economy. of course, this cost analysis would not be complete unless it incorporates the impact of other concurrent and complementary proposals. the analysis must include the new long - term debt proposal for all firms with more than $ 100 billion in assets, and the other existing rules that affect capital and firm incentives, like the stress capital buffer and the supplementary leverage ratio. meaningful, accurate input can only be provided if regulators are clear about the desired end state of reforms and how they would work together to complement the framework, avoiding conflicting or contradictory requirements. approaching reform in a piecemeal manner increases the risk of arriving at a capital end state that is inefficient, redundant, and unfair to those subject to the regulation and harmful to banks, their customers, and the broader economy. community reinvestment act late last month, the federal bank regulators adopted a new final rule to implement the community reinvestment act ( cra ). the purpose of the community reinvestment act is to improve access to credit in all communities where banks are located, especially low - and moderate - income ( lmi ) communities. the cra was enacted in 1977 shortly after the civil rights movement and against the backdrop of other significant federal laws designed to address financial inclusion and equal access to credit. at the time congress passed the cra, it found that banks had a " continuing and affirmative obligation to help meet the credit needs " of their local communities. 3 congress reinforced this obligation by instructing the federal financial supervisory agencies to encourage banks to help meet the credit needs of those same communities. 4 as you know, my support for the important goals of the cra did not translate into support for the final regulations, and i would like to highlight a few specific deficiencies in the final rule that led to this result. in my view, it was absolutely essential that the final rule be straightforward and clear, encouraging banks to meet the credit needs of their communities without unintentionally disincentivizing or limiting banks from supporting their communities. while the rule includes many positive changes, those changes ultimately did not outweigh its shortcomings, including that the agencies arguably exceeded the authority granted by the cra statute. the rule is unnecessarily complex, overly prescriptive, and directs outcomes that result in disproportionately greater costs than benefits, adding significantly greater regulatory burden for all banks, but especially for community banks. even the foundational question - are banks doing enough to

briefly, ( a ) no return to the markets can be permanent and hence credible with capital controls still imposed on the economy. the full lifting of capital controls, signalling also the end - date ( which could be q1 next year ) would be the catalyst for the full recovery of trust of depositors, but also boost investor confidence in the prospects of the economy. ( b ) regaining the investment grade held in 2008 is as important as ensuring debt sustainability. this should be at the top of greece ’ s policy agenda over the next year or so, we are only two notches far away. its significance is comparable to meeting the maastricht nominal criteria that allowed the country to enter the euro area. ( c ) given the prolonged fiscal consolidation and private disinvestment that took place ( 2007 : investment was 27 % of gdp, today it is 11 % of gdp, the lowest level since 1960 ), the country needs an investment shock. reviving domestic and foreign investment is crucial to supporting 4 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches the economic recovery. that is why it is important for the government to speed up the privatisation agenda, not so much as a revenue exercise, but as a great opportunity to attract fdi in key sectors of the economy, such as transport, energy, logistics and tourism. i would recall a proposal i made in the summer of 2014, which links reduced primary surplus targets with a drastic gradual reduction of corporate tax rates in line with the fiercely competitive corporate tax rates applied by greece ’ s neighbours in the balkans. if such steps are taken and there is no slackening of effort, no reform fatigue, no complacency, etc., i am pretty confident that my country will soon no longer bean outlier of the eurozone and become a normal south european country. thank you very much for your attention. i am really honoured to be here today among such clever people! 5 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches