products : commercial banking, investment banking, equities, fixed income, asset and wealth management, foreign exchange and more. this is important because it means we can provide holistic solutions to the specific financial needs of firms and individuals. 17. this array of financial services is supported by world - class professional services. hong kong has top - notch capabilities in law, accountancy, tax, risk management and compliance. 18. and we have an outstanding talent pool. hong kong has a well - educated local workforce. but we are also a welcoming city that attracts top professionals from around the world, creating a deep and diversified bench of talent. 19. and let ’ s not forget the legal system and regulatory environment. hong kong is renowned for its unique bilingual common law system. we have a highly - regarded, independent judiciary – as well as an internationally - recognised, forward - looking regulatory environment. that means we offer a fair and predictable marketplace in which all financial institutions can operate and prosper. 20. each of the above is a great asset in its own right. when you put them all together and it runs like clockwork, you have a powerful ecosystem that would be very hard to replace. this kind of infrastructure is so sticky that it ’ s “ hard to move ” – to quote a senior executive at a leading global asset manager, who just reaffirmed that hong kong will remain their one and only asian hub. 21. because our system functions so smoothly, even under stress, it ’ s easy for people to take it for granted. at the hkma, we can never do that. as a market facilitator, we are always looking for new opportunities for our financial sector. and, as a supervisor, we are constantly working to create policy headroom so that market players can seize those opportunities. opportunity — china 22. as we speak of opportunity, the future of finance – from hong kong ’ s perspective – can be summed up in three words : china, green and technology. 2 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches 23. by china, i mean connecting the mainland and international financial markets via hong kong. hong kong is the only gateway of its kind to the mainland ’ s capital markets. only hong kong can play this role – because of a combination of advantages that only hong kong has. 24. we are part of china, supporting the country ’ s economic development for more than four decades. that ’ s why the financial infrastructure connecting hong kong with the

. indeed, i have a gripe about the term “ strategic defaulter ” being increasingly thrown around in ireland to characterise the mortgage arrears problem. this term, ill - defined in the irish context, is a transplant from the united states ( where it is used mainly to refer to people who have decided to walk - away from their non - recourse mortgage loans, but are living on in the property for a last few cost - free month. 5 the context being so different here, i find much of examination of the standard financial statement ( sfs ) returns of defaulting borrowers in ireland has shown that, indeed, monthly amounts due on the original monthly schedule represent a remarkably small portion of current monthly income, for a relatively high fraction of borrowers. evidence that default is correlated with factors other than affordability is often taken in the us as indicating that “ strategic default ” is present. for example, if the extent of negative equity of a household is correlated with default status, this could be seen as indicating “ strategic default ”. such a correlation exists in irish data ; however, forthcoming research from the central bank seems to suggest that, once affordability factors are bis central bankers ’ speeches the irish use of this value - loaded 6 term inauthentic ; a rhetorical use, which obscures the diversity and complexity of arrears circumstances. but we need to understand the multiplicity of causes for such behaviour if we are to be effective in correcting it. among other cases contributing to the persistent surge of mortgage arrears, is it not plausible that some, perhaps many, would be better characterised as some variety of “ wait - and - see ” behaviour? though different to the us archetype of “ strategic default, ” “ wait and see ” is not a safe or viable plan for the borrower, or for society, and clearly calls for corrective action. let me elaborate on a few examples of situations which i would characterise as “ wait - and - see. ” • slow to face facts. it takes time for many borrowers to understand and come to terms with their own changed circumstances and the consequences of their past investment and / or borrowing decisions. the over - indebtedness which many now face may seem to them to be something for which they themselves bear at most a part of the responsibility. the fact of their legal obligation to pay debts, including those assumed to finance leveraged property investments, is blurred in their minds