may 2013 we announced that we would extend the minimum horizon for this procedure until july 2014 ; in november 2013, this was further extended for as long as necessary, and at least until july 2015. this form of forward reassurance provided banks with some certainty about their eurosystem funding for as long as necessary, and therefore especially in conditions of renewed turbulence. this reassurance has also helped ease concerns about the expiration of the two three - year operations. a third occasion when communication mattered was during last summer, when we were facing pronounced volatility in the money market forward curve which threatened to undermine our accommodative monetary policy stance. we succeeded in narrowing down market expectations regarding the path of our instruments. in other words, we clarified our reaction function by including forward guidance in our communication. more precisely, on 4 july 2013 the governing council stated that it expected “ the key ecb interest rates to remain at present or lower levels for an extended period of time ”. this qualitative statement about the likely evolution of policy interest rates was complemented by a narrative describing the macroeconomic conditions on which this guidance was based and which would effectively determine the length of the “ extended period ”. more precisely, the governing council explained that its expectation was based on “ the overall subdued outlook for inflation extending into the medium term, given the broad - based weakness of the economy and subdued monetary dynamics ”. this conditionality of the guidance ensures full consistency with the ecb ’ s strategy and mandate and thus ultimately guarantees its credibility. note a difference between our approach to verbal communication regarding the conditional path of our instrument and the approach taken by other central banks. our main motivation was to regain control of the short - term segment of the money market in conditions in which that market was being influenced by expectations and external factors that we considered misaligned with our monetary policy inclinations. in other words, the stance of policy was considered appropriate, given the outlook for price stability prevailing at the time. but the way the stance was reflected in market prices had become subject to shocks that we wanted to minimise. unlike other central banks, we had not reached the lower bound and the intention bis central bankers ’ speeches was not to inject further doses of monetary stimulus. we wanted to prevent the stimulus that had been introduced from being removed by excess market price volatility. but that was not all : let me stress that we have followed up words with actions. in line with the governing council ’

a prerequisite for adoption of the euro, will also serve to guide prospective member states. the name “ maastricht ” will therefore always be connected with the euro and will forever have a prominent place in the history of europe. when the maastricht treaty was ratified ten years ago, many doubted whether emu would ever amount to more than the solemn words of a treaty or a laudable objective to be reached at some point in the distant future. however, during the 1990s, policy - makers, governments, central bankers and other political and economic agents showed great resolve and determination to ensure that the single currency would become a reality. today, we can look back on a period of more than five years in which the ecb has successfully pursued a stability - oriented single monetary policy serving more than 300 million citizens. and we all have the tangible proof of monetary union in our pockets, following a highly successful cash changeover process, which represents another historic milestone in the process of european integration. with the euro, this network of interrelations and mutual dependencies in europe has undoubtedly reached a new level. when talking about the possible political implications of the euro, there are fundamental questions about the future of europe to be answered, and i hope that my subsequent remarks will provide some interesting insights. can monetary union function properly without some form of political union? is a “ currency without a state ” a viable construct? indeed, the question of whether a single currency requires - or inevitably leads to - a single state is hotly debated. i think that one of the reasons for this confused state of affairs is that “ political union ” is a rather abstract concept. it can mean different things to different people. on the one hand, political union can be broadly understood as a dense network of integrated policies, common rules and established procedures, as a union with strong and active supranational institutions, with common symbols and a common identity. the european union already exhibits many of these features. if, on the other hand, we understand political union as the establishment of an entity that resembles the traditional nation state, the european union may still have some way to go, if indeed this is the direction that europeans want to take. today ’ s union is not a european federation, for example, or a united states of europe, with a constitution and a single executive. the euro marks the achievement of full integration in the monetary field. in purely functional terms, it is therefore an end point,