peter praet : have unconventional policies overstretched central bank independence? challenges for accountability and transparency in the wake of the crisis keynote address by mr peter praet, member of the executive board of the european central bank, at the " symposium on building the financial system of the 21st century : an agenda for europe and the united states ", frankfurt am main, 29 march 2017. * * * i would like to thank claus brand for his contribution to this speech. evolution in consensus on the role of central banks and central bank independence in the course of monetary history, consensus on the role of monetary policy and on the appropriate degree of independence of the central bank has fluctuated considerably. during major crises, the pendulum has tended to swing from one extreme to the other. in the heyday of the gold standard, i. e. the decades preceding world war i, there was a commonly accepted understanding of how to preserve monetary and financial stability. the gold standard provided what we call a “ nominal anchor ”. it effectively ensured central bank independence from other public policies by subjecting monetary policy to an automatic rule. 1 at the same time, there was a clear understanding of the role of central banks as a lender of last resort. under that regime, central banks enjoyed sufficient discretion to take effective action in the event of banking panics. adherence to the oft - quoted bagehot principle ( “ lend freely at a high rate against good collateral ” to solvent, but illiquid institutions2 ) ensured that lender of last resort activities did not threaten monetary stability. the pendulum began to swing away from this pre - war consensus when world war i prompted many countries to subordinate monetary policy to financing war and to suspend the gold standard. countries returning to the gold standard after world war i, however, turned to overly rigid management of monetary affairs. lacking the necessary discretion, following the wall street crash and the global recession in 1929, and the subsequent banking crisis, monetary policy prompted a precipitous collapse in money and prices. 3 this spawned the greatest loss in jobs and output on record in what came to be remembered as the great depression. in a fateful irony of monetary history, the role of monetary policy in precipitating these calamitous events did not usher in monetary reform. on the contrary, notions hardened that monetary policy was powerless and that macroeconomic stability needed to be safeguarded through other policies. 4 this shift in emphasis culminated in fiscal dominance, which contributed

frank elderson : forests and finance panel contribution by mr frank elderson, member of the executive board of the european central bank, at cop26 world leaders ’ summit presidency event on “ action on forest and land use ”, frankfurt am main, 2 november 2021. * * * the challenges addressed here today are of vital importance to the network of central banks and supervisors for greening the financial system ( ngfs ). since its foundation in 2017, the ngfs has grown with lightning speed from eight to almost 100 members today. our membership encompasses central banks and supervisors from developing, emerging and developed economies. covering five continents, ranging from the biggest economies to the smallest island states – none immune from storms, fires, floods and deforestation. the bad news is that until a few years ago, climate change and environmental degradation were all but blind spots for the financial sector. the good news is that this is no longer so. the work of the ngfs has decisively contributed to the insight that climate and environmental risks are a source of financial risk, bringing them squarely within the mandates of central banks and supervisors. and to the understanding that the financial sector needs to be part of the solution to the ongoing climate and environmental crises. with our large and committed membership, our leverage on the financial sector can hardly be overestimated. together we supervise all global systemically relevant banks and over two - thirds of systemically relevant insurers. together we cover 88 % of the global economy and 85 % of all global emissions. at the ngfs we have been working hard over the past four years to integrate climate - related and environmental risks into the work of central banks and supervisors. we published a guide recommending that supervisors clarify their expectations that banks and insurers should revisit their very dna to address climate - related and environmental risks. in addition, the ngfs has developed forward - looking scenarios, identified data gaps and assessed how climate change is relevant for monetary policy. through these activities, clear light has been shone on the relevance of climate change for the financial sector. concrete tools have been developed and significant progress has been made. however, forests – and more broadly, nature – have so far remained too much in the shadows. recognising the harm that nature - blind financial flows may cause, and that climate change and environmental degradation are very much related, last month the ngfs published a study on biodiversity and financial stability. we – and the financial institutions we supervise – need to