##virus pandemic, energy prices soared. global supply chains were disrupted. at the same time, the lifting of lockdowns meant households were able to normalise consumption. the war in ukraine further exacerbated the situation. inflation increased significantly worldwide. it rose in switzerland, too, although later and to a lesser extent than elsewhere ( slide 6 ). initially, swiss inflation was mainly driven by rising import prices, particularly for energy. rising import prices spilled over to domestic inflation ( slide 7 ). given the marked inflationary pressure, it was time to tighten monetary policy. we stopped buying foreign currency and let the swiss franc appreciate. this dampened imported inflation. in june 2022, we raised the snb policy rate by 50 basis points to −0. 25 %. we started to sell foreign currency in the fourth quarter of 2022 to support the tightening effect of interest rates. for 2022 as a whole, our foreign currency sales totalled approximately chf 22 billion. in 2023, we even sold foreign currency worth some chf 133 billion. to put this into context, chf 133 billion corresponds to 17 % of switzerland ’ s gdp. the combination of rising interest rates and foreign currency sales was effective in quickly bringing inflation back into the range of price stability. the appreciation of the swiss franc dampened imported inflation in particular, which initially played a significant role. the increase in interest rates had a broader impact, curbing both imported and domestic inflation. 9 without the use of foreign currency sales, the snb would have had to raise the policy rate to a higher level. our decisive action contributed to keeping medium - term inflation expectations anchored. cf. fritz zurbrugg. ‘ competitiveness of swiss companies – the snb's contribution ’, speech at the swiss cfo day, 13 january 2016. specifically currencies against which the swiss franc is traded. cf. thomas jordan ( 2024 ), ‘ the swiss national bank ’ s monetary policy response to the post - covid period of high inflation ’ in monetary policy responses to the post - pandemic inflation, centre of economic policy and research. page 5 / 8 fifteen years of foreign exchange interventions – an assessment i began my remarks by saying that i would look back at our monetary policy over the past fifteen years. what is my assessment? i would like to focus on three aspects. the first covers the side effect of foreign exchange interventions : the large balance sheet. the

the escalated political tension was also something we had not anticipated. in particular, the damage it has inflicted on the tourism sector will significantly shave off one significant source of external revenue the economy has relied on. still, we see the economy ’ s growth momentum to remain in tact. here i am not alone in believing so. the latest set ’ s ceo survey released last week showed that the majority of listed companies ’ ceos remained confident in the growth prospect of the thai economy. obviously, this is a difficult time for the economy. but you have to remember that we are no strangers to difficult challenges, some much worse than what we are facing. most importantly, as i repeatedly said on different occasions, thailand possesses strong economic fundamentals and room for maneuvering the right policy mix that makes us resilient against economic shocks. allow me to elaborate on some of these. first, thailand ’ s external position remains strong. our external debt to gdp has hit an alltime low since 1980, recording 29. 4 percent last year. our foreign reserves doubled within three years reaching over 100 billion us dollar at present day. the amount of foreign reserve has by far exceeded the short - term external debt by more than four times. this provides us an ample room to safeguard against instability from volatile capital flows and exchange rate movements. second, the government ’ s fiscal position continues to improve as reflected by a falling trend of public debt to gdp. this gives the government the financial flexibility to tackle economic problems and stimulate the economy if necessary. it is no coincidence that credit rating companies often stated the strength of our fiscal and external position in their underlying reasons for affirming thailand ’ s sovereign ratings. in fact, to cite james mccormack, the head of asia sovereign of fitch ratings, at the firm ’ s last week annual thailand conference, unless political uncertainty significantly undermines thailand ’ s future growth prospect, it is unlikely that thailand will be downgraded, for the country ’ s sovereign credit fundamentals remain sound. third, the banking sector remains healthy and strong enough to weather the current global financial turmoil. the bis ratio remains high and the ratios of npls to total loans continued to decline. together with the implementation of ias39 accounting standard in 2006 - 2007 and the adoption of basel ii by the end of this year, the banking sector would be less prone to adverse shocks. finally, the soon - to - be - implemented second phase of the financial sector master plan will further improve efficiency of