the country has and will have specific financing needs over the next 18 months. is a new programme for greece a scenario that ’ s being considered? the eurogroup has outlined a clear sequence. when the current review is concluded successfully, and if the greek authorities so wish, a follow - up arrangement will be discussed with the eurogroup. but it is first and foremost the responsibility of the greek government to create growth and regain financial independence. this requires in my view a clear resolve to boost economic reforms, a prudent fiscal path and an unequivocal confirmation that greece will honour its international commitments. doubts about the country ’ s creditworthiness will then recede and foreign investors will return to greece. the new government is negotiating with the european commission, the ecb and the imf in full awareness of the fundamental hypothesis that in the end no one would want a grexit. if that is true, why didn ’ t europe realise earlier that the greek programme was not working effectively? the recession and unemployment in greece cannot be compared with the recession and unemployment in cyprus, ireland, portugal and spain. my question is : would a failure of the programme eventually undermine the future of the euro area? from a very difficult starting position, and through painful efforts, greece has made good progress in restoring fiscal and external sustainability, as well as in putting banks on a sound footing and strengthening the basis for growth and job creation. by the end of 2014, economic indicators were clearly pointing to positive growth and better prospects ahead. indeed, in its forecast released one month ago, the european commission expected greece to grow by 2. 5 % in 2015 and 3. 6 % in 2016, one of the highest growth rates in the euro area. and the arduous efforts of the greek people need to be recognised here. but let ’ s not fool ourselves : adjustment was inevitable and, believe me, it would have been much worse without european and international support. that said, we should always learn from the past. for instance, i believe that the programme should have put more emphasis, at an earlier stage, on reducing rents – in the economic sense – and fighting vested interests in the greek economy, to allow for a fairer sharing of the adjustment burden. also, in its crisis - fighting toolbox, europe did not have at its disposal instruments available to institutions such as the world bank, which supports social safety nets when countries undertake structural adjustment. according to some rumours, the ecb played a

africa ’ s policy approaches to this priority area. the future of work and central banking much of the research being conducted on the future of work in relation to the fourth industrial revolution revolves around issues directly related to fiscal policy. beyond this, many of the policy areas being affected, such as skills and competition, are outside of the direct ambit of central banks. however, insofar as the future of work could have an impact on the macroeconomy – through its effect on labour, aggregate demand and supply, prices and therefore the equilibrium interest rate – it certainly could influence the conduct of monetary policy. monetary policy could be affected through various channels. prices could be lowered, for example, as retail sales become digitalised, as many already are. as a result, inflation could decelerate because online retailers face much lower operational costs than traditional businesses. anders borg, sweden ’ s former minister of finance, also notes that feed - through from exchange rate depreciations might be less than it has 9 under australia ’ s g20 presidency in 2014, all g20 countries were asked to prepare medium - term growth strategies to provide a systematic framework for addressing policies and priorities in the growth agenda. the strategies prepared are comprehensive in scope, spanning macroeconomic policies and structural reforms to promote strong, sustainable, and balanced growth. page 6 of 12 been historically. the theoretical starting point is that a permanent depreciation should be fully absorbed by consumer prices. in a digital world, currency depreciation could imply that the profit - margin squeeze is accelerating. the recent limited impact of dollar appreciation on inflation in some of the emerging markets shows that this could be at least one underlying factor. 10 monetary policy will also be affected by labour demand and supply. one can assume that, during a transition, jobs will be lost. however, should the displaced workers be unable to find other jobs, the equilibrium rate of unemployment could increase, shifting the phillips curve11 outwards. inflation could decelerate if we assume that the productivity of robots will be greater than that of humans, causing a decline in the wages of the remaining workforce. however, the shape of the philips curve can also be affected if, for example, trade union power is reduced or the expected disinflation is not realised because firms decide to increase mark - ups, cancelling out the impact of lower wage growth. the macroeconomic impact of these developments remains uncertain. what is clear, however, is that monetary policy will have to