strategy. incumbents are also migrating, although more cautiously, to the public cloud. however, the cloud computing market is highly concentrated and amazon web services has built a dominant position. as the core financial functions lift and shift to the cloud, the risk of a single point of failure will emerge, and yet cloud providers are unregulated and out of the direct reach of financial supervisors. this raises questions about the effectiveness of the strategy followed so far by regulators vis - a - vis financial institutions ’ third party service providers, which in essence consists in setting requirements on financial intermediaries regarding their contractual relationships with their service providers. the evolving balance of power to the benefit of dominant bigtechs service providers may challenge the effectiveness of such a strategy going forward. second, the question of conduct. our regulation deems certain practices acceptable and others not. technological developments are making it possible to use information that was previously out of reach of a financial intermediary. this could potentially allow a more accurate assessment of risk or a more “ responsive ” pricing of service. but what is possible may not be ( socially ) acceptable – to take one example, the current development of “ social network informed credit scores ” raises questions about financial intermediaries ’ governance and risk control frameworks, when privacy concerns or discriminatory bias are at stake. ( b ) let me now turn to new risks, which are non - financial in nature but closely intertwined with the digitalisation of finance. in my view, two in particular merit financial supervisory scrutiny. first, the strategic independence of incumbent banks. if incumbents depend on bigtechs for key infrastructure such as cloud computing, if they rely on the same bigtech to distribute their products through their platforms and then compete with bigtechs on certain segments, they will see their strategic independence challenged in the same way as hotels and retailers did. this process of commoditisation of incumbents may lower credit standards to compensate for higher pressure on margins and exacerbate their funding gap because of lower customer stickiness. second, the development of cyber - risk. with greater interconnections between technologies and the financial system and the opening up of information systems, the banque de france observed in its financial stability report of december 2017 that cyber - risk is moving from an idiosyncratic risk to a potential source of systemic risk which needs to be addressed. this perspective is widely shared among public and private decision makers and it should not come as a surprise

”, comparable to the financing of growth and major infrastructures in the 19th century or the management of great financial crises in the last 100 years. the progress report of the ngfs, released in october is hence an important step. indeed, for the first time, this coalition of the 21 v willing central banks and supervisors, has unanimously agreed that climate - related risks – as a source of financial risk – are within a central bank ’ s mandate. the ngfs will not stop there and next year will publish its first comprehensive report, which will provide – on a voluntary basis only – policy recommendations for central banks and supervisors. this will take place at the upcoming ngfs conference, at the banque de france in paris, on 17 april 2019 : you are all most welcome! to prevent the airplane from crashing, we can help by shedding light on climate risks in order to take accurate and timely decisions, and by seizing opportunities while aligning incentives and mobilising capital. ii. anticipating climate - related risks 1 / our first priority should be the disclosure of existing exposures in the financial sector, what i call “ the snapshot of risks ”. the recommendations of the task force on climate - related financial disclosures ( tcfd ), chaired by mr. bloomberg with sponsorship from the financial stability board ( fsb ), have been groundbreaking as they provide a practical framework allowing companies to disclose their climate - related financial risks. however, an accurate and consistent vision of the risks requires a wider implementation of the tcfd ’ s recommendations. significant room for progress remains in this area. to enable markets to price risks, we need comparable metrics – thanks to a common taxonomy – and better access to higher quality and more consistent data. i therefore fully page 3 sur 6 support the work of the technical expert group on sustainable finance of the european commission which is concretely developing a taxonomy ; our first ngfs workstream is also working in this field. we should then gradually move towards compulsory transparency based on a “ comply or explain ” principle. article 173 of the french energy transition law – as it sets the environmental social governance ( esg ) - climate approach as a new market standard – could usefully serve as a reference studied at the european level. 2 / beyond the " snapshot of risks ", the ngfs is working on a " video of risks ", with long - term forward - looking stress tests to assess the dynamic effects of climate change on the economy and financial stability