samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
why there was previously a band surrounding the inflation target. the main purpose was to explain that the riksbank is not able to control inflation precisely in the short term, but that it aims to limit deviations from the target. the band was abolished in 2010 because the riksbank then assessed that it no longer had a role to fill. in the memorandum published in connection with the decision, it was noted : “ there is considerable understanding for the fact that inflation commonly deviates from the target and that the deviations are sometimes larger than 1 percentage point. inflation can thus be outside of the tolerance band without threatening the credibility of the inflation target. such deviations have proved to be a natural part of monetary policy. ” 13 the view was therefore that even the relatively broad band of 1 to 3 per cent gave the appearance of excessive precision. however, as economic agents did not find it noteworthy that inflation was outside this band at times, the riksbank felt it was not a problem. the tolerance band was thus a pedagogical tool intended to illustrate the uncertainty surrounding the inflation development. it was never intended to be a target range, i. e. that the target was actually 2 percentage points wide, and that inflation of marginally over 1 or just under 3 was as consistent with the target as inflation of 2 per cent. 14 this appears to be many people ’ s interpretation today, however. the idea then appears to be that a broader target range would mean the riksbank did not feel as forced to bring inflation up to 2 per cent, which in turn would mean that monetary policy would not need to be as expansionary and that rising debt could be dampened. as i have just described, however, the policy the riksbank is pursuing today is due to the fact that the period in which inflation has remained below target has gradually become longer, and long term inflation expectations have fallen. the riksbank wants to avoid that expectations become permanently stuck at a level that is too low. a relevant question is therefore whether a tolerance band would influence expectations in the economy in a desirable way. if the riksbank reintroduced the band tomorrow, would long - term inflation expectations suddenly increase and adjust to 2 per cent? it is hard to see why that would be the case. if the repo rate were to be raised as a result of the band being reintroduced, as the idea appears to be, then the result could instead very well be that both inflation and inflation expectations

of our nation. i challenge our young college freshmen here to develop their love and enthusiasm for statistics, for with this goes the development of their critical thinking. on this note, the bsp unites with the philippine statistical community and the academe in honoring this year ’ s finalists and in congratulating the winners and their mentors. thank you very much.
central bank of kenya launch of the persons with disability digital accessibility report remarks by dr. patrick njoroge governor, central bank of kenya wednesday, december 2, 2020 as prepared for delivery good morning, good afternoon, good evening! i am delighted to join you today for the launch of the persons with disability digital access report. let me express my appreciation to the kenya bankers association ( kba ) for the invite. the timing of this event is indeed apt coming on the eve of the international day of disabled persons which aims to promote an understanding of disability issues and mobilize support for the dignity, rights and well - being of persons with disabilities. according to the world bank1, 15 percent of the world population experience some form of disability with high prevalence in the developing countries. in kenya, as per the 2019 census statistics, 2. 2 percent of kenyans are living with some form of disability. of this population, only 0. 5 percent are included within the financial system. 2 this is a significant level of financial exclusion that needs to be urgently addressed. on a broader front, the united nations ( un ) 2030 agenda for sustainable development that seeks to ensure shared prosperity for all global citizens is disability inclusive. the agenda that will be realized through the sustainable development goals ( sdgs ) aspires that the disabled will not be left behind in shared prosperity. in particular, the sdgs call for nations to work towards including the disabled in education, employment and more broadly ensuring their social, economic and political inclusion. https : / / www. worldbank. org / en / topic / disability who world report on disability ( 2011 ) http : / / www. handicap - international. org / uploads / media / goodpractices - gb2coul. pdf turning to the kenyan banking sector, the central bank of kenya ( cbk ) has set a vision of a banking sector that works for and with kenyans. the vision is operationalized through the kenya banking sector charter issued in february 2019. the charter is anchored on four pillars : customer centricity, risk based pricing, transparency, and ethical banking. while all the four pillars strive towards all kenyans being included in the banking sector, two of them are particularly pertinent for our discussions today — in our view they encompass the expectations with regard to the inclusion in the banking sector of persons with disabilities. the first is customer centricity. banks should ensure that their products and services are tailored to the

the outcomes of this event. thank you!
rules of the game have to be continuously adapted. international institutions and fora are changing and adjusting. many initiatives have been taken. altogether this should help make the global economic and financial system more resilient. but we have also learned that it is never time for complacency. efforts to ensure global stability and prevent crises have to be made constantly by all of us without exception. in this context, i am confident that the euro area and the economies of the asia - pacific region will continue to work in close cooperation in the years ahead to ensure that these important goals are met. i thank you for your attention.

