samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
result of their function, the currency reserves encompass large financial risks, while the comparable returns are relatively low. compensation for the gold price risk and the dollar exchange rate risk, in particular, is relatively poor. it is therefore inevitable that tighter bounds will be set on snb profit distribution, once the existing distribution reserve has been exhausted.

of oil. the evidence thus far is that demand has slowed a little, but supply has increased rapidly in recent years and is expected to remain at a high level this year. this matters because, usually, more supply of something and a cheaper price is good news, not bad. to be sure, lower oil prices require adjustment on the part of producers – corporate and sovereign. but this has always been so and an increase in the availability of energy and cheaper prices has generally, in the past, been seen as a plus for overall global growth – a positive ‘ shock ’. this was because the response of consumers of oil to a decline in its price was to consume more – not just more oil but other goods and services as well, using the higher real income afforded by lower oil prices. it was thought that this outweighed the negative effects of spending cutbacks in oil - producing countries. it seems people are less confident this time of a fall in oil prices being expansionary. why so? the fact that the united states has become a larger oil producer ( and a significant producer of the short - run ‘ marginal barrel ’ ) is clearly relevant. so is the possibility that consumers both there and in europe may, for particular reasons, be more inclined to save any windfall from lower oil prices than they used to be. these factors may, for a time, work against the traditional positive effect. in addition, the price for oil was high enough, for long enough, that many investment and spending decisions were taken around the world that look, perhaps, not quite so sound in hindsight. hence, producer countries have budget strains ; some sovereign wealth funds are liquidating financial assets ; spreads on debt instruments issued by energy companies have widened sharply ; exploration and new investment is being curtailed rapidly. it seems as though the sheer strength and longevity of the preceding period of very high oil prices prompted behaviour that made some players more vulnerable to a price decline. that, of course, is not unknown in the history of commodity markets. having said all that, people might be being a little too pessimistic about the effects of the fall in oil prices. it is still equivalent to a reduction in taxes for a very large number of consumers around the world who now have more disposable income to spend or to repay debt. the shareholders and state owners of the producing assets, who gained from the higher prices, are wearing most of the costs of the lower price, along with those who provided
8 per cent in 2003 and 2004. it is widely recognized that the contribution of asia to global growth has generally been very impressive in recent years, and may continue to be so, for several years in future. the current account on the balance of payments has been in surplus for many if not all asian economies. the private capital flows to the emerging asia have recovered from an outflow of us $ 52 billion in 1998 to an inflow of us $ 151 billion in 2004. at the same time, the reserve build up in the region has been significant. in the backdrop of the resilience of the asian economies and their ability to bounce back after a deep financial crisis, there is resurgence of confidence in their future. strategies in the form of having mutual swap agreements under the chiang mai initiative, to guard against speculative attacks, could now be enlarged, and could also be supplemented by greater co - operation and co - ordination in the exchange rate regimes and policies. indeed, from a longer - term perspective, we must note that asia is appropriately poised in terms of abundance in factors of production – labour and capital – particularly labour, as the demography is clearly in favour of asia to sustain a long - term growth. the emergence of surplus factors of production in asia combined with financial strength would impact prices, wages and exchange rates. asian economies could explore strategies to evolve a system whereby they could not only prevent and, if necessary, manage financial crises on their own to the extent possible, but also play a more active role in co - ordinating policies with other major developed economies. these arrangements could be consistent with continued and an active role of imf in international monetary cooperation. 2 / 4 it is useful to recall that the acute sense of interdependence aroused by the financial “ contagion ” in 1997 convinced the asian economies of the importance of economic cooperation, one that reflected their common interests and priorities as well as strengthened their voice in the global arena. among others, this led to two parallel movements – one in south asia in the form of the saarc initiative and the other in east asia reflecting the asean + 3 initiative. the idea of having an integrated financial system so as to provide viable ‘ safety net ’ in times of crisis germinated. as a result, the idea of “ asean + 3 ” initiative1 gained prominence. this, in turn, was reflected in two correlated developments. first, in 2000, asean + 3 countries mutually agreed to form a network of

