samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
however, overcoming the challenges posed by excessively high inflation requires the contribution of other players as well. fiscal policy has a major role to play in protecting the most vulnerable income groups from excessive inflation, but has to act in a manner that does not amplify current inflationary pressures. targeted and temporary fiscal measures cushion the energy shock, without persistent implications for aggregate demand. in addition, the deterioration of the macroeconomic situation alongside the uncertainty surrounding the outlook for inflation and interest rates pose risks to financial stability. the ecb needs to be alert to any emergence of fragmentation across euro area financial markets, which could compromise the timely return of inflation to its target. such phenomena could lead to a tightening in financial conditions over and above the extent warranted to contain inflation. at the same time, an abrupt tightening in monetary policy may lead to sharp increases in sovereign bond yields and a widening of spreads of the vulnerable sovereigns, with severe consequences for financial stability. the above illustrate the complicated situation which the governing council has to face. the importance of swift action to control inflation as soon as possible cannot be stressed enough ; still, the tightening pace should be well - adjusted, in order to avoid amplifying economic slowdown and posing a threat to financial stability. this is a very narrow path to tread that demands careful navigation. in the present environment, monetary policy needs to remain an anchor of stability and confidence that inflation will return to its target in a timely manner. in navigating this path, it is important to maintain prudence and gradualism. as former ecb president mario draghi3 has said, " in a dark room you move with tiny steps. you don't run, but you do move. " with these words, let me wish you a very productive and fruitful conference. thank you for your attention. 1 in the absence of the monetary policy measures, gdp would have been at least 2. 7 % lower by end - 2018, and annual inflation 1. 3 % weaker. see rostagno, m., altavilla, c., carboni, g., lemke, w., motto, r., saint - guilhem, a. and yiangou, j., " a tale of two decades : the ecb's monetary policy at 20 ", ecb occasional paper no 2346, december 2019. 2 see keynote speech by fabio panetta, member of the executive board of the ecb, at the

cepr - eabcn conference on " finding the gap : output gap measurement in the euro area " held at the european university institute on 14 november 2022, https : / / www. ecb. europa. eu / press / key / date / 2022 / html / ecb. sp221114 ~ 23b213922c. en. html. 5 / 6 bis - central bankers'speeches 3 ecb press conference on 7 march 2019. see https : / / www. ecb. europa. eu / press / pressconf / 2019 / html / ecb. is190307 ~ de1fdbd0b0. en. html. 6 / 6 bis - central bankers'speeches
of 6. 5 percent plus an additional spread of 8. 5 percent, consisting of a default risk premium, a term premium, an inflation risk premium, and the commercial bank ’ s compensation for costs, none of which are directly affected by the policy rate. the press is constantly urged to frame the debate as inflation versus growth, and with inflation still moderate, only the excessively conservative central bank could be against growth! never mind that overly accommodative policy today will set up inflation for the future ; never mind that the last forty years of economic theory and practice suggests that the best way central banks can support growth over the medium term is by keeping inflation low and stable. the reality, of course, is that high inflation is not stable. as we have seen in india ’ s own past, and in other emerging markets, moderately high inflation tends quickly to become very high inflation. the currency then becomes volatile, leading occasionally to external stress. after bis central bankers ’ speeches all, one of the reasons we were termed the fragile five in the summer of 2013 was because of our high inflation. moreover, the saver eventually recognizes that high inflation erodes the value of his financial savings and switches to real assets like gold. since we do not mine gold in the country, this also puts pressure on the current account. in sum, the fragilities associated with high inflation accumulate, and eventually could lead to crisis. however, the belief that there is a strong powerful domestic constituency against inflation in india, which was drummed into our heads as students, may be a myth, certainly at moderately high levels of inflation. without any political push back as inflation rises, what is to ensure macroeconomic stability? unlike more authoritarian asian economies that used severe administrative measures to deal with bouts of high inflation during their growth phase, our democratic structure rightly does not permit such measures. so it is better that we tackle inflation up front by building the necessary institutions. perhaps this is why successive governments, in their wisdom, have given the rbi a measure of independence. certainly, such concerns would support the current government ’ s decision to enshrine its commitment to low inflation through a formal inflation target and the creation of a monetary policy committee. interestingly, a similar public dynamic seems to be at work in attitudes towards cleaning up the public sector banks. clearly, over - levered promoters have no incentive to see the banks tighten screws and demand repayment. some public sector bank ceos with a short

with its history, but also one imbued with cultural and economic vigour, and with its eyes set firmly on the future. i think it would be hard to find a city, and indeed a country, more suited to being the de facto capital of the euro area for this week. 2 / 2 bis - central bankers'speeches
republic of macedonia for continuation and intensification of the structural reforms, the realistic expectations for achieving faster growth and the expectations for setting a date for the republic of macedonia to start negotiations for getting the status of a member of the european union, then, intensification of the process of liberalization of the capital flows in 2008, as well as the larger financial integration of the european capital markets through issuance of eurobonds, definitely build a foundation of realistic expectations for much higher capital inflows in the forthcoming period. bis working party on monetary policy in central and eastern europe, 21 - 22 february 2005, sinaia, romania. buiter w. h. and grafe c., " anchor, float, or abandon ship : exchange rate regimes for the accession countries ", european investment bank papers, 7 ( 2 ), 2001. these expectations are supported also by the positive interest differential and attractiveness of the securities that are listed on the domestic securities market. under such circumstances, key challenges of the monetary policy, in the context of the capital account liberalization and potential risks for deepening of the current account deficit in the republic of macedonia, are the following : 1. capital inflows, depending on the degree of variability, may cause speculative pressures on the denar exchange rate, which would increase the vulnerability of the economy. the experience of the more advanced transition economies shows that these effects may be partially mitigated by attracting foreign direct investments and securing their dominance in the composition of inflows, where the generally higher rates of return on investments provide certain protection from quick and sudden changes in the capital flows. another issues is the size of the capital inflows that given the implementation of the strategy of exchange rate targeting potentially puts at test the capacity of the nbrm for their sterilization and causes certain implications upon the monetary policy conduct, and the exchange rate regime. through the presentations that follow we will likely see a number of such experiences. 2. foreign capital inflows, especially the facilitated access of the banks to foreign capital, may cause credit boom and expansion of the domestic consumption. that may generate additional increase in the current account deficit. from the point of view of the current situation, the upward trend of credit growth that started in the republic of macedonia in 2003, largely emerges from the low starting point and at the same time indicates the natural process of increase in the degree of financial intermediation. nevertheless, having in mind the potential implications from the

points since january aims to support growth and to keep inflation close to the 2 per cent target over the medium term. given the many unknowns in the current environment, we will continue to monitor the situation very closely and adjust our outlook in the light of new information.
##ous shocks ”, keynote speech at the austrian financial market authority supervisory conference 2022, 4 october. 9. latest data point q2 2022. based on the methodology outlined in cera, k. ( 2022 ), “ measuring marketbased and non - bank financing of non - financial corporations in the euro area ”, box 2 in ecb committee on financial integration ( 2022 ), “ financial integration and structure in the euro area ”, april. 10. financial stability board ( 2022 ), “ enhancing the resilience of non - bank financial intermediation ”, 10 november. 11. the esrb letter to the european parliament on the aifmd review, 23 march 2022 ; the esrb letter to the council working party on the aifmd review, 23 march 2022 ; the esrb response to the european commission consultation on the review of the aifmd, 29 january 2021 ; the esrb considerations regarding the aifmd, 3 february 2020 ; the esrb recommendation of 6 may 2020 on liquidity risks in investment funds ( esrb / 2020 / 4 ), 6 may 2020 ; the esrb response letter to a consultation of the european commission on the review of solvency ii, 16 october 2020 ; the esrb letter to members of the european parliament on the solvency ii review, 2 february 2022 ; and the esrb letter to the council working party on the solvency ii review, 2 february 2022. 12. esrb ( 2022 ), “ concept note on the review of the eu macroprudential framework for the banking sector ”, march. 13. european securities and markets authority ( 2022 ), “ eu financial regulators warn consumers on the risks of crypto - assets ”, 17 march. 14. staking refers to the process of actively participating in crypto - asset transaction validation on a proof - ofstake blockchain. rewards can be earned, which are akin to a source of passive income for crypto - asset holders. policymakers must assess whether staking could be considered another source of non - bank lending, with the crypto - asset holder acting as a lender and the blockchain protocol as the borrower. see european banking authority ( 2022 ), “ eba provides its advice to the eu commission on non - bank lending ”, 4 may. copyright 2022, european central bank

as well as the strong anchor for policy rate expectations provided by our enhanced forward guidance, will continue to deliver the monetary policy stimulus necessary for inflation convergence. in any event, all our policy instruments can be adjusted to ensure that inflation moves towards our aim in a sustained manner. 1 non - mfi loans include debt securities issued indirectly via nfc financing subsidiaries resident in other euro area countries. 11 / 11 bis central bankers'speeches
for their insight and contributions over the years. thank you all, and have a great conference.

