against climate change will be won or lost. energy demand in asia is expected to double by 2030 on the back of economic growth, urbanisation, and rising affluence. some 45 million people in southeast asia still do not have access to electricity. fossil fuels will continue to play an important role in meeting the energy demands of asia, at least for the next few years. the key to addressing the tension between development and decarbonization lies in credible and inclusive transition pathways, based on strong public - private partnerships. transition plans should enable progressive decarbonisation that is aligned to net zero goals while taking account of developmental needs and providing support for communities to pivot to new growth opportunities in a green economy. the gfanz asia - pacific network has the potential to spearhead this effort in asia, mobilising banks, insurers, asset managers, and service providers in this part of the world, and facilitating alignment in a credible and inclusive transition towards net zero. i am pleased to be part of this effort as chair of the advisory board of the gfanz asiapacific network, from two perspectives. first, as chair of the network of central banks and financial supervisors for greening the financial system ( “ ngfs ” ), i look forward to opportunities for collaboration between the ngfs and gfanz, exploring further how financial regulators and financial institutions can work together to address climate related risks and advance the net zero agenda. second, from the perspective of the mas, which is actively working with the financial industry to develop green finance solutions, markets, and infrastructure, i look forward to opportunities for partnership between mas and the gfanz asia - pacific network to promote a vibrant green finance ecosystem here in asia. the task ahead is daunting. asia is diverse – across stages of economic development, and across a variety of climate related risks and transition challenges. but the task is hugely purposeful, and if we succeed, transformative. for if we can successfully help asia transition to net zero, it will go a long way in getting the world to net zero. thank you very much. * * * * *

higher than any other country in the world. if our exchange rate moved up and down like the japanese yen against the us dollar, we would be in deep trouble. singapore has no capital or exchange controls. anyone can move funds freely into and out of singapore, whether in s $ or foreign currencies. the non - internationalisation policy does not try to prevent currency speculation per se, or to limit the flow of capital into and out of singapore. it imposes only one restriction : non - residents may not borrow s $ for activities unrelated to the singapore economy, though they may buy and sell as much s $ as they wish. this restriction on borrowing s $ is to make it harder for non - residents to accumulate ammunition through borrowing for a speculative attack on the s $. despite the non - internationalisation policy, there is virtually complete capital mobility in singapore. empirical studies have shown that domestic s $ interest rates are almost entirely determined by parity with offshore us dollar interest rates, adjusted for future exchange rate expectations. in economist ’ s jargon, the “ interest parity condition ” holds. the role of hedge funds in the asian crisis is controversial. there is evidence that the hedge funds were active in a number of the regional currencies before and during the crisis. although some observers are convinced that hedge funds were the main culprits in bringing currencies down, the evidence is not conclusive. nevertheless, we believe that our policy of non - internationalisation helped to protect the s $ against excessive volatility during this unstable period. of course the policy could not have been effective if singapore ’ s economic fundamentals had not been sound, and if we had not had a floating exchange rate which could be managed flexibly in line with these fundamentals. we had an easier ride than hong kong, which also had a sound economy, but whose currency was, for good reasons, pegged to the us dollar. going forward, we intend to maintain the non - internationalisation policy, but to periodically review its scope and implementation. in the early phase of our development as a financial centre, international and regional business serviced out of singapore could be conducted in us dollars. but as our financial centre matured, and our capital markets became more comprehensive and integrated, foreign players increasingly wanted to issue s $ debt and equity, and to hedge their positions using s $ swaps and repurchase agreements. at the same time, the singapore economy and our foreign reserves have grown