top policymakers from the region and to also build networks with fellow financial sector leaders. • the aflp will be administered jointly by temasek management services and singapore management university, with the first intake of aflp participants slated for november this year. conclusion 46. singapore ’ s financial sector has thrived on constant adaptation : the development of new capabilities and instruments, a willingness to take risks, and at every stage the evolution of regulation and risk - management practices so that we can mitigate the downsides inherent in the business. 47. we are now embarked on our next phase of development as a financial centre. it will be driven by deeper collaboration between mas and the industry, a collective effort to leverage on new technologies, and by staking a position as a leading global centre of financial skills and expertise. the exciting thing is that we can actually achieve this. bis central bankers ’ speeches

only within the dbu ). in addition, dbu activities were subject to large exposure and equity investment limits. 16. the asian dollar market was hence regulated along broadly similar lines as the eurodollar market in london. foreign banks had to meet high standards before they were admitted to singapore, but once in, their offshore operations were regulated in the same way as in other reputable financial centres. much weight was placed on the foreign banks having reputable home regulators exercising oversight of their global operations. however, mas imposed an additional overlay of prudential requirements on the banks ’ domestic businesses in singapore. 17. the dbu - acu divide also provided a simple basis for offering developmental incentives to encourage the growth of offshore banking activities out of singapore. the incentives were in the past focused on the acu. 18. the dbu - acu divide served us well for decades, but has been losing its relevance. there are a number of reasons for this development. first, since 2004, our developmental incentives have no longer been based on the domestic vs offshore distinction. second, the divide between domestic and offshore banking has in practice become increasingly porous. 19. third, and most importantly, there have been major global regulatory developments in the last five years, that have resulted in banks ’ offshore activities being subject to rules that are broadly similar to those governing the domestic banking business in singapore. bis central bankers ’ speeches • new global rules have increased the amount and quality of capital as well as the liquidity buffers that banks need to hold • global regulators have also agreed on a common framework to control large exposures to a single counterparty 20. these global regulatory reforms have put all banks on a sounder footing. it has also reduced the relevance of mas rules that distinguish between offshore and domestic banking activities of foreign banks, since home regulators will now be requiring their banks to meet enhanced standards on a group - wide basis. 21. post - global financial crisis, we have also seen a strengthening of co - ordination among home and host regulators. mas is an active member of the global crisis management groups of regulators of foreign banks with significant operations in singapore. this aims to enhance regulators ’ preparedness and coordination in crisis management. 22. a fourth reason why the dbu - acu divide is of less relevance today has to do with the significant changes in mas ’ own banking regulations, aimed at reducing systemic risks. • all banks will be required to meet enhanced liquidity requirements that apply to