samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
exposes the private sector to a certain amount of competitive pressure, just as we have done for 350 years. several measures are needed for resilience on the payment market the riksbank also carries out other work than the analysis of the e - krona to safeguard the resilience of the payment market. for example, we are working within the framework of the swedish retail payments council to survey the possibilities of making card payments and withdrawing cash in an offline situation, which is to 14 see mancini griffoli, t., martinez peria, m. s., agur, i., ari, a., kiff, j., popescu, a., and rochon, c. ( 2018 ) “ casting light on central bank digital currency ”. imf staff discussion note. sdn / 18 / 08. it may, however, be difficult to know what the right price is in such a market. theoretically, an efficient market is considered to be one in which no company makes excess profits. the price of one product should approximately reflect the cost of producing one more product, known as the marginal cost. but if the price were to reflect the marginal cost, the company would make a loss in these special markets. in normal industries, the marginal cost normally rises when production encounters bottlenecks. for natural monopolies, fixed costs dominate instead, so that a price corresponding to the marginal cost will be too low. 6 say when disruptions have made it impossible to check the balance of the account or credit to which a card is linked. 16 at present, certain cards do not function at all in an offline situation, while others do. if we were to be impacted by a complete breakdown of both the internet and telecommunications, it would not be possible to withdraw cash. consequently, we cannot, at present, rely upon cash being available in a crisis situation. it is possible that the e - krona could play a role for sweden's crisis preparedness. but in any case, the riksbank needs to clarify its role as provider of money in appropriate forms in a crisis situation. in the same way as the riksbank is ‘ lender of last resort ’ for the banking system, we have a responsibility to enable payments in a crisis, to be a ‘ money provider of last resort ’. personal reflections two years of intensive work on the e - krona have now passed and i will be leaving the chairmanship

appropriate foundations for such a system, provided that phase - in arrangements are respected and implementation is coordinated globally. thank you for your attention. bis central bankers ’ speeches
the duty to create the enabling environment by removing price distortions, promoting competition and protecting the interest of consumers. equally important are the continuous efforts to safeguard transaction security and enhance user confidence in order not to undermine the role of e - payments as a key enabler for financial inclusion. since there are participants from around the region especially from the asean countries, i hope that one day we would have one card for asean, where atm cards issued by any bank in the asean countries can be used to transact within the asean region. i hope you will benefit and be inspired from the discussions, debates and sharing of best practices during this forum. i also hope there would be a change in the mindset of the industry in driving financial inclusion via e - payments. on this note, i wish you all an engaging and productive forum. bis central bankers ’ speeches

this issue previously : debelle g ( 2018 ), ‘ interest rate benchmark reform ’ speech at isda forum, hong kong, 15 may ; debelle g ( 2017 ), ‘ interest rate benchmarks ’, speech at finsia signature event : the regulators, sydney, 8 september ; debelle g ( 2016 ), ‘ interest rate benchmarks ’, speech at kanganews debt capital markets summit 2016, sydney 22 february ; debelle g ( 2015 ), ‘ benchmarks ’, speech at bloomberg summit, sydney, 18 november. this is in notional value terms. see butler m ( 2019 ), ‘ ending reliance on libor : overview of progress made on transition to overnight risk - free rates and what remains to be done ’, speech at the investment association london, 21 february. available at : < https : / / www. fca. org. uk / news / speeches / ending - reliance - libor - overview - progress - madetransition - overnight - risk - free - rates - and - what - remains >. see working group on sterling risk - free reference rates ( 2018 ), ‘ term sonia reference rates consultation – summary of responses ’, november. available at : https : / / www. rba. gov. au / speeches / 2019 / sp - dg - 2019 - 04 - 11. html 5 / 6 4 / 12 / 2019 progress on benchmark reform | speeches | rba < https : / / www. bankofengland. co. uk / - / media / boe / files / markets / benchmarks / term - sonia - reference - rates - consultationsummary - of - responses. pdf? la = en & hash = cfd2ab11a3156b31cb15030962eca9987befced8 > see national working group on chf reference interest rates ( 2018 ), ‘ minutes from the meeting of the national working group on chf reference interest rates ( 31 october 2018 ) ’, 14 november. available at : < https : / / www. snb. ch / n / mmr / reference / minutes _ 20181031 / source / minutes _ 20181031. n. pdf > see financial stability board ( 2018 ), ‘ interest rate benchmark reform – overnight risk - free rates and term rates ’, 12 july. available at < http : / / www. fsb. org / wp - content
we stop enlargement or shut out its natural consequences, it wouldn't, in the end, save one job, keep one firm in business, prevent one delocalisation. for a time it might, but not for long. and in the meantime europe will become more narrow, more introspective and those who garner support will be those no in the traditions of european idealism but in those of outdated nationalism and xenophobia. but i tell you in all frankness : it is a contradiction to be in favour of liberalizing europe's membership but against opening up its economy. " 3 since its foundation in 1957, the eu has continuously been engaged in a process of enlargement. the process, having begun with the inclusion of the uk, ireland and denmark in 1973, has proceeded for the time being with the challenging accession of the ten central and eastern european countries on may 1st, 2004. thus, enlargement has become an important aspect of the eu policy. distinguished guests, almost in every meeting on the eu and the turkish economy, i am faced with questions such as " what can turkey contribute to the eu, in other words, what will be the advantages of the eu from turkey's membership? " or " what does turkey expect from being a full member of the union? ". but, there are no easy and quick answers to these questions. therefore, my answer will rather be a long one. apparently, there are very strong arguments in favour of turkish membership such that turkey will bring the islamic world and the western world together or a larger eu with turkey will certainly be a much bigger power playing an important role in the world. apart from political aspects, it is clear that the debate on the turkish membership is very much related to the economic structure of turkey. hence, i want to make one thing clear : although membership is a political decision in essence, my answers to the questions i mentioned will focus mainly on economic aspects. having this in mind, now i ’ d like to start with the notion of competitiveness on a global level and its implications for both turkey and the eu. the 20th century has been a new era in terms of diminishing borders in trade and means of production and led to increasing competition all around the world. as we all know, europe and the united states ( us ) had been the engines of world development in the last few centuries. however, emergence of new actors into the picture in recent decades has changed

and economic output. moreover, we need to understand that we continue to live in an economic environment with downside risks. in such circumstances, we cannot afford to continue to operate with such thin minimum regulatory capital and liquidity requirements. the system does not have the capacity for another round of bail outs, nor does the public have the tolerance for it.
like to warmly invite you to this exhibition, which opens on 20 november here at the museum fur kommunikation in berlin, before it continues its journey around europe, having already been shown in italy, slovakia and spain. i should like to take this opportunity to wish you a very enjoyable and informative experience during your visit to the “ language of money ” exhibition and to once again congratulate the museum fur kommunikation in berlin on this valuable initiative.

sectional analyses across different countries derived from short time series. we are therefore working to create the conditions for superior policy evaluation. 1. what is financial stability? macroprudential policy is a relative newcomer to the policy space. in some respects, the level of knowledge and experience in this area is roughly on a par with that in the field of monetary policy some years ago. the specific policy goals are difficult to quantify, transmission channels are often unknown, and the data sets and analytical methods need to be developed. why do we need macroprudential policy? the world of traditional banking regulation offers little scope for curbing the systemic repercussions of financial crises because it focuses primarily on the economic health of individual market participants. for the most part, microprudential analysis is based on the assumption that the financial system as a whole is stable, that markets are liquid and that market players that run into difficulties will not have a significant detrimental impact on the financial system or the economy as a whole. bis central bankers ’ speeches but that view is a short - sighted one, because past episodes in which seemingly isolated microprudential risks were either misinterpreted or underestimated have taught us that our work needs to take a broader perspective. risks to the stability of the financial system can arise if large institutions create negative externalities ( too big to fail ), if institutions are highly interconnected ( too connected to fail ), or also if many smaller institutions are exposed to similar types of risk ( too many to fail ). this key takeaway from the recent financial crisis prompted the establishment of macroprudential authorities around the world that focus on risks that might threaten the financial system as a whole. let ’ s begin with the mandate and the objective. the objective of macroprudential policy is to safeguard financial stability. financial stability is the term used to denote the financial system ’ s ability to perform its key macroeconomic functions – particularly so in the event of unforeseen events, periods of stress or structural upheaval. for the costs of financial crisis can be heavy – not only with regard to the amount and duration of real economic losses but also concerning the often considerable fiscal costs. it is not about completely curbing risks and fluctuations in the financial markets but instead about reducing negative externalities caused by the distress of individual institutions or market segments. here, we need to ask ourselves how “ financial stability ” can be measured and concrete indicators formulated. after all,
problem will not be helpful for small and medium size enterprises only. during our visit today we have found yet another evidence that there are successful entrepreneurs in our country. the good news is that banks are willing to grant loans and the “ bad ” news is reserved for the italian government : stand ready and start arranging yet another credit line!

- effective the cover. • it is therefore important to allow cross - border provision of insurance services. capital market integration in capital markets, asean has made good progress in integration, starting with thailand, malaysia and singapore. concrete measures have been put in place to harmonise disclosure requirements and broaden market linkages. for investors, the asean trading link among thailand, malaysia and singapore provides a single gateway to all three exchanges. bis central bankers ’ speeches • this means an investor in one country can buy shares in the other two markets through his local stockbroker. for issuers, thailand, malaysia and singapore have adopted fully harmonised prospectus disclosure requirements, known as the asean disclosure standards. • this means an issuer can tap all three markets with a single set of prospectus, yielding greater efficiency and cost savings. • a streamlined review framework for such prospectuses is targeted to be implemented later this year. this will shorten the time taken for the issuer to obtain approval for a multi - jurisdictional offering and provide greater certainty on the timeto - market. for fund managers, thailand, malaysia and singapore have launched the asean collective investment scheme framework, which is a mutual recognition framework providing fund managers with a streamlined authorisation process for the cross - border offering of funds. • this means that a fund manager authorised to manage a fund in one country can market the same fund in the other asean countries. these are significant steps towards achieving an integrated asean capital market. but they are not enough. in fact, it is like a bridge three - quarters completed. it marks good progress but is not quite useful until it is end - to - end. and end - to - end integration is what we need to fully realise the benefits of our efforts on the capital market front. asean needs to continue enhancing linkages across its markets. • we should build on the asean trading link among thailand, malaysia and singapore by further broadening and deepening post - trade linkages. • establishing clearing, settlement, and custody links will make the asean trading link a full - fledged end - to - end platform across the three asean markets. and with the progressive participation of the other asean exchanges, we would have created a truly integrated asean capital market – one that will : • enhance trading volumes ; • lower the cost of corporate fund raising ; • provide investors with more choice and ease of access ; and • enhance liquidity and stability in the market. conclusion to achieve its potential, asean must integrate further. economic
success to all who will be involved in translating the design into reality.

required to follow. it relies largely on the application of simple, mechanical formulas for assessing how much capital a bank should hold. the essence of the old capital accord was that it represented an attempt to monitor the prudential soundness of banks by using a standardised risk measurement framework, which was applied to all institutions and which employed data based on a snap - shot of their balance sheets at certain specified reporting dates. the approach was standardised since regulators specify the precise form in which the calculation of capital adequacy is to be performed - for example, the specific risk categories into which assets are to be assigned. there are, of course, still plenty of rules - based aspects to the new capital framework : it's difficult otherwise to understand what the many hundreds of pages of the basel ii document are needed for. however, the point i want to stress is that the advanced approaches, and especially irb, introduce a new element into banking supervision. for want of a better term, i'll call this process - regulation. whereas the old accord focused on rules, the irb approaches focus instead on the processes by which risks are managed. rather than prescribing detailed rules for assessing capital adequacy, supervisors will in future need to assess the adequacy of the internal processes used by firms to manage their risks. this is reflected, for example, in the approach that we propose to take to the validation of irb systems : we will not be prescribing specific numerical standards that we expect internal risk measurement systems to achieve. rather, we will discuss with each individual irb bank how its system performs in relation to the bank's own internal objectives and appetite for risk. irb will require us to engage in a dialogue with ais to understand how they go about developing and approving their irb models. as a result, the future for banking supervision is likely to take the form of an active discussion with our counterparts in the risk management and credit control functions. it will be less a matter of us setting hard and fast rules, and more a matter of us holding a dialogue with risk managers. of course, the dialogue cannot be open - ended : at some point we will have to draw our conclusions and make our assessment. but those of you in irb banks can expect us to show a different level of engagement, and a greater intensity of interest in, your risk management systems than we have previously shown. 2 / 5 pillar 2 as
and much learning. 5 / 5

