the country ’ s problems, when the italian economy ’ s weaknesses, such as lacklustre productivity growth, predate the single currency. such biases will not go away until the economies have converged sufficiently. why does making the labour market more flexible appear to be the keystone of reforms to be carried out in france? reforming the french labour market has become extremely symbolic in europe : it is considered everywhere as proof of france ’ s willingness to reform. that ’ s what makes it essential. the new french government fully understands this. however, this can only be a first step. the notorious “ flexicurity ” includes the word “ security ”. making the labour market more flexible can unleash potential, but doing so also requires safeguarding workers ’ careers and reforming their training. there is also the problem of the mismatch between france ’ s output and foreign demand, as shown by its external deficit, which is one of the highest in the euro area. this deficit is not the result of an overly rigid labour market, but rather of a skills mismatch. education and training must therefore be at the heart of the reforms of the french economy. should inspiration be taken from the italian “ jobs act ” reform, which introduced a single labour contract? 1 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches each country has its own unique features, but it ’ s true that, with the “ jobs act ”, italy went further than france. what is more, this reform is starting to bear fruit. several plans are also on the table for eurobonds, these european bonds whereby the risks are more or less shared among the member countries. what is the current thinking on these? discussions are under way, in particular within the european systemic risk board. but it is unrealistic to imagine, as is too often the case in france, that technical fixes can solve political problems. prior to any reform of the euro area, discussions need to take place on the joint projects and their democratic basis. public debt, whether french or european, constitutes the taxes of tomorrow and beyond. who will vote for these taxes? the national parliaments or the european parliament? and what will they finance? these are very political choices. with the economic upswing and the return of confidence in europe, the time has come to embark on this joint reflection. doesn ’ t the coming increase in interest rates pose a threat to the countries with weak public finances? the increase in long - term interest rates is the

, may. 17. in addition to complying with its mandate as specified in the treaties, any policy action on the part of the ecb that addresses environmental sustainability concerns must also adhere to the general provisions of eu primary law, including the principles of proportionality, an “ open market economy ” and institutional balance. 18. see elderson, f. ( 2021 ), “ greening monetary policy ”, the ecb blog, 13 february. 19. see schnabel, i. ( 2021a ), “ from green neglect to green dominance? ”, 3 march ; schnabel, i. ( 2021b ), “ societal responsibility and central bank independence ”, 27 may. 20. see schnabel, i. ( 2021a ), ibid ; parker, m. ( 2018 ), “ the impact of disasters on inflation ”, economics of disasters and climate change, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 21 – 48 ; ecb and esrb ( 2020 ), “ positively green : measuring climate change risks to financial stability ”, june. 21. the cjeu has recognised that measures that serve the objective of safeguarding an appropriate transmission of monetary policy are likely both to preserve the singleness of monetary policy and to contribute to its primary objective of maintaining price stability. see case c - 62 / 14, gauweiler v deutscher bundestag, ecli : eu : c : 2015 : 400, para 50. 22. see schnabel, i. ( 2021a ), op. cit. 23. on 4 february 2021, the ecb issued a press release to announce that the eurosystem aims to start making annual climate - related disclosures for its non - monetary policy portfolios within the next two years, using the recommendations of the task force on climate - related financial disclosures ( tcfd ) as the initial framework. several eurosystem central banks already make climate - related disclosures for some of their non - monetary policy portfolios. 24. the speech by frank elderson at the recent green swan conference hosted by the bank for international settlements ( bis ) highlights the important role of the ngfs in coordinating central banks ’ work on climate change. see elderson, f. ( 2021 ), “ the embrace of the horizon : forcefully moving with the changing tide for climate action in financial sector policies ”, 3 june. 25. on 22 september 2020, the ec