7 %. 3 / 5 bis - central bankers'speeches the contrast between the strong depreciation of the colombian peso in the last two years and what happened in the main countries of the region with which we usually compare ourselves can be explained in part by the relative deterioration in our country's fiscal soundness, which led to the loss of its investment grade in 2021. recently, a better perspective of fiscal adjustment has been seen with the 2022 tax reform and the announcements of the financial plan regarding compliance with the adjustment plan contemplated in the fiscal rule, which contributed to the colombian peso appreciation of last december and january in a favorable international environment. however, it must be recognized that uncertainty about the future of oil and coal exploration and exploitation has kept the exchange rate highly vulnerable to international events. it also helps to explain that in international situations of greater risk aversion, such as the one observed this week, the colombian peso suffers more significant depreciations than other currencies in the region. inflation outlook what is the outlook for inflation for 2023 and 2024? the first thing i must say is that banco de la republica is strongly committed to creating the necessary conditions for returning inflation to the target. the bank's technical team's projections suggest that, although by the end of this year, we would still have the permissible range of 3. 0 % + / 1. 0 %, we would reach that range by the end of 2024. as we stated in the press release issued after the last meeting of the bank's board of directors, with the decision to increase the policy interest rate by 75 bps last january, the monetary policy approached the position required to induce in the medium term a convergence of inflation towards its 3. 0 % target. indeed, the uncertainty is considerable, and future decisions will depend on the information we have at any given time. however, in our central scenario, we expect inflation to be approaching a decreasing path, which would initially be driven by a substantial reduction in the growth rate of food prices. core inflation would continue showing increases for the rest of this semester. still, the outlook is that in the second half of the year, it will also start to show a decreasing trend, reinforcing the behavior of food prices and helping the convergence process toward the target. this process would continue throughout 2024. surely there is great uncertainty, and there are risks in projections such as those described. in addition, those

of public debt, at 91 %. and so this is one more reason why effective limits for government debt are urgently needed. binding fiscal rules and an institution that observes their adherence are just one component of a consistent reform agenda. additionally, it is important for capital markets to resume their role of 7 / 9 bis central bankers'speeches disciplining national fiscal policy. as for enterprises, more deeply indebted countries ought to pay higher interest rates. this will only happen if the no - bail - out clause in the maastricht treaty really does have teeth. therefore, it must be possible to restructure public debt without posing major risks to the financial system. the july 2016 edition of the bundesbank ’ s monthly report describes what needs to be done to make this possible. there are two reforms i would now like to mention. first, we need to sever the sovereign - bank nexus. a strong inter - linkage between banks and sovereigns increases the probability of a bail - out by other member states and weakens incentives for risk - oriented pricing. and it is precisely this sovereign - banking nexus that contributed to a mutual intensification of the crisis in the euro area, when banks suffered from declining prices for sovereign bonds in their balance sheets and countries from struggling banks in their territory. the european banking union already marks a huge step towards untangling this dangerous embrace. however, to complement the banking union, it is also crucial that we do away with the preferential treatment of sovereign debt in banking regulation. this implies that, similar to banks ’ lending to the private sector, sovereign exposures will need to be backed by capital and also be part of a large exposures regime. a second measure concerns the design of the european stability mechanism ’ s financial assistance programmes. the esm is there to provide resources to countries that apply for an esm financial assistance programme. however, these funds are generally used not only to cover budget deficits, but also to redeem maturing sovereign bonds. by implication, when a programme is activated, european taxpayers are, in essence, bailing out the respective country ’ s creditors. this does not exactly foster willingness on the part of member states to agree to restructure a programme country ’ s debt. instead of a truly viable solution being reached, when push comes to shove, a strategy of muddling through would win the day. that ’ s why the bundesbank is proposing to add a clause to the government bonds