samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
regarding credit and market risks. and we will base our position in international supervisory and regulatory groups on the knowledge and experience we gain during the project. our review is certainly a huge project – in 2017 alone, we will be conducting more than 100 assessments, each of them covering three to four models. nevertheless, the benefits will be equally large. in addition to business models and risk management, we are currently focusing on a third issue : credit risk. most prominently, this includes the issue of non - performing loans that i mentioned before. it is the banks themselves that have to tackle this issue as quickly as possible. however, they sometimes face obstacles in the form of inadequate national legislation and national judicial frameworks, as described in the stocktake of national practices we published in september. here, policymakers can play an important role by reforming relevant legislation. as supervisors, we can assist the banks by pointing out best practices and ensuring that they are applied. today, we will close the public consultation on our guidance for banks on dealing with non - performing loans. that guidance takes the form of recommendations to banks and defines a number of best practices that we have identified. it sets out our supervisory expectations and serves as a basis for supervisors to evaluate how banks handle nonperforming loans. conclusion ladies and gentlemen, to sum up : banks are more resilient than they were just a few years ago. however, they still have to improve their fitness. they have to adjust to a new economic environment ; they have to adapt to the digital world ; and they have to become more efficient and 2 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches deal with legacy assets. this is no small task, but it has to be done. moreover, the banks have to get used to a new regulatory framework. that framework should be finalised by the end of the year, and it should be finalised at the global level. banking became a global sector years ago, and regulation must follow in order to ensure stability. thank you for your attention. 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches

the wheel ” but those who are generally more competent at what they do. this also means keeping the risks of digitalisation in check, what should also be the benchmark for institutions. it is not individual ideas we are talking about, but a bank ’ s overall package – including risk management. thank you. 5 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches
mr duisenberg outlines the benefits of european monetary union, growth and stability for europe speech by the president of the european central bank, dr w f duisenberg, at the global economy conference organised by the economic strategy institute in washington, d c on 27 april 1999. introduction following almost a decade of meticulous preparation and economic convergence, 1 january 1999 saw the start of stage three of economic and monetary union ( emu ), with the introduction of the euro and a single monetary policy for the euro area. this area constitutes an economic region that roughly equals the united states in terms of both its economic strength and its degree of macroeconomic openness. the euro area has a population of 292 million, which is slightly larger than that of the united states, at 270 million, and a somewhat smaller gdp of eur 5, 800 billion compared with the eur 7, 600 billion of the united states. as will be clear from these figures, the euro area economy is of a formidable magnitude, and indeed is one of the largest economies in the world, with a purchasing power matched only by that of the united states. it is my conviction that emu has the potential to stimulate further the growth of the euro area economy and to increase the prosperity of its participants. at the same time, a successful emu is also in the interest of the united states and the world economy in general, creating opportunities for trade, direct and portfolio investment. before i address the benefits of emu and the stability - oriented policies that have to be implemented to ensure that these benefits are achieved, let me briefly mention the main institutional bodies involved in the formulation and implementation of the single monetary policy. monetary policy is determined by the governing council of the european central bank ( ecb ), which consists of the eleven governors of the national central banks ( ncbs ) of the participating member states and the six members of the executive board of the ecb. the implementation of the single monetary policy is the responsibility of the eurosystem, which is comprised of the ecb and the eleven ncbs of the participating member states. the executive board of the ecb is a separate decision - making body. its role is to ensure that the tasks conferred upon the european system of central banks ( escb ) are implemented, either through its own activities or through the ncbs. economic growth - the benefits of emu i should now like to address the benefits of emu and why i believe that the introduction of the euro

must be implemented to ensure that the opportunities of the single currency are achieved. monetary policy alone - however well designed and implemented - cannot solve europe ’ s economic problems. policy - makers in all areas must be determined to take proper account of the new environment of stage three of emu and its consequences when forming their policies.
##jourd ’ hui la forme qu ’ aura l ’ europe ou nous vivrons demain, car le changement qui naitra du changement est imprevisible ». je vous remercie de votre attention.

