samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
##uance activities. thank you.

for 13 % of the issue and is guaranteed by the hkmc. class a has been assigned a triple - a rating by both moody's and s & p's. the award of this top rating to class a reflects the good credit quality of the underlying mortgage pool and the credit enhancement through subordination provided by class b, which absorbs the first loss in the mortgage pool. the low level of subordination at 13 % reflects the high quality of the collateral, the innovative structuring of the issue and market's confidence in the hkmc's ability to manage the credit risk of the mortgage portfolio. while there have been other un - guaranteed mbs transactions in hong kong, today's issue sponsored by the hkmc is the largest un - guaranteed hong kong dollar mbs in hong kong. moreover, it is the first - ever un - guaranteed hong kong dollar mbs that carries a triple - a rating. i believe that the hkmc's introduction of triple - a - rated mbs through credit tranching will become a benchmark for other mbs issuers in hong kong. with today's mbs issue, the hkmc now accounts for about a quarter of the total securitisation transactions in hong kong in the past ten years and is the largest issuer of asset - backed securities in hong kong. for the future, the corporation has plans to expand the scope of its business to cover non - mortgage assets and selected overseas markets a€ “ as always, in a prudent commercial manner. these new business initiatives will help to further broaden the local debt market, and strengthen hong kong's role as an international financial centre and funding hub in the region. we are grateful for the enthusiastic response of the banks joining the management group for this issue and find it very encouraging. we are also very pleased to learn that a diverse group of investors including retirement funds, insurance companies, banks and other institutional investors have shown a keen interest in the issue. let me conclude by thanking hsbc, the sole arranger and lead manager, for their highly professional work to make this issue a great success. i would also like to thank the co - lead managers, dz bank ag, hong kong branch, icbc ( asia ) and bmo capital markets corp and co - managers, anz investment bank and commonwealth bank of australia, for managing and distributing the issue. i look forward to your continuing support of our corporation and its debt iss
a host of factors behind involving legal and governance issues, and political risks. but whatsoever the reasons, it is a gap that can only be filled by bringing together capital and know - how from the public and private sectors. indeed, the g20 has recently highlighted the importance of infrastructure investment as a growth driver, but many challenges remain in overcoming the obstacles to identifying “ bankable ” projects. 9. in the face of immense uncertainties and challenges ahead of us, imf ’ s assessment of the prospects and risks, as well as advice on policy response for the region at this juncture is particularly important. we look forward to the presentation by imf and the dialogue during the panel discussions. 10. thank you. bis central bankers ’ speeches

2016 annual report, at 28, march 24, 2016. from banks and other data sources and then offer their own suite of open apis to outside developers. by partnering with data aggregators, banks can open their systems to thousands of developers, without having to invest in creating and maintaining their own open apis. this also allows fintech developers to build their products around the apis of two or three data aggregators, rather than 15, 000 different banks and other data sources. and, if agreements between data aggregators and banks are structured as data aggregators performing outsourced services to banks, the bank should be able to conduct the appropriate due diligence of its vendors, whose services to those banks may be subject to examination by safety and soundness regulators. 18 some banks have opted for a more “ closed ” approach to fintech developers by entering into individual agreements with specific technology providers or data aggregators. 19 these agreements often impose specific requirements rather than simply facilitating structured data feeds. these banks negotiate for greater control over their systems by limiting who is accessing their data - - often to a specific third party ’ s suite of products. likewise, many banks use these agreements to limit what types of data will be shared. for instance, banks may share information see, e. g., 12 usc § § 1861 - 67 ; division of banking supervision and regulation and division of consumer and community affairs federal reserve system, guidance on managing outsourcing risk, www. federalreserve. gov / bankinforeg / srletters / sr1319a1. pdf, december 5, 2013 ; steven boms, “ yodlee response to consumer financial protection bureau request for information regarding consumer access to financial records, ” docket no. cfpb 2016 - 0048, february 21, 2017, www. regulations. gov / document? d = cfpb - 2016 - 0048 - 0033. ( “ yodlee... has complied with hundreds of bank audits and with examinations by the office of the comptroller of the currency throughout its history. ” ) see, e. g., “ finicity and wells fargo ink data exchange deal, ” press release, april 4, 2017, www. finicity. com / press - release - finicity - wells - fargo - ink - data - exchange - deal / ; wells fargo & co., “ intuit signs new data - exchange agreement with wells fargo
economies, there is a system of disclosing the donations made to political parties, expenses incurred on bureaucracy / regulators / policy makers etc. i wish to raise a debate here on why we should not have similar disclosure norms and transparent practices by our corporates. in the meantime, there is a need for a strong internal control framework for such expenses, which should necessarily be monitored by the organization ’ s vigilance mechanism. 25. i would also urge the community of vigilance officers not to go overboard and remain circumspect while dealing with corruption cases. one has to be able to draw a distinction between a “ tip ” and a “ graft ”. it would, perhaps, be in order for the organisations to prepare a code of ethics which should clearly outline the expectations from the employees while dealing with the various stakeholders. improving effectiveness of vigilance function 26. this brings us to the basic question of how to make the vigilance function more effective without creating any fear in the mind of employees. in my view, institutions should lay more emphasis on the preventive vigilance aspect so that the problem may be addressed in the initial stages itself. organizations can benefit by inculcating a sense of honesty and responsibility among its employees. ownership of the vigilance function should not rest merely with the few officials manning the vigilance department, it should traverse across the length and breadth of the organization. 27. in this context, it will be appropriate to quote renowned poet alexander pope who said “ an honest man is the noblest work of god. so my friends, there is no substitute to honesty. honesty is not a concept or a word. it is a way of life. honesty pays in life. dishonest people may prosper at times but in the end, it is the honest man who wins. honesty needs no excuses. honesty leads to mental peace. it answers your conscience. an honest man needs no vigilance. it is meant for people who are black sheep in any organization. so, let us all pledge to be honest in life, not only in our public dealings as public servants but as human beings to fellow human beings on the earth. one must have a value system and must stick to that on all costs ”. 28. the second aspect in my opinion would be a clear and transparently professed intolerance for misconduct, by both insiders and outsiders. while well laid down vigilance policy can address the internal

