to reaffirm their support when we have earned it ; and to offer informed guidance on when to change course. accountability is only one reason the federal reserve relies on public outreach and participation. we also rely on participation for our effectiveness, because the best ideas in finance and economics can, and often do, come from a wide variety of sources. agencies like the federal reserve are a collection of expertise — informed by experience and positioned to turn a broad range of information into policy. but we are not, and cannot be, a monopoly on insight or wisdom. the federal reserve recognizes these limits, and the need to invite new ideas, through a variety of initiatives. we seek out a qualified, diverse workforce, and foster an inclusive workplace. 3 we meet frequently with a range of advisory councils, drawing on expertise in banking, modeling, and consumer and community finance. 4 we have increased transparency around our policy process and issued new reports on financial stability and banking supervision and regulation, with new details about our work. 5 and across the federal reserve system, our staff publishes a wide range of economic and policy research and plays an active role in academic discourse. 1 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches monetary policy itself shows the value of participation and transparency. u. s. monetary policy is the sole responsibility of the federal reserve. yet some of the most important innovations in the field have come from outside the reserve system. since 1935, we have decided monetary policy by committee, a structure that has served us well because it is designed to capture different views of a wide and varied national economy. and over the past several decades, the fomc has greatly increased its own transparency — from postmeeting announcements, to announcing an objective for inflation, to a published survey of economic projections, to postmeeting press conferences ( which will now take place after every fomc meeting ). 6 as many of you know, over the course of 2019, we will be reviewing our monetary policy strategy, tools, and communication practices, and we will hold a research conference on the subject with outside speakers, as well as “ fed listens ” events at a number of reserve banks, to hear from a broad range of constituencies. but these improvements are more than a simple matter of disclosure. they are an invitation to participate, and a way to provide the public with the means and opportunity to inform our work. this year, we are taking similar steps to improve a cornerstone of our post - crisis rules. supervisory stress

in the right direction but clearly need to be strengthened and built upon. the success of the banking union will depend on the establishment of a solid resolution mechanism, – probably even more than a full common deposit insurance scheme. regarding the backstop of the single resolution fund, in the interests of financial stability, we should consider extending the maturities on the credit lines. and we will not achieve an effective and 4 / 6 bis central bankers'speeches profitable banking union without cross - border consolidation in europe : there are still too many roadblocks and not enough cross - border restructuring. unfortunately, there was almost no progress at all on the capital markets union in the december agreement. let us finally move on from a rhetorical consensus in principle to concrete headway, notably on harmonising bankruptcy regimes and strengthening esma. both the banking union and the capital markets union are the key components for a genuine “ financing union for investment and innovation ” : i have put forward this idea as a way of better channelling our abundant resources – our eur 340 billion private savings surplus – towards the concrete needs of european economy : the energy transition, smes ’ equity or digital innovation. but the strengthening of the euro area should also include public mechanisms of solidarity. regarding the esm, it should not be just about managing crises ex post, but about preventing them ex - ante above all by reinforcing our precautionary tools. we need to avoid having ex ante criteria that are so strict that in practice they prevent the esm from being used preventively. these actions should also be supplemented by a common fiscal capacity : these words are probably less contentious than a common “ budget ”, but as the president of the ecb wrote last week, we shouldn ’ t shy away from its stabilisation function. if so, it would support the single monetary policy and price stability. * * i will conclude by quoting president mario soares, one of the key actors of portugal's accession to the european community : “ recent history has shown that rather than deferring crises we must confront them head on, with a determination to overcome them9 ”. let us face the challenges for 2019 with this determined spirit : brexit and the european elections as well as national domestic elections including in portugal, and now in spain. our role as european central bank is to be faithful to our mandate while remaining totally independent. but we also have to be more attentive than ever to our environment : we