these partners, including the financial institutions, industry associations and trade unions. ii. their valuable perspectives will help to ensure that our workforce has the skillset to be relevant and responsive to the needs of the industry. 6 / 7 bis - central bankers'speeches c. i hope that the ibf will continue to strengthen this tripartite effort in building an agile, competitive and resilient workforce for the financial sector. together, as a tightly - knit tripartite community, we can ride on the new engines of growth to scale new heights, and further strengthen our position as a leading international financial sector in asia. with that, i wish ibf a happy golden jubilee, and everyone a wonderful evening ahead. 1 based on the 2024 global financial centre index. 2 residents refer to singapore citizens and permanent residents. 3 this refers to roles that are md - level and above. 4 " southeast asia enters its " digital decade " as the internet economy is expected to reach us $ 1 trillion in gross merchandise value by 2030 ", nov 2021 5 the future skills accelerator was co - developed by ibf and a pilot group of 15 fis back in 2022. it leverages ai technology to accelerate the workforce transformation process in an organisation. in particular, it automates the process of identifying skills needed for job roles, personalising training to close the skills gap, and facilitating job mobility within organisations. 7 / 7 bis - central bankers'speeches

the anchor currency ’ s monetary policy is leading to rising domestic macroeconomic imbalances. in the history of the global monetary system, this has been quite a usual event ( frankel 1999 ). it merely indicates that one monetary policy does not fit the size of all countries pegging to the anchor currency. by contrast, a decline in demand motivated by rising distrust in the stability of the respective anchor currency per se, in particular, its domestic stability, is a very different scenario. such a scenario could have profound implications for the international role of the respective anchor currency. however, i do not expect this scenario to materialise. indeed, changes in the dominant international currency have been very rare. the third and final reason why implications for the international role of the us dollar and the euro are likely to be limited is that, as in the past, a move towards more exchange rate flexibility is unlikely to signal that emerging markets will implement the textbook rules of a domestic nominal anchor and an independent float, as is the case in the united states and the euro area. emerging markets can be expected to move towards greater exchange rate flexibility if and when the monetary policy stance of advanced economies – for reasons that are either cyclical or structural in nature – becomes increasingly inconsistent with higher inflation rates in emerging countries. but, at the same time, emerging markets are likely to continue paying close attention to exchange rate fluctuations. this will hold, in particular, for fluctuations against the us dollar and the euro. against this backdrop, i would expect that, even if emerging markets adopt a more flexible exchange rate regime, changes in the use of the euro and the us dollar as international currencies will continue to be gradual. thank you very much. references abiad, a., leigh, d. and mody, a., ( 2007 ), international finance and income convergence : europe is different, imf working paper, no. 64, international monetary fund, washington. akin, c. and m. a. kose ( 2007 ), changing nature of north - south linkages : stylized facts and explanations, imf working paper 07 / 280, washington dc. barajas, a., l. erickson and r. steiner ( 2007 ), fear of declaring : do markets care what countries say about their exchange rate policies?, paper presented at the 8th jacques polak annual research conference, 15 - 16 november. bordo, m. and h. james ( 2006 ), one world money