million but interestingly, it has a banking sector with assets approximately seven times its gdp. the initial bail - out proposal offered on 16 march 2013 would have required all depositors ( including those with balances below €100, 000 ) to contribute a once - off levy of 10 per cent to raise €5. 8 billion. this proposal was rejected by the cypriot parliament mainly due to the “ bailing - in ” of small deposit - holders and thus, undermining the deposit insurance guarantee, which is a central tenet of their banking system. the final agreement reached entailed, amongst others, a substantial haircut to be imposed on deposits above €100, 000, the resolution of laiki bank into a “ good ” and “ bad ” bank with full protection of deposits under €100, 000, and the “ good ” bank being absorbed by the bank of cyprus. the rest of the cyprus banking sector would be unaffected by the resolution process. the cyprian banks reopened on 28 march 2013 and one hopes that the authorities can sufficiently restore public and investor trust in their banking sector so that they are able to quickly lift the capital controls without contagion spreading throughout europe, as such contagion may result in spill - over to the rest of the world. whilst in the case of greece the concept of private sector involvement was introduced, the cyprus package involved the „ bailing - in [UNK] of bank creditors and certain categories of depositors as part of the rescue effort. this may yet have wider unintended consequences, as it may contribute towards undermining of public confidence in vulnerable banks and also lead to outflows from the more risky peripheral euro - zone countries. this approach may also deter investors from returning to periphery bank debt markets, and has the potential of reversing some of the recent improvements in wholesale funding conditions in that region. these developments must be seen against a euro - zone economy that contracted by 2. 3 per cent in the final quarter of 2012 and that is expected to remain in recession during the first half of this year. furthermore, unemployment is at a historically elevated level of 12 per cent. there exists the real possibility that cyclical unemployment could evolve into structural unemployment, while the social implications of persistent high unemployment levels, especially among the youth, in the euro - zone should not be underestimated. bis central bankers ’ speeches the domestic economy south africa ’ s economic growth accelerated to 2. 1 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2012 compared

, coal ), 23 percent of major agricultural crops ( corn, cotton, rice, soybeans, wheat ), and 40 percent of base metals ( copper, aluminium ). regional economic outlook, october 2011. kenya and ethiopia ’ s exports of cut flowers ; rwanda exporting branded coffee and has also broken into the u. s. handicrafts market ; mali ( fresh mango exports to europe ), lesotho ( apparel exports ), and uganda ( frozen fish ). these are also landlocked countries. in mali, the key innovation was to overcome obstacles by developing a multimodal transport system ( road, rail, sea ) as an alternative to air freight, while meeting quality and phytosanitary requirements. service exports have been growing fairly strongly in sub - saharan african countries, even though not as fast as in emerging partners. eurostat describes ssa as central and southern africa, so there could be some discrepancies with other figures. regional economic outlook, october 2011. chinese fdi to sub - saharan africa, as a share of total fdi to the region, climbed from less than 1 percent in 2003 to 16 percent by 2008. investments from india are also significant : by 2006, indian investment stocks in sub - saharan africa were almost as large as chinese fdi flows in the region. these investments are increasingly widespread geographically and in terms of industries. chinese investment is also directed toward manufacturing, construction, finance, agriculture, and service. bis central bankers ’ speeches ssa economies were in good macroeconomic shape going into the crisis. no wonder we were able to cope better during the crisis. most countries had balanced budgets or modest surpluses and because of debt relief initiatives, debt levels were also low. countries had accumulated reserves and modest savings levels and inflation was relatively low or under control. thus, most countries had flexibility to ease policies, which helped to dampen the impact of the crisis particularly on poverty alleviating initiatives. however, countries that did not have flexibility of easing macroeconomic policies continued to rely heavily on foreign aid. policy adjustments in most of the african countries have been country - specific. it should be pointed out that africa is not a homogeneous geographic space, it is a continent made up of countries, so the policy responses were also country - specific. in response to price shocks, few flexible exchange rate countries have had to tighten monetary policy. however, interest rates remain at low levels set during the financial crisis. nominal effective exchange rates have