60 ( series 14 ) itraxx main europe 5 yr 23. 04 * 206. 55 88. 00 ( apr 8, 2011 series 14 ) 186. 00 ( series 14 ) wti 61. 47 145. 29 ( on july 3, 08 ) 72. 66 ( sep 22, 2010 ) 88. 91 us treasury 10 yr 5. 29 2. 05 3. 74 ( feb 8, 2011 ) 1. 98 dow jones ( april 29, 2011 ) implied value of dow jones ( feb 8, 2011 ) dxy 80. 08 88. 19 72. 93 ( apr 29, 2011 ) 76. 83 since last one year as on sep 14, * data pertains to may 1, 2007. the data for the entire period ( april 1, 2007 to 1st week of aug, 2007 ) is not available. bis central bankers ’ speeches
##ity would be far worse. the country would no longer benefit from the solidarity of the euro area, which has given it the time to make the necessary adjustments. bis central bankers ’ speeches

existed on march 14, risk premia have narrowed, foreign exchange markets are somewhat more stable, energy and commodity prices are lower, perceptions of risk in the financial system have diminished, and the flight to quality is less pronounced. nevertheless, liquidity conditions in markets are still substantially impaired and the process of de - leveraging remains underway. and this will amplify the headwinds facing the u. s. and global economy. in this context, policymakers and financial market participants need to continue to act forcefully. and their actions need to be proportionate to the challenges. financial institutions need to continue to improve the quality of disclosure, and even the strongest institutions face compelling incentives to raise new equity capital so that they can take advantage of the opportunities ahead. actions to strengthen the capacity of the major government sponsored enterprises, the federal housing finance board and the federal housing administration to provide finance to the mortgage market and help reduce the risk of avoidable foreclosures are a very important complement to the broader policy actions already in place to contain the downside risks to the economy. the federal reserve, working closely with other major central banks, will continue to provide liquidity to markets to help facilitate the process of financial repair. looking forward, we face as a nation a number of very important policy questions. this financial crisis, as all past crises, has highlighted vulnerabilities that require action. no economy is stronger than its financial system, and as we continue to focus on the immediate challenges of financial repair and supporting economic growth, we need to begin the process of building consensus on a comprehensive set of change to our regulatory framework. in addition to a stronger set of protections for consumers, the overwhelming imperative of reform must be to put in place a stronger framework for financial stability. our objective should be a system that preserves the unique strengths of our financial markets in providing individuals and entrepreneurs access to capital and credit, but with a greater capacity to withstand stress. this will require significant changes to regulatory policy and the supervisory framework. and the focus has to be on changing the incentives that all financial market participants face in managing the risk in exposure to adverse outcomes. in my view, there are a set of important objectives and principles that should guide this effort. • we need to ensure there is a stronger set of shock absorbers, in terms of capital and liquidity, in those institutions, banks and a limited number of the largest investment banks, that are critical to market functioning and economic health, with a stronger
adopted the framework in 1993 at a time where it was felt that the local jurisdiction should align itself to international standards of banking supervision. our banks have since then maintained capital adequacy ratios higher than the 10 per cent minimum required. over the years, the international banking sector has evolved, so has our local banking industry. it was observed at the presentations made by banks on their progress towards the implementation of basel ii that advances have been made in risk management, information systems, and banks ’ internal processes. our banking industry is on track. with its three pillars, basel ii provides a rigorous framework that ties the amount of capital that banks require to maintain with their specific risks, thus establishing an enterprise - wide risk management framework. pillar i provides a range of approaches to calculate the capital charges for credit, market and operational risk. pillar 2 requires banks to develop an internal capital adequacy assessment process ( icaap ) that set capital targets that are commensurate with the banks ’ risk profile and control environment. pillar 3, market discipline, complements the minimum capital requirement and the supervisory review process. it aims at encouraging banks to disclose to market participants essential information. in other words banks are also monitored by the markets. state of readiness of our banks the presentations organized by the bank of mauritius turned out to be very fruitful exercise. i wish to thank the banks for their participation in this exercise. i have to mention here my regrets for not being able to attend the presentations made by the banks during the last two weeks. nonetheless i have been duly briefed by my staff of the basel unit who were present, on progress made by individual banks with respect to the implementation of basel ii. a number of issues were raised that would need to be taken up at the level of the main committee and working groups. some of them would be addressed today in the presentation to be made by the basel unit in the course of this special banking committee meeting. it came out during the presentations that banks are striving to build up their capabilities to move to the new framework. we noted the contrast in approach between the international banks and the local banks. the former are getting full support from their head office while some local banks are having recourse to the service of consultants to upgrade their systems. overall most banks, with the exception of one or two banks, will be able to meet the march 2008 target for the parallel run. it was also felt that individual banks had a number of issues specific

