of assets and tools that obscure the source of funds not only facilitate evasion, but also increase the risk of theft, hacks, and ransom attacks. these risks are particularly prominent in decentralized exchanges that are designed to avoid the use of intermediaries responsible for know - your - customer identification and that may require adaptations to ensure compliance at this most foundational layer. 6 finally, it is important to address any regulatory gaps and to adapt existing approaches to novel technologies. while regulatory frameworks clearly apply to defi activities no less than to centralized crypto activities and traditional finance, defi protocols may present novel challenges that may require adapting existing approaches. 7 the peer - to - peer nature of these activities, their automated nature, the immutability of code once deployed to the blockchain, the exercise of governance functions through tokens in decentralized autonomous organizations, the absence of validated identities, and the russian invasion of ukraine has raised questions about the use of crypto - asset markets for sanctions evasion. see, for example, comments by carol house, the director of cybersecurity for the national security council : “ the scale that the russian state would need to successfully circumvent all u. s. and partners ’ financial sanctions would almost certainly render cryptocurrency as an ineffective primary tool for the state ” ( as quoted in hannah lang ( 2022 ), “ u. s. lawmakers push treasury to ensure russia cannot use cryptocurrency to avoid sanctions, ” reuters, march 2, para. 7 ). see board of the international organization of securities commissions ( 2022 ), iosco decentralized finance report : public report ( madrid : oicv - iosco, march ), https : / / www. iosco. org / library / pubdocs / pdf / ioscopd699. pdf. - 7the dispersion or obfuscation of control may make it challenging to hold intermediaries accountable. it is not yet clear that digital native approaches, such as building in automated incentives for undertaking governance responsibilities, are adequate alternatives. connections to the core financial institutions there are two specific areas that merit heightened attention because of heightened risks of spillovers to the core financial system : bank involvement in crypto activities and stablecoins. to date, crypto has not become sufficiently interconnected with the core financial system to pose broad systemic risk. but it is likely regulators will continue to face

panel on ‘ the role of central banks and sustainability in the post - covid recovery ’ speech by l. federico signorini omfif global public investor virtual launch 29 july 2020 the extraordinary impact of the covid pandemic required an aggressive monetary policy response to avert the risk of financial meltdown and sustain economies worldwide. like all major central banks, the ecb reacted quickly. the measures taken are well known and need not be listed here. they led to further monetary accommodation and an additional, large injection of liquidity ; they were effective in calming markets, protecting monetary policy transmission, and preventing a financial crunch and a deflationary spiral. this time, besides monetary policy, other domains of public policy also became active immediately. fiscal policies responded vigorously and more or less simultaneously across the world, with measures to support households and firms. this included, to varying degrees, debt moratoria, loan guarantees, direct grants to firms, income support, and more. a third actor, namely banking regulation and supervision, also played a key role. however, the most important regulatory actions in my view were those taken before the pandemic, in response to the global financial crisis. thanks to basel iii ( and other actions ), when banks were hit by the pandemic crisis, they were considerably stronger than before 2008. this is true worldwide, but let me give you a few key figures on italy. between the start of 2007 and the start of 2020, the ratio of the highest - quality capital to risk - weighted assets almost doubled, reaching 14. 0 per cent. in march 2020, the mean liquidity coverage ratio stood at 174 per cent of the regulatory requirement ; it has increased further in the meantime. ( no liquidity requirement existed in 2007 ). furthermore, the weaknesses on italian banks ’ balance sheets caused by the sovereign debt crisis have largely been reabsorbed : in march, the net non - performing loan ratio had dropped by two thirds from its 2015 peak, i. e. from 9. 8 to 3. 2 per cent. given the strong position in which the banking system entered the crisis, banking authorities worldwide were in a position to encourage banks to use their capital and liquidity buffers. 1 buffers are designed to allow banks to withstand extraordinary stress due to exceptional events, and avoid credit crunches. so far, thanks also to enormous liquidity injections by central banks and ample state guarantees, there are few signs of the kind of credit