hand views from governor ’ s interactions in various multilateral fora on global developments and outlook, and the implications of global spillovers for the indian economy and for the setting of monetary policy. in hindsight, these insights turned out to be invaluable. in a situation in which several emes were jumping on to the bandwagon of tightening monetary policy and aes were announcing normalisation or joining their emes in raising policy rates, india held its ground and is among a few countries that have retained an accommodative monetary policy 7, despite some views that we have fallen behind the curve. only time will tell whether or not india has got it right but so far, this approach has served us well and helped in charting a course into the future which is different from the world. conclusion in the hallowed tradition of central banks, the rbi as an institution shuns the glare of the limelight, preferring to remain unglorified and grounded. yet when the chips are down and crises loom, it rises up from the depths that it inhabits and flings itself at the gathering storm. when the job is done, the recovery secured and macroeconomic and financial stability ensured, it falls back, usually unsung, but always on guard. the pandemic continues to shape the future, but the rbi remains armed and battle ready. continuously evaluating highly volatile and uncertain conditions and remaining prepared to protect the economy from shocks, the rbi has committed all its instruments to this objective, using conventional measures and fashioning new ones, as the pandemic experience showed. the lessons of the pandemic will be imbibed and the rbi will emerge stronger and more resilient than before, and committed to its mandate of price stability, keeping in mind the objective of growth. in fact, the statement of december 8, 2021 states that “ our motto is to ensure a soft landing that is well - timed. ”

the rules we already have today is paramount before we engage in major new integration steps. to cut a long story short : a fiscal union, which would require member states to surrender substantial national sovereignty, hardly seems feasible at the moment. and as long as there ’ s no willingness to transfer national sovereignty to the european level, there will be no basis for mutualising sovereign risks – and that ’ s why the proposal to establish a european deposit insurance scheme ( edis ) isn ’ t the right institutional response to restore the balance between liability and control in the euro area. as long as actions taken at the national level, such as drafting insolvency law or very high stocks of government bonds on banks ’ balance sheets, can have a substantial impact on the health of financial institutions, edis would allow risks to be shifted to the european level. this would send the wrong incentives to banks and investors alike. the mutualisation of risk would not go hand in hand with the necessary mutualisation of control rights – irrespective of the single supervisory mechanism that was put in place. the second way of restoring the balance between liability and control, meanwhile, would be to strengthen the maastricht approach based on individual responsibility. this would leave economic and fiscal policy, as well as ultimate liability for public debt, in the hands of the individual member states. but how could such a decentralised approach work better in future than it has done in the past? one of the problems in the run - up to the crisis was that the fiscal rules were incapable of effectively limiting the increase in public debt. although the rules were changed after the crisis, the european commission was granted more flexibility in interpreting them. and it has used this flexibility quite a few times so far – and always to interpret the rules very loosely. as a result, the binding force of the budgetary rules is weaker than ever before, as we can see, for instance, in the budgetary developments in france, spain and portugal. one way of ensuring that the rules are binding would be to install a new and independent authority, a fiscal council. this institution would not be exposed to the same political conflicts of interest as the commission, which has to assess whether national budgets comply with the stability and growth pact and hammer out political compromises between the interests of the different member states. " debt is a two - edged sword. used wisely and in moderation, it clearly improves welfare. but, when it is used imprudently