single market in banking. in cases where national legislation goes beyond crd iv, regulatory fragmentation also raises complicated legal questions : what powers does the ssm have in applying national law that goes beyond european norms? under article 4 ( 3 ) of the ssm regulation, the ecb must apply all relevant eu law. and where eu law is composed of directives, the ecb has to apply the national legislation transposing those directives. the question is therefore : what does “ transposition ” mean? does it just cover national provisions that strictly implement crd iv word for word? or does it cover any national provisions that are rooted in crd iv? in the context of our football match, these two cases might be compared to the following situation. the general rule – i. e. “ crd iv ” – would be that a foul in the penalty box would require a penalty kick. now there might be some players for whom an additional rule would apply : if they were to commit a foul in the penalty box, they would also immediately be handed a red card. that rule would go beyond a strict implementation of crd iv ; but it would still be rooted in it, in the sense that a foul in the penalty box requires sanctions. so, depending on the interpretation of “ transposition ”, two supervisory approaches might emerge. the first approach would render the ecb directly competent to apply national legislation. the second approach would require it to apply national legislation indirectly by issuing instructions to national authorities – which, of course, then raises the question of who would be held responsible if such an instruction were to lead to a legal decision by the national competent authority? in my view, the first approach – the direct competence of the ecb – might be warranted when two conditions are met. first, when the power in question falls within the tasks conferred on the ecb under articles 4 and 5 of the ssm regulation. second, when the power in question is linked to relevant eu law : that is, the supervisory framework as defined, in particular, by relevant eu directives and regulations, such as crd iv, the capital requirements regulation, and the bank recovery and resolution directive. in any case, we need a consistent approach towards applying national legislation that goes beyond european norms. returning to our football match, fragmented rules clearly pose a problem for the referee. but they are also a problem for the players and for the game itself. banks in the euro area still do not compete

appears to be rather calm. that ’ s what i said, we have to look at how things were done, under what circumstances and what its real liquidity is ; it will depend on government liquidity, tax revenue etc … and there are very different tax arrangements involved. in some countries there are tax claims, in others there are assets … these are two different “ animals ”. there are things that may have been good in certain situations, but when that situation passes the question is whether or not the instrument should become permanent. it is similar with our unconventional monetary policy measures : when the crisis is over, there will be those that say why not carry on with the measures because buying government bonds is a really good thing … and they would like it to become a permanent instrument, but this would go against our initial intention. the same applies to these instruments that were devised during the crisis and thought of as part of the programme, but were not, in my understanding, designed to be permanent. bis central bankers ’ speeches