. and the increase in the incomes of the super - rich ( the top 0. 1 per cent ) has been sharper still, with an accentuation of the concentration of wealth. 9 “ secular stagnation ” and the “ second machine age ” the fact that development is a non - linear process is perceptible, among other things, in the lack of substantial productivity gains in the advanced countries consequent to the spread of the new information and communications technologies. 10 in most of these countries per capita output has risen only modestly, where it has not actually contracted, as in italy. the global financial crisis, which stemmed from the bursting of the subprime mortgage bubble in on the enormous improvement in living and health conditions practically everywhere in the world since world war ii and on the uneven developments in the distribution of income and opportunities, with reference to environmental, health, and political disasters, see angus deaton ’ s profound, impassioned recent book, the great escape : health, wealth and the origins of inequality, princeton, n. j., princeton university press, 2014. a. b. atkinson, t. piketty and e. saez, “ top incomes in the long run of history ”, journal of economic literature, 49, 1, 2011 ; f. alvaredo, a. b. atkinson, t. piketty and e. saez, “ the top 1 percent in international and historical perspective, ” journal of economic perspectives, 27, 3, 2013. d. acemoglu, d. autor, d. dorn, g. h. hanson and b. price, “ return of the solow paradox? it, productivity, and employment in u. s. manufacturing ”, american economic review, 104, 5, 2014. bis central bankers ’ speeches the united states in 2007, and the euro - area sovereign debt crisis, which was triggered in early 2010 by the revelation of grave underestimates of the greek budget deficit, have been accompanied by what has come to be known, as if in contrast to the “ great moderation ” of the previous two decades, as the “ great recession. ” 11 even in the united states and the united kingdom, the countries that left the acute phase of the crisis behind them most quickly, the growth rate remains lower than in the pre - crisis years. in the euro area as a whole output is still below its pre - crisis level, which it is projected

workers who might previously have been left on the sidelines — including those with records of past incarceration or who lack a particular certification or degree. given that the large majority of working - age households, those at the middle and lower ends of the income distribution, rely primarily on wage income, advancing our employment mandate has served the country well. in today ’ s new normal, with the low responsiveness of inflation to labor market tightness, there appears to be little evidence so far of a tradeoff with our price - stability objective. the sustained strengthening of the labor market also adds to the productive capacity of the economy by attracting people on the sidelines to join or rejoin the labor force and move into employment. what about the risks? of course, there are also risks. the past three downturns were precipitated not by rising inflation pressure, but rather by the buildup of financial imbalances. extended periods of abovepotential growth and low interest rates tend to be accompanied by rapid credit growth and see stephanie r. aaronson, mary c. daly, william wascher, and david w. wilcox ( 2019 ), “ okun revisited : who benefits most from a strong economy? ” paper presented at the brookings papers on economic activity conference, held at the brookings institution, washington, march 7 – 8, https : / / www. brookings. edu / wpcontent / uploads / 2019 / 03 / okun - revisited - who - benefits - most - from - a - strong - economy. pdf. - 7elevated asset valuations, which tend to boost downside risks to the economy. 9 it is not hard to see why a high - pressure economy might be associated with elevated financial imbalances, especially late in the cycle. as an expansion continues, the memory of the previous recession fades. profits tend to rise, experienced loss rates on loans are low, and people tend to project recent trends into the future, which leads financial market participants and borrowers to become overly optimistic. risk appetite rises, asset valuations become stretched, and credit is available on easier terms and to riskier borrowers than earlier in the cycle when memories of losses were still fresh. historically, when the phillips curve was steeper, inflation tended to rise as the economy heated up, which naturally prompted the federal reserve to raise interest rates. in turn, the interest rate increases would have the collateral effect of damping increases in asset