of governors are nominated by the president and confirmed by the senate. each reserve bank has a board of directors drawn from business, public, labor, nonprofit, and banking leadership within its district. in consultation with the board of governors, the reserve bank directors choose a president to run the bank. 5 the board of governors oversees the reserve banks and is responsible for formulating bank regulations ; supervising banks ; and making decisions regarding lending, other than discount window lending, to depository institutions. 6 the seven members of the board of governors serve 14 - year terms, with one term ending in january of each even - numbered year. the terms run independently of the person serving in them, and members are often appointed, as i was, to fill the unexpired portion of a term. as see alberto alesina ( 1988 ), “ macroeconomics and politics, ” in stanley fischer, ed., nber macroeconomics annual, vol. 3 ( cambridge, mass. : mit press ), pp. 13 – 62 ; vittorio grilli, donato masciandaro, and guido tabellini ( 1991 ), “ political and monetary institutions and public financial policies in the industrial countries, ” economic policy, vol. 6 ( 13 ), pp. 342 – 92 ; alex cukierman ( 1992 ), central bank strategy, credibility, and independence : theory and evidence ( cambridge, mass. : mit press ) ; alex cukierman, steven b. webb, and bilin neyapti ( 1992 ), “ measuring the independence of central banks and its effect on policy outcomes, ” world bank economic review, vol. 6 ( 3 ), 353 – 98 ; alberto alesina and lawrence h. summers ( 1993 ), “ central bank independence and macroeconomic performance : some comparative evidence, ” journal of money, credit and banking, vol. 25 ( may ), pp. 151 – 62 ; alex cukierman, pantelis kalaitzidakis, lawrence h. summers, and steven b. webb ( 1993 ), “ central bank independence, growth, investment, and real rates, ” carnegie - rochester conference series on public policy, vol. 39 ( 1 ), pp. 95 – 140 ; and alex cukierman, geoffrey p. miller, and bilin neyapti ( 2002 ), “ central bank reform, liberalization and inflation in transition economies – an international perspective, ” journal of monetary economics, vol.

more granular guidance on ccp resilience, focusing on governance, stress testing credit and liquidity risk, margin, and recovery planning. while this guidance will not establish new standards beyond those set out in the pfmi, i believe that it will encourage ccps and their regulators to engage in thoughtful dialogue on how they could further enhance their practices. the fsb has led the work on resolution planning for ccps, publishing draft guidance this past february. the guidance covers a range of topics, including the powers that resolution in 2013, cpmi - iosco launched a multi - level, multi - year monitoring program to evaluate how the principles and responsibilities in the pfmi are being implemented around the world. several different assessments have been completed to date and the findings have provided important insight on both the progress and methods by which authorities and ccps have sought to implement the pfmi. in 2014, cpmi - iosco published supplemental guidance and a menu of recovery tools to help financial market infrastructures, including ccps, meet the expectations in the pfmi that all financial market infrastructures have a comprehensive and effective recovery plan. while the work done in the context of the joint work plan represents significant regulatory efforts related to ccps, progress is also being made on a parallel path. in particular, it is important to highlight the adoption and implementation of the sec ’ s covered clearing agency standards, which further strengthens the risk management standards that clearing agencies registered with the sec must meet. in addition, the sec and the industry have been working jointly to shorten the settlement cycle to two days for many securities products, culminating in the sec ’ s adoption of amendments to rule 15c6 - 1 ( a ) earlier this year. authorities need in order to effectively resolve a ccp, the potential incentives related to using various loss - allocation tools in resolution, the application of the “ no creditor worse off ” safeguard, and the formation of crisis management groups - - a key step in facilitating cross - border regulatory coordination in the event of a failure of a systemically important ccp. ensuring the safety of the system also requires an understanding of the interdependencies between ccps and their clearing members. work on this is ongoing. preliminary analysis confirms that there are large interdependencies between banks and ccps, including common exposures related to financial resources held to cover market and credit risk, as well as common lending and funding arrangements. having pushed for the move