samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
, ‘ foreign currency conversion services in australia ’, july. for example, bank customers may also incur additional fees charged by the ‘ correspondent banks ’ that intermediate the payment to its final destination on behalf of the sending bank. these fees may not be known at the point of the transaction and can result in less foreign currency being received than expected. see bullock m ( 2019 ), ‘ modernising australia's payments system ’, speech to the central bank paymentsconference, berlin, 25 june. reserve bank of australia ( 2019 ), ‘ review of retail payments regulation : issues paper pdf ’, november. © reserve bank of australia, 2001 – 2019. all rights reserved. the reserve bank of australia acknowledges the aboriginal and torres strait islander peoples of australia as the traditional custodians of this land, and recognises their continuing connection to country. we pay our respects to their elders, past, present and emerging. https : / / www. rba. gov. au / speeches / 2019 / sp - gov - 2019 - 12 - 10. html 12 / 12

government can use the new payments platform to make, and receive, some of its payments. so it is a busy time at the reserve bank. further details on these and other projects that we are working on will be available in the bank ’ s annual report, which will be tabled in parliament and released mid next month. thank you. my colleagues and i are here to answer your questions. 5 / 5 bis central banker's speeches
financial regulation in south africa, s. a. financial sector forum, johannesburg 2001. republic of south africa, national treasury, budget review 2004, rp18 / 2004, pretoria, 18 february 2004. republic of south africa, national treasury, medium - term budget policy statement, october 2003, rp201 / 2003, pretoria, 2003. south african reserve bank, governor ’ s address, 1994 to 2003. south african reserve bank, bank supervision department, annual reports, 1994 to 2003.

management, business support and cash processing. i would also like to thank all our staff at regional branches for strengthening their role as ambassadors of the bank of korea. i hope that you can expand your horizons by communicating with people in your regional communities, while taking pride in the fact that you are making actual contributions to developing those same communities. the bank of korea stands at a new turning point this year. after several years of construction, the completion of our new headquarters is just around the corner. in several months, we will return to where we originally undertook our duties since 1950. i would like to express my genuine gratitude to those involved in the construction for all their hard work. with the advent of the post - covid era, i hope that this new year will be a year for the bank of korea to leap forward in a new environment. as we greet this new year, i want to wish you and your family all the very best of health and good fortune. thank you. 4 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches
” markets for smes in italy and germany could serve as examples to gain insights into best practices for the establishment of sme markets. the development of bond and equity markets for smes and mid - sized companies would also encourage more cross - border investment within the eu and from foreign investors. fourth, measures to develop alternative financial intermediaries for young companies and smes. in this context, efforts should be intensified toward the creation of a risk capital market for non - listed companies such as a market for venture capital funds and markets for infrastructure financing. mifid ii is an important step towards improving the functioning of eu trading venues and setting the stage for the development of sme capital markets. however, further steps are necessary, in particular to correct differences throughout the eu in the tax treatment of these products both at the issuer and investor level. fifth, measures to improve investors ’ access to business, credit and financial information on smes. it is well - known that most smes are not rated by rating agencies. the lack of adequate and readily available information on the credit quality of smes is a structural problem in the eu as a whole and in the central, eastern and southern european region, in particular. this is one of the major reasons that smes in the eu have historically faced significant difficulties to access funding from capital markets. there is, thus, the need of a harmonised eu approach to credit scoring comparability of sme data. improving the availability of financial information is paramount in allowing investors to gauge the riskiness of securitized products. in this respect, it is important to develop national credit registers for smes, allowing for higher transparency, standardization and comparability of underlying assets. a final word of caution is in order. most of the measures i discussed above will likely have only medium - to long - term effects in reviving credit markets in the eu because most of these measures constitute fundamental changes in the structure of the financial system. such structures naturally change only gradually over time. in the short term, monetary policy will continue to play the major role in determining liquidity provision to banks and the cost of funding for the private sector. non - standard monetary policy measures and progress towards a banking union are, thus, of prime importance, in order to reduce market fragmentation and allow the normal transmission of monetary policy to the most vulnerable areas of the monetary union. bis central bankers ’ speeches

tutte le poesie, mondadori, 1984 meridiani, p. 1, 245 2 translator ’ s note : the connubio ( or “ marriage ” ) refers to the coalition made by cavour between the centre right and the centre left. 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches
good parts of financial innovation and not to repeat past excesses that have contributed to the crisis. risk management needs to provide life jackets, not golden parachutes.

the same is also true of the euro area vis - a - vis the rest of the world ( chart 2 ). for germany this result reflects two factors. first, the fact that, in spite of its large net international investment position, the economy ’ s stock of fixed - income liabilities has closely 4 / 13 bis central bankers'speeches tracked its stock of fixed income assets. and second, the fact that the drop in interest rates on those liabilities has been significantly larger than on its assets, since germany has acted as both a safe haven for investors during periods of financial stress, and as the premier safe - asset provider in the euro area in the context of the shrinking supply of aaa - rated government debt. 4 it is not possible to say definitively from the data whether these results are due to shifts in interest income within the euro area or vis - a - vis the rest of the world. but from what we can tell, there are no signs that low interest rates are shifting financial income away from stronger countries and towards weaker ones, as is often claimed. in fact, redistribution of financial income within countries – that is, across sectors – seems much more important than across countries. for germany, we can see that the government and non - financial corporations have made large windfall gains. the household sector, often thought to have lost out the most in germany due to its large net saver position, has in fact only recorded a mild loss in net interest income, since the household borrowing rate has fallen more than the lending rate. and if one runs the same exercise from mid - 2014, when our credit easing began, the household sector actually accrues a slight gain. in germany the financial sector has been most affected. but this has been driven more by the earlier fall in interest rates in 2008 than the impact of our measures since mid - 2014 – an issue i will return to later. such sectoral aggregates will nevertheless always mask a wide dispersion of effects across households. this is not straightforward to measure, but we can make some inferences from the eurosystem ’ s household finance and consumption survey. two waves have taken place so far – in 2010 and 2014 – which gives us the possibility to see how net financial income5 has shifted between different households as interest rates have fallen. in this period 2 - year euro area benchmark bond yields fell by 130 basis points and 10 - year bonds by 110 basis points. what we see is that, for the whole
continue to pay close attention to the evolution of risks as well as to economic and financial developments in the canadian and global economies.

rates. at the bank of canada, we will keep working to provide the stability that's most conducive to risk taking and investment. with governments providing the right policy background, and with the business community doing its part to invest, together we will all be able to help canada's economy to grow - and canadians to prosper - in the years ahead, no matter what surprises may come. thank you. i would like to thank eric santor for his help in preparing this speech. 1 see c. haun and t. sargent, " decomposing canada's post - 2000 productivity performance and pandemic - era productivity slowdown, " centre for the study of living standards, international productivity monitor 45 ( 2023 ) : 5a€ “ 27. 2 see w. gu, " investment slowdown in canada after the mid - 2000s : the role of competition and intangibles, " statistics canada analytical studies branch research paper no. 474 ( february 2024 ). 6 / 6 bis - central bankers'speeches
supervisory issues. i hope that the presentations that will take place today and tomorrow will stimulate and provide further ideas for the insurance community in further developing insurance markets and products in the gcc countries. all that remains is for me to wish you an interesting and productive forum, and to thank the organizers, once again, for putting on a stimulating program. thank you.

willem f duisenberg : another step in the direction of a united europe address by dr willem f duisenberg, president of the european central bank, on the occasion of an audience by dr carlo azeglio ciampi, president of the italian republic, in the context of the meeting of the governing council of the european central bank in rome, rome, 2 april 2003. * * * on behalf of the european central bank ( ecb ) and all members of the governing council, i should like to thank his excellency - dottore carlo azeglio ciampi - for his kindness and hospitality to receive us today, on the eve of the governing council meeting in rome, despite the geopolitical tensions we are currently facing. moreover, i should like to thank governor dottore antonio fazio and the banca d ’ italia for organising this meeting of the governing council outside frankfurt am main. the governing council has decided to meet, in principle, two times a year outside the ecb premises in frankfurt, in order to emphasise the federal character of the eurosystem, the collective consisting of the ecb and the national central banks of the member states that have adopted the euro. the decentralised set - up of the eurosystem - with the ecb representing the hub of the system and the national central bank its spokes - has contributed to the acceptance of the euro as the single currency of more than 300 million citizens, as in particular the national central banks are well - equipped, in terms of knowledge of language and national backgrounds, to communicate to the general public. contrary to the public perception about other european institutions, the eurosystem is being perceived as relatively close to the heart of the public. i am very pleased to chair tomorrow ’ s meeting of the governing council here in rome. the fact that the governing council meets in rome is symbolic, in many aspects. first, rome is regarded as the cradle of the european - christian civilisation, as we know it nowadays. the roman empire was the first attempt to create a unified europe. although this period in history has greatly contributed to the development of the european continent, this experience has also made clear that europe cannot be unified by means of force, with some nations or peoples subordinated to others. unfortunately, this was a lesson, which europe had to learn the hard way. it took us almost 2, 000 years to realise that the continuous perils of war and oppression had to end.
npl ratio at 1. 98 percent as of november 2014. on the external front, we have been able to sustain current account surpluses since 2003, due to strong structural flows from remittances, bpo receipts and tourism. this has allowed us to build up our gir to $ 80 billion, which is more than 10 months ’ worth of imports of goods and payment for services. ladies and gentlemen, with these macroeconomic indicators, it would seem that the philippines was not severely affected by the gfc. this is true. we believe this was because we have “ kept our own house in order ”. keeping one ’ s own house in order entails putting together policies that are responsive. however, what can be considered responsive today, may not necessarily be what is responsive in the future. keeping one ’ s house in order, therefore, requires creativity and innovativeness. ladies and gentlemen, in the areas that are under the purview of the bsp, keeping our house in order has meant : 1. being focused on our primary goal of keeping prices stable. bis central bankers ’ speeches we have done this by ensuring that our monetary policy framework is well calibrated and appropriately flexible. we constantly improve our surveillance capabilities, fine - tune our econometric models, perform scenario building, and engage the market and our regional counterparts to make sure the inputs to policy are always fresh. to illustrate, during our last policy meeting, we kept our policy rates steady, even as some in the region have lowered their policy rates. our assessment then was that inflation would remain within the government ’ s target range of 2 to 4 percent over the policy horizon and that the risks to this forecast are balanced. for now, therefore, we deem the stance of monetary policy to be appropriate. 2. being deliberate in adopting the global financial reform agenda. while we agree with the goals of the global reforms, our adoption of these has been based on our unique domestic market conditions. for instance, we adopted the capital requirements of basel 3 in january 2014 because our banks were already above the new requirements anyway. meanwhile, we have decided to phase in the adoption of the other components of basel 3, including those related to liquidity and leverage. our approach to reform has always been pragmatic. but we do not subscribe to the view of others that “ if it ain ’ t broke why fix it ”. there is always a better way of doing things, but one needs to have

- has always been very fiscally responsible because they know that they can finance a big part of the debt of the government by issuing pesodenominated bonds. indeed, around 80 percent of our debt is domestic debt, and much of that is longer than two years. in summary, what you have is the financial and banking conditions of the philippines that are consistent with long - term growth. no shortcuts. no boom and bust. we try to keep growth as steady as possible and to make sure that the banks are strong so that the economy will be supported by price stability, financial stability, and the payment system that we support. thank you very much. 4 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches
level of structural unemployment. the main contribution the single monetary policy can make to the welfare of the people in the euro area will be the maintenance of price stability in the medium term. although monetary policy - making in europe is not an easy task, i am confident after the experience of the first 11 months that the eurosystem is both determined to assume this task and is well equipped to do so.

