rates low in view of the new economy. in response, let me emphasise the following point. the new economy is primarily a supply - side story. an inappropriately lax monetary policy would not create better conditions for the emergence of a new economy. on the contrary - by jeopardising the maintenance of price stability - such a policy could seriously endanger the credibility of the ecb. it would thereby undermine confidence, raise risk premia in interest rates and damage the prospects for economic growth and job creation. it is for precisely this reason that the ecb will, in line with its mandate, continue to preserve price stability in the euro area. this ensures that monetary policy makes its full contribution to overall economic welfare, while also providing an environment in which the new economy - should one emerge - will be able to flourish. 2. transparency and communication policy i should now like to turn to another issue which has been frequently discussed within the framework of our regular dialogue, namely the issue of transparency. i have already referred to the regular dialogue between the european parliament and the ecb, the transcripts of which are published on the websites of our institutions. moreover, at the press conferences held after the first meeting of the governing council every month i present the ecb ’ s assessment of the economic environment underpinning our monetary policy decisions. you will also be aware of the broad variety of ecb publications, in particular the monthly bulletin, and of the numerous press releases issued and speeches held by the members of the executive board of the ecb. these, as a rule, are also made available to the public via the ecb ’ s website. therefore, i can only confirm my conviction that this wide range of communication tools, in which not only the considerations in favour, but also the arguments that were raised against a decision are presented, resemble in substance “ summary minutes ”. it should also be borne in mind that, by virtue of the regular press conferences and the rapid publication of the transcripts of the questions and answers on the ecb website, detailed information about the governing council ’ s reasoning is made available very shortly after the meetings. we thereby avoid the delays that are inherent in the publication of all forms of official minutes. let me also seize this opportunity to recall that we always take our decisions from a euro area - wide perspective. this is fundamental to the conduct of a truly single monetary policy. the publication of ecb reports on the economic developments of individual euro area member states,

financial instruments. as already underlined on the occasion of previous hearings in front of you, this calls first for much more transparency, without any consideration of vested interests ; second for much less short - termism in the decision - making processes, contrary to the most recent trends ; and third for a systematic elimination of the procyclical aspects of our regulatory, prudential, accounting and taxation rules, which are amplifying considerably the fluctuations that are inherent in the functioning of market economies. the financial stability forum ( fsf ) has identified the main avenues for such reforms. what we now need is strategic lucidity and, where appropriate, a great deal of political energy to counter considerable vested interests. the g20 and the imf are and will be decisive in this respect. but a much better functioning of the financial sphere does not suffice. we also need sound macroeconomic policies that are sustainable in the medium and long run. in particular, we need to avoid the creation of the large domestic and external imbalances which are very much at the root of the present difficulties. an effective surveillance of macroeconomic policies of the major systemically important economies is of the essence. only the imf can perform this decisive function, provided its mandate is strengthened. in terms of institutional set - up, we need two major improvements : • first, the international financial architecture requires a strengthening of the informal groupings, in particular the fsf and the g20. the fsf is unique in that it links all the authorities and institutions that have a systemic influence on financial markets, which are very largely decentralised and – for many of them – independent from the political sphere. the necessary enlargement of the fsf is key. particularly important in a time of global crisis has been the new authority of the g20, which is a truly global informal grouping in comparison with the g7, which itself continues to be useful in a situation where the turbulence comes from the industrialised countries. • second, on top of the imf ’ s strengthened surveillance mandate, the governance of the international financial institutions, particularly the imf but also the world bank, should become more effective and representative. in particular, a full representation of emerging market economies, commensurate with their importance in the global economy, is indispensable. * * * by way of concluding my introductory remarks, i would like to stress two points. first, as regards euro area policies, persistent wage growth