samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
significant progress has been achieved. however, the future may still add to the extraordinary challenges we are now confronted with. i rely on the academic community to help the policymakers in the decisive decisions they will have to take. thank you for your attention. i wish you all a fruitful and stimulating conference. bis central bankers ’ speeches

should overcome the green / brown dichotomy by assessing transition risk on the basis of the transition plans instead. regarding the digitalisation of finance, in addition to the support to the development of regulations, like dora and mica, that are intended to facilitate the development of innovations in a confidence and financial stability enhancing framework, we can, as central banks, play a positive operational role in revisiting the central bank money services we provide. this is indeed what we have started to do with the conduct by the banque de france of 9 experiments which consisted in putting central bank money “ on the ledger ” for interbank settlement purposes of securities transactions or cross - border payments, and with the launch by the ecb of an investigation phase for a digital euro for merchants and citizens ’ daily payments needs. however, let me note here that issuing a retail cbdc raises a number of challenges, in particular because financial intermediaries, including banks, play a key role in the security and financial stability of our monetary and financial system. these challenges need to be addressed by design in the architecture and functionality of a digital euro, for example by introducing holding limits and by promoting an intermediated model. this is why it is essential that the financial intermediaries, along with the other stakeholders, be properly involved in the investigation phase that is currently conducted. but it must be clear that beyond regulators and central banks, the private sector has also a key role to play to ensure that the digitalisation of finance indeed brings about the efficiency benefits it is expected to deliver without jeopardizing the stability of our financial system. from that perspective i would like to underline the strategic importance of the european payments initiative. 3 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches the epi is currently the only project aiming to offer an integrated pan - european payment solution with a common brand, and not based on the interoperability of heterogeneous domestic solutions. i regret that part of the european banking community has prioritised other interests over a common, lasting project. this shrinking of the number of shareholders has inevitable consequences on the capacity of the initiative, leading epi to give up on a european card scheme, and leaving this field open for international schemes in the short and medium term. on the other hand, we can also acknowledge that epi has decided to invest in the next generation of payments : mobile, account - to - account and instant payments. eight of the first ten european banks and the two largest european
robert ophele : cyber security in the financial sector opening speech by mr robert ophele, deputy governor of the bank of france, at the conference “ cyber security in the financial sector ”, paris, 17 june 2014. * * * emmanuelle assouan, frederic hervo, claudine hurman, caroline keribin, clement martin and axel petitprez have also contributed to the preparation of this speech. ladies and gentlemen, i am very happy to introduce this conference about cyber - security in the financial sector. this issue could be considered in the first place as very technical, the type of issue that has to be addressed only within a limited forum of experts. this would be an error and on the contrary, it is key that public authorities, including central banks, dedicate sufficient attention to cyber - security, given its system - wide implications notably for the functioning of the financial system. over the past decade, the financial sector has changed considerably with the emergence of the internet and the use of new information technologies. the market has been able to innovate and improve the quality, the performance and the efficiency of services such as online banking, mobile payments, and settlement platforms. public authorities have indeed encouraged dematerialization in the financial sector to foster economic growth and also to reduce the operational risks inherent in previously non - automated processes. for example, the new european regulation on central securities depositories requires using dematerialized securities and promotes automated and straight - through processes in securities settlement systems. in this sense, technological evolutions have allowed to address some of the operational risks inherent to financial activities, especially to curb operating errors in processes ( representing a significant source of losses relative to operational risks ). from this point of view, cyber - activities are a source of economic growth and progress, being essential for the financial sector. however, despite the fact that internet development and electronic transactions growth allowed a better control of operational risks due to diminishing human or operating errors factors, it also triggered the emergence of new risks. the rapid expansion of networks and technologies, the opening of it systems to external exchanges, the growing amount of electronic transactions have caused the emergence of a new type of crime called “ cybercrime ”. the financial sector is indeed an attractive target for cybercriminals : an american study1 led by symantec shows that the finance and insurance sector is among the principal sectors affected by cyber - attacks, just behind public administration. this of course

this efficiently defeats numerous attacks. i thank you for your attention and wish you fruitful and vivid discussions on all of these aspects, hoping this conference will provide you with a comprehensive overview of the stakes of cyber security and responses to cyber threats. i now give the floor to dr. steve purser. bis central bankers ’ speeches
mario draghi : monetary policy in unconventional times introductory remarks by mr mario draghi, president of the european central bank, at the ecb colloquium held in honour of mr jose manuel gonzalez - paramo, frankfurt am main, 16 may 2012. * * * ladies and gentlemen, dear jose manuel, it is my pleasure to welcome you here today on the occasion of this colloquium on “ monetary policy in unconventional times ”. it is held in the honour of jose manuel gonzalez - paramo to mark the end of his eight - year term as member of the ecb ’ s executive board. the topics of today ’ s colloquium are not only of great relevance, but i believe also very close to your heart, jose manuel, as they reflect two of the main areas which you have dealt with during much of your career : the first topic concerns the experiences gained with the ecb ’ s non - standard measures and monetary policy during crisis times. jose manuel was closely involved in shaping these measures during his time at the ecb, having been in charge of monetary policy operations for several years, also prior to the financial crisis. jose manuel joined the ecb in times that seemed very different from today. financial markets seemed to work rather efficiently in an environment of low volatility and seemingly little risk. liquidity was distributed by stable and efficient interbank markets at ( almost ) uniform prices throughout the euro area. the operational framework served well its purpose of transmitting the decisions by the governing council on policy rates to market rates. monetary policy relied on standard monetary policy operations. money market rates were quite stable and close to the ecb ’ s main refinancing rate, with fluctuations in money market rates being within a few basis points. how times have changed! over the past few years, a number of standard and non - standard measures have been implemented as the eurosystem ’ s response to the dysfunctions in money markets caused by the financial and sovereign debt crises. you have been involved in the design and the implementation of these measures in all phases of the recent crisis : in the early phases, the ecb mainly responded to the crisis by adjusting the timing of its liquidity provision and the lengthening of the maturity of its open market operations, which helped to stabilise short term rates in an environment of high volatility and extreme distrust. later on, we dealt with the design and the launch of longer - term refinancing operations,

of structural reform will be important to foster consumer and investor confidence in medium and long - term growth and employment opportunities in the euro area. this, in turn, should also have a positive short - term effect on spending and investment decisions in the euro area. we are now at your disposal for questions.
put forward in the public debate might possibly play a part.

as in a country with a fixed exchange rate. in sweden that was actually the case in 73 of the past 100 years, with results that were excellent in some periods and considerably worse in others. it is important to learn from those experiences. what distinguishes a monetary union is that the exchange rate is locked irrevocably. that means there is no room for the type of misguided economic policy that characterised the 1970s and ’ 80s, for example, when sweden used repeated devaluations in an attempt to rectify the situation. such failures must be avoided at any cost. against this background it is not remarkable that the discussion about economic policy with emu has focused on stabilisation policy. even so, it is important to start from a broader perspective. the issues to do with stabilisation policy have featured prominently in the swedish debate. this has to do with a strong keynesian tradition and the ability of lars calmfors and his former colleagues to place the so - called insurance argument in the centre of the whole discussion about a monetary union. the latter naturally has to do with the fact that the very dramatic crisis which hit sweden in the early 1990s was so closely connected with stabilisation policy. it is hardly surprising that in many other countries the discussion took a very different course before they adhered to the emu. it is extremely important that our discussion about economic policy – with or without the euro – does not overlook or play down the supply side of the economy. countries that create conditions for a smooth adjustment of labour markets and a favourable development of productivity will almost certainly do well as members of the monetary union. measures to this end are naturally warranted in any event – they promote prosperity. but they also alter the conditions for stabilisation policy and reduce the need for ‘ insurance ’. in this context it may be worth recalling that the overheating that led up to the crisis in the early 1990s was by no means primarily due to the growth of demand being notably strong, though demand was certainly too high in relation to the economy ’ s productive capacity. annual gdp growth from 1985 to 1990 was actually no more than 2. 4 per cent. what really mattered was poor conditions for growth ; productivity rose only 1. 1 per cent and employment in hours only 1. 3 per cent. if productivity growth in the late 1980s and early 1990s had been half or one percentage point higher, things could have been very different. our tendency to concentrate the emu discussion on
have increased. it is now more than ever important and necessary that europe responds cohesively and decisively to the challenges it is facing. i believe we should remember the words of a great european, carlo azeglio ciampi, spoken in this room more than ten years ago : “ if we act alone we will be at the mercy of events bigger than us, events that threaten peace and european security. ” i am confident that the foundations on which the eu project is built are strong enough to achieve the objectives that have been entrusted to us by the people of europe. i am now looking forward to the debate. thank you for your attention. 4 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches

