% on refinancing loans. the interest rate on three - month certificates of deposit will continue to equal the key policy rate. 3 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches on the one hand, taking into account improved inflation expectations and the inflation forecast, the current and projected decrease in interest rates on nbu operations will maintain the attractiveness of hryvnia savings. on the other hand, the cut in nbu interest rates will support economic recovery on the back of persisting macrofinancial stability. the nbu will continue to cut its key policy rate, provided the fx market remains stable and inflation declines over the forecast horizon. when easing fx restrictions and transitioning to a more flexible exchange rate regime, the nbu will take into account the need to maintain the high attractiveness of hryvnia assets. the nbu's revised macroeconomic forecast envisages further key policy rate cuts. the key policy rate will be cut gradually, and provided the conditions allow it, so as not to undermine the trend towards a steady decline in inflation or fx market stability. that said, the nbu is not compelled to stick to its key policy rate forecast. given high uncertainty, any further decisions and revisions of the nbu's key policy rate forecasts will largely depend on whether or not the forecast's assumptions materialize, as well as on the trends of key macroeconomic and financial indicators. thank you for your attention! 4 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches

head for the storm cellars. ” 3 the financial crisis conditions of the past two years have substantially abated. those that headed to the storm cellars have returned to see what lies in its wake. and washington has placed itself centrally in the clean - up efforts, seeking to repair the regulatory system. this is kevin warsh ( 2009 ), “ the panic of 2008, ” speech delivered at the council of institutional investors 2009 spring meeting, washington, april 6. kevin warsh ( 2009 ), “ longer days, fewer weekends, ” speech delivered at the 12th annual international banking conference, chicago, ill., september 25. irving kristol ( 1980 ), “ two economic questions, ” wall street journal, june 26. a wholly worthwhile task. improvements in regulatory policy – if part of a broader review of the financial architecture – could herald greater prosperity for future generations. but, efficacy, not convenience, should be the foremost goal of policymakers. and we will have done ourselves no favors if what is billed as “ comprehensive regulatory reform ” overpromises and under - delivers. we need a broader understanding of what occurred, more basic changes in our financial architecture, and more useful tools in our arsenal for reform efforts to be worthy of the name and equal to the challenge. prevailing theory of the case : empowering regulators the prevailing theory has it that financial firms, particularly the largest and most systemically significant, engaged in practices that begat the financial crisis. to redress these wrongs, regulatory powers should be substantially expanded, the theory goes. the incumbent regulators lacked sufficient authorities, or were not up to the task. but the structure in which their successors operate will purportedly make them masters of the craft. apparently, a new grant of broad and sweeping regulatory powers will treat the infirmities that ail us. in my view, this theory has some understandable appeal – and begins to shed light on some important truths – but the narrative and recommended reforms are still deficient. let me explain. first, the panic of 2008 that exacerbated the recession is the result of a multitude of flawed private and public practices, with regulatory error being only one part. some meaningful blame should be placed at the doorstep of regulators, here and abroad. but the investigation should not cease at the first signs of fault. the mortgage finance system is owed far stricter scrutiny to gather a fuller appreciation of the causes of the crisis. the government - sponsored enterprises ( gses