2009. a collapse in the gold price or heavy currency losses by the snb, however, would increase the risk that the profit distribution would have to be adjusted before 2017. the snb has been pointing out this risk for some considerable time, regardless of the current plan to strengthen its provisions. the snb stabfund it is just over a year since the package of measures to support ubs was announced. over that period, the risks in the snb stabfund have been significantly reduced. two key indicators are in the spotlight : the amount of the snb ’ s loan to the stabfund, and the snb ’ s overall risk exposure, including non - funded assets. the stabfund took over assets of usd 38. 6 billion as of 30 september 2008. of that total, usd 8. 8 billion consisted of contingent liabilities that did not need to be funded at the time. the remainder was funded with the equity capital paid in by ubs ( 10 % of total assets, i. e. usd 3. 9 billion ) and the debt capital advanced by the snb, which thus initially amounted to usd 25. 8 billion. risk exposure for the snb, i. e. the total portfolio less the equity capital, was thus equal to usd 34. 7 billion as at end - september 2008. the snb ’ s loan to the stabfund stood at usd 20. 8 billion at end - october 2009, a reduction of usd 5 billion – almost one - fifth – on the initial figure. the funds to repay the loan came from repayments and earnings on the assets, and from proceeds of asset sales. the stabfund came to the market for the first time in june 2009. the market ’ s more positive performance made it possible for occasional sales to a total value of usd 1. 5 billion to be conducted by the end of october 2009. contingent liabilities declined by usd 4. 7 billion, mainly as credit default swaps ( cds ) expired or were prematurely terminated. at the end of november 2009, non - funded assets totalled usd 4. 1 billion. total risk exposure fell by usd 10. 2 billion to usd 24. 5 billion. changes in the snb ’ s risk exposure with respect to the stabfund are summarised in table 1. one effect of the recovery in the financial markets that began this spring was to trigger rises in the market values of most of the investment categories held in the stab

##rdise the stability of the financial system. finally, the national bank law provides for powers on the part of the national bank to impose minimum requirements on systemically important financial market infrastructures as a third tier of oversight. detailed implementation provisions for oversight will be laid down in an ordinance to be issued by the national bank. in early november 2003, the national bank submitted a consultation draft of this ordinance to interested parties. the draft itself can be found on our website. i would now like briefly to address three central points connected with oversight : which systems should be overseen by the national bank? what minimum requirements should the operators of these systems fulfil? and finally : how will collaboration with other regulatory and supervisory authorities especially the swiss federal banking commission ( fbc ) - be structured? oversight focuses on systems which might constitute a threat to the stability of the swiss financial system. the question of the systems to which this applies cannot be answered in precise terms. the ordinance lists a number of criteria that we will consider when assessing the systemic importance of an infrastructure. in addition to the type, number and monetary volume of the transactions that are cleared or settled via a system, the outcome of the assessment will depend, for example, on the other financial market infrastructures with which a system is linked, and whether or not the clearing and settlement of transactions can be diverted temporarily to another system in the event of a failure in the first system. the latter option alleviates the problem somewhat. given these and other criteria, it can be assumed that the group of systems overseen by the national bank will be composed first and foremost of those payment and securities settlement systems that are part of what is known as the swiss value chain. these are the interbank payment system swiss interbank clearing ( sic ), the secom securities settlement system and x - clear, the central counterparty. in addition, however, the multi - currency payment system continuous linked settlement ( cls ), which is used to settle foreign exchange transactions, may also be classified as systemically important. closer investigation will reveal whether or not this group will be expanded to include yet more systems, such as that operated by postfinance. the national bank ’ s main points of reference in respect of the minimum requirements that the operators of these systems must fulfil are two internationally recognised standards : the “ core principles for systemically important payment systems ” and the “ recommendations for securities settlement systems ”. like the two standards just mentioned, the national bank ’ s minimum