the fact that we are true to our primary mandate of safeguarding price stability. the governing council will not tolerate inflation. hb : is greece an isolated case? could the same happen to other countries as well? trichet : greece was clearly in a unique exceptionally grave situation before it embarked on its adjustment programme. but i call solemnly upon all countries to implement programmes commensurate to recover sound fiscal situation. hb : what has to be done? trichet : what we must achieve first, are sound and rigorously implemented adjustment programmes fully in line with the commitment of governments to take all measures needed to meet their fiscal targets this year and the years ahead in line with excessive deficit procedures and to accelerate fiscal consolidation and ensure the sustainability of their public finances. hb : do you see any risks for european taxpayers? trichet : our message from the very outset has been that risks for european taxpayers will not materialise if all governments concerned are faithful to all their commitments. they must keep to the rules and commitments. they must behave themselves properly and alert their peers, the other governments, to also behave properly. mutual surveillance is essential. hb : do you now start the same what the central banks in the united states and the united kingdom have already been doing for a while? trichet : that is not comparable. what the federal reserve and the bank of england have done was “ quantitative easing ”. they were injecting liquidity into the markets and that with the explicit goal of augmenting the overall liquidity. as i said already what we are doing through the securities market programme is not quantitative easing. hb : is the ecb violating the spirit of the treaty of maastricht? trichet : no, not at all. we cannot imagine doing anything that would violate the treaty – not even for a moment. what we are doing is of course in conformity with the treaty ’ s letter. what we are doing is in full conformity with the spirit of the treaty. hb : why are you now being criticised by the banks? trichet : are we? if so, it is probably because we are doing things that we have not been asked to do by them. that would be proof of our independence vis - a - vis interest groups. that refutes the argument that we have acted as a result of pressure from the banks. i am therefore very pleased to be being criticised by the banks. hb : you don ’ t see

denis beau : macroprudential policies to mitigate housing market risks opening remarks by mr denis beau, first deputy governor of the bank of france, at the committee on the global financial system – bank of france conference " macroprudential policies to mitigate housing market risks ", paris, 24 june 2024. * * * ladies and gentlemen, it is my great pleasure to welcome you and all the distinguished speakers at the banque de france, here in paris, to this first - of - its - kind conference on " macroprudential policies to mitigate housing market risks ". the conference builds on the very interesting and useful work of a dedicated study group of the bank for international settlements'committee on the global financial system. the study group published a report in december 2023 that you have probably all heard of. this work has been all the more valuable as experience with macroprudential policy is quite recent in most countries, even if macroprudential policy for housing market risks is gaining ground – be it in the form of borrower - based or capital - based measures. one of the report's strong added values is to draw on the practical experience of 14 countries around the globe, with a combined total of 168 years of experience, to provide us with concrete lessons for macroprudential policy implementation. as we will reflect today, from a practical point of view, on how best to implement macroprudential policy for housing risks, we have to remember that macroprudential policy cannot be considered in isolation. beyond theory, we are now in a time of realworld policy - making with all the challenges this entails, starting with the many interactions real - life macroprudential policy has to take into account. let me highlight two of them in my introductory remarks today. 1. how to adapt? the challenge of the interaction with the macroeconomic environment the first interaction challenge is centered on the question : how to adapt? how can and should housing - related macroprudential policy deal with the current macroeconomic environment? the cgfs report highlights that a majority of countries have set up intermediate objectives for macroprudential policy for housing risks that mostly refer either to borrower or lender resilience or to dampening the cycle. however our understanding of macroprudential tool effectiveness is largely based on the experience from upswings. there is still a lot to learn about the optimal use of macroprudential tools in housing