the monetary policy meeting in april 2003 the riksbank judged that inflation towards the end of the forecast period would be somewhat below target if the repo rate were left unchanged. a strict application of our simple rule would have resulted in a repo rate cut, but since temporary fluctuations in energy prices were the chief reason for the inflation forecast being below 2 per cent, the riksbank decided to leave the repo rate unchanged. in order to clarify that the riksbank did not wish to bring inflation back to the target over the normal two - year horizon, the riksbank decided on this occasion to place particular emphasis on an inflation measure that was not as strongly affected by the fluctuations in energy prices. how has the strategy worked? so how has this strategy worked, i. e. highlighting on different occasions other indices than the cpi as a way of illustrating that there sometimes may be reason to depart from the rule that cpi inflation should be 2 per cent one to two years ahead? with hindsight we can conclude that despite out attempts to be explicit in our communication, it appears that we haven't got our message across in all respects. the strategy does indeed seem to have been successful insofar as we have seldom been asked, especially in the last few years, why the repo rate has not been changed in spite of an inflation forecast that is above or below target. sometimes, however, and particularly during a couple of months in autumn 2003, the interpretation has been that the riksbank has " changed target variable ". but this has not actually been the case ; the inflation target is and has always been defined in terms of the rate of increase in the cpi, even if we've often made it clear that policy in the time horizon in question has been based on a different index, mainly und1x. permit me to return to last year's discussion about energy prices in order to illustrate what i believe could be one of the problems. as i mentioned, the repo rate was not lowered in april 2003 despite the fact that our forecasts pointed to below - target cpi inflation two years ahead. the reason was that the forecast of cpi inflation was depressed by energy price effects that were judged to be transitory and that were expected to subside just beyond the forecast horizon. however, the measure that was considered a better reflection of longer - term cyclical inflation, und1x excluding energy, was forecast to be in line with the inflation target at the end of

which was rooted in the us housing market and caused a synchronised global recession, should continue to serve as a sober reminder of this. let me briefly now turn to the second thing on everyone's mind when they think about the economy - the ringgit. when it comes to the ringgit, bnm's role is to make sure that its value does not swing too fast or too much either way, and to allow an orderly price discovery. under a flexible exchange rate, it is reasonable for the ringgit to fluctuate from time to time. these adjustments allow the domestic economy to adjust to global economic and financial shocks. we saw this during the federal reserve's rapid and large interest rate adjustments last year, which caused huge shocks to the global economy. at one point, the ringgit declined as much as 11. 5 % between end - march to early november, before appreciating by 7. 8 % towards the year end. yet the real economy grew by 8. 7 % during the year, thanks in no small part to the ringgit's role as a shock absorber. 2 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches in recent weeks, the ringgit has come under renewed pressure – underscoring the need for more than short - term solutions. we need structural reforms that will strengthen our growth prospects and encourage more investment opportunities. this will increase demand for the ringgit and secure a more enduring appreciation in its value over time. ultimately, to secure our future, the country must stay the course in implementing vital reforms. the issues we need to address are not new. but history and the passage of time should inform how we move forward. we must fortify our defences against crises. we must critically examine our priorities to increase our growth potential and meet sustainable goals. we must rebuild the buffers we have drawn down on to strengthen our resilience to future shocks. and we must enhance our capacity to adapt and change in order to manage risks and exploit opportunities that we may not yet see today. ladies and gentlemen, for many of the challenges malaysia faces, the solutions require a whole - of - nation approach. hence the theme of this symposium – " structural reforms for a stronger malaysia ". today will see in - depth discussions on various issues that my team has been working on in recent years. there will be seven sessions delving into topics such as digitalisation in the payments sector, financial sector policies, and broader economic and monetary concerns