addition, in line with the best practices issued by the international standard setters, the deposit guarantee schemes directive ( dgsd ) recognized dgss as fully - fledged participants of the safety net. under the dgsd, member states may allow dgss to perform more than a reimbursement function and use the available financial means to prevent the failure of a credit institution ( preventive interventions ) and to finance measures in the context of national insolvency proceedings ( alternative interventions ), subject to certain conditions and limitations ( notably the least cost criterion ). 4 the use of measures other than payout has significant advantages. not only are they less costly than payout, but from a system - wide perspective they also help to safeguard depositors ’ confidence and overall financial stability, mitigating the disruptive effects of piecemeal liquidation. 5 italy ’ s longstanding experience confirms the central role of dgss in crisis management. since the establishment of the two italian dgss, 90 interventions out of 93 have been preventive or alternative and only 3 have been payouts. 6 alternative measures proved to be paramount to solve banking crises and a real strategic partnership can be identified among banca d ’ italia and the two italian dgss. see article 11 ( 3 ) and 11 ( 6 ) of the dgsd. piecemeal liquidation is therefore the worst crisis management option, with negative impacts on public confidence and on overall financial stability, while interventions other than payout ensure the continuity of the bank ’ s borrowing relationships and the preservation of the enterprise value and of the employment level, and a high degree of depositor protection. see ‘ the banking crises of 2023 : some initial reflection ’, speech by paolo angelini, deputy governor of banca d ’ italia, at the event ‘ promoting accountability in times of crisis ’, november 2023 ; a. de aldisio, g. aloia et al., ‘ towards a framework for orderly liquidation of banks in the eu ’, notes on financial stability, 15, august 2019 ; and ‘ protecting depositors and saving money ’, occasional paper series, ecb, frankfurt am main, june 2023. more specifically, the interbank deposit protection fund ( fitd ) has managed 16 interventions since 1987, of which 9 were alternative interventions, 2 were depositor payouts and the remaining 5 were preventive interventions. the deposit guarantee scheme for cooperative banks ( fgdcc ) has carried out

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