samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
øystein olsen : management of the government pension fund global ( gpfg ) introductory statement by mr øystein olsen, governor of the norges bank ( central bank of norway ), before the storting ’ s standing committee on finance and economic affairs, oslo, 30 april 2013. * * * please note that the text below may differ from the actual presentation. charts in pdf i would like to thank the chairman and thank you for giving norges bank the opportunity again this year to report on the management of the government pension fund global ( gpfg ). chart : changing the regional allocation the investment strategy of the gpfg builds on its specific features, purpose and our perception of the functioning of financial markets. the gpfg is a large fund and features a long investment horizon. the objective of investment management is to preserve the longterm international purchasing power of the gpfg. in 2012, the investment strategy was changed. as a result, investments in emerging markets have increased. just over 10 percent of the overall portfolio is now invested in these markets. chart : increasing investments in real assets the allocation to equities was increased to 60 percent between 2007 and 2009. when the allocation to real estate reaches 5 percent further ahead, the gpfg's allocation to real assets will make up two - thirds of the overall portfolio. the long - term expected return on real assets is higher than on nominal bonds. the risk is also higher, but the long - term investment horizon puts us in a solid position to carry that risk. the key to realising the higher return is to adhere to the strategy also in times of heightened uncertainty, as we did through the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009. an official framework for rebalancing back to a set allocation to equities has now been established. this will help ensure that this strategy is carried out during the next period of high volatility in financial markets. chart : lower costs management costs for equities are higher than for fixed - income securities. the cost of managing many small shareholdings is higher than managing a few large ones, as is the cost of managing investments in emerging markets in relation to developed markets. overall management costs as a percentage of the gpfg have nonetheless fallen over time. we have exploited its size to realise economies of scale. in the past few years, costs have been reduced also in krone terms. this is partly due to reduced use of external managers. costs

delivered a downpayment on that hope. basel ii reinforces the expectation of less procyclical contribution from banking by trying to accelerate the adoption of more - formal, quantitative risk - management techniques. another important benefit that will accompany any success in reducing the cyclicality in credit quality in banking is the reduction in the degree of volatility in bank earnings that will increase the long - term capitalized value of banks. this is just another way of saying that better risk management in banking is in the long - term interest of everyone : bank management, bank regulators, the public, and the stockholders of banks.
would be to ban de gregorio ( 2009 ) argues that low interest rates are not responsible for the bubbles or for the financial meltdown, because a number of countries had neither bubbles nor financial instability ( e. g., canada and chile ), while others had housing bubbles but their financial system was much more resilient ( e. g., spain ). it should be noted that there were some important warnings of the risks that were being incubated. worth singling out is the work by raghu rajan presented in jackson hole in 2005 ( rajan, 2006 ). the existence of cars. however, it seems more reasonable to build safer cars, buckle up and drive prudently. crises will continue to happen, but the proper way to act is to strengthen the financial system and macroeconomic policies, in order to minimize their consequences and probability of occurrence. we must not remain in the notion that a crisis cannot be prevented and thus there is nothing we can do about it. going back to the car analogy, the fact that accidents will always happen does not mean that we must allow driving at any speed and with no regulation. quite the contrary, we know that crises are especially severe when they affect the financial system, so it is reasonable to improve regulatory mechanisms, particularly to allow financial innovation while keeping vulnerability under control. meanwhile, it is necessary to continue devoting efforts to the detection of early alerts, although, as i have already pointed out, unambiguous indicators are impossible to find. but there are symptoms of fragility, very common in emerging economies. high and persistent current - account deficits, misaligned exchange rates, currency mismatches in the financial and corporate sectors, excessive increases in the prices of assets and credit, all signal a potential problem, although they do not result necessarily in a crisis. 8 therefore, a look at the indicators is not enough, it is important to put them together to detect fragilities. this is precisely what we try to do in our financial stability reports, which allow us to gain an overall vision of vulnerabilities, although, once again, it does not provide a final verdict. finally, new financial realities require new sets of information to examine, or to compile when not available. 9 crisis management that this is the worst financial crisis since the great depression nobody disputes. moreover, the initial shock on the global economy does not differ much from the one that hit in the 1930s. there

