samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
to thank the australian - thai chamber of commerce for the invitation. thank you.

special position granted to them under the act and the regulations, have been found to be using innovative ways to structure transactions in a manner to circumvent regulations. 1 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches during the course of our onsite examinations, we have come across instances where arcs have been used or allowed themselves to be used, if i may say so, as a conduit to evergreen distressed assets. in many cases, there is a lack of transparency and consistency in the issuance and periodical valuation of security receipts ( srs ). the practices surrounding levy of management fee leaves much to be desired. it is also observed that a few entities find new ways of achieving their designs once a particular practice has been called out as a violation or deviation. wherever it had come to our notice, we had directed the entities to arrange for remediation including setting aside capital charge on gains thereon but only a responsible conduct by the supervised entities themselves can bring the required efficiency to the system. in extreme cases, it may call for regulatory or supervisory actions which of course we would like to use only as a last resort. with regulations shifting towards a more principles - based approach, supervision is required to focus more on the substance of transactions rather than their legal form. this means that supervisors, instead of relying on the technical compliance presented by the management, may have to scrutinise the economic purpose and the underlying unstated intent behind the transactions. very often we get representations to our observations stating this is industry practice or clarifications are pending from the rbi. sometimes there are incorrect or intelligent interpretations of the circulars. these are not acceptable excuses for failing to do the right thing. therefore, i would urge you all to adopt a regulation plus approach where you not only comply with the letter of the regulation but also its spirit. robust governance led by the board is a pre - requisite to ensuring that arcs fulfil their intended mandate. towards this objective, i would like to share with you a few thoughts on the effective functioning of the board. effective functioning of the board effective functioning of the board requires several elements including competent leadership, committed directors with diverse expertise, independence, clarity in roles and responsibilities and diligence. the chairperson of the board is the guardian of governance acting as a lynchpin between the board, the management, and the shareholders. a good chairperson facilitates constructive discussions, encourages diverse perspectives, and guides the board towards consensus on critical matters. however,
the one hand, there was a concern that a commitment to unlimited bond purchases could cross the dividing line between monetary policy and other policies. however, this was more a question of design than of principle. what was needed was to create safeguards and limits to contain such risks, which we achieved with, among other things, the requirement for an esm programme to guarantee sound economic policies. the european court of justice has since confirmed that the design of omt was fully in line with the ecb ’ s mandate. set against this was the material risk – had we failed to act decisively – of a catastrophic unravelling of the euro area with severe deflationary consequences. by july 2012 spreads vis - avis german ten - year government bonds had reached 5 % in italy and 6 % in spain, with even wider spreads in greece, portugal and ireland. the cost of deflation protection had risen from 184 basis points in january 2012 to 276 basis points in july. so, what gave us the courage to act was the conviction that there was a far greater risk if we did nothing. inaction would have meant nothing less than the failure of our mandate and, potentially, of the currency we had been tasked with preserving. this reality made the course taken inescapable – meaning it was the only viable option for any responsible policymaker. while omt was never activated, the effect of our commitment to do what was necessary to preserve the euro was profound, and equivalent to that of a large - scale asset purchase programme : spreads in vulnerable countries fell on average by more than 4 % over the next two years. the macroeconomic impact of omt was also analogous to purchase programmes carried out in other countries. in fact, ecb research finds that the gdp and price effects of omt were broadly in line with those estimated for the quantitative easing that took place in the united states and the united kingdom. 10 humility the third quality, humility, comes from the recognition that the power and responsibility held by public servants are not boundless, but are derived from the mandate conferred on them which provides the guidance for decision - making and sets the limits of action. 4 / 7 bis central bankers'speeches public servants, and central bankers in particular, have a political mandate, in that the mandate is bestowed on them through a political process. ecb board members are appointed by the chamber of states – the eu council – and a view is expressed on those appointments by representatives of the people :

a discussion about exactly how it will end. 3 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches oh, and we thought that ending it meant ending it, i. e. stopping in september. the baseline expectation is, as mario draghi has said, that there will be no sudden stop. this is a technical discussion. 4 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches
, there is good reason to be optimistic about the canadian economy. these are exciting times. new opportunities, new technologies and new industries are all waiting right around the corner. the students here today will be the ones who will shape the future, with the tools developed through their imagination and ingenuity. i cannot wait to see how it turns out. i would like to thank russell barnett for his help with this speech. 6 / 6 bis central bankers'speeches

