samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
am also confident that, when the time comes, the fed will act to ensure that inflation remains firmly under control.

5 to 10 years increased only ¼ percentage point. while such movements obviously bear watching, i would note that such a combination – namely, a substantial jump in near - term inflation expectations coupled with a relatively modest uptick in longer - run expectations – has often accompanied previous sharp increases in gasoline prices, and when it did, those movements were largely reversed within a few months. 4 information derived from the treasury inflation - protected securities ( tips ) market also suggests that financial market participants ’ longer - term inflation expectations remain well anchored even as the near - term outlook for inflation has shifted upward. in particular, while the carry - adjusted measure of inflation compensation for the next five years has increased about 1 / 4 percentage point since earlier this year, forward inflation compensation at longer horizons is roughly unchanged on net. much of the increase in five - year inflation compensation has been associated with the surge in food and energy prices, and the level of this measure appears consistent with a normal cyclical recovery after adjusting for those effects. commodity prices and inflation now i would like to explain in further detail why i anticipate that recent increases in commodity prices are likely to have only transitory effects on headline inflation. the current configuration of quotes on futures contracts – which can serve as a reasonable benchmark in gauging the outlook for commodity prices – suggests that these prices will roughly stabilize near current levels or even decline in some cases. if that outcome materializes, the prices of gasoline and heating oil are likely to flatten out fairly soon, and retail food prices are likely to continue rising briskly for only a few more months. consequently, the direct effects of the surge in commodity prices on headline consumer inflation should diminish sharply over coming months. overall inflation and core inflation regularly deviate from one another. when this has occurred over the past 25 years, the tendency has been for overall inflation to subsequently converge to core inflation, and not the other way around. an example of this pattern was seen in the months following hurricane katrina in 2005. bis central bankers ’ speeches over time, i anticipate that the recent surge in commodity prices will also affect the prices of a broader range of consumer goods and services that use these commodities as inputs. many firms are seeing such costs escalate and will pass along at least part of these increased raw materials costs to their customers. nevertheless, i expect the overall inflationary consequences of these pass - through effects to be modest and transitory, provided that longer - run inflation expectations remain well
have slowed amid tighter regulations by the us to safeguard national security and supply chains. both countries have stepped up domestic industrial policies. china has committed us $ 1. 4 trillion over five years to augment domestic technology and digital infrastructure. the us has passed the us $ 280 billion chips act to boost semiconductor research and production capabilities over the next ten years. these measures have led to not just reduced trade and investment between the two countries but is also shaping broader shifts in global trade patterns and supply chains. these shifts are most evident in the electronics industry. america ’ s share in china ’ s electronic exports fell by 4 % points between 2017 and 2021, while regional economies such as taiwan, vietnam, and thailand gained market shares. at the same time, these three economies exported more to the us market in 2021, compared to 2017. vietnam has seen the largest increase in its exposure to the us market, at 14 % points. looking ahead, increased domestic capacity for electronics production in both china and the us will likely lead to a substitution of imports. the us - proposed chip 4 alliance with taiwan, south korea, and japan for semiconductor production could potentially divert trade flows away from countries that are not part of this arrangement. at the same time, it is also possible that some trade could be diverted from china to lower cost regions such as vietnam, india and mexico, which are emerging as competitive assembly locations for final electronics products. the result of all this geoeconomic fragmentation is most likely slower global growth. several studies show that the long - term effects of receding globalisation are costly. according to an imf study, a scenario of limited trade fragmentation would reduce global gdp by 1. 2 %. a wto study found that under a more adverse scenario of a full technological decoupling from 2020 to 2040, the loss in gdp would be 8. 0 - 12. 0 % in individual countries during this period. ultimately, low - income developing countries furthest from the technological frontier will suffer most acutely from reduced knowledge diffusion from advanced economies. supply chain diversification will increase inflationary pressures. first, relocating operations will incur high upfront costs. even if governments have the fiscal resources to subsidise duplicate supply chains, there may be insufficient labour to sustain it. second, restrained global competition will increase the market power of larger firms or domestic oligopolies, resulting in reduced innovation and higher prices. third, reduced technology sharing and collaboration will hamper the widespread adoption of best practices

to pick up again as soon as the outlook improves. it may take some time, but we are on the right track to making singapore as a world - class financial centre.
augmented reality ( ar ) headsets and blockchain technology. 3 current share of manufacturing is 17 per cent. 6 / 6 bis - central bankers'speeches

so as to address the risk inherent in them. similarly, if an exposure has sensitivity to more than one risk factor it should be subjected to the risk management framework applicable to all the relevant risk factors. 17. in view of the volatility in prices of commercial real estate ( cre ), higher risk weight and provisioning norms have been prescribed by us for the cre sector. we have prescribed differential loan to value ( ltv ) ratio, risk weights and provisioning for individual housing loans in order to differentiate the risks involved in low value and high value home loans. in order to support the residential housing sector, we have carved out ( vide circular dated june 21, 2013 ) a separate sub - sector out of cre viz. cre - rh ( commercial real estate – residential housing ). the circular defines cre - rh as below : cre - rh would consist of loans to builders / developers for residential housing projects ( except for captive consumption ) under cre segment. such projects should ordinarily not include non - residential commercial real estate. however, integrated housing projects comprising of some commercial space ( e. g. shopping complex, school, etc. ) can also be classified under cre - rh, provided that the commercial area in the residential housing project does not exceed 10 % of the total floor space index ( fsi ) of the project. in case the fsi of the commercial area in the predominantly residential housing complex exceeds the ceiling of 10 %, the project loans should be classified as cre and not cre - rh. 18. carving out of cre - rh was done with the intention of providing regulatory support to lending towards residential housing projects by allowing lower provisioning and risk - weights. apart from this, different slabs of ltv ratios, risk weights and provisioning have been prescribed to support housing loans for lower income groups while stressing the need for higher stake of home buyers in high cost houses. 19. the ltv ratio – risk weight matrix for housing loans as also cre and standard assets provisioning for both housing as also cres are tabulated below : bis central bankers ’ speeches 20. the restructured housing loans should be risk weighted with an additional risk weight of 25 %. in view of the higher risk associated with housing loans at teaser rates i. e. at comparatively lower rates of interest in the first few years, after which rates are reset at higher rates, we have prescribed higher standard
##ll73. htm 4 blockchain equivalent of delivery versus payment ( dvp ). tokens and assets for which payment is made are transferred simultaneously. 5 https : / / www. bis. org / press / p240403. htm 6 iadi survey brief on the role of climate in deposit insurers'fund management, 2023. 6 / 6 bis - central bankers'speeches

