samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
considerations of being a small, highly globalised economy ”, central bank of ireland, financial stability review 2019 : i. [ 18 ] clancy, d. et al. ( 2023b ), “ reshoring production in small open economies ”, mimeo [ 19 ] makhlouf, g. ( 2022 ), “ remarks by governor gabriel makhlouf on the publication of the financial stability review 2022 : 1 ”, 15 june 2022. [ 20 ] ioannou, d. et al. ( 2023 ), “ the eu's open strategic autonomy from a central banking perspective. challenges to the monetary policy landscape from a changing geopolitical environment ”, ecb occasional paper no. 311 [ 21 ] central bank of ireland ( 2022 ), “ the central bank of ireland ’ s framework for macroprudential capital ”, june 2022. ©2023 central bank of ireland

calculations, both in terms of net present value, and also in terms of refinancing risk. the banks : liquidity what happened to all the money that flowed in during the 2000s? the answer can be expressed in different ways, and i will be selective here. from one point of view, the money flowed out again : the pension funds, insurance companies, banks, sovereign wealth funds and others who had invested in irish bank bonds and wholesale deposits were repaid, at first out of borrowings made from the eurosystem, and then increasingly out of the realisation and sale of assets and the repayment of loans made by the banks. given all of the emphasis that has been placed on the different elements here, it is perhaps worth looking at the magnitudes. figures 2 and 3 look at the “ irish headquartered group ” of credit institutions which is the most relevant for our purposes. there has been massive downsizing of this category of banks. 4 ( there has also been downsizing of the other banks active in ireland, but these are less central to the fiscal - banking nexus that has been at the heart of the irish crisis, so i will not dwell on that here ). a few points are worth noting from these figures. first, the relative importance of bonds and deposits : deposits very much larger at all time periods ; bonds5 disproportionately invested by foreign concerns. second, the changing relative importance of foreign business on both the asset and liability side – growing up to the beginning of 2009, shrinking thereafter. third, the way in which central bank financing was used effectively in the classic lender of last resort function during the crisis. the banks : troubled loans as was already foreseen at the outset of the programme, repairing the banks is a lengthy process. at first, negotiators on the other side were inclined to wonder why more action had not already been taken. but already by the time the programme had been negotiated, they realised that this was going to take time. as imf staff put it at that time : “ the criticallyweakened banking sector can be returned to health only at a calibrated pace. ” this downsizing has generally been labelled “ deleveraging ”, though i prefer not to use that term, as it could equally refer to a situation where total balance sheet size is maintained, but financed with a higher proportion of equity. this term includes a wide range of different instruments, such as commercial paper,
often better than our upside scenarios as well. as an illustration, in august our central forecast was that the unemployment rate would end 2020 at close to 10 per cent and still be above 7 per cent at the end of 2022 ( graph 1 ). in our upside scenario, the unemployment rate was expected to end 2020 a little lower than 10 per cent, but still be around 7 per cent later this year. thankfully, the actual outcome for the unemployment rate has been much better than this, with the peak now looking to be behind us and the unemployment rate ending 2020 at 6. 6 per cent. graph 1 1 / 7 bis central bankers'speeches it is reasonable to ask : what explains these better - than - expected outcomes? there are 3 factors that i would like to point to. the first is the success that australia has had in containing the virus. that success has meant that the restrictions on activity have been less disruptive than we feared. it has allowed more of us to get back to work sooner and it has reduced some of the economic scarring from the pandemic. as is increasingly clear from experience both here and overseas, the health of the population and the health of the economy are inextricably linked. the second factor is the very significant fiscal policy support in australia, which as measured by the change in the aggregate budget position is almost 15 per cent of gdp ( graph 2 ). most of this support has been delivered by the australian government, but the states and territories have also played a role too. this support has been more substantial than was assumed in august and has made a real difference. it has provided a welcome boost to incomes and jobs and helped front load the recovery by creating incentives for people to bring forward spending. there has also been a positive interaction with the better health outcomes, which have allowed the policy support to gain more traction than would otherwise have been the case. graph 2 the third factor is that australians adapted and innovated. when the virus first came to our shores, many people hunkered down, but as the days wore on, households and businesses adjusted and changed what they do and how they do it. this resilience has helped keep the economy going and kept people in jobs. many firms changed their business models, moved online, used new technologies and reconfigured their supply lines. households adjusted too, with spending patterns changing very significantly. some of the spending that would normally have been done on travel and entertainment has been

2009 ) : “ banking : key driver for inclusive growth ”, address delivered at the mint ’ s “ clarity through debate ” series in august 2009 at chennai. government of india ( 2006 ) : report of the working group on savings eleventh five year plan, planning commission, december. government of india ( 2007 ), eleventh five year plan document, planning commission. government of india ( 2008 ), the committee on financial inclusion ( chairman : c. rangarajan ). inclusive growth analytics : framework and application ( 2009 ). elena ianchovichina and susanna lundstrom, world bank. reserve bank of india ( 2008 ), report on currency and finance 2006 – 08.
- 10 - 10 - 20 - 20 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 consumer corporate housing consumer, from 181 days to 1 year consumer, over 3 years commercial, 30 - 89 days commercial, from 181 days to 1 year housing, over 3 years ( 1 ) data for may 2010 are provisional. ( 2 ) sum of commercial and foreign trade loans. ( 3 ) weighted averaged rates of all operations performed in the month. ( 4 ) nominal rates. ( 5 ) uf - indexed rates. sources : central bank of chile and superintendence of banks & financial institutions. figure 7 ees : inflation expectations cpi inflation ( * ) ( annual change, percent ) ( percent ) - 2 - 2 - 4 - 4 at december 2010 in one year in two years march 2010 ipom june 2010 ipom ( * ) gray area : as from second quarter 2010, forecast. sources : central bank of chile and national statistics bureau ( ine ). figure 8 mpr and forward curve ( percent ) jul. jul. ees june 2010 forward, march 2010 ipom mpr jul. jul. jul. ees march 2010 forward, june 2010 ipom eof, first half of june source : central bank of chile.

0. 3 4. 0 4. 4 3. 8 3. 7 wti oil price ( us $ / barrel ) lme copper price ( us $ cent / lb ) terms of trade ( annual change, % ) - 16. 1 4. 1 4. 1 12. 5 14. 3 - 5. 6 - 7. 2 external prices, in us $ ( annual change, % ) 12. 2 - 6. 1 - 6. 2 3. 7 3. 4 3. 0 3. 3 ( e ) estimate. ( f ) forecast. source : central bank of chile. figure 5 output by sector ( * ) ( average index, 2006 - 2009 = 100 ) imacec ( * ) ( index, 2003 = 100 ) retail sales manufacturing output ( * ) seasonally - adjusted series. sources : central bank of chile and national statistics bureau ( ine ). table 2 economic growth and inflation ( annual change, percent ) 2010 ( f ) 2011 ( f ) gdp domestic demand domestic demand ( w / o inventory change ) gross fixed capital formation total consumption goods and services exports goods and services imports current account ( % gdp ) 3. 7 7. 6 7. 5 18. 6 4. 0 3. 1 12. 2 - 1. 5 - 1. 5 - 5. 9 - 2. 8 - 15. 3 1. 8 - 5. 6 - 14. 3 2. 6 4, 0 - 5, 0 14. 5 11. 3 23. 0 7. 8 1. 0 25. 8 - 1. 2 average cpi inflation december cpi inflation cpi inflation in around 2 years ( * ) 8. 7 7. 1 1. 6 - 1. 4 1. 8 3. 8 3. 2 3. 1 average cpix inflation december cpix inflation cpix inflation in around 2 years ( * ) 8. 4 8. 6 2. 8 - 1. 8 0. 7 3. 3 3. 5 3. 5 average cpix1 inflation december cpix1 inflation cpix1 inflation in around 2 years ( * ) 7. 8 7. 7 2. 8 - 1. 1 - 0. 1 1. 8 3. 2 3. 2 2012 ( f ) 3. 0 3. 2 3. 1 ( f ) forecast. ( * ) inflation forecast for second quarter 2012. source : central bank of chile. figure 6 loans by type of credit lending interest rates ( annual change, percent ) ( percent )
reduce the settlement risk and enhance efficiency, the patil committee has also proposed setting up of a robust clearing mechanism. the settlement was proposed to be initially on dvp i basis ( i. e. trade by trade basis ) to address the counterparty settlement risk and gradually migrate to dvp iii ( net settlement of funds as well as securities ) to impart enhanced settlement efficiency. ( the delivery versus payment ( dvp ) modules can be broadly classified into three broad categories viz. dvp i, dvp ii and dvp iii. under dvp i, the funds leg as well as the securities leg are settled simultaneously on a contract - by - contract basis. under dvp 2, while the securities leg is settled on a contract - by - contract basis, the funds leg is settled for the net amount ). under dvp iii, both the funds and the securities legs are settled for the net amounts. ) outlook for development of corporate debt market patil committee has recommended two important measures to be initiated by the government, namely rationalization of stamp - duty, and abolition of tax deduction at source, as in the case of government securities. hopefully, these would be acted upon soon. as the corporate debt markets develop and rbi is assured of availability of efficient price discovery through significant increases in public issues as well as secondary market trading, and an efficient and safe settlement system, based on dvp iii and stp is in place, rbi is committed to permitting market repos in corporate bonds. in the medium term, considering the overall macro - economic situation, the ceiling for foreign investment in both government securities and corporate debt will continue to be calibrated as an instrument of capital account management. in particular, a more liberalized access to foreign investment would be appropriate when, among other things, an efficient and safe settlement system is well entrenched, aggregate consolidated public debt to gdp ratio reaches a reasonable level, say less than 50 per cent, and the corporate debt market acquires depth and liquidity with significant role for insurance and pension funds in india. in the past, the government securities dominated the debt market in india, partly on account of the fiscal dominance and the absence of contractual savings. in the absence of contractual savings only banks tended to deploy their funds in the corporate bond market, mainly through private placement. rbi is hopeful that the recent slow but steady development of insurance sector, mutual funds etc. coupled with the existence of

