and metaphysics galen strawson. through my interactions with him, he helped me answer the question, " how does one construct a thoughtful, systematic world view? " after i completed my studies at oxford, galen also helped me hone further academic pursuits and advised me on plans that ultimately led me to pursue a phd in economics. he was generous with his time and offered very useful advice in comparing british and american economics programs. outside of my studies, i enjoyed participating in extracurricular activities that i did not have the opportunity to participate in during high school or college. those included the oxford union, the debate society, and traveling through italy, greece, and the middle east during spring break of my first year. one of my favorite experiences at oxford was producing, acting in, and serving as the dialect coach for the performance of " for colored girls - " by ntozake shange. i did so alongside my still very close friends, ambassador susan rice and congresswoman terri sewell. it was sponsored by the oxford university dramatic society and presented in the historic oscar wilde theatre at magdalen college. it was the first time " for colored girls - " was put on at oxford, because it was the first time there were six black women to put it on! i helped actors from liverpool and trinidad and tobago ( and some from the u. s. ) learn regional american accents. they joined four of us from the u. s. in the show, which included singing the aretha franklin hit " respect. " we sold out every single show. in addition to sharing american culture, i picked up on the cultural influences of the british isles. songs from irish rock band u2, such as " pride ( in the name of love ) " and " new year's day, " seemed to constantly play in the background during my time at oxford. that exposure proved vital a few years later when i was teaching at harvard and two gentleman named paul and david came to speak to my colleagues and me about debt relief for highly indebted poor countries. initially, i did not understand why 2 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches everyone was abuzz about these visitors, until someone whispered the familiar song titles in my ear. those words instantly transported me back to my time in britain. i was, of course, speaking to bono and the edge. lasting bonds while the u. s. and u. k. share close cultural bonds - look no further than james bond, adele, down

participants in the public policy debate on regulatory reform believe that more will need to be done to ensure the safety and soundness of financial institutions, guard against systemic risk, and substantially contain the too - big - to - fail problem. some additional potential regulatory devices are already under active consideration, both among u. s. bank supervisors and in international forums. these include proposals to create special charges on firms based on their systemic importance, to require contingent capital that would be available in periods of stress, and to counter pro - cyclical tendencies by establishing special capital buffers that would be built up in boom times and drawn down as conditions deteriorate. each of these ideas has substantial appeal. a number of thoughtful proposals are being discussed, though each idea presents considerable challenges in the transition from good idea to fully elaborated regulatory mechanism. yet to gain traction are proposals for what might be termed structural measures – that is, steps that would directly affect the nature and organization of the financial services industry. but discussion of such concepts is clearly increasing. one suggested approach is to reverse the 30 - year trend that allowed progressively more financial activities within commercial banks and more affiliations with non - bank financial firms. the idea is presumably to insulate insured depository institutions from trading or other capital market activities that are thought riskier than traditional lending functions, although separating trading from hedging and other prudent practices associated directly with lending is not an altogether straightforward proposition. in any case, this strategy would seem unlikely to limit the too - big - to - fail problem to a significant degree. for one thing, some very large institutions have in the past encountered serious difficulties through risky lending alone. moreover, as shown by bear stearns and lehman, firms without commercial banking operations can now also pose a too - big - to - fail threat. still, imposition of higher capital and liquidity requirements for riskier trading and other capital market activities can, if well devised and implemented, achieve some of what proponents of this approach seem to have in mind. another approach is to attack the bigness problem head - on by limiting the size of financial institutions. it is notable that current law provides very little in the way of structural means to limit systemic risk and the too - big - to - fail problem. the statutory prohibition on interstate acquisitions that would result in a commercial bank and its affiliates holding more than 10 percent of insured deposits nationwide is the closest thing to such an instrument. policy commentators might usefully attempt to develop similarly