samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
report on the economic governance framework. thank you for your attention. bis central bankers ’ speeches

mario draghi : plenary debate of the european parliament on the ecb ’ s annual report 2013 introductory statement by mr mario draghi, president of the european central bank, to the plenary debate of the european parliament on the ecb ’ s annual report 2013, brussels, 25 february 2015. * * * mr vice - president, mr vice - president of the commission, honourable members of parliament, ladies and gentlemen, i am very pleased to participate in this plenary debate. to lay the ground for our discussion, i would like to discuss three topics : the ecb ’ s monetary policy, focussing on the rationale for our latest monetary policy measures, the ecb ’ s commitment to accountability and transparency, and the progress towards building a deeper economic and monetary union ( emu ). i will thereby address most of the issues which the econ committee highlighted in its draft resolution. the ecb ’ s monetary policy for several quarters now, inflation in the euro area has been on a continuous downward trend. at the same time, in january 2015 market participants were expecting inflation to return to levels closer to our policy aim only over a horizon which stretched well beyond any meaningful definition of medium term. in an environment of weak economic recovery and subdued money and credit developments, risks were increasing that falling inflation expectations would feed back into weakening actual inflation. such a self - reinforcing process could have posed severe downside risks to our price stability objective. against this background, we judged that the degree of monetary accommodation that had been introduced in 2014 was insufficient. a more forceful monetary policy response became necessary. with key interest rates at their lower bound, the governing council of the ecb considered outright purchases of public securities to be the only remaining instrument which could be activated on a sufficient scale to broaden and strengthen the measures already in place. thus, we decided in january to launch an expanded asset purchase programme. under the programme the eurosystem will continue its purchases of simple and transparent asset - backed securities and of covered bonds. in addition, we will start purchasing on the secondary market investment - grade securities issued by euro area governments, public agencies and european institutions. the purchases will start in march. the combined purchases of public and private sector securities will amount to €60 billion per month. the programme is intended to last until end - september 2016. in any case, it will last until the governing council sees a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation which is consistent with its aim of achieving inflation
a rate below the floor of the corridor. to keep the cash rate near the target, the rba needed to accurately estimate the demand for reserves, forecast changes in the supply of reserves, and conduct omos daily ( and sometimes more than once in a day ). the system worked well for many years, with the cash rate almost always at the cash rate target. compared with the other two options, this system has a couple of attractive features. because it entails a smaller balance sheet than under excess or ample reserves systems, it naturally implies lower interest rate risk for the rba. similarly, it implies a smaller footprint of the rba in financial markets. indeed, this system supports more cash market activity than the other options because on any given day it is more likely that some banks are facing a shortage of reserves and need to borrow from other banks to meet their needs. despite these benefits, the board has decided not to return to a scarce reserves system. such a system entails the highest risk of the banking system running into liquidity shortages. a scarce reserves system requires the central bank to have accurate estimates of reserve demand and supply on a daily basis and respond actively to shortterm fluctuations as needed. in the past, this appeared to be very successful, with only a few trivial deviations in the cash rate from the target ( graph 4 ). however, a large part of that may have been because of the convention by cash market participants to almost always conduct trades in the cash market at the target rate set by the board. having moved away from that environment, such a convention may not re - emerge. graph 4 cash market by monetary policy implementation system * daily cash market volume * $ b $ b 5. 0 5. 0 excess reserves 2. 5 2. 5 scarce reserves bps bps spread to the es rate * rolling 30−day average. source : rba. r e s e r v e b a n k o f au s t r a l i a cash rate cash rate target moreover, even though the cash rate in the past would trade close to target, there were lengthy periods when liquidity was tight in broader money markets, such as for repo and bank bills. this was evident when market rates traded noticeably above the cash rate or overnight index swaps ( which measure expectations for the future cash rate ), even though the cash rate was trading at the target ( graph 5 ). this tightening in financial conditions reflected, in part, the

we must act now, and we must act together, to secure a cleaner and greener future. 1 link to “ ngfs glasgow declaration action ” : www. ngfs. net / sites / default / files / ngfsglasgowdeclaration. pdf 2 / 2 committed to bis central bankers'speeches
balanced picture of the current situation in the indonesian economy, banking system, and of the treatment of the broader financial obligations of the indonesian private sector.

operative and the government ’ s determination to tackle this problem. at the same time, we recognized that the trade finance arrears that had been built up by some indonesian banks during the currency and financial turmoil were prejudicing current access by indonesian entities to trade financing across the entire economy. we agreed to settle these arrears and have paid the due amount. most recently, in december 1998, we cleared additional arrears. this was, we believe, an important signal to the international banking community. in addition, for those banks that agreed to maintain their trade financing activities in indonesia, we agreed to guarantee all new trade finance facilities for a year after we received confirmation of these banks ’ commitment. turning again briefly to the corporate sector which had been reluctant to enter discussions with its creditors, we also agreed in june 1998 to set up an agency, the indonesian debt restructuring agency or indra, to provide foreign exchange protection to those borrowers that had renegotiated their debts with their creditors. strengthening these borrowers by reducing their residual foreign exchange risk improves their creditworthiness, thereby creating an incentive to complete a restructuring. these efforts were followed by the jakarta initiative in september 1998 which aimed at setting the right framework and incentives for bilateral debtor / creditor negotiations. these measures combined, and the real money that has been paid to foreign creditors, in particular by bank indonesia, show our real determination to resolve the current situation. indeed our support has been proven with the expenditure of very large sums of our scarce foreign exchange resources reflecting the high priority we give this subject. i would urge you, therefore, not to adopt a reflexive reduction in your activities in indonesia. instead, please do focus on the systems in place now and the opportunities open to you within our new strengthened framework. another very important point i would like to mention here is the high levels of capital - backing required in some jurisdictions on new lending to indonesia. we believe these levels of provisions are excessive and that they constitute a great hindrance to a resumption of activity in our economy. let me also take this opportunity to share with you some developments in our banking restructuring program. it is not a secret that the pre - crisis indonesian financial system was unhealthily fragile and vulnerable to external shocks. we certainly underestimated the vulnerability of our domestic banking system to a crisis in the corporate sector and its potential to paralyze the banking sector ; we also probably underestimated the riskiness of many loans
2002. see lagarde, c. ( 2021 ), “ happy anniversary to euro cash! ”, the ecb blog, 31 december. 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches

global financial system. russia ’ s invasion of ukraine has increased our concern about cyber security. globally, state - sponsored cyber attacks have increased in frequency and sophistication since the war in ukraine began. that increases the risk of attack on a canadian bank, other financial institution or our financial market infrastructures. given the interconnected nature of financial markets, the impact of a successful cyber attack on one institution could spread to the broader financial system. the war has also further added to the level of uncertainty around the transition to a low - carbon economy. in the short term, it threatens global energy security, increasing the dependence on higher emitting fossil fuels like coal, and risks slowing the transition. over the medium term, transition uncertainty means that assets exposed to the fossil - fuel sector, including those found in the pensions and retirement savings of many canadians, are at risk of large and rapid repricing. we need better transparency about climate exposures by businesses and financial institutions. we also need clear transition plans by global policymakers. together these can help mitigate the risk of a disorderly and painful transition that hurts both our financial system and our economy. finally, cryptoassets are a growing vulnerability. more canadians are investing in cryptocurrencies. but the growth of these markets has outpaced global efforts to regulate them. like other speculative assets, cryptocurrencies are vulnerable to large and sudden price declines. and recently, some stablecoins — a type of cryptocurrency — have failed to deliver on their promise of stability. while cryptoassets do not yet pose a systemic risk to the canadian financial system, the lack of regulation means they don ’ t have the safeguards that exist for more traditional assets. and their risks may not be well - understood by investors. regulators around the world and in canada have recognized this risk and are working to address it. let me conclude by underlining that vulnerabilities are best thought of as weaknesses in the financial system. in normal times they may not have much impact. but large shocks can cause much more economic and financial damage when vulnerabilities amplify their effects. we have summarized the main vulnerabilities that are highlighted in the fsr. the report also outlines what is being done to mitigate them and to develop contingency plans because even the best planning can ’ t eliminate risk. it ’ s a very comprehensive report and offers just a snapshot of the work
but the output gap is unlikely to narrow significantly as the pace of recovery in final demand is expected to be moderate. in these circumstances, prices are expected to be stable for some time. 5. in sum, the positive cycle among production, income and expenditure continues steadily and is reflected in the improvement in corporate profits and the rise in employees ’ income. thus, despite the restraining pressures from fiscal policies, including the consumption tax hike and the decline in public - sector investment, japan ’ s economy is expected to continue its recovery, supported by the yen ’ s depreciation until early spring and the expansion of information - related demand. however, the economic recovery is unlikely to gather significant momentum, as a result of fragility in some sectors, as well as the continued balancesheet adjustment pressure. in these circumstances, building an economic environment which increases the confidence of the private sector is vital to strengthening the economic recovery. in this process, effective structural reforms to draw out the dynamism inherent in the economy continue to be essential in addition to appropriate macroeconomic policies.

