our banking supervisor. the snb will focus on systemic issues while the sfbc will deal with institutional aspects. this job - sharing is based on the premise that each authority will be able to make use of its comparative advantage. furthermore, if oversight activities require it, the snb will be able to co - operate with foreign authorities. 5. conclusion i would like to conclude my address with a repeated call for co - operation. in the field of financial system stability there is no alternative to close co - operation between private market players like you and the regulatory and oversight authorities. on the one hand it makes sense in this field to rely on market forces to stimulate, as energetically as possible, an eagerness for progress and innovation. institutions like csds, icsds and ccps are made to make markets work. on the other hand we have to take into consideration that there are economic forces working in this area that may nevertheless lead to sub - optimal outcomes. therefore, regulators and overseers must take on a more active, complementary role. first, the financial system can be affected by problems of asymmetric information, in particular in the form of moral hazard. it may also entail negative externalities, which by definition are not internalised by individually optimising market players. specifically in the field of clearing, payment and settlement systems, where such externalities are present, regulatory and oversight authorities aim at taking into account these systems as a whole, thereby focusing on the links between all components. in other words, some of these systems are " too interlinked to fail " and must therefore be regulated and overseen with special care. second, the financial system may be subject to limited competition. in the field of securities clearing and settlement systems the production of services is based on processes with high fixed costs. there is thus a risk that the free play of market forces is limited and that actual market developments might lead to monopolies that greatly damage efficiency. regulatory and oversight authorities must therefore also make it their goal to prevent potential abuses of market power. against this background, i strongly believe that trust - based co - operation between the providers of market utilities and regulatory and oversight authorities remains the key to the continued successful development of an efficient and secure financial system that can handle fast - changing needs in the future. ladies and gentlemen, thank you for your attention.

transmission of the snb ’ s monetary policy. as of august 2023, domestic banks held 28 % of all outstanding snb bills ( dark red ), while other investors held 72 % ( light red ). our implementation approach has not only worked well in normal times, but it has also proven itself in times of financial market stress. in march of this year, the snb had to provide significant liquidity assistance to credit suisse. this led to a corresponding increase in total reserves, as indicated by the blue line on slide 11. while credit suisse faced large - scale outflows of customer deposits, other banks experienced large liquidity inflows. this resulted in a higher supply of, and lower demand for, liquidity in the money market. consequently, saron ( red line ) as well as other swiss franc money market interest rates experienced some downward pressure and started to deviate more significantly from the snb policy rate. cf. maechler and moser ( 2020 ) for a discussion of the snb ’ s monetary policy implementation in the context of a negative policy rate. page 5 / 10 initially, the snb absorbed the additional liquidity to mitigate the downward pressure on money market interest rates by conducting overnight reverse repo transactions. specifically, in addition to continuing to conduct the ‘ regular ’ reserve - absorbing operations ( one - week reverse repos and snb bills with maturities ranging from 28 to 336 days ), we set a ‘ hard floor ’ in the overnight segment of the repo market by offering overnight reserve - absorbing repos – the blue diamonds in the chart. this countered the downward pressure on money market interest rates, including saron. as a result, during this period saron never deviated by more than ten basis points from the snb policy rate. following the initial phase, the snb stabilised money market conditions further by increasing the outstanding volume and variety of its reserve - absorbing operations. between march and june, we issued snb bills with a seven - day maturity, in addition to the regular longer maturities. this short maturity was attractive for investors during this period of financial market stress. the wide range of reserve - absorbing instruments allowed the snb to increase its absorption volume very rapidly. as a result, saron moved closer to the snb policy rate once more as overall money market conditions normalised. by june, the distortions in swiss franc money market conditions due to the crisis at credit suisse