in the lcr. 12 while this also an exception is hilberg and hollmayr ( 2011 ). they extend a new - keynesian model introducing an interbank market and allowing the central banks to alleviate the liquidity shortage on the interbank market varying haircuts on eligible assets ; see b. hilberg and j. hollmayr ( 2011 ), “ asset prices, collateral and unconventional monetary policy in a dsge model ”, european central bank working paper series, no 1373. for a discussion on collateral used in private transactions see g. gorton and a. metrick ( op. cit. ) and j. geanakoplos ( 2010 ), “ the leverage cycle ” in d. acemoglu, k. rogoff and m. woodford, eds., nber macroeconomic annual 2009, vol. 24, pp. 1 – 65, university of chicago press. bindseil ( 2013 ) discusses how the collateral framework can interact with liquidity regulation ; see u. bindseil ( 2013 ) “ central bank collateral, asset fire sales, regulation, and liquidity ”, mimeo, european central bank. for a description of the eurosystem collateral framework, see the ecb website, http : / / www. ecb. europa. eu / paym / coll / html / index. en. html. specifically, level 1 assets are entirely taken into account in the lcr ( no haircut ) and thus benefit from a more beneficial treatment in the lcr than in the eurosystem ’ s collateral framework, while level 2 assets generally enjoy lower haircuts in the eurosystem ’ s collateral framework than in the lcr. these differences certainly reflect the different objectives of the lcr and the eurosystem ’ s collateral framework. central bank refinancing always benefit from a 100 % rollover rate no matter the quality of the assets used in the transaction. a 100 % rollover rate ensures equal treatment between central banks implementing monetary policy through repo operations and central banks implementing monetary policy through outright purchases of bis central bankers ’ speeches depends on the opportunity cost of obtaining liquidity from the eurosystem, there may be a number of lcr - constrained banks with large amounts of non - hqla collateral that is eligible for monetary policy operations. imagine a post - crisis monetary policy framework where the liquidity provision by the central bank would again be rationed and implemented through competitive
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call for market participants to have in place policies and procedures for handling material nonpublic information, internal controls, an independent compliance function, recordkeeping requirements, and training programs. additional specific recommendations are advanced for credit portfolio management activities conducted from the private side and from the public side. at a recent bond market association conference, attendees noted that the principles contained in the statement generally are workable. however, questions of interpretation do arise under the statement and can be expected to continue to arise as the market develops additional innovations in credit portfolio management. questions of interpretation may arise in determining whether and to what extent information is public or private, especially for organizations operating in global markets. does material nonpublic information on one name in an index fund taint the entire index? are the bank's internal ratings or changes in internal ratings private information? issues of “ signaling ” private information also arise when public - side traders become aware of transactions entered into on the private side. that is, to what extent can traders infer material nonpublic information through action ( or inaction ) in private - side business lines? last, but certainly not least, information may be confidential or proprietary even if it does not rise to the level of material nonpublic information. the misuse of confidential or proprietary information that is not material nonpublic information may not give rise to securities law violations, but it may give rise to common law claims. the statement and recommendations of the joint market practices forum brings to light important potential conflicts of interest in credit derivatives trading and helps to identify issues that may arise in connection with credit portfolio management. the statement and recommendations provide guidance on credit portfolio management for financial institutions that may be new to the derivatives markets and provide a catalyst to further improvements in the risk management environment. credit risk transfer is still a relatively young market, and attention to issues such as these should help participants develop confidence in both the new instruments and markets that will lead to more liquid and reliable transactions. anti - tying restrictions on banks finally, i want to discuss the nature of anti - tying regulations for financial institutions, an issue that can be very confusing to nonbankers. as innovations create new financial instruments, services, and markets, and as firms expand the scope of the types of financial services they offer, the business - decision process is similar to that which many of you apply in your own business. financial institutions are trying to build customer loyalty by offering a broader menu of financial services to corporate customers
for - one ). 25. speech given by andrew bailey at the financial and professional services dinner, on monday 10 july 2023 ( bankofengland. co. uk ) 26. letter from david bailey, nathanael benjamin and vicky saporta on ‘ innovations in the use by deposit - takers of deposits, e - money and regulated stablecoins ’ | bank of england 27. project agora : central banks and banking sector embark on major project to explore tokenisation of cross - border payments ( bis. org ) 28. the bank of england is also closely involved in efforts coordinated by the g20 to enhance cross - border payments. g20 roadmap for enhancing cross - border payments : consolidated progress report for 2023 - financial stability board ( fsb. org ) 29. this will also support hm treasury ’ s work this year in setting out a national payments vision sarah breeden deputy governor, financial stability ©2024 bank of england.

the implementation of such changes over a short period of time raises some concerns ; and while considerable progress has been made in addressing the 42 directives under the fsap umbrella there is still much to be done. over the next few years we need to implement fourteen significant eu legislative measures, including for example the international accounting standards regulation - the importance of which i highlighted earlier, as well as the new capital adequacy regime. we need to achieve so much so quickly, that there is a danger that people will take their eye off the ball. this is relevant not just to the authorities but also the firms and institutions who need to introduce new systems and new procedures. all this needs to take place in parallel in the course of the normal business day. and in doing so we need to ensure that the changes which are being introduced to enhance the eu financial sector do not themselves threaten the stability of that system. i have this morning traversed a broad territory. firstly, what is financial stability? secondly, how do we at the bank of england fulfil our role to maintain the stability of the financial system? and finally, highlighting some of the key areas that are currently active on our agenda. as you see, we have to extract from the global canvas the issues that pose the greatest threats and to then focus on them. international cooperation is the key to this, and events such as today ’ s conference with its range of distinguished speakers and attendees from across the globe can only help this process.
to answer your questions. 4 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches

first of all, this is the risk of the pandemic worsening in 2022. secondly, we consider the risk of a more persistent rise in inflationary pressure in the world economy and, accordingly, a faster and more considerable tightening of monetary policies by foreign central banks in the next few years. thirdly, this is the risk that a considerable increase in debt burden in a number of countries might provoke a financial crisis over the medium - term horizon. the worsening pandemic scenario assumes that many countries will have to reintroduce tough anti - pandemic restrictions, which will drag down economic activity. consequently, as in the previous year, russia will face a decline in the demand and prices for its exports and will also be forced to impose anti - pandemic restrictions, which will reduce domestic demand, although not as drastically as in 2020. nonetheless, contracting demand will cause a faster decline in inflationary pressure, as compared to the baseline scenario. hence, it will become reasonable to cut the key rate as early as 2022 h1. the economy will start to recover in 2022 h2, and it will be appropriate to shift towards neutral monetary policy in order to maintain price growth rates in the future. according to the global inflation scenario, the acceleration of global inflation will become steadier by 2022. elevated inflationary pressure and a further rise in inflation expectations will force advanced economies ’ central banks to start monetary policy normalisation earlier. in particular, the us fed might begin to raise its policy rate as early as 2022 q2. monetary policy normalisation in advanced economies will cause a decline in external demand and, consequently, a slightly lower growth pace of the russian economy in 2023 – 2024, as compared to the baseline scenario. furthermore, inflation will speed up in 2022, spurred by a rise in russian companies ’ costs and higher inflation expectations. nonetheless, in 2023 – 2024, inflation will edge down closer to 4 % due to contracting external demand and a tighter monetary policy than assumed in the baseline scenario. the third alternative considered in the guidelines this year is the financial crisis scenario. its difference from the global inflation scenario is in how financial markets might respond to monetary policy normalisation in the usa. the rebound in the world economy and low rates caused spikes in debt burden, primarily public debt. this process still continues, although at a more moderate pace. it remains to be seen yet whether particular countries are capable of handling this debt burden
