, emerging asia ’ s bond markets are expected to grow 18 - fold from us $ 5 trillion in 2009 to us $ 90 trillion in 20305. 7. there is therefore great scope for financial intermediaries in asia to play a key role in financing asia ’ s future growth, channelling surpluses to meet the region ’ s needs, and facilitating closer integration of trade and financial markets in the region. dbs, with its extensive network in asia, is well - poised to be at the forefront of these trends. dbs has done well in this respect - for instance, dbs ranks amongst the top 5 mandated arrangers of asia pacific syndicated loans ( ex - australia and japan ). in singapore, dbs is also part of a bank consortium led by temasek holdings to provide long - tenor financing to singaporebased corporates in infrastructure projects in asia pacific. role of local banks in singapore ’ s financial system 8. even as our local banks like dbs expand into the region to ride on asia ’ s growth, it is important that they remain deeply rooted in singapore, their home market. they have been and will continue to be a crucial part of singapore ’ s financial system. local banks have an important role to play in safeguarding singapore ’ s financial stability, particularly in times of crisis. to continue to play this role effectively, our local banks should continue to strengthen their systems of management, risk control, technology, operations and expertise as businesses evolve. 9. local banks are also well - positioned to serve the local community, and in particular, support the development of small and medium - sized enterprises ( smes ). i was told that dbs launched an enhanced social enterprise banking package in july that offers social entrepreneurs virtually free banking transaction services and loans on preferential terms, giving them time to focus on building their businesses and pursue social causes. i have met some of these social entrepreneurs who have the opportunity to showcase their products and services in a dedicated dbs ‘ social enterprise corner ’ here at dbs ’ mbfc headquarters. source : dealogic. source : “ super cycle report ”, standard chartered bank ( 2010 ). the numbers are quoted in nominal terms. bis central bankers ’ speeches 10. singapore will continue to evolve and grow its role as an international financial centre. the development of the marina bay financial centre ( mbfc ) is a testament to singapore ’ s commitment to support the long - term growth of the financial industry. with today ’

quite fallacious, a point understood long ago by homer, who told of how ulysses had himself tied to the mast so as not to fall victim to the songs of the sirens. more recently, the notion that more flexibility is always preferable has been pretty well gutted by modern game theory ( not to mention modern monetary economics ), which has shown in many contexts that the ability to commit in advance often yields better outcomes. for illustration of the potential benefits to policymakers of even modest self - imposed restrictions on flexibility, consider fiscal policy, which shares with monetary policy some of the same issues that arise when a group of shifting membership makes a series of policy decisions that have both short - run and long - run implications. in the short run, fiscal policymakers may have important and legitimate reasons i refer to these features as communication rather than as rules because they simply make public the elements of the policy framework, that is, constrained discretion. even when the inflation target itself is set outside the central bank or by an outside agency with the cooperation of the central bank, for the most part inflation - targeting central banks themselves rather than outsiders ( such as the legislature ) are the principal enforcers of their own targets and procedures. “ self - enforced ” inflation targets are the only case i will consider here. to depart from budget balance, sometimes even substantially - - for example, to appropriate funds to deal with a national emergency or to provide a stimulus package to assist economic recovery. in the long run, however, maintaining public confidence requires that fiscal policy be conducted in such a way that the ratio of national debt to gdp remains stable at a moderate level. arguably, public confidence, and hence the ability of policymakers to use fiscal instruments aggressively to address short - term concerns, is enhanced by whatever legislative rules, guidelines, or procedures exist that - however gently or firmly - - tend to compel the policymakers to bring the budget back toward balance, and the debt - gdp ratio back toward stability, after the crisis has passed. true, spending caps, comprehensive budget resolutions, mandatory long - term deficit projections, and similar provisions, to the extent that they are effective, may reduce at least a bit the flexibility of fiscal policymakers. but if intentionally yielding a bit of flexibility increases public confidence in the long - run sustainability of the government's spending and tax plans, fiscal policymakers may find that adopting these rules actually enhances their ability to act effectively in the short run. as with fiscal policy, public beliefs