samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
“ let the future of finance be that of financing the future! ” with mark carney ’ s speech, we have come to an end to today ’ s conference. before we move on to the much deserved reception with drinks and snacks, please allow me to share a few closing thoughts with you. i would first of all like to thank the acpr and bank of england for co - organizing this event with us. without their commitment and hard work, we would have never such an impressive line - up of speakers : more than 35 different speakers, moderators and panelists! i want to thank in particular the organizing committee, consisting of representatives of our three organizations for all their hard work. and i want to thank you all for coming here, from all corners of the globe. we hope, as do all ngfs members, that this conference has inspired you. and that you will go home motivated to take the next steps for integrating green finance into supervisory practices. and if you get back home, and you want to get to work, but you are also unsure how to start : know that the ngfs is open for business and that we very much welcome applications from those willing to enthusiastically contribute to the work of the ngfs. and let me just say this though : sustainability is not some niche. it ’ s is not a " nice to have " for the happy few. sustainability is crucial for our own survival. there is no alternative. without rendering our way of life sustainable, we die. in fact, people are dying already. the world health organization states on its website that “ climatic changes already are estimated to cause over 150, 000 deaths annually. ” and the site provides us with direct links to scientific studies on this subject. so as long as we keep speaking about sustainable finance we will not have succeeded. we do not need a thing called ‘ sustainable finance ’. we need all finance to be sustainable. this is our ultimate to - be - or - not - to - be moment. finance will be sustainable or there will be no finance. we as a regulatory community, we as the central banks and prudential supervisors of the world, have a crucial role to play in all of this. a role squarely within our mandate as supervisors and financial stability authorities. we must contribute to this great financial transformation by ensuring the safety and soundness of financial institutions and the system as a whole in this transformational process. the good news is that we have already come a long

way, as is evidenced today by all the examples we ’ ve heard, by all the institutions present, and by all the inspiring speakers and participants. and once we have reached that goal of all finance being sustainable, we will have ensured a better horizon for our children and their children. a horizon - a future! - that to our children is not tragic, but positive and bright. we will have overcome the tragedy of the horizon. that “ the last syllable of recorded time ” be not the word “ tragedy ”. so let us together ensure that horizons from this day will no longer be associated with tragedy, but instead with a bright, green, sustainable future. let the future of finance be that of financing the future! thank you.
the lisbon agenda. this has been focussed on improving economic performance in europe over the past few years. it has been motivated by europe ’ s generally poor record, apart from a few countries including ireland, in regard to both employment and productivity growth. moreover, in recent years, the growth performance of the european economy has been disappointing, with the economic upturn in europe much weaker than in the us and asia. the longer term trend is also worrying - the european economy has grown less quickly than the us over the last decade, during which time europe has moved from having a higher rate of productivity growth than the us, to a lower one. the problem, however, is not simply the comparison with the us productivity growth in europe has deteriorated with respect to its own past. the net result has been a slowdown in the rate of growth of output per head, the main determinant of living standards. relative to the us, in terms of the improvement in living standards, europe is now losing ground. these developments have raised questions as to whether europe ’ s economic structures are less favourable for economic growth. in particular, it would appear that structural rigidities have meant that the european economy has been slow to adapt to the increasing pressures of globalisation and rapid technological change. international competition is intensifying and europe faces a dual challenge from the us and asia. for europe to prosper, it needs to have an appropriate economic base, recognising that in the decades ahead competition in global markets is going to be intense. it was for these reasons that, in lisbon in march 2000, the then 15 eu leaders agreed that the eu should commit to raising the rate of economic growth and employment. in the lisbon strategy european leaders committed the eu to become by 2010 “ the most dynamic and competitive knowledge - based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs ”. however, so far, progress in achieving the lisbon objectives has been poor. there are various reasons for this. in terms of the economic environment, the last four years have not been helpful to the chances of achieving the lisbon goals. many countries have found themselves in a dilemma because of structural weakness and weak demand, national economic performance has been poor. as national economic performance has been poor, it has been more difficult to implement the lisbon agenda. however, the problems in delivering on lisbon objectives have not been solely or even largely due to outside circumstances. there is the problem that the strategy itself has become too broad

