samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
reserve's section 13 ( 3 ) powers on the evolution of financial markets and the economy, as well as official sector responses to future economic crises? in responding to a crisis, how should the official sector best calibrate its lending response through the central bank, compared to its spending response through the fiscal authorities? and, in an emergency like the covid - 19 pandemic, where should decisions about the allocation of resources in the economy rest? if independence is prized in allocating emergency aid, should there be a new, independent agency with responsibility for economic investment? 23 these are interesting theoretical questions. in practice, however, the federal reserve is what congress has made it. its coordination with treasury and its administration of economic relief proceed as congress has directed. looking ahead i would like to leave you with some observations on challenges still ahead of us — in the near term, medium term, and long term. near - term challenges — those arising within the next twelve months — are many. to manage them, i commend to you martin wolf's advice : " above all, make sure we get through this. that is our chief aim. " 24 like many of you, i have confronted new legal and compliance questions arising from a remote workforce, and have had to balance new priorities against ongoing commitments. to get through this, we have to do both. we have to walk and chew gum at the same time. financial institutions have to sustain — and, in some cases, improve — cyber security and anti - money laundering programs. 25 the pandemic is no excuse to lower your guard. if anything, there is a heightened need for cyber vigilance. many federal agencies have published warnings of pandemic scams aimed at financial institutions and their customers. 26 among other schemes, hackers and digital con - artists may try to exploit the realities of the " digital divide. " employees and customers without regular internet access at home may resort to connecting from public places. there are inherent risks to viewing or printing confidential information outside of secure locations. those risks could be magnified in the decentralized environments that now count as our places of business. https : / / www. newyorkfed. org / newsevents / speeches / 2020 / hel200625 2 / 4 the federal reserve ’ s pandemic response - federal reserve bank of new york in the medium term — by that i mean over the next couple of years — we need to anti

by appropriate and timely actions. recent decisions by the governing council regarding both policy rates and liquidity provision show that we are ready to make the necessary decisions. many instruments remain available should further risks materialize. there should be no doubt that the eurosystem will ensure that price stability, as currently defined, will be maintained in the euro area. bis central bankers ’ speeches
to the economy and financial markets, to mediate credit and payments, and to redistribute risks appropriately. in other words, it is capable of performing its function in an orderly and efficient way. iceland ’ s banking system meets the demands made of it and performs well on stress tests conducted by the central bank and fme. table 1 main vulnerabilities risk explanation exchange rate developments macroeconomic imbalances are pronounced. the current account deficit poses the risk of a depreciation of the krona. shifts in carry trades and other exposures could catalyse a sudden turnaround. the fx market relies on three market makers and is still relatively thin. some borrowers from the commercial banks have little or no hedge against exchange rate movements. global interest rates and in recent years, interest rates and premia have been at a historical low. premia interest rates have begun to climb and sooner or later premia will rise again, increasing corporate financing costs. terms of trade export prices could drop and oil prices rise. unfavourable developments could widen the current account deficit and erode national income. economic and social infrastructure is sound. the central bank ’ s macroeconomic forecast assumes a deterioration in the terms of trade. international market high dependence on market funding and deposits on call makes credit funding ratings and global market conditions crucial for the commercial banks. experience shows that credit assessment can shift suddenly. asset quality of rapid credit growth often eventually leads to poorer loan quality. loans commercial banks with equities as collateral are substantial. prices of equities and real estate are buoyant. although arrears and impairment are at a low, they are unlikely to remain so over the next few years. table 2 resilience resilience explanation economy the economy is flexible and in the past has shown itself capable of tackling cyclical swings through adjustment of imports. investment and output growth have been robust. the long - term economic outlook is favourable. strength of the commercial banks the commercial banks ’ liquidity and capital ratios have never been higher. they have built up liquidity in foreign currency and secured refinancing into 2008. profitability is strong from the bank ’ s diverse operations and assets are diversified. institutional and supervisory framework iceland ’ s framework is the eea agreement and its guidelines are international best practice and transparency. economic and social infrastructure is sound. financial supervision has been boosted and extensive cross - border cooperation is in place. payment and settlement systems payment system infrastructure

