s administrator. attention is paid to the additional controls necessary for survey - based benchmarks, which have been a particular cause of concern. replacing benchmarks the second option, replacing existing benchmarks with new ones, is challenging for two reasons. first, it may be difficult to find a superior alternative benchmark, which is robust and also captures the relevant economic exposures. second, even if a suitable alternative can be identified, making the transition may not be a straightforward matter. the iosco principles outline desirable features for robust financial benchmarks. notably, they call for benchmarks to be anchored to observable transactions in active underlying markets. one could consider going further : relying only on actual market prices as benchmarks. indeed, there are some cases – for instance, short - term repo markets – in which underlying markets are sufficiently liquid to reliably support benchmarks that are simply averages of the rates at which participants transact. in other cases, market prices could at least be used as a cross - check against a survey - based measure, even when they cannot be used directly to calculate the benchmark. in other cases, it may be hard to find a suitable market price that tracks the desired aspects of market conditions. if a replacement benchmark does not fully reflect the economic exposures that are being hedged, the hedgers will not be able to manage their risks as effectively. moreover, in the absence of appropriate governance, controls and regulation, market prices can also be subject to manipulation. benchmarks derived solely from transactions also face the challenge of how to determine the benchmark rate should there be no transactions in the relevant market on a particular day, or indeed over a whole series of days – for example during periods of stress. even if a superior alternative benchmark could be found for some markets, several issues would need to be addressed before making a switch. existing benchmarks are already written into an enormous number of contracts, some of which could still have years, if not decades, to run. these contracts would have to be closed out and / or rewritten, which raises issues of coordination and of legal risk. taking these concerns into account, last year the financial stability board ( fsb ) established a steering group of regulators and central banks to help coordinate upcoming reviews of existing benchmarks against iosco ’ s standards and to examine the feasibility of developing alternative benchmarks, at least for some markets. the main focus is on the major global interest rate benchmarks : libor

##ystem. the question remains whether in future retail payments integration will be mainly a compliance - driven process or whether it can be pushed further, making electronic payments more widely used. currently, there is evidence of cross - country convergence in the euro area, especially for cards, direct debits and credit transfers, and the speed of convergence has clearly accelerated for most of the payment instruments studied since the introduction of the single currency. 5 despite the convergence, however, there are still large differences in payment behaviour, starting with a choice between cash or cashless payments and then, say, selecting from a range of cashless payment instruments. for instance, the persistent use of cheques in some countries, even though it is steadily declining, shows that payment behaviour changes slowly. this also means that cash remains an important means of payment in the foreseeable future. therefore, the eurosystem continues in its efforts to protect the integrity of the euro banknotes and stay ahead of counterfeiters, e. g. with the introduction of our new series of euro banknotes, called the europa series. promoting further integration of retail payments in europe is seen as economically and socially advantageous. there is empirical evidence that initiatives to integrate and harmonise retail payment markets boost trade and consumption and benefit the whole economy. 6 data from 27 markets in europe between 1995 and 2009 confirms that the shift to efficient proposal for a directive on payment services in the internal market ( “ psd2 ”, european commission / 24 july 2013 ) and proposal for a regulation on interchange fees for card - based payment transactions ( “ if regulation ”, european commission / 24 july 2013 ). see martikainen, e., schmiedel, h. and takalo, t. “ convergence in european retail payments ”. ecb occasional paper no 147, june 2013. sigma convergence and conditional beta convergence for cash, debit card, credit card, direct debit, credit transfer, cheque and e - money in the 27 eu countries for 1995 – 2011 were measured. hasan, i., de renzis, t. and schmiedel, h. “ retail payments and the real economy ”. ecb working paper no 1572, august 2013. bis central bankers ’ speeches electronic retail payments stimulates overall economic growth, consumption and trade. this effect is most pronounced for card payments, followed by credit transfers. deeper integration of retail payments is expected to bring about more price convergence among cashless retail payment