- maybe you will soon join one of them, once you have graduated from your engineering school - are profoundly transforming the latter. they offer a wide range of services, particularly focused on cryptoassets. i would like to remind you in passing that the term " crypto - currency " is misleading and often used incorrectly, as no crypto - asset currently fulfils the three functions of money, i. e. a medium of exchange, a unit of account and a store of value. this crypto - asset market has grown exponentially since the covid - 19 pandemic. however, in 2022, the succession of spectacular crises including the collapse of the ill - named ( algorithmic ) stablecoin terra usd and the collapse of the ftx platform, brought to light the vulnerabilities of this emerging ecosystem and the nascent bridges between crypto - assets and traditional finance. the collapse of ftx led to the bankruptcy of two banks - signature and silvergate - while, conversely, the failure of the silicon valley bank threatened the deposits of circle ( the usd coin issuer ) which were placed there. some of these vulnerabilities are specific to the crypto sector, such as the high volatility associated with the lack of economic fundamentals underlying some cryptoassets ; others are shared with the traditional financial system, such as operational risk and in particular cyber risk. all of them may jeopardise the stability of the financial system as a whole. how then should these new players be regulated? 2. 2 the existing framework - europe is leading the way thanks to dora and mica the european regulatory authorities reacted swiftly to regulate the new risks that big techs ’ inroads into the financial sector carry, with the digital operational resilience act ( dora ) on operational resilience, and the digital markets act ( dma ) on fair and non - discriminatory access to platforms. dora in particular represents a major and innovative step forward, with the establishment of an oversight framework for monitoring third - party service providers that are identified as critical for european financial institutions. these providers shall be required, under possible on - call duty, to collaborate with client institutions to enable them to comply with their own obligations in terms of it security and business continuity. as regards crypto - assets, although the size of the ecosystem remains relatively small to date, which limits the contagion effects on traditional finance, the instability of the sector shows

to sell part of its government bond portfolios. these forced sales, which were not anticipated by the bank, resulted in the crystallisation of unrealised losses, real losses in other words, as the securities sold shed value with the increase in key interest rates decided by the us central bank ( the fed ). the subsequent downgrading of svb's rating by moody's and the aborted capital increase by the bank fueled a negative spiral between liquidity and solvency, which led to its bankruptcy on 10 march 2023. tech players, fearing the loss of their deposits, which greatly exceeded the minimum guaranteed by the us guarantee fund, withdrew them all the more massively and in record time - in one click - as they represent a financially and digitally “ educated ” clientele. does this " one - click " bank run, which neither banking regulation nor supervision by the authorities responsible for enforcing it were able to prevent, means that the digitalisation of our economies and of finance is making this regulation and supervision fundamentally inadequate? 1. 1. the current framework has not been invalidated by the current crisis... i will give a negative but cautious answer to this question. in other words, i will answer with a " no, but ". the " no " seems justified to me for the following three reasons : - since 2019, svb has benefited from a very light regulation compared to the rules laid down by the basel committee to limit the liquidity and interest rate risks inherent to the transformation activity carried out by banks. as regards the first risk, these rules require that banks comply with short and long - term liquidity ratios, and as regards the second risk, that the sensitivity of banks'balance sheet to various interest rate shocks be monitored. in the united states, these rules were not applicable to svb, as certain exemptions, introduced in 2019 under the proportionality principle, apply to banks that are considered to be less important, this concept being understood in a broad sense since it includes banks with a balance sheet total of up to usd 250 billion. - the post mortem analyses carried out and published by the fed suggest that, had svb been subject to these rules, it would not have complied with the short - term liquidity ratio as defined by the basel committee. moreover, svb's heavy reliance on tech companies'deposits should have alerted its supervisor if the additional monitoring tools required by international standards had been put in place. the same fed