##ing on specific industries and sections of the population. 3 however, the rise of certain companies and sectors, and the decline or even disappearance of others, cannot be put down to international trade alone. the impact of technological progress in driving structural change is at least as strong. 4 free trade thus often finds itself cast in the role of scapegoat for what is in any case a perpetual process. there is no escaping the reality of this ongoing structural change if a country wants to maintain its competitiveness over the long term. there have also been increasing calls of late for free trade to be curbed because it is not ‘ fair ’ for certain countries. in this context, the concept of ‘ fairness ’ is applied in entirely different ways. it is used in assessing bilateral trading relationships, for example, or in connection with alleged violations of existing trade rules. i would like to briefly address both these aspects. it seems rather odd to insist that trade between two countries can only be regarded as fair if the bilateral balance of trade is in equilibrium. trade between the actors in these countries is voluntary, and therefore only takes place if all of the participants stand to benefit from the exchange. such trade is not a zero - sum game in which one side ’ s gain is the other side ’ s loss. the view that the trade balance between two countries should be in equilibrium ignores both the reality of global value chains and also the very essence of specialisation. today semifinished products and intermediate inputs can move back and forward across national borders cf. autor et al. ( 2016 ), for example. cf. world trade organization ( 2017 ), for example. page 3 / 9 many times before the end product is complete. simply netting bilateral trade flows is no basis for judging whether trade is fair or not. bilateral trade balances that are not in equilibrium are not a problem per se, and are instead much more an expression of the respective parties focusing on their own strengths. a country ’ s deficit with one trading partner can be financed through its surplus with another. that said, i do not want to paint too rosy a picture of the current trading system. this brings me to the second facet of the concept of ‘ fairness ’. the accusation that not all countries play by the rules of global trade is not without justification. chart 3 shows that the number of tariff and non - tariff barriers to trade has increased again of late – with the latter often opaque and thus potentially even more damaging than customs duty

mario draghi : one year of ecb banking supervision speech by mr mario draghi, president of the european central bank, at the ecb forum on banking supervision, frankfurt am main, 4 november 2015. * * * ladies and gentlemen, back in 2012, when it was decided to establish a single supervisory mechanism ( ssm ), many a critic claimed that either it was impossible, or that it would take forever. and yet here we are, marking the first anniversary of the ssm with this conference, reflecting no longer so much on the structure of supervision, but on its content. now, the critics tell us that other necessary improvements to the institutional architecture of the euro area, and of the eu, are either impossible, or will not happen during our lifetime. you will forgive me for not being convinced. the establishment of the ssm was neither the start, nor the end of the suite of institutional reforms that we must undertake to restore in europe the stability that is the premise for a return to prosperity. but it was a crucial step and in many ways it was the key to going further. let me put the ssm ’ s significance in a broader perspective : in the early years of the euro, we lived under the illusion that we had established a fullfledged monetary union. there can, however, only be a single money if there is a single banking system. for money to be truly one, it has to be truly fungible independent of its form and independent of its location. in particular, deposits, which are the most widespread form of money, have to inspire the same level of confidence wherever they are located. to ensure that deposits are truly as safe everywhere across the euro area, the likelihood that a bank fails has to be independent of the jurisdiction where it is established. resolution has to follow the same process in the event that a bank fails. and, when push comes to shove, depositors must be afforded similar protection wherever they are located. fundamentally, this was and remains the agenda of banking union. and it is why banking union was conceived with three pillars : a single supervisory mechanism, a single resolution mechanism, and a uniform deposit insurance scheme, which remains to be specified. for money to be truly one, we need all three. supervision had to come first, not because it was the easiest to establish, but because it was the necessary condition to proceed with the other pillars of banking union. that the ssm was established at the ecb owes much