requirement with regard to fiscal policy is noteworthy. as a result, for example, this year there is some vagueness regarding the expected deviation from the budget deficit target, and estimates of the actual deficit currently range from 2. 5 to 3. 5 percent of gdp. this vagueness is accentuated by additional factors : · an interpretation that has been submitted to the state controller by the ministry of finance is that the budget deficit target is binding only at the planning stage. does this mean that there is no practical significance to the question of how the budget is implemented relative to the target? · it is not clear what the implications are of the departure expected this year for the path of the deficit target in coming years, and for the medium - term real interest rate ; · has there been a change - and if so, who made the decision - in the definition of the rules by which the deficit should be managed, so that what is binding is only that part of the government ’ s decision that relates to its expenditure ceiling but not to the budget deficit? the justification for ignoring the income side appears to be based on the assumption that changes in actual relative to planned revenues always derive solely from the gap between predicted and actual growth - an assumption that is unfounded also with respect to 2001. · the experience of 2001, when the inflation reserve may be utilized in order to increase expenditure in real terms, illustrates the need to review the necessity of including an inflation reserve in the expenditure budget. if this tradition persists, it should be given a place of its own in the government ’ s decision noting the assumption of inflation and its implications for tax receipts too. this last estimate is required this year, for example, in order to answer the question of what role is played by the deceleration of inflation, relative to the rate assumed in the budget, in explaining the underperformance of tax receipts. this factor, rather than slower growth, may explain most of the shortfall. thus, it is necessary to update the formulation of the fiscal policy decision, not only because of the change in the data but also in order to strengthen the discipline of fiscal policy as well as its transparency. these remarks refer to the accepted format of the macroeconomic framework that was in place till now, and that may be submitted to the government once again when the budget for 2002 is discussed. it appears to us that the perspective should be expanded in several directions. as far as fiscal policy is concerned, the routine decision regarding the

##e. ltd., a chinese bond issuer, issued eur 400 million in 2016. pt saka energi indonesia, also a new issuer here, issued a usd 625 million bond in 2017. under the chongqing connectivity initiative, first - time bond issuers from chongqing issued a total of usd 900 million in singapore. c. many multinational corporations that have successfully issued bonds in singapore, continue to tap on singapore for repeat issuances. this is a clear testament of the attractiveness of our debt market ecosystem. for example, the treasury unit of japan ’ s hitachi international limited, has been a frequent issuer in our bond market for over a decade. boc aviation has issued numerous bonds in currencies including usd, jpy, aud, cnh and sgd since 2010. d. singapore ’ s bond market has also grown in sophistication. for instance in the area of covered bonds, singapore has transited from a debutant to an advanced covered bond market in the region. our 3 local banks have established their global covered bond programmes, with wellreceived issuances denominated in usd, eur and aud. 9. we are rolling out the red carpet for new asian issuers. mas introduced the asian bond grant scheme this year to support first - time asia issuers in singapore ‘ s bond market, up to an amount of s $ 400, 000. we have received good interest thus far. ii. financing asian infrastructure development the second area is in infrastructure finance. asia ’ s infrastructure financing needs are vast, far beyond what government and bank financing will be able to provide. the 10. asian development bank estimates that developing asian countries will need to invest usd 1. 7 trillion annually in infrastructure till 2030 to fulfil its medium - to long - term growth potential. private 2 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches sector debt financing can play a significant role here. singapore ’ s bond market is drawing in private capital for infrastructure projects. about 60 % of asean infrastructure projects have benefitted from project finance or 1 1. advisory services of singapore - based banks. let me highlight three examples : a. belt and road initiative bonds or bri bonds. chinese banks in singapore have issued bonds to finance bri projects. china construction bank singapore branch issued rmb 1 billion ( usd 145 million ) of bri bonds last year. bank of china singapore branch recently issued rmb 4 billion ( usd