trends ’, bank of italy occasional papers, 401, http : / / www. bancaditalia. it / pubblicazioni / qef / 2017 - 0401 / index. html. the duration of insolvency procedures ranges from 4. 8 years in the most virtuous districts to 10 years in the less efficient ones. the duration of real - estate foreclosures ranges from 2 to 8 years. recovery procedures. until then, the implementation of these mechanisms will need close monitoring. i argued above that de - risking is a key factor for banks to contain the cost of funding and to attract fresh capital. some commentators link de - risking to the creation of a european deposit insurance scheme ( edis ), the missing pillar of the banking union, arguing that regulators should tighten prudential rules on sovereign exposures to break the link between banks and the sovereign. 14 this proposal does not fully consider the fact that the microeconomic and macroeconomic costs of such a prudential reform could be sizeable, while the benefits are uncertain. the bank - sovereign nexus, in fact, goes well beyond simple direct credit exposures, and depends above all on the impact that both banks and sovereigns have on the real economy. furthermore, in some circumstances increasing banks ’ sovereign exposures may actually play a stabilizing role. 15 these considerations, shared by most global supervisors, recently led the basel committee to leave unchanged the prudential treatment of sovereign assets. the problem of high public debt should be addressed by governments directly, with determination. it should not be improperly tackled with prudential regulation. more generally, while it may make sense to start from a clean slate before going forward with edis, blind spots should be avoided. while npls or sovereign bonds may represent a source of risk for some banks, for others – such as large intermediaries engaged in investment banking – risks take the form of a high incidence of complex financial instruments, those classified for accounting purposes as level 2 and level 3. these are, to a large extent, assets and liabilities not directly traded in active markets or marked to model, whose value is difficult to assess. at the end of 2016 there were about €3. 6 trillion of these instruments on the assets side and €3. 2 trillion on the liabilities side of the balance sheets of euro - area significant institutions. the total is €6. 8 trillion, about 12 times that of net npls

or taking medication related to this pain, and that these behaviors are far more common among prime - age men than prime - age women. see case and deaton ( 2015, 2017 ). - 12 at least some of these explanations potentially relate to the growing divide between large metro areas and other areas of the country. as noted earlier, the opioid epidemic appears to be particularly acute in smaller cities and rural areas. in addition, employment in non - metro areas tends to be more concentrated in manufacturing, which is the sector that has experienced the largest decline in employment from automation and globalization. 29 similarly, research suggests that workers in less populous areas have been more likely to be directly affected by increased import competition from china due to the geographical distribution of industries. 30 and for many less populous areas, job opportunities are less diverse than in bigger cities, so that when a plant shuts down, there are fewer local alternative job opportunities for unemployed workers, especially with comparable levels of employment security or benefits. these striking results naturally raise the question of whether we are seeing heightened migration from the less populous areas to the larger metros with greater economic opportunity. a conventional assumption in economics is that regional differences should narrow over time as workers move toward areas where jobs are more plentiful and wages are higher. 31 in reality, americans ’ propensity to move is currently at its lowest level in many decades. in 2016, the fraction of the population that had moved within the united states in the past year was 11 percent, down from 17 percent or more in the early 1980s, with the steepest decline in the fraction of people moving longer distances, across county or state lines. 32 the evidence suggests that the decline in based on staff analysis of publically available data from the bureau of economic analysis on metropolitan and nonmetropolitan employment by industry. this observation reflects unpublished calculations from pierce and schott ( 2016b ). see blanchard and katz ( 1992 ). data on internal migration rates come from the current population survey and are published annually by the census bureau ; see “ table a - 1. annual geographic mobility rates, by type of movement : 19482016, ” https : / / www. census. gov / data / tables / time - series / demo / geographic - mobility / historic. html. - 13 geographic mobility cannot be fully explained by population aging, by the housing boom and bust, by changes in the composition of industries, by the increasing ease of telecommuting from longer distances