would not be left to chance in future but instead would be worked through in advance and part of what it would be to be a responsible, regulated entity. but it also gave the impression that each plan would be idiosyncratic, unique to the firm. in fact, as time as gone on it has become clear that for g - sibs many of the elements of the plans are similar and the identified barriers generic. indeed discussions in cmgs for individual g - sibs has translated into minimum requirements for resolvability at the level of the fsb. in the way that we are removing barriers, we are expressly setting out to provide a platform for cooperation to work, ensuring that home and host interests in this process are aligned. the fsb ’ s tlac standard is a good example of how the dynamic of resolution planning in cmgs has provided the impetus for the policy changes. put crudely, if the kas set out what legal powers resolution authorities needed, they did not describe the resolution transaction – how the resolution powers should be applied to g - sibs. work since in cmgs has confirmed the transaction is a bail - in. and, in a way, this is what the tlac standard really represents – agreement among authorities that it is not feasible or credible to take a g - sib apart at the operating company level during a resolution weekend. rather the key operating companies need to be recapitalised by bail - in to support continuity in critical economic functions ( cefs ), and to buy time for the subsequent reorganisation of the firm ( to the degree that is required ). the precise tool used, and the point in the group at which resolution powers are applied, may vary. but at the heart of all the resolution plans drawn up in the cmgs is a bail - in transaction. if tlac implies a bail - in transaction, what is required to make this transaction work? i want to cover three dimensions : the quantity, quality and distribution of instruments to be bailed in. the principles that cover the term sheet provide the best guide to the policy intent. as regards quantity, the principles provide a robust minimum global standard so that g - sibs can fail without placing the rest of the financial system or public funds at risk of loss. the principles require resolution authorities to make a prudent assumption about losses incurred on the way into resolution and the need for prudent valuation at that point. resolution authorities must also

with new technologies such as crypto - assets. it is clear that supervision and regulation must take climate risks into account. in principle, supervisors treat climate risks in the same way as other risks – banks should be aware of and manage these risks, with supervisors providing a framework. however, potentially lowering regulatory standards in order to achieve climate policy objectives would be outside the scope of the supervisory mandate. moreover, lower capital requirements reduce banks ’ resilience – and ultimately their ability to finance the ecological transformation. the answers to the questions about how to deal with new technologies and new risks cannot be provided by supervisors alone. we act on behalf of society – and politicians consequently stake out the framework in which we operate. moreover, we are accountable to politicians for what we do. broad public dialogue is needed for a stable financial system. we are, naturally, in close contact with the supervised institutions. but the relevant ecosystem is very much broader : rating agencies, analysts, enterprises and households as users of banks ’ services, non - governmental organisations, journalists and the media, academia – ultimately, all parts of society benefit from having a stable financial system and have a contribution to make to our debate on the role and future of the financial system. in future, we want to expand our formats for public dialogue. the “ bundesbank in dialogue ” series is already up and running – and we would like to make greater use of it going forward. in the autumn, we will launch a new series of debates looking at the impact of structural change – digitalisation, demographics, decarbonisation and deglobalisation – on competition and risks in the banking sector. we will also participate in the events to mark the 10th anniversary of the single supervisory mechanism next year. the ssm ( single supervisory mechanism ) is an example of successful integration. a recent evaluation by the european commission finds that the ssm ( single supervisory mechanism ) provides good quality and proactive banking supervision. [ 30 ] cooperation between national and european supervision is working well and thereby creating trust. throughout europe, events are planned to mark this anniversary, from an exhibition to international research conferences and workshops. 4 conclusion banks are doubly impacted by structural change. their balance sheets reflect the adjustments taking place in the real economy, while at the same time they themselves face a digital transformation. strong supervision allows the financial system to function smoothly even in difficult economic times. the recent turmoil in the international banking markets has underscored the importance of effective regulation and