samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
especially the most needy, and writing a more exciting chapter in that history book. ” i look forward to the deliberations and the outcomes over the next two days as we reimagine the future of the african banking sector. thank you!

##rencies, most notably bitcoins and more recently stablecoins. however, they have turned to be less of payment instruments and more of wealth management tools. further, they have largely remained out of the realm of regulation, but are being closely watched by regulators. closer home, a medley of financial services have emerged on digital platforms, most notably digital lending. a lot of these digital players, not being deposit takers have operated below the radar of regulators. this has caused grave social strife through exhorbitant interest rates, aggressive debt collection and overindebtedness. regulators must therefore review their perimeters without stifling innovation. this is a discussion we are currently having in kenya, with a bill under consideration by parliament to empower cbk to regulate fintechs offering digital lending services. as i draw to a close, the african banking sector has done relatively well in the pandemic but we must not be complacent. the pandemic remains far from over while the global terrain is rapidly shifting. we came into the pandemic with a well - developed digital ecosystem, leveraging mobile phone technology particularly in kenya, ghana, rwanda, tanzania and uganda, among others. these digital rails have enabled the financial sector keep the lights on as they delivered much needed services. will these advantages be enough to move the african banking sector to the next frontier? the simple answer is no, and african banks must reset their paths. they must keep their customers at the heart of everything they do while building ecosystems that meet customer needs at every stage of their lifecycle. most importantly, they must build new ships that will steer them in the deeper ocean that they must play in. there is work to be done. i close with a personal message that i sent ceos of commercial banks on january 2, 2021 : “ congratulations, 2021 is finally here! with 2020 now consigned for the history books we should also acknowledge our many accomplishments during a very unusual year. thank you for your contributions, even those that appeared small or trivial. looking ahead, however, more than ever before the spirit of the legendary trailblazers is needed — courage and hope for the future. we will rise to the challenges along the way with the responsibility of a leader, treading boldly where others have not trodden. unsurprisingly, the period ahead will provide us many opportunities to recommit to a shared future, ultimately improving the lives of those around us
a 30 - year mortgage, even though the borrower will be able to enjoy a low interest rate in the first two years, the repayment burden could become much heavier as a result of interest rate hikes in the years that follow. this could have serious consequences for the well - being of those families in the coming years. therefore, i hope that the public will be cautious and should not underestimate the risks that rising interest rate could have on repayment ability, asset prices and the overall economy in hong kong. bis central bankers ’ speeches

norman t l chan : recent economic and financial developments in hong kong remarks by mr norman t l chan, chief executive of the hong kong monetary authority, hong kong, 22 february 2013. * * * the property market in hong kong moderated briefly after the introduction of the fifth round of prudential measures on property mortgages by the hkma in september 2012 and the new tax measures by the government in october 2012. however, activities in the property market picked up again recently, with significant increases in transaction volume and prices of residential properties as well as commercial and industrial properties. the risk of overheating in the property market has, once again, risen sharply. moreover, the recent increase in intensity of the quantitative easing by central banks in europe, the us and japan has made it more difficult and uncertain for them to “ exit ” these measures in the future. it will be particularly so when inflationary pressures emerge again in the advanced economies, and the pace and extent of interest rate hike could be greater than originally expected. in fact, in the last quarter of 2012, the hkma already started requesting local banks to assume a of 300 bps increase in interest rate above the baseline scenario for its mortgage portfolio when conducting stress testing. in order to further enhance banks ’ risk management in property mortgage lending and to strengthen borrowers ’ resilience to withstand future interest rate hikes, the hkma has just issued a set of guidelines to banks, requiring them to adopt an increase of 300 bps instead of 200 bps of interest rate when stress - testing the repayment ability of mortgage applicants. this measure is applicable to all types of mortgages, including residential as well as commercial and industrial property mortgages. the risk of overheating in the commercial and industrial property market also continues to rise. our experience shows that the quality of commercial and industrial property mortgages will deteriorate more significantly than that of residential property mortgages during market downturns. in view of these circumstances, our guidelines have also required banks to lower the maximum ltv ratio of mortgage loans for commercial and industrial properties, whether or not for self - use, by 10 percentage points from the existing applicable levels. for example, for mortgage applicants with income mainly derived from hong kong, the maximum ltv ratio will be lowered from 50 % to 40 %. if the applicant ’ s income is mainly derived from outside hong kong, the maximum ltv ratio will be lowered from the current 40 % to 30 %. the
situation. for some unlisted cooperative banks, conversion into joint stock companies will be part of a broader transformation of governance also comprising stock exchange listing. these interventions will greatly enhance access to capital markets and help overcome the problems with the current process of share price determination, which the law reserves to the shareholders ’ meeting. stock exchange listing will also ensure the liquidity of the investments of shareholders who wish to dispose of their holdings. the banca popolare di vicenza is one of the cooperative banks that have embarked on this process as part of the measures required by the supervisory authorities. as the explanatory note published on our website yesterday describes in more detail, in 2014 evidence emerged that this bank had committed irregularities in share buybacks. in agreement with the new european supervisory bodies, which were about to start operating, we scheduled a targeted inspection for immediately after the european comprehensive assessment. this intervention, conducted by bank of italy inspectors as part of the single supervisory mechanism, revealed other practices not in compliance with the rules. as soon as the initial findings of the investigations begun last february started to emerge, the bank of italy and the ecb concurred fully on urging the banca popolare di vicenza to adopt immediate corrective measures. the top executives and almost all of the senior management were replaced ; a capital strengthening plan was drawn up, the success of which is ensured by the presence of an underwriting consortium ; and a radical reform of corporate governance is planned for the cooperative ’ s conversion into a joint stock company and its simultaneous stock exchange listing. a reform of the mutual banking sector is also needed now. self - financing, the main source of funds for increasing these banks ’ capital, has essentially dried up as a result of the recession. in the absence of any decisions, the necessary increase in provisions to cover bis central bankers ’ speeches non - performing loans would lead to a further reduction in the capacity for self - financing ; a significant part of the mutual banking system would incur negative evaluations by the supervisory authorities and might not be able to meet the need for a larger capital endowment. this could give rise to situations that would be difficult to manage within the new crisis resolution framework, also considering the constraints of the regulations on state aid. mutual banking systems in other euro - area countries have long since instituted highly integrated organizational structures capable of realizing economies of scale, unitary risk control mechanisms, and safety nets for the liquidity and solvency of the participating banks. some of these

issue warnings where risks are deemed to be significant ; and issue recommendations for remedial action where appropriate. ” thank you very much for your attention, i am now at your disposal for questions.
’ s house museum, for hosting today ’ s event. elizabeth, over to you. bis central bankers ’ speeches

policy – broadly defined – tended to countenance investor expectations. at year - end 2007, the outstanding public debt of fannie mae and freddie mac totaled about $ 5. 0 trillion, roughly comparable with the publicly held treasury debt of $ 5. 1 trillion, and spreads to treasuries on their senior debt amounted to about 30 to 50 basis points, even though the institutions were thinly capitalized relative to their asset composition and risk characteristics. in the fall of 2008, however, gse senior debt spreads widened significantly to more than 500 basis points. market participants grew increasingly skeptical of the gses'financial and operational wherewithal and were uncertain of the depth of government support. when markets decided to test policymakers, as markets are especially wont to do during panics, the treasury was forced to intercede, effectively taking control of the entities. congress authorized successive administrations to take forceful actions, including appropriations of up to $ 200 billion to - date, to assure investors and counterparties that the institutions would remain solvent. these efforts, while necessary and well intended, have not completely resolved the uncertainty around the gses to market participants. indeed, even after extraordinary actions most recently by the federal reserve to improve liquidity and market functioning in the agency debt markets, confidence in the gses is less than markets were long accustomed to before this period began. when presumptively risk - free, highly liquid assets backed by the highest - grade sovereign are subject to large swings in value, the risk - return profile of virtually all other assets becomes highly uncertain. the resulting portfolio reallocation boosts demand for treasury securities, and reduces demand for assets that are genuinely riskier, placing upward pressure on risk premiums across a wide range of markets. in addition, financial firms that had assumed that their holdings of gse debt were as good as cash were forced to reassess the adequacy of their liquidity positions, adding to balance sheet pressures and leading to even greater safehaven demands for treasury securities. across a broad range of financial institutions and financial markets, an unhealthy mix of recession dynamics and panic conditions appear at work. but, in my view, it is predominantly the latter – the uncertainty with respect to financial intermediation and the corresponding breach of articles of faith – that have exacerbated the downturn. conclusion let me offer several concluding observations that may help frame a new foundation for growth and ensure that discarded articles of faith are repaired,
for four bis central bankers ’ speeches euro area countries indicates continued progress in restoring sound public finances. however, euro area countries should not unravel progress made with fiscal consolidation. a full and consistent implementation of the euro area ’ s macroeconomic surveillance framework, together with the necessary policy actions by euro area countries, will help to raise potential growth, increase the euro area ’ s resilience to shocks and facilitate job creation. we are now at your disposal for questions. bis central bankers ’ speeches

has been revised upwards. the risks surrounding the economic outlook for the euro area continue to be on the downside. geopolitical risks, as well as developments in emerging market economies and global financial markets, may have the potential to affect economic conditions negatively. other downside risks include weaker than expected domestic demand and insufficient implementation of structural reforms in euro area countries, as well as weaker export growth. according to eurostat ’ s flash estimate, euro area annual hicp inflation was 0. 5 % in may 2014, after 0. 7 % in april. this outcome was lower than expected. on the basis of the information available to us at today ’ s meeting, annual hicp inflation is expected to remain at bis central bankers ’ speeches low levels over the coming months, before increasing only gradually during 2015 and 2016, thereby underpinning the case for today ’ s decisions. meanwhile, inflation expectations for the euro area over the medium to long term continue to be firmly anchored in line with our aim of maintaining inflation rates below, but close to, 2 %. looking ahead, the governing council is strongly determined to safeguard this anchoring. our assessment has been supported by the june 2014 eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area. they foresee annual hicp inflation at 0. 7 % in 2014, 1. 1 % in 2015 and 1. 4 % in 2016. in the last quarter of 2016, annual hicp inflation is projected to be 1. 5 %. in comparison with the march 2014 ecb staff macroeconomic projections, the projections for inflation for 2014, 2015 and 2016 have been revised downwards. it should be stressed that the projections are conditional on a number of technical assumptions, including exchange rates and oil prices, and that the uncertainty surrounding each projection increases with the length of the projection horizon. the governing council sees both upside and downside risks to the outlook for price developments as limited and broadly balanced over the medium term. in this context, we will closely monitor the possible repercussions of geopolitical risks and exchange rate developments. turning to the monetary analysis, data for april 2014 continue to point to subdued underlying growth in broad money ( m3 ). annual growth in m3 moderated further to 0. 8 % in april, from 1. 0 % in march. the growth of the narrow monetary aggregate m1 moderated to 5. 2 % in april, after 5. 6 % in march. in the recent past, the increase in the mfi net external
simple but powerful idea – that the well - off cannot go on doing obscenely well even as the rest keeps moving backwards. the message from this collective rage is that growth itself can be destabilizing if it is not inclusive. bis central bankers ’ speeches on that sobering thought, ladies and gentlemen, please join me in welcoming mr. tharman shanmugaratnam to deliver the 13th l. k. jha memorial lecture on the challenge of inclusive growth. bis central bankers ’ speeches

