intend to discuss all 43 of its recommendations in this speech, but that i would only like to highlight a few which hold particular relevance for this audience. the first is the development of a general code of conduct for financial market participants that would be pre - empted by the formation of a financial markets standards group. this group, led by senior market professionals, would provide a forum to discuss compliance issues and to resolve conflicts in standards of market practise. another recommendation is that the necessary data to carry out cross - market 5 see http : / / www. resbank. co. za / lists / news % 20and % 20publications / attachments / 8743 / 2018 % 20fmr % 200 7. pdf page 7 of 9 monitoring and surveillance could be collated via trade repositories, aiding both market discipline and transparency. regulation covering conflicts of interest and market abuse will also be considered. and in addition to our review of benchmark interest rates, regulators may also investigate ways to expand the repurchase market and encourage technological innovation to aid the competitive landscape. a final version of the review is being deliberated and will be handed over to the financial markets implementation committee comprising representatives from the nt, fsca and sarb, to give effect to the recommendations. finally, of specific interest to the audience here tonight, may be the progress that the sarb has made in accommodating collateral substitution in its operations. changes to our systems will allow banks to replace or substitute assets used as collateral in the main repurchase auction, in line with international best practice. in particular, the sarb will be transitioning the current master repurchase agreements into the global master repurchase agreement ( gmra ) to allow for this substitution. system changes are in progress, and full functionality for market participants is anticipated around midmay. once the gmras have been signed, our counterparties will be able to substitute collateral posted at the sarb. collateral substitution is expected to ease some of the demand for high - quality liquid assets through a more efficient use of such assets. more information on these and other initiatives is contained in the fmd newsletter6, accessible on the sarb website, with some printed copies available here as well. concluding remarks let me conclude by once again extending, on behalf of fmd and the sarb, our appreciation to all market participants for your continued support and cooperation, which has aided the orderly functioning of our markets. a

sturzenegger, ‘ does it matter how central banks accumulate reserves? evidence from sovereign spreads ’, nber working paper no. 28973, june 2021. available at : https : / / www. nber. org / papers / w28973 agustin samano ‘ international reserves and central bank independence ’, policy research working paper no. 9832, 2021. available at : https : / / openknowledge. worldbank. org / handle / 10986 / 36483 olivier jeanne and damiano sandri, ‘ global financial cycle and liquidity management ’, bis working papers no. 1069, january 2023. available at : https : / / www. bis. org / publ / work1069. pdf in addition to these tools, we should consider our macro policy narratives. for a start, we need to rediscover the dangers of government borrowing. responsible policymakers never forget that fiscal debt is risky. but the nature of policy discussions is that while many claims are valid, some points get more emphasis than others. in the past decade, one such point was that fiscal consolidation hurts growth and is therefore self - defeating. another was that higher government debt levels were safer than previously thought. i have personally observed these claims justify sustained fiscal slippage in south africa. if we had felt the urgency of debt sustainability more keenly, we would have had a wiser conversation. we need a more responsible set of narratives around fiscal risks. 35 we also need to think more clearly about allocative efficiency. one of the strongest lessons i have learnt as a policymaker is that poor countries are poor not simply because they do not have money, but because they do not use money effectively. too often, there is a tendency to look at a problem, cost out a solution and focus on raising the cash. implementation is just a black box. but good policymaking starts with implementation and the financing need should reflect what can be used efficiently. indeed, one might cast the volatile and often damaging history of capital flows as a conflict between budget constraints and capacity constraints. capital flows provide spending power and can radically shift the budget envelope, but implementation capacity is stickier, and budgets can easily overshoot capacity. this point is relevant, once again, in the global dialogue about climate change justice and the financing that should be directed from rich countries to poor ones. there is a strong focus on costing the climate change impact for poor countries and