##b has been given supervisory responsibilities, to ensure, besides price stability, also proper conditions of financial stability in the euro area. we must work continuously to build up a resilient, robust and efficient financial system that is essential for the long - term prosperity of our monetary union. in this work cooperation between the eurosystem, the ssm and national central banks and supervisors is essential. thank you for your attention. bis central bankers ’ speeches

stability. there are benefits in maintaining a high level of integration with the united kingdom after brexit, and indeed, trade openness is in the dna of the eu. but brexit also entails making important policy choices regarding how open the eu ’ s financial markets need to be, and what measures need to be in place to ensure financial stability, protect eu consumers and investors and safeguard the single market. while not confirmed, current discussions indicate that the way in which we will interact with the united kingdom in the area of financial services will be based on the eu ’ s existing equivalence regime, with some expected enhancement. the aim would be to ensure sufficient regulatory and supervisory cooperation, information exchange and mechanisms to minimise unwarranted disruption in the functioning of markets linked to a potential loss of market access. this will of course be vital for the uk - eu situation after brexit, but also provides an opportunity for our relations with other key non - eu countries. however, a key principle underpinning third - country regimes needs to be maintained : we should avoid a situation in which non - eu firms are able to operate across the single market on the basis of a different rulebook and without a proper institutional framework. we cannot permit opportunities for regulatory arbitrage and let risks build up in the financial system. it is also crucial that brexit does not lead to a race to the bottom in regulatory and supervisory standards, and that the efforts that have been made to strengthen the financial architecture of the eu following the crisis do not unravel. the framework thus needs to provide sufficient safeguards for maintaining financial stability. and, as risks differ across financial services, this in turn implies that different financial services may need to be regulated by different third - country models. in the short term, a number of proposals should be adopted. first, on the review of the prudential framework for banks ( the capital requirements regulation and directive ) the european commission proposed that non - eu headquartered banks with subsidiaries in the euro area would establish an intermediate parent undertaking within the eu. this would bring certain non - eu branches under the umbrella of european banking supervision, as is established practice in the united kingdom and united states. going forward, further harmonisation of the regulatory and supervisory framework of third - country branches in the union would be of the essence. second, we need to adapt how large investment firms are supervised to reflect the many similarities between their activities and those of banks. it therefore makes sense