be detected on the labour market. the causes of the german labour market problems are primarily structural. this can also be seen by the comparatively large number of long - term unemployed. wage formation is mainly geared to the interests of “ insiders ” who already have a job and not to those “ outsiders ” who would prefer moderate wage settlements. the accelerated adjustment of east german wages to the west german standards is one example of insufficient wage differentiation. it is precisely in the lower wage groups that it would be important to structure wage substitutes in a more incentive - friendly way. from a current perspective it remains an open question whether the establishment of european monetary union will ultimately also lead to a reduction in labour market rigidities. however, i should add that we are witnessing a gradual erosion of industry - wide pay bargaining at least in eastern germany. and we also observe working hours becoming more flexible. however, further steps will have to follow so that a wage policy which is in line with market requirements can help to stimulate employment friendly growth. furthermore, the non - accelerating rate of unemployment, or nairu, could also fall in germany. in the united states all the signs indicate that the nairu declined significantly during the long boom. according to the bundesbank ’ s calculations, which may like other calculations be regarded with some degree of uncertainty, nairu has risen in germany almost throughout the entire period since the end of the seventies. in western germany, it is likely to have been above 8 % towards the end of the 1990s. when i now come to the second area of my comments, “ growth and productivity ”, i do not have to tell you about the us economy ’ s success story in the 1990s. it is well - known to you. in short : output and productivity growth has been very buoyant especially since the mid - 1990s - that is in an advanced phase of the upturn. the scale and the timing of these productivity increases can scarcely be explained in terms of the normal cyclical pattern. i wonder whether schumpeter would have already interpreted the available evidence as a long wave. in germany, the gdp growth rate in the 1990s was almost 1½ percentage points below the corresponding us figure. currently, the difference in the trend growth is likely to be slightly more than one percentage point. 3 when considering the individual components of demand, the different momentum of capital spending is particularly striking. whereas real investment in machinery and equipment in the united states has been growing at an annual average of almost

the same entity, who is accountable to the customer? as the number of 3rd - party intermediaries involved in a financial service grows, there might also be increased operational risks. we will need to adapt our regulatory approaches. pay greater attention to market conduct, consumer protection, and technology risks. regulatory frameworks will need to become more modular and agile. entity - based regulation remains relevant for the provision of key services such as deposit - taking, insurance, and the offer of securities. but for the growing number of players who offer niche financial services, we need to rely increasingly on activity - based regulation. this is all still fairly familiar ground, as the fundamental structure of financial services remains largely intact. intermediaries continue to be at the centre, even as distribution becomes more decentralised with diverse players and new ways of connecting with customers. stepping a layer down, let us now examine the underlying infrastructure of financial services. technology is enabling a fundamentally different approach to financial infrastructure, compared to the centralised systems of today. take for example, open crypto networks based on self - executing smart contracts and noncustodial financial services, where users maintain control over their assets at all times. by replacing intermediaries and central parties, these networks aim to reduce both the cost and risk of finance. by decentralising key aspects of financial infrastructure, such as access, data, and code, open crypto networks can also potentially enhance inclusion and innovation. when firms of all sizes, and even individuals, can directly access financial infrastructure, it could mean more competition and inclusion. when transaction data is available to all participants, and not confined within the intermediary responsible for the transaction as is the case today, it could mean more contestability and transparency. w hen code can run directly and publicly on these networks, unlike proprietary code that runs on private servers, it could mean more interoperability and innovation. we are certainly not at the point where these self - governing networks can meet the high standards of governance, security, resilience that we demand of critical infrastructure. even so, central banks would do well to incorporate these innovations in designing the next generation of payment infrastructure. these ideas could be particularly relevant to the development of cbdcs. finally, we turn to the layer at the base of the system – the instruments, or forms of money that should confer the properties of a public good. 2 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches the decentralisation of instruments is most clearly