samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
the upside or on the downside : 2 percent is our goal. second, the framework statement discusses the challenges in providing a similar fixed goal for employment. it quite rightly emphasizes that monetary policy is not a prime determinant of maximum employment, even in the long run. the committee ’ s policy stance is based on an bis central bankers ’ speeches ever - evolving assessment of the maximum level of employment in both the medium and the long term. my own assessment of the long - run unemployment rate, consistent with 2 percent inflation, is currently 5 percent – and that assessment has fallen greatly over the past 18 months. finally, the framework statement describes how the committee weighs the two mandates – promoting maximum employment and promoting price stability – against one another. importantly, it stresses that, from the point of view of monetary policy, the two mandates are typically complementary. as i noted earlier, monetary policy pushes employment and inflation in the same direction. but, as it turns out, most shocks that push employment down also tend to push inflation down over the medium run. hence, monetary stimulus designed to raise employment will also help the fomc pursue its inflation objective. indeed, the past few years provide a clear example of the complementarity of the fomc ’ s two mandates. in terms of the employment mandate, labor market outcomes have been distressingly weak. we can see this weak performance in a number of ways, but i ’ ll use two particular metrics : the unemployment rate and the employment - population ratio. the unemployment rate rose rapidly beginning in 2007, peaked at 10 percent in late 2009 and has fallen only gradually to its current level of 5. 9 percent. the second graph depicts the fraction of people over the age of 16 who have a job. that fraction fell sharply beginning in 2007 and has since risen only slightly. bis central bankers ’ speeches to be clear, some of this slow recovery in employment can be attributed to a key demographic force : an increasing fraction of the people aged 16 and over reach retirement age every year. but the recovery in employment is a highly subdued one, even if we strip out this demographic effect by focusing only on those people aged 25 to 54. so, employment has been below its maximum level over the past seven years. what about inflation? the following graph shows that pce inflation has averaged 1. 5 percent since the beginning of the great recession in 2007. so, inflation has also been low relative to the fomc ’ s target. and

appropriately, on the contribution monetary policy can make to sustained economic growth. but i want to emphasize that, while low inflation is essential in this context, it is not sufficient by itself. other policies, both macro - and micro - economic, must continue to focus on enhancing productivity and raising our production potential over the medium term. this focus is extraordinarily important if we want to achieve sustained, solid economic growth and rising standards of living over time. we should not lose sight of it as we go through the current short - term difficulties.
watch how these policies work in other economies and adjust our own thinking at the bank of canada as appropriate. in short, should the need arise, we ’ ll be ready. i would like to thank stephen murchison for his help in preparing this speech. bis central bankers ’ speeches

creation. the adjustment process is being facilitated by a stronger u. s. economy, a lower canadian dollar and low interest rates. the risks around this outlook are roughly balanced, which is to say that there are things that could disappoint us and others that could surprise us on the upside. on the downside, weakness in emerging markets such as brazil and china could turn out to be more pronounced than we expect, or commodity prices could fall further as new supply weighs on prices. on the upside, however, it is possible that as momentum builds consumer and business confidence will see a synchronized upturn – not just in canada, but in the united states – adding more momentum to growth. this factor is important to economic cycles, yet inherently it can ’ t be forecast. there are many such elements of uncertainty in the process of making monetary policy. that ’ s why the bank has characterized its decision - making process as one of risk management. we go beyond determining the most likely outcome for the economy. we also identify the major risks we face, in either direction, and think about how we should react if those risks materialize. in short, we ’ re paid to worry, and to be prepared. that ’ s just prudent policy - making. so it ’ s fair to ask what we would do in the unlikely event that the economy was hit with another major negative shock, one that significantly threw off our projection. with the economy already exhibiting slow growth and interest rates already very low, there would appear to be very little room to manoeuvre. indeed, the bank ’ s policy rate today is 0. 5 per cent, just one - quarter point above the record low set in 2009, a dark time for the global economy. back then, at the height of the financial crisis, we believed that our key rate was at its effective lower bound, and we would need other tools in order to provide any additional monetary stimulus. as a result, the bank spelled out how it would conduct unconventional policies in an annex to our april 2009 mpr. since then, we have reflected on our experience and have seen how other central banks have conducted their own unconventional policies. we have updated that document and are publishing it on our website today. i ’ m going to elaborate on these policies, but before i do, i need to be absolutely clear about two things. first, today ’ s remarks should in no way be taken as a sign that we are planning to embark on
provide bank customers with better and stronger protection. it also marks a new era for hong kong as asia ’ s premier international financial centre in the enhancement of consumer protection in the financial realm. 8. thank you. bis central bankers ’ speeches

