by the global community. the bulk of the evidence, and appropriate risk considerations in the weak economic environment of today, suggest much caution should be exercised when implementing short - term fiscal consolidation measures, especially in those cases where the long - term sustainability of public finances is not threatened. structural reform fatigue is settling in, with electorates weary in both creditor and debtor countries to pursue tough measures to ensure medium - term fiscal consolidation and containment of the sovereign crisis in europe. moreover, financial markets remain jittery as the final outcomes of agreed commitments are not a foregone conclusion. the risk of disorderly outcomes is high, and balance sheet repair, especially of those banks most exposed to the european periphery, should be bolstered. hoping for the best is no substitute for preparing for the worst, and the markets are well bis central bankers ’ speeches aware of that. more extreme measures on debt restructuring might be unavoidable if fiscal transfers are ruled out and fatigue settles in debtor countries. in an environment of financial uncertainty and fiscal retrenchment, monetary policy should remain supportive. emerging market economies ( emes ) and smaller, financially stable aes, are threading carefully in this uncertain environment, and as we saw a few years ago, it is unlikely that full decoupling will occur under most scenarios. the fund ’ s advice should properly recognize that the rebalancing challenges are not the same across this heterogeneous group of economies ; thus, an adequate level of differentiation in terms of policy advice is called for. in this regard, we would like to note that : if the external scenario should worsen significantly, many emes with flexible exchange rates and inflation - targeting regimes would have scope to adjust monetary policy, thanks to a timely process of raising interest rates to contain overheating risks. going forward, these economies will be able to react flexibly to changing global circumstances in a context of anchored inflationary expectations. other emes have limited room for maneuver, as their economies have expanded beyond their potential output, with widening fiscal and external deficits, and thus today face the risk that external shocks might unhinge inflationary expectations and force pro - cyclical monetary and fiscal policy adjustments. a third group of emes has maintained structurally high national saving rates throughout the expansion phase of the global cycle and might be subject to a natural deceleration as the global economy cools down. in these cases, undertaking reforms to boost domestic demand would help sustain

with which we discuss and express our judgments, thereby undermining the capacity to make appropriate decisions on monetary policy. the more transparent, the more cautious board members will be in pronouncing their judgments. that is why we have decided not to reveal board members ’ names in the minutes, so as not to inhibit an open, technical and independent discussion. in the pursuit of monetary policy effectiveness and predictability, we feel that the discussion itself is more important than names. a recent study by meade and stasavage ( 2008 ) compared the fed ’ s federal open market committee discussions before and after 1993, at which time it was decided to publish detailed records of deliberations of the meetings five years after they had been held. the study concluded that knowing the transcripts were to be made public had made members of a monetary policy committee more reluctant to offer dissenting opinions. in general, transparency and its limits depend chiefly on the characteristics of the board. for example, at one extreme we have the european central bank which does not keep minutes and dissent is very limited ; and at the other extreme we have the bank of england where each board member has individual responsibility. 4 chile, like the united states, takes an intermediate stance. that ’ s why blinder ( 2004 ) says, there is no “ one - size - fits - all ” approach to communication and transparency. communications policy the central bank website carries a document called “ communications policy ” which specifies the principles and norms governing the bank ’ s communication with the public. it states that the bank communicates with the public by way of official notices and publications, minutes, previously announced public conferences, interviews or public declarations made by board members. it also says that the governor is directly responsible for all the information the bank puts out, except for whatever the individual board members might publish or say in public. at the same time, the policy rules that the bank must publish all information or resolution relevant to the market as soon as it has been validated, thus obliging itself to give out all market - sensitive information as quickly as possible. whenever a board member or bank executive gives a talk with information that could be relevant for the market, it is published on the website. any public presentation given by the governor is posted on the web as soon as they begin so that the general public has access to the information at the same time as those present. in my own case, and so that there is no discrimination between those who attend