€27. 1 billion in late 2010 to €13. 5 billion in the second quarter of 2020 – see link [ 11 ] central bank of ireland. sme market report 2020 - the impact of covid - 19 on smes 2020 [ 12 ] central bank of ireland. sme market report 2020 - the impact of covid - 19 on smes 2020 [ 13 ] see central statistics office business impact of covid19 - https : / / www. cso. ie / en / methods / surveybackgroundnotes / businessimpactofcovid - 19 / [ 14 ] lambert, d., mccann f., mcquinn j., myers s., yao, f. financial stability notes : " sme finances, the pandemic, and the design of enterprise support policies " vol 2020, no. 8 [ 15 ] see central statistics office business impact of covid - 19 [ 16 ] ibid [ 17 ] central bank of ireland. " trends in sme and large enterprise credit and deposits q2 2020 " 11 september [ 18 ] ibid [ 19 ] central bank of ireland. sme market report 2019 [ 20 ] ibid [ 21 ] see https : / / www. centralbank. ie / regulation / brexit for more details on the central bank ’ s work on brexit [ 22 ] esri " covid - 19 and brexit hit different parts of the economy " 17 september 2020 https : / / www. centralbank. ie / news / article / speech - braving - the - storm - ed - sibley - 4 - nov - 20 6 / 7 06 / 11 / 2020 “ braving the storm : the unprecedented challenges facing smes ” - deputy governor ed sibley [ 23 ] central bank of ireland. quarterly bulletin, qb4. october 2020 [ 24 ] esri " covid - 19 and brexit hit different parts of the economy " 17 september 2020 [ 25 ] lambert, d., mccann f., mcquinn j., myers s., yao, f. financial stability notes : " sme finances, the pandemic, and the design of enterprise support policies " vol 2020, no. 8 [ 26 ] ibid [ 27 ] a full summary of all government supports is available here : https : / / dbei. gov. ie / en / what - we - do / supports - forsmes / covid - 19su

has become a key issue in the political negotiations on the banking union, namely the voting arrangements that will apply in the future. it is clear that the concerns of the uk and other “ out ” countries will need to be addressed. i think it would be unfortunate if the “ ins caucus ” sought to agree a common position on matters before engaging in debate around the eba table, so as to benefit from the views of other countries – and indeed i would not see the caucus leading to a block vote, as individual supervisors will still retain their responsibility for policy - making. but, as i said, the governance and voting arrangements for the eba clearly need to change. another key point of discussion relates to the scope of the ecb ’ s responsibilities in terms of the number of banks it is responsible for, and the speed with which its new mandate is implemented. it is clear that at the outset, a core group of systemically important banks will be subject to direct ecb supervision, albeit with some supervisory tasks delegated to national supervisory authorities. however, an open question subject of considerable debate relates to the timing of any subsequent assumption of responsibility for banks from programme countries and / or smaller banks. broadly casting the ecb ’ s mandate to cover all banks will avoid any disruptive capital flows between institutions subject to the two different regimes, and will also acknowledge the fact that severe problems have arisen from clusters of banks that sit below any obvious systemic threshold, but which nevertheless have imperilled the finances of governments. ireland and spain are, of course, examples of this. this approach was considered at the october eu summit. there is, however, a practical question regarding the speed with which the ecb can reasonably assume responsibility – and potential reputational risk – for such a large universe of credit institutions, even with a model involving significant delegation of tasks to national authorities. this points to the need to articulate some transitional arrangements. one approach might be a transitional phase of supplemental, but not direct ecb supervision, for the wider set of small banks. in this interim period, the ecb would issue its supervisory manual for use by national supervisory authorities for the smaller banks too. and, crucially, the ecb could be given the power to step in to inspect the financial soundness of any particular bank or subset of banks outside of the systemic group but which are flashing red on its radar. a small supervisory swat team could be sent in to kick the tires alongside the national supervisor that retains