, really. we were so focused on our decision on monetary policy that we didn ’ t discuss this. but the point is generally speaking that fiscal sustainability is of utmost concern in countries which have high debt. i also have two questions. the first one : you ’ ve dropped the easing bias on qe. does that also mean that you would argue that the risks to the inflation outlook have become broadly balanced similar to growth? or would you still say that the risks to the inflation outlook are tilted to the downside? the second one is a very different one. you are ecb president for more than six years 4 / 10 bis central bankers'speeches now and member of the governing council for even longer. what would you say? what makes a good ecb president? what are the most important skills? draghi : well, the second question is easy to answer : i let others judge, it ’ s not up to me. on the first and we were always – and it goes back in tradition – not to discuss risks about inflation. we ’ ve discussed risks about growth. the point here is basically that we see headline inflation driven often by energy prices, food prices and other components that are more volatile. then we look at underlying inflation to judge the robustness of the convergence. these measures of underlying inflation are still – some of them actually ticked up a little. others, in general are subdued. the picture isn ’ t much different from last time, really. in this sense, i said before that the decision we took today is obviously using incoming information like, as i said, the reduced variance. otherwise it ’ s really backward - looking ; it doesn ’ t send any new signal. two questions : first of all, in a recent speech by benoit coeure he seemed to make two remarks. the first was that the eurozone is less at risk of a taper tantrum in the us when it comes time to draw a close to any new bond purchases under qe. the second seemed to be in that in boom markets at least, the flow of qe no longer matters ; it ’ s a lot more about the stock. i ’ d be interested in hearing yours and mr constancio ’ s views on these two points that mr coeure made. my second question is on the latvian issue and how it pertains to the division of labour between the european central bank and the national central banks. you said at the european parliament hearing recently that the permission

, in which every president and every governor has the opportunity to speak without interruption. the first of these is referred to as the economics go - round. it is kicked off by a presentation on current economic conditions by federal reserve staff economists. then, the presidents and governors describe their individual views on current economic conditions and their respective outlooks for future economic conditions. the presidents typically start by providing information about their district ’ s local economic performance. we get that information from our research staffs, but also from our interactions with business and community leaders in industries and towns from across our districts. the chairman speaks at the end of the first go - round. he briefly but thoroughly summarizes the preceding 16 perspectives. i can assure you that this is no easy task – and the chairman ’ s balanced and thoughtful treatment of our remarks is one of the many reasons that he commands such respect among his colleagues. he then provides his own views on the economy. bis central bankers ’ speeches the committee next turns to the second go - round, which focuses on policy. again, the staff begins, with a presentation of policy options. after that, each of the 17 meeting participants has a chance to speak on what each views as the appropriate policy choice. this set of remarks is followed with a summary by the chairman, in which he lays out what he sees as the committee ’ s consensus view for future policy. the voting members of the fomc then cast their votes on this policy statement and thereby set monetary policy for the next six to seven weeks. i hope that this description of an fomc meeting conveys two things. first, the meeting participants view monetary policy as a largely technocratic exercise that is fundamentally apolitical. as i mentioned earlier, our policy discussions are largely based on informationgathering and model analyses by meeting participants and their staffs. i would say that the tone of the discussion is pretty much in accord with its rather technical substance. there is disagreement, of course. how could there not be in such challenging and unusual economic times? but, as a relative newcomer, i ’ ve been impressed with how the dialogue within the meeting room is always fundamentally grounded in a deep respect for the job at hand and for each other. second, my description of an fomc meeting highlights how the structure of the fomc mirrors the federalist structure of our government. representatives from different regions of the country – the various presidents – have input into fomc deliberations. and