conference has only further matured. it has grown both in audience and in breadth of topics. and this year ’ s program is, once again, testimony to that. i wish you all an inspiring two days. 1 national bank of the republic of north macedonia, accessed on 7 december 2021, rnm fintech survey final report clean 211220. pdf ( nbrm. mk ) 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches
jean - claude trichet : in memory of wim duisenberg speech by mr jean - claude trichet, president of the european central bank, on the occasion of the memorial service for mr wim duisenberg, amsterdam, 6 august 2005. * * * it is with great sadness and emotion that we all are here in the concertgebouw after the terrible loss of wim duisenberg, our first president and our dear friend. the french writer chateaubriand said : “ in my eyes, nobody is going down in the grave ( … ). death, in touching us, does not defeat us ; it only makes us invisible ”. wim is, and will for ever continue to be, present with us, in our heart and soul, with each and every one of us, and with our dear european central bank. he will be with us as a great central banker, a great first president of the european central bank, and a great european and friend. as regards the central banker, i would like to say very simply that, seen from my own perspective hen i was governor of the banque de france, the monetary policy of de nederlandsche bank was a role model for an institution and a currency wanting to inspire confidence, to improve credibility and to be state of the art in the handling of monetary policy in the uncharted european waters of that time. can i also say, gerrit, en passant, that the netherlands ’ economic strategy was also a role model for france ’ s economic strategy. and as a natural consequence, wim, as president of de nederlandsche bank, was a role model for fellow central bankers in europe. at the helm of the national central bank of the netherlands, as president of the committee of governors, as president of the bis, as a key member of the delors committee, as president of the european monetary institute, wim always displayed three unique qualities : • a fantastic capacity to synthesise the most complex situations ; • an exceptional gift for taking clear decisions in an expeditious way ; • and, finally, a strong determination to stick to the decision and stand firm in all circumstances, even when going through unexplored and difficult territory. each of these three qualities can be possessed independently of the others. what is absolutely exceptional in the case of wim is that he had all three of them simultaneously. as far as demanding circumstances and exceptional challenges are concerned, wim had

dream that, in my case, has become reality. however, it would never have become reality without the support, commitment, resolve and efforts of all of you. i really feel privileged having worked with you. you have all the reasons in the world to be proud of your achievements ”. never did this sentence have a better application than to yourself, wim : “ you have all the reasons in the world to be proud of your achievements ”. wim, je kunt met recht trots zijn op alles wat je hebt bereikt in je leven.
capability and integrity to produce high quality and secured materials. under the moa, the bsp shall produce one hundred sixteen million pieces of blank cards for the phil id for three years. we will print the id at less than $ 1 a piece – 60 cents to be exact. we will provide the needed equipment and space for the embedding of personal information onto the blank cards, which will be done by the philippine statistics authority. the card issuance will start in april 2020. i ’ ll stop here and i look forward to a meaningful conversation regarding the national id system for all. thank you. 1 / 1 bis central bankers'speeches

for development and influencing the impact of borrowings on the profile and structure of total external debt. a continuing review of bangko sentral regulations governing external debt and other foreign exchange transactions is likewise undertaken to keep our rules attuned with current global and domestic conditions and to foster a regulatory environment that supports the objective to achieve inclusive growth for the country. in all these undertakings, a good monitoring system is indispensable. flares allows us to perform all these with relative ease and accuracy. conclusion i have, on a number of occasions in the past, said that the philippines managed to “ survive ” today ’ s crisis, because we purposed to invest in the reforms yesterday …. and today, ladies and gentlemen, we add flares to the list of governance reforms we have instituted. as we enlist public and private sector entities to enroll in flares and encourage more banks to participate, it is my hope that flares would indeed help us better manage our external debt. in turn, i hope this will ensure and protect our desired trajectory of sustained higher economic growth. maraming salamat sa inyong pagdalo at pakikinig. bis central bankers ’ speeches
ngfs climate scenarios

