corrections on all major stock exchanges and to a veritable flight into the swiss franc. the record highs the swiss franc reached on 21 september went in tandem with the stock markets hitting record lows. in response to the rapid and marked appreciation of the swiss franc, we cut interest rates in an extraordinary move on 24 september. following this step, and in the course of a broader normalisation of the financial markets, the euro rebounded somewhat vis - a - vis the swiss franc. our currency nevertheless remained strong against the euro. at the end of november, it was quoted at 3. 5 % above its average rate during the first eight months of the year. the euro - swiss franc rate was somewhat more volatile as well. its volatility in additional currencies now stands at about the same level as previously against the d - mark. on the stock markets, a distinct corrective movement set in even before the end of september. meanwhile, most stock indices are above the level obtaining on 10 september. bond yields have increased a little in the last few weeks as well. both effects can be interpreted as a sign of renewed optimism concerning the economic development in the medium term. in the days after the terror attacks, the resiliency of the financial system was put to a test never before described or even considered in any emergency plan. payment transactions in us dollars were affected directly. faced with the possible breakdown of individual banks and parts of the system which are crucial for carrying out transactions, the federal reserve - by way of the discount window pumped massive amounts of liquidity into the system. on the basis of a swap agreement, the european central bank supplied banks in the euro area directly with dollar liquidity. the national bank was in close touch with the swiss banks and - should this have been necessary - we would have been in a position to lend support as well. the demand for swiss franc liquidity also rose sharply. naturally, we made the necessary amounts available to the full extent. as was to be expected, it became evident that only a part of this liquidity was needed, and we were able to reabsorb it through repo transactions as early as 12 september. on the two days following the attacks, repos totalling approximately sfr 40 billion were turned over. the experiences gained in the aftermath of 11 september have shown three things. firstly, that the financial system - even in this unique and completely unexpected situation - still managed to function

mario draghi : money and monetary institutions after the crisis speech by mr mario draghi, president of the european central bank, at the conference on “ money and monetary institutions after the crisis ”, in memory of curzio giannini, bank of italy, rome, 10 december 2013. * * * summary central banks should continue to focus primarily on what they can and are mandated to achieve, which is price stability over the medium term. delivering on their mandate is the only way for central bankers to maintain public trust. pursuit of this mandate must be backed indirectly by public preferences, seen from a longerterm perspective. the actions undertaken by the ecb have not represented a departure from the ecb ’ s mandate but rather the opposite, namely its pursuit by all the means demanded by the situation. it is now crucial to complete the reform agenda at european and national level. with this agenda there can be no place for withdrawing into nationalism and protectionism. * * * introduction ladies and gentlemen : i very much appreciate having the opportunity to intervene in this conference, not only because it honours curzio giannini, but also because the issues that were close to his heart have turned out to be fundamental questions concerning the role of central banks in the postcrisis environment. the morning session has touched upon topics of vital importance for central banks. i would summarise them along two main lines. first, should the objectives ( though not necessarily the mandate ) of central banks be broadened? second, and related, how can central banks retain and increase public trust and preserve their legitimacy and independence? although these are issues that affect all central banks, i will naturally speak from the perspective of the ecb and our specific institutional context. the objectives of monetary policy claudio borio has presented a thought - provoking paper on the question of whether central banks had too narrow a focus in the decades preceding the global financial crisis. he now asks whether they should widen their horizon, in particular towards addressing financial imbalances. claudio first documents that there is a financial cycle of credit booms and busts that overlaps with the more usual business cycle, but which has a longer duration, in particular in the buildup phase. although not always easy to detect, this cycle is often characterised by the interplay between soaring real estate prices and easy credit, and both are in principle observable. second, claudio argues that monetary policy ( possibly in combination with other policies such as macro - prude