benoit cœure : the global and european aspects of policy coordination speech by mr benoit cœure, member of the executive board of the european central bank, at the global research forum on international macroeconomics and finance, washington dc, 14 november 2014. * * * for a central banker from the euro area, the notion of policy coordination and cooperation has a somewhat different meaning than it does for policymakers from other advanced economies. on the one hand, it has a global dimension capturing the difficult questions of whether and how to align monetary policies so as to achieve an optimal international policy mix. but on the other hand, it has a meaning as well in our domestic environment : within the euro area we are also involved, in a sense, in international policy cooperation. we have to achieve price stability in an environment of different national fiscal and structural policies. thus, in my remarks this afternoon i would like to discuss these aspects from a euro area perspective : the implications of policy cooperation internationally and domestically. in doing so, it would seem natural to build on the insights coming from open economy macro literature for the international aspects, and closed economy macro literature for the domestic ones. but because of our unusual environment, i will need to draw from a third field as well, and one which is still under development : the “ macroeconomics of monetary unions ”. and as i will show, our natural experiment in the euro area is now starting to produce some very clear and important findings. the global aspects of the policy mix starting with the global aspects of the policy mix, let me say from the outset that i belong to the “ sceptical ” school and see limited scope for, and advantages to formal monetary policy coordination at a global level. it is quite clear that there are qualitative benefits to coordination, due to cross - border spillovers. moreover, those benefits are likely to be higher in crisis situations as coordinated actions provide signals that are significantly stronger than the sum of uncoordinated individual measures. but coordination tends to happen anyway in such instances, as the direction of the necessary policy action is strongly positively correlated across countries, and all actors have a shared interest in removing unwelcome tail risks. the currency swap arrangements that were set up between a number of central banks during the 2007 – 08 crisis, including the ecb, are just one example of how explicit coordination is possible outside of a formal framework, at short notice and with great effect. the question is therefore whether we need
we have not yet finished the banking union. fundamentally, portugal has longer - term growth issues. it has made a huge effort in the past few years but needs to persevere. bis central bankers ’ speeches

or counterparty risk problems for banks. such situations are also a matter of concern from a systemic liquidity viewpoint, and may take two extreme forms : market liquidity could temporarily dry up or individual funding liquidity problems may affect a significant market player. 9 such liquidity problems are typically lowprobability events, but the potential loss to the financial system if they were to materialise is great. in today ’ s financial markets, the fear is that a large proportion of market participants may have become excessively complacent ; a situation which may well have been exacerbated by high levels of liquidity, the stability of which is difficult to predict. what then can be done to enjoy the advantages of credit derivatives, while simultaneously minimising the systemic risks they could generate? first, we need to understand what the main problem is. here, it should be acknowledged that the opacity of the credit derivatives market, and especially of structured synthetic instruments, is a potential source of concern. the complex interaction between cash instruments and credit derivatives has made it increasingly difficult to monitor where different, possibly sizeable, positions are taken and where risks are concentrated. it is similarly difficult to monitor whether and when simultaneous attempts by market participants to unwind their positions could have an impact on market prices and systemic liquidity. 10 it is therefore becoming increasingly important for risk managers, in both the private and the public sectors to understand which risks are being accumulated by what financial entities. second, since there is no simple solution to the problem of opacity, what is the right direction to take? the challenge is to work towards an adequate transparency framework. more and improved data on net credit risk exposures and on the concentration of positions – which tend to build up easily in highly leveraged and opaque markets – could help to mitigate sizeable shortcomings in both see, for example, imf gfsr ( 2005 ), geithner fed of ny ( 2006 ). see lagana et al. ecb ( 2006 ) and ecb financial stability review, box 9, december 2006. see institute of international finance ( 2007 ) and joint forum ( 2006 ) for further details and definitions. ecb financial stability review, june 2006. counterparty and systemic liquidity risk management. in fact, such data could help market participants and competent authorities to value, price and manage more effectively the increasing risks posed when investors behave in a homogenous way. however, it is important
in the first half of fiscal 1997. judging from the above developments, however, the economic recovery on the whole will most likely continue in the future. at the same time, there remain factors, such as balance - sheet adjustment pressures, which tend to keep private demand from gaining strength. also, the influence of the recent plunge in stock prices on corporate sentiment requires careful scrutiny. in these circumstances, it is essential to promote necessary adjustments by such means as a swift implementation of effective reforms in japan s economic structure. this is an important ingredient in the efforts to strengthen the basis for medium - term growth in japan ’ s economy.

