households and corporate sector, though in some of the countries, like the baltic states, romania, bulgaria and serbia, the correction of the interest rates on loans was more pronounced at the corporate segment. macedonia and poland have the feature of a sharper correction at the housing segment, compared to the corporate. the magnitude of the correction along different sectors is conditioned upon many specific factors, the initial levels, the riskiness of the portfolios, for instance, and hence it is difficult to infer which banking sectors had larger “ progrowth ” adjustment in the interest rate policy. what is also important is the fact that the costs of financing were reduced, and the intensity of the reduction did not differ much compared to the changes of the key policy rate ( highest difference of about 2 p. p. is observed for macedonia, serbia and bulgaria ). thus, access to financing for both households and corporate sector was facilitated, contributing to higher propensity to borrow and underpinning economic recovery. chart : 3 lending interest rate and the adjustment * interest rates on enterpise loans, in % interest rates on household loans, in % slo srb rom pol mkd slo srb rom pol mkd lit lat hun est czr cro bul bih hun est czr cro bul bih lit lat change 2016 - 2007 in pp - 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 policy rate lending rates - 6 - 7 - 8 source : central banks ’ internet pages. * policy rates in baltic countries are approximated with the ecb interest rate, while for bulgaria, where currency board is in place, the interbank rate is used as a proxy. the ease of the lending rates, was probably important, but not sufficient prerequisite for enabling stronger credit financial flows in the region. although in the last couple of years signs of credit recovery are visible in many of the countries, it is still tepid, and in some of the countries deleveraging of the private sector continues. the average rate of change in the last three years is still negative in countries like slovenia, hungary, latvia, croatia, bulgaria, indicating that some structural obstacles, such as high npls, new regulatory requirements, deleveraging of the private sector, still act as drag for a stronger credit revival. also, cleaning up of the balance sheet of the banks may to some extent distort the data on the credit support. in order to make a qu

italy ’ s external position. the exchange rate of the lira at the end of 1992 the country ’ s net liabilities amounted to 11 per cent of gdp ; at the end of 1996 the ratio was well below 4 per cent ( figure 2 ). the current account surpluses that are forecast will bring the net external position roughly into balance by the end of this year and then make italy a net creditor. part of the item “ errors and omissions ” consists of capital outflows that are not recorded in the capital account ; accordingly, the country ’ s external position is almost certainly already in balance. in september 1996 non - residents ’ holdings of italian government securities denominated in lire and foreign currency totalled 350 trillion lire, as against 290 trillion at the end of 1995 and 100 trillion in december 1992. this progression is evidence of foreign investors ’ growing interest in the italian securities market, but it is also the result of a policy aimed at diversifying the sources of treasury finance. it exposes the domestic market, albeit deep and efficient, and government funding to interest rate movements in international markets and to the evaluations and decisions of international investors. the growing volume of public debt placed abroad is matched by the steady and substantial improvement in the external balance of the private sector. starting from a net external debtor position of around 90 trillion lire at the end of 1992, by september of last year households and enterprises had built up a net creditor position of around 200 trillion ( table 2 ). the 1992 currency crisis caught italian households and enterprises severely off balance ; the latter, in particular, had built up substantial foreign currency liabilities, trusting in the stability of the exchange rate, even though this confidence was at odds with the expectations implicit in the significantly lower cost of borrowing in foreign currency compared with that in lire. the depreciation of the lira resulted in italian firms incurring heavy losses. in the last few months of 1992 they began to reduce their foreign currency liabilities and build up their foreign currency assets and continued to do so on a major scale in the following years. the private sector ’ s gross external liabilities, about three quarters of which consisted of borrowings by non - financial enterprises, remained virtually unchanged at around 450 trillion lire ; their composition changed, however, as the foreign currency share fell sharply. on the other hand, the external assets of enterprises, households and other nonbank operators rose from 370 trillion lire at the