##lining possible avenues for regulation. this document is open for consultation on the acpr website and we encourage industry stakeholders to provide their input. 2 ) the challenge of international coordination for an effective and global regulatory framework that being said, these regulatory issues are global, which means that we need to ensure that national regimes are consistent with each other in order to avoid any risk of regulatory arbitrage. to this end, we need to speed up international work under the aegis of the fsb. highest priority should be given to the finalisation of the fsb recommendations on stablecoins and other crypto - assets, in cooperation with other international standard - setting bodies ( cpmi, bcbs, fatf ). the second priority should be to regulate the interconnection between the traditional financial system and the crypto - asset market in a secure way. the timely and faithful implementation of the basel standards on the prudential treatment of banks'crypto - asset exposures, published in december 2022, will be key from that perspective. the development of crypto - asset based services in banks must take place within a prudent framework that limits the risks for financial stability. consequently, the enforcement of prudential standards should strictly take into account the developments of interconnections between crypto - assets and regulated entities, such as banks. lastly, two new issues will require a global regulatory response. defi is the first one : its use of public blockchains and its global reach make it difficult to allocate 3 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches responsibilities and impose strong regulatory requirements such as in mica. but the fsb is working on it : it has already published a report on defi's vulnerabilities and policy work is in progress. second, we need to address challenges raised by worldwide crypto conglomerates. the fsb has also initiated work on this type of crypto - asset service providers to identify and monitor the risks associated with the concentration of their activities. to conclude, let me just stress that it is not clear to me what is going to be the future of the crypto ecosystem and the shape that the financial landscape will eventually take as a result. market forces will decide. but what is clear to me is that, for the crypto ecosystem to overcome the confidence crisis it is currently facing, and to develop on a sustainable basis, a confidence prone regulatory and supervisory framework is needed. central banks have an important role

the role of the monetary policy committee to navigate the right settings for monetary policy to achieve our mandate for low and stable inflation and contributing to maximum sustainable employment. this is our best contribution to the ultimate purpose of the reserve bank, which is to enable prosperity and wellbeing of all new zealanders : toitu te ohanga, toitu te oranga. along the way, we need to steer our way through uncertainties and threats to our mandate from the evolving economic environment. our least regrets approach is one tool to navigate these judgements. a least regrets approach to uncertainty : hawks, doves and the white heron ( he kotuku ) references bannister, g, finger, h, yosuke, k, siddharth, k & loukoianova, e ( 2020 ) ‘ addressing the pandemic ’ s medium - term fallout in australia and new zealand ’, imf working paper, 2020 / 272. brainard, w ( 1967 ) ‘ uncertainty and the effectiveness of policy ’, american economic review, 57 ( 2 ), pp 411 - 25. caggiano, e castelnuovo and g nodari ( 2018 ) ‘ risk management - driven policy rate gap ’, economics letters, 171, pp 235 - 238. conway, p ( 2000 ) ‘ monetary policy in an uncertain world ’, reserve bank of new zealand bulletin, 63 : 3, pp 5 - 15. evans, c, gourio, f, fisher, j., & krane, s ( 2015 ) ‘ risk management for monetary policy near the zero lower bound ’ brookings papers on economic activity, spring 2015, pp. 141 - 219. evans, c ( 2019 ) ‘ on risk management in monetary policy ’, federal reserve bank of chicago speech. ferrero g, pietrunti, m & tiseno, a ( 2019 ) ‘ benefits of gradualism or costs of inaction? monetary policy in times of uncertainty ’, bank of italy temi di discussione, 1205. greenspan, a ( 2004 ) ‘ risk and uncertainty in monetary policy ’, federal reserve board speech. hawkesby, c ( 2020 ) ‘ covid - 19 and the reserve bank ’ s balance sheet ’, reserve bank of new zealand speech, delivered on 20 august. kaminska, i ( 2014 ) ‘ what ’ s with the doves and hawks ’, video published by the financial times, available at http : / / www.