might also add here the acquisition by the dgf of shares valued at €1, 803 million of nova caixa galicia banco catalunya banc held by minority investors in these banks following the burden - sharing exercises undertaken, and the subscription by the frob of capital and subordinated debt instruments of sareb for a total of €2, 192 million. the second type of public financial aid refers to the so - called asset protection schemes ( apss ) or other guarantees offered by the dgf or the frob under resolution or restructuring processes. apss consist of the assumption by the guarantor of a majority portion of the risk associated with specific portfolios of the beneficiary bank. these apss, therefore, involve a cost that depends on the actual losses incurred whose real amount will only be known at the end of the period over which the guarantee is in force. in any event, the expected value of this cost shall be regularly evaluated by independent experts so that the guarantor agency ( the frob or the dgf ) may make the related provision in its financial statements. finally, the third type of public aid comprises state - backed guarantees of debt issues by certain banks and the extraordinary credit facilities offered to provide liquidity to the sector. as regards these guarantees, no loss from these contingencies is expected to arise for the state, which will in turn receive revenue in the form of fees and commissions. currently, 2 69 % of the guarantees granted have been returned and the termination process is expected to continue in accordance with the redemption of the issues. likewise, all amounts drawn down on the credit facilities were duly repaid and the other available facilities have been settled following the recapitalisation or, where appropriate, disposal of the recipient banks. as of today, therefore, the public assistance granted is essentially in the form of the capital contributions made and the guarantees offered. that said, not all of the public assistance granted that i have described involves a direct cost to the taxpayer, since the banking industry has also contributed via the dgf. hence, to estimate the direct cost to the taxpayer of the aid provided to banks, we should first consider the amounts paid out by the frob to these banks, add this to the expected cost of the apss extended by the frob ( at banco de valencia and caja sur ) and of other guarantees and coverage offered by it in connection with resolution processes, and subtract the amounts recouped or

expected to be recouped. that is to say, we should firstly calculate the funds paid out by the frob to purchase shares or contingently convertible bonds, which amount to €53, 553 million, adding these to the estimated cost of the apss and other guarantees granted in resolution processes which, on the latest valuations available, account for €2, 087 million. from this amount it would be necessary to subtract the recovery of the amounts disbursed through the redemption of convertible bonds subscribed by the frob or the disposal of the frob ’ s shareholdings in the banks receiving aid. here, the €1, 760 million from the sale of as at 30 april 2014. bis central bankers ’ speeches ncg and the return of the aid granted to banca civica by caixabank3 should be recorded. further, the convertible bonds subscribed by the frob in caja3 ( absorbed by ibercaja ), ceiss ( absorbed by unicaja ) and liberbank, are highly likely to be redeemed before 2017, entailing the return of €1, 135 million. the most uncertain element of the recoverable amounts is the estimation of the outcome of the sale of catalunya banc, currently under way, and of the divestment of bfa / bankia and bmn. however, it is likely that these disposals will entail an appreciable lessening of the cost that the restructuring of the financial system has involved for taxpayers. in any event, the figures are sizeable. however, in terms of gdp they are not higher than those recorded in other european countries during the financial crisis despite the fact that, in most of them, banks have not had to face a real shock with an impact on the scale of that of the collapse of the real estate sector in spain. as discussed earlier, the banking industry – via the deposit guarantee fund – has also contributed notably to stabilising the financial sector. this contribution has been possible thanks to the maintenance at all times, despite the severity of the economic and financial crisis, of appreciable financial soundness at most institutions, representing more than 80 % of the sector as a whole. the dgf ’ s support was in the specific form of direct injections into cam, unnim and ccm ( for a value of €7, 942 million ), the apss