segments stood at 42. 8 percent 32. 7 per cent respectively during the period between march 2005 and march 2013. bis central bankers ’ speeches growth in bank deposits • ner accounted for less than 2 per cent share in all india bank deposits and like the trend observed in respect of bank credit, the share hovered at around 2 per cent during the period between march 2005 and march 2013 ( table 2 ). • across segments, the deposit collection is relatively more in urban and semi - urban segments. accordingly, the average share of urban and semi - urban deposits in total deposits of ner remained at 46. 0 per cent and 34. 9 per cent respectively, while the same for rural segment stood at 19. 1 per cent during the period between march 2005 and march 2013. trends in c - d ratio • the cd ratio of ner as whole as well as individual states is far below the national average. the performance of ner in respect of this indicator worsened from around 40 per cent in march 2007 to 32. 9 per cent in march 2013, which is a point to be noted. bis central bankers ’ speeches • cd ratio of rural segment decreased from around 54 per cent during the period between march 2007 and march 2008 to around 43 per cent in march 2013. villages covered by banks • the total number of villages in ner remained at 42, 250 ( source : census, 2011, govt. of india ). of these, only 1866 villages ( 4. 4 per cent ) were covered under financial inclusion plans as on march 2012 ( table 3 ). on the other hand, the number of bcs appointed increased from 939 in march 2011 to 1592 in march 2012. • across eight ne states, the progress in number of villages covered is significantly on higher side in the case of assam and tripura than other states. bis central bankers ’ speeches urban co - operative banks • there are only 17 urban co - operative banks in ner out of 1586 urban co - operative banks in all india ( source : urban banks department, rbi ). rural co - operative banks • there exists a two tier system of rural co - operatives in ner. all the states of ner are having two - tier short term cooperative credit structure i. e., a state cooperative bank at apex level and primary agriculture cooperative society ( pacs ) at ground level. there are no district central cooperative banks functioning in these states. the pacs are direct members of the state cooperative banks. •

. the ecb is involved in the oversight of uk central counterparties through supervisory colleges and a memorandum of understanding with the uk authorities. this framework enables us to monitor risks to the euro – also due to good cooperation with our british colleagues and legal certainty afforded by the european court of justice. in view of brexit, some might now ask whether it would make sense in the future for the majority of euro clearing to take place outside the eu. well, that depends on whether the new framework will offer us the same level of involvement as we have today. and it depends on whether the new framework will be strong enough to ensure financial stability in the euro area. to sum up : access to the european market is important for the financial sector. and the financial sector is important for the british economy. losing that access would therefore have an impact – not only on the banking sector itself but also on the uk ’ s economy. we are talking about jobs, income and prosperity. the question therefore is : will london remain a global financial centre? yes, it will. but at the same time, it might lose part of the business, while europe might attract some of it. the race is on, and many cities are competing for the banks – either to keep them, in the case of london, or to attract them, in the case of other cities in europe. in the end, there probably won ’ t be a winnertakes - it - all scenario. some banks might go to dublin, some to paris, others to frankfurt or elsewhere in europe. as i said, the ecb is neutral. still, the competition must not result in a race to the bottom with regard to regulation, supervision or taxation – neither in the uk nor in the rest of europe. such a lowering of standards might work in the short term, but in the long term it would do more harm than good. that is why european banking supervision will not change its policies in the wake of brexit. in fact, strong rules and strong supervision should attract banks – they boost the reputation of banks, increase people ’ s trust, and that ’ s good for business. and above all, strong rules serve a purpose : they help to prevent future crises – not only at a national but also at a global level. and financial crises can be very costly. the financial sector will always test the boundaries of regulation ; it will always look for the best deal – globally. we therefore need global rules to make the