erm ii parties on bulgaria and assessment of prior commitments of bulgaria ” and “ letter by executive - vice president dombrovskis and commissioner gentiloni to erm ii parties on croatia and assessment of prior commitments of croatia ”, european commission, 10 july 2020. 11 it is worth noting that the core work of the comprehensive assessment exercises on bulgarian and croatian banks took place and was finalised before the outbreak of the coronavirus ( covid - 19 ) pandemic and hence could not take into account the impact of this crisis. 12 for example, the ecb will not adopt decisions addressed to banks in the member state concerned, but rather instructions addressed to the nca, which will in turn adopt the required national administrative measures addressed to banks. moreover, the member state in close cooperation is not represented in the governing council. for this reason, a special procedure allows the nca in close cooperation to express disagreement with the supervisory board ’ s draft decisions and with any objections by the governing council to those draft decisions. if no agreement is reached, the member state may opt to terminate close cooperation. 13 the application letters from the bulgarian and croatian authorities including the annex with the post - entry commitments to be taken at the time of erm ii entry are available on the ecb website. see “ application letter from the bulgarian authorities ” and “ application letter from the croatian authorities ”. 4 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches

dimension of the launch of the euro and the great number of watchers and academics, not to speak of market participants, who were very sceptical, to say the least, about emu, it is surprising to me that the successful transition to the euro has received so little attention from academic researchers. stressing the importance of the monetary pillar at the time of the introduction of the euro must not be interpreted as suggesting that, now that the ecb has matured, we do not need it any more. in fact, in see, for example, trichet ( 2005a, b ) see, for example, assenmacher - wesche and gerlach ( 2006 ), kugler and kaufmann ( 2005 ) and hofmann ( 2006 ). see woodford ( 2006 ). christiano and rostagno ( 2001 ) present a theoretical framework showing that monitoring monetary dynamics can help to minimise the possibility that inflation expectations might settle on a point that is inconsistent with the central bank ’ s inflation objective. in this context, a central bank commitment to systematically monitor monetary indicators and factor them into policy would act as an insurance device which prevents instability from arising in the first place. the interesting feature of this commitment is that, in equilibrium, such a central bank would not necessarily be observed to react to unstable dynamics in monetary aggregates, as these would never materialise in the first place. however, such a favourable outcome would presuppose, rather than disprove, the existence of the strategic commitment to act forcefully in the event of abnormal developments in monetary indicators. christiano, motto and rostagno ( 2006 ) show that taking into account monetary indicators in the conduct of monetary policy can also alleviate the macroeconomic volatility arising from overly optimistic expectations. in an earlier paper, christiano, motto and rostagno ( 2003 ) also showed that a monetary policy rule that assigned more weight to monetary developments would have substantially mitigated the severity of the great depression. see borio and lowe ( 2002, 2004 ), borio, english and filardo ( 2003 ), borio ( 2005 ) and white ( 2006 ). see detken and smets ( 2004 ) and adalid and detken ( 2006 ). for a more detailed discussion see trichet ( 2005c ) and ecb ( 2005 ). helping us to take good and timely policy decisions, the monetary analysis has played an important role in our success in fully preserving the