other jurisdictions. for example, some regulators such as the us federal financial institutions examinations council publish selected supervisory information on banking institutions operating in the us market, including on subsidiaries of european banking groups, regularly ( on a quarterly basis ). parts of these data are “ confidential ” in europe, but this is not so on the other side of the atlantic. as mentioned earlier, a change in attitude by eu financial regulators would greatly benefit the quality of the risk - monitoring and risk - evaluation work undertaken by macro - prudential bodies. in addition, it would provide a concrete signal of increased transparency to market analysts and financial market participants. in turn, it would help significantly to minimise the reporting burden of the industry. let me try to illustrate my point with some examples. the breakdowns of banks ’ credit exposures by type of collateral or counterparty sector ( e. g. central government, non - financial institutions, financial institutions, small and medium - sized enterprises ( smes ), residential mortgages or commercial property ) are reported to supervisory authorities, but these breakdowns are not part of regular harmonised public financial reporting. hence, surveillance indicators and assessment exercises based on publicly available credit exposure data may by impaired by the high level of aggregation of the information disclosed. for example, if early warning signals were to point to risks emerging in commercial property or the sme sector, it would be important to assess the relevance of banks ’ exposures to this particular asset class in a systematic way. this is not possible if all credit exposures are disclosed in aggregate. furthermore, the breakdown of credit exposures can be rather important for monitoring banks ’ risk profiles in the macroprudential context. in risk assessment work, the quality of top - down stress testing results may be compromised if the distribution of credit exposures by bank across the main exposure classes needs to be approximated. likewise, information on credit risk parameters, notably on incurred losses by type of exposure, would need to be consistently disclosed by banks, or to be made available to macro - prudential authorities from supervisory sources. in turn, owing to the importance of such credit exposure data, i much welcome the efforts being undertaken to harmonise the datasets in existing credit registers, subject also to an improved coverage, even if this can only complement extensive supervisory reports. the analysis of financial institutions ’ sovereign debt exposures constitutes another example where ( regular ) publicly available information has proved to be insufficient to carry out a reliable macro - pr

, make the development of a comprehensive macroprudential supervision absolutely essential. ecb monthly bulletin, july 2010. an effective macro - prudential framework aims at delivering a thorough analysis of systemic risks, as well as the formulation of appropriate policies to address such risks identifying, in a timely fashion, the emergence and build up of critical vulnerabilities, and deciding on effective ( pre - emptive ) intervention. central banks have a very important role in this regard. at the european level, a new body will be set up : the european systemic risk board ( esrb ), which will be an independent body responsible for conducting macro - prudential oversight of the eu ’ s financial system as a whole and which will be supported analytically and logistically by the ecb. the esrb should be seen as a component of a global framework of macro - prudential oversight, also allowing it to contribute to the assessment and containment of global risks. in this sense, systemic risk surveillance and preventing those risks from materializing will be a key contribution to sustainable long term growth prospects. conclusion let me conclude. the global crisis of the last years has shown that policymakers around the globe have acted successfully. confidence has come back. with our policy actions, we at the ecb have supported credit flows to the economy and thus dampened the negative effects of the crisis to the extent possible. looking ahead, we now need to draw lessons from the crisis and focus on the elements that ensure that the global recovery is sound and sustainable. for this, i believe four elements are essential. these are strengthening growth prospects, fiscal sustainability, price stability and financial stability. for price stability and financial stability, central banks play a key role. they will shape the global recovery by maintaining price stability and safeguarding financial stability. price stability is the central contribution that monetary policy makes to economic growth, to job creation and to financial stability. financial stability, in turn, will be a major focus of policy - makers in the aftermath of the crisis. central banks have specific tasks and responsibilities in this domain. for example, the ecb will contribute to the esrb to conduct macro - prudential oversight at a european level. of course, central banks cannot act alone. actions are required to address all conditions and challenges to spur long term economic growth. we all have to work together. national governments, regulators and supervisors, and the private sector and financial industry have to proceed with the difficult, but vital, measures