small traditional banks, equal to 72 per cent on average, is higher than that of both the large significant groups ( 66 per cent ) and of the specialized intermediaries ( 64 per cent ). for all intermediaries, the process of restructuring and adapting to the new economic, regulatory and market landscapes, as well as to technological advances, must proceed with determination. stronger balance sheets and greater efficiency can be achieved if the industry is reshaped in various ways, in terms of size, ownership structures and business models. as i have often pointed out, initiatives to expand the scale of operations of small banks such as mergers or greater integration of business areas across banks can prove beneficial to the extent that they reduce cost ratios, increase and diversify earnings, and enhance banks ’ ability to compete on the market. the reform of the mutual banks ( bccs ) was designed to achieve the necessary efficiency gains and economies of scale to meet the challenges associated with the transformation of the banking sector, whilst preserving these banks ’ original mutualistic spirit. the establishment of two new mutual banking groups brings the number of groups now operating in italy to 54, comprising 310 banks, while there are 100 stand - alone banks. at the end of 2008, there were 81 groups and 499 stand - alone banks. the two new groups, which this year will be subject to the ecb ’ s comprehensive assessment, must take swift action to cut costs and rationalize their distribution network by tackling the cases of individual bccs in difficulty. the financial conditions of the mutual banking groups, their operating model, organizational arrangements and governance must ensure their long - term sustainability. the single supervisory mechanism does not expect these banks to achieve the same profitability as the other intermediaries, but it must be sufficient to maintain adequate capital levels, which are indispensable to continue carrying out their work of funding the economy effectively. households ’ financial assets amount to around €4. 4 trillion, two and a half times gdp, a considerable sum by comparison with the countries of mainland europe, though still below that recorded in the united kingdom and the united states. around one third of household wealth is held in cash and deposits, one third in managed assets, and one third is invested directly in shares and bonds, both public and private, and in other assets. the share of cash and deposits, which had declined to 23 per cent in 2000, has gradually increased, reflecting the fall in market rates and the uncertain economic outlook. in the

the press is not aware of successful interventions ; most of the interventions are successful, but not all of them can be. recourse to special administration – the most intrusive of supervisory interventions – occurs as soon as the seriousness of the situation so requires. nowadays this is an ‘ early intervention ’ measure : unlike in the past, when searching for possible solutions was an essential part of the special administrators ’ work, this measure can only be taken when there is a prospect of recovery ; otherwise liquidation is inevitable. this is a very fine line, and we are extremely careful as to how we tread it. experience shows that in most cases, special administration is an effective instrument that can help relaunch an intermediary or avoid traumatic solutions for crises. since 2007, around 80 intermediaries have been placed under special administration, more than half of which have subsequently returned to business as usual. when liquidation has been necessary, the support for purchase and assumption transactions provided by deposit guarantee schemes has made an orderly exit from the market possible, usually with no losses for current account holders and savers. preventive interventions by deposit guarantee funds to avoid the emergence of crises have also been and continue to be an important tool for preserving stability. european legislation explicitly provides for this type of intervention and also establishes a wide range of safeguards to avoid using resources that are compulsorily earmarked for covered deposits ( up to the european ceiling of €100, 000 ), which would breach state aid rules. the private nature of italian funds is a further guarantee of a thorough and prudent assessment in compliance with the least - cost test, according to which interventions other than reimbursing deposits can only be implemented if the cost is lower for the funds than it would be in the event of liquidation. in most cases, preventive intervention has made it possible to manage difficult situations successfully. we have underscored on more than one occasion that the european framework for bank crisis management needs to be equipped with procedures that allow an orderly exit from the market of intermediaries for which the activation of a resolution is not justified by public interest. the specific reference here is to the orderly liquidation adopted by the us federal deposit insurance corporation ( fdic ), which has dealt with the crises of over 500 intermediaries since 2008, thereby averting risks to the overall stability of the banking system. we regularly give an account in our reports of our supervisory work and of the measures we adopt in this sphere,