of inflation dynamics and the general economic outlook, including through the impact of the very significant terms of trade deterioration. in particular, the inflation dynamics associated with the energy shock component, to which the euro area is particularly exposed, are of a different nature compared to demand - driven overheating dynamics. the transmission of interest rate changes in the money market the money market is key for the implementation and transmission of monetary policy : it acts as a seismograph for liquidity conditions and market expectations of future policy, while money market rates are central to the transmission of monetary policy through their impact on economy - wide financing conditions. it follows that it is important that money market rates adjust in line with changes in key ecb interest rates. this applies in particular to changes in the deposit facility rate ( dfr ), which represents the relevant policy rate in conditions of excess liquidity. the available evidence suggests that our july rate hike of 50 basis points, which increased the dfr from - 0. 5 per cent to zero, has been well transmitted to money market rates overall. in particular, the euro short - term rate ( €str ) moved up by the full size of the change in policy rates ( chart 1 ). this is especially important, since the €str is the basis for the overnight interest rate swap curve, along which the market prices expectations of future policy. the reaction was similar across deposits by banks and by the different types of non - bank financial institutions that are active in the money market. the near - complete adjustment of repo rates for transactions based on a broad collateral pool – which are predominantly driven by a motivation to borrow or lend cash – was immediate. chart 1 the july 2022 rate hike by 50 basis points and rate changes across money market rates segments ( basis points ) sources : bloomberg, mmsr, brokertec / mts and ecb calculations. notes : general collateral ( gc ) and refers to cash - driven repo transactions and non - general ( non - gc ) refers to collateral - driven repo transactions. the bars show the difference between the average rate of the period 1 - 26 july ( before the hike ) and the period 27 july - 19 august ( after the hike ). for 1 - month government bills, the bars show the difference in the respective rate between the average rate of the period 10 – 27 june ( before the hike ) and the period 27 july – 11 august ( after the hike ). at the same time,
be compatible with their independence or even with their mandates to ensure price stability? bis central bankers ’ speeches the reform of the international monetary system will be the central theme of the last session that will take the form of a roundtable chaired by martin wolf. i am particularly grateful to bill white for accepting the difficult task of drawing a summary of our symposium which is bound to be both dense and captivating. i would like to hand the floor to axel weber to chair the first session, and, once again, i would like to thank all the eminent personalities who have agreed to participate in this symposium. bis central bankers ’ speeches

