##tremism, says that saving is wrong. there is far too little investment. the international labour organization ( ilo ) says that the unemployment rate in the euro area has shot up and that one - quarter of the population is seriously threatened by poverty. the ecb is creating winners and losers from the crisis. last year, the wealth of the rich in western europe rose by 5. 2 %. the us investor warren buffett has said that there is class warfare and that it is his class, the rich class, that is winning. your policy, mr cœure, is geared towards reducing large portions of the population to poverty and safeguarding the profits of a few. cœure : our clients are not the rich, but the citizens of europe. the ecb is accountable to the european parliament for everything that it does, and the european parliament is directly elected by the people. we are not responsible for changing the distribution of income in europe. that is within the political domain, which is why we have political parties who argue about how income should be distributed. we would be in clear violation of our mandate if we were to aim at enforcing a certain wealth distribution. we should stay away from this. and by the way, we ’ re not afraid of discussing inequality : we have ourselves created the household finance and consumption survey, which has uncovered new and sometimes controversial facts on wealth inequality in europe. ratz : it ’ s not all about the citizens of europe for the ecb – they ’ re not even being asked. let ’ s take greece, for example. since 2010, its economy has shrunk by 25 %. this year, it is expected to grow by 0. 7 %, which is extremely little. we ’ re not going to live to see greece recover. the people of greece are not being asked about the troika ’ s recommendations, even though the measures have a profound impact on society : salaries and pensions have been reduced, unemployment benefits have been cut and hospital care has deteriorated. that is not a policy for the people, it is a policy for the banks. cœure : we supported the troika ’ s decisions, but for good reason, because we are talking about countries that had to borrow huge amounts of money from the financial markets because their tax revenue did not suffice. greece, portugal, ireland and cyprus had spent too much. then suddenly the market stopped lending them money. without assistance from the eu and the im

g10 recommendations should be implemented in europe. the post - fsap period offers a unique window of opportunity finally, i will devote the last part of my remarks to some reflections on the strategy for financial integration going forward, now that the financial services action plan ( fsap ) is approaching its completion. i believe that there is now an excellent opportunity to devise and engage in a strategy that delivers the full potential of financial integration. but in order to reap this potential, it is essential that a consistent post - fsap strategy is adopted. i see several components in such strategy for public authorities and market participants. let me begin with the role of public authorities. first, it is crucial that authorities implement the fsap measures, which provide the legal infrastructure for a single financial market, in a coherent manner. in this respect, i would highlight the provisions of the new investment services directive, which will provide the single market for financial services with a core legislative framework. furthermore, the lamfalussy process of regulation and supervision, now being extended from the securities field to the banking and insurance sectors, will allow for more flexible and uniform technical regulations. this dynamic process should ultimately produce a genuine common financial legislation and regulation for market players, while respecting the principle of subsidiarity enshrined in the treaty. second, there may be scope for simplifying the current regulatory framework, thereby reducing the corresponding regulatory burden on financial institutions. the implementation of fsap measures and of the the so - called lamfalussy approach should not, in any respect, lead to an additional layer of complex regulation - this would run counter to the spirit of the single market as it would not provide the right incentives for market participants to extend their activities throughout the eu. in this context, i want to recall that a main objective of the lamfalussy process is to allow for more flexible and uniform technical regulations. if adopted ambitiously, such a process could lead to the development of a true eu rulebook to which institutions may refer directly for their cross - border business. third, promoting a robust supervisory and financial stability framework for integrated financial markets. as integration proceeds, financial institutions will increasingly engage in cross - border business. furthermore, this is likely to bring a change in the transmission channels for systemic risk, notably as a result of a possible increase in the risks of cross - border contagion. consequently, it is important that authorities - supervisors and central banks - seek