christian noyer : does money matter? a european perspective speech by mr christian noyer, governor of the bank of france, at the 4th ecb central banking conference “ the role of money : money and monetary policy in the twenty - first century ”, frankfurt am main, 9 november 2006. * * * it is a great pleasure and honour for me to take part in this central banking conference. my communication will be organised as follows : i will first review some stylized facts about money and inflation that show that money still matters ; second, i will relate these stylised facts to the two - pillar monetary policy strategy of the eurosystem. i will conclude my presentation by addressing some interesting challenges we face in implementing our monetary analysis. some stylized facts about money and inflation let me start with a well known paradox which can be articulated in three propositions : first, price stability is the objective of all central banks ; second, as milton friedman put it " inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon " ; and third, nevertheless, in most countries, money has little or no part in the design or implementation of monetary policy. there is, of course, one noticeable exception : the euro area. before getting into more details about our approach, i would like to mention two reasons why i think money, as such, remains an essential component for the design and implementation of monetary policy. • first, money is still of direct relevance to monetary policy in exceptional circumstances : either strong ( or hyper ) inflation or deflation. when paul volker brought down us inflation from 13 % to 3 % in three years, he did it by setting a cap on central bank money growth. and symmetrically, when the japanese authorities had to fight deflation, they resorted to a " quantitative easing " policy, which basically meant they were targeting a specific amount of central bank money. there has been considerable debate over the theoretical underpinnings of those policies : namely whether a specific channel of transmission of monetary policy, independent of interest rates, could be identified. in any case, those experiments show, in my view, that setting a path for money growth ( or its level ) can prove very effective in controlling expectations - or pin down the price level - in an extreme environment. • in more normal circumstances, however, the relationship between money and prices is more subtle and uncertain. in modern market economies, the demand for money exhibits - at least in the short and medium run - some chronic instability, if not
bank.

than 8 per cent. the country also jumped six positions to 34 out of 140 counties in the travel and tourism competitiveness index 2019 of the world economic forum ( wef ). 26. recognising the potential of the sector, the government has provided targeted policy support. the ministry of tourism has two major schemes : swadesh darshan for integrated development of theme - based tourist circuits ; and prashad as a pilgrimage rejuvenation and spiritual, heritage augmentation drive for development of tourism infrastructure in the country, including historical places and heritage cities. 27. the multi - pronged supportive policy interventions in the sector may have to be reviewed and revamped, if tourism has to contribute more to the economy matching its potential. a closer look at some of the global leaders in travel and tourism such as france and spain would suggest that these countries not only have excellent natural and cultural resources, but policies to support an exceptionally attractive tourist infrastructure, including a high hotel density offering all range of choices, quality public transport systems, networked air connectivity with considerable route capacity, and most importantly, safety and security. 28. initiatives need to be taken in the direction of improving and integrating various modes of transportation ( linking air / train / metro / road / sea ) with the provision for single point of booking, eregistration of service providers ( travel agents, transport operators, hotels, tourist guides, etc. ). strict provisions of penalty for non - compliance would boost confidence of tourists, alongside an effective and speedy grievance redressal system for both domestic and foreign tourists. research conducted by a private agency6 suggested that if we can increase international tourist arrivals to 20 million ( i. e., about double of current arrivals ), the incremental income would be us $ 19. 9 billion, benefiting an additional 1 million people in the travel and tourism industry. 7 ( v ) food processing for surplus management 29. covid has brought the importance of food security and food distribution or supply chain network to the forefront of public policy debate in india. successive years of record production of foodgrains and horticulture crops has transformed india into a food surplus economy. recognising this challenge, much of the policy attention in recent years for the sector has focused on addressing post - production frictions, comprising agri - logistics, storage facilities, processing and marketing. greater focus on processed food is one option that could help in dealing with multi - pronged
hierarchy of capital inflows, equity inflows dominate debt inflows and as such we have a stricter regulatory regime for debt in comparison with equity. in 2007 - 08, when the global market conditions were benign and the indian economy was going at a rapid pace, there were large debt inflows resulting in rupee appreciation. reserve bank ’ s efforts to contain the rupee volatility in turn resulted in large rupee liquidity which had to be sterilised at considerable fiscal cost lest inflationary pressures became unmanageable. in the circumstances, the regulatory framework discouraged borrowing by indian companies. i don ’ t need to amplify that this measure was in the greater interest of the economy including that of the companies. it would have been the bis central bankers ’ speeches end of a nice story if the companies had moderated their foreign currency borrowings in response to these regulations. 8. but how did the companies respond? let me elaborate three different ways in which they tried to circumnavigate the regulation with the caveat that there may be others. a. some companies issued convertible debentures, which, till 2007, was a permitted instrument for equity investment. but such debentures were structured in such a way that they were predominantly debt rather than equity. as an example, in a convertible debenture of 100 rupees, only 10 rupees were convertible to equity on maturity. b. some others adopted a slightly more sophisticated approach. they issued equities with a put option at a specified strike price in favour of the investor thus camouflaging the debt nature of the instrument. to illustrate, suppose an equity instrument valued at 10 rupees is issued with a put option after five years with a strike price of 20. at the appropriate time, the investor exercises the option and sells back these shares at rupees 20 to the issuer, thereby getting a fixed return of close to 15 per cent. the economic essence of the whole transaction is that the company has borrowed the funds at a cost of 15 per cent. c. yet others adopted an innovative approach. a company issues a share valued at 10 rupees at a premium of rupees 25, 000 and enters into a shareholders ’ agreement promising a guaranteed dividend of 8 per cent on the face value of the share as well as the share premium. the structure needs no elaboration. 9. what does the regulator do when such

more pivotal role in the corporate sector. in my perspective, the companies act 2013 proposes significant improvements in the corporate sector operations and casts huge responsibility on company secretaries ; it is for you professionals to live up to the enhanced expectations and responsibilities that will now be coming your way and ensure that the proposed improvements come to fruition. my best wishes to the institute in its continued endeavours to bring about a more vibrant, ethical and responsible corporate india. thank you. bis central bankers ’ speeches
) apex i, ii, iii & iv investment term credit refinance fund ( itcrf ) source of funding usaid ( gou ) bou & commercial banks eib ( gou ) world bank ( gou ) export refinance scheme ( ers ) cotton sub - sector development project ( csdp ) crop finance fund ( cff ) bou world bank / ifad libyan government export promotion fund ( epf ) export credit guarantee scheme ( ecgs ) energy for rural transformation refinance fund ( ertrf ) distressed flower project fund ( dfpf ) source : bank of uganda gou bou / usaid ( gou ) world bank ( gou ) gou in the period prior to 2006 / 07, when the development finance department and all its activities were transferred to the uganda development bank limited ( udbl ), dfd also coordinated a number of credit related programs. these included the linkage banking program under the africa regional agricultural credit association ( afraca ) ; the capacity building program ( cbp ) for micro finance institutions under the cotton sub - sector development project ; research and advocacy on government programs, policies and processes from a gender perceptive under the gender and economic reform for africa ( gera ) initiative of the north south institute of canada ; capacity building for rural women financial intermediaries program financed by a grant sourced from ifad ; and the danida - funded rural financial services component ( rfsc ), which was aimed at widening financial services outreach to the rural areas. although these schemes yielded some individual successes, they have not transformed agriculture in this country. agriculture valued added per worker measured at constant 2005 us dollars, has remained very low, despite uganda ’ s favorable resource endowments, increasing only marginally from an average of us $ 212 in the 1990s to an average of us $ 219 in the past five years, according to the world bank ’ s world development indicators. public support to the agriculture sector over the decade to 2015 has also included tax exemptions and subsidies, including the current agriculture credit facility ( acf ) that primarily targets value addition in agriculture and provides for a maximum interest rate of 12 percent using budgetary resources. the fiscal incentives have included : i ) tax exemption on income earned by financial institutions lending to agriculture that was introduced in 2006 / 07 ; ii ) income tax exemptions for new rural agro - processing investments ; and iii ) zero rating for vat on most agricultural inputs and services.

