##sb has been dedicated to advancing this important work ever since. the challenges associated with cross - border payments are widely known and longstanding. prior attempts to make improvements have struggled to gain traction. in october 2020, the fsb delivered a multi - year roadmap to the g20 leaders who endorsed the way forward and committed to advancing meaningful change aimed at increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of cross - border payments. 2 ultimately, we are focused on addressing the core challenges associated with cross - border payments : cost, speed, accessibility, and transparency. it goes without saying that making improvements is easier said than done. frictions underlying existing processes span multiple legal, operational, processing, technological, and structural issues, which can differ greatly by region. to break down the magnitude of our task, the see financial stability board, enhancing cross - border payments : stage 3 roadmap ( basel : financial stability board, october 13, 2020 ), https : / / www. fsb. org / wp - content / uploads / p131020 - 1. pdf. - 7roadmap includes a set of practical actions designed to address specific topics, which we refer to as “ building blocks. ” we are taking a comprehensive approach and engaging the public and private sectors because both need to be a part of the solution if we are to achieve the ambitious goals we have set for ourselves. to begin, we must decide what the actual improvements are that we want to see, and how we will monitor our progress in achieving them. these decisions will define the level of ambition, create accountability and shape how the roadmap is operationalized at the global, regional, and national levels. as a first step, the fsb has formed a task force that is responsible for setting specific, quantitative targets. these targets will set the tone and pace for work that follows and are therefore among the most important deliverables the fsb will complete this year. we plan to publish a consultative paper in may and deliver a final set of targets to the g20 in october. several groups are charged with advancing one or more building blocks over the course of this year, with the fsb providing annual updates to the g20. to deliver the roadmap, we are collaborating closely with the committee on payments and markets infrastructures of the bank for international settlements, which has a key role given the position of central banks in the payments ecosystem. in addition to setting targets, the fsb is leading

to money market funds, and the steps taken by the federal reserve to reduce the risks associated with the extension of intraday credit by clearing banks in triparty repo funding markets. these discrete steps are useful, particularly insofar as they cast light on implicit, but unpriced, support for short - term funding that has been provided by some financial intermediaries. but they do not address head - on the dynamic described in the text. markus k. brunnermeier and martin oehmke ( 2013 ), “ the maturity rat race, ” the journal of finance, vol. 68 ( 2 ) ( april ), pp. 483 – 521. bis central bankers ’ speeches would arguably place the merged firm in the too - big - to - fail category. 4 the calculation of a precise subsidy is difficult, and each such effort will likely occasion substantial disagreement. but several measures provide at least directionally consistent results. key additional reform measures in sketching out the kinds of steps needed to address these remaining vulnerabilities, let me begin with wholesale funding generally, and then circle back to too - big - to - fail. short - term wholesale funding at a conceptual level, the policy goal is fairly easy to state : a regulatory charge or other measure that applies more or less comprehensively to all uses of short - term wholesale funding, without regard to the form of the transactions or whether the borrower was a prudentially regulated institution. the aspiration to comprehensiveness is important for two reasons. first, the risks associated with short - term funding are as much or more macroprudential as they are firm - specific. from a microprudential perspective, sfts are low risk, because the borrowing is short - dated, overcollateralized, marked - to - market daily, and subject to remargining requirements. the dangers arise in the tail and apply to the entire financial market when the normally safe, short - term lending contracts dramatically in the face of sudden and significant uncertainty about asset values and the condition of counterparties. a regulatory measure should force some internalization by market actors of the systemic costs of this intermediation. second, to the degree that regulatory measures apply only to some types of wholesale funding, or only to that used by prudentially regulated entities, there will be a growing risk of regulatory arbitrage. ideally, the regulatory charge should apply whether the borrower is a commercial bank