market regulators, the autorite des marches financiers and the ontario securities commission. this oversight will soon be based on new international standards developed with the participation of the bank. it is worth noting that lessons learned during the creation of canada ’ s central counterparty for repo transactions were very useful in the development of these new standards. implementation of the central counterparty the metaphor frequently used by the industry to describe the financial system infrastructure is simple and appropriate : it ’ s called “ plumbing. ” why? because it is essential to the viability and efficient functioning of markets. as for our financial system, the plumbing is quite complicated. hence, developing this new infrastructure took a great deal of time. it is a complex process, in terms of both creating and implementing adequate and robust risk - control mechanisms. moreover, time is required to resolve operational issues, such as the development and testing of required software for both the central counterparty and the participants, and issues associated with the interaction between new software and existing systems. the launch of the first phase of the service therefore represents a major step. but much remains to be done. delivery will take place in three phases. phase one deals with bilateral repo transactions on a single government of canada security, although these represent only a small fraction of the market. phase two, planned for the end of this year, will incorporate cash transactions on fixed - income securities and repo transactions negotiated by intermediaries, including those with anonymous counterparties. finally, phase three, proposed for 2013 – 14, will target general - repo transactions in which any security in a predetermined basket of instruments can serve as collateral. the introduction of this last phase is expected to significantly increase the volume of trades made through the central counterparty, as well as the liquidity and efficiency of the repo market. international efforts to mitigate risk in short - term funding markets in canada, the creation of a central counterparty will contribute significantly to limiting the risk of instability emanating from the repo market. at the international level, the financial stability board is currently assessing potential reforms of repo markets and for loans of securities in the context of its work on the shadow banking sector. 4 the repo market is part of this sector because it is a form of credit intermediation which, like banking intermediation, rests on maturity transformation and may include leverage effects. there are a number of possible reforms. financial stability board, “ securities lending and rep

circumstances. the second purpose is clarification. while concentrating on improving the strength and the size of the eu, accessibility and clarity might have been neglected over the years. the constitution shall put this back in order. it seeks to make the eu and its decision - making process more transparent and comprehensible for the citizens. so, europe is given itself a new constitution to consolidate existing achievements ; to codify key objectives and common values ; and to provide a stable and effective foundation for the future. the eu has embarked on a special method for drafting the new constitution. as you know, over the last one and a half years representatives from national and european institutions discussed in the convention what europe ’ s new constitution should look like. the ecb has followed these debates with great interest. it welcomes the draft constitution as presented by the convention in june. however, as central bankers, we had to learn a new lesson. for the first time since the setting up of the erm in 1979, a major reform of the eu takes place without monetary integration being in the limelight. the reason is simple : as far as monetary integration is concerned the eu has reached a “ sustainable endpoint ”. the maastricht treaty gave the eu a modern “ monetary constitution ” which does not need be changed. it is sound both in terms of the objectives set and the allocation of responsibilities between different actors and levels of government. the convention rightly recognised this. its draft constitution takes over the provisions relating to emu without changes in substance. the single monetary policy is, by its very nature, indivisible. thus, it is an exclusive competence of the union. the task of conducting monetary policy, as well as all other central banking tasks, has been assigned to an independent european central bank, which fulfils the task together with the national central banks of the euro area and with the clear primary objective of maintaining price stability. the draft constitution explicitly mentions the european system of central banks, the escb, in the first part of the constitution. thus, it acknowledges the federal nature of the monetary authority of the european union and its sui generis character. finally, the more specific provisions concerning monetary policy in the current treaty as well as the statute of the ecb and the escb will in their substance remain unchanged and form part of the constitutional texts of the union. i very much welcome that the fundamental features of the current set - up of emu have been preserved. after