higher than at the end of 2022 ( 247 % ). liquidity had been the big worry in early 2023 in the wake of the silicon valley bank crisis. here too, french banks demonstrated their soundness : at the end of 2023, their aggregate lcri stood at 147 %, and their nsfrii at 115 %, well above the minimum of 100 % [ slide 6 ]. image liquidity : french banks are also solid the supervisor's report does not highlight any specific vulnerability in terms of liquidity for the six main french banking groups. although deposits have shifted from sight deposits into interest - bearing deposits and regulated savings accounts, total deposits have continued to increase slightly. [ see slide 7 ] presentation of the annual report of the au … image total deposits have continued to rise consequently, there can be no doubt : french banks can be, and are in a credit - provider mind - set. this holds true for housing loans : low figures for new housing loans are now due to demand, which remains on hold but should gradually pick up again with average lending rates back down below 4 %. loans to businesses - including smes - continue to register positive growth in terms of outstandings. i now turn to the third vertex of the triangle, which is currently more of a specific challenge for french banks, namely profitability. until 2022, their return on equity ratio ( roe ) was comparable to that of other european and international banks, but since then, a gap has opened up, with a stable ratio in france but cyclically - driven increases elsewhere in europe. [ slide 8 ] presentation of the annual report of the au … image roe : a stable situation for the main french banks... indeed, during the interest rate hikes of 2023, french banks faced a steeper increase in their interest expense than in their interest income due to the specific features of our business model : i. e. the weight of regulated savings in liabilities and the predominance of fixed - rate housing loans on the asset side of the balance sheet. consequently, their net banking income ( nbi ) declined by 3 % in 2023. elsewhere in europe, a higher proportion of variable - rate loans resulted in a faster increase in returns on assets. nevertheless, french banks ’ net profit has remained stable thanks to both a diversified business model that combines substantial amounts of fees and income from market activities, and a low cost of risk : fixed - rate housing loans contribute to this

central bankers'speeches increasing, but remains below our target. already before the 2008 crisis, central bankers firmly believed that price stability is a necessary – and for some even a sufficient – condition to ensure financial stability. this view is referred to as the ‘ jackson hole consensus ’. following the financial crisis, financial imbalances were seen as a huge source of disruption which decision - makers needed to remedy, questioning the relationship between monetary and financial policy tools and objectives. let me give two polar views on that. a first approach, in line with the ‘ jackson hole consensus ’, is to clearly separate monetary stability from financial stability. in line with the tinbergen rule and the mundell efficiency principle respectively, one policy should fulfil one objective and each policy tool should be assigned to the objective it can fulfil the best. in this regard, monetary policy would not be efficient at mitigating financial imbalances but would not generate them either. on the other side, an extreme approach is to consider that both policies are strongly intertwined and that their respective objectives could be merged : in this case, monetary policy could reduce risk taking and target asset price bubbles. i consider that full adherence to the separation principle and the combining of objectives are both approaches that are too radical to conduct monetary and financial stability policies. the implementation of unconventional policies has blurred the frontier between the two objectives. let me quote here my colleague vice - president vitor constancio : “ macroprudential policy and monetary policy rely on separate tools and aim to achieve different objectives. yet, they need to be co - ordinated, which is a non - trivial task. ” 3 it is a wise view. keeping monetary policy aligned with its primary objective of price stability but not blindly sticking to the separation principle may help us to manage our two main objectives and strengthen our credibility. as you may know, the banque de france, like many other central banks, has had the dual mandate of maintaining price stability and preserving financial stability since 2013. the financial stability mandate is demonstrated by the fact that the governor of the banque de france has the sole right and responsibility to make proposals for implementing macroprudential instruments to the high council for financial stability, the french macroprudential authority. i consider this specific role assigned to the governor of the banque de france as an opportunity to make price and financial stability objectives more consistent. first, macroprudential policy complements the monetary policy framework decided