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er ) at a weaker level ( devaluation of 25 % ), recalibrate capital controls and hike the key policy rate from 10 % to 25 %. 1 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches our life became easier as international aid grew and the imf approved new programs with ukraine : first, program monitoring with board involvement, in end - 2022, and then full - fledged program ( eff ) in march 2023. this support allowed us to fully focus on ensuring macroeconomic stability – and i will now walk you through the outcomes we were able to achieve. in fact, today we are considering path to normalization of our policies – something difficult to imagine a year ago, in the summer of 2022. let's start with fx market as since february 2022 exchange rate has been our main nominal anchor. meanwhile, in summer of 2022, we saw that the initial peg supported by tight fx restrictions diverted from the fundamentals : reserves approached the dangerous level multicurrency practice was entrenched and led to additional demand via permitted channels. thus, we repegged the exchange rate by 25 % while further tightening the capital controls. this gave us space on the fx market but spread widened again after a while. as fx mismatches shrank ( partially due to the grain deal ), international support accelerated and the reserves position improved, we refocused the goals of our fx regulation towards minimizing the spread between exchange rate on cash and interbank segments of fx market. so, we expanded the options for population to satisfy its demand for fx while in addition strengthened our financial monitoring and made additional effort to improve the attractiveness of assets in national currency. as a result, er expectations stabilized and the spread between exchange rates has almost disappeared. in our policy mix, the key policy rate became a secondary policy tool. the hike from 10 % to 25 % in june a year ago was done primarily to stabilize the fx market and ensure attractiveness of assets in national currency. as in many other, even advanced, economies, we have faced weak transmission amid vast banking sector liquidity. in our case, the excessive banking reserves were the outcome of central bank purchases of bonds and fx from the government. in order to strengthen the transmission, we employed both conventional and unorthodox tools : reserve requirements were revived as monetary instrument. the ratios were increased in several steps by 10 – 20 pp depending on currency and term helping to freeze some part of liquidity