both horses at once. this is doable but it is tricky. it also raises an interesting question about the relative costs of supervising smaller firms versus higher fscs levies to cover failures, which would merit further study. fourth, how is technology going to affect all this? this is obviously a huge topic in its own right, and others here will touch on it so i will make only two brief comments. one, in my view the jury is still out on whether open banking and / or psd2 are the gateway to a bigger change. two, it is notable that some digital banks are making material inroads into the current account market – is this the leading edge of a bigger change, or not? fifth, might brexit create opportunities to move further on proportionality for smaller firms? i ’ ve already talked about the way in which we make the regime tougher for larger firms. this is entirely appropriate, but is not the same as saying we should have a weak prudential regime for smaller firms – indeed, i think that is the last thing we need both from a safety and soundness and a competition perspective. however, there may be a reasonable case that a simpler ( simpler, not weaker ) regime for small firms would advance both our safety and soundness and competition objectives. we have often argued in europe for simpler approaches for small firms, but the differing legal traditions across the eu27 and the desire to harmonise regulation and supervision are powerful forces in the opposite direction. it is impossible to know at this stage, but under some brexit outcomes we might have room to revisit this question for small domestic firms. it is notable that both switzerland and the u. s. are taking quite radical steps in this area ; while i am cautious about the leverage - ratio - only capital regimes they are working on, and small british firms might be cautious about a 9 % leverage ratio requirement, we are taking a close interest. sixth, there is the debate – which came up most recently in the context of the treasury select committee ’ s inquiry into solvency ii – about whether our competition objective would be better cast as a primary objective. i have a number of reservations about this idea. one is purely practical : with the fca and cma already having primary competition objectives, do we really want a third regulator doing this for the financial services sector? it strikes me as a recipe for bureaucratic overlap. another is that the sort of referee role the

“ ladder of participation ” model, devised originally by sherry arnstein in the late 1960s. the rungs of the engagement ladder are, in ascending order : inform ; consult ; involve ; collaborate ; and empower. as we move up the ladder, we increase the degree of citizen engagement in decisions that affect them. the rsa stop short of recommending the top rung, but do propose various initiatives to increase citizen involvement and collaboration. armed with this framework, i have been thinking about how far the bank of england has so far climbed the citizen engagement ladder. truth be told, i suspect for the first 300 years of its life, the bank of england scarcely had its foot on the first rung. it saw little need even to inform the wider public about the economy and policy. trust among the public was anonymised, institutionalised and given. when tempted to step up a rung, the bank quickly contracted an acute form of vertigo. over the past 25 years the bank has taken significant steps up the engagement ladder, in part in response to the public ’ s trust shift, in part reflecting the bank ’ s wider policy responsibilities. these steps have transformed how the bank “ informs ” and “ consults ” the public on its views and policies. one simple diagnostic is the rise in the bank ’ s publication count. seventy years ago, the bank published precisely one speech a year. today, rarely a day passes without multiple publications. then, the bank uttered publically fewer than 5, 000 words per year. last year, it uttered in excess of 4 ½ million. over the past two decades, it would not be an exaggeration to say there has been a genuine revolution in central bank communications. perhaps even more importantly, there has been a revolution in central bank attitudes towards public engagement. this revolution has, with luck, increased the public ’ s understanding of the economy and economic policy. but there is no question in my mind that it has also enhanced very significantly central banks ’ own understanding of the economy. having ascended some rungs of the engagement ladder, our panorama on the economy has been much enhanced. looking back over the past five years, and looking forward to the next five, the bank is taking further steps towards securing a foothold on the next rungs of the engagement ladder. this will increase the extent to which we “ involve ” and “ collaborate ” with a wider set of citizens, as well as “ informing ” and “ consulting ” them. from