and the various steps underway to help promote and support its adoption. i will then discuss the global foreign exchange committee ’ s ( gfxc ) objectives, which include the ongoing evolution and maintenance of the code. finally, i will spend some time discussing particular areas where the market is evolving and where the gfxc is currently soliciting additional input, including on “ last look. ” development of the code and its principles the foreign exchange working group ( fxwg ), led by guy debelle of the reserve bank of australia, was established under the auspices of the bank for international settlements ( bis ) markets committee in july 2015. 2 it was tasked with facilitating the development of a single, global set of principles for the fx market and accompanying tools to promote adherence to those principles. i had the pleasure of leading the work stream to write the code, while chris salmon of the bank of england led the effort to create tools to promote adherence. the work of the fxwg was supported by the market participants group ( mpg ), led by david puth of cls, which included members from all corners of the fx industry. 1 / 6 bis central bankers'speeches as made clear in the foreword, the code is not regulation — it is a set of voluntary, global best practices. the development of successful best practices requires active engagement from a diverse spectrum of market participants, which we were fortunate to have throughout this effort. the fx global code is intended for all fx market participants engaged in the global wholesale market. this includes sell - side institutions, certain market infrastructures, and buyside institutions as well. the spectrum of buy side institutions active in fx is particularly complex and varied, encompassing hedge funds, high frequency trading firms, asset managers and corporates among others. the size and complexity of their fx market activities and the nature of those activities may differ significantly. hearing the viewpoints of many different institutions was critical to delivering a relevant code for this diverse landscape, recognizing that while the code applies to all, the details of precisely how it applies may differ. i found that the series of frank debates and discussions that we — market participants and central bankers alike — had over the past two years was an important process in itself, and not just a means to an end. the result was multiple drafts of the code and, ultimately, a product that more clearly articulated principles and defined terminology. the 55 principles within the global code focus on promoting transparency, fairness and mitigating risk across six

emerging markets and for monetary policy. three plenary sessions will address these themes and i will make a few introductory comments on each of them. the regulatory response to the financial crisis the global financial crisis has spurred a review of banking regulations. much of the discussions in international forums, such as the international monetary fund and the bank for international settlements, have centred round the appropriate regulatory responses to prevent a recurrence of unfettered lending by banks in future. achieving global consensus on these issues has not been easy, and while progress has been made, significant differences still remain. there is the risk that the crisis will result in excessive politicisation of regulatory issues in a quest to ensure that someone is seen to be responsible for the crisis. this has the potential to create a new moral hazard by giving the impression that with the agreement on basel iii, the system is safe. but the regulators do not run the institutions and there are no absolute guarantees of safety. nevertheless, if things do implode, it would be the regulator that would be deemed to be responsible. the possibility also exists that there has been too much of a focus on banks, rather than on the broader financial system. over - regulation of banks could not only reduce lending, but it could result in more disintermediation, thus preparing the ground for the next crisis. what the recent crisis has shown is the inventiveness of financial markets to come up with products or institutions that circumvent existing regulations. furthermore, there is the danger that the pendulum could swing too much in the direction of an excessively tight regulatory regime which could, in turn, stifle the recovery of the banks and their ability to lend, with adverse consequences for the broader economic recovery. south africa did not have a banking crisis, thanks to prudent management and appropriate regulation and supervision. nevertheless, the country has not been spared the fall - out of the crisis, nor is its regulatory environment immune to the changes that are being implemented at the global level. experience and implications of europe ’ s economic policy challenges : lessons for emerging - market economies the crisis was characterised by a sharp and relatively synchronised global downturn. the recovery, however, has been varied across countries and regions. the euro area has been particularly hard hit. its banking sector is still in recovery mode, and while there appears to be some stability currently, the sovereign debt issue that threatened the existence of the euro zone as a single currency area earlier in