not appear to matter decisively. the relative lack of support for globalisation among lower - skilled workers and the least educated could indicate that they are uncertain about the general costs and benefits of globalisation, but see the individual costs and benefits more clearly, perhaps more rationally. concerns about the economic costs of globalisation for certain groups in society have led to the creation of the european globalisation adjustment fund, an eu initiative which aims to help workers made redundant as a result of changing global trade patterns to find another job as quickly as possible. i should also note that, generally speaking, surveys indicate that people in the eu are not protectionist, though they are somewhat more so in france. however, europeans are more inclined to support redistribution, and this is in keeping with recent results in the literature indicating that europeans are more concerned about inequality more than the americans. 4 third, there is no prima facie evidence that measures of reported happiness or “ life satisfaction ” are negatively affected by globalisation. regression analysis suggests a positive relationship between “ life satisfaction ” in oecd countries in the mid - 2000s against the ranking of each oecd country in a globalization index ( see figure 1 ). 5 more globalisation seems to make people happier, at least according to this simple bivariate evidence, although the correlation could also mean that happier countries tend to become more globalised. 6 fourth, and this an important issue to which i will turn later in my speech, eu citizens believe that globalisation is influenced far more by the eu than by national governments. indeed, it is unlikely that any european country can have sufficient weight to influence the course of globalisation and the “ rules of the game ” of the global economy. only the eu as a whole can i draw here from a range of opinion polls, including eurobarometer ( 2007 ), ccfr ( 2006 ) and worldpublicopinion & ccfr ( 2007 ). note that the methodology across opinion is not necessarily directly comparable. see alesina, di tella and macculloch ( 2004 ). they show that concern for inequality is high among the poor and the leftist in europe, while it is restricted to rich leftists in the united states. this is the a. t. kearney / foreign policy globalization index, which tracks and assesses changes in four key components of global integration, incorporating measures such as trade and investment flows, movement of people across borders, volumes of international telephone traffic, internet usage

the poorer members of society. the degree of financial literacy of the population, according to the evidence, raises concern as to people ’ s ability to reap the benefits of globalisation. these are matters which central banks and other policy - making authorities should have a keen interest in pursuing. to sum up, the recent financial turmoil will not make financial globalisation more popular. unless policy authorities, starting from those in charge of financial supervision, draw the appropriate lessons and have the courage to recognise what went wrong and how their task can be improved, they risk loosing the confidence of citizens, and ultimately their independence. in europe, a reflection on the degree to which the current lamfalussy framework can be pushed to accommodate a much increased cooperation between national supervisory authorities is certainly required. 5. what can europe do? to summarise, policy - makers should acknowledge more fully the negative perceptions of the european public opinion towards globalisation. in addition to uttering the globalisation - isgood - for - you mantra, policy - makers should make it clear that they are aware of the painful adjustment costs for those workers and firms confronted with increasing global competition. the same policy - makers need to ensure that the necessary policy steps are taken to help those individuals and groups adjust to the new circumstances. what is the role for europe in all this? as i said, european citizens are aware that the challenges of globalisation can hardly be tackled at the local level. there thus seems to be an important role to be played by european institutions in the governance of globalisation. so why is this not happening? there may be two related reasons. the first is that for europe to be more effective at the global level, it has to act in a united way. such unity requires that actions conducted at the national level are more coordinated or even replaced by a european actor. the creation, or strengthening, of a european actor is objected, in many areas, by the national policy makers. “ turkeys don ’ t vote for christmas ” is a dictum that would apply well to the case. over the last few years national political or technocratic players have developed a resistance to the continuous strengthening of the european policy role and increasingly defended their national prerogatives, opposing further devolution of power to the european level. the argument – which is related to the second reason why europe is not more present on the world scene – is that such a devolution is not supported by the people of europe, often