data. these returns are analysed on a weekly basis and information submitted to management regularly. these reports, in conjunction with feedback on market activity generated by the multi - disciplinary cell, enable us at the bank to keep a close tab on the financial systems ’ activities. as the crisis developed, we began sharing some of the data with the treasury as part of the coordinated response that we felt was warranted. we all know the importance of trade channels for a small open economy like ours which basically relies on inward and outward trade to survive. by and large, the availability or nonavailability of trade credit was not directly under the purview of the central bank in as much as this was taken care of by the commercial banks and their network of correspondent banks in all the major countries. but as the crisis began to pinch and as banks became nervous about lending to one other, we saw some signs of potential difficulties for some local banks due to the non - availability, or inadequacy, of foreign exchange credit facilities from their usual sources. the bank immediately decided to make available to commercial banks operating in mauritius a special foreign currency line of credit, aggregating usd125 million, to finance the country ’ s requirements in trade. that line of credit represented more than 5 per cent of the total resources available to the central bank. this showed how concerned we were and how prompt we were to react to emerging financing difficulties which would have made it impossible for us to keep our economy on an even keel. there were a few other things that we did even before the crisis unfolded. we at the bank were the first to warn about a possible real - estate bubble in the integrated resort scheme sector which prompted a few well - targeted attacks on the governor but did lead to greater caution on the part of banks. similarly, well before the sub - prime crisis had assumed the dimensions it took, the bank had debated the efficacy of allowing all mortgage - related exposures of banks being allowed the lower risk weight of 35 per cent under basel ii. 2. coping with macroeconomic challenges let me now move on to the 2nd theme, coping with macroeconomic challenges. mauritius, as a small open economy, has of course not been immune to the effects of the global crisis. although we weathered fairly well the first - round effects of the global financial crisis and the ensuing economic downturn, the global financial crisis began to impact on economic activity in the country in the second half of 2008, hitting the export

benoit cœure : euro cyber resilience board for pan - european financial infrastructures introductory remarks by mr benoit cœure, member of the executive board of the european central bank, at the second meeting of the euro cyber resilience board for pan - european financial infrastructures, frankfurt am main, 7 december 2018. * * * it is a pleasure to welcome you back to frankfurt. since our last meeting in march, we have been very busy at the ecb and across the eurosystem, and we have made considerable progress in our work to enhance the cyber resilience of the financial sector. the cyber threat facing the financial sector continues to be a challenge. from banking trojans affecting individual customers to systemic threats posed by ransomware and targeted attacks from advanced persistent threat ( apt ) groups, the landscape is evolving on a daily basis. at our previous meetings, we shared with you the eurosystem cyber strategy for financial market infrastructures ( fmis ) 1. this strategy rests on three pillars : individual fmi resilience, sector resilience and strategic regulator - industry collaboration. i am pleased that in the last few months, the ecb and the eurosystem have made significant progress in putting in place the building blocks for enhancing the cyber resilience of the european financial ecosystem and operationalising the strategy. we have developed two key tools to improve fmi resilience : the cyber resilience oversight expectations ( croe ) 2 and the tiber - eu framework3. the croe serves three key purposes : ( i ) it provides fmis with detailed steps on how to operationalise the cpmi - iosco guidance on cyber resilience for financial market infrastructures4, ensuring they are able to make improvements and enhance their cyber resilience over a sustained period of time ; ( ii ) it provides overseers with clear expectations against which to assess fmis under their responsibility ; and ( iii ) it provides the basis for a meaningful discussion between the fmis and their respective overseers. the public consultation on the croe provided some very useful feedback, which we carefully considered, and the final version was published earlier this week. the central banks of the eurosystem will work closely with the various financial infrastructures to enhance their cyber resilience, with the croe serving as a good basis for this work. enhancing cyber resilience is of crucial importance. equally important, however, is to test whether the enhancements that have