on our balance sheet will remain stable for a good while, and that the downward pressure on longterm interest rates will persist. in other speeches, peter praet has already shown that the reinvestment policy indeed has a very persistent impact on term premia2. likewise, our continued pledge to keep key policy rates at their current levels well past the end of net purchases has assured in the past and will assure in the future that the short - end of the curve remains firmly anchored at low levels. as we move further in time, the main instrument for shaping the stance will again become the key policy rates, including forward guidance about their likely evolution. as such, our communication will likely be further specified and calibrated to ensure that inflation continues to evolve in line with our objective. we will continue to inform markets to the best of our ability about the state of our thinking about the way forward, making adjustments to our policy as predictable as possible. predictability and gradualism should also limit the spillovers to central, eastern and southeastern european ( cesee ) countries when we decide on normalizing our monetary policy. indeed, the federal reserve “ taper tantrum ” of may 2013 did lead to sizeable capital outflows from catching - up economies, including in the cesee region. however, the monetary policy tightening alluded to in ben bernanke ’ s tapering speech came as a surprise to financial markets ; as said before, the ecb ’ s monetary policy normalization aims to be gradual and predictable. moreover, since then, cesee countries have taken steps to reduce their vulnerabilities : most of them now have deeper local currency debt markets, smaller macro imbalances, and stronger macroeconomic frameworks. nevertheless, cesee countries are still exposed to a tightening in global financial conditions, due to their generally elevated external liabilities ; at 56 % of gdp on average ( in 2017 ), most cesee countries have a relatively high external debt ratio. vulnerability to a rise in global rates varies greatly across the region, however, reflecting not only differences in debt levels but also in the structure of countries ’ external liabilities, including the role of fdi versus more volatile capital inflows in those liabilities and the shares of foreign currency and short - term debt. hence, cesee countries should take advantage of the current stronger global economy to 4 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches continue to build resilience to changes in external financial conditions. structural

the treaty because only 5 member states were ready to implement them at the time. second example is the social charter, that was negotiated together with the maastricht treaty, but that was not acceptable at the time for the british government. a third example of flexibility brings me back to my own business. as you surely know only 12 out of the 15 current member states have until now adopted the single currency. according to the treaty, member states that have not yet adopted the euro are called " member states with a derogation ". two categories can be distinguished. the uk and denmark make up one category : these member states got respectively an opt - in and an opt - out. the second category consists of the member states that can't adopt the euro because they do not yet comply with the well - known convergence criteria. only sweden is currently in this position, but very soon a number of new member states will join sweden, having the vocation - and even the legal obligation - to adopt the euro at the right moment. it is very obvious that the member states of the euro area are more advanced in economic integration than the others are. so, this is clearly a case of " closer co - operation ", which has taken shape in the creation of a forum where the ecofin - ministers of the euro area can discuss the economic situation in the world, in the european community and in the euro area, and its consequences for economic policy making. this forum is, as you know, called the " eurogroup " and i'm sure that minister reynders will tell you everything about it after lunch. so to us, central bankers, closer co - operation or models of flexible integration is not some kind of theoretical exercise, we live with it constantly. ladies and gentlemen, my feeling is that the royal institute and the national bank have chosen for the colloquium of today a topic that is very much alive in the ongoing debate about the future institutional framework of european integration. the fact that we could find a series of utmost distinguished speakers ready to discuss this topic today with you, is a further demonstration of its importance.