also broadly reflected in the december 2017 eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, which foresee annual hicp inflation at 1. 5 % in 2017, 1. 4 % in 2018, 1. 5 % in 2019 and 1. 7 % in 2020. compared with the september 2017 ecb staff macroeconomic projections, the outlook for headline hicp inflation has been revised up, mainly reflecting higher oil and food prices. turning to the monetary analysis, broad money ( m3 ) continues to expand at a robust pace, with an annual rate of growth of 5. 0 % in october 2017, from 5. 2 % in september, reflecting the impact of the ecb ’ s monetary policy measures and the low opportunity cost of holding the most liquid deposits. accordingly, the narrow monetary aggregate m1 continued to be the main contributor to broad money growth, expanding at an annual rate of 9. 4 % in october, after 9. 8 % in september. the recovery in the growth of loans to the private sector observed since the beginning of 2014 is proceeding. the annual growth rate of loans to non - financial corporations increased to 2. 9 % in october 2017, after 2. 4 % in september, while the annual growth rate of loans to households remained stable at 2. 7 %. the pass - through of the monetary policy measures put in place since june 2014 continues to significantly support borrowing conditions for firms and households, access to financing ‒ notably for small and medium - sized enterprises ‒ and credit flows across the euro area. to sum up, a cross - check of the outcome of the economic analysis with the signals coming from the monetary analysis confirmed the need for an ample degree of monetary accommodation to secure a sustained return of inflation rates towards levels that are below, but close to, 2 %. in order to reap the full benefits from our monetary policy measures, other policy areas must contribute decisively to strengthening the longer - term growth potential and reducing vulnerabilities. the implementation of structural reforms in all euro area countries needs to be substantially stepped up to increase resilience, reduce structural unemployment and boost euro area productivity and growth potential. regarding fiscal policies, the increasingly solid and broad - based expansion strengthens the case for rebuilding fiscal buffers. this is particularly important in countries where government debt remains high. all countries would benefit from intensifying efforts towards achieving a more growth - friendly composition of public finances. a full, transparent and consistent implementation of the stability and growth pact and of the

and the federal reserve as unnecessary and even counterproductive. as a result, in 1994, the fomc began explicitly announcing its policy decisions. in a bid to further increase transparency, the fomc introduced a balance of risks assessment in early 2000 as part of its policy decisions. the balance of risks assessment was designed as a vehicle to communicate the committee's sense of the economic outlook over the " foreseeable future. " the foreseeable future is one of those wonderful phrases we central bankers get to use. it is not intended to refer to a specific time horizon, and indeed, when the fomc introduced the balance of risks statement, it suggested that the time horizon encompassed by the foreseeable future might well vary depending on the economic circumstances. however, in contrast to the previous " bias " statement, the concept of the foreseeable future in the balance of risks statement was intended to extend well beyond the upcoming intermeeting period. the balance of risks statement is released to the public at the conclusion of each fomc meeting. by contrast, prior to 1999, the " bias " statement was only made known to the public after a six - week lag in the release of the minutes for each fomc meeting. this past march, the fomc took a further step toward increased transparency by including the roll call of the vote on the federal funds rate target, as well as an indication of the preferred policy choice of any dissenters. indeed, press coverage following the september fomc meeting noted the two dissents in favor of a policy easing reported in the announcement following that meeting. so why have the federal reserve and many other central banks moved toward a policy framework involving greater transparency? the principle that central banks should be free of political interference in pursuing legally mandated objectives is now widely regarded as a key tenet supporting central bank credibility and effectiveness. however, democratic societies rightly should expect that central banks, as public institutions, should be publicly accountable for their actions, and greater transparency in central banking is an important factor in ensuring that this is the case. but central banks have found transparency useful for monetary policy purposes as well. by providing a clear rationale for their actions and an assessment of the economic outlook, central banks can reduce unnecessary uncertainties faced by market participants. moreover, investors armed with a clearer understanding of the central bank's motives and views are better able to anticipate future monetary policy actions. this, in turn,