than a monetary arrangement. as hans tietmeyer said many years ago, the monetary union is a community that shares a common destiny. and we should not forget that we are also a community of values. price stability is the best contribution that central banks can make to the stability of the financial system. price stability is even a necessary condition for financial stability. however, price stability is not a sufficient condition. many people share responsibility for financial stability, and all must live up to that responsibility. the crisis has revealed weaknesses in the institutional framework. thus far, it has not been sufficiently possible to encourage the member states to implement policies that are in line with our benchmark. fiscal policies, wage policies and structural policies must conform to our stability target of inflation of just under 2 %. i am convinced that we will find ways of achieving this. conclusion before i finish, i should like to recount a short anecdote. once, while raymond barre was prime minister [ 1976 – 1981 ], he asked me, given that i worked at the treasury, whether i often travelled to brussels. in that case, he said, i must meet hans tietmeyer. he said : “ he is very influential, and he is a tough negotiator. if you have issues to discuss with him, good luck! ” that was a considerable compliment. germany and europe have much to thank hans tietmeyer for. he was resolute in ensuring that the euro would be a stable currency. today, after having had to cope with the worst financial crisis since world war ii, we can say with confidence that the euro has been a stable currency since its inception and that the euro area is a stable community. as i said earlier, hans tietmeyer is the author of a book entitled “ the euro challenge ”. i am certain that the euro will be equal to that challenge. thank you.

governor of the banque de france when it became fully independent. central bank independence was “ europeanised ” and became the model for the ecb. on 1 january 1994, more than 16 years ago, i saw for myself the enormous difference that it makes to preside over a fully independent institution. it has now long been demonstrated – both theoretically and empirically – that central banks are better able to ensure low and stable levels of inflation when they are independent. of course, independence does not mean arbitrariness. instead, that independence is tied to a concrete objective. and independence requires accountability. in the case of the ecb, its mandate specifies that the delivery of price stability is its primary objective. the quantitative definition of price stability does not just contribute to the anchoring of inflation expectations. it also provides people with an objective yardstick with which to judge our work. the mandate and the independence of the eurosystem are enshrined in europe ’ s treaties. these are quasi - constitutional in nature. monetary policy has been removed from the remit of national politics. at the same time, the ecb – like other central banks – cannot complain that it has lacked advice from politicians. this is something of a tradition when it comes to independent central banks. don ’ t forget adenauer ’ s famous “ guillotine speech ” in 1956. half a century later, heads of state or government attempted – again, unsuccessfully – to influence the monetary policy of the ecb. when growth weakened in 2003 and 2004 the then leaders of the three large euro area countries demanded an instant reduction in interest rates. the governing council refused to reduce rates, and i was proud to refer to the adenauer precedent. later, at the end of 2005, many governments warned against increasing interest rates. we did indeed increase rates, the ecb stuck to its mandate, and today nobody disputes the fact that our decisions were correct. at the time, however, we were under considerable pressure. we withstood that pressure. in most cases, criticism of independent central banks is sparked by restrictive decisions. expansionary policies are rarely criticised. this shows that many pressure groups, as well as politicians, who often are under short - term pressure, don ’ t think in terms of the time horizons considered by central bankers. the ecb is independent. it does not allow any government, institution or lobby to influence its monetary policy decisions. the citizens of germany and the rest of europe can rely on us