gross settlement system has registered a phenomenal growth, reaching an average of around rmb700 billion each working day. 4. i won ’ t bore you further with the numbers as i am sure you are very familiar with them. surely it is useful for us to pause, look back, take stock and try to think of ways in which we can continue to excel as we go forward from where we are. so without further ado, let me quickly turn to the main theme of my remarks this morning : “ what does it take to build a successful global hub for offshore rmb businesses? ” the key to success, if i may summarise it, lies in the acronym : “ pips ”. 5. “ pips ” stands for “ policy headroom, infrastructure and people / products ”. let me cover these three elements in the reverse order. for people and products, i have said many times that for any financial centre to thrive and out - compete other centres, the crucial building block would be its people and products. it goes without saying that a world class financial centre must have the right people designing and distributing the right products that serve the needs of the financial consumers. this is an important and core component of the soft power that i have been talking about in the last few years. it is a key attribute that differentiates a global hub from the other financial centres. people and products fall into the area in which the financial industry, including the individual firms, practitioners and industry bodies like the tma, can and should play a dominant role. i am sure that you will agree with me bis central bankers ’ speeches that policy makers and regulators, while having the responsibility to safeguard financial stability and to accord appropriate protection to financial consumers, are not really well suited to get too involved in gauging market demand and designing financial products that would best meet the requirements of the consumers. 6. having said that, policy makers and regulators do have a crucial role to play in respect of policy headroom and infrastructure, which are the first two elements of “ pips ”. let me elaborate further. 7. clearly there could not be any offshore rmb markets if the mainland did not make a move in 2009 to change its policy of not allowing the use of rmb in cross - border trade and other transactions. but of course, the mainland authorities were and still are understandably wanting to open up the capital account on an incremental basis, taking one step at a time

. 113 ( may ), pp. 394 – 400. 5 / 6 bis - central bankers'speeches vissing - jorgensen, annette ( 2019 ). " central banking with many voices : the communications arms race, " paper presented at the 23rd annual conference of the central bank of chile. woodford, michael ( 2005 ). " central bank communication and policy effectiveness ( pdf ), " in the greenspan era : lessons for the future, proceedings of a symposium sponsored by the federal reserve bank of kansas city, held in jackson hole, wyo., aug. 25 – 27. kansas city : federal reserve bank of kansas city, pp. 399 – 474. 1 the views expressed here are my own and are not necessarily those of my colleagues on the federal reserve board or the federal open market committee. 2 see, for example, goodfriend ( 1986 ) and cukierman and meltzer ( 1986 ). 3 lindsey ( 2003 ) provides an extensive account of the history of fomc communications from 1975 to 2002. 4 see orphanides and williams ( 2005 ), among many others. 5 the document containing the 2 percent inflation target, named the " statement on longer - run goals and monetary policy strategy, " also clarified that the committee would not set a quantitative target for maximum employment and stated that the committee would follow a " balanced approach " in promoting both sides of the dual mandate. 6 notable early studies include eggertsson and woodford ( 2003 ) and adam and billi ( 2006 ). 7 some recent contributions include acosta ( 2023 ), gardner and others ( 2022 ), and ehrmann and wabitsch ( 2022 ). 8 see swanson ( 2023 ) and jarocinski and karadi ( 2020 ). 9 this " cacophony problem " could be severe if policymakers actively tried to sway market expectations to align with their personal views ( vissing - jorgensen, 2019 ). 6 / 6 bis - central bankers'speeches