“ technical ” relates mainly to the interfaces that banks are obliged to offer according to the psd2 and the rts. the psd2 and the rts do not provide technical specifications ; they only set high - level requirements. in order to remain technologically neutral, and to cater for potentially different approaches by psps, the rts give the account - servicing psp the choice of establishing an interface dedicated to payment initiation services or allowing tpps the use of the online banking interface used by their normal customers. as a consequence, the approximately 4, 000 banks offering sepa credit transfer could in theory finally try to meet the legal requirements of psd2 and its rts by developing and offering a proprietary interface. thus, in a worst - case scenario, any tpp would need to manage 4, 000 bespoke it - projects to connect to each of those banks, thereby clearly going against the spirit of the new directive. back in february 2014 in the ecb ’ s legal opinion on the proposed psd2, we pointed out the importance of working towards a standardised european interface to facilitate pan - european pis. the european commission has also clearly articulated recently that a standardised interface is their preference, since it provides the technical basis for competition and allows even the smallest players, including start - ups ( fintechs ), to enter the market with new and innovative services that could be offered with a pan - european reach. it is a step in the right direction that only a few initiatives are currently developing standardised specifications for application programming interfaces ( apis ) and the erpb already called for close cooperation between these projects. i would even go a step further and encourage these initiatives to join forces and agree on one common technical specification so that the whole of europe could base their systems upon one or a few technical api standards. this will greatly 2 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches facilitate market entry, avoid fragmentation and allow for competition at the service level, avoiding obstacles at the technical level. to promote the uptake of standardised apis, the european commission has invited market participants to establish an api evaluation group, which has just started its work. i call on the banks to actively, substantively and speedily contribute to the activities of this group, as its findings are essential for the competent authorities, after consulting the eba, to grant an exemption from the rts obligation to offer a fallback solution for the dedicated interface. i am of course aware that

had predicted. that is why we have often characterised what we were experiencing as a “ free fall ” in economic activity. the immediate policy action taken by central banks, governments and parliaments across the world stopped this “ free fall ” and laid the foundations for a gradual recovery in europe and elsewhere over the course of 2009. i would venture to say that if central banks, governments and parliaments around the world had not acted as resolutely as they did, it could have become the most difficult episode for advanced economies since the first world war. the ecb was in the vanguard of the world ’ s central banks. we have confirmed our capability to take bold and timely action. our “ trademark ”, which was vital for maintaining confidence, has been the ability to take the necessary immediate and exceptional decisions whilst, at the same time, remaining inflexibly attached to our primary objective of maintaining price stability in the medium term. the ecb ’ s medium - term orientation in its interest rate policy and in the design of nonstandard measures has helped to contain the emergence of both deflationary and inflationary risks. inflation expectations remained well anchored throughout the crisis, while we provided essential support to the real economy through the banking system and the financial markets. some of the most important non - standard measures that we used were an unlimited provision of liquidity to banks, an extension of operations for periods of up to one year and a moderate, yet highly effective purchase programme for covered bank bonds, which reactivated this segment of the bank funding market. overall, our non - standard monetary policy measures – which are known collectively as “ enhanced credit support ” – have served the euro area economy well. they have supported the functioning of the money market, contributed to improving financing conditions and allowed for a better flow of credit to the real economy than could have been achieved through interest rate reductions alone. by and large, banks have been passing on the sharply lower key ecb interest rates to households and businesses. designing a timely exit strategy from our non - standard measures was a central part of the ecb ’ s response to the crisis. in september last year, we set out our overall strategy. in december, we decided on its implementation. the guiding principle is that to the extent that the situation returns to normal, keeping such measures in place for longer than required risks changing the behaviour of financial market participants in an undesirable manner. we do not wish to breed dependency. thus, in december 2009,