to contend with a strong appreciation of the swiss franc. this brings me to the institution that is inextricably linked with the success of the euro : the ecb. 2. the ecb ’ s monetary policy ensures a stable currency in the euro area the ecb has acted resolutely during this crisis to safeguard price stability in the euro area in line with its mandate and with full independence. on 9 august 2007, for example, the ecb was the first central bank worldwide to react decisively to the turbulence emerging in the financial markets. however, the financial market situation deteriorated so dramatically in the course of 2008 that the transmission of monetary policy was significantly disrupted. central banks across the world were repeatedly faced with a situation in which liquidity in short and longer - term money markets threatened to dry up. in this context, the conventional monetary policy of the eurosystem also reached the limits of what it could achieve. against the backdrop of this extraordinary situation, the ecb took a number of “ non - standard ” monetary policy measures. these mainly include refinancing operations with full allotment against collateral, longer - term refinancing operations with an extended maturity and the expansion of the list of assets eligible to be used as collateral. all these non - standard measures are temporary in nature and can in principle be withdrawn at any time if we see upside risks to price stability. in germany the ecb ’ s two three - year longer - term refinancing operations in particular have made headlines. bis central bankers ’ speeches the aim of these operations was to guarantee the refinancing of the banking system over the longer term in order to support the flow of credit from banks to the real economy. the demand from banks was high, with around 500 institutions participating in the first operation in december 2011. for standard longer - term refinancing operations, this figure is closer to 100. the second operation, in february 2012, had around 800 participants, including a large number of small credit institutions, more than half of which were german. these banks frequently grant loans to small and medium - sized businesses, which form the backbone of growth and employment in the euro area. in these two operations the eurosystem allotted around a trillion euro, although the net provision of liquidity was only about half that figure. these are large sums. i would ask, however, that you bear the following points in mind : first, the interest rate in these two operations

were also a consequence of dynamic export growth and not just resulting from import compression due to the recessionary period. 6 / 16 bis central bankers'speeches slide 6 the impressive correction of current account deficits in some euro area countries has been mirrored in a significant adjustment of intra - euro area trade and current account imbalances ( see slide 7 ). as a result, some euro area countries with large external surpluses now record current account surpluses mostly vis - a - vis countries outside the euro area. 7 / 16 bis central bankers'speeches slide 7 fiscal deficits have been reduced. fiscal effort, measured as the change in the structural primary balance, has been significant in many countries ( see slide 8, chart on the left ). as a result, and also thanks to the reduction in interest payments, fiscal deficits are now in almost all countries below 3 % of gdp ( see slide 8, chart on the right ). 8 / 16 bis central bankers'speeches slide 8 beyond fiscal deficits, the level of public and private debt has also posed concerns in some countries. in the run - up to the crisis, it was not so much public debt but rather the private sector indebtedness that increased substantially ( see slide 9 ). this should be underlined because, as jorda, schularik and taylor ( 2016 ) said : “ … private credit booms, not public borrowing or the level of public debt, tend to be the main precursors of financial instability in industrial countries. ” 2 it was only after the crisis that public debt increased, on account of the necessary interventions. more recently, both public and private sector debt levels stabilised, thanks to consolidation efforts and private sector deleveraging, even if remaining rather diverse across countries. focusing on the programme and post programme countries, private debt levels in percent of gdp are currently lower than 10 years ago in spain, portugal and greece, but still higher in cyprus and ireland. public debt however is higher than at the start of the crisis, across the euro area. increasing the growth potential of euro area economies would help to achieve a downward shift in the debt - to - gdp ratios. 9 / 16 bis central bankers'speeches slide 9 synchronisation of economic cycles and symmetric shocks an important aspect stemming from the theory of optimal currency areas, relates to the risk of asymmetric shocks to countries in a monetary union, placing them in different phases of the economic cycle, which would make a single monetary