the stance of monetary policy to offset some significant global growth headwinds and global disinflationary pressures. i believe this shift was well timed and has been providing support to the economy and helping to keep the u. s. outlook on track. monetary policy is in a good place and should continue to support sustained growth, a strong labor market, and inflation returning to our symmetric 2 percent objective. as long as incoming information about the economy remains broadly consistent with this outlook, the current stance of monetary policy likely will remain appropriate. that said, monetary policy is not on a preset course. the committee will proceed on a meetingby - meeting basis and will be monitoring the effects of our recent policy actions along with other information bearing on the outlook as we assess the appropriate path of the target range for the federal funds rate. of course, if developments emerge that, in the future, trigger a material reassessment of our outlook, we will respond accordingly. in january 2019, my fomc colleagues and i affirmed that we aim to operate with an ample level of bank reserves in the u. s. financial system. 3 and in october, we announced and began to implement a program to address pressures in repurchase agreement ( repo ) markets that became evident in september. 4 to that end, we have been purchasing treasury bills and conducting both overnight and term repurchase operations. these efforts have been successful in achieving stable money market conditions, including over the year - end. as our bill purchases 1 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches continue to build reserves toward levels that we associate with ample conditions, we intend to gradually transition away from the active use of repo operations. and as reserves reach durably ample levels, we intend to slow the pace of purchases such that our balance sheet grows in line with trend demand for our liabilities. let me emphasize that we stand ready to adjust the details of this program as appropriate and in line with our goal, which is to keep the federal funds rate in the target range desired by the fomc, and that these operations are technical measures not intended to change the stance of monetary policy. finally, allow me to offer a few words about the fomc's review of the monetary policy strategy, tools, and communication practices that we commenced in 2019. this review — with public engagement unprecedented in scope for us — is the first of its kind for the federal reserve. through 14 fed listens events, including a research

jeremy c stein : comments on “ market tantrums and monetary policy ” speech by mr jeremy c stein, member of the board of governors of the federal reserve system, at the 2014 monetary policy forum, new york city, 28 february 2014. * * * the views expressed here are my own and are not necessarily shared by other members of the federal reserve board and the federal open market committee. i am grateful to nellie liang for helpful conversations. i am delighted to have the opportunity to discuss the paper “ market tantrums and monetary policy. ” it is timely, provocative, and extremely insightful. let me start by summarizing what i take to be the paper ’ s main messages. first, the authors argue that policymakers should pay careful attention not just to measures of leverage in the banking and shadow banking sectors, but also to the financial stability risks that might arise from the behavior of unlevered asset managers, such as those running various types of bond funds. notably, assets under management in fixed - income funds have grown dramatically in the years since the onset of the financial crisis, even while various measures of financial - sector leverage have either continued to decline or remained subdued. second, the authors develop a model of agency problems in delegated asset management, according to which an environment of low short - term rates can encourage asset managers concerned with their relative performance rankings to “ reach for yield, ” which in turn acts to compress risk premiums. moreover, the model has the feature that this reach for yield can end badly, with a sudden and sharp correction in risk premiums that arises endogenously in response to a small tightening of monetary policy. the events of the spring and summer of 2013, when there was a rapid rise in bond market term premiums, are cited as a leading example of what the model sets out to capture. third, the authors assert that the conventional regulatory toolkit, which is largely designed to contain intermediary leverage, is not well suited to dealing with the asset - management sector. given this limitation of regulation, and because monetary policy has a direct influence on the behavior of asset managers, the financial stability risks that these managers create should be factored into the design and conduct of monetary policy. presumably, this consideration would imply that monetary policy should be somewhat less easy in a weak economy, all else being equal, to reduce the probability of an undesirable upward spike in rates and credit spreads down the road. the authors are careful to