climate risks, by measuring the carbon footprint of the assets that they finance and the " green ” share of these assets relative to a set of targets. the implementing decree of the act, which is currently being drafted, will specify the information concerned and its presentation. from a broader perspective, we should aim at greater clarity : there are about 400 climaterelated information disclosure schemes. imposing requirements or formulating recommendations in terms of information disclosure can be a powerful instrument for ensuring market discipline, as long as the information is targeted and pertinent, as evidenced by a number of successful examples. at the international level, under the aegis of the financial stability board, a first task force known as the " enhanced disclosure task force " and composed of sector representatives had already issued recommendations in 2012 to improve, simplify and focus the communication of systemically important banks on the nature of their risks. at the national level, the guide on the relevance, consistency and readability of financial statements published by the french financial markets authority in july 2015 is another positive example. clarification is a challenge to be taken seriously. we have therefore decided, within the financial stability board and with the support of the recent g20 in antalya, to set up very shortly – by the beginning of 2016 – another dedicated task force ( edtf ). its work should be completed within one year in order to rapidly ensure the effective disclosure on climate risk. it will formulate recommendations for voluntary disclosure, according to harmonised and therefore comparable methods. this should enable stakeholders and the public to find out about the share of financial sector assets linked to carbon emissions and the sector ’ s exposure to climate risk. 3. the time horizon challenge : the gradual implementation of stress tests stress testing is an integral part of risk management by financial institutions. it is particularly developed in the insurance and reinsurance sectors. modelling disaster risk and capital levels – as set out in solvency ii – takes into account some of the climate risks. but the current regulatory framework for banks somehow overlooks climate change as a source of risk. yet this would be the way to handle the question of the time horizon. in this respect, the act on energy transition provides for the submission by end - 2016 of a report on the implementation of a scenario of stress tests representative of the climate risks for banks. however, achieving this raises serious questions. two approaches are possible. either comprehensive stress testing, covering all risks and associated asset classes for financial institutions, which would allow supervisors

the past eighteen months will readily tell you! one can argue that exchange rate certainty is not an essential complement to the european single market - any more than exchange rate fixity is essential to achieving benefits from free trade more generally. but there is no doubt that intra - european exchange rate certainty would - through the increased competition resulting from greater transparency of prices and lower transactions costs, through broader and deeper capital markets, and through the associated improvement in economic resource allocation - enhance the benefits derived from the single market. whether or not it is essential, therefore, most people would, i think, agree that, other things equal, exchange rate certainty would be very desirable in this context. the potential disadvantage of monetary union can equally be simply stated, though it is perhaps more difficult to assess. essentially there is a risk that the single monetary policy - the single, one - size - fits - all, short - term interest rate - within the euro area, which is a necessary corollary of the single currency, will not in the event prove to be appropriate to the domestic needs of each of the euro - member countries. there is no doubt that such risk exists. it may result from cyclical divergence where for example would we be in the uk now, confronted as we are with relatively strong domestic demand growth, if we were obliged to have german - level interest rates? or where would germany and france be as they struggle to sustain domestic demand if they were constrained to have interest rates at the uk level? the risk may arise from differences in fiscal positions even though these are to be constrained through the stability pact. or it may result from economic shocks of some sort that have a bigger impact on some countries than on others. the rise in oil prices in the early 1970s or german reunification are classic examples. - 2so the risk of divergent monetary policy needs within the euro area is real. and the damage it could cause if serious tensions between member countries were to emerge is substantial, because alternative adjustment mechanisms, such as labour migration or fiscal redistribution, that exist within individual countries, and which help to alleviate the similar regional tensions that arise at the national level, are not well - developed at the pan - european level. the maastricht treaty, of course, recognised this risk, and the famous convergence criteria were designed precisely as a means of reducing the risk to manageable proportions by requiring that, before they join the euro club, countries should have achieved at least a minimum degree of macro - economic convergence