##i funds, built over three building blocks : baseline resilience, systemic resilience, and fund specific additional resilience. the first two building blocks amount to a 250 basis point minimum. and the framework also requires pension schemes to put in place operational processes enabling them to deliver collateral within five days and to support ldi funds in drawing down during stress. this framework provides us with a suitable framework for addressing non - bank vulnerabilities more generally. we can use this framework to contain non - bank vulnerabilities and so to mitigate their financial stability impacts. but this is a conference for pension funds, so i will leave on a message to the experts at this conference. ensuring financial stability is not only a job for financial stability authorities and regulators such as tpr, but also for participants. the fpc has set out a steady - state resilience framework to promote financial stability. but let me leave you with an encouragement to each play your role. ldi fund managers and pension schemes must ensure lessons from the crisis are learned and fully embedded into their operations and onto their balance sheets. i look forward to your support in building the operational and financial resilience that will help ensure we deliver financial stability. i ’ d like to thank alex briers and natan misak for their assistance in drafting these remarks. i would also like to thank renee horrell, david baumslag, leo fernandes, pierre ortlieb, steven dodkins, stephane amoyel, lee foulger, gian valentini, clare macallan, thomas wise, danny walker, ali moussavi, andrew bailey, and georgia waddington for their helpful input and comments. the views expressed here are not necessarily those of the financial policy committee. 1. see a roadmap for increasing productive finance investment 2. the responsibility for supporting and enabling an orderly transition to net zero is wider than the pension sector. it is for the entire finance sector to support and enable that transition. see climate action : approaching a tipping point? − speech by sarah breeden 3. see risks from leverage : how did a small corner of the pensions industry threaten financial stability? − speech by sarah breeden 4. in this speech, i will use ‘ ldi funds ’ to refer to leveraged ldi funds and ldi mandates in which many pension schemes invest. 5. see thirteen days in october : how central bank balance sheets can support monetary and financial stability −

out today with respect to ldi funds ’ leverage. further frameworks may need to be built up. such frameworks would allow market participants to be better prepared for shocks while allowing regulators and financial stability authorities to be more transparent about our expectations. whether these frameworks address vulnerabilities from leverage, liquidity mismatch, or liquidity demands from margin calls, they can draw on the building blocks we have used to calibrate ldi resilience. non - bank frameworks should capture both systemic and idiosyncratic risks. they should account for risks specific to individual participants. in calibration they should draw on the tails of distributions, which include system wide stresses, to calibrate resilience. the timeframes the calibrations are drawn from should consider the options and incentives for raising additional liquidity that are in place, and operational processes should be improved to ensure this additional liquidity can be supplied. non - banks should not have any impediments to drawing down on their liquidity during stress. given a suitable framework for addressing non - bank vulnerabilities, the question for financial stability authorities, regulators, and participants, is where should these frameworks be applied? phrased another way, what activities and which markets are systemic? some non - bank regulatory frameworks are already being built. uk authorities issued a discussion paper on money market funds ( mmfs ) last year. [ 23 ] and ahead of a consultation paper to be released later this year, the fpc judged that mmfs should be able to withstand severe but plausible levels of investor outflows without amplifying stress and increasing risks to financial stability by holding more liquid assets. it is for staff at the uk authorities to calibrate a range of holdings of liquid assets maturing within a week that would address financial stability risks from mmfs. however, it is easy to see how the illustrative scenario i talked you through earlier could be used to calibrate the appropriate resilience of mmfs. mmfs could have a range of holdings to reflect idiosyncratic and systemic risks. these holdings could be calibrated according to observed historical outflows, as seen in the dash for cash and ldi stress events. and as discussed in the discussion paper, the usability of these holdings will also be a key consideration for the uk authorities. conclusion the fpc have recommended a framework for the steady - state resilience of ld