samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
##closure process and another 1. 7 million loans that are three or more payments behind. moreover, due to ongoing delays in the foreclosure process, more than 40 percent of loans in foreclosure are more than two years delinquent. while these statistics are indicative of a historic level of homeowner stress, they are down from their post - crisis peaks, and there are signs that further gradual improvement may lie ahead. the share of loans entering delinquency for the first time has been trending lower for for example, see elizabeth a. duke ( 2012 ), “ economic developments, risks to the outlook, and housing market policies, ” speech delivered at “ 2012 financial forecast, ” an event sponsored by the virginia bankers association and the virginia chamber of commerce, held in richmond, va., january 6 ; and elizabeth a. duke ( 2011 ), “ rebalancing the housing market, ” speech delivered at “ the housing market going forward : lessons learned from the recent crisis, ” a policy forum sponsored by the board of governors of the federal reserve system, september 1. bis central bankers ’ speeches more than two years. this decline in early - stage delinquencies has coincided with sustained reductions in broader measures of delinquency – most notably, total loans past due. these favorable trends likely reflect somewhat better economic conditions. but efforts to resolve troubled mortgages through loan modification, short sales, and deeds - in - lieu of foreclosure should also be credited. further, mortgages that were originated using the tight underwriting that has prevailed since 2008 would presumably have lower delinquency rates, and recent vintage loans now make up an increasing share of outstanding mortgages. there are some promising signs in the trend of house prices as well. although house prices have continued to fall year - over - year, the pace of decline has slowed notably and the month - over - month readings have shown increases for three months now. national house prices fell less than 1 percent for the year ending in march. with the exception of the period around the 2010 first - time homebuyer tax credit, this year - over - year decline was the smallest since early 2007. moreover, according to corelogic data, home prices have risen in more cities lately than they have fallen. indeed, over 45 percent of cities saw their home prices rise more than 1 percent in the past three months, the most since early 2006. these modest improvements in house

bring the budget toward balance should also be evaluated with regard to the economic effects on work and retirement behavior, private saving, and the distribution of income likely to result from particular policy choices. the benefits of taking timely and appropriate federal budget actions are important for the long - run health of the u. s. economy. 4 / 4
march of globalisation. trade as a share of gdp rose from 31 % to 54 % in the euro area between 1999 and 2019, whereas in the united states it rose from just 23 % to 26 %. [ 2 ] europe ’ s integration with global value chains was deeper too, with gvc participation roughly 20 percentage points higher than in the united states. the economic benefits of all this were real. integration with global value chains led to lower import prices, technology spillovers, and productivity gains from the international division of labour. [ 4 ] and when regions were faced mainly with local shocks, trade openness helped buffer the domestic effects, allowing countries to diversify risks and exploit multiple sources of external demand. but two factors have emerged in recent years that expose the vulnerabilities of this model. first, the efficiency gains of this unfolding of production have been shown to be prone to risks. as global supply chains have become progressively leaner and more efficient through “ just - in - time ” production, they have also become extremely vulnerable to disruptions in the face of global shocks that affect multiple sectors at once. in fact, as we saw during the pandemic, global value chains materially transmitted and amplified global shocks. during the contractionary phase of the pandemic, gvc - related spillovers amplified the decline in global imports and exports by 25 %, according to one study. [ 7 ] and during the recovery phase, mismatches between burgeoning global demand and restrained supply have contributed to surging industrial goods inflation. supply bottlenecks are found to have contributed to half of the rise in manufacturing producer price inflation in the euro area. second, it has become clear how much global production relies on critical raw materials sourced from just a few countries – an arrangement that can quickly become a vulnerability when geopolitics change and countries with different strategic goals emerge as more risky trading partners. for example, china was estimated to control over half of the global rare earths mining capacity in 2020, and 85 % of rare earths refining. in europe ’ s case, the european commission has found that 34 products used in the eu are extremely exposed to supply chain disruptions given their low potential for diversification and substitution inside the union. [ 10 ] and this vulnerability has become more evident as a result of the russia - ukraine war. the euro area is highly dependent on russia for, among other things, cobalt and vanadium. these are key inputs for the

management bis central bankers ’ speeches
i will conclude with my view of the role of integration for malaysia. since the financial crisis, malaysia ’ s growth has become more dependent on domestic demand and less dependent on external demand. while the resilience of domestic demand in the challenging environment is a noteworthy achievement, the reduced contribution of the external sector has clearly pushed malaysia on to a lower growth trajectory. since 2007, the contribution of net exports to real gdp growth has been negative with the sole exception of 2014. over the longer term, the contribution of the external sector will need to expand to support a healthy and sustainable economy. therefore, for malaysia, economic integration and strengthening our economic ties with other countries is a necessity. preferential arrangements such as trans - pacific partnership agreement, the regional comprehensive economic partnership and asean free trade agreements have a critical role in spurring productivity growth, accelerating structural reforms and creating a diversified, competitive and resilient malaysian economy. once again, welcome to this conference, and thank you. bis central bankers ’ speeches

