##ers and c willeke ( eds ), monetary analysis : tools and applications, ecb, pp 47 - 62. see swiss national bank : monetary policy decisions of the swiss national bank for 2000, snb quartalsheft 4 / 1999, pp 1923. see p gerlach - kristensen : a two - pillar phillips curve for switzerland, mimeo, 2006. see o issing : the role of macroeconomic projections within the monetary policy strategy of the ecb, economic modelling, vol. 21, 2004, p 725. in practice it has to date proved difficult to capture statistically, in a sufficiently reliable way, the longerterm price effects of monetary policy on the basis of available macroeconometric models. ” 8 in recent years, several papers have come to the conclusion that monetary and credit aggregates – or variables which rely heavily on money growth such as the so - called “ money gap ” – provide valuable information for future inflation in the euro area. this is particularly true for the longer forecasting horizon, confirming the claim that monetary development is key to understanding inflation in the long run. in a recent bundesbank discussion paper, boris hofmann shows that the relationship between money and prices seems to continue. 9 in my view, the two - pillar approach of the ecb does not only show that there is a special relationship between the choice of a strategy and the need for forecasts. the use of a particular concept for monetary policy also has consequences for the efforts a central bank makes to improve its forecasting abilities. for the ecb one possible extension might be found in a more strongly formalised combined assessment of the information included in both pillars for future inflation developments at various time horizons. when i point to the fact that different strategies in monetary policy require different forecasting approaches i don ’ t want to deny that all central banks face a lot of similar forecasting problems. they all want to reduce the limits of forecasting. i hope that our conference has made a contribution to this aim. see l papademos : macroeconomic theory and monetary policy : the contributions of franco modigliani and the ongoing debate, bnl quarterly review, vol. lviii, june - september 2005, pp 187 - 214. see b hofmann : do monetary indicators still predict euro area inflation?, bundesbank discussion paper, 2006, forthcoming.

assistance to credit suisse required the utmost flexibility from the snb. as lender of last resort, it initially provided credit suisse with classic liquidity assistance ( ela ). based on an emergency ordinance by the federal council, it also provided an additional liquidity assistance loan ( ela + ). the statutory basis for this facility made it possible for loans granted under ela + to be secured solely by means of preferential rights in bankruptcy proceedings. ultimately the snb granted a further loan guaranteed by the federal government's public liquidity backstop ( plb ). thanks to ela +, it was possible to create the time window required for finding a comprehensive solution during the phase of high and exceptionally rapid outflows at 1 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches credit suisse. without ela + credit suisse would have been in jeopardy of being unable to meet its financial obligations before the announcement of the acquisition by ubs, entailing substantial risks for financial stability. however, even after the acquisition had been announced, the snb's liquidity assistance remained crucial for credit suisse and ubs. there are statutory limits on the snb's room for manoeuvre in the area of financial stability. further tasks that are also important for the stability of the financial system fall under the responsibility of different authorities. for example, the snb is not responsible for the supervision of banks, and it has no legal basis to take over or resolve a bank. similarly, the snb cannot guarantee customer deposits at banks or provide banks with unsecured liquidity, i. e. without sufficient collateral cover a€ “ also not in the case of an acute crisis that poses a threat to global financial stability. the statutory framework for the snb's tasks and instruments is clear, and so too is the division of roles between the authorities. for the snb, its role as lender of last resort is of the utmost importance. neither in the case of the crisis at credit suisse nor in preceding crises was there ever a situation in which the snb would not have provided emergency liquidity assistance if this had been requested by a bank or if necessary to safeguard financial stability. the snb works continuously on being able to optimally perform its tasks as lender of last resort at any time. this includes testing its own emergency operations, as well as maintaining good contacts with other key central banks, relationships that are particularly valuable when it comes to