samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
future, bringing the benefits of instant payments to communities across america and improving the way households, businesses, and government agencies make payments for many years to come.

are critical to the stability of the financial system. in particular, we are taking a more “ macroprudential ” approach, one that goes beyond supervisors ’ traditional focus on the health of individual institutions and scrutinizes the interrelationships among firms and markets to better anticipate sources of financial contagion. to do that, we are expanding our use of the kind of simultaneous and comparative cross - firm examinations that we used to such good effect in the scap. the federal reserve ’ s ability to draw on a range of disciplines – using economists, market experts, accountants, and lawyers, in addition to bank examiners – was essential to the success of the scap, and a multidisciplinary approach will be a central feature of our supervision in the future. for example, we are complementing our traditional onsite examinations with enhanced off - site surveillance programs, under which multidisciplinary teams will combine supervisory information, firmspecific data analysis, and market - based indicators to identify problems that may affect one or more banking institutions. although regulators can do a great deal on their own to improve financial oversight, the congress also must act to fix gaps and weaknesses in the structure of the regulatory system and, in so doing, address the very serious problem posed by firms perceived as “ too big to fail ”. no firm, by virtue of its size and complexity, should be permitted to hold the financial system, the economy, or the american taxpayer hostage. to eliminate that possibility, a number of steps are required. first, all systemically important financial institutions, not only banks, should be subject to strong and comprehensive supervision on a consolidated, or firmwide, basis. such institutions should be subject to tougher capital, liquidity, and risk - management requirements than other firms – both to reduce their chance of failing and to remove their incentive to grow simply in order to be perceived as too big to fail. neither aig, an insurance company, nor bear stearns, an investment firm, was subject to strong consolidated supervision. the federal reserve, as the regulator of bank holding companies, already supervises many of the largest and most complex institutions in the world. that experience, together with our broad knowledge of the financial markets, makes us well suited to serve as the consolidated supervisor for systemically important nonbank institutions as well. in addition, our involvement in supervision is critical for ensuring that we have the necessary expertise, information, and authorities
some day allow statistical agencies to tap into a great many economic transactions on a basis close to real time. more generally, i am certain that the possibilities for creatively harnessing technology for the improvement of economic measurement are much broader in scope - although, as in many other areas of endeavor, the precise directions those advances will take are difficult to predict. if we had the appropriate database, of course, who knows?

, we have developed hedonic price indexes for network routers and switches using, in the case of the former, data from product catalogs and, in the case of the latter, privately produced reports evaluating the performance of the products. however, hedonics are by no means a panacea. most important, the measured characteristics may be acting only as proxies for the qualities of the services that buyers ultimately value. this, again, raises the difficult issue of the appropriate scope for value measurement and poses the question of whether the correct approach may be to move toward directly pricing the services we obtain from our information processing systems rather than pricing separately the individual hardware components and the software. the federal reserve staff has found that, when detailed data are available on prices and on quantities, we can produce results that are comparable to those based on hedonics, using the conceptually simpler " matched model " approach. indeed, we have taken this approach in constructing j. steven landefeld and bruce t. grimm, " a note on the impact of hedonics and computers on real gdp, " survey of current business ( december 2000 ). ana aizcorbe, carol corrado, and mark doms, " constructing price and quantity indexes for high technology goods, " industrial output section, division of research and statistics, board of governors of the federal reserve system, july 26, 2000. quantity and price indexes for several high - tech items. in the case of semiconductors, we relied on data from three private vendors for information on nearly 100 unique microprocessors, more than 200 types of memory chips, and more than 80 other chips. we also acquired nominal sales and unit value data for about 1, 100 distinct computer models. neither hedonic nor matched - model techniques are sufficient to deal with the introduction of wholly new products that differ fundamentally in their characteristics from their predecessors. this will continue to be one of our major ongoing challenges. i am encouraged by the progress that economists and economic statisticians have been making to date in tackling the daunting task of measuring real output and prices in a rapidly changing economy. the challenge that lies ahead is, indeed, large, and to meet it will require the support of the business and academic communities to supply the information and to help develop the tools that our statistical agencies require. the information revolution, itself, will also surely play an important role. for example, high - tech information systems might
good analytical basis still needs to be developed. this is an area where brilliant scholars like markus brunnermeier can make an invaluable contribution. and he has already started to do so. i herewith extend my sincerest congratulations to you – markus – for winning the 2008 bernacer prize, which you very much deserve. brunnermeier, m., crockett, a., goodhart, c., persaud, a. d. and h. shin ( 2009 ), “ the fundamental principles of financial regulation ” ( preliminary conference draft ), geneva report on the world economy 11, january.

tangible total assets of 6. 2 %, using us accounting standards ( us gaap ), whereas the main european banks have a level of 3. 7 % when using ifrs accounting standards. however, according to fdic calculations, if the us banks ratio would be calculated according to ifrs, the same as in europe, the ratio comes down to 3. 8 % very similar to the european level. when calculated with the same accounting standards the average leverage ratios of the large american and european banks are quite similar. the explanation for this has to do with netting rules : under the us gaap the american banks have total assets of 10 trillion dollars but applying ifrs that is changed into 16 trillion dollars. this huge difference explains the difference in the leverage ratios but, importantly, has necessarily to impact also the published risk - weighted capital ratios of european and american banks. this means that the capital ratios are then not comparable although that is many times ignored by market and media perceptions, clearly to the detriment of european banks. third, the restructuring efforts in the stressed countries to strengthen their banks with the help of the european stability mechanism ( esm ) funds have led to improved funding conditions for euro area banks. with the financing provided by the esm, banks in spain, portugal, greece and ireland have been recapitalized. bank deposits in these countries have risen by around 200 bn since september last year, and the cost of both deposit and bond funding for banks has fallen significantly. euro area banks ’ issuance of medium and longterm debt has increased and we have also seen a noticeable pick - up in repo market activity. all these changes have led to lower use of central bank liquidity. hundreds of banks have made use of the option to repay the liquidity provided through the ecb ’ s three - year longerterm refinancing operations. these repayments amount to some €300 billion, more than half of the net liquidity injection of 500 bn, provided by our two big ltro operations. our lending to bank counterparties has declined from 14 % of the euro area gdp at the peak to around 8 % today. despite these positive trends, there is still a negative perception in the market about european banks and more measures are indeed necessary. the fact that improved bank fundamentals have not been translated into higher price - to - book ratios tells us that there is a confidence problem as regards euro area banks. and if this is left unaddressed
economy is full of uncertainty, including over geopolitical factors. that being said, our commitment to achieving the 2 percent inflation target will never be compromised. with our unwavering determination, i am confident we can achieve that goal. thank you. see, for instance, haruhiko kuroda, “ what we know and what we do not know about inflation expectations, ” ( speech at the economic club of minnesota ), april 19, 2015. bis central bankers ’ speeches

