is related to actual or expected recessionary situations. its effect on inflation is expected to persist for some time ahead ; however, it will only be a transitory one. regardless of these conclusions, the bank of albania is constantly monitoring the situation. it has all the proper instruments to prevent long - term negative effects that may arise from low inflation, and stands ready to use them, if necessary. our projections suggest that the albanian economy will improve progressively over the next two years. the improvement of the growth rate will contribute to strengthening the economic and financial equilibriums in albania, and will be a determinant factor for the return of inflation to target in the medium term - horizon. the balance of risks surrounding this projection is mostly on the down side. thus, the expansion of economic activity continues to be decelerated by unfavorable economic developments in the euro area, low oil prices in global markets, as well as the still hesitating behavior of many economic and financial agents to undertake long - term business projects. bis central bankers ’ speeches against this backdrop, the bank of albania deems that economic policies and structural reforms should focus on the following : • continuation of the actual combination of economic policies, based on the stimulating monetary policy and the consolidating fiscal policy. the monetary policy will remain accommodative over this horizon and the intensity of the monetary stimulus may be further strengthened if that is judged as necessary. fiscal consolidation mitigates the structural weakness in albania and creates more space for expansion in the private sector. • implementation, without delay, of the plan of measures for tackling and finding a final solution for non - performing loans. this plan seeks to reduce the crediting risk and increase the bank credit supply in albania. its success is an essential precondition for the medium and long - term growth of the albanian economy. • acceleration of structural reforms, especially in relation to completing the infrastructure, improving the business climate, expanding the knowledge, and improving the labor market. in conclusion, i would like to once again thank the imf mission for the useful and constructive talks. thank you for your attention! bis central bankers ’ speeches

in the upturn : patterns had been broken, parallels with previous crises thanks to resolute action on the part of central banks and other authorities the crisis entered a less acute phase. however, the financial markets were still not functioning effectively and support measures were still needed. but, a total collapse had been avoided and it was possible to see signs of a normalisation on some financial markets. nevertheless, the situation was highly uncertain. it was also difficult to assess the real economy. did the major falls in gdp in sweden and abroad mean that potential gdp had declined? in many countries the households had experienced substantial falls in house prices. to what extent would the need of the households to strengthen their balance sheets mean that consumption would decline and that the ability of monetary policy to stimulate the economy would be weakened? 5 it was clear that the economic patterns that prevailed before the financial crisis had largely been broken. in such a situation it was natural to study the form of the economic recovery following previous crises. the overriding conclusion that could then be drawn was that the recovery would be slower than normal. 6 however, it is also the case that every crisis is unique in many respects and there were circumstances that pointed in the opposite direction. among other things, the emerging economies in asia, led by china, recovered relatively quickly and became something of a driving force for the recovery in the rest of the world. another positive factor was that growth was rather good around the world when the crisis began. 7 with hindsight, it can be noted that the recovery in many areas, and not least in sweden ( see figure 1 above ), has been much more rapid than we could have expected. as can be seen in figure 2, the riksbank began to increase the repo rate somewhat earlier than predicted during the most severe phase of the crisis and the repo - rate path was given a somewhat more “ top heavy ” profile. it is natural to try to learn from previous crises, but at the same time we must be careful not to draw too far - reaching historical parallels. in the midst of the crisis there was, for example, sometimes a slightly careless tendency to refer to the swedish crisis of the 1990s, despite the fact that the circumstances at that time were entirely different. my point here is that if somewhere at the back of your head you have a preconceived idea of how a crisis should develop then it is easy to miss signals that may indicate that the course of the crisis is moving in