samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
has shown steady growth based on the domestic market and on caricom. the dependence on caricom has been critical for our manufacturers though it is a small market and these economies have been subject to pronounced income fluctuations in recent years. • the agricultural sector has shown a chronic decline which has been exacerbated, ( hopefully temporarily ) by the scaling down and restructuring of the sugar sector. figure 5 sectoral distribution of employment ( 2001 - 2004 ) ( in thousands ) jobs created goods - producing sector ( excluding petroleum & gas ) 2001 - 2004 172. 7 168. 3 167. 2 0. 3 agriculture 40. 1 36. 1 31. 4 - 15. 1 petroleum & gas 15. 5 17. 2 16. 1 19. 1 3. 6 manufacturing 53. 9 56. 6 55. 8 59. 4 5. 5 construction 71. 2 72. 6 81. 2 10. 0 water and electricity 7. 6 6. 6 7. 4 7. 3 - 0. 3 324. 2 338. 2 348. 9 363. 4 39. 2 services sector transport, storage & communications 38. 9 41. 8 41. 6 40. 3 1. 4 wholesale & retail 89. 8 94. 5 11. 2 community, social & personal services 21. 1 154. 5 158. 1 163. 3 175. 6 finance, insurance & real estate 43. 7 46. 6 5. 6 not classified 1. 5 1. 6 2. 1 1. 0 - 0. 5 514. 1 525. 1 534. 2 556. 3 42. 2 total employment source : cso employment if we look at the sectoral evolution of employment, we also see a similar pattern. over the past four years, employment growth has been fastest in community, social and personal services, in the distributive trades and in construction. there has been a modest increase in employment in manufacturing and a substantial decline in employment in the agricultural sector. clearly, the sustainability of this pattern of employment generation is open to question. figure 6 central government fiscal operations1 ( in per cent of gdp ) total revenue budget 25. 1 25. 3 28. 7 29. 0 energy sector 5. 9 9. 3 10. 8 12. 4 non - energy sector 19. 2 17. 9 16. 6 25. 7 23. 9 26. 6 27. 3 current expenditure 24. 5 22. 8 24. 4 25. 1 capital

build on these foundations. the current period of high energy prices is providing us with much needed space to accelerate the reform process and to make the necessary structural changes. it ’ s a question of seizing the moment.
in both the february 2020 and 2021 outgoing rotation groups. earnings are weekly and were compared with all members of the outgoing rotation group in february 2020. 2 see the federal reserve banks'small business credit survey : 2021 report on employer firms ( pdf ) fielded in september – october 2020. 3 see the frbs'small business credit survey in note 2 as well as small business credit survey : 2021 report on firms owned by people of color ( pdf ) released on april 15, 2021. 4 data comparisons are for the period between february 2020 and march 2021. 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches

jerome h powell : community development speech ( via webcast ) by mr jerome h powell, chair of the board of governors of the federal reserve system, at the " 2021 just economy conference ", sponsored by the national community reinvestment coalition, washington dc, 3 may 2021. * * * good afternoon. it is a pleasure to be with you today. together, over the past year, we have been making our way through a very difficult time. we are not out of the woods yet, but i am glad to say that we are now making real progress. while some countries are still suffering terribly in the grip of covid - 19, the economic outlook here in the united states has clearly brightened. vaccination levels are rising. fiscal and monetary policy are providing strong support. the economy is reopening, bringing stronger economic activity and job creation. that is the high - level perspective — let ’ s call it the 30, 000 foot view — and from that vantage point, we see improvement. but we should also take a look at what is happening at street level. lives and livelihoods have been affected in ways that vary from person to person, family to family, and community to community. the economic downturn has not fallen evenly on all americans, and those least able to bear the burden have been the hardest hit. the pain is all the greater in light of the gains we had seen in the years prior to the pandemic. covid swept in as the united states was experiencing the longest expansion on record. unemployment was at 50 - year lows, and inflation remained under control. wages were moving up, particularly for the lowest - paid workers. long - standing racial disparities in unemployment were narrowing, and many who had struggled for years were finding jobs. it was not until the later years of that expansion that its benefits had started to reach those on the margins. during our fed listens events, we met with people around the country and heard repeatedly about the life - changing gains of the strong labor market, particularly at the lower end of the income spectrum. just a few months later, those stories changed to ones of job losses, overextended support services, and businesses built over generations closing their doors for good. while the recovery is gathering strength, it has been slower for those in lower - paid jobs : almost 20 percent of workers who were in the lowest earnings quartile in february of 2020 were not employed a year later, compared to
trading partners'gdp world gdp at ppp 2013 ( f ) ipom jun. 14 2014 ( f ) ipom mar. 13 3. 4 3. 1 3. 3 3. 0 2015 ( f ) ipom ipom ipom ipom ipom ipom dec. 13 mar. 14 jun. 14 dec. 13 mar. 14 jun. 14 ( annual change, percent ) 4. 2 3. 6 3. 7 3. 6 3. 8 3. 9 3. 9 3. 9 3. 5 3. 5 3. 3 3. 7 3. 8 3. 7 united states eurozone japan china india rest of asia ( excl. japan, china and india ) latin america ( excl. chile ) 2. 8 - 0. 6 1. 9 7. 7 5. 1 3. 8 2. 7 1. 9 - 0. 4 1. 5 7. 7 4. 6 3. 9 2. 2 2. 5 1. 3 1. 3 8. 2 6. 4 4. 7 3. 7 lme copper price ( us $ cent / lb ) brent oil price ( us $ / barrel ) terms of trade - 4. 1 - 3. 2 2. 6 2. 7 2. 4 1. 0 1. 2 1. 0 1. 3 1. 5 1. 6 7. 4 7. 3 7. 3 5. 3 5. 4 5. 4 4. 0 4. 1 4. 1 2. 9 2. 3 2. 0 ( levels ) ( annual change, percent ) - 1. 6 0. 2 - 0. 9 - 0. 5 2. 7 1. 4 1. 0 7. 2 6. 3 4. 5 3. 4 2. 9 1. 5 1. 1 7. 2 6. 3 4. 5 3. 4 3. 1 1. 7 1. 0 7. 2 6. 2 4. 4 3. 0 - 1. 5 - 1. 1 - 1. 5 ( f ) forecast. sources : central bank of chile based on a sample of investment banks, consensus forecasts, the imf and statistics bureaus of respective countries. figure 7 cpi inflation ( * ) ( annual change, percent ) cpiefe inflation ( * ) ( annual change, percent ) - 2 - 2 - 2 - 2 - 4 - 4 - 4 - 4 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14

might be better characterized as a " nearprime " market, with quite different lending standards than appear to have been applied in the united states [ chart : percentage of subprime mortgages in arrears for more than 90 days or in foreclosure ]. conclusion allow me to conclude. the housing market plays an important role in the national economy. and changes in housing activity and prices can have far - reaching effects. the turbulence of the past 12 months emanating from the u. s. housing market has posed risks and challenges for many people – and for the conduct of monetary policy. although the canadian economy has not escaped the effects of financial market dislocations or the weakening u. s. economy, the canadian financial system and the housing market have shown considerable resilience, in part reflecting prudent practices. canada's monetary policy framework continues to play an important role in anchoring inflation expectations, and thus in supporting sustainable economic growth and a sound growth in housing activity and prices over the past decade was underpinned by a number of factors including regional migration ; income growth from strong employment, rising wealth from financial assets, and relatively low interest rates ; as well as, in recent years, innovations in the mortgage market. housing market. macroeconomic stability cannot eliminate asset - price run - ups, but it does help a good deal when financial decisions are made, and it helps to mitigate the impact when run - ups and reversals do occur. a foundation of low, stable and predictable inflation will continue to prove valuable in helping canadians to make informed decisions about housing – and indeed about many forms of spending and investment.
end of the year. looking ahead to next year, the growth momentum is expected to remain weak. it continues to be supported by our standard and non - standard monetary policy measures, but the necessary process of balance sheet adjustment in the financial and non - financial sectors and an uneven global recovery will continue to dampen the pace of recovery. the risks surrounding the economic outlook for the euro area remain on the downside. euro area annual hicp inflation was 2. 5 % in october 2012, according to eurostat ’ s flash estimate, compared with 2. 6 % in september and august. on the basis of current futures prices for oil, inflation rates could remain at elevated levels, before declining to below 2 % again in the course of next year. over the policy - relevant horizon, in an environment of modest growth in the euro area and well - anchored long - term inflation expectations, underlying price pressures should remain moderate. current levels of inflation should thus remain transitory. we will continue to monitor closely further developments in costs, wages and prices. risks to the outlook for price developments continue to be broadly balanced over the medium term. upside risks pertain to further increases in indirect taxes owing to the need for bis central bankers ’ speeches fiscal consolidation. the main downside risks relate to the impact of weaker than expected growth in the euro area, in the event of a renewed intensification of financial market tensions, and its effects on the domestic components of inflation. turning to the monetary analysis, the underlying pace of monetary expansion continues to be subdued. in september the annual growth rate of m3 decreased to 2. 7 %, from 2. 8 % in august. monthly outflows from m3 reflected to some extent the reversal of portfolio shifts into the most liquid components of m3. accordingly, the annual rate of growth of m1 declined to 5. 0 % in september, from 5. 2 % in august. at the same time, we have observed a strengthening in the deposit base of banks in some stressed countries, amid improvements in investors ’ confidence in the euro area. the annual growth rate of loans to the private sector ( adjusted for loan sales and securitisation ) declined further to – 0. 4 % in september, from – 0. 2 % in august. this development was mainly due to further net redemptions in loans to non - financial corporations, which led to an annual rate of decline in these loans of – 1. 2 %, compared with – 0. 5 % in august.

1 january 2013 with a view to the ssm becoming operational in the course of 2013. we are now at your disposal for questions. bis central bankers ’ speeches
development of separate models for the major quantifiable risks, a system of capital standards together with a supervisory review of other, non - quantifiable risks, seems more likely. conclusion 15. let me conclude. the overall issue of this conference, particularly of this session, is where capital regulation is heading. in my address, i have argued that, as supervisory objectives are unchanged, a reduction in banks ’ capital adequacy would not be desirable. neither is there a cause for fundamental alterations in the basic framework of the capital accord. at the same time, the basle committee is committed to maintaining the effectiveness of capital regulation and willing to consider improvements, where possible. in this regard, the advances made by market participants in measuring and modelling of credit and other risks are potentially significant and might at some point be incorporated into capital regulation. but before we reach that stage, there are still formidable obstacles to be overcome.

host of not only the first ever conference on climate risks and supervision, but also the first ever conference of the central banks and supervisors network for greening the financial system. we hope and are convinced it won ’ t be the last.
quantitative and / or credit easing. in many countries, the authorities have also had to provide substantial direct support to financial institutions facing difficulties. although we have been spared that in canada, this support has been an important bolster for the global recovery. while these policy actions have been timely and effective, they imply that the incipient recovery depends to a considerable degree on official action. at what stage will private demand be robust enough to make the recovery self - sustaining? clearly, we haven't reached that point yet. a second important risk is the possibility of persistent strength in the canadian dollar, which would work against the positive factors that i mentioned earlier. the recent rise in the dollar is, in part, a reflection of the same factors that are leading to a recovery in canada, notably the rebound in commodity prices. it is also a result of a more generalized weakening of the u. s. dollar, as global financial conditions normalize. other things being equal, a persistently strong canadian dollar would reduce real growth and delay the return of inflation to target. if a stronger dollar were to alter the path of projected inflation relative to that presented in our july monetary policy report, we would need to take that into account. as we have said before, even though we are at the effective lower bound for our policy rate, we retain considerable flexibility through the use of unconventional monetary policy instruments, including quantitative easing. the output gap and the evolution of potential output i'll now turn to the output gap and potential output. the output gap is the difference between actual and potential output – with the latter defined as the level of output that can be achieved with existing labour, capital, and technology without putting sustained upward pressure on inflation. the concept has been much maligned, partly because it is not an observed variable, and it is subject to considerable measurement problems. however, it remains a convenient " shorthand " for characterizing underlying inflation pressures, and for bridging between the current conjuncture and the factors that will condition economic growth over the medium term, as the output gap is closed. our current situation of excess supply ( a negative output gap ) implies, all else being equal, that core cpi inflation can be expected to decline and then recover as actual output growth exceeds potential, while the level of output returns to potential. the output gap is best used to complement more detailed and micro - founded analysis, particularly that captured in more formal models. for example, our main projection model for the canadian

and by working to make the financial system more stable and efficient, it is contributing to the recovery that will take hold over the medium term. this work also helps to ensure that a sound foundation is in place for the work that must be done to meet the longer - term challenges that lie ahead.
real - estate loans – the eurosystem ’ s quarterly bank lending survey is showing a slight tightening since 2010. however, a growing percentage of german banks ’ loans for house purchase is long - term. although this reduces the risks to households of possible changes in interest rates during the interest rate lock - in period, banks ’ interest rate risk increases inversely. it is impossible to predict when the favourable lending conditions – which are not confined to the area of real - estate financing – will reverse themselves. a hike in interest rates would entail a decline in valuations and prices in the financial markets. funding which, under the current conditions, seems adequate could prove no longer sustainable. each and every individual market participant can hedge against this scenario – through an adequate capital ratio and by structuring contractual terms in a forward - looking manner. financial 3 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches stability concerns also make it necessary, however, to identify risks which could affect the financial system as a whole. these risks are not always visible to individual banks or market participants. this is the case if, in cases of distress, individual market players are regarded as being either “ too big to fail ” or “ too interconnected to fail ". another risk to financial stability, however, can arise if multiple financial institutions are exposed to similar macroeconomic risks ( too - many - to - fail ). capital adequacy is therefore the foundation of the financial system and a prerequisite for cushioning risks – akin to the ability of a bridge to bear a certain load provided it is built out of stable materials. at the same time, a bridge cannot be too stiff, and it must be supple enough to offset heavy loads. by the same token, financial stability considerations make it necessary to bolster resilience and at the same time maintain the ability to respond to change. one type of change addressed in this report is the growing importance of fintechs, new technologies which, for instance, facilitate direct lending through platform - based brokerage or investment advice. new technologies can help make the financial system more stable by improving lending and risk dispersion. however, they can also encourage herding behaviour. this is why we are keeping a very close eye on these markets and developing regulatory criteria which strike a proper balance between competition policy, financial stability and technological neutrality. derivatives trading is another area in which the financial markets are witnessing change. in 2009, the g20 decided that standardised over - the

