of the credit system that is a necessary foundation for economic recovery. ” 20 in this context, shouldn ’ t we discuss the taboo of making use of public funds? we cannot forget that by limiting policy options on the usage of public funds, legislators and regulators may have ended up exacerbating risks in the event of a ( systemic ) crisis. against this background, should we not discuss : the application of the brrd in its current form only to banks that are eligible for the european safety net? the revision of the brrd and state aid requirements for medium - sized banks with systemic relevance where national authorities are willing to engage in the burden sharing without distorting competition? alternative ways to ensuring the exit of medium - sized and small - sized banks from the market while preserving value and protecting creditors and non - financial borrowers? special insolvency proceedings as an alternative to the ‘ atomistic ’ liquidation regime with a limited usage of public funds as a bridge to safeguard financial stability? while the absorption of losses by private stakeholders should be the norm, flexibility should be preserved as the financial system ’ s network structure plays a fundamental role in deciding whether there is the need for a government to intervene. 21 we should not forget that financial stability and public trust are in fact a public good. to inform these discussions, a clear definition of what constitutes public interest and critical functions is required. a comprehensive approach across legislation and stakeholders ’ interactions thoroughly analysing cross - implications is thus required to minimise moral hazard and vested interests while preserving the market discipline necessary. let me conclude. much has been achieved since the inception of the crisis ten years ago. nevertheless, the foundations of the european architecture are still not sufficiently robust to withstand the impact of a future crisis. this should be the focus of policymakers and relevant institutions. 5 / 7 bis central bankers'speeches as the political will to steer further the integration progress is currently insufficient, it is urgent, and in the best interest of european citizens, that we revisit the existing rules now. if it is not possible to complete the banking union as originally foreseen, we must structurally revisit the project to ensure that we have sufficient tools to safeguard financial stability when the next crisis hits. thank you for your attention. 1 as prepared for delivery. 2 www. bundesregierung. de / content / en / pressemitteilungen / bpa / 2018 / 20... 3 minefi. hosting. aug

##ure. com / augure _ minefi / r / contenuenligne / downloa... 4 geithner, t. ( 2016 ), “ are we safer? the case for strengthening the bagehot arsenal ”, per jacobsson lecture, imf – world bank annual meetings, 8 october. 5 draghi, m. ( 2018 ), “ risk - reducing and risk - sharing in our monetary union ”, speech at the european university institute, florence, 11 may. 6 basel committee on banking supervision ( 2017 ), “ high - level summary of basel iii reforms ”, available at www. bis. org / bcbs / publ / d424 _ hlsummary. pdf. 7 guiso, l., herrera, h., morelli, m. and sonno, t. ( 2018 ), “ global crises and populism : the role of eurozone institutions ”, cepr discussion paper dp12944, 20 may. 8 veron, n. ( 2018 ), “ bank crisis management and resolution : what is missing? ” in “ towards a more resilient euro area : ideas from the ‘ future europe ’ forum ”, ceps, and veron, n. ( 2018 ), “ eu financial services policy since 2007 : crisis, responses and prospects ”, global policy volume 9, supplement 1, june 2018. 9 klaus regling recently noted that : “ germany should not forget that its banks received more public money during the financial crisis than almost any other european banking system – with the exception of spain and ireland. taxpayers had to shoulder high losses. it is wrong to assume that german banks would never need any money ”, interview published in suddeutsche zeitung, 25 june 2018. 10 nouy, d. ( 2017 ), “ banking union, three years on – has it lived up to its promises? ”, statement at the single resolution board conference, brussels : “ banks are supervised and resolved at european level, but in the event of a failure, the negative consequences are felt mainly at national level. ( … ) if, for instance, the spanish banco popular had actually failed, portugal ’ s deposit insurance scheme would have had to refund depositors in the portuguese subsidiary. that is a consequence of having supervision and resolution at european level. the portuguese authorities would not have been involved in either process. ” 11 restoy, f. ( 2018 )