who led this work, ciara lawler. i ’ d also like to thank the architects from henry j. lyons, who designed the space, dublin city council, our archivist, ross higgins, and many teams across the bank including facilities management, fusion, security and porters. to conclude, i hope you enjoy this event and that you will return to visit us with your friends and families. 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches
respect to the implementation of structural reforms of the public and real sectors, with respect to privatisation or harmonisation of consumption with real possibilities and requirements of our country ’ s development, with respect to financial discipline at all levels, may not be compensated for by political yarns. work on the feasibility study does not supplant work on structural reforms! neither structural reforms nor the feasibility study “ recognize ” party interest, pre - or post - election times, “ specific needs ” of the transition in serbia, but only the things that have actually been done. the national bank of serbia does not need either imf or the world bank to “ propel ” it, as these institutions are real partners rather than ordering parties for us. we know what we ought to do and it is our hope that other economic policy actors will, if not follow our lead, then at least not try to stop us on our way. thank you.

nbs created a stable economic environment and successfully slashed inflation, forcing the government and policy makers to face the reality. and the reality is unyielding : inflation does not create jobs, it does not push gdp up, and, perhaps most importantly, inflation has not created welfare anywhere in the world! is it then possible that, even after the devastating consequences of the 1992 - 1993 hyperinflation on the country ’ s economy, serbia has still not grasped how damaging the effects of inflation can be?
of the public sector has kept real interest rates very high for over a decade. bold privatization efforts, broadening the tax base, and reforming the social security system are the best ways to correct this situation, and i may say that they are all under way. macroeconomic stability and political stability are the keys to achieving sustainable growth in a low inflation environment.

mr. ercel explains developments in the turkish economy that help in understanding the country ’ s market opportunites speech by the governor of the central bank of the republic of turkey, mr. gazi ercel, on the occasion of the conference on “ private provision of infrastructure in turkey ” held at ciragan palace in istanbul on 3 / 4 / 97. for a comprehensive understanding of the opportunities offered by turkey ’ s market, i should stress the implications of our journey toward liberalisation. in 1980, with world conditions changing and the domestic economy in crisis, turkey launched a structural adjustment program based on free market principles and an outward - looking economic policy. since then, a series of liberalisation measures have been taken. the most significant accomplishment of the turkish liberalisation process is that it has restructured economic relations. both the financial system and the foreign exchange system have been liberalised. before discussing turkey ’ s economic performance, i would like to describe some features of our foreign exchange system and financial system. let me begin with the foreign exchange system. efforts to liberalise turkey ’ s balance of payments go all the way back to the great depression, and ever since the 1930 ’ s, the issue has been whether to liberalise the current account or the capital account. now these questions have been settled. let me summarise the state of the foreign exchange regime under five headings : 1. residents are permitted to buy, sell, and use foreign exchange freely. 2. residents are also allowed to purchase, through authorised financial institutions, shares quoted on foreign stock markets, and are permitted to transfer foreign exchange abroad to pay for purchases of such securities. 3. by the same token, non - residents are allowed to buy and sell turkish securities quoted on the turkish stock market. they are also allowed to buy and sell turkish government securities through intermediary institutions operating in turkey. 4. a substantial part of the controls on capital movements were removed, greatly easing inflows and outflows of credit. turkey has accepted the provisions of article viii of the articles of agreement. 5. to avoid excessive risks for the banks, new regulations were adopted governing the foreign exchange position of the commercial banks. the banks are free to set their own rates for buying and selling foreign exchange. our foreign exchange system, described above, is very convenient for foreign capital flows. now let me describe the main characteristics of our financial system. even though our efforts to liberalise the financial system did not begin until 1980
to a potentially disastrous chain reaction of failures. minimizing systemic risk in payment and settlement systems is not only an objective in itself. it is also a precondition for achieving financial stability and for the efficient conduct of monetary policy. these, in turn, are necessary for the integrity of the euro as a major global currency. our oversight role is enshrined in both domestic and european legislation. domestically the legal basis is the central bank act of 1997. in the broader european context, one of the basic tasks of the european system of central banks ( of which the bank is a member ) is " to promote the smooth operation of payment systems ". the eurosystem is further empowered " to ensure efficient and sound clearing and payment systems within the community and with other countries ". back in the early 1990s, central banks focussed on large - value netting systems where the safety concerns were more evident. gradually, however, the focus of oversight has been extended, to varying degrees in different countries, to : • real - time gross settlement systems, • retail payment systems, • payment instruments such as payment cards, direct debits and credit transfers, • third - party service providers, • central counterparties, and • securities clearing and settlement systems. the extensive range of activities now subject to oversight reflects their potential impact on financial stability and their links to the smooth conduct of monetary policy. central banks are organised so that their operational role in payment systems does not conflict with their oversight role. the bank currently directly oversees the irish real - time gross settlement system, iris, and the two retail payment systems concerned with paper and electronic clearing. in doing so, it applies the provisions of the central bank act, 1997 that require all payment systems operating in the state to be approved, and have their rules vetted, by the central bank. in approving any payment system's rules, we must have regard to the "... proper and orderly regulation of the payment system concerned and of competition between payment systems... ". in assessing the soundness of these domestic payment systems, we use as reference the internationally recognised principles developed by the committee on payment and settlement systems of the central banks of the g10 countries. in addition to these direct arrangements, the central bank is involved in a number of co - operative oversight roles. thus, in relation to the target system, which interlinks all eu euro - denominated real time gross settlement systems, we participate in the eurosyst

