central bankers to have candid discussions on the best approaches to be adopted. true it is that the implementation of cbdcs touches the core of central bank mandates of monetary and financial stability and that each country should consider its own requirements and subsequently adapt the design features of its cbdc to ensure the intended policy objectives and specificities are met, while mitigating associated risks. in the new post - covid global financial architecture that is currently taking shape around us, the potential of the use of cbdcs is, and will be, prominent. it is therefore vital that we are able to adapt ourselves and be ready to act in the most appropriate manner in this new financial architecture. at the bank of mauritius, we are already gearing up for this. i have noted that the agenda across the 3 days is a very packed one. but i am certain that what participants will reap in terms of knowledge, experience and sharing will be simply priceless. we are fortunate that eminent subject matter experts from all continents have willingly accepted to put their expertise at the disposal of the central banking community. 4 / 5 bis - central bankers'speeches we are very eager to hear about the participants'experiences on their respective cbdc journeys, not only on the payment system side, but also on the monetary and financial stability sides. the lessons on consumer experience, including challenges and solutions for service delivery will benefit the greater number. pertinent questions from market players and consumers will keep rising and, as central bankers, it is our duty to reflect on them, and provide meaningful answers. ensuring strong privacy safeguards while meeting financial compliance rules, who will be able to access sensitive cbdc payments data and for what purpose, are some of the questions which we currently face and need concrete answers to. my call to all participants is to make the most of this opportunity for interacting with peers, sharing experiences and working together to devise the best possible approach for the elaboration and roll out of cbdcs. before i end, i would like to reiterate the need for close collaboration between participants, stakeholders and the public in general. next month, the bank of mauritius will be issuing a document for public consultation on cbdc. i encourage all stakeholders concerned to be fully involved in the discussions and share their views. i wish you all a fruitful workshop. ladies and gentlemen, i thank you for your attention. 5 / 5 bis - central bankers'speeches

said that monetary union was only feasible if the prevailing principle of each member state bearing individual responsibility for its own fiscal policy was not undermined by collective liability. ladies and gentlemen in a monetary union, there are negative repercussions for all other member states if one country has excessive debt – even if they are responsible for their own budgets. a monetary union therefore requires fiscal guidelines. that is why the decision, taken in connection with the euro rescue measures, to tighten fiscal rules in a bid to promote individual responsibility was a step in the right direction. ultimately, however, applying the rules is what counts, or, to put it in the words of a footballer ahead of tomorrow ’ s important world cup match : “ it ’ s what happens on the pitch that matters. ” you cannot put it more succinctly than germany ’ s football legend adi preissler. as regards the proper application of the rules, some doubts are justified, as is evident from the current debate surrounding a flexible interpretation of the stability and growth pact. the pact, which was reformed less than three years ago, allows much scope for discretion. moreover, there is a risk that last week ’ s decisions of the european council will provide even more of a pretext for a lax interpretation. however, an excessively generous interpretation of this leeway would certainly undermine the credibility of the stability and growth pact. and let us not forget : in the medium term, the pact stipulates balanced or close to balance budgets. the 3 % mark that is frequently used as a yardstick is therefore a ceiling and is not intended as a regular target. this is, incidentally, also true of the 60 % debt ratio that almost all euro countries breach. the commission should therefore apply a narrow interpretation to the rules, and the german government should lend it its decisive support. that, too, is part and parcel of being a role model. nor is consolidation a growth brake, but rather a precondition for sustainable growth. more debt is no precondition for successful structural reform. binding debt rules are a necessary, but by no means sufficient, condition for strengthening the principle of individual responsibility in a monetary union. to this end, the no bail - out principle would have to be more credible, amongst other things. ultimately, that would mean allowing governments to become insolvent. that, in turn, requires robust banks : going forward, neither a sovereign default nor the insolvency of a major bank must threaten