on financial intermediation may be very different, as they have substantial financial resources, a strong brand image, a global customer base and privileged access to cutting - edge technologies. 4. can they nevertheless eliminate bank intermediation, if we take a long term view? this question brings me to my prognosis to conclude my speech. it seems to me that instead of eliminating bank intermediation, the competition exerted on banks by non - bank financial players and by tech companies, as well as banks ’ reaction to this new competitive environment, will probably lead to a redistribution of the cards of financial intermediation, around a combination of several models that would include : 1 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches - the traditional bank intermediation model - the non - bank financial intermediation model implemented by the asset management sector a so - called “ re - intermediated ” model in which fintechs and bigtechs play the role of intermediary for banks, in particular vis - a - vis retail clients - a completely disintermediated model based on blockchain technology i will not venture to forecast the weight that the traditional bank intermediation model will have at the end of this transformation. this will depend in particular on banks ’ ability to rise to the challenges they face, notably in terms of profitability and technology, and to adapt the services they offer to the digital era but also on the fight against climate change. nonetheless, this transformation seems to me to clearly imply adjusting our regulatory framework for all activities that will contribute to financial intermediation in the future. these transformations will have a positive impact on the efficiency and stability of our financial system, provided they are accompanied by better user experiences and more diversified financing of the economy. but they also carry risks, which must be managed. this implies reviewing the scope and content of certain regulations to ensure that the regulatory framework is favourable to innovation and neutral with respect to technologies, but also guarantees an appropriate and homogeneous treatment of risks throughout the financial system according to the “ same activity, same risk, same rules ” principle. ( e. g. non - bank financial players, technology service providers, issuers and managers of crypto asset trading platforms ) thank you for your attention. 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches

i should note that my views are not necessarily those of my colleagues on the board of governors or the federal open market committee. the taylor curve and the variability tradeoff let us begin by asking what economic theory has to say about the relationship of output volatility and inflation volatility. to keep matters simple, i will make the strong ( but only temporary! ) assumption that monetary policymakers have an accurate understanding of the economy and that they choose policies to promote the best economic performance possible, given their economic objectives. i also assume for the moment that the structure of the economy and the distribution of economic shocks are stable and unchanging. under these baseline assumptions, macroeconomists have obtained an interesting and important result. specifically, standard economic models imply that, in the long run, monetary policymakers can reduce the volatility of inflation only by allowing greater volatility in output growth, and vice versa. in other words, if monetary policies are chosen optimally and the economic structure is held constant, there exists a long - run tradeoff between volatility in output and volatility in inflation. the ultimate source of this long - run tradeoff is the existence of shocks to aggregate supply. consider the canonical example of an aggregate supply shock, a sharp rise in oil prices caused by disruptions to foreign sources of supply. according to conventional analysis, an increase in the price of oil raises the overall price level ( a temporary burst in inflation ) while depressing output and employment. monetary policymakers are therefore faced with a difficult choice. if they choose to tighten policy ( raise the short - term interest rate ) in order to offset the effects of the oil price shock on the general price level, they may well succeed - but only at the cost of making the decline in output more severe. likewise, if monetary policymakers choose to ease in order to mitigate the effects of the oil price shock using more formal econometric methods, kim, nelson, and piger ( 2003 ) also found that structural breaks in the volatility and persistence of inflation occurred about the same times as the changes in output volatility. stock and watson ( 2003 ) provide a recent overview of the debate. on output, their action will exacerbate the inflationary impact. hence, in the standard framework, the periodic occurrence of shocks to aggregate supply ( such as oil price shocks ) forces policymakers to choose between stabilizing output and stabilizing inflation. 6 note