proceed from the conservative assessments of the maximum possible debt burden on the russian economy, which does not pose a threat to macroeconomic stability, say, no more than 25 – 30 % of gdp. anyway examples from the russian history show that the real interest rates the russian budget has to pay, should the government debt exceed 35 – 40 %, became exorbitant and accelerated the debt spiral. among the negative outcome of government debt growth i may also call the ousting of corporate and private borrowers by the state. by the way, the maximum permissible debt burden is higher in the countries witnessing persistently low inflation and persistently low inflation expectations. the long - term real interest rates in these countries are lower, which means that debt burden limits are higher. this is another manifestation of interdependence between fiscal and monetary policies : the more successful the central bank is in terms of securing sustainable price stability, the larger is the room for manoeuvre used by the government to build up budget deficit and government debt to pursue a countercyclical policy. actually, there is no choice whether the government debt is good or bad. any medicine can be fatal, or at least toxic, if overdosed. the same is true of the government debt : it can easily turn out from a basis for the financial system development to its grave digger. this is one of the reasons which cannot help being taken into account in shaping fiscal policy. while assessing the size of potential development of the russian debt market, one cannot help taking into account several material risk factors. the first one is various off - balancesheet budget liabilities, explicit and implicit ones. the case of vnesheconombank shows that they may be rather significant. therefore, balancing federal budget alone without accounting for debt accumulation by the regions is insufficient. such factor as population aging and the need to finance the growing costs of pension provision in the next five to ten years cannot be ruled out either. the second factor is high uncertainty in the global commodity markets, first of all, the oil market. this is another argument in favour of using conservative scenarios. finally, there is uncertainty with regard to the duration of the period of low oil prices. but the total amount of the macroeconomically stable debt burden is, unfortunately, an absolute value not depending on the period, during which the debt is being accumulated. the lack of clear fiscal strategy in the future can destabilise the markets already now. whether the

senad softic : we will carefully monitor developments and possible changes media statement by mr senad softic, governor of the central bank of bosnia and herzegovina, on possible impacts of the euro introduction in croatia. statement issued on 7 august 2020. * * * the central bank of bh does not expect major challenges related to the introduction of the euro in croatia, said the governor of the central bank of bh he said that the foreign exchange risk in transactions with croatia will remain insignificant, as long as the currency board regime is in force in bh, or until bh introduces the euro. how much will the adoption of the euro in croatia, sooner or later, have an impact on bosnia and herzegovina, given the border connections and the turnover that still exists? we do not expect major challenges regarding the introduction of the euro in croatia. on the contrary. the exchange rate regime in force in croatia is a managed fluctuating exchange rate. the fact that croatia is in erm ii means, among other things, that the cnb has successfully maintained the exchange rate of the kuna against the euro in a certain narrow spread. therefore, fluctuations in the exchange rate of the kuna against the euro, and consequently against the km, were not strong. this means that foreign exchange risk in the financial system and the real sector, from this aspect, was not emphasized. with the introduction of the euro, foreign exchange risk in transactions with croatia will become negligible, as long as the currency board regime is in place in bh, or until bh introduces the euro. therefore, when croatia introduces the euro, the risks of doing business with croatia will be lower because the foreign exchange risk of changes in the value of the kuna against the euro will be eliminated. also, exchange operations ( currency exchange operations ) will be simpler because the same money will be used in 17 other countries. it is possible that in the medium term, the croatian economy will become more integrated and turn to countries that have the euro. but i repeat, there should be no major challenges. the cbbh will monitor the developments very carefully and take measures in time, if necessary. 1 / 1 bis central bankers'speeches