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##co report leaves a wide range of options for ccps to meet the requirements put forward. we need to make sure that their implementation does not give rise to regulatory arbitrage and competitive distortions. in this regard, i mentioned earlier that cpmi and iosco are currently carrying out an implementation monitoring exercise for the pfmi : monitoring the implementation of the guidance on recovery and resolution will also be a priority. we also need to better understand the systemic implications of pushing risk back to participants through allocation of uncovered losses and liquidity shortfalls. how will stress be transmitted through the system once a ccp ’ s pre - funded resources have been exhausted? an understanding of interdependencies, such as common participation, is particularly important. we also need to make sure we consider scenarios in which multiple ccps enter recovery simultaneously. for instance, some clearing participants may be unable to fulfil all their obligations if multiple ccps simultaneously ask for emergency cash calls and replenishments. in this context, more thinking on ccp crisis scenarios could give us a somewhat clearer idea of the specific problems ccps might have to face in a recovery situation, including the potential size of losses and liquidity shortfalls. to that end, deeper analysis of reverse stress testing to cover hypothetical portfolios and market conditions which go beyond ‘ extreme but plausible ’ would also be helpful. this is why cpmi - iosco have identified stress testing as a policy priority, and will soon launch a work stream to develop potential guidance regarding best practices and methodologies. the objective would be to ensure that all ccps apply reliable and comparably robust stress testing frameworks. conclusion despite the work that still needs to be done to ensure the full effectiveness of ccp recovery and resolution, it is important to understand that ccps are truly beneficial for the preservation of financial stability. since the financial crisis, the systemic importance of ccps has greatly increased, and there may be concerns within the market about their safety and soundness. some of these concerns are legitimate, and regulators are taking them serious and aim at addressing them. however, it should be recalled that the alternative to central clearing is far more risky : the non - cleared world, which existed before the crisis, was dangerously opaque, did not allow for pooling of risks, and was inefficient in terms of collateral mobilisation. risk management frameworks of ccps shall be designed to provide the right incentives to all stakeholders to manage theirs risks