help to further this approach. i thank the open university for having invited me to give this talk, and i look forward very much to your questions and comments.
be examined in its totality for practicable implementation at all offices / departments. i am sure that most of the newer software programmes would have all the essential and desirable features as mandatory part of their architecture. the software that are currently in use would have to be scrutinised from the point of view of conformity to the minimum security requirements that i had dwelt upon. as leaders who would be using technology as a cutting edge towards excellence in services, you would all agree that these key requirements of security are required to be addressed in the sessions of today. it is gratifying to note the initiative taken by iba in organizing such seminars and conferences which facilitate transfer of knowledge. i am sure that the deliberations of the day would be enriching to all the delegates. i wish the conference all success. thank you.

60 ( series 14 ) itraxx main europe 5 yr 23. 04 * 206. 55 88. 00 ( apr 8, 2011 series 14 ) 186. 00 ( series 14 ) wti 61. 47 145. 29 ( on july 3, 08 ) 72. 66 ( sep 22, 2010 ) 88. 91 us treasury 10 yr 5. 29 2. 05 3. 74 ( feb 8, 2011 ) 1. 98 dow jones ( april 29, 2011 ) implied value of dow jones ( feb 8, 2011 ) dxy 80. 08 88. 19 72. 93 ( apr 29, 2011 ) 76. 83 since last one year as on sep 14, * data pertains to may 1, 2007. the data for the entire period ( april 1, 2007 to 1st week of aug, 2007 ) is not available. bis central bankers ’ speeches
innovation that may have significant macroeconomic benefits to all involved. we are therefore keen to draw on the policy debate arising from this conference to move financial services in zambia to new frontiers. as bank of zambia, we will play a catalytic role and facilitate private sector led developmental initiatives. i thank you.

point start trending upwards again. for the moment, however, the declining trend inflation component is something we will have to deal with. so what does this environment imply for central banks? despite accommodative monetary policy, inflation may remain persistently below the central bank ’ s objective for a considerable amount of time. this could undermine monetary authorities ’ credibility and the effectiveness of their policies. to support credibility, central banks may therefore want to push the cyclical inflation component even harder, more aggressively easing policy in conventional and unconventional ways. as janet yellen 2 for a thorough analysis of this phenomenon in the euro area, see ciccarelli, m. and c. osbat ( 2017 ) low inflation in the euro area : causes and consequences. ecb occasional paper no 181, january. 3 ha, j., ivanova, a., ohnsorge, f., unsal and d. filiz ( 2019 ). inflation : concepts, evolution, and correlates. world bank policy research working paper no. 8738. 4 a thorough empirical analysis of how the changes in the global economy can be characterized by a trend in inflation is provided in cecchetti, s., hooper, p., kasman, b., schoenholtz, k. and m. watson ( 2007 ). understanding the evolving inflation process. paper presented at the us monetary policy forum, 9 march. for a discussion of the decline in trend inflation and increase in inflation persistence in the euro area over the past decade, see ciccarelli, m. and c. osbat ( 2017 ) low inflation in the euro area : causes and consequences. ecb occasional paper no 181, january. 5 see hindrayanto, i., samarina, a. and i. stanga ( 2019 ). is the phillips curve still alive? evidence from the euro area. economics letters 174, 149 ‐ 152. for a discussion of these results in a broader context, see bonam, d., galati, g., hindrayanto, i., hoeberichts, m., samarina, a. and i. stanga ( 2019 ). inflation in the euro area since the global financial crisis. dnb occasional study no. 3. observed in the us context, “ given that inflation has been so very low for so long [ … ] it may be necessary to have a hot labor market for inflation to move back
a stone on the scales, fell the biggest pine i ’ ve got. 8 thank you for your attention! text from olav h. hauge ( 2002 ) : “ lagnaden gjer mange til heltar. aforsimar i utval ”, det norske samlaget. translated by helle snellingen and veronica harrington, staff translators, norges bank. from olav h. hauge ( 1988 ) : ” mange ars røynsle med pil og boge – 99 dikt av olav h. hauge ”, det norske samlaget. translated by helle snellingen and veronica harrington, staff translators, norges bank.

northern rock shine towards us. we are indeed witnessing crises at banks in neighbouring countries. yngvar ustvedt ( 1994 ) “ henrik wergeland – en biografi ”, gyldendal norsk forlag a / s. source : www. dokpro. uio. no. text from “ henrik wergeland – samlede skrifter ”, ed. herman jæger, didrik arup seip, halvdan koht and einar høigard, published by steenske publishers, 1918 - 1940. poem translated by anne born, published in " the army of truth ", the university of wisconsin press. the turmoil spread to money and credit markets in august. few knew who was exposed to losses, and banks, funds and financial establishments started to question counterparties ’ financial situation, and held on to their money. this resulted in a surge in banks ’ premia on short - term interbank rates. moreover, banks had to bring back on their books loans from companies they had established, which further reduced their capacity and willingness to provide new loans. several large foreign banks have received capital infusions from sovereign - wealth funds in the middle east and asia to bolster their financial strength. what began as isolated losses in a small segment of the us home mortgage market led to a confidence crisis, which spread to money and credit markets in many countries in autumn 2007. in the us, there is a risk that the losses will increase in other segments of the property market and on ordinary consumer and business credit. many of the new financial instruments which were forged to diversify risk have proved to be non - viable. it is now difficult for many companies to raise new capital or procure long - term funding. there are also signs that prices and activity in property markets have reversed and are falling in many european countries. around the turn of the year, doubts were raised as to the financial strength of some us banks. the new year was ushered in amid fears of a setback in the us and a sharp decline in global equity prices. so far this year, the market capitalisation of the oslo stock exchange has declined by more than 15 per cent, or more than nok 300 billion. when the interbank market seized up, many central banks injected extra liquidity. in periods, norges bank has also provided additional loans to banks. this has reduced swings in interbank rates. norwegian banks borrow dollars short in
generally more effective, in part by ensuring that market expectations are formed efficiently. see for example : blinder, alan, charles goodhart, philipp hildebrand, david lipton and charles wyplosz ( 2001 ) how do central banks talk? geneva reports on the world economy 3, geneva : international center for monetary and banking studies as central bankers, we are aware that the potency of monetary policy actions can be strengthened if markets understand the overall intention behind the central bank ’ s policy decision and the results it expects to achieve. indeed, the emergence of “ open mouth ” operations as a policy tool outside of the traditional channels of monetary policy has been recognized by central bankers. as pointed out by ehrmann and fratzccher ( 2005 ) : “ central banks have direct control over a single interest rate, usually the overnight rate, while their success in achieving their mandate requires that they are able to influence asset prices and interest rates at all maturities ”. in the case of the bangko sentral, we typically adjust our overnight policy rate, when necessary, by increments of as low as 25 basis points. if we really think about it, we do not expect that such a marginal adjustment in a very short - term instrument will do the job for us. rather, we rely on the markets to interpret our signals properly and allow for appropriate adjustments in the prices of financial assets that really matter, including the longer - term tenors. in general, central banks now avoid surprising the market since this could generate unwarranted volatility. this is where communication comes in : it increases the predictability of policy decisions and helps the market anticipate how the central bank might react to a particular situation, event or development. indeed, good transparency practices promote greater market efficiency. for an inflation targeting central bank such as the bangko sentral, communication is crucial in anchoring inflation expectations. to help guide public expectations, it is incumbent upon an inflation targeting central bank to disclose its outlook for future inflation. managing the expectations channel is, therefore, critical. apart from influencing the market with its policy actions, communication also allows the central bank to obtain useful feedback from its stakeholders, which in turn is an important input to policy formulation. given these arguments in favor of communication, the next critical issue is the extent of transparency. how transparent should central banks be? my view is that central banks should take a pragmatic approach to communication. while transparency is a good policy

of generating fresh perspectives but also in fostering regular exchange and cooperation among the participants. have a wonderful stay in our country. thank you and mabuhay!