in only the already effective budget support measures. an upturn in the economy and domestic demand will also be driven by the easing of monetary conditions resulting from the monetary policy pursued. this will support lending, and its growth rate will rise from 3 – 8 % this year to 6 – 11 % in 2021 – 2022. the lending potential will also be maintained owing to the regulatory easing and the expansion of the bank of russia ’ s specialised refinancing instruments. according to our estimates, the easing of monetary policy is needed to maintain annual inflation close to 4 % over the forecast horizon. the slump in domestic and external demand this year will be considerably containing inflation, which induces the risk of its substantial deviation downwards from the target in 2021 and over a medium - term horizon if no additional monetary policy measures are introduced. the disinflationary pressure of weak demand will offset the effect of temporary proinflationary factors, that is, the ruble weakening and the observed elevated demand for individual products, already this year. we believe that a rise in inflation expectations caused by the above factors will also be temporary. we expect that the impact of limited demand on inflation will be stable and long - lasting. given the transmission lag of monetary policy, we should take actions already now. based on our forecast, annual inflation will reach 3. 8 – 4. 8 % by the end of the year amid the easing of monetary policy, and will further on stabilise close to 4 %. moreover, we expect a reversal of inflation trends in the middle of the year. monthly inflation in annualised terms will begin to go down, while annual inflation will still continue to rise. as to the balance of payments, we expect that the current account balance will decline to negative values in 2020 and 2021 ( to usd 35 and 18 billion respectively ). this will mainly result from the slump in exports caused by the reduction in external demand and in export revenues, primarily from oil sales. i would like to point that the temporary switch to a current account deficit is an expected effect produced by the considerable oil price downturn under the influence of the fiscal rule. receipts from fiscal rule - based foreign currency sales make it possible to support the economy and domestic consumption. in this situation, imports are contracting to a lower degree compared 2 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches to exports driven by the decline in oil prices. as a result, the current account balance will drop to negative values. in 2022, when

dollars. • fourth, the ecb extended the eligibility of collateral that could be used for central bank financing, facilitating banks ’ refinancing liquidity shortages caused by halts in interbank lending. • fifth, the ecb introduced in may 2010 the securities markets programme. by intervening in the secondary markets of public and private debt securities, the ecb could ensure depth and liquidity in dysfunctional market segments and restore the proper functioning of the monetary policy transmission mechanism. • finally, in september 2012, the ecb announced the outright monetary transactions ( omt ) initiative, essentially the intention to purchase, if necessary, securities of euro area member - states in economic adjustment programmes from the secondary market. although not activated, the announcement of the initiative has contributed significantly to the improvement in financial market conditions, the decline in sovereign bond spreads and the gradual reversal of financial fragmentation. changes in the eu architecture • with the outbreak of the euro area crisis, it was made clear that both imbalances in the real economy and in the financial sector are sources of financial instability. • a more comprehensive policy framework was therefore necessary. • in this context, improvements in the policy framework aimed at completing the emu architecture with more coordination of economic policies, sufficient backstops to address liquidity shortfalls and, last but not least, common supervision of the financial sector. • the stability and growth pact was strengthened through a series of eu regulations in 2011 and 2013. the new legislation clearly defined debt reduction rules, sanctions in case of non - compliance and a new surveillance procedure monitoring the emergence of macroeconomic imbalances. in addition, fiscal coordination and surveillance was further strengthened through the ex - ante co - ordination of fiscal and structural policies of member states of the euro area. • moreover, the “ fiscal compact ”, agreed by the euro area and some eu member states, in march 2012 further strengthened fiscal governance. the treaty, which entered into force at the beginning of 2013, requires structural deficits limited to 0. 5 % of gdp and the introduction of fiscal rules in each country ’ s national legislation. • furthermore, the euro area, as well as some eu member states agreed in march 2011 on the “ euro plus pact ”, a commitment to undertake additional reforms, on top of the eu - wide “ europe 2020 ” obligations, to promote competitiveness, employment and productivity. • in the meanwhile, the european financial stability facility ( efsf ) provided financial assistance to sovereigns which faced temporary liquid