##ausibility of all possible scenarios, but also the nature of the shocks and the best policy reaction in order to deal with this uncertain environment. just focusing on one or a few forecast figures would make it difficult for policy - makers to transmit the complexity of monetary policy deliberations to the public in a precise and transparent manner. over a medium to long - term horizon, inflation forecasts based on statistical analysis become very inaccurate. yet, medium to long - run inflation expectations are crucial in guiding the consumption and investment decisions of private agents. in order not to lose sight of the low frequency developments that may influence inflation over longer horizons than are used in the forecasts, the ecb has reinforced its analytical framework with a monetary perspective. this ‘ pillar ’ looks at price formation from a medium to long - term standpoint and is intended to purge monetary policy from the risk of becoming unduly short - sighted and overreacting to the latest economic news. by constantly reminding the central bank that in the long run prices and money stock increases are correlated, the monetary pillar is a standing support to the ecb ’ s commitment to price stability at all horizons that are relevant for economic decisions. taking decisions and evaluating their consequences on the basis not only of the shorter - term indications from the analysis of economic and financial conditions, but also of money and liquidity considerations, allows a central bank to see beyond the transient impact of the various shocks and to maintain a more steady policy course. looking back over our first six years of operations, monetary analysis has helped to underpin the medium - term orientation of our monetary policy conduct. allow me also to stress that the analysis of monetary indicators at the escb consists of an articulated process, whereby a detailed study of all the components and counterparts of m3 provides a detailed picture of the latest monetary developments, alongside the broad picture of the underlying trends. as i said, a world in which policy is conducted in a “ data - rich environment ” - to quote an article by ben bernanke2 - can be one in which both central bankers and other economic agents become captive to the latest macroeconomic indicator and may lose direction. in such a world, a central bank will only be successful in delivering price stability if it provides an anchor for the inflation expectations of the public and if it is as transparent as possible about its ultimate policy objective. for this reason, the ecb decided to be fully transparent about the numerical definition of its goal, price stability, that the treaty on

, in particular, to the ecb ’ s series of working papers, the aim of which is to disseminate the findings of the ecb ’ s internal research. finally, various statistical data, as well as the speeches held by the members of the executive board, can also be accessed via the ecb ’ s website. the ecb ’ s communication policy gives clear priority to maintaining and enhancing the credibility of the eurosystem and confidence in the euro, both of which are crucial elements in the successful conduct of monetary policy. in this context, one should always bear in mind the fact that the governing council acts as a collegial body, and that all decisions have to be communicated to the public in a clear and consistent way. speaking a common language is particularly important for a central bank operating in a monetary union comprising several countries. contradictory indications about the decisions taken by the ecb and the underlying reasons might trigger unwarranted market expectations and increase uncertainty, thereby running counter to the very objective of being transparent with regard to the conduct of monetary policy. i should like to stress that the information provided at the press conferences held after the meetings of the governing council, together with the analysis contained both in the ecb monthly bulletin and in the other channels of communication i mentioned earlier, comes very close, in substance, to the publication of “ summary minutes ”. in view of the broad variety of publicly available information issued by the ecb, it is my firm belief that the ecb can stand comparison with other central banks in the field of transparency. 2. publication of forecasts and national data relating to the euro area in this context, i should also like to comment briefly on the request to publish the ecb ’ s internal forecasts. first, it would clearly be premature to consider such a step since the eurosystem has yet to gain experience with its forecasts. more time will be needed before we can assume that all the technical issues have been addressed properly, and the publication of forecasts can be considered without endangering the ecb ’ s credibility. i am confident that we can achieve this in the course of next year. let me also emphasise that the role of the ecb ’ s internal forecasts in the decision - making process should not be overestimated. such forecasts constitute one piece of information made available to the governing council, but certainly not the only one. the role of the ecb ’ s internal forecasts within the monetary