as the economy recovers. 14 a third is that large - scale asset purchases ( lsaps ) can complement conventional policy actions by making financial conditions more favorable for growth even when short rates are constrained by the zlb. 15 armed with these insights, policymakers were prepared and able to act quickly and decisively when the financial crisis hit. a great deal was learned about the zlb and unconventional policy tools along the way. 16 indeed, another conference organized by the boston fed was held in october 2010 to assess lessons learned, and the proceedings of that conference were published in a special issue of the jmcb in february 2012. for me, the most interesting aspect of that conference was that participants took the zlb as a defining feature of the landscape : what was once viewed as primarily theoretical had become grounded in practice and experience. the zlb in 2019 this brings me to today. the federal reserve has embarked on a review of its monetary policy strategic framework. as was the case 20 years ago, the question is how to best achieve our monetary policy goals in the context of low inflation and the zlb. indeed, the policy questions we are grappling with today are exactly the ones laid out in woodstock. the one fresh wrinkle is that with estimates of the neutral real interest rate much lower than those that prevailed 20 years ago, the zlb is likely to be an even more powerful force than was imagined in 1999. 17 in approaching this question today, we should take lessons from the conference held in woodstock 20 years ago : bring together leading researchers and policymakers, draw out the best and most creative thinking, and take a long - run view of how we can navigate the environment before us. i am happy to say that this process is already in train, with the fed ’ s framework review incorporating perspectives from a wide range of stakeholders, culminating in an academic conference next week in chicago. conclusion in closing, i want to add a personal thanks to ken west for all he has done to promote outstanding research that is both innovative and relevant to the real - world problems that central banks face. and my best wishes for the jmcb, which i hope may continue its illustrious record for the next 50 years. as a researcher and policymaker, the one thing i am certain about is that fostering an open and active dialogue between researchers and policymakers is the best way for us to succeed in our work. thank you. 1 for references to the early literature, see james cl

daleep singh : implementing the fed ’ s facilities - moving at maximum speed with maximum care remarks ( via audio webinar ) by mr daleep singh, executive vice president and head of the markets group of the federal reserve bank of new york, before the money marketeers of new york university, 17 april 2020. * * * as prepared for delivery good morning everyone. thanks for being here, and let me begin by offering best wishes for everyone ’ s health under these difficult circumstances. i should also make clear at the outset that the views i express are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the federal reserve bank of new york or the federal reserve system. in my remarks today i ’ d like to review the context in which the federal reserve launched an unprecedented set of policy actions, and i will then describe our approach to standing up emergency facilities at maximum speed with maximum care as we execute our mission. context in mid - march as you will no doubt recall, financial markets in mid - march were seized by the uncertainty caused by virus outbreak, both in terms of the speed and scale of impact on the economic outlook, and for society as a whole. extreme uncertainty triggered unprecedented market volatility across asset classes, escalating into a system - wide deleveraging event that appeared to overwhelm the capacity of financial intermediaries to absorb and transfer risk in an orderly manner. liquidity dried up across markets, including in u. s. treasuries, the benchmark upon which virtually every other asset is priced or hedged, the foundation for the dollar ’ s primacy as a reserve currency, and the source of funding for our federal government. as uncertainty rose and liquidity deteriorated, demand for cash and safe assets rose and demand for assets with any form of credit or liquidity risk plummeted. for a few weeks in march, even treasury yields began to rise, especially in longer maturities, and so did the cost for almost all forms of household and corporate borrowing. access to financing beyond overnight tenors became severely impaired, causing acute dislocation across short - term funding markets and triggering outflows across prime money market funds. in the race to safety, dollars became increasingly scarce, intensifying the stress across global markets. emerging market economies experienced an unprecedented outflow of capital from non - residents. sovereign yields surged in the most indebted european countries. the ominous reality was that a synchronized global selloff had taken on a life of