s golden jubilee. " circulation " simply means that it can be used for everyday commercial transactions. i anticipate that this is an innovation, which in time, other member countries may wish to emulate. the grenada $ 50 banknote is a most beautiful note. it is distinctly grenadian, reflecting grenada's rich history, culture and identity. it offers a stunning and unique design. the features include : the images of iconic grenadians and grenadian landmarks ; the use of the safeguardtm polymer substrate ; a banknote that is the same size as the existing ec $ 50 banknote ; a complex polymer window within the holographic strip ; two ( 2 ) serial numbers : a horizontal fluorescent and a vertical magnetic ; and a tactile emboss in the form of a triangle to assist the blind and visually impaired. it is our expectation that the grenada $ 50 note will commence circulation in june of this year. at that time, you will be able to use it for commercial transactions such as in your neighbourhood shops, stores and supermarkets. i suspect some of us will want to retain a grenada $ 50 note as a keepsake for posterity. the choice will be yours. you should also know that the note will be legal tender in any eccu member country so although it will only be issued in grenada, you will be free to spend it in any country in the currency union. fellow grenadians, as you see, touch and feel your grenada $ 50 note, let it inspire you! indeed, may it inspire current and future generations of grenadians to greatness because g is for grenada, and g is also for greatness. envision what could be - and should be - in our beautiful isle of spice. envision what it will take - and what will be your contribution - to double the size of the grenadian economy over the next decade. and permit me to be pellucidly clear, this " big push challenge ", as i refer to it, is about much more than economics. fundamentally, it is about doubling space and 3 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches opportunities for each and every grenadian to maximise your time, talents, treasure, testimony, touch and trust, in service to you, your families, your country and our humanity. so as we set sail or, if you prefer, take flight for the next 50 years, let us do so with a sense

of purpose, pride, passion and patriotism. most importantly, let us do it together! and never forget : " with god, all things are possible. " happy golden, grenada! onward. forward. upward. one people. one journey. one future. one love. i thank you. 4 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches
financial integration in europe, pp 50 – 51. 9 / 9 bis central bankers'speeches

as well. the latter have a public mandate, making them an important pillar of the german economy. and they should stay that way – which is also why this pillar needs to be refreshed. specifically, the landesbanken spring to mind here. something like two months ago, the first sale of a landesbank to private investors was set in motion, bringing a long and arduous journey to a close. this transaction is a novelty for the german banking sector. it was a forced sale, admittedly, but it shows that a transaction like this is doable – yes, it is possible to sell a landesbank to private investors, and even at a price that many had considered impossible beforehand. with a little luck, this story will be a prelude for bigger solutions in the landesbank sector. the market environment, in any case, is still exceptionally favourable. as a banking supervisor i will always take a neutral stance when it comes to structural policy. industrial policy is out of bounds for central banks, and rightly so – even if that ’ s a view not everyone would agree with. that said, i would like to take this opportunity to encourage banks and savings banks to explore fresh and creative avenues – before problems force them to do so. but we also need to take a look beyond the german horizon. because in a currency and banking union, one could be forgiven for wondering whether we need more cross - border mergers in the euro area. the management of the ssm took quite a clear line on this topic in a recent speech. 10crossborder mergers and acquisitions within the ssm are rare, it was said, and the degree of concentration across the ssm banking sector, and particularly in a number of member states, is too low. 11according to the ecb, this is due not least to the political and supervisory obstacles that still persist in the euro area. even if there is some evidence to suggest that cross - border mergers and acquisitions tend to be more successful and have less of a negative impact on competition, 12 i currently see national mergers as a more promising avenue for tapping synergy gains. in my view, only once these synergies have been harnessed will institutions think more along european and cross - border dimensions. for now, cross - border mergers in the euro area will probably be few and far between. that ’ s because mergers and acquisitions across national borders are exceptionally complex transactions on account of the cultural and lingual