anita angelovska bezoska : journalists are one of the main transmitters of monetary policy messages address by ms anita angelovska bezhoska, governor of the national bank of the republic of macedonia, at the journalist workshop - 2018, organized by the national bank of the republic of macedonia, skopje, 25 december 2018. * * * distinguished media representatives, welcome to the fourth journalist workshop hosted by the nbrm. i am glad to see you in greater numbers this year, which is confirmation of your interest in the topics that will be the focus of today ’ s event. allow me to take a brief look at several basic, yet important aspects of central bank communication : 1. why is central bank transparency and communication important and needed? 2. how has central bank communication evolved over the years? what were the challenges in the period after the outbreak of the global crisis and how were they addressed globally? 3. challenges in central bank communication in the republic of macedonia. a comparison between the current and the past transparency level and central bank communication shows an exceptional transformation in this segment. the need for strengthening central bank transparency was brought to the fore for the first time in the 1990s, implying enhanced communication with the public, including the media. this change is associated with the concept of central bank independence, or the independence of the monetary policy from fiscal policy. namely, high inflation in the 1970s, feed by the inflationary bias of the discretionary fiscal policy, drew a clear distinction between monetary and fiscal policy objectives and instruments by granting a high level of central bank independence, on the one hand, and setting fiscal rules, on the other. the aim was to eliminate any monetary financing of governments and their excessive borrowing, which, as witnessed in the past, could lead to high price volatility. alongside the concept of enhanced independence, greater central bank responsibility was required, which is also achieved with greater transparency. this required introduction of different communication and information on the policy conduct, and on central bank data and positions, assessments and expectations for the economic variables. at the end of the last century, the central bank community realized that besides performing its function effectively, it can also fully achieve its independence, only if it applies higher level of transparency and developed communication within its mandate. yet another factor that emphasizes the need for greater central bank transparency is the financial market liberalization in the 1990s. the perception and theory that the monetary policy is more effective if the central bank systematically surprises the markets has long been left

sabine lautenschlager : the leverage ratio – a simple and comparable measure? speech by ms sabine lautenschlager deputy president of the deutsche bundesbank, at the evening reception of the deutsche bundesbank / safe conference “ supervising banks in complex financial systems ”, frankfurt am main, 21 october 2013. * 1. * * introduction ladies and gentlemen, i am very happy to welcome you to the guest house at the deutsche bundesbank ’ s central office. it ’ s a pleasure to have you here. although you will have noticed that our premises are located somewhat outside of the city centre, it ’ s only a ten - minute walk to the goethe university ’ s campus from here. this isn ’ t just convenient for those of you who decided to walk from the university to the headquarters of the deutsche bundesbank. having a walking distance between the bundesbank and the goethe university also facilitates exchange and cooperation between the two institutions, which both have a strong stake in financial market and regulation research. i value this exchange very highly and i am convinced that cooperation in this field is indeed a very good idea. i therefore also would like to thank the safe center at the goethe university, who has organised this conference together with the deutsche bundesbank. i would also like to extend a particularly warm welcome to all of the contributors to today ’ s conference sessions. the conference asks a very fundamental question : how can we, how should we supervise banks given that the financial system is inherently complex? many books were and still will be written to examine this question comprehensively, and they will offer different and sometimes contradictory answers ; at least, that is my prediction. i nevertheless want to share my fundamental view of this topic with you. so, how can or should supervisors deal with complexity? i am convinced that in a complex world – first – supervisors need a toolbox with different instruments to cope with this complexity, and – second – those tools will not generally be that simple. as i ’ m sure you are aware, i am not an academic but a practitioner. and as a practitioner i ’ ll give you a practical example to make my point. i ’ d like to talk about a measure you all know very well : the leverage ratio. it ’ s not really a new concept, but it ’ s certainly a fashionable one. it has been claimed to be a simple fallback measure for dealing with an increasingly complex banking system, a kind of panacea for complexity