samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
ernst welteke : reforming europe closing remarks by mr ernst welteke, president of the deutsche bundesbank, at the european banking congress, frankfurt, 21 november 2003. * 1. * * introduction delivering closing remarks at the end of an inspiring day is a curse and a blessing at the same time. on the one hand, the final speaker faces the problem that everything has already been said. on the other hand, it is a feature of human nature to remember best what one heard last. i will try to exploit the latter by widening the perspective and commenting on a few overarching issues. 2. a constitution for the european union a fully developed european identity is evolving only slowly. it may receive an additional boost from the european constitutional process. i am a strong proponent of the european constitution. however, i have some objections to articles concerning the foundations of european monetary union. the constitution was drafted under a consensus that no changes of substance were to be made to the monetary framework. while the changes now envisaged look fairly small, they make a difference. as nobody can surely want to endanger the stability of the single currency, the intergovernmental conference must redraft the articles in question so as to preserve the tried and tested status quo - if they decide to renegotiate the draft. i am well aware of the difficulties of reopening the negotiations, and especially of finalising them again. i regard three issues as crucial : 1. article i - 3 of the draft constitution mentions “ balanced growth ” as one of the objectives of the european union, whereas the wording “ non - inflationary growth ” has been in the treaty up to now. price stability must not be dropped from the list of objectives of the eu. 2. the independence of the monetary authorities is a defining feature of european monetary union. therefore, the constitution must guarantee the independence not only of the ecb but also of the national central banks. article i - 29 of the draft must be amended accordingly. a second - rate independence of the national central banks, that is independence guaranteed by national laws only but not by the constitution, is not acceptable. 3. the unique status of the ecb as an institution “ sui generis ” is given up in the draft constitution. this reclassification may open the door to assigning objectives other than price stability to the ecb. the mere possibility of the ecb being forced to abandon its crystal - clear stability orientation might be

. they all together made this european banking congress again a success.
. in the story of financial crises that the book tells, unsustainable build - ups of exposures, underestimation of risks and an erosion or inadequacy of regulatory capacity are the common elements of all crises. when i joined the rbi, food inflation had been a headline issue for almost two years, beginning late 2007 and consolidating very sharply in the first half of 2008. there was definitely a global dimension to this during that period, but what was striking was that even after global food inflation moderated, indian food inflation persisted. the weak monsoon of 2009 was, of course, blamed and we all believed that softening was only one good monsoon away. well, 2010 was a good monsoon but, as it turned out, there was little respite in food inflation. let ’ s wait for 2011, we thought. 2011 was also a relatively good monsoon year, but in the immediate aftermath of the monsoon, there wasn ’ t much respite. fortunately for policymakers, data from recent weeks suggests a softening in food inflation, but the level is still rather high. during the two years i have been with the rbi, persistent food inflation has been one of the critical challenges to monetary policy formulation. there is a view, entirely legitimate, that carmen m. reinhart & kenneth s. rogoff, 2008. “ this time is different : a panoramic view of eight centuries of financial crises, ” nber working papers 13882, national bureau of economic research. bis central bankers ’ speeches monetary policy has no role in dealing with food inflation. policy actions should, instead, be triggered by some measure of core inflation. however, this argument weakens somewhat when we move from a scenario where food inflation episodes are transitory, or short - lived, to one in which they are persistent, as has been the case in recent years. in the face of persistent food inflation, just as with any persistent supply shock, the appropriate response is seen to be to use monetary policy to prevent the spill - over from the shock into more broadbased or generalized inflationary pressures. in other words, in order to keep inflation under check, relative prices across categories of commodities have to change in favour of the ones facing the supply shock. i want to get away from the monetary policy perspective for now and focus on the issue of relative prices. when we bring these into the discussion, we immediately enter the realm of microeconomics, i

