innovation. let me conclude here. every business cycle is unique. however, we may try to find patterns and take lessons from the past and from other countries. in summary, over the long run, business cycles tend to be more moderate and co - movement appears to be less strong than we would expect. most of this can be explained by the absence of international shocks to the economy. however, since economies have increasingly become integrated, the risks of disturbances spilling over to other countries seem to be greater than ever. on the other hand, as i have indicated, modern economies are becoming more resilient at the same time. this may be viewed as a positive effect of increased economic linkages. it is my opinion that this effect should be encouraged ; and i am convinced that the task of improving economic linkages is well dedicated to the amcham. looking at the current business cycle, i am convinced that the worst part is behind us now. most indicators point to a sustained recovery of the us and the world economy. as we emerge from this downturn it will become clear that the dutch economy has experienced a volatile business cycle and that strong linkages to the us economy can be a great advantage.

or ‘ pillars ’ of the new capital accord. that also goes for the new european capital adequacy directives. pillar 3 recognises that market discipline has the potential to reinforce and support minimum capital standards ( pillar 1 ) and the supervisory review process ( pillar 2 ). this way, it helps to ensure that banks maintain appropriate levels of capital as a cushion against potential future losses arising from risk exposures. pillar 3 contains proposals for greater disclosure by banks, pertaining to three broad categories, the so - termed scope of application of the accord, a bank ’ s capital adequacy, and its risk exposures and assessments. for essential elements of the new capital accord, such as the use of an internal ratings based approach ( irb ), disclosures will even be required for supervisory recognition. this means that a supervisor is not supposed to recognize the use by a bank of these techniques, unless the bank has met the disclosure requirements. in this respect, in addition to pillar 1 with its irb, pillar 3 marks the transition to a fundamentally new approach in prudential supervision. as to the content of the information, pillar 3 aims to provide for a comprehensive set of consistent and comparable disclosures. it should, in other words, establish a common framework for the information to be made available by banks, and that would allow a meaningful comparative analysis by recipients of that information. comparability is greatly enhanced by the use of the risk weighting methodologies in the context of pillar 1 as a common yardstick for the purpose of public disclosure. at the same time, however, pillar 3 should not become overly prescriptive. that is why pillar 3 attaches great importance to qualitative disclosures. this will allow a specific bank to explain and elaborate the particular characteristics of its operations in plain language. an interesting dimension to the development of the pillar 3 disclosures is the relationship vis - a - vis the accounting standards, and vis - a - vis listing requirements promulgated by securities regulators. as i have said before, the costs of public disclosures by banks should be limited. therefore, banks may rely on disclosures under accounting or listing requirements insofar as these are materially equivalent to pillar 3 requirements. however, such requirements have a broader focus than the third pillar, which aims at banks capital adequacy. pillar 3, in other words, is a more specific interpretation of the general rules, as a reflection of its more precise objective. supervisors