so closely interlinked that it is difficult to draw a clear boundary between them, which is one reason i think it would be good if the riksbank were to have main responsibility for macroprudential policy. 18 the importance of independent macroprudential policy the riksdag has given the riksbank an independent status. this is based on the insight that there may be reasons for economic policy makers to pursue a shortterm policy that is incompatible with long - term goals. this is usually referred to as the ‘ time inconsistency problem ’ and is commonly found in economic policy. in monetary policy, the fundamental problem is that decision - makers are happy to promise low and stable inflation, at the same time as they also wish – after households have formed expectations of low and stable inflation – to conduct a more expansionary monetary policy to increase employment. however, households realise this and incorporate this knowledge into their inflation expectations, which leads to inflation becoming excessively high. one solution to the time inconsistency problem is to delegate monetary policy to an independent central bank with an inflation target. my assessment is that this is a solution that has worked well in sweden. time inconsistency is also a problem in macroprudential policy. one example of this is capital requirements for banks. 19 the supervisory authority would very much like to set high capital requirements for the banks so that they do not take excessive risks. at the same time, however, in a recession, it may be desirable to mitigate capital requirements because high levels can lead to a reduction of lending and, ultimately, a credit crunch. the banks understand this when they choose how much risk they will take, which leads to risk - taking becoming excessive. the time inconsistency problem is an argument for the management of macroprudential policy, just like monetary policy, by an independent authority. 20 monetary policy and macroprudential policy obviously differ in several respects. for example, monetary policy is guided by an inflation target of 2 per cent, while the target of macroprudential policy is harder to formulate in a simple and clear way. this may make it more difficult to evaluate macroprudential policy decisions and hold the decision - makers to account. but i think it can be solved. it should be possible to develop and adjust the structures for democratic follow - up and control exercised by the general council of the riksbank to macroprudential policy. the publication

data. the other expansionary measures are expected to provide a further contribution of 0. 3 percentage points. since much depends on what intervention is taken and how it is implemented, to make any comprehensive assessment it will be necessary to await further details ; the priority assigned to forms of investment support is certainly a welcome development. the government has requested authorization from parliament to increase the deficit from that indicated in the new policy scenario, by up to 0. 4 percentage points of output, in order to finance greater spending necessitated by exceptional events, in particular to secure italy ’ s territory and buildings and to manage migration flows. the current policy scenario does not take account of the effects on output of these eventual extra expenses. for the subsequent two years ( 2018 - 19 ), the gdp growth forecasts in the current legislation scenario are unchanged with respect to april ’ s estimates ( 1. 2 per cent in 2018 and 1. 3 per cent in 2019 ) ; the policy scenario, by contrast, has revised them downwards, by 0. 2 percentage points a year. this change likely reflects the nature of the planned interventions and, in particular, the remodelling of the expected increases in indirect taxes. 2. the public finances in 2016 compared to april ’ s economic and financial document, the update slightly modifies the estimates for this year. net borrowing is expected to reach 2. 4 per cent of gdp, one tenth of a point more than in the april forecast. the variation is mostly ascribable to lower growth expectations ; running counter to this was the downward revision of capital expenditure and the upward revision of direct taxes. although the new estimate is less favourable, the deficit is nonetheless expected to contract compared with 2015 ( from 2. 6 to 2. 4 per cent of gdp ). available data on the cash balance and revenues are compatible with the government ’ s estimates for net borrowing. at least in the first seven months of 2016 ( compared with the year - earlier period and taking account of the effects of the main operations that have no impact on net borrowing and of a number of temporal asymmetries ), it can be estimated that the general government borrowing requirement has improved by slightly more than what would be consistent with the government ’ s estimates of net borrowing for this year. the government ’ s forecasts of greater direct tax revenues in 2016 are in line with the trends observed so far in revenues for the state budget. in the first eight months of the year, net of lotteries and other