##tisation certainly spreads existing risks, it may in fact encourage the creation of further risks, particularly by relaxing the incentives for banks to screen and monitor borrowers in order to alleviate the informational asymmetries associated with credit contracts. 16 in addition, it has been argued that the markets for securitised loans and credit derivatives may have failed to spread risks as effectively as expected and, by contrast, may have exacerbated information asymmetries, probably as a result of their opacity and the complexity of the underlying contracts. more generally, the recent turmoil has highlighted a number of weaknesses in the credit markets, namely in the areas of transparency, valuation, risk management practices, the current prudential framework and market functioning. however, a number of recommendations have been put forward by a wide range of fora and organisations ( e. g. the financial stability forum ) that should be fully implemented in order to restore the public ’ s confidence in the ability of securitisation to contribute to social welfare. to sum up, financial systems provide an important contribution to productivity, innovation and non - inflationary economic growth in the long term. central banks have a keen interest in ensuring their orderly and efficient functioning since this is essential for the smooth conduct of monetary policy and for the safeguarding of financial stability. see for instance altunbas, y., l. gambacorta and d. marques ( 2007 ), “ securitisation and the bank lending channel ”, ecb working paper 838. for a review of the development of the literature on the credit channel see bernanke, b. ( 2007 ), “ the financial accelerator and the credit channel ”, speech at the fed atlanta conference on “ the credit channel of monetary policy in the twenty - first century ”, 15 june. see rajan, r. ( 2005 ), “ has financial development made the world riskier? ”, nber wp 11728 and sufi a. and a. mian ( 2008 ) “ the consequences of mortgage credit expansion : evidence from the 2007 mortgage default crisis ”, paper presented at the may 2008 federal reserve bank of chicago banking structure conference.

with respect to the eurosystem ’ s own collateral eligibility criteria and the calibration of its risk control framework. as the work carried out by the fsb has shown, the actual set of information to adequately gauge systemic and firm - level risks arising from securities financing transactions is as a matter of fact rather straightforward. assuming a specific home - currency for the transactions covered, six transaction specific information items are essential : ( 1 ) the counterparty of the transaction, ( 2 ) the principal amount, ( 3 ) the interest rate or lending fee, ( 4 ) information on underlying collateral ( including type, issuer, maturity, currency and valuation of the collateral ), ( 5 ) information on the applied haircut as well as ( 6 ) the tenor or maturity of the transaction. i would add to these also information about re - use of securities. the workshop today intends to assess the grounds designing an infrastructure and data collection set - up ensuring confidentiality, efficiency in the data transmission, but also looking for potential synergies, and ensuring through the publication of different levels of data aggregation to relevant stakeholders that this exercise can be beneficial to regulators or supervisors as well as market participants. the involvement of all relevant stakeholders from the very beginning should allow that synergies can be explored and benefits reaped. turning now to the second of my initial questions, how could these data be better collected? i have earlier this year, in a conference organized by the european commission, 2 launched a proposal to create a eu central database on repos, as a joint effort by public authorities and the financial industry. i am counting on this workshop to launch the practical discussion about the main issues and the challenges to be addressed and, most importantly, the possible solutions for this proposal to become reality. when i first launched my proposal last april i noted that due to its role in macro - prudential financial stability and the closeness of repo to monetary policy, the ecb would be well placed to centralise the data gathering for the euro repo market. this remains true, but today i would like to emphasise that the ecb see constancio, v ( 2012 ) “ shadow banking – the ecb perspective ” speech by vitor constancio, vice - president of the ecb, towards better regulation of the shadow banking system, european commission conference, brussels, 27 april 2012 bis central bankers ’ speeches organised this workshop by taking a wider perspective on the subject and acting just a catalyst.