##17 % 20redi % 20conference % 20on % 20inclusive % 20growth % 20final _ 0. pdf ). see ‘ high unemployment yet few small firms : the role of centralised bargaining in south africa ’, american economic journal : applied economics 4 ( 3 ), by j r magruder, published in july 2012. page 8 of 12 that said, as long as the fed has credibility around its price stability mandate, meaning that as long as its commitment to 2 % is believed, there is scope for flexibility. 10 for this reason, interest rate decisions tend to respond to both inflation and employment dynamics. as the economist john taylor has shown, one can predict the path of interest rates quite accurately by using simple rules that include the deviation of inflation from the target and the deviation of unemployment from the nairu rate. at the sarb, we also look at these sorts of rules. we do not use them to dictate policy, but we certainly consider both inflation and the real economy when we set interest rates. this is why the taylor rules for south africa have a weighting on both the output gap and inflation relative to the target. 11 this should also be clear from any statement of the sarb ’ s monetary policy committee ( mpc ) or from the biannual monetary policy review, all of which are available on our website. there are two ‘ takeaways ’ from this discussion. even a central bank with an employment mandate will still behave like an inflation targeter. and inflation - targeting central banks also consider real variables such as growth and unemployment when they make monetary policy. conclusion central banks have the power to deliver low inflation. where monetary policymakers have adopted other priorities, such as financing governments or prioritising high employment, they have caused widespread economic damage. in such cases, countries have struggled with higher inflation, higher borrowing costs and eventually as former chairman ben bernanke once explained : “ the key to explaining why price stability promotes stability in both output and employment is the realization that, when inflation itself is wellcontrolled, then the public ’ s expectations of inflation will also be low and stable. in a virtuous circle, stable inflation expectations help the central bank to keep inflation low even as it retains substantial freedom to respond to disturbances to the broader economy. ” from the benefits of price stability published on 24 february 2006 ( https : / / www. federalreserve. gov / newsevents / speech

they can get a wider range of better and cheaper financial products and services. our vision is to put the interest of the consumer, competition, security and trust between stakeholders at the centre through european legislative initiatives. 1 / 2 bis - central bankers'speeches last but not least, the fight against payment fraud is also a leading priority in the bnb supervisory practice, and i believe that the new european legislation will enable payment service providers to share fraud - related information with each other. this will increase consumer awareness and expand refund rights for those consumers who are victims of fraud. the new european legislation will also ensure levelling of the playing field between banks and non - bank payment service providers, and in particular by giving non - bank payment service providers access to all eu payment systems. this process will go hand in hand with setting appropriate adequate safeguards in order to ensure the right conditions for the entry of innovative financial services. thank you for your attention! 2 / 2 bis - central bankers'speeches