or the fed's preferred measure of personal consumption expenditures, it is still much too high and so my job is not done. i interpret these data as indicating that we haven't made much progress on our inflation goal, which leaves me at about the same place on the economic outlook that i was at the last fomc meeting, and on the same path for monetary policy. because financial conditions have not significantly tightened, the labor market continues to be strong and quite tight, and inflation is far above target, so monetary policy needs to be tightened 3 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches further. how much further will depend on incoming data on inflation, the real economy, and the extent of tightening credit conditions. another implication from my outlook and the slow progress lately is that, as of now, monetary policy will need to remain tight for a substantial period of time, and longer than markets anticipate. but there are still more than two weeks until the next fomc meeting, and i stand ready to adjust my stance based on what we learn about the economy, including about lending conditions. other data such as those on the housing sector, personal income, and surveys that provide managers'views of economic conditions in april will come in over the next few weeks. i would welcome signs of moderating demand, but until they appear and i see inflation moving meaningfully and persistently down toward our 2 percent target, i believe there is still work to do. thank you, kathy, and i'm happy to take a few questions. 1 the views expressed here are my own and not necessarily those of my colleagues on the federal reserve board or the federal open market committee. 2 one can find the senior loan officer opinion survey on bank lending practices at the following link. https : / / www. federalreserve. gov / data / sloos. htm. 3 for a given level of tightening in various financial market data, estimates of the equivalence in tightening of the policy rate vary widely, and, as the shift in financial conditions since early march showed, financial conditions themselves are a moving target. 4 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches

christopher j waller : financial stabilization and macroeconomic stabilization - two tools for two problems speech by mr christopher j waller, member of the board of governors of the federal reserve system, at the graybar national training conference, san antonio, texas, 14 april 2023. * * * thank you, kathy, it's a pleasure to be with you today. i am going to focus my remarks on the economic outlook, including how the recent turmoil in banking has affected that outlook. 1 relative to the federal open market committee's ( fomc ) economic objectives, data for the first quarter indicate that economic output and employment are continuing to grow at a solid pace while inflation remains much too high. the fomc raised its target range for the federal funds rate to 4 - 3 / 4 to 5 percent at its march meeting, and our statement noted that recent banking developments are likely to result in tighter credit conditions and to weigh on economic activity, hiring, and inflation. we didn't know then, and still don't know, the extent of these possible effects. so, perhaps even more closely than usual, i will be watching the data to evaluate the appropriate path of monetary policy. the sudden failure of silicon valley bank ( svb ) and signature bank, which contributed to stresses felt by other mid - size banks, was a classic bank run, in which the rapid withdrawal of funds by depositors created severe liquidity problems. svb was a specialty bank serving the tech sector. unlike other banks, where a substantial share of deposits is insured and verifiably safe, more than 90 percent of svb's deposits were above the $ 250, 000 - per - account limit for deposit insurance. additionally, those deposits were largely from many of the same types of businesses, resulting in additional risk. chair powell has directed vice chair for supervision barr to report by may 1 on svb's failure, including the federal reserve's supervision and regulation of the bank. based on what is already in the public record, svb seems to have done a terrible job managing its risks. a bank run that undermines confidence in other banks is the most fundamental risk to the financial system, and the fed, serving as the lender of last resort, was created in part to prevent such a development. the job of the lender of last resort is to provide sufficient funds to the banking system so that depositors can be confident they will be able to withdraw their funds on