easily wage growth falls in response. if people recognise the drop in productivity growth, and demand growth falls alongside it, and / or if nominal wage growth is reasonably flexible and can accommodate the decline in the warranted real wage without unemployment having to rise, it needn ’ t result in higher inflation. but if demand fails to decline or if there ’ s resistance in real wages inflation is likely to rise. all speeches are available online at www. bankofengland. co. uk / news / speeches and @ boe _ pressoffice tighter than the rate of unemployment alone would suggest. though this assessment is necessarily preliminary, the news since the end of the furlough scheme does not look to have changed that picture. in october, claims for unemployment benefit fell again and survey indicators of labour market conditions tightened further. although it ’ s made little contribution to higher inflation so far, the risks to future inflation from the tight labour market may well be more significant. developments in domestic costs tend to be more persistent than those in tradable goods prices ( chart 6 is one indication of that ). they ’ re unlikely to introduce the same degree of a trade - off between the mpc ’ s objectives : stronger labour demand narrows the output gap and raises inflation11. and, although it ’ s possible that these strains too could pass – there ’ s a chance these frictions are simply the result of the sheer speed of hiring, and will ease of their own accord – there ’ s also an upside risk to wage costs from currently high inflation. if wage earners ’ expectations of future inflation rise in response, of if they seek compensation for the rises in the costs of living that have already occurred, wages could also accelerate further, even without any additional decline in unemployment. the paths of all these things are, of course, extremely uncertain. but that ’ s always the case, to one degree or another. precisely because policy decisions take time to work, and because other things can intervene in the meantime, it isn ’ t possible to control inflation perfectly. what we can do – and what is the best possible approach – is to think at every meeting about the level of interest rates that will maximise our chances, a couple of years from now, of hitting the inflation target exactly. that is what we will continue to do. thank you. this is a more subtle question than i ’ ve pretended here. stronger demand for labour clearly doesn ’ t introduce a trade - off : it reduces

eddie yue : keynote speech - 2023 bund summit keynote speech by mr eddie yue, chief executive of the hong kong monetary authority, at the 2023 bund summit, hong kong, 22 september 2023. * * * distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, good morning. it is an honour and a pleasure to join you today at the 5th bund summit. with globalisation now at a crossroads amid increasing risk of geo - economic fragmentation, this session " what's next for globalisation " could not be more timely. globalisation has brought enormous benefits to emerging markets and helped keep global inflation in check. the golden era of globalisation, however, has given way to a gradual slowdown in global trade in goods after the 2008 financial crisis. in certain parts of the world, public support for globalisation has also waned for various reasons, notwithstanding the obvious benefits of better, more affordable products delivered by globalised value chains. it appears that this slowing down in global goods trade is likely to continue, leaving trade in services and other flows to pick up the baton in sustaining globalisation. as economic efficiency becomes less of a priority, the global economy risks being fragmented into different blocs. such setbacks to globalisation are unfortunate, particularly for asia, given the region's relatively open economies. according to the imf, if the world were to segregate into two distinct blocs with little or no trade between them, asia pacific's gdp could be reduced by over 3 % annually. such a dismal outcome seems unlikely, as no economy can be fully self - sufficient. a fullblown financial decoupling is also unlikely, given how highly interconnected the global financial system is. even so, we now seem to be moving down the path towards fragmentation, as practical and pragmatic economic considerations are giving way to protectionism and cross - border restrictions. our recent joint study with the bank for international settlements ( bis ) finds that the total number of global value chain network linkages dropped by some 30 % between february 2020 and the end of 2021. of course, part of these changes may reflect pandemic disruptions, and efforts by businesses to shorten and regionalise supply chains. unfortunately, geopolitics has also played a part. with all these developments, one question often asked is about the role of china in this " new normal " environment. how will china's trade and investment relationship with some of its major trading partners evolve