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made. financial stability was safeguarded by the bank of greece with the support of the government during the crisis, greek banks were cut off from international markets and, until june 2012, experienced an unprecedented outflow of deposits, equivalent to one third of the deposit base. in response, they resorted increasingly to short - term financing from the eurosystem. at the height of the crisis in june 2012, total central bank financing to credit institutions came close to €140 billion. in addition, although greek banks entered the crisis with satisfactory capital adequacy ratios, the heavy losses they suffered from 2010 onwards and especially the impact of private sector involvement ( psi ) resulted in nearly all banks being faced with a capital shortage at end - 2011. the recapitalisation of greek banks thus became imperative, in order to fully protect depositors. under these adverse circumstances, the government and the bank of greece took a number of decisive actions aimed at safeguarding financial stability and protecting depositors. the most important of these actions involved : • the uninterrupted coverage of banks ’ short - term liquidity needs and the public ’ s demand for cash ; • the securing of adequate public funds for the recapitalisation and restructuring of the greek banking sector ; bis central bankers ’ speeches • the resolution of weak banks under a new legal framework ; and • the recapitalisation of core banks. steps towards the restructuring of the banking system the establishment of an appropriate resolution framework allowed for a smooth restructuring of the banking sector. by end - 2013, twelve banks had been resolved, mainly via the transfer of their healthy assets to another bank. also, following a bidding process, the assets and liabilities of cypriot bank branches were transferred smoothly to a greek bank. with the completion of the recapitalisation process by mid - 2013, banks ’ capital adequacy ratios had been restored. the hellenic financial stability fund ( hfsf ) is now the largest shareholder in each of greece ’ s four core banks and has a buffer of over €8 billion to meet any further capital needs. the banking landscape today is different from that prevailing at the start of the crisis. excess capacity has largely been eliminated, fewer but stronger banks are in operation, and the first benefits from the exploitation of synergies are already visible. institutional reforms to reinforce eu economic governance the crisis served as a catalyst for strengthening economic governance in the eu, in general, and the euro area, in particular. support mechanisms