with stronger liquidity, higher solvency and, in the most recent period, improved asset quality. this success was based on three key factors : first, political ownership, socioeconomic awareness and social dialogue. policymakers were committed to the programme ’ s goals and showed deep knowledge of the virtuous response mechanisms to be activated in the critical sectors. on the other hand, the public understood the urgency and even - handedness of the programme. the political compromises achieved between policymakers and social partners were key to ensuring a broad and collective ownership of the programme, which in turn determined its effective and timely execution. second, the positive, intense and fast response by the export sector, which grew by around 45 % in real terms between 2008 and 2017. this contributed to the correction of the 4 / 6 bis central bankers'speeches current account deficit, to put external debt on a downward trajectory, and to mitigate the impact of lower domestic demand on the non - tradable sector. this positive response by the tradable sector was much stronger than expected and was not driven exclusively by foreign markets ’ growth, given that there were important market share gains during this period. third, the maintenance of the general public ’ s confidence in the financial system, as evident in the consistent stability of aggregate deposits. this allowed the financing of the economic activity to proceed without major disruptions and prevented the resort to capital controls. the fear and deposit drain observed in other economies that were subject to assistance programmes did not occur in the portuguese case. this was not by accident, since there was an active and persistent effort by the authorities to preserve confidence in the financial system throughout the implementation of the programme. after the assistance programme the macroeconomic adjustment initiated by the economic and financial assistance programme has continued after the programme ended in 2014, with encouraging results. gdp has been growing at an average annual rate above 2 %, reflecting the continued dynamism of the export sector and, more recently, the rebound of private investment. fiscal consolidation proceeded, with the budget balance expected to be around – 0. 5 % in 2018 and public debt entering a downward trend. the current and capital accounts were kept in surplus and the cleanup of banks ’ balance sheets has intensified, with npls declining from over 50 billion euro in june 2016 to about half this amount in end 2018. despite the undisputed progress, there is no room for complacency. the history of the past 40 years teaches us that the initial impact from an

will be, however, a coordinated distribution of tasks between the ecb and the national supervisory authorities, depending on the size of banks and national banking systems. with all banks in the euro area under unified supervision, responsibility for deposit guarantee and resolution shall be held at the level where supervisory powers are exercised, i. e. at european level. banking union must therefore cover not only integrated supervision, but also shared deposit guarantee and bank resolution mechanisms. if a single supervisory mechanism is not accompanied by european deposit guarantee and bank resolution mechanisms, it represents banking union under construction and therefore an incomplete separation between sovereign and banking risk. fiscal union lack of fiscal discipline among member states during the pre - crisis period revealed the need to strengthen the european fiscal policy institutional framework. important decisions have already been taken in this field, involving a range of regulations to promote fiscal discipline in member states ( for example the so - called “ six pack ” and “ fiscal compact ” ). however, work for the construction of that pillar is still currently under way. these regulations must be complemented by institutions assuring their effective implementation. indeed, europe needs a qualitative change towards fiscal union. economic union the achievement of a genuine economic union requires the establishment of an institutional framework able to assess, coordinate and monitor member states ’ economic policy measures and reforms. special emphasis should be placed on areas with a potentially higher impact on competitiveness, economic growth and employment, simultaneously promoting social cohesion. member states ’ economic policies and macroeconomic imbalances are an issue of common interest and therefore require a “ win - win ” concerted response. the “ european semester ” and the “ euro - plus pact ” are important improvements in this area. strengthening democratic legitimacy and accountability to move towards more integrated fiscal and economic policies we need to implement mechanisms ensuring democratic legitimacy and accountability in joint decision - making. if this political dimension is ignored, we will not be able to evolve towards greater financial, fiscal and economic integration, for lack of legitimacy and accountability. this political dimension of the integration process must reconcile two sources of concern : the need for a legitimate response vis - a - vis “ the whole ” ; and the need to ensure that all parts, irrespective of their size, are represented and participate in the decision - making process. in particular, the so - called “ community method ” must be revitalised, in tandem with restoring the european commission ’ s central role, by strengthening its effectiveness and legitimacy. bis central bankers ’ speeches this