fees available from larger and more complex deals in north america. another problem is that such companies tend not to look to enhance securities with original ratings below triple b. this in turn raises questions about fundamental credit quality in the region as well as about the potentially wider role for rating agencies. another area where we might expect to see further innovation is the securitisation of pools of assets such as mortgages or receivables. we have recently witnessed the resurgence of the mortgage - backed security market in hong kong, spearheaded by the hong kong mortgage corporation. this market has the potential to develop even further if the property market recovers buoyancy. but there is also probably scope for more activity in the securitisation of such things as credit card receivables, leasing receivables and the like. these could form attractive debt securities, although, as we have seen with so many issues of securities, the existence of the securities does not necessarily mean that there is an active market in them after the initial placement or sale. thus, we are by no means standing still. but, speaking for the monetary authority itself, we see our role as confined largely to that of a catalyst for innovation or a provider of public goods in cases where market mechanisms are unable to respond effectively to an evident need - although it may in practice be difficult to define particular situations in quite such clear - cut terms. it was, for example, partly in that catalytic role that we first issued exchange fund paper a decade ago as a means of kick - starting the debt market and supplying high quality assets for liquidity management purposes, accompanied by the establishment of the central moneymarkets unit as a centralised electronic depositary for debt instruments. more recently the cmu has established electronic links with euroclear, clearstream and some other national depositaries in our own region. in some of these developments, as in the emergence of initiatives to develop internet trading in bonds, we may be seeing the beginnings of a more global and potentially more liquid and transparent market than has hitherto been typical for debt instruments. returning to the matter of the monetary authority ’ s role, we do not seek to coerce any parties to use a particular market ; nor without very sound reason to stimulate activity artificially ; nor to take a lead as issuer, investor, arranger or market - maker when others should be equally capable of fulfilling such functions ; nor ourselves to subsidise activities the viability of which ought clearly

many countries in recent decades. making the euro a lasting success is of course an ongoing process and indeed, in line with the title of hans ’ speech, “ a permanent challenge and task ”. this task requires the input of many persons, firms and institutions. of course, the eurosystem is not the least important in this respect. this brings me to the second point made by hans on which i should like to focus. that is that, in the end, even the most independent central bank cannot guarantee the maintenance of price stability if no real support for this objective is given by fiscal policies, politicians, social partners, good academic analysis, the financial community as present here this evening and the public at large. although, technically speaking, an independent central bank is able to maintain price stability in the medium term, in the longer term the actual outcome would be radically different without the existence of what hans would call an entrenched stability culture. the importance of this cannot be overstated here in europe, where we have just introduced a new currency in eleven countries with different histories, cultures and backgrounds. establishing and maintaining a european culture of stability is of the utmost importance. this also explains why central bankers regularly express their views on other policies, be it fiscal policies or structural reforms. i have done so in the past and shall continue to do so in the future - as always, on a constructive basis and in recognition of the fact that the central bank does not decide on these policies, but only gives its advice. the german authorities have received a great deal of advice from hans over the past six years. perhaps they did not always like his advice - for instance when they wanted to revalue the stock of gold - but i am sure that they were not surprised that he gave it. they would have been really surprised, however, if the president of the deutsche bundesbank had not expressed his views. to help to establish and maintain a culture of stability is also one of the reasons why a central bank needs to be open and communicative. we at the ecb attach great importance to this principle and are making every effort to practise it. we are prepared to learn from experience and to adjust our line of thinking wherever and whenever it proves necessary. only the pope is infallible - central bankers are not. communication should not be unidirectional. we are willing to listen to others and to exchange information and views with them, while at the same time bearing in