samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
##ring confidence in our institution and their support for our monetary autonomy over the last 100 years. may the national bank continue to enjoy such broad support! through its actions, it will continue to uphold the trust which has been placed in it thus far.

strategy which was pursued until 1999. since 2000, our interest rate decisions have been based on our medium - term inflation forecast and our definition of price stability, which we consider achieved if annual inflation remains below 2 %. the second constant in the national bank ’ s activity over the past 100 years has been its adherence to the rules of monetary discipline. this strategy has allowed us, as it did our predecessors, to conduct a coherent monetary policy over all these years while shielding our institution from all kinds of demands, both economic and political. willingness to adapt given the strong disruptions in the international environment in the past 100 years, pursuing a policy of stability and applying the rules of monetary discipline has not been an easy undertaking. let us not forget the obstacles we encountered in adhering to the rules of the gold standard and the fixed exchange rate system in times of war or during major international upheavals. let us also remember the difficulties that money supply targeting caused in the context of financial market deregulation in the past 20 years. quite often, the implementation of our policy was undermined by a highly unstable international environment. the ability to adapt, therefore, became crucial. our predecessors demonstrated this willingness to adapt to new developments time and again, for example, when switzerland had to be reintegrated in the international system of payments in the postwar period, in the fight against speculative capital inflows in the 1960s, in managing the volatility of the swiss franc in the 1970s or curbing inflation in the late 1980s. apparent in all these phases were the same determination to ensure monetary stability, the same commitment to apply rules and the same necessity of having to take an often hostile environment into account. the direction was always clear, but many obstacles had to be overcome along the way. we are celebrating the 100th anniversary of the establishment of the swiss national bank in quite exceptional circumstances. indeed, switzerland enjoys great prosperity : we are close to full employment, price stability has been maintained for almost 13 years, and the economic prospects are favourable in almost all respects. this enviable situation could not have been achieved without our economy striving for greater efficiency or without its ability to take on new challenges and make the most of the international environment. all this has not been easy, neither for the companies nor for the employees. the good economic situation can also be attributed to the country ’ s sound financial health. national savings are high, the external accounts are solid, and public finances are on the
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modelling approach of policy rate paths implied by a large set of taylor rules shown here in chart 3. clearly, the ecb ’ s policy rate implied by these simple reaction functions lifts off later but catches up quite soon. © dnb in my view, one key element of the success of monetary policy over the last few years has been in ensuring that the large inflationary shocks did not cause a de - anchoring of expectations. one way to assess the risk of de - anchoring of expectations is this modelbased analysis shown here on slide 4. in this euro area application, dnb staff assess the path of inflation that is consistent with anchoring long - run inflation expectations going forward. as you can see on the left - hand side, at the september 2023 governing council meeting, the projected path of inflation depicted by the green dots was slightly above the anchoring - compatible path of inflation, the blue - dashed line. therefore, further policy tightening was justified as this clearly posed an upward risk to inflation. the right - hand side of chart 4 shows the same analysis conducted at the march 2024 governing council meeting. as you can see, the latest projected path of inflation is consistent with anchoring long - run inflation expectations. so, our policy of running a tight ship seems to have paid off. over recent years, policy decisions have been made in an environment of high uncertainty and large shocks. we knew that icebergs were looming in the dark, but it was hard to predict where. this uncertainty not only included the inflation outlook and the balance of risks, but was also related to the transmission of the extraordinary tightening of monetary policy. the governing council has therefore opted to take a data - dependent approach. underlying this approach are three criteria. first, the inflation outlook in light of the incoming data. second, the dynamics of underlying inflation, based on indicators which remove some of the high - frequency movements in inflation. and third, evidence on the strength of monetary policy transmission. the focus on incoming data was particularly important, because making projections in an environment of high uncertainty is inherently difficult. not surprisingly then, the forecast errors of the eurosystem staff as well as those of other institutions have been sizeable. you can see this in chart 5, which shows the inflation forecast errors from the eurosystem staff projections since 2021. yet, what ’ s more important than the forecast errors themselves is understanding the underlying cause of these errors. and as you can see in chart 5,
provides an excellent forum for all of us to learn from each other and shape our strategies. let us use this opportunity to fine - tune our own knowledge and skills and move with confidence towards delivering sustainable growth to our economies and usher better lives for our people. that is my wish for all of us and i am certain that we would have the energy and the resilience to succeed. thank you.

their free will, having assessed the risk and the profitability of the transaction involved. but, central banks could acquire assets just by making book entries. they could issue currency and get others to part with their assets in exchange for that currency. all that happens in a central bank ’ s balance sheet is the creation of a liability item in the form of “ currency liability ” and an asset item representing the asset the bank has acquired. this would make both assets and liabilities to rise simultaneously. this extraordinary power is being enjoyed by a central bank due its functioning as the monetary authority of a country. however, the community has given such a power to a central bank with a non - violable obligation attached to that power : the responsible use of the discretionary power vested with it. there are two reasons why a central bank should use its discretionary power of issuing currency responsibly. this is valid even when the financial system stability has been made either a core objective or an ancillary objective of a central bank. first, the issue of currency over and above the needs of the society will expand the nominal aggregate demand creating an excess demand for goods and services. since the aggregate supply is inflexible to meet this demand in the short run, the excess demand will put pressure for prices to rise. if this continues year after year, it generates inflation, reducing the wealth of people in real terms and creating a series of adverse consequences that hinder the long term growth. second, in an open economy which most countries have today, the rise in the aggregate demand could partly be met out of imports. unless the country makes a surplus in its current account, the payment for imports has to be made either through capital inflows ( both debt capital and non - debt capital ) or running down the existing foreign reserves. both generate long term balance of payments problems and exert pressure on the exchange rate to depreciate. thus, the irresponsible use of the discretionary power of a central bank to acquire assets by creating a currency liability will lead to a depreciation of both the domestic value of its currency ( domestic inflation ) and the external value of its currency ( continuous depreciation of the exchange rate ). however, the fall in the external value of the currency is linked to, and preceded by, a fall in the domestic value. in other words, depreciating exchange rates are an effect and not the cause of domestic inflation. hence, the
a discussion about exactly how it will end. 3 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches oh, and we thought that ending it meant ending it, i. e. stopping in september. the baseline expectation is, as mario draghi has said, that there will be no sudden stop. this is a technical discussion. 4 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches

risks and future crises. at the same time, banks would not compete on a level playing field, and that would weigh on efficiency. ladies and gentlemen, the reforms that followed the financial crisis of 2008 were far - reaching, and they placed a burden on the financial sector – of that there is no doubt. do the reforms offer a full insurance contract to prevent each and every risk to financial stability? well, no ; such rules do not exist. but there is no doubt that they help to make the global financial sector a safer place. they make it less likely that we will experience a second financial crisis of the same magnitude. looking ahead, we should not forget that we live in a globalised world. and any attempt to turn back time, any attempt to isolate one country from the rest of the world is not only a pipe dream ; it is a perilous dream. 2 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches that is particularly true in the case of finance and banking. so, instead of building walls, we should come together to discuss how we can deal with a global banking sector, how we can reap the benefits and keep the risks in check. that is the only way forward. walking backwards will only lead us to where we came from : another global financial crisis. thank you for your attention. 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches
under such contracts will require servicers to make investments in staffing and information technology infrastructure. and finally, in the future, compensation for servicers likely will need to recognize the different resources required for loss mitigation as opposed to simple payment accounting and forwarding. fannie mae and freddie mac it would be unrealistic to expect the private mortgage market to rebound without defining the ongoing role of fannie mae and freddie mac. these government sponsored enterprises ( gses ) have continued to issue large quantities of securities even as private securitization faltered, apparently because investors have continued to believe that the government stands behind them. that experience suggests that, at least under the most stressed conditions, some form of government backstop may be necessary to ensure continued securitization of mortgages. however, restarting the gses in their old forms would do nothing but ask for a repeat of recent history. without getting into specific proposals today, i ’ ll simply say that whatever is the ultimate future for fannie and freddie, market participants will need to see a clear roadmap for both the individual institutions and the role of government in housing finance before private markets can begin to map a course for themselves. conclusion today i have attempted to outline a framework for a better - functioning mortgage market that protects consumers and provides transparency to lenders, investors, and all market participants. this is the housing finance market we need to create if responsible homeownership is to return as a safe and viable option for the majority of consumers. it is a market that would be attractive and profitable for lenders, servicers, and investors who are prepared to engage in prudent, responsible, and transparent business practices. lending, when done responsibly, is good for business. homeownership, when sustainable, is good for consumers. leverage, when used judiciously, is critical to a functioning market. it would be hard to overestimate the damage that has been done to the housing market in recent years, and especially to the millions of families that are suffering the devastating consequences of foreclosure. it would be equally difficult to overestimate the damage that would be done in the future if we must live with a chronically impaired mortgage market. we absolutely need to change our systems so that they function properly, support the emergence of simpler, more transparent markets, ensure aligned incentives among all parties, and, above all, protect consumers. that, i would hope, is the

market of homeownership yet to come.
3 bis - central bankers'speeches

kevin greenidge : research is the compass that guides us through uncharted waters remarks by dr kevin greenidge, governor of the central bank of barbados, at the 2023 annual review seminar, bridgetown, 25 july 2023. * * * distinguished guests, esteemed colleagues, and friends joining us. as the governor of the central bank of barbados, it is with immense pride and gratitude that i welcome you to the 43rd annual review seminar. this cherished tradition, which has spanned over four decades, holds a special place in the heart of our institution. it is a momentous occasion that not only celebrates the outstanding research of our dedicated staff, but also opens the doors to fresh perspectives and innovative ideas from researchers both near and far. as we gather here in person for the first time since the onset of the covid - 19 pandemic, we cannot help but reflect on the challenges and uncertainties that have defined these past years. the theme of this year's seminar, " 2023 - the road to recovery : removing roadblocks and building bridges, " aptly encapsulates the spirit of hope and determination that fills the air. together, we embark on a journey of exploration and collaboration, seeking innovative pathways to navigate the complexities of our ever - changing economic landscape. at the heart of our endeavours lies the importance of economic research. it is the very compass that guides us through uncharted waters, providing crucial insights and evidence to inform our policies and actions. in the face of global turbulence, research has been our anchor, helping us adapt swiftly to unforeseen challenges while keeping our focus firmly fixed on the goal of fostering economic resilience and prosperity for the people of barbados. as the central bank of barbados, our mission extends beyond traditional monetary and financial functions. we bear a collective responsibility to ensure the stability and sustainability of our nation's economy, a task that requires us to be at the forefront of innovative solutions and cutting - edge research. the seminars of the past have paved the way for a deeper understanding of our economic ecosystem, and this year's event promises to be no different. in keeping with the evolving needs of our world, we have structured a keynote panel that explores the theme " innovative financial solutions for climate resilience. " climate change poses a formidable challenge that demands collaborative action and visionary thinking. by examining how the financial sector can contribute to climate resilience, we seek to build bridges between sustainable practices
financial stability as i have already mentioned, in light of more integrated global financial markets, emerging markets ’ central banks need to consider, in addition to the traditional cyclical considerations ( output and inflation gaps ), capital flows and financial stability issues that may arise in periods of stress. specially as vulnerabilities may build up gradually and at some point might suddenly lead to a non - linear, portfolio adjustment or stress event in local financial markets. hence, in addition to strengthening and consolidating macroeconomic fundamentals, emerging markets need to adopt and maintain strong micro and macro - prudential measures to ensure an adequate functioning of the financial system and limit systemic risk. also, even - though micro and macro prudential policies have their own set of instruments, stress - test scenarios have to be modelled in a framework that incorporates monetary policy. final remarks i would like to conclude by highlighting that the global economy will continue to operate in an environment of high - uncertainty. this imposes important tradeoffs for emerging markets ’ central banks, as higher cross - border financial integration has amplified emerging economies ’ exposure to developments in global markets. in spite of that, experience shows that the benefits that are inherent to a higher global financial integration outweigh the costs. in this context, authorities in both advanced and emerging economies should avoid adopting measures that could limit financial flows across countries. overall, economies should focus on strengthening their financial systems and, in general, their macroeconomic policy frameworks. the challenge is to minimize potential costs associated with greater international financial integration without reducing the benefits that this process has generated. once again, i would like to thank you for the invitation.

given the cross - border nature of these funds, we have sought to ensure international coordination in codifying these measures, as exemplified by the fact that the commission de surveillance du secteur financier ( cssf ) in luxembourg is also publishing a similar consultation paper on ldi funds. given the international nature of these funds, such coordination is important to ensure the effectiveness of these measures. we also continue to progress our work on the phased implementation of the macroprudential measures for irish property funds announced last year. and in addition to our work on property funds and ldi funds, we continue to work with international partners to develop and operationalise the broader macroprudential framework for the funds sector. we are also considering feedback received to our discussion paper on an approach to macroprudential policy for the sector. the deadline for feedback closed last week and a feedback statement will be published next year. thank you for joining us this morning. i will hand you over to director of financial stability mark cassidy to take us through the report, before answering your questions. 2 / 2 bis - central bankers'speeches
rising slightly to 0. 8 % in 2021, and further to 1. 3 % in 2022. the monetary policy measures taken by the ecb in march were critical in removing the tail risk of the covid - 19 pandemic and the ensuing drop in economic activity morphing into a financial crisis. since march, that risk has receded materially. however, financial conditions are still tighter today than at the outset of the covid - 19 pandemic. taken together, two main factors called for additional monetary policy easing : the deteriorating 1 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches inflation outlook threatening our medium - term price stability objective and the unwarranted tightening of financial conditions. the governing council last thursday decided to increase the amount of the pandemic emergency purchase programme ( pepp ) by an additional €600 billion to a total of €1, 350 billion, to extend the net purchase horizon until at least the end of june 2021, and to reinvest maturing assets acquired under the programme until at least the end of 2022. two specific aspects of the pepp made this programme the most appropriate tool in our arsenal to step up the monetary policy impulse. first, in line with the execution of the programme over the past two months or so, the in - built flexibility of the pepp purchases can still play a key role in market stabilisation, safeguarding the smooth transmission of monetary policy across asset classes and among jurisdictions. second, asset purchases are particularly effective in easing the monetary policy stance in the current crisis environment because they can directly affect market funding conditions for companies and the price of credit for households and small and medium - sized businesses. the increase in the envelope for the pepp adds, of course, to the comprehensive package of monetary policy measures that we have implemented in response to the covid - 19 crisis. in addition to substantially scaling up our asset purchases, we are providing liquidity at much more favourable conditions through our credit operations. the targeted longer - term refinancing operations ( tltro iii ) are the most prominent and effective among them, as they allow supporting bank lending to those affected most by the spread of the coronavirus, in particular small and medium - sized enterprises. in addition, we have significantly eased collateral requirements, to make sure that banks can make full use of our credit operations and help sustain the flow of credit. all these measures will support liquidity and funding conditions in the economy and help sustain the flow

learn about the euro in an entertaining and enjoyable way. ladies and gentlemen, i sincerely hope that you will enjoy your visit to the euro exhibition. it is a pleasure for me, on behalf of the european central bank, to declare the exhibition open. bis central bankers ’ speeches
num. of firms germany note : the three criteria to be considered a " hidden champion " are the following : ( a ) the firm is among the top three in the global market or is number one for a particular niche business area on the continent where the firm is based, ( b ) the firm has less than 5 bil. euro in revenue, and ( c ) the firm is little known to the general public. source : hermann simon, hidden champion of the 21st century.

jens weidmann : the financial crisis, ten years on - what have we learned? speech by dr jens weidmann, president of the deutsche bundesbank and chairman of the board of directors of the bank for international settlements, at ruhr university bochum, bochum, 22 may 2017. * * * 1. introductory remarks professor paul professor roos ladies and gentlemen students i ’ m well aware that i ’ m not the first central banker to speak before you in the “ ikf impulse ” series. indeed, my predecessor axel weber delivered his third - to - last speech as bundesbank president here in april 2011. i, too, will deliver my third - to - last speech today - but that ’ s just for the month of may. incidentally, his speech was titled “ the role of economic policy after the crisis ", which, from today ’ s perspective, seems somewhat premature - after all, the euro area had not yet put the crisis behind it at that time. quite the opposite, in fact - the crisis had yet to come to a head in the euro area. as the situation in greece and other member states progressively worsened, some even went as far as to question the continued existence of monetary union. with that in mind, “ after the crisis ” is more likely referring to the global financial and economic crisis, which began in 2007 and reached its crescendo in autumn 2008 with the collapse of lehman brothers and the severe economic downturn that followed. to that extent, it is not premature to talk to you here today about the financial crisis ten years on and to ask what we have learned. however, i will scarcely be able to do justice to the complexities of the crisis, complete with its causes, implications and the lessons we can learn from it, in just over 45 minutes. i would therefore like to focus on aspects that are especially relevant from my perspective as a monetary policymaker, while noting that the observations i am about to make are not exhaustive. 2. the significance of the liability principle ladies and gentlemen if you give some thought to the causes of the crisis, it becomes clear that the financial crisis and the later euro - area crisis follow a common theme : the liability principle was undermined in the run - up to both events. walter eucken, founder of the freiburg school and a pioneer of the social market economy, condensed the liability principle into a simple formula : “ whoever reaps the benefits must also