small bank holding company policy statement and apply it to certain savings and loan holding companies, ” press release, april 9, www. federalreserve. gov / newsevents / press / bcreg / 20150409a. htm. bis central bankers ’ speeches firms. this system helps community banks by eliminating requirements that are relevant only to large, geographically diversified banks. this tiered approach allows us to account for the differences in business models and risk levels among different types of banks. our goal is not to develop one state - of - the - art approach to regulation and supervision, but instead multiple state - of - the - art approaches that are appropriate for each type of institution we oversee. supervision of community banks is not a watered - down version of supervision of larger banks, but a significantly different process tailored to the business model of smaller banks. for community banks, the primary purpose of prudential regulation is to ensure the safety and soundness of each individual institution, thereby protecting the deposit insurance fund. the crisis showed that such a focus on individual institutions was inadequate to account for and contain the systemic threats posed by risks at larger, more complex institutions, and much of the improvement in oversight has been directed at systemic risk. the board is committed to making sure that new supervisory standards do not trickle down to community banks when they may only be appropriate for larger institutions, whether they be systemically important institutions overseen by the large institution supervision coordination committee, other large banking organizations with more than $ 50 billion in assets, or regional banking organizations with between $ 10 billion and $ 50 billion in assets. 3 for example, the board has made it clear that capital stress tests and other aspects of the comprehensive capital analysis and review requirements do not apply to community banks, either explicitly or implicitly. in addition to board members making this point in public speeches and in meetings with bankers, the federal reserve ’ s examiner training emphasizes that these requirements, which were established under the dodd - frank act, will apply only to large banking organizations. the fed also made changes in 2014 to better tailor our program of consumer compliance supervision of smaller institutions. under the new approach, the intensity of bank examinations is based on our assessment of the risk profile of individual community banks, including how each identifies and manages consumer compliance risk. risk assessment begins before examiners arrive at the bank, allowing examiners to focus on higher - risk concerns at the banks they supervise. we have also directed examiners to spend less time on

reforming the international monetary and financial system and preserving monetary and financial stability in financially integrated small and open economies mar guðmundsson, governor of the central bank of iceland, panel comments in the 50th anniversary conference of the central bank of malta, valletta, 4 may 2018. let me begin by congratulating all at the central bank of malta on the bank ’ s 50th anniversary and thank governor vella for the invitation to speak at this conference. i spoke in a central bank of malta conference here in valetta around the middle of the 1990s. at that time iceland had more or less fully liberalised its capital account and had a pegged exchange rate. malta also had a pegged exchange rate but still had some capital controls. the world has changed since then and our understanding of it even more. we in iceland went towards a flexible exchange rate and inflation targeting, while you entered monetary union. overall, we have both done well, but our road in iceland has been bumpier. the heading of this panel is challenges facing central banks after the financial crisis. that is a big menu. for my introductory remarks i choose two related issues that have been high on my mind for years, both as a policy maker in a small, open and financially integrated economy and during my tenure at the bis. these are potential reforms to the international monetary and financial system ( imfs ) and how small, open and financially integrated economies ( sofies ) can preserve monetary and financial stability in a world of global financial integration and large and volatile capital flows. both of these are unfinished business and the road ahead is foggy. the post - war global economic order was initially based on the principles of free trade in goods, current account convertibility, and monetary stability through fixed but adjustable exchange rates vis - a - vis the us dollar. open capital accounts were the exception, however. at the time, trade integration was seen to be more important for economic progress than financial integration. it worked well for a long while, and some call the period from 1950 to 1970 the golden years. yet there were inherent flaws in this set - up that contributed to its demise in the early 1970s, not least the well - known triffin dilemma regarding the conflict between the domestic economic objectives of the country providing the main reserve currency and the required international supply of that currency. in this case it was the us dollar. then capital accounts were opened up, with strong momentum in the 1980s and early 1990s. capital controls were increasingly undermined by