evidence that data difficulties account for a significant part of the decline in productivity growth as calculated by the bureau of labor statistics. 7 3. the zlb and the effectiveness of monetary policy : from december 2008 to december 2015, the federal funds rate target set by the fed was a range of 0 to ¼ percent, a range of rates that was described as the zlb ( zero lower bound ). 8 between december 2008 and december 2014, the fed engaged in qe – quantitative easing – through a variety of programs. empirical work done at the fed and elsewhere suggests that qe worked in the sense that it reduced interest rates other than the federal funds rate, and particularly seems to have succeeded in driving down longerterm rates, which are the rates most relevant to spending decisions. critics have argued that qe has gradually become less effective over the years, and should no longer be used. it is extremely difficult to appraise the effectiveness of a program all of whose parameters have been announced at the beginning of the program. but i regard it as significant with respect to the effectiveness of qe that the taper tantrum in 2013, apparently caused by a belief that the fed was going to wind down its purchases sooner than expected, had a major effect on interest rates. more recently, critics have argued that qe, together with negative interest rates, is no longer effective in either japan or in the euro zone. that case has not yet been empirically established, and i believe that central banks still have the capacity through qe and other measures to run expansionary monetary policies, even at the zero lower bound. 4. the monetary - fiscal policy mix : there was once a great deal of work on the optimal monetary - fiscal policy mix. the topic was interesting and the analysis persuasive. nonetheless the subject seems to be disappearing from the public dialogue ; perhaps in ascendance is the notion that – except in extremis, as in 2009 – activist fiscal policy see, for instance, mokyr, vickers, and ziebarth ( 2015 ). see byrne, fernald, and reinsdorf ( forthcoming ). inside the fed, the range of 0 to 1 / 4 percent is generally called the elb, the effective lower bound. bis central bankers ’ speeches should not be used at all. certainly, it is easier for a central bank to change its policies than for a treasury or finance ministry to do so, but it remains a pity that the fiscal lever seems

. the oil exporting countries have been additionally hit hard by the sharp drop in international oil prices, that not only has put significant pressure on their public finances and balance of payments, but has also derailed their long term diversification plans ; while oil prices have recovered somewhat, economic activity is expected to remain subdued for some time. the low - income countries, many already under considerable social and economic strain, are facing daunting challenges because of the crisis and are falling further behind in income convergence. their heavy debt burden, limited financing options, and little or no policy space make it almost impossible for them to meet the challenges on their own. we call on the international community to rise to the occasion in helping these countries generously through grants, concessional financing and debt relief. we support the extension of the g20 debt service suspension initiative, as well as the extension of the catastrophic containment and relief trust, and welcome the progress in securing additional resources for the poverty reduction and growth trust. we encourage all public and private creditors to participate in similar debt relief operations. the plight of fragile and conflict - affected states in the menap region, some facing refugee and humanitarian crises, calls for a timely and proportional international response. the role of international institutions — particularly the fund — has been instrumental in helping 1 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches countries to alleviate their significant financing pressures arising from the pandemic. we laud the agile response of the imf to support more than 80 members in the first few months of the crisis through its emergency and other financing facilities. the imf moved swiftly to expand and adapt its lending toolkit to the needs of the members, including through temporary increases in access limits to its emergency facilities. yet, requests by some other 20 members for emergency support are still pending for various reasons. we call upon the fund to ensure that its support is available to all members in an evenhanded manner without exceptions, and that emergency financing lives up to its name. we look forward to further refinements of the fund ’ s lending toolkit, including the introduction of a pandemic support facility. as the global economy is bracing for a challenging post - crisis recovery, the fund must stand ready to assist members through financial support and tailor - made as well as country specific policy advice and capacity development to ensure that the transition and the subsequent recovery proceed smoothly. this could only be achieved by a strong, quota - based, and adequately resourced imf, with the quotas