samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
inflation prints exceed the target and do not even correspond to the lowest inflation rates observed in mexico during recent years. these caveats are all the more important as the target has not been achieved in the past, in the sense that inflation has not been fluctuating around 3 percent. in fact, since the end of 2003 when this objective became effective, inflation has varied around a mean of 4. 3 percent. moreover, during the nine years after the establishment of the target, inflation has not exhibited any clear path of convergence towards it. this lack of convergence may for an excellent account of the persistence of financial crises and their common causes see reinhart, c. and k. rogoff ( 2012 ), this time is different : eight centuries of financial folly, princeton university press. bis central bankers ’ speeches partially explain why inflation expectations for the short and medium terms, as reflected in analysts ’ surveys, have long remained stubbornly above the target. 4 these considerations call for vigilance in monetary policy. the target is the principal guide and has not been attained. furthermore, negative shocks could easily complicate convergence. risks include the following : weather and animal health problems could fuel agricultural price rises ; new episodes of heightened risk aversion could trigger currency depreciation with some effects on inflation ; public - sector prices could be higher than anticipated ; and finally, some aggregate demand pressures may arise in light of conventional measures suggesting that slack in the economy has disappeared. concluding remarks in spite of a weak global environment, mexico ’ s gdp kept growing at rates surpassing historical records. analysts ’ outlook for the mexican economy posits a slight deceleration in 2013 and a recovery the following year. there are both downside and upside risks to this scenario, including on the positive side, further progress on structural reforms. substantial capital inflows resulting in unusually favorable financial conditions in mexico have been supportive of economic activity. however, economic agents should remain prudent as these flows, for many reasons, could stop and even revert. finally, the short period of recent improvement in inflation, the extraordinary factors that explain it, and the absence of convergence toward the inflation target, require a vigilant monetary policy. convergence of inflation to the permanent target demands more than a few months of good results. for empirical evidence of the lack of anchoring of inflation expectations on the target, see carrasco, c. and j. ferreiro ( 2012 ), “ inflation targeting and inflation expectations in

mexico, ” applied economics, july. bis central bankers ’ speeches
solely from a model and the published forecast supplemented with personal judgements. figure 3. forecasts for the gdp gap monetary policy report 1 / 2009 source : the riksbank the significance of the personal judgements becomes even clearer when we see the forecasts for the repo rate ( figure 4 ). according to our forecast, a much more expansionary monetary policy was needed during the crisis than was suggested by ramses. figure 4. forecasts for the repo rate monetary policy report 1 / 2009 source : the riksbank personal judgements are also necessary in normal situations ; and the forecasts in the main scenario published by the riksbank in the monetary policy reports and updates are produced in this way – with support from models but with the addition of considerable personal judgements. the forecasts gradually emerge during a rather long and labourintensive process that spans several weeks. bis central bankers ’ speeches the forecasts in the alternative repo rate scenarios, on the other hand, are produced in a different manner. here we use the main scenario as a starting point and then make a purely model - based adjustment using ramses. no personal judgement over and above that in the main scenario has been made. the forecasts in the alternative repo rate scenarios are thus less thoroughly analysed than those in the main scenario. if the alternative repo rate scenarios were supplemented with personal judgements, the forecasts and mean squared gaps would probably look different. the main reason for this simplified approach is that it would require too many resources to produce complete, detailed forecasts for several different repo rate paths. of course, it is not written in stone how main forecasts and alternative scenarios should be produced, and the riksbank is currently reviewing the decision - making process to see how it could be improved. but this is the way we have worked until now. one can thus imagine that part of the explanation as to why an alternative repo rate scenario may give a smaller mean squared gap than the main scenario could be that it is only a purely model - based adjustment of the main scenario. this raises another question : if one were also to supplement the alternative repo rate paths with personal judgements, would one always conclude that the main scenario would give the lowest loss? the answer to this question should reasonably be “ yes, at least most of the time ” – there are some reservations, which i will discuss in a moment. we try to conduct the policy we judge to be

