countries? b. what are the major causes of the current world imbalances? c. do imbalances impede world growth? d. what are the best ( domestic / global ) policies to mitigate the imbalances? are there any chances for ( efficient ) international cooperation? who should do what? e. how are the current changes in regulatory and supervisory frameworks influencing eu - wide imbalances? are they mitigating them or deepening them? f. can creditor countries ( such as china or germany ) act as “ locomotives of growth ” given that the juan is quasi - fixed against the us dollar and the “ german currency ” is fixed against the “ currencies ” of many trading partners in the eurozone? and what proportion of the potential fiscal impulse will merely benefit those mainly asian countries whose products are becoming more and more competitive on eu markets. bis central bankers ’ speeches

of the recommendations are aimed at the riksdag and the government and concern the forms for the monetary policy debate and the appointment of the members of the executive board. as these recommendations are not directed at the riksbank, i will refrain from commenting on them. with regard to the recommendations aimed at the riksbank, i shall first comment on some suggestions on which i agree with the authors. this applies, i can say now, to most of their suggestions. i will then also take up a couple of points on which i do not entirely agree with the conclusions drawn by the authors. one of the recommendations given is that the riksbank should make it clear in its inflation report that the flexibility of our inflation - targeting policy means that we attempt to subdue fluctuations in both inflation and the real economy. this is a point i agree with, but in my opinion we have actually already done so. with effect from the second inflation report this year, we have a special box explaining how the riksbank has scope when setting interest rates to give consideration to developments in both inflation and the real economy. the box is an extract from a document entitled “ monetary policy in sweden ”, which we published in may this year. the fact that inflation targeting gives consideration to the stability of both inflation and the real economy is moreover something we have long emphasised in speeches and other forms of communication. however, it is probably fair to say that we have gradually become clearer on this point, as we have learnt more about how inflation - targeting policy should be conducted. another recommendation in the evaluation is that the riksbank should base its forecasts on its own assessment of which repo rate path is appropriate ; that is, that we should take a step further compared to our current method. at present, we base our forecasts on the development of the repo rate expected by the financial markets. professors giavazzi and mishkin give several reasons why they advocate that the riksbank should present its own interest rate forecasts. perhaps the most important reason is that this would show most clearly what the riksbank ’ s own expectations of future monetary policy are. this would make it easier for companies and households to plan for the future. this point of view is easy to agree with, and i have expressed similar thoughts myself in various speeches. we are currently considering and working on how this might be achieved. compensating for earlier deviations from target as i mentioned to begin with