subject of a central bank intervention is a result of failure of the management, shareholders and board of directors to execute their responsibilities as per the set laws, ethical and corporate governance procedures. for instance, nearly all the banks closed or sold in uganda since the turn of the century failed because of outright fraud by shareholders, excessive lending of funds to insiders – managers and shareholders, collusion to cover up irregularities between board of directors and the management, and misreporting of the true state of the bank ’ s financial position, among many factors. therefore, speed is of the essence to preserve the residual assets of any failing bank so as to fully cover the deposit liabilities. otherwise, any delay in intervention and resolution, is an opportunity to shareholders and management of these commercial banks that have caused their collapse in the first place, to further strip these institutions of the remaining residual assets and value ; thereby shifting the burden of paying the depositors funds to the tax payers. i wish to urge some level of caution to those advocating for bureaucratic and static procedural guidelines in the resolution of financial institutions. while there is some merit in the proposal, such procedural guidelines should recognise the dynamic nature of banking crises ; allow flexibility and the need to not curtail the ability of the regulator to proactively respond to an evolving state of a failing institution and the predatory behaviour of a bank ’ s managers and shareholders. overall, the current supervision and resolution framework may not be perfect but it has served this country well, especially in the period after the enactment of the financial institutions act, 2004. the primary objective of bank regulation is to protect depositor ’ s funds and no depositor has lost any money in the resolution of any commercial bank since 2004. finally, i have been reliably informed that counterfeiting of currency is quite prevalent in this area. counterfeiters are simply robbers of people ’ s hard earned monetary value and should be dealt with firmly. indeed, the bank of uganda in the proposed amendments to the bank of uganda act has included tougher penalties and sanctions as a means to deter this vice. however, the population also has a responsibility of acquainting themselves with the security features of our currency, through the various public awareness “ know your money ” campaigns carried out by the bank of uganda. for business units that deal with relatively high volumes of cash, they should consider buying the necessary detection gadgets. i wish to end my remarks by once - again thanking you all for attending this

, such risks need to be addressed by policy instruments dedicated to ensuring resilience while curbing cyclical excesses – that is, supervision and macroprudential policy. in the current situation, we see that risks stemming from excessive risk - taking or any misaligned asset prices are contained in the euro area. this assessment is supported by continued moderate private sector credit expansion and leverage. however, we have certainly noticed that equity prices have continued to rise – albeit from previously low levels – and that sovereign bond yields are historically low. moreover, ecb estimates suggest that corporate bond risk premia are moving towards levels seen before the financial crisis. in addition, co - movements in financial markets have increased since summer 2014. these developments justify the need for close monitoring with a particular focus on asset markets but also on banks, insurers and pension funds as well as the less - regulated nonbank financial sector and the non - financial private sector. as financial and business cycles are not always aligned across countries and sectors in the euro area, area - wide monetary policy needs to be complemented by more targeted macroprudential policy. unlike monetary policy that influences the euro area across the board, macroprudential policy instruments can be applied in a granular manner, addressing risks at the country, sector and institutional level. macroprudential policy therefore provides the most appropriate instruments for mitigating financial stability risks, thereby supporting the price - stability oriented monetary policy. in that respect, concerns about the stability of the banking system have been addressed over recent years, through efforts to put a comprehensive regulatory framework in place and notably the set - up of banking supervision at the european level with the establishment of the single supervisory mechanism ( ssm ). the regulatory framework for banks is at this stage largely in place. but a few important elements such as leverage ratio, the net stable funding ratio ( nsfr ) and total loss absorbing capacity ( tlac ), which should be finalised in order to complete our framework for banks, are outstanding. in addition, macroprudential tools for the banking sector are also available but should be extended to also encompass ltv ( loanto - value ) and dti ratios ( debt - to - income ), the leverage ratio, limits to specific large exposures to shadow banks and to maturity transformation. given the achievements in the regulatory framework for banks and the changing landscape in the euro area financial system, our attention naturally shifts to the more opaque and less regulated parts