remarks by rhys mendes deputy governor greater charlottetown area chamber of commerce november 26, 2024 charlottetown, pei sticking the landing : keeping inflation at 2 % introduction good morning, it ’ s wonderful to be here in charlottetown today to give my first public speech as a deputy governor at the bank of canada. i ’ m delighted not only to visit prince edward island but also to learn more about the local economy. to do our job well at the bank, we need to understand how our policies affect people and businesses across this vast country. that ’ s why i ’ m meeting with business and community leaders from several sectors while i ’ m here. our job at the bank is to keep inflation low and stable, so we aim to keep it centred on a 2 % target. this is how we ensure the economy works best for all canadians. inflation has now come down significantly and is back at 2 %. we want it to stay there. for this reason, we decided last month to lower our policy interest rate by 50 basis points to 3. 75 %. our focus now is on ensuring that inflation remains low, stable and predictable. we need to stick the landing. the past few years have been difficult for canadians. the covid - 19 pandemic caused the sharpest economic downturn in a century, which was followed by an unexpectedly fast rebound. inflation surged to a four - decade high, and the bank responded by increasing interest rates to levels not seen since the early 2000s. we did what we believed was necessary to restore price stability. and it worked : inflation has returned to 2 %, and interest rates have started to come down. but it hasn ’ t been painless. higher interest rates were a burden for families and businesses. inflation is back to normal, but it may not feel that way for many people. especially if they are facing higher interest payments on their mortgages or other loans. with all of this in mind, the bank owes it to canadians to assess how effective our interest rate decisions were in countering high inflation. i ’ ll begin by discussing the factors that led to the run - up in inflation, and i ’ ll explain how monetary policy worked to address them. my aim is to shed some light on the question of whether higher interest i would like to thank justin - damien guenette, oleksiy kryvtsov and konrad zmitrowicz for their help in preparing this speech. not for publication until 08 : 05am eastern
mitigate the negative feedback loop from weakening economic conditions to the functioning of the financial sector. lower policy rates would also have the effect of shoring up business and consumer confidence. the latest inflation forecasts continue to show subdued price pressures, with headline inflation expected to settle at around the middle of the target range for 2009 and at the lower bound of the target range for 2010. on balance, downside pressures on prices predominate due mainly to expectations of a marked deceleration in global economic activity, which is expected to continue to dampen imported inflation and inflation expectations, and weaker domestic demand conditions. in addition to the reduction in its policy rates, the bsp also moved to ensure that there is sufficient liquidity in the system. the bsp : 1. enhanced the existing peso repurchase agreement ( repo ) facilities through relaxed valuation and a broader list of acceptable collaterals ; 2. established a us dollar repo facility to augment dollar liquidity in the foreign exchange market and ensure the ready availability of credit for imports and other legitimate funding requirements ; 3. reduced the regular reserve requirement by two percentage points on 14 november 2008 ; 4. liberalized rediscounting guidelines which include increasing the rediscounting budget to p40 billion in 14 november 2008 and to p60 billion on 02 march 2009, aligning rediscounting rate with the rrp rate, easing the npl ratio requirement and increasing loan value of all eligible papers ; and 5. launched the credit surety fund ( csf ) program which provides guarantee to small cooperatives to ensure continued access to financing of small businesses. the bsp has also acted swiftly to bolster confidence in the financial system, through timely communication and greater transparency. moreover, to safeguard the confidence in the banking system, the monetary board approved on 30 october 2008 the guidelines allowing financial institutions to reclassify financial assets from categories measured at fair value to those measured at amortized cost. financial institutions were allowed to reclassify their investments in debt and equity securities from their held for trading or available for sale categories to the held to maturity or the unquoted debt securities classified as loans. the bsp also allowed banks not to deduct unrealized mark - to - market losses in computing for the 100 percent asset cover for fcdus, effective until 30 september 2009 ). this reduced the need for banks to source dollars from the foreign exchange market. what lies ahead for the philippine economy? in

##amat sa inyong lahat! mabuhay ang pilipinas!