individuals. thank you for your attention. 3 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches
cement the importance at the bank of england of low and stable inflation – stressed repeatedly that low inflation “ is not an end in itself.... [ it is ] a necessary means to the end of sustainable growth of output and higher living standards ”. 4 it ’ s important that we don ’ t lose sight of this overriding aim. eddie was equally clear that, in the long run, the best contribution that monetary policy could make to achieving a prosperous and vibrant economy was to deliver enduring price stability. he had seen at first hand the pernicious costs of the high and variable inflation of the 70s and 80s : companies and households unable to budget and plan efficiently ; resources misallocated ; long - term contracts avoided for fear that large swings in inflation would end up biting one party or the other. the value of hard - earned savings eroded. out of that pain and misery emerged a consensus – a hard won consensus – that low and stable inflation was a prerequisite for economic prosperity. more recently, though, there have been some worrying signs that cracks may be appearing in that consensus. a sense that inflation is somehow yesterday ’ s war. that central banks should focus more on growth. that a period of higher inflation may even aid the recovery. this is dangerous talk. it sometimes feels like we ’ ve been here before. one of the mistakes made by policymakers in the late 1960s was to allow inflation to get out of control after nearly two decades of price king ( 1997 ), “ inflation targeting 5 years on ”, speech given at the london school of economics. king ( 1997 ), “ changes in uk monetary policy : rules and discretion in practice ”, journal of monetary economics. george ( 1999 ), annual cornwall lecture. bis central bankers ’ speeches stability. as sir alec cairncross, who worked in a host of senior economic roles in the heart of the civil service during this period, put it “... governments in the last years of the 1960s … allowed inflation expectations to develop that proved increasingly difficult to extinguish ” ( cairncross 1992 ). there is little doubt that policymakers of that time had a strong aversion to inflation, but they were complacent about the risks posed by further stimulus. it would be irresponsible to repeat the same mistakes again. how do we ensure that the lessons of yesteryear are not forgotten? that a period of relative price stability does not breed complacency?

. importantly, this exit strategy is clear, transparent and open to public scrutiny. openness and transparency have been the cornerstones of uk monetary policy since the monetary policy committee was established in 1997. that has never been more important than now. the inflation target is symmetric. that requires the mpc to set policy in a symmetric way. the committee adjusted monetary policy boldly and decisively on the way down in order to meet the inflation target. and, let me assure you that, when the time comes, we will be prepared to respond with equal vigour on the way back up.
necessarily reflect those of the federal open market committee ( fomc ) or others in the federal reserve system. economic outlook let me begin by saying that despite the challenges and uncertainties we ’ ve faced since the pandemic took hold, the economy is now positioned to grow quickly. in fact, with accommodative financial conditions, strong fiscal support, and widespread vaccinations, i expect that the rate of economic growth this year will be the fastest that we ’ ve experienced since the early 1980s. and that ’ s not only a forecast — we are already seeing signs of this pivot to strong growth in the economic statistics, as i ’ ll discuss in a minute. if this sounds like good news, that ’ s because it is. but robust economic growth this year by itself isn ’ t enough to achieve the truly strong and full economic recovery that we are aiming for. we are still far from our goals of maximum employment and price stability, known as the fed ’ s “ dual mandate. " 1 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches to inform our decision - making, we consider a broad range of factors that help us understand developments affecting economic growth, labor markets, and inflation. i ’ ll start with the most common measure of the overall economy : gross domestic product, or gdp. i mentioned that i expect gdp growth this year to be the fastest in decades. specifically, i see inflation - adjusted, or real, gdp increasing around seven percent this year. this is welcome progress after the toughest period for the economy in living memory and a winter when the pandemic was particularly severe, and the economy suffered as a result. despite the truly devastating effects of the pandemic on employment, recent job growth is the strongest it ’ s been since last summer. over 900, 000 jobs were added in march, and i am hopeful that we will see very strong job gains over coming months as the economy continues to reopen. it is very encouraging to see people getting back to work and to see these gains starting to be more widespread, including in the sectors and regions that were hit hardest by the pandemic. but, even with the gains that have occurred, let ’ s not forget that there are about eight and a half million fewer jobs today than before the pandemic. to put that number in context, this is a shortfall similar to what we saw at the worst point of the aftermath of the great recession. this means we will need big

