longstanding partnership on climate investments and also regional transition activities. we are also working with the glasgow financial alliance for net zero ( gfanz ) to set up a hong kong chapter, and are inaugural members of the capacity - building alliance of sustainable investment ( casi ), and the green investment and finance partnership. all these partnerships are formed to ensure that economies, big and small, all have the opportunity to play their part and are not left behind in the transition to ensure a just, orderly, and equitable future. once again, i would like to thank you all for coming here today. i encourage you to take full advantage of this platform and i wish you all an inspiring and insightful day ahead. thank you very much! 2 / 2 bis - central bankers'speeches

expectations of public support and lead to a deterioration in public finances. this gives rise to multiple equilibria where sudden shifts in confidence can be self - fulfilling. in this context, the main purpose of stress testing is to break that circularity. our first european tests included 81 banks, compared with only 19 for the united states. the basic exercise was sound and taken as such by analysts when it was published. somehow clumsily, however, a few banks were added at the last moment, with only limited investigation, and these are precisely the banks which proved problematic afterwards and which undermined the credibility of the whole exercise. this mistake will not be repeated and the coverage for the new stress tests has been carefully examined. a lot has been made of the fact that no sovereign stress was made on the banking book. and indeed, as regulators, we did not want to give any credibility to a scenario that we consider unacceptable. however, there will be, like last time, full, total, and transparent disclosure of exposures to sovereigns for each individual bank. everybody will therefore be free to make their own assumptions and calculations. with knowledge of the exposure, it does not take a rocket scientist to figure out some scenarios. it turns out that, during the last exercise, such calculations would produce very reassuring numbers. but, for some reason, they were never made public by most analysts. just as an illustration, the total exposure of french banks to sovereign debt in southern europe is 38 % of total tier 1 ( 13 % without italy ). i will let you draw your own conclusions. even in an apocalyptic scenario, only a small fraction of french banks ’ tier 1 ratio would be compromised. the same results apply, with some variations, to other countries. conclusion let me now conclude. like all other major advanced economies, the euro area is facing big challenges in adjusting to the post - crisis environment. for all, these challenges relate to long - term fiscal sustainability. they are neither bigger nor smaller for the euro area than for the united states, the united kingdom or japan. they may be more complicated to solve because, by nature, our governance is more complex and we face specific collective action problems. it may take us longer to deal with difficulties as they appear, and we are paying a price for this relative inertia. but problems are being tackled, reforms are being implemented and i am convinced that, in the end, the euro area will emerge as a stronger and more robust entity