term investments. we have taken steps to ensure that financial stability does not become another source of problems for the economy. however, the power of central banks has its limits. can we do anything about the differences in people ’ s perceptions of economic recovery? no, i don ’ t think we can. i think we should leave this up to national governments. in times such as these, central governments ought to prioritize fiscal incentives, including targeted measures to maintain consumption levels for those who have lost part or all of their income to the quarantine. like other central bankers, we in ukraine can only provide a favorable monetary environment and ease financial market conditions. but this is a good question to ask, and the corona crisis has given it special relevance. we will have two days to discuss, in particular, how monetary policy affects economic inequality and whether economic inequality should be among a central bank ’ s goals. and as we talk about it, we should find the answer to the most fundamental question : is the dual mandate of central banks justified, or is it more appropriate to focus on inflation? thank you for your attention. i wish you fresh ideas and interesting discussions! 4 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches

back of possible problems with the regularity of international aid provision and the repercussions of the war russias attacks on ukrainian energy infrastructure facilities are increasing the risk to ukraine's ability to go through the coming winter smoothly the duration and intensity of hostilities, are increasing the risk that a large part of ukrainians who had gone abroad, will not return, and that some more ukrainian may decide to leave the country. there is still a risk that the " grain corridor " will cease to operate. instead, the rapid implementation of a recovery plan for ukraine, generating foreign investment inflows and substantial funding could accelerate economic growth to twodigit figures, and facilitate faster return of inflation to its target of 5 % set by the nbu. the nbu board has decided to keep its key policy rate at 25 %. supporting the exchange rate stability and protecting international reserves require ensuring that yields on hryvnia assets stay attractive in the long run. this is one reason why the nbu has decided to keep its key policy rate unchanged. interest rates on hryvnia deposits continue to rise in response to the key policy rate hike in june. we certainly appreciate the ministry of finance's decision to increase the rates on hryvnia domestic government debt securities. first, such step has already enabled a sizeable increase in volumes of borrowing, which reduces the need of monetary financing of the budget. second, it will provide the additional necessary impetus to other rates, which will make hryvnia assets more attractive. 3 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches in order to stabilize exchange rate expectations and reduce pressures on international reserves, the nbu developed a new mechanism that will provide households with more options to protect their savings from the risk of exchange rate fluctuations and will help dampen demand for fx cash. such an instrument will enhance the effect of monetary transmission, and improve resilience of the fixed official exchange rate regime. moreover, the nbu has developed a set of potential measures for reinforcing monetary transmission and optimizing the structural surplus of hryvnia liquidity. the detailed design of these measures is being discussed as part of current consultations of the nbu and the ministry of finance with the international monetary fund. the updated forecast, like the previous one, envisages maintaining the key policy rate at a level of 25 % at least until q2 2024. if required, the nbu stands ready to raise the key policy rate above its forecast and