and gibraltar accounted for c. 60 % ( €1. 8bn ) of non - life business written in ireland through branches or freedom of services ( equating to c. 11 % of the total non - life market ) and c. 96 % ( €2. 5bn ) of life insurance business written in ireland through branches or freedom of services. these interactions between the insurance industry in ireland and the uk include the sale of insurance products, financial arrangements such as cross border reinsurance, and the use of outsourced service providers. this cross - border business has been an important channel in improving the provision of insurance to irish businesses and consumers, some of it quite specialist in nature. the crossborder model works well, in both directions, when provided by firms that are financially resilient, well managed, with a solid business strategy and are knowledgeable about the irish insurance market. the potential loss of eu authorisation will affect the ability of uk and gibraltar - based insurance undertakings to continue performing certain obligations for eu policyholders ( and vice versa ) and will impact the service continuity of contracts concluded before the uk leaves the eu. without action, there are risks that uk and gibraltar - based insurers passporting into ireland will lose their ability to continue to provide insurance cover, including collecting premiums, making mid - term alterations and negotiating and settling claims on any outstanding insurance contracts – ranging from long - term life insurance policies to annual motor insurance contracts – taken out prior to the uk ’ s departure from the eu. the larger firms typically have activated plans to obtain licences in the eu27. however, there are some providers, often offering relatively niche products or serving niche markets, where the cost of setting up and running a new eu subsidiary may be prohibitive. in addition to the contract continuity risk, there are clear risks of reduced competition and a reduction in customer choice. the central bank continues to take a proactive, risk - based approach to ensuring affected firms have credible plans to address these brexit risks. we are also engaging directly with the firms, with eiopa, and with the uk authorities. we have sight of credible plans to ensure continuity of service for more than 90 % of the life and non - life markets. nonetheless, there remain tail risks of some smaller providers not being sufficiently proactive or organised, which may affect the provision of services post brexit. markets in fund management, uk fund managers could lose the right to manage irish authorised

the country has and will have specific financing needs over the next 18 months. is a new programme for greece a scenario that ’ s being considered? the eurogroup has outlined a clear sequence. when the current review is concluded successfully, and if the greek authorities so wish, a follow - up arrangement will be discussed with the eurogroup. but it is first and foremost the responsibility of the greek government to create growth and regain financial independence. this requires in my view a clear resolve to boost economic reforms, a prudent fiscal path and an unequivocal confirmation that greece will honour its international commitments. doubts about the country ’ s creditworthiness will then recede and foreign investors will return to greece. the new government is negotiating with the european commission, the ecb and the imf in full awareness of the fundamental hypothesis that in the end no one would want a grexit. if that is true, why didn ’ t europe realise earlier that the greek programme was not working effectively? the recession and unemployment in greece cannot be compared with the recession and unemployment in cyprus, ireland, portugal and spain. my question is : would a failure of the programme eventually undermine the future of the euro area? from a very difficult starting position, and through painful efforts, greece has made good progress in restoring fiscal and external sustainability, as well as in putting banks on a sound footing and strengthening the basis for growth and job creation. by the end of 2014, economic indicators were clearly pointing to positive growth and better prospects ahead. indeed, in its forecast released one month ago, the european commission expected greece to grow by 2. 5 % in 2015 and 3. 6 % in 2016, one of the highest growth rates in the euro area. and the arduous efforts of the greek people need to be recognised here. but let ’ s not fool ourselves : adjustment was inevitable and, believe me, it would have been much worse without european and international support. that said, we should always learn from the past. for instance, i believe that the programme should have put more emphasis, at an earlier stage, on reducing rents – in the economic sense – and fighting vested interests in the greek economy, to allow for a fairer sharing of the adjustment burden. also, in its crisis - fighting toolbox, europe did not have at its disposal instruments available to institutions such as the world bank, which supports social safety nets when countries undertake structural adjustment. according to some rumours, the ecb played a