central bankers'speeches
christine lagarde : interview in le parisien interview with ms christine lagarde, president of the european central bank, and le parisien, conducted by mr matthieu pelloli and published on 9 april 2020. * * * from emmanuel macron ’ s repeated references to “ war ” to queen elizabeth ii invoking the spirit of the blitz, memories of the darkest hours in our history are resurfacing. are we in effect facing a war? there are probably points of comparison. what is certain is that an invisible enemy is severely testing our healthcare systems and our extraordinary healthcare workers. and that same enemy is putting the global economy under strain. our way of life has been altered, and for some it has been turned completely upside down. you were minister of the economy in 2008, at the time of the last global economic crisis. how does the current crisis differ from the previous one? the origins of the 2008 crisis were financial. the current crisis is, in the first instance, a healthcare crisis. if you think about it, it can also be traced back to the ecological and biological chaos of the world. in some ways, it ’ s the revenge of the living! the economic consequences are difficult to quantify, but they will certainly be severe. today, it ’ s not a question of stimulating the economy, as we did in 2008, but of putting it on hold for the time needed to contain the virus in order to pave the way for a fast and functional recovery. in 2008 multilateralism played a decisive role. is that conceivable now, with heads of state like boris johnson, donald trump and jair bolsonaro? the spread of the virus, and its ruthless and indiscriminate nature, will hopefully serve as a reminder to commentators who believe multilateralism belongs to the 1950s that it in fact has many virtues. we need it now to help us manage the response, and we will need it later to organise our exit from the crisis. just imagine that china, the european union and the united states were back on their feet, but that the entire southern hemisphere, from south america to africa, had then been hit by the virus. we wouldn ’ t be that much better off, facing the risk of a second wave. you have said that you fear a “ considerable ” recession in the euro area. of what magnitude? in 2009 growth contracted by 4. 5 % in the euro area and by 2.

dealing with the situation of developing countries. our compatriots are concerned about the solidity of european banks in general and that of french banks in particular. many readers are wondering if their savings are safe? are they safe? european banks are much stronger than they were in 2008. their capital ratios have practically doubled. their regulatory framework has been strengthened and their supervisors are far more vigilant and scrupulous than they were back then. the banking sector is as strong as one could wish for. savers can rest assured. 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches
, but so far we have not seen anything. 5 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches

these monetary policy decisions need to be complemented by other instruments. sometimes it seemed like you were not exactly among mr draghi ’ s most ardent supporters. i have always supported president draghi. but when you heard him being talked about as the saviour of the euro or the person who had rescued spain, it didn ’ t sit well with you. well, he didn ’ t see it like that either. in spain, we rescued ourselves, off our own backs, with the help of our european partners, including the ecb. mr draghi made a key contribution, but there ’ s no single saviour here. it was a set of circumstances and a matter of everyone carrying out their responsibilities in their individual roles. as vice - president will you continue to appear alongside president lagarde? i have no idea. i suppose it will continue like that. it ’ s an unwritten rule, a tradition. traditions can change, but they can also be of value. brexit, trade and currency wars, geopolitical tensions. all of this in an environment of lower growth, zero rates and stimulus plans. when you were in government you joked that you slept like a baby, in that you woke up crying every two hours. how are you sleeping now? well. very well! i wouldn ’ t wish what happened in 2012 on my worst enemy. the situation now is totally different ; back then we were on the brink of collapse. the spanish economy, the italian economy, doubts about the integrity of the euro … the situation of the spanish banking industry was terrifying and contagion was spreading to the treasury. it was a dramatic situation. i don ’ t think there is going to be a recession in europe, that ’ s very unlikely. but yes, i am worried that we 2 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches will have two or three years of subdued growth, of below - potential growth. that is what is worrying me at the moment. and that this subdued growth may mean that the price stability objective is not met. monetary policy is not the philosopher ’ s stone, it cannot be used to fix everything. other policies are needed. so do you echo the calls of presidents draghi and lagarde for countries with fiscal space, above all germany, to boost spending and investment? this is important, yes, but my proposal goes further than that. our current system of national fiscal policies and national budgets, with a set of rules like the