funds at the global level. 29 the fsb has also made some progress in studying the impact of large investors ’ strategies on market liquidity. in a recent pilot simulation exercise, the fsb employed a modelling approach to assess the consequences of market stresses and examined the resilience of liquidity across a range of corporate bond markets. 30 the central bank provided liquidity to mutual funds in the united states, to selected broker - dealers and central clearing counterparties in the uk. similar arrangements were made by the bank of japan. iosco, “ recommendations for liquidity risk management for collective investment schemes, ” february 2018. the approach was an adaptation of a model of the bank of england. this line of action deserves to be brought further forward. there have been from time to time episodes of hesitations and reversal, such abandoning the idea of identifying globally systemic non - bank intermediaries ( in my view an ill - advised move ), some timidity in prescribing ex - ante liquidity rules, and now perhaps a sense that all that needed to be done has been done. the risks, however, are too new, too complex and too little understood for any complacency. continued evaluation of the effectiveness of the available tools in a macro perspective, and increased coverage, as well as improved analytics, of systemic resilience testing, should in my view be actively pursued. fintech, regulation and systemic risk fintech, broadly defined, includes very diverse technology - enabled financial innovations encompassing the provision of a whole range of financial services, such as payments, insurance, lending and crowdfunding, trading and investment services. 31 fintech is changing the landscape in which intermediaries and policymakers are operating, as new business models are developed by exclusively fintech firms or by incumbents responding to competition. fintech activities can generate institution - specific risks, financial and operational, and systemic risks. the financial risks are not in principle different from those borne by other intermediaries, and depend on the business model adopted by the service provider. for example, some platforms providing fintech - enabled credit directly match borrowers with lenders, acting as agents. if investments and loans are matched by maturity, and investors are unable to liquidate their investments before the loan matures, the platform bears no liquidity risk. only a small proportion of platforms currently engage in leverage, as they use their own balance - sheet to fund loans. 32 these platforms are exposed to

##lity, and contagion – a survey, ” imf wp / 11 / 92, 2011 ; the evidence in the literature suggests that funds tend to avoid opaque markets and assets, and this behavior becomes more pronounced during volatile times, with portfolio rebalancing mechanisms contributing to explain contagion patterns. also c. jotiikasthira, c. lundlbadand t. ramadorai, “ asset fire sales and purchases and the international transmission of funding shocks, ”, journal of finance 67 ( 6 ). given the limited relevance of the risk of managers ’ insolvency. more recently, the focus on liquidity management has increased, but still mainly from the perspective of individual funds. these issues should continue to receive all the attention they deserve ; but there seems to be a case that they need to be accompanied by a macroprudential approach. the authorities should assess how shocks originating in one part of the financial system can be transmitted to the others components, both directly and through their impact on markets. this is a very challenging objective, requiring data and complex analytical frameworks. one tool that could be useful is macroprudential stress testing. the work on stress testing tools for non - banks is still in its infancy. 27 an additional challenge is the identification and design of appropriate policy instruments. tools aimed at protecting the stability of individual asset managers are available in many jurisdictions, for example liquidity requirements, rules restricting the amount of illiquid assets that can be held by open - end funds, redemption suspension and redemption gates. their effectiveness for macroprudential purposes should be evaluated. standards aimed at preventing the excessive accumulation of risk ex ante, such as minimum maturity - matching rules, are more effective in this sense than those meant to manage a fund ’ s crisis ex - post, such as gates, which may even have counterproductive signalling effects. the former set of standards should in my view include mandatory rules to ensure that funds investing in illiquid assets beyond a certain share of their portfolios may not operate as open - ended funds. finally, the adoption of a macroprudential approach to the risks arising from asset management could require the adjustment of the institutional framework for financial supervision. in many countries, the authorities in charge of the regulation and supervision of these entities have no financialstability mandate. should their mandate be expanded to include financial stability? given the cross - sectoral nature of financial stability risks, if several authorities