risks and maintain clear, sufficient, and timely communication to avoid unintended outcomes. finally, to strengthen the safety net for crisis response, asean + 3 authorities could start discussing the future of the cmim, which has been in existence for more than 20 years now. the cmim has unique value as a regional self - help mechanism with regional ownership, which could help avoid the potential stigma associated with borrowing from the international monetary fund ( imf ). however, over the years, the region's economies and financial markets have grown significantly and become more integrated, both within the region and globally. in contrast to the simple balance of payment shortfalls of the past, any future crisis will likely be much more complex. while the asean + 3 members continue to build on the readiness and effectiveness of the cmim, the imf has adapted its lending framework and facilities and has provided financing to member countries in response to the covid - 19 pandemic shock. other regional financial safety nets have launched new instruments to support their members. it may be time to review the role and design of the cmim. adding a financing instrument to mitigate the impact of shocks may be one option to consider. for more than two decades now, the asean + 3 finance process has been successful in developing strong regional cooperation and providing the foundations for regional stability. i strongly believe that it is important to maintain the momentum of this cooperation while adapting to the changing environment. 3 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches thank you. 4 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches
making – all possible loans to creditworthy borrowers. making new loans and working out existing loans is hard work. it is even harder in stressed situations. but your deep understanding of the customers and communities you serve makes your work vitally important to this recovery. efforts to repair the financial system while i will admit that many of the government initiatives aimed at easing the financial crisis have been focused on the largest institutions, i would still argue that many of these programs have recognized the importance of institutions of all sizes to a degree that i have never seen before. for example, when money market funds began experiencing runs after the lehman bankruptcy, the treasury immediately came out with a money market fund guarantee. after hearing from banks, especially community banks, about the risk the guarantee posed of draining uninsured deposits from the banking system, the treasury modified the guarantee to cover only balances in place as of the date the guarantee was first announced. similarly, the capital available under the tarp capital purchase program was made available to all institutions, regardless of size. in fact, about two - thirds of all recipients of tarp capital are community banks, demonstrating the degree to which these programs were made available to community banks. the fdic also initiated a number of changes to support the financial infrastructure, and community banks in particular. deposit insurance was increased to $ 250, 000, something that had long been sought by community bankers. and the guarantee was recently extended to the end of 2013. in addition, unlimited insurance was made available for demand deposits, and was modified to include iolta and low - interest now accounts. these changes have been of huge assistance to community banks and their small business customers. moreover, the fdic made its debt - guarantee program available to banks of all sizes. the debtguarantee and demand - deposit - guarantee programs required joint action by the fdic, federal reserve, and treasury to invoke the systemic risk exception in the federal deposit insurance act. in the past, systemic risk had been thought of as involving a single large institution. in the recent cases, we invoked the systemic risk exception with respect to the system as a whole, thereby allowing assistance to flow to institutions of all sizes. for its part, the federal reserve has also taken steps to assist smaller institutions. for example, all banks can borrow funds under the federal reserve term auction facility, which operates much the same as the discount window, but offers longer terms. and regulation d was recently modified to allow community banks to earn

to the next generation of professionals. as you identify this kind of talent, i hope they will be joining you for next year's forum. thank you and enjoy the rest of the day! 1 / 2 bis - central bankers'speeches 1 these remarks represent my own views, which do not necessarily represent those of the federal reserve board or the federal open market committee. 2 / 2 bis - central bankers'speeches
call this the middle age spread of the middle income trap! 35. finally, as i leave you ruminate over parkinson ’ s laws, i shall conclude, that such ineffable laws stand as warnings to us all. but if we can escape their pernicious embrace, i believe, our long - term future can be just as miraculous as our past. to achieve this, we must work together. we must put aside trivialities. and, above all, we must give strategic thinking and visioneering, priority on the national agenda of economic operators and political decision - makers. it is high time to look beyond vision 2020. bis central bankers ’ speeches

as in australia, without waiting for them to actually make losses first, as is the norm in central bank legislation. dynamic provisioning, which flies in the face of accounting practice, is equally important. this would allow us to carry on the battle against currency volatility, conduct open market operations, or omo ’ s, in the low - yield environment. without these extra resources, the only omo ’ s that your central bank will be able to undertake will be, not open market operations, but open mouth operations – with no money to put where our mouth is! 24. as i reflect on the timing of “ tapering ”, an astute observation of a former chairman of the us federal reserve, william mcchesney martin ( jr ), comes to mind : “ the job of the fed is to take away the punch bowl just as the party is getting going. ” i suspect that the macroprudential measures, that we introduced recently, to minimise the risk of overheating in the construction sector, must have evoked similar sentiments in the industry. the bank is now seen as the killjoy, preventing enthusiastic promoters from turning the whole country into a gigantic building site. where they see only benefits, the bank sees risk, with a capital r. igniting the new engines of growth 25. but let us not end on a dismal note for my hopes are high for a steady recovery. i believe mauritius can move into the premier league of small states, and become one of the tigers of tomorrow ’ s commerce, by igniting new engines of growth. 26. writing, in the 1940 ’ s, william henry beveridge, social reformer extraordinaire, defined the road to progress as the elimination of the five giants, of want, disease, ignorance, squalor and idleness. we have done much in mauritius to eliminate want, disease, and squalor. we still have much work ahead to tackle more vigorously the giants of ignorance and idleness. we absolutely must increase savings ; reform the public sector and make it more a servant than a master of the people ; engage women more in our society, in our businesses and indeed in our banks ; extract greater efficiency in education and health ; and develop greater productivity and innovation in our economy. 27. i believe we shall see the drivers of growth sustained but we must do more, much more, to ignite innovation in business and in mauritian society at large. the
priority areas i mentioned. having done some of the right things does not mean that we can be complacent, since the economic challenges will not get any easier in the current and future global environment. thank you.

##c statement and board discount rate action, " press release, february 2. 5 the first instance of this type of qualitative forward guidance appeared in the august 2003 fomc statement. in particular, the statement included the following language : " the committee judges that, on balance, the risk of inflation becoming undesirably low is likely to be the predominant concern for the foreseeable future. in these 6 / 8 bis - central bankers'speeches circumstances, the committee believes that policy accommodation can be maintained for a considerable period " ; see board of governors of the federal reserve system ( 2003 ), " fomc statement, " press release, august 12. 6 meade and others ( 2015 ) find that, due to fomc communications, financial market participants anticipated the 2004 monetary policy tightening in advance, but that in the absence of such communications they did not anticipate the policy tightening that occurred in 1994. see ellen e. meade, yoshio nozawa, lubomir petrasek, and joyce k. zickler ( 2015 ), " the effects of fomc communications before policy tightening in 1994 and 2004, " feds notes ( washington : board of governors of the federal reserve system, september 24 ). 7 the fomc employed both date - based and outcome - based explicit forward guidance in the period following the 2008 financial crisis, as well as more qualitative forward guidance. for a more detailed discussion of the forward - guidance language employed by the fomc during the period from 2008 to 2015 and a review of the evidence of the effects of such forward guidance, see jeffrey campbell, thomas b. king, anna orlik, and rebecca zarutskie ( 2020 ), " issues regarding the use of the policy rate tool, " finance and economics discussion series 2020 - 070 ( washington : board of governors of the federal reserve system, august ). 8 the fomc introduced outcome - based forward guidance in its december 2012 statement. from august 2011 to november 2012, the fomc used date - based explicit forward guidance. for example, the august 2011 fomc statement noted that the fomc would likely keep the federal funds rate at exceptionally low levels " at least through mid - 2013. " the date in the forward guidance was updated to " at least through late 2014 " at the january 2012 meeting and updated again to " at least through mid2015 " at the september 2012 meeting. see board of governors of