samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
a point where actually the side effects of negative rates mean that you need to scale it back? we will be looking at the side effects as part of the strategy review. there is no question about that. we need to be attentive to that. financial stability is not our first driver of concern and consideration, but we will have to look at it, of course, yes. don ’ t forget that we need to have a banking sector in the euro area that acts as a good channel of transmission. which means what, that you could extend tiering? 2 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches multiple responses! as i said yesterday, we are not considering that at the moment. president trump left davos saying that actually he ’ s still thinking about possible tariffs against germany and europe in general. you ’ re seeing growth in europe ; how do you match up the two? we ’ re saying modest growth in europe. we ’ re saying a bit more modest downside risks as well, so that ’ s probably the reason why it ’ s kind of slightly balanced to the upside, but very slightly. we shall see. what i was pleased about is to see that there had been a good first meeting between ursula von der leyen, president of the european commission, and president trump. it ’ s better to start off on a good footing and there will be difficult relationships going forward, and points of negotiation that will be hard. whether it ’ s trade, whether it ’ s tax, whether it ’ s technology, whether it ’ s energy – there are multiple topics. as ursula said, europe and the united states have been friends for a long, long time. it will not go away and in many instances, they have joint interests but europe is different. europe operates on different values, with different systems, and that needs to be secured and preserved for the sake of the europeans. are tariffs the biggest concern you see for the european economy? it ’ s a big concern, let ’ s face it. don ’ t forget that there is trade intra - europe and that would not indeed be affected. but trade with the united states, which is an important trade partner, would be affected if there was a sudden rise in tariffs, yes – or a tariff war. tit for tat, you tariff me, i ’ ll tariff you : that ’ s going to operate as a brake on the economy, for sure. you ’ ve done a number of public events in

possible. the ssm and the single resolution mechanism are complements and we need progress on both these fronts. as victor hugo once remarked, “ you can resist an invading army ; you cannot resist an idea whose time is come. ” i believe that banking union is just such an idea. but it now depends on us – as policymakers, as commentators, as citizens – how it is turned into reality. if we are anything less than wholly ambitious, then we will have learned nothing from this crisis. thank you for your attention. bis central bankers ’ speeches
##ly so as to ensure that the above - mentioned risks to price stability do not materialise.

scenario, such as the one i have described, which is a real risk in a monetary union or with a fixed exchange rate regime, policy - makers undoubtedly face the very difficult challenge of having to avoid an overheating of the economy in the face of surging capital inflows and rapid credit growth. monetary policy would be the ideal instrument to tackle such a problem but it is simply not available. actually, monetary policy makes things even worse for east, because it is set by west with a view to ensuring price stability in west itself. given the convergence process and the required higher rate of growth of productivity and income in east, as compared with west, the monetary policy set by west is too expansionary for east. as an illustration, a 4 % interest rate might be appropriate for an economy growing at a steady state rate of 2 % and with 2 % inflation – i ’ m giving these numbers for purely illustrative reasons – but is certainly not appropriate for an economy growing in real terms at 6 % or more, as required by the catching - up process. as the inflationary pressures arise in east, the monetary policy becomes pro - cyclical, further destabilising the economy and making the adjustment more abrupt later on. the recent financial turbulence in the united states and europe has shown the dangers of keeping interest rates too low, compared with the economy ’ s underlying rate of productivity and income growth, for a prolonged period of time. when i raised the issue myself, about two years ago, i noted that there was still very little literature on this issue. 11 some progress has been made, but the issue is still not sufficiently recognised in academic and policy fora. indeed, when one looks at the current situation in many emerging market economies, one cannot but be struck by the huge gap between these two variables which, in my view, is the sign of a major distortion in the allocation of resources that might lead to future abrupt adjustment. 12 fiscal policy can be activated to attenuate the inflationary pressures arising from the monetary stimulus, but the size of the fiscal restraint might have to be quite ample. banking supervision and related prudential measures could also be implemented to limit credit expansion. their quantitative impact is of course uncertain, especially in an environment of full capital mobility. capital controls might be applied to contain inflows, but they are not allowed in the eu. see allsopp and vines ( 1998 ). “ inflation, expectations and current challenges to monetary policy
few remarks, it is my singular honour to call upon the mr. mutua kilaka, financial secretary, ministry of finance to give his remarks and officially launch our website. bwana kilaka. karibu sana.

critical – countercyclical fiscal policy to sustain demand through supporting jobs is important at the initial recovery period – in the medium term, fiscal policy should be directed firmly towards growth and long term development objectives – adequate capital spending should be a top priority to address large deficits in infrastructure and human capital • central banking in post - crisis africa – inflation in most countries has reverted to single digits, and the likelihood of a significant liquidity overhang is minimal – in many countries exchange rates have also been strengthening towards the precrisis level. re - correction after the crisis – all these factors point towards retaining the current supportive monetary policy stance in most countries and for central banks to avoid conventional wisdom to raise interest rates soon – central banks should be in no hurry to tighten their policy rates when underlying inflation is below target. they need to continue with the same monetary stance until the expected inflationary pressure threatens instability in the economic environment what the central bank of kenya has done during the crisis • the central bank of kenya – has pursued an accommodative monetary policy stance to help cushion the economy from the negative effects of the global financial crisis • measures taken so far – reduction of cash reserve ratio from 6 % to 4. 5 % ( 100 basis points in december 2008 and 50 basis points in july 2009 ) – thus releasing an equivalent of ksh. 12. 5 billion for lending to the economy – consecutive reduction of the central bank rate from 8. 75 % to 7. 75 % to signal to banks to lower lending rates – allowing a reduction in foreign exchange reserves to less than 3 months to take pressure off the depreciation pressure of the kenya shilling vis - a - vis the hard currencies ( had the cbk not allowed this, the inflationary effect of the shilling ’ s depreciation would have been worse – in terms of intermediate imports, oil prices etc ) kenya ’ s fiscal policy attempts to spur economic activity during economic downturn the 2009 / 10 finance bill took recovery head on – six solutions : • commitment from treasury to maintain a stable macroeconomic environment • creating fiscal space through expenditure rationalization from non - productive sectors / activities to productive sectors • reducing the cost of doing business • developing key infrastructure facilities and public works to stimulate growth, employment and poverty reduction • fiscal stimulus through measures that expand economic opportunities in rural areas for employment creation global outlook • the fear of the “ second great depression ” has subsided – impact of the crisis on output has been ameliora
globalization, and the collapse of this system offers us a cautionary tale. furthermore, in a world where public and private actors taking part in economic activity are becoming ever more diverse, it would be quite a challenge to agree on what is desirable globalization and what is not. if, in despair, unilateral action, such as trade bans, mandatory domestic incorporation, or forced repatriation, is taken, everybody would become worse off. is there a way out of this predicament? if the objective of global governance is to secure global financial stability, and if global financial stability is a public good, global governance can be analyzed as a microeconomic problem regarding public goods. there are well - known options to solving the problems posed by public goods. the most straightforward is to have the public sector provide the public goods. alternatively, rules could be established regarding the consumption of public goods. another option is to tax the consumption of public goods or subsidize the production thereof. there are still other options, such as changing the public character of the goods by increasing their exclusivity. not all may be applicable to international financial stability, and some may be more easily implemented than others. in view of the discussions during various international fora in which i have participated, i have a feeling that we are making it more difficult for ourselves by opting for the seemingly most obvious option – tasking the public sector with providing international financial stability. as tommaso observed, there is a limit to what individual nation states can provide as global public goods. a coherent set of public goods provided by a single global public entity would be desirable, but there is no workable way of introducing such an arrangement consistent with our democratic principles. international organizations are often criticized for deficits in democratic accountability. on the other hand, a democratically elected world government with the power to tax is unthinkable in the near future. the current situation in the euro area is an example of this intractable problem. we therefore should aim for a more practical approach, combining various options that are known for solving the public good problem. some public goods, such as effective supervision of globally important financial institutions, could be provided at the national level. supranational institutions could be asked to take on specific tasks, such as monitoring global financial developments and identifying macroprudential risks, without undermining democratic principles. private actors could be made to follow certain rules, such as the basel rules on

small but important step forward. thank you for your attention. bis central bankers ’ speeches
think that there are a number of good reasons to believe that it will be. in the first place, we now have institutional arrangements in hong kong to put the financial sector provisions of the basic law into practice. in particular, the hong kong monetary authority, which i represent, has the legal powers, monetary instruments and financial resources - including us $ 63 billion of foreign currency reserves - to fulfill its role as the central bank of hong kong and to maintain the value of the hk dollar. during the four years of its existence, the hkma has built up a good working relationship with the people ’ s bank of china which has made it clear in public that it will not take over the role of the monetary authority in hong kong after 1997. the separate role for hong kong after 1997 is underscored by its separate membership alongside china of international organizations such as the bank for international settlements and the asian development bank, and its participation in the imf ’ s new arrangements to borrow. of course, what matters is not what i say but what the market actually thinks. judged by this criterion, there is genuine confidence about the future. this is shown by the consistent stability of the hk dollar ; the strength of the stock market, though it has its ups and downs in line with expectations about us interest rates ; the growth in hk dollar deposits of about 20 % over the last year ; and the decline in the margin of our 10 - year exchange fund notes over us treasuries to around 50bp compared with 90bp at the end of 1996. so far as foreign banks operating in hong kong are concerned, hong kong political risk largely seems to have disappeared as an issue. we have seen no exodus of banks from hong kong ; rather, we have seen an increased appetite among the foreign banks to take on long - term hk dollar assets, including residential mortgage loans and syndicated credits. although the margin on these have come down significantly over the last year, they are still attractive compared with the margins available to foreign banks in their home countries. the importance of international regulatory standards we do not anticipate any radical changes in hong kong ’ s system of banking supervision after 1997, nor in its attitude to the entry of foreign banks. no doubt, however, these will evolve in line with trends in global regulation. this reflects the guiding principle of our supervision in hong kong which is to follow international standards. there are a number of practical reasons for wanting to do so. first, it is in keeping

for individual supervisory authorities to build up a relationship of trust which allows for a free flow of information in both directions, adequate safeguards on the confidentiality of information received and an avoidance of over - hasty and disruptive supervisory action based on that information. at the end of the day the effectiveness of global regulation depends in large measure on cooperation among regulators. as a major international financial centre, hong kong will continue, after 30 june 1997 as it has done before, to play its part in fostering such cooperation.
nout wellink : core principles for effective deposit insurance systems – where do we stand? speech by dr nout wellink, president of the netherlands bank and chairman of the basel committee on banking supervision, at the conference on the core principles for effective deposit insurance systems, basel, 23 september 2009. * * * introduction it is my pleasure to address this joint conference. as you know, the core principles for effective deposit insurance systems were developed jointly by iadi, the international association of deposit insurers, under the excellent leadership of marty gruenberg, and the basel committee on banking supervision. these two bodies, together with the financial stability institute, organised this conference in order to promote the core principles and to contribute to their implementation and further development. last july, the world commemorated the 40th anniversary of the man - on - the - moon. when neil armstrong set foot on the moon 40 years ago, he spoke the famous words “ that ’ s one small step for man, one giant leap for mankind ”. last june, the core principles for effective deposit insurance systems were published. admittedly, these are different works and i would not dare to put the core principles on par with the moon landing and the various countries ’ space programs. nevertheless, the core principles are a milestone in regaining financial stability after the current crisis. the question is : where do we stand? recent events the recent crisis that started in summer 2007 reminded the wider public once again that banks are susceptible to problems of insolvency or illiquidity. northern rock was one of the first victims, following problems in the mortgage credit markets. once its problems became publicly known, a classical bank run occurred with many customers queuing outside northern rock ’ s branches to withdraw their savings. after the northern rock episode, the consensus emerged that deposit insurance systems with low levels of coverage, partial insurance and likely delays in repayment, are not effective in preventing a bank run. one year later, in september and october 2008, this insight became topical once again. the financial turbulence, it was feared, could develop into an international financial crisis as severe as the great depression in the 1930s. in several jurisdictions, bank customers were reportedly shifting their deposits to the perceived safety of other banks or instruments. policy makers had no choice but to respond. some authorities stated publicly that all bank deposits would be safe or that deposit insurance coverage would be unlimited. elsewhere, the maximum level of deposit insurance coverage was raised, at least temporarily, or coins

science, but they are useful and valuable, all over the world! i wish all of you a stimulating conference!
it a success. thank you. 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches

yandraduth googoolye : combatting financial crime in mauritius speech by mr yandraduth googoolye, first deputy governor of the bank of mauritius, at the training workshop for senior management of law enforcement agencies in collaboration with the commonwealth secretariat, ebene, 6 december 2017. * * * ladies and gentlemen, good morning. i am delighted to be here today to address such a distinguished and expert audience. i will try to be short as it is said that it is better that you leave your audience before your audience leaves you. the country should be one and unified. we are all servants of the state. having different factions within the state inhibit progress. building fictitious walls arise sometimes out of ego. pulling in different directions does not help. it is with concerted action and co - ordination that progress can be achieved. co - operation within the different organs of the state is therefore imperative. we need to put our heads together for our common benefit. a piece of information standing alone is like being part of a puzzle. it is when different organisations fighting for a common goal put whatever information they have together that a bigger picture can emerge and better preventive action can be taken. the bank of mauritius has been in the forefront of the war against financial crime for around 15 years now. it issued its first guidance notes on aml / cft setting out the minimum standards to be applied by all financial institutions under its purview, on 19 december 2003, thus setting the stage for a credible banking sector. a strong legal and regulatory framework is the basis of any effective regime. the guidance notes is a dynamic document which over the years, has been updated to reflect the latest global developments, as well as to incorporate emerging best practices recommended by international standard setters, namely the fatf and the bank for international settlements. the guidance notes have been revamped in 2017 to include, amongst others, the following, ( i ) proliferation financing regarding the transfer and export of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. ( ii ) duty of financial institutions to identify and assess ml / tf risks on an enterprisewide level. ( iii ) information to be collected by financial institutions for natural, legal person and legal arrangements with a view to developing an initial customer risk profile. ( iv ) enhanced due diligence to be performed by financial institutions in respect of wire transfer transactions to ensure that wire transfer systems are not used by criminals as a means to break the audit trail. in the
. central banks, regulators and policymakers can – and indeed must – play an active role in shaping a potential move to dlt - based markets through playing with purpose, playing in a collaborative way, pondering the implications of innovation, promoting responsible innovation for the public good, and informing an appropriate policy and regulatory response. thank you. page 6 of 6

, this could be aimed at aggregate or sectoral credit conditions, and it could have a goal of making our banks more resilient. it would need to be pursued by executive agencies under clear mandates from legislators, and it would benefit greatly from transparency. a painful lesson for the bank of england is that our warnings of “ underpriced risk ” and system - wide fragilities in our financial stability reports were perhaps admired by some but made no difference. and, alongside our domestic and international peers, we are not in this for plaudits! people – the markets, firms, households – take notice of our inflation report, mpc minutes and speeches on monetary policy not, essentially, because they might sometimes be interesting or well done, but for the simple reason that the mpc is the body that sets sterling interest rates in the real world. if the authorities were able to deploy credible macroprudential tools, their stability warnings would probably be taken more seriously in future, because they would be able to follow up words with actions. monetary policymakers would need to be attentive to the use of such instruments, as they would affect credit conditions. such instruments would also help to underpin the consensus that monetary policy should focus on the path of nominal demand at the aggregate level, with macroprudential policy seeking to address over exuberance in particular sectors or in credit markets generally and the resilience of the banking system. slow moving threats to stability : a continuing challenge if the authorities could make a regime along those lines work in practice, we would reduce one threat to stability : out - of - control credit booms that undermine the stability of the financial system and so jeopardise the supply of credit that lubricates economic activity. i do think that we should direct some of our energies to that, alongside making the financial system more resilient in case, as is inevitable, “ credit boom and bust ” cannot be eliminated. but i should flag that this would not wave away all potential threats to stability. a lesson of this ( and past ) crises is that cumulative imbalances in the domestic and global economy blanchard o, g dell ’ ariccia and p mauro ( 2010 ), “ rethinking macroeconomic policy ”, imf staff position note, spn / 10 / 03, february 12, 2010. a point made in conversation by, for example, anil kashyap. eventually come home to ro