. the latest observations are for february 2023. chart 3 inventory - to - gdp ratio and related survey indicators in the euro area ( standard deviation from historical ( 1999 - 2019 ) mean ) sources : eurostat ( inventory investment - to - gdp ratio ), s & p global ( pmi stocks of purchases and finished goods ), european commission ( adequacy of stocks ) and ecb calculations. note : the latest observations are for the fourth quarter of 2022 for the inventory investment - to - gdp ratio and the first quarter of 2023 for pmi stocks and adequacy of stocks. the energy crisis the energy crisis has had similar effects. [ 6 ] the sharp increase in wholesale energy and commodity prices has raised not only energy and food inflation but also – indirectly – core goods and services inflation ( chart 4 ). chart 4 contributions of energy - sensitive components to goods and services inflation in the euro area ( annual percentage changes and percentage point contributions ) sources : eurostat and ecb staff calculations. notes : the term “ energy - sensitive component ” reflects items with a share of energy in direct costs above the average share of energy across services items ( panel a ) and non - energy industrial goods ( neig ) items ( panel b ). the latest observations are for february 2023. these effects are starting to be reabsorbed. lower energy and commodity prices have translated into lower energy inflation ( chart 5 ). and they should eventually pass through to food and core inflation – consistent with the easing in pipeline price pressures ( chart 6 ). this is compressing medium - term consumer inflation expectations [ 7 ], and might temper catch - up wage demands. but how quickly these effects will be reflected in the inflation data is uncertain. and concerns about inflation persistence [ 8 ] make projecting core inflation particularly challenging. chart 5 headline inflation and components in the euro area and the united states ( annual percentage changes and percentage point contributions ) sources : eurostat, us bureau of labor statistics and ecb calculations. note : the latest observations are for february 2023. chart 6 pipeline pressures and input / output prices ( panel a ) : annual percentage changes ; panel b ) : diffusion index ) sources : panel a ) : eurostat and refinitiv and hamburg institute of international economics ( hwwi ), panel b ) : markit. notes : panel a ) : for brent crude oil in euro, the monthly value represents the average of the data available ( working days up

our net asset purchases. this transparency has contributed to reducing policy - induced uncertainty on the rate outlook, thereby extending the planning horizon of investors and, ultimately, moderating volatility. more recently, the enhancement of our forward guidance in june has provided a similar sense of the direction of the rate outlook in the euro area beyond the expected end of net asset purchases in december. by clarifying that the governing council expects its key policy rates to remain at their present levels at least through the summer of 2019, we increased transparency around our near - term policy intentions, which investors could then reflect in their asset allocation strategies. 6 it may therefore not be surprising to see capital flows by euro area residents being rather unreactive to the nearing end of the app, thereby limiting any abrupt and adverse spillovers from policy normalisation in the euro area to global financial conditions. i would call this the “ international stock effect ” of our app. moreover, the benefits go both ways, meaning that our forward guidance is also likely to have contributed to reduce the sensitivity of euro area rates to foreign spillovers. on my last slide you can see that ecb researchers, using the diebold - yilmaz methodology, find that spillovers from us treasury bonds to german bunds – the yellow line – have remained remarkably stable, at low levels, over the past year or so, despite the continued upward pressure on long - term us treasury yields. 5 / 7 bis central bankers'speeches ecb forward guidance, and clear communication more generally, may therefore have helped insulate the euro area from unwarranted foreign tightening pressures and comfort its monetary autonomy, at a time where the independence of monetary policies under floating exchange rates and freely mobile capital has been challenged by international financial integration. 7 and if communication indeed provides an effective shield, then further changes in our forward guidance, if warranted in the future, may help us remain in control of financing conditions along the policy normalisation path. 8 conclusion overall, therefore, and with this i would like to conclude, it is fair to say that much clearer communication, not only by the ecb, but also by other major central banks, together with a commitment by central banks to handle changes to the size of their balance sheet with care, have contributed to substantially reducing sudden and sharp directions of change in cross - border capital flows. this is despite the notable divergence in the pace of policy normalisation across advanced economies. as a result, policymakers have been able to