like you. let me make one additional point about the fed's interest in economic and financial education. as chairman greenspan has said, " educated consumers are simply less vulnerable to fraud and abuse. " and when millions of educated consumers make good personal financial choices, our economy is strengthened in fundamental ways. a strong and flexible economy means that resources are directed to the areas of greatest need, productivity and innovation are supported, and the ability to withstand shocks is enhanced. goals and expectations as policymakers and educators who believe deeply in the power and effectiveness of economic education, we must be clear about our goals and expectations. such clarity helps us allocate our resources appropriately, target the areas of greatest need, and ensure a sustainable commitment to the most - effective educational initiatives. let me make a point that is self - evident. we certainly expect that economic and financial literacy can keep people from making uninformed decisions. but it cannot keep them from making bad decisions. additionally, education will not always overcome circumstances. unemployment happens to even the most financially literate, as do medical emergencies. thus, though successful financial education programs will help individuals minimize or avoid the worst consequences of financial setbacks, education will not necessarily reduce the frequency of financial emergencies. also, education will not overcome human nature. procrastination, for example, can heavily affect financial outcomes, and education may not overcome the tendency to put off financial changes. in a study of defined contribution plans by james choi and others, one - third of self - reported undersavers said they intended to increase their savings rate in the next few months, but almost none actually made a change in their 401 ( k ) savings rate. this finding amply demonstrates the value of bringing a variety of disciplines to bear in creating effective programs. clearly, neoclassical economics, with its strong assumptions about rational decisionmaking, provides a helpful theoretical framework, but we will also need to rely on other models and frameworks to help us better understand how people process information and make decisions. the work of economists such as richard thaler on the benefits of " low - willpower " techniques to increase savings is an example in this regard. education is not likely to work if presented in a one - size - fits - all package, and it often works best when employed in conjunction with other targeted initiatives. this is particularly true for low - and moderateincome consumers. research at the board by jeanne hogarth and chris anguelov using data from the 1998 survey

have a deep, meaningful, and, most important, practical, understanding of the largest, most systemically important, banks operating in the united states, as well as an understanding of the markets in which they operate. i believe that it can do so, in its role as umbrella supervisor of banking organizations and direct supervisor of state chartered member banks, while respecting the prerogatives of the primary supervisors of banks and other holding company subsidiaries that are not under its direct supervisory authority. and, an important point given the u. s. institutional structure, such an approach continues to be consistent with a healthy dual banking system - - in which banks chartered by the federal government and by the respective states exist and compete side - by - side. the value of the dual banking system has withstood the test of time. crisis management and liquidity assistance the global trends toward market finance, consolidation, and global integration has expanded the range of liquidity and other crisis scenarios that central banks may need to confront. the market turmoil in the autumn of 1998 and the extreme risk - aversion that pervaded credit markets in 2002 amid accounting scandals in the united states may suggest that major market disruptions are probably more likely today to originate from shocks to financial markets that are outside the banking sector. of course, if such shocks and the attendant market stress appear to pose risks to a central bank ’ s macroeconomic objectives, policymakers can make appropriate adjustments to the stance of monetary policy. in addition, if policymakers are particularly concerned about improbable but highly costly events, they might well wish to consider market stress in their monetary policy deliberations even when the modal forecasts for macroeconomic variables such as inflation and economic growth have not changed much. central banks can also be a calming influence on markets in a crisis simply by standing ready, as i noted earlier, to provide liquidity assistance if necessary. although shocks may originate in global debt and equity markets, they may well reverberate in the banking sector. for example, in 1998, banks were faced with a surge in loan demand from borrowers with reduced access to their usual market funding sources. assistance from the central bank may involve expanding the liquidity of the entire financial system through open market operations, or it could entail direct loans through the discount window to meet the liquidity demands of specific institutions. on the latter point, i would note that the federal reserve has recently restructured its lending programs so that credit can be routinely