mario draghi : hearing at the committee on economic and monetary affairs of the european parliament introductory statement by mr mario draghi, president of the european central bank, before the hearing at the committee on economic and monetary affairs of the european parliament, brussels, 12 november 2015. * * * mr chairman, honourable members of the economic and monetary affairs committee, ladies and gentlemen, i am pleased to be back again with this committee for the last hearing of 2015. the ecb ’ s accountability to you, the european parliament, is a central counterpart to the ecb ’ s independence. and transparency is a precondition for your holding us to account. as you are aware, following a public access request, last week we released the diaries of all members of the ecb ’ s executive board ‒ including my own ‒ for the period from august 2014 to end - july 2015. but we will not stop there. starting next february, we will publish these diaries on a monthly basis. it is only natural that some of you will raise questions with regard to the meetings my colleagues and i have had ; after all, the whole point of publishing the diaries is to give the public and you a better understanding of with whom we are interacting. but let me be very clear : whatever the date, we have had and still have a clear rule – we do not discuss marketsensitive information in non - public meetings. for our monetary policy to be effective, however, it is important to meet market participants and to also hear their views. for the remainder of my remarks, i will mainly talk about two issues : first, our current economic outlook and the upcoming reassessment of it at our december meeting ; and second, as requested by econ coordinators, the macroeconomic adjustment programmes over the last half - decade and the ecb ’ s role in them. economic developments and monetary policy incoming data confirm that the recovery in the euro area is progressing moderately. so far, economic activity in the euro area has shown some degree of resilience in the face of external influences that tend to weaken demand. while external demand has receded, euro area exports market shares have increased. the lower cost of energy and our monetary policy measures are supporting consumption and, increasingly, new capital formation. however, downside risks stemming from global growth and trade are clearly visible. moreover, inflation dynamics have somewhat weakened, mainly due to lower oil prices and the delayed effects of the stronger euro exchange rate seen earlier in the year

and the commission for help, and they also asked the ecb to contribute its expertise at a time when europe needed it most. this setup was codified in the esm treaty and by the co - legislators in the two - pack ; the ecj confirmed its legality. in line with this, the ecb has since provided its advice in programmes in five member states. but we should not forget that the respective national governments are responsible for programme implementation, while the final responsibility for programme design and the disbursement of financial assistance lies with the eurogroup. since 2010, three countries have now successfully completed their programmes, and ireland is a particularly good example of how such programmes can deliver the necessary adjustment and restore financial stability, economic competitiveness and fiscal sustainability. it has shown that a country which takes strong ownership of its programme can come out of it with robust growth and a more stable financial system, and that eventually employment will also rebound. there is no doubt that the adjustment process was painful. but we should keep in mind that the adjustment would have caused significantly more hardship in the absence of financial assistance. the programmes had to address excessive macroeconomic imbalances which had accumulated over several years in the run - up to the crisis, often reflecting misguided national economic policies. as we have said before : don ’ t blame the fire damage on the fire brigade. throughout the programmes in ireland and elsewhere, the ecb has played the role assigned to it under the treaty – to be the central bank for the euro area and to provide liquidity to financial institutions, including those in programme countries, when warranted. at times, this meant that risk - management considerations made it necessary for us to consider the progress of programme implementation when deciding on provision of further liquidity if the soundness of the domestic financial sector was intimately linked to programme success. we did so in full accordance with our rules and legal framework and in full independence. this was the case for ireland. and this continues to be the case for greece and cyprus. please allow me to conclude. bis central bankers ’ speeches five years ago, the programme framework came to life. it is certainly part of our path toward a genuine economic and monetary union to integrate the european stability mechanism and the related programme work fully into the legal framework of the european union ; we again called for this most recently in the five presidents ’ report. but it is even more important that we take decisive steps to avoid a member state needing a programme in the