help the economy to avoid the worst and prepare the country for a stronger recovery. * * * page 3 of 3
for safe, secure, sound, efficient, accessible and authorized payment systems in the country. in this context, i would briefly outline the developments taking place in this space. 10. at the heart of payment market infrastructures ( pmis ) is the one owned by central banks which the world over is a real - time gross settlement ( rtgs ) system. as the world moves closer to real time everything, including payments and the inflection on innovation, better governance and wider access, the role of the rtgs system is evolving. this places new demands on the business and technology architectures of pmis and rtgs systems in particular. to move closer to providing access to the rtgs for longer durations, the customer timings have been recently extended. there has been a growing demand for providing wider access to the rtgs system and allow participation of non - banks. the highlevel committee on deepening of digital payments ( cddp ) recommended that nonbanking entities should be included as associate members of payment systems and 4 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches become an active player in enhancing acceptance infrastructure in the country. the recommendations are under examination. 11. another development in the markets is related to implementation of legal entity identifier ( lei ). in view of the financial crises across the world, lei has provided a way to identify financial connections so that regulators and firms can better understand the true nature of risk exposures across the financial system. in india, lei has been mandated across various sectors in the financial markets including derivatives and non - derivatives market and also for large corporate borrowers. this is being implemented in a phased manner. since it has been made mandatory for large corporate borrowers to obtain lei, banks should, apart from advising such borrowers to obtain lei, encourage such borrowers to obtain lei for their parent entity as well as all subsidiaries and associates. implementation of lei for large borrowers may help banks in better monitoring of transactions and hence, exposure of such borrowers across nations. 8. let me now conclude. the role of financial sector in a growing economy cannot be overemphasized. as the most important segment, the fixed income market in india has to grow to cater to the investment needs of an economy that aspires to become a usd 5 trillion economy in near future. while the rbi and other sister regulators will continue to draw the contours of growth with financial stability in mind, the market needs more activity, innovation and enterprise from

rules and a consistent application over time will reinforce the credibility of the process of euro area enlargement. this will, in turn, facilitate the sustainability of convergence. the framework is flexible enough to accommodate the country - specific features of all countries that want to adopt the euro. i would also like to emphasise that meeting the convergence criteria in a sustainable manner before joining the euro area is in the interest of all parties concerned and above all for the candidate countries themselves. i am now at your disposal for questions.
colleagues from abroad. all of you have played a part in creating an institution. some of you won ’ t have agreed with things we have said or done at one time or another! but you nonetheless sustained support for the bank as an institution and for the arrangements under which we operate. whatever success we may have had over the years owes a lot to the support and trust that the financial sector, the political leadership and our community – whom we serve – have been prepared to give us, even on occasions when they didn ’ t agree with us. we have also benefited greatly from the support of our international colleagues. thank you for that support. we shall continue to do our utmost to be worthy of it. thank you all for coming to be part of this celebration. please enjoy your evening.

lending rates. we see muted investment, despite firms building up cash reserves. this cannot be solved by further accommodation, but is a clear cut case for the right structural policies. in fact, with structural economic policies directed towards more competitiveness, sustainable fiscal budgets and financial sector policies and governance that set the stage for sound banks ’ balance sheet and more stable financial market conditions, economic confidence and confidence in the euro area as an economic and financial centre will return and unleash the willingness for more credit provision, more investment and domestic demand. conclusion with this, let me conclude. the euro area economy continues to recover, albeit at a slow and uneven pace. reflecting the weak economic and monetary dynamics, underlying price pressures in the euro area are expected to remain subdued over the medium term. the ecb ’ s monetary policy has successfully contributed to this outlook. our stance is accommodative in full consistency with our prime task to maintain price stability in the euro area. this is vindicated by the consistent anchoring of inflation expectations for the euro area over the medium to long term in line with our aim of maintaining inflation rates below, but close to, 2 %. yet, there is no doubt that the outlook on inflation remains subdued and we expect only a very gradual upward movement towards inflation rates below, but close to, 2 % later on. that ’ s why our monetary policy will continue to provide an appropriate degree of accommodation. and just be reminded that our forward guidance to keep interest rates at present or lower levels for an extended period of time remains in place. let me also assure you that the ecb has and always will respond to downside risks to price stability if they were to emerge going forward. here our policy rate margin still leaves some room for manoeuvre and our operational framework provides the necessary tools to react swiftly if warranted. bis central bankers ’ speeches but let ’ s be clear : by ensuring price stability, the ecb is making its contribution to the economic recovery. yet, a durable return to robust and sustainable growth requires that governments persevere in their fiscal and structural reform agenda. bis central bankers ’ speeches
##f. let me stop here. thank you ladies and gentlemen.