achieving inclusive growth : the challenge of a new era ”, a topic he is very well qualified to address because of the combination of perspective he brings to it – asian values and ethos combined with wide ranging international study and experience. inclusive growth is of course a topic of undoubtedly great interest to us in india – but also of interest, i believe, to every country in the world – rich and poor alike. the quest for inclusive growth draws from a powerful lesson of development experience – that growth has no meaning, or indeed even no legitimacy, if those at the bottom of the pyramid get left behind. but consensus, if any, breaks down right at that point. beyond the basic premise that inclusive growth is desirable, virtually every issue and nuance – starting from what constitutes inclusive growth to how it is to be achieved and sustained – is up for a contentious, and oftentimes acrimonious, debate. this debate, like several others in development economics, is one that has frowned on moderation. at one extreme is the “ trickle down ” theory which holds that the benefits of growth would automatically trickle down to the bottom ; that the trickle down is a process that must be left to its natural pace and path, and forcing it down will be counterproductive. at the other extreme is the activist view that rubbishes trickle down and holds that redistributive policies must be part of the development paradigm, even if it means compromising on the quality and pace of growth. as we all realize, inclusive growth is a deeply emotive issue that has transcended economics to enter into political discourse and electoral platforms. in the era of globalization, the debate on inclusive growth has quite naturally acquired international dimensions too. is a world order in which some countries prosper while others get left behind sustainable? if not, what are the obligations and responsibilities of rich countries, and of poor countries? and in a world dominated by nation states, how do we build a constituency for the global economy? the concerns about inclusive growth are not unique to emerging and developing economies. they are resonating in the rich world as well. last year, we saw a massive demonstration of popular discontent around the world. the “ occupy wall street ” movement in new york ’ s zuccotti park was the most prominent, but by no means the only one. despite its amorphous nature, and its refusal to articulate a set of demands, the protest campaigns across the world were shaped by a
##ance : la declaration du 9 mai 1950, jean monnet foundation for europe, european research centre, 2000, pp. 251 – 253. bis central bankers ’ speeches

. and pisani - ferry, j., “ the governance of the european union ’ s international relations : how many voices? ”, in bis central bankers ’ speeches in the economic sphere, what should our shared goals be? the “ five presidents ’ report ” 17 seeks to answer this question from the perspective of our monetary union. but the question is also relevant for the internal market, and thus for the european union as a whole. the five presidents ’ report stresses that we need to reinforce the stability of our economies by developing solidarity mechanisms, in particular within the monetary union, while ensuring that governments and economic actors behave responsibly. this is what has been done within the framework of the banking union, and it ’ s what we must aim to do within the framework of the capital markets union. 18 likewise, greater risk sharing in the fiscal sphere presupposes sufficient economic convergence among participating countries. solidarity cannot turn into a system of permanent transfers, which is not part of the founding “ contract ” of monetary union. to put it another way, this is about establishing a new european social contract, which can be designed only under john rawls ’ “ veil of ignorance ”. 19 such greater risk sharing also presupposes responsible fiscal policies, which are in the interests of both individual countries and their neighbours. i want to make this clear : we cannot advocate a europe of solidarity while believing that the economic policies of each euro area country are the business of that country ’ s parliament alone. the crisis has fully exposed that contradiction. second, efficiency gains could be achieved if we were to progressively pool certain resources within the framework of the single market – with such action being justified by economies of scale and scope, network effects and externalities. this was the logic behind the establishment of the european coal and steel community in 1951, and today it informs the juncker plan, as well as efforts to develop an energy union and a single digital market. the joint implementation of a political project and an economic strategy also assumes that our political union will be strengthened. to remedy the “ executive deficit ” 20 – in other words, to reduce the difficulties involved in taking decisions that i mentioned earlier – we should favour sharing decisions that affect the future of the euro area within common institutions with a european mandate and democratic oversight at european level. how would the governing council of the ecb have dealt with the crisis if it was just a club of 19 national governors making decisions by consensus? following the lead of jean
cannot be preserved by the goodwill of one side alone. one cannot overlook the difficulties of the current situation, be blind to growing geopolitical differences or ignore the prospect of an increasingly polarised world. much in this is highly political, therefore beyond the scope of this conversation. concerning economic and financial institutions, one should be both realistic and hopeful. the goal, to quote raghuram rajan, should be to create ( or rather, maintain )'safe spaces in which countries, albeit with different values and systems, can interact regardless of their respective domestic policies or international tensions '. looking ahead, this needs genuine engagement on all sides. 3 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches

third, the integration of impact evaluations into wb projects and programs, which requires building capacity in client countries and allows for optimizing design and delivery. strengthened international cooperation is essential to assisting those in need and enhancing preparedness for future crises in order to prevent their most dramatic impacts. our constituency firmly supports multilateral institutions and international coordination efforts. as with its 2021 g20 presidency, italy enters the 2024 g7 presidency firmly committed to those efforts. 3 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches