customer identification procedures iii ) monitoring of transactions, and iv ) risk management customer acceptance policy the salient features are : • no anonymous or fictitious / benami accounts to be allowed • not to open / close accounts when unable to apply appropriate customer due diligence ( cdd – decision to close a / cs to be taken at reasonably high levels after issuing due notice to the customers ). • define parameters of risk perception to enable categorisation of customers • documentation / information requirements for different risk categories ( to prepare a profile of each customer ) • circumstances where a customer is permitted to act on behalf of another person / entity, should be spelt out ( eg., account is operated by a mandate holder ) • identity of the customer does not match with those of criminal backgrounds / banned entities ( terrorists, etc. ) customer identification procedures ( cip ) • customer identification – identifying the customer and verifying his / her identity by using reliable, independent source documents, data or information. bis central bankers ’ speeches • the banks must be able to satisfy the competent authorities that due diligence was observed based on the risk profile of the customer in compliance with the extant guidelines in place. • such risk - based approach is considered necessary to avoid disproportionate cost to banks and a burdensome regime for the customers. • nature of information / documents required would also depend on the type of customer ( individual, corporate etc. ) cip – when customer id is required • while establishing a banking relationship • while carrying out a financial transaction as in the case of a “ walk in customer ” • when the bank has a doubt about the authenticity / veracity or the adequacy of the previously obtained customer identification data cip – pmla requirements • banks to obtain “ officially valid documents ( ovd ) ”. • ovds are “ passport, driving license, the permanent account number ( pan ) card, the voter ’ s identity card issued by the election commission of india ; uidai letter containing name, address and aadhaar number and nrega card duly signed ” or any other document as may be notified by the central government. • when there are suspicions of money laundering or financing of the activities relating to terrorism / there are doubts about the adequacy or veracity of previously obtained customer identification data, banks should review the due diligence measures including verifying again the identity banks are required to verify the identity of the customer for all international money

, there were no contemporaneous hard data showing investors ’ excessive optimism in property markets, though there were lots of anecdotes of property investors ’ excessive optimism. moreover, in retrospect, the government itself was overly optimistic : it anticipated a substantial scarcity of office space partly because of internationalization of the japanese financial markets in its “ metropolitan reconstruction plan ” ( 1985 ), and in “ the 4th national comprehensive development plan ” ( 1987 ). see shimizu, c., t. watanabe, and k. g. nishimura, “ house prices in tokyo : a comparison of repeat sales and hedonic measures ” mimeo, reitaku university and hitotsubashi university, 2010. there is sizable rigidity in continuing rents partly because of institutional factors. the cpi rent is the weighted average of market - determined new - contract rents and institutionally rigid continuing rents with more weight on the latter. see shimizu, c., t. watanabe, and k. g. nishimura, “ residential rents and price rigidity : micro structure and macro consequences ”, journal of japanese and international economies 24 ( 2010 ) 282 – 299. chart 7 price - to - rent ratio of tokyo residential area source : author ’ s calculation. central bank policy facing investors ’ excessive optimism and banks ’ loose lending standards, the bank of japan used its then - conventional window guidance to control banks ’ lending volumes. although the direct control of lending through the practice of window guidance was criticized as a discretionary measure contrary to market principles, window guidance at a time of seemingly excessive optimism could be interpreted as one form of macro - prudential measure, albeit a crude one, to dampen excessive optimism through the exercise of moral suasion. however, as financial deregulation got under way, window guidance proved to be ineffective and failed to curb loans outstanding in the late 1980s. what was the monetary policy stance at that time and the public ’ s expectations about the policy? around 1986, the market expectation was that the easy monetary policy would continue for a substantial period. this was partially due to the government ’ s commitments in the international policy coordination pledged during that period. there were also confounding issues at the time : the fallout of black monday ( october 19, 1987 ), the fear of a recession stemming from the substantial appreciation of the yen, and the lack of significant inflationary signs in the cpi. in fact,