to create a predictable framework for resolving banks that fail in the future. the brrd provides a toolkit for resolving banks, such as the bailing in of unsecured liabilities in lieu of the bailing out of the banks by taxpayers. the central bank has been designated as the national resolution authority and is already working with the banks to develop resolution plans in line with the brrd requirements. for larger eurozone banks, including our own, resolution decisions will be made from january next year by the single resolution board in brussels. it will avail of the new prefunded resolution funds in the eurozone, which are to be gradually mutualised. let me now turn to the transformation of the supervision of eurozone banks from 2014. as i mentioned earlier, in 2012, eu heads of states and governments agreed to transfer the responsibility for supervising banks to the european level with the establishment of the ssm. eurozone banks have come under the supervision of the ecb since november 4, 2014. the ecb directly supervises the largest european banks, including bank of ireland, aib, permanent tsb and ulster bank, with our assistance and that of other national supervisors. we supervise the smaller banks under the oversight of the ecb. the revamped banking supervisory framework put in place at the central bank by matthew elderfield has mostly been superseded by the ssm. our domestic supervisory engagement cycle, approval procedures, and internal supervisory guidance, enshrined in prism, were effective from 2011 to october 2014 ; they have now been replaced by the prescriptions of the ssm supervisory manual, which are guided by a similar, if not more, tough, intrusive and sceptical ethos. daily supervision of the larger banks is conducted by joint supervisory teams, mostly made of central bank staff, but always headed by an ecb coordinator based in frankfurt. these coordinators propose draft decisions drawn in consultation with us to the supervisory board of the ecb, where i sit. when approved, these draft decisions are submitted to the governing council and finally signed by the president of the ecb. in the central bank, banking supervision was reorganised and further strengthened in the course of 2014. approved headcount in banking supervision was brought up to 140, and actual headcount has increased to 124. we have thus reduced, albeit partially, the numerical gap with eurozone standards. instead of two generalist divisions, we now have three : one is dedicated to ongoing

that are a central feature of full - blown financial crises can only be properly understood if more is done to measure the inter - connections across different financial entities and different sectors of the financial system. for instance, there has been a significant improvement in the monitoring of shadow banking at european and global levels, as captured by the reports published by the esrb and fsb. at the same time, the matrix of who - to - whom linkages remains sparsely populated, both across sectors and across borders. an improved statistical understanding of inter - connectedness would be very helpful for financial stability policymakers. 1 see stefan avdjiev, mary everett, philip r. lane and hyun song shin ( 2018 ), “ tracking the international footprints of global firms, ” bis quarterly review ( march ), 47 – 66. 2 more generally, the granular, detailed data collected by anacredit has transformative potential for a wide range of financial stability topics. 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches