the treaty because only 5 member states were ready to implement them at the time. second example is the social charter, that was negotiated together with the maastricht treaty, but that was not acceptable at the time for the british government. a third example of flexibility brings me back to my own business. as you surely know only 12 out of the 15 current member states have until now adopted the single currency. according to the treaty, member states that have not yet adopted the euro are called " member states with a derogation ". two categories can be distinguished. the uk and denmark make up one category : these member states got respectively an opt - in and an opt - out. the second category consists of the member states that can't adopt the euro because they do not yet comply with the well - known convergence criteria. only sweden is currently in this position, but very soon a number of new member states will join sweden, having the vocation - and even the legal obligation - to adopt the euro at the right moment. it is very obvious that the member states of the euro area are more advanced in economic integration than the others are. so, this is clearly a case of " closer co - operation ", which has taken shape in the creation of a forum where the ecofin - ministers of the euro area can discuss the economic situation in the world, in the european community and in the euro area, and its consequences for economic policy making. this forum is, as you know, called the " eurogroup " and i'm sure that minister reynders will tell you everything about it after lunch. so to us, central bankers, closer co - operation or models of flexible integration is not some kind of theoretical exercise, we live with it constantly. ladies and gentlemen, my feeling is that the royal institute and the national bank have chosen for the colloquium of today a topic that is very much alive in the ongoing debate about the future institutional framework of european integration. the fact that we could find a series of utmost distinguished speakers ready to discuss this topic today with you, is a further demonstration of its importance.

amounts to sek 500 billion in total, which is more than the sum of all the loans currently taken out by small and medium - sized enterprises put together. added to this are new asset purchases of up to sek 300 billion, almost doubling the riksbank ’ s bond holdings. the riksbank also has the possibility to, via an agreement with the us federal reserve, lend us dollars corresponding to sek 600 billion. this is more than the total value of the riksbank ’ s gold and currency reserves. with these measures, therefore, the riksbank has the possibility of supplying at least sek 1, 400 billion to the banking system to ensure corporate money does not run out and to mitigate the effects on output and employment. added to this, there is also the possibility to borrow unlimited amounts of money on a weekly basis if necessary. at the same time, it is worth remembering that our measures come on top of the generous and enormous efforts currently being made by the central banks in the world ’ s major economies. going forward, it will be extremely important to monitor developments in the economy, both to evaluate the measures we have implemented and to see whether more needs to be done. the riksbank will follow developments via many information sources. we follow indicators of how the real economy is developing in the very short term and we are working to identify more indicators that can provide additional information about different parts of the economy. naturally, we will also closely follow the extent to which our programme of corporate lending is being used. as always, we are closely monitoring developments on financial markets and we are talking to market participants, banks and companies. we also have a close dialogue with other authorities and with central banks in other countries. if i may conclude with a personal reflection. as i mentioned earlier, this is the third major crisis in the swedish economy that i have been involved in dealing with. the first was the crisis in the early 1990s as head of the swedish bank support authority, colloquially known as the “ banking er ”, which was responsible for the state ’ s support measures to banks. then, it was a question of guaranteeing the solvency of banks. the second was the financial crisis in 2008 ‒ 2009 when the riksbank took action and basically guaranteed to supply the banking system with all the liquidity required to ensure it continued to work. i now have reason to say this for the second time as governor of the riksbank. but the crisis this time