samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
labour market flexibility. attention must now shift towards implementing this reform agenda. closing the implementation gap is essential in order to reap the full benefits of structural reforms in terms of both a higher growth potential in the medium term and improved consumer and business confidence in the short term. we are now at your disposal for questions.

the main issuers of so - called eurobonds or international securities. today, over 250, 000 outstanding isins ( 20 % of these isins are euro - denominated ) are issued through the two icsds, with a value of roughly €9. 2 trillion. from a european capital 2 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches market perspective, these assets are important. they account for about 25 % of all outstanding marketable assets eligible as collateral with the eurosystem. i would like to see the announced strategy of the two groups to bring eurobonds to be settled in t2s starting to take effect by 2018. issuance as we see t2s roll out, it has become apparent that despite the progress towards a more integrated market, issuance has remained a largely national business across the eu, often as a result of legacy structures and national rules. indeed, the issue was first identified in the t2s harmonisation agenda in 2011 and remains relevant today. recently adopted legislation, namely the csdr level ii, addresses certain aspects of the location of issuance. in particular, it covers the rights of issuers, allowing them to have their securities recorded in the csd of their choice. however, despite both t2s and the csdr, fragmentation endures and a domestic issuance process at european level does not exist at the moment. there are several possible reasons why the market has failed to generate a more integrated and efficient securities issuance industry. these include legal constraints and, specifically, uncertainties arising from issuing in foreign jurisdictions, where some or all aspects of the issuer ’ s domestic law no longer apply. in addition, regulatory restrictions or domestic market practices may prevent issuers from reaching out to the whole eu investor base. take, for example, restrictions on the location of primary dealers in sovereign debt or national registration procedures. the result is that – regardless of the launch of a single securities settlement engine ( t2s ) and the single legal framework ( csdr ) – the market has remained national, from the perspective of securities issuance. debt instruments, even supranational ones, are issued nationally and issuers and investors often fail to reach each other across europe. although icsds issue eurobonds in a global environment, they remain in the context of specific market infrastructures ( under the rules of the market where the icsd is located ). this status quo restricts the investor base, in particular the pan
ways to grow and manage their own money. we also thank all the speakers and delegates from here and overseas who have come to contribute to the crafting of the regional agenda for child and youth finance. and to our foreign delegates, we hope you enjoy your stay here in the philippines. thank you all and mabuhay! bis central bankers ’ speeches

parents of elementary school pupils. schools now request this program which runs parallel to the classroom teachings of elementary pupils. at the same time, 12 banks joined hands to launch the kiddie account program. while these banks were no stranger to children ’ s accounts, they all agreed on the need to make saving affordable, accessible and convenient to attract more kiddie savers. after negotiations that took nearly two years, the 12 banks agreed on a common denominator : children are welcome to open accounts with them with a minimum deposit of only 100 pesos or less than us $ 3. 00. and to further help make saving a habit, bank representatives also go directly to schools to service children ’ s deposits. so far, so good : thousands of new accounts are being generated by the kiddie account program and withdrawals are minimal. since children exert influence in household decisions, we hope that their habit of saving will rub off on other members of the households, including the adults. based on the results of the bsp ’ s household finance survey, only 20 % of philippine households maintain bank accounts. we are therefore looking at this program as a way to help raise the savings rate in the philippines. i understand that yesterday many of our foreign delegates visited the aurora quezon elementary school to observe how financial lessons are taught and to hear how banks are implementing their kiddie account programs. did you find it useful? that is good to know. ladies and gentlemen, our continuing journey takes us through uncharted territory. nevertheless, we are encouraged by positive feedback – from the pupils who start saving regularly, to the teachers who say they learn life lessons from the program. also a positive is the 2011 citi financial quotient survey where the philippines showed sustained improvements in its score. nevertheless, we have a long way to go and a lot more to learn. it is for this reason that we look forward to this regional meeting on child and youth finance for asia and the pacific. i hope therefore that our conference today will be successful and fruitful. finally, we thank the child and youth finance international for bringing this regional meeting to manila and for taking the lead in the global movement to promote the habit of saving among schoolchildren. we also commend their design props today – the multi - colored bis central bankers ’ speeches balloons and throw pillows. it reminds us that while we are tackling a serious subject, we should not forget that our intended beneficiaries should find it fun to find
evident from all the economic mistakes countries have made in history, and continue to make today. but i also know it is true because i often hear people in south africa contemplating these temptations. people ask, wouldn ’ t it be worth taking big risks, having more inflation, borrowing as much as we can get away with, if only we could get some growth and some jobs? they even say, in a highly unequal country like south africa, wouldn ’ t it be politically safer to take macroeconomic risks to try and get poverty and unemployment lower? but this is wrong, for two reasons. first, this only seems attractive until you ’ ve actually tried it. macroeconomic stability is like oxygen. you don ’ t miss it until you haven ’ t got it, and then it ’ s all you can think about. people who want to engineer a short term boom and ignore the long term costs won ’ t like it when the long - term shows up, which history suggest normally starts after about two years. if you don ’ t think inflation matters, go try some. or ask all the zimbabweans or venezuelans who had to leave their countries when their economies collapsed. unorthodox policies have totally orthodox consequences, as those people can confirm. second, countries with difficult social foundations need to be more careful about macroeconomic stability, not more reckless. that ’ s because a macroeconomic crisis is an incredibly wrenching social experience, and you need a very strong society to get through one peacefully. when a country blows up its own macroeconomy, its policy options narrow, to the point where all the choices are bad ones. if you can get anyone to lend to you, it will be the imf. one way or another, you will end up doing real and brutal austerity. what we have had in south africa over the past few years isn ’ t anything like this. we have interest rates close to all - time lows – the repo rate is at 6. 5 % currently – and government spending has been increasing every year, faster than inflation. real austerity is having interest rates at 65 %, as in argentina at present, and cutting pensions and grants and firing government employees. we should avoid reckless economic policies unless we want to risk putting our society through that pain and stress. this brings me to end of my speech. in conclusion, i would like to leave you with four principles for confronting populist economic policies, drawn from

