funds. this void could most likely be filled by lending to small and micro enterprises and retail clients. as you are aware, the assessment of credit needs of small & micro enterprises and retail, is a different ball game altogether. a nondisruptive shift would require the bank staff to acquire new capabilities for credit appraisal of self - employed individuals and people with little or no credit history. the competition in the shape of small finance banks, with a mandate to focus exclusively on small business units, small and marginal farmers, micro and small industries and other unorganized sector entities, which would operate through technology - focused, low cost structure, is already on the anvil. as part of this strategic shift, banks would also need to improve their analytical abilities for big data. as i spoke earlier about lending to customers with little or no credit history, banks would need to employ some non - conventional tools for assessing credit worthiness of such bis central bankers ’ speeches customers, which can, among others, include credit card usage, travel patterns, bill payment history and so on. lack of attention to these segments by the banks might allow p2p lenders to sneak in and compete for the piece of the pie. here again, i would like to use the caveat that we are yet to finalise our regulatory stance on p2p lending. ( iv ) ifrs implementation : with the mca announcing the much awaited ind as implementation road map for the financial sector, scheduled commercial banks ( other than rrbs ) are required to comply with the standards for accounting periods beginning from april 1, 2018. in this endeavour, the banks would need to deal with challenges resulting from implementation of expected credit loss ( ecl ) based provisioning framework, classification and measurement of financial assets and impact of alignment of the regulatory guidelines with ind as on regulatory capital computations under the basel iii framework, leverage and liquidity ratios, etc. as a supervisor, our off - site reporting formats would need to be revisited. in essence, huge capacity building initiatives at the level of both the regulator and the regulated are required. while it may not be possible to precisely quantify the impact of ind as implementation at this stage, rough estimates globally indicate a transitional impact of 25 – 50 % increase in provisioning levels on account of implementation of ecl based provisioning framework. a 2014 international survey1 of select banks indicated that over half of them expected an impairment provision increase of up to 50 per cent across all asset classes.

jean - claude trichet : lessons from the crisis speech by mr jean - claude trichet, president of the european central bank, at the european american press club, paris, 3 december 2010. * * * ladies and gentlemen, i would like to start by thanking the organisers for inviting me to share with you my thoughts on the economic and financial crisis. the crisis is not yet over, but we should certainly start drawing lessons and we should certainly start implementing them. times are challenging, and europe ’ s citizens expect all policy - makers to be up to the responsibilities of fulfilling their respective mandates. as far as the european central bank ( ecb ) is concerned, i recall that we were among the first central banks in the world to react to the outbreak of the financial turmoil back in august 2007. since then, we have continued to act with a posture that i have called “ credible alertness ”. this posture includes both standard monetary policy, which is implemented through interest rate changes, and non - standard policies, which are implemented, in essence, through special liquidity operations and interventions in some bond markets including covered bonds. it is my opinion that the ecb ’ s governing council has demonstrated a strong ability to keep the european monetary vessel on course through the waves of a financial storm that has often been defined as the most serious since the great depression. throughout the global crisis, resolute action by policy - makers has helped to avoid a repeat of the economic policy disasters of the 1930s – and to foster close cooperation around the world, including among central banks. but recent developments in european sovereign debt markets remind us that the crisis is not yet over. they also remind us that economic and monetary union rests on two pillars : an “ economic ” pillar and a “ monetary ” pillar. the “ monetary ” pillar obviously refers to the ecb, its mandate and its independence. the “ economic ” pillar comprises the fiscal regime enshrined in the stability and growth pact ; the national frameworks of economic policy ; and the system of mutual surveillance. it is very important to understand – and it has perhaps not yet been sufficiently understood – that the developments we are currently witnessing in europe ’ s economy have to do with the “ economic ” functions of economic and monetary union. they have essentially three origins : unsound fiscal policies in a number of member states ; inappropriate macroeconomic policies in a number of member states ; and overall an inadequate system of surveillance by all member states. this is the triangle