for equivalence assessment – for financial market infrastructure ( fmi ). market functioning, and therefore financial stability, is dependent on the continuity and orderly operation of services provided by these infrastructures. the multilateral nature of fmis also mean that their services are often cross - border and accessed by a wide range of market participants. since the development of the pfmi by iosco and the bis committee for payments and market infrastructures ( cpmi ), these standards have been used by many regulators including singapore as a key basis for comparability assessments. cpmi - iosco has also been conducting level 2 assessments of jurisdictions ’ implementation of the pfmi. assessments of the eu, japan, us and australia are complete, and assessments of singapore and hong kong are under way. such peer assessments against international standards will help to promote greater understanding and alignment amongst various jurisdictions ’ frameworks. peer assessments have also helped to identify and close gaps at the entity level. for instance, the recent level 3 assessment by cpmi - iosco on the implementation of the pfmi5 by ten ccps ( including sgx - dc ) helped to identify gaps and shortcomings which cpmi - iosco expects to be addressed by the ccps and their respective regulators by the end of the year. as outstanding issues are addressed and the progress tracked, regulators should also have greater confidence in undertaking their equivalence assessments of ccps that their domestic market participants can access. this can then provide greater certainty to global market participants. 2 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches improving market access for ccps singapore, as with other jurisdictions, will be commencing our clearing mandate next year thereby enhancing the role of ccps as a risk mitigating tool. however, a clearing mandate cannot be effectively implemented if access to ccp remains an issue for counterparties, particularly smaller players. we share similar concerns to those that have been expressed by esma. in this regard, it is noteworthy that esma has looked into possible ways to improve ccp access and has, for example, proposed indirect clearing arrangements which strikes a balance between having an appropriate level of indirect client protection and counterparty risk. i hope today ’ s forum will allow mas and other regulators to learn from esma ’ s insights. to enable a wider range of market participants – including those based outside singapore - to have direct access to ccps in singapore, mas will allow our ccps to introduce self - clearing and remote clearing memberships. this benefits not only

the participants but the ccp and the system as a whole ; with a larger and more diversified pool of participants, the impact on the ccp due to a default of any single particular participant would be reduced. self - clearing can also widen ccp access on cost - effective terms and allow proprietary derivatives trading firms, such as buy - side players, to join ccps as members and thereby reduce their counterparty and fellow customer risks. ccps will have the flexibility to design suitable self - clearing models, taking into account the risks and needs of self - clearing members. we have seen recent innovations by eurex and cme to allow certain market participants which are not allowed to take part in the ccp risk mutualisation as a result of their mandates, to selfclear on the ccp. remote clearing will allow offshore participants, which do not currently have a presence in singapore, to join our ccps, thus bringing about new, additional liquidity to local markets. the increased breadth and depth of the markets in turn benefits onshore members which will continue to be key players in our domestic markets. at the same time, such memberships allow offshore firms to gain familiarity with the local market and to deepen their participation. there are some understandable concerns if remote or self - clearing can undermine financial stability in domestic markets. in singapore, our regulatory standards and expectations will not change. we will only allow ccps to admit self - clearing or remote clearing members if they have put in place adequate admission, ongoing monitoring and risk management frameworks. beyond equivalence assessments, we will consider the formation of supervisory colleges for our ccps should they be deemed as internationally active. putting recovery and resolution plans in place allow me to share a final set of remarks on recovery and resolution plans. even as we continue to strengthen the resilience and accessibility of ccps, we must continue our efforts to ensure that recovery and resolution plans for ccps are in place. there have been greater focus and thought given to arrangements to deal with default risks but it should also be recognised that other risks such as custody and investment risks can also pose a threat to a ccp's viability. hence, in line with the cpmi - iosco report on recovery of financial market infrastructures, mas expects and will place priority to ensure our ccps have clear arrangements to enable custody and investment losses to be allocated in a way which allows ccps to be solvent and can continue to provide its critical services. at the