you. references 1. anarfo, e., abor, j. y., osei, k. a., and gyeke - dako, a. ( 2019 ). monetary policy and financial inclusion in sub - sahara africa : a panel var approach. journal of african business 20 ( 4 ) : 549572. 2. mehrotra, a., and yetman, j. ( 2015 ). financial inclusion issues for central banks. bis quarterly review, march. 3. morgan, p. j. and pontines, v. ( 2014 ). financial stability and financial inclusion. asian development bank institute ( adbi ) working paper no. 488. july. 4. sahay, r., cihak, m., n ’ diaye, p., barajas, a., mitra, s., kyobe, a., mooi, y. n., and yousefi, s. r. ( 2015 ). financial inclusion : can it meet multiple macroeconomic goals? imf staff discussion note sdn / 15 / 17, september. 5. un capital development fund ( uncdf ). financial inclusion and the sdgs. available at https : / / www. uncdf. org / financialinclusion - and - the - sdgs 6. world bank ( 2018 ). financial inclusion overview. october 2. https : / / www. worldbank. org / en / topic / financial available at inclusion / overview # 1 7. yetman, j. ( 2017 ). adapting monetary policy to increasing financial inclusion. bank of morocco – cemla - ifc satellite seminar at the isi world statistics congress on “ financial inclusion ”, marrakech, morocco, july 14.

in india from the perspective of strengthening financial stability. it was, in that context, considered appropriate to stipulate a lower limit of 49 per cent for the first five years, after which the extant fdi limits would kick in. corporate governance and exposure norms 30. corporate governance and prudential exposure norms are important aspects of new bank policy ; more so, in the context of allowing corporates to own banks. the guidelines for licensing of new banks deal on the subjects extensively. the guidelines mandate the nofhc to have at least 50 per cent independent directors on its board and they should have special knowledge or practical experience in economics, finance, accountancy, banking, insurance, law and some such fields. the nofhc shall not have any credit and investment ( including equity / debt capital ) exposure to any entity belonging to the promoter group except those held under it and the new bank cannot take any credit and investment ( including investments in equity / debt capital ) exposure on promoters / promoter group entities or individuals associated with the promoter group or the nofhc. financial inclusion 31. one of the main planks of licensing policy is to assess how the banks would serve public interest. the guidelines require the promoters to address how the bank proposes to achieve financial inclusion, comply with the priority sector lending targets and minimum 25 per cent branch presence in rural unbanked centres. the project report and the business plan of each applicant will be evaluated to make an assessment about these aspects. fairness and transparency of licensing process 32. the fairness and transparency of the licensing process are no less important given the enthusiasm shown by the corporate houses, nbfcs and public sector entities to get banking licence. i may also add that there were suggestions from certain quarters for auctioning of new bank licences. no doubt, banks are for public good. but, banks are special. they are highly leveraged financial institutions. they are the conduits for monetary policy transmission and constitute the core of payment and settlement system. they accept uncollateralized deposits from members of public and their deposits are insured. the purpose of issuing new bank licences is to serve public interest. auctioning of bank licences is unheard of in any jurisdiction. nevertheless, issues relating to fairness and transparency were to be dealt with. it was, therefore, decided to place the names of the applicants for bank licences on the rbi ’ s website after the last date of receipt of applications. accordingly, rbi disclosed the names of