is largely electronic and efficient. steps have been taken to enhance security and contingency plans. systems meet international standards. fiscal position the treasury ’ s position is strong with consecutive fiscal surpluses. net external treasury debt, including foreign reserves, is virtually zero. no pension gap is foreseeable.
, i am sure that the panel discussion tomorrow on the spanish countercyclical provisions experience will offer not just an interesting study in history, but also some lessons for the future. without further ado, i am pleased to open this first conference on financial stability giving the floor now to rafael repullo, director of cemfi, who will chair the first session. thank you for your attention. 5 / 5

twofold objective. on the one hand, it seeks to prevent or mitigate the emergence of systemic risks over the expansionary phase of the credit cycle, as well as to strengthen the resilience of financial institutions against these risks. this is typically carried out through countercyclical instruments, such as capital buffers, which should be accumulated over expansionary periods and, eventually, be released in downward phases in order to smooth total credit over the cycle. second, macroprudential policy is concerned with the structural features of the financial system. this is a notion that has to do with the impact on systemic risk arising from the size, 3 / 5 complexity and interconnections of certain financial institutions. it is essential that financial institutions duly internalise the impact of their decisions on the whole system, which is generally greater for larger, more complex, more interconnected and less substitutable financial institutions. capital buffers specifically tailored to the most systemic banks have been introduced in recent years in many countries, within the framework of the g20, the financial stability board and the basel committee on banking supervision initiatives, precisely to address this issue. another interesting tool for financial stability, of potential macroprudential use, are the stress test exercises. notwithstanding their current limitations, stress tests represent a major effort by supervisory authorities to assess the impact of different adverse scenarios on the financial system, to convey its state of resilience to the public and to inform the necessary follow - up actions. summing up, the macroprudential policy toolkit has significantly expanded in recent years. this is a change in the right direction because, beyond conferring new powers to central banks and supervisory authorities, it requires the adoption of a system - wide perspective in policy - making. this new set of powers has been introduced rather quickly – over a few short years – and this leaves us with a number of questions still awaiting answers. we need to better understand the effectiveness of the new instruments in improving the resilience of the financial system, in reducing systemic risks, and the trade - offs between different policy options. we also need to understand how macroprudential policies can affect risk - taking attitudes by different agents and to what extent the provision of credit to the real economy may be affected, especially during difficult periods. after a thorough analysis, it might be the case that the current macroprudential toolkit is still insufficient or incomplete. the european union ’ s macroprudential framework
central and eastern european countries ’ accession to the eu and their eventual participation in the euro area.

proximity can often mean economic and financial linkages. but even economies on the other side of the globe, with few direct linkages, can be affected for no other reason than that they are classified as “ emerging markets ”. such countries might well have some weaknesses such as those noted above which, given time and a measure of economic and financial stability, might be adequately addressed. but under conditions of widespread desire to shed risk, they become immediate stumbling blocks for markets. this can put intense pressure on the policy authorities and economies of these countries - pressure which few countries can withstand easily. for these reasons, the picture looks different from the perspective of the emerging market economies. what is good for us after a long period of evolution need not be good for another country at a much earlier stage of that evolution. in modern parlance, it is essential to get the sequencing right. countries have to attain a high standard of financial infrastructure and regulation before they can submit themselves to the potential instability inherent in the totally free movement of capital. in the meantime, they should integrate themselves as closely as they can into the international capital market and, as their markets evolve towards maturity, they can take additional steps progressively to liberalise their regulatory regimes. to expect them to do it in the other order is to ask them to run before they can walk. 3. what should we do about it? fortunately, there is now a widespread agreement that something has to be done to improve the international financial system. the degree of instability, if it continues unchecked, could lead many participating countries to question the whole legitimacy of the system. the severity of the contractions in asia is the most striking example, but so is the sudden recognition that a hedge fund can become so important that its failure could pose a systemic threat to the united states and international economy. the fact that the second most important exchange rate in the world the us dollar - yen rate - could move by 20 per cent in a month without there being a material change in fundamentals has also caused concern. i think there is now agreement that something has to be done, and it is heartening to see that the united states has taken a leadership role, including by convening the group of 22 and its three working parties. i also think that the australian government has played a very useful role - first by its representations to the imf urging more flexibility in its handling of the indonesian crisis, and secondly by its attempt to keep the momentum of apec heading in the
that you make the ecb move forward with the council, despite some people maybe not agreeing or not happy? let me tell you, we have a mandate and we have to comply with this and this mandate does require the ecb to bring inflation back below 2 %. close, but below 2 % and we ’ ll do everything that is needed within our mandate to comply with this. so : more europe, more europe, more europe? [ in french ] more europe, more europe, more europe. the audio and video of the interview in french can be found here : http : / / www. dailymotion. com / video / x26ijk8 _ mario - draghi - l - europe - a - besoin - d - une - franceforte _ news bis central bankers ’ speeches

