decision makers within those businesses. this is because we have wanted to very clearly ensure accountability sits with the directors, and also because these individuals are much closer to their day - to - day operations. the importance of open and honest disclosure from insurers is clear. sadly, this openness has proven to not always exist. in cbl, we now have an example of a regulated entity that did not engage with the reserve bank openly. justice courtney ’ s judgement in the hearing for cbl ’ s liquidation noted “ a lack of candour in dealing with the company ’ s auditors and the regulator ” 4 the reserve bank ’ s relationship charter5 seeks – in part – to address these kinds of issues in a practical and positive manner. by establishing how we will interact with an institution, we are laying down a clear marker. what does this mean in practical terms? the reserve bank needs to more often positively verify the information and assurances it receives from regulated institutions. we will be intensifying our “ show me, don ’ t just tell me ” style of engagement with the industry. and, we will be expecting to see a great deal more of this verification activity happening at the senior management and board level. an example of this new approach being applied is our review of the appointed actuary regime. you will be aware that this review is ongoing, and some of you have received visits from the reserve bank ’ s team. a sample of 15 insurers were selected for this review, aimed to represent the diversity of the new zealand insurance industry ( e. g., small and large insurers, life and general, branch and locally incorporated, directly employed and external consultant. for those who took part in the interviews or provided us with submissions, we thank you for your time and your open, free and frank discussions. https : / / forms. justice. govt. nz / search / documents / pdf / jdo / cc / alfresco / service / api / node / content / workspace / sp acesstore / 193a6a73 - 1a5b - 436e - af77 - e6ef7173c9fa / 193a6a73 - 1a5b - 436e - af77 - e6ef7173c9fa. pdf https : / / www. rbnz. govt. nz / news / 2018 / 12 / reserve - bank - aims - for - best

emerging problems. 1. international aspects of the fiscal crisis and recovery of the 1980s in trade, migration and finance, ireland had of course been an exceptionally open economy for a very long time. the large migration flows, especially to the uk and the new world, and the currency and banking links go back to the early 19th century at least, with scarcely any overall interruption. irish banks parked their excess resources in the london money market right up to the 1960s – a pattern familiar to many african countries today. nor is the current crisis the first ( o grada, 2011 ) – indeed the potentially turbocharged nature of the globalized economy is well - illustrated by the rapid recovery from the previous severe crisis of less than a generation ago, whose onset coincided with the decoupling – for the first time since just after the napoleonic wars – of ireland ’ s currency from sterling. the earlier of the two macroeconomic cycles we look at happened at a point where global capital markets were still just beginning to move into the high gear that we see today. we may think of this as turbocharger mark 1. it allowed the irish government to access foreign capital to some extent without much by way of credit risk premium, but the fear of a sudden stop of this capital flow brought expansion to an end and resulted in a painful and protracted recession through the 1980s. that crisis had its origin in the turbulent macroeconomic years of the 1970s which themselves saw ireland make several severe demand management errors which stifled its capacity to benefit fully from the opportunities offered by eu ( ec ) membership from 1973. new opportunities there were, and especially the higher prices for agricultural produce under the common agricultural policy. but that was not all : eu membership became a major channel for transmitting globalization to ireland. but the expansionist fiscal response to the stagnation of the 1970s created a huge and spiralling government and balance of payment deficit which proved difficult to reverse in the early 1980s. by this stage, membership of the erm of the european monetary system had broken the currency link with sterling, and the irish pound was prone to being realigned against the stronger erm currencies – something that happened about once a year for the first 8 years of the system. it is interesting therefore to contemplate how international factors influenced the fiscal correction of the 1980s. although exchange controls still existed and indeed had been as with many african countries, the tendency for comparative advantage in trade to lead to heavy concentration in exports on just a few commodities is a