samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
, disclosure, disciplined governance, incentive mechanism and supervision. japan was slow developing and putting in place such framework. i emphasize this aspect because, if expeditious and forceful progress had been made to deal with the capital loss in general and that of banking system in particular, monetary policy in japan might have found different environment to operate. amid a major shock such as the collapse of key asset prices, a need to address the nexus of monetary and prudential policies can't be overemphasized.

toshihiko fukui : 100th anniversary of the bank of japan ’ s presence in new york remarks by mr toshihiko fukui, governor of the bank of japan, at the reception for the 100th anniversary of the bank of japan representative office in new york, new york, 6 january 2005. * * * distinguished guests, chairman greenspan, president geithner, ladies and gentlemen, it is my great pleasure to welcome you to tonight ’ s event commemorating the 100th anniversary of the bank of japan ’ s presence in new york. beginning of the bank of japan ’ s new york office in 1905, exactly one hundred years ago, the bank opened its office here in new york. its original mission was to oversee the business related to government debt issuance. at that time, japan was engaged in warfare against russia. baron korekiyo takahashi, deputy governor of the bank at the time, was asked to raise the necessary funds - 10 million pounds, between three to four percent of japan ’ s gdp at the time abroad. he first went to london, then the largest financial market in the world. since japan was only a small emerging nation at that time, it comes as no surprise that baron takahashi could only raise half the necessary funds there. fortunately, he came across a prominent american banker, head of kuhn, loeb & co., who agreed to underwrite the remaining half. baron takahashi, who later became governor of the bank of japan and eventually prime minister of japan, wrote in his autobiography that he was utterly surprised by the fact that this american banker literally made the decision overnight. even in those days, it appears, u. s. bankers had boldness and decisiveness when it came to completing a deal. around the time the deal was struck, the yield spreads of the imperial japanese government debt over the british consol, a measure of risk premium against the benchmark of the era, peaked around 300 basis points. it tightened to around 150 basis points one and a half year later. when the first official of our new york office arrived in 1905, he must have had a strong brew of cultural shock. for example, back in tokyo street cars barely started to move on the ground ; whereas in new york, subway service was already in its second year of operation. also, i ’ m certain that he wasted no time in attending a yankee game, whose history in new york started just two years earlier. the year 1905 was roughly half a century
subsequently at a relatively quick pace, the planned tltros were let to run their course. while credit drawn by banks under this facility will be outstanding for the next three to four years, the facility itself is not an active instrument today. as a consequence, while all the instruments – including indeed the credit extended to banks under the previous tltros – interact to determine the stance prevailing today, the main source of easing at present comes from the interaction between the app, the moderately negative shortterm interest rate and the forward guidance on both these policy tools. our forward guidance clarifies the relationship between our two main instruments. it sets the conditionality that governs them and the sequencing of their phasing out. it also provides information about their expected life. with the last dfr reduction in march 2016, the app became the margin along which the governing council can still ease policy to a meaningful degree if needed. keeping policy rates at their present level for the entire life of the app is an enabling condition for the purchases to exert their full impact. this is why we have coordinated the guidance about our key interest rates and our asset purchases very carefully and, since march 2016, we have consistently communicated that our key policy rates are expected “ to remain at their present levels for an extended period of time, and well past the horizon of our net asset purchases. ” the appropriate calibration of this set of instruments is of course always a highly complex exercise and requires a broad range of analytical inputs and policy judgement. it works backward : from a desired medium term inflation outlook – one which is most consistent with the objective and with its numerical clarification that the governing council announced in may 2003 – to the broad financing conditions that can support that outlook, to the calibration of the governing council ’ s instruments that can foster those financing conditions. concretely, these exercises start from the governing council ’ s assessment of the prospects for inflation to return to levels that are close to 2 % by a meaningful time frame and with a reasonable degree of confidence. if the prospects for achieving that desired outcome are too weak, the governing council will form a view on the degree of accommodation that is necessary to make that outcome less uncertain. working backwards, this exercise is designed to promote the level and shape of the yield curve that, according to past regularities, can be expected to deliver the requisite amount of stimulus, taking into account the endogenous adjustment of the whole spectrum of market conditions – including

required to ensure a sound basis for economic growth. with china being one of the most important trading partners for the euro area and vice versa, recovery in the euro area and china is in our mutual interest. i am confident that we are on a good track. thank you for your attention.
in europe ”, april 2016. 2 see special feature a entitled “ financial integration and risk sharing in a monetary union ” in financial integration in europe report, april 2016. 3 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches 3 see special feature b entitled “ national options and discretions in the prudential regulatory framework for banks ” in financial integration in europe report, april 2016. 4 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches

, the financing structure of european companies is still predominantly bank - based. a look at the balance sheets of german companies, for instance, shows that bank credit still accounts for about 15 % of the liability side. this is certainly lower than the 22 % observed at the end of the 1990s, but compared to the us or the uk there is still room to increase the share of capital market financing. second, although banks ’ cross - border exposures have increased, capital market integration remains incomplete. in the banking sector, for instance integration has concentrated on the interbank market while credit markets for companies remain predominantly national. the bis central bankers ’ speeches integration of the markets for capital may have increased in europe, but the ownership structures of many companies have not. they are still strongly national. the relatively low level of integration in european capital markets represents a barrier for risk sharing. equity holdings in the us, for instance, are much more widely dispersed throughout the entire country. thus, when a negative shock hits an industry or a specific region, the resulting losses are spread widely beyond that region. in europe they are not, because equity holdings are much more concentrated nationally. empirical studies for the united states show that integrated markets for capital cushion around 40 % of the cyclical fluctuations between the us federal states. a share of around 25 % is smoothed via the credit markets, while fiscal mechanisms cushion just 20 % of shocks. studies for canada and sweden come to similar conclusions. against this backdrop, two general lines of action could be followed in europe. first, it might be beneficial to increase the share of capital markets in the financing structure of companies. this would, of course, require a shift away from the traditional bank - based system to a certain degree. in this context, it might be worth taking a closer look at tax regimes, among other things. currently, tax treatment still favours debt financing over equity financing. removing this bias in taxation would encourage companies to strengthen their equity base and thus turn more towards capital markets in their search for sources of funds. on a side note : strengthening the equity base is also a central issue with regard to banks, as the crisis has shown. nevertheless, strengthening the equity base of banks is less a question of providing the right incentives, but rather a question of outright regulatory requirements. and here, we have already come a long way. the second line of action would be to deepen the integration of capital markets, which might eventually result in the formation of a capital markets union
. it is necessary for the authorities concerned to continue coordinated work on this issue. iii. the role of central banks in maintaining financial stability the experience of the financial crisis has brought renewed attention to the role of central banks in financial safety nets, which in turn contribute to financial stability. this has led to the assignment of macro - prudential roles and financial regulatory authority to central banks in the united states and europe. in this respect, the bank of japan has had an important role in both micro - and macroprudential dimensions for maintaining financial stability. from a micro - prudential perspective, the bank conducts on - site examination and off - site monitoring of a wide range of financial institutions including securities firms, and urges improvement in risk and business management when necessary. from a macro - prudential perspective, the bank implements appropriate policy measures based on its analysis and assessment of the condition of the financial system as a whole by utilizing the information obtained from financial institutions as well as from the markets. measures taken by the bank from a macro - prudential perspective during the crisis include resumption of stock purchases held by banks, and provision of subordinated loans. in this way, the bank of japan plays a critical role in maintaining the stability of japan ’ s financial system. the bank will continue to make every effort, in both micro - and macroprudential dimensions, to ensure and maintain this financial stability. thank you very much for your attention.

banque de france, whole sale central bank digital currency experiments with the banque de france, new insights and key takeaways, july 2023. i
i ’ d like to emphasize the impact of sustainability in our lives. sustainability is not just a business decision that we have to make, but one that will have impact on our lives and the world as we know it. it ’ s important that we act now. the sooner we do, the sooner we will reap the benefits of sustainable finance in the post - pandemic world. thank you and a pleasant day to everyone. 5 / 6 bis central bankers'speeches 6 / 6 bis central bankers'speeches

