enrollment rates have picked up noticeably among individuals aged 25 and over. presumably, many of these older students are striving to keep pace with the new demands evolving in the job market. indeed, an important aspect of the changing nature of jobs appears to be that an increasing number of workers are facing the likelihood that they will need retooling during their careers. the notion that formal degree programs at any level can be crafted to fully support the requirements of one ’ s lifework is being challenged. as a result, education is increasingly becoming a lifelong activity ; businesses are now looking for employees who are prepared to continue learning, and workers and managers in many kinds of pursuits have begun to recognize that maintaining their human capital will require persistent hard work and flexibility. 2 peter cappelli, “ are skilling requirements rising? evidence from production and clerical jobs, ” industrial and labor relations review ( april 1993 ), pp. 515 - 530 ; and “ technology and skill requirements : implications for establishment wage structures, ” new england economic review, special issue on earnings and inequality ( may / june, 1996 ), pp. 139 - 154. 3 david h. autor, lawrence f. katz, and alan b. krueger, “ computing inequality : have computers changed the labor market, ” national bureau of economic research working paper 5956 ( march 1997 ). economists have long argued that more than half of the market human capital produced in a worker ’ s lifetime is produced on the job4. several decades ago, much of that on - the - job training was acquired through work experience ; today we are seeing greater emphasis on the value of formal education and training programs for workers. developing human capital is perceived by many corporations as adding to shareholder value. if idea creation is increasingly the factor that engenders value - added, then training and education are crucial to the growth of company value - added and profitability. in the private sector, a number of major corporations have invested in their own internal training centers - - so - called corporate universities. some labor unions have done the same. more broadly, recent surveys by the bureau of labor statistics and by the department of education indicate that the provision of education on the job has risen markedly in recent years. in 1995, the bls report showed that 70 percent of workers in establishments with 50 or more employees received some formal training during the twelve months preceding the survey. most often this training was conducted in house by company personnel, but larger firms also

clear, we are still mid - step in implementing it. of course things could go wrong, in transition or in the end - state. the world certainly gives us plenty to worry about. but i am absolutely unwilling to have things go wrong because we have retreated from the reforms agreed over the last eight years. for the avoidance of doubt : what was intended will be implemented. i hear many pleas for “ tweaks ”. some of these are not quite as modest as is claimed. we are wise to the disguise. but we will of course work to identify and pursue opportunities to give a smoother finish to the reforms, addressing unintended consequences. solvency ii provides one example. it introduced a risk margin : the compensation that a third party would require to absorb the assets and liabilities of another firm that runs into trouble. this provides an extra degree of protection for policyholders, and therefore advances the pra ’ s objectives. but because of its design under the current legislation, the risk margin is very sensitive indeed to risk - free rates. this level of volatility is not justified by the historical evidence and does not in my view serve a useful purpose. rather, it may be dangerously procyclical. so in the immediate aftermath of the referendum, we invited – indeed encouraged – firms to apply for transitional measures to smooth the impact of the risk margin during a time of market turbulence, and i also very much welcome the european commission ’ s request for eiopa to review the risk margin ’ s role more broadly. take the leverage ratio as another post - referendum example of steps we are taking to put a smoother finish on the reforms. the framework was originally introduced to mitigate the risk to financial stability of excessive leverage. in august we decided to exclude central bank reserves from the exposure measure. they do not expose a firm to additional risks : as the ultimate settlement asset, central bank reserves are a unique asset class. leaving reserves in scope would have obstructed the effective implementation of monetary policy. but neither did we want to take them out only to see a reduction in the nominal amount of capital required to meet the uk leverage ratio standard. so in making the change, we made clear that we will recalibrate the standard to offset this impact. the policy intent of our framework is preserved, while the unintended consequence is addressed. in a similar vein, let me say a quick word on the reforms currently being discussed in basel – specifically the review