roughly 4½ %, and in switzerland only 3 %. excessive government debt therefore represents a massive threat to price stability. putting an effective limit on government borrowing is thus a primary pillar of any policy of stable money. monetary union, as a union of stability, therefore required sound public finances. having said that, it soon became clear that calling for sound public finances would not be enough. a requirement of this kind had to be reinforced by fiscal rules. in this context, a part was played by the following considerations. first, the finding that public budgets have a tendency to excessive borrowing ; think, for instance, of the theory of political business cycles. second, the concern that governments in a monetary union have an even greater incentive to borrow because the costs of an unsound policy can be spread more widely. and, third, from the outset there was the fear that, despite the no bail - out principle, market discipline on its own would not be enough to control such a tendency to incur debt. 3. monetary union and crisis the framework of monetary union was quite coherent, it reflected well - established regulatory policy principles, and the attempt was made to learn the lessons and not to repeat the errors of the past. nevertheless, the crisis has shown that, in some places, this framework was too weak. the fiscal rules, for example, lacked the necessary bite. instead, the reform of the stability and growth pact in 2005 in fact saw some of its teeth drawn as a result of political influence. at the same time, the disciplining effect of the financial markets was even smaller than had already been feared. at times, the risk premiums for government bonds from the countries now in crisis shrank to a few basis points. the fiscal rules and market discipline were thus too weak, and many euro - area countries ran up too much debt. in any event, the dangers that excessive government borrowing posed to monetary union were at least recognised. the dangers of unsound macroeconomic developments, on the other hand, were largely blanked out. it is true that the 1989 delors report warned about potential imbalances resulting from the adjustment process after completion of economic and monetary union or from differing economic policy stances. in contrast to the field of fiscal policy, however, there were no precautions to limit such risks. thus, in the run - up to the crisis, housing bubbles and large current account deficits emerged, while many countries ’ competitiveness deteriorated. we see these developments

vaut en particulier a la veille de l ’ elargissement de l ’ union europeenne. valery giscard d ’ estaing et helmut schmidt ont rappele, a juste titre, dans un article commun publie il y a quelques jours, que “ le succes de la monnaie unique depend, a terme, de l ’ accomplissement de nouveaux pas sur le plan politique. sans cela, les changements de gouvernement intervenant dans l ’ un ou l ’ autre des pays membres risqueraient de remettre en cause la solidite de l ’ union. (... ) on aurait pu s ’ attendre a ce que le traite d ’ amsterdam contienne des decisions prises par les pays participants, mais ceux - ci n ’ etaient pas capables de s ’ accorder sur des reformes. (... ) l ’ union monetaire est un projet federal qui doit etre accompagne et soutenu par d ’ autres mesures. elle n ’ a jamais ete faite pour rester un ilot isole dans l ’ œil d ’ un cyclone d ’ interets nationaux. ” pour toutes ces raisons, il est necessaire que la cooperation franco - allemande devienne encore plus intense, afin que le dynamisme de l ’ integration ne faiblisse pas apres l ’ entree dans l ’ union monetaire. l ’ unification europeenne est et reste un objectif porteur.