samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
good and loan quality remains satisfactory. the bsp ’ s stress test exercises and simulations point to favorable banking system prospects even with risks to the outlook. moving forward, we expect non - performing loans to remain manageable, cars to stay above the 10 - percent requirement, liquidity to be sufficient, and profitability to stay intact. we are confident that the worst is over. we have started to open up the economy as lockdown measures have resulted in flattening the curve and allowed the government in building the necessary health capacity. the bsp will continue to monitor developments as they unfold. further policy responses will be dependent on how the data evolves. going forward, the bsp is prepared to use the full range of its monetary instruments and to deploy additional measures, as needed, in fulfilment of its price and financial stability objectives. even as the bsp maintains its independence, we will continue to work hand - in - hand with the national government to ensure that the coronavirus pandemic will leave little permanent scar on the philippine economy and its people. 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches

every bit counts. it is in this spirit of collective action that mas is publishing a sustainability report, to account for what we are doing together with the financial industry, and in our own right, to help remake a greener world and secure a more sustainable future. 8 / 9 bis central bankers'speeches we want to be the change we want to see. 9 / 9 bis central bankers'speeches
have put in all the points of substance that i wanted to make, and i hope and believe that they will stand the test of time. ” they certainly did. and so did your suggestion that it might be desirable for the exchange fund in time to adopt “ more of a feature of a central bank ” : hence the hkma, which was formed ten years after the advice you gave. of course, we also had the privilege of your involvement over the period from 1990 to 1997 as a member of our board, the exchange fund advisory committee, and in your occasional trips to hong kong. so, ladies and gentlemen, it is with great pleasure that i now invite charles to speak in our first session of this hkimr first summer workshop.

peter pang : the 10th anniversary of the bis representative office for asia and the pacific remarks by mr peter pang, deputy chief executive of the hong kong monetary authority, to a reception for the 10th anniversary of the bis representative office for asia and the pacific, hong kong, 7 july 2008. * * * mr hannoun, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, it gives me great pleasure to celebrate with you this evening the 10th anniversary of the bis representative office for asia and the pacific. ten years is a long time. long enough for us to see the robust recovery of the asian economies following the 1997 financial crisis. long enough to see china catapult onto the world stage and its emergence as a global economic powerhouse. long enough for oil prices to rise 11 - fold from us $ 13 a barrel in 1998 to us $ 145 a barrel now. and it is long enough for terms like google, ebay, facebook and myspace to move from being the preserve of computer geeks to the mainstream. i am sure you all have your own stories to tell about these past ten years. it was also 10 years ago that the bis made the important decision to set up its first overseas office in the asia - pacific region, and to strategically locate it in hong kong. this put the bis at the right place, and at the right time, to meet the growing needs of asia. to this end, the functions of the asian office have evolved and expanded over time – from organisation of meetings and seminars to conducting research, to providing dealing and banking services. and the office has grown from a start - up staff of six to its current 33. we are celebrating this occasion in this lovely restaurant above the star ferry – which is an icon in hong kong and a symbol of quality and value - for - money service. the bis asian office is also a " star " entity. the word " star " has been chosen carefully and with good reason – each letter of the word symbolises and embodies the excellence of bis'activities : s : surveillance – the asian office is clearly a star performer in its surveillance work on regional economic and financial developments. this is self - evident from reading the background notes prepared on the region for various bis and regional central bank meetings. t : topical studies and research – the asian office, with its pool of economists and financial experts, is well placed to conduct research. under the auspices of the asian research programme initiated in 2006, many topics that are of interest and relevance to
pursuing policies which lead to sustainable non - inflationary growth in the euro area. given the size of the economy of the euro area, a stability - oriented policy will help to create a favourable environment conductive to non - inflationary growth at the global level.

stability for the international financial system. emu represents new opportunities and challenges for financial institutions and markets. up to now, one can distinguish essentially between four types of stability effects which the euro's arrival has brought : exchange rate stability, price stability, financial stability and fiscal stability. to these four, let me add a fifth stability aspect given that emu and the euro provide and will provide an anchor of stability for central and eastern european accession countries. exchange rate stability first, exchange rate stability is directly related to the single market for goods and services, as well as development of financial markets in the european union. the single currency has completely removed exchange rate risks for exporters and importers, debtors and creditors across the 12 countries of the euro area. cross - border trade, investment and financial transactions are fostered and, in particular, small and medium - sized companies are encouraged to enter the euro area - wide markets. these developments increase competition, improve resource allocation and the investment climate and thus contribute to higher long - term potential growth in the euro area. this - if i may say so - internal " exchange rate " stability aspect has often been overshadowed by the disproportionate interest in us dollar / euro exchange rate. the dollar / euro exchange rate movements have, in fact, been fully in line with the dollar's historical fluctuations vis - a - vis the european currencies prior to the introduction of the euro. more importantly, the weight of the fluctuating part in exchange rate " baskets " is, in all member states, now much smaller than in the past. for example, for austria as a small open economy the external stability of the currency was of prime concern. with the introduction of the euro this has changed significantly because external trade is much less important for the euro area than it was for austria. other than austria which prior to the introduction of the euro followed a policy of tying its currency to the dem, the eurosystem does not have an exchange rate target. while austria ’ s stability oriented currency policy made sense for a small open economy, it would not be wise to try to maintain a fixed exchange rate between the international currencies in an era of globalisation of financial markets and full liberalisation of capital transfers. the euro area economy is far less open than the economies of the individual euro area countries. this tends to limit the impact of external economic developments and in particular of exchange rates and external prices on domestic euro area prices. thus,
60 ( series 14 ) itraxx main europe 5 yr 23. 04 * 206. 55 88. 00 ( apr 8, 2011 series 14 ) 186. 00 ( series 14 ) wti 61. 47 145. 29 ( on july 3, 08 ) 72. 66 ( sep 22, 2010 ) 88. 91 us treasury 10 yr 5. 29 2. 05 3. 74 ( feb 8, 2011 ) 1. 98 dow jones ( april 29, 2011 ) implied value of dow jones ( feb 8, 2011 ) dxy 80. 08 88. 19 72. 93 ( apr 29, 2011 ) 76. 83 since last one year as on sep 14, * data pertains to may 1, 2007. the data for the entire period ( april 1, 2007 to 1st week of aug, 2007 ) is not available. bis central bankers ’ speeches

