samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
net outflow of capital from the region. the facts i have mentioned may lead outsiders to regard the nordic region as one group, made up of similar economies. however, there are also some striking differences. nordic countries – institutional differences eu - membership monetary policy regime sweden yes inflation target of 2 per cent ( + / - 1 percentage points ) denmark yes erm ii finland yes member of emu iceland no ( eea - agreement ) inflation target of 2½ per cent norway no ( eea - agreement ) inflation target of 2½ per cent sg 240802 we differ in our relations to the eu and with respect to monetary policy regimes. sweden, denmark and finland are members of the eu. finland is also a member of emu. the danish krone is linked to the euro through a fixed exchange rate, while sweden, iceland and norway have inflation targets and a floating exchange rate. our financial markets differ in size and structure. bonds outstanding, march 2002. per cent of gdp government private us iceland denmark sweden finland norway source : bis, imf sg 240802 government bond markets are generally small, even in relation to gdp. there is, however, a relatively large market for private bonds, especially in denmark. the bond market in denmark is twice the size of the stock market. stock market values. per cent of gdp end 1999 sep 2002 finland iceland denmark source : national central banks, imf sg 240802 finland has the largest stock market relative to the economy. this reflects, i believe, the rise of nokia as the world ’ s leading mobile phone company. we see that the finnish and swedish markets have followed the us market more closely than the other nordic markets. this also reflects differences in industry structure. the sector composition of the three scandinavian stock exchanges provides an illustration. the oslo stock exchange is heavily dominated by the energy sector, which is practically absent on the other nordic exchanges. norway has small traditional industries, but the it and telecom sector is comparable to the other countries ’ in relative size. the different sector composition of the stock exchanges also illustrates the potential for diversification by investing across the nordic countries. the difference in sectoral composition may in part explain the differences in correlation of nordic stock exchanges with the world economy. sector composition of norex exchanges. september 2002 100 % 90 % 80 % 70 % 60 % 50 % 40 % 30 % 20 % 10 % 0 % stockholm industrials and materials financial services copenhagen oslo it / telecom energy consumer goods and services other source

years, and will reach approximately 90 per cent of gdp by the end of this decade, according to estimates from the ministry of finance. this implies further investments of considerable amounts, also in the us market. while the us economy has always been an important trading partner, our investments abroad and the globalisation of the financial system will further increase our interest in the us economy in the years ahead. the links, already important, will expand further.
of authentication of the person requesting the services ( 75 % – 99 % in the figure ). stage 4 – full electronic case handling : the publicly accessible website offers the possibility to completely treat the public service via the website, including decision and delivery. no other formal procedure is necessary for the applicant via " paperwork " ( 100 % in the figure ). more information available in online availability of public services : how is europe progressing? web based survey on electronic public services. report of the fifth measurement, capgemini for european commission, october 2004.

value - added services on top of the sepa products. it is worth referring here to regulation no 2560 / 2001 of the european commission, which established the principle of equal charges for cross - border payments and comparable domestic payments within the eu, which in turn has created an imbalance between bank fees and costs of cross - border payments. this imbalance can only be overcome if the handling of cross - border payments is reorganised to become as efficient and inexpensive as the handling of national payments, which is the primary goal of sepa. an aspect which deserves particular attention in the discussion on sepa is the harmonisation of the law within the payment area. the proposed payment services directive ( psd ) establishes the necessary legal framework for sepa payments and will also apply to existing national payment products. the aim of the directive is to harmonise the market access requirements for non - bank payment service providers. this will create a level playing field with enhanced competition in national markets. the directive will provide clarity and certainty with regard to the core rights and obligations of users and providers of payment services. it will also provide the necessary legal framework for sepa, as it will harmonise existing, and differing, national legal requirements. please note that the eurosystem sees sepa as “ an integrated market for payment services which is subject to effective competition and where there is no distinction between cross - border and national payments within the euro area. ” over the long term, all euro area payments will become domestic, reaching a level of safety and efficiency that is at least on par with the best performing national payment systems today. let us consider together the potential benefits of sepa for the polish market participants. the following questions seem to be of particular importance here : • what ’ s the role and place of polish payment infrastructure in the sepa world? • will sepa increase the consolidation of the polish banking sector? • will sepa reinforce the competitiveness of polish entrepreneurs? • what roles are there to be played and who should play them so as to ensure that sepa contributes to the success of the polish economy and increased consumer satisfaction? • what benefits may the polish payment market participants gain before poland joins the euro area? now, let me ask the presidents to take the floor.
. the geographic pattern of lending can matter, as certain areas of the country are experiencing much more difficult conditions in their housing market than other areas. neighborhoods ; in fact, foreclosure filings have increased at a faster pace in middle - or higher - income areas than in lower - income areas that are the focus of the cra. 11 two key points emerge from all of our analysis of the available data. first, only a small portion of subprime mortgage originations are related to the cra. second, cra - related loans appear to perform comparably to other types of subprime loans. taken together, as i stated earlier, we believe that the available evidence runs counter to the contention that the cra contributed in any substantive way to the current mortgage crisis. conclusions our findings are important because neighborhoods and communities affected by the economic downturn will require the active participation of financial institutions. considering the situation today, many neighborhoods that are not currently the focus of the cra are also experiencing great difficulties. our recent review of foreclosure data suggested that many middle - income areas currently have elevated rates of foreclosure filings and could face the prospect of falling into low - to - moderate income status. in fact, 13 percent of the middleincome zip codes have had foreclosure - rate filings that are above the overall rate for lowerincome areas. helping to stabilize such areas not only benefits families in these areas but also provides spillover benefits to adjacent lower - income areas that are the traditional target of the cra. recognizing this, the congress recently underscored the need for states and localities to undertake a comprehensive approach to stabilizing neighborhoods hard - hit by foreclosures through the enactment of the new neighborhood stabilization program ( nsp ). the nsp permits targeting of federal funds to benefit families up to 120 percent of area median income in those areas experiencing rising foreclosures and falling home values. in conclusion, i believe the cra is an important model for designing incentives that motivate private - sector involvement to help meet community needs. the cra has, in fact, been helpful in alleviating the financial isolation of many areas of concentrated poverty, but as our report illustrates, there is much more that could be done in these communities. contrary to the assertions of critics, the evidence does not support the view that the cra contributed in any substantial way to the crisis in the

change will force business and government to continuously reevaluate previously held assumptions and adapt to change. there is no static, optimum model either for financial service providers or for financial regulators, as both are engaged in a continuously evolving process. i am optimistic that recent financial reforms and continuing innovations will translate into more useful financial products and services to a broader spectrum of consumers and businesses and, in turn, fuller participation by all segments of our society in the kind of economic progress we have experienced to date.
financial stability, the exchange rate and the economic cycle. we will comment further on the sovereign money initiative in due course. ladies and gentlemen, thank you for your attention. it is now my pleasure to give the floor to fritz zurbrugg, who will present our financial stability assessment. bis central bankers ’ speeches

