you add another leg, its end must also lie on that plane, otherwise things get wobbly. so, it is not about whether the legs are arranged symmetrically ; it is about whether their ends are on the same plane. the same applies to monetary union. it is not necessary for all policy areas to be integrated symmetrically. what is needed is for control and liability to be situated on the same plane. only if control and liability are aligned either at the national or at the european level are the incentives for sound policymaking in place. take the example of a credit card. if it draws on your account, and you are the only one using it, then you will feel the consequences of splashing out. by the same token, if you share a credit card within your family that runs on a shared account, things should be fine as well. but if you give away your credit card without being able to rein in spending, the beneficiary might be unable to resist the urge to indulge. this is why the measures taken so far to contain the crisis have skewed the delicate balance between control and liability. the crucial question is this : how can we restore that balance? 2. 1 a fiscal union benoit cœure and emmanuel macron have made proposals that aim at creating a fiscal union – that is, centralised decision - making in the fiscal realm, combined with fiscal transfers or mutual liability in the form of eurobonds. a genuine fiscal union could indeed restore the balance between control and liability. if decision - making is shifted from the national to the european level, the deficit bias of the individual member states inherent in the current set - up of emu would be mitigated. while this, in itself, is not a guarantee for sound fiscal policy choices, this framework is at least consistent with the concept of mutual liability. what kind of sovereignty shift are we talking about? last year, michel sapin declared that “ la commission, je le rappelle, n ’ a absolument pas le pouvoir de rejeter, retoquer ou censurer un budget, comme j ’ ai pu le lire. ici, comme ailleurs, la souverainete appartient au parlement francais. ” in a fiscal union, that would change. a member state would have to follow through on the demands of a european fiscal authority. as such, a common fiscal authority

jens weidmann : at the crossroads – the euro area between sovereignty and solidarity speech by dr jens weidmann, president of the deutsche bundesbank and chairman of the board of directors of the bank for international settlements, at sciences po, paris, 12 november 2015. * 1. * * introduction ladies and gentlemen thank you kindly for inviting me here today. it is a great pleasure and a privilege to speak before such an international audience. even more so than my generation, you live a truly european life. your studies have an international outlook, and, in all likelihood, you have done, or will do, part of these studies abroad. some of you have started them at the campus europeen franco - allemand in nancy. and you are the first generation that has come of age with our common currency. europe not only comes naturally to you. your perspective on european matters is also invaluable because europe is not yet your legacy – but it is your future. to give credit where credit is due, the european legacy that you have come upon was shaped to a large extent by the efforts of french visionaries. back in 1949, economist jacques rueff declared that “ l ’ europe se fera par la monnaie ou ne se fera pas. ” in 1962, a commissioner penned a memorandum for a common currency for the first time – his name was robert marjolin. in 1969, the commission made a second proposal for a monetary union that resulted in the exchange rate system known as the “ snake ” – here, the commissioner in question was raymond barre, a graduate of sciences po. and the plan that finally served as a blueprint for our economic and monetary union was developed by a committee of national central bank governors. but it was chaired by the then president of the commission : jacques delors. the euro was always a political project that sought to establish even closer ties between the nations of europe. but of course, it was more than just a political project – it was also a promise of prosperity. in recent years, this promise has proven elusive for many in the euro area, prompting some to regard the requirements of our common currency not as an anchor of stability, but as a veritable straitjacket. the rescue mechanisms that were put in place prevented the crisis in the euro area from coming to a head. but they did so by mutualising fiscal liability on a substantial scale. fiscal and economic policies, by contrast, are essentially still a