australia ( 1990 / 91 ) - 3. 8 - 3. 8 * taiwan did not experience a contraction in gdp * * excluding china and japan ^ assumed to start in september quarter 1981, as per nber dating committee source : imf, ceic, thomson financial, abs, rba even accepting that the pre - crisis situation was unsustainable, it is clear that the cost of the asian crisis was enormous, and the recovery slow. in fact, the average rate of per capita gdp growth in east asia post - crisis was a little more than half what had been seen in the decade up to 1996. what did we learn? we learned a good deal about the nature of crises from these events. this was a different sort of crisis from the ones that had often been seen in earlier periods. it was not a standard example of a currency crisis resulting from lax macroeconomic policies, in which large budget deficits ( often funded from abroad ), easy money, high inflation and so on lead to a loss of confidence in the policy regime and capital flight. in those cases, the standard remedy is mainly macroeconomic tightening to restore discipline and investor confidence. 7 in asia, by contrast, fiscal and monetary policies had always been reasonably conservative. inflation rates were low by developing country standards, budgets were reasonably controlled in most cases, and government debt levels were generally not excessive. 8 prior to the asian crisis, the academic literature attempted to explain currency crises as a result of unsustainable fiscal policies or self - fulfilling speculative attacks. as the asian crisis was not able to be adequately explained under these models, a raft of new research emerged, and so called “ third - generation ” models were developed. for example, see krugman, p. ( 1999 ), “ balance sheets, the transfer problem, and financial crises ”, international tax and public finance, 6, pp. 459 - 72 ; chang, r. and a. velasco ( 2001 ), “ a model of financial crises in emerging markets ”, quarterly journal of economics, 116, pp. 489 - 517 ; caballero, r. and a. krishnamurthy ( 2001 ), “ international and domestic collateral constraints in a model of emerging market crises ”, journal of monetary economics, 48, pp. 513 - 548. some have argued that in some respects the mexican crisis was a precursor to the “ new ” type of crisis seen in asia ( see ito, t
an economist and academician with considerable contribution in the field of islamic economics, finance and banking. dr abbas started his academic career in 1968 with university of alabama, in the united states of america as a professor of economics and later at the florida institute of technology. in 1984, he joined the imf in washington dc as an economist before serving as the organisation's executive director and dean of its executive board. he completed his term at the imf in 2008. dr abbas is also the recipient of several awards from several governments and from the islamic development bank, he received the annual prize for research in islamic economics in recognition of his service in advancing the knowledge in islamic finance. he has published books and research articles on a wide range of areas including microeconomic theory, mathematical economics and islamic economics. during his tenure at inceif, dr. abbas will also engage in research and consultancy in on islamic finance, including guiding academic research and supervising dissertations and theses of inceif students. he will also present lectures abroad organised by inceif as part of the efforts to strengthen the international alliances that have been established with inceif from other centres of learning in other parts of the world. his appointment as the inaugural holder of inceif chair of islamic finance would certainly give inceif the opportunity to raise its capacity to become a world class learning institution dedicated to islamic finance. dr abbas valuable knowledge and insights and his extensive experience in both academia and at the imf, will benefit and enhance the knowledge and expertise of inceif graduates as well as the academia and financial community. since its establishment in 2006, inceif has grown from strength to strength and has been recording a steady increase in the number of students for its three programmes, the chartered islamic finance professional or the cifp, masters in islamic finance and phd in islamic finance. the first batch of cifp graduates received their scrolls in february 2009 and all 32 have gained employment or have continued their studies further. this year, inceif will see the first batch of masters in islamic finance graduate and next year will see the first batch of students to graduate from the phd programme. this is indeed a significant milestone for inceif that is achieved in such a short period of time. as the chancellor of inceif, it is my hope that the setting up of the inceif chair of islamic finance will contribute to the development of expertise of the academic faculty and students at inceif in addition to expanding further understanding

of islamic finance by the financial community. please join me in welcoming dr abbas mirakhor to deliver his lecture.
the ratio of debt to 2 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches assets close to its highest level in two decades on an overall basis, and this is also true for speculative - grade and unrated firms. and whereas previously, mostly high - earning firms with relatively low leverage were taking on additional debt, analysis of detailed balance sheet information indicates that firms with high leverage, high interest expense ratios, and low earnings and cash holdings have been increasing their debt loads the most. historically, high leverage has been linked to elevated financial distress and retrenchment by businesses in economic downturns. regarding corporate bonds outstanding, recent years have witnessed little change in the relative shares of investment - grade bonds and high - yield bonds. credit quality has deteriorated within the investment - grade segment, where the share of bonds rated at the lowest investment - grade level has reached near - record levels. as of mid - 2019, just over half of investment - grade corporate bonds outstanding were at the lowest end of the investment - grade segment. in comparison, the share of high - yield bonds outstanding that are rated “ deep junk ” has stayed flat at about one - third over the past few years, well below the financial crisis peak of 50 percent. in an economic downturn, widespread downgrades of these low - rated investment - grade bonds to speculative - grade ratings could induce some investors to sell them rapidly — for instance, because lower - rated bonds have higher regulatory capital requirements or because bond funds have limits on the share of non - investment - grade bonds they hold. this concern may be higher now than in the past, since total assets under management in bond mutual funds have more than doubled in the past decade, and these funds now hold about one - tenth of the corporate bond market. the redemption behavior of investors in these funds during a market correction is unclear. further down the credit quality ladder, there has been sizable growth in leveraged lending, accompanied by a notable deterioration in underwriting standards. net issuance of leveraged loans to risky borrowers grew rapidly last year and boosted leveraged loans outstanding to a level exceeding $ 1 trillion overall, although the pace of issuance has slowed more recently as the interest rate environment has shifted. while leveraged loans have traditionally had important investor protections, covenants for leveraged loans issued in the past few years have weakened dramatically, and they often include features that increase opacity and risk. a substantial share of the leveraged loans are packaged in collateralized loan obligations ( cl

##gilant and ensure compliance with the standards of cybersecurity and data privacy consistent with established regulations and best practices. with the rapid evolution of digital technologies, it is a must for us to continuously collaborate and share information as a community. this way, we can be proactive and take intelligent countermeasures to prevent, detect, and respond to these threats. thank you for your attention.