samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
crushed.

piero cipollone : tips ( target instant payment settlement ) - the new eurosystem market infrastructure service – banca d ’ italia as service provider and manager of the business relationships with the financial community welcoming remarks by mr piero cipollone, deputy governor of the bank of italy, at tips webinar, bank of italy, 12 july 2021. * * * it is a great pleasure to welcome you here today to this seminar on target instant payment settlement ( tips ), the eurosystem market infrastructure for the settlement of instant payments in central bank money. the seminar will illustrate the architecture and functioning of the platform developed by the bank of italy on behalf of the eurosystem, and its contribution to retail payments market innovation in europe. tips was launched in 2018 and allows transactions to be settled in central bank money across europe within seconds. in launching tips, the eurosystem acknowledged that the capacity to transfer funds in a matter of seconds is a powerful one, and has great potential with respect to traditional credit transfers. the implementation of the system was carried out by the 4cbs – the central banks of france, germany, italy and spain, which are the providers of the eurosystem market infrastructures. the bank of italy, in particular, was responsible for developing the service and it was also entrusted with the task of operating the platform. from the 4cbs ’ perspective, tips represents a break with the past as well as increasing awareness of the fact that digitalization is blurring the lines between wholesale and retail. before tips, eurosystem projects such as target2 and target2 - securities ( t2s ) were designed to promote integration and harmonization of market infrastructures within the euro area, meeting the needs of financial market operators, depositories and large custodian banks. with tips, the eurosystem has provided the european financial community with an infrastructure designed to support the provision of innovative, customer - friendly retail payment solutions for the benefit of european citizens. in fact, tips was developed with the aim of fostering the integration of retail payment services and of eliminating barriers due to a lack of interoperability between different settlement platforms based on the sepa instant credit transfer ( sct inst ) scheme – i. e. the standard tips ( target instant payment settlement ) – the new eurosystem market infrastructure service : banca d ’ italia as service provider and manager of the business relationships with the financial community welcoming remarks by piero cipollone
beginning of an historic shift in our approach toward money and payments? the payment universe, both locally and globally, has evolved very rapidly over the past five years. the last wave of technological change in payments was 20 years ago when central banks introduced real - time gross settlement systems ( in our case, target followed by target2 ). the new wave is more focused on retail payments and driven by technology. before passing any judgement, we have to start from the principle that innovation is good because it makes payments cheaper and faster. that ’ s an area where we ’ re learning a great deal from our african and latin american colleagues. there ’ s a lot of leapfrogging toward innovative solutions. in the end, the new landscape will be a mix of public and private solutions. so the key question for the years to come is how to combine core public infrastructures like the ecb ’ s fast payment platform, tips, with private systems, and what impulse central banks can give to make this happen in an integrated way. this is a particular challenge in europe where the retail payment world remains fragmented along national lines. the eurosystem is working on it. we ’ d better act fast here, because we don ’ t want this new world of payments to be dominated solely by us and chinese actors. europe has a particular interest in developing its own approach and standards so it can be safe and efficient at home and attractive as an international reference. how do stablecoins, private and public, fit into this discussion? stablecoins have the potential to leverage technological change to bring new and cheaper services to customers – provided that the long list of risks i highlighted is addressed properly. you ’ re asking me whether a public stablecoin will also fit into this landscape. that ’ s an area where we ’ re treading very carefully because the prospects differ across jurisdictions. central bank digital currencies ( cbdcs ) raise a number of serious questions to which we don ’ t yet have answers. although they might look like an attractive proposition for individuals wishing to reap the benefits of technology while holding a safe store of value, they may have shortcomings of their own : there are many ways to implement cbdcs, which we need to study carefully. if they make bank funding more fragile and more vulnerable to liquidity shocks and bank runs, then they might be bad for financial stability and financial intermediation. central banks shouldn ’ t have their heads in the sand and avoid that

