independent financial supervisor. this is because short - term incentives to relax supervisory policies may have important consequences for financial stability in the long run, which may, in turn, also affect monetary policy - making. moreover, this argument applies to both micro - and macro - prudential supervision. the importance of independence in this field is actually recognised worldwide and enshrined in the basel " core principles for effective banking supervision ". the basel core principles are part of the " key standards for sound financial systems " laid down by the financial stability board ( fsb ) that warrant priority implementation, depending 1 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches on country - specific circumstances. moreover, implementation of these principles is generally assessed through the imf / world bank financial sector assessment programs ( fsap ). allow me now to make four general points on the topic of policy coordination in a globalised world, focusing again on the financial stability domain. first, i think it is helpful to take a step backwards to review the rationale for international cooperation and global standards when it comes to the financial and banking system. the history of banking crises has painfully illustrated that financial stability is a global public good, with the costs of systemic banking crises often exceeding 100 % of a country's gdp. yet, if each jurisdiction is left to itself when it comes to safeguarding financial stability, the cross - border spillovers of financial distress can result in individual jurisdictions " underinvesting " in financial stability. that is why global cooperation is needed. another way to think about this is to build on helene rey's seminal work on the monetary policy dilemma / trilemma, which has an analogy in the area of financial stability, as pointed out by dirk schoenmaker. in short, any two of global financial stability, financial integration or national financial policies can be achieved, but not all three at the same time. the main message is that if we want to live in a world with an open global financial system, then safeguarding financial stability requires a set of minimum global standards. failure on this count could result in regulatory fragmentation, regulatory arbitrage and an uneven playing field for internationally active banks. this philosophy is what drives the work of the basel committee, and it underpins a common set of shared values among our members. thus, it came as no surprise that the committee – including under stefan ingves'chairmanship – was able to coalesce around the basel iii reforms, given the mutual interest

extensive experience in monetary policy management, and in banking and financial regulation and supervision. he has been at the forefront of efforts to address and resolve the financial crisis that began in 2007 and the subsequent european sovereign debt crisis. as well as for his profound knowledge of monetary and financial matters, governor noyer is known for the extremely courteous and careful way in which he always expresses his opinions and even his most serious disagreements. i am sure, ladies and gentlemen, that you are going to enjoy and benefit from the quality, both in substance and in form, of the address that governor noyer is about to give. ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much. bis central bankers ’ speeches