samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
will edge closer within the target band by end year as inflationary pressures decline in the quarters ahead. the bank also stands ready to implement sound monetary policies and take appropriate measures aimed at consolidating macroeconomic stability. 29. thank you for the attention. bis central bankers ’ speeches

the ministry of finance. currently the bank of ghana and the ministry of finance have reviewed and approved the terms of reference for the legal consultants to draft a deposit insurance law for industry. it is our expectation that the deposit insurance agency would become operational by end december 2014 and that could afford some protection to all depositors. 20. the key challenge going forward to the banking industry is how to maintain the continued high levels of profitability over the medium to longer - term and more particularly, when the interest rate environment begins to shift its course. it appears to us at the bank of ghana that, among many other avenues for maintaining the bottom line like massive cost cutting and growing non - fee - based income, the answer could lie in taking up the sme challenge – which in the words of a recent banking survey means harnessing the sme potential. 21. although the banking sector has not witnessed new entrants this year, the number of microfinance institutions licensed by the bank of ghana has more than doubled to 228 by june 2013, from 90 in december 2012. the increasing trend in acquisition of licenses by microfinance institutions signals the increasing demand by economic agents at the lower echelon of financial service provision. bis central bankers ’ speeches 22. traditionally, banks are known to focus largely on corporate as well as personal and consumer banking. thus, the increasing number of microfinance institutions suggests a broadening of the scope of financial service provision at the micro level. this leaves a wide financial services gap, which has been referred to as the “ missing middle ” and constitutes mainly small and medium enterprises ( smes ). 23. mr. chairman, the critical role that this segment of society plays in any economy cannot be overemphasised. various studies show that promoting the development of smes can be used as a catalyst for economic growth, employment and poverty reduction. and yet, by their nature, smes are constrained from accessing financial services, especially through the major banks due to lack of proper governance, weak management systems, technical knowledge, and poor labour skills. although most banks are aware of the potentials of smes, venturing into the sector requires painstaking efforts to help them overcome these constraints. nevertheless, sme financing can be a good business for banks and a better understanding of the sector should provide enough incentives for banks to start and build business relationships with them. this is an investment that can be done now within the environment of high bank profitability. 24
; vii. review and updating of sama regulatory requirements in other related areas. sama ’ s regulatory initiatives are aimed at protecting the interest of depositors and consumers of banks, besides ensuring the safety and soundness of banks. in conclusion, i would say that in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the financial landscape has changed substantially and still continues to change at a rapid pace. in order to cope with the challenges ahead, the supervisors and central banks are required to have better management of systemic risks through coordination and cooperation in global standards and policies. we believe that basel iii when fully implemented will contribute significantly in managing the systemic risks and strengthening of global financial system. however, this will require substantial investment in systems and human resources as well as strengthening of governance and risk management frameworks. but this does not mean that we should excessively rely on advanced risk methodologies and models, and undermine the role of sound professional judgment and common sense. in practice, the use of quantitative risk models have proved much more effective when coupled with judgment and institutive thinking. we have been emphasizing upon our banks the value of strengthening risk management frameworks and methodologies along with requiring their boards to institute a strong corporate governance culture to manage the banks effectively. we at sama are also actively monitoring the new developments both globally and in domestic markets, and are fully geared to ensure stability of our financial system. i wish you a fruitful symposium! bis central bankers ’ speeches

responsibility increases with the increase in investment awareness and competition among financial institutions. here arises the evident need to develop standards and ethics of the profession and to implement such standards in a very professional and scientific integrity. dear graduates, the responsibility entrusted to you must be borne with professional enthusiasm and competence. the knowledge you have acquired through your training here is only part of the cherished objective. the more important requirement is to conduct yourselves in a sound professional manner, comply with regulations, and invest your capabilities and knowledge to attain real professionalism. may allah render your knowledge useful to you and your country. i wish you all success, and may god bless you.
3 % per cent of their total assets, including off - balance sheet assets such as trade finance commitments. in addition, because trade finance involves the importer ’ s bank and the exporter ’ s bank through a letter of credit, the changing risk weight on loans between financial firms is likely to adversely affect trade finance. finally, the liquidity rules, which require banks to match long - term obligations with long - term funding could also penalise trade finance. i thank you for your attention and wish you the best. 4 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches

ever greater size should be reduced. systemic risk buffers and higher capital requirements for systemically important institutions are instruments which counter this incentive. their introduction is therefore welcome. in other words, there should be at least three, not just two, taxis waiting at the taxi ranks of large stations, to return to the image i used earlier. however, capital buffers are only a first line of defence to help banks weather adversity better. this is particularly important for banks that would be especially difficult to wind up. further measures are necessary to ensure that it is, in extremis, possible for large and very interconnected banks, too, to fail. 6. banking union 6. 1 single resolution mechanism a vital building block in the process of making the banking system more stable is creating the regulatory framework for the orderly resolution of failed banks. to achieve this aim, procedures need to be put in place which allow the principle of liability to be implemented effectively. the eu has made crucial progress recently, with the adoption of a harmonised bank resolution regime ( the bank recovery and resolution directive ) and the decision to create a single resolution mechanism ( srm ). essentially, the new rules are designed to ensure that banks that run into difficulties in future can be wound up, with their owners and creditors being first in line to foot the bill. the srm provides expressly for a bank - financed resolution fund only being second in line, while public funds would only be used as a last resort. despite a number of exceptions in the bis central bankers ’ speeches fine print, which are part and parcel of the process of compromise, the resolution mechanism agreed upon allows a fundamental principle of market economics to be enforced. the bundesbank welcomes this agreement as an important complement to common european supervision. but we still believe that a treaty change will be needed, all the more so as the decision - making processes seem to be as complex as ever. the aim must be to set up a european resolution agency equipped with clear decision - making structures. a matter which has yet to be decided conclusively, but one that will be of particular interest to you, is the question of which banks will need to pay into the single resolution fund, and how much. an appropriate approach would be to have different contributions depending on an institution ’ s size and its specific risk profile. banks will be asked to bring the fund up to its target volume of 55 billion euro over a period of eight years, beginning in the year
power standards. cesee - 10 figures are gdp - weighted averages. bis central bankers ’ speeches turning to gdp per capita, we see a different picture. while the cesee - 10 cover a comparatively small area, in 2010 their gdp per capita in purchasing power standards was on average almost three times higher than that of china. as you can see, the income level in russia was close to the gdp - weighted average in the cesee - 10. but does this mean that cesee ( and russia ) can lean back? no, on the contrary : china ’ s impressive growth path over the past 15 years constitutes a challenge to all other economies, including cesee and russia. data on gdp growth show that china stands out with a remarkable real gdp growth of 309 % over the period from 1995 to 2010. china had chosen a highly controlled opening - up strategy. the chinese growth model relies upon a large pool of domestic savings and investment ( which, to a large extent, comes from abroad ), lower labor costs and thus labor - intensive exports. by contrast, in cesee and russia, central planning was overthrown in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when a major shift in economic, political, cultural and sociological paradigms occurred in these countries. russia ’ s growth model has, to a large extent, rested on industrial production and, increasingly, on energy exports. in the cesee - 10, by contrast, capital inflows – mainly from western europe – together with institutional reforms and eu accession have spurred export - led growth. even if cesee and russia started out from higher gdp per capita levels than china, their growth performance has still been remarkable. the financial crisis, however, has challenged the current growth models not only in these regions. chart 3 : real gdp growth source : oenb calculations based on imf data. note : 1995 = 100. while china has weathered the financial crisis quite well, 1 cesee and russia were directly hit. 2 despite these differences, all three markets face common challenges both in the real economy and on the financial market, such as rising external imbalances and decelerating despite a decline in real gdp growth against precrisis levels, china nevertheless recorded positive annual growth rates of between 9 % and 10. 5 % over the period from 2009 to 2010 ( imf ). most recently, however, real gdp growth slowed down again from 9. 5 % in the second quarter to 9. 1 % in the third quarter of

properly communicated to our constituency, the filipino public, through such documents as the inflation report and regular press statements. we welcome your comments on the contents of the report and hope that you will continue to actively participate in the public dialogue on the monetary policy process. thank you and good morning.
however, in practice, one should also take into account the idiosyncratic features of central banks when compared with private financial institutions, such as the fact that their ability to issue legal tender also contributes to their resilience by guaranteeing a future stream of income. furthermore, however a central bank ’ s risk budget is set, in specific institutional set - ups the range of measures adopted by a central bank in a financial crisis could – provided that the independence of the central bank is preserved – be further extended if a government guaranteed those operations that led to risks exceeding that budget. these two points mean that a line must be drawn in terms of the financial risk taken by a central bank. this line is not merely quantitative in nature. it is also determined by the goals to be achieved by the specific measures adopted by a central bank. while it could be argued that the government could take the necessary risks associated with the provision of support in terms of financial stability, the central bank remains responsible for the risks incurred by measures associated with monetary policy geared towards ensuring price stability. these two goals may sometimes converge – for example when the impairment of the transmission mechanism for monetary policy needs to be addressed using measures which will, at the same time, improve the resilience of the financial system. when intervening to provide liquidity, a central bank must avoid favouring certain sectors over others in terms of liquidity support. it must avoid distorting competition or otherwise hindering the efficient allocation of resources. while the central bank should therefore be very careful in its market interventions, this is not an argument in favour of inactivity. on the contrary, when asymmetric information – owing, for example, to a lack of market transparency or the opacity of certain financial instruments – threatens the functioning of a particular market segment, there may be grounds for the central bank to intervene. in such cases, intervention may be what is needed to restore market efficiency. “ fx reserve management : trends and challenges ”, bis papers, no 40, may 2008. 3. what central banks can do to help contain a financial crisis it follows logically from the points i have just made that the central bank, as the only player that has no liquidity constraints, can and should help to overcome a liquidity crisis by injecting additional cash into the system. in doing so, it should use all available instruments, but should not take on excessive credit risk. its objective of providing the financial system with adequate amounts of

the importance of risk management considerations – in line with the theme of this conference – in determining central bank policies in the area of crisis management. we can add this to the long list of reasons why advances in the field of risk management, pursued in conferences such as this, will be essential in preventing and – should it prove necessary – managing financial crises in the future. thank you very much for your attention.
jean - claude trichet : interview with aachener zeitung on the occasion of the awarding of the 2011 international charlemagne prize of aachen interview with mr jean - claude trichet, president of the european central bank, on the occasion of the awarding of the 2011 international charlemagne prize of aachen, conducted by ms birgit marschall, mr bernd mathieu and mr peter pappert of the aachener zeitung, and published on 27 may 2011. * * * question : mr president, people in europe are worried about the debt crisis in the euro area. what is your take on the current situation? trichet : we are experiencing a dramatic global financial crisis, which is also impacting on the euro area. this is the deepest recession since the second world war. all the advanced economies – the united states, japan and europe – must draw lessons from it. the outlook for the monetary union is favourable : the euro and prices are stable. the average inflation rate in the euro countries over the last 12 years has been just under 2 %, and in germany it has been as low as 1. 5 % ; this is a better result than was achieved during the 50 years of the deutsche mark. question : so where does the problem lie? trichet : the real problem in the euro area is that the economic union – the “ e ” in emu – between the euro countries has not been properly implemented. there is a need for much improvement on that score. the most important lesson from the crisis is that the euro countries must coordinate their economic and financial policies better – and do so urgently. question : we are a long way from there, look at greece. trichet : in recent years the eu governments have ignored the rules of the stability and growth pact. unfortunately the large countries – i. e. france, germany and italy – tried to weaken the stability and growth pact or even rescind it in 2004 and 2005, when they themselves were not complying with it. i expressed grave concerns at the time, because the letter of the pact was weakened and the spirit of the stability pact was being violated. the weakening of the pact had devastating consequences. we urgently require effective and reliable governance that conforms to common economic goals. question : the heads of state or government recently agreed on tougher rules for the stability pact. is this enough? trichet : no. we are asking the heads of government, the european commission and the european parliament to go further and to be

when ngeu funding is considered. the share allocated to economic, social and territorial cohesion and to the common agriculture policy has decreased to 30. 5 %, and 30. 9 % respectively. the latter policies have themselves been modernised, taking into account the objective of the green and digital transition. see european commission ( 2021 ), “ the eu ’ s 2021 - 2027 long - term budget and next generation eu : facts and figures ” and “ multiannual financial framework 2021 - 2027 ”.
the right thing and ensure a quick and fair resolution for these customers. we have communicated this to their ceos. thank you, i will now take your questions.