1990. the international islamic liquidity management corporation ( iilm ), established in 2010, is a further global collaborative effort to enhance liquidity management in the islamic financial system. conclusion to fully realise the asian potential, continuing the transformative momentum of the region will not be complete without ensuring that the benefits of development are widely shared. experience has shown, even in the advanced economies, that when inequality is high and a significant proportion of the population is excluded from the opportunity to participate meaningfully in income and wealth generation, instability follows. to ensure that rapid economic growth and transformation does not further widen the social divide and disenfranchise those who remain excluded from its benefits, access to high - quality, healthcare, social security and financial inclusion is now an important focus of the region. the contour of the global economy is fundamentally changing amidst mounting challenges and continued uncertainties. in this environment, asia has become an important source of stability. while the region is affected by the ongoing economic and financial crisis originating from europe and the united states, the asian region continues to remain on a growth trajectory, although at a more modest level. greater regional cohesiveness and cooperation, however, has enhanced asia ’ s potential to address these new challenges that are confronting the region. the success of the region is not only in the interest of the asian economies, but the world. bis central bankers ’ speeches
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rameswurlall basant roi : acceptance speech - 2017 central bank governor of the year award for africa acceptance speech by mr rameswurlall basant roi, governor of the bank of mauritius, for the 2017 central bank governor of the year award for africa, port louis, 7 april 2017. * * * excellencies, members of the diplomatic corps mr james king, africa and middles east editor for “ the banker ” fellow bankers distinguished guests ladies and gentlemen good afternoon it ’ s an exceptional honour to have been selected for the 2017 central bank governor of the year award for africa by “ the banker ” magazine. i am humbled to have received the award this afternoon. i thank “ the banker ” for giving recognition to the work of the bank of mauritius. this accolade comes as a pleasant assurance that we have not been erring in terms of decisions and actions. it also reflects the high central banking standard that the bank is striving to maintain. this afternoon ’ s event is also, in some sense, a magnificent celebration of the progress made by our jurisdiction. i am summoned to briefly reflect on myself in the central banking profession. i wish not to be presumptuous and i ask for your forbearance. it ’ s just that i am a central banker who has spent his life doing his job with an elevated sense of duty and devotion. i have been in the central banking arena for about 40 years. and 40 years of central banking – an honourable profession that imposes rigours and military - like discipline on the person holding the office – have moulded me into what i stand for today. it has been and continues to be a weary long march from dripping dusk to drizzling dawn and to dripping dusk again. barely a few months after i had joined the bank of mauritius in 1976, i had a very brief encounter with the then governor of the bank. that memorable encounter had instantly made me, as someone neither uber - ambitious nor loquacious as many of today ’ s young professionals, realize that the road to success is always under construction. i was made to understand that education does not always lead to more success in the real world. the better you perform in the world of academia, the worse you may turn out to be at solving real world ’ s problems. in academia, problem solving involves only a part of the brain – the rational part that reads and writes, retains information and connects the dots. this
press forward with structural reforms, promoting good governance, increasing transparency, and harmonizing standards. this task must also include efforts to integrate the lowincome countries into the global economy. the current circumstances provide good reasons for addressing these issues. the international monetary fund has been at the center of world economic cooperation since its establishment. the fund should continue to play a crucial role in strengthening the areas i have emphasized through its surveillance and its lending activities.

