because there is a common fiscal framework which is discussed on an ongoing basis. the rules are politically rather than legally binding. can it be simplified? it is doubtful. does it work? yes, when member states use it as support for sound policies rather than making it a scapegoat. so it solves some, but not all, problems. nor can the banking union be expected to solve all problems. backstoppers are the assistance programmes that impose strict conditions on the borrowers. this will always be controversial, but the requirements are milder than the conditions and interest rates that a crisisridden member state may obtain on market terms. another example is the crisis management of individual banks in recent years, e. g. in italy and spain. it should be remembered that although the brrd / srmr4 rules apply, the build - up of mrel funds has by no means been completed yet. in the most controversial cases, the eu institutions assessed that the banks concerned were not systemically important in a community context, and the further management of these banks was left to the national authorities. those authorities then insisted that the banks had regional systemic importance and obtained the approval of the european commission for measures with an element of state aid that does, to some extent, distort competition. if this indicates a flaw in the system, it lies not in the banking union but in the general eu rules on state aid, which might be criticised for not having been brought in line with the brrd. however, there has not been any talk about using shared funds in connection with crisis management by e. g. the srf. the measures taken have been at the expense of the relevant member state itself. the brrd, bank recovery and resolution directive, and the corresponding rules for euro area member states, the srmr, single resolution mechanism regulation, both adopted in 2014. side 7 af 9 a third example is contributions from the srf, the single resolution fund financed by the banks. they are incredibly well protected. srf funds can be used only after bail - in of the equivalent of 8 per cent of the liabilities of a failing bank. this typically corresponds to 25 per cent of the riskweighted assets. calculations show that during the crisis period after 2008 only one systemically important european bank had losses exceeding this threshold. furthermore, contributions from the srf may not exceed 5 per cent of the bank's liabilities, and it is a receivable

the interest - rate spread in relation to the euro interest rate, and this is now as low as 20 basis points. when capital flows are reversed at some point in the future, we are of course also prepared to sell currency. those who are familiar with our operations will be in no doubt that danmarks nationalbank's currency defence will be extremely resolute in terms of both intervention and widening of the interestrate differential. danmarks nationalbank must continually monitor the krone's position in the market, and the decision - making structure must be designed for decisions on intervention or adjustment of interest rates to be taken at any time. danmarks nationalbank has the flexibility required to be able to act immediately. in recent years, many central banks have introduced fixed published dates for monetary - policy decisions, but the fixed - exchange - rate policy is not compatible with such fixed decision - making dates. a central aspect is that measures can be taken immediately to halt any inappropriate exchange - rate movement in order to prevent a crisis from emerging. the situation in the currency market can quickly change. when conducting a fixed - exchange - rate policy, it is therefore not advisable to prepare the market for forthcoming changes in the interest - rate differential, as practised by many central banks with other monetary - policy objectives. furthermore, we take the view that all parties in the market must have access to the same information, at the same time, from danmarks nationalbank. danmarks nationalbank's monetary - policy announcements are thus published with great precision via several channels simultaneously. no hints are given to certain groups capable of interpreting such messages. danmarks nationalbank therefore never comments on forthcoming changes, even though we frequently are asked questions in this respect. at the more technical level, we have ensured that the market participants receive information on the expected development in liquidity. on a monthly basis, danmarks nationalbank publishes estimates of expected day - to - day movements in the banks'overall liquidity, and at the same time releases information on the expected dates of danmarks nationalbank's sale or purchase of certificates of deposit. additional information on the development in liquidity is published on a daily basis, giving market participants a good opportunity to prepare their positions, and to subsequently analyse developments. on this basis, there is normally no great uncertainty concerning the scale of danmarks nationalbank's interventions in the foreign - exchange market. openness and transparency are generally given high priority in our modern society. for