ruled out. to sum up, keeping domestic and external imbalances in check is the only way the cee economies will be able to cope with any strong volatility headwinds. 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches
jean - claude trichet : interview with frankfurter allgemeine zeitung interview with mr jean - claude trichet, president of the european central bank, and the frankfurter allgemeine zeitung conducted by mr benedikt fehr, frankfurt am main, 17 december 2008. * * * mr trichet, ten years ago you were governor of the french central bank. how did you celebrate the historical event, the introduction of the euro? at midnight i invited all employees, who had worked extremely hard towards this event, to join me to celebrate both the euro and the new year with foie gras and champagne. and i told them that the people of europe were very fortunate that they had performed this task so well, as had all other colleagues in the euro area. what did the introduction of the euro mean to you personally? i can tell you that i was full of pride on that day. i had been in favour of the creation of the euro for a long time. in the early 1990s i had negotiated, on behalf of the french government, the maastricht treaty regarding the creation of the currency union ; and it was an honour to negotiate with horst kohler, then german staatssekretar and now president of the federal republic of germany. as the governor of the independent banque de france, which became fully independent on 1 january 1994, i had, together with my colleagues on the conseil de la politique monetaire, conducted a monetary policy which resulted in inflation in france averaging 1. 4 % per year in the five years prior to 1 january 1999. if we had not achieved this, the euro could not have been introduced. have you ever doubted the success of the euro in the past ten years? no, certainly not. but of course we are living in times when one cannot sit back complacently. like all central banks, the european central bank has had to manage many challenges and shocks, such as the asian crisis, the bursting of the internet bubble, the oil and commodity price shock or the threats to the stability and growth pact. but i was always convinced that the euro is a success – and proof of the fact that the people of europe are able to put into effect a historic plan that they have undertaken. not all europeans share your enthusiasm. according to some surveys, many europeans are still critical of the euro. the survey i have in mind was conducted by the european commission

, while their implementation could be improved, in particular as regards the preventive arm of the pact. finally, let me support the calls expressed in the report of the high level group chaired by wim kok to renew the impetus in the lisbon process and to sharpen its focus. in this context, we restate our strong support for all efforts on the part of governments, parliaments and social partners implementing the reform agenda and focusing on those reforms that will support employment growth, foster investment and stimulate innovation and productivity. progress in this direction will not only enhance the underlying growth potential of the euro area economy over the medium term but will also help to bolster consumer and business confidence over a shorter horizon. we are now at your disposal for questions.
, jackson hole symposium 2018. 15 see nevo, a. and wong, a. ( 2018 ), “ measuring inflation in the modern economy – a micro price - setting view ”, ecb forum on central banking. 5 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches

rates may work smoothly in an economic model, i am less certain how the general public would react, particularly after millennia of positive nominal rates. not only would such rates be deeply unpopular, there may also be unintended changes in behaviour that could dampen the effectiveness of the measure. the fact that banks do not pass negative rates on to most depositors, 3 and notably not to households, is a warning sign for central banks of how people may react if attempts were made to extend the lower bound of rates downwards by replacing cash with some form of remunerated digital currency. what assets the central bank ought to hold against these widely held liabilities driving bank disintermediation and deleveraging? a potential decision to issue a central bank digital currency ( cbdc ) needs to be assessed in relation to the impact on the financial system. in an extreme case, during a systemic banking crisis, holding risk - free central bank - issued cbdc could become vastly more attractive than 1 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches bank deposits. there could be a sector - wide run on bank deposits, magnifying the effects of the crisis. even in the absence of a crisis, readily convertible cbdc could crowd out bank deposits – putting the two - tier banking system at risk. then, the efficient flow of credit to the economy would likely be impaired. the central bank – now holders of deposit funding – would have to decide which projects to finance, either directly, by replacing commercial banks, or indirectly, by deciding which banks would receive funding. this would lead to a situation in which the central bank pretends to know better than the established system of the decentralised allocation of credit. overall, there is currently no convincing motivation for the eurosystem to issue cbdc to the general public. it is unnecessary and appears to be disproportionate to the aims put forward by its proponents. there is no need to fix something that is not broken. if anything, one could imagine a digital representation of cash that replicates the features of cash in the reasonably distant future, if people demanded it. and i have not even mentioned the insufficient robustness or reliability of some technologies like dlt, or their energy insufficiencies and dependencies. how does technological change affect the monetary transmission mechanism and monetary policy? technological change has multifaceted effects on the transmission mechanism. it is important not to jump to conclusions, for example that, because the phillips curve has become flat
##urities between two and 30 years trades at a negative yield. however, we will still purchase such securities as long as their yield to maturity exceeds the rate on the ecb ’ s deposit facility, which currently stands at - 20 basis points. this decision has two implications. first, it provides a strong commitment by the eurosystem to implement the pspp in all eligible jurisdictions. second, it curbs expectations about future government bond yields falling below the deposit facility rate, which could ultimately have a negative effect on banks ’ incentives to sell government bonds. the transactions under the pspp will be conducted via institutions eligible for participation in the eurosystem ’ s regular monetary policy operations as well as other regular counterparties used by the eurosystem for the investment of its euro - denominated investment portfolios. will the eurosystem be able to meet its quantitative targets? some market reports have suggested that the eurosystem may not be able to buy the intended amounts of government bonds in the market. let me state firmly that at this point there are no signs of issues in respect of sourcing the bonds. there were similar concerns in other countries at the time they launched large - scale asset purchases and yet they had no problems meeting their quantitative targets. and as so often in economics, the question boils down to an issue of supply and demand, and whether there will be a market clearing price. the concerns can be justified only if there is a mismatch between the effective supply of securities and the intended scale of our purchases. if that is the case, there will be no price that can clear supply and demand, and this would prevent us from buying the desired amounts. concerns about the potential scarcity of bonds are based on three main factors. first, there are expectations that net issuance from euro area jurisdictions over the life of the programme will be modest. indeed, the european commission forecasts that the aggregate euro area public budget deficit will fall to - 2. 2 % in 2015 and - 1. 9 % in 2016. as a result, the net issuance 7 of medium - and long - term securities by the euro area debt management offices ( dmos ) in 2015 is expected to be around €200 billion. looking at individual countries, a large majority will have a positive net issuance in 2015, but there are a few countries, e. g. germany, where net issuance is expected to be marginal or even negative. note, however, that the average weighted

##sco, 22 july. 7 see www. ecb. europa. eu / press / pr / date / 2013 / html / pr131010. en. html. 8 see knight, f. ( 1921 ), “ risk, uncertainty, and profit ”, mifflin, boston, new york. 9 dow jones euro stoxx 50 volatility index. 7 / 7 bis central bankers'speeches
attention to those regions and market segments that find themselves furthest from the targets. this is the case, because we may need a more in - depth understanding of the market practices and a dedicated action plan for those regions in order to see substantial progress at a global level. indeed, rome wasn't built in a day. nor did the splendour of florence arise overnight. they required time and dedication. conferences like this create the necessary time – to reflect, make connections, and share insights. and above all, they provide the inspiration to stay dedicated to our ambitions – and make our goals a reality. so let me wish you all good discussions and a lot of food for thought to inspire action once you go back home. thank you. 3 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches

