. the fomc statement itself can, in the new regime, also be used as a platform to communicate the committee ’ s tolerance for deviations of inflation from the 2 percent longer - run goal, and, indeed, it has served this purpose in the past — for example, with the threshold - based guidance linked to inflation outcomes introduced in the fomc statement in december 2012. 11 the most recent sep, an addendum to the minutes of the september 2020 fomc meeting, is available on the board ’ s website at https : / / www. federalreserve. gov / monetarypolicy / fomccalendars. htm. the guidance from the december 2012 fomc statement was the following : “ to support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the committee expects that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends and the economic recovery strengthens. in particular, the committee decided to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1 / 4 percent and currently anticipates that this exceptionally low range for the federal funds rate will be appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6 - 1 / 2 percent, inflation between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than a half percentage point above the committee ’ s 2 percent longer - run goal, and longer - term inflation expectations continue to be well anchored ” ( paragraph 5 ). the statement is available on the board ’ s website at https : / / www. federalreserve. gov / monetarypolicy / fomccalendars. htm. - 7third element in the tplt framework studied by bernanke, kiley, and roberts ( 2019 ), policy reverts to an inertial taylor rule after liftoff, so policy remains accommodative for some time, which depends in their formulation on the degree of policy inertia in the reaction function. our september fomc statement also calls for policy to remain accommodative for some time after liftoff. once the conditions to commence policy normalization have been met, the sep “ dot plot ” will convey the median participant ’ s projections over a three - year horizon not only for inflation, but also for the pace of liftoff as well as the ultimate destination for the policy rate. i will have more to say

on inflation itself that policy will react to, but going forward, policy will not tighten solely because the unemployment rate has fallen below any particular econometric estimate of its long - run natural level. this guidance has an important implication for the taylor - type policy reaction function i will consult. in particular, i will continue — as i have done since joining the fed — to consult policy rules that respect the taylor principle as a benchmark for calibrating the pace and destination of policy rate normalization once, after the inflation and employment thresholds have been reached, the process of policy normalization commences. consistent with our new framework, the relevant policy rule benchmark i will consult after the conditions for liftoff have been met is an inertial taylor - type rule with a coefficient of zero on the unemployment gap, a coefficient of 1. 5 on the gap between core pce inflation and the 2 percent longer - run goal, and a neutral real policy rate equal to my sep projection of long - run r *. as discussed earlier, the degree of inertia in the benchmark rule i consult will depend on initial conditions at the time of liftoff, especially the reading of the staff ’ s cie index relative to its february 2020 level. such a reference rule, which becomes relevant once the conditions for policy normalization have been met, is similar to the forward - looking taylor - type rule for optimal monetary policy derived in clarida, gali, and gertler ( 1999 ). the stability properties of taylor - type rules in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models have been studied by bullard and mitra ( 2002 ) and gali ( 2008 ), among others, and they show - 12 that for the standard taylor coefficient of 1. 5 on the inflation gap and a coefficient of zero on the unemployment gap, the rational expectations equilibrium is unique for standard parametrizations. one dimension along which our new framework may appear to differ from the threshold forward - guidance proposals advocated by some others is that our september fomc guidance explicitly requires that, at the time of liftoff, in addition to inflation reaching 2 percent ( on an annual basis ), labor market conditions must have also reached levels consistent with the committee ’ s assessments of maximum employment, and i offered earlier the metrics on some of the labor market indicators i will follow to make that assessment. however, any difference between our september fomc guidance and similar threshold guidance policies that depend only on realized