point is that central banks ’ ﬁnancial assets are, like those of ﬁnancial institutions, subject to climate - related ﬁnancial risks. so for the sake of risk management, it is in central banks ’ own interest that the ﬁnancial risks of climate change and climate policies should be as transparent as possible. therefore, central banks should consider only purchasing securities or accepting them as collateral for monetary policy purposes if their issuers meet certain climate - related reporting obligations. in terms of monetary policy implementation, central banks could also examine whether they should use only those credit ratings from rating agencies that appropriately include climate - related ﬁnancial risks. with such measures, central banks would help promote market transparency and standards at rating agencies and banks. so monetary policy implementation should be part of the toolbox when central banks act as catalysts for greening the ﬁnancial system. 5 conclusion ladies and gentlemen, to summarise brieﬂy : first, i am very much looking forward to pushing ahead with the ngfs agenda together with the bcb. second, an important goal will be to achieve more market transparency on climate - related risks – as a solid foundation for adequate risk management and risk pricing. and third, in their own interest, central banks have an important role to play in the mission for more market transparency. climate change is the challenge of our times. but we can succeed if we act now - responsibly, jointly and forcefully, at all levels. in closing, let me wish you all a successful webinar. footnotes : 1. english : german corporation for international cooperation. https : / / www. bundesbank. de / en / press / speeches / climate - risk - the - merits - of - transparency - and - the - role - of - central - banks - 851634 3 / 4 24 / 11 / 2020 climate risk – the merits of transparency and the role of central banks | deutsche bundesbank https : / / www. bundesbank. de / en / press / speeches / climate - risk - the - merits - of - transparency - and - the - role - of - central - banks - 851634 4 / 4

peso both by 35 %. even the relatively strong economies of taiwan and singapore had allowed their currencies both to depreciate by 15 %. notwithstanding this, the hong kong economy is still expected to grow in 1998 by 3. 5 % in real terms. although this is somewhat below the growth rate of 5. 2 % recorded in 1997, it is a highly respectable growth rate in the light of the circumstances that we face in the asian region and is higher than most of the economies in the region that have devalued their currencies. most developed economies would be delighted to achieve such a growth rate in 1998. the slowdown is also considered healthy, given a degree of irrational exuberance seen in asset markets in the past couple of years. indeed, inflation this year will slow down further to 5 % from 5. 8 % in 1997, with the unemployment rate staying low and the current account remaining broadly in balance. thus the hong kong economy will not be too much affected by the devaluation of the exchange rates of our competitors. this is understandable for a highly service - oriented economy which hong kong now is 8. one country, two currencies 11. perhaps i should digress a little here and address a related issue which has been the subject of some attention, with considerable apprehension amongst observers. this concerns whether the currency of the mainland of china, the rmb, would be forced into devaluation by the asian financial turmoil and if so what would be the implications for the hong kong dollar ’ s link to the us dollar. the chinese 7 as an illustration, residential mortgage loans, which account for roughly 25 % of total domestic loans extended by the banking sector, have been of very high quality, helped by the prudent lending policy of the banks, including for example a maximum loan to valuation ratio of 70 %. as at the end of september 1997, the actual average of this ratio was only 52 %. the delinquency ratio, measured by loans overdue for more than 90 days as a percentage of total outstanding loans, stood at only 0. 1 % as at end - september 1997. even during the property downturn in the second half of 1994 and 1995, the delinquency ratio remained low, at around 0. 2 %. 88 the contribution of the services sector to gdp is now about 85 %. - 4leaders have clearly and repeatedly said that the rmb will not be devalue