of the berlin wall to push ahead with this monetary unification plan without waiting for similar progress to be made on the political unification front. nevertheless, launching monetary union was in itself a political decision of the utmost importance since it meant transferring an essential part of national sovereignty – the monetary policy – to a supranational authority. after that, and despite the lack of a european state, the euro rapidly gained recognition as a credible currency for what i think are two basic reasons. on the one hand, the ecb and the eurosystem, in charge of euro - zone monetary policy, have a clear mandate : price stability. on the other hand, their leaders are totally independent. they can neither receive nor ask for instructions from any outside interests, especially national governments. they must protect the sole collective interest of the zone as a whole. the monetary policy decision - making process has not only been centralised but also depoliticised. that said, there is no denying a certain lack of symmetry in the current structure of emu, the relative weakness of the politico - economic pillar vis - a - vis the monetary pillar. unlike monetary policy, fiscal policy remains in the hands of national states. up to a certain point – which i have already mentioned – this situation corresponds to the principle of subsidiarity. however, we have to prevent inadequate national policies from causing any damage for the other partners and, in particular, for the common good that the euro enshrines. this is why the budgetary rules or constraints that make up the stability and growth pact were defined. as we all know, the provisions of the pact have not been fully respected. but they have constantly exerted a certain amount of pressure on states that have flouted the rules and it is to be hoped that the revised version of the pact will be applied more rigorously. we also know that the finance ministers of the euro - area member countries meet regularly within the eurogroup. some politicians talk about wanting to transform this group into europe ’ s economic government. from a personal point of view, i don ’ t see any objection to this, quite the contrary. but, if the objective – stated or not – of such a rise in power were to reduce the independence of the central bank, then it would be a really bad thing. however, the risk is very slight as this principle of independence is set in stone in the treaty. i would add that the lack of visibility and substance of

any war between france and germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible ". so, the memory of the two wars made for a very strong political will to further european integration. at its heart was a process of franco - german reconciliation and cooperation. so, although the start of the european integration process dates back to the years after world war ii, the first official attempt to set up an economic and monetary union was not made until 1970, when the so - called werner report ( commissioned by the european council ) outlined the main features of emu and the road to its achievement. however, due to strong turmoil in the international economy ( the collapse of the bretton woods system and the oil crisis ) and the absence of both policy coordination and political will, this first attempt at monetary union proved unsuccessful. it was not until the end of the 1970s that the monetary integration process resumed, more specifically with the establishment of the european monetary system. despite considerable difficulties, especially during the first years, the ems contributed to a broadening of the " acquis communautaire ", on the basis of which a genuine project for monetary union could be set in motion. this new initiative was based on the " delors report ", again commissioned by the european council, which came up with a blueprint for an economic and monetary union in europe and specified the successive stages through which it would have to go. further negotiations resulted in the treaty of maastricht, which, despite the serious problems in the ems during the years 1992 - 93, finally led to the launch of emu in 1999. the ems crises in 1992 and 1993 could have been fatal for the emu project and served to show that emu was not inevitable. however, the crises also underlined the political will of europe's leaders and showed that they were ready to adopt difficult measures in order to move on to economic and monetary union. apart from an ever - stronger underlying political will, two long - term structural factors which prepared the way for the key decisions on emu can be singled out, namely, an increasing degree of economic integration and a growing consensus on macroeconomic policy objectives. economic integration in europe has advanced enormously over the last few decades. trade interdependence has increased. with growing financial integration in europe and more foreign direct investment flows, income from wealth has also become more internationally diversified. economic linkages between the european countries have therefore grown much stronger. this interde