limited by a set of rules of origin whereby local exports only benefit from preferential access to the eu market if the percentage of the value of the product that originates in malta exceeds a minimum threshold. if this agreement is to be upgraded, however, malta would have to make commitments over and above those it has today. indeed, many of the countries with whom the eu has a comparable agreement have managed to obtain a better deal than malta not only because they are much larger in terms of market size, but also because they have entered into additional commitments. eea countries, for example, do indeed participate in eu programmes, but they have also offered substantial rebates on loan - related interest payments and committed nearly ecu 500 million in direct grants for projects in specific eu regions. in other words, eea countries contributed to the eu ’ s financial resources, and specifically to the eu ’ s regional policy, without being members of the eu. in addition, it is well known that membership of the eea implies taking on a large part of the eu acquis, whether past, present or future, without having any say in the decision - making process. nor is the obligation to come into line with the acquis unique to the eea. as is the case with switzerland, which is an efta but not an eea country, the eu ’ s trading partners are increasingly being required to approximate their national laws with those of the eu as a precondition for access to its market. the second conclusion to emerge from this analysis, therefore, is that if malta seeks to negotiate a more advantageous form of association agreement, our exporters will only be able to secure improved access to the eu and its partners if the maltese government makes commitments in areas other than those covered by the present agreement, including a commitment to achieve legal equivalence with the eu acquis. pressures to liberalise, the costs of restructuring and the obligation of legal equivalence will arise irrespective of eu membership it could be argued that as a non - member the pace with which this legal equivalence would have to be achieved would be slower than that implied by the current enlargement calendar. in practice, however, the difference in timing is subtle. it must not be forgotten that nine other countries are also about to in addition, a recent study by the world trade organisation shows that this is one of the regions with the lowest concentration of regional trade arrangements, a situation which is not expected to change much in

edward scicluna : central banks on the way out of the covid - 19 crisis but facing new global challenges speech by mr edward scicluna, governor of the central bank of malta, at the 2022 conference of mediterranean central banks " building resilience in uncertain times : safeguarding financial stability, encouraging investments ", jointly organised by the central bank of the republic of turkey, the organisation for economic co - operation and development ( oecd ), the european institute of the mediterranean ( iemed ) and the bank of spain, session " central banks on the way out of the covid - 19 crisis but facing new global challenges ", istanbul, 31 october 2022. * * * fellow governors, ladies and gentlemen i would like to thank our host, governor kavcolu and his team, the oecd, iemed, and the bank of spain for their invitation and for their warm welcome. i have come to share my views at this seventh annual conference of mediterranean central banks on the challenges we monetary policymakers are facing in the current macroeconomic and geopolitical environment, because as mediterranean countries we have an obligation to explain our respective position and its relevance to our region. because financial instability in any one country does not help the attractiveness of the whole region in the eyes of the investor. let me start with what is relevant to any central banker wherever he or she comes from. i think that what is sharply standing out today is the sharp trade - offs confronting us central bankers. the biggest being that between containing inflation and avoiding a recession. and in spite of the uncertainty surrounding the outcomes, the decision cannot be put off, since a wait - and - see approach is likely more costly, and certainly riskier. what is the price of not tackling inflation decisively? that we know. the high tax on the disadvantaged, on those on fixed incomes, incentivising rent seekers, the waste of dog chase tail wage - price spirals. at the same time we hear that a recession is not just around the corner but on our door step. we hear that certain indicators are also giving out the message that certain prices have peaked and some are even falling. so why all this unrelenting rush to kill off inflation when the recession has started to do the work itself. let us be careful. my understanding is that the financial markets and economic forecasters do not believe that the recession as seen today will be so deep that it will do all our