in aggregate demand and, by extension, in inflation. faced with these circumstances, on the ecb governing council we acted rapidly and forcefully. in particular, we announced on 18 march the launch of the pandemic emergency purchase programme ( pepp ), which allows the ecb to purchase public and private sector bonds and other debt instruments. the pepp had an initial envelope of €750 billion ( 6. 6 % of euro area gdp in 2020 ) and was scheduled to last until end - 2020. it paved the way for a gradual easing of financing conditions which has continued to date. the targeted longerterm refinancing operations ( tltros ) for the banking sector were also very successful. for example, in the june 2020 operation, participating banks received a total of €1. 31 trillion, a record for eurosystem refinancing operations. estimates by banco de espana researchers suggest that the pepp will have had a firstorder positive impact on inflation and on the gdp growth rate in the 2020 - 2022 period. 2 the evidence available also suggests that the tltros have fulfilled the function for which they were designed, as banks have used the financing received to grant loans to the real economy. 3 admittedly, it is difficult to accurately quantify the economic and financial deterioration that would have ensued had the pepp and the rest of the measures not been launched, and therefore to estimate the resulting overall effect on euro area macroeconomic developments. but one of the main effects of the monetary policy measures, in a setting as adverse as that in place at the onset of the pandemic crisis, has been to avoid disruption on financial markets that would have ultimately given rise to a much deeper and persistent crisis. for further details, see p. hernandez de cos ( 2021 ) : “ the european central bank's monetary policy : response to the pandemic crisis and future challenges ". speech at the universidad autonoma de madrid ( uam ). see aguilar, p., o. arce, s. hurtado, j. martinez - martin, g. nuno, and c. thomas ( 2020 ). “ the ecb monetary policy response to the covid - 19 crisis ”, occasional paper no. 2026, banco de espana. see, for example, the october 2020 bank lending survey in spain. there is a summary of the results of the survey for the participating spanish banks in menendez - pujad

miguel fernandez ordonez : contribution of global banks to financial stability opening speech by mr miguel fernandez ordonez, governor of the bank of spain, at the international capital markets and emerging markets roundtable, institute of international finance ( iif ), washington dc, 17 april 2011. * * * let me start by thanking the iif for giving me this opportunity to present my views on global banks. i will speak from my perspective as spanish banking supervisor. and i should say from the outset that in my country global banks have not given us the most problems. indeed, the main message of my intervention today is that we should not fall into the trap of automatically equating “ global banks ” with “ dangerous banks ” in terms of financial stability. this may be an intuitive reaction to the crisis. but it would be a mistaken one, in my view. in fact, based on our experience, i would like to give you some examples of how global banks can make a positive contribution to financial stability. naturally, these are only examples, and i would certainly not presume to have all of the answers on this complex issue. but i hope these examples will be illustrative of the point i am trying to make. first of all, it is true that some global banks have experienced severe problems. we have seen large, complex and interconnected banks and financial companies on the brink of bankruptcy, both here in the united states, and across europe. the taxpayers of some of the most developed countries of the world have been called on to support global banks headquartered in their countries. indeed, after the lehman bankruptcy, it is fair to say that the entire global financial system was put at risk by the difficulties of some banks operating worldwide. it quickly became clear that an unprecedented and unacceptable level of systemic risk had built up over the “ boom ” years. and that a significant amount of taxpayer ’ s money had been put at risk as a result. this prompted a forceful, and understandable, reaction from all sides. the public, bank investors, regulators, supervisors and politicians alike all agreed that we needed a profound overhaul of the treatment of systemic risk. i believe that the reactions to this challenge from the g - 20, at the highest political level, as well as from the financial stability board ( fsb ) and the basel committee of banking supervisors ( bcbs ), have been proportionate to the size of the problems and risks we have encountered since the outbreak of the crisis. the costs have