samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
a difference. we will also learn about other sources of energy from which we can tap on and strengthen. this is the challenge of the new generation of leaders if they will truly be able to make lasting and meaningful changes in their environment. on this note, let me wish you an enriching and highly energised summit. bis central bankers ’ speeches

this relatively simple measurement, which requires only minimal modeling effort, the risk manager can flag the most illiquid positions as a special concern and can monitor changes in the portfolio ’ s aggregate liquidity over time. of course, as i discuss below, this simple measurement may not identify the full range of potential liquidity risks. this example of measuring liquidity risk shows how important market transparency is to efficient risk management. that is, judging liquidity risk is easier in a transparent market like the equity market, from which the foregoing example is actually taken, than in a non - transparent market like the corporate bond market. however, as this audience knows well, the transparency of the corporate bond market will improve next year when the collection and dissemination of data on secondary market trading begin. i suspect this new source of data will improve the ability of fixed - income risk managers to measure and manage the liquidity risk of corporate bond portfolios. although a number of methods for measuring liquidity risk are already used, the quantification and modeling of market liquidity remains a relatively new area in which i expect to see, and i encourage, further growth. another weak spot of risk - management models is the risk associated with unknown common positions. that is the risk that several firms are holding the same positions, and all of those firms are basing their value - at - risk estimate on the assumption that these positions could be liquidated more quickly than they actually could. this circumstance is also known as a “ crowded trade. ” examples include the fixed - income relative - value arbitrage in autumn 1998. in autumn 1998, simultaneous liquidations by many market participants, some of them forced because of collateral or margin calls, caused liquidity spreads to widen far beyond the limit that a risk - management model using historical data would have deemed possible. in the wake of this experience, market participants reported that they had not fully understood the balance sheet of long term capital management ( ltcm ) and other large players, and hence, in some cases, their risk - management models had underestimated their own portfolio ’ s risk. prudent risk managers are probably aware of this limitation in their models - - more aware now than they were before the ltcm crisis, perhaps - - and all risk managers should try to manage this risk as best they can. unfortunately, there are no easy ways to account for it in a typical risk model. essentially what risk managers can do is to forecast other investors ’ needs for
- being, access to credit, and opportunities for homeownership of many of our fellow citizens.

advertising of mortgage products. as we did for our recently released proposed rulemaking on credit - card disclosures, we will be doing extensive consumer testing to evaluate the effectiveness of current and proposed disclosures required of all mortgage lenders. of course, the information provided by even the best - designed disclosures can be useful only when it is well understood. accordingly, the federal reserve produces a range of consumer education materials, including information to help potential borrowers understand adjustable - rate and other alternative mortgages, and we actively promote financial education by partnering with outside organizations. however, combating bad lending practices, including deliberate fraud or abuse, may require additional measures. under the home ownership equity protection act ( hoepa ), the board has the responsibility to prohibit mortgage lending practices that it finds to be unfair and deceptive. in 2001, the board banned several practices for high - cost loans, such as loan flipping – a practice characterized by frequent and repeated refinancing to generate fees for lenders. we will consider whether other specific lending practices are unfair or deceptive and should thus be prohibited under hoepa. next week we are holding a public hearing to gather input about potential abuses in mortgage lending. we will also continue to seek input from consumer and industry groups, the federal reserve ’ s consumer advisory council, our fellow regulators, and others who may have useful insights about mortgage lending practices. we have also used, and will continue to use, supervisory guidance to help mitigate problems in nonprime lending. last year, together with other federal banking regulators, we issued guidance concerning so - called nontraditional mortgages. we have also issued draft supervisory guidance concerning underwriting standards and disclosures for subprime mortgages. the agencies are now reviewing the many responses to the draft proposal. the patchwork nature of enforcement authority in subprime lending poses a special challenge. for example, rules issued by the board under hoepa apply to all lenders but are enforced – depending on the lender – by the federal trade commission, state regulators, or one of the five federal regulators of depository institutions. to achieve uniform and effective enforcement, cooperation and coordination are essential. we are committed to working closely with other federal and state regulators to ensure that the laws that protect consumers are enforced. together with other regulators and the congress, we have much to do and many issues to consider. we undertake that effort with utmost seriousness because our collective success will have significant implications for the financial well
close and constant contact with credit institutions gives them a thorough understanding of banking systems, – they are responsible for ensuring that payment systems operate smoothly, – and they contribute to banking supervision. i thank you for your attention.

validation, to intermediaries. moreover, it is clear that some functions should remain under the sole responsibility of intermediaries. in particular, i believe that the eurosystem should not have the role of managing digital euro holdings : the banque de france closed its last private customer accounts over 20 years ago, and does not intend to reopen any. customer relationship management is best handled by financial intermediaries, as they have the experience in this field. they would also ensure compliance with the related regulatory requirements, including kyc and aml / cft. such a design would allow them to preserve the role of financial intermediaries in the retail payment system, and would ensure the high level of privacy required by the public. finally, regarding the possible risks of banks ’ deposit conversions, we must and will ensure that a digital euro remains a means of payment rather than a saving / investment asset. this could be achieved by capping the maximum amount of digital euro in circulation, at a low enough level. in a completely other field, regulated savings, ceilings for the livret a have proven an efficient tool, without requiring the intervention of a big brother to check on them. page 5 sur 7 ii. building on our experiments with the private sector on a ‘ wholesale ’ cbdc to be ready for the future by comparison, the topic of a wholesale cbdc is less contentious and of less concerns to stakeholders ; but it should not be perceived as less important. we central banks have been very proactive here, as demonstrated by the “ wholesale cbdc focus ” of the bis innovation hubs. the banque de france is at the forefront here, and we have especially identified two critical use cases for improving the payments ecosystem. first, the tokenisation of securities. a wholesale cbdc could be used for the settlement of such securities issued on dlt, which is essential to prevent market and liquidity fragmentation. this technology also streamlines the information flows in financial markets, from trading to exchange procedures and settlement. second, a wholesale cbdc could enhance cross - border and crosscurrency settlements. over the past year, we have successfully completed the first phase of our experimentation programme, comprising 9 experiments, hand in hand with the private sector and with other public actors. thanks to these experiments, we have developed a direct technical expertise including two key innovative assets born in the banque de france : a proprietary dlt technology, called dl3s. this blockchain has been entirely
free and open to support its status as an international financial centre, providing financial services that mobilise us savings to the rest of the world and attracting foreign investments, and servicing domestic financial intermediation at the same time. london, of course, has much of the european economy in addition to the united kingdom economy. hong kong has the mainland of china, the third largest trading partner, the fourth largest economy, the largest foreign reserve holder and home to participants in the key financial markets that collectively form the largest player in the world. the second point i wish to make is that, under " one country, two systems ", there are two financial systems in china, both in a position to serve the interests of the country in the allimportant function of financial intermediation. this is unique and there are no relevant precedents in the financial history of the world. because of the uniqueness of this arrangement, there is understandably considerable scepticism both internationally and within china on how it might work. let me tell you. the two financial systems are different in a variety of ways, with the financial system on the mainland operating in the developing environment of a socialist market economy and the one in hong kong operating in the familiar environment of a capitalist free market economy. we all know that where there are differences, there are opportunities for exploiting relative strengths, addressing relative weaknesses and maximising synergies between the two systems, remembering always the national interest of making financial intermediation more efficient for the country as a whole. in other words, there is a need to develop a complementary, mutually - assisting and interactive relationship between the two financial systems. this incidentally is national policy, articulated by premier wen on the occasion of the national finance working meeting held early last year. given, however, that there are considerable controls in the financial system on the mainland, including capital controls, and that the financial system in hong kong is among the freest in the world, to develop the complementary, mutually - assisting and interactive relationship between the two financial systems there is a need first to establish channels to promote the mobility in an orderly manner between the two financial systems of ( 1 ) money, ( 2 ) investors and fund raisers, ( 3 ) financial instruments and ( 4 ) financial intermediaries. given also the increasing use and the clear prospects of the renminbi as a medium for international financial transactions there is also a need secondly to develop the ability of the financial system in hong

. people were interested in each other and took time to greet each other, like bikers still do now. you see that a lot less these days. 5 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches
. with that, i will pass you to my colleague. 2 / 2 bis - central bankers'speeches

ueda kazuo : the bank's semiannual report on currency and monetary control statement by mr ueda kazuo, governor of the bank of japan, before the committee on financial affairs, house of councillors, tokyo, 17 november 2023. * * * introduction the bank of japan submits to the diet its semiannual report on currency and monetary control every june and december. i am pleased to have this opportunity today to talk about recent economic and financial developments and about the bank's conduct of monetary policy. i. economic and financial developments i will first explain recent economic and financial developments. japan's economy has recovered moderately. exports and industrial production have been more or less flat, supported by a waning of the effects of supply - side constraints. corporate profits have been at high levels on the whole, and business sentiment has improved moderately. in this situation, business fixed investment has increased moderately. the employment and income situation has improved moderately. private consumption has increased steadily at a moderate pace, despite being affected by price rises. with regard to the outlook, japan's economy is likely to continue recovering moderately, supported by the materialization of pent - up demand, as well as by factors such as accommodative financial conditions and the government's economic measures, although it is expected to be under downward pressure stemming from a slowdown in the pace of recovery in overseas economies. the year - on - year rate of increase in the consumer price index ( cpi ) for all items excluding fresh food is slower than a while ago, mainly due to the effects of pushing down energy prices from the government's economic measures, but it has been in the range of 2. 5 - 3. 0 percent recently owing to the effects of a pass - through to consumer prices of cost increases led by the past rise in import prices. regarding the outlook, it is likely to be above 2 percent through fiscal 2024 and then decelerate in fiscal 2025. meanwhile, through fiscal 2025, the bank expects that underlying cpi inflation will increase gradually toward achieving the price stability target of 2 percent. concerning risks to the outlook, there are extremely high uncertainties surrounding japan's economic activity and prices, including developments in overseas economic activity and prices, developments in commodity prices, and domestic firms'wage - and price - setting behavior. under these circumstances, it is necessary to pay due attention to developments in financial and foreign exchange markets and their impact on japan '
dimitar radev : no stone has been left unturned on the topic of euro adoption in bulgaria statement by mr dimitar radev, governor of the bulgarian national bank, during a hearing at the 48th national assembly, sofia, 27 october 2022. * * * mr. speaker, ladies and gentlemen members of parliament, let me begin with this. the true debate today is for or against the euro – the euro as a symbol of the european project and our commitment to this project. in the item on the agenda where we are considering this issue, this topic is placed below'expert questions '. in the next item, this topic comes up directly. however, in both cases the topic is the same. let me say it squarely, the question about the euro area is first and foremost a political one, not an expert one, and the answer to this question must be given by the national assembly. actually, in my opinion, the question is whether bulgaria will stay indefinitely in the future anchored in europe's deep periphery, with the poverty, corruption, institutional impotence and external dependencies inherent to this periphery, or a joint effort will be made to change all this by speeding up the already greatly delayed process of joining the euro area. a few words about the expert analyses supposed to inform this process. this is the third discussion in parliament on the topic of analysis of the implications of the euro area accession, in which i have taken part over the last six months. during the previous discussions i had the opportunity to point out that these questions had been raised at least twenty years before, and they have been answered repeatedly, even in the last months and weeks. for example, just a few months ago the economic and social council to the national assembly approved an analysis about the implications of bulgaria's euro area accession for the economic development, inflation and incomes in the country. this analysis was conducted at the request of the speaker of the national assembly and was brought to the attention of the members of parliament. let me highlight that by law the economic and social council is a consultative body expressing the will of civil society organisations regarding the economic and social development, with its members representing trade unions, employers, industry organisations, organisations of pensioners, the socially weak and the disabled, women's organisations, as well as distinguished independent scientists who are specialists on the issues of the economic and social policy. the conclusion made by the economic and social council, which represents such a wide variety

including those made via internet or through other it devices. we expect that the new law would reduce the number of disputes between providers and users of payment services, as well as the number of cases where the bnb should get involved directly. please allow me to thank you and to once again congratulate you on this year ’ s very good results. i wish you joyful celebrations, a happy banker ’ s day, and very happy christmas and new year, as well as good health and success in the new year! thank you for your attention. 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches
most households to afford to service their loans. i take some comfort from the fact that arrears rates on mortgages remain low. even in western australia, where there has been a marked rise in unemployment and where house prices have fallen by around 10 per cent, arrears rates have risen to around 1½ per cent, which is not all that high compared with what we have seen in other countries in similar circumstances and earlier episodes in australia ’ s history. we have provided some information in the latest smp on interest rate resets on interest - only loans. these can see the required mortgage payments rise by nearly 30 – 40 per cent for some borrowers. there are a number of these loans whose interest - only periods expire this year. it is worth noting that there were about the same number of loans resetting last year too. our assessment is that there are quite a few mitigants which will allow these borrowers to cope with this increase in required payments, including the prevalence of offset accounts and the ability to refinance to a principal and interest loan with a lower interest rate. while some borrowers will clearly struggle with this, our expectation is that most will be able to handle the adjustment so that the overall effect on the economy should be small. 8 this switch away from interest - only loans should see a shift towards a higher share of scheduled principal repayments relative to unscheduled repayments for a time. we are seeing that in the data ( graph 8 ). it also implies faster debt amortisation, which may have implications for credit growth. 10 / 13 bis central bankers'speeches there is a risk of a further tightening in lending standards in the period ahead. this may have its largest effect on the amount of funds an individual household can borrow, more than the effect on the number of households that are eligible for a loan. this, in turn, means that credit growth may be slower than otherwise for a time. to me, that has more of an implication for house prices, than it does for the outlook for consumption. finally, in thinking about the resiliency of household balance sheets to higher interest rates, it is important to think about the environment in which interest rates would be rising. that environment is highly likely to be one where wages and household incomes are also growing faster than currently, improving the ability of households to afford higher mortgage repayments. one final risk that i would like to touch on is the related risk stemming from low wages

- oos ), fortius ( for - tee - oos ) – communiter ( ko - moo - ni - ter ). faster, higher, stronger – together. maraming salamat at mabuhay ang mcpi. mabuhay ang pilipinas. 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches
mortage in foreclosure process ( % of total credit ) ( % of total credit ) total prime subprime total prime subprime figure 5 monetary policy rates in g3 ( percentage ) us eu japan source : bloomberg. figure 6 spreads between libor and overnight index swaps ( ois ) ( basis points ) spread libor / ois 1 month spread libor / ois 3 months spread libor / ois 6 months - 20 jan. 07 apr. 07 jul. 07 oct. 07 jan. 08 may. 08 ago. 08 source : bloomberg. figure 7 real interest rates ( percentage ) - 1 us oecd ( 1 ) 10 year nominal bond return, minus same period expected inflation. ( 2 ) short term nominal interest rate minus cd. sources : bloomberg, oecd and survey of professional forecasters. figure 8 banking credit approval standards ( * ) corporate credits ( big and medium ) consumption credits - 10 - 10 - 20 - 20 - 30 - 30 - 40 - 40 - 50 - 50 - 60 - 60 - 70 1t03 1t04 us 1t05 euro area 1t06 1t07 uk 1t08 japan - 70 1t03 1t04 1t05 us ( credit cards ) uk 1t06 1t07 1t08 euro area japan ( * ) positive value is more flexibility in credit approval. sources : ecb, bank of japan and federal reserve. figure 9 oil wti prices and gsci grain and cereals and gsci energy ( dollars per barrel ; index 01 / 01 / 2007 = 100 ) jan. 07 may. 07 sep. 07 jan. 08 may. 08 sep. 08 gsci energy gsci grains and cereals oil wti source : bloomberg. figure 10 annual inflation ( * ) ( percentage ) jul latin america asia em europe em jul g3 economies ( * ) geometric average of countries each region. ( 1 ) latin america : brazil, mexico, chile, colombia y peru. ( 2 ) asia em : china, india, indonesia, south korea, malaysia, singapore, taiwan and thailand. ( 3 ) europe em : czech republic, hungary, poland, russia andturkey. ( 4 ) g3 : us, euro area and japan. source : ceic data. figure 11 inflation forecast for 2008 ( * ) ( percentage ) g3 latin america emerging asia emerging europe ( * ) geometric

and much learning. 5 / 5