the other players come to expect interventions and anticipate the later measures. on balance, it has become clear that an interventionist strategy for managing financial crises can easily lead to a dead end. - 4iv so how can the imf escape from this dead end on a lasting basis? naturally, there is no magic formula. but there are a few general conclusions. the first requirement is that the fund should concentrate less on correcting a market outcome that has already occurred. instead it should try to influence the ex ante setting in which the financial markets operate and to improve their functioning. that begins with improved prevention. above all, this requires more transparency and information so that the financial markets can form their expectations more rationally and more realistically and so that the imf itself can assess the need for action more quickly. specifically, this means publishing more data ( especially on the maturity structure and denomination of external debt ), publishing timelier data and at shorter intervals ( if possible, monthly instead of twice - yearly ) and using more sources, that is not only the data of the borrowers themselves but also data from the lending financial institutions in the industrial countries. improving the data quality of a number of countries will certainly require a substantial intensification of basic statistical work and more openness. however, the return of benefits is likely to be considerable. the advantages of greater transparency are obvious. the countries concerned have a greater recognition of the need to take certain action. the “ ownership ” of adjustment programmes, in particular, increases. and there are less uncertainties for the market players. the limits of such transparency must lie where confidentiality and the “ internal openness ” of advisory or decision - making processes have to be upheld. but in the integrated world of today it must also be clear that national sovereignty is increasingly coming up against its limits. the imf itself can contribute towards more information. but it is not a rating agency. the ultimate responsibility for correctly assessing chances and risks in a given country remains with the players in the financial markets. in the broader sense, greater prevention also includes technical support. for example, the international community can and should provide support, especially in the field of banking supervision, where a number of emerging economies evidently still have some weaknesses. the bis recently set up the institute for financial stability in order to train expert staff, and the committees of the g - 10 central bank governors, which mostly meet in basle, have now intensified their cooperation with the representatives of the

financial crisis in the 1990s. the bank ’ s response next, i will talk about the bank ’ s response. the bank has enhanced monetary easing since march, implementing three measures as follows. the first is the special program to support financing mainly of firms. the total size of this program is about 110 trillion yen. specifically, the bank decided to purchase cp and corporate bonds within about 20 trillion yen, which is equivalent in size to a quarter of the japanese market. in addition, it introduced funding measures of about 90 trillion yen to encourage lending by financial institutions. these include a scheme in which the government takes the credit risk of lending by financial institutions to small and medium - sized firms and the bank provides funds to those financial institutions on favorable terms. this represents a case of cooperation between the government and central bank to support corporate financing, while making their respective 1 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches roles clear. the second is an ample provision of yen and foreign currency funds. as for the yen funds, the bank decided to purchase a necessary amount of jgbs without limit, with a view to maintaining stability in the bond market and stabilizing the entire yield curve at a low level. regarding foreign currency funds, the bank has provided a large amount of u. s. dollar funds based on cooperation with five other major central banks. the third is active purchases of etfs and j - reits. the aim is to prevent firms ’ and households ’ sentiment from deteriorating through volatility in financial markets, thereby supporting positive economic activity. in addition to the enhancement of monetary easing, the bank has made regulatory responses in order to ensure financial system stability. based on an international agreement, the full implementation of the finalized basel iii standards has been deferred by one year, and banks have been encouraged to use their capital and liquidity buffers. moreover, the bank announced with the financial services agency in april an easing of regulation on the leverage ratio requirement. financial system stability provides support for corporate financing and is also a prerequisite for monetary policy to exert its maximum effect. the bank ’ s response has already had considerable effects. japan ’ s financial system has maintained stability on the whole, and the lending stance of financial institutions has been active. under these circumstances, bank lending for may registered the highest increase in the last 30 years, and cp and corporate bond issuances have increased significantly. tension in financial markets has abated. the bank will continue to support financing mainly of firms and