of micro - entrepreneurs across the country. bis central bankers ’ speeches
our countries and it is well within your reach to do so. concluding remarks to sum up, ladies and gentlemen, i want to acknowledge the vital role played by the credit union movements in meeting the needs of our people. the benefits derived from credit unions are manifold as seen from the improvements in the living standards of members. assets are accumulated and savings are encouraged to help improve the livelihood of members. credit unions need to take on board good governance and risk management practices so as to minimise losses to capital and hard earned earnings. the legal framework needs to be reformed to allow for modernisation and innovation. the governance structure is very critical to the success and growth of credit unions. fit and proper guidelines should be followed in the election of committee members. members need to be kept fully informed of the operations of their credit union. data collection through a centralised data system will help in better positioning the credit union industry. lastly, credit unions need to be innovative in diversifying products and use of technology. we believe that the credit union movement is an ideal vehicle to reach the poor and less privileged and i wish to again reassure the movement in fiji that the rbf will partner with you to outreach microfinance development to this sector of our population so as to make a positive impact on the lives of our people. the reserve bank values the contribution made by the credit unions in fiji and hopes that the movement will grow and expand in the future with the right kind of governance framework. i know that you will have a lot to discuss and share in this congress. one of the better ways of success is to learn from one another ’ s experiences and with the attendance, like the one we have here today, i am sure that the outcome of this congress will be a success. with those words, i wish the congress well and it is my privilege and honour to now declare the 2009 credit union pacific congress officially opened. thank you.

you.
james mcandrews : negative nominal central bank policy rates – where is the lower bound? remarks by mr james mcandrews, executive vice president and director of research of the federal reserve bank of new york, at the university of wisconsin, madison, 8 may 2015. * * * the views expressed in this speech are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the federal reserve bank of new york or of the federal reserve system. the swiss national bank ( snb ), the european central bank ( ecb ), danmarks nationalbank ( dnb ), and the swedish riksbank recently have pushed short - term interest rates to levels below the “ zero lower bound. ” the current extent and depth of negative policy rates is unprecedented ; previously only denmark had a modestly negative policy rate in 2012 through 2014. the actions of the four central banks have led a number of commentators to ask, is the concept of a zero lower bound on interest rates valid? if not, what might be the lower bound, if any, on nominal interest rates? indeed, some economists have suggested that with changes to the monetary system, we could in fact eliminate the lower bound to interest rates altogether. i ’ ll first review the reasons given by the central banks for setting negative policy rates – in all cases, the negative rates were seen as a means of advancing the banks ’ macroeconomic objectives in the current environment. but much of my talk will focus on the unique complications associated with negative nominal interest rates and the extent to which these complications constrain how low the rates can be set. after outlining these challenges, i ’ ll suggest that the zero lower bound on policy interest rates is much like the low tide mark on a beach : standing at that border between the land and the ocean, you can continue to lower your elevation by walking into the water, but with each additional step, you will need to push against the increasing resistance of the water. there is a distinct qualitative difference between positive and negative nominal interest rates, just as there is a distinct qualitative difference between the beach and the ocean. the zero lower bound is marked by this same qualitative difference : zero is a rate below which a central bank encounters the distinctive and increasing costs of a negative nominal rate, relative to a nonnegative rate of interest. purpose in september 2014, the ecb lowered its deposit rate to its current level of negative 0. 2 percent. more recently, in

