countries in difficulty, i know some of the facets of the work that is done here. i learn fast, i work hard and i ’ m surrounded by exceptionally competent people. so to the extent that i can sometimes challenge some of the conventional views and the sort of home - grown conventional wisdom, i think it ’ s very healthy. yes, it could be an advantage. it could be. you are the first woman to lead the ecb, which used to be a man ’ s world. how are people reacting? i think they notice but i think they tolerate it and hopefully they will accept that i can do as good, if not a better job than men would. i think that ’ s the beauty of diversity and the openness of this institution, actually, to accept, engage and respect differences and to try to include them. 1 / 6 bis central bankers'speeches do you believe it ’ s important that a woman is leading such a prominent institution like the ecb? yes, i do, because i see too many younger women – not necessarily younger women actually – but too many of my colleagues and friends and people that i meet in the course of everyday life, who look up to me and say to themselves or say sometimes to me, “ about time that a woman does this job ”, number 1. number 2, “ if she can do it, maybe i can do it, too – and if not me then my daughters maybe can do it. ” so i think that as a signal it ’ s important. it honestly gives me, i would say, additional responsibilities because i don ’ t want to let them down. that puts an additional weight on my shoulders. i have to honour that. also the european commission is led by a woman now. do you think that will make a difference somehow? i ’ m sure it will. when you look at some photos from the days when the european union was set up in the first place, or when you look at old photos – sometimes not so old photos – of the ecb, of the governing council, it does make a difference, if only optically. but i also think that it brings an added dimension, which is the sheer dimension of diversity of thinking. but also in policy. oh, i think everybody brings … maybe risk - taking? on risk - taking, i think, it has been demonstrated empirically now by a lot of analytical work that has been done on the trade floor and in

shocks very gradually, or, more exotically, “ rational inattention ”, which formally recognizes the limits to agents ’ information processing abilities. these points are clearly high on the agenda as christiano, l., motto, r. and rostagno, m. ( 2003 ) : “ the great depression and the friedman - schwartz hypothesis ”, journal of money, credit and banking, 35 ( 6 ), 1119 – 1197. major contributions include : benartzi, s. ; thaler, r. h. ( 1995 ) : “ myopic loss aversion and the equity premium puzzle ”. quarterly journal of economics, 110 ( 1 ) : 73 – 92 ; daniel, k., hirshleifer, d. and subrahmanyam, a. ( 1998 ). “ investor psychology and security market under - and overreactions ”. journal of finance, 53 ( 6 ) ; hogarth, r. m. ; and reder, m. w. ( 1987 ). rational choice : the contrast between economics and psychology. chicago : university of chicago press ; kahneman, d. and diener, e. ( 2003 ). well - being : the foundations of hedonic psychology. russell sage foundation. woodford m. ( op. cit. ). for instance, a notable policy recommendation arising from akerlof and shiller ’ s book “ animal spirits ” was to set targets for credit growth. and yet, credit developments already are an important input into the ecb ’ s monetary analysis. bis central bankers ’ speeches well. but what we don ’ t want on our wish - list is to include all these features in a single big model as was done in the 1960s and 1970s. that would be a recipe for utter complexity and obscurity. it is also evident to me, as a policy - maker, that policy decisions are shaped by interactions between actors or interest groups. take the question of euro area adjustment. who will bear the cost of the much - needed sovereign and private deleveraging? to what extent will the social cost of the crisis bear on political outcomes, and thus on economic policy decisions? how much fiscal risk - sharing can be accepted by the people of europe, and what should be the optimal combination of inter - temporal risk - sharing through balanced budget rules, “ horizontal ” risk - sharing between countries ( such as through the esm ), and “ vertical ” risks