on a periodic basis. we must put in place mechanisms for the effective assessment, management, and transfer of 3 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches disaster risks. advances in technology, innovation, research, and market integration put us in a strong position to address these challenges. indeed, there are few human enterprises where the application of technology and innovation can have as much social purpose and public good as in the area of protecting societies against natural disasters. singapore ’ s insurance industry is committed to this goal. and i am pleased that ntu has been a key partner in many ways, contributing to our vision of being a global centre of excellence in insurance and risk management. thank you and i wish you a meaningful time at the conference. 4 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches

, has been necessary to ensure sufficient liquidity in the system as weak bank balance sheets suppress intermediation. but excess liquidity remaining in the system longer than necessary is in turn a recipe for inflation into the medium term. the mechanisms for mopping up the excess liquidity need to be put in place early. meanwhile, the scale of fiscal stimulus, and funding needed to support this, has raised the spectre of destabilised sovereign bond markets and the crowding out of private borrowings. this does not bode well for private capital formation, and could create stresses downstream for corporations which do not have the advantage of sovereign backing. further, if deficits are seen to be structural, market reaction could negate much of the effect of fiscal stimulus. there is also the issue of how to restore private - sector driven intermediation of credit in due course. while government support for businesses ’ access to credit is necessary now, it cannot continue indefinitely. in other words, even as we take unconventional measures, we need to have an eye on medium - term sustainability, and make clear our " exit " strategy and timing. just as we must not be behind the curve in taking action to stabilise markets, we need to anticipate what lies ahead and plan accordingly. this is crucial because that later - stage " exit " action represents not just the end of this phase but a crucial transition into another set of conditions with totally different policy demands. third, we need to consider the global dimension of our responses, and the impact on other economies. for instance, the bank deposit guarantee scheme that first started in ireland triggered a domino effect and made its way to this region. to minimise uncertainty, some degree of coordination to remove these guarantee would be necessary. as governments in the developed economies inject huge sums of public funds to shore up banks, the instinct is to place demands on these banks to lend domestically. this may seem sensible individually. but collectively, this'abandon - thy - neighbour'policy can trigger a big reduction of credit, and undermine economic recovery that eventually hurts the developed economies. protectionist measures hurt emerging economies most, and they can trigger a backlash that sets the world back. we must resist such regression. asia ’ s responses let me now turn to the impact of the crisis on asia, and responses to that. asian economies will slow considerably. those that are more highly dependent on external demand will contract more sharply than the rest. but unlike during the asian financial