routine toolkit of monetary policy implementation. given that tradition, it may be a natural step, under non - standard circumstances, to adapt this procedure by significantly expanding the volume of purchases and focusing on governments bonds with longer maturities. the eurosystem comes from a different tradition. for us, “ reverse transactions ” with banks – on the basis of repurchase agreements or collateralised loans – are the single most important – and in many respects exclusive – instrument in open market operations. given that tradition, it has been a natural step to extend the maturity of our refinancing operations and make adjustments to the collateral requirements. second, principles need to be stressed very firmly. for reasons known to all of us, the euro area has a clear separation of responsibilities. the ecb ’ s enhanced credit support fully respects this separation. third, preparations for exit are important. the governing council will ensure that the measures taken are quickly unwound, and the liquidity provided is absorbed, once the macroeconomic environment improves. long - term refinancing operations ( like operations with shorter maturity ) provide liquidity over a fixed time horizon and run off in a fully predictable way. by contrast, the unwinding of outright purchases typically requires an additional decision, namely whether to hold the securities to maturity – and if not, when to sell. the route taken by the eurosystem limits such decisions to our covered bonds purchases and for the rest relies on built - in mechanisms for the re - absorption of liquidity. by their nature, fiscal policies lack a similarly strong built - in mechanism when it comes to the unwinding of stimulus. discretionary policies need to be invoked to engineer an exit from the current degree of fiscal expansion. a return to sound, sustainable public finances, thus strengthening overall macroeconomic stability, must be ensured. euro area governments should prepare and communicate ambitious and realistic fiscal exit and consolidation strategies within the framework of the stability and growth pact. conclusions let me draw to a close. i have described to you the profound changes in the environment in which we have operated over the past two years. these changes have made it unavoidable that we take monetary policy measures that are unprecedented in nature, scope and magnitude. these measures fall into two categories : first, standard measures in the form of interest rate changes ; and second, a number of non - standard measures, which together constitute the ecb ’ s policy toolkit of enhanced credit support. these are special and primarily

jorg asmussen : introductory statement for the panel discussion on “ the g20 and the future of global economic governance ” statement by mr jorg asmussen, member of the executive board of the european central bank, at the iif annual membership meeting, washington dc, 12 october 2013. * * * it is a pleasure to be on this panel today to discuss the g20 ’ s future. this is a topic to which i feel close : i have been involved in g20 meetings of finance ministers and central bank governors since this forum first met in berlin in 1999. i also had the honour to serve as the german chancellor ’ s sherpa in the leaders ’ summit in cannes in 2011. the elevation of the g20 as the premier forum for international economic cooperation in the pittsburgh leaders ’ summit was a welcome development in its own right. it reflects the recognition of the growing importance of emerging economies and the need to foster a continued informal dialogue between them and advanced economies. the g20 ’ s earlier achievements, especially at the washington ( 2008 ), london and pittsburgh ( both 2009 ) to the seoul ( 2010 ) summits, were quite impressive, both as regards the content and the time frame in which they were accomplished. they included inter alia a coordinated policy response to the cyclical downturn, the launch of the imf ’ s governance reform and an increase of imf resources, as well as political impetus to a broad financial reform agenda. questions about the g20 ’ s legitimacy were raised at times by countries not represented. but the group ’ s effectiveness in pushing ahead reforms provided the necessary backing in “ leading by example ” and what one could call the “ output legitimacy ” of the g20. more recently, however, the g20 seems to have lost its earlier momentum. the case for acting in unison has diminished now that the most acute phase of the global financial crisis is behind us. what we observe is a quite common phenomenon, however. while informal formats gain importance in times of crisis, there is a clear tendency to revert back to the “ input legitimacy ” of the more formal formats and gatherings of pre - crisis times. it is interesting to note that the imf world economic outlook this time speaks about increasing heterogeneity1 in countries ’ economic performance whereas only six months ago the talk was of a 3 - speed recovery and three years ago we had a one - speed economic cycle in the global economy. against the background of this changed global environment