that the shift from depository intermediation to professional asset management has increased tail risk to socially excessive levels and has left the world more vulnerable to rare but potentially very serious tail events ; he suggests some ways in which regulation should be increased. in assessing this argument, we might find it useful to separate the question of whether the world is riskier from the question of whether systemic risk has risen. the increased ability to disentangle risk and tailor risk profiles should mean that risk has come to be lodged more in line with investor appetites, a change that has probably tended to reduce the price of risk and encouraged riskier capital projects to be funded. but individual investors at greater risk need not imply increased systemic risk fatter tails and greater potential for losses feeding back on the macroeconomy. in fact, industrial economies have been marked by much less variability in output and inflation over the past twenty years. many reasons have been given for this so - called great moderation, but developments in financial markets have likely played a role in making the economy more resilient. as a consequence of greater diversification of risks and of sources of funds, problems in the financial sector are less likely to intensify shocks hitting the economy and financial market. the experience of 2001 - 03 is instructive. unusually large declines in equity prices and increases in defaults and risk spreads - surely tail events by most definitions - reduced wealth and raised the cost of capital but did not aggravate the downturn by impinging on the flow of funds. financial intermediaries were not so troubled as to cut off the provision of credit, and in any case, many borrowers had alternative sources of funds. in addition, we have not seen a clear upward trend in volatility of financial asset prices over the past twenty - five years, as one might expect if herding had increased in importance. judging from options prices, market participants are expecting the volatility of financial asset prices to be damped in the future ; they are also requiring lower - term premiums for placing funds for longer terms. i do not share raghu's nostalgia for the systemic - risk implications of bank - dominated finance. oldstyle crises involving impaired depository institutions had substantial spillover effects ; their repair took time, during which economic activity was affected ; and emergency measures to deal with them often involved moral hazard because they were aimed at stabilizing ailing intermediaries. i think we would all agree that the industrial

3 ) for more details, see minutes of the september 2024 ipom. sources : central bank of chile, national customs service and the tax administration. figure 5 inflation annual inflation expectations ( surveys ) ( annual change, percent ) total ( percent ) core ( without volatiles ) eee 1y eof 1y eee 2y eof 2y ( 1 ) series consider the 2023 cpi reference basket and the splice made by the central bank of chile. median of responses are shown. ( 3 ) eof considers the survey from the first half in january 2018. from february 2018 onwards, it considers the last survey published in the month. sources : central bank of chile and national statistics institute. figure 6 currencies ( 1 ) ( 2 ) interest rates on nominal 10 - year bonds ( 1 ) ( index 1. jan. 24 = 100 ) ( difference with respect to 1. jan. 24, basis points ) u. s. eurozone chile latin america jan. 24 mar. 24 may. 24 jul. 24 u. s. eurozone chile latin america ( right axis ) sep. 24 - 100 - 25 - 200 jan. 24 mar. 24 may. 24 jul. 24 sep. 24 ( 1 ) for latin america, considers the simple average of brazil, mexico, colombia and peru. ( 2 ) dashed vertical line marks statistical cut - off of june 2024 ipom. ( 3 ) an increase in the index indicates a depreciation of the currency and a decrease an appreciation. for the u. s., the multilateral dollar index ( inverted ) calculated by the federal reserve is used. sources : central bank of chile and bloomberg. table 1 gdp growth projections ( * ) ( annual change, percent ) june 3. 0 % june 1. 5 % june 1. 5 % 2. 25 % 2. 5 % 2. 5 % september 2. 75 % 2. 25 % september 1. 5 % september 1. 5 % 2. 5 % 2. 5 % ( * ) projections included in each monetary policy report. symbols on the right indicate change compared to june 2024 projection. source : central bank of chile. figure 7 private consumption projections ( * ) gfcf projections ( * ) ( annual change, percent ) ( annual change, percent ) - 3 - 6 - 4 - 9 - 8 24 ( f ) 25 ( f ) 26 ( f ) 24 ( f ) 25 ( f ) 26 ( f ) -