##es from 39. 5 to 42. 3 per cent, both measures to take effect by october 2012 ; completion of the 15th general review of quotas by january 2014 ; and a reduction of advanced european countries ’ representation at the executive board and the elimination of appointed executive directors, to be implemented in late 2012. this agreement was considered by imf management as “ … the most fundamental governance overhaul in the fund ’ s history, and the biggest ever shift in influence in favor of emerging market and developing countries to recognize their growing role in the global economy ”. 5 and yet, the proposed increase in quota shares of emes is still well below the figure that would be consistent with their near 60 per cent stake in the world economy. furthermore, the reform, approved by the imf ’ s board of governors in december 2010, is still to be implemented, since the required endorsement by u. s. congress on the most important measures has not thus far been possible. as a result, the envisaged more prominent role for emes in fund governance has not materialized and, notwithstanding the huge expansion of world economic and financial transactions over the last years, the fund has not seen a general quota increase since 1999. in addition, work on the 15th quota review has been delayed, and is unlikely to be completed by the deadline set under the fund´s articles of agreement ( december 15, 2015 ). thus, contrary to the quota ‐ based nature of the fund, its financing has relied disproportionally on borrowed resources. it is also important to note that the 2010 imf reform disregarded a modification of the criteria for the designation of the fund ’ s managing director, a position that traditionally has been reserved for european nationals. the implications of this overall situation for the efficiency, credibility and legitimacy of the fund are evident. growing frustration of a number of emes with the current framework for global economic governance, has coincided with a proliferation of alternative schemes for international cooperation under the form of bilateral arrangements, regional financial agreements and new multilateral financial institutions. it is difficult not to establish at least some degree of causality between both trends. the emergence of new sources of international finance, be it at the bilateral, regional or multilateral level, is a welcome development. global needs of financing for crisis prevention and resolution, and development, are huge and not covered by existing arrangements. however, it is also important to take into consideration that to the extent that those new alternative sources of financing respond to dissatisfaction

with current global governance, they may end up implying a wider dispersion of global decision making or, to put it differently, the advent of a parallel governance framework. should this be the case, the challenges for creating adequate channels for coordination and communication, and more generally for proper cooperation among the different institutions involved, would become much greater. will the recent economic difficulties in emes affect in any significant way the current situation? this is very unlikely. notwithstanding the complexities of the problems they face, as a result of a combination of factors emes will most probably continue to show higher rates of growth than aes. in fact, according to the latest imf projections, the share of world gdp “ imf executive board approves major overhaul of quotas and governance ”, press release no. 10 / 418, november 5, 2010. bis central bankers ’ speeches accounted for by emes will adhere to an upward trend in coming years, with the oecd reaching similar conclusions for a much longer forecast horizon. 6 it is therefore evident that as the center of gravity of the world economy continues to move towards emes, a corresponding adjustment of global economic governance will inevitably take place. as a result, we are basically left with two alternatives. one, to promote and embrace an orderly, guided change towards a better, more inclusive and representative global governance framework, and the other, to keep stalling the much ‐ needed reform process, with the risk that even higher levels of dissatisfaction of emes result in the emergence of additional alternative financing schemes, and a more complex framework for global economic governance. allow me to make a last reflection. the predominance of national considerations over the global interest has for long been an obstacle for effective global economic governance. as some have noted, global governance in essence depends on the ability of sovereigns to find consensual solutions to common challenges and on their willingness to stick to their agreements. 7 this problem is present even in cases where a political commitment with the common interest appears to be stronger, as illustrated by the difficulties that have emerged on the road to create the institutional infrastructure required for the adequate functioning of the european monetary union. in my view, the reluctance of individual nations to subject decisions to global rather than local needs, is closely linked to an inadequate understanding by the authorities, and the public in general, of the implications of interdependence among countries for national prosperity in a globalized world. clearly, we also need a much