##isation or net - zero targets. yet other strategy - focused transition plans pay heed to facilitating their clients'and sectors'decarbonisation pathways. these objectives are not necessarily in conflict, but they are different and it is important to understand which objective is driving which part of the transition plan. in the next phase of our work on transition planning, the ngfs will study : how the prudential approach to transition planning can factor in the needs and challenges of emerging markets ; how corporate transition plans feed into financial institutions'transition plans ; and how the credibility of financial institutions'transition plans can be assessed. conclusion before i conclude, let me highlight two additional areas of work that we will focus on. the ngfs will set up a new taskforce on adaptation finance. adaptation financing is critical for building economic resilience and fostering sustainable development. it is particularly relevant for emdes, which are expected to face the brunt of climate change. however, there are significant hurdles to crowding in private sector financing, such as a lack of clear metrics for assessing impact and financial return. the taskforce will explore issues related to the scaling up of adaptation finance, and identify how central banks and supervisors could best contribute to such efforts. the ngfs will also continue to advance efforts on assessing nature - related financial risks. this will build on the conceptual framework for nature - related financial risks that we published earlier this year. 5 / 6 bis - central bankers'speeches this would include setting out illustrative case studies relating to the assessment of nature - related financial risks, as well as bridging modelling and data gaps identified within the framework. central banks and supervisors are stepping up to facilitate climate action. this is reflected not just in the phenomenal growth of the ngfs'membership, but also in our growing work programme and expanding network of collaborators and partners. central banks and supervisors will do their part to facilitate and co - ordinate their efforts across the ecosystem, to support a successful transition towards net zero. i wish everyone an engaging discussion ahead. thank you. 1 the world bank, " climate and development : an agenda for action ", november 2022. 2 in the ngfs scenarios, the shadow carbon price is a proxy for the intensity of government policy ( e. g. carbon taxes ) and changes in technology and consumer preferences. 3 ngfs, " monetary policy and climate change : key takeaways from the membership survey and areas for further analysis ",

in the case of unsound public finances. in such a set - up, eurobonds could indeed be a logical next step. however, giving up sovereignty in this way would represent a radical change and require wide - ranging legislative changes nationally and at the european level. such changes would need the support not only of policymakers but also of the general public. and, on this point, we should be realistic. there is no willingness to do that at present – not in germany or in any other country of the euro area. thus, a fiscal union is a long way off. for the time being, that leaves us with the second option : implementing both liability and control at the national level. this would mean strengthening the original maastricht framework, creating a “ maastricht 2. 0 ”. among other things, that would require strengthening the rules on borrowing – not only does the stability and growth pact need teeth, it also has to be able to bite. the rules have since been tightened – now they have to be applied and compliance has to be ensured. let me mention something as an important side note at this point : european integration is certainly making progress. on tuesday this week the eu finance ministers formally adopted the single supervisory mechanism, which will be a central pillar of the envisaged european banking union. thus, a major step has been taken in improving the framework of monetary union. now, what is my conclusion in this particular case of burden sharing versus efficiency? well, the bundesbank ’ s position has always been clear and consistent. sound incentives are indispensable for countering the biases inherent in the euro area ’ s architecture. bis central bankers ’ speeches some burden sharing is necessary, and it is being implemented through the rescue mechanisms that grant financial assistance. but if burdens are shared in a manner that distorts incentives even further, no lasting resolution of the crisis will be possible. introducing eurobonds would shift the balance closer to burden sharing and further from efficiency. in the long run, this would destabilise the whole monetary union and harm all of us. 5. conclusion ladies and gentlemen, we all see the same crisis and we all share the same explanations for it – more or less. nevertheless, the proposed solutions seem to be rather different from each other. in my speech, i have argued that most of these differences can be traced back to the tug of war between sharing the burden and setting the right incentives,