april 17, 2020 ) ; “ it is when the horizon is the darkest and human reason is beaten down to the ground that faith shines brightest and comes to our rescue " ( may 22, 2020 ) ; and similar other quotes. 14. in particular, i would like to refer to my december 2023 statement following the macro prudential measures undertaken on november 16, 2023 : “ financial stability is a public good … …. we do not wait for the house to catch fire and then act. prudence at all times is our guiding philosophy. ” the spirit behind these statements are key to withstanding a period of multiple crises. our communication was backed up by appropriate policy actions. evidently, communication played a critical role in maintaining stability in the turbulent times of recent past. robust regulation and supervision for stability 15. it goes without saying that a sound regulatory framework for the regulated entities ( res ), together with a robust supervisory and monitoring mechanism, are key enablers for ensuring financial stability. from a prudential perspective, so far 5 financial stability was also described as a public good in nani palkhivala memorial lecture ( das, shaktikanta ), january 16, 2021 as the reserve bank is concerned, measures like the revised norms on classification and valuation of investments ; the scalebased regulation for nbfcs ; revised regulations for micro finance loans ; four - tiered regulatory approach for urban cooperative banks ( ucbs ) ; and steps to contain potential credit exuberance in unsecured loans are some illustrations of prudential design of regulations in the interest of maintaining financial stability. 16. looking ahead, the financial system will continue to face newer challenges. there is a continuing need for financial sector entities to strengthen their levels and quality of capital, while further sharpening the risk management standards. the reserve bank is now working on issues like adoption of revised basel iii standards in a phased manner ; issuance of guidelines for expected credit loss ( ecl ) ; liquidity coverage ratio ( lcr ) ; and prudential framework for financing of project loans. our overall approach is consultative. for instance, with regard to the ecl framework, even after issuing a discussion paper and receiving stakeholder comments which we got examined by an external working group, we now propose to issue a draft circular for implementation of ecl. the idea is to get stakeholder comments on certain specifics of the framework considering its significance for the banking sector. our endeavour is to maintain a
regarding the many payments system issues that the rba is working on, but we would welcome the opportunity to talk about these during the hearing, if that were possible. thank you. my colleagues and i are here to answer your questions. 4 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches

. the forward - looking indicators suggest further growth in jobs over the months ahead with vacancies at a very high level. our central forecast is for the unemployment rate to decline to below 4 per cent later this year and remain below 4 per cent next year. if this comes to pass, it would be a significant milestone. australia has not experienced unemployment rates this low since the early 1970s, almost half a century ago. the main source of uncertainty about the outlook continues to be covid - 19. the pandemic is not yet behind us and it is entirely possible that there will be more outbreaks. it also remains to be seen how households use all those savings that they have accumulated over the past two years. there are major geopolitical uncertainties and our largest trading partner, china, is working through a difficult adjustment in its property market. the sharp pick - up in inflation in parts of the 1 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches world, especially in the united states, has come as a surprise and is an additional source of uncertainty about the outlook. inflation for the first time in several decades, inflation has become a major issue in the global economy, although it is worth noting that inflation rates in most of asia remain low. in the united states, cpi inflation is running at more than 7 per cent and in the united kingdom it is expected to be at a similar rate soon. in germany, inflation is 5. 7 per cent and in new zealand it is 5. 9 per cent. these are the highest rates in decades and the higher inflation is turning out to be more persistent than earlier expected. this lift in inflation largely reflects the surge in global demand for goods during the pandemic coinciding with a reduced ability of the global economic system to produce and distribute goods. a related factor in a few countries, including the us and the uk, has been a decline in labour force participation, which has reduced the supply of labour and contributed to stronger wages growth. higher prices for petrol, electricity and gas have also pushed inflation up in many countries. in australia, we too have had higher inflation than we and others expected, although the increase here is smaller than in many other countries. in headline terms, inflation is 3½ per cent and in underlying terms it is 2. 6 per cent. we are feeling the effects of global supply - chain problems and higher oil prices, but we have not seen the same increases in goods prices as have occurred in the united states. it
interests not only slows the reform process but often leads to compromised solutions that fail to address the original underlying goal of the reform. therefore, it is vital to have a well thought - out strategy for the timing and manner with which structural reforms are instigated. to conclude, the central theme running through the paper is to point to the intricacy of achieving monetary and financial stability while at the same time maintaining the delicate balance of short run stabilization efforts and long run structural reforms. this is perhaps the toughest challenge for emerging market. but despite the challenge, the overall direction of change in emerging market economies to date is fundamentally reassuring. much has been achieved in term of strengthening the monetary framework and financial system development. thank you.