that the crb commands the confidence of bank customers. the legal framework should deal with data protection, dispute resolution and the timely sharing of data between lenders. we have begun to put this framework in place, but the task is not yet complete. thank you.
of members of the policy board behind the statement of 17 july, the majority would like to confirm with more confidence that such a mechanism is at work. are prices declining? the second point is whether or not it can be maintained that deflationary concerns have been truly dispelled when cpi and the gdp deflator are still falling. as chart 5 shows, these price indexes are declining while wpi has recently begun to exceed the prior - year level. such movements in cpi and the gdp deflator may provoke an argument that not only has deflationary concern not been dispelled, but that the economy is actually in a deflationary state. the reason we are afraid of deflation is because once the economy falls into a deflationary spiral, which is a vicious circle where price declines depress economic activity in turn leading to downward pressure on prices, it is very difficult to escape from it. to avoid such a situation, in february 1999 the bank adopted the zero interest rate policy, which was a drastic monetary easing measure. all this shows that how to interpret the decline in cpi and the gdp deflator is an important issue and we have been carefully examining it. a close look at the movement of price statistics may not always lead to a full understanding of what price changes indicate. this is because various price indexes often move in different directions or temporarily their movement does not appear consistent with the movement of other economic indicators. for example, take the latter half of 1988, which is the peak of the bubble period. while the economy was strong, measured prices were extremely stable. another example is 1991, immediately after the bursting of the bubble. notwithstanding the fact that the economy entered a serious recession, inflation marked a peak. furthermore, in 1996 while the gdp deflator traced its largest decline of the 1990s, gdp growth recorded its highest figure in the post - bubble period. these examples underscore the importance of assessing the movement of price indexes in relation to the overall economic situation. the current decline in cpi is partly attributable to such structural changes as those in the distribution system in addition to the past appreciation of the yen and the falling prices of consumer durables. it is also due to the decrease in unit labor cost, which is often observed in the early stage of economic recovery. in the early stage of recovery, productivity rises as idle resources are brought back into use, unit labor cost declines, and then downward pressure on prices is seen.

joint efforts in carrying out macroprudential policy, fulfilling their respective functions. furthermore, in june 2014, the two entities together established a task force with the aim of holding regular joint meetings, and they have been fostering further coordination. the bank is determined to continue with its efforts to contribute to ensuring the stability of the financial system, making use of these arrangements. thank you. bis central bankers ’ speeches
surely help us to do so. paragraph 3. 21, report of the hong kong securities review committee, 1988. i should disclose that i was an advisor to the src. bis central bankers ’ speeches

down immediately. in the event, the hong kong government and the clearing banks underpinned the clearing house. this episode warrants more study than it has received. had it been london, chicago or new york, it would have entered the folklore of policy memory. as with banks, public policy has to have two components. first, minimum standards to ensure that ccps do not fail. iosco / cpss are currently consulting on updated standards. ( my earlier remarks go to that. ) but second, a clear ex ante framework is needed for limiting disorder if, nevertheless, a ccp does in fact fail. i shall therefore close with a few preliminary thoughts on frameworks for handling the failure of a ccp. as with any business activity, if an institution is insolvent or otherwise cannot pay its debts, it has to stop trading, close and go into liquidation. that can be a disastrous course for a major financial institution at the very heart of important capital markets. policy in this general area revolves around building regimes that avoid taxpayer solvency support but are less disruptive than orthodox corporate liquidation. in the banking sphere, where a great deal of work is underway internationally, this is known as “ resolution ”. in the case of a distressed ccp, it is most likely that it would have been brought down by the failure of a very large clearing member and so would have unmatched positions as well as continuing matched positions. for the surviving clearing members, they would suddenly find themselves having unmatched positions, with continuing obligations to clients but a non - performing ccp on the other side. two strategies come to mind, which i am airing for debate. the first would be “ recapitalising ” the ccp so that it can carry on. the second would be to aim to bring off a more or less smooth unwinding of the ccp ’ s book of transactions. on the former route, in the banking sphere the basic strategy is to develop regimes for bondholders to share in the losses after the equity is wiped out ; a distressed bank gets “ recapitalised ” in some way through a reconstruction of its liabilities. but ccps do not issue debt, so there is not obviously an economic equivalent of recapitalisation by way of haircutting the debt claims of bondholders. recapitalisation would seem to entail an injection of new outside capital. that should not come from the public sector. so the only options are