samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
##en levina, harsh mehta, tabitha rendall, nyssa roberts, matthew waldron and danny walker for their helpful input and comments. the views expressed here are not necessarily those of the financial policy committee. 1. my focus today is on risks from private non - financial corporations ( pnfcs ), but risks from the corporate sector can, and historically have, also arisen through commercial real estate ( cre ) exposures. we stress test uk banks to ensure they are well capitalised to declines in cre prices and to continue lending in a severe downturn. 2. micro companies are to companies with less than £316, 000 in total assets. 3. there is some evidence that pension funds behaved counter - cyclically during the gfc for example. 4. the annual remit letter from the chancellor sets this out in detail. 5. the survey will be run by a polling company on behalf of the bank of england. we hope to launch it in the next few months. sarah breeden executive director, financial stability strategy and risk ©2023 bank of england

policy is transmitted. understanding how businesses make investment decisions informs our understanding of the monetary transmission mechanism. on the financial stability side, our aim is a resilient financial sector that can support the economy even in times of stress. diversity and robustness in the channels of finance to the real economy increases resilience. that is why we are interested in the way firms finance investments and the constraints they may face. and, of course, we have a secondary objective to support the economic policy of the government. the work i have been drawing on today is part of our work to support the government ’ s productivity agenda and will i hope be helpful in developing policy responses that go wider than the bank ’ s primary objectives. so while the bank of england may not be as directly – or reluctantly – involved in the provision of liquidity and finance to the midlands economy as we were in geach ’ s day we remain very much engaged in these issues. all speeches are available online at www. bankofengland. co. uk / speeches th our birmingham office, which celebrated its 190 birthday this year, no longer discounts bills of exchange in competition with the midland bank, which is itself soon to return to birmingham. rather it is our eyes and ears in the region. along with our network of agents'offices in other parts of the country it helps us to understand what is going on, on the ground, in the economy. indeed, the large and representative survey i have drawn on so heavily today, was only possible through our agents'network using their contacts with firms. i hope charles geach would have been pleased. thank you. all speeches are available online at www. bankofengland. co. uk / speeches
to me personally, over the years. i am also grateful to the staff of mas, whose professionalism, dedication and hard work have enabled us to reorientate our approach and transform the financial sector smoothly and safely. mas and the industry will need to continue to work together to realise the vision of a more dynamic, competitive and vibrant financial sector in singapore. that is the ultimate test of the success of our efforts to grow the sector, and make singapore a key financial hub in asia.

has not translated, on available estimates, into an overvaluation of residential real estate assets. that said, we must continue to monitor this market closely in case this risk materialises, and to analyse other facets of the conditions under which mortgages are granted that are less influenced by the collateral value. 24 / 29 a second relative facet is the effort that repaying the mortgage entails for agents that have incurred this debt. once again, empirical evidence shows that loan - to - income and debt service - to - income ratios are relevant variables for determining the probability of mortgage default, although the low interest rate environment mitigates the risk. in any event, as more than half of new mortgage loans continue to be taken out at a variable rate, high loan - to - income ratios continue to be a source of possible vulnerability for households. however, in this instance too, mortgage lending standards appear to be prudent, with no evidence that they have recently eased. third, an additional dimension that is also relevant for estimating the probability of default is the maturity of the mortgage loans granted. longer maturities are usually related to more foreclosures. likewise in this case, standards have become stricter following the crisis and have not eased in recent months. empirical evidence further shows that it is the combination of some of these dimensions that may prompt disproportionate increases in the probability of loan default. these mortgages with very lax conditions in several dimensions have also become much less significant in recent years. 25 / 29 the evidence available also reveals that households cease to meet their financial obligations when they have to forgo a portion of the regular income they receive or when they lose their jobs. but lending standards and price - setting policies play a key role in mitigating these impacts. hence, a key factor in the monitoring of bank mortgage lending standards is the extent to which interest rates charged vary in step with the risk borne. prudent behaviour would advise charging a higher interest rate the greater the risk assumed. in this respect we can see that, set against pre - crisis behaviour, where there was scarcely any relationship between certain risk characteristics of mortgage loans and the interest rate charged, the relationship is now positive and statistically significant. nonetheless, we should also note that this relationship has gradually diminished in intensity in recent years, in a trend that banks should strive to reverse so as to have prices properly reflect all the costs and risks assumed. generally, then, the main
product and labour markets that restrict competition, employment flexibility and wage differentiation, and we support them in these efforts. they would not only promote employment and support potential growth, but would also contribute to moderating price pressures. we are now at your disposal for questions.