vitor constancio : repo market and securities lending – towards an eu database introductory remarks by mr vitor constancio, vice - president of the european central bank, to the ecb workshop “ repo market and securities lending – towards an eu database ”, frankfurt am main, 3 december 2012. * * * ladies and gentlemen. i am pleased to welcome you all to this workshop. your presence today makes clear the wide interest and also the urgency to enhance the monitoring of the eu repo market. i want particularly to highlight the participation of the us authorities that kindly accepted to share their experience, the bank of england, with whom we share the same transparency concerns, and last but not least the european commission and esma who have their special say on the subject of regulatory reporting and trade repositories regulation. for years before the crisis, repos provided a stable and liquid market. since the start of the euro, the euro repo market proved to be very successful. in the past years secured lending via repos has increased significantly, and, according to our estimate, since 2002 its daily turnover more than doubled. this increased importance of the repo market particularly since the onset of the financial crisis stems, of course, with the market perception of credit risk concerns linked to unsecured transactions. the growth in this market was also underpinned and promoted by key legislative changes such as those brought by the collateral directive, which provided for a clear and harmonised framework across the eu. yet, in 2008, following deterioration in market confidence, financial integration in money markets deteriorated, as witnessed in an upward drift in cross country dispersion for overnight rates and a significant decline in interbank market activity, particularly in the unsecured segment. some leading commentators ( gorton and metrick 1 ) even argued that the core problem of the financial crisis in the us was a run on repos. as a result of the combined effect of the measures implemented by the ecb, the euro money market conditions improved during 2012, although its fragmentation remains still high. against this background, a key lesson from the crisis is that we need to better understand and monitor the repo as well as the securities lending markets, given their importance for the efficient functioning of the financial system. this has been confirmed by the analysis conducted at global level by the financial stability board ( fsb ). also our us friends are conducting initiatives aimed at the same objective. the workshop today gathers together key representatives
##e price inflation, where housing services constitutes 17 percent of the pce price indexes'measure of core inflation. 6 / 6 bis - central bankers'speeches

in supervisory practice, insofar as resource constraints will always limit the number of supervisory examinations. possible need for structural solutions beyond remedial or punitive measures directed at specific firms and future - oriented changes in supervisory practice, structural solutions may be needed to address the range of problems associated with mortgage servicing. similarly, the foreclosure documentation problems are another reminder of the degree to which foreclosure has been preferred to mortgage modification, notwithstanding various efforts to change this imbalance. here again, a more structural solution may be needed. the explosive growth of securitization as a vehicle for financing mortgages was accompanied by the emergence of a sizeable mortgage servicing industry – that is, a group of firms servicing mortgages that they did not own or, in many cases, that they had not originated. while there have surely been economies associated with this industry, there have also been chronic problems. it has been increasingly apparent that the inadequacy of servicer resources to deal with mortgage modifications – an area that was a point of supervisory emphasis – was actually a reflection of a larger inability to deal with the challenges entailed in servicing mortgages in many jurisdictions and dealing with a complicated investor base. for example, foreclosure procedures are specifically the province of real property law governed by the states, and can vary not only by state, but also within states and sometimes even within counties. with or without regulatory changes, it is quite probable that servicer fees to securitization trusts will increase to reflect the costs associated with the complexities of the contemporary mortgage model. the impetus for change in the mortgage servicing industry is likely only to increase as the advantages of servicing rights for regulatory capital purposes become limited after the new basel iii requirements are implemented. 1 it is possible that servicing issues can be satisfactorily addressed through the actions of the various primary regulators. however, in light of the range of problems already encountered, and the prospect of further changes in the industry – including the possible migration of more servicing activity to non - banking organizations – it seems reasonable at least to consider whether a national set of standards for mortgage servicers may be warranted. the case for concerted, coordinated action is much clearer with respect to the slow - moving pace of mortgage modifications. regardless of the findings that emerge from the examinations underway, and remedial actions required to correct past mistakes, this episode has again drawn attention to what can only be described as a perverse set of