a lot in this regard. we have to strengthen the legal framework as applicable to entities operating in the city and their counterparties in the domestic sector. it is possible that many business entities that can potentially relocate to gift city are waiting for this framework to be put in place. 16. an ifsc should have a legal structure that is sufficiently supportive of the swift resolution of conflicts and disputes arising from the settlement / enforcement of complex international financial contracts. the contract should be of international standard and enforceable in the court of law and preferably similar to isda documentation. 17. the existing laws governing financial contracts in india should be reviewed and gaps addressed. based on the review, a world class legal framework for financial contracts in gift could be enabled, either by appropriately amending the existing laws governing financial contracts or enacting a fresh law. either way, this should be expedited, may be by constituting a high level working group to address this gap in mission mode. 18. in addition, a unified financial regulatory framework providing for a single regulator for gift city could contribute to better regulation and supervision of the financial entities in the city. while individual regulators can supervise the entities initially when the size of the business is small, a unified regulator would be necessary to pay undivided attention to the ifsc. work on the design of such a framework should begin soon so as to be able to implement this in time. 19. in conclusion, fiscal incentives and other leeway will take gift forward only so far, work in areas that i have just suggested is essential for fully harnessing the ifsc ’ s business potential. 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches

in parallel to the institutional debate and the positions taken by academics, commentators and politicians, all the official documentation drawn up during that time, from the constitution to the treaty of lisbon, underlines the political will to grant a strong independent status to the ecb and the national central banks ( ncbs ). the points of view expressed are solely those of the author. i would like to thank nicola de giorgi, fabio recine, inigo arruga oleaga and livio stracca for their comments. see louis ( 1995 ), banking supervision in the european community : institutional aspects, editions de l ’ universite de bruxelles ( brussels ) ; and t. padoa schioppa ( 2004 ), regulating finance : balancing freedom and risk, oxford, p. 75. the treaty of lisbon strengthens the ecb ’ s position in several ways : i ) it establishes the principle according to which the ecb is independent in the exercise of its powers ; ii ) explicit reference is made to the financial independence of the ecb ; iii ) the primacy of the objective of price stability for the eurosystem, which is included as one of the union ’ s objectives, is confirmed, together with the ( new ) objective for an “ economic and monetary union, whose currency is the euro ” ; iv ) the ecb is recognised as an institution of the european union, joining the council of the european union, the european commission and the european parliament, even though it has legal personality. it can sometimes seem as through central banks are obsessed with the question of independence, which, now that it has been laid down in the treaty, would appear to have been achieved. yet, it is surprising how often, ten years after the start of economic and monetary union, measures continue to be proposed at national level that in some way or another threaten the independence of the central banks, in particular, with respect to their functional, institutional, personal and financial independence. 3 i refer to two very recent examples, concerning two countries – italy and germany – where draft legislation introduces measures that risk contravening the principle of independence established in the treaty. in italy, the 2008 financial law, which was approved by the parliament on 24 december 2007, provides for measures to reform the banca d ’ italia aimed at reviewing “ in a general manner [ its ] means of financing, expenditure control, and payment of salaries and emoluments ”. these provisions do not take into account