samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
no, i am not making a bid for the fca – i like twin peaks thank you ; and the pra and the fca work together, and martin and i put great emphasis on that happening. but as i said earlier we are in many ways in the second phase of the financial crisis, and this phase has at its root conduct of business, towards customers, in financial markets, and in areas of public policy such as financial sanctions and anti - money laundering. at its most serious, this confluence of conduct risk can threaten the safety and soundness of firms. let me be clear, as a prudential supervisor i do not condone misconduct, and i support martin and the fca in what they are doing. society expects higher standards, and the pra supports the fca in upholding these standards as part of the global effort to restore trust between financial institutions, regulators and – most importantly – the public. three things strike me as important as part of this effort and i pick these three because they are close to my role and that of the pra and the wider bank of england. first, the fair and effective markets review under my colleague minouche shafik, with martin and charles roxburgh, is vitally important to establish the better standards that society reasonably expects. second, we need better international coordination among authorities to enable conduct risks to be dealt with effectively, but also in ways that do not threaten safety and soundness. that is a high priority. and third, to support credit and borrowing in the economy, and thus growth, we must all work to ensure that people feel confident to use banks and thus overcome the legacy of mistrust from revealed misconduct. the fourth issue on which i want to comment concerns incentives. these lie at the heart of good pro - active supervision, getting the incentives right. unfortunately, we see areas where that has not happened. i want to cover two of those. the first is remuneration. once again there is a lot being said on this subject. my view has not changed. we need a system where senior people who are responsible for the performance of their firms understand that for a reasonable period of time a meaningful proportion of their remuneration is at risk of being taken away. there is nothing new about this ; after all, it is how the traditional partnership system worked. so let me be blunt, the bonus cap is the wrong policy, the debate around it is misguided, and the

/ tlac - press - release /. financial stability board ( 2015 ) ‘ assessing the economic costs and benefits of tlac implementation ’. herring, r j and carmassi, j ( 2014 ) ‘ complexity and systemic risk ’, the oxford handbook of banking, 77. independent commission on banking ( 2011 ) ‘ final report recommendations ’. marques, l b, correa r and sapriza h ( 2013 ) ‘ international evidence on government support and risk taking in the banking sector ’, international monetary fund working paper no 13 / 94. morgan, d p and stiroh, k j ( 2005 ) ‘ too big to fail after all these years ’, frb ny staff report no 220. usher, a p ( 1943 ) the early history of deposit banking in mediterranean europe, harvard university press. bis central bankers ’ speeches
assurances are neither feasible nor realistic. therefore, i continue to encourage bankers to present issues to their supervisors so that the issues can be raised in bilateral or multilateral discussions of specific topics - the process by which issues have been addressed in the past.