, as a consequence, those facing the financial system as a whole. as we all know only too well, heightened concern over counterparty risks led to severe dysfunction in financial markets, particularly after the collapse of lehman brothers and the bailout of aig in september 2008. the problems surfaced most acutely in the united states. thus we have observed the bold attempts at regulatory overhaul in the u. s., of which the so - called volcker rule has become something of an icon. in my understanding, the volcker rule is designed to deter banks from taking excessive risk in capital markets, where volatility is inherently high and in which bankers do not necessarily have informational advantage in predicting market developments. rather, the volcker rule urges banks to return to their traditional stronghold of commercial banking business, in which they can utilize their informational advantage based on long - term relationships with their customers. in other words, the rule attempts to insulate long - horizon relationship banking from the occasional brutality of the sometime short - horizon capital markets. in this way, we can prevent the possible misuse of public assistance given to banks. the rationale for the volcker rule could be applied to liquidity risk management as well. that is, commercial banks should not rely too much on fickle wholesale funding, but should focus more on stable deposits based on long - term relationships with their customers. asian perspectives of heterogeneity : don ’ t put carnivorous lions and herbivorous elephants in the same cage here i cannot help feeling that this rule is quite congenial to the traditional japanese, and probably asian, view of what banks are. in japan, loans constitute roughly half of corporate debt financing, and deposits roughly three quarters of banks ’ balance sheets. long - term relationships are the rule, not the exception. i believe this dominant role of the banking sector in the financial system is more or less similar in the rest of asia as well. it is no coincidence that financial systems in the asia region have remained relatively stable during the current crisis : we have not suffered a serious deterioration in confidence or market dysfunction, since our banks have largely remained as traditional banks, and shadow banking had at most a limited presence. in order to prevent another global financial crisis of this magnitude, we truly need a thorough and internationally harmonized overhaul of financial regulations, as is currently being undertaken by various international regulatory bodies. however, as mentioned before, proper consideration must be given to the regional heterogeneit
borders. as you can see from the chart, high inflation is not unique to norway. in many countries, inflation is even higher than in norway. there are several reasons why inflation has reached such a high level internationally. 1 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches the impact of the covid - 19 pandemic continues to linger. demand for goods was high during the pandemic, underpinned by expansionary monetary and fiscal policies. at the same time, the pandemic led to supply chain disruptions. in sum, these factors have led to rapidly rising prices for globally traded goods. freight rates have also risen sharply. supply problems have been amplified by russia ’ s invasion of ukraine. the invasion has also led to soaring energy prices. gas and electricity prices have continued to increase through summer and could push up inflation abroad in the short term. other prices, some of which rose sharply following the invasion, have recently edged down. these include oil prices and prices for metals and agricultural products. global supply chain disruptions also appear to have eased somewhat. because of the high level of inflation, central banks in many countries have raised policy rates and signalled further rate increases ahead. several central banks have raised rates by larger increments than usual. high inflation and rising interest rates could dampen growth among many of norway ’ s trading partners ahead. in norway, prices for many imported goods have risen sharply. but external developments are only part of the story. the rise in prices for domestically produced goods and services has also accelerated in recent months. one of the main reasons for this is the pressures in the norwegian economy. chart : the labour market is tight we feared for some time that unemployment would become entrenched at a high level in the wake of the pandemic. but after a rapid recovery, the level of activity in the norwegian economy is now high and spare capacity is limited. the labour market is tight. since june unemployment has fallen slightly more than we expected and is now at a very low level. the employment rate is at its highest for more than ten years. the number of people outside the labour market has decreased, which is a welcome development. at the same time, the number of job vacancies is high, and labour shortages are a challenge in many industries. with intensified competition for labour, employers are willing to go to greater lengths to recruit people with the right skills. we expect wage growth to continue to rise ahead. new data also indicate that wage growth

for some time – is crucial if the fund is to deliver the returns we expect in the longer term. thank you for your attention.
the domestic growth outlook has deteriorated, not only due to developments in the euro zone and us, but intensified further by labour market instability. such actions as we have seen in the mining and agricultural sectors in particular, not only amplify wage pressures, but hurt output growth and export volumes, raise the prospects for even higher unemployment and aggravate the widening in the current account deficit. the third quarter gdp figures provided the first glimpse of the negative impact from the strike action, as growth slowed from 3. 4 per cent in the second quarter to 1. 2 per cent quarter - on - quarter. mining reflected a contraction of 12. 7 per cent, bis central bankers ’ speeches while manufacturing grew a paltry 1. 2 per cent. the negative impacts of the strike action on growth have not fully fed through and we are likely to see further weakness in the quarter ahead. both business and consumer confidence are far from robust and it is unlikely that the demand side of the economy will provide much support. the bank has lowered its growth forecast to 2. 5 per cent for 2012, improving to 3. 6 per cent in 2014 – with risks tilted to the downside. inflation forecasts on the other hand, have been adjusted higher and the risks are tilted to the upside. the forecast do not take into consideration the new cpi weights or the rebasing that will take place in january 2013, nonetheless, the cpi forecast was revised higher to 5. 5 per cent for 2013 ( previously 5. 2 per cent ), and the forecast for 2014 kept unchanged at 5. 0 per cent. the outlook for core inflation remains relatively benign, with a peak of 5. 0 per cent in the first quarter of next year and an average of 4. 8 per cent in 2013, dropping to an average of 4. 5 per cent in 2014. the combination of low global growth, domestic challenges further hampering the growth outlook, rising wage settlements, a weaker rand and higher current account deficit – makes for a very difficult combination of factors to consider when making policy decisions. olivier blanchard in 2006 presented a paper entitled “ monetary policy ; science or art ”. he said that monetary policy can pretend to be close to science if it can be conducted using simple and robust rules, however, monetary policy must be closer to art if it is frequently confronted to new, poorly anticipated and poorly understood, contingencies. in that case, each of these contingencies requires fast thinking and having to make decisions, not

fully based on existing research but rather on well trained intuition. there is little doubt that monetary policy has gravitated towards being more of an art than a science. thank you bis central bankers ’ speeches
basis of expected inflation trends a couple of years ahead. at present, we see no actual problems for the banks and the stability of the financial system. nor do we see any major problems for the household sector as a whole to meet its obligations, which does not prevent problems for individual households from arising when the interest rate sooner or later begins to rise. all in all, there is good reason to closely monitor loan developments and the build - up of debt in society. thank you.

