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are my own. at the same time, i would like to thank david vestin for his help in writing this speech and petra frid for her help with the diagrams. i would also like to thank mattias erlandsson, jesper hansson, pernilla meyersson, ulf soderstrom, anders vredin, frida fallan, charlotta edler, ann - leena mikiver, cecilia roos - isaksson and marianne sterner for their valuable comments on the speech and elizabeth nilsson, calum mcdonald and gary watson for their assistance translating it into english. sweden have, in recent years, seen a development towards a higher share of market financing for swedish companies. as things look now, there is considerable probability that global interest rates will remain low over a long period of time, and then monetary policy will have to find other ways of working to attain the inflation target than those we are used to, and many of the measures will have consequences for the balance sheet. we need to endeavour to attain a better analysis of how measures that have an effect through the balance sheet affect the economy and become as clear and systematic when we talk about these as we have tried to be with regard to steering interest rates. i intend to begin with a historical retrospective – focusing on the past 30 years – and to describe how monetary policy has developed over time. then i will move on to the challenges that monetary policy has faced and that have led to the use of new tools. this takes me to the international discussions about the monetary policy toolbox, and, in conclusion, i would like to discuss what opportunities and limitations the riksbank inquiry ’ s proposed new act entails. the development of monetary policy – a retrospective ever since central banks in the modern sense were created, their objective has been clear : to provide the economy with a payment system and with a means of payment and to ensure that the value of these funds remains stable over time. central banks have been able to conduct monetary policy to attain their objectives – price stability and a smoothly functioning payment system – by varying the volume of the means of payment or adjusting terms and conditions in their payment systems. the central banks provide liquidity that enables us to make payments smoothly. gold standard and redeemable money create credibility during the second half of the 19th century, the gold standard was introduced. the meant that the value of a banknote, the means of payment at the time, was directly linked to something