everyone will be able to follow the reasoning of the individual executive board members with regard to each interest rate decision. stating the names in the minutes will make us even more open and clear. it will provide better opportunities for evaluation and accountability. the second change is that we will now hold press conferences in connection with all of the monetary policy meetings, and not, as before, only when we have adjusted the interest rate. the motives for keeping the interest rate unchanged are just as important as the motives for adjusting it. together with publishing our own interest rate forecasts, press conferences after each monetary policy meeting will provide better and more regular information on the considerations we make. finally, we executive board members will normally avoid implying prior to a meeting what interest decision might be made there, what is known as signalling. and by this i mean signalling above the interest rate forecast, press releases and minutes of meetings that have earlier been published. the actual need for signalling has declined, not least with the publication of our own interest rate path. our assessment is that it is enough to communicate our intentions clearly in connection with the seven monetary policy meetings held every year. moreover, we publish our own interest rate forecasts in connection with three of these meetings, when a monetary policy report is published. on the other four occasions we will report a qualitative assessment of how the most recently published interest rate forecast relates to the new information received. i would like to point out that the individual members of the executive board will continue to express their own opinions in public. but this will above all be a question of afterwards clarifying and explaining personal deliberations made in connection with the monetary policy meetings. differences of opinion within the executive board will also be clear from the minutes, possibly even more so than before. these changes will in my opinion help us to better live up to the requirements for making decisions in the correct manner as required of us as a public authority. the purpose is also to attain more efficient communication with the financial markets and the general public. conclusion when the inflation target was introduced, after the riksbank had been forced to abandon the fixed exchange rate at the beginning of the 1990s, under great drama, many people probably doubted that the policy would succeed. but confidence in the riksbank ’ s ability to maintain low and stable inflation in the long - term gradually increased. and there are several factors that have been decisive so that we could achieve the credibility of monetary policy that we currently enjoy. the change of regime

: 1385 ), chapter 3, article 3. changes for more efficient communication ever since the inflation target was introduced, openness and clarity have been guiding principles for us. we have gradually implemented changes to become more transparent and more efficient in our communication. in february we presented for the first time our own forecast of the development of the policy rate over the coming years, something that our colleagues in norway and new zealand have also done. and as i mentioned earlier – a central bank can hardly be much more open and clear with regard to its monetary policy intentions. this increases the opportunities for evaluation and accountability. it has also become easier for us to explain our decisions and forecasts and to outline alternative scenarios for the interest rate. we are better able to live up to the requirements made in our interaction with the general public and the financial markets. there are also other examples of measures taken to increase our openness. here i am thinking about the publication of minutes from the monetary policy meetings, our monetary policy reports, the many speeches held by executive board members every year and the hearings of the governor by the riksdag committee on finance. clarity, not just openness – quality, not just quantity but efficient communication is not merely about quantity, it also concerns quality. publishing a lot of information and doing so very often does not necessarily make the message clearer and the communication more efficient. it is not enough to merely be open. one might say that it is a question of giving the right information at the right time and about expressing oneself clearly. this is an important aspect that ties in with a survey of central banks recently made by jp morgan. there the riksbank was ranked as the most open central bank. but the main message of the study was that a central bank, once it had passed a particular degree of openness, perhaps did not become much more predictable by providing even more information. and i believe there is some truth in this. at least if the central bank is already very open, the quality of the communication may be more important than the quantity. and we are consciously working all the time to become even better with regard to clarity and efficiency in our communication. as recently as a couple of weeks ago, we executive board members decided to take a few further steps in this direction. to begin with, the public minutes of the monetary policy meetings will now state which of the board members has said what in the general discussion. this means that we have both a correct decisionmaking procedure and