short time. the european banking industry is likewise intensively involved in target2. indeed, if it were not strongly requested by the banking industry, the single shared platform would still be nothing but a distant dream. and it is also clear that we will only be able to realise target2 securities with the active involvement and constructive cooperation of the banks and the central securities depositories ( csds ). target2 securities should not be understood as a hostile or, indeed, friendly takeover of the csds ’ business by the eurosystem. the main issue here is also our core function, ie settlement in central bank money. the eurosystem has no intention of using target2 securities to set up a european central securities depository. in this respect target2 securities differs from the us fedwire securities system which is a fully - fledged central securities depository though only for government paper. in europe, the csds will retain full responsibility for the safe custody and administration of securities and for relationships with their customers. however, target2 securities demands that, in technical terms, the maintaining of securities accounts also be effectively transferred to the eurosystem platform. given the fact that if for reasons of security and efficiency the integration of securities and central bank money accounts is required there are just two options. either the central banks “ outsource ” their money accounts to the various csds or the csds shift their securities accounts to the eurosystem. for the reasons i mentioned at the start of this speech, the second approach is the clear favourite. however, i would like to emphasise again that using target2 securities will make sure that the proven, clear delineation of responsibilities in the market will remain intact, ie central banks provide the settlement in central bank money, csds are the owners and custodians of securities accounts. naturally, we must also bear in mind economic considerations when providing settlement services. this prevents “ public ” money from being “ wasted ” and guarantees that it will be used sensibly. at the same time, it enables us to tackle any potential competitive distortion. take, for example, target2 : it will not only meet user demands but will also ensure costeffectiveness. the idea to establish a single technical platform for target2 translates into exploiting economies of scale and achieving cost reductions. cost - effectiveness also means making maximum use of the synergies the eurosystem has to offer with regard to target2 securities as well. this, in turn

alternative proposals that may be put forward by private companies. iv are central banks faced with a conflict of interests in their function as both system operators and overseers? this question has already been adequately discussed and convincingly answered in the context of target. even if conflicts of interest were to arise, we counteract these by applying international oversight standards and by keeping a strict separation of our various roles. the general public is also aware of this separation of functions. the discussion regarding possible conflicts of interest is, of course, always brought up again whenever central banks, using their own oversight authority for example, would try to enforce the use of their own systems. this would be fundamentally problematic like any approach to prescribe the usage of a specific market infrastructure by means of the oversight function or by other regulatory powers. i do not think that it would be a wise decision for us to withdraw from our role as service provider and to restrict ourselves to the pure oversight function. in my opinion, this would not be beneficial to our objectives in payments and financial stability. it would also be contrary to experience in other countries, such as in the united states and japan. the role of a central bank would then ultimately be guided by a different model in which the regulatory aspect could become much more significant. this means, however, that we should take care of the economic and functional viability of our own systems. otherwise, the political significance of our systems and our role could be put into question. therefore, it would be very unfortunate if activity in our own systems were to be eroded by an increased provision of central bank liquidity to other systems. i am, however, confident that with target2 and target2 securities, we are providing a convincing answer in all respects to the issue of the operational involvement of central banks. v ladies and gentlemen, “ we are living in a system where you are either on the wheel or under it ”. these are not my words but those of a great german philosopher from the 19th century, and yet they are still as relevant as ever. applied to central banks, the underlying message is that we must act as the wheel and ensure momentum by means of our own systems. and to ensure that we do not end up under the wheels, we have to take on the competition.