a reference value for a monetary aggregate, and not a target value. this means that, although monetary developments will be used as the main indicator of potential inflationary or disinflationary pressures, the escb will not react in an almost mechanical way to correct deviations from the reference value in the short term. secondly, the escb will not focus solely on the analysis of monetary aggregates, but will complement this analysis with a broadly based assessment of the outlook for future price developments. on the one hand, the chosen strategy will, in my view, ensure as great a degree of continuity as possible in relation to the existing strategies of national central banks in the euro area. on the other hand, due consideration has simultaneously been given to the unique situation created by the transition to monetary union, in which a possibly growing international role of the euro is but one element. 3. what are the prospects for international policy co - ordination between central banks? are target zones for the key currencies conceivable, or even desirable? the ecb, acting on behalf of the escb, is already beginning to play a major role in international fora, such as those at the bank for international settlements ( bis ), the oecd and in a g7 and g10 context, and i expect this role to grow considerably in significance once the escb is operational. in all fora, the ecb's role will be to contribute to the international policy discussions from the perspective that price stability in the euro area is its prime objective. at the same time, the ecb will seek to make the best contribution it can to stable international developments. in particular, the introduction of the euro will reduce the number of major currency blocs in the global financial system. in principle, this should simplify the exchange of views on financial issues at the global level. each of the main partners – the united states, the euro area and japan – will be in a position to speak for a comparatively large economic area and will be similarly vulnerable to possible consequences of instability. they may thus have a greater incentive to take on a share of the responsibility for helping to maintain a stable global environment. on the question of exchange rates and target zones, i would like to state clearly that, in its monetary strategy, the escb does not have an exchange rate target. nor do the united states and japan. an exchange rate target for an area as large and relatively closed as that of the euro

in substance, this statement is similar to what other central banks call “ minutes ”. as far as i am aware, no other central bank regularly communicates in such a prompt and open manner with the public immediately after its monetary policy meetings. giving these press conferences immediately after the governing council meetings also ensures that decisions and information are disseminated rapidly and even - handedly across the entire euro area and beyond. these press conferences are a tangible expression of the eurosystem ’ s commitment to be open, transparent and accountable in its conduct of monetary policy. they are supplemented by our appearances before the european parliament, by our monthly bulletin, annual report, working paper series and numerous speeches and presentations such as my remarks here today. in my view, the eurosystem ’ s commitment to openness should not be in doubt. turning to another point, critics of the eurosystem have argued that the single monetary policy has focused too closely on cyclical developments, in contrast to the public commitment made to a medium - term orientation. these criticisms are supported by the claim that the interest rate cut in april 1999 was made so as to support employment and growth prospects in the short term. let me be clear. the single monetary policy has had, and will continue to have, an appropriate medium - term orientation, in line with the strategy i described a moment ago. in this respect, monetary policy must always remain focused on the maintenance of price stability over the medium term. in april 1999, downward risks to price stability were appearing, which stemmed from the cyclical slowdown that occurred in the aftermath of the financial turmoil in emerging markets during mid - 1998. these downside risks made it necessary for the governing council to act. interest rates were cut. the focus on the primary objective of price stability driving this decision does not exclude, however, that – given risks to price stability are very often related to cyclical developments – in many cases the policy action required to maintain price stability may also help sustain real activity. the governing council ’ s decision to lower interest rates in april 1999 clearly helped to sustain confidence and thereby real activity in the short term. nevertheless, this decision was made to ensure the maintenance of price stability over the medium term. of course, central bankers should and do welcome the opportunity to help sustain the real economy and employment – even if the sustenance provided is only temporary. however, we must not raise expectations that the short - term impact of necessary monetary policy actions on real activity will always