we worry that adding to this framework a second objective of financial stability will most likely create an important degree of confusion and discretion, putting our transparency and credibility at risk. nonetheless, while we do not think that the policy rate should be part of a macroprudential framework, we cannot completely rule out its use with financial stability considerations when facing a critical situation. the second question refers to the institutional framework for decision making regarding macroprudential policies. in this regard, a first issue relates to who should make decisions lim et al., 2011 ; tovar mora et al., 2012 ; claessens et al., 2013 ; kuttner and shim, 2013 ; bruno et al., 2014 ; zhang and zoli, 2014 ; akinci and rumsey, 2015 ; cerutti et al., 2015. bis central bankers ’ speeches regarding macroprudential policies at a system - wide level. a second issue refers to the decision making process within the central bank in relation to the macroprudential tools within its mandate. the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008 has been widely active in institutional design around the world ; particularly in countries were the crisis imposed large losses on taxpayers. there is a wide variety in the way decision making about macroprudential policies is organized, and to the extent to which decisions are mandates or recommendations. in the united kingdom, a specific committee – the financial policy committee – was set at the bank of england with the responsibility for delivering financial stability through macroprudential regulation. decisions by this committee, which is chaired by the governor of the bank and where the treasury has voice but not voting rights, are mandatory for the prudential regulator ( the bank of england ). in the case of the united states, the financial stability oversight council was formed to identify systemic risks and gaps in supervision and to recommend regulatory enhancements. it is chaired by the treasury. the central bank ( the federal reserve ) is part of the council alongside the heads of eight main federal regulatory agencies. the council identifies systemically important financial institutions, which are supervised by the federal reserve, and recommends policies to its members. in chile, as in many other countries in the world, a financial stability council was created that gathers together supervisors and the central bank. it is chaired by the ministry of finance. the council assesses issues of financial stability and coordinates information sharing. with regard to the decision making within the central bank in relation to its macroprude

- playing field and to minimise the potential for arbitrage through harmonization, particularly in the case of the proposed bank levy. at the same time, we must ensure that banks, especially the larger ones, go back to their core business of extending credit to the real economy and refrain from engaging in the kind of risk - taking that gave rise to the recent crisis. priority must, therefore, be given to the one measure that is most likely to influence the banks ’ ability to take risk, that is the bcbs proposals on bank capital. capital buffers must henceforth be commensurate with the degree of risk undertaken. it is no longer acceptable that profits are privatised and losses socialised. in a broader context, another important challenge is to ensure that systemic risks are addressed without unduly constraining financial innovation and integration. finally, the opportunity provided by the current period of reflection should also be used to examine the possible consequences of some of the reform proposals for the functioning of financial markets and for the implementation of monetary policy, and by extension also for the real economy. references 1. european central bank, the incentive structure of the “ originate and distribute ” model, 2008. 2. francis boyer lecture of the american enterprise institute for public policy research, “ the challenge of central banking in a democratic society ”, 1996. 3. http : / / www. reuters. com / article / idusn0132320120071003 4. the high - level group on financial supervision in the eu, 2009. 5. basel committee on banking supervision, “ strengthening the resilience of the banking sector ”, 2009. 6. basel committee on banking supervision, “ international framework for liquidity risk measurement, standards and monitoring ”, 2009. 7. directive 2009 / 111 / ec of the european parliament and of the council of 16 september 2009 amending directives 2006 / 48 / ec, 2006 / 49 / ec and 2007 / 64 / ec as regards banks affiliated to central institutions, certain own funds items, large exposures, supervisory arrangements, and crisis management. oj, l 302, 17. 11. 2009, p. 97. 8. european commission public consultation regarding further possible changes to the capital requirements directive ( “ crd ” ). the consultation was closed on 4 september 2009. 9. european commission public consultation regarding further possible changes to the capital requirements directive ( “ crd ” ) – launched on 26 february 2010. 10.