specific responses the bank of greece has acted similarly to other ncas on the regulatory front and adopted similar measures with that of the ssm for the less systemic institutions that fall under our supervisory competence. in addition, and as we did not have in place countercyclical capital buffer to release, we decided to ‘ freeze ’ the level of other systemically important institutions buffer at the existing levels for a year. banks also announced in the early stage of the crisis, a system - wide loan moratorium that is compatible with the relevant eba guidelines. the initial expiration date of december 2020 will now be extended in line with new eba guidelines, within the cap of the 9 - month period. at the same time, the greek government has taken a series of fiscal and labor market measures to support businesses and employment. these measures are similar to the ones taken in other jurisdictions and include the subsidization of loan installements of small and medium sized enterprises hit by the pandemic. the fiscal support measures and the recession have led to a sharp reversal of the general government budget surplus into deficit for 2020 and, combined with deflation, to a significant increase in the debt - to - gdp ratio. however, the inclusion of greek government bonds in the pandemic emergency purchase programme ( pepp ) of the ecb, their acceptance as collateral in the eurosystem ’ s liquidityproviding operations as well as the positive developments in international financial markets, contributed to the uninterrupted access of the greek state to capital markets and the further decline of the government bond yields. i would like now to say a few words about our proposal to set up an asset management company ( amc ) that addresses the top two challenges for greek banks ( the high level of npls and the high share of dtcs in bank capital ) simultaneously, by introducing a straightforward market - based approach. this proposal is currently under review by the greek government and if adopted could be a decisive country response to the crisis and a relevant precedent for other jurisdictions. the proposed amc could take up the legacy npls on top of those envisaged to be taken up by the hellenic asset protection scheme ( haps ), about €30 billion, as well as the new npls resulting from the pandemic ( estimated at about 8 - 10 billion euros ). hence, a total of about €40 billion. in a nutshell, according to the bog proposal : an npl transfer at net

previous crisis. 2. how european regulators responded to the crisis this time the response by the regulatory authorities to the crisis was immediate and ( so far ) effective. there are two reasons behind this prompt reaction : first, the previous crisis was very recent and the lessons learnt had not yet been forgotten, and second, the pandemic is a symmetric shock and hit hard all member states. this facilitated the decision making process by regulators, amid a period when monetary and fiscal authorities also provided enormous support. in fact, all players in the eurozone were fully aligned ; central bankers, regulators, political authorities. in a nutshell, rapid common action is now the name of the game, unlike in previous crises. the relief measures taken by the regulatory authorities are more or less known. i would like though to comment on two of them which i think are relevant for future policy actions but also for 1 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches a potential review of the existing framework : the first has to do with the usability of buffers. despite the accommodative monetary policy that provided ample liquidity to credit institutions and the clear communication from the supervisory authorities on the timeline for the flexibility granted, we notice that most banks across the globe are reluctant to dive into their buffers. recall that the essence of macro prudential buffers is to support the real economy during an economic downturn, thus mitigating procyclicality. i can think of several reasons behind this but i believe that the primary reason is the uncertainty about the true impact of the pandemic to the balance sheet of corporates and households. policy makers should review this issue and the effectiveness of macroprudential buffers after the end of the ongoing crisis. the second has to do with the recognition of credit losses. here the authorities also acted quickly and clarified the interplay between loan moratoria and loan categorization. however, there is a widespread view that many banks in the euro - area underestimate their credit losses due to the pandemic, especially for the performing customers that are currently benefiting from payment deferrals. the recent letter by the chair of the ssm regarding the identification and measurement of credit risk in the context of the covid - 19 pandemic communicates clearly the supervisory expectations. therefore, it seems ( correctly in my view ) that the asset quality of european lenders will be in the epicenter of the supervisory action this year. 3. country