has - at least so far - led the government to opt for remaining an important owner. when the government as part of a crisis resolution steps in as an owner of last resort, the intention is usually to get out of this position once the bank has proved to be profitable again. this is probably cf. kane and klingebiel ( 2002 ). source : st. meld. 39 ( 1993 - 94 ). source : for sweden : jennergren and naslund ( 1998 ). for norway : norges bank, moen ( 2003 ). see hoggarth, reis and saporta ( 2002 ). peek and rosengren ( 2000 ) look at the loan supply shock facing u. s. firms borrowing from japanese banks during the banking crisis in japan. they identify a substantial impact on u. s. real estate activity from this supply shock. see ongena, smith and michalsen ( 2003 ) and vale ( 2002 ). good advice, but there is a delicate balance between restoring private ownership quickly and trying to recover as much as possible of the government ’ s fiscal costs. the norwegian banking crisis was handled swiftly and transparently and at relatively low cost to the taxpayers. furthermore, the banks that came out of the crisis had trimmed their operating costs and established much better systems to evaluate credit risks. in one respect, we were rather lucky compared to others. the crisis built up gradually, so there was time to assess the situation and strengthen the defences of the financial system before the crisis became systemic. the banks ’ equity capital provided the first line of defence and the banks ’ collective guarantee funds the second when bank losses started to soar. the third line of defence - the government bank insurance fund - was only established when it was evident that the first and second lines of defence did not hold, but it was nevertheless established in time. by and large most scholars seem to agree that the resolution of the crisis in norway was fairly successful. but even if it was, right there and then, there is no guarantee that the same recipe will be successful in future or in other countries. in recognition of this and to avoid moral hazard, the law establishing the government bank insurance fund has now been repealed and the fund has ceased its operations. even if government capital injections in the large problem banks were the right resolution method in the early 1990s, it is far from evident that such a rescue operation would be the right method should a large bank fail in the future.

labour force in hedmark and 2. 9 per cent in oppland had registered as unemployed. this is well below the national average of 3. 9 per cent. the increase in unemployment on a national basis in 2002 primarily occurred in the service industries. in january, manufacturing took over the lead as the industry with the highest increase in unemployment. manufacturing unemployment is now 3700 higher than a year ago. agriculture and forestry account for a larger share of employment in hedmark than in other counties. because of the large tracts of forest in this county, forestry is a particularly important sector. the wood and wood products industry accounts for about a fourth of manufacturing employment. as in the rest of the country, the public sector and parts of the private service sector are important for employment in hedmark. business and financial services account for a smaller share than the national average. in spite of interest rate cuts and a stimulatory government budget, overall economic policy has been tight as a result of the strong krone. the depreciation of the krone exchange rate since january and the reduction in the interest rate have, however, contributed to an easing of monetary policy. in the inflation report, we presented two alternative scenarios for the norwegian economy. in the baseline scenario, where the interest rate is held constant at 5½ per cent and the krone exchange rate at the average for the past month, mainland gdp is projected to increase by 1¼ per cent this year and 2 per cent next year. this is lower than what is considered the long - term growth potential in the economy. in 2005, growth is projected at 2¼ per cent. an alternative scenario, which incorporates monetary policy easing in line with market expectations - as they were then, points to higher growth over time. the rise in prices for goods and services produced in norway is being influenced by markedly higher wage growth in norway relative to trading partners. wage growth moved up further last year, even in industries where profitability had weakened considerably. a more moderate rise since last summer is related in part to lower air transport prices ( increased competition between airlines ) and a slower rise in house rents. the rise in prices for imported consumer goods has been pushed down by the strong krone exchange rate. the shift in clothing imports from high - cost countries to asia and eastern europe has also contributed. in the near term, the appreciation of the krone over the past two years will be reflected in the underlying rise in prices. subsequent developments will