gained in stature simply because it is a member of the dwindling family of international currencies. for this reason, we expect it to maintain a role as an instrument of portfolio diversification. 3. 2. implications for the exchange rate in principle, the following applies : the more the single currency proves to be a stable and strong currency, the greater will be its advantages for switzerland, too. with the launch of the euro, the standard deviation of the trade - weighted exchange rate of the swiss franc vis - a - vis the currencies of the european trading partners has narrowed considerably. the decrease in exchange rate volatility is due to the fact that the euro - as already mentioned - has to some extent replaced weak and extremely volatile currencies. this is a welcome advantage for the swiss economy, which is closely interconnected with the eu. the volatility of the exchange rate is one thing ; the level of the exchange rate is another. since the beginning of 1999, the swiss franc has appreciated by more than 9 % against the euro. in the beginning, the development of the swiss franc exchange rate against the euro was relatively stable. however, in the aftermath of 11 september, investors became increasingly risk - averse. this led to a further strengthening of the swiss franc, which had already appreciated during the year 2000. the strength of the swiss currency is a considerable challenge for our export - oriented economy. one has to put things in perspective, though. first, rather than on the nominal exchange rate, the competitiveness of the swiss economy depends on the real exchange rate, which is corrected for inflation. if, for example, the swiss franc appreciates by 2 % and domestic inflation is 1 %, prices of swiss products are raised by 3 % abroad. yet as soon as foreign inflation exceeds the level of 3 %, the competitive disadvantage for the swiss export sector resulting from the nominal appreciation is more than compensated for. in fact, inflation has been slightly higher in euroland. in real terms, the appreciation of the swiss franc against the euro is therefore about 5 %. it should be noted that a real appreciation of 5 % over a period of more than three years is not extraordinary by historical standards. to be sure, the euro has also lost some ground against the us dollar and the yen. there are, however, some factors that point to a future rise in international demand for euros. these include the growth of the euro financial market

of credit suisse by ubs. the snb's central role in managing this crisis initially involved using liquidity assistance loans to create a time window within which a solution could even be worked out. since then, we have been supporting the successful implementation of the takeover with additional liquidity assistance, which we are granting in both swiss francs and foreign currencies. i would now like to explain our crisis response to you in more detail. we have provided emergency liquidity in various forms. the established access to liquidity assistance loans for banks experiencing financing problems is provided against collateral in the form of securities and mortgages. these loans are subject to interest, including a risk premium. this is classic last - resort lending. the facilities used in such cases are known as the liquidity - shortage financing facility, or lsff, and emergency liquidity assistance, or ela. the federal council's emergency ordinance of 16 march 2023 paved the way for two further types of liquidity assistance loan specifically for the credit suisse case, namely ela + and the public liquidity backstop ( plb ). this legislation enables us to lend a further chf 200 billion. ela + has a volume of chf 100 billion and is secured by means of preferential rights in bankruptcy proceedings. this ensures that our loans would be repaid with high priority in the event of bankruptcy. we can allocate the second chf 100 billion within the framework of the plb. these loans are also secured by preferential rights in bankruptcy proceedings and, in addition, by a federal guarantee - that is to say, they are guaranteed with taxpayers'money ( hence'public'in public liquidity backstop ). the interest rate on both types of loan is higher than that charged on the established liquidity assistance facilities. 3 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches the dramatic situation and enormous time pressure required the use of emergency law. in granting ela +, we are going to the limits of what is feasible for the snb, because with this loan preferential rights in bankruptcy proceedings are the sole security. we provided this liquidity only because rapid action was critical to restoring counterparties'confidence in credit suisse and stopping the outflow of client funds. without the snb's willingness to provide further liquidity via ela +, a global financial and economic crisis could easily have been set in motion. in our view, this would have been irresponsible.