and turkey. ( 5 ) data through september 2011. sources : bloomberg, ceic data, imf and statistics bureaus of respective countries. bis central bankers ’ speeches figure 3 inflation indicators ( annual change, percent ) - 2 - 2 - 4 - 4 cpi cpi excluding food and energy sources : central bank of chile and national statistics institute ( ine ). figure 4 price of electricity ( annual change, percent ) - 10 - 10 - 20 - 20 - 30 - 30 source : national statistics institute ( ine ). bis central bankers ’ speeches figure 5 output growth ( quarterly change, percent ) chile ( * ) world - 2 - 2 - 4 - 4 - 6 - 6 - 1 - 1 - 2 - 2 gdp domestic demand domestic demand w / o inventory change figure 6 growth forecasts for the year 2009 ( annual change, percent ) 5. 9 - 2 - 1. 7 - 4 - 2 - 1. 7 - 4 - 4. 7 - 6 chile dev. economies latin america emerging asia emerging - 5. 2 - 6 europe ( 1 ) consensus forecasts from january 2008 to december 2009. for emerging asia, forecasts are available as from march 2008. black bars show actual growth in 2009. ( 2 ) geometric average for the u. s., the eurozone and japan. sources : central bank of chile, consensus forecasts and imf. bis central bankers ’ speeches figure 7 monetary policy interest rates ( percent ) developed emerging chile ( 1 ) simple average of monetary policy rates of each group of countries. ( 2 ) considers the eurozone, japan and the u. s. ( 3 ) brazil, china, colombia, the czech republic, hungary, mexico, peru, poland, south africa and south korea. sources : respective central banks and bloomberg. figure 8 unemployment ( * ) ( index centered on mean of period 1990 - 2011 ) 40 1. 100 1. 100 1. 000 1. 000 - 20 - 20 - 40 - 40 90 93 96 99 02 05 08 11 capital goods imports ( * ) ( millions of dollars, moving quarterly average ) 06 07 08 09 10 11 ( * ) seasonally - adjusted quarterly series. sources : central bank of chile, national statistics institute ( ine ), and ricaurte, m. 2011, “ indicadores de mercado laboral para la comparacion de las crisis asiatica y financiera internacional ”. preliminary document, central bank of chile, march.
this respect, particularly as part of our efforts to join the oecd. in this light, i therefore intend, in the initial stages, to publish the oecd definition alongside the israeli definition – both in statistics and in terms of budget deficit targets – and at a later stage we will publish and set policies solely according to the international definition. incidentally, the international rating agencies are aware of this difference in definition and they regularly approach the bank of israel for our deficit figures according to the international definition. concerning the definitions and budget targets i would like to add finally one other matter. occasionally there are calls to categorize certain items of government expenditure as if they belong to another budget ( for example, " the development budget " ) and there are always reasonable arguments for doing this, but generally these do not stand up to serious analysis. i suggest we do not adopt such ideas and we keep the accepted definition framework, both in international and in economic terms. in conclusion, it is important that we stand up to the pressure – and there will always be pressure – to increase government spending beyond the 1. 7 percent ceiling. there are always good reasons for increasing one expenditure item or another, but if it is decided to increase a particular expenditure, the government should change its order of priority so that it stays within the budgetary framework. it is imperative that we continue to maintain the necessary budget discipline. this policy will only increase the chances for growth to continue in the long term and that the resources for dealing with various problems – primarily problems of society – will continue to grow. last year, the caesarea conference marked 20 years since the economic stabilization plan. it's good to be reminded now and again of the great achievements of that plan and the great achievements of the 1990s and the past three years. but looking forward, we must take advantage of these achievements to keep our economy on course, while at the same time solving the problem of government debt and the problem of poverty, which remains one of the central problems that the israeli economy and society must deal with. thank you.

s independence in making decisions, and on the other will constitute an important control mechanism. this is necessary because independence must always be accompanied by responsibility and appropriate checks and balances. fourth, a proper system of reporting and transparency should be established - reporting to the government, the knesset and the public. i am currently working together with the prime minister and the minister of finance on the bank of israel law in an atmosphere of mutual understanding regarding the importance of concluding this matter quickly. i hope that in the next few months a proposal for a new bank of israel law will be laid before the knesset, and with your valuable help we will at last celebrate the successful conclusion of this important process. thank you very much.