team spirit. it has not always been easy to draw the appropriate line between preserving the diversity of national traditions, cultures and institutional arrangements, which illustrate the richness of europe, and being european in the definition of the policy missions and pursuing the public interest. tommaso was a central banker by profession, but he was also an advocate of a united europe by deep personal conviction. european unification as a project which is economic in content and historically strategic. on the one hand, the creation of a single market was a process. a process that could ultimately lead to the contradiction which tommaso referred to as the “ inconsistent quartet ” – that free trade, free mobility of capital, a system of fixed exchange rates and autonomous national monetary policies were incompatible. one of the four would come under pressure and would have be surrendered in order to avoid inconsistency. the single currency was the way to square the circle in merging all the independent national monetary policies. one single money for one single market. tommaso saw the creation of the single currency as an ultimate integrative step, in the clearly defined policy field of monetary policy and was very aware of the responsibility given to the ecb to make this a success and a stepping stone for completing and achieving economic integration. the euro contained a strong commitment to move towards more economic integration. one of the lessons of the present crisis is precisely the necessity to not only very strictly apply the governance of the fiscal policy that was enshrined in the maastricht treaty and in the stability and growth pact, but to reinforce very significantly this governance and to enlarge it to the surveillance of competitive indicators and macropolicies. this is why i called, on behalf of the governing council of the ecb, for a quantum leap towards strengthening the institutional foundations of emu and deepening economic union. the framework for economic governance needs to take into account that the euro area must operate, de facto, as a quasi - fiscal federation, in which the college of participating governments has the responsibility of exerting a very strong surveillance on national economic and fiscal policies. tommaso has always been very profoundly convinced that it was necessary to reinforce considerably the e letter in emu in order for economic union ( eu ) to be fully commensurate to monetary union ( mu ). and the time to move is now. we need, in particular, a stronger role of eu institutions, quasi - automaticity of the surveillance process, quasi -

jean - claude trichet : interview with le figaro, frankfurter allgemeine zeitung, irish times and jornal de negocios interview with mr jean - claude trichet, president of the european central bank, by jean pierre robin ( le figaro ), benedikt fehr ( frankfurter allgemeine zeitung ), paul tansey ( irish times ) and rui jorge ( jornal de negocios ), conducted on 11 july 2008 and published on 18 july 2008. * * * 1. could you outline how you see the euro economy evolving over the short run and the implications for euro interest rates? i always said – on behalf of the governing council with all our colleagues, vitor constancio, john hurley, christian noyer and axel weber – that in order to have clear indications on what the euro area economy has been doing in the last months, we should take together the first and second quarter of 2008. whilst the first quarter was very dynamic, due to particular circumstances including the weather and its impact on construction in germany for instance, the second quarter is likely to be weak. our base line scenario is that we will have a trough in the profile of growth in the euro area in the second and third quarters of this year and, following this, a progressive return to ongoing moderate growth. i have also said clearly that the risks for growth were on the downside. amongst these risks are the influence of the ongoing very significant financial market correction, the possible further increases in, oil and commodity prices and the possible unwinding of global financial imbalances. as regards interest rates, i have nothing to add or to withdraw from what i said before on behalf of the governing council – that we trust that our decision to raise our key interest rate from 4. 0 % to 4. 25 % will contribute to achieving price stability in the medium term in line with our definition. i also mentioned that we had no further indication for our future interest rates, that we are never pre - committed and that we will do in the future what is appropriate to deliver price stability in the medium - term and to be credible in doing so, since this is essential to anchoring inflation expectations. 2. central banks, including the ecb, have been responsible for a lot of monetary growth in the recent past. to what extent are central banks to blame for the present inflation, in the euro area and elsewhere? in the euro