2002. see lagarde, c. ( 2021 ), “ happy anniversary to euro cash! ”, the ecb blog, 31 december. 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches
yen against the euro ) had a negative impact on outstanding fx volumes. due to this increase in fx risk, most banks announced more restrictive allocation policies for the future, and the austrian authorities increased their monitoring activities of these loans. • austrian banks were first movers in the cesee banking markets in the late 1980s. since then they have continuously expanded their presence and are now significant players with highly diversified exposures across the whole cesee region. 1 according to business segment reports, the largest austrian banks according to figures from the bis, the overall exposure of austrian banks to cesee amounted to about eur 191 billion at the end of q2 2008 or 66. 5 % in terms of at ’ s gdp forecast for 2008. their share in the entire generated consolidated profits of eur 3. 3 billion in the first half of 2008 in cesee, compared to eur 1 billion in the domestic segment and – eur 0. 3 billion in the rest of the world. in recent months, the global economic slowdown has also led to increasing vulnerabilities in cesee, especially in hungary, the ukraine and latvia ; and the risk aversion of global investors towards this region has increased. in addition, local banking systems are quite exposed to foreign exchange risks given the high share of foreign currency loans. austrian measures to combat the financial crisis • the measures adopted by austrian policymakers to fight the financial crisis were endorsed by the austrian parliament in october 2008 and encompass primarily two new laws, the interbank market support act ( interbankmarktstarkungsg ), and the financial market stability act ( finanzmarktstabilitatsg ). • the austrian measures were designed in accordance with the common principles highlighted in the ecofin meeting on october 7, 2008, and the declaration on a concerted european action plan that the heads of state or government of the euro area made on october 12, 2008. this declaration, which defines specific cornerstones regarding national measures for supporting the financial markets, shows that the european union is in the position to act quickly and coordinated in the case of a financial crisis. • with the interbank market support act, an “ austrian clearingbank ” ( oesterreichische clearingbank ag ) was established as a special purpose entity for strengthening the inter - bank market. the austrian clearingbank serves as an intermediary on the interbank market by borrowing funds and lending such funds to credit institutions and insurance undertakings. the republic of austria

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the development of a large, mainly externally focused non - bank sector. these are primarily investment funds and other investment vehicles. macro prudential policy in this arena is at an early stage of development internationally, but the bank is partaking in on - going assessment of the risks with a view to working with our international colleagues to develop a macro prudential toolkit in this sector. 32. see speech by former governor lane tail risks and the irish economy 33. see the speech delivered at the macgill summer school 2019. ©2019 central bank of ireland

be thought of as a symptom of being small, open or having a strong reliance on certain sectors. the historic volatility of the irish macro - financial environment is perhaps the most visible representation of being small, open and highly globalised. recent central bank research has looked at the cross - country volatility or unpredictability of a range of macro economic financial variables since 1980. 22 relative to its european peers, ireland ’ s macro variables move more, or in other words, have higher highs and lower lows. credit and house prices display the largest divergence to our european neighbours, and with the recent credit boom and house price peaks and troughs this is perhaps no surprise. however gdp, household income, and employment also move more relative to european countries. * * * as evidenced by our volatility, the irish economy has vulnerabilities, these can be cyclical or structural. i will first briefly look at cyclical sensitivities, before speaking in more detail on structural ones. cyclical can be how responsive the irish economy is to the global economic cycle. depending whether the global economy is performing strongly or weakly, how much does this affect ireland. central bank research compares the effect of a global output shock on ireland, the us, uk and euro area. 23 of those large economies studied, over time, ireland is the most affected by, or the most responsive to, a negative global shock. looking further within a subset of small open economies, ireland is less negatively affected than singapore or sweden, but more affected than switzerland and new zealand for example. today, the responsiveness to the global economy is particularly relevant with weakening global growth prospects and subdued global final demand. * * * turning now to structural vulnerabilities. these are features of the irish economy that would mean it is more susceptible to idiosyncratic structural shocks that may have significant macroeconomic effects. one way of looking at the propensity for structural shocks of the irish economy is to compare how much actual economic performance is different to previous forecasts through time. in other words, how hard it is to anticipate future performance from current information. the bigger the differences the harder it can be for businesses and households to prepare for the future. it is illustrative to see how we compare with other countries. the forecast errors for ireland are at the higher end of the scale when comparing across eu member states. 24 in fact, ireland has the highest forecast errors
state runs into difficulties. it ’ s not about us favouring one country over another. it is simply about making the best of a difficult situation. what we have done is right. it ’ s the best we could do, and it has been working. bis central bankers ’ speeches

