” when putting forward our proposed paths for policy rates. we can achieve this either by a greater emphasis on the uncertainty of interest rate forecasts, or by basing them beyond some horizon on some formula that incorporates the market yield curve. the reason given for this recommendation is that there is no real information in interest rate forecasts that extend further than a couple of quarters ahead. we at the riksbank are well aware of how uncertain interest rate forecasts are in the longer run and we have therefore endeavoured to draw attention to this uncertainty. we have done so, for instance, by publishing uncertainty bands around the interest rate paths and by repeatedly emphasising the fact that the repo rate path is a forecast and not a promise. of course we can make further efforts to point out the uncertainty of these forecasts if necessary, but we believe that the market and the general public have already understood that the forecasts are uncertain in the longer run and should therefore be taken with a pinch of salt. one indication of this, which professors goodhart and rochet also point out, is that “ the market seems to have retained a, healthy, scepticism whether the official projections would be realised ” during the period we have been publishing a repo rate path. this applies in particular to the period following the global financial crisis, when there was extreme uncertainty surrounding all of the forecasts. however, the fact that interest rate forecasts in the longer run are uncertain does not mean that we should not make such forecasts. and when we make our own interest rate forecasts we should also publish them. by publishing these forecasts we can explain more clearly to the general public and the market how we view future developments and how we reason when making our monetary policy decisions. i find it difficult to see how this could be harmful. to instead base long - term forecasts on market expectations of the policy rate is a method we have already tried and decided to abandon. if we use market expectations of the policy rate as a starting point, it may be difficult to determine how the interest rate is connected to other developments in the macro economy. our own forecast for the interest rate has the advantage that it is produced together with the forecasts for gdp, inflation, employment and so on. moreover, market expectations can vary substantially over time, which can lead to the information content in the macro forecasts as a whole declining. the evaluators also consider that the riksbank ’ s schedule for the

funds. in many countries, there are no such funds. this hidden wealth is an aspect to consider when discussing the distributional effects of expansionary monetary policy. references hasselberg, y. and ohlsson, h. ( 2016 ), “ collective wealth formation : conflict and compromise in sweden, 1950 - 2000 ”, in hudson, p. and tribe, k., ed., the contradictions of capital in the twenty - first century : the piketty opportunity, agenda publishing, pp. 109 - 130. nilsson, c., soderberg, j. and vredin, a. ( 2014 ), “ the significance of collective pension saving for the swedish financial system ”, economic commentaries 2014 ( 3 ), sveriges riksbank. oecd ( 2019 ), pensions at a glance 2019 : oecd and g20 indicators, oecd publishing, paris, https : / / doi. org / 10. 1787 / b6d3dcfc - en. oecd ( 2020 ), pension markets in focus 2020, http : / / www. oecd. org / finance / pensionmarketsinfocus. htm. ohlsson, h., roine, j and waldenstrom, d. ( 2020 ), “ inherited wealth over the path of development : sweden, 1810 – 2016 ”, journal of the european economic association 18 ( 3 ), pp. 1123 - 1157. waldenstrom, daniel ( 2016 ), “ the national wealth of sweden, 1810 – 2014 ”, scandinavian economic history review 64 ( 1 ), pp. 36 – 54. waldenstrom, d ( 2017 ) “ wealth - income ratios in a small, developing economy : sweden, 1810 - 2010 ”, journal of economic history 77 ( 1 ), pp. 285 - 313. 6