trilemma framework is perhaps too stark, it is analytically helpful to recognise the genuine tensions across inter - linked policy dimensions. let me focus in on the monetary policy and financial trilemmas. in relation to monetary policy, brexit does not alter the status quo, which no commitment on either side to stabilise the value of sterling against the euro and the bank of england and the european central bank each pursuing an independent monetary policy. in relation to financial stability policies, much has already been written as to the prospects for post - brexit financial services trade between the uk and the eu. in relation to the clearing of euro - denominated trades in the uk, president draghi has recently pointed out that “ it will be important to find solutions that at least preserve, or ideally enhance, the current level of supervision and oversight. 5 ” this is important both in relation to the ecb ’ s role as a supervisor of clearing member banks and as the central bank of issue for the euro. 1 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches more broadly, the maintenance of financial stability necessarily requires considerable bilateral and multilateral collaboration across major central banks. during the global financial crisis, this included a network of currency swap lines to facilitate access to foreign - currency liquidity, while fora such as the bank for international settlements and the financial stability board enable the sharing of analysis and information across jurisdictions. similarly, there is a significant degree of coordination in banking regulation through the basel committee. still, there are inevitably differences of degree in terms of the scale of coordination within the eu relative to that achievable through global institutional frameworks. let us see if some intermediate - level arrangements between the uk and the eu will be delivered through the upcoming eu - uk negotiations. 1 this work now carries on under the umbrella of trinity research in social sciences ( triss ), which is the successor institution to the iiis. the work of the iiis is archived at www. tcd. ie / iiis. 2 maurice obstfeld, jay c. shambaugh and alan m. taylor ( 2005 ), “ the trilemma in history : tradeoffs among exchange rates, monetary policies and capital mobility, ” review of economics and statistics 87 ( 3 ), 423 – 438. 3 dirk schoenmaker ( 2011 ), “ the financial trilemma, ” economics letters 111, 57 – 59. 4 dani rodrik ( 2011 ), the globalization paradox

allocating €340 million as a dividend to the shareholders, the same amount allocated in each of the last six years and equal to 4. 5 per cent of the capital. therefore, we propose allocating €40 million to the special item for stabilizing dividends, which would then amount to €200 million. pursuant to the statute, shares exceeding the 3 per cent threshold are not entitled to a dividend. therefore, the dividend actually due to the shareholders would amount to €273 million. the dividend corresponding to the shares exceeding the threshold, equal to €67 million, would be allocated to the ordinary reserve. as a result, the remaining profit for the state would be equal to €5, 906 million which, in addition to taxes for the year amounting to €1, 409 million, would bring the total amount allocated to the state to around €7, 315 million. the total amount allocated to the state over the last five years would therefore reach €25 billion, in addition to taxes amounting to €6. 5 billion. 5 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches