some knowledge of the german language has enabled me to better understand the culture of the country. oversimplifying, i would say that the french and english languages seem to be very much designed to “ communicate ”. my understanding of the german language is that it is very much designed to “ think ”, with its verbs at the end of the sentence. i am not surprised that it is such a good language for philosophy. focus : are you trying to say that germans are not as good at small talk? trichet : not at all! i just want to say that the german language itself is particularly well suited to reflection. in speeches, for example, speakers let the audience think along with them. only at the end of a sentence is the audience able to understand exactly what is actually meant. this is why it is pretty unacceptable for people in the audience to whisper during a speech.

blueprint to overcome frictions with national cultures. one is inclined to question the network character of european banking supervision at large : wouldn ’ t a single authority do a more efficient job? i want to iterate two essential arguments against this reasoning. instead of a steady path towards more centralised supervision, i am arguing for a balanced mix of centralised stringency and national diversity. first – and well known to most in the business – good supervision requires us to be close to banks. this is not only a matter of physical proximity. language, business environment, culture and many other accompanying characteristics of the banking business have local roots. the generally slow process of european integration aside, we cannot expect regional diversity to ever become extinct. while the ecb has indeed done a remarkable job of steering the ssm through its first year, this does not imply that it is bound to solve any organisational difficulty in a top - down manner. instead, we should take advantage of bottomup engagement whenever it is feasible. second, we should keep in mind the need for self - control. we have to assure our internal balance of powers. again, this is not meant as a subtle reach for national privileges but bis central bankers ’ speeches instead as a call for institutional diversity. this is not to be confused with harmonised supervision, which remains ever paramount. importantly, institutional diversity can only be maintained if national supervisory authorities have a meaningful voice in the process. diversity cannot be maintained by itself. it needs to be actively promoted via the ssm governance culture. 5. conclusion the ssm has gained a reputation as a tough but fair supervisor. i have argued for the preservation of its network character. in order to retain a power balance, we have to allow for multi - level governance. we should aim for an open - minded leadership that governs the ssm according to supreme aims. let me reiterate three important aims and implications. • risk - adequate supervision implies that we should allow for flexible supervisory requirements when applicable. • efficient processes require us to use our human resources in areas of the ssm where they will be most useful. • maintaining diversity and subsidiarity within the ssm network requires us to actively promote the involvement of national supervisory authorities. european integration essentially involves learning to manage diversity. in this respect, the ecb has proved itself to be a prototype for self - awareness and openness. recent ssminternal analyses of strengths and weaknesses and organisational changes show that it is not