we will put in place a process to ensure that the principles set out in the paper are implemented in practice. however, we also need to redouble our efforts to develop more consistent benchmarks for sound liquidity at global banks. this includes benchmarks for liquidity cushions, maturity mismatch, funding liquidity diversification, and resilience to stress. the mandate of the committee ’ s working group on liquidity has been expanded to deal with this next set of issues. strengthening risk management practices a third area of high priority focus is on strengthening governance and risk management practices. most of the risk management shortcomings revealed by the crisis related to the failure to implement the basics of firm - wide risk management. this points to weaknesses in governance at the top of the firm. what can we do differently in the future? first and foremost, it remains the responsibility of the private sector to take the lead in strengthening firm - wide governance and risk management frameworks. as far as supervisors are concerned, we are enhancing our supervisory tools and standards to reflect recent lessons, especially in areas like securitisations ; management of contractual and noncontractual exposures to off balance sheet vehicles ; stress testing and the management of firm - wide concentration ; and sound valuations. we will be issuing additional guidance on these topics around the new year. we also need to do a much better job following up on our guidance in a coordinated global manner. finally, we can use the leverage of pillar 2 – the supervisory review process – to promote improvements in firm - wide governance, risk management, and controls, and to establish clear links to the assessment of capital adequacy. pillar 2 also can be used to promote better alignment between long term risk management and control objectives and the incentives created by compensation schemes. such coordinated supervisory follow up efforts will be critical to ensure that industry and supervisory sound principles are sustained when competitive pressures reassert themselves. strengthening counterparty credit risk another building block of the committee ’ s strategy is strengthening counterparty credit risk practices. the committee will review the treatment of this risk under the three pillars of basel ii to strengthen minimum capital, risk management, and transparency inside and outside banks. this effort can help individual banks and the system better withstand the failure of one or more major counterparties. it also can help contain leverage outside the banking sector, and it can reinforce efforts to strengthen the infrastructure for otc derivatives, possibly using pillars 1 and 2 as inducements. this

bank had plenty of time to my predecessors on the board of de nederlandsche bank had plenty of time to choose otherwise. they did not, however. this is how the history of de nederlandsche bank begins, the institution whose mandate is to ensure that people can have confidence in the financial system. a history that the current board is thoroughly and painfully aware of, thanks to the independent study conducted by researchers at leiden university. a history that provides the current board with a clear mandate. a history that inextricably links my fellow board members and me to boards of past generations. the current board, however, has resolutely decided to take a different path. on behalf of de nederlandsche bank, i acknowledge that many of my predecessors viewed people as nothing more than merchandise. that many defended the existence of slavery and the prolongation of slavery. and that many later ignored the ramifications of slavery for a long, long time. on behalf of de nederlandsche bank, i also acknowledge our involvement as an institution. some of the money that served as dnb ’ s start - up capital was earned from slavery. dnb accepted products from the plantations, such as coffee and sugar, as collateral for a loan. and when slavery was abolished, dnb paid compensation to plantation owners on the instruction of the ministry of colonies, including to board members of de nederlandsche bank. on behalf of de nederlandsche bank, the current executive board today apologises for these reprehensible facts. we offer our sincere apologies to all descendants of enslaved people in the netherlands, in suriname, in bonaire, sint eustatius and saba, in aruba, curacao and sint maarten. we apologise to all those who, because of the personal choices of my predecessors, were reduced to the colour of their skin. to an amount. to a commodity listed in a ledger. we apologise to everyone who still bears the consequences of those choices even today. over the past few months, i have heard many personal stories – stories of suffering, but also of resistance and struggle. i heard painful stories. i learned a great deal. and it hurt. what i heard brought the suffering of the past and present very close to home. and at the same time, that suffering remained terribly, disconcertingly distant for someone who grew up in the far north of the country. the conversations i