look forward to our discussion. 1 these remarks represent my own views, which do not necessarily represent those of the federal reserve board or the federal open market committee. 2 the fed also used its open market operations authority to purchase agency residential and commercial mortgage - backed securities and conducted repo operations with an expanded set of global counterparties. some of the 13 ( 3 ) facilities were versions of those that had been used during the 2008 financial crisis and others were new, such as corporate credit facilities, which directly purchased corporate bonds to support the flow of credit to the economy. all 13 ( 3 ) lending facilities require the approval of the secretary of the treasury. for further details, see board of governors of the federal reserve system ( 2021 ), " funding, credit, liquidity, and loan facilities, " webpage. 2 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches 3 for a further description of these actions, see board of governors of the federal reserve system ( 2021 ), " supervisory and regulatory actions in response to covid19, " webpage. 4 for a discussion of the 13 ( 3 ) lending facilities and their usage, see board of governors of the federal reserve system ( 2020 ), financial stability report ( pdf ) ( washington : board of governors, november ). 5 this issue is most relevant when the assets purchases are those that the fed can purchase using its open market operations authority, including treasury and agency debt and agency - backed mortgage - backed securities. programs to purchase other types of debt would need the approval of the secretary of the treasury under section 13 ( 3 ) of the federal reserve act. 6 for a discussion of potential reforms, see inter - agency working group on treasury market surveillance ( 2021 ), recent disruptions and potential reforms in the u. s. treasury market : a staff progress report ( pdf ) ( washington : u. s. department of the treasury, november ) ; and inter - agency working group on treasury market surveillance ( 2022 ), enhancing the resilience of the u. s. treasury market : 2022 staff progress report ( pdf ) ( washington : u. s. department of the treasury, november ). 3 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches
andreas dombret : the yin and yang of resolving the european sovereign debt crisis speech by dr andreas dombret, member of the executive board of the deutsche bundesbank, at the peterson institute, washington dc, 17 october 2013. * 1. * * introduction ladies and gentlemen thank you for having me here today. it is a great honour to speak at an institution as distinguished as the peterson institute. for more than 30 years now, the institute has provided essential analytical input for the work of policymakers around the world. and when i say policymakers, i explicitly include central banks, as the institute ’ s president, adam posen, has intimate knowledge of our trials and tribulations. he served on the bank of england ’ s monetary policy committee and has worked with many other central banks including the bundesbank. he is therefore in a unique position to provide analysis and advice to central bankers such as myself. such advice is especially valuable in turbulent times such as these. looking back, we see a crisis that has spanned more than six years. it began with turbulence on the us housing market, followed by a global financial crisis, a global recession and a sovereign debt crisis in the euro area. it is this last episode i would like to focus on in my speech. mark twain once said : “ a man who carries a cat by the tail learns something he can learn in no other way ”. applied to the euro area, it seems that we have had the cat by its tail more often than not over the past three years. and as mark twain predicted, we have learnt a lot. we have learnt a lot about the inner workings of the european monetary union – both economically and politically. true, everybody looks at the crisis from a slightly different angle but it seems that most of us have learnt the same lessons. at least in terms of the causes of the crisis, most of us seem to have made the same diagnosis. according to this diagnosis, the main causes of the crisis can be found at the national and at the european level. at the national level, there was high public debt and a lack of competitiveness in those countries that are now at the centre of the crisis. at the european level, there were weaknesses in the institutional framework of monetary union. but if most observers agree on the diagnosis of the crisis, why can ’ t they agree on the appropriate therapy? why is such a vast array of cures proposed? in my speech, i would like to

a surplus. the recession has a contributing factor, but not the only one. we also have a clear improvement in competitiveness based on changes in our labour costs and in productivity. the most pressing problem facing the spanish economy is to restore market confidence. there is no other way to achieve this than meeting the fiscal consolidation targets, completing the clean - up and restructuring of our banking system, continuing with the process of private and public deleveraging and moving ahead with the reforms undertaken to improve our competitiveness. if we manage to make progress on those fronts in 2013, i am confident it will be possible to resume economic growth and to create net employment in 2014. bis central bankers ’ speeches
kiyohiko g nishimura : future of central bank cooperation in asia, latin america and caribbean states remarks by mr kiyohiko g nishimura, deputy governor of the bank of japan, at the boj - cemla seminar on regional financial cooperation, tokyo, 11 october 2012. * 1. * * introduction : central bank cooperation in asia good morning, honorable speakers and distinguished guests. welcome to the annual meetings of the imf / world bank group, and in particular, to this boj / cemla seminar on regional financial cooperation, which is one of the most relevant and pressing issues in our increasingly inter - connected world. today, in my remarks, i would first like to touch upon the history of cooperation among central banks in asia, followed by an assessment of what has been achieved since the asian currency crisis of the late 1990s, and how this helped asia weather the shocks of the current global financial crisis. then i will discuss the issues we face today in this post - crisis world. the bank for international settlement, the bis, is the first name that comes to mind when considering cooperation among central banks. the bis provides opportunities for major central banks to discuss various issues, including international banking standards and global financial stability. 1 however, most asian central banks had to wait until the latter half of the 1990s to become directly involved in bis activities. it was this circumstance that led the bank of japan to propose the establishment of the executives ’ meetings of east asia and pacific central banks, or the emeap, which was officially established in 1991 with the members of eleven economies of east asia and oceania. 2 the emeap plays a particularly important role in promoting the exchange of opinions among practitioners and the maintenance of a surveillance network. member central banks share information at the working group meetings which cover financial markets, banking supervision, payment and settlement systems, and information technology. to take a prominent example, the working group on payment and settlement systems ( wg / pss ) regularly updates its “ red book ”, using methods similar to those adopted by the bis, to explain details of the payment and settlement systems of the member economies. currently, the working group on financial markets ( wg / fm ) is closely monitoring the impact of the european sovereign debt crisis upon financial markets in asia and oceania. 2. two financial crises and asian financial markets in the past two decades, member economies of the emeap have experienced two financial crises : the asian currency crisis of the late

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prevented by inclusion in the bank act 1998 of exceptions to general dutch law which are specifically based on the treaty. nonetheless, some provisions in the dutch civil code might still conflict with the treaty or the statute of the european system of central banks. the bank act 1998 hence contains the provision that where this occurs, the provisions of the dutch civil code shall not apply to the bank. public body the third approach to the legal regimes applying to the bank relates to the fact that the bank holds public authority. pursuant to the bank act, the bank exercises public - law powers and is consequently a public body in terms of the general administrative law act. as emerges from the bank act, the bank, in exercising its powers, is not hierarchically subordinate to the minister of finance and is hence an independent public body which performs its public tasks at a remove from the minister. the minister need thus be less concerned with details and can concentrate more on the main thrust of policies. however, the minister remains accountable to parliament for the relevant policy areas. he must provide the required conditions, such as sound legislation and an adequate set of instruments to allow a public body to operate efficiently and effectively. as the minister should also monitor the quality of the public body ’ s performance, he needs the requisite instruments such the right to ( aggregated ) information, budget approval, receipt of an annual report and annual accounts, the right to appoint and dismiss directors and members of the supervisory organs and to intervene if the public body is neglecting its task. the minister ’ s instruments must, however, be geared to the specific nature of the relevant public body. this applies particularly to the bank which, for various reasons, is an exceptional public body. first and foremost because the bank ’ s status as public body only covers its dutch powers under public law and not those powers which it exercises on the basis of european community law, namely its system tasks. and secondly because the treaty requires that the bank, as part of the system, shall function completely independently from political influence. this raises the question whether the minister has enough scope to exercise his responsibility for the bank ’ s non - system tasks, including the supervision of financial institutions. the answer is yes, provided that the instruments available to the minister are carefully selected. moreover, the bank is an exceptional public body because of the concept ‘ supervision at a distance ’, meaning that for supervisors of financial institutions, the distance from political influence is an essential point of departure for the independent and expert exercise of

- system tasks are concerned. the bank can hence rightly be termed a ‘ triplex sui generis ’ institution. it plays on several legal chessboards. in performing its tasks, the bank repeatedly faces the challenge of succeeding in this simultaneous game.
by regulatory actions. apart from having built up a significant capital base reflected in the capital to risk - weighted assets ratio ( crar ) for the sector of 12 %, specific steps have been taken to meet the interest rate risk. first, separate provision for capital against market risk has been introduced. second, a gradual building up of investment fluctuation reserve up to 5 % of the markedto - market portfolio ( out of tax - free profits ) by march 2006 has been mandated, and several banks have already achieved the target. third, an enabling risk management environment has been provided to banks to hedge their risks through vanilla derivative instruments. fourth, conservative accounting norms followed did not allow banks to book unrealized gains. fifth, as a one time measure, banks were allowed to transfer securities to htm, after booking the mtm losses against these. thus, banks in india, in general, have the resilience to withstand some rise in interest rates. impact on the real sector readjustment of the currencies would also have implications for the real sector. significant readjustment of the currencies and rise in interest rates could slow down the global growth. this would entail a reduction in export opportunities and reduction in investment demand for emes, in general, many of which depend on export demand to sustain their growth. rise in interest rates, by slowing down spending, may have a negative impact on the global economic growth. thus, readjustment of the currencies may affect several emes in a significant way. the impact of any slowdown on india may be assessed with reference to two factors. first, india's economy is largely domestic - demand driven. while india ’ s exports constituted 11. 5 per cent of gdp, its share in the world trade is only 0. 8 per cent. second, india's exports basket is fairly diversified. some concerns arise with regard to the implications for employment in case of a slowdown in the exports sector, especially with regard to the significant specialisation in bpo / it enable services. rapid job growth that absorbs the huge supply of agricultural labour into its industrial work force is necessary for socio - economic stability in india. any negative impact on employment resulting in substantial decrease of real earnings and widening income inequality is likely to reduce overall welfare and increase the cost of structural adjustments required, especially in the absence of meaningful social safety nets. monetary and prudential measures as responses the outlook for output growth in india has