have to be matched by better risk management systems. a policy decision for a reduction would have to be taken in consultation with the banking industry in the light of the icaap assessment. the new framework provides an incentive for better risk management. banks should seize this opportunity. i now leave the floor to the mr chinniah, assistant director supervision for a presentation.
central bankers'speeches

there yet. hence, our discussion today on transition plans focused on climate. and transition plans are crucial in getting from lofty targets to credible implementation. in that way, they are somewhat similar to ndcs : nationally determined contributions. an ndc is a government's way to outline concrete measures to meet its stated climate policy objectives – and a transition plan is a company's way to outline its measures to meet its climate goals. in some ways, they face similar problems : what should such a plan entail? how detailed should it be? what objectives should it serve? and who reviews it and judges its appropriateness? 2 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches we could provide regulatory or market - based incentives for companies to follow through. one could hope for the market to do that, trusting financial institutions to only finance those companies that are on a path that is in line with their stated climate goals. or one could imagine a world in which regulatory and supervisory pressure aims to ensure that a transition plan is followed by action. the outcome will probably be somewhere in the middle. whatever the outcome may be, the ngfs is leading ground - breaking work on this issue and we will make an important contribution to finding that landing zone. 6 conclusion ladies and gentlemen, let me conclude. our discussions today showed that we still have a long journey ahead of us. yet they also demonstrated, how far we have already come and that our network is able to navigate through uncharted territory. and all of you also left no doubt : no matter the length of the journey, we have more than enough left in our tank. i said at the beginning, that all of the input we received today may have seemed impressive, but also a bit overwhelming. but most importantly, i hope that you leave here today inspired and motivated. we have heard and discussed many ideas, let us now return home and put them into action – and let us continue to collaborate and to share the experience we gather in our network. but before i let you go, please give a big round of applause to the team behind the scenes. dear ravi, you and your team not only had the idea for this workshop, you also executed the plan to perfection. a big thanks to you and your team – and, of course, to jean and the secretariat, who gave invaluable support. thank you very much! 3 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches
stayed ( see graph 3 ). the governments of the region reached the conclusion that they “ had to make their economies more resilient to international capital flows. the simplest way of doing this was to cut expenditure ( particularly investment expenditure ), keep savings high, run current account surpluses and build up international reserves ”. 4 macfarlane ( 2005 ). 5 / 10 in china's case, the story is more complicated. 5 it did not suffer in the asian crisis, but it still absorbed the same lesson as the countries that did. that is one of the reasons that china has chosen to run current account surpluses and build international reserves. but a more over - riding reason is the awareness by its government that, as a result of its economic liberalisation, it has to create about 20 million jobs per year just to absorb the exodus of workers from the countryside. in other words, it has to run its economy at an exceptionally fast pace, and is reluctant to adopt policies which might run counter to this aim in the short run, even if they would contribute to maintaining longer - run sustainability. see dooley, folkerts - landau and garber ( 2003 and 2005 ) for an interesting account of the asian approach to balance of payments adjustment. 6 / 10 i think historians will regard the economic liberalisation of china as the major economic event of the past 30 years, with its effects showing up in countries and economic variables that at first sight seem remote from it. to date, the size of the chinese surpluses have been smaller than for japan and other east asia, but china's influence in other ways has been greater. all asian countries are acutely aware of their level of competitiveness vis - a - vis china, both in international trade and investment, and this is an additional reason why they have resisted appreciations of their own currencies. the rapid increase in chinese manufactured output and exports, based on its exceptionally low labour costs, has affected its competitors in asia as much as its customers such as the united states. ( iii ) low central bank interest rates the high supply of asian savings is not the explanation for the sharp fall in central - bank - determined interest rates in 2001 and 2002. that fall was a response by central banks in the developed countries to the collapse of the global equity market boom and associated recession that occurred in most of their countries. but the interesting question is why did those interest rates go so low ; for the united states, japan and the euro