##ecd average of 7. 2 %. the occupational pension funds have grown very fast in the last few decades, through mandatory contributions from all wages and salaries, low operational costs, and long spells of good returns. around the turn of the century, they were the third - largest in eu and efta countries in terms of assets as a share of gdp, at around 80 %, after switzerland and the netherlands. shortly before the international financial crisis struck, iceland had overtaken even these countries. the funds were bound to grow much more, as they were far from reaching maturity in the sense that most of those receiving pensions had not accumulated rights based on their lifetime earnings. the clearest measure of this was the fact that the pension burden, or pensions as a share of contributions, was still below 50 %. at that time, it was estimated that, at maturity, the funds would amount to 1½ times gdp. they came close to that just before the financial crisis, but this was not “ real ”, as i will come to later. it is noteworthy that the funds do not obey simple classifications. some of the funds have an employment guarantee and would be characterised as defined - benefit funds, where the employer bears the investment risk, but in iceland only the government, municipalities and banks can guarantee pension funds. but the rest are not pure defined contribution funds. the investment risk is borne collectively by the members, and there is some scope for smoothing changes in benefits and for some risk - sharing among generations. this can matter when you have a once - in - a - lifetime shock to returns, as we experienced during the international financial crisis. the third pillar of the pension system entered the stage rather late here in iceland. it was only in 1998 that legislation on tax incentives for voluntary private pension saving was adopted, but these incentives were subsequently increased. voluntary private pensions saving then increased by leaps and bounds, reaching 10 % of gdp in 2002 and 15 % of gdp in 2007. this saving has proven to be an important cushion during the current crisis, as early repayment was temporarily allowed. so far, these early repayments have amounted to 2½ % of gdp. this is akin to a fiscal stimulus and has supported private consumption this year and last. let me now say a few words about the economic and financial effects of the pension system that we have built up here in iceland. the first thing to note is that it is always those who are economically active today who support today ’ s pension
reliability and efficiency of the payment system.

the expression of emotions and attitudes. there has been very little analysis of sustainable paths for a modern industrial economy, so that we have little idea of what would be required in the way of policy and what sorts of outcomes could be expected. solow feared that the concept of sustainability would remain a slogan, without materializing into policies to encourage the use of sustainable resources. almost 30 years later, data on the trend in greenhouse gas concentration – the leading cause of global warming – are not encouraging. in fact, the growing use of fossil fuels has pushed the concentration of greenhouse gases to levels that are dangerously close to generating a temperature increase of more than 1. 5°c, with potentially catastrophic consequences for our planet according to the united nations intergovernmental panel on climate change. some effects are already evident. at global level, the last four years have been the warmest since 1880. in italy, 2018 was the warmest year in the past two centuries and 2017 was already characterized by a strong intensification in weather conditions, with severe cases of drought over most of the country that caused serious repercussions on the water supply. climate change and the risks to the financial sector in europe, southern countries like italy will be most affected by the expected consequences of climate change, which pose new risks for the real economy and for the stability of the financial sector. first, there is the ‘ physical risk ’ stemming from progressive climate change, in particular involving an increase in temperatures, greater irregularity in rainfall patterns and an increased probability of extreme weather events. according to all the main climate change scenarios, italy will be the european nation that is most exposed to damage caused by its rivers flooding. these phenomena could result in significant losses in terms of human life and costs in terms of the destruction of public and private infrastructure, forcing households, firms and the state to allocate a large amount of financial resources to their reconstruction. the steady increase in temperatures could have permanent effects on the country ’ s productive capacity. the effects of climate change on the real economy may spread to the financial sector through various channels. natural disasters interrupt the productive functions of firms and households, increasing their financial vulnerability, reducing the value of the assets pledged as collateral for loans, and making it more difficult for them to repay loans. the increase in climate change - related risks could cause banks to tighten credit towards households and firms in high - risk areas, with possible negative repercussions on the transmission of monetary policy stimuli. if the
hesitate to take up on account of high cost of servicing small value accounts. 16. however, sfbs and payments banks with reliance on high - end technology can pose significant challenges to cooperative banks. payments banks sponsored by telecom companies can easily capture the remittance business from these banks. co - operative banks have to substantially alter their approach to protect their turf from this competition onslaught. relevance of co - operative banks 17. with still a sizable population remaining without access to formal institutional finance, the issue of financial inclusion has taken a whole new meaning in this 21st century. financial inclusion is not only about credit, but involves providing a wide range of financial services, including saving accounts, insurance, and remittance products. co - operative banks with their peculiar character of local feel and democratic set - up are automatically placed at the centre of any meaningful financial inclusion drive. ensuring the last mile connectivity will only help these banks to sustain their business. however, for these to happen, co - operative banks need to focus on corporate governance and imbibe the current distributive technology to offer low cost products and turn the tide in their favour against the likely onslaught of competition from small finance and payments banks. position of unlicensed dccbs 18. as there were many unlicensed cooperative banks operating in the country, the committee on financial sector assessment ( cfsa ) ( chairman : dr. rakesh mohan ) had recommended bis central bankers ’ speeches that no unlicensed cooperative bank may be allowed to operate in cooperative space beyond 31 march 2012. 19. as on march 31, 2009, there were 31 state cooperative banks ( stcbs ) and 371 district central cooperative banks ( dccbs ) functioning as part of short - term cooperative credit structure. out of these, 313 banks ( stcbs - 17 and dccbs - 296 ) were unlicensed. the reserve bank of india in pursuit of its commitment to allow only licensed cooperative banks to do banking business in india relaxed the licensing parameters that enabled 290 cooperative banks ( stcbs / dccbs ) to get banking license from rbi. only 23 banks remained unlicensed as on date in four states viz. ( uttar pradesh – 16, jammu & kashmir – 3, maharashtra – 3, and west bengal – 1 ). 20. regulatory action was initiated by rbi against unlicensed banks by issuing directions to them prohibiting from acceptance of fresh deposits in may 2012, and show - cause notices were issued for rejection

