could ask for the same conditions and adjustments? that ’ s exactly the key problem. there is a discussion about relaxing the conditionality emerging in ireland and portugal, and also in greece this debate is gaining new traction. but foot - dragging on addressing the structural problems will perpetuate the crisis, and the market reaction reflects this concern. why not change those principles and make a softer adjustment? once more, the financial assistance can only buy time but does not address the root causes of the crisis. it is like a painkiller. if you do not ensure that you cure the illness you will be worse off once the effect wears off. i would also doubt that public support for the necessary reforms increases if they are spread even more over time, not to mention public support in the countries guaranteeing the rescue mechanism. bis central bankers ’ speeches in greece, there ’ s a lot of debate on the need to renegotiate parts of the program. is there space to make some changes? the key point is that there is an agreement that all involved parties including the greek government have signed. if the agreements were now seen as being open to renegotiation, then for instance the portuguese prime minister would have difficulties facing his parliament and explaining that he is to implement reforms. i think that would be a very dangerous strategy. it would harm those countries that are implementing reforms very quietly. greece is usually described as a special case. could that be so in this case, in a positive sense, allowing greece to adjust the program? greece is already receiving special treatment. adjustment will be spread over a much longer time. greece benefitted from an exceptional debt relief. you see, greece got much more support than any other country. relaxing this already softened framework even further cannot be an option. one of the leaders of the two parties that could win says that the greek government would request a total change of the program. what response would a unilateral move from greece create? who will be elected in greece is a democratic decision that we all have to accept. but also the newly elected greek government is bound by existing agreements. if it unilaterally opted out of the programme, it would mean that in my view the basis for more financial help will no longer be given. greece would have taken its decision but would also have to bear the consequences. we will all be affected, but my assessment is that greece will be worse off than everybody else. have you prepared any contingency plans

one point is of particular importance to me here : fiscal backstops are not the path towards to greater mutual liability. fiscal means can only ever be the last resort within a well - defined liability cascade. but without this last resort, there is the risk of bank recoveries or resolutions being delayed. this is why it must be ensured in advance that fiscal means are available to plug any capital shortfalls in an emergency. only then will the resolution authority at the head of the decision - making chain take on the risk of resolving a systemically important institution. this will make creditor bail - ins the rule and not the exception. this, in turn, is the prerequisite for risks being adequately priced by lenders. 5. where is further economic policy action needed? i mentioned three aims of the banking union at the beginning of my speech : more strongly integrated and also more stable financial markets, as well as the need to disentangle the risks of banks and governments. the banking union alone will not be able to achieve these aims, but it is a key building block that must be augmented and soundly anchored. i would like to emphasise three areas. first, credibly separating the risks of banks and governments requires further regulatory action plans. the banking union by itself does not change banking regulation. in future, the resilience of institutions will be strengthened by basel iii and the additional capital requirements for systemically important financial institutions. but this is not enough. the preferential treatment afforded to government debt instruments needs to be put to an end in the medium term. sovereign bonds need, like other bank exposures as well, to be backed by capital. the existing limits on large exposures should be gradually extended to cover sovereign debt. second, deeper integration of the markets for capital in europe should be made possible. after all, cross - border investment allows opportunities – and risks – to be better shared. this strengthens the resilience of the financial system. despite the essentially free movement of capital, there are still legal and institutional barriers in europe. third, the banking union can accelerate integration of the financial markets by introducing a common set of supervisory standards. but above all, it can also contribute to better risk assumption by the private sector. the single resolution mechanism in particular is expected to make private investors participate in risks that materialise. but for this to become reality, the new rules need to be rigorously applied, and exceptions to the bail - in of creditors must be mini