nout wellink : the labour market in 2040 – greyer but full of vitality speech by dr nout wellink, president of the netherlands bank and chairman of the basel committee on banking supervision, at the symposium “ demographic ageing : a broader view ”, science center nemo, amsterdam, 11 october 2007. * * * imagine : it is the year 2040. those who turn 32 this year will then be 65 and so are now halfway there. demographic ageing will have reached its pinnacle in 2040. more than 4 million dutch people will then be older than 65, working out at a quarter of the population, whereas that age group now makes up less than 15 %. for every person over - 65, there will be just two compatriots aged between 20 and 65 1. in such a greying society, our cities and towns will look quite different to now. amsterdam city centre is likely to be a largely pedestrian zone, allowing for wider footpaths. political pressure will have forced the monument conservation authority to relax its rules. large groups of older people in the city will have been obliged to remove thresholds, install stair lifts and knock through walls. the two universities in the capital will have been forced to merge because of the smaller inflow of new students. only a handful of the many places of entertainment around rembrant square will still remain, but the classical performances at the concertgebouw and the muziektheater aan ’ t ij will be sold out every night. subsidies for museums may even have been scrapped owing to the overwhelming increase in visitor numbers. and here, in nemo, where today ’ s children make their first discoveries in the area of science and technology, there may be a shopping mall with stores full of books, golfing equipment, spectacles, hobby accessories, fine chocolates and garden tools. of course this is mere speculation. time will tell what life will really be like in 2040. but it ’ s a sure thing that the older people of the future will have a major influence. today we are looking at the economic consequences of population ageing. i want to talk to you about the impact of ageing on the labour market and how we can prepare ourselves for it. labour force in 2040 for a start, the average worker in 2040 will be older than at present and so have more work experience. owing to the rise in the number of pensioners, he will have fewer
towards the size it had in early 2012. that would imply an increase of around 1 trillion euros. there is considerable debate amongst economists and market participants as to whether the size of a central bank ’ s balance sheet is a relevant bis central bankers ’ speeches parameter ; and, above all, whether it has an impact on inflation expectations. let me give you my take on this. the statement by the governing council is not formulated as a firm commitment but as an expectation. nevertheless, it is very significant. it should certainly be seen as a clear indication that further policy action, if necessary, will not be inhibited by any overall quantitative restraint or limit. this is all the more important that the eurosystem balance sheet will be expanding whereas balance sheets of other central banks are bound to contract. communication on the size gives a very concrete signal and content about future policy intentions. as such, it can only help in bringing expectations more in line with our definition of price stability. i will end up with two remarks on the relationship between monetary and other policies. first, when inflation is low, it matters whether nominal wages are rigid or flexible. japan benefits from a high degree of wage flexibility. that is favorable to competitiveness, but may increase the economy ’ s vulnerability to deflationary pressures. by contrast, in europe, and especially in france, nominal wages are fairly rigid and keep growing, even in the current context, at a robust 1. 1 % annual rate. while this may be negative for profits and competitiveness, it currently provides a buffer and protection against any deflation risk. second, on fiscal policy : if, following milton friedman ’ s famous statement, “ inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon ”, central banks should be able to control inflation in all circumstances. i believe this is fundamentally true. recent experience has shown, however, that monetary policy is most efficient when operated in a supporting environment, especially as regards fiscal policy. this is often presented as a case for “ cooperation ” between fiscal and monetary authorities. i am not fully comfortable with this concept, as i don ’ t see how it fits with central banks ’ independence. however, there is no denying that fiscal and monetary policies interact, more or less harmoniously. following the crisis, concerns have been expressed on the risk of “ fiscal dominance ” as major central banks were engaged into large purchases of government bonds. in the current low inflation environment, the issue is different. depending on how they are conducted, fiscal policies

i think we are close to the former ( levels ), and should be now sufficiently patient on the latter ( duration ). in other words, as transmission is of the essence, so is the persistence of our monetary policy. 1 / 2 bis - central bankers'speeches 1 villeroy de galhau, f., monetary policy transmission : where do we stand?, speech, 22 may 2023 2 lagarde, c., breaking the persistence of inflation, speech, 27 june 2023 2 / 2 bis - central bankers'speeches