risk models has not made people with grey hair, or none, wholly obsolete.
about is inflation. in other words, all of these are working to relax the speed of the importation process. the president is already on this. that is why i am quite confident that we will be back to normal inflation next year. no tradeoffs between price and financial stability 1 / 2 bis - central bankers'speeches the other reason that this is the case is that we [ at the central bank ] essentially prevented knock - on effects from supply shocks because we were aggressive. we increased the policy rate from 200 basis points ( bps ) to 625 bps in just nine months. we were able to do that because we knew that bank balance sheets could take it [ the impact of the rate hikes ]. with high policy rates - while they [ the banks ] could have [ incur ] losses on their holdings of government securities - but with the higher interest rates, they earn more money. on the whole, because the banks have very strong balance sheets, financial stability was never a constraint in our use of the policy rate to quell inflation. on the narrowing interest rate differential and the weakening exchange rate the other reason we did that [ raise the policy rate ] is, as the us [ united states ] increased its policy rate, its policy rate became very close to ours. if you asked people a hypothetical question, " if the interest rate on the peso instrument is the same as the interest rate on a dollar instrument, which instrument would you choose? " even filipinos would choose the dollar because of all the advantages of the king dollar. that is the other reason. the differential between our policy rate and the us policy rate, if it narrowed too much, could cause a very large fall in the peso. however, this [ depreciation ] is also partly reflecting fundamentals since the current account deficit increased, and the deprecation of the peso last year was clearly not good for trade numbers. as foreign exchange pressures wane, the central bank can dedicate full resources and focus on fighting inflation it [ the depreciation ] was due to the differential and the fact that people look at the exchange rate and say, " all the corporations that borrow abroad wanted to buy their dollar needs for debt servicing. " so, the moment we give [ delivered ] the 425 bps [ in cumulative ] policy rate increase, the peso appreciated. after a long series of policy rate adjustments, year - to - date [ from 1 january to 4 april 2023 ]

, the peso actually appreciated by 2. 0 percent. in other words, the exchange rate is no longer adding to the inflation problem. that is the situation. the policy rate [ adjustment ] addressed two issues : first, it prevented the knock - on effects of supply shocks from spreading too much. second, it made the peso stronger, which also significantly reduced inflationary expectations. and, as i said, we did it without any risk that financial stability is reduced. 2 / 2 bis - central bankers'speeches
been huge and there is widespread agreement that we cannot allow this to happen again. nevertheless, we should also recognize that a number of global banks have managed to navigate these rough and unchartered waters without capsizing, indeed, if you allow me to extend the metaphor, some have even been able to help to calm the waters. it is important to learn the lessons from all of our experiences, both good and bad, to help us better shape the future regulation and supervision of the financial system. and it is with this in mind that i want to comment on our experience with global banks headquartered in spain. as i will stress throughout my intervention, the global nature of systemically important banks should not be seen as a negative attribute. globalization allows countries and cultures to learn from each others ’ experiences, enriching us in a very broad sense. of course we want a safer world, but a key foundation of safety is a world that is able to grow. and growth goes hand - in - hand with openness and globalization. in fact, globalization has been the engine of growth in the years before the crisis. and global banks have played a key role in this process and, therefore, in delivering growth to our societies. some banks have become global because they have accompanied domestic non - financial companies in their international expansion process. bis central bankers ’ speeches our largest global banks became international around fifteen years ago. they went first to latin america, following their large domestic customers ( utilities, oil companies, telecom firms, construction and technology firms and so on ) into those new markets. once in the new markets, the banks were able to familiarize themselves with the needs of other local customers and started to provide banking services to local households and firms. the beneficiaries of this process were not only spanish companies, but also firms and households of the host countries. this natural expansion process has created benefits in terms of risk and income diversification for the banks involved, thus reducing their probability of failure and contributing to a safer financial system worldwide. moreover, global banks help to better allocate resources across the planet by contributing to fund investment processes in countries where savings are insufficient and, in the opposite situation, providing more opportunities for depositors and savers to channel their funds to better opportunities. this natural expansion process should continue for banks in emerging countries whose non - financial companies are expanding abroad into other emerging countries or into more mature countries. we should not bring this process into a halt, reducing welfare across

