objectives. 20 in fact, redistribution is a channel through which monetary policy can play a stabilizing role : those who gain the most from expansionary monetary policy are more likely to spend a greater share of their disposable incomes on consumption. 21 we need to update our analysis of the trade - offs, given the structural changes in the canadian economy over the last few decades. does the divine coincidence still hold as well as it did in the past? could monetary policy under a dual mandate be as effective as fiscal policies — such as taxes and transfers — at achieving full employment? an alternative to a dual mandate would be to target the growth rate or level of nominal gross domestic product ( gdp ). 22 while technically quite different, i see this as being in the same neighbourhood as the dual mandate because it puts more weight on other aspects of the economy that matter for welfare. nominal gdp targeting has received renewed attention recently because it could reduce the chances of running out of conventional firepower, much in the same way as plt. it also allows more flexibility to deal with situations where there is a trade - off between price and output stabilization. a good example of this is when oil prices are rising in an economy that is a net importer of oil, because this pushes inflation up while also weakening the economy. still, adopting a nominal gdp target shares the same drawbacks i mentioned earlier with respect to other frameworks like plt or a dual mandate. there are other practical issues too, because gdp is subject to frequent revisions, and so the objective would be a moving target. more research is needed here as well. 20 n. gornemann, k. kuester and m. nakajima, “ doves for the rich, hawks for the poor? distributional consequences of monetary policy, ” board of governors of the federal reserve system international finance discussion paper no. 1167 ( may 2016 ). 21 a. auclert, “ monetary policy and the redistribution channel, ” national bureau of economic research working paper no. 23451 ( may 2017 ) ; o. coibion, y. gorodnichenko, l. kueng and j. silvia, “ innocent bystanders? monetary policy and inequality, ” journal of monetary economics 88 ( june 2017 ) : 70 – 89 ; g. kaplan, b. moll and g. l. violante, “ monetary policy according to hank, ” american economic review 108, no. 3 ( 2018 ) :

and adding to market volatility, particularly in times of stress. secured transactions, especially transactions via ccps, have reanimated the money market in times of high uncertainty. this is also reflected in the fact that the share of international counterparties on trading platforms such as gc pooling increased during the crisis. one reason is that it became apparent during the financial crisis that big and well - established counterparties, too, can become illiquid or insolvent. under these circumstances, collateralisation has become more important. however, there is a growing gap : the importance of collateral quality has risen sharply, and at the same time, high quality and liquid collateral is becoming a limiting factor. furthermore, the ability to increase debt funding through repo transactions will also be limited by regulatory changes in the future. additionally, the ample liquidity provided by the eurosystem, especially via the two three - year ltros, together with the enlarged collateral framework for eurosystem refinancing has led to reduced activity in this market segment, too. the decisive question for market participants now is whether the eurosystem will stick to or reduce its non - standard monetary policy measures such as the full allotment policy and the enlarged collateral framework. given declining excess liquidity related, in particular, to the early repayments of the threeyear ltros, new business models may arise in the medium term as banks ’ funding needs will pick up again. it is therefore up to market participants to find a new balance between risks and benefits in relation to cross - border lending. furthermore, the importance of banks ’ collateral management will be further enhanced as a consequence of the crisis. credit institutions should aim to manage their collateral more bis central bankers ’ speeches efficiently without taking on additional risks. ccps and the use of trading platforms can contribute to this. another important factor on the repo market of the future will be the planned financial transaction tax ( ftt ). in its current design, it may harm the short - term repo market segment, as even a low tax rate of 0. 1 % for trading a sovereign bond represents a high burden to short - term and revolving repo transactions. to illustrate the problem, i would like to give you an example : for an over - night repo transaction with a current interest rate of 0. 04 % and a volume of eur 10 million, a total of eur 10, 011 ( ie eur 11 in interest and