this issue. in recent years, some government agencies, including the china securities regulatory commission and china banking regulatory commission, have issued some very helpful guidelines on corporate governance. however, what the government should do to further improve corporate governance remains to be studied. the selection of corporate governance model. international practices have been characterized in this regard by different selections. for example, there are anglo - saxons model, lain river model, japan - korea model, and so on. experiences in the past ten years have shown a trend of convergence among these patterns, despite differences remaining in many other aspects. in this consideration, the selection of a corporate governance model suitable to the chinese situation remains to be further explored. the problem of insider control and ownership ambiguity. in early 1990s, china began to introduce the concept of corporate governance mainly because many enterprises faced serious problems of insider control and ambiguity in ownership. so far, the problem remains not fully solved and thus deserves further discussion. the remaining issues of “ debt - equity ” swap. a problem closely linked with insider control was the distortion and irregular transactions created in the process of massive “ debt - equity ” swap that took place in 1999, despising the principles of corporate governance. leaders of the state council have also been highly concerned with this issue. given the mistakes, what should be done to clean up legacies left over by the debt - equity swap? feasible ways to promote corporate governance. in china, companies with the best corporate governance are generally those listed in the market as they are subject to the guidelines of corporate governance issued by regulatory authorities and to the supervision of investors, general public and the market. the practice of listed companies also indicates that joint - stock reform is an important way out and thus to have large and medium - sized enterprises listed is a crucial and effective measure to foster corporate governance. without joint - stock reform and public listing, are there any other feasible ways to make substantial progress in corporate governance in the enterprises? in my view, the answer might not be so encouraging. the role of party committee in corporate governance. in china, the communist party committee, in addition to investors, board of directors, management and stakeholders, also plays a role in corporate governance. the related issues need further study. the role of stakeholders in corporate governance. we have benefited from many good experiences in corporate governance from abroad. however, relevant authorities in china have always been shy from clearly stating their attitudes towards the stakeholders ’ role in corporate governance. compared with the principles on

in the months ahead. no other area of the united states has experienced the potential supply - demand imbalance in electric power that currently confronts california. historically, public utility commissions, there as elsewhere, set prices in order to deliver a guaranteed rate of return on capacity, whether it was used or not. that capacity " buffer " settled around 15 percent of summer peak loads in many cases. for a variety of reasons – including a failure to expand capacity in response to increased demand – the previous summertime buffer in california has by now largely disappeared. because inventory buffers are not feasible for electrical systems, capacity buffers must absorb the full brunt of supply - demand imbalances. such a system, confronted with relatively inelastic demand, cannot avoid extreme price increases or, alternatively, blackouts when demand for power plus an operationally minimal capacity buffer approaches or exceeds available supply. this would be the case whether power is being generated in a wholly free market or in the wholly controlled markets that in decades past were governed by public utility commissions. if new capacity is not available in such circumstances, demand must fall. it will fall voluntarily in response to high prices or other forms of conservation that dissuade less essential uses, or it will fall through brownouts, blackouts, or other forms of involuntary rationing. the recognition of the critical role of adequate capacity buffers has raised interest in deregulated electric power systems in the forward selling of the output of new generating plants. the reduced risk that forward sales provide can increase the incentive to build new capacity. analogies to the economics of office buildings are evident. few office buildings would be constructed in the absence of the ability to reach long - term leases. short - term rental agreements are no more conducive to new office construction than spot prices for electric power are to the building of new power plants. i should note that while much attention is focused on the construction of new generating capacity, questions related to the adequate capacity for transmission and distribution also loom large in california and elsewhere. beyond issues strictly related to the economics of energy production and distribution, the current crisis in california is having profoundly important effects on public and private finance – from pressure on the state budget as billions of dollars are expended to finance power costs to the budget problems of many struggling california businesses and households. but there are no financial fixes to the imbalance of supply and demand for power. until new capacity is put in place or demand is constrained by higher