a pivotal process, it becomes apparent that we were not competent and brave enough to take the necessary measures to make it viable in the long term and to optimise its advantages. in fact, despite its positive developments, albeit too slow and not always consistent, a sense of distrust still permeates the european integration process, of which the emu is a cornerstone. the causes of this phenomenon extend well beyond economics, into a political and cultural domain of great complexity, which is too large to explore here. but it will always be said that 20 years ago the european ideal was pushing forward, and the emu project, inherently novel and bold, had the charm and vitality of a benevolent utopia. as time went by, due to of developments anchored in very heterogeneous factors, it turned inwards, became self - satisfied with real and imaginary feats, became somewhat narrow in its outlook, was unable to convince people of its true merits, turned a deaf ear to relevant criticism, and set itself adrift from the public. however, this path is being inverted. the european monetary union has proved itself able to withstand all this ( although, at great cost, it is true to say ), because the underlying vision is sound, its failure would bring unimaginable costs, and it has still been possible to a degree to reform its mechanisms. the emu ’ s success is vital for europe in the context of globalisation, and only with the euro can we aspire to succeed both at domestic and global level. it has become commonplace to state that mario draghi, as president of the ecb, declared in 2012 that “ the ecb is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro ”, and added that this would be enough. however, it has been less emphasised that this statement, which is generally considered to have 2 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches been a key determinant for the subsequent course of events, was not issued by the president of one the classical eu institutions but that of a still recent institution, albeit one with particular responsibilities in this field and effective tools to act. it should also be noted that it was not issued by a political leader of one of the most powerful eu member states, which also provides food for thought. in his famous speech in 1962, the president of the usa, john f. kennedy, said that we chose to go to the moon “ not because [ it is ] easy, but because [ it

the ssm would ensure shared ownership of problems and decisions, encouraging a broader vision on the implications of the ssm ’ s decisions on financial stability. this could be achieved through the establishment of intermediate committees similar to those of the ecb ’ s monetary policy function. the separation of supervisory functions from regulatory ones is necessary for the political legitimation of regulatory standards. the overlap of regulatory and supervisory territories guarantees compliance with the principle of central responsibility for financial stability. in this 1 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches context, it is necessary to find ways to ensure and safeguard this basic principle within banking union. it is also essential to determine which coordination and convergence mechanisms between territorial regulatory and supervisory authorities can be established between the banking union and the remaining eu member states. one should not underestimate how much has been achieved in recent years. nevertheless, the foundations of europe ’ s financial architecture are still not sufficiently robust to withstand the impact of a future crisis. this should be a priority for policy - makers and relevant institutions. decisive political will to move forward with the completion of the banking union is required. in the absence of this will, europe must revisit its existing rules to safeguard financial stability. this is in the best interests of its people as few things can be more destructive to citizens ’ trust in european institutions than threats to financial stability. 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches