the financial sector. under the negative list regime, the market access and business operations of financial institutions must also meet the qualification requirements and be conducted with licenses. there is no contradiction between the negative list management and the strengthening of interim and ex - post oversight, either. under the negative list mode, regulators can shift more resources from access management to interim and ex - post oversight to improve regulatory efficiency. second, we will coordinate and promote the opening - up of the financial service sector, the reform of the rmb exchange rate formation mechanism and rmb internationalization. the reform of the rmb exchange rate formation mechanism should aim at enhancing the flexibility of the rmb exchange rate and allowing the exchange rate to act as an “ automatic stabilizer ” in macroeconomic stability and balance of payments. the internationalization of rmb should be market - oriented. regulatory authorities should reduce the restrictions on the cross - border use of rmb. besides the market - based principle, we should also improve the support system for the use of domestic currency, which will in turn create more favorable environment and conditions for the market to play its due role. third, we will prevent risks while accelerating opening - up. we should intensify macroprudential management, implement more professional and effective financial regulation, establish sound “ firewalls ”, improve the capability of forestalling and defusing major risks, and align our regulatory competence with the level of opening - up. 2 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches in the new situation, based on our weaknesses and the demand for higher - level opening - up, we will further financial opening - up toward greater progress and provide strong support to the building of a new development pattern and high - quality economic development. thank you. 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches

with contingent access to fund resources. surveillance today does not provide a meaningful check on ex ante policies, and resources are only made available when the financial need is acute. access to supplemental resources from the fund on a precautionary or contingent basis could make a critical difference in preventing short - term liquidity crises from becoming full - scale solvency problems leading to default. of course, access to such contingent financing should be limited to countries whose policies were judged reasonably sustainable, and consistent with a reduction in balance sheet risks over time. with an enhanced surveillance framework designed to help keep policy on a stronger path that does reduce risk over time, and with contingent finance that could be mobilized quickly, the fund would be better positioned to contain the risk of deeper financial crisis. and more of the policy reform that is a necessary accompaniment to fund finance resources could be supported ex ante, rather than ex post. catalyzing better policies sooner is the best defense, though it will never be a perfect defense, against crises. facilitating restructurings we have seen some progress in the last few years in efforts to improve the framework for sovereign restructurings. in particular, collective action clauses have now become the market standard where emerging market governments issue debt under foreign law. it will take some time for the full stock of sovereign emerging market debt to include these provisions for restructuring by majority action, but this progress is nonetheless important. but there are also some experiences that overshadow these more encouraging developments, and expose a breakdown in the broad consensus that had formed the basis for the successful past strategies of collaboration among the official sector, borrowers, and private creditors. without commenting on the specifics of any particular case, let me offer a view of what i see as fundamental tenets of a credible approach by the international community to situations where a sovereign finds it necessary to restructure its obligations to private creditors : the imf should be willing to lend to a sovereign that is in default to its private creditors only when two conditions have been established : first, the country must commit to a credible medium - term adjustment program, one that offers the prospect of a successful restructuring and a reasonably early return to the capital markets. this has to be established up front for any restructuring effort to work. commitment to a credible adjustment path that offers the reasonable prospect of a return to financial viability and growth is the necessary foundation for engagement by the creditors in a restructuring process. without that, there is little basis for meaningful engagement. the science of