, isidro, the floor is yours. 3 / 3
##preciate? south africa ’ s reserves, at just over usd42 billion, are relatively low for that type of exercise. furthermore, pegging the rand to the us dollar would not imply an automatic peg to other currencies, such as the eur, which is the currency of our biggest trading partner bloc. pegging also has the problem that if prices and wages are increasing, any competitive advantage will soon be eroded and there will be calls for changing the peg. aggressive reserves accumulation either in the context of a peg or to prevent or moderate appreciation also carries significant costs, given the wide interest rate differential between the interest paid on sterilization and the interest earned on reserves. this results in a negative cost of carry and places the bank ’ s income position at risk. the bank recorded a loss of approximately r1, 0 billion during the 2009 / 10 financial year. it is however important to point out that this loss was incurred as a direct result of the bank executing its public policy responsibilities rather than owing to any inappropriate risk taking or wasteful expenditure. over the past year, the bank continued to purchase foreign exchange as part of its strategy to steadily increase the level of foreign exchange reserves. gross reserves increased by approximately usd8, 0 billion from april 2009 to usd42, 3 billion in april 2010. the international liquidity position increased by usd5, 0 billion to usd38, 5 billion over the same period. apart from foreign exchange purchases by the bank, this increase in official reserves was also due to foreign currency deposits from government, the allocation by the imf of sdrs to south africa and valuation adjustments. although valuation adjustments contributed positively to reported usd official reserves over the financial year, there were periods where the bank published substantial declines in the level of reserves due to valuation losses stemming from the diversified nature of reserves in terms of currencies. the financial markets department continued to enhance reserves management policies in order to adjust and streamline our investment strategies. the investment policy, which provides a strategic and operational framework for reserves management, was reviewed during 2009 / 2010. the investment policy is reviewed every three years for governance purposes and also to ensure that it is responsive to and keeps pace with changes in the reserves management activities of the bank and the external environment. the recent global financial crisis provided an ideal opportunity to incorporate into the policy the lessons learned, while also aligning the policy with refinements to international best practice. conclusion the turmoil experienced in the euro zone with regard to sovereign

for their important contribution to the development of this forward - looking vision 2015. thank you. bis central bankers ’ speeches
“ integrating micro and macroeconomic perspectives on financial stability ”, university of groningen, 26 may 2008.

while many liabilities were in foreign currencies – proved a constraint on monetary policy. central bankers understood that any reduction in the policy rate would likely weaken the currency, which in turn would raise the value of domestic borrowers ’ liabilities relative to their assets, with negative consequences for the solvency of both the nonfinancial corporate sector and the banking system. however, in the years following the asian crisis, currency and maturity mismatches were reduced substantially. in sum, stronger macroeconomic and financial fundamentals gave korean policymakers the flexibility they needed to respond to the crisis with more expansionary monetary and fiscal policies. improvements in the bank of korea ’ s monetary framework served the country well during the crisis and are likely to provide additional benefits in the future. over the past decade, many emerging market economies, including korea, have reoriented monetary policy toward domestic price stability and away from a focus on stabilizing exchange rates. the bank of korea, indeed, adopted a formal inflation targeting regime in 1998. since then, the exchange value of the won has become more flexible, inflation has declined to an average of about 3 percent, and – as i have discussed today – the ability of the bank to conduct appropriate countercyclical monetary policies has increased. this anniversary is also a good time to consider the challenges that the bank of korea and other central banks will face in the future. in the medium term, like the federal reserve and many other central banks, the bank of korea will have to manage its exit from accommodative policies. as is typically the case in the early stages of an economic recovery, the bank will have to weigh the risks of a premature exit against those of leaving expansionary policies in place for too long. because economic conditions vary, the appropriate timing of the exit is likely to differ across countries. to guide these important decisions, each central bank will have to carefully monitor economic developments in its own jurisdiction. financial reform is another important challenge facing central banks, including those in emerging market economies like korea. even though the origins of the recent financial shocks were largely outside the emerging markets, the international transmission of these disturbances was extraordinarily rapid. in the emerging market economies, these disturbances manifested themselves principally in terms of volatile capital flows, with capital outflows earlier in the crisis and capital inflows today each creating significant financial and economic challenges. strengthening the international financial system and ensuring that financial institutions are carefully regulated, well capitalized, liquid
assets can also be tokenized on other forms of distributed ledger technology. 6 request for information and comment on financial institutions'use of artificial intelligence, including machine learning, 86 fed. reg. 16837 ( march 31, 2021 ). 4 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches

