and liquidity constraints, particularly in dollars, have prompted certain groups to deleverage. it has undertaken an in - depth analysis and published studies on developments in household credit as well as the reallocation of households ’ financial investments, particularly between bank savings products and insurance savings products. ii ) 2011 – and this is my second point – was a year that saw the reinforcement of the methods used in prudential supervision. it was above all the year in which the process of merging banking and insurance supervision was completed. having been set up in the midst of the crisis that we are going through, the acp continually reviews the methods it uses to deal with new challenges. on the one hand, the traditional activities of on - and off - site inspections have been enhanced by taking the best procedures and practices from each of the two sectors, leading to improved quality and comparability in the assessment of the situation of the different institutions being inspected. during the year, the acp thus developed a more cross - functional mode of operating, thereby responding to the intention that led the government to merge the former authorities in 2010. the acp ’ s college has set out priorities for the supervision of each of the two sectors in a coordinated manner, and the acp has set up an autonomous and cross - functional research directorate. on the other hand, in line with international and european initiatives, the acp ’ s supervisory methods are complemented by the “ stress test ” approach to ever more complex scenarios and by the monitoring of the systemic nature of certain institutions. organised by the european authorities ( the eba for banks and the eiopa for insurance companies ) and the basel committee respectively and implemented concretely in france by the acp, these approaches supplement the individual supervision of banks and facilitate the macroprudential supervision of the financial system. the acp ’ s supervision methods have also fully taken on board its remit with respect to consumer protection, which is an essential condition for maintaining consumer confidence in the french financial sector. the acp ’ s mandate is to promote, in coordination with the amf – the report of our joint unit will be presented to you shortly – the sound conduct of market players ’ commercial practices bis central bankers ’ speeches without hampering responsible financial innovation that is suited to each category of customers. in 2011, the acp thus took a whole range of measures, of which i will only mention the main ones. the acp has put in place a system for monitoring

given scope to wait until the crisis has abated, which could be rational in a long - term perspective. many players in the financial markets also appear to be governed by a “ follow the leader ” principle. there are probably some who avoid going their own way because of the risk of making bad investments and being depicted as losers. it then seems simpler to follow the others, as if things do go wrong, at least the player is not the only one in disgrace. the reward structure in the fund management field probably also reinforces this behaviour. as long as a person has not done a worse job than the average among the competitors, he can look forward to a bonus. it would probably be a better idea if the personal income were more closely connected to the absolute result achieved by the fund. however, the desire to follow others is probably also an expression of uncertainty. the players have too little information to really dare to act independently. it is doubtless the case that players in the financial markets, including the mutual fund investment companies, live in a complicated world. in this world it can be rational to do as the larger players do in the hope that they are better informed. however, this is not always the case, which means that the strategy of following the big players could contribute to worsening financial crises. when everyone rushes for the door at the same time, there is often a crush. and in a crush, it is easy to panic. the broad use of statistical risk models can have a similar effect. it is, of course, a good thing to use risk models as an aid and we can conclude that they have enabled great progress in the management of financial risks. however, there is an evident problem here. when an increasing number of players are using the same models, they are also likely to react in a similar way when there is unease on the markets, which can reinforce fluctuations and trigger new signals from the models, and so on. what is rational for one individual institute may in this case be irrational as a whole. increased transparency reduces risk of herd behaviour so is it possible to counteract this type of behaviour? allow me to begin by emphasising that economic risk - taking in itself is an important factor behind economic growth. however, risk - taking also means that not all investments will bear fruit. this is why we have created national bankruptcy regulations enabling businesses to be liquidated in an orderly manner. for the same reason, we must assume that financial crises will emerge even in