more likely to result in harm to consumers get more attention. and we continue to improve our examiner commissioning training program to ensure that it fully reflects the lessons of the recent crisis. with the congress ’ s support, we have also taken action to relieve small holding companies of certain requirements by raising the asset threshold for the board ’ s small bank holding company policy statement from $ 500 million to $ 1 billion, and by applying this statement to small savings and loan holding companies. the small bank holding company policy statement promotes local control of community banking organizations by acknowledging that smaller companies have less access to the capital markets and allowing them to fund acquisitions with a higher level of debt than would otherwise be allowed. we also relieved small holding companies of requirements to comply with consolidated capital requirements, recognizing that their bank subsidiaries make up most of their assets and are already subject to capital rules. in addition, in conjunction with this change, we eliminated quarterly and more detailed consolidated financial reporting requirements for holding companies with less than $ 1 billion in assets, and instead require parent - only financial statements on a semiannual basis. 6 consistent with the economic growth and regulatory paperwork reduction act ( egrpra ), the board is also working with the other federal banking agencies to identify banking regulations that are outdated, unnecessary, or unduly burdensome. as part of the egrpra review, the agencies have held several public outreach meetings with bankers, consumer groups, and other stakeholders. 7 several themes have emerged during the discussions. for example, community bankers in rural areas have noted that it can be difficult to find an appraiser with knowledge about the local housing market at a reasonable fee. bankers have asked the agencies to consider increasing the dollar threshold for requiring appraisals, which could allow them to use a less formal valuation of collateral for a larger number of mortgage loans. in addition, bankers have raised concerns about the extent of the financial reporting requirements established by the banking agencies. in response, the banking agencies have already taken steps under the auspices of the federal financial institutions examination see board of governors of the federal reserve system ( 2015 ), “ federal reserve board issues final rule to expand applicability of small bank holding company policy statement and apply it to certain savings and loan holding companies, ” press release, april 9. an additional egrpra outreach meeting is scheduled to be held in washington, d. c., on december 2, 2015. bis central bankers ’ speeches council to consider options to eliminate or

, too, affects both the community of neighbouring countries as well as the country causing the problem. the architects of monetary union were well aware of the problem of incentives. which is exactly why they took precautions. it was, therefore, laid down from the start in the treaty of maastricht that a country is forbidden from assuming the debt of another country or the community of states. in other words, this laid down the foundation for a general no bail - out principle. the maastricht treaty is, thus, guided by the principle of individual responsibility, or the balance of liability and control. in the concise words of german economist walter eucken : “ whoever reaps the benefits must also bear the liability. ” or, in very down - to - earth terms : whoever orders, pays. an additional security threshold for monetary union as a stability union is the prohibition of monetary financing of governments. the central banks of the eurosystem, that is the european central bank and the 19 national central banks, are forbidden from directly financing euro - area countries. in order for this ban on monetary financing of governments to be implemented in practice, the independence of the eurosystem from political instructions was enshrined at the same time. bis central bankers ’ speeches political decision - makers cannot, therefore, force the central banks of the eurosystem to grant member states loans or directly purchase their sovereign paper. ultimately, these measures could contravene the mandate of ensuring price stability, causing lasting harm to the eurosystem ’ s credibility and thus to the very foundations of a successful monetary policy. germany has, in the past, had bad experiences with central banks which were not free of political lobbying. for example, expenditure on arms in the first world war was financed directly by the central bank, which essentially catered to the needs of the government. the consequence was a complete devaluation of the reichsmark. by contrast, the independence of the eurosystem was firmly anchored. first, institutionally, by prohibiting national and supranational institutions from issuing the ecb or the national central banks with instructions. and second, functionally, by awarding the sole prerogative regarding strategies and measures to ensure price stability to the eurosystem. the independence of the central banks is further safeguarded by specific debt ceilings, which are intended to prevent member states from accumulating excessive debt. a country ’ s public deficit is not supposed to exceed a maximum of