probably in a position to share skills with others rather than require assistance. nonetheless, the point remains that emerging markets themselves need to formulate their opinions effectively and to be listened to by the key committees. formulating an opinion requires both technical skills and organisation. the uk has been active in strengthening the regulatory skill set in emerging markets. as a major contributor to the financial sector reform and strengthening ( first ) initiative – a us $ 53m multi - donor capacity building programme for financial sectors in developing countries – we believe that resources must be both forthcoming and targeted appropriately. such targeting requires co - ordination between donors and must be in response to the real needs of a country. to this end we see it as imperative that there is effective follow up to the imf ’ s fsap missions to channel technical assistance to where it is most needed. it is also important for individual regulators in developed markets to contribute to capacity development elsewhere. the growing interconnectedness of the financial system means it is in our interests to do so. sometimes bilateral links can be valuable, especially where the legal and regulatory systems are similar, in former colonies or territories perhaps. at the fsa we have a practice of receiving secondments from other regulators, which is valuable for us, and we hope for them. perhaps more relevant for singapore is ensuring that emerging markets ’ concerns and experiences are heard. a thousand different voices can be lost in the clamour so it is important that objections are raised in an organised way, for example through regional organisations. then the international committees themselves must ensure their consultation processes are meaningful and wide - ranging. though this combination of adjusting committee structures, and membership, enhancing technical assistance and encouraging effective consultation we can ensure that regulatory standards are truly global and fit for purpose in countries at all stages of financial market development. conclusion so to return, finally, to my introductory question – is the global regulatory system fit for purpose in the 21st century? – it would be impossible, i think, to respond with a categorical ‘ yes ’. there are a number of enhancements which need to be made. in each case there are signs of progress. but there will be a continuing need to push and prod, if we are to overcome the forces of inertia built into the existing cumbersome system. the new chairman of the financial stability forum will find a sizeable agenda of work in his in - tray.

europe ( for example, denmark, germany and the united kingdom ), the authorities had intervened precisely to avoid the collapse of banks that were in difficulty ( bear sterns, northern rock, ikb and roskilde ). in the light of this assessment, it is legitimate to ask why the failure of lehman brothers was not prevented. various theories have been put forward in this regard. the one i find most credible is that there was a political veto, at the highest levels, against the use of public funds to rescue an investment bank. indeed, right after the bank ’ s failure was announced, the us secretary of the treasury himself confirmed that, “ i never once considered that it was appropriate to put taxpayer money on the line in resolving lehman brothers ”. 1 the timing of the lehman crisis also played a key role. only a few days later the us treasury had taken on the sizeable debt of fannie mae and freddie mac, a decision which was criticised in the press. straight after this step was taken, it appeared that the us treasury did not want to be charged with using “ i never once considered that it was appropriate to put taxpayer money on the line in resolving lehman brothers ”, dow jones, 15 october 2008. public money and practising what has been called a kind of “ financial socialism ”. there is no doubt that the pressure of public opinion played a role. we could stop here, with a negative assessment of the political decision taken by the us administration, which proved to be wrong. however, perhaps the problem might be more complex than that. as subsequent events have shown, in particular when the first rescue package was rejected by the us congress, opposition to providing the financial sector with public funds came not only from within the government, but also from parliament. the members of the us congress, many of whom face voters at the beginning of november, feared that such a decision would compromise their re - election. there was opposition to rescuing lehman brothers, therefore, not only from within the administration, but also from congress and, more broadly, from public opinion. in other words, the decision was largely the result of a democratic process. ultimately, it was the us citizens who did not want to rescue lehman brothers. this analysis is not restricted to the lehman brothers case alone. even in countries where bankruptcies were successfully avoided through intervention, the decision was fiercely criticised by the respective parliaments and public opinion. in some cases, it was only possible to take the decision because