to fail. on the other hand, expectations of public support for too - systemic - to - fail institution are likely to have been reinforced by the market turmoil that followed the failure of lehman brothers. let me now flag some of the questions / challenges that could be addressed today. the first question that naturally comes to mind is the measure of the phenomenon, i. e. : “ how big is the implicit subsidy? ” a quick look at the literature shows that measuring the subsidy is difficult, since it is implicit and tied to market perceptions. in addition, differences in funding prices between large or systemic banks and small or non - systemic banks can be due to factors unrelated to potential government support, such as differences in economies of scale and scope, or differences in the size and liquidity of bonds issuance. overlooking these alternative factors could lead to overestimate the size of the implicit public subsidy. second, one would also like to ascertain whether the presence of an implicit subsidy does lead to higher risk taking, and the quantitative importance of this effect. the third question has to do with regulation, i. e. : “ what can be done to address this issue? ” it seems that there are three main approaches : • some regulatory measures try to eliminate possible symptoms of the implicit subsidy. for instance, proposals on restrictions on bank market activities have been justified by the objective of limiting the implicit subsidy to non - traditional banking activities. • another approach is to directly target the underlying cause of the problem, for instance by making easier the resolution of problems at large banks without resorting to taxpayer money. some progress has been achieved in the us ( through the orderly liquidation authority ), and in europe ( through the recovery and resolution directive ). • a third approach, illustrated by the g - sibs framework, is to offset the implicit subsidy with additional capital and bailinable debt requirements the so called tlac or other regulatory measures. concluding remarks to conclude, i would offer two remarks which you may want to keep in mind. the first remark has to do with the comparative advantage of too - systemic - to - fail institutions, and in particular of global systemically important banks. in reaction to the crisis, many regulatory reforms have been put in place on capital and liquidity, credit exposure to counterparties, supervision, and trading activities. bis central bankers ’ speeches these reforms will impose higher costs on systemic institutions compared to their nonsystemic ( smaller ) peers. the logic makes perfect sense

enriching the financial ecosystem and making it more efficient and resilient lies in strengthening the relationships between players and their diversity. what do we want to do and what are we doing at the banque de france and the acpr to support this development of the fintech ecosystem? the short answer to this question, which i will now illustrate, is, on the one hand, to be a useful player in the fintech ecosystem and, on the other hand, to promote and implement a regulatory framework and appropriate supervisory practices that foster both innovation and the stability of our financial system. 1 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches * in order to be a useful player in the fintech ecosystem, we have two objectives : facilitate and experiment facilitate, firstly. this is what we are doing via the implementation of specific support tools. for instance, under the aegis of a national start - up correspondent, who is also the french tech correspondent, the banque de france has just deployed a network of regional start - up correspondents in each of the 13 french tech capitals. their mission is to be the key point of reference for rating start - ups and providing them with support and guidance thanks to their knowledge of funding mechanisms and of the main players in the ecosystem. as regards the acpr, i no longer need to present thefintech innovation unit, which has already held hundreds of meetings with start - ups since its creation. its purpose is to provide an easily accessible entry point for those with innovative projects, giving them some initial regulatory guidance to help them shape their projects and then refer them to the right correspondents for the necessary registrations or authorisations. naturally, our facilitation efforts are not limited to bilateral contacts alone. facilitating also means helping players in the ecosystem to engage with each other and find solutions without necessarily resorting to regulatory measures. it is in this spirit that we run the acpr - amf fintech forumand that we have created working groups or task forces in order to make concrete progress on important issues for the ecosystem, such as the access of digital asset service providers to the bank accounts and banking services they need. admittedly, dialogue does not solve everything, but we very often find that many difficulties can be ironed out through improved dialogue and a better understanding of the practices and technologies used by the various stakeholders. second objective : experiment. here i would like to give two different illustrations of this approach. the exploratory workshops conducted by acpr on