supply of foreign exchange is clearly higher than the demand. the current managed float scheme aims at preventing excessive volatility of the dollar in the long - term so as not to affect consumers and investors´ spending and saving decisions. at the same time, the current framework avoids providing a “ foreign exchange insurance ” that would favor short - term inflows of “ hot money ”. unlike what happened in the past, avoiding a hysterical reaction by the monetary authority in the first two days of turbulences was key to prove the adequacy of the current exchange rate regime : the “ fear of floating ” so much discussed in the economic literature is still alive in the argentine collective memory, even among sophisticated analysts and the specialized press. therefore, an early migration to a fully floating exchange rate regime might be a reckless action and a point of no return. afterward, and in order to reduce uncertainty, action taken by the monetary authority combined direct intervention in the foreign exchange market – in coordination with the stateowned banks – to avoid inflationary pressures and the provision of liquidity in the money market so that the natural increase in interest rates would not become persistent and thus threaten credit dynamics. to that end, monetary policy instruments were used such as the absorption of central bank securities ( lebacs and nobacs ) which, far from being conventional debt – they are backed by reserves – make up liquidity “ cushions ” that may be used in a situation of financial stress. besides, regulatory measures were adopted – bimonthly calculation of banks ’ reserve requirements – to “ decompress ” monetary stress situations. another eloquent example of the strategy developed in the past few years to face contingencies is the recovery of banking liquidity. just as reserves play the role of liquidity insurance for the monetary authority, banks ’ cash is the first defense line against unexpected events. for this reason, banking regulations fostered the recovery of liquidity, equivalent to almost 40 percent of total deposits, among the soundest in the region. moreover, other financial solvency indicators are robust : partly driven by a regulation limiting bank financing to the public sector, the exposure of the financial system to the government was dramatically reduced since the crisis ( 18 percent of public sector - related assets, a record low in years, which also makes resources available to finance the private sector ), the nonperforming portfolio is record low, the system has already shown profits for a couple of fiscal years now, and the process of
positive and correct they may be. rather, a lasting stabilisation of the financial system calls for a holistic policy approach which links the microprudential base – in other words, the perspective on the individual institutions – with the macroprudential perspective and which simultaneously integrates the macroeconomic background and developments in the financial markets. realising such as a holistic approach is certainly not an easy task. but i regard it as the right course for arriving at a lasting stabilisation of the financial system. thank you for your attention.

income households and enterprises that lack traditional tangible collateral. demand for tangible assets to secure loans has for many years locked out the bottom pyramid from the more affordable credit market. opening up this market to them enables them join the formal sector and engage in more inclusive businesses that generate better and sustainable incomes and benefit from inclusive growth. • expansion of bank branches and mfis to reach the lower pyramid due to lower barriers to entry, enhanced competition and declining costs of maintaining accounts. the numbers of branches have consequently increased exponentially from 534 in 2005 to 1272 in 2012. the expansion in bank branches is not only enhancing financial inclusion, but also funding more inclusive businesses. ladies and gentlemen : the innovation that spurred most of these developments has ensured increased financial inclusion, which is a sure way of tapping potential in the lower pyramid into inclusive businesses through creation of stable formal sector employment opportunities that pay sustainable incomes, reduce cost of operations, enhance inclusive growth and reduce poverty sustainably. the bank will therefore continue to work with market players and stakeholders, including the g20 challenge partners to enhance financial inclusion and build inclusive businesses that employ the poor. thank you very much for your kind attention. bis central bankers ’ speeches
supreme court, poses obvious formidable challenges. still, we must begin the important work of developing a framework capable of analyzing the growth of an economy increasingly dominated by conceptual products.

a few recent and important steps forward in europe and in france. the eurosystem is now incorporating climate change into the ecb's monetary policy operations, as announced by president christine lagarde in early july. when it comes to its non - monetary policy portfolios, after achieving the 2°c objective, the banque de france will now align them with the 1. 5°c objective, starting with european equities by end - 2023, and completely by end - 2025. as supervisors, the french acpr conducted the first pilot stress tests dedicated to climate risks in 2021, followed by the ecb in 2022. many jurisdictions ( 36 at this stage, including japan ) have followed, or are following the same road. the release last summer of six updated ngfs ( v ) macrofinancial scenarios will allow for enhanced assessments. this network, based in the banque de france with an asian chair, ravi menon of mas, now has more than 120 members. we are very happy to count the bank of japan and the japanese fsa among them. c. raising stakes for standard setting and supervisory requirements appropriate disclosure is obviously of the essence to foster sound and trustworthy green finance. europe has been a pioneer in drafting standards. since then, the newly born issb ( vi ) has published two draft standards on general disclosure requirements and climate - related disclosures, and the us sec ( vii ) has published a proposal on climaterelated requirements, which would – if adopted – gradually come into force between 2024 and 2026. these initiatives are obviously welcome : climate change is a global topic. and we cannot, even if we wanted it, have a single standard. but we collectively have to ensure that these standards are interoperable : as a bottom line, when an entity complies with a set of requirements from any jurisdiction, it should mean that it also complies with the global baseline provided by the issb. none of the major sets of norms are carved in 3 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches stone ; the efrag and issb are fortunately working hard towards convergence, and making strong and quick progress. as a complement to stress tests, relying on robust transition plans from banks and insurers is the best way forward. it would allow for a dynamic, holistic and risk - based approach, which in my view is far preferable to static and not risk - based greensupporting and brown -
term funding markets, including some spikes in repo rates in 2019, but overall vulnerabilities stemming from liquidity and maturity mismatches in the financial sector still appeared low — especially so at large banks, which had substantially reduced their reliance on short - term wholesale funding from pre - crisis levels. in late 2019, market participants were telling us that the most salient risks to the u. s. economy were from trade frictions, the challenges facing monetary policy given the proximity of interest rates to their effective lower bound, and market liquidity. 1 then the covid event unfolded. on february 21, while we were with the italian authorities in riyadh for the g20 meetings, italy announced quarantines of the northern towns being hardest hit by the new virus. this was a trigger for what became a rapid change in market sentiment, as investors began to prepare for what was beginning to seem might be a significant slowdown in economic activity. volatility rose ; selling pressure rose. as other european governments began to adopt travel bans, lockdowns, and school closures, there was a surging demand for safe assets. with fears of a widespread economic slowdown proliferating in late february and early march, treasury prices rose and yields fell sharply, as usually happens when the economic outlook worsens. and as often happens when a shock leads to a surging demand for safe assets, some risky assets became very difficult to sell. then on march 11, roughly two weeks after the first italian quarantines, the w ho declared covid - 19 a global pandemic, and several new countries announced lockdowns and border 1 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches closings. this was the trigger that turned what up to then had been a reasonably familiar, if concerning, flight to safety into a historically unprecedented dash for cash. corporates preparing for a potentially extended disruption in revenues began seeking cash reserves en masse, while financial firms uncertain about the value of assets and counterparties began cutting their exposures. as a result of this scissoring, we saw serious strains in several financial markets. some of the most severe strains emerged in short - term funding markets and among institutions engaged in liquidity transformation. i will highlight a few. first, we saw a pullback from commercial paper, or cp, markets. in an effort to contain risk in an abruptly slowing economy, investors shortened the maturities at which they were willing to lend in the

third, the integration of impact evaluations into wb projects and programs, which requires building capacity in client countries and allows for optimizing design and delivery. strengthened international cooperation is essential to assisting those in need and enhancing preparedness for future crises in order to prevent their most dramatic impacts. our constituency firmly supports multilateral institutions and international coordination efforts. as with its 2021 g20 presidency, italy enters the 2024 g7 presidency firmly committed to those efforts. 3 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches