a succession of threats and crises. this was certainly the case in both the examples i just mentioned, which produced landmark institutional reforms, including the ssm, which has brought us here this evening. the process may well continue in the face of the war in ukraine and its geostrategic and energy implications for europe. incidentally, if this terrible war continues and sanctions are extended to energy imports, the european union, which is a large net energy importer from russia and shares borders with ukraine, may face acute economic and financial stability risks, which are not yet incorporated into our models. but can we afford to continue moving forward in this pattern of reform - through - crisis? i am not sure we can. the world around us is changing. we have all heard about de - globalisation. personally, i find the term somewhat misleading since important globalising forces are still at play today. but there is little doubt, concerns over supply chain security and diversification are becoming more dominant, increasing the need to provide a regional counterweight. this is the familiar theme of open strategic autonomy. in a recent speech at the peterson institute, president lagarde argued that the european union is “ well placed to succeed in a world where the global order is more fragmented ”, because of its large internal market and experience in arbitrating disputes between countries. true, but much more needs to be done to make the arbitration process and consensus - building more effective. the stakes are not just financial. as popular discontent and reaction to globalisation continue, they challenge some of the foundational principles of the democratic, rules - based order that we have taken for granted in the west. reform through crises, particularly ones prolonged by squabbles between member states, not only undermines europe ’ s role on the international scene, but also weakens social cohesion, fuelling anti - european sentiment and extremism. in this context, i am not sure we can afford – either financially, socially or politically – to keep relying on the same crisis - reacting propulsion mechanism. a multipolar and partially de - globalised world order, is one where the eurozone needs to act proactively, not re - actively. no doubt, most of the action required is political and rests with institutions beyond the central banks and supervision authorities. but let ’ s not underestimate the role these can play. first of all, there are several areas of financial integration where reforms have stalled. it ’ s never

polite to talk shop at dinner, so i won ’ t go into details, but we are all aware of the missing components of our banking and capital market union. the recent revival of the european deposit insurance scheme ( edis ) is a step in the right direction, but not the only one needed. both banking crisis management and the bank resolution processes need reforms, not least since the existing schemes impose undue burdens on smaller institutions, while segmentation across multiple decision - makers undermines efficiency. another area where proactive involvement may be necessary is the ongoing technological revolution that is sweeping so many areas of finance. in this context, again, the mica regulation currently under deliberation deserves special attention, not least since this is an area where europe could aspire to generate the next wave of the “ brussels effect ”, i. e. set the standards and rules for other parts of the world. our potential contributions, however, extend beyond our immediate remit. inasmuch as institutional independence allows us to take a more long - term view, central bankers are well - placed to push for a more far - sighted approach. take fiscal federalism and debt mutualisation, both historically contentious issues. many, including germany ’ s current chancellor have described the next generation eu decision as europe ’ s hamiltonian moment, an opportunity to combine eu fiscal capacity with common rules and conditionality. there is little doubt the ngeu constitutes a tremendous opportunity, but it is still built as a temporary crisis response. for it to become a landmark reform, it needs to be transformed into a permanent mechanism, combining fiscal centralisation with supervision. that ’ s bound to cause some friction, within and between member states, and require major compromises, of the sort that traditionally require the arrival of the persian fleet – or a global pandemic. my point is that we cannot afford to wait for that. we should be proactive and prompt this discussion early on, starting with our own national audiences and governments, which need stand up to the fiscal challenges posed by the rise in overall debt. these discussions won ’ t be easy and there will no doubt be moments of tension. but it is our responsibility to make sure they start early. to go back to the eve of the battle of salamis, one historical source tells of a moment when the spartan commander - in - chief, eurybiades, became so enraged with themistocles, the athenian general, that he raised his staff to strike