of finance, but presided over by the governor, rbi. in conclusion, i would like to highlight three aspects of financial stability. first, we keep in mind our vulnerability to real sector shocks which would affect financial stability. the major sources of such shocks in india are very sharp rise in oil prices and extraordinary monsoon failures. second, we have political system stability in india though there have been coalition governments at the federal level. we are aware that most of the currency crises in developing countries occurred around the times of political elections, particularly in countries with the presidential form of government. our experience in india is that political cycles have had a relatively muted impact on financial stability. in any case, sociopolitical preference for greater financial stability needs to be appreciated and the weight accorded to financial stability in india appears to be higher than in some other countries. third, developing countries differ so much in size, nature and structure of the economy, level of development and sociopolitical conditions that my observations here are more of random thoughts to be mulled over rather than structured issues in respect of financial stability in developing countries. thank you.

carolyn wilkins : monetary policy and the underwhelming recovery remarks by ms carolyn wilkins, senior deputy governor of the bank of canada, to the sfa society toronto, toronto, ontario, 22 september 2014. * * * introduction good afternoon. thank you for inviting me. i ’ m delighted to be here today with this group of accomplished investment professionals. what i will speak about today intertwines your professional world with mine. let me start with what we ’ ve all observed : the recovery from the global financial crisis has been underwhelming, to say the least. it has left us debating what kind of growth we can reasonably expect after so much disappointment. it has also left us debating how central banks should conduct monetary policy without compromising financial stability. during the crisis, central banks and governments took unprecedented action. they worked together to prevent the failure of systemically important financial institutions, and to provide exceptional monetary and fiscal stimulus. these policies were successful in preventing the worst. but even this forceful policy response could not prevent a severe and protracted global recession. massive amounts of wealth were destroyed. the values of equities and housing plunged. the loss to global output was roughly $ 10 trillion by the end of last year. all told, the crisis left the global economy with 62 million fewer jobs. 1 the recovery has had repeated false starts and still faces considerable headwinds. global growth has averaged only around 3 per cent over the past two years. that ’ s well below the average prior to the crisis, and it is unlikely that 2014 will be much better. financial markets are reflecting these lowered expectations. that ’ s part of the reason why long - term interest rates in the major advanced economies, including canada, are very low. today i ’ m going to talk about three important matters for central banks. first, to conduct monetary policy, we need to know how much of this slow growth is cyclical and how much is structural. second, to calibrate our policy we need to know how these factors, taken together, are affecting the neutral rate of interest. and third, making judgments about the impact of these factors is not an exact science. as you know, there is a lot of uncertainty. that is why we take a risk management approach to achieving our inflation target. disentangling cyclical and structural factors so how much of this slow growth is cyclical and how much is structural? history teaches us that balance - sheet recessions such as the