exports awards ” dated 10th december 2019. 4 imf ( 2021 ), “ boosting productivity in the aftermath of covid - 19 ”, g - 20 background note, june. 5 pyarelal, gandhi, m. ( 1958 ). the last phase vol. ii. ahmedabad : navajiban publishing house, p. 65 5 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches
annika & sariola, mikko & silvo, aino ( 2019 ) : investment weakened by uncertainty and 3 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches the structure of the finnish economy, 17. 12. 2019, bank of finland bulletin 5 / 2019 jalasjoki, pirkka & karkkainen, samu & vanhala, juuso ( 2021 ) : public finances carried households and businesses through the covid - 19 crisis, 15. 6. 2021 bank of finland bulletin 3 / 2021 4 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches

, latino small businesses are more concentrated in a few industries and significantly underrepresented in the professional, scientific and technical services sectors, which also tend to be the most lucrative. third, the size of the latino population in a given metro area does not mean that there is a larger share of latino - owned businesses in the same — which is, to me, somewhat counterintuitive. digging into and understanding the causes of these issues and identifying possible paths forward is not only an imperative but an opportunity, and of course the focus of much of today ’ s agenda. it is clear that there is a pressing need for expanding technical support, diversifying sources of financing, especially at the micro level, and, in the case of the geographic conundrum, further collaborating on policy and community advocacy. i very much look forward to today ’ s discussion and thank you again for your participation. it is now my pleasure to introduce nancy lee of interise, marlene orozco from slei, and claire kramer from the new york fed. 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches
attention.

, however, has by no means been stable. i have had a hard time, sometimes as a central banker, and sometimes as the head of a trading company, dealing with fluctuations in foreign exchange rates. in the meantime, eu countries made efforts to stabilize foreign exchange rates between member countries and such efforts paid off at the end of the 20th century. they gave birth to a single currency, the euro. the euro will no doubt contribute to enhancing trade and investment within the region and will be a model for other regions in the world. and it will take some time to get clues to what extent the euro will play the role of a key currency and lead to the stability of foreign exchange rates between major currencies. i should also add that we might need to review the background history and rationale behind the special drawing rights ( sdr ) of the imf which were created in 1969. the other important challenge in the 21st century is how we can devise the exchange rate regime in order to stave off currency and financial crises in the emerging economies and also how to contain resultant contagion to the minimum. we understand that the past currency crises in latin american and asian countries were brought about by individual and unique factors. still, we have no choice but to make steady efforts to learn from the past crises in various countries in order to ward off currency crises and contain contagion. i am told that this conference will take up such issues related to currency crises and i am convinced that your discussions will provide a good opportunity to enhance our understanding. a better understanding of an ideal exchange rate regime may not lead to a universal currency system all the countries around the globe accept. i have several times witnessed a currency system, once optimal for a certain country at a certain time, gradually become fraught with inconsistencies and unstable in time. yet, pessimism is not what i want to spread. a series of inconsistencies in the international currency have, in my judgement, deepened our understanding of the functions and roles of an exchange rate regime and have encouraged the evolution of such a system. to rack our brains and map out ways to achieve a better exchange rate regime is one of the most important challenges for central bankers. i am convinced that with the experts from all over the world exchanging their experiences and views, this conference will contribute to meeting such a challenge. and i believe this conference will also provide clues to how to map out charts through troubled waters. thank you for your