the margin provisions in a way that takes appropriate account of the relatively low systemic risk posed by most end users. for example, we are considering if it would be appropriate to allow a banking organization that is a dealer or major participant to establish a threshold with respect to an end - user counterparty, based on a credit exposure limit that is approved and monitored as part of the credit approval process, below which the end user would not have to post margin. the board appreciates that posting margin would impose costs on end users, possibly inhibiting their ability to manage their risks. the board also believes that the margin regime should be applied only to contracts entered into after the new requirement becomes effective. a much - discussed part of the act is the requirement that banks push portions of their swap activity into affiliates or face restrictions on their access to the discount window or deposit insurance. under the push - out provisions, banking organizations with deposit insurance or access to the federal reserve ’ s discount window will have to reorganize some of their derivatives activity, pushing certain types of swaps out of subsidiary banks and into separate legal entities that will require separate capitalization and separate documentation of trades with existing customers. the act permits domestic banks to continue to engage in derivatives activities that have been a traditional focus of banks, including hedging activities and dealing in interest rate swaps, cleared credit default swaps, and other swaps that reference assets that banks are eligible to hold. however, because of the specific language contained in the act, this exemption for traditional bank derivatives activities does not apply to foreign banking firms that have access to the federal reserve ’ s discount window through their u. s. branches. a possibly unintended effect of the act ’ s push - out provision may be to require some foreign firms to reorganize their existing u. s. derivatives activities to a greater extent than u. s. firms. conclusion as the implementation process for the act continues, the challenge facing the board is to enhance supervision, oversight, and prudential standards of major derivatives market participants in a manner that promotes more - effective risk management and reduces systemic risk, while retaining the significant benefits of derivatives to the businesses and investors who use them to manage financial market risks. the board is working diligently to achieve these goals. bis central bankers ’ speeches
target, a flexible exchange rate and a debt to gross domestic product ( gdp ) ratio that trends downward to sixty percent. we no longer have conceptual frameworks for economic management for very small economies. that is the market that we at central bank of barbados are well positioned to claim as our own. we are already out of the boxes. we have a framework for anchoring our exchange rate by the use of fiscal policy to contain aggregate spending and imports. it is, as far as i know, unique in the world. other countries are doing what we do, and like us have kept up the value of their currencies. but they are doing it instinctively, often because they have vast natural resources and small populations. we are the only ones who have a theory and a way to know when we must adjust and by how much. and this is just the beginning. we are working on a tool to measure whether our fiscal policies are sustainable, building on the work we did with colleagues across the region, in the book we published last year. from this work we may derive fiscal rules that make sense for small open economies that are credible and can be implemented. also ongoing is analysis of investment and the current account of the balance of payments ( bop ), intended to demonstrate that the conventional indicators may give misleading signals. bis central bankers ’ speeches beyond this, we must venture out into the fields of competition and competition policy, financial stability analysis, finance and development, and payments, to name a random few, in search of policies and guidelines that are appropriate for small very open economies. i say this is a golden opportunity for us at cbb to take ownership of policy design for economies like our own, worldwide. nobody else is doing this work. this can become our trademark, and when it does, we will attract talent from around the world to the ars, people with an interest in economic and financial management of svoes. that is the promise of our future. we will go forward in concert with colleagues from across the region. our research agenda will be reflected in the other conferences hosted in the region, and in the research that is undertaken in our universities and reflected in our journals. we have the potential to be a fount of ideas that can spread across the world, because we are coming up with policies that work. we have every reason to look forward to the discussion and debate of the next few days. at the end of our sessions i am confident we would all have gained insight, and

have identified many lines of new research waiting for our explanation. our time here will have been well spent. bis central bankers ’ speeches
this workshop. i am expecting to learn a lot from the four cutting - edge research papers and three insightful lectures to be presented. in the face of many challenges for central bankers, let me quote from anne of green gables by the canadian writer lucy maud montgomery. i would like to emphasize that it is a well - known masterpiece not only in canada but here in japan. anne says to her stepfather, old matthew, " isn't it splendid to think of all the things there are to find out about?... it wouldn't be half so interesting if we knew all about everything. " anne's words sound very encouraging to all economists and central bankers who are making numerous efforts to find out new ideas, solutions, and policy tools. with anne's encouragement in mind, i am hoping that all the participants in today's workshop will be able to find out something - - or many things - - that are interesting, inspiring, and helpful in tackling the challenges ahead. thank you.

