the driving force behind open banking. this trend benefits both relatively small players ( fintechs ) and technology giants whose business model is based on the monetisation of data ( gafams and batx, whose entry into the european market is more recent ). these changes are the natural result of a process of creative iteration, and promise to simplify practices by diversifying them. nevertheless, they have significant consequences for the structure of markets, with a substantial impact on our ability to impose and control our public policy choices regarding financial services, in particular in terms of legal, technological and operational certainty. for instance, which law is applicable, when the provision of services involves players established in different jurisdictions with sometimes contradictory legal requirements? the united states in particular is characterised by a broad definition of extraterritoriality. besides the identification of the legal framework, there is also the question of the ability of a judicial authority to enforce the law, given the size of financial groups, the large number of 1 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches intermediaries, or the location of their various activities. the digitisation of financial services also introduces a new form of dependence on physical ( mobile phones and connected objects ) as well as digital ( search engines, mobile applications ) entry points and on the non - european technology companies that control and dominate them. yet, competition law, created in the 19th century in a period when the state took a stand on monopolies, is proving to be ill - equipped to deal with these technology companies. lastly, the dematerialisation of activities, by increasing the number of interconnections and system entry points, makes them more vulnerable to potential “ cyber - attacks ” and to their use for money laundering and terrorist financing purposes, and makes them more dependent, to counter this, on non - european players who also operate outside the regulated financial sectors. b - in the area of payments, digitisation is likely to have additional consequences, which also pose major challenges in terms of sovereignty. here, i would like to highlight two that deserve special attention : the first is the development of new types of settlement assets. the operation of our payment systems currently relies heavily on the largely complementary use of two types of settlement asset that can be exchanged at any time at par : central bank money, the only legal tender settlement asset, which is the money for the settlement of transactions between financial intermediaries, and commercial bank money, which is generally preferred for the settlement of retail transactions

due consideration is given to developmental objectives. as much as possible, the cbn has avoided direct intervention in development financing, particularly where lending at interest rates below the market rates are involved. the bank has, in this regard, embarked on schemes to establish quasi - government institutions and encouraged government funding through the budget. there are also some relevance in the provision of refinancing and credit guarantee schemes, as earlier outlined, particularly for the agricultural and industrial sectors. the risk is that such schemes could discourage the growth and efficiency of financial intermediation, particularly the mobilization of domestic savings. macroeconomic policy environment economic policies can only succeed where infrastructural impediments to supply response have been substantially minimized. because most macroeconomic policies ( especially monetary policy ) work best through their effect on aggregate demand and supply conditions, structural problems could make the economy less responsive to policies. when a policy fails to achieve the intended objectives, it creates credibility gap for the central bank and outright pessimism in the process. our approach to dealing with this problem has been to enhance public understanding of what monetary policy can and cannot do, while collaborating with other organs of government to ensure the complementarity of the various economic policies. financial market infrastructure and institutions the absence of efficient and sound financial institutions and necessary market infrastructure, which are critical to effective conduct of monetary policy and its transmission mechanism, constitutes a major constraint to the achievement of policy goals in most developing countries. institutional reforms, enforceable tax policy, simplified accounting framework and a fair and efficient judicial system, are important for effective policy implementation in a coherent, credible and consistent manner. credible information poor and unreliable data is another major constraint to credible policies. the lack of timely and reliable data renders monitoring and evaluation of policy implementation difficult and the analysis arising from such data, less reliable. this undermines the setting of accurate targets and causes delays in policy response to changes in economic conditions. fiscal dominance the essence of complementarity between monetary and other policies, particularly the fiscal policy, has always been emphasized as critical to the effectiveness of monetary policy. in countries characterized by fiscal expansion, resulting from large deficits financed by the banking system, particularly the central bank, the achievement of monetary policy objectives becomes very difficult. indeed, the outcome of the central bank policies becomes uncertain. this problem has been addressed, effectively, in many countries particularly among those that have experienced intractable problem of inflation, through the prohibition of central bank lending to the government. efforts