, there is a broad consensus among economists that monetary policy is not a suitable tool for fine - tuning economic developments. any attempts to sacrifice the medium - term goal of price stability to efforts to meet short - term objectives will ultimately weaken the stability of a currency. to prevent monetary policy itself disrupting the economy, it needs to be made and kept independent of pressures arising from short - term political and electoral objectives. a second key factor behind a successful monetary policy is the macroeconomic policy framework laid down in the treaty. while preserving the value of our currency is our primary occupation, the treaty recognises that the ecb does not operate in a vacuum. so, it has created a harmonious institutional structure in which areas of shared responsibilities across policy domains are carefully avoided, and the single monetary policy finds a standing safeguard in the virtuous principles disciplining its policy counterparts. the stability and growth pact is a central component in this structure. the past three decades have taught us that fiscal laxity, far from enhancing collective prosperity, has only made endeavours by central banks to preserve the value of money costly and painful. the principles underlying the pact have restrained and ultimately reversed what appeared an unrelenting growth in public liabilities. this has reduced the long - term cost of borrowing and made easier the task of the single monetary authority. within the framework of the treaty and the provisions set in place to implement the stability and growth pact, national governments exchange views, agree on general guidelines and policy recommendations, and share frank assessments. for its part, the ecb accepted the invitation to participate in an informal dialogue with governments and other political actors. this was done on the clear understanding that the purpose was to share information and insights, not to receive guidance or instructions on matters of monetary policy. the institutional balance upon which this dialogue rests, while adequate and balanced, is delicate and at times fragile. we thus take note with increasing alarm that the voices calling for co - ordinated action by the monetary and fiscal authorities have become louder and more authoritative recently. according to these voices, the ‘ policy mix ’ should be improved, and the monetary and fiscal authorities should agree on ‘ common standards that define general principles ’ guiding policy conduct over time. we note these ideas with concern. if such steps were taken, they would undermine the independence granted to the ecb in pursuing its mandate. they would alter the incentives of economic actors to discharge their respective duties to the best of their ability. they would blur policy responsibilities

yves mersch : interview with bloomberg interview with mr yves mersch, member of the executive board of the european central bank, and bloomberg, conducted by mr piotr skolimowski and ms carolynn look on 6 february 2018. * * * bis general manager augustine carstens said in his speech in frankfurt the other day that there is a “ strong case ” for authorities to rein in digital currencies because of their links to the established financial system. how would you respond? the general manager of the bis is usually also reflecting the views that are expressed around the table when central bankers come together. you won ’ t be surprised to know that we at the ecb are fully in line with his views and we have similar worries, or similar endeavours we are working on. the question is not so much that these virtual currencies ( vcs ) are already at a level that would cause huge disruption in the real economy, but we are currently more concerned about the social and psychological effect they seem to have. in this respect money has to do with confidence and that ’ s why we, central bankers, feel that we have a certain role to play to preserve confidence of the public in our legal tender. there is so much money flowing in that it ’ s like a gold rush – but there is no gold. what specific role can the ecb as a banking supervisor play in reining in digital currencies? it ’ s important to stress that we are a supervisor and not regulator. but supervisors can also impose certain requirements in terms of risk mitigation and prudent behaviour. but by and large, many banks out of their own initiative have already taken clear positions that they will not venture into this gold rush. but that being said, it ’ s not only the question of the bank supervisor. also from the monetary policy perspective, the central bank has a mandate to promote sound and efficient payment systems. from that point of view, it remains appropriate that we keep a clear distinction between virtual private initiatives, not backed by anyone, and trusted public currencies that are legal tender and backed by whole economies. are you coordinating your efforts with other authorities? we are obviously in a constant dialogue with other authorities, whose mandate is to maintain the integrity of the markets, protection of investors and of consumers. therefore we should have a deeper reflection on where the action is needed. there is an area of investor protection, then there is oversight of the financial market infrastructure. if