macroprudential tools contained in the ssm regulation are thus specific aspects of the financial stability mandate of the ecb, which is based on the specific authorisation in article 127 ( 6 ) of the tfeu. neither the ssm regulation in general, however, nor article 5 in particular confers a general competence on the ecb in the fields of financial stability and macroprudential policy. democracy, independence and financial stability when we interpret the competences of public institutions we are essentially discussing the limits of their powers. as with any discussion on public powers, the aspect of legitimacy also needs to be considered. in the field of financial stability and macroprudential policies, a multitude of institutions are involved, such as parliaments, eu political institutions, national governments, and expert bodies at both the european and the national level. some of these actors derive their legitimacy from their independent expertise, others from their democratic accountability. what role each of them should play in achieving financial stability is intimately connected with the source of their legitimacy. this brings me back to the first point of my speech : financial stability might be an objective less well suited to independent expertise - based bodies than a price stability objective. even though the treaty does not give a definition of price stability, it is an objective that is quantifiable. the ecb governing council aims to maintain inflation rates below, but close to, 2 % over the medium term. putting a figure on price stability makes monetary policy more transparent and provides a clear and measurable yardstick against which european citizens can hold the ecb accountable. for financial stability no such clear yardstick exists. without clear objectives, however, it is much more difficult to measure the performance of independent, expertise - based institutions and hold them to account. 21 beyond that, the pursuit of financial stability often involves choices with stronger distributional implications. this is an additional argument in favour of the ultimate responsibility remaining in the political sphere. financial stability is thus a policy area where expert bodies and politically accountable institutions are called on to cooperate, with no one having exclusive responsibility. in this field, expert bodies with strong guarantees of independence, such as the ecb, might be better suited to “ contributing ” in an advisory capacity 5 / 7 bis central bankers'speeches while the “ ultimate responsibility ” is rather borne by institutions embedded in political accountability arrangements at the national level. otherwise political pressures to adopt one or the other stance in questions of financial stability might also threaten central bank independence.

' shield'( development of effective countermeasures ) is traditional in the security field, our ability to adequately secure ai systems will have a major influence on the ability of different actors to make extensive use of this technology. 2 / even though ai technologies are not yet fully mature, it seems to me that central banks and financial supervisors should embrace them without delay, for at least three reasons. 1 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches first, to continue to carry out our missions effectively, by doing more and doing it better. ai can of course help us become more efficient, by increasing the level of automation. but we also want to offer new capabilities to agents. for example, our lucia tool, an ai - based system with the capacity to analyze large volumes of banking transactions, allows us to assess the performance and relevance of banks'aml / cft models during our on - site inspections second, to develop critical expertise in ai. using ai for our own purposes allows us to gradually acquire a good command of the technology, and is a very effective way of properly understanding its benefits and risks. the virtues of learning by doing explain why internal uses of ai are very complementary to the supervision of ai systems deployed by the financial sector. for example, very recently, the acpr, with the help of banque de france's innovation center, le lab, organized a " suptech tech sprint ", a hackathon intended to explore what generative ai can bring to the various supervisory functions. in three days, this event revealed the potential of large language models ( llm ) for supervision. finally, to drive the financial ecosystem, by sending a signal to the market that it too can – or must – take the plunge. for example, the cutting - edge work being carried out at the banque de france on post - quantum cryptography is raising awareness among private stakeholders about the need to address this threat. so, while it is clear to me that central banks and supervisors must seize the opportunities offered by ai, the question is : how do we do that? 3 / it seems to me that we must first lay down a fundamental principle of governance : ai must be at the service of humanity and society, and not the other way round. from this perspective, even if it does not solve all the problems, the ongoing adoption of the european ai act, the world's first binding text laying down the principles of " trustworthy ai ", is a welcome step