consumer of accounting services over the compulsions and convenience of the provider of these services. at a fundamental level, this marks a substantial change that has been brought about in the recent times in the governance of the auditing profession. in fact, the move in the 1980s towards ethical behaviour got gradually subsumed under the expanded notion of corporate governance, renewed discussions on which emanated from the cadbury report of 1992. over time, the voluntary nature of self regulation and corporate governance has metamorphosed into an overlay of additional layer of rules and compliances such as the sarbanes - oxley act. essentially, this is premised on two pillars : ( a ) the mechanism by which corporations are directed and controlled ; and ( b ) the mechanism by which those who direct and control a corporation are supervised. in matters relating to corporate governance, secretarial practices play a critical role. in india secretarial practices have evolved over a period of time in differing business environments and have had different usages. the need to harmonise and consolidate the diverse secretarial practices in use in india, has given rise to the quest for standards and codes in this area too. towards this end, the institute of company secretaries of india ( icsi ) has constituted a secretarial standards board ( ssb ) with the objective to formulate secretarial standards based on applicable laws, business environment and best secretarial practices. the establishment of this board represents a significant step towards harmonization, integration and standardisation of diverse secretarial practices prevalent in the corporate sector. these standards lay down the principles ’ which companies are expected to adopt and adhere to in discharging their corporate responsibility. it is heartening to note that this has been a collaborative endeavour with consultations across the sector. it is thus that the ssb comprises eminent members of the profession and is represented by the regulatory authorities such as the department of company affairs, the securities and exchange board of india and your institute ’ s sister professional bodies such as the institute of chartered accountants of india and the institute of cost and works accountants of india. we trust that the guidance notes developed by ssb and the clarifications given by it on issues arising out of the standards will contribute to better corporate governance. we as regulators at the reserve bank, too, have sought to catalyse conditions for good corporate governance. we have been at pains to emphasise that compliance with regulatory requirements is the minimum requirement of good

, the burden for taxpayers could be lightened by requiring that public funds be recouped from the banking system at a later stage, when financial stability is no longer at risk – as envisaged by the ‘ key attributes of effective resolution regimes for financial institutions ’, drawn up by the financial stability board. 6 to conclude, while much has been done to reduce risks, we lag behind on risk - sharing measures, which are their natural complement. even for those already in place, such as the single resolution fund, the path to complete risk mutualization is very long. what are the costs of this unfinished construction? an incomplete banking union is a source of risk in itself. if neglected for too long, it will discourage banks ’ reorganizations and consolidation processes as the cost of funding and capital remain subject to excessive uncertainty, with likely undesirable effects on banks ’ ability to support both investment and consumer spending. in this transitional phase, when banks are still building up adequate loss - absorbing buffers and governments are without their traditional tools of intervention, the risks are even greater. 5 avgouleas e., c. goodhart, 2016, ‘ an anatomy of bank bail - ins – why the eurozone needs a fiscal backstop for the banking sector ’, european economy, 2016. 2., 5 december. 6 financial stability board, 2011, ‘ key attributes of effective resolution regimes for financial institutions ’, principle 6. 5. we should also remember that completing the banking union is a priority per se, and should not be conditional on other interventions. i refer, in particular, to the much debated possible change of prudential treatment for sovereign exposures, which is among the measures called for in order to move forward with the creation of the edis. a draft report presented to the committee on economic and monetary affairs of the european parliaments ( econ ) 7 makes the entry into force of the insurance phase of edis conditional on reducing risks in the banking sector. in this regard, while recognising that changing the prudential treatment for sovereign exposures could help to break the bank - sovereign nexus, i believe that it should not be considered as a pre - condition for, or an alternative to, the completion of banking union. a clear timeline for deposit insurance, as we had for the single supervisory mechanism and the single resolution mechanism, would help reassure markets as to the soundness of the overall banking framework and the willingness of member states to pursue