₹ 427 billion which amounted to only 16. 43 % of the total amount involved. looking at the huge task on hand with as many as 66, 971 cases involving ₹ 1, 415 billion pending before them as on march 31, 2014, i would like to say that reserve bank has a lot of expectations from the debt recovery tribunals. banks approach drts as a last recourse, so cases before drts need to be dealt with more strictly. 27. we are very much concerned that the sanctity of debt contracts has been continuously eroded in india, especially by large borrowers. the system protected large borrowers and their right to stay in control, rendering bankers helpless vis - a - vis large and influential promoters. as explained earlier, we are separately dealing with this issue through the treatment towards wilful defaulters and non - cooperative borrowers. 28. since pendency of large number of cases in drts is one of the prime issues that needs to be addressed, i would like to draw your attention to some of our other concerns and need for better efficiency of drts : • it is understood that in a number of cases, drt grants time to borrower / applicant to make payment and subject to payment, bank ’ s sarfaesi action is stayed and matter lingers on for a long period. • though section 17 ( 5 ) provides that an application under section 17 shall be disposed of within 60 days of date of application ( extendable up to 4 months ) the said time frame is not being strictly followed in practice. there is long delay in passing orders by the drts. • the officials of drts / drats should be given proper training so that they appreciate the very purpose and adjudicate the cases in a way to meet the purpose for which these tribunals are established. • as per the rddbfi act, though the cases are to be disposed of within six months, in some cases, the next date itself is given after six months to one year. • when an appeal is filed before drat against the order of drt, though there is provision for stipulation of deposit of 75 % of the amount of debt due as a precondition for admission of appeal, most drats are exercising their discretion and bis central bankers ’ speeches do not insist for deposit of any amount despite the specific pleas made by the bank in this regard. • in many drts, even frivolous applications filed by the

our set - up, with a clear medium - term focus, the eurosystem does not need or have to react mechanically to short - term deviations of monetary growth from the reference value. instead, monetary developments, i. e. both the developments of the components of m3 and of its counterparts, are analysed very carefully in order to examine and extract their information content for future inflation. * * * part 2 : the achievements of the eurosystem ’ s monetary policy what preliminary assessment can we make of the first six years of the single monetary policy? i would like to underline the following points, considering successively price stability, macroeconomic stability and convergence, monetary stance and predictability. 1. the achievement of the overriding policy objective : price stability confronted with a series of adverse exogenous supply shocks ( affecting in particular oil prices, food products and services prices ) leading to a rise in the hicp of above 2 % in year - on - year terms from 2000 to 2002, the level around which the hicp has hovered since, the eurosystem has been able to achieve its main objective : since the eurosystem became responsible for monetary policy in the euro area, hicp inflation has averaged 2 %, which is near to the “ close to but below 2 % ” at which we aim over the medium term. let me remind you that hicp inflation was around 4 % in the 1980 ’ s and about 9 % in the 1970s [ see figure 1 ]. until recently, the single monetary policy also succeeded in stabilising and anchoring medium to longterm inflation expectations at around 1. 8 % to 1. 9 %, despite all the above mentioned shocks. that is to say, once again, at a level close to, but below, 2 % in accordance with our definition of price stability – whether one takes the inflation expectations derived from surveys ( for example, consensus forecast, or the ecb survey of professional forecasters – [ see figure 2 ] ) or those drawn from market data, notably index - linked government bonds. recently, the awareness of a durable higher cost of oil has pushed expectations slightly above 2 %. the last december key ecb interest rate ’ s hike has however brought these market expectations back to 2 % that is to say in line with our definition of price stability over the medium term. 2. macroeconomic stability and convergence price stability has not come at the expense of higher unemployment. moreover, there are no visible signs