. ashx >. rba ( 2018 ), ‘ box c : spillovers from public investment ’, statement on monetary policy, february, pp 40 – 42. © reserve bank of australia, 2001 – 2018. all rights reserved. https : / / www. rba. gov. au / speeches / 2018 / sp - ag - 2018 - 06 - 15. html 8 / 8
’ s ability to avoid a deflationary episode. examples where countries reached the lower bound for nominal interest rates are rare. and even if this event were to materialise, a number of effective monetary policy actions are still possible at zero nominal interest rates and various plausible solutions for escaping from a liquidity trap have been proposed. this notwithstanding, prevention is better than cure and a safety margin for inflation rates above zero proves helpful to avoid that the effectiveness of these alternative policies has to be tested in reality. in order to calibrate the adequate safety margin for inflation rates in this respect, we took into account the studies which have tried to assess the likelihood of nominal interest rates hitting the zero lower bound for various levels of inflation objectives. results in this area differ to some extent, as they depend on a number of specific assumptions. but the available studies indicate that the likelihood decreases to very low levels when the central bank aims at an inflation rate above 1 %. we are thus convinced that focusing on inflation of below but close to 2 % provides a sufficient safety margin against nominal interest rates hitting the zero lower bound. rationales for aiming for positive inflation ( 2 ) : measurement error in the hicp a second reason to aim for low positive inflation is that available inflation statistics may be subject to a positive measurement error, which would imply that strict price stability, that is, zero inflation, as measured by the price index would de facto mean a declining price level. in the specific case of the hicp, the precise estimation of such a measurement bias continues to be surrounded by uncertainty. but taking into account the continuous improvements implemented by eurostat in the index, the bias is likely to be small and to decline further in the future. rationales for aiming for positive inflation ( 3 ) : inflation differentials within the euro area third, as regards the possible presence of sustained inflation differentials within a currency union, i should note that such differentials are and should be considered a normal feature of any currency area. indeed, they are an integral part of the adjustment mechanism resulting from not fully synchronised economic shocks in the various countries forming the euro area. the single monetary policy cannot address such differentials, in the same way that in a single country monetary policy cannot reduce inflation differentials across regions or cities. depending on the causes of temporary differentials, national remedies may be needed to prevent harmful developments in the country, notably in connection with competitiveness. overall, it is crucial that product and labour

institute will continue to make a valuable contribution in future - to ensure an even better understanding of the swiss economy. bis central bankers ’ speeches
norman t l chan : a fascinating train journey speech by mr norman t l chan, chief executive of the hong kong monetary authority, at the cuhk ( the chinese university of hong kong ) business school master degree graduation ceremony 2015, hong kong, 21 november 2015. * * * professor michael hui, professor kalok chan, parents, graduates, ladies and gentlemen : 1. it is a great honour to be invited to attend today ’ s graduation ceremony. it is also a great pleasure to be back to cuhk, where i spent the most beautiful part of my life as a student. there were so many fond memories and i cannot tell you how much i have missed my campus life even though i have graduated for nearly 40 years. 2. my fellow graduates, today is a memorable and joyful occasion not only for you, but also for your parents, your family, your loved ones and your friends. you have all worked very hard and gone through many rounds of examinations and challenges before you can be here today on this occasion. you must feel very proud and wish to tell everybody that “ i have made it ”. my heartfelt congratulations to you all : you have made it. you have received a master degree that provides you with the knowledge and skills that are badly needed and sought after in the modern era of business and finance. so many of you may think that you have earned a train ticket for a smooth journey to the place you are destined to go : success. is it so? 3. i am not sure if i know the answer, but let me depict a different scenario for you to think about. let ’ s say you have a train ticket that would enable you to go through the admission gate of the train station and reach the train platform. when you are there you immediately realise that there are many trains waiting to depart. your ticket doesn ’ t really tell you which train you should board and the signs on the trains are not clear either. so you will have to decide which train you should get on, without knowing whether this particular train is indeed the right one that can take you to your desired destination. but this is not the worst part. when you get on the train, you find that there are already lots of people there and that there is no seat assigned to you. all the window seats have been occupied. so you have to struggle to find a seat for yourself. and this is not the end of the story. 4. after you have settled

global monetary policy shocks. i would therefore like to thank you all for taking the time to join our workshop today, which brings together seasoned researchers and policymakers dedicated to understanding these vital issues. i look forward to their insights and i hope you enjoy the workshop. thank you. last revision date : 25 august 2022