approaches. the question we need to consider is whether there is consistency between the results of the statistical and structural approaches. if not, how do we deal with the divergences? 5. second, in the first stage of the exercise, the criteria applied to the systemically important countries have been more stringent. the screening however has been largely mechanical though, based as it was, mainly on deviations from the mean or median. there has been no analysis, however, to check whether such deviations indeed constitute large and systemic imbalances warranting corrective action. such a mechanical approach, without the application of mind, can lead to anomalies. let me give two illustrations of the type of potential anomalies using india as a case study. 6. large deviations from the mean is the criteria adopted for screening in on the basis of private savings irrespective of whether the country concerned is running a current account deficit or a current account surplus, or its stage of economic development. if, for the sake of argument, such a country was running a current account deficit and adjusted its private savings downwards, it would need to expand its current account deficit and then get screened in by the external imbalance indicators. in india, for example, our growth has been driven by domestic savings. if because of the mutual assessment process ( map ), india was bis central bankers ’ speeches asked to reduce domestic savings, it will increase our dependence on foreign savings, actually adding to imbalances. this would indeed be paradoxical. 7. the second illustration is the treatment of public debt. instead of deviations from the mean / median, what was attempted was deviations from asymmetric reference values for developed and developing countries, with higher thresholds for developed countries. these thresholds are based on historic averages rather than on current assessments of debt sustainability related to expected or projected growth rates. the adjustment period to stabilize the debt is also very backloaded. the year 2030 is long - term enough, and to paraphrase the immortal words of lord keynes, many of us here may well be dead. one reason why the fiscal balance in advanced countries is so important to the global economy is that by virtue of being reserve currency issuing countries their deficits have large spillover effects. 8. there are two issues here. first, there is no justification for using different debt to gdp ratios for advanced countries and emerging and developing countries ( emdcs ). if we take a forward
system that also evolve and change. moreover, the data that are used to estimate model parameters and to formulate the economic outlook are inherently uncertain and are often revised as the statistical agencies refine their estimates or gather more information. in addition to uncertainties surrounding macroeconomic models and measurement, there are a number of risks that, if realized, could shock the economy and financial system, making it more difficult for policymakers to confidently assess the economy and the economic outlook. despite these challenges, monetary policymaking requires a forward - looking approach, since its actions affect the economy, labor markets, and inflation with a lag. 2 the post – financial crisis economy and monetary policy at the zero lower bound when i joined the fomc in late 2018, despite nearly a decade of accommodative monetary policy following the financial crisis and subsequent recession, one of the primary concerns was that inflation had persistently been running slightly below the committee ’ s 2 percent inflation target. there was a recognition that the “ natural rate of unemployment ” may have been lower than many on the fomc had estimated, and that inflation may have become greenspan ( 2004 ), bernanke ( 2007 ), and powell ( 2018 ) offer discussions of how risk and uncertainty may influence monetary policy in practice. see alan greenspan ( 2004 ), “ risk and uncertainty in monetary policy, ” american economic review, vol. 94 ( may ), pp. 33 – 40 ; ben s. bernanke ( 2007 ), “ monetary policy under uncertainty, ” speech delivered at the 32nd annual economic policy conference, federal reserve bank of st. louis, st. louis ( via videoconference ), october 19, https : / / www. federalreserve. gov / newsevents / speech / bernanke20071019a. htm ; and jerome h. powell ( 2018 ), “ monetary policy in a changing economy, ” speech delivered at “ changing market structure and implications for monetary policy, ” a symposium sponsored by the federal reserve bank of kansas city, held in jackson hole, wyo., august 24, https : / / www. federalreserve. gov / newsevents / speech / powell20180824a. htm. - 3less responsive to reductions in the unemployment rate. 3 this recognition meant that preemptive increases in the federal funds rate based on expected reductions in the unemployment rate alone may not have been needed to keep inflation and

will promote financial stability and healthy economies. ultimately, the focus of financial education is all about improving individual financial well - being and how we can support individuals to achieve that. john adams, who was the second president of the united states, once said, " all the perplexities, confusions and distresses in america arise not from defects in their constitutions or confederation, not from a want of honour or virtue, so much as from downright ignorance of the nature of coin, credit and circulation. " 18. thank you very much for being with us here today to kick off the financial literacy month 2022. 4 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches
their investment income in the medium term. many non - banks tend to compensate by searching for yield in riskier, more illiquid and higher duration assets. this can be a welcome and intended outcome of monetary policy accommodation as it may help to ease financing conditions for non - financial corporations. but this trend also has a flip side, as it contributes to rising risks and vulnerabilities in non - banks ’ balance sheets, with potential negative repercussions for the stability of the whole financial system. liquidity risk is a particular source of concern, especially for funds that invest in illiquid assets but offer daily redemptions. we have recently witnessed cases in which funds holding considerable amounts of illiquid assets faced severe difficulties in dealing with large - scale outflows. nevertheless, these cases had no systemic repercussions : because the outflows were triggered by idiosyncratic factors and, most importantly, because the financial market environment was benign. but this does not always need to be the case. another source of concern is the elevated exposure of non - banks to highly indebted segments of the corporate sector. excessive risk - taking may adversely affect the ability of non - banks to absorb shocks, especially if economic conditions deteriorate. downgrades of corporates to subinvestment grade ratings may force non - banks to sell assets to fulfil their investment mandates. this could amplify price movements in credit markets in times of low market liquidity. it could also generate spill - overs to the wider financial system and the real economy, as funding flows might recede and the cost of corporate financing might increase. developing a macroprudential framework for the non - bank financial sector should thus be treated as a priority. new policy instruments should ensure that non - banks can sustain their financing of the real economy under different economic conditions. they should aim to mitigate risks related to pro - cyclical risk taking, excessive leverage, liquidity and maturity transformation by increasing transparency on fund leverage and aligning redemption terms more closely with the liquidity of funds ’ assets, for example. by internalising the impact that non - banks ’ actions might have on the rest of the financial system and the real economy, such policy tools might curb non - banks ’ potential to amplify exuberance in upturns and adversely affect financial and economic conditions in downturns. conclusions let me conclude. at present, the weaker cyclical momentum and

