andreas dombret : shared challenges, different perspectives, shared solutions? speech by dr andreas dombret, member of the executive board of the deutsche bundesbank, at the 13th high - level meeting for the arab region " banking standards and regulatory and supervisory priorities ", abu dhabi, 14 december 2017. * * * 1. shared challenges, different perspectives ladies and gentlemen, let me start by asking a question : why are we here? don ’ t worry, i won ’ t get too philosophical. of course, it only takes a quick glance at this meeting ’ s programme to find the answer. we are here to talk about “ global banking standards and regulatory and supervisory priorities ”. but if you compare the economies, the financial sectors and the supervisory institutional set - ups of different countries in the arab region, europe or elsewhere, you realise how different they are in many respects. yet about 150 people from 20 to 30 countries that apparently have little in common travelled all the way to abu dhabi for this conference. so why are we here? the reason is that, despite all the differences between our financial sectors and supervisory set - ups, the challenges financial institutions and supervisors face are surprisingly similar. i am convinced that when faced with complex challenges – some of them familiar, others entirely new – it helps to work together and take different perspectives into account. and given that all of you travelled here for this meeting, you and i clearly share this belief. over the next couple of minutes i will offer you my perspective on our shared supervisory challenges. first, i want to quickly remind us all how we got here – what lessons were learned from the global financial crisis and what has been done since then. i ’ ll also give you, of course, my own take on the finalisation of basel iii just last week in frankfurt. and last, i will touch upon current and future challenges we face, and how i think we should tackle them. 2. lessons learned and the post - crisis agenda the global financial crisis that erupted in 2007 has helped us to understand – better than ever before – that markets are not always efficient. on the contrary, financial markets have a tendency to exaggerate and so experience cyclical instability. you could say that tomorrow ’ s downturn builds up during today ’ s upturn, when optimistic market participants are deaf to sceptics ’ warnings. financial crises, we have to acknowledge, are an inherent part of the financial system. for regulators and supervisors this means that

jens weidmann : europe ’ s monetary union – making it prosperous and resilient speech by dr jens weidmann, president of the deutsche bundesbank, at harvard university, cambridge, 25 november 2013. * 1. * * introduction dear hans - helmut kotz, dear professor friedman, ladies and gentlemen, i would like to thank you for the opportunity to speak here today. president harry truman is famously said to have asked to be sent a one - armed economist. he was tired of having exponents of the dismal science proclaiming “ on the one hand, this ” and “ on the other hand, that ”. today, it sometimes seems like the opposite is true. in the eyes of many politicians, economists, at least if they are central bankers, cannot have enough arms now – arms with which they are to pull all the levers to simultaneously deliver price stability, lower unemployment, supervise banks, deal with sovereign credit troubles, shape the yield curve, resolve balance sheet problems, and manage exchange rates. it is probably safe to say that this change in attitude is not just due to a sudden surge in the popularity of economists and central bankers. rather, it reflects the widespread view that central banking has come to be the only game in town. and quite a few economists seem to agree with this notion. to some, the notion that the primary goal of central banks is to keep prices stable has become old - fashioned. against the backdrop of the financial crisis, they argue that financial stability has become just as important, if not more so, than price stability. consequently, many contend that the central bank ’ s role as a lender of last resort applies not only to banks, but to sovereigns as well. this demand is aimed particularly at the european monetary union ( emu ). but such a move would run counter to the current institutional framework, under which fiscal policy remains a national responsibility – and under which, for this and other reasons, the eurosystem is forbidden from financing european institutions or member states. to others, the idea of central bank omnipotence is illusory and fraught with risk. if financial and fiscal concerns dominate central bank decision - making, it is no longer independent in its decisions on how to keep prices stable. omnipotence then turns into impotence. so the question remains : how do we make the emu robust and resilient? in my remarks, i wish to argue that by