those that are backed with an underlying asset and those that rely on an algorithm to continuously match the supply and demand of circulating units. unsurprisingly, the stablecoins that show the least volatility are those that back every issued unit with an equal amount of fiat currency. why use a proxy, then, if you can have the real thing – unless the issuers of that proxy seek to interfere with the control of trusted assets circulating in the economy the poor performance of crypto - assets is not an excuse for complacency, but rather a reminder of the importance of the central bank ’ s objective to maintain price stability. fulfilling this objective is conditional on the independence of the central bank, as ensured by a narrow but clearly defined mandate. central banks must not be overburdened with multiple goals without having the appropriate instruments to achieve them. this brings me to the role of the ecb in the oversight of market infrastructures. less is more the ecb has a treaty - based task to promote the smooth operation of payment systems, as part of which it takes a close interest in the regulatory framework for market infrastructures which clear and settle securities and derivatives in euro, in particular central counterparties ( ccps ). this reflects the systemic impact ccps can have in situations of extreme stress, by disrupting repo markets or channelling liquidity strains to banks – which are also monetary policy counterparties – thus affecting the circulation of liquidity in payment systems. ultimately, ccps may need to rely on central banks as lenders of last resort. central banks therefore have an important role to play in the regulation of central clearing – a notion which is largely recognised but often misunderstood. in this context, let me say a few words about recent developments in the area of ccp regulation, and in particular the outcome of the legislative process regarding the revision of the supervisory framework for ccps, the european market infrastructure regulation ( emir ii ), and the recommendation to amend article 22 of the statute of the escb and the ecb. the ecb recommended to eu legislators that its statute be amended to clarify that the ecb had legal competence over ccps, which would have allowed it to perform its statutory monetary policy role under emir ii. we made the case that the ecb needed explicit general competence to monitor and address risks relating to our mandate, including broad discretion to take necessary measures in exceptional situations where the stability of the euro is at stake. we also cautioned

but that could be quite significant, because it ’ s pretty expensive to find an alternative to a bank to hold your money. but the economics of this is also : is there a negative interest rate where it ’ s counter - productive to push the rate lower because it hurts credit creation. i think that that ’ s very much an open question. this is essentially a reason why it ’ s natural in the circumstances to move in small steps. it ’ s natural to move in small steps to make sure you can assess whether any of these counterproductive side effects kick in. we ’ ve seen more negative rates elsewhere, so i don ’ t particularly think there ’ s a technical limit yet. on the purchasing guidelines : we ’ ve created this open - ended programme of €20 billion a year. we wouldn ’ t have done that if we believed there was a kind of a super short - run collision between the purchase programme and the current limits. so i disagree with your assessment of looking at some, to me pretty short horizons, like nine months. so we have much longer horizons in our calculations. but you know the tactics of how we run the purchase programme evolves. so it would be a mistake for anyone to say : well here ’ s my assumption and here ’ s what i ’ m backing. 10 / 11 bis central bankers'speeches what you should pay attention to is : we ’ ve got an open - ended programme, we ’ ve given you conditions under which it will come to an end. and i think the kind of concerns that we would be unable to run the programme, i don ’ t think you should be too concerned about that. honestly, at the governing council, any potential collision with the current limits is so far in the future that if we ’ re stuck at that situation, i don ’ t think that ’ s top of the list of headaches to worry about. but do you think you have the authority to exceed the one - third cap? again, remember : this is self - imposed, this is an ecb decision about these limits. there ’ s very good reasons for the limit, but we also have our ultimate mandate, which is to deliver price stability. so we don ’ t want to raise the limits. there ’ s good reasons to have these limits and as of now we don ’ t see a reason to raise the limits. we think the current policy is sustainable within the limits and therefore for now it ’ s a non -