the holding of government debt by the banking sector. might that not be a major problem for countries and banks? the financial crisis has shown that there is no risk - free asset. this includes government bonds. the incentives set by the regulatory framework have to be aligned with this insight. obviously, this is not only a european issue. the solution has to be global. we have to discuss this important issue in the basel committee, recognise that there are no risk - free assets and calibrate the rules properly. sensible rules and adequate transition periods can help mitigate all related risks. bis central bankers ’ speeches

systemic implications, we revert to financial stability. i firmly believe that the first and most important job for a central bank is to ensure the integrity of money and the banking system. 2. joint supervision and crisis response mechanisms building bridges of continuous communication with local bank managers, home supervisors and headquarters of the mother institutions has proved to be critical in dealing with the problems before they get out of hand. while communication is an advice that is frequently used, we made a good use of that beyond mere courtesy. we acknowledged that financial development was following a certain pattern. financial institutions like all other businesses adopt marketing strategies and stick to such strategies in all markets. what this means for us is that once new product are developed and tested in other markets, they will follow the same pattern of marketing in other markets as well. in the years that preceded the crisis, financial institutions started the practice of lending in exotic currencies, offering very low interest rates and being without any economic relation with the borrower activity. being aware of these developments, from previous communication with other central banks in the region, we were alerted to spot the first sign of such behavior in our economy. therefore at the first signs of such credits, we discussed with the management of our banks and stopped administratively lending in these currencies for all unhedged borrowers. on a systemic level, i do believe the recent experience highlighted some issues that need to be looked more carefully in the future. i will highlight here only three of them. the policies that facilitated the capital inflows into economies of the region were not followed by actions which could have provided the needed liquidity when these flows reversed or stopped. countries of the region did not benefit from the swap agreements or similar arrangements that would allow us access to short term liquidity. one can certainly say that in normal times that could be resolved at group level. however, this didn ’ t necessarily prove to be the case in the recent experience. because our financial systems are inter - connected, i think this issue deserves more attention in the future. a crucial step in alleviating the financial crisis in cee countries was the vienna initiative, which stabilized both the balance sheets of the big banking groups operating in the region and the trust of our public in them. i think such a facility needs to be permanent, at least in the case of global or european potential financial financial regulation and regulatory arbitrage was a serious issue before and throughout the crisis. before the crisis, banking groups would play