peter praet : interview in handelsblatt interview with mr peter praet, member of the executive board of the european central bank, in handelsblatt, conducted by mr jan mallien and mr daniel schafer and published on 10 december 2015. * * * mr praet, rather than the next big flood of money that was expected from the european central bank ( ecb ), there was only a very small expansion of the existing stimulus. did you have to back down? does the majority of the ecb ’ s governing council no longer support your and mario draghi ’ s policy? quite the opposite : we had a very strong majority! by way of explanation : the relevant working groups provide the executive board with an analysis of the different measures and the board discusses a monetary policy package, which i then put forward to the governing council. what was agreed last week is exactly in line with what i proposed to the council on thursday, taking into account what was discussed in the committees. you had already met the other members of the ecb ’ s governing council for dinner on wednesday though. did you encounter so much resistance then that you scaled back your proposals before thursday ’ s meeting? the dinner always takes place, but these issues are not discussed during the meal. it is true that at first i was not sure how the proposals would be received. but in the end, the discussion was not very controversial. not everyone was in favour of my proposals, but it is not the case that we said “ we want this ”, and then got less. that is just not true. if you didn ’ t want to achieve anything more, why did you create such high expectations beforehand? we had already talked about reviewing our measures when the governing council met in malta in october. the markets already reacted to this back then, which was understandable. the problem was that the markets ’ expectations grew ever bigger in the meantime and were persisting, even though the most recent economic data had been encouraging. one big problem was that, during the quiet period...... i. e. the days directly before the governing council meeting, when members of the council are not allowed to talk about monetary policy...... during this period, the markets exaggerated the situation again. but we could not respond to it because we are obliged to remain silent. what do you mean by “ exaggerated ”? that there was speculation about a package of measures that
of the fund, through the executive board, have the responsibility that the fund takes sensible decisions. they have an equally important responsibility to safeguard the credibility and soundness of the institution. this can best be done by ensuring that, to the extent possible, the game is played according to the rules. to best pursue its mandates, the fund must not only be competent and financially sound, it must also be able to preserve its own independent judgment. with this caveat, i would have no problem sharing the very widespread belief that if the fund did not exist, we would have to invent it.

thomas jordan : real estate prices falling in the us, rising in switzerland – implications for the snb ’ s monetary policy summary of a speech by mr thomas jordan, member of the governing board of the swiss national bank, at the hochschule fur technik und wirtschaft, chur, 18 december 2007. the complete speech can be found in german on the swiss national bank ’ s website ( www. snb. ch ). * * * developments in the real estate market are important for monetary policy. real estate markets can influence inflation and economic cycles, but also the stability of the financial system. property bubbles can result in a massive misdirection of capital and thus give rise to lengthy and difficult adjustment processes. therefore, the snb closely monitors developments on the real estate markets both in switzerland and abroad. the economic outlook is still clouded by undesirable developments on the us real estate market, notably in the period 2004 - 2006. given the size of the united states and the broad international spread of investments in the us mortgage market, these distortions have had a serious impact on the world ’ s financial markets and on global economic development. for some years now, switzerland too has been experiencing a construction boom and a relatively sharp rise in property prices in certain regions and in given market segments. comparison of the swiss and us real estate markets shows, however, that these markets differ in a number of key respects. in particular, stricter discipline is observed in switzerland in terms of compliance with credit conditions, and price swings have been considerably less extreme. moreover, there is no evidence to date of any upsurge in speculative trends on the swiss property market. at present, neither a general property bubble nor any general mortgage problem could probably be said to exist. although the banks have largely drawn the correct conclusions from the real estate crisis of the 1990s with regard to lending in switzerland, it is still essential – given the losses on the us real estate market – to carefully assess risks when granting loans ( including mortgages ) in switzerland too.
typically, that means lowering our policy interest rate to stimulate demand when economic slack is putting downward pressure on inflation and raising that rate when we see excess demand emerging. but the shutdown is not typical. the most recent data indicate that inflation has declined sharply. but that is due less to overall economic slack than to some specific factors — especially the drop in prices of gasoline and travel services, as well as shifts in spending. these shifts mean that the standard consumer price index ( cpi ), based on the cost of a fixed basket of goods, is less meaningful. while many of these changes will reverse when businesses reopen, we expect to see some persistent price effects, which will differ across products and services. - 10 we will also likely see some further changes in consumption patterns. these will affect the true underlying price pressures throughout the crisis and recovery period. during that adjustment, official inflation measures might be less informative than usual about capacity pressures. at the bank, we are working to assess the impact that these shifts in spending patterns can have on measured inflation. during the shutdown, consumers have cut their spending on goods such as food away from home, airfare, clothing and gasoline and on services such as haircuts. on the flip side, the share of food purchased in stores and pharmaceutical products has risen sharply. overall, the results indicate that the decline in inflation experienced by consumers may be less than indicated by the official cpi measure. moreover, stimulating demand cannot do much to influence inflation as long as the stores, and indeed much of the economy, remain closed. in this setting, monetary policy needs to be even more forward looking than usual, seeing beyond the shutdown to its potential implications for the subsequent recovery. the loss of household wealth coupled with self - reinforcing weakness in business and consumer confidence could continue to weigh on aggregate demand after the restrictions are lifted. some businesses will fail, and workers will not regain their old jobs. supply chains, both in canada and globally, may be disrupted for some time. while the steps we have taken should help, we are likely to emerge from the shutdown with both demand and supply weaker than before. the scarring associated with the shutdown could lower productivity, which tends to result in higher inflation. but the bank ’ s analysis suggests that the decline in demand stemming in part from weaker business and consumer confidence is likely to have a larger effect. on balance, there is likely to be downward pressure on inflation. as restrictions are lifted, monetary

sekian, terima kasih.
is often quickly exported abroad. equally important, growth and stability abroad makes all our jobs at home easier. this illustrates the externalities in the work we all do, with more effective fulfillment of our domestic mandates helping to bring us collectively to a better place. thank you for your kind attention. bis central bankers ’ speeches

the potential timing and pace of tapering confused market participants. market participants seemed to conflate the prospective tapering of asset purchases with monetary policy tightening, and pulled forward their expectations about the likely timing of liftoff and raised their expected paths for policy rates. lately, we seem to have done better : the tapering down of the fed ’ s asset purchase program went smoothly and market participants now seem to share the assessment embodied in the fomc ’ s march summary of economic projections that lift - off is likely to begin sometime later this year. as you know, we ’ ve taken a number of steps in recent years to increase transparency and improve our communications. this includes regular press conferences by the fed chair following fomc meetings ; the publishing of growth, inflation and short - term rate forecasts of fomc participants ; and a concerted attempt to lay out the guideposts that the fomc will look at to assess progress toward our mandate. we also have explained in considerable detail what tools we will use and how we will likely use them to ensure to ensure a smooth lift - off. a second area we have focused on is doing a better job safeguarding financial stability. simply put, we failed to act both early enough and decisively enough to stem the credit excesses that spawned the financial crisis and the great recession. the u. s. was not alone in this shortcoming, but given our position in the global financial system, we especially should have done better. we ’ ve taken important steps through new legislative mandates and a broader effort to rethink our regulatory and supervisory framework. in particular, systemically important banking organizations must now hold amounts of capital and liquidity that are better aligned with their risk profiles. other changes have also been implemented, such as central clearing of standardized otc derivatives contracts, that should make the global financial system more resilient and robust. although this effort remains very much a work in progress, i think it will enable us to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past decade, and enable us to take a more proactive stance toward mitigating potential future vulnerabilities. of course, we at the fed are not alone here. since the recent financial crisis, central banks worldwide have been engaged in a broad rethinking of how to better fulfill their mandates. let me close with a final thought. the largest problems that countries create for others often emanate from getting policy wrong domestically. recession or instability at home