and unambiguously free from insolvency risk. bis central bankers ’ speeches
muhammad bin ibrahim : future responsibility and response - ability proofing compliance - keynote address by mr muhammad bin ibrahim, governor of the central bank of malaysia ( bank negara malaysia ), at the 9th international conference on financial crime and terrorism financing ( ifctf ) " future proofing compliance : responsibility and response - ability ", kuala lumpur, 4 october 2017. * * * " compliance, past and future " this is an important and serious gathering. i am encouraged to see many leaders and key compliance officers of the financial industry here at the international conference on financial crimes and terrorism financing, signifying the industry ’ s commitment to a safer and more secured financial system. it is worth repeating that public trust and confidence in the financial system cannot be compromised. the cost of financial crimes and terrorism financing are staggering. based on the united nations office on drugs and crime ( unodc ), money laundering transactions are estimated to cost economies between 2 % to 5 % of global gdp. this equals to usd1 to 2 trillion annually. it is a humongous amount. beyond monetary terms, these activities have destructive consequences for the lives of many, especially the poor and underprivileged. we must do better on this if we really want to ‘ future - proof ’ our financial system. three points are worth mentioning on compliance : first, it is not the end, it is a means to an end ; second, it should be viewed within a broader context of a financial institution ’ s responsibilities to society ; and third, it should be approached in partnership with other key participants in the financial system. compliance as a means to an end the past decade has been a turning point for compliance. arising from major systemic failures of governance, regulators have since elevated the importance of compliance. for good reason, this has led to tighter regulations, greater scrutiny and stronger enforcement. the industry has in turn, invested heavily in their compliance function. it is estimated that some firms could spend up to 10 % of their revenues on compliance within the next few years. this is by no means an insignificant amount. yet, as we have seen over the recent years, this has not put a stop to money laundering and terrorism financing. a case in point is a major bank in the asia pacific region which is being investigated for more than 50, 000 violations of money laundering and terrorism financing. perhaps we need to take a step back and question if the industry has the right understanding of compliance. if the motivation for the increased compliance is merely

/ 4 bis central bankers'speeches instead, compliance needs deep understanding. it needs to consider incentives, ethics and professional conduct. it needs to leverage on mutually reinforcing partnerships. it needs to fulfil its responsibility to contribute to the well - being of society. after all, compliance is an enabler, it is not the end outcome that we seek. this is how we should future - proof our financial system and compliance. on that note, i wish all of you a productive conference. 4 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches
at between 1 and 1. 5 percentage point for the period 2014 - 18. what is more, since 2013 the euro area has created 11 million jobs. you may not like low rates ; indeed the markets anticipate, reasonably in my view, that short - term rates are close to bottoming out. but there can be no doubt about two very real facts that unite us on the governing council. our decisions are guided solely by our mandate of price stability, in the face of inflation that is currently too low at less than 1 %. given the recent slowdown in economic activity – starting with germany – these low short - term rates must and will remain in place : it would undeniably be a mistake to raise ecb rates now. we are all realists here, so we should focus on two issues : - the first is clarifying the definition of the ecb ’ s inflation target, and above all sharing it better with economic agents – businesses and households. this is crucial to allow them to better adjust their inflation expectations ; that is precisely the aim of the strategic focus we are going to launch with christine lagarde. - the second issue is limiting the negative effects of low rates on financial stability, and in particular on banks and insurers. we do not lack the tools to do this – you with your strategic adaptation, and us with our “ macroprudential ” policies. but this brings me to my second part. ii. meeting three major challenges to strengthen euro area banks. i would like to share with you a strong belief : europe needs strong banks. a dynamic economy requires a strong banking industry ; it's true in france, and it's also true in germany. undeniably, euro area banks are stronger than they were ten years ago. as a result of regulations and of their streamlining efforts, they page 5 sur 7 were able to significantly shore up their balance sheets. in particular, their solvency and liquidity have improved, while the weight of npl has drastically declined : their common equity tier 1 ratios ( cet1 ) rose from 9 % at end - 2009 to 14. 6 % in june 2019. in addition, the major german banks themselves have seen their npl amount fall more than twofold over the past five years, sliding from eur 81 billion at end - 2014iii to eur 33 billion at end - march 2019. euro area banks are nevertheless experiencing a serious problem of profitability, which is

deploy to tackle them. let me close by thanking you for being with us today! 4 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches