savings not otherwise available? foreign holders whose gse debt is redeemed will reinvest the proceeds in u. s. treasury issues, * * * some observers have suggested that the availability of fixed - rate mortgages is tied to the size of gse portfolios. we see little empirical support for this notion. for example, we have found no evidence that fixed - rate mortgages were difficult to obtain during the early 1990s, when gse portfolios were small. indeed, the share of fixed - rate mortgage originations averaged slightly less than 80 percent in 1992, when gse portfolios were small, and averaged 66 percent in 2004, when gse portfolios were large. clearly, these data do not support the proposition that the size of the gses'portfolios positively contributes to the availability or popularity of fixed - rate mortgages. it is, of course, mortgage securitization, and not gse portfolios, that is the more likely reason for the continued market support for the popular thirty - year fixed - rate mortgage. * * * without a notable direct or indirect effect on primary home - mortgage rates, it is difficult to see how the gses'portfolios can influence homeownership. the evident de minimis to small changes in home mortgage interest rates owing to gse mortgage market intermediation suggested by recent studies would have little effect on homeownership. indeed, a comprehensive survey by ron feldman finds that a change in mortgage rates would have to be at least 200 basis points before it would have more than a trivial effect on homeownership. 9 most analysts conclude that the primary determinants of homeownership appear to be the loan - to - value, debt - to - income, and payment - to - income ratios associated with the mortgagor and the mortgage. over the 1990s, homeownership rates in the united states increased from about 64 percent to about 67 percent. much of this increase seems to be due to growing incomes of households, a generally lower level of interest rates, and an increased ability to extend loans to borrowers who require higher loan - to - value ratios. the generally declining level of mortgage rates that occurred in the 1990s reflects the fact that worldwide interest rates have been generally lower and that worldwide development cannot be a consequence of gse portfolio growth. even with smaller portfolios, fannie and freddie would remain formidable institutions and their profits would provide more than sufficient support for their special

andreas dombret : statement at the workshop on " digital finance regulatory challenges " statement by dr andreas dombret, member of the executive board of the deutsche bundesbank, at the g20 conference " digitising finance, financial inclusion and financial literacy ", wiesbaden, 26 january 2017. * * * mr von weizsacker, ladies and gentlemen, for a first approach when talking about regulatory challenges in the age if digitalisation in finance, i would like to consider three aspects of financial technology and regulation : first, i perceive no general need for separate regulation ; to me it seems even detrimental to treat comparable businesses with equal risks in a different way, second, regulators have to stand ready to propose solutions for emerging risks. we should initially concentrate on the basics, such as setting the right incentives, but – beyond that – should refrain from regulating “ theoretical risks ". we should closely monitor fintech evolution to be able to act swiftly, once risks become relevant in practice, third, international exchange about experience with fintechs is very fertile to set the right course for future regulation from the outset. the way we perceive financial technology has transformed over the last years. when the buzzword “ fintech ” emerged a few years ago, everybody was excited : is there a better way ahead for doing finance – maybe even without banks? i also remember regulators in a state of anxiety : is traditional financial regulation unsuitable for high - tech financial innovations? today and up to now, we have a far more relaxed view about business disruption and regulatory challenges. in germany, fintechs have not forced us to overhaul existing financial regulation or to consider a new framework. the reason for this lies in the setup of german financial regulation : the rules apply to specific business models and their associated risks – technology is, by and large, treated neutrally. this becomes apparent in our financial services landscape. some digital innovators that actually accept deposits or lend money need to be licensed as credit institutions. for some other business models, the rules for financial services institutions apply. other innovative businesses remain unregulated, but this is for a good reason : they are non - financial in character and only provide auxiliary services complementary to financial services. by treating financial innovations equally under the regulatory framework, german regulators follow the maxim of “ same business, same risk, same rules ". but the important strategic question is : does this principle offer enough orientation for the future – given that no one knows how financial innovations