that there is yet again a huge under - pricing of risks in the financial system and, therefore, it is not a question of if, but when, generic asset bubble caused by manifold increases in balance sheets of central banks will burst. specifically, currently the global liquidity has become a bigger concern than it was in pre - 2007 period what with ultralow and near - zero policy rates and major central banks ’ balance sheets 1. 50 to 3 times their pre - 2007 levels, adding about usd 4 trillion in incremental central bank liquidity. worse, us banks are reportedly keeping excess reserves of us $ 1. 5 trillion with the fed rather than lend to small businesses and households. alongside, non - financial corporations in the us are reportedly sitting on cash and liquid assets worth usd 2 trillion which they do not know what to do with it! in this background of huge deluge of global liquidity, there are unmistakable signs of asset bubble inflating again in almost a replay of the last global financial crisis. as the table i shows, as of 14 september 2011, the over - valuation of gold – what we can also call gold bubble – with reference to 7 competing asset classes varied from 84 % against highly correlated metal prices proxied by lmex, 90 % against wti crude, 123 % against us treasuries proxied by jp morgan index, and roughly 250 – 300 % against credit default swap index, dow jones, the us dollar index dxy and the us home price case - shiller index. ( to detect an asset bubble ( gold in the present case ), fair value / price of gold with reference to competing asset classes like us dollar, us stock market, crude oil, the us treasuries, credit risk, base metals, and us house prices, proxied, respectively, by the dxy ( euro, pound sterling, japanese yen, swiss franc, canadian dollar and swedish krona ), the dow jones industrial average ( djia ), wti spot, j. p. morgan bond index, cdx ig, a cds index for investment grade us bonds, london metal exchange ( lmex ) ( nickel, tin, aluminium, copper, zinc and lead ) and s & p case - shiller index, has been computed. the table i is self - explicit. this intuitively appealing methodology of computing fair value is reasonably robust and rigorous based as it is on the assumption that bis central bankers
first part of our fintech strategy is called “ all banks go fintech ”. in short, we want banks to go “ all in ” with fintech, and fully digitalise their operations, from front - end to back - end. 15. the future is full of uncertainties. this is something we have all witnessed first - hand over the past two years with the pandemic. challenges and interruptions to day - to - day activities, including banking activities, can happen unannounced. the only thing certain and that has been a constant throughout these ups and downs is digitalisation. 16. indeed, the banking industry also recognises the value of digitalisation. at least we like to think this is why banks have so positively embraced the hkma ’ s fintech drive so far - rather than due to any regulatory pressure! jokes aside, i trust the figures i quoted earlier are proof that the earlier smart banking initiatives have laid a strong foundation for our banks to take this next step in their fintech journey. 17. the hkma is keen to support banks during this process. under the fintech 2025 strategy, we will be rolling out a tech baseline assessment to help the hkma identify those areas that we may be able to offer support. as part of this exercise, we will be inviting banks to submit a three year plan for technology adoption within q4 2021. we will then assess and benchmark the results against overseas peers to identify whether there are firstly, any business areas – such as investech, wealthtech, insurtech and greentech - where technology is underused, or secondly, any specific technology types, including artificial intelligence and blockchain solutions – that are not receiving sufficient attention. based on the findings of this exercise, we will consider what support the hkma can offer to help the banking sector reach the next level of fintech sophistication. if everything goes according to plan, you can expect to see the results in the first half of 2022. 18. in parallel, we will continue to provide guidance on fintech areas that may present opportunities or risk management challenges to the banking industry. this will help banks adopt novel technologies with more confidence and less apprehension that regulators may come knocking! as an example, as part of our two - year regtech roadmap, we will soon be publishing a “ regtech adoption practice guides ” series to address how regtech solutions can be applied to cloud computing, blockchain

central bankers'speeches
of those entities do not diminish the relevance of the business model to the measurement principle. indeed, over time if the valuation model is not relevant to the business model, the business model itself is likely to change. rather, the lesson to be learned from such manipulation is that we – preparers, users and auditors of financial statements – need to be vigilant in evaluating actual business practice, and restrict the use of particular measurement principles to the relevant business models. to this end, safeguards should be implemented to eliminate a firm's ability to overstate gains or understate losses by switching back and forth between business models or by reclassifying assets from one business segment to another. for example, from a regulatory perspective, assets in a financial institution's liquidity reserve, by their nature, imply utility through sale and, therefore, should be valued at market price. in terms of reliability, the measurement principle should reflect the ability of all types of entities to calculate a value within a reasonable range of confidence throughout the economic cycle and the life of the financial instruments. there is a good deal of reliability when the fair value of a financial instrument is observable in an active market. you accountants refer to these observable inputs to fair value as level 1. as you leave the active markets and get into the so - called level 2 and level 3 inputs to fair value measurements, an entity's ability to reach a consistent fair value or an estimate of fair value within a reasonable range of values for a particular financial instrument significantly diminishes. as the recent financial crisis has shown us, a financial instrument's fair value can vary widely among entities in similar markets. and the existence of wide variability in valuation models makes comparisons between entities difficult if not suspect. the reliability of amortized cost is not as questionable. amortized cost simply is the amount paid to acquire a financial asset, adjusted for any unaccreted discount or unamortized premium. all entities calculate amortized cost using the same formula. of course, amortized cost is not a panacea. entities purchase assets at different times and the timing of expected cash flow changes can result in different measurements for the same financial instruments. if the receipt of future payments is in doubt, impairment must be estimated. the use of a reserve for credit losses helps distinguish between contractual amounts due and payment uncertainty created by economic or borrower - specific conditions. current accounting standards permit credit reserves only for losses likely

during the height of the cold war, stating a view that remains applicable today, “ [ w ] e now stand in the vestibule of a vast new technological age - one that, despite its capacity for human destruction, has an equal capacity to make poverty and human misery obsolete. ”
instability also has substantial externalities on the economy, and on social cohesion through unemployment. the recent financial crises have brought the failings of the financial system into focus, not forgetting the impact of new technologies, such as high frequency trading, fintechs, or crypto - assets. but rules have their limitations. an ethical approach is needed if we are to respect the spirit of the rules – and not just the letter of the law – and if we are to make informed decisions when clear rules are not available. in addition to financial institutions'in - house ethical practices, the financial sector must now also consider how society – ngos, the media, fellow citizens included – perceive its activities from an ethical standpoint. clearly, the 2007 – 09 crisis was partly created by an imbalance : too much trust had been placed in ethics, while the rules were insufficient. the weaknesses in the corporate culture of financial institutions were thrust into the spotlight ; incentives to take risks were too powerful and governance was inappropriate. 1 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches certain anglo - saxon expressions perfectly illustrate the period : " too big to fail " created a widespread moral hazard, " tick the box " encouraged overly lax self - regulation through a purely formal compliance with the rules... and in so doing, the " light touch " of the british fsa at the time clearly showed its limitations. since then, i am happy to say that we have significantly tightened up the rules. with the crd iv capital requirements directive and basel iii for banks and, at least in europe, solvency ii for insurers, quantitative requirements have been reinforced to ensure greater resilience, governance of financial institutions has been improved and compensation policies for bankers have been reined in a little. international regulation is our common good. it strengthens a sound financial system. but as we strengthen international regulation, we must not lower our guard in terms of ethics. ten years later, this would generate the opposite imbalance to that of 2007 – 08. in other words, there's a risk that the pendulum could swing back the other way. 2. ethics must permeate the day - to - day practices and culture of financial institutions. over and above the good intentions, declarations and codes of conduct, which did nothing to prevent the excesses that caused the 2008 crisis, the challenge now is for all actors from the bottom to the top of these organisations to adopt an ethical approach. as the " banking conduct and culture

. is it sad to leave at a time when central banks have become such important players? c. n. it is not good that we are seen as the only game in town. we cannot replace governments, simply because they are not seen to be acting quickly enough. we have created in the euro area many new institutions and new rules. they must now be used. it is up to the parliaments and governments to decide the reforms to be made, but they have to take their responsibilities. mr noyer, thank you for this interview. bis central bankers ’ speeches
board or the federal open market committee. 2 / 2 bis - central bankers'speeches

alan greenspan : globalization remarks by mr alan greenspan, chairman of the board of governors of the us federal reserve system, at the institute for international economicsa€™ inauguration of the peter g peterson building, washington, 24 october 2001. * * * i am pleased to be with you tonight as the institute for international economics dedicates this extraordinary new building. i am also pleased to note that you are celebrating your twentieth year in the business of thinking critically about vital international economic issues. it hardly seems that long. before the tragic events of september 11, discussions of the international economy had increasingly come to be centered on issues related to the growing integration of our economies. the strife we had witnessed over economic globalization was the twenty - first century's version of debates over societal organization that go back at least to the dawn of the industrial revolution, and many of the intellectual roots of those debates go back far longer. there has been a simmering down of the more vociferous protests against globalization since september 11. but the debate surrounding the increasing cross - border integration of markets inevitably will be rejoined. the issue elicits such strong reaction because it centers on the important question of how economies are organized and, specifically, how individuals deal with one another. globalization as generally understood involves the increasing interaction of the world's peoples through their national economic systems. of necessity, these economic systems are reasonably compatible and, in at least some important respects, market oriented. during the past half - century, barriers to trade and to financial flows have generally come down, resulting in a significant broadening of world markets. expanding markets, in turn, have enhanced competition and nurtured what joseph schumpeter called " creative destruction, " the continuous scrapping of old technologies to make way for the new. standards of living rise because the depreciation and other cash flows of industries employing older, increasingly obsolescent, technologies are marshaled, along with new savings, to finance the production of capital assets that almost always embody cutting - edge technologies. this is the process by which wealth is created incremental step by incremental step. it presupposes a continuous churning of an economy in which the new displaces the old. the process is particularly evident among those nations that have opened their borders to increased competition. through its effect on economic growth, globalization has been a powerful force acting to raise standards of living. more open economies have recorded the best growth performance ;