samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
jerome h powell : introductory comments – roundtable on the interim report of the alternative reference rates committee introductory comments by mr jerome h powell, member of the board of governors of the federal reserve system, at the roundtable on the interim report of the alternative reference rates committee, sponsored by the federal reserve board and the federal reserve bank of new york, new york city, 21 june 2016. * * * i want to thank you all for coming today, and i also want to thank the alternative reference rates committee ( arrc ) for all its work in developing its interim report. this report marks a new stage in reference rate reform. 1 reference benchmarks are a key part of the financial infrastructure. about $ 300 trillion dollars in contracts reference libor alone. but benchmarks were not given much consideration prior to the recent scandals involving attempts to manipulate them. since then, the official sector has thought seriously about financial benchmarks, conducting a number of investigations into charges of manipulation, publishing the international organization of securities commission ’ s ( iosco ) principles for financial benchmarks and, through the financial stability board ( fsb ), sponsoring major reform efforts of both interest rate and foreign exchange benchmarks. 2 the institutions represented on the arrc have also had to think seriously about these issues as they have developed this interim report. now, we need end users to begin to think more seriously about how they use benchmarks and the risks they are taking on by relying so heavily on a reference rate – in this case u. s. dollar libor – that is less resilient than it needs to be. in saying this, i want to make it clear that libor has been significantly improved. ice benchmark administration is in the process of making important changes to its methodology, and submissions to libor are now regulated by the united kingdom ’ s financial conduct authority. however, the term money market borrowing by banks that underlies u. s. dollar libor has experienced a secular decline. as a result, the majority of u. s. dollar libor submissions must still rely on expert judgement, and even those submissions that are transaction - based may be based on relatively few actual trades. this calls into question whether libor can ultimately satisfy iosco principle 7 regarding data sufficiency, which requires that a benchmark be based on an active market. that principle is a particularly important one, as it is difficult to ask banks to submit rates at which they believe they could borrow on a daily basis if

needs to happen, and if the arrc members, the official sector, and end users and other market participants all jointly coordinate in finalizing these plans, then a successful transition can be made with the least disruption to the market, leaving everyone in a better place. bis central bankers ’ speeches
ecb banking supervision ( 2020 ), " guide on climate - related and environmental risks ", november. 5 ecb banking supervision ( 2022 ), " thematic review on climate and environmental risks 2022 – final results ", 2 november. 5 / 5 bis - central bankers'speeches

significant macroeconomic consequences and these should be factored in when designing and implementing them. while the crisis has clearly had global ramifications, its impact on financial systems was not uniform across the world. differences in financial structures do matter. banks remain central in our financial systems : this is especially true for continental europe where they are responsible for more than 80 % of financial intermediation. these differences suggest that we should be careful in crafting the regulatory answer to the crisis. our experience in france is that our banks ’ universal model has weathered the storm relatively well. it would be a major paradox to put in place rules which would challenge such universal models. there needs to be scope for different countries to tailor solutions to their circumstances, while at the same time doing so within a globally agreed framework. many banks have improved significantly their capital position through raising high quality capital. yet, banks may not feel comfortable if their new capital position is barely above the new minimum. indeed, a critical issue going forward relates to the behavior of banks with respect to capital buffers they retain on top of the existing minimum. if banks target buffers above the regulatory minimum, which is an endogenous market outcome, they may need to raise even larger amount of equity than what can be expected just looking at the current package. on the one hand we know from empirical studies that weaker capitalized banks typically exhibit weak loan growth compared to other better - capitalized banks. on the other, banks may find it less costly to adjust loan volumes and loan pricing than capital, as frictions in the market for bank capital make the latter option more expensive. finally, any regulatory framework needs to manage avoidance and regulatory arbitrage, and keep up with innovation and other forms of structural change. for this, a necessary, but not sufficient condition is that standards are comprehensive in coverage and consistent across jurisdictions. i am not sure, for instance, that the leverage ratio, if it was to be implemented as a compulsory instrument, would meet this double test. at the current level of accounting divergences, consistency will be very difficult to achieve. furthermore, there is a risk that it would encourage migration of credit activities towards other – less regulated – parts of the financial system. it is therefore important that consistency apply across standards and countries. convergence between accounting standards is a precondition for a consistent implementation of some of the prudential reforms discussed by the basel committee. it is also essential that new prudential standards for banks become
people are highly indebted, that could tip the economy into recession. recessions that follow periods of rapid credit growth tend to be deeper and longer lasting. since we start from a vulnerable position, we need to be especially careful. to insure today against such risks in the future, the bank has introduced both new affordability tests for borrowers and a cap on the proportion of any lender ’ s new residential mortgages at high multiples of borrowers ’ incomes. by acting early, the bank can reduce the need for more drastic action later on. and by acting as we have, we can encourage a broadening of the housing market recovery. we recognise that there are large differences in housing markets across the uk. around one in five new london mortgages are extended at or above 4. 5 times borrower income, compared to one in ten across the uk as a whole, and one in twenty in scotland. capping the riskiest borrowing means that for every high ratio mortgage six must be extended at lower ratios. this helps spread lending capacity across the country, further contributing to balanced growth and a sustained economic expansion. trade good domestic policy cannot, on its own, guarantee balanced growth in an open economy like the uk ’ s. our fortunes are also tied to those of our trading partners. in recent years those fortunes have been modest. demand from the uk ’ s traditional markets, such as europe, is a staggering 25 % below a continuation of its pre - crisis trend. this is because the uk relies heavily on the slow - growing advanced economies ( chart 1 ). in contrast, the commonwealth countries, which account for only a tenth of uk exports, have grown over three percentage points faster on average each year than our major trading partners between 2008 – 13. the need to diversify trade to faster - growing economies in the commonwealth and emerging markets is clear. this will require both the continued initiative of uk businesses and a determined trade strategy. in short, we all need to be inspired by another great scottish figure, david hume. hume brilliantly showed that free trade was beneficial to all ; that it acquainted nations “ with the pleasures of luxury, and the profits of commerce ”, spurring them on “ to further improvements in every branch of domestic and foreign trade. ” 2 his ideas helped usher in the first great era of globalisation during the 19th century. in this wave, the british economy grew twice as fast as during the preceding century ( table 1 ). almost exactly a

to my statement of our objective for this conference, namely to achieve an advance in our understanding of systemic risk. this is of course not our only objective : we also hope that you manage to enjoy the opportunity of meeting with so many colleagues from around the world, enjoy the bank's hospitality, and for those of you from overseas to enjoy your visit to london. thank - you.
— but recognize the opportunity. ” the covid - 19 pandemic may be unprecedented in scale, but as in most global economic crises, it provides important lessons to governments in terms of preparing for similar challenges and seizing opportunities to move forward. the pandemic emphasizes the importance of building sufficient buffers during good times and the need to speed up the modernization of the country ’ s ict infrastructure and policies. the list of reform possibilities is longer than what i have offered. there are deep learnings that we should collectively heed if we are to rise above the crisis and forge ahead towards the goal of a stronger and more inclusive society. thank you and good day 4 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches

framework for accounting and reporting within the escb, the annual accounts of the ecb and the allocation of monetary income of the euro area national central banks and losses of the ecb for the financial years 1999 to 2001. let me also draw your attention to some of the decisions taken by the governing council at its previous two meetings. first, the ecb budget for 2001 has been approved. it includes a staff increase of 7 %. by the end of 2001, the ecb will therefore have approximately 1, 100 staff members. second, in connection with the bank of greece ’ s entry into the eurosystem, the governing council adopted several legal instruments on the transfer of foreign reserves from the bank of greece to the ecb, the crediting to the bank of greece of a corresponding claim on the ecb and the contribution to the capital, reserves and provisions of the ecb by the bank of greece. these legal acts will be published in the official journal of the european communities shortly. amendments to several other legal instruments were also adopted. third, i should like to mention that, following the very positive reaction to last year ’ s " helsinki seminar ", the ecb is organising a second seminar with high - ranking officials from the central banks of the eu accession countries. this seminar will be held tomorrow in vienna, in co - operation with the oesterreichische nationalbank, and will focus in particular on issues related to the price dynamics in accession countries, the role of the central banks in managing the accession process and the co - operation between the eurosystem and the accession countries ’ central banks. the " vienna seminar " will be followed by a press conference at 4 p. m. tomorrow. finally, i should like to inform you that the governing council has decided that its next meeting, which is scheduled for 4 january 2001, will be held by means of a teleconference. the press conference originally planned for that day has thus been cancelled. the next press conference will take place on 1 february 2001.
of last year ’ s bumper crops, the easing of the global inflation surge, and vanishing effects of the pandemic will foster a gradual disinflation. the nbu estimates inflation will be quite volatile in 2022 due to base effects. in addition, like in many other countries, the rise in inflation in ukraine will last longer than expected. 1 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches taking into account the strong pro - inflationary factors and the need to continue supporting the post - pandemic economic recovery, inflation is projected to return to the target range of 5 % ±1 pp in 2023. what will be the overall state of the ukrainian economy? we have revised the forecast for real gdp growth in 2022 to 3. 4 %, down from 3. 8 %. the growth will be underpinned by consumer demand and still rather favorable terms of trade. yet the potential for growth will be limited by the rather heavy fallout from the coronavirus crisis, relatively high energy prices, and shortages of certain raw materials, especially in the first half of the year. in 2023 – 2024, real gdp growth will accelerate to about 4 % per year. this will be due to the following factors : geopolitical conditions will stabilize during 2022. the negative impact of the pandemic will fade completely. the global economy will continue to grow. and the terms of trade will remain rather favorable. according to our forecasts, the current account deficit will widen to 3. 3 % of gdp in 2022 and to 3. 3 % – 3. 5 % of gdp in the coming years due to the revival of domestic demand from both consumers and investors. under what conditions would this forecast materialize? the primary assumption of the nbu board is that ukraine will continue to make progress on its cooperation with the imf. imf financing was a significant catalyst of the ukrainian economy in 2020 – 2021. cooperation with the imf stands to be at least as important in the years ahead, especially as geopolitical tensions loom large and competition for capital between ems and other countries intensifies amid the tighter monetary policies pursued by central banks around the globe. key risks to the forecast are still posed by an escalation of the military conflict with russia and a longer and more pronounced global price surge than expected earlier. the stoking of tensions in the media regarding the possibility of military aggression has decreased the value of ukrainian assets and increased depreciation pressures. prolonged geo

that facilitates the recruitment and maintenance of high - quality staff. uwi has been a strong supporter of the ccms but the university may also have to do more if we are to maintain a high quality center for monetary research. and finally, the time may have come when we need to look to the private financial community - the banks, the insurance companies and so on - to contribute to the financing of the ccms, if even for paid research. let ’ s face it, we all stand to benefit from the work that could emanate from a well - staffed, wellresourced and high quality regional center for monetary and financial studies. with these few words, mr. chairman, i would like to wish all the participants a most stimulating and successful conference.
sine qua non of a sustainable expansion. it was the rise of inflation, in one form or another, which spelled the death knell of our previous expansions. • in the long expansion which began in the 1960s and ended in 1974, inflation had already risen to 10 % by the september quarter of 1973, which was before the effects of opec i had been felt. following the rapid wage escalation of 1974, inflation then peaked at 17½ % early the following year. • we had a rather weak expansion in the 1970s, which received a boost from the rises in commodity prices associated with opec ii in 1979. but by 1981 another wage escalation pushed inflation from a low point of 8 % in 1978 to a peak of 12½ % in 1982. • in the strong, but shorter - lived, expansion of the 1980s the story was rather different. although the increases in prices and wages were a good deal higher than we have become accustomed to in the 1990s, there was no sudden acceleration in the latter stages of the expansion as there had been in earlier episodes. it was a boom in credit - financed asset prices and the associated speculative activity that did the damage. at some stage the boom was bound to be followed by a bust, whether of its own accord, or as a result of monetary tightening. while asset price inflation is conceptually different to cpi inflation, and is further removed from the ordinary operation of monetary policy, it is nevertheless a classic case of the type of imbalance that can occur in the latter stage of an expansion and lead to its abrupt and painful ending. there are several other types of imbalances that often accompany the latter stages of an expansion and that can be a warning of danger. one is monetary excess, which is usually manifested as excessive provision of credit, and which often ends up financing speculative activity. i have already mentioned this in relation to the 1980s, when the credit expansion was primarily to business and resulted in the over - leveraging of that sector. it is also possible for the imbalance to show up as over - lending to households, as happened in the uk in the late - 1980s. another imbalance that can occur is in physical investment. we are accustomed to thinking of investment as a good thing and only ever worrying about it if it is too low. but over - investment can also be a problem at times in that it can lead to the build - up of over - capacity. this in turn can lead to a

to continue to drive the economy forward but also the industry sector is expected to contribute favorably if the millennium challenge account projects are implemented. the agriculture sector is also anticipated to improve in 2006. • the balance of payment of the country outlook appears favorable. official international reserves have increased to a comfortable level of 6 months of import cover in may 2006, and are expected to continue to increase in 2006.
should have been created already when times were calm and their activation was not immediately not required. macroprudential policy in the euro area along with single banking supervision within the banking union, the european central bank was also given a mandate in macroprudential policy. the ecb can impose more – but not less – stringent requirements than the actions taken at national level on the basis of eu legislation. ( slide 3 ) the purpose of these asymmetric powers of the ecb is to prevent what is called the inaction bias in the conduct of macroprudential policy by national policy - makers. this bias towards inaction might arise because the deployment of macroprudential instruments is unpopular and tends to meet with opposition from the banks and their customers alike. in the euro area, governing council of the ecb has an important, although a shared responsibility in the macroprudential field. this has the advantage that national analysis is complemented with independent ecb analysis and the state of the euro area as a whole being reflected in policy actions. for example : in a monetary union where monetary policy is designed for the area as a whole, it may be unable to temper national credit cycles. nationally targeted macroprudential policy is useful and it needs to take the limitations of monetary policy into account. national credit cycles vary both in frequency and amplitude. for this reason, the development of macroprudential policy is of particular importance for the euro area countries. national authorities ’ role is very important in the conduct of macroprudential policy within a monetary union. the analysis of the macroeconomic situation and the local conditions is the foundation for policy making. one function of national macroprudential policy is also to act as first line of defense against systemic risks. that benefits a country ’ s neighbours as well : in integrated markets, systemic risks and problems spread rapidly across sectors and borders. the macroprudential framework in finland ( slide 4 ) the finnish macroprudential framework is pragmatic. in a small country the framework was built on within the existing institutional structures. a close co - operation between the relevant institutions is of key importance and in particular the synergies between the central bank ’ s maroeconomic expertise, [ macroprudential analysis ] and supervisor ’ s regulatory and institution - specific expertise. the decision making body is the board of the finnish supervisory authority ( fin - fsa ), chaired by the deputy governor of the bank of finland.

a reform of banking structures in the eu. thinking about all the work that has been done in order to reform banking regulation on both sides of the atlantic, it would be unfortunate if the regulations would turn out to be ineffective due to international loopholes of regulatory arbitrage. therefore, regulatory convergence should definitely remain on the agenda. it is perhaps less important what forms and forums are used to advance it. thank you very much for your attention! bis central bankers ’ speeches
luis de guindos : fostering resilience and convergence in economic and monetary union keynote speech by mr luis de guindos, vice - president of the european central bank, at the conference " five years with the euro ", latvia, 7 january 2019. * * * it is an honour to have been invited here today to celebrate the fifth anniversary of latvia adopting the euro. of course, this year also marks the 20th anniversary of the euro. such anniversaries are a good opportunity to look back and reflect on what has been achieved over these years, and to think about what steps we now need to take to ensure that the coming years will be prosperous for everyone in the euro area. latvia joined the euro area at a difficult time. inflation in the euro area was low, and the risks of deflation and a de - anchoring of inflation expectations were high. now, the monetary policy measures taken to foster recovery have paid off. today the euro area can look back on more than five years of economic growth, with over nine million more people employed now than at the start of the recovery. in terms of growth, latvia in particular has really shone during this time. as a result of this continued growth, we in the governing council of the ecb confirmed at our meeting last month that we are confident the sustained convergence of inflation to our inflation aim will proceed. as a result, net purchases under our asset purchase programme ended last month. the end of net asset purchases does not mean that monetary policy accommodation has ended, however. substantial accommodation will continue to be provided by our forward guidance on key policy rates and our policy of reinvesting the sizeable stock of assets acquired. moreover, further efforts are required to reinforce structural resilience, boost productivity growth and sustain economic convergence within the euro area. introducing structural economic reforms, building up buffers and completing the single market are all key here. i would therefore like to take this opportunity to draw some lessons from latvia ’ s experience within the euro area to consider what specific steps can be taken to ensure the long - term success of the euro. five years of the euro in latvia joining the european union and the euro area has been a good experience for the latvian economy overall. when the euro was introduced 20 years ago, gdp per capita in latvia was around 30 % of the average for the then 15 members of the eu. today, that figure is around 60 %. although latvia certainly suffered during the financial crisis, its

more productive and gradually bringing down high public debt. structural reforms to enhance the euro area's supply capacity can help reduce price pressures in the medium term. it is therefore vital that the reform of the eu's economic governance framework is concluded, in order to anchor expectations and support fiscal discipline. 4 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches