measures that we took to maintain price stability in the euro area. 2 as you can see on my next slide, declining transaction volumes in eonia over the past three years coincide with the start of our large - scale asset purchases and the associated mounting excess liquidity in the system. 2 / 10 bis central bankers'speeches but part of the decline also reflects a stronger role of non - banks in managing liquidity. i will come back to this in a minute. these two factors together have lowered the ability of eonia to accurately reflect banks ’ borrowing costs. on my next slide you can see how exposed eonia has become to sudden fluctuations in this environment : in november last year we observed that, amid thin liquidity conditions, comparatively small changes in transaction amounts can cause pronounced volatility in the level of eonia. 3 / 10 bis central bankers'speeches the problems faced by benchmarks have resulted in a notable regulatory effort to establish improved benchmark rates. at a global level, this has resulted in the adoption in 2013 of iosco ’ s principles for financial benchmarks, which have been endorsed by the financial stability board ( fsb ). the fsb coordinates international work to review and reform benchmarks and has encouraged public authorities and the private sector to identify robust overnight risk - free rates. 3 in the eu, these efforts have resulted in the adoption of the eu benchmarks regulation, which lays down requirements to ensure accuracy and integrity. 4 the regulation requires benchmarks to be reliable and robust, and underpinned by observable transactions in an active market determined by competitive supply and demand forces. eonia and euribor in their current form do not comply with these requirements, and may therefore be prohibited for use, at least in new contracts, from january 2020, unless reformed in the case of euribor. it is also uncertain whether their use in legacy contracts will be permissible. the volume of such legacy contracts with maturities beyond 2019 is substantial. a quarter of outstanding interest rate derivatives using eonia and more than half using euribor have maturities in 2020 or later. 80 % of floating - rate debt securities using euribor – worth almost €1. 5 trillion – also extend beyond 2019. and as mentioned above, a substantial share of mortgages are referenced to euribor. inadequate preparation by the private sector could result in market dislocation once current benchmarks become obsolete. progress in creating a new euro area benchmark new benchmarks are

with, in the end, virtually no costs for taxpayers when the restored banks were sold. after the financial crisis and the misbehaviour of several institutions, which by the way, is still being uncovered, the change of culture from easy public bailouts to a new culture of private bailing - in is justifiable and i support that trend. the burden of proof should be put on those who want to invoke exemptions to the new approach. however, for those of us able to understand the externalities to the whole economy and society that a financial crisis can generate, balanced and complex judgements have always to be applied. a distinction has to be made between how to deal with a few individual cases and the way to address the risks of generalised financial crises. the new european legislation contemplates the necessary exceptions that, as a last resort, foresee interventions that can safeguard financial stability in a member state or in the area as a whole. i trust that the new legislation will be applied by the competent authorities with rigour, wisdom and a sense of proportion in the aftermath of our comprehensive assessment. 2. banks ’ balance - sheet repair and the economic recovery i turn now to the implications of banking union for other economic aspects. some economists are of the view that negative developments in bank credit in the eurozone are predominantly due to credit supply restrictions linked with insufficient capital to absorb losses supposedly still unrecognised. 5 this view is not entirely correct. we have observed a marked acharya, v. and s. steffen, “ falling short of expectation? stress - testing the european banking system ”, ( 2014 ) ; kashyap, a. commentary on similarities between eu and japan ; kashyap, a. et al. “ how does financial regulation change bank credit supply? ” ( 2014 ). bis central bankers ’ speeches increase in banks ’ capital ratios since the beginning of 2009. since the onset of the global financial crisis, the top 20 european banks have increased capital in dollar amounts, net of share buy - backs, by much higher numbers than the corresponding top 20 american banks : usd 289 billion by eu banks against usd 179 billion by us banks. and according to the fdic, the leverage ratios of the biggest european banks, calculated according to the same accounting standards, are very close to their american peers. 6 since mid last year in particular, european banks have implemented write - offs and increased provisions and capital, partly