samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
flows to emerging economies. as regards the medium and long term, the nature and functioning of transactions differ from those for short - term transactions. the financial services provided by banks for longer - dated terms are, essentially, financing and the extension of guarantees and bonds needed to participate in international tender procedures. on many occasions these are syndicated operations, or operations performed by several banks from various countries. we should highlight here the role played by export credit companies. this activity is subject to the rules set under the oecd arrangement on officially supported export credits, or the oecd consensus, as it is usually called. the oecd consensus the oecd consensus, signed in 1976, has regulatory status in the european union and seeks to prevent financial facilities granted by a state to an exporter from distorting bis central bankers ’ speeches competition and giving an exporter an unfair advantage against competitors from other countries. the consensus also works on the assumption that official support is warranted only if there is a “ market failing ” that prevents the private sector from properly meeting its task as a financier. the consensus sets common rules for exports in the medium and long term, understanding as such terms over two years, and specifies that official support may take the form of either direct public financing of the export, or the underwriting by the public sector of the refund of the export financing granted by private institutions. in spain, cesce ( spanish export credit insurance agency ) pursues its activity on behalf the state, complementing that of the banking system. among its operations, what affords the greatest value added is the coverage of credit risk arising from a spanish export, of a relatively high amount, at a term of over two years, habitually financed by a bank. such coverage is the norm for exports towards countries with appreciable risk and in transactions which, frequently, have the sovereign guarantee of the importing country. cesce also provides underwriting on the state ’ s behalf for the political risks associated with exports ( the main such risk being default by the sovereign or by the institutions backed by the sovereign ), except in operations at less than two years in eu and oecd countries, where it is considered that there is a sufficiently developed private underwriting market ; it also extends guarantees and bonds for participating in international tender procedures and projects. from 1998 to 2007 there was a strong expansion in international banking activity in financing for spanish companies ’ international activity. banks took on a relevant

america, abraham lincoln, once said that the best way to predict the future was to create it. as i see it, today, digital technologies are bringing this vision one step closer to becoming a reality. thank you for your attention.
. 36. for an earlier discussion, see schnabel, i., ( 2020 ), “ monetary policy in changing conditions ”, speech at the second ebi policy conference on “ europe and the covid - 19 crisis – looking back and looking forward ”, frankfurt, 4 november. 37. ahmed, r. et al. ( 2024 ), “ losing traction? the real effects of monetary policy when interest rates are low ”, journal of international money and finance, vol. 141, march ; and van den end, j. w. et al. ( 2020 ), “ macroeconomic reversal rate : evidence from a nonlinear is - curve ”, dnb working paper series, no 684, de nederlandsche bank, may. 38. related, there could be a “ reversal interest rate ” at which accommodative monetary policy becomes contractionary. see brunnermeier, m. k. and koby, y. ( 2018 ), “ the reversal interest rate ”, nber working paper series, no 25406, national bureau of economic research, december. 39. berger, d. et al. ( 2021 ), “ mortgage prepayment and path - dependent effects of monetary policy ”, american economic review, vol. 111, no 9, september, pp. 2829 - 2878 ; and eichenbaum, m., rebelo, s. and wong, a. ( 2018 ), “ state dependent effects of monetary policy : the refinancing channel ”, nber working paper series, no 25152, national bureau of economic research, october. 40. bundick, b., hotz, l. and lee smith, a. ( 2023 ), “ how optimal was u. s. monetary policy at the zero lower bound? ”, research working paper series, no 23 - 14, federal reserve bank of kansas city, december. 41. gorodnichenko, y. and sergeyev, d. ( 2021 ), “ zero lower bound on inflation expectations ”, nber working paper no 29496. similarly, there is evidence that the effect of persistent deviations of inflation from target on long - term inflation expectations is not stronger at the effective lower bound. see moessner, r. and takats, e. ( 2020 ), “ how well - anchored are long - term inflation expectations? ”, bis working papers no 869.