play in the provision of sound and stable islamic finance services. epilogue islamic finance has grown into an industry that is indispensable in understanding the global financial system. the bank of japan will closely follow developments in the islamic finance industry through its ifsb observer membership status. japanese financial institutions and companies have just stepped into the world of islamic finance. we hear that some financial institutions are already actively engaged in islamic finance business by cultivating new markets and setting up local companies. some companies are already introducing the framework of islamic finance to finance their projects. i am convinced that we will be seeing more in the near future. i would like to close my remarks by expressing my hopes that the proceedings of this symposium will deepen understanding of islamic finance among japanese financial institutions and companies, and that it presents an opportunity for the creation of new financial services. thank you for your kind attention.
attention.

are brute and forceful, and it seems unlikely that incorporation of intertemporal optimization and other adjustment processes would completely undermine the basic results. closed economy : inverse dependency ratio and “ boom and bust ” in property markets let me now apply this model to the real world. assets such as residential and commercial property, equities and even art objects are essentially all “ long - term stores of value, ” that is, means of transferring purchasing power from the present to the immediate as well as distant future. and among these long - term stores of value, residential property is usually the most popular in many countries for various reasons including preferential tax treatment. so if the model has a reasonable explanatory power, we expect movement in real residential property prices5 to coincide with that of the inverse dependency ratio ( i. e., ratio of working - age ( 15 – 60 ) population to the rest ), which corresponds to the ratio of the young working population to the old non - working dependent population in the simple olg model, abstracting from child - age population. figure 2. 1 shows real land prices in japan ( national average, for all purposes ) juxtaposed with the inverse dependency ratio from 1955 to date. this figure shows, firstly, that the relative abundance of young people coincided with sharply higher property prices. secondly, in contrast, the relative abundance of old people seems to be leading to lower property prices. it should be noted here that declining property prices greatly aggravated the balance sheet adjustments of japanese corporations, as will be explained later. the us case is illustrated in figure 2. 2. in the united states also, an increasing inverse dependency ratio seems to have coincided with the property bubble. after the bubble burst of 2007, property prices seem to have followed the long run movement of the inverse dependency ratio, although it would be premature to draw any conclusions from this at the moment. how about the european experience? figure 2. 3 shows the situation in ireland. a sharp ascent in property prices coincided with an increase in the inverse dependency ratio, and then we see a free fall. this free fall suggests a painful adjustment is coming. spain is shown in figure 2. 4. again, a sharp increase in property prices coincided with an increase in the inverse dependency ratio, and then prices declined. germany, having no bubble in 2008, is if the young are not constrained to save, they then face inter - temporal optimization of consumption allocation. introductory economic theory tells us that in
2015 ), “ the influence of monetary policy on bank profitability ”, october. 3 brunnermeier, m., langfield, s., pagano, m., reis, r., van nieuwerburgh, s. and vayanos, d., “ esbies : safety in tranches ”, esrb working paper series, no 21, september 2016. 5 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches

jean - claude trichet : interview with de tijd and l ’ echo interview by mr jean - claude trichet, president of the european central bank, with de tijd and l'echo, belgium, conducted by messrs wouter vervenne, wouter vandriessche, marc lambrechts, luc charlier and serge quoidbach on 4 december 2009 and published on 10 december 2009. * * * is the euro area now definitely out of recession? if so, will the expected recovery be sufficiently strong to create jobs? jean - claude trichet : the second quarter of this year saw the end of the period of free fall in terms of growth. this very difficult period lasted two full quarters following the intensification of the crisis in mid - september 2008 ( editor ’ s note : following the collapse of lehman brothers ). as of the third quarter of 2009 we have been experiencing positive growth again. this will be the case in the fourth quarter, too. according to the projections of the eurosystem staff, average growth next year should also be positive, albeit still modest. and with a level of uncertainty – and i should like to stress this point – that remains very high. this is related to a number of factors, primarily international. as regards employment, taking into account the “ lags ” usually observed after periods of recession, we could see an increase in unemployment even with growth rates returning to positive territory. we must therefore act with determination to strengthen confidence. indeed, it was confidence that was so dramatically lacking following the events of september 2008. all of our actions today within the governing council of the ecb are aimed at strengthening the confidence of households and firms in the medium term. were you aware that this confidence would be so difficult to re establish? in a cycle such as this, the decline is often much steeper than the recovery, which is slower. hence the importance, for us, of : ( i ) assuring our fellow citizens that we are able to ensure price stability and thereby defend their purchasing power ; and ( ii ) convincing firms that the financial environment will continue to incorporate a low level of inflation in the years to come, which will be reflected in medium and long - term market interest rates. last thursday the ecb announced the progressive phasing - out of its extraordinary measures. does this mean that market conditions are now completely back to normal? moreover, analysts view the details announced for the 12 - month refinancing