it has been harder than we might have wished to stimulate consumption. " the reserve bank and the treasury now have a work programme focused on whether there are ways to reduce the likelihood of finding our economy out of sync again ; or on handling it differently if we do. " what is clear is that in a globalised world most of the government's economic policies, including fiscal, industry and immigration policies, are all constrained by other countries'policies and by international pressures on them. with financial markets so interconnected, any small country's domestic monetary policy also now needs to be seen in an international setting. " nevertheless, there is no question that we can run an independent monetary policy. we have control of our ship. if global winds are not behind us or our economy is out of sync with influential economies, then our progress becomes more difficult, and things can get uncomfortable. we may have to modify our chosen course. " but with major economies now raising their interest rates, global conditions are becoming aligned to containing inflation. in these conditions, new zealand monetary policy is increasingly effective. indeed in some respects we are in a more comfortable position than some other countries, having already raised interest rates. " in the meantime, we are starting to see some other countries, especially small open commodity economies, realising this too as they start to face the same pressures. they have been following the new zealand experience with interest. "
eddie yue : what ’ s next in our fintech journey keynote speech by mr eddie yue, chief executive of the hong kong monetary authority at the hong kong fintech week 2020, hong kong, 2 november 2020. * * * good morning everyone. welcome to hong kong fintech week. 1. i ’ ve always wanted to speak to you from a virtual stage, especially given the nature of this event. 2. this year, thousands of you are joining virtually from around the world. this surely reflects the extraordinary energy in hong kong ’ s fintech sector. 3. the rise of fintech has led some people to ask whether it will replace banks one day. i tend to think about it a bit differently : i ’ d like to know how technology can make banking better. technology won ’ t replace banking ; it will make it better. 4. there are three core principles that will always be the bedrock of good banking. these hold true for tech companies coming into finance and for traditional banks embracing technology. i ’ m talking about good service, customer trust, and efficient capital management. these principles have endured through the eras of the abacus, the ledger, and the first computers. they are timeless. 5. we can compare this to food – one of our favourite subjects in hong kong. you can eat in a michelin - starred restaurant or a dai pai dong. you can buy food in the market and cook it yourself. you can order a take - out and have it delivered. you can eat a thousand different ways. but you can ’ t have a meal without food — and you can ’ t have banking without service, trust, and capital. 6. yes, technology is replacing some traditional banking channels and processes. but that actually enhances those core principles. so, i don ’ t think technology will replace banks. rather, i ’ ll be making the case today that technology will make banks better — whether it is delivered by an established bank or a new market entrant. a new era established 7. in 2017, the hkma launched seven initiatives to begin a new era of smart banking. since then, the competitive landscape for banking in hong kong has changed quite a lot. we are proud to be one of the first markets in the region to have fully digital banks — or virtual banks. as we speak, our city has one of the highest numbers of virtual banks in asia. 8. today, customers can choose from a wider range of banking providers

##uous circle. i am impressed by the extensive work carried out by the world bank in its flagship study, and i once again thank them for their contribution to the economic development in the region through this work. ladies and gentlemen, with these brief opening remarks i hope i have conveyed how important i believe the topic of our conference is, and how pleased i am to see you all here to participate in the event. i wish all participants productive discussion in the coming two days. thank you.
name of this booklet is anna & alex take on the banknote forgers. after these introductory remarks it is now a pleasure for me to declare this euro exhibition open. you are kindly invited to come closer to view the exhibition and the children ’ s booklet.