appetite to facilitate discussions at all levels of the organisation. this, too, they must change. these are a few of my thoughts on the topic of governance and the role of supervisory boards. now i am looking forward to having a discussion with you. thank you for your attention. 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches
well. recent estimates of international institutions point out a prolonged period of recession in developed economies and a sharp slow down in growth rates of developing economies. addressing these challenges, g - 20 summit held in brazil on 8 - 9 november 2008, issued a communique that included the following statement : “ we affirmed our determination to take all necessary steps to foster non - inflationary growth in a stable and sustainable manner according to the needs and available instruments in our respective countries, including through monetary and fiscal policy. ” distinguished guests, as concerns over inflationary pressures have subsided all over the world, maintaining the smooth functioning of financial system and efficiency of credit markets has become the main priority of policy makers. it will be proper to evaluate the recent developments in turkish economy in this perspective. in turkey, the banking system has been relatively prepared for the current crisis in terms of foreign exchange liquidity. its foreign exchange short position is also well contained. foreign exchange position of the public sector is almost negligible. the household sector is net creditor in terms of foreign exchange, while real sector is net debtor. since securitized products are rarely used in the turkish banking sector, the ongoing financial turmoil has not put a marked pressure on local banks through that channel. current account deficit, historically a source of vulnerability for the turkish economy, is likely to experience a sharp drop in the upcoming period due to correction in commodity prices, slow down in economic activity and depreciation in new turkish lira. still, extraordinary fluctuations in global liquidity conditions have adversely affected turkey like other countries, which are sensitive to international financial developments. at this point, i would like to emphasize that we will continue to take the necessary measures to contain the adverse effects of the global financial turmoil on the domestic economy, provided that they do not conflict with the price stability objective. the general framework of the central bank ’ s liquidity management is fairly flexible and wellstructured to fulfill its lender - of - last resort role and meet both new turkish lira and foreign exchange liquidity requirement of the banking system effectively. we will not allow any setback in new turkish lira money markets and will ensure smooth operation of payment system. in this context, judging that inflation will display a more rapid fall than envisaged before, the monetary policy committee has decided to lower the borrowing rates by 50 basis points on november 19, 2008. in addition, the margin between the lending and borrowing rates was reduced by a further 50 basis points

higher level of prosperity. before ending my speech, i would like to reiterate my belief that the turkish competition authority will further contribute to the level of prosperity in turkey in the upcoming years. i would like to thank everyone who had a hand in the organization of this conference and for your attention.
##ing, mobility and transportation, and importantly, develop a safe and secure data marketplace. 7 likewise, mas seeks to create a smart financial centre, where technology is used pervasively in the financial industry to increase efficiency, create opportunities, allow for better management of risks, and improve lives. to that end, the mas will pursue a holistic developmental path that is underpinned by smart regulatory and developmental policies that are conducive to innovation. a balanced regulatory approach must encourage financial institutions to thrive on innovation, yet keep risks in check, to maintain the safety and stability of our financial system. our development strategy will entail close partnership between mas and industry, to promote a culture of innovation in our financial sector. we have embarked on a number of key initiatives to develop new capabilities, infrastructure and talent in technology and innovation. financial services will feature strongly in our national skillsfuture effort, and mas will work with industry, the institute of banking and finance, as well as educational institutes to build capabilities in financial technology and innovation. mas also recently launched the financial sector technology & innovation ( fsti ) scheme, to support the creation of a vibrant innovation ecosystem in singapore. the opening of lumenlab today bears testimony to metlife ’ s confidence in singapore ’ s proposition as a leading insurance market and our vision to be an innovation hub for new and emerging insurance risks. lumenlab is an enlightened response to asia ’ s healthcare and retirement needs in the next decade, and is well aligned with mas ’ strategy to have innovation - led growth drive our next phase of development as a global insurance market. conclusion congratulations to metlife and lumenlab. i look forward to continued partnership with you in singapore. thank you. transcript of speech by prime minister lee hsien loong at founders forum smart nation singapore reception, prime minister ’ s office singapore ( 2015 ). bis central bankers ’ speeches

singapore.