policy framework. after all, history offers our only empirical guide. a large part of my professional career has involved dealing with episodes of financial disruption. as president of the paris club in the mid - 1980s, i was closely involved in the resolution of the sovereign debt crisis that had struck a large number of countries in latin america, africa and the middle east. more than 50 countries defaulted. even if advanced economies were not touched directly, their financial systems were deeply implicated. and the impact on entire continents in the emerging world – economically, and by way of consequence in social and human terms – was profound. prominent examples of critiques of the existing macroeconomic literature include : p. krugman ( 2009 ), “ how did economists get it so wrong? ” new york times ( 2 september ) ; and w. h. buiter ( 2009 ), “ the unfortunate uselessness of most “ state - of - the - art ” academic monetary economics ” financial times ( 3 march ). at the french treasury and then as governor of the banque de france, i also witnessed first hand the exchange rate crises of the european monetary system in 1992 – 93. a succession of emerging market crises followed later in the decade : the “ tequila crisis ” in mexico in 1994 ; the asian crisis from 1997 ; and the russian crisis of 1998. each of these rocked global financial markets and created new challenges for monetary and financial policy. here in the united states, the collapse of ltcm in 1998 and the bursting of the “ dot - com bubble ” at the turn of the century were episodes of significant financial disruption, with an impact that reverberated across the atlantic. and, as president of the european central bank since 2003, i have been very closely involved in the global response to the current crisis, in concert with colleagues at the fed and other leading central banks. in short, my professional life has been one of dealing frequently with financial crisis. what have i learned from this experience? and what are the implications from these lessons for the refinement of policy design? in anticipation of my answer to these questions, allow me to give an initial flavour of my response, which will be organised around two themes. first, i will argue that financial crises share some commonalities. in particular, crises are associated with the emergence of euphoria and complacency in financial markets, typically supported by rapid credit growth and a growing belief that new concepts like financial innovation or technological advances have rendered old

the more committed to moving ahead with the energy transition following russia's horrific and unprovoked invasion of ukraine. to conclude, we call on regulators, supervisors, standard - setting bodies and financial institutions to join us in answering the question : " what distance do you still have to cover, within your mandate, to reach a pariscompatible transition path? " and then join us in taking action. join us in urgently taking all the steps necessary to ensure that our journey through sharm el - sheikh takes us to paris in time. thank you. 1 elderson, f. ( 2021 ), " the ngfs glasgow declaration – from a coalition of the willing to a coalition of the committed ", speech at the cop26 finance day presidency event on " a financial system for net zero ", 3 november. 2 elderson, f. ( 2022 ), " towards an immersive supervisory approach to the management of climate - related and environmental risks in the banking sector ", speech at the industry outreach on the thematic review on climate - related and environmental risks, 18 february. 2 / 2 bis - central bankers'speeches