might be more potent than we might think. 5 so, i wonder, for example, whether the thought of “ getting caught ” even crosses someone ’ s mind if a prohibition is so routinely disregarded that violating that rule is normal. in the libor and fx cases, for example, traders discussed openly their manipulation of 4 / 6 bis central bankers'speeches reference rates in electronic chat rooms that they knew were recorded and monitored. the fact that those traders used a back channel to communicate evidences an awareness of wrongdoing — not to mention the brazen content of their communication. i have to conclude that the risk of getting caught either never crossed their minds or was massively discounted. on behalf of their firms, compliance personnel can help identify the root causes — especially the situational factors — that contribute to control failures. a thorough and honest exploration of those factors can help inform structural and governance changes mandated in enforcement actions. it is in everyone ’ s interest for those reforms to succeed, to fulfill the mantra of “ never again. ” i do not think this type of inquiry is easy — not because the root causes are unknowable. rather, it may be uncomfortable to ask the right questions. here are some examples. there are sure to be others. are behavioral expectations — and the consequences of violating those expectations — clear? in other words, does the company say, “ this is the conduct we want, and this is how we will hold you accountable for it. ” does the company employ leaders who are visible role models of good conduct and fire those who are not? are systems of compensation and promotion aligned with corporate goals and purposes? and, if there is a pattern of misconduct, are you sure that your incentive programs are based on merit? can the heads of business lines — the people responsible for p & l — explain how it is that each part of their business makes money and manages the associated risks? if not, are they really capable of effective oversight? when misconduct comes to light, does the company assess itself and challenge assumptions with brutal honesty? upon learning of misconduct, is the company willing to intervene in a timely fashion? if there is an emerging pattern of misconduct, how quickly is it identified and addressed? finally, are there particular desks or teams in which everyone is quite junior? too junior, perhaps, to have worked through a down business cycle or the financial crisis? if so, are we giving that area adequate supervision and compliance attention? concluding thoughts i

payments system. while the private sector excels at customer - facing activity, central banks provide the basis for trust, ensure liquidity, and set standards. central banks, while independent institutions, are accountable to the general public. this accountability necessitates building public confidence through intensive communication, namely, explaining the specific policy decisions taken by decisionmakers under specific economic conditions. shifting to data - driven decision - making and evolving together with changing technologies will ensure that central banks remain effective and credible, in turn enabling us to fulfill our mission of creating value for society. distinguished guests, lietuvos bankas is pleased to organize this centenary conference in cooperation with our colleagues from the bank for international settlements ( bis ), an institution that serves as a central bank for central banks. lietuvos bankas'relationship with the bis is almost as old as both these institutions! the bis commenced operation in 1930, and in march of 1931, lietuvos bankas became its shareholder. please allow me to give the floor to mr. luiz pereira da silva, deputy general manager of the bank for international settlements. luiz, the floor is yours. 1 from the speech " monetary policy in a changing economy ", delivered 24 august 2018 at " changing market structure and implications for monetary policy " symposium sponsored by the federal reserve bank of kansas city, in jackson hole, wyoming. 3 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches