the dollar – it would be about building a more stable global financial system. it would also be about providing an additional channel for foreign investors to invest in europe, including into sustainable finance and the green bond markets. there are major challenges involved in taking the cmu forward. for that, we need a clear vision and persistence. we need to revitalise the action plan. with this in mind, in my view it would be useful to reassess the narrative attached to the cmu. a new concept – “ growth and investment union ” for example – might put a more positive drive on the project. dear colleagues, the current global headwinds underline the importance of boosting the economic revival of europe through structural reforms, public and private investment in research and innovation, and a revitalisation of the single market. we need to complete the emu financial architecture to enhance capital allocation and improve private risk sharing. only in this way can we reap full benefits of the single market. and, crucially, europe ’ s economic revival needs to be combined with the greatest challenge of our generation : tackling and mitigating climate change. it calls for a consistent strategy from the eu on how to pursue economic and ecological transformation of our societies and enterprises. in this challenging task, the financial system will need to play an important role in managing risks and mobilising capital for green investments. let me wish you most productive discussions and enjoyable days in helsinki! – many thanks for your attention. 1 see padoa - schioppa 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches

the eyes of the public would be enhanced. in exceptional situations, the rules need to allow flexibility, but this should be based on predetermined and consistent criteria. 3 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches an expenditure rule can be defined as a medium - term ceiling for the growth of government expenditure, set in relation to the estimated future economic growth and taking into account the stock of public debt. such a rule would probably serve more effectively as an operational fiscal policy guide than the current rule that is based on the structural fiscal balance. the so - called automatic stabilizers, such as increased expenditure through unemployment insurance in an economic recession, are important mechanisms of economic adjustment in the eurozone countries. the expenditure rule would not prevent the operation of automatic stabilizers. the expenditure rule supports responsible fiscal policy, as we have seen in countries like the netherlands, sweden and finland where it has been used over the past decades. recent research by the imf has come by and large to a similar conclusion : the compliance rate of expenditure rules is greater than that for budget balance rules, especially if it is directly under the control of the government and the rule is enshrined in law or in a coalition agreement. empirical research also indicates that the presence of expenditure rules is associated with stronger fiscal performance, i. e. a higher primary balance and countercyclical fiscal policies. finally, it is essential to repeat the paramount importance of national ownership of responsible fiscal policies. both an expenditure rule and an independent fiscal council can be valuable tools for that goal – but they are only tools, which should be used well. it is worth quoting the director of the imf ’ s fiscal department, vitor gaspar, and his co - authors : “ one extreme and dangerous manifestation … is the expressed perception by many analysts that european fiscal governance releases countries from their national responsibilities. nothing could be further from the truth : fiscal policy is, first and foremost, a national responsibility. ” several eu member states have in fact lived in line with gaspar ’ s recommendation and used the eu rulebook as an instrument to reinforce national ownership of fiscal policy. belgium, denmark, luxembourg and the netherlands introduced national expenditure rules in 1992 in response to the maastricht treaty and its debt and deficit rules. sweden and finland followed suit after becoming members of the eu in 1995. germany went so far as to introduce a constitutional debt brake, which has recently been discussed in germany and criticised for its excessive rigour that may prevent the