a glance at the treaty would help to prevent false political ambition. already today, the dialogue between the eurogroup and the ecb is intensive. it cannot and must not be transformed into coordination including monetary policy. the young currency euro needs political influence least of all. the much - vaunted “ political visibility ” of the eurogroup exists. and yet, as i may recall at this juncture : the only spokesman for the euro is the president of the ecb. he is “ mr euro ”. any political attempt to involve the ecb ex ante in political decisions or to create a second “ mr euro ” ( namely, the chairman of the eurogroup ) would only lead to a blurring of responsibilities and thus to confusion. conclusion 1. right from the start, the ecb has demonstrated responsibility, reliability and consistency in its monetary policy. the ecb is close to its objective of safeguarding price stability, and keeping inflation below 2 % in the medium run. the inflation rate in the euro area is likely to drop back below 2 % in the second half of 2001. the ecb is pursuing its own strategy, geared to european conditions. its decisions are based on its own analyses. it is not sailing in the wake of the fed. up to the present, it has pursued a policy of “ steady as she goes ”. hectic responses by central banks transmit themselves to the markets and increase volatility. 2. the ecb must go on working to enhance its credibility and to strengthen the confidence of the markets and residents. to accomplish that, it is important to withstand political pressures and to defend the independence constitutionally enshrined in the ec treaty against political “ attempted embraces ”. in this respect, the ecb should be less modest. it should be less reluctant to issue public clarifications whenever concealed attacks on its independence are concerned. that is to say, the ecb must be prepared, to a greater extent than in the past, to carry out conflicts with the european parliament and the eurogroup in public. the increasing political demands being made on the ecb must be met with greater self - assurance. failing that, the young institution will run the risk of being forced on to the defensive in the event of a serious test. 3. politicians are not doing themselves any favours by making demands on the ecb going beyond the maastricht treaty. instead, the politicians should concentrate on the major challenges arising in their own fields

an assessment of inflation prospects based on a broad range of indicators. it is only the combination of the strict orientation of monetary policy towards an unambiguous objective – price stability – and a pre - announced strategy – the two - pillar strategy of monetary growth and inflation prospects – that guarantees the transparency of the monetary policy decisions taken by the eurosystem, and their public control. in addition, the eurosystem informs the public regularly about its assessment of risks to stability ( through press releases, press conferences, etc. ), thereby contributing further to the transparency of its monetary policy decisions. the policies of the eurosystem are often compared to those of other systems. but the eurosystem need not shrink from comparison with other monetary policy strategies. incidentally, in this connection the question has already been raised as to which monetary policy strategy other central banks pursue, if not “ looking at everything ”. 2. the transparency of the ecb governing council ’ s decisions transparency is an ambivalent concept. an “ excess ” of information may also result in less transparency of monetary policy decisions. in the debate on the transparency of monetary policy, quantity and quality are often confused. more information does not automatically imply more transparency. on the contrary : more information may easily give rise to confusion, and thus to less transparency. hence “ natural limits to transparency ” exist : perfect transparency would imply that the central bank must make available all the information which contributed to its decisions. for purely practical reasons, this is impossible. in practice, therefore, transparency is invariably partial, and can never be complete and perfect in the sense of the theoretical models. criticism of the alleged non - transparency of the eurosystem ’ s monetary policy, and calls for the publication of minutes, are heard particularly often from the anglo - american press and academia. remarkably, the disagreements about assessing inflation forecasts between the members of the decision - making bodies of those central banks that publish their minutes have engendered confusion precisely among those commentators who insist on the publication of the minutes of the ecb governing council. in the specific situation of the eurosystem, the publication of minutes would pose particular risks. whereas the entire euro area is considered in the ecb governing council, national viewpoints are the rule among the general public, and also among policy - makers and the parties to pay settlements. that is illustrated by the frequently - asked question “ is a change in interest rates good for our country? ” hence the publication of minutes involves