##modative monetary policy, the swift and effective implementation of structural reforms, in line with the 2016 countryspecific recommendations recently approved by the european council, will not only lead to higher sustainable economic growth in the euro area but will also make the euro area more bis central bankers ’ speeches resilient to global shocks. fiscal policies should also support the economic recovery, while remaining in compliance with the fiscal rules of the european union. full and consistent implementation of the stability and growth pact over time and across countries is crucial to maintain confidence in the fiscal framework. at the same time, all countries should strive for a more growth - friendly composition of fiscal policies. we are now at your disposal for questions. bis central bankers ’ speeches
an interest rate reversal. to address interest rate risk, borrowers are increasingly opting for long - term loans with fixed interest rates, while banks are able to adequately hedge against risks arising from these longer interest rate lock - ins. nevertheless, both investors and banks must use the current low - interest - rate environment responsibly. and of course we should not forget that hedging against interest rate risk comes at a cost to banks. as a rule, loan contracts should only be signed if borrowers can continue to repay them even at higher rates of interest. and, in light of current events, there is another danger that we should not overlook – that of foreign exchange risk. the discontinuation of the minimum exchange rate for the swiss franc and the subsequent appreciation thereof may create difficulties for borrowers who have taken out property loans in swiss francs. if default rates were to rise, banks could run into difficulties. however, unlike in austria or poland for example, loans in swiss francs play only a minimal role in germany. according to current figures, property loans in swiss francs account for only around €2 billion of the entire volume of property loans of over €1, 000 billion in germany. we thus see no need to be overly concerned. 6. what can we do? even though the risks emanating from the real estate market currently appear to be low, we must still be prepared for all eventualities. financial supervisors need to be prepared in case a bubble should emerge on the real estate market. it is thus crucial that we have tools at our disposal to contain the corresponding risks. this means that, in the end, it will be up to the central banks to step in and spoil the fun just as the party is in full swing. over the past few years we have begun putting together such a toolbox. we are currently closely examining a number of new tools to ascertain the precise effect that they would have. however, before we can use such tools, we need a fitting legal basis. the central body for systemic financial supervision in germany, the financial stability committee, is working on this at the moment. in the next few months, it plans to present the federal government with recommendations on establishing a legal basis for the use of these instruments. bis central bankers ’ speeches however, elected politicians are also currently planning measures which i believe are headed in the wrong direction from an economic perspective. the cap on rents that is to be introduced in the near future aims

and lenders have a duty not to ignore this risk. in the current environment, banks should exercise particular caution when granting property loans. the bundesbank will fulfil its responsibilities. we will continue to closely monitor the real estate market, mortgage lending and the banks granting these loans and take action as soon as necessary. thank you very much. bis central bankers ’ speeches
unfortunately, it often seems that a crisis is needed to bring about real and profound changes. the major changes in the economic policy frameworks that we made as a result of the crisis in the early 1990s are well known so i will only mention them briefly here. the inflation target instead of defending a fixed exchange rate, the task of monetary policy from now on would be to keep inflation low and stable. in january 1993, the riksbank announced that an inflation target of 2 per cent would enter into force with effect from 1 january 1995. gradually, changes in the monetary policy framework confirmed the new order. the price stability target was written into the law in 1999, at the same time as monetary policy decisions were delegated to an independent executive board. the fiscal policy framework for its part, fiscal policy would focus considerably more than previously on keeping public finances in good condition so as to maintain market confidence. the budget process was changed so that it would be easier to gain control over government spending, while public net lending would, on average, be positive through the so - called surplus target. 7 the purpose of the latter was, of course, in the long run to get rid of the rampant government debt and to restore confidence in public finances. industrial agreement swedish wage - formation also changed. it now works in a completely different way than in the 1970s and 1980s. one important reform was the so - called industrial agreement in 1997, under which the manufacturing industry has set the benchmark for wage negotiations and ultimately steered wage cost increases in the entire economy for almost twenty - five years. 6 dagens nyheter, 20 november 1992, section a, p. 5. for a discussion on the interaction between fiscal and monetary policy, which is not specifically addressed in this speech, see jansson ( 2021 ). 5... laid the foundations for positive developments the ‘ total renovation ’ we made after the 1990s crisis has contributed to the overall positive developments during these past thirty years. the swedish economy is working better. i would just like to briefly mention a few examples of this. firstly, inflation has been low and stable. measured in terms of the cpif, it has been at 1. 8 per cent since 1995, and volatility has been low. inflation has been so low and stable that the inflation target has sometimes been questioned. however, the question leads to some circular reasoning and rather reflects the fact that the inflation target has worked well. one purpose of the target is precisely that inflation should

##z bank on the opening of its branch in kimbe, and look forward to its future plans to expand its branch network throughout png. thank you for listening.
events in europe, but also by domestic forces. the experience of the past few years is that those domestic factors – good or bad – can loom just as large as ones further afield when it comes to asia ’ s economic performance and, therefore, our own. in the final analysis, sensible and credible policies at home, the strength of our financial institutions and the resilience and adaptability of the businesses and employees that make up the australian economy, will continue to be our greatest assets.

countries that have not had an impaired banking system, those policy reactions have had a considerable effect. they were, amplified by the spill - overs that occurred because the stimulus took place in all countries more or less at the same time. yet the upswing is uneven. it has been very strong in asia and latin america, moderate so far in the us and weak overall in europe ( which itself has quite a mix of growth performances across countries ). of importance to australia is that the strongest growth in demand has been nearby. apart from japan most of the economies in the east asian region have experienced a “ v - shaped recovery ”. while some of this recovery reflects the process of re - stocking of durable goods around the world, it also reflects strong demand within the region. commodity prices generally rose somewhat after the very large falls in late 2008. but of significance for australia, prices for those resources which serve as the raw materials for steel production in particular have been exceptionally strong. prices for iron ore and coal rebounded very sharply during 2009 and early 2010. contract prices for iron ore in the current period are double those of a year ago ; until recently spot prices were well above even that level though they have retreated somewhat of late. in short, global growth, while uneven, has been recovering in the places and in the form that was most likely to deliver a boost to australia ’ s terms of trade. it looks like our terms of trade this year will again reach the 50 - year high seen two years ago. it could, of course, be that some of this recent increase in prices turns out not to be permanent. some economies in asia will probably, one way or another, experience a moderation in the pace of expansion over the coming year, because the pace of growth over the past year can ’ t be sustained without problems arising. the chinese authorities have been seeking for some months to take the steam out of certain sectors of their economy, particularly housing prices. they may be having some success. for this and other reasons, we and other forecasters are assuming that this peak in the terms of trade won ’ t be sustained. but to reach that 50 - year high twice in three years would appear to signal that something pretty important has been going on – something more than just temporary cyclical events. it is increasingly apparent that the asian region is becoming large enough that it has a tangible independent impact on the global economy and on australia in particular. china and nonjapan east asia together accounted
instrument in this regard. thank you for your attention! 5 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches

particularly with the recent approval of a fiscal reform in that country. in addition, experience shows that electoral periods like the one that will be taking place in mexico this year, may prompt episodes of substantial volatility in the foreign exchange market. the mexican peso has shown a moderate appreciation vis - a - vis the us dollar in recent weeks, although in a context of wide fluctuations, with sentiment about the renegotiation of nafta as the main determinant. a combination of other factors has also influenced, in one direction or another, the evolution of the peso - dollar rate, including expectations related to the normalization of monetary policy in the united states, the perception of risk in international financial markets, and some concern about the electoral process in mexico later in the year. on the other hand, domestic interest rates have continued to follow an upward trend, a result both of monetary policy actions by the central bank and the behavior of external interest rates. it should be noted that mexican financial markets have adjusted in an orderly way to the recent episodes of international turbulence. consequently, with the recent increase in long - term interest rates in the united states, the corresponding differential for the long end of the curve has narrowed during the course of this year. to sum up, monetary policy in mexico is facing a scenario where attaining the inflation target by the end of 2018 seems no longer feasible. this is explained essentially by the pass - through from the exchange rate to prices, and by a recent and anticipated trajectory for non - core inflation which is above previous projections. even though no evident demand pressures on inflation are neither observed nor envisaged, the mixed signals from different indicators and the uncertain future path for the economy, provide additional reasons for caution in the implementation of monetary policy. in view of the nature of inflationary pressures and the adjustment to the monetary policy rate that would be required to reduce inflation to 3 percent by december of this year, with the costs for the real sector that this would imply, in my opinion monetary policy must focus on convergence to the target over a time frame that allows : 1. to preserve the credibility of the central bank ; 2. to continue to avoid second - round effects of the observed and potential future shocks on inflation ; and 3. to minimize costs for economic activity. consequently, it is necessary to lengthen the period over which the target will be met. under the assumptions noted above, this would be achieved in early 2019, although materialization of some of the
watched. most important, there is a reassurance that in the context of current rise in inflation all are on the same side, viz., on the side of price stability. the fiscal authorities, monetary policy, the financial markets and corporates are committed to the objective of price stability and minimising volatility. in this background, therefore, rbi will continue its dialogue with market participants to fine tune its response to minimise volatility while emphasising the importance of reserve bank ’ s credibility in maintaining price stability consistent with the compulsions of the growth dynamics in our country at this juncture. thank you.

area could easily conflict with the maintenance of price stability and could, therefore, not be sustainable. according to our monetary policy strategy, the exchange rate of the euro will thus be an outcome, rather than the objective, both of the economic, monetary and other policies pursued in the euro area, and of cyclical developments in the euro area and abroad. it will be monitored as one of the indicators of monetary policy and as a source of potential changes in the price level in the euro area. however, the exchange rate will play a far smaller role in the euro area than it has played in the member states in the past. in line with the escb ’ s approach to the euro exchange rate, the ministers of finance, who are ultimately responsible for the exchange rate policy of the euro, have agreed to issue so - called exchange rate orientations only in exceptional circumstances, such as in the case of clear and persistent misalignments of the euro. this is apparently not the case at this juncture. nor is there any indication that such misalignments will be unavoidable in the future. in particular, the fact that our strategy does not include any exchange rate target vis - a - vis the us dollar does not imply that the euro / dollar rate will be unstable or volatile, or that the escb is against reasonably stable exchange rates. the pursuit of stability - oriented monetary and budgetary policies on both sides of the atlantic would put in place one of the major prerequisites for a reasonably stable euro / dollar exchange rate. at the current juncture, the policy framework in both regions seems to bode well for the adoption of such policies. absolute stability is, of course, impossible to guarantee and would not even be desirable, if the united states and the euro area were to go through business cycles which are not fully synchronised.
stability. this is necessary for sustainable growth and sustainable job creation. and that is the reason why we recommend not only towards the social partners but also price setters to strictly avoid those second round effects.

exactly where new risks will arise. simple rules can form a clear benchmark in uncertain situations, and there is a lot of academic theory to back this up. the economist frank knight introduced the concept of “ knightian uncertainty ” by making a distinction between uncertainty and risk in the sense that uncertainty cannot be quantified. indeed, we don ’ t know where we are heading, or what we will encounter along the way. we simply have to learn to live with unknown unknowns. another economist, hayek, also saw imperfect knowledge as a central issue. simple, robust rules can make a difference in such an uncertain and imperfect world. in a complex environment, we cannot possibly consider or measure all the conceivable outcomes. as well as being too expensive from an information point of view, it is also too complex to weigh up all the different options. bis central bankers ’ speeches although we like to assume our economic models are rational and omniscient, this is certainly not the case in reality. it would be more accurate to describe our world as having bounded rationality and imperfect information. simple rules are a way of reducing a complex problem with many unknowns to simpler tradeoffs, like yes or no, above or below, or left or right. it ’ s as in traffic : in the vast majority of situations, driving on the correct side of the road is good advice. or reducing your speed in misty weather. if we can progress along the road of simplicity, i ’ m sure we can also stop the pace of regulatory expansion. as leonardo da vinci said, “ simplicity is the ultimate sophistication ”. simplicity and transparency can help restore the public ’ s trust in the financial sector. financial institutions can achieve this by switching to clear business models, with streamlined structures and a prudent mindset. if they do so, the amount of regulations to be complied with can be reduced and the remaining regulations can be simplified, if and where applicable. in addition, simple rules can help us focus on key risks, as well as forming a guide for the future. greater trust, increased transparency and less complex risks will ultimately make the overall financial system more robust. and that in turn will make it easier for central banks to promote financial stability. thank you! bis central bankers ’ speeches