swedes would not be able to resist the attraction of the euro. as an emu supporter, i can of course see the advantages of the euro, but to believe in a general, spontaneous transition would be going too far. this meant that the idea of a'euroisation'was also a bad argument in the debate prior to the start of the emu. if the swedes are to be won over to the idea of the emu, we should be emphasising the facts. personally, i believe that it will be easier to arouse interest in a discussion based on facts, when the euro banknotes and coins appear next year. globalisation requires stable game rules after this in - depth foray into the world of the euro, i shall return to the more general issues following on from the current internationalisation process. this creates, as i said earlier, the right conditions for a more rapid economic growth, but it does not offer any guarantee that this will be the case and it is important to remember this. the swedish economic crisis at the beginning of the 1990s is still fresh in most of our memories. that experience provided a clear illustration of the importance of pursuing a long - term, credible economic policy. however, it also showed the importance of building up properly functioning institutions to oversee the financial markets when deregulated. in sweden it was evident that the supervisory authorities were not prepared for the reality that would prevail after the deregulation of the credit markets in the 1980s. similar conclusions can be drawn from the crises in for example mexico and asia. these also show clearly that countries wanting to participate on the international capital markets must meet the requirements for openness and provision of information. this is positive, not only because it facilitates access to international capital, but also because the requirements make it more difficult for the governing elite and pressure groups to line their pockets at the expense of the majority of the population, if they want to take part in international society. the crises during the 1990s have also demonstrated that problems in one country can spread to other countries at a much greater speed than before. for this reason, some people would like to see an inbuilt time lag in the markets, for instance by introducing a tax on financial transactions, to reduce the damage to individual countries when capital moves rapidly across borders. this idea is based on most of the transactions on the international financial markets being pure speculation. naturally, there is some harmful speculation that needs to be counteracted

for the rapid industrialisation that took place during the latter part of the 19th century, when sweden joined the global economy in earnest. we know that there was great mobility within the international economy of that time, described for example in vilhelm moberg's books about the swedish emigrants. many of us have relatives in the usa as a result of the massive emigration, when more than one million swedes left the country to seek their living elsewhere. this process was made easier when the obligation to carry a passport was abolished in 1860 and it became easier to move across sweden's borders. there was also considerable migration within sweden. today's labour market cannot compare to this in terms of flexibility! another important element in the dynamic economy of that time was the development on the financial markets. the rapid industrialisation of sweden would hardly have been possible without functioning capital markets that ensured savings were channelled where they were most needed. the deregulation of the swedish interest rate markets in 1864 was important for this capital transfer, but was not sufficient to enable large - scale industrialisation in sweden. this required, in addition, access to the international capital market. i shall let the major swedish railway project began in the mid - 1800s explain why. the state paved the way abroad sweden was sparsely populated with vast distances, which made railway construction relatively expensive, compared with large parts of europe. in addition, the railways tied up investment capital for a long period of time. as there was a shortage of long - term savings in 19th century sweden, they were forced to seek financing abroad. in 1857 the swedish national debt office ventured out onto the international capital market. the first railway loan was issued in germany and comprised the start of an era with extensive capital imports to sweden lasting more than 50 years. this provided sweden with access to capital for productive investments on a scale that would scarcely have been possible otherwise. the central government borrowing paved the way abroad for other borrowers, such as municipalities, mortgage institutions and industrial companies. the large swedish banks were to a large extent given the task of acting as intermediary in bond loans and thus had the opportunity to develop contacts with foreign banks. the integration of the financial markets increased. for sweden, this meant that our manufacturing companies could make use of the greater access to capital and lower interest rates in industrially - developed europe. gothenburg, with its proximity to the british goods and capital markets, played an important role here. for instance, the skandinavis