education statistics website at https : / / nces. ed. gov / programs / digest / 2014menu _ tables. asp. see table 11 in board of governors of the federal reserve system ( 2014 ), report on the economic wellbeing of u. s. households in 2013 ( pdf ) ( washington : board of governors, july ). see stephanie riegg cellini and latika chaudhary ( 2012 ), “ the labor market returns to a for - profit college education, ” nber working paper series 18343 ( cambridge, mass. : national bureau of economic research, august ) ; david j. deming, claudia goldin, and lawrence f. katz ( 2012 ), “ the for - profit postsecondary school sector : nimble critters or agile predators? ” journal of economic perspectives, vol. 26 ( winter ), pp. 139 – 64 ; and kevin lang and russell weinstein ( 2012 ), “ evaluating student outcomes at for - profit colleges, ” nber working paper series 18201 ( cambridge, mass. : national bureau of economic research, june ). see riegg cellini and chaudhary, “ the labor market returns ” ; deming, goldin, and katz, “ the for - profit postsecondary school sector ” ; and lang and weinstein, “ evaluating student outcomes, ” all in note16. see lang and weinstein, “ evaluating student outcomes, ” in note 16. 11 u. s. code § 523 ( a ) ( 8 ) prevents education debt from being discharged in bankruptcy unless the debtor proves that paying the debt would “ impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor ’ s dependents. ” for the complete 11 u. s. code § 523 ( a ) ( 8 ), see the u. s. government publishing office website at www. gpo. gov / fdsys / granule / uscode - 2011 - title11 / uscode - 2011 - title11 - chap5 - subchapii - sec523. the great recession also affected the way students borrowed to pay for college as private lenders tightened underwriting standards. private lenders originated more than $ 20 billion in student loans during the 2007 – 08 academic year. however, that figure fell to about $ 9. 4 billion in the following year and reached just $ 5. 6 billion bis central bankers ’

grappled with many of the same issues. but as we lived through it, there was much uncertainty about the evolving structure of the economy and about the influence of monetary policy. despite those uncertainties, the trauma of the 1970s was still so vivid throughout the 1980s that preventing a return to accelerating prices was the unvarying focus of our efforts during those years. in recognition of the lag in monetary policy ’ s impact on economic activity, a preemptive response to the potential for building inflationary pressures was made an important feature of policy. as a consequence, this approach elevated forecasting to an even more prominent place in policy deliberations. * * * after an almost uninterrupted stint of easing from the summer of 1984 through the spring of 1987, the fed again began to lean against increasing inflationary pressures, which were in part the indirect result of rapidly rising stock prices. we had recognized the risk of an adverse reaction in a stock market that had recently experienced a steep run - up - indeed, we actively engaged in contingency planning against that possibility. i, nonetheless, wish to thank my colleagues david stockton, david wilcox, don kohn, ben bernanke and john taylor for their many suggestions and reminiscences. in the event, the crash in october 1987 was far more traumatic than any of the possible scenarios we had identified. previous planning was only marginally useful in that episode. we operated essentially in a crisis mode, responding with an immediate and massive injection of liquidity to help stabilize highly volatile financial markets. however, most of our stabilization efforts were directed at keeping the payments system functioning and markets open. the concern over the possible fallout on economic activity from so sharp a stock price decline kept us easing into early 1988. but the economy weathered that shock reasonably well, and our easing extended perhaps longer than hindsight has indicated was necessary. that period was followed by a preemptive tightening that brought the federal funds rate close to 10 percent by early 1989. in the summer of that year, we sensed enough softening of activity to warrant beginning a series of rate reductions. however, the weakening of demand already under way, some pullback of credit by lenders, and the spike in oil prices associated with iraq ’ s invasion of kuwait were sufficient to produce a marked contraction of activity in the fall of 1990. but perhaps aided by our preemptive action, the recession was, to then, the mildest in postwar history. however