www. imf. org / - / media / files / publications / wp / 2020 / english / wpiea2020110 - print - pdf finckenstein, v. ( 2021 ). how international aid can do more harm than good : the case of lebanon. lse ideas strategic update www. lse. ac. uk / ideas / assets / documents / updates / lse - ideas - how - international - aid - can - do - more - harm - than - good. pdf seth, m. ( 2017 ). south korea's economic development, 1948 – 1996. oxford research encyclopedia of asian history https : / / doi. org / 10. 1093 / acrefore / 9780190277727. 013. 271 1 for example, seth ( 2017 ) reviews a slow post - war recovery in south korea despite an unprecedented foreign aid. while finckenstein ( 2021 ) discusses how foreign aid might have been harmful for lebanon. 7 / 7 bis - central bankers'speeches

international financial support and measures to mobilize internal resources should help the government finance the budget deficit without resorting to monetary financing the war is grinding on. the russian aggression continues to put significant pressure on public finances. given the need for large expenses on defense capability, budget expenditures for 2024 have been raised considerably. the draft state budget for 2025 envisages that expenditures will remain high – the budget deficit will exceed 19 % of gdp. the budget expenditures are planned to be financed on account of further increases in budget revenues, financial support from international partners, and more domestic borrowing though selling domestic government debt securities, made possible thanks to efforts of the government with the nbu's assistance. this will enable the country to mobilize necessary resources and avoid returning to monetary financing over the forecast horizon. the course of the full - scale war continues to be the key risk to inflation dynamics and economic development the time needed for inflation to return to the 5 % target and the sustainability of ukraine's economic development will strongly depend on the nature and duration of the war. the russian aggression continues to generate the following risks : the emergence of additional budget needs, mainly those to maintain defense capabilities the likelihood of an additional hike in taxes, which – depending on its parameters – might spur the pressure on prices further damage to infrastructure, especially energy and port infrastructure, which will limit economic activity and put supply - side pressures on prices a deepening of adverse migration trends and further widening of labor shortages on the domestic labor market. the uncertainty also persists over the volumes of international partners'further support for ukraine. among other things, this is due to many countries being focused on their internal election cycles and russia making sabotage attempts in other countries and at the level of international institutions. at the same time, a number of positive scenarios might also materialize in relation to large inflows of funds to ukraine coming from frozen russian assets. these scenarios may also be related to a further expansion of export opportunities, the acceleration of european integration processes, and a faster pace of repairs in the energy sector. 2 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches taking into account the balance of risks, the need to bring inflation back to its 5 % target in the coming years, and to ensure the sustainability of the fx market, the nbu board decided to keep the key policy rate at 13 % in recent months, interest rates on hryvnia instruments have been declining, reflecting the impact of previous monetary easing measures. however, the