are extremely valuable because they provide the opportunity to share experiences from real - life settings, including what has worked and what has not, as well as the pitfalls and the nuances. hopefully, some general guiding principles can emerge, that will prove useful for practitioners gathered here today. in conclusion, the guidelines for monetary policy communications are probably due for a refresh given the increased complexity facing the formulation and implementation of monetary policy. for 3 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches sure, central banks must continue to talk, engage, and be accessible and accountable. how we do it could evolve, and this high - level seminar serves to help us do just that and hone our communication skills. i wish you a most productive session. thank you. references bernanke, b s ( 2007 ), “ federal reserve communications ”, speech at the cato institute 25th annual monetary conference, washington, d. c., 14 november. blinder, a s, goodhart, c, hildebrand, p, lipton, d, and wyplosz, c ( 2001 ), how do central banks talk? geneva reports on the world economy 3, international center for monetary and banking studies and centre for economic policy research. blinder, a s ( 2007 ), “ monetary policy by committee : why and how? ” european journal of political economy, vol. 23 ( 1 ), pp. 106 – 23. blinder, a s, ehrmann, m, fratzscher, m, de haan, j d, jansen, d j ( 2008 ), “ central bank communication and monetary policy : a survey of theory and evidence ”, journal of economic literature, vol. 46 ( 4 ), pp. 910 – 945. chehal, p and trehan, b ( 2009 ), “ talking about tomorrow ’ s monetary policy today ”, frbsf economic letter, 35. cruijsen, carin a b v d, eijffinger, s c w & hoogduin, l h ( 2010 ), “ optimal central bank transparency ", journal of international money and finance, vol. 29 ( 8 ), pp. 1482 – 1507. demiralp, s, and jorda, o ( 2002 ), “ the announcement effect : evidence from open market desk data ”, economic policy review, federal reserve bank of new york, vol. 8 ( 1 ), pp. 29 –

country from meeting its national needs of public investment. an expenditure rule could well be applied across the eu by including it in the next reform of the stability and growth pact. it could help redress one major problem : before the crisis, the rate of expenditure growth exceeded the growth rate of potential output in many countries, and there were no adequate buffers. particularly when economic growth is strong, there are all the good reasons to pay attention to fiscal responsibility. good times should be used for building fiscal buffers. ladies and gentlemen, our experiences during the past years have underlined the importance of fiscal policies that support the long - term economic well - being of euro area citizens. the monetary union needs fiscal rules. it needs rules that reinforce countercyclical policy and fiscal sustainability, as i write in my forthcoming economic policy thriller “ walking the highwire – rebalancing the european economy in crisis ”, to be published in february 2020. slide 4 – walking the highwire however, neither rules nor market discipline can work properly without timely and reliable fiscal data. perhaps the most devastating failure of fiscal policies took place in greece before the sovereign debt crisis. 4 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches without reliable fiscal data, rules and market discipline did not work, and greek fiscal policy was unsustainable for too long. the results were tragic. one may ask, how much of the ensuing suffering would have been avoided had only fiscal data been reliable. fortunately, it looks like we can now be confident that history will not repeat itself at least in this case. i wish you a pleasant and productive conference! 5 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches