japan and other economies could sometimes be misleading. various challenges posed by demographic changes have been and will be among the paramount issues lying ahead for a broad group of countries including japan. for example, growth rate of the chinese working - age population has slowed since the late 1980s, and is projected to turn negative by 2020 ( chart 3 ). other asian economies will also find themselves in the midst of population aging in due course. it is a must - face reality which is just yet - to - come. looking at europe, in the euro - area peripheral countries, immigration contributed to the expansion of the populations until 2007. conversely, after the global financial crisis, the immigration momentum was lost and some countries in the region are now faced with even some emigration while suffering from lower economic growth owing to the lower population growth or even because of the declining population. rather than trying to cover all of the relevant topics under the theme of demographic changes and macroeconomic performance in my remark, i focus on japan ’ s experience of population aging that, i hope, will help ensuing discussions in this conference, because bis central bankers ’ speeches japan can be addressed an “ advanced country ” in a sense that it has been faced with various challenges that stem from population aging ahead of other countries. i begin by explaining demographic changes in japan briefly, and then move on to identifying the issues related with macroeconomic performance. finally, i will touch on the policy implications of demographic changes. ii. demographic changes in japan i begin by pointing out four relevant facts in order to consider the linkage between japanese demographic changes and macroeconomic performance. first, in former times, the japanese population growth rate was high, and the japanese working - age population was remarkably large. today, this may sound way beyond our imagination. however, in the aftermath of world war ii, overpopulation was considered a challenge to cope with. for example, japanese emigration to brazil by sea was restarted in 1952 and continued until 1973. it is usually understood that japan ’ s period of high - growth began in the mid - 1950s and ended in the early 1970s. the expansion of the working - age population, in tandem with the free trade regime, provided strong grounds for rapid growth. a comparison of the japanese population by age group between the beginning and the end of the high - growth era clearly points to a rapid increase in the japanese working - age population taking place during the period as confirmed by chart 4 showing a blip moving upward in the population pyramid. for your

masaaki shirakawa : demographic changes and macroeconomic performance – japanese experiences opening remarks by mr masaaki shirakawa, governor of the bank of japan, at the 2012 boj - imes conference, hosted by the institute for monetary and economic studies, at the bank of japan, tokyo, 30 may 2012. * i. * * introduction good morning. i am very pleased to have a lot of participants from central banks, international organizations, and academia in this year ’ s annual boj - imes conference. on behalf of my colleagues at the bank of japan, i am privileged to welcome you all here in tokyo. the theme of this year ’ s conference is “ demographic changes and macroeconomic performance. ” on the theme, i am sure that japan is the most notable case that provides a basis for discussion. japan ’ s population and the working - age population – that is, the population aged between 15 and 64 years – came to decline after their peak - years in 2007 and in 1995 respectively. the share of the population aged 65 years or older rose rapidly to 23 % in 2010 from 12 % in 1990 ( chart 1 ). in the meantime, japan ’ s economic growth gradually slowed during the past two decades mainly for two reasons. in the former half of the period, the japanese economy was hobbled by the crippling effect of the burst of the bubble. in the latter half, the rapid population aging hampered the japanese economy through a variety of channels. in an attempt to illustrate that, i frequently rely on the cross - country comparison of growth rates including japan. among g - 7 countries, the japanese gdp growth rate per working - age population – an indicator least affected by demographic changes in the short run – was the highest. by contrast, the japanese per capita gdp growth rate was almost the same as the average, and the japanese gdp growth rate, which is subject to the decreases in the total population, was below average ( chart 2 ). neoclassical growth theories normally do not distinguish the overall population from the working - age population due to analytical simplicity. however, without taking into account the distinction between the two variables explicitly, the very challenges that japan is currently faced with will be outside the scope of analysis. in the macroeconomic policy discussions in other economies, japan ’ s experiences are frequently cited, and a lot of lessons are drawn over the past decade. however, a general conclusion obtained in such policy discussions without considering the differences in the demographic factors between