mario draghi : interview with europe 1 interview with mr mario draghi, president of the european central bank, with europe 1, conducted by mr jean - pierre elkabbach on 23 september 2014, aired on 24 september 2014. * * * europe 1 : you have already acted decisively in june and september. if unemployment continues to grow, can the ecb continue to stimulate the economy? monetary policy will stay accommodative for a long time and i can say that the governing council is unanimous in its commitment to use the available instruments within its mandate to bring inflation back to close but below 2 %. interest rates will stay at the present level for an extended period of time because they can ’ t go much lower than that. in europe, is there a risk today of deflation or even of recession? for the euro area as a whole we don ’ t see risk of deflation. we see risk of too low inflation for too long a time and for the euro area as a whole, as i ’ ve said many times our recovery is modest, weak, uneven, and fragile, but it ’ s not recession. do you have a lot of liquidity at the ecb? yes, we ’ ve shown that we have a lot of liquidity in the ecb. and could you show it again? and we ’ re certainly, as i said before, we ’ re certainly ready to use all the instruments within our mandate to make sure that … to obtain more of growth by 2017, 2018 : what needs to be done? one talks about developing infrastructure and about investing. how? where to invest? i said before that monetary policy can ’ t be the only thing producing growth. there must be two other components. one is structural reforms. we can provide as much credit as we can to the private sector. but, if for a young entrepreneur it takes months in some countries before he can have the permits, the authorisations, to open a new shop he will not ask for this credit. so let ’ s abolish bureaucracy. yes, indeed and if this young entrepreneur would like to open a new shop and finally has the permit but he is overburdened by taxation, he will not apply for credit. so credit is the necessary but not sufficient condition to have growth. in your building, at the ecb, when one thinks about france, does one say that france is the sick man of europe? well, frankly, i must
confidence that god will always be with us to support and smooth our moves towards a better future. thank you. bis central bankers ’ speeches

the last two years reaches 14 % and 50 % respectively. 17. fifth, non - cash national movement ( gnnt ) launched in 14 august 2014 gains strong supports from various government institutions. bank indonesia consistently makes extensification and intensification programs for effective gnnt program. ladies and gentlemen, distinguished guests, mandates of bank indonesia 18. as a payment system authority, the mission of bank indonesia is to manage and maintain safe, efficient, and smooth payment system and money management through access expansion and by considering the national interest. the mission will be achieved through two important aspects : first, payment system strengthening and second, proactive in initiating cooperation and collaboration. data of mocit, 2014. mark plus insight netizen survey, 2014. bis central bankers ’ speeches 19. payment system strengthening is specified in four pillars : first, effective and efficient money management system ; second, payment electronification expansion ; third, reliable and safe payment infrastructure ; fourth, strong and rigorous supervision and oversight. on this occasion, we will focus more on exploration of the second pillar, i. e. payment electronification expansion. 20. in relation to the payment electronification expansion, one of the visions of bank indonesia in non - cash sector is to realize a society with strong preference to using non - cash payment instruments and facilities in making financial transactions, also known as less cash society. 21. the realization of less cash society is important to boost more efficient economy, in addition to promoting better governance in financial management by the community, businesses, and government institutions. ladies and gentlemen, distinguished guests, electronification 22. in the beginning, we frequently use the term digital payment services ; however, in line with the focus and efforts to achieve the mission in non - cash sector, we consider electronification as a more appropriate term. 23. electronification is an incorporated and integrated effort to change cash payment into non - cash payment. expanded use of electronification is defined as an effort to change most payment mechanism from physical into digital or from manual into electronic and to increase limited financial access to wider ( inclusive ) financial access. 24. expanded payment electronification strategy is made through an integrated campaign effort involving all stakeholders. we will seek facilitation with the government and the relevant institutions which may potentially serve as the catalyst of use of payment system electronification. 25. expanded payment electronification is also an integral part of financial inclusion policy to increase the access of unbanked people to financial institutions. through the use
bank ’ s monetary policy decisions. looking into the future is always difficult, but i think that the central bank can feel satisfied with how accurate its inflation forecasts have turned out to be. i would like to conclude by thanking the office of the prime minister and other government authorities for their pleasant cooperation. i also thank the financial institutions for their good collaboration. last but not least, i would like to thank the employees of the central bank for their fine work, without which the bank could not have achieved such impressive results.