that, in a period of high uncertainty, being seen as fully committed could shift financial markets between polar opposites – from working against us to working with us. that is why the crisis abated very quickly in 2012 when – within a few months – the heads of state or government agreed to launch the banking union and the ecb acted to remove unwarranted fears in financial markets. it became clear that our commitment to the euro was beyond doubt. the euro is, of course, irreversible. the lesson was also that, in times of crisis, the most important signal for policymakers is their determination to act. and this lesson was absolutely crucial when the pandemic hit us last year. recognising the risk of self - fulfilling cycles, the ecb reacted quickly and forcefully by launching the pandemic emergency purchase programme. the message we sent was clear : there are no limits to our commitment to the euro. and that message holds true today. equally important was the response by governments. the decision to launch next generation eu ( ngeu ) was a clear demonstration of european unity that broke with the past in many ways. its size of €750 billion ; its structure, which benefits most those worst hit by the pandemic ; and its funding via european common debt – all represented a watershed. as a result, i believe that the intrinsic fragility of the euro area has now declined. europe has proven that it will come together and take decisive action when needed. this is what the euro crisis taught us about how crises must be managed : they require the commitment of all policymakers for the benefit of all europeans. the importance of policy alignment the euro crisis in turn led to a third, more slow - moving crisis. europe slipped into a period of what i termed at the time “ lowflation ” : a persistent low - growth, low - inflation environment. this gave rise to the third lesson i want to underline : the importance of a balanced policy mix. 2 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches when inflation is low and interest rates fall towards zero, the optimal policy mix changes. monetary policy becomes more effective in lifting demand when fiscal policy reinforces it. in the mid - 2010s, however, the euro area saw the opposite happen. monetary easing was met by a premature and uncoordinated fiscal tightening. between 2013 and 2018, fiscal policy tightened by around 2. 5 percentage points of gdp, while in the united states it loosened
food production for an increasing population goes hand in hand with ensuring access to affordable, safe and nutritious food. the way food nourishes our bodies, energy fuels the economy. so, energy needs to be secure, affordable and sustainable. i could go further and stress once again that for a healthy economy there is a substantial need for a healthy financial and banking systems. however, today ’ s conference will not generate either solutions or concrete answers to the multiple of issues the food and energy security rises, but it will most certainly cast a new light on possible ways to handle the challenges ahead of us. these discussions aim to help us all on a journey we have embarked, a journey that can only be made through constant and diverse dialogue until we reach common ground and close to perfection possible solutions. thank you, ladies and gentlemen, for your attention. i wish you a lively and successful debate. bis central bankers ’ speeches

conditions. our approach is one of open - mindedness. we indeed welcome change by banks. but this change is welcome so long as banks are able to demonstrate that risks are being appropriately and adequately managed. our staff will make a presentation on cloud - based 3 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches services in this meeting. i look forward to some stimulating debates for our common benefit. ladies and gentlemen, i am convinced that our agenda will stimulate exciting and constructive discussions. the presence of our partners from the imf, world bank and the fsb can only enrich the debate. let me end by quoting timothy geithner, the 75 th us secretary of the treasury who served under president barack obama. i quote : “ looking past the immediate crisis, a more resilient system must be built on stronger and better designed shock absorbers, both in the major institutions and in the infrastructure of the financial system ”. unquote. ladies and gentlemen, this is for what we must ultimately aim. along these lines, i wish all of you a pleasant stay in mauritius and fruitful deliberations over these two days. i invite those of you who have some spare time to experience the beauty of our island. thank you. 4 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches
of essence. bis central bankers ’ speeches

pentti hakkarainen : threats to operational and policy effectiveness? key talking points by mr pentti hakkarainen, deputy governor of the bank of finland, at the panel discussion “ how real is a threat to policy capacity arising from financial outcomes? what are realistic options for threat management? ”, workshop on the finances of central banks, organised by the bank for international settlements, basel, 12 november 2013. * * * when considering potential threats to the policy effectiveness of the central banks, the key concept is credibility. credibility of the central bank is almost synonymous with its ability to make its actions effective in the market. this is equally important for the effectiveness of policy commitments as for the effectiveness of actual monetary policy operations. credibility has at least the following components : • the financial position of the central bank : sound finances are important for the de facto independence of the central bank. the reason for this is clear. an independent central bank should be able to fund its operations independently and not become dependent on the government discretion for its financial resources. • the institutional position of the central bank as a public institution, its prerogatives and its legal independence. independence protects the bank from political influences and makes it possible for the bank to pursue its mandate in a consistent way. only consistent policy can be fully effective. • the quality of the bank ’ s operations and communications. to be able to influence the market, the central bank ’ s policy intentions must be transparent and the practical implementation of the policy must be perceived as professional. otherwise the market reactions to policy may not be as desired. so, a sound financial position is not the only condition for policy effectiveness. there seems to be a mutually reinforcing relationship between these three factors of credibility which i mentioned. they tend to support each other, and to a degree they can substitute for each other, too : for example, a central bank with a solid institutional position and an excellent professional record may remain effective even if its finances are relatively weak in the medium term. the three factors of credibility are not independent either. for example, political tolerance for the central bank ’ s financial losses may be quite small and therefore a more immediate threat to policy effectiveness than the loss of capital itself. large financial losses if not well understood and justified might undermine the institutional position of the central bank and also endanger its professional reputation as a high - quality institution. my point is then that central bank finances must be considered in the context of political and market perceptions. the
federal open market committee. 3 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches 2 for an example of recent research that looks at twitter posts during fomc days, see schmanski and others ( 2023 ). 3 dessaint, foucault, and fresard ( 2023 ) find that alternative data mainly helps forecast short - term outcomes. 4 for example, soderstrom ( 2002 ) shows that when there is uncertainty about the persistence of inflation, it is better to implement monetary policy that is aggressive than gradual. 4 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches

philipp m hildebrand : where is productivity growth in europe? summary of a speech by dr philipp m hildebrand, member of the governing board of the swiss national bank, to the vereinigung basler okonomen, basel, 28 october 2004. the complete speech can be found in german on the swiss national bank ’ s website ( www. snb. ch ). * * * since 1996 the e. u. is lagging behind the u. s. in terms of productivity growth. this phenomenon has become more pronounced since 2001. the growth of gdp per work hour in the e. u. between the periods 1990 - 1995 and 1995 - 2002 is lower by two percentage points per year. this difference amounts to 2, 8 percentage points per year if one compares the periods 1990 - 1995 and 2000 - 2005. differences in gdp measurement account for roughly 0, 5 up to a maximum of 1 percentage point of the productivity growth differential. the remaining difference is caused by two factors. on the one hand, total factor productivity growth has accelerated in the u. s. this was made possible by a wideranging restructuring of the u. s. economy which provided an optimal backdrop for the new information and communication technologies. on the other hand, capital deepening in europe was lessened by employment growth. the productivity of this additional labour input has to be increased through strong educational efforts, open markets and additional investment. labour market reforms remain indispensable in order to enhance the productivity of all workers. product market reforms will be crucial in order to unleash the full productivity potential of the new technologies. increasing productivity is the key to securing our welfare and the stability of our social security systems.
thomas jordan : central bank independence since the financial crisis - the swiss perspective summary of a speech by mr thomas jordan, chairman of the governing board of the swiss national bank, at the cfs presidential lectures, goethe university, frankfurt am main, 9 november 2017. * * * the complete speech can be found in german on the swiss national bank ’ s website ( www. snb. ch ). the financial crisis presented central banks with significant challenges. they resorted to unconventional monetary policy instruments and expanded their field of operations. as a result, central banks have faced growing criticism. in particular, the question has arisen as to whether their independence is still justified. the experience of the swiss national bank ( snb ) since the financial crisis has shown that independence continues to be sensible and necessary ; central banks can best fulfil their mandate of ensuring price stability and contributing to the stability of the financial system if they are protected from political pressure. central bank independence will only endure as long as politicians and the public are convinced of its benefits. to this end, central banks must fulfil their mandate to the best of their knowledge and ability, while retaining a sense of proportion and a long - term perspective when implementing measures. not every short - term deviation from an objective requires an activist response. moreover, central banks must be conscious of their limits and avoid an accumulation of tasks. for an independent central bank to be perceived as legitimate in a democracy, it must be granted a clear mandate against which its performance can be assessed. however, the environment in which central banks operate is highly complex, and conditions can change rapidly. for this reason, mandates usually only sketch out a framework for central banks ’ operations. this gives them much - needed flexibility in difficult situations. as a counterweight to its independence, a central bank has a duty to report on its actions, and the results. indeed, the snb has regularly provided detailed reports on matters relating to both monetary policy and financial stability. for example, it has explained the rationale behind deciding to discontinue the minimum exchange rate or introduce the negative interest rate, and how these measures have helped it to fulfil its mandate. as regards financial stability, the fact that macroprudential instruments often have powerful distribution effects speaks against handing over the entire responsibility for such instruments to the central bank. in contrast to monetary policy, these measures are sometimes targeted at specific sectors and groups, and thus also have fiscal implications. in switzerland, macropr

##udential tasks have therefore been divided up between the government, the financial market supervisory authority and the snb. the snb is responsible for assessing the systemic importance of banks and financial market infrastructures, and plays a key role in the deployment of the countercyclical capital buffer. 1 / 1 bis central bankers'speeches