public and private investments. this all calls for investments in global public goods to be increasingly managed at the eu level. two open questions remain. how do we solve the triffin dilemma and what role will europe play in the global financial safety net ( gfsn )? a more international page 6 sur 7 euro will provide increased options to store global liquidity, but the goal will obviously not be to turn the euro into a dominant currency. on the contrary, we would aim for reliance on multiple currencies to offer stability to the international financial system through diversification of risks. regarding the global safety net, the euro area generated a quantum jump for the regional layer of the gfsn in creating the european stability mechanism ( esm ). in addition, the euro area countries were instrumental for the strengthening of the imf resources and the sdr allocation and rechannelling. the weight of the euro in the sdr basket should increase in the future in proportion of the increase of its international use. finally, the eurosystem is already providing international liquidity through existing swap lines and repo facilities with other central banks, and stands ready to do more if and when warranted. 2. invoicing international trade with the eu ranking as the world largest trading block, the euro has ample margin to improve as an international trade invoicing currencyvi. the choice of invoice currency is a complex and largely private phenomenonvii, partly driven by the structure of global value chains, which are being reshuffled. developing as an invoicing currency, for instance in energy markets or in the context of free trade agreements, would be important steps to gain a global role. viii indeed, it would create the need to store euros for future trades, and consequently lead to the development of a full range of euro - based financial tools. 3. safeguarding cross - border payments by technological advances in international financial infrastructures the euro area should remain on the frontier for cross - border payments, including the g20 agenda adopted in october 2021. the g20 roadmap for 2027 has indeed committed to bring profound improvements in this area including in setting ambitious targets on costs, speed, and accessibility of cross - border payments. but the challenge for all the stakeholders, central banks, regulators as well as the private sector, is to deliver and ultimately meet the expectations page 7 sur 7 of end - users. this remains a strategic priority for the banque de france, which in parallel

has paved the way for a more prospective solution : namely a wholesale cbdc that could be issued by the eurosystem, deploying experiments such as the jura project of cross border wholesale payments in coordination with the bis and the swiss national bank. * * in the 1960s, us secretary of treasury henry fowler warned that " providing reserves and exchanges for the whole world is too much for one country and one currency to bear. " ix to fowler, we answer : “ we in the euro area are happy to help. ” i thank you for your attention and i wish you a good forum. i lagarde, c., challenges along europe ’ s road, speech, 11 may 2022 villeroy de galhau, f., the eurosystem and its monetary policy : from an “ impossible dilemma ” to a possible roadmap for normalisation, speech, 6 may 2022 iii qje paper by fahri and maggiori iv see the council conclusions on achieving the eu ’ s economic and financial strategic autonomy in an open economy : one year after the commission ’ s communication. v villeroy de galhau, f., capital markets union : unleashing europe ’ s potential, speech, 30 november 2021 vi ecb report on rie : only 60 % of extra - euro area exports of goods were invoiced in euro in 2020 vii recent research by amiti, itskhoki and konings viii see the document trade and investments in energy in the context of the eu common commercial policy ix quote available here https : / / www. imf. org / external / np / exr / center / mm / eng / mm _ sc _ 03. htm ii