precision. this can be unhelpful and unnecessary for decision - making. sound qualitative assessments supported by some quantitative analysis and reasonable assumptions can be even more insightful. that is why, for the bank ’ s own climate biennial exploratory scenario exercise which we formally launch next month, we are putting emphasis on the qualitative questionnaire and an assessment of business model changes, rather than the traditional capital - adequacy metrics. 9 look at both physical and transition risks coherently as you undertake your analysis and as you determine your strategic response. some combination of these risks will materialise. if you are assuming there is no price on carbon in your risk models, you ’ re implicitly assuming a high degree of warming. if you do believe some policy action is inevitable but don ’ t know what the shadow price of carbon is, don ’ t assume it is zero. that is equivalent to not knowing for sure how bank rate will evolve but assuming it away when discounting over 30 years. given the sensitivity to core assumptions, there is considerable value in running credible, independent, standardised scenarios. that will make your results more easily comparable to others, even if you use in addition other scenarios and models that you find more relevant to your business. don ’ t be afraid to share lessons learned, disclose key assumptions and limitations in your analysis and where possible work together to improve understanding. here it is worth highlighting the excellent work being done by the climate financial risk forum in the uk which brings together senior financial sector representatives to build capacity and share best practice in managing climate - related risks and opportunities. the working group on scenario analysis has produced some really useful guidance and tools that should be useful both to financial firms and to businesses. 10 next steps it is critical that financial firms recognise now that the race to net zero has started. indeed many have. 11 see climate biennial exploratory scenario. see climate financial risk forum. the glasgow financial alliance for net zero includes 87 asset managers representing us $ 36. 95 trillion in assets under management ; 43 banks with us $ 28. 5 trillion in assets ; and 58 asset owners with us $ 7. 4 trillion in assets under management. in support of their ambitions, and consistent with our expectations, they need to run climate scenarios as part of business as usual risk management and embed climate risk management within day - to - day decision - making. time is running out. perfection tomorrow cannot be the enemy of progress today.
the competition for high - end customers. in the mid and long term run, we are confident in china ’ s banking reform and hope that more foreign - funded financial institutions will participate in this market to promote competition, innovate and improve services and strengthen economic prosperity and development.

management were not qualified, then through replacement of the management team would there be a fundamental turn for the better in terms of operation of the banks? on the basis of better operation and with profit accumulation for some time, would reform of corporate system and share - holding arrangement improve the bank performance? experience for many years indicates that the effect was not optimistic as with the reform of state - owned enterprises by following the above perception. to trace the problem to its source, we find that the problem of state - owned entities lies not only in weak management but also in the more fundamental problem of corporate system. hence, the 16th congress of the cpc and its third plenary session both emphasized once again the direction of the reform of state - owned enterprises. comparing state - owned banks with state - owned enterprises, it will be easy to find out the high similarity between them. if in the past state - owned enterprises acted like government organizations or featuring “ quasi - bureaucratic system ” to some extent, then state - owned commercial banks are more like government organizations instead of commercial entities. state - owned commercial banks have instituted apparent administrative hierarchy and officialdom in terms of personnel system, remuneration system, staff benefits, social security and internal incentives system. decision - making power of the persons in charge of state - owned commercial banks is more than often limited, and lacks market - oriented incentives. although there is big difference in the responsibility assigned to a bank clerk for savings counter and to a credit officer with high ability of risk control, there is no big difference in terms of remuneration. with inadequate internal incentives and deficient outside pressure, reform of state - owned commercial banks might long protract if solely emphasizing on the improvement of management. documents of the 16th congress of the cpc have clearly stated the direction of share - holding reform. efforts shall be made to change the operation mechanism of enterprises in real earnest through changes in the structure of corporate governance. this idea should also fit in with the reform of stateowned commercial banks. the reform of state - owned commercial banks is also reform of state - owned enterprises in its very nature. ( ii ) whether or not to actively push state - owned commercial banks to be public listed companies? one opinion mistakes listing in the stock market as the ultimate target of the reform. some people believe that going public is aimed at financing for capital infusion of banks and for internal incentives of the management team. it is certain that the purpose of listing of state - owned commercial banks
during the training and continue encouraging and supporting one another. i sincerely wish you all the very best on your leadership journey. thank you. 2 / 2 bis - central bankers'speeches

