the fsf included only 11 jurisdictions ( all of which were advanced economies ), the fsb includes 24 jurisdictions and 73 representatives, which include all the members of the g20 and of which 10 are emerging market economies. in fostering global financial stability, the actions of the fsb have the potential to affect the global economy and financial system in important ways. success in promoting global financial stability should benefit everybody, through more sustainable and stronger economic growth. at the same time, financial stability policy will also affect institutions and markets beyond the fsb ’ s membership. recognizing the wide - reaching effects of its work, the fsb must seek input from a broad range of stakeholders, each of whom brings a different perspective to the issues under consideration. while we are directly accountable to the g20, we are, through the g20, accountable to all of the people affected by our actions. in my view, that means we must engage in genuine, substantial dialogue with all of these stakeholders, to a greater and more effective degree than we have in the past. let me take an example that may be of particular relevance to many of you here tonight : our regional consultative groups or rcgs. these are six groups around the globe — the americas, europe, the middle east and north africa, sub - saharan africa, the commonwealth of independent states, and asia — that bring together fsb members with about 70 additional jurisdictions. these groups help the fsb get broader input into its policy development and improve our outreach efforts. each rcg meets once or twice a year to discuss policy development, regional and global financial vulnerabilities, and other current topics of particular interest to the respective region. for instance, topics discussed at the last meeting in asia included capital flow volatility, cyber resilience of financial institutions, and fintech. these rcgs are great in concept, but they have struggled in practice. we have already begun a study to look back at how the rcgs have operated since their creation in 2011, how they interact with the fsb, and what best practices have been learned. even while that study is underway, i am committed to improving our mechanisms for reaching out to countries outside the fsb for genuine learning about the effects of fsb actions. i plan to attend a number of rcg meetings each year because of the importance i place on making sure these groups are truly useful tools, and we will improve these vital conduits of two - way information in order to improve

in place for long enough to have effects that we can measure and analyze. for those reforms, we need to 3 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches ask several key questions. first, to what extent are those reforms having the intended effects and building a more resilient financial system? second, have those reforms had any unintended, adverse effects that we can address? these first two questions are, perhaps, apparent. we should also ask a third question, however, that is equally important : can we achieve a strong level of financial resilience with reforms that are more efficient, simple, transparent, and tailored? if so, we owe it to everyone affected by the policies recommended by the fsb to try, because there is a strong public interest in the efficiency of the financial sector, just as there is in its safety and soundness. if reforms are unnecessarily burdensome and we can achieve strong resiliency more efficiently and simply, we should be able to boost sustainable financial and economic activity, thus benefitting everyone. evaluating reforms in light of these questions requires rigor — in terms of the selection of evaluation topics, the choice of analytical methods, the assessment of effects, and the development of policy conclusions. this rigor is critical for the quality and credibility of the evaluation work. for this reason, the fsb developed a clear evaluation framework, under which the evaluations are based, as much as possible, on quantitative data to measure the costs and benefits of reforms. equally critical to a successful review is a truly open mindset with which to evaluate the relevant data. one public measure of whether we are doing this review process well will be whether we recommend any improvements or revisions on the basis of it. in any system as complex and consequential as the body of post - crisis financial regulations, there will always be aspects — and sometimes material aspects — that can be improved on the basis of experience and analysis. a credible review process that is both rigorous and dispassionate will find a few. last year, the fsb completed the first two evaluations under its framework, of the effects of reform on infrastructure fin ance and the clearing of derivative contracts. we are currently engaged in work examining the effects of reforms on the financing of small and medium enterprises, which are the lifeblood of many of the world ’ s economies. we will consult publicly on the findings of this evaluation in june, ahead of the g20 summit in osaka.