borrowers are linked not only through intermediaries like banks, but also through nonbanks, such as money market mutual funds and hedge funds, and through the capital markets and securitization. regulation can only build resilience in, and affect intermediation and lending by, the parts of the system that are, in fact, regulated. regulatory policies that aim to increase the resilience of regulated institutions, and lean against asset bubbles by restraining the growth of lending by such institutions, can be circumvented when financial activities migrate into less regulated parts of the financial system, parts likely farther from the protections of deposit insurance and the lender of last resort. consequently, credit extension and associated vulnerabilities can increase outside of the heavily regulated banking system. in our current system of financial regulation – one that is diffuse and without a single, central regulator – the antidote to such differences in regulatory approach is to put a premium on a high level of cooperation and coordination among relevant financial regulators. comprehensive financial regulation is required, but comprehensive financial regulation is not the same as unified financial regulation. looking around this audience today, i see evidence of the fragmented american financial regulatory system. for example, we have representatives of banks regulated by the office of the comptroller of the currency, the federal deposit insurance corporation, and the federal reserve, many in tandem with state bank regulators ; we have bank holding companies regulated by the fed ; we have brokerdealers regulated by the securities and exchange commission, we have exchanges regulated by the commodity futures trading commission ; we have consumer financial products regulated by the consumer financial protection bureau ; and we have insurance companies regulated by the state insurance commissioners. i could go on. needless to say, it ’ s a complicated regulatory system. and such a fragmented structure itself demands unusual and extensive degrees of coordination and cooperation among financial regulators so as to maximize the potential for comprehensive and harmonized regulation. without such coordination and cooperation, there will be regulatory gaps and overlaps. from this perspective, it made sense to create yet another regulatory body – the financial stability oversight council – which is dedicated to the goal of coordination. the fsoc calls for agency head and senior - level staff participation of relevant financial regulatory bodies, requires regular meetings and reports on emerging risks to financial stability, and designates systemically important financial institutions. making regulatory tools work to manage emerging risk and create resiliency indeed, the goal of coordination among regulators is to make the
based on their own circumstances and needs, but taking also into account what is going on outside their borders. such action has the best chance of mitigating the effects of global shocks on their economies and, by extension, on the international economy. when we all do what is right for our domestic economies, we are also most likely to do what is right for the world economy.

lawrence schembri : stress prevention – central banks and financial stability remarks by mr lawrence schembri, deputy governor of the bank of canada, at a joint bank of canada, international monetary fund, centre for international governance innovation and peterson institute for international economics workshop, ottawa, ontario, 6 may 2016. * * * for the better part of the past two centuries, central banks have played an important role in the maintenance of financial stability, but primarily one of “ stress or crisis management. ” in particular, central banks have served as lender of last resort, providing liquidity to prevent stress from sparking contagion in solvent, but illiquid, financial institutions. but that role is starting to change. while central banks responded boldly to the global financial crisis with liquidity provision and monetary policy actions to avoid a repeat of the great depression, the severity of the economic fallout obliges us to ask whether they could have done more to prevent it, rather than just trying to manage and mitigate its economic impact. this query goes well beyond considering whether monetary policy aggravated the financial vulnerabilities that contributed to the crisis and raises broader questions concerning the responsibilities of central banks. it ’ s time, then, for central banks to rethink their role in financial stability : • first, by recognizing that while the best contribution monetary policy can make to financial stability is price and macroeconomic stability, this is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for financial stability ; • second, by focusing on crisis prevention through means other than monetary policy, while at the same time modernizing their role as liquidity provider or lender of last resort ; and • third, by enhancing their contribution to financial stability by exploiting two of their key strengths – their financial - system - wide perspective and their analytical capacity. going beyond monetary policy as a crisis prevention tool in thinking about enhancing the role of central banks, we should reconsider two notions that have helped to advance our analysis. the first is the “ lean versus clean ” debate. as lars svensson has compellingly argued, monetary policy is too blunt an instrument to be used to mitigate financial vulnerabilities. other tools are better suited for this purpose. the second notion is the “ lines of defence ” analogy, with monetary policy serving as the last defensive barrier when other measures to reduce financial vulnerabilities and mitigate systemic risks are either absent or inadequate. this view suggests that actions be taken sequentially. consider,