context of the financial crisis. for instance? there are a number of rules in the ecb, namely defining the counterparts to our monetary policy, and the rules for accepting collateral. so if the ecb does leave the troika, you will not be able to have waivers. we need to have assurances that imbalances are credibly tackled. does that explain why you have stopped accepting greek debt as collateral? the initial technical extension was possible, because we had this credible prospective of finalising the review, which made it possible to prolong the waiver. recently, however, the governing council concluded that it is no longer possible to assume that there will be a successful conclusion of the programme review. what do you need from the greek government? at the moment this is a topic for politicians to discuss. bis central bankers ’ speeches could emergency liquidity assistance be extended for months? emergency liquidity assistance ( ela ) can only be temporary and can be given only to solvent banks. when you have a systemic crisis, you may need flexibility in terms of duration. is a country that is cut off from ela cut out of the monetary union? ela is provided to banks, not to countries. and i will not comment on speculative scenarios. we are not in that situation. we suspended the waiver on government debt to be accepted as collateral, but greek banks are still counterparties. when they have insufficient eligible collateral for monetary policy, they will have access to ela. ela is given by the national central bank, which bears the risk and should depend on its own judgment of the solvency of the banking sector. however, since last year it is the single supervisory mechanism that supervises the banking sector. how does this work? yes, it is the responsibility of the ssm to provide an assessment of the solvency of banks. bis central bankers ’ speeches

year of restrictions, as well as social and economic difficulties. for 2020, the imf forecasted a contraction of real gdp in europe of 7 percent, the biggest contraction after world war ii. thanks to the extraordinary policy response, even more dramatic consequences have been avoided. i understand that the full extent of the pandemic ’ s impact on companies in 2020 is yet to be revealed as time passes and more data becomes available. i agree that long - lasting changes in the structure of the economy will occur, even though they are hard to predict at this moment. moving forward, a better policy calibration is needed in order to weather these structural changes and banks should put in place arrangements for restructuring the debt of those firms that can be saved, while facilitating the orderly exit of those firms that are unlikely to succeed in the postpandemic economy. the uncertainties remain extremely high and further delays in the economic recovery will put more pressure on the public resources and complicate the trade - offs in their reallocation. however, i would like to end on a more optimistic note and say that we do hope for a swift 1 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches recovery as we continue to do our part in curbing the effects of the pandemic. with these in mind, i wish ms laura valderrama success with her presentation on the results of the analysis of corporate vulnerabilities and a very fruitful discussion to all the panelists and guests. mr kammer you have the floor. 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches