bracket, the proportion of italian senior high school graduates rose to 70 per cent, against an oecd average of 81 per cent. the proportion of children completing junior high school studies has also been rising, gaining more than 10 points in recent years to over 80 per cent. for university education, however, the gap is certainly worrying. here, italy seems hard put to keep up with the other advanced countries : again in 2009, the proportion of graduates in the 25 – 64 age group was less than 15 per cent, or just half the oecd average ; amongst people aged between 25 and 34 years, it exceeded 20 per cent, compared to an oecd average of around 37 per cent. over the past twenty years, direct testing of reading comprehension, logical and mathematical skills, and the ability to combine pieces of information to solve problems of varying complexity, reveals a similarly worrying picture. at the end of primary school italian students are at least as skilled as in the other developed countries, but in the later stages of formal education they fall behind. for 15 - year - olds, the gap found by the pisa survey carried out by the oecd in 2006 corresponded to around one school year ; and although this diminished between 2006 and 2009, it remained significant. the gap reflects severe disparities between different parts of italy, with the scores in the north slightly above the oecd average and those in the south dramatically lower. these disparities are subject to various interpretations involving their geographical distribution or the discrepancies between different schools rather than within any individual school. yet the fact remains that a country like ours, poor in material resources and now lagging on various fronts, should invest in “ knowledge ”, not “ below ” or “ around ” but above the average of other countries with more natural resources. such deficits are also observed in respect of the skills of the adult population. the international adult literacy and lifeskills survey ( all ) conducted in 2003 to gauge functional literacy and numeracy together with analytical and problem - solving abilities shows that about 80 per cent of italians aged between 16 and 65 are unable to apply linear reasoning and draw inferences of average complexity by extracting and combining information provided in written texts that are little more than basic. they are, that is to say, functionally illiterate : they lack adequate reading comprehension, logical and analytical skills to respond to the demands of modern life and work. this is the highest percentage in any of the

already expected to settle at a considerably lower level, falling to around 3. 5 per cent, before returning to around 2 per cent in 2024. these projections are subject to a high degree of uncertainty, as the most recent developments also suggest. indeed, in the last two quarters, the forecasting errors made by the ecb and by the eurosystem ’ s staff were much higher than in the past. our analyses indicate that the direct effects of the forecasting errors relating to energy prices – which are the main exogenous variables, whose changes are inferred from the prices of futures contracts – explain over 60 per cent of the overall error made in forecasting inflation ; the share rises to 80 per cent when indirect effects are also taken into account ( e. g. those on sectors such as transport ). these results confirm the validity of the models used, though they draw our attention to the quality of the forecasts employed as inputs, which include, among others, in addition to energy prices, developments in world trade. there has undoubtedly been a general underestimation of the effects that the excess demand in the united states, particularly in the durable consumer goods sector, would have on the rest of the world via energy prices and, together with the impact of the measures adopted to counter the pandemic, via supply chain bottlenecks. even more significant, however, has been the underestimation of the geopolitical tensions, with the sharp drops in gas supplies from russia – observed as early as the beginning of last year – attributed first ( and probably mistakenly ) to the cold winter in that country and then to pressures by the russian government in connection with the nord stream 2 pipeline. but the most important factor has, of course, been the outbreak of the war : while the prices of futures had continued to predict descending oil and gas prices up to the end of last year, the conflict has left not only current but also expected prices at very high levels. the repercussions of rising energy prices for inflation, which were therefore to be considered as temporary owing to the widespread expectations of base effects soon turning negative, instead became more persistent. the risks of a de - anchoring of inflation expectations and of a price - wage spiral the worsening of the terms of trade and the loss of purchasing power caused by rising energy prices will tend to hold down final demand in the euro area, moderating the pressure on prices. however, the risk that long - term