our monetary policy stance will remain accommodative with the full allotment mode of liquidity provision. let me now explain our assessment in greater detail, starting with the economic analysis. the gdp outcome for the fourth quarter of 2012 was weak, with eurostat ’ s second estimate indicating a contraction of 0. 6 % quarter on quarter. the decline was largely due to a fall in domestic demand but also reflected weak exports. as regards 2013, recent data and indicators suggest that economic activity should start stabilising in the first part of the year. a gradual recovery should commence in the second part, with export growth benefiting from a strengthening of global demand and domestic demand being supported by our accommodative monetary policy stance. furthermore, the improvements in financial markets since july last year and the continued implementation of structural reforms should work their way through to the economy. at the same time, necessary balance sheet adjustments in the public and private sectors, and the associated tight credit conditions, will continue to weigh on economic activity. this assessment is also reflected in the march 2013 ecb staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, which foresee average annual real gdp growth in a range between – 0. 9 % and – 0. 1 % in 2013 and between 0. 0 % and 2. 0 % in 2014. compared with the december 2012 eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections, the ranges have been revised slightly bis central bankers ’ speeches downwards. the revision for 2013 mainly reflects a more negative carry - over effect from the outcome for real gdp in the fourth quarter of 2012, while the projected path of the recovery has remained broadly unchanged. the governing council continues to see downside risks surrounding the economic outlook for the euro area. the risks relate to the possibility of weaker than expected domestic demand and exports and to slow or insufficient implementation of structural reforms in the euro area. these factors have the potential to dampen the improvement in confidence and thereby delay the recovery. according to eurostat ’ s flash estimate, euro area annual hicp inflation was 1. 8 % in february 2013, down from 2. 0 % in january. the on - going decline in annual inflation rates mainly reflects the energy and food components of the price index. looking ahead, while the monthly pattern of headline inflation rates may be somewhat volatile, underlying price pressures should remain contained given the environment of weak economic activity in the euro area. inflation expectations are well - anchored and in line with price stability over the medium term. the

mario draghi : central bank communication opinion piece by mr mario draghi, president of the european central bank, of the edited transcript of his speech at the pr manager of the year award ( 15 july 2014 ), published in handelsblatt, 4 august 2014. * * * today, central bank communication is right at the heart of monetary policy. it is actually a monetary policy tool in itself. even for those with little interest in central banking, it is difficult to avoid the pronouncements of one or other of us in the newspaper. those people may even end up reading the articles, if only because central bank communication can have a major impact on financial markets – and hence on their savings. central bank communication was not always so extensive. think back to the days when the most important central bank in the world – the federal reserve ( fed ) – would not even publish its interest rate decisions ; rather, it would let the outside world derive them from the market reaction. today, this sounds unbelievable. but it was only in 1994 that the fed decided to make its interest rate decisions public in real time. designed between 1994 and 1998, the european central bank ( ecb ) was born at the start of a new era for central banking. two developments during this period raised the importance of communication. first, the increasing independence of central banks made it more important to communicate with and be accountable to the public. second, against a backdrop of liberalising financial markets, the effectiveness of monetary policy became more and more dependent on steering expectations of future interest rate policy. in the first case, the main challenge for the ecb was to reconcile three attributes of central banks that do not immediately fit together : being very powerful and independent yet unelected. the best example of a country that had done this successfully was germany. its answer was to uphold the deutsche bundesbank ’ s independence but to constrain its powers within a narrow mandate. and the contours of that mandate were not set by the central bank itself, but by legislators, who themselves were democratically elected. this model has worked because, by sticking closely to its mandate, the bundesbank has gained the trust of the people. it has cultivated this trust by actively communicating the rationale for its mandate and its plans to achieve it. this inspired the ecb ’ s founding fathers to give the ecb an equally clear and narrow mandate oriented towards price stability. and we have established trust by clearly communicating that mandate and