an environment of very low interest rates has been a success, but it was not the first instance of using transparency as a commitment device. the most important thing to be transparent about are the policy objectives. the ecb was an early advocate of goal transparency. the commitment to the famous definition of price stability in 1999 and its clarification in 2003, “ below, but close to 2 per cent in the medium term ” are the most important cases in point. the latter step was taken to underline the symmetry of our price stability objective, meaning that downward deviations from the definition are just as undesirable as upward deviations. i now invite the distinguished members of our panel to address the question of transparency in monetary policy each from their own point of view. 1 chydenius, a. : memorial on the freedom of printing. in jonasson, m. and hyttinen, p. ( eds. ) : anticipating the wealth of nations. the selected works of anders chydenius ( 1729 – 1803 ). routledge 2012. 2 e. g. holmstrom, b. : discussion of the panic of 2007 by gary gorton. in : mantaining stability in a changing financial system, proceedings of the 2008 jackson hole conference. federal reserve of kansas city 2008. 3 this widely used quote is according to ” the keynes centenary ” by paul samuelson, published in the economist, vol. 287 ( 1983 ), p. 19. there has been some debate about whether keynes actually ever said this. 4 bernanke, b. : monetary policy in a new era. conference on rethinking macroeconomic policy, peterson institute, washington dc, october 12 – 13, 2017. 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches

erkki liikanen : is more always better? accountability, and the clarity of message transparency, introductory remarks by mr erkki liikanen, governor of the bank of finland, at the panel discussion " is more always better? transparency, accountability, and the clarity of message ", ecb central bank communications conference, frankfurt am main, 14 november 2017. * * * why do we need transparency? is more always better? there are two basic reasons for transparency in monetary policy : the first is public accountability of central banks. the second reason is better policy effectiveness. anders chydenius, the 18th century finnish clergyman and economist drafted the world ’ s first freedom of information act ( enacted in the kingdom of sweden in 1766 ). this was 98 years after the riksbank was founded. chydenius summarized the connection between transparency and political liberty in the following way : " the liberty of a nation is preserved not only by the laws, but by public information and knowledge as to how they are being administered. " 1 chydenius ’ statement presents the accountability argument for transparency in its simplest and the most forceful way. the rule of law alone is not sufficient for freedom, but the transparency of the use of executive power is also necessary. until a generation ago, central banks were rather secretive organizations, shrouded in a kind of monetary mystique. this started to change in the 1990 ’ s, when the independence of central banks rose to the top of the reform agenda, in order to improve the credibility of monetary policy. as central banks became more independent, it was natural that accountability and transparency had to develop as well. citizens and their political representatives needed to be able to monitor how central banks used their independence. considering the ecb, an important forum for its accountability are the regular hearings of the president of the ecb at the european parliament. these hearings are both a forum of scrutiny and a venue for communication of policy goals and strategies. the accountability framework was strengthened further after the ecb was entrusted with the powers of banking supervision in the euro area. since then, also the chair of the supervisory board appears regularly in the european parliament. beyond the formal accountability requirements, the ecb was the first major central bank to organize regular press conferences after each monetary policy meeting of the governing council. they are not just one - directional communication but enable useful interaction between the press and the president and the vice - president of the ecb. a more recent, but a very important step