condition for the effective and successful operation of the eth and the snb. for without independence, ladies and gentlemen, research cannot be free and monetary policy cannot be shielded from special interests. but independence is neither a law of nature nor a matter of course. rather, it is rooted in the population's belief that our institutions deliver their best results when they are independent. in other words, independence pays off for the population because they benefit from stable prices and scientific progress. but how can this belief best be upheld, especially given that it is continuously being challenged by a wide range of stakeholders? what does independence rely on? first, the eth and the snb must genuinely live their independence and perform their tasks as well as they possibly can. in the case of the eth, for example, this means always conducting unbiased research, sharing its results with interested parties, thereby making them accessible and verifiable, and meeting the highest educational standards. for the snb this means ensuring that monetary policy is always geared to maintaining price stability. but it also means constantly developing its analyses and methodologies. maintaining a dialogue with the academic community is very important here. 2 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches second, both institutions must be accountable. the snb must report comprehensively on its activities to the federal assembly and to the public. the eth board, on the other hand, must report annually to the federal council on the fulfilment of its strategic objectives. and third, if the eth and the snb are to retain their independence, it is essential that they only pursue objectives that are covered by their mandates and for which they have the appropriate instruments. a special interest - driven expansion of our remits would not be compatible with our independence as enshrined in law. moreover, such an expansion would have no democratic legitimacy and this could sooner or later lead to a restriction of independence. the eth and the snb must limit their activities to those areas for which the legislature granted them independence and the requisite instruments. moreover, if they are to continue fulfilling their statutory mandates, neither institution can allow itself to stand still. on the contrary, they must be highly flexible in order to respond to a rapidly changing environment. this is why the law affords the eth and the snb substantial latitude when it comes to the fulfilment of their tasks. a look at the recent past demonstrates just how important this latitude is : geo

should neither flag in our commitment nor in the demands we make on ourselves. ladies and gentlemen, the eth and the snb bear a considerable responsibility for the development of our country. by ensuring price stability, the snb makes a significant contribution to creating stable economic and social conditions in switzerland. the eth ensures technical innovation and scientific progress. economic stability and scientific progress complement each other perfectly. these qualities enable switzerland to assert itself in a constantly changing world and to find solutions to new challenges. independence is critical to the fulfilment of both of our institutions'mandates. upholding this principle is not always convenient ; indeed, defending it may even require courage at times. nonetheless, our two institutions should continue to live their independence, to hold fast to it and to demand again and again that it be respected. may i take this opportunity to thank sincerely all of you who contribute with such dedication and enthusiasm to research, teaching and innovation at the eth. our country needs you and we are proud of you. after all, you are the ones who prevent us, in the words of zurich's business community during the debate about the siting of the snb's governing board, from becoming intellectually'ossified '. keep up the good work! thank you. 4 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches