of budgetary orthodoxy in europe... the imf says that a fiscal stimulus is useful but it is not questioning europe ’ s budgetary criteria. the imf is emphasising fiscal stimulus in countries which have the means, which have the room for manoeuvre, i. e. in countries where the debt is sufficiently low, and in particular in germany. france has a debt approaching 100 % of gdp and it doesn ’ t have the room for manoeuvre for a fiscal stimulus. do you think the german government is prepared to launch a stimulus? they ’ ve started doing so. tax cuts are planned and public investment has increased. but there is also a fairly broad consensus among germans on the need to keep public debt low as the population is ageing. it is a collective policy choice in germany that has to be respected. the greek debt crisis has resurfaced. would the greeks have been happier if they hadn ’ t joined the euro? even with the sacrifices that have been demanded of the greek people, they have never expressed a wish to leave the euro. i don ’ t think that greece should not have been included in the euro. its problems are not related to its euro membership : administrative shortcomings, very weak social protection, problematic tax collection, highly specialised economy... again, the euro exposes a country ’ s strengths and weaknesses. greece needs to overhaul its administrative and political structures to be able to prosper in the euro. the greeks are still facing this predicament, but they have to be commended for the major reforms that they have undertaken. and to give a boost to europe ’ s economy, wouldn ’ t it be possible to lower the value of the euro against the dollar? the ecb has conducted a very expansionary monetary policy to stimulate inflation and 2 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches employment, a necessary step for the euro area. the ecb has no specific exchange rate target, but the single currency has adjusted as a consequence. since its last peak in 2011, the euro has depreciated by almost 30 % against the dollar. the euro is now at a level that is appropriate for the economic situation in europe. 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches

ltro was decided and when it was executed, so it gives only a partial picture of what is happening. that picture was not positive. credit was tightening all over the euro area in different degrees of intensity, more dramatically in the southern regions. we have to ask ourselves why this is so. the ltro allotment ( in december ) was eur 490 billion. the return of shorter - term liquidity from the banking system before the ltro was about eur 280 billion, so that the net injection was only eur 210 billion. and the bank bonds coming due in the first quarter were also about eur 210 billion. therefore, it is likely that banks simply repurchased their own bonds coming due. we have avoided an even worse credit crunch. wsj : would you be open to doing more, or longer, ltros if needed? draghi : you know how we answer these questions. we never pre - commit. wsj : the ecb protected its greek bond holdings from losses by swapping the bonds for new ones. critics say the ecb should suffer the fate that private sector bondholders have suffered. what ’ s your response to that? draghi : the securities market program bought these bonds because the monetary policy transmission channels were broken. the purchase of these bonds was done for public interest reasons. also people tend to forget that this money the ecb has spent is not private money. it is public money, it is taxpayers ’ money and the ecb is committed to protect the taxpayers ’ money. wsj : will that lessen the impact of future purchases, or are you willing to wind down the smp? draghi : the smp holdings are small if compared to the size of the european bond markets, and the interventions have become smaller and smaller in recent times. wsj : can you rule out future debt restructurings? some analysts would say that a country like portugal would benefit from this. draghi : we have confidence that the program countries are taking appropriate actions and that the targets of their programs are achievable and realistic. wsj : there ’ s been a lot of discussion on whether the chinese will get involved, whether china will buy bonds. what do you see on chinese institutional involvement in european financial markets? draghi : so far i don ’ t see any official public involvement in european financial markets. there have been lots of talks and conversations. i hear about them but i haven ’