better able to judge the extent to which the committee's rationale is reasonable and persuasive. the projections also function as a plan for policy – albeit as a rough and highly provisional one. as i mentioned earlier, fomc participants will continue to base their projections on the assumption of " appropriate " monetary policy. consequently, the extended projections will provide a sense of the economic trajectory that committee participants see as best fulfilling the federal reserve's dual mandate, given the initial conditions and the constraints posed by the structure of the economy. to illustrate, consider the question of the length of time over which a central bank should aim to restore price stability following an unwanted increase in inflation. a central bank that places weight on both employment and price stability, like the federal reserve, would not attempt to disinflate immediately or establish a fixed time frame for the restoration of price stability. rather, the optimal expected time required for completing the disinflation would depend on a host of factors, including the size of the initial deviation from price stability, the initial state of the real economy ( for example, the level of unemployment ), whether the rise in inflation resulted from transitory or more persistent sources, the extent to which inflation expectations are well anchored, and so on. in circumstances in which disinflationary policy is necessary, the extended economic projections would make clear that the federal reserve is committed to maintaining price stability, but they would also provide some indications about what the committee views as the most appropriate pace of disinflation, given the state of the economy and the requirements of the dual mandate. in like fashion, the speed at which policy aims to return the economy to its sustainable rates of growth and employment following a period of resource slack should depend in part on the nature and extent of inflation risks, among other considerations. more generally, the extended projections will convey additional information about the committee's policy strategies and thus help augment the committee's transparency, predictability, and accountability. finally, the extended projections will embody information about fomc participants'evaluations of certain long - run features of the economy, evaluations determined both by the economy's structure and by the committee's policy objectives. because of the extension of the projection horizon to three years, participants'inflation projections will convey more information regarding their views about the measured rate of inflation that, in the long run, is the historical data we will provide on forecast errors will starkly illustrate this

and policy practice. in particular, although inflation - targeting central banks certainly pay attention to economic growth and employment, their formal accountability is often largely couched only in terms of a price - stability objective. likewise, the communication strategies of inflation - targeting central banks tend to be focused on the formal inflation objective and the horizon over which that objective will be achieved. as i have emphasized today, the federal reserve is legally accountable to the congress for two objectives, maximum employment and price stability, on an equal footing. my colleagues and i strongly support the dual mandate and the equal weighting of objectives that it implies. of course, as i have discussed, the federal reserve's influence over these objectives differs importantly in the long run : monetary policy determines the long - run inflation rate, whereas the factors that influence the sustainable rates of growth and employment in the long run are largely outside the central bank's control. still, over time, monetary policy must strive to foster rates of growth and employment close to their long - run sustainable rates. the federal reserve must thus be accountable for the effects of its policies on the real economy as well as on inflation. the enhanced projections that i have described today will provide additional information pertinent to both halves of the federal reserve's mandate. at a more technical level, the federal reserve differs from most inflation - targeting central banks in that it provides information about the independent projections of committee members rather than a single collective forecast. to some extent, that difference reflects the relatively large size of the fomc and the geographic dispersion of committee participants ; those factors would make the development of a detailed consensus forecast quite difficult as a practical matter. but, as i will discuss briefly, such a diversity of viewpoints can enhance the quality of policy decisions. the diversity of the committee an important strength of the federal open market committee is its diversity. the board members and reserve bank presidents who sit around the table at each meeting of the fomc bring a wide range of perspectives to the deliberations that reflect the participants'professional backgrounds, the regions of the country with which they are most familiar, and their differing approaches to economic and policy analysis. the task participants face at each meeting is to forge a rough consensus regarding the outlook, the risks to the committee's objectives, and the appropriate policy response. of course, it is not always possible – indeed, it would be rather unusual – to come to a set of conclusions that fully represent the views of every participant