of banks in the form of associations or foundations ( savings banks first and foremost ), which reached its peak during the nineteenth century. these institutions served to counter usury and to overcome the aversion of “ first - generation ” savers towards the banking system. the great banking crises of the thirties fortified the role of the public banks, which served to restore savers ’ confidence in the banking system and allowed an orderly flow of financing to the economy. the development of the italian economy and decades of financial stability safeguarded by an effective system of public supervision brought a considerable part of the population into contact with the banking system. the evolution of markets and their increasing openness brought the public banks ’ entrepreneurial features increasingly to the fore, with a corresponding de - emphasis of their original social functions. the reform of the public banks that parliament enacted at the beginning of the nineties in response to these tendencies sanctioned the passing of the public law model of banking ; the law separated the institutions ’ original social - welfare and charitable purposes from banking activity, assigning the former to the foundations and the latter to companies limited by shares the most compelling reason for the reform, at the urging of the supervisory authorities, was to allow the introduction of organizational and operational models able to ensure higher standards of competitiveness and efficiency. an important factor was the central role assigned to banks ’ capital by the supervisory system then being forged at community level ; the limited scope for italian public banks to raise funds directly in the equity market hindered their growth and ability to compete. the legislative solution adopted - the original institutions to remain in existence after transferring their banking activity to companies limited by shares - also sought to exploit the valuable social and civic function that most of the public credit institutions had historically performed. initially, the reform legislation was basically neutral concerning the practical options for the banking foundations ; it defined the spectrum of activities open to them, clearly drew the border between banks and foundations, and laid down what the latter could not do, namely manage banks. the remodeled foundations ’ sizable endowments fueled expectations that they might satisfy the growing financial needs of the voluntary and non - profit sector. the banking foundations, it was felt, could fill the gap left by the shrinking of the welfare state ; but in order to occupy a central position in the nonprofit sector, it was argued, they had to dispose of their equity interests in banks at once. however, realizing the full potential of the banking foundations requires that they cease being regarded as a pool of resources to

to impose steel and aluminium tariffs. equity market prices fell more markedly in countries with large current account surpluses. in germany and japan, for example, the major stock market indices were down by more than 4 % on the day after the announcement. the us decision on 22 march of further tariffs on chinese imports exacerbated market concerns, with the s & p 500 down by nearly 5 % on the day after the announcement. industrial sectors directly affected by the 3 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches tariffs were amongst the biggest losers. such movements appear more pronounced than would be consistent with the direct economic effects of the measures announced to date. they seem to anticipate the effects of retaliatory measures and price in some chance that the scenario i described earlier may occur. and by fuelling uncertainty among market participants, fears of a “ trade war ” have added to the volatility already witnessed earlier this year in equity markets. none of this supports growth and employment. longer - term influences besides short - term cyclical factors arising from a potential transition to a more protectionist regime, there are likely to be longer - term effects on the economy too. trade openness supports growth in productivity and hence the long - run potential output of our economies. competition from trade, and the benefits offered by larger markets, can encourage a more efficient allocation of labour and capital across sectors and across firms. this improved allocation supports innovation and hence productivity. this is why the eu single market is at the heart of the european integration process. these effects are also borne out by the data. according to one estimate, eu gdp per capita would be as much as a fifth lower in the absence of the integration since 1950. 7 see badinger, h. ( 2005 ), “ growth effects of economic integration : evidence from the eu member states ”, review of world economics, 141 ( 1 ) : 50 – 78. this is supported at the microeconomic level as well. data collected by the competitiveness research network confirms that european firms that export are more productive and pay higher wages than non - exporting firms in the same sector. moreover, this is not simply because exporting firms are more productive in the first place, but also because firms become more productive through exporting. firms in their first year of exporting post greater productivity gains than similar businesses that do not export. 8 see ecb ( 2017 ), “ firm heterogeneity and competitiveness in the european union ”, economic bulletin