central bankers'speeches
, while still respecting the legal processes, i am of course more than willing to do so. my colleagues and i are here to respond to your questions. bis central bankers ’ speeches

equipment has declined over time. this is partly, but not wholly, explained by the steady decline in the relative price of machinery & equipment. graph 6 these shifts are significant and are consistent with the rising importance of investment in information technology. within the broad heading of intellectual property, we can further disaggregate the data into investment in computer software, r & d and artistic originals ( graph 7 ). over recent times, the strongest growth has been in investment in software, with investment in this area doubling over the past seven years. the picture for r & d is a little different ; investment in r & d has not grown for a few years now, but this follows earlier strong growth. graph 7 the impact of the increased investment in technology is also evident in the figures for output growth by industry. in particular, since the early 1990s, the fastest growing industries in the australian economy have been information, media & telecommunications and professional, scientific & technical services. both have grown faster than the mining industry, recording compounded average growth of around 5 per cent per year. the effects are also evident in the labour market, with strong demand for various types of workers in information technology. indeed, some of the pockets of the australian labour market in which wage growth has picked up over recent times are in professional, scientific & technical roles. the second structural change that i want to highlight is a shift in the industries in which investment is taking place. this shift can be seen in this next graph, which shows the share of non - mining investment accounted for by various industries ( graph 8 ). in the 1980s, the manufacturing industry accounted for around one quarter of non - mining investment in australia. at that time, manufacturing required high levels of investment in machinery & equipment, not only to expand capacity, but to offset fairly high rates of depreciation. so investment in the manufacturing industry accounted for a large share of total investment. but since the mid 1990s, manufacturing has accounted for a steadily declining share of non - mining investment. today, that share stands at just 11 per cent. in contrast, the shares of investment accounted for by information, media & telecommunications and professional, scientific & technical services have increased significantly. combined, these two industries now account for about 16 per cent of non - mining investment, up from around 8 per cent in the early 1990s. investment in health, education and transport has also increased as a share of total investment. graph 8 given these structural changes, one question that sometimes gets
european parliament over the next parliamentary term to complete the banking union and support your work to further strengthen the regulatory framework. 3 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches

haga clic aqui para escribir texto. 01. 03. 2018 developments in the economic situation asociacion espanola de directivos, santa cruz de tenerife luis m. linde governor introduction let me begin by thanking the tenerife asociacion espanola de directivos for their kind invitation to me to join you today. the european environment i shall devote my address to the current situation of the spanish economy. i will begin by highlighting the favourable cyclical juncture at which the euro area – the economic environment closest to us – stands. the upturn in which the euro area economy is immersed may be classified as robust and dynamic, and extensive to all productive sectors and countries. the euro area economy began to show signs of strength in the closing months of 2016, and these stepped up in the second half of last year. as a result, gdp at the close of 2017 was growing at 2. 7 %, a rate not seen since the start of monetary union and one significantly above what was expected a year earlier. these figures comfortably exceed the potential gdp growth estimates for the area as a whole and thus contribute to erasing the negative output gap generated by the crisis. one of the characteristics of the current expansionary phase is its intensity in terms of job creation, meaning that the euro area as a whole has now exceeded pre - crisis occupation levels. wage restraint and the reforms carried out in some countries have been conducive to the vigorous response by employment to economic growth. the euro area - wide unemployment rate has fallen to 8. 7 %, compared with levels close to 13 % at the height of the crisis, although there are substantial cross - country differences, ranging from an unemployment rate below 4 % in germany to 20 % in greece and 16. 5 % in spain. moreover, a balanced pattern of economic growth can be seen. adding more recently to the momentum of private consumption, the sole engine of growth of the start of the recovery, has been the dynamism of business investment. low financing costs, the sound performance of final demand and high capacity utilisation are enabling investment to pick up to pre - crisis levels. however, factors persist that might restrict medium - term investment projects, including most notably low potential growth expectations, the adjustment of balance sheets and the correction of high corporate debt levels still under way, and the problems that are creating political uncertainty. euro area exports, boosted by more buoya