lexparency. org / eu / tfeu / art _ 130. - 2in a well - functioning democracy, important public policy decisions should be made, in almost all cases, by the elected branches of government. grants of independence to agencies should be exceedingly rare, explicit, tightly circumscribed, and limited to those issues that clearly warrant protection from short - term political considerations. with independence comes the responsibility to provide the transparency that enables effective oversight by congress, which, in turn, supports the fed ’ s democratic legitimacy. at the fed, we treat this as an active, not passive, responsibility, and over the past several decades we have steadily broadened our efforts to provide meaningful transparency about the basis for, and consequences of, the decisions we make in service to the american public. we are tightly focused on achieving our statutory mandate and on providing useful and appropriate transparency. 3 sticking to our mandate it is essential that we stick to our statutory goals and authorities, and that we resist the temptation to broaden our scope to address other important social issues of the day. 4 taking on new goals, however worthy, without a clear statutory mandate would undermine the case for our independence. we continue to strive to improve our transparency. over my five years as chair, i have pursued this aim by extending postmeeting press conferences to all fomc meetings and instituting ongoing personal dialogue with legislators. this continuous dialogue goes well beyond the regular testimony, established by statute, in which i report to the congressional committees that have oversight responsibilities regarding monetary policy. although the federal reserve has been independent since its inception in 1914, its dual mandate only became part of the law in 1977 ( see bernanke, 2010 ). the existence of the dual mandate reflects the fact that the federal reserve ’ s monetary policy independence corresponds to operational, or instrument, independence, rather than goal independence. see debelle and fischer ( 1994 ) for an analysis of the distinction between types of independence. - 3in the area of bank regulation, too, the fed has a degree of independence, as do the other federal bank regulators. independence in this area helps ensure that the public can be confident that our supervisory decisions are not influenced by political considerations. 5 today, some analysts ask whether incorporating into bank supervision the perceived risks associated with climate change is appropriate, wise, and consistent with our existing mandates. addressing climate change seems likely to require policies that would have significant distributional and other effects on companies,

. in coordination with other agencies, we have made significant progress on the key substantive issues relating to the volcker rule and are hoping to complete it by year - end. finally, the federal reserve is preparing to regulate and supervise systemically important nonbank financial firms. last week, the financial stability oversight council designated two nonbank financial firms ; it has proposed the designation of a third firm, which has requested a hearing before the council. 4 we are developing a supervisory and regulatory framework that can be tailored to each firm ’ s business mix, risk profile, and systemic footprint, consistent with the collins amendment and other legal requirements under the dodd - frank act. thank you. i would be pleased to take your questions. see daniel k. tarullo ( 2013 ), “ dodd - frank implementation, ” statement before the committee on banking, housing, and urban affairs, u. s. senate, july 11 ; and board of governors of the federal reserve system ( 2013 ), “ federal reserve board approves final rule to help ensure banks maintain strong capital positions, ” press release, july 2. see board of governors of the federal reserve system, federal deposit insurance corporation, and office of the comptroller of the currency ( 2013 ), “ agencies adopt supplementary leverage ratio notice of proposed rulemaking, ” joint press release, july 9. u. s. department of the treasury ( 2013 ), “ financial stability oversight council makes first nonbank financial company designations to address potential threats to financial stability, ” press release, july 9. bis central bankers ’ speeches