greeks have to do to obtain this new loan? no, there is no tug - of - war. there are a number of commitments that were made by the greek government vis - a - vis the eurogroup, as you pointed out. the eurogroup asked the euro working group and the institutions concerned to verify the implementation of this agreement, and we are almost at the end of this process. i am very confident that in the coming days they will dot the i ’ s and cross the t ’ s of the agreement, which will open the way to disbursing this tranche of aid to greece. this will be the culmination of much hard work on the part of the greek government to comply with the terms of the agreement made in summer 2015. it is really significant effort, with very substantial reforms, and i think we can all be pleased that we are approaching the end of this phase of the discussions. people are asking, and rightly so, if the greeks are doing enough to satisfy their creditors... we are checking the details. i am not worried about the fact that the decisions can be made in the coming days. bis central bankers ’ speeches as long as there is no growth in greece, won ’ t it be very difficult to make reforms? yes, that ’ s true and that ’ s what ’ s making the situation difficult for the greek government and for the greek people in general. but, on the other hand, if there ’ s no reform, there ’ s no growth. so the reforms are vital – the sooner, the better. that ’ s why i am glad that we are now very close to an agreement. the faster the agreement is concluded, the sooner confidence can return to the greek economy, including depositors ’ confidence in greek banks, foreign investors ’ confidence in the greek economy. i believe there is a real chance now to enter a positive spiral of confidence for the greek economy. we are very near to it. olivier blanchard, the imf ’ s former chief economist, is calling for a fresh restructuring of greece ’ s debt. what does the european central bank, as a very large holder of greek debt, think of this? he ’ s right. to begin with, let ’ s not forget that greece ’ s debt has already been restructured. it is sometimes said that europe waited for too long and that it is now time to start restructuring greece ’ s debt. let ’ s bear in mind that greece ’

– to appropriately consider their risk of default. this would in principle make market discipline more linear and effective ex ante. and coupled with proposals for mechanisms for orderly sovereign default15, it might also help attenuate the severity of crises. yet it would also be a partial equilibrium solution, since it would reduce the ability of domestic banks to act ex post as a contingency liquidity buffer to their sovereigns, and that may leave bond markets even more at risk of multiple equilibria. in the absence of an alternative fiscal backing, sovereign yields might in other words increase morein times of financial stress. all in all, however desirable it may be from a prudential perspective, it seems odd to discuss this proposal without considering its fiscal consequences. taken in isolation, such proposals are therefore unlikely to resolve the tension between market discipline and safe assets in the euro area. and this matters, for two reasons. first, because sovereign debt provides a safe asset for the financial system, which is increasingly dependent on a sufficient supply of such assets. and if sovereigns are not supplying safe assets, then someone else has to. second, because sovereign debt provides a safe liability for the government through which it can stabilise the economy. and if governments are unable to perform this role in the euro area, there is insufficient stabilisation at the national level, and by implication also for the euro area as a whole. sovereign debt as a safe asset sovereign debt is highly prized in the financial system for its function as a safe asset, and safe assets in turn perform two vital roles in the system, which make them a close substitute of money. first, they provide a low - risk and liquid store of value, which is key for long - term investors, such as pension and insurance funds, and more generally for meeting regulatory liquidity and solvency requirements. and demand for both functions has increased significantly due to recent regulatory changes in the eu which translate the global financial regulatory overhaul. changes to capital requirements for insurers and pension funds, for example, have been specifically designed to encourage them to match the duration of their assets and liabilities, 4 / 9 bis central bankers'speeches raising demand for long - dated sovereign issues. the new liquidity coverage ratio induces banks to increase holdings of high quality liquid assets, of which government bonds are major part. and the shift of a large number of otc derivatives transactions to central counterparties ( ccps ) elevates demand for safe