unsecured guarantee, and thus no means of preventing lehman ’ s failure existed. the lehman failure provides at least two important lessons. first, we must eliminate the gaps in our financial regulatory framework that allow large, complex, interconnected firms like lehman to operate without robust consolidated supervision. in september 2008, no government agency had sufficient authority to compel lehman to operate in a safe and sound manner and in a way that did not pose dangers to the broader financial system. second, to avoid having to choose in the future between bailing out a failing, systemically critical firm or allowing its disorderly bankruptcy, we need a new resolution regime, analogous to that already established for failing banks. such a regime would both protect our economy and improve market discipline by ensuring that the failing firm ’ s shareholders and creditors take losses and its management is replaced. thank you. i would be glad to respond to your questions.

the capacity to meet the needs of banks serving different communities and with different needs and operating models. for that reason, commenters stated that the federal reserve is uniquely positioned to offer nationwide access to a new payment and settlement service for faster payments. fednow will allow faster payments to reach banks of all sizes and their customers across the country, which is especially important for rural communities, who often struggle with access to financial services. guided by our public mission, the federal reserve serves the needs of all banks, no matter how small or challenging to reach, and with competitive fairness. in response to our request for feedback last november, several commenters emphasized how much they value the federal reserve's mission of providing nationwide access on fair, transparent terms and expressed concern that a sole private - sector rtgs service provider may be less likely to exhibit the same commitment over the long run. safety is also vital. if the federal reserve does not establish the fednow service, there will be a single provider of real - time retail payment services. we are mindful of the serious safety issues associated with a single point of failure, a risk that will rise as faster payments grow. stakeholders have noted the importance of having access to more than one real - time payment service for back - up purposes in order to provide resiliency through redundancy. in fact, many banks already take advantage of having connections to multiple operators today in check, ach, and wire services. the federal reserve has always had a vital role in promoting the safety and 3 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches stability of the u. s. payment system by providing liquidity and operational continuity especially in times of stress. the fednow service would allow the federal reserve to extend this role into the real - time retail payment market. finally, competition will promote efficiency and innovation. the u. s. real - time retail payment infrastructure stands to gain from competition, including through higher service quality and lower prices over the long run, which in turn should support wider adoption. the fednow service will provide a neutral foundation for innovation and competition in end - user faster payment services. in response to the request for feedback, merchants and fintech companies commented that a federal reserve real - time retail payment service could broaden the scope for innovation in faster payments. they noted that a single provider that is owned and operated by one segment of the payment industry may focus on a narrow set of use cases that do not reflect the full breadth of possible use cases for faster