##9. 03 50. 78 226. 36 1, 848. 21 3, 230. 81 3, 765. 36 5, 688. 13 2, 898. 31 65. 96 33. 91 147. 65 219. 56 484. 17 29. 34 134. 42 466. 85 106. 08 182. 61 337. 13 845. 09 25. 79 633. 92 553. 81 137. 87 131. 75 354. 54 908. 7 605. 45 1, 007. 1 170. 98 89. 35 362. 11 1, 050. 32 30. 6 574. 61 831. 26 222. 85 96. 85 389. 97 1, 263. 04 44. 84 463. 86 1, 115. 01 2, 597. 47 2, 692. 12 3, 285. 07 3, 312. 67 - 733. 2 - 633. 34 - 1, 073. 24 - 2, 403. 06 414. 36 766. 98 261. 25 572. 68 293. 12 770. 47 122. 44 631. 55 1, 218. 48 467. 62 630. 43 396. 52 1, 353. 9 170. 93 539. 4 1, 701. 22 596. 87 697. 61 552. 44 1, 405. 42 600. 83 4, 626. 57 645. 49 577. 2 550. 37 2, 390. 15 195. 59 611. 87 2, 095. 44 623. 13 421. 89 295. 49 1, 425. 35 95. 22 656. 82 3, 418. 49 4, 777. 28 5, 698. 39 9, 597. 24 5, 613. 34 korea indonesia thailand malaysia china philippines singapore 1, 912. 08 407. 56 697. 66 344. 15 1, 363. 72 38. 3 1, 394. 51 1, 555. 06 394. 39 854. 72 505. 42 1, 990. 39 30. 54 1, 407. 47 1, 428. 16 459. 11 679. 22 561. 76 2, 077. 37 1, 415. 34 3, 244. 27 539. 4 613. 85 552. 64 2, 640. 18 36.

the robustness of the preliminary estimates has been challenged ( bernanke ( 2007 ), ihrig et al ( 2007 ) ). irrespective of the empirical underpinning, there are serious practical problems with including global economic slack in the day - to - day decision - making process, not least because the task of finding a meaningful measure of global slack seems daunting. in the light of all these arguments, how strong is the impact of globalisation on domestic inflation dynamics – as opposed to that of an improved conduct of monetary policy? to my mind, globalisation has arguably had some visible effect, but its strength does not live up to popular expectations. nonetheless, the effects of globalisation are an issue for central bankers be it because of increased model, data and parameter uncertainty, or, more generally, because the flattening of the inflationactivity trade - off is more of a double - edged sword than a clear - cut blessing. it should suffice to say that, in the eurosystem, we understand that the currently low inflation levels do not allow for complacency on our part. instead, we will continue to do our utmost in order to keep long - run inflation expectations solidly anchored. 2. 3 new keynesian models and money the new keynesian paradigm at its current stage leaves no role for monetary variables in the inflation process. in its standard form, it does not allow for an active role for monetary indicators in monetary policymaking, either as an important variable in the monetary transmission process, or as an indicator of future inflation. does that really mean that money no longer matters – and that it should not matter for monetary policy? no, clearly not. firstly, from an empirical point of view, there is plenty of evidence that monetary aggregates contain valuable information about risks to long - run price stability and the monetary transmission process. our own research ( schumacher / scharnagl ( 2007 ) ) shows that monetary variables help predict future inflation over and above the information content of economic factors included in traditional phillips curves. additionally, recent studies ( greiber / setzer ( 2007 ) ) support the assessment that the recent surge in house prices and loose monetary conditions are related phenomena. significant bidirectional links between money and housing can be identified for both the euro area and the usa. this proves that integrating money into our analytical framework delivers important and indispensable insights for monetary policy. secondly, from a modelling perspective,