detailed crisis plan that can be put in place within very short notice. the crisis plan should include the following types of information : organisational structure • a division of responsibilities for analysis, information, decision - making, etc. • staffing requirements for different tasks, with substitutes. analysis plan • a description of the information necessary to make a decision about whether or not a systemic crisis may occur. • necessary information about systemically important individual banks. information strategy • a plan for informing and coordinating information and decisions with the other domestic agencies involved in the crisis. • a plan for informing authorities in other countries about the situation. • a plan for communicating with the financial markets. • a plan for spreading information to the public and media ( ex ante and ex post transparency ). plan for implementing ela • a clear description of the routines which must be followed and the legal requirements which must be met for ela. legal procedures, for example contracts, for lending against other collateral than what is normally eligible • an inventory of the instruments available for implementing ela. • guidelines for acceptable collateral and appropriate haircuts. internal preparedness is important in order to be able to consider requests for ela, as the timeframe for reaction normally is very limited. it is important to note that preparation is crucial also if a central bank is to deny a request for ela. if the central bank has no organisation for analysing systemic consequences and the availability of measures, it is very likely that it will not dare not to lend. no central bank wants to give financial institutions and markets the slightest reason to depend on central bank support rather than their own efforts to avoid financial meltdown. clearly, ela is a last resort measure that central banks use only when the stability of the financial system is at stake. a well - planned and clear lolr function need not encourage moral hazard. on the contrary, a central bank with clear guidelines and a solid analysis capability is in the best position to pinpoint those situations in which ela is necessary. in all other situations, clear guidelines help the central bank to stand firm against the institutions ’ demands for help and to force markets to solve financial problems by themselves.

stefan ingves : the riksbank's role in the economy speech by mr stefan ingves, governor of the sveriges riksbank, at umea university, umea, 6 february 2006. * * * let me begin by thanking you for the opportunity to come here and talk to you! travelling around the country and meeting representatives of different regions, industries and sectors of society is an important part of the openness the riksbank wishes to maintain. these trips provide us with input for our discussions at the bank, while we build up confidence in our operations. this is my first public appearance as riksbank governor, and it feels good to stand here in front of students, teachers, local politicians, regional business representatives and other umea residents. i hope we will have a stimulating discussion and i will certainly do my best to answer your questions. introduction after living and working abroad for many years, it is an honour, as well as exciting and a pleasure to be back in sweden and at the riksbank. the bank i left some years ago is now different in many ways. the most important change is that the riksbank has been governed since 1999 by an executive board, consisting of a governor and five deputy governors, which makes all of the strategic decisions, including monetary policy decisions. previously the interest rate decisions were formally made by the general council, which now instead appoints the members of the executive board. the riksbank has obtained greater independence in relation to parliament and this is why its management has been given greater breadth – five deputy governors compared with two previously. the change towards greater independence for the riksbank coincided with the clarification of the bank ’ s monetary policy task. it is now written in the sveriges riksbank act that the bank shall maintain price stability. this is a development that has also taken place in many other countries. inflation was for a long time a major problem in many parts of the world, but since the shift in monetary policy towards a greater focus on price stability, inflation has been brought under control. in addition to sweden, twenty or so other countries currently have inflation targets, although not all of them have chosen exactly the same system for inflation targeting. sweden was one of the first in this context. the increased independence has entailed greater demands for the riksbank to explain its decisions. when i worked at the bank prior to 1999, work had already begun on improving analyses and communication and aiming