better take into account certain strategies, and thereby accept a certain level of risk. a likely effect of recovery options or transfer tools is that the structure of the remaining group might become less complex and therefore carry less risk. besides, the stance on waivers of internal requirements for entities located in the same member state ( or even in the same banking union ) has proven overly conservative. we need pragmatism, and consistency between the srb and the ssm : when an entity has been waived from capital requirements, or is simply not subject to capital requirements, the resolution authority could apply the same on mrel. proportionality to risk could entail other changes, such as the calculation of banks ’ contribution to the srf. as of today, the size of institutions has an overwhelming importance in the determination of these contributions. this is more than questionable : size does matter in order to bring an institution under the scope of resolution, but size and risk are two different notions and they should be more clearly differentiated in technical implementation. in order to ensure the fairness of contributions, and greater adherence to the srm overall, it is necessary to adapt formulae accordingly. beyond fairness, penalising the largest banks or groups prevents the emergence of pan - european groups, which is one of the banking unions ’ objectives. here let us acknowledge that page 5 sur 5 we have collectively failed so far ; we have a banking union without really crossborders european banks. this is a major weakness. this is where we should bring our ziel, our strategic objective, into our field of vision. and even more so since mrel requirements in the european union are, on the whole, far more stringent than the tlac international standards and their translation into other jurisdictions ’ regulations. * * * let me conclude by saying that, in 2022, after the first seven years of existence of the single resolution mechanism, it may be time to recall what clausewitz rightly identified as the greatest difficulty : “ to adhere steadfastly in execution to the principles which we have adopted. ” that does not mean showing rigidity in technical implementation, on the contrary. it means taking a risk - based approach and conducting a balanced analysis of the best way forward in order to serve these principles in a relevant way. i will end my speech with another phrase of roman wisdom : in medio stat virtus, virtue lies in the middle. i thank you for your attention.

cooperation to function, institutions must be efficient and accepted by all economic players. this means that they must have clear mandates, appropriate resources and governance that correctly reflects today ’ s multipolar and interdependent economic and financial world. in this area, the g20 also agreed on robust measures aiming in particular to adapt the resources and functioning of the bretton woods institutions. for instance, while we have observed an increasing number of bilateral initiatives, such as swaps offered by major currency issuers, such as the fed and eurosystem, as well as, in a very different context, by china, these mechanisms cannot alone constitute a coherent insurance system. this is why the g20 decided to triple imf resources to usd 750 billion, which is unprecedented. the intervention tools were also reformed. a multilateral instrument for the prevention and early management of crises was also created, the flexible credit line ( fcl ) ; mexico, poland and argentina have already signed up and this has without doubt reduced the risk of contagion. in addition, the poverty reduction and growth fund was established for the poorest countries. this clearly reflects the imf ’ s commitment to reforming its assistance and solidarity framework to help the most vulnerable countries. similarly, the adequacy of the resources of multilateral development banks was reviewed and, for example, the capital of the asian development bank was tripled. in order to enhance the legitimacy and efficiency of key players in the international financial architecture, the bolstering of resources must go hand in hand with a reform of their governance. as a european, i am perhaps not the best person to give my views on the governance of financial institutions, and of the imf in particular because, for emerging countries to be given a fair representation, it is most often the representation of european countries that is called into question. you may therefore be tempted to interpret my suggestions negatively. i would, however, first like to say that the representation of european countries should not be contested : europe is a diverse continent that encompasses small, new, and even emerging countries alongside large and established developed nations. overall, it is somewhat under - represented in a community that is still made up of sovereign states. and, above all, it seems to me that this is the wrong question or solution given our current challenges : while the issue at stake here is improving dialogue with a view to achieving concerted and operationally - applicable solutions, i do not believe that anyone really asserts that the optimal