these events objectively in the mid - 1980s, the bundesbank concluded that capital controls had proved ineffective, even as a temporary shield for monetary policy. in the long term, the parallel opening up of product markets and financial markets has proved to be an enduring model of success in germany. monetary policy and macroprudential policy the second issue that i would briefly like to highlight here is the interaction between monetary policy and macroprudential policy, which is sure to be discussed in greater depth during the workshop. the international debate to date has indicated agreement that monetary policy must always be focused primarily on the objective of price stability. there is much less of a consensus on what role monetary policy can effectively play to prevent financial crises, and whether and to what extent it can intervene early to help combat the emergence of financial market distortions and asset price bubbles – the “ lean versus clean debate ” is just one aspect of this issue. what is clear, meanwhile, is that the financial crisis has significantly increased the overlap between monetary policy, prudential supervision and macroprudential policy. macroprudential policy has to play a key role in dampening the procyclicality of the financial system. but its toolbox includes instruments that have an immediate impact on the monetary policy transmission channel, eg the credit channel. this interaction between monetary policy and macroprudential policy will be one of the most important areas for research over the next few years. the overriding aim must be to achieve sustainable and practicable results that can quickly and effectively underpin monetary policy. this fast implementation would enable it to pursue a steady monetary policy course geared to anchoring inflation expectations. bis central bankers ’ speeches macroprudential policy requires its own instruments and must be clearly delineated from microprudential policy. under the german government ’ s ten - point plan, the bundesbank has a key role to play in macroprudential policy. this role is to be steadily expanded in order to strengthen the bundesbank ’ s ability to act in this field. it must be “ permanently able to identify systemic risks on the financial markets ”. the bundesbank is currently considering how best it can effectively implement this mandate both materially and organisationally. risks of a low - interest rate environment third, i would like to mention an issue to which the bundesbank devoted a whole chapter in its most recent financial stability review : the risks to financial stability associated with a low -

2017 ), “ monetary policy in a new era ”, conference on rethinking macroeconomic policy, peterson institute for international economics, 12 – 13 october 2017. 3 see, for example, constancio, v. ( 2018 ), “ past and future of ecb monetary policy ”, speech at the conference on “ central banks in historical perspective : what changed after the financial crisis? ”, organised by the central bank of malta, valletta, 4 may 2018 ( www. ecb. europa. eu / press / key / date / 2018 / html / ecb. sp180504. en. html ). 4 setting short - term interest rates above the natural rate puts downward pressure on activity and inflation. setting them below the natural rate has the opposite effect. see, for example, cœure, b. ( 2016 ), “ assessing the implication of negative interest rates ”, yale school of management, new haven, 28 july. ( www. ecb. europa. eu / press / key / date / 2016 / html / sp160728. en. html ). cœure, b. ( 2017 ), “ outlook for monetary policy in the euro area ”, association d ’ economie financiere, paris, 2 february ( www. ecb. europa. eu / press / key / date / 2017 / html / sp170202 _ 2. en. html ) 5 the shadow banking sector accounts for around 40 % of the eu financial system. see draghi, m. 2018, welcome remarks at the 3rd annual conference of the ( www. ecb. europa. eu / press / key / date / 2018 / html / ecb. sp180927. en. html ) 5 / 5 esrb, frankfurt, october. bis central bankers'speeches