un bodies ( un development programme, un climate change conference, un conference on trade and development … ). given the insufficient achievement of economic development in africa and part of south asia, there is a need to review the functioning of development aid. we could say the same concerning climate change, stronger coordination between un bodies and the bwi could be achieved, with the latter providing the macro - financial framework needed to assess risks and policies, following the example of the ngfs. * * let

the “ upside ” – by ever increasing demands – and on the “ downside ” – by criticism of prolonged low interest rates and non - standard policies. today, it seems all the more important to me to restate three principles : monetary policies cannot do everything, and cannot perform miracles. they cannot repair the damage caused by protectionist uncertainties ; they can neither replace reforms conducive to long - term growth, nor more growth - enhancing fiscal policies. monetary policies in the major advanced economies are guided by their sole domestic mandate : price stability and contracyclical demand management. they are not targeting exchange rates. this is the fruitful paradox of recent years : the coexistence of “ domestically focused ” policies that results in a “ globally - cooperative ” monetary environment. and for this purpose, monetary policy must be conducted in full independence. that is, independently of political powers, of course, and we regret to have to say it again. but also 1 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches independently of short - term pressures or any particular economic interests. so we take account of market indications, but we must not be market dependent ; this includes not relying too exclusively for inflation expectations on market - based measures. we are data dependent and i say this in particular for the ecb : in our coming governing council meetings, we will assess actual economic data and we will act accordingly if and when needed. ii. financial stability issues and crises on financial stability issues, the bretton woods system has undergone numerous disruptions and crises since its inception, including its quasi break - up in 1971. and a decade after the gfc, we still have to define the future of our current international monetary system, or “ non - system ” as many describe it. today we will discuss financial stability risks caused by the growth of cross - border flows and financial assets. over the past few years, international capital flows have been too abundant in good times, – potentially fueling domestic bubbles and destabilising national financial systems – but also prone to “ sudden stops ” in bad times. the exponential increase of contagion effects through cross border flows and stocks, but also asset price volatility, has led to an evolution of the imf ’ s view on capital flows, from its original doctrine of liberalisation, into a more pragmatic institutional view. more importantly we need to enhance the crisis prevention toolkit and avoid excessive risktaking. our first line of defense to address financial stability