the european parliament and of the council amending regulations ( eu ) no 648 / 2012, ( eu ) no 575 / 2013 and ( eu ) 2017 / 1131 as regards measures to mitigate excessive exposures to third - country central counterparties and improve the efficiency of union clearing markets. 3. opinion of the european central bank of 26 april 2023 on a proposal for a regulation amending regulations ( eu ) no 648 / 2012, ( eu ) no 575 / 2013 and ( eu ) 2017 / 1131 as regards excessive exposures to third - country central counterparties and improve the efficiency of union clearing markets and a proposal for a directive amending directives 2009 / 65 / eu, 2013 / 36 / eu and ( eu ) 2019 / 2034 as regards the treatment of concentration risk towards central counterparties and the counterparty risk on centrally cleared derivative transactions. 4. in addition, we should strengthen the european securities and markets authority ’ s capacity to ensure a level playing field in the supervision of eu ccps and adequate coordination in crisis situations. 5. €133 billion out of €166 billion. 6. financial stability board ( 2014 ), “ key attributes of effective resolution regimes for financial institutions ”, 15 october. 7. resolution plans are, in principle, non - binding, to ensure the necessary flexibility and discretion in what would be truly exceptional circumstances. in addition, while within the eu resolution authorities are legally required to consider the contagion risks for all eu countries when deciding on resolution measures, this does not apply globally, as under global standards resolution authorities are only liable vis - a - vis their home jurisdictions. 8. the active account proposal would require financial counterparties and non - financial counterparties that are subject to the clearing obligation to ( i ) hold, directly or indirectly, active accounts at ccps established in the eu so that at least a certain proportion of the services identified as being of substantial systemic importance are cleared at eu ccps, and ( ii ) provide reporting on this. for further background, see footnote 3. 9. non - default losses are losses deriving from operational risk, investment and custody risk, and general business risk. 10. in the hypothetical extreme stress scenarios considered by the committee on payments and market infrastructures ( cpmi ), the financial stability board ( fsb ) and the international organization of securities commissions ( iosco ), all ccp service lines were able to absorb default losses. by contrast,

christian noyer : some thoughts on the financial crisis speech by mr christian noyer, governor of the bank of france, at paris - europlace, tokyo, 18 november 2008. * * * ladies and gentlemen, it is a great pleasure for me to be here and share some thoughts on the financial crisis. it is too early to draw all the lessons from recent events in financial markets. it is however vital to start reflecting on the experience of the last few months. even more in periods of tension than in normal times, action and reflection should reinforce one another. it is at the very moment of managing the current crisis that we lay the foundations for the future financial system. having said that, i propose to reflect with you on four topics : • the nature of the financial crisis • the policies implemented to address it • the macroeconomic outlook • the outlook for financial regulation the nature of the crisis the crisis first emerged as a liquidity crisis. the first symptoms appeared at the beginning of august 2007 when serious disruptions surfaced on the inter - bank market. more than a year later, tensions on money markets are still with us. recent weeks have witnessed abnormal levels of spreads, a shortening of maturities, and the contraction, or even closure, of some market segments. through spill - over, these tensions are also affecting non - financial corporations and, more broadly the financing of the economy. the crisis also emerged as a crisis of securitisation. securitisation is an old and successful technique used to refinance a range of loans. what was new about it is that it got used extensively in highly unstable financial structures, which were financing short - term assets that were illiquid, complex, and whose value proved to be uncertain and contingent upon models. the instability of such structures was largely masked. indeed, cheap money allowed easy refinancing of poor quality debt and of assets with uncertain value. also, favourable ratings and credit enhancements artificially boosted the quality of loans underlying structured products. the rise in defaults on such loans, first on subprime mortgages, triggered a chain of reactions whose consequences are still unfolding now. credit protections proved illusory. liquidity dried up much more quickly than it had appeared. rating agencies massively, suddenly and sharply downgraded products which until then were deemed of the highest quality. the demise of the “ new ” securitisation chain highlights two fundamental realities. the first one is that far