activity. the snb is a bit of a special case. in summer 2011, switzerland was confronted with an excessive appreciation of the swiss franc as a result of the euro area crisis, an appreciation that continued to the point where it posed a serious threat to price stability. as a result, we resorted to a range of unconventional tools to increase swiss franc liquidity and – eventually – introduced an exchange rate floor of 1. 20 swiss franc per euro in september 2011. so, are central banks doing too much in terms of unconventional policy? the answer is – again – “ no ”, but less categorically than in the case of conventional policies. on the one hand, being the only ones left to react to weak economies and high unemployment forced many central banks to take further action – action that was justified by their mandates. on the other hand, the jury is still out on the overall assessment of unconventional policies. for one thing, while evidence suggests that quantitative easing in particular succeeded in lowering long - term borrowing rates, its effect on the real economy is less certain. 6 for another thing, such policies may have important side - effects : they may lead to additional risktaking in financial markets and thus contribute to financial instability, 7 and they can create spillover effects to the rest of the world – notably emerging markets, where capital flows in search of higher yield can fuel asset prices and currency movements. 8 a complete assessment of the positive and negative effects of these measures will thus have to wait until we have data on the full experience, that is, until the complete exit from these policies. an assessment of the effectiveness of the snb ’ s minimum exchange rate is clearer : this measure has played a decisive role in addressing the imminent risk of deflationary developments and has thus been successful. given the still weak economic environment, it remains the central tool to ensure that monetary conditions are appropriate and that the snb ’ s primary objective of price stability is fulfilled. the period since the collapse of lehman brothers has also underlined the value of central banks being able to respond flexibly to unexpected circumstances. on 30 november, the swiss electorate will vote on the so - called “ gold initiative ” ( “ save our swiss gold ”, in full ), which, paradoxically, would severely constrain the snb ’ s room for manoeuvre in a future crisis. let me digress for a few minutes to explain why the snb is opposed to this initiative. the
and it became considerably difficult to push inflation expectations down to levels consistent with the previously set inflation target of 4 percent. although not attaining inflation targets stems from factors beyond the domain of monetary policy, overshooting of inflation target for two consecutive years and also the expectation of overshooting 2008 target have undermined the role of inflation targets as an anchor for inflation expectations. in fact, studies within our bank indicate that gradually more weight is attached to past inflation in forming expectations and as of mid - 2006 inflation expectations have become more susceptible to variables like exchange rate and risk premium. according to the central bank, if this situation becomes permanent, the cost of fighting inflation will increase. therefore, in an open letter to the government in june 2008 the central bank proposed setting new targets for the medium term in order to control inflation expectations and to re - establish the reputation of the implemented regime. the government accepted this proposal and the inflation targets for 2009 to 2011 were revised as 7. 5, 6. 5, and 5. 5 percent, respectively. hence, the inflation targets to be used as a reference by economic agents to form their expectations were set with the objective of containing inflation expectations and reducing the cost of the fight against inflation. bearing in mind that altering inflation targets might lead to the deterioration in the inflation expectations in the short run, the central bank implemented the target revision along with monetary tightening. thereby, the negative impact that might be created by the upward revision of targets has been contained. as a matter of fact, during the period of target revision, a slight deterioration was observed in the medium - term inflation expectations but with diminishing political uncertainties and monetary tightening, inflation expectations have been contained ( chart 3 ). in the last quarter of 2008, the aggravated lack of confidence in the global financial markets had unfavorable effects on the global liquidity flow and created an extraordinary demand especially for us dollar liquidity. this led to significant depreciation of the try, as was the case for currencies of other developing countries. despite these developments in the exchange rate, slowdown in total demand and the decline in commodity and food prices affected inflation outlook positively, which provided room to maneuver for monetary policy. against this backdrop, the central bank has taken several measures to support the liquidity of the financial system and to ensure the efficient functioning of the credit markets. chart 3. inflation expectations for the next 12 and 24 months 12 months target revision 24 months kas. 08 eyl. 08

thursday 15 october, thursday 19 november, thursday 27 october, tuesday 24 november, tuesday 17 december, thursday
the third anniversary of the establishment of the kosovo credit guarantee fund honourable, mr rinor gjonbalaj, chairman of the board of directors at the kcgf mr christian heldt, german ambassador to the republic of kosovo, mr bedri hamza, minister of finance, mrs lisa magno, usaid kosovo mission director, mr riccardo serri, head of the eu office, mr alessandro tappi, chief investment officer at eif, i am honoured to celebrate today with you the third anniversary of the establishment of the kosovo credit guarantee fund. it has been a privilege for the central bank to contribute, within its legal mandate, to the process of the fund establishment, in particular in the area of proper legal framework. this fund has achieved tremendous success during these past three years, assisting the economic development and creation of new jobs in kosovo. within such a short time, the fund has managed to guarantee more than 2, 560 loans amounting to eur 100 million, with a guaranteed amount totalling to eur 47. 5 million. studies to date show that, among others, access to finance is one of the obstacles to private sector development. challenges faced by small and medium - sized enterprises for access to finance in one hand, and challenges faced by financial institutions during risk assessment of the financing of these enterprises on the other hand, are already known. so, by providing credit guarantees, the fund has assisted in overcoming these challenges by facilitating access to finance for small and medium - sized enterprises. therefore, financial institutions have channelled their liquidity into the type and value of proper funding for the needs of small and medium - sized enterprises. this additional funding mechanism has helped them to develop, create new jobs, and export, thus positioning kosovo at a competitive level in the regional and european markets. an essential prerequisite for the proper functioning of the fund is the interaction with a stable and efficient banking system. the continuous growth of competition in the banking system and the advancement of this sector have led to a decline in cost in bank financing conditions, and improvement thereof. the average effective interest rate on loans in march 2019 was 6. 7 %. this level of interest rates has now approximated the cost of bank financing in kosovo to other countries in the region. also, lending of the banking sector has increased significantly, raising its lending rate to ever eur 2. 8 billion, with an annual growth rate of 11. 4 % in march 2019. considering the high level of banking sector

of textbooks for secondary and higher level as well as the preparation of the national strategy for financial education. dear media, allow me, on my own behalf but also on behalf of the central bank of the republic of kosovo, to thank you for following the activities and events that the cbk organizes every year and that has never lacked your support and presence. this is especially important in conveying informational and educational messages to the kosovar public.
with excessive credit expansion and elevated asset prices.

