gertrude tumpel - gugerell : priorities for eu infrastructures and prospects of transatlantic infrastructures speech by ms gertrude tumpel - gugerell, member of the executive board of the european central bank, at the eurofi conference, nice, 12 september 2008. * * * question 1 : what are the priorities to develop the competitiveness of eu securities infrastructures? answer 1 : firstly, from a central bank perspective a clear priority for eu securities infrastructures is to overcome the current fragmentation which leads to unnecessarily high costs, especially for cross - border transactions. i see t2s as a good example of this. t2s, as a neutral and borderless shared settlement infrastructure, will yield positive scale effects, and it will promote competition in asset servicing, as csds strengthen their offerings in services other than settlement. secondly, harmonisation, harmonisation will lead to further cost savings, transparency and foster competition in the value chain. we will see significant initiatives in harmonisation efforts throughout the securities life cycle, assisted by the catalytic effect of t2s. the eurosystem, itself, will initiate work of the t2s advisory group together with market participants to develop action plans for harmonising both settlement - related processes and processes related to corporate actions. thirdly, in order for securing the competitive market place of the single market and thereby maintain and attract issuers and investors to europe, we need to re - think the risks to the robustness and resilience of the entire financial system, which includes securities infrastructures. first of all we need a single set of standards consistently implemented in the european union. in this respect, i welcome the request of ecofin to escb and cesr to finalise their recommendations. ( this will also facilitate harmonisation and avoid regulatory arbitrages that can lead to the “ race to the bottom ” ). second, the current financial crisis is showing how fast problems in one market can spread over to other markets. in consequence, the operational processes, risk management policies and procedures of each system are more related to those of other systems. therefore priorities should be made to obtain a holistic and systemic european ( and maybe global ) approach to widening our risk assessment concepts and our coordination with other market participants within the value chain, so that risk and crisis management procedures can be optimised. after the publication of the cpss report on interdependencies, central banks are currently investigating if and if so

peter praet : interview in neue zurcher zeitung interview with mr peter praet, member of the executive board of the european central bank, in neue zurcher zeitung, conducted by by ms claudia aebersold szalay and mr peter a fischer and published on 19 september 2015. * * * mr praet, you have been chief economist of the ecb for the past four years now. during this period, the policy of the ecb has changed somewhat. does it make a difference who the chief economist of the ecb is? both the president and the chief economist have changed, but what has changed most of all during this period is the economic environment in which we find ourselves. at the onset of the crisis in 2007, we still thought we were simply dealing with an external liquidity shock. so, the central banks across the globe reacted accordingly, and at the time the ecb also focused on providing liquidity to banks. i can still remember the headlines back then, saying that the ecb was providing €100 billion in liquidity, which seemed an incredible sum at the time. the crisis nonetheless escalated. yes, it quickly turned into a credit crunch, which in 2012 escalated into a euro crisis. however, to come back to your first question : the circumstances have changed dramatically ; the identity of the chief economist plays a minor role in that sense. ecb decisions are not a “ one - man show ”, but rather the result of discussions amongst the members of the governing council. that is an open, professional and collegial exchange, and this is the basis on which the ecb ’ s governing council makes its decisions. you give the impression, however, that you take a more anglo - saxon approach, whereas your two predecessors, issing and stark, were rather more of the tradition of the deutsche bundesbank and were, therefore, more stability - oriented in their thinking. i would firmly disagree. i and the entire executive board of the ecb have utterly committed ourselves to price stability. that is our mandate, the task enshrined in the european treaties. we see price stability as symmetrical ; it works in both directions. we fight inflation – when prices rise too quickly – with the same determination as when prices rise too slowly. and with our policy we have certainly been successful in terms of counteracting fears of deflation, i should like to think. all of our policies, including the less conventional ones, are