be inadvisable to opt at this stage for simpler, “ instant ” solutions, such as imposing wide - ranging supervision over bank fees, or forbidding banks to charge fees at all. we must give the new system time to operate properly, and to allow the banking supervision department to deal with flaws that may come to light. supervision must be the last step, not the first, and even then only if there is absolutely no alternative. sweeping supervision is not advisable, is unacceptable around the world, will take us back to somewhere we do not want to be, and is likely to have an adverse effect on competition which we all favor so highly, and thus, in the final analysis, on consumers. this would probably occur because supervision is likely to result in the banks setting uniform fees, at the exact level determined, and the quality of service to customers would be impaired. moreover, and certainly no less important, it would probably deter potential competitors, particularly foreign banks, from entering the field of banking in israel, meaning that competition would remain at its low level. clearly we must give the reform a chance ; it has been in effect just two weeks. it is also important that we all support the supervisor of banks in advancing the reform, and he, on his part, will do what is necessary to correct any flaws and to speed up the whole process.

is one of the better digitally defended sectors in the economy. as it should be. but given the size and urgency of the threat, we need to do even more to keep financial services safe. this is why cyber resilience will absolutely be a key focus area in our supervision of the financial industry in the coming years. this goes both for de nederlandsche bank, and for the european central bank. our aim is to make financial services safer against cyber threats. not only by increasing the resilience of the financial sector itself, but also by stepping up the robustness of the entire chain of ict service providers. dora, the european digital operational resilience act, that came into effect at the beginning of this year, gives us additional tools to accomplish this aim. to start with, under dora, threat - led penetration tests are mandatory for the largest financial institutions in europe. in the netherlands we have been conducting these kinds of tests voluntarily for over eight years with good results, and we are very pleased that it is now becoming the norm at the european level. but dora also imposes stricter requirements for managing cyber risks in outsourcing chains. for example, financial firms face stricter rules for conducting due diligence on potential ict providers. as a result, fintechs may also experience more stringent due diligence from financial sector customers. and very importantly, under dora, european supervisors can conduct inspections of critical third - party ict service providers in tandem with national supervisory authorities. we expect bigtechs like google and microsoft to be placed under eu - wide supervision. and, just as with the banks, we are going to test their readiness to detect and withstand cyberattacks. 2 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches despite all efforts, there is no such thing as perfect cyber security. it is therefore vital that financial institutions take measures to recover quickly after cyber incidents. this is crucial to ensure that services can continue and people don't lose trust in financial firms or the financial sector as a whole. the results of the ecb's 2024 cyber stress test show that there is room for improvement on the recovery front. so it's a very good thing that dora also imposes new requirements on institutions'continuity plans and backup policies. they need to develop a culture where cyber incidents are quickly detected and reported, they need to have their playbooks in place and they need to have clearly defined management roles and responsibilities. these are key ingredients for