in what continues to be a fascinating journey. for example, see : lowe p ( 2014 ) “ australia ’ s rmb policies and future direction ”, introductory remarks at the rmb internationalisation roundtable, sydney, 23 july ; and lowe p ( 2014 ) “ some implications of the internationalisation of the renminbi ”, opening remarks to the centre for international finance and regulation conference on the internationalisation of the renminbi, sydney, 26 march. bis central bankers ’ speeches
. thereafter, a discussion will follow. you will understand that under present circumstances and high market volatility, the speakers would like to focus on questions directly related to the subject of tonight ’ s conference. i beg for understanding that we decline to comment the most recent market or policy developments. let ’ s welcome professor rogoff.

crisis, inflation in switzerland remained subdued due to low oil prices and strong appreciation of the chf 08. 11. 2018 ten years after the crisis : evolving markets and the challenges for the snb | andrea m. maechler and thomas moser | © swiss national bank the snb monitors the microstructure of the market in real time using high - frequency data eurchf exchange rate and order book on 8 february 2018 high high tick time 08. 11. 2018 ten years after the crisis : evolving markets and the challenges for the snb | andrea m. maechler and thomas moser | © swiss national bank source : snb. low 1. 160 1. 158 1. 158 1. 156 1. 156 1. 154 1. 154 1. 150 1. 148 1. 152 1. 150 1. 148 1. 146 1. 144 1. 144 12 : 00 15 : 00 18 : 00 1. 142 09 : 00 12 : 00 15 : 00 eurchf ( rhs ) 8 february 2018 : turnover ( left chart ) ; bid - ask spread ( right chart ) since february 2017 : turnover ( left chart ) ; bid - ask spread ( right chart ) 08. 11. 2018 ten years after the crisis : evolving markets and the challenges for the snb | andrea m. maechler and thomas moser | © swiss national bank 18 : 00 source : snb. low low 1. 146 1. 142 09 : 00 eurchf 1. 152 turnover high 1. 160 bid - ask spread high unusually high trading activity for the eurchf pair between 17 : 00 and 17 : 30, but robust liquidity conditions sources : bloomberg, jp morgan, snb. since the beginning of the year, various risk - off phases have led to an appreciation of the chf 08. 11. 2018 ten years after the crisis : evolving markets and the challenges for the snb | andrea m. maechler and thomas moser | © swiss national bank sources : bloomberg, snb. options market reflects the fragility on the foreign exchange market 08. 11. 2018 ten years after the crisis : evolving markets and the challenges for the snb | andrea m. maechler and thomas moser | © swiss national bank sources : sic, ssx, snb. unsecured transactions have practically disappeared in favour of secured transactions 08. 11. 2018 ten years after the crisis : evolving markets and the challenges for the s
me state very clearly that the euro area is not a closed club. it is open to any eu member state that fulfils the convergence criteria on a sustainable basis. iv. conclusion the baltic experience demonstrates that euro membership is not just about economics. the economics alone make only for a partial analysis of the failure or success of an adjustment bis central bankers ’ speeches programme. the political motivations – such as the determination to join the euro area or to safeguard the political capital invested in emu – have often been underestimated by markets during the crisis. i firmly believe that both economic and political arguments will ultimately also prevail in countries currently in the middle of an adjustment process that is similarly painful to latvia ’ s experience. thank you very much for your attention. bis central bankers ’ speeches

m. ( 1968 ), “ the role of the monetary policy ”, american economic review, vol. 58 ( 1 ), pages 1 - 17. gaspar, v., perez - quiros, g. and sicilia, j. ( 2001 ) : “ the ecb monetary policy strategy and the money market ”, international journal of finance and economics 6 ( 4 ), pages 325 - 342. goodfriend, m ( 1991 ) : “ interest rates and the conduct of monetary policy ”, carnegierochester conference series on public policy. gurkaynak, r., sack, b. and swanson, t. ( 2005 ) : “ do actions speak louder than words? the response of asset prices to monetary policy actions and statements ”, international journal of central banking 1 ( 1 ), pages 55 - 93. lindholdt, p. and wetherilt, a. ( 2004 ) “ anticipation of monetary policy in uk financial markets ”, bank of england working paper 241.