our common european endeavour. • in this regard, private and public risk - sharing should be enhanced by moving forward with the banking and the capital markets union, and by creating a centralised fiscal stabilisation tool. to avoid moral hazard, risk - sharing should go hand - in - hand with risk reduction and close economic policy coordination. moreover, we need to improve income convergence and to ensure that economic rebalancing operates symmetrically. • last but not least, a final point on greece : in order to bolster investors ’ confidence in the prospects of the greek economy and to be able to refinance maturing debt on sustainable terms, greek governments must continue the implementation of reforms and avoid reneging on programme - related commitments. sources : bank of greece ( 2018 ), monetary policy 2017 - 2018. https : / / www. bankofgreece. gr / pages / en / bank / news / pressreleases / dispitem. aspx? item _ id = 6112 & 57fb - 4de6 - b9ae - bdfd83c66c95 & filter _ by = dt. bank of greece, ( 2018 ), report on operational targets for non - performing exposures, 6 september. www. bankofgreece. gr / pages / en / bank / news / pressreleases / dispitem. aspx? item _ id = 6170 & list _ id = 1af869f3 - 57fb - 4de6 - b9ae - bdfd83c66c95 & filter _ by = dt cahen, d & de larosiere j. ( with the support of lucie truchet ) ( 2018 ) “ ensuring a viable emu : are we on the right track? ” eurofi regulatory update, september 2018. www. eurofi. net / wpcontent / uploads / 2018 / 09 / eurofi _ regulatory _ update _ vienna2018. pdf. 6 / 8 bis central bankers'speeches cœure, b., ( 2018 ), interview with the newspaper kathimerini ( eirini chrysolora ), 5 september 2018. www. ecb. europa. eu / press / inter / date / 2018 / html / ecb. in180905. en. html draghi, m., ( 2018 ) “ the benefits of european supervision ”,

peter praet : communicating the complexity of unconventional monetary policy in emu speech by mr peter praet, member of the executive board of the european central bank, at the 2017 ecb central bank communications conference " communications challenges for policy effectiveness, accountability and reputation ", frankfurt am main, 15 november 2017. * * * central bank communication has been fundamentally affected by the fallout from the global financial and economic crisis. 1 throughout that period, central banks succeeded in preventing a de - anchoring of inflation expectations. to do so, they adopted a broad range of unconventional measures, the functioning of which is very difficult to explain to the public. this applies, for example, to the notion of negative nominal interest rates, which is hard to communicate because it challenges the conventional wisdom that thrift and patience are virtues that deserve pecuniary remuneration. against this backdrop, i would like to discuss three communication challenges that are particularly relevant to the euro area and the ecb ’ s monetary policy. the first challenge is to bear in mind the multi - country nature of our monetary union, which requires communication to be tuned to the specific context of different national audiences so as to ensure broad participation in the public debate on euro area monetary policy. the second challenge for monetary policy communication is to take into account the increasing complexity of monetary policy by ensuring consistency over time and clarifying the state contingency of the policy stance. to ensure consistency over time, it is essential for the central bank to adopt a clear organising framework, centred on the ultimate objective, for the ecb consisting of price stability, and adhering to a state - contingent reaction function that determines how the monetary policy stance adjusts to changing economic conditions. as the economic environment that monetary policy faces may indeed be subject to massive swings, state contingency may entail pronounced differences in the monetary policy stance over time. this, in turn, requires careful explanation – in particular in circumstances that call for unconventional measures and, hence, leave markets and the general public without empirical precedent to help them anticipate and rationalise the central bank ’ s actions. the third challenge is for the communication framework to provide clarity on the use of specific tools in a multi - instrument context, when the central bank reaction function acquires an additional dimension. in normal times, the central bank reaction function mainly specifies the contingencies for loosening, tightening or maintaining a given policy stance. in unconventional times, it also needs to spell out which tool would