##bilities to trade and financial shocks since the crisis, however, growth has slowed, mainly on account of a drop in tfp growth and receding fdi inflows. in the new euro area countries, tfp growth remains, unlike in other cee countries, the main driver of growth. but the general slowdown is being felt in all economies in the region, which suggests that, despite the ongoing benefits of the single market and the euro, the cee business model has become vulnerable to shocks to international trade and financial conditions. the benefits of the single market for sustained convergence thus needs to be consolidated, by implementing reforms towards a more balanced growth model that is less vulnerable to changes in external conditions, such as those that have emerged recently. global trade has faced headwinds in recent years as trade - restrictive measures have outpaced liberalising measures. 16 cee economies have been disproportionately affected by this for two reasons. first, trade in cee economies is especially responsive to cyclical developments. since these countries have consistently been more open to trade over the past two decades, their trade elasticity is higher than in the rest of the eu. in addition, the value chains in which they participate mainly involve trade in durable goods, which have a high level of income elasticity. 17 second, cee economies have increasingly specialised in certain industries, which may have made them more exposed to industry - specific shocks. in some countries, for instance, vehicle exports represent nearly 30 % of total manufactured exports, making them more vulnerable to the threat of increasing car tariffs. moreover, the effect of tariffs could be amplified, as a large share of goods cross borders multiple times during the production process. 18 headwinds could also result from changes in the international financial landscape. net foreign liabilities stood at over 70 % of the cee economies ’ gdp in 2018, which is higher than in many other emerging economies. in particular, fdi was comparably high and accounted for 50 % of total external financing up to 2010, thus providing stability. the share of fdi liabilities has 2 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches declined since then and accounted for 42 % of total external financing in 2018. while many countries in the region have improved their current account balances in recent years, they may remain vulnerable to changing external financial conditions due to their dependence on foreign financing. these developments confirm that sustained policy efforts are needed to maintain a steady convergence path. the region ’
: did the economics profession recruit and promote the individuals best able to bring the energy, the fresh insights, and the renewal that every field and every body of knowledge needs to remain healthy? when this question is asked again someday, when economics is tested by future challenges, i hope that our profession will be able to say that we have done all we could to attract the best people and the best ideas. that, i believe, is the very worthy goal of this conference, and i look forward to seeing it advanced by today ’ s discussions and by the continuing commitment demonstrated by the aea to diversity. thank you to those who organized the conference and to the distinguished members of our profession who have come here today to take part in it. bis central bankers ’ speeches

providing both financial means and technological transfer. today privatisation is almost complete and one has to look for new engines pushing forward the catching - up process. currently, i see three main risks that have to be addressed as priorities by policy - makers : ( i ) ( ii ) ( iii ) increased financial vulnerabilities, in relation with fast credit growth and mounting external imbalances ; rising inflation pressures which hurt external competitiveness ; and the challenge of ensuring high future potential growth.. this third challenge belongs to the long - run as future economic developments will need to feed productivity growth beyond the dynamics of catching - up, through technological and production process innovation. it is however a present concern to the extent that recent signs of increasing labour market shortages and decreasing fdi inflows question the capacity to maintain gdp growth at the high levels recorded in the past. addressing these risks and challenges will require the conduct of prudent macroeconomic policies insuring short - term stabilisation, with fiscal authorities avoiding pro - cyclical loosening and generous spending policies, and monetary authorities preserving price stability and guaranteeing financial stability. however, macroeconomic policies alone are not sufficient to improve the long - term growth potential : they are aimed at fostering a stable and transparent business environment, but have to be supplemented by the implementation of structural policies designed to enhance labour market participation, labour mobility, competition in goods market, investment in education, r & d and infrastructure. it appears very clearly that the challenge of a stable and sustainable path for the catching - up process is closely interlinked with the challenge of a successful integration in the euro area. for that purpose, it is in the interest of the new member states themselves to be patient while accelerating structural reforms in order to meet both these challenges. euro area accession will come in due course as the well deserved reward for the efforts of each country in creating the conditions of its own long - term economic prosperity. i look forward to such accessions.