to be used as a description of sector - specific policy instruments that could be used to deal with potential instabilities in a particular sector, usually the housing sector. bis central bankers ’ speeches bagehot, walter ( [ 1873 ] 1897 ). lombard street : a description of the money market. new york : charles scribner ’ s sons. bao, jack, josh david, and song han ( 2015 ). “ the runnables, ” feds notes. washington : board of governors of the federal reserve system, september 3. bisias, dimitrios, mark flood, andrew w. lo, and stavros valavanis ( 2012 ). “ a survey of systemic risk analytics ( pdf ), ” ofr working paper 0001. washington : u. s. department of the treasury, office of financial research, january. caballero, ricardo j., and alp simsek ( 2013 ). “ fire sales in a model of complexity, ” journal of finance, vol. 68 ( december ), pp. 2549 – 87. duarte, fernando, and thomas eisenbach ( 2015 ). “ fire - sale spillovers and systemic risk ( pdf ), ” federal reserve bank of new york staff reports 645. new york : federal reserve bank of new york, february. financial stability board ( 2015a ). global shadow banking monitoring report 2015 ( pdf ). basel, switzerland : fsb, november. — — — — ( 2015b ). thematic review on otc derivatives trade reporting : peer review report ( pdf ). basel, switzerland : fsb, november. — — — — ( 2015c ). transforming shadow banking into resilient market - based finance : standards and processes for global securities financing data collection and aggregation ( pdf ). basel, switzerland : fsb, november. fischer, stanley ( 2014 ). “ financial sector reform : how far are we? “ speech delivered at the martin feldstein lecture, national bureau of economic research, cambridge, mass., july 10. — — — — ( 2015 ). “ macroprudential policy in the u. s. economy, ” speech delivered at “ macroprudential monetary policy, ” 59th economic conference of the federal reserve bank of boston, boston, october 2. flood, mark d., victoria l. lemieux, margaret varga, and b. l. william wong ( 2015 ). “ the application of

a good bit we do not know. 10 this lack of data can impede the design of regulation. there is a long history of data collection focused on banks, and supervisory data have contributed to our quantitative approach to regulation and supervision. for example, when we examine the likely implications of the failure of an institution ’ s largest counterparty, we learn a great deal about the health of that institution and gain greater insight into its connections, through that counterparty, to other institutions. but data on a range of activities – including securities lending, bilateral repos, and derivatives trading – that create funding and leverage risks remain inadequate and hence could prove destabilizing if sufficiently large or widespread. we gain some insight into these markets through our supervisory relationships with the largest bank holding companies, but the activities of important nonbank market participants, such as asset managers, and the interconnections across institutions remain more opaque. efforts are under way to deal with these gaps : the legal entity identifier initiative is working to allow regulators and private counterparties to trace activities by institution ; the ofr, the securities and exchange commission, and the federal reserve are cooperating with the industry to collect data on bilateral repos ; and the fsb has finalized standards for collection of data on securities financing transactions. 11 regulators in the united states and abroad have begun to require the reporting of detailed derivatives transaction data to trade repositories. unfortunately, as a recent report shows, inadequate data standards and limitations on authorities ’ access to trade repository data have prevented the benefits of derivatives trade data reporting from being fully realized. 12 for a discussion of developments in u. s. treasury markets on october 15, 2014, see u. s. treasury and others ( 2015 ). the phrase “ what you don ’ t know can ’ t hurt you ” is well known. according to the oxford dictionary of proverbs, the oldest written version of this saying comes from 1576, in petit palace, by g. pettie ( as noted in miller ( 2009 ) ). ( i am indebted to michael kiley for this reference. ) information on the cooperative effort to collect data on bilateral repos is available on the ofr website. for details on the fsb ’ s standards for collecting data on securities financing transactions, see financial stability board ( 2015c ). see financial stability board ( 2015b ). bis central bankers ’ speeches an illustration of the possible interaction between better data and better policies is the