of total european inflation. nevertheless, inflation has become more " domestic " and broad - based : core inflation excluding energy and food - has gradually increased and reached 5. 0 % in october, and this is precisely where monetary policy has a more direct impact. the ecb governing council therefore decided at the end of october to raise its key rates by a further 75 basis points, bringing the deposit facility rate to 1. 5 %. in doing so, we have removed a substantial part of our accommodative monetary policy, and are clearly approaching the " normalisation range ", which can be estimated to be around 2 % in the euro area. we should reach this level in december. 1 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches beyond this, i believe that we will probably continue to raise rates, but we may do so in a more flexible and possibly less rapid manner - " jumbo " rate hikes will not become a new habit. a favourable condition to interrupt rate hikes would be clear signs of a turnaround in the core inflation trend. faced with persistent inflation, we have therefore demonstrated our resolve to bring it down towards our target level. i will reiterate here our forecast, our commitment and our capacity : together with the governing council, alongside christine lagarde, we are going to bring inflation down towards 2 % within two or three years. ii. what we differ on today : fiscal measures and energy prices this is the most difficult issue today, for fundamental reasons, not just questions of timing or of personalities. the first steps towards the necessary european coordination have already been taken : taxation of'inframarginal'electricity producers ; principle of collective gas purchases. the banque de france is not an energy specialist ; i would just like to mention two shared lessons. the first is from france : fiscal measures, taken at the domestic level to help households cope with rising energy prices, may be politically necessary as well as effective in smoothing the inflation shock. the " tariff shield " introduced at the end of 2021 explain 3 - percentage points of the inflation differential in favour of france. it can thus help to reduce " second round effects " on prices and wages. but it can only be temporary : it is intended to smooth the shock, not to give the illusion that it no longer exists. the french government will therefore courageously start to reduce support for households by increasing gas and electricity tariffs by 15 % next january and february. the second lesson is from germany : domestic

be fully reflected in the banks'equity capital? on this subject, we believe that we must take the time to identify precisely all the advantages and disadvantages of such a solution, which may appear simple but has multiple side effects. on the one hand, the impact of these unrealised losses is already taken into account in the shortterm liquidity ratio, the lcr. on the other hand, systematically accounting for debt securities at their market value would lead to a rise in the volatility of equity capital, with the risk of generating pro - cyclical sales phenomena. in particular, this would have a downward impact on equity capital during periods of rising interest rates - as we are currently experiencing - with the harmful consequences that you can imagine for the financing of the economy and for the public debt market : a fall in the supply of long - term fixed - rate loans and disorderly sales of debt securities. the third issue concerns supervisory practices. sound regulation implemented at the global level is a good thing. but it cannot be at its best without strict, intrusive and reactive supervision. the tools provided by the basel committee for the supervision of liquidity risk, in particular those used for monitoring the concentration of financing or the maturity gaps between assets and liabilities, already enable supervisors to have a detailed view of the risks specific to each bank and to react appropriately. could they be strengthened by introducing, for example, new alert thresholds? could we also consider introducing such thresholds on the level of unrealised losses, which would trigger supervisory action? will these adjustments to regulation and supervision be sufficient to prevent failures in this new age of one - click bank runs? while basel committee members undertook, when finalising the basel iii agreements in 2017, to only consider new changes to the rules once they had been implemented at a global level ( a commitment known as the “ hard stop ” ), should the recent emergence of digital transformations in the financial sector and their rapid evolution not prompt us to be more vigilant and to anticipate the next move? i believe so. it is essential that the role played by new technologies and social networks in speeding up liquidity stresses be properly taken into account by regulations. at the same time, in the digital age, with easier access to information, and rumours, and the ability to conduct banking operations instantaneously, we will have to examine the regulatory assumptions, in particular with regard to the flight of some deposits. 2. digital finance :