leading up to the crisis were in many ways enormous. the clearest manifestation is perhaps the current account deficit that averaged over 17 % of gdp during the years 2005 – 2008. both it and the large positive output gap were bound to correct – a process that was likely to be associated with a significant slowing of growth, if not an outright recession. as a matter of fact, the central bank of iceland predicted more or less consistently from 2007 onwards that there would be a recession in iceland in 2009. this projection had nothing to do with the collapse of the banks but everything to do with the known investment profile of big projects in the energy and aluminium sectors and the accumulating signs of a grossly overheated economy. this belies the common statement that forecasters never predict recessions! the shocks that hit iceland in 2008 and the imminent correction of unsustainable balances shaped macroeconomic developments in iceland in the years that followed. but so did the policy responses, which took two main forms. the first was the crisis management regarding the failing banks, which i have already mentioned. the second was the economic programme developed by the icelandic authorities in co - operation with the imf. the imf programme had three key goals : stabilisation of the exchange rate, fiscal sustainability, and reconstruction of the financial sector. comprehensive capital controls were an important element in the programme, but their rationale was to help to stabilise the exchange rate in a situation where the currency had fallen more than 50 % in 2008, where foreign krona positions that were a legacy of carry trade and capital inflows amounted to around 40 % of gdp, and where a large fiscal deficit that had to be financed in the domestic market had developed. in this situation, the capital controls gave monetary policy more scope to focus on the domestic economy, as is demonstrated in figure 3, which compares developments in short - term real interest rates during and after the currency and banking crises in korea in 1997 and iceland in 2008. iceland ’ s recession was deep. but it was probably not as deep as many might have thought when they entertained the image of the total collapse of an entire banking sector, plus a major currency crisis. but then we should bear in mind the nature of the shocks. a significant part of the impact of the banking collapse was felt in other countries. furthermore, the bis central bankers ’ speeches economic shocks disproportionally affected overblown sectors ( banking and construction ). most of the
and became president rather unexpectedly ; both men had had extensive legislative and budget experience in the congress ; and both men had belief systems anchored by strong core values. during my years at the cea, the focus of the economic policy team underwent a number of twists and turns. in the fall of 1974, inflation was the critical issue. some months later, it became apparent that a recession was under way, and attention turned toward policies for recovery. subsequently, the focus on inflation returned. it was a challenging time, and we did not solve all the problems that we confronted. nevertheless, i found my time there quite rewarding and benefited greatly from my work with the other members and with the very highly skilled staff. i could recount much about the work of the cea at that time, but i will only highlight three themes that recurred during my tenure. first, economic modeling is as much art as science. economic policy makers face enormous uncertainty. economic models provide a set of useful tools to frame future outcomes ; but as we were reminded repeatedly during our efforts to forecast the economy in 1974 and 1975, models can go off track in myriad ways. objective and thorough analysis, as is the norm at the cea, is the most effective counterweight to this challenge. second, high - quality and timely data are crucial inputs to the process of making economic policy. because we had access to high - frequency data, we were able to see that the sharp further downturn in the economy in early 1975 reflected largely an inventory correction and that final demand was holding up. that insight provided support for the view that, so long as final demand was sustained, recovery was imminent. as it turned out, that was the right call. finally, as hard as this can be to achieve, economic policy should take the long view. although pressures to use the government's tools of economic management to achieve one or another shortterm aim are always present, the tools of government are, in fact, most appropriately used to create an environment in which private economic activity can flourish over the longer run. as i indicated, the focus of the cea has changed over the years as the economic challenges facing the nation have changed. through all this history, the cea has, in most cases, provided the president with the best economic advice available at the time and has, crucially, been a consistent advocate for the importance of market forces. whether or not all of those involved in passing the employment act and creating

of the soviet empire, and with it central planning, has left market capitalism as the principal, but not universally revered, model of economic organization. nevertheless, the vigorous debate on how economies should be organized in our increasingly globalized society and what rules should govern individuals ’ trading appears destined to continue.