christine lagarde : imfc statement statement by ms christine lagarde, president of the european central bank, at the forty - ninth meeting of the international monetary and financial committee, imf spring meetings, washington dc, 19 april 2024. * * * introduction since our last meeting in october, the global growth outlook has improved somewhat, reflecting revised growth prospects across both advanced and emerging market economies. the disinflationary process has continued amid falling energy prices, the normalisation of supply conditions and tight monetary policy. while the global economy has weathered the tightening of monetary policy well, growth prospects remain subpar by historical standards. risks to the global outlook are broadly balanced for both economic activity and inflation, though rising geopolitical tensions pose an upside risk to inflation and a downside risk to growth. the governing council in april kept the three key ecb interest rates unchanged at their september 2023 levels. it considers that these policy interest rates are at levels that are making a substantial contribution to the ongoing disinflation process. the governing council's future decisions will ensure that its policy rates will stay sufficiently restrictive for as long as necessary. it will continue to follow a data - dependent and meeting - bymeeting approach to determining its interest rate decisions, based on the same three criteria that guided its decisions during the earlier tightening phase and the current holding phase : the inflation outlook, the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission. if the governing council's updated assessment of these criteria were to further increase its confidence that inflation is converging to its 2 % medium - term target in a sustained manner, it would be appropriate to reduce the current level of monetary policy restriction. at the same time, the governing council is not pre - committing to a particular rate path. in march the governing council concluded the review of the operational framework for implementing monetary policy, which will help us steer short - term market rates in line with our policy stance as the eurosystem balance sheet normalises. the new framework clarifies how the ecb will implement monetary policy in the future. this year we also celebrated the 25th anniversary of the euro. this is an important reminder that there is strength in unity as we look ahead to future challenges. economic activity over the past year, economic activity in the euro area has broadly stagnated, as slower global demand and the impact of tighter financing conditions have weighed on growth. real gdp was flat in the final quarter of 202

##130 billion. we have taken care that our actions are never a replacement for the political decision - making process. that people are turning to the central bank on issues that demand a political rather than technical response reveals a serious weakness in the institutional functioning of the euro area. this weakness fuels excessive expectations concerning the ecb. what is the nature of this dysfunction? if proof were needed, the summit of 12 july provided an example : the 19 government leaders of the euro area were shut away for 17 hours to discuss the details of measures expected of a country that makes up less than 2 % of the region ’ s gdp. the decision - making mechanism at the heart of the monetary union does not work well. it is based on an intergovernmental principle that is no longer appropriate. each of the leaders considers public opinion in his or bis central bankers ’ speeches her own country, and his or her own country alone. as a result, the compromises reached are unlikely to be the best outcome for the euro area as a whole, but instead represent the greatest common denominator between the member countries. further, they are the result of never - ending negotiations that increase uncertainty. the five months of negotiation on greece have come at a significant economic and financial cost. there is an urgent need to abandon this intergovernmental process in favour of a process of shared decision - making based on votes and democratic legitimacy. so, in short, you are calling for a form of economic governance at the heart of the euro area, which implies further transfers of sovereignty. do member countries really want this? one thing is certain : if this issue is not addressed, starting today, the monetary union will face the same type of crisis again and again. the greek crisis has let the genie out of the bottle regarding countries leaving the euro area, and it will not be easy to put it back in again. how to proceed? by understanding that replacing the intergovernmental process with shared decision - making will not diminish the sovereignty of member countries. on the contrary, it will provide more room for the political dimension by ensuring shared responsibility that will enhance mutual trust. today the ecb functions on the following principle : the governing council has a discussion, it then votes if necessary, before moving on to something else. and that works! take as an example the implementation of the european fiscal framework, which has become complex and opaque. if there were european fiscal instruments that were discussed within a “ ministry of finance