( ii ) are, in his opinion, complete, fair and properly drawn up ; ( iii ) present a true and fair view of the affairs of the financial institution ; the banking act 2004 also empowers the central bank to, inter alia, impose on an auditor of a bank a duty to carry out an extended scope audit or other examination and make recommendations as necessary. the bank of mauritius may also require the auditor to submit a report as to whether, in his opinion, the systems of credit provisioning and write - offs specified by the central bank are being complied with and whether or not measures to counter the possibility of money laundering or the funding of terrorist activities have been adopted by the financial institution and are being implemented in accordance with any enactment relating to anti - money laundering and prevention of terrorism and with guidelines or instructions issued by the central bank. the bank also issued a guideline on transactions or conditions respecting well - being of a financial institution reportable by the external auditor to the bank of mauritius. this guideline was reviewed in february 2014 and lays down the ground rules respecting certain types of relationships between financial institutions and their external auditors. the relationships are described in terms of categories of transactions or conditions impinging on the well - being of financial institutions that must be reported by their external auditors to the bank of mauritius. additionally, in terms of section 39 of the banking act and the guideline on transactions or conditions respecting well being of a financial institution reportable by the external auditor, the external auditors have an obligation to report directly to the bank of mauritius if they become aware of serious issues during their audit that the supervisor should know about in the public interest. in furtherance of a more effective and efficient oversight, the bank of mauritius holds trilateral meetings with the banks and their external auditors on an annual basis after the publication of the audited financial statements to review the financial results and discuss any issue of concern. concluding remarks no governance system, however well designed, can fully prevent a financial institution from being victim to frauds and other malpractices. the bai case is a crying lesson to be learnt where 3 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches deceptive practices enabled the group to mask the huge losses of the bai group since december 2010. the auditing profession has an important role to play in ensuring that financial reports reflect the way the business has actually been run or the risks to which the business has actually been exposed. the ethical values, integrity and impeacha

oversight requirements for systemically important payment systems [ 22 ], introducing a more forward - looking approach to identify payment systems that are systemically important. and today we are launching a public consultation on the new regulation, which will then become operational by mid - 2021. we are also completing the public consultation on our new framework for electronic payment instruments, schemes and arrangements, the so - called pisa framework. pisa extends our oversight [ 23 ] to digital payment tokens [ 24 ], including stablecoins, and to payment arrangements providing functionalities to end users of electronic payment instruments [ 25 ]. as a result, technology providers can become subject to oversight. as part of our comprehensive policy, we are working to safeguard the role of sovereign money in the digital era : we want to be ready to introduce a digital euro, if needed. a digital euro would combine the efficiency of a digital payment instrument with the safety of central bank money. it would complement cash, not replace it. together, these two types of money would be available to all, offering greater choice and access to simple, costless ways of paying. we have started a public consultation to seek feedback from people across europe and gain a better understanding of their needs. it will be completed in january, and the results will be published once they have been analysed. https : / / www. ecb. europa. eu / press / key / date / 2020 / html / ecb. sp201127 ~ a781c4e0fc. en. html 3 / 6 01 / 12 / 2020 from the payments revolution to the reinvention of money a digital euro would need to be carefully designed, in order to enhance privacy in digital payments [ 26 ], respect the rules on countering illegal activities and avoid interference with central bank policies, first and foremost monetary policy and financial stability. in particular, a digital euro should be a means of payment, not a form of investment that competes with other financial instruments. this would require limiting the holdings of individual users [ 27 ] and mean that, unlike stablecoin issuers, the issuer of the digital euro – the ecb – would not aim to acquire deposits. a digital euro would support the modernisation of the financial sector and the broader economy. it would be designed to be interoperable with private payment solutions and would thus represent the “ raw material ” that supervised intermediaries could use to offer pan - european, front - end payment solutions.