##d subramanian ( 2004 ), why india can grow at 7 percent a year or more : projections and reflections, imf working papers 04 / 118, international monetary fund. 5. warnock, veronica cacdac and francis e. warnock ( 2008 ), markets and housing finance, journal of housing economics.
debt securities. euro area investment funds hold about eur 400 billion or approximately 10 % in outstanding debt securities issued by euro area banks. banks, on the other hand, lend to funds mainly through repo transactions. so any potential shock to the investment fund sector may quickly spill over to other parts of the financial system. when identifying possible weak spots in the financial system, it is sometimes useful to look back to past crisis events. i recall some 20 years ago, when long - term capital management ( ltcm ), a large and highly interconnected hedge fund, collapsed, in the wake of turbulence from the 1998 russian crisis. the rapidly changing market environment effectively turned ltcm ’ s business model into a key amplifier. ltcm was betting on longer - term developments in fixed - income markets using exceptionally high leverage. when the fund collapsed, fire - sale spillovers and counterparty exposures threatened to erode the stability of the financial system. to be clear, i am not predicting another ltcm crisis any time in the near future. but i would like to use the case of ltcm to exemplify some key vulnerabilities which played a role in the collapse – acknowledging that ltcm was not an open - ended fund and did not face redemption risk, as most mutual funds do. in particular, let me focus on risks stemming from liquidity mismatches, leverage and interconnectedness across the financial system. the asset management industry keeps reminding us that vulnerabilities in funds cannot be presumed to resemble those of banks. and it is true that investment funds do not issue deposits and that potential losses in a fund are borne by end - investors. but there is a fundamental difference between the equity in banks and the equity in funds. investors in an open - end fund can run by redeeming their units, whereas equity holders in a bank can only run by selling their shares to other market participants. a run by investment fund unitholders can therefore resemble a run by bank depositors. in both cases, the institution is, in principle, forced to sell assets in a fires sale in order to meet its short - dated liabilities. in general, asset managers are highly aware of their fund ’ s liquidity position. in the interest of investors, the fund managers have incentives to minimise any impact from their own actions on financial markets, while at the same time accommodating share creations and redemptions. so a bank - like run by unitholders in a

for questions. bis central bankers ’ speeches
credits, foreign direct investment and portfolio flows, have dropped significantly in the last few years. in the case of bank credits, total flows declined by about us $ 200 billion during the 1997 - 1998 period, although the decline has been at a more moderate pace in the last two years. in the light of this, it is important that the bank plays a catalytic role in mobilising resources within and outside of the region. one approach to this challenge would be for the bank to return to basics and improve the three channels of financial intermediation, namely, banking, equity and debt, through a number of measures. first, the bank could increase investment in the financial infrastructure in asia. just as physical infrastructure, such as airports and highways, facilitates the movement of people and goods, financial infrastructure, such as the payment and settlement systems for the banking and securities sectors, facilitates the safe and efficient movement of money. the importance of a robust payment and settlement system in this region is underscored by the events of 11 september. secondly, the bank could expand the technical assistance programme to assist economies in restructuring the banking sector. small and medium - sized enterprises employ the most workers in asia and they are mostly dependent on bank financing. the banking sector in asia, devastated by the asian financial crisis, has not fully recovered. banks understandably are adopting a very conservative lending strategy towards companies with a lower credit rating, such as small and medium - sized enterprises. the bank ’ s assistance in speeding up the banking sector reform would help smes to get back on their own feet, thereby reducing unemployment and poverty. thirdly, the bank could expand assistance in building up the institutional capacity of individual economies to improve corporate governance in the private sector. emphasis should also be made to improve the auditing, disclosure and transparency standards of publicly - listed companies. as seen in the asian crisis and again in the enron incident, good corporate governance is critical to restoring investor confidence in the equity markets. fourthly and lastly, the bank could assist with the development of the bond market in asia. clearly the financial intermediation process cannot be dominated by one or two intermediaries. earlier, in 1990, when it was the banks in the united states that seized up as a consequence of a collapse in the value of real estate collateral, the capital markets were able to substitute for the loss of bank intermediation. in asia, there is considerable room to develop a bond market to serve as a back - up in

faces would widen and become more complex as a firm grows larger and / or undertakes a wider range of activities that are more complex, converging eventually on the basel standards, as illustrated by the following diagrams. all speeches are available online at www. bankofengland. co. uk / news / speeches and @ boe _ pressoffice figure 3 : illustrative example of graduated liquidity requirements all speeches are available online at www. bankofengland. co. uk / news / speeches and @ boe _ pressoffice
policy evaluation in law and which provides the necessary financial and data resources. it is important for researchers to contribute their expertise and ideas, and play a part in this process. more often than not, bright ideas are the “ by - products ” of stimulating debate with peers. that ’ s the reason why we ’ re all here today, so without further ado, i will bring my speech to a close. thank you for your attention. bis central bankers ’ speeches

sectional analyses across different countries derived from short time series. we are therefore working to create the conditions for superior policy evaluation. 1. what is financial stability? macroprudential policy is a relative newcomer to the policy space. in some respects, the level of knowledge and experience in this area is roughly on a par with that in the field of monetary policy some years ago. the specific policy goals are difficult to quantify, transmission channels are often unknown, and the data sets and analytical methods need to be developed. why do we need macroprudential policy? the world of traditional banking regulation offers little scope for curbing the systemic repercussions of financial crises because it focuses primarily on the economic health of individual market participants. for the most part, microprudential analysis is based on the assumption that the financial system as a whole is stable, that markets are liquid and that market players that run into difficulties will not have a significant detrimental impact on the financial system or the economy as a whole. bis central bankers ’ speeches but that view is a short - sighted one, because past episodes in which seemingly isolated microprudential risks were either misinterpreted or underestimated have taught us that our work needs to take a broader perspective. risks to the stability of the financial system can arise if large institutions create negative externalities ( too big to fail ), if institutions are highly interconnected ( too connected to fail ), or also if many smaller institutions are exposed to similar types of risk ( too many to fail ). this key takeaway from the recent financial crisis prompted the establishment of macroprudential authorities around the world that focus on risks that might threaten the financial system as a whole. let ’ s begin with the mandate and the objective. the objective of macroprudential policy is to safeguard financial stability. financial stability is the term used to denote the financial system ’ s ability to perform its key macroeconomic functions – particularly so in the event of unforeseen events, periods of stress or structural upheaval. for the costs of financial crisis can be heavy – not only with regard to the amount and duration of real economic losses but also concerning the often considerable fiscal costs. it is not about completely curbing risks and fluctuations in the financial markets but instead about reducing negative externalities caused by the distress of individual institutions or market segments. here, we need to ask ourselves how “ financial stability ” can be measured and concrete indicators formulated. after all,
denis beau : the digitalisation of the financial sector - new challenges, new levers closing speech by mr denis beau, first deputy governor of the bank of france, at the 4th assises des technologies financieres, 30 september 2021. * * * ladies and gentlemen, i would first like to thank the president, eric woerth, for inviting me to close these 4th assises des technologies financieres, and to provide my insight, as a central banker and supervisor, into the challenges posed by the digitalisation of financial services. in the framework of our mission to safeguard monetary and financial stability, the main issue for the banque de france is how we can facilitate and accompany the digitalisation of the financial sector, which is a source of efficiency gains, while at the same time preserving the stability of our monetary and financial system. in order to present the concrete responses we are trying to bring to this issue, i shall start by reminding you of the new challenges posed by digitalisation to the safety and efficiency of the financial sector, before describing the three main areas where we are working to respond, in line with our mandate. i. the digitalisation of the financial sector poses new challenges a ) in terms of security, one of the main concerns raised by the current digital transformation of the financial system is it or cyber - risk. the digital transformation considerably increases financial system participants ’ surface area of exposure to cyber - threats, and hence their vulnerability to such risk. this stems in particular from their internal transformations, which rely in large part on the development of open - platform it systems and on greater use of it outsourcing, especially via the cloud. the public health crisis has significantly amplified this exposure : the widespread use of remote working has been accompanied by a massive roll - out of new collaboration tools and new software. this ( sometimes hasty ) deployment of third - party software and new methods of labour organisation has amplified the overall vulnerability of the sector. the need for vigilance is being even further heightened by the fact that cyberattacks are evolving constantly and becoming increasingly sophisticated. on a technical level, this phenomenon can in part be explained by the diffusion of “ turnkey ” hacking tools and a general increase in computer skills. on an economic level, the huge financial rewards to be gained from attacks is leading to a surge in the number of potential hackers. this dual trend has taken cyber - risk into a whole new dimension : at the company level, it represents a

1. 00 - 2. 00 jul - 08 oct - 08 jan - 09 apr - 09 jul - 09 oct - 09 jan - 10 - 2. 00 jul - 08 oct - 08 jan - 09 apr - 09 jul - 09 oct - 09 jan - 10 source : reuters, ecb calculations, and r. gurkaynak, b. sack, and j. wright ( 2008 ), " the tips yield curve and inflation compensation ", federal reserve working paper. latest observation : 19 - jan - 10 for the euro area, 15 - jan - 10 for the us.
/ en / publications / reports / studies / payment - behaviour - in - germany - 738024 [ https : / / www. bundesbank. de / en / publications / reports / studies / payment - behaviour - in - germany738024 ] 6. https : / / coinmarketcap. com / de / charts / [ https : / / coinmarketcap. com / de / charts / ] 7. study by kantar on behalf of the ecb ( european central bank ), study on new digital payment methods, march 2022.

andreas dombret : can we manage with less? the debate on greater proportionality in regulation presentation by dr andreas dombret, member of the executive board of the deutsche bundesbank, to board members of baden - wurttemberg savings banks, stuttgart, 24 april 2017. * * * 1 introduction dr herrmann, ladies and gentlemen banks and savings banks have come under fire in the media again recently. referring to " shock charges ", " fee stings " and " piggish banks ", it was as if the big daily newspapers were trying to outdo each other with their headlines. the reason? more and more banks and savings banks are introducing fees for services that were previously free – and they're becoming more open about it too. these new fee structures have come about as a result of the banks'quest to find new sources of income. to a certain extent, it's entirely legitimate to do this – after all, banks need to make money somehow. and we consumers need to get used to the idea that we'll be paying for banking services in future because as we've been told, the " culture of freebies " is coming to an end. the thing is, other sources of income that banks and savings banks could rely on in the past are drying up. in today's low - interest - rate environment, interest gains, which are so important to many institutions, are not as plentiful as they once were. and even after the period of low interest rates finally comes to its long - awaited end, danger will still be lurking in the form of interest rate risk. but it's not just interest rates that are causing banks and savings banks headaches. even though most institutions would probably put the interest - rate environment at the top of their list of pressing problems, i expect regulation would not be much further down. regulation is also the topic of my talk today – that's what i agreed with the organisers. many institutions see regulation in general, and specifically the reforms of the past few years, as a constraint and a burden. today i'd like to explore this viewpoint further and will also take the opportunity to explain why i'm convinced that we need the regulatory reforms anyway. i'd then like to talk about whether or where i see potential to revise the regulatory framework and how these changes could perhaps provide institutions with some degree of relief. 2 regulation as a burden but let's start with the idea of
george a provopoulos : the impact of climate change in greece opening address by mr george a provopoulos, governor of the bank of greece, at the presentation of the report of the climate change impacts study committee, athens, 1 june 2011. * * * first, i wish to welcome you and thank you for attending today ’ s event, which will present the results of an ambitious initiative undertaken by the bank of greece, namely a study of the economic, social and environmental impact of climate change in the case of greece. as you all know, environmental issues are not usually a matter of concern to central banks, whose principal mission is to safeguard monetary stability. it has been my view, however, that environmental themes deserve more attention, especially in a country not accustomed to studying issues of a long - term nature. when the bank of greece, nearly two years ago, announced its initiative to set up a study committee, the need for action to deal with the impact of climate change was urgent, though not as much as it is today. in the course of these two years, we have all witnessed the ongoing change in the climate and its significant impact at the global level, but also an economic crisis that prevents us from understanding the long - term benefits of investment aimed at adaptation to climate change. with the release of this report, the bank of greece, in line with its broader role and its tradition of studying the structural problems of the greek economy, helps fill a gap as regards scientific analysis and information on climate change, on its impact and on ways of dealing with it. this report represents a first attempt at a comprehensive study of the impact of climate change for greece – in particular of the cost of climate change that would be borne by the economy, the cost of implementing adaptation measures, as well as the cost of moving to a low - emissions economy, in the context of the global effort to mitigate climate change. for the first time and for close to two years, this project brought together teams from different scientific disciplines ; the teams included physicists of the atmosphere, climatologists and geophysicists, experts in agriculture, forestry and fisheries, as well as experts on water resources, tourism, the built environment and energy, not to mention economists and sociologists. the findings of the study document the need for greece to shield itself from the risks of climate change and to adopt an appropriate long - term strategy. the climate changes, as they unfold, affect and will continue to

the study ’ s cost - benefit analysis are made in euro terms. before giving the floor to the other speakers, i would like to express my deepest gratitude to all of the distinguished scientists who took part actively in such an ambitious joint effort, without remuneration but out of sheer dedication to this important project which they were called upon to carry out. bis central bankers ’ speeches