adequate pricing of externalities, and encouraging innovative, sustainable investment, for instance through subsidies. at the same time, governments have to manage social and economic transaction costs, as we all tend to be myopic. the lessons from behavioural economics also apply to the energy transition. indeed, striking the balance between the medium - to longer - term gains of the energy transition and short - term transition costs may be the most complicated task for governments, whose mandates are in most cases no longer than four or five years. 1 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches but also the private sector and households have a role to play. it is not appropriate to only rely on the government. the difficult message is that all economic actors bear a responsibility and their actions are not substitutes ; that is, if we want an orderly transition to be successful. at de nederlandsche bank, we definitely also play a role. as a supervisor and regulator, as a central bank and as a leader by example. as a supervisor and regulator, we have a responsibility to make sure that financial institutions manage their climate - and nature - related risks. these risks have an impact on the soundness of financial institutions, which is something we watch over. and ignoring these risks is not compatible with sound risk management. in general, financial supervisors are intensifying their focus on climate - and environment - related risks. the ecb has put climate - and nature - related risk high on the agenda. banks under its supervision must comply with the supervisory expectations for good risk management by the end of this year. at dnb, we are on the same track for the banks, insurers and pension funds under our supervision. while there has been progress, we are still not where we need to be. as supervisors, we are doing what we can to nudge the sector in the right direction. for example, by publishing good practices, like the guides on managing climate and environmental risks from the ecb and dnb. but if these efforts prove insufficient, enforcement will come into view as a viable option. as a central bank, our objective is to maintain price stability and to safeguard financial stability. climate change and nature degradation have an impact on both and, hence, fall squarely within our mandate. also, as a central bank, we are an adviser to the government, as economic and financial policies impact monetary and financial stability. in that role we aim to contribute to stable long - term climate and environmental policies by providing economic analysis

the uncertainty surrounding the level of success of the “ common framework ” for debt restructuring, both initiatives represent an unquestionable improvement on the part of multilateral coordination in sovereign debt resolution. third, the main multilateral development banks ( such as the world bank, the european 2 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches investment bank and the african development bank, among others ) are also playing an important role in this crisis. throughout the pandemic, these institutions have deployed a series of emergency measures in line with their mandates and spheres of influence. for instance, their fresh financial support to the middle east and north africa ( mena ) region since the outset of the pandemic amounts to over usd 8 billion, adding to the usd 4. 3 billion of imf emergency financing and usd 7. 2 billion of imf financing provided through regular programmes. finally, the recent g7 agreement to back a new global minimum tax rate for multinational companies is a step in the right direction to address the tax challenges arising from globalisation and the increasing digitalisation of economies. undoubtedly, major steps have been taken in this crisis to strengthen international cooperation, but much ground has still to be covered. on this path, coordination between multilateral and regional institutions is also important, insofar as the latter may complement the support measures provided by international financial institutions. in this setting, the eu should play a leading role in seeking to attain reinforced and inclusive multilateralism, and an area of cooperation governed by international rules. the strengthening of the european project as a support for multilateralism let me conclude these remarks by focusing on the european policy response to the crisis and on the tasks still pending on the european policy and institutional agenda. on this occasion, we have seen a genuinely common european response, in which the ecb ’ s monetary policy has not been the only game in town. the creation of the ngeu fund stands out as a decisive tool to support the recovery of european economies at the current juncture. this fund incorporates elements of solidarity and allows us to strengthen the possibilities for countries to transform their economies in light of the challenges ahead. some of these elements, such as the issuance of large - scale european supra - national public debt to finance reforms and investments in the countries most affected by the pandemic, are unprecedented in the history of the eu. however, the ngeu fund is not – and therefore should not be seen as – the stabilisation mechanism that the euro zone needs