asset purchases and beyond. these fundamental features of our forward guidance have a clear logic. they are meant to communicate that our set of measures will evolve over time in a way that can most efficiently internalise and exploit the intimate complementarities among the various instruments, notably the asset purchases and the negative rate policy. all other features of our forward guidance are of a parametric nature and can be recalibrated depending on incoming data. looking forward to our next monetary policy meeting in june, we will be able to draw on a more expanded information set than is available today, organised around new projections and including an updated assessment of the distribution of risks surrounding the economic outlook. 1 for a more detailed account of these phases, see : the ecb and its role as lender of last resort during the crisis speech at the committee on capital markets regulation conference on the lender of last resort – an international perspective, washington dc, 10 february 2016. 2 the bls has traditionally combined risk factors in one single factor. however, since 2015q1 the survey has asked banks about the contribution to easing standards coming from two distinct risk factors, “ risk perceptions ” and “ risk tolerance ”. 6 / 6 bis central bankers'speeches

benoit cœure : monetary policy in the crisis – confronting short - run challenges while anchoring long - run expectations speech by mr benoit cœure, member of the executive board of the european central bank, at the journees de l ’ afse ( association francaise de science economique ) 2013 “ la crise de l ’ union economique et monetaire ( uem ) : enjeux theoriques et perspectives de politique economique ”, university of orleans, orleans, 17 may 2013. * * * i wish to thank federic holm - hadulla and massimo rostagno for their contributions to this speech. i remain solely responsible for the opinions contained herein. ladies and gentlemen, dear colleagues, it is a great pleasure to speak to you today. i would like to use this opportunity to reflect on a fundamental tension lying at the heart of monetary policy : a central bank ’ s success in ensuring macroeconomic stability depends on it having a credible commitment to price stability. and to build and nurture such credibility, it should have a track record of responding in a consistent, transparent and predictable way to shocks hitting the economy. at the same time, financial and macroeconomic disturbances are sometimes of a scale and complexity that they alter the underlying structural relationships between key economic variables. this, in turn, challenges monetary policy - makers to temporarily adapt their established strategies to a new environment without undermining their inflation - fighting credentials. the current crisis provides a salient case study of such a tension : starting with a loss of confidence in the solvency of certain financial institutions, the crisis quickly morphed into a broad - based impairment of private financial intermediation. as a consequence, the link between monetary policy impulses and economic aggregates – which is the structural relationship most relevant for central banks – was severely affected. confronted with this new environment, central banks across the globe have expanded their toolkits to compensate for their reduced influence on economic outcomes. the measures they took have in many cases helped to stabilise the economy. but they have also triggered a lively debate on where to draw the line between crisis - fighting efforts on the one hand – and a general departure from established principles of monetary policy on the other. i would like to consider how central banks can resolve the tension between anchoring longterm expectations and flexibly confronting short - term challenges. i will argue that the key to success lies in a clear -