, they implement themselves, based on the terms specified by the parties. smart contracts may allow for what is called " atomic settlement. " rather than relying on each party to separately carry out its leg of the transaction, smart contracts can effectively combine the two, or more, legs of the transaction into a single unified " atomic " act that is executed by the smart contract. this may be an additional robust way to achieve delivery - versus - payment ( " dvp " ) and payment - versus - payment ( " pvp " ) functionality, such that one leg of a transaction settles if and only if the other leg settles as well. atomic settlement is useful because it can mitigate settlement and counterparty credit risks : it ensures that the buyer will not pay if the seller does not deliver ; and conversely, that the seller will not deliver if the buyer does not pay. in fact, private sector institutions are testing use cases to better understand the benefits and risks of this technology. firms have executed foreign - exchange trades using blockchain technology with smart contracts in an attempt to improve efficiencies. separately, financial institutions have used blockchain to facilitate intraday repo transactions. parties to these transactions may have more flexibility as to when the transactions settle, which in turn has the potential to create additional capital and liquidity efficiency. and blockchain's atomic settlement functionality may serve as another way to achieve an important risk mitigant : using repurchase agreements as an example, the repo " seller " can have confidence that it will receive the specified loan amount in exchange for the collateral it conveys ; while the repo " buyer " knows it will receive the specified collateral. 2 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches these efforts are still in early stages, but i expect that as functionality expands with more currencies, eligible securities, and new products, there will be more participation and growth. that isn't to say that there aren't risks associated with tokenization and the use of smart contracts : smart contracts can have bugs and potential cyber vulnerabilities ; and instantaneous settlement raises its own set of risks. but there is considerable promise, and i look forward to seeing what private sector participants come up with to potentially enhance the way traditional transactions are conducted. artificial intelligence the second area i will discuss is artificial intelligence. can you go anywhere without hearing about ai? ai, as i am sure you know, is currently seeing a surge in interest thanks
, l. sigalotti ( 2016 ), ‘ an indicator of inflation expectations anchoring ’, banca d ’ italia, mimeo neri s., a. notarpietro ( 2014 ), ‘ inflation, debt and the zero lower bound ’, banca d ’ italia questioni di economia e finanza ( occasional papers ), no. 242 rey h. ( 2013 ), ‘ dilemma not trilemma. the global financial cycle and monetary policy independence ’, federal reserve bank of kansas city economic policy symposium bis central bankers ’ speeches

- performing loans to total loans fell to 18. 2 % at the end of 2016, at the same level as in the previous year. therefore, the reduction of non - performing loans and creation of stimuli to boost sound lending has been and remains a priority issue for us. the bank of albania has worked in several aspects to address this problem. first, the assessment of the credit risk and the recoverability of non - performing loans have been subject to intensive monitoring during our on - site examinations. in parallel, we have maintained a prudent approach in assessing lending policies and practices applied by banks. second, the bank of albania has fulfilled its engagements under the national plan for the reduction of non - performing loans. in this regard, the bank of albania has made regulatory amendments to clarify the concept of non - performing loans write off and the administration of properties taken into ownership as a result of collateral enforcement. moreover, the bank of albania has cooperated with the imf to review the regulatory framework about the licencing of companies that purchase bad debt. third, we have strengthened the regulatory and reporting requirements for banks as regards the due management of credit risk, in accordance with european practices. fourth, we have intensified the communication with the banks to address the credit portfolio quality, concerning both the treatment of non - performing loan borrowers and loss loan write off. fifth, the coordinative role of the bank of albania has produced results in terms of restructuring borrowers exposed to more than one bank and will continue in this year to prepare an interbank cooperation platform for a solution to common borrowers ; the bank of albania is drafting it in cooperation with world bank ’ s finsac project. in our judgement, the steps taken insofar for resolving non - performing loans will contribute to a fruitful environment to boost sustainable and sound lending. this is a major priority, which requires a multidimensional action matrix and a broad cooperation between state authorities and the banking system. in this aspect, the bank of albania drafted and promoted the signing of a joint memorandum of understanding for the sound growth of credit in albania1. in the supervisory process, the bank of albania has supported the pursuit of pro - active policies 5 / 8 bis central bankers'speeches against potential risks, with regard to both the quality of the risk analysis performed by banks, and the creation of adequate provisions. this new approach, introduced a year ago, has required amending the regulatory framework, as well as internal practices and capacities