over national payment systems, central banks guard against systemic risks that could be transmitted via these systems. there are therefore clear synergies between financial stability and other tasks. central to these synergies is the wealth of knowledge on the financial system through the central bank´s active presence in financial markets. again, the structural differences in financial systems across the euro area mean that the financial stability task is more appropriately located at the national level, although communication and co - ordination across borders are increasingly important. whereas all national central banks have a financial stability task, not all have direct competence in the field of prudential supervision. the choice to delegate the supervisory task to the central bank is, of course, based on national circumstances and preferences. however, the important synergies between the financial stability and supervisory tasks should not be ignored. i will come back to this issue when i discuss the supervisory arrangements in the netherlands. in general, it is important to stress that on both a national and european level the national central banks remain involved in discussions on prudential supervision. this is essential for the proper execution of their financial stability task and, as such, enables the system to contribute to the smooth conduct of supervisory policies. recent developments in europe regarding supervision recently, the perception of increased cross sector and cross border financial integration has resulted in demands for enhancing the supervisory structure in europe. i fully subscribe to the ambitions to speed up the regulatory process of supervision in europe. moreover, the convergence of supervisory practices would serve a level playing field in european financial markets. last year, a european committee under chairmanship of mr brouwer – director at the dutch central bank – made several recommendations on this point. as i explained, the involvement of national central banks will continue to offer welcome expertise in assessing the supervisory needs and challenges of financial integration. concerning topics directly related to financial stability and systemic risks, the national central banks will be at the frontline of european discussions, together with their counterparts from the ministries of finance. however, i would warn against the suggestion of introducing a single european supervisor. it is a misconception to expect that a top down approach to the design of supervision in europe would promote financial integration. clearly, that would simply ignore the structural differences on the national level. indeed, the practice of emu has shown that a critical mass in integration is needed before institutional convergence ( i. e. the introduction of the euro ) can work as a catalyst. likewise, i would warn against the suggestion that

nout wellink : the role of national central banks within the european system of central banks - the example of de nederlandsche bank introduction by dr nout wellink, president of de nederlandsche bank and president of the bank for international settlements, to the paper ‘ the role of national central banks within the european system of central banks : the example of de nederlandsche bank ’, oesterreichische nationalbank conference ‘ competition of regions and integration in emu ’, vienna, 13 - 14 june 2002 * * * introduction i would first like to thank the oesterreichische nationalbank for inviting me to this conference and take up the challenge of discussing the role of national central banks in europe. clearly, this role underwent a fascinating metamorphosis with the introduction of the single currency. suddenly, a strong, european dimension was added to these institutions that were traditionally largely confined to national boundaries. consequently, the national central bank in europe is of a peculiar sort and has a double identity. on the one hand, it is deeply rooted in national tradition and sovereignty, which reflects specific national tasks and responsibilities. on the other hand, it is part of a system of central banks responsible for a fully supranationalised monetary policy and related, common tasks. let me now briefly outline my paper on the role of national central banks in europe. first, i will shortly discuss the general framework of the european system of central banks. subsequently, i will touch on the system tasks and related national responsibilities. here, i will specifically spend some time on financial stability and supervision. clearly, this policy area has seen some major developments recently, both on the national and european level. the european system of central banks what exactly is the european system of central banks? what explains its unique institutional and operational set - up? these are crucial questions in analysing the role of national central banks or, for that matter, understanding monetary union in general. nevertheless, the questions are seldom asked, let alone answered. since the second world war, european integration has been a co - operative effort in which common objectives in principle override the size and power of the individual participants. the european system of central banks is a both a product and a reflection of this european community of member states. hence, the fundamental notion underlying the system is a joint and equal responsibility to carry out the tasks assigned by the treaty. in this set - up, the ecb operates as the legal entity that links