not. i will not dwell on this. instead, i turn to a different question that fukuyama does not address. clearly, strong governments are needed for countries to have the governance to prosper. equally, free markets underpin prosperity. but why is it that every rich country is also a liberal democracy subject to rule of law? i will make two points in what follows : first, free enterprise and the political freedom emanating from democratic accountability and rule of law can be mutually reinforcing so a free enterprise system should be thought of as the fourth pillar underpinning liberal market democracies. second, the bedrock on which all four pillars stand is a broadly equitable distribution of economic capabilities among the citizenry. that bedrock is fissuring in industrial countries, while it has to be strengthened in emerging markets like india. free enterprise and political freedom why are political freedoms in a country, of which representative democracy is a central component, and free enterprise mutually supportive? there is, of course, one key similarity : both a vibrant democracy and a vibrant free enterprise system seek to create a level playing field which enhances competition. in the democratic arena, the political entrepreneur competes with other politicians for the citizen ’ s vote, based on his past record and future policy agenda. in the economic sphere, the promoter competes with other entrepreneurs for the consumer ’ s rupee, based on the quality of the product he sells. but there is also at least one key difference. democracy treats individuals equally, with every adult getting one vote. the free enterprise system, by contrast, empowers consumers based bis central bankers ’ speeches on how much income they get and property they own. what then prevents the median voter in a democracy from voting to dispossess the rich and successful? and why do the latter not erode the political rights of the ordinary voter. this fundamental tension between democracy and free enterprise appeared to be accentuated in the recent u. s. presidential elections as president barack obama appealed to middle - class anger about its stagnant economic prospects, while former massachusetts governor mitt romney appealed to business people, disgruntled about higher taxes and expanding healthcare subsidies. one reason that the median voter rationally agrees to protect the property of the rich and to tax them moderately may be that she sees the rich as more efficient managers of that property, and therefore as creators of jobs and prosperity that everyone will benefit from. so, to the extent that the rich are self -

: hart publishing ), p. 159, 162. barron j., and m. staten, ( 2003 ), “ the value of comprehensive credit reports : lessons from the u. s. experience. ” in credit reporting systems and the international economy ed. margaret miller. boston : mit press. zhang b et al, sustaining momentum, the 2nd european alternative finance industry report, cambridge centre for alternative finance ( cambridge university, september 2016 a ) ; zhang b et al, the 2015 uk alternative finance industry report, cambridge centre for alternative finance ( cambridge university, february 2016 b ) world bank. 2011a. general principles for credit reporting. washington dc : world bank. www. worldbank. org / en / topic / financialsector / publication / general - principles - for - credit - reporting international finance corporation 2012. credit reporting knowledge guide, washington dc : world bank. ( 1 ) source : page 1 – “ the european credit information landscape : an analysis of a survey of credit bureaus in europe ” aei. pitt. edu / 33375 / 5 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches