. fairly frequently, however, at about a third of the meetings, at least one member has entered a reservation against the interest rate decision. as an aside it may be worth pointing out that for some time now it has perhaps been more noticeable than before if we are in disagreement. these days, we also have to decide on a forecast for the repo rate. at the meeting in july, for example, all of the board members agreed to increase the interest rate. but three of us felt that the forecast for the repo rate path in the period ahead should be some - what lower. this disunity attracted a lot of attention in the media and also provided some clues that made it easier to forecast what the vote would be at the latest meeting. previously, before we began publishing interest rate forecasts, there were also different opinions among the board members about how the interest rate should develop in the future. but as no forecast for the repo rate was published and there was nothing concrete to enter a reservation against, any differences of opinion were not visible to the outside world. it is probably also the case that the future development of the repo rate was not discussed as much internally then as it is today. disagreement a healthy sign another thing that i feel is worth pointing out is that disagreement among the members of the board should not be seen as a sign of weakness. this would perhaps be a reasonable interpretation if you held the view that the board members should be so wise that we can simply " calculate " which decision is the only possible correct one and agree on it. unfortunately, the world is far too complicated for this to be possible. and if it were possible there would be no real reason to let the monetary policy decisions be made by a board with six members. it would be enough to have a single wise decision - maker. in recent decades, however, the trend has been in the opposite direction. all over the world, it has become more and more common to let monetary policy decisions be made by a group of individuals – a committee or board – rather than by a central bank governor alone. probably the most important explanation for this is that many central banks have become more independent in this period. this has made it seem more natural to delegate the right to make decisions to a group of people rather than to one individual. this development has meant that research on monetary policy decision - making in groups has accelerated. 1 one result that has emerged is that groups tend to make better decisions than

same time, the regulations must be compatible with international standards. if necessary, a “ swiss finish ” must be added. the “ swiss finish ” is not because we want to be a model pupil. it is needed in cases where the global minimum requirements do not guarantee the desired level of stability for switzerland, because of our particular circumstances. effective regulations mean that the goal which the measures aim to achieve can actually be achieved, and that compliance with the rules can be efficiently enforced and monitored. finally, it is obvious that regulations are always associated with costs for the entities being regulated. these private costs are justified from an overall economic point of view as long as the regulations are in line with the principles i have already mentioned and thereby help to make the banking industry much more stable. as regards swiss bank regulations, it is primarily the risks emanating from developments in the real estate and mortgage markets which are presently the focus of public interest. however, the most decisive factor for the long - term importance of the swiss banking centre is the alleviation of the tbtf issue. only if this can be done, will it be possible to provide a home to international banks in switzerland in the long term. thus, regulatory efforts to contain the tbtf issue convincingly in switzerland are extremely important. with the swiss tbtf legislation, which is currently being implemented, we are making good progress in this respect. the package of legislation rests on two pillars. first, systemically important banks are subject to significantly higher capital and liquidity requirements with a progressive component. second, arrangements must be made to ensure that systemically important banks are resolvable in a crisis, so that it is not necessary to resort to public funds. if these measures are implemented in full, incentives to take on excessive risk will be substantially reduced. this will diminish the likelihood of a crisis, as well as the costs to the taxpayer, should a crisis nevertheless occur. at the same time, the measures help to strengthen domestic competition, because they reduce the implicit subsidies to the tbtf banks. however, we have not yet achieved our objective. on the one hand, the current legal and organisational structures of the two global big banks do not yet ensure an orderly wind - down in the event of a crisis, although the measures they have already announced are all steps in the right direction. on the other hand, international provisions need to be drawn up to ensure that sufficient resources are available for a wind - down of systemically important banks