the riksbank ’ s target both one and two years ahead, mainly due to lower wage cost increases and improved productivity growth. during 2004 und1x inflation is expected to amount to an average of 0. 6 per cent, which is 0. 5 percentage points lower than the december forecast. the corresponding figure for 2005 is 1. 2 per cent, which entails a revision of 0. 4 percentage points for the year. at the end of the two - year period that comprises the main focus of the forecasts, inflation according to und1x is expected to be 1. 6 per cent, on the assumption of an unchanged repo rate. so what are the risks that might upset the picture i have just presented? we make it clear in the inflation report that we consider the risks of a poorer development in swedish and international economic activity to have declined as the recovery has progressed. experience also shows that it is easy to underestimate the force of an upturn once it has found a foothold. developments in the labour market in both sweden and the united states are one factor pointing in the other direction. in addition, developments in the euro area remain sluggish and in the united states there are problems with imbalances in foreign trade in particular. our opinion is nevertheless that, compared with the picture we present in the main scenario, there is an upside risk for inflation from economic activity in sweden and abroad, with links to price trends. there are arguments that we could have either overestimated or underestimated cost pressure. compared with the december assessment, we have revised up our basic view of productivity, although there is considerable uncertainty in this area, given the surprising developments over the past six months. on the other hand, the uncertainty regarding wages has diminished somewhat, as central wage agreements have now been concluded for a large part of the labour market. all in all, our assessment is that the risks in this field are balanced. the conclusion of the discussion on risks in the inflation report, and which i have only briefly touched on here, is that we saw reason to make an upward adjustment in the main scenario inflation forecast of around a tenth of a percentage point. this does not alter the conclusion that inflation in terms of both cpi and und1x will be below the target level during the coming two years. during the first year we believe that inflation will be significantly below two per cent. we have also assessed that inflation will be marginally below the target at the end of
singaporeans. the answer lies in individuals, financial institutions, and mas working together to build strong skills in technology. we have been doing that, but we need to do much more. mas looks forward to ideas and initiatives on what else we can do collectively to build up tech skills. if we do this right, we can over time grow a strong singaporean core in the technology functions – just as we have done in the broader financial sector. thank you. © 2021, government of singapore.

has lost around 18 % of its external value in little over a year, regardless of whether this was judged to be the result of the strength of the us dollar rather than any intrinsic weakness of the euro itself. it is worth noting, however, that the euro was launched at a time when the euroland currencies were particularly firm against the dollar - having climbed, in the case of the deutsche mark, by almost 50 % since its low point in 1985. against this background, and the widening of interest differentials in favour of the dollar in recent months, the direction of the euro ’ s movement is, with hindsight, hardly surprising. the depreciation of the euro is of course a fact, and it is perhaps the only concrete basis for the scepticism that one hears being expressed about the euro. but, from what i gather as an observer from afar, there are a number of other factors, less tangible, which also contribute to that scepticism. i shall go through some of them with you, noting once again that perception from many miles away may indeed be quite different from reality. the first factor concerns structural rigidities, which appear to observers from my side of the world to be more serious in euroland than in many other economies, big and small. the severity of these structural rigidities is seen to be undermining the ability and the efficiency with which euroland can respond to change. of course, we recognise that some loss of adaptability may be the price that has to be paid for a relatively stable society and a comfortable social safety net, and that the trade - off has effectively been arrived at through a democratic process. but it is hard to believe, as an outsider, that the trade - off is an optimal one. i cannot imagine, for example, what goal of social stability could justify labour market and social security arrangements that deliver an unemployment rate of double digits ; or contribute to delaying, if not preventing, the arrival of the “ new economy ” in euroland. i understand that some still do not believe that there can be a new economy, in which the technological revolution enables productivity gains that are capable of sustaining a much higher rate of non - inflationary growth. of course, we should always question and critically examine any unusual phenomena, rather than embrace them blindly. but, meanwhile, investors are putting their money where this unusual phenomenon is allowed, by structural flexibility, to be manifested in full force, notably in the united states