particularly because – and this is a centrepiece of your policy and i think it is the main difficulty you face – the northern european countries, a number of countries there, have been quite clear about the vague attempts at euro area reform put forward by emmanuel macron. why not, but first of all your public finances have to be balanced? not only public finances. growth in france must become strong again, structural unemployment must fall and public finances must be rebalanced. this is what our partners expect, and they ’ re right, it ’ s in our interest. 2 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches and so there can be no far - reaching reform of the euro area as long as france has these imbalances in its public finances? this has long been the case. the lack of reforms or their hesitant nature in france has long been an obstacle to the reform of the euro area. and french politicians are partly responsible. this obstacle is being removed as there is a reform momentum and a downward dynamic in the deficit. and therefore, the barriers are now increasingly in the euro area and take the form of a state of mind which keeps on wanting to set the north and south of the euro area against each other. there is a form of political fragmentation of the euro area which persists, even as the economic fragmentation is declining. it ’ s in the heads of euro area politicians who tend to regard themselves as being from the north, the south, although these distinctions make no sense in that we are all in the same boat. but how come it doesn ’ t make sense? these distinctions are real. austerity is in the north now ; it ’ s much weaker in the south. it is a reality and moreover you can see it in the data. no, i don ’ t agree with you. consider how spain, a southern country, has reformed its labour market. the north believes that if the south is pulling through now, it ’ s because of the efforts the north has made, and it is having a training effect... say that to spanish, portuguese and greek workers and employees. tell them that if they are pulling through it ’ s thanks to the efforts of the north. it ’ s thanks to their own efforts, which were very difficult. so there has been a reform movement that in some instances has not been completed, but which has been very painful for the countries of southern europe, in the countries that were in crisis, and now we have to
. we have to improve very significantly risk management in all pertinent institutions. and last but not least, we have to introduce much more discipline in the macroeconomic policies, and that of course goes for fiscal policies, but also for appropriate discipline to prevent excessive domestic and external imbalances.

by about 0. 5 percentage points. hori and shimizutani ( 2005 ) find some evidence of lower price expectations being correlated with consumption delay in japan, but the effects do not look large. finally, consumption delay is less compelling for households who are financially constrained and whose consumption varies more strongly with current income. benito and mumtaz ( 2009 ) estimate between 20 – 40 % of uk households display such “ excess sensitivity ”. see bachmann, r, berg, t and sims, e ( 2015 ), “ inflation expectations and readiness to spend : cross - sectional evidence ”, american economic journal : economic policy, 7 ( 1 ) ; hori, m and shimizutani, s ( 2005 ), “ price expectations and consumption under deflation : evidence from japanese household survey data ”, international economics and economic policy, 2 ; benito, a and mumtaz, h ( 2009 ), “ excess sensitivity, liquidity constraints, and the collateral role of housing ”, macroeconomic dynamics. bis central bankers ’ speeches world, where private debt levels remain very high relative to history, including the uk ( chart 3 ). when a household takes out a mortgage or a firm secures a loan, the amount owed is denominated in cash terms – that is, not adjusted for inflation. unexpected, generalised, and persistently falling prices then mean the real value of debt increases : the same amount of money is owed, but that money now buys more goods and services. as a result, more consumption or investment needs to be foregone to service the debt. this debt - deflation dynamic was at the core of the great depression7 and in the japanese malaise following the collapse of the asset bubbles of the 1980s. it would be a particular concern if the pace of wage growth were to follow prices down. there is no evidence of that in the uk, where wage growth has picked up over the past six months. and more broadly, following the 2008 financial crisis debt deflation has been the dog that hasn ’ t barked ( chart 4 ). 8 but we shouldn ’ t rest too easy – there are several reasons why the dog might have just been sleeping, and central banks need to be vigilant against the risk that recent low inflation stirs it from its slumber. 2. global factors and domestic inflation low global inflation matters for the uk because we are an open economy. around one - third of the goods and services consumed by uk households are
##schen der ezb und dem europaischen parlament in den letzten acht jahren, und den beitrag unserer beiden institutionen zur europaischen integration. mit einigen uberlegungen zur zukunft der eu, und insbesondere der wirtschafts - und wahrungsunion, werde ich dann schließen. 1 ) the ecb ’ s actions since its creation : permanent alertness, resolute action and fierce independence let me first reflect on the ecb ’ s actions since its creation. with current discussions sharply focused on how to deal with the financial and sovereign debt crisis, it is sometimes forgotten that our primary objective is to maintain price stability in the euro area. more precisely, we aim to maintain inflation rates in the euro area below, but close to, 2 % over the medium term. this is what the treaty demands from us. this is what the citizens of the euro area expect from us. and this is what we have delivered. price stability is a necessary condition to foster sustainable economic growth, job creation and to ensure the well - being of europe ’ s citizens. one fundamental indicator is medium and long term inflation expectations. inflation expectations that are in line with our definition of price stability help employers and bis central bankers ’ speeches employees in the euro area to agree fair wages. they help businesses small and large to make longer - term investments. they ensure, all things being equal, a more favourable financial environment because market medium and long term interest rates incorporate stable price expectations. and they help governments to play their role in macroeconomic stabilisation. preserving inflation expectations in line with price stability has been far from easy. let me remind you of a few of the many shocks to the economy since 1999. the early 2000s saw the bursting of the “ dot - com ” bubble. medium and long term inflation expectations remained stable. then came the terrorist attacks of 9 / 11. inflation expectations remained stable. we saw dramatic surges in oil prices. once again, medium and long term inflation expectations remained stable. then, in 2007, there were the first signs of an unprecedented financial crisis, the repercussions of which continue to this day. what happened in late 2008 in particular could have resulted in an economic catastrophe not seen since 1929. authorities across the world took action to avoid another great depression. we at the ecb responded by lowering interest rates and introducing our non - standard measures

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policy would increase short - term rates and at the same time push down medium - to long - term interest rates. furthermore, asset purchases are exceptional measures associated with particular risks and difficulties. therefore, they should be first in line when it comes to reducing the very expansionary stance. it remains to be seen how many rate hikes there will be by the end of the year. in any case, the exit from the very accommodative monetary policy should be swift and smooth. swift enough to affect the price path and to prevent second - round effects and a de - anchoring of inflation expectations. yet at the same time smooth enough so that households, corporates and financial markets can cope with it. for central banks, the challenge will be to sustain the recovery while containing the upward pressure on inflation in the medium term. in my view, negative interest rates will relatively soon be history in the euro area. they no longer fit the changed environment. fiscal policy, too, faces challenges in terms of mitigating the distributional implications of rising energy and commodity prices. these challenges won ’ t become smaller, as the recovery is slowing and fiscal buffers have already been used to mitigate the economic fallout from the covid - 19 crisis. during the pandemic, monetary and fiscal policy acted in concert. now their interplay could change. the goal of the eurosystem ’ s monetary policy is crystal clear : price stability in the medium term. although higher financing costs might be an additional challenge for governments, the eurosystem must not hesitate to do what is necessary to fulfil its mandate. and governments and financial markets alike have to prepare for rising interest rates. market participants as well as everybody else can rely on us to do our job of preserving the value of our money! thank you for your attention. i wish you a fruitful conference. 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches

to help us to measure progress towards to financial inclusion in namibia. this is because we will now know where we are and how far we are from our final destination. this should then enable us to plan and act better in implementing our financial sector development and inclusion agenda. in fact, this will put us on the right path to reach our intended objectives. what is particularly pleasing to know is the fact that finscope 2011 has attempted to collect information on financial literacy. it is our hope that this would provide a view and give us a baseline with which we can work, going forward. financial literacy is an important aspect in the process of ensuring financial inclusion. this is because consumers will only be able to effectively make use of available products and services if they are aware and are well bis central bankers ’ speeches informed ; not only of the availability of products and services but also of how they can make use of such and on what terms. director of ceremonies, the purpose of this gathering is for finmark trust to share with us the outcome of the namibia finscope 2011 survey. let me therefore end here and allow them enough time to do just that. i thank you! bis central bankers ’ speeches
ardian fullani : recent developments in the albanian economy speech by mr ardian fullani, governor of the bank of albania, at the press conference on monetary policy decision of the supervisory council of the bank of albania, tirana, 30 september 2009. * * * the supervisory council of the bank of albania reviewed the monthly report of monetary policy, at its meeting of september 30, 2009. after getting acquainted with the latest economic – financial developments at home and at the conclusion of the discussions on their expected future performance, decided to keep the key interest rate unchanged, at 5. 75 percent. this interest rate is in consistency with the maintaining of inflation close to the bank of albania target for a medium - term period. * * * the analysis of the latest economic and monetary developments confirmed our expectations for an overall downturn of the economic activity at home and a reduction of the domestic inflationary pressures, for a relaxation of monetary markets and a slowing recovery of financial intermediation, and has also highlighted the still fragile equilibrium of the economic and monetary indicators. the conclusions of our discussions converged to a decision - taking to keep the key interest rate unchanged. the purpose of this position is to further maintain and consolidate the established balances, thus considering the macroeconomic stability as an indispensable precondition for a stable and long - term growth. the economic activity at home is backed up by an improvement of the overall global climate, during the last two months, by attempting improvement signs of lending activity and by the seasonal effect of summer time. global economy is being characterised by a more moderated downturn of the economic activity at industrialised countries, accompanied with a growth of the world trading activity and low inflationary pressures at global level. nevertheless statistical data regarding the albanian economy still remain at low level, the indirect indicators suggest this later is characterised by a positive economic growth, but slower compared to the succeeding years. the low pace of both retail sales and budget revenues increase, the exports slowdown, the lower expansion of lending to the economy and business and consumer ’ s confidence indexes show that albanian economy is going through a slower growth phase relative to the one of previous year. this situation is also mirrored on the low inflationary pressures, revealed by the low level of core inflation, which is a proper appraiser of the domestic demand pressures. in august 2009, annual inflation pointed to 2. 2 percent, remaining within the targeted band of the bank of albania, but close to its lower limit

well - stabilised financial environment shall provide the needed spaces for the growth of monetary stimulus in the economy.
that threatened to spiral out of control. in line with its price stability mandate, the ecb intervened in each of these episodes so as to tackle the specific threats to the monetary policy transmission that arose with each incarnation of the crisis. the policy actions of the ecb, and of all other major central banks, have been able to repeatedly ward off self - sustaining feedback loops characterised by disorderly deleveraging. the challenge ahead for central banks consists, in my view, of combining such a backstop role during a crisis with a credible commitment to adopting symmetric behaviour in the run - up phase of financial imbalances. bis central bankers ’ speeches

in the policy rate so that the impact on financial and monetary conditions is of the originally - desired size. but another solution is to anchor other rates directly to the central bank policy intentions by the provision of liquidity. the fixed - rate full allotment regime can achieve this outcome because, in effect, it squeezes out the premium at short maturity via the intermediation role taken up by the central bank. this assumes, however, that the counterparties of the central bank are still fundamentally sound. a similar logic can also be applied to longer maturities. the central bank can provide liquidity at longer maturity at the average policy rate that will prevail in the future over this maturity. this can be done at any level of policy rate. the existence of the deposit facility provides a floor to the overnight rate. and the central bank can extend its influence over term credit by lengthening the maturity of its lending operations. see, friedman, m. and schwartz, a. j. ( 1982 ), monetary trends in the united states and the united kingdom : their relation to income, prices, and interest rates, university of chicago press, chicago, pp. 1867 – 1975, and meltzer, a. h. ( 1999 ), “ commentary : monetary policy at zero inflation ”, in new challenges for monetary policy : a symposium sponsored by the federal reserve bank of kansas city, federal reserve bank of kansas city. bis central bankers ’ speeches one notable application of this logic was the 12 - month refinancing operation enacted in december 2009. in this operation, the ecb stood ready to satisfy fully the demand for liquidity at one - year maturity. the interest rate charged on this liquidity was the average mro rate that would prevail over the life of the operation. this type of measure is distinct from attempts to flatten the “ risk - free ” yield curve via forward guidance which is often discussed in the literature. the reason is that it is aimed at squeezing out the premium faced by banks over and above the current and expected policy rate. let me recall that, in the euro area, about three - quarters of corporate finance comes from banks. hence, anchoring banks ’ funding conditions to the desired level can help ensure that lending rates faced by households and firms continue to reflect policy intentions. this was indeed the case during the first phase of the crisis, with lending rates declining in tandem with policy rates according to standard regularities. 3 central banks ’ willingness to