average almost exactly 2 % per year in the euro area. by comparison, inflation from 1961 to 1991 ( when the convergence criteria for participation in economic and monetary union were decided ) averaged over 10 % in portugal, greece and spain, but also 6. 6 % in france and 3. 4 % in germany. 6 the euro reduces transaction costs for producers, their employees and end clients. it facilitates price comparisons and bank transfers, while eliminating currency risks in intra - euro area trade and investment. note that close to 50 % of france ’ s exports go to other members of the euro area. finally, and above all, the interdependence and shared responsibility implied by the euro create a european solidarity imperative in the face of the crisis. this “ de facto solidarity ” is the greatest challenge that the european union faces today, against the background of a greater disparity across countries. if i may turn schuman ’ s formula on its head, it now calls for “ concrete achievements ”. the temptation to go it alone in economic affairs, so evident in the past ( remember the competitive devaluations of the 1980s and 90s ) is no longer this logic also underpins the gradual integration of countries that emerged from the yugoslav wars. in particular, the so - called “ copenhagen criteria ” notably require that national institutions guarantee “ democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities ”. it also makes membership conditional on “ adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union ”. presidency conclusions, copenhagen european council, 21 – 22 june 1993. “ europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. it will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity ”, robert schuman ’ s declaration, 9 may 1950. standard eurobarometer 77, european citizenship, spring 2012. source : ameco database ( european commission ). bis central bankers ’ speeches appropriate. this does not preclude countries from having different views or different interests, but it creates a duty to overcome these differences and act together. 2. reducing unemployment the current crisis, with its associated fall in incomes and rise in unemployment, has however bred misunderstanding and sometimes anger in many parts of europe. unemployment in the euro area stood at 12. 2 % in september 2013, compared with 7. 6 % at the beginning of the financial crisis in the second quarter of 2007. young people have been hit especially hard : more than 3
collateral damage. i hope and anticipate that trust and integrity again will be amply rewarded in the marketplace as they were in earlier generations. there is no better antidote for the business and financial transgressions of recent years.

and portfolios. it is commonly observed that hedge funds are " opaque " - - that is, information about their portfolios is typically limited and infrequently provided. it would be more accurate to say that the opacity of hedge funds is in the eye of the beholder ; the information a fund provides may vary considerably depending on whether the recipient of the information is an investor, a counterparty, a regulatory authority, or a general market participant. from a policy perspective, transparency to investors is largely an issue of investor protection. the need for counterparties to have adequate information is a risk - management issue, as i have already discussed. much of the recent debate, however, has focused on the opacity of hedge funds to regulatory authorities and to the markets generally, which is viewed by some as an important source of liquidity risk. liquidity in a particular market segment might well decline sharply and unexpectedly if hedge funds chose or were forced to reduce a large exposure in that segment. concerns about hedge fund opacity and possible liquidity risk have motivated a range of proposals for regulatory authorities to create and maintain a database of hedge fund positions. such a database, it is argued, would allow authorities to monitor this possible source of systemic risk and to address the buildup of risk as it occurs. various alternatives that have been discussed include a database maintained by regulators on a confidential basis, a system in which hedge funds submit position information to an authority that aggregates that information and reveals it to the market, and a public database with nonconfidential information on hedge funds. i understand the concerns that motivate these proposals but, at this point, remain skeptical about their utility in practice. to measure liquidity risks accurately, the authorities would need data from all major financial market participants, not just hedge funds. as a practical matter, could the authorities collect such an enormous quantity of highly sensitive information in sufficient detail and with sufficient frequency ( daily, at least ) to be effectively informed about liquidity risk in particular market segments? how would the authorities use the information? would they have the authority to direct hedge funds or other large financial institutions to reduce positions? if several funds had similar positions, how would authorities avoid giving a competitive advantage to one fund over another in using the information from the database? perhaps most important, would counterparties relax their vigilance if they thought the authorities were monitoring and constraining hedge funds'risk - taking? a risk of any pre