stable frameworks have also made it easier to stimulate the economy strongly during the crisis without anyone questioning the credibility of the inflation target or the sustainability of our public finances. one could also say that long - term credibility and sustainability are necessary conditions for monetary policy and fiscal policy to be able to provide short - term stimulation. a rather worn but appropriate expression used with regard to fiscal policy is to “ save for a rainy day ” during good times. we appear to have succeeded in doing so this time. so the second of the three global challenges i listed does not actually apply to sweden. better regulatory framework also important for us one cannot rule out the possibility that our previous crisis contributed to some extent to our bank system managing better this time than banks in many other countries. but the swedish banks ’ memories still do not appear to have been terribly long. a couple of them were carried away by the over - optimism in the baltic countries, and most of them would have faced much larger problems if the swedish authorities had not intervened so resolutely. on the positive side, they largely avoided securities containing high - risk us mortgages. new share issues and good earnings capacity mean that the swedish banks now appear well - capitalised from an international perspective. the first challenge – the design of a better regulatory framework and more effective supervision – is of course something to which sweden is contributing in various ways. our own financial markets and banks coped relatively well on this occasion, but it is nevertheless clear that we are also hit hard when there is international turmoil. moreover, the financial sector in sweden has some distinguishing characteristics which make stability and clear game rules particularly important. from an international perspective, the swedish banks ’ collected balance sheet totals are large in relation to our gdp, market funding comprises a larger share than in most other countries, and funding from abroad is relatively extensive and largely short - term. our own swedish regulatory framework also needs to be renewed. for one thing, we need to look into the division of responsibility and the powers of authority of the different government agencies. for instance, the riksbank is responsible for the stability of the financial system in sweden, but has no really effective tools to carry out this task. finansinspektionen ( the swedish financial supervisory authority ), on the other hand, has tools that could be used to influence the banks ’ behaviour. but it does not have the task of counteracting macroeconomic developments than entail risks for financial stability. another important issue that

##notes at the new depots in the future, in order to further reduce the number of cash transports. this would of course be done under our supervision. at present these banknotes are transported to the riksbank for destruction, which gives rise to additional transports. we are also investigating whether, as a temporary solution, it would be possible to make banknotes unusable prior to transportation to the riksbank for final destruction. i believe that the new structure will give us more economically - efficient cash management, where costs and income will more visibly fall to those who participate in the market. the banks and cash - intransit companies will find new forms for their operations and develop their own cash management in a better way than an authority can. i also believe that these measures will help us achieve a higher level of security for the provision of cash in sweden. cash transport robberies – a social problem the large number of robberies of cash transports in sweden comprises a major problem for all of us – each of us is affected in some way by cash management in our society. developments have become even more troubled over the past years, as we have unfortunately seen an escalation in the violence used during the robberies and attempted robberies, through the use of explosives and heavy weapons. i regard these recent developments with great concern and hope that this forum will enable us to improve the security of cash transports and cash management in general. the number of robberies of cash transports doubled from the already high figure of 30 - 40 robberies a year to 70 - 80 robberies a year in 1998 and 1999 and has since then remained at this very high level. statistics from the european security transport association, esta, show that sweden holds a scarcely honourable third place with regard to the number of cash transport robberies in relation to the population. we had a total of 224 cash transport robberies between 1998 and 2004, while the corresponding figure for denmark was 93, for norway 42 and for finland only 4. equally alarming is the fact that sweden accounts for one tenth of the total capital losses in cash transport robberies in europe ; if one takes into account the size of the population, we were the country that lost the second highest amount of money, after ireland. it is sometimes claimed in the media that there is a link between the riksbank ’ s closure of its depots and the increase in cash transport robberies. i would doubt that claim. first and foremost, it must be remembered