the money market participants in prospera ’ s survey thought at the time that the repo rate would be brought back into positive territory towards the end of 2016 and then continue to increase. one can say that the riksbank purchased government bonds that gave a return of approximately zero but that were expected to be funded according to the repo rate forecast. the chart shows that the riksbank therefore expected to make a loss, as the funding costs were expected to be higher than the yield. 11 chart 4. actual and expected interest rate developments per cent repo rate survey mpr february 2015 mpr october 2016 - 1 - 1 note. survey responses show the mean value for the repo - rate expectations of money market participants in february 2015. “ mpr ” refers to the riksbank ’ s forecast for the repo rate in its monetary policy reports. sources : statistics sweden and tns sifo prospera but chart 4 also shows that the repo rate has so far turned out to be much lower than the interest rate forecasts. the bonds have therefore risen in value and the funding of the bond purchases seems to become cheaper than expected, something which, at least in the short term, has led to higher profits than expected for the riksbank. this is 11 an alternative measure of the future repo rate is provided by the market ’ s pricing of certain derivatives. this pricing suggested that the repo rate would increase more slowly than in the riksbank ’ s forecast, but the bond purchases would realise losses also according to these market - based expectations. 6 reflected in, for example, the forecast for the riksbank ’ s dividend - qualifying profit in 2015 and 2016. 12 at the end of 2014, a total loss of just over sek 10 billion was expected for those two years. 13 in march 2015, when bond purchases had begun on a small scale, the expected loss had risen to almost sek 14 billion. the latest forecast, from october this year, has the benefit of hindsight and indicates that the outcome will instead be a profit of almost sek 13 billion. losses likely in the period ahead the fact that the riksbank ’ s bond purchases have so far been profitable does not mean that this will always be the case. for example, the ever - lower interest rates have made bond purchases after the spring of 2015 increasingly costly. the riksbank has now purchased bonds for about sek 275 billion and several bonds have a

consumer loans to the pre - pandemic level. however, given recent months ’ data, we will soon make a decision on additional macroprudential measures to cool down this segment of the retail market. 2 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches i will now speak on possible risks to the forecast. proinflationary risks continue to prevail. we consider that the main risk is a potential anchoring of inflation expectations at a high level. fuelled by high inflation expectations, temporary growth might become sustained. there is a slight increase in risks associated with a possible faster normalisation of monetary policies in advanced economies. as a result, market volatility in emerging market economies might intensify, which can affect exchange rate and inflation expectations. there are also certain risks caused by structural changes in the labour market due to the pandemic. the demand for some professions is declining, whereas the demand for others is rising. this is confirmed by data on a record - high increase in vacant jobs. adjusting to the new needs of the economy requires time for specialist retraining. consequently, this provokes local staff shortages. the situation is aggravated even more due to the restrictions on the inflow of labour migrants, which affects construction and seasonal agricultural works most seriously. the situation in the labour market might increase companies ’ costs. proinflationary risks associated with the environment in global commodity markets persist. nonetheless, june — july recorded the first signs of a decline in world prices. therefore, i would say that this risk is less acute than at the moment of our previous key rate meeting. furthermore, investment from the national wealth fund and geopolitical risks are still in the focus of our attention. disinflationary factors are much weaker. a rich harvest might result in a more significant seasonal decrease in food prices. the pandemic situation is still uncertain. the spread of new coronavirus strains worldwide might force countries to introduce new restrictions and disrupt production and supply chains, which in turn might slow down global economic recovery. for russia, this would involve a decrease in external demand and intensify disinflationary risks, on the one hand. on the other hand, if borders are closed, domestic demand will remain elevated longer, which might become a proinflationary factor. in conclusion, i would like to comment on monetary policy prospects. beginning from march, we have raised the key rate by a total of 2. 25 percentage points. we will