who are the victims of fraudulent activity. sometimes these efforts target vulnerable populations, like the elderly, who are particularly susceptible to certain forms of fraud. despite this known problem, efforts by regulators have been frustratingly slow to advance, and seem to have done little to address the underlying root causes of this increase in fraud. why has this important issue failed to garner greater attention from all of the appropriate regulatory and law enforcement bodies? different governmental agencies may share an important role in addressing this problem, but the need for a joint and coordinated solution does not excuse collective inaction. climate - related financial risk of course, not every issue falls within the scope of the federal reserve's responsibilities. even when policymakers identify an issue or priority that they would like to pursue, it is imperative to ask whether that priority falls within the scope of our mandate and authorities. statutes and regulations, paired with the " soft " power of examination, can be deployed in ways that may not be primarily directed towards the priorities mandated for banking regulators. i've noted previously that the banking agencies'climate - related financial risk guidance arguably pushes the boundaries of appropriate regulatory responsibilities. banks have long been required to manage all material risks, including weather - and climate - related risks. and while this additional guidance seemed to do little to advance the goals of promoting the safe and sound operation of banks it, in effect, posed significant risks of influencing credit allocation decisions. ultimately, banking regulators should not dictate credit allocation decisions, either by rule or through supervision. bank regulatory policy should be used to address the needs of the unbanked and expand the availability of banking services. it should not be used to limit or exclude access to banking services for legitimate customers and businesses in a way that is meant to further unrelated policy goals, sometimes referred to as " de - banking. " 7 / 12 bis - central bankers'speeches once we have identified problems and determined that they are within the fed's responsibility, we must consider alternative approaches to address them, focusing on identifying efficient solutions. new technologies and services often require novel regulatory and supervisory approaches, and we recognize that past approaches may not be effective. often regulators take a " more is better " approach to regulation and guidance. over the past several years, the banking industry has faced an onslaught of proposed and final regulations and guidance, materials that require a significant time commitment to review, to comment on, and to implement. many times, these require changes to policies and procedures or risk management practices.

percent over recent quarters. the degree to which these data may be understated is underlined by backing out from the total what appears to be a reasonably accurate, or at least consistent, measure of productivity of corporate businesses. the level of nonfarm noncorporate productivity implied by this exercise has been falling continuously since 1973 despite reasonable earnings margins for proprietorships and partnerships. presumably this reflects the significant upward bias in our measurement of service prices, which dominate our noncorporate sector. nonetheless, the still open question is whether productivity growth is in the process of picking up. for it is the answer to this question that is material to the current debate between those who argue that the economy is entering a “ new era ” of greatly enhanced sustainable growth and unusually high levels of resource utilization, and those who do not. a central bank, while needing to be open to evidence of structural economic change, also needs to be cautious. supplying excess liquidity to support growth that turns out to have been ephemeral would undermine the very good economic performance we have enjoyed. we raised the federal funds rate in march to help protect against this latter possibility, and with labor resources currently stretched tight, we need to remain on alert. whatever its successes, the current monetary policy regime is far from ideal. each episode has had to be treated as unique or nearly so. it may have been the best we could do at the moment. but we continuously examine alternatives that might better anchor policy, so that it becomes less subject to the abilities of the federal open market committee to analyze developments and make predictions. gold was such an anchor or rule, prior to world war i, but it was first compromised and eventually abandoned because it restrained the type of discretionary monetary and fiscal policies that modern democracies appear to value. a fixed, or even adaptive, rule on the expansion of the monetary base would anchor the system, but it is hard to envision acceptance for that approach because it also limits economic policy discretion. moreover, flows of u. s. currency abroad, which are variable and difficult to estimate, and bank reserves avoidance are subverting any relationship that might have existed between growth in the monetary base and u. s. economic performance. another type of rule using readings on output and prices to help guide monetary policy, such as john taylor ’ s, has attracted widening interest in recent years in the financial markets, the academic community, and at central banks. taylor - type rules or reaction functions have