the end it is the private sector that creates and maintains the market. designing the appropriate tools to support and provide a backstop for market functioning is an important agenda for the global central banking community. as the example of the recent bank of england interventions demonstrates, we are still in a learning - by - doing phase of this process. concluding remarks where does this leave the conduct of monetary policy in a context of financial stability operations? i will conclude with two points i see as key. first, it is important to keep such financial stability operations distinct from monetary policy, both in terms of communication and operationally. to the extent that such operations distort the intended monetary policy signal, they paradoxically risk interfering with monetary policy transmission, even as they are intended to support the market functioning on which that transmission relies. second, while respecting the need for separation between monetary policy and financial stability operations, policy makers also need to recognise the unavoidable interactions between the two. after all, an injection of central bank reserves owing to a financial stability operation can have monetary implications via the portfolio balance channel just like qe. and, by design, financial stability operations will have implications for asset prices and financial markets and institutions that influence the overall stance of financial conditions, and thus highly relevant in deciding the appropriate level of bank rate. bank of england monetary policy decisions cannot be taken by the mpc entirely independently of actions implemented by the bank for financial stability purposes : their consequences for the stance and transmission of monetary policy need to be identified and internalised in the mpc ’ s process. early, open and transparent communication among the various parties involved – that is, across the various relevant bodies ( mpc, fpc, bank executive ) within the bank, among the bank and other uk policy institutions such as the treasury, and between policy makers and market participants – is therefore crucial. while financial stability operations remain ‘ temporary and targeted ’ – as emphasised in the bank ’ s initial announcement of its recent gilt market interventions on 28 september 2022 – a natural distinction with the necessarily lower frequency evolution of monetary policy ( and the monetary trends that ultimately determine inflation ) exists. as others have described, this is a key element of the gilt purchases made by the bank in september and october, in the face of market dysfunction. it has rightly be made central to the communication of recent policy interventions, in line with the need for transparency that i have highlighted. the delicate balance between maintaining a clear distinction and internal

##ising the inevitable interaction is important for the bank and the wider central banking community. bank of england references broadbent, b. ( 2022 ). “ reliable partners, ” speech given at gresham college, london. broadbent, b. ( 2021 ). “ lags, trade - offs and the challenges facing monetary policy, ” speech at leeds university business school. busetto, f., m. chavaz, m. froemel, m. joyce, i. kaminska and j. worlidge ( 2022 ). “ qe at the bank of england : a perspective on its functioning and effectiveness, ” bank of england quarterly bulletin q1. cunliffe, j. ( 2022a ). letter to mel stride, chairman of the house of commons treasury select committee, 5 october 2022. cunliffe, j. ( 2022b ). letter to mel stride, chairman of the house of commons treasury select committee, 18 october 2022. elsby, m. w. l. and g. solon ( 2019 ). “ how prevalent is downward rigidity in nominal wages? international evidence from payroll records and pay slips, ” journal of economic perspectives 33 ( 2 ), pp. 185 - 201. evans, c. l., j. d. m. fisher, f. gourio and s. krane ( 2015 ). “ risk management for monetary policy near the zero lower bound, ” brookings papers on economic activity ( spring ), pp. 141 - 196. haskell, j. and j. martin ( 2022 ). “ economic inactivity and the labour market experience of the long - term sick, ” imperial college london. hauser, a. ( 2022 ). “ thirteen days in october : how central bank balance sheets can support monetary and financial stability, ” speech at the ecb money markets conference, 4 november 2022. hauser, a. ( 2021 ). “ from lender of last resort to market maker of last resort via the dash for cash - why central banks need new tools for dealing with market dysfunction, ” speech at thomson reuters newsmaker, london. pill, h. ( 2022 ). “ what did the monetarists ever do for us? ” presentation at the walter eucken institut / stifung geld und wahrung conference – inflation and debt : challenges for monetary policy after