a first question is how the burden of high public debt levels in western societies will be shared between generations. this question is particularly pertinent in the euro area because all countries are bound by law to start reducing their debts to below 60 % of gdp – and average public debt levels in the euro area are currently in excess of 95 % of gdp. if fiscal consolidation starts today, then the generation which has benefited most from this debt will play the largest role in reducing it. but if consolidation is delayed, then future generations will have to bear the burden of debt reduction – this would constitute a direct transfer from our children and grandchildren to ourselves. bis central bankers ’ speeches and it is only us who are taking the decision. our children and grandchildren have no power to raise their objections. a second question with intergenerational consequences is how to spread the costs of demographic change. in the eu, it is projected that by 2060 there will be just two workingage people for every person over 65, compared with a ratio of 4 : 1 today. this means the weight of supporting an ageing population will rest on ever fewer shoulders. if current generations are proactive in reforming pension systems, they can reduce the load that the shrinking working age population will have to carry. but if they choose instead to preserve their entitlements, then they make the lives of future generations commensurately harder. they would be effectively sacrificing their descendants ’ quality of life for their own. in other words, all western societies are facing choices about the distribution of responsibility. do we, the current generation, take responsibility for the long - term fiscal challenges that we have played a large part in creating? or do we delay and pass the consequences of our choices onto our children and grandchildren? i think it is fairly clear what a perspective of intergenerational justice would imply. this perspective is of course not new. the so - called “ demographic time bomb ” has been predictable for many years. indeed, i pointed to this issue when i spoke here in greece in early 2008. but what has changed today is the urgency for action. the crisis has meant that these difficult choices can no longer be delayed. one might say it has pressed the fastforward button and brought the challenges of the future into the present. this is the broader context for the ongoing consolidation process in greece. certainly, it is about increasing spending control and tax collection. but it is also about putting greece on a sustainable path

mark w olson : a look at fair lending through the lens of the new hmda data remarks by mr mark w olson, member of the board of governors of the us federal reserve system, at the consumer bankers association 2005 fair lending conference, arlington, 7 november 2005. * * * i want to thank joe belew and the consumers bankers association for inviting me to be with you here this morning. i am especially pleased to speak at this particular annual fair lending conference because it gives me an opportunity to discuss fair lending in the context of the new pricing data that were collected under the home mortgage disclosure act ( hmda ) for the first time this year. later, federal reserve board staff members will discuss in detail the board's analysis of the 2004 hmda data and fair lending procedures. but now, i want to review the history and purpose of the hmda data collection and offer my perspective on the new pricing data, its impact on fair lending evaluations, and how the data can be used to monitor your institution's lending programs and explore new lending opportunities. as you are all aware, amendments to the regulation implementing hmda required the reporting of loan - pricing data for higher - priced loans, beginning in 2004. these additional requirements reflect significant changes in the mortgage credit market in recent years. technological advancements and the practice of credit scoring have resulted in new strategies for analyzing, underwriting, and pricing mortgage loans. because technology allows lenders to price for risk more efficiently, access to mortgage credit has expanded. this expansion, which is largely in the subprime market, has grown dramatically in the last decade, with generally positive, but sometimes negative effects. the change in reporting requirements was also the result of a fundamental reassessment of the nature of mortgage lending abuses. previously, it was presumed that a potential result of inconsistent mortgage loan administration was denial of credit on the basis of race, sex or other impermissible factors. more recently, the pricing of loans - - not just the availability of loans - - has been a potential source of discriminatory lending practices. home ownership is at record highs among low - income and minority borrowers, many of whom may not have qualified for mortgages prior to the development of risk - based pricing technologies. this is generally viewed as a very positive development, since home ownership is often the single most important step toward asset accumulation and wealth building in this economy. however, the increase in mortgage lending among lower - income and minority borrowers