samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
senad softic phd governor, central bank of bosnia and herzegovina conference : macroeconomic imbalances and eu convergence 07 november 2019 welcome speech and opening of the conference dear friends of the central bank of bosnia and herzegovina, distinguished panelists, dear guests, dear colleagues, a very good morning to all of you. it is my great pleasure to welcome you to sarajevo, to another international research conference of the central bank, jointly organized with the usaid finra project. a number of experts have agreed that large macro imbalances were the main cause of the euro area crisis. the eu has reacted with many institutional and organizational changes. this process will continue and our conference hopes to be a part of the efforts to discuss both the macroeconomic imbalances and the eu convergence process. i would mention some of the main macroeconomic imbalances : excessive government deficits and debts, excessive bank credit expansion, stock market and real estate bubbles, and large external account surplus or deficits. all of them can result in serious economic problems if unattended. in bosnia and herzegovina, as you all know, we have a currency board regime. we do not have independent monetary policy, nor can we use nominal exchange rate as a policy tool. if action is needed, we must rely on fiscal policy or use flexible labor markets to bring about the necessary adjustment. fiscal policy options can also be limited, especially if there is a trend of ageing population or decrease in working age population. in the case of structural imbalances, even fiscal policy measures can be of reduced efficiency. policy makers must keep in mind the macroeconomic context. let us take, for example, the annual growth rates of credit in bh in 2006, 2007 and the first half of 2008. just before the global financial crisis ( gfc ), loans to private sector were growing at the rate higher than 30 per cent annually. although it was viewed as a sign of overheating, the policy makers also considered factors such as low initial levels of lending. today, such accelerated credit growth would be considered a serious vulnerability. similarly, the path of the accession towards the eu is bringing structural changes to a candidate country ’ s economy. the convergence process itself will generate imbalances that, if not addressed properly, may be dangerous for macroeconomic stability. if the imbalances are neglected, the country may, at best, stay in the accession process for a long time. during the accession period, the legal framework and

but emerge stronger. " cbbh and i personally will do everything in our power to make it so. " thank you
transactions in t2s is expected by midmay 2011.

, and disclose considerable information. the u. s. authorities believe that the few u. s. banks that will remain on basel i but that have small offices or subsidiaries abroad should be permitted by host countries to maintain those operations so long as the organization retains a high capital position and strong u. s. supervisory oversight. foreign subsidiaries of u. s. banks, of course, would be subject to whatever requirements the host country imposes on all banks operating in its jurisdiction, including basel ii requirements. we will be working with the aig at basel to minimize any issues that may arise because of different capital regimes for the consolidated operations of foreign banks and the choices available to their subsidiaries in the united states. u. s. supervisors will cooperate with foreign supervisors to provide any required inputs from u. s. subsidiaries of foreign banks that the home country supervisors need for their consolidated supervision. the banking agencies here are also willing to consider transition methodologies to assist foreign banks that want to use irb here to adopt a - irb and ama approaches. we urge u. s. subsidiaries of foreign banks, in commenting on the u. s. anpr, to advise both u. s. and home country supervisors of any problems that our proposed scope of applications may cause them and, in particular, of their suggestions for addressing these problems, while recognizing the desire of the u. s. authorities to apply only the advanced portions of basel ii in this country.
based analysis of the short - term effects of structural reforms in labour and product markets ”, oecd economics department working papers no. 948, oecd publishing. this study provides useful insights into the shortterm effects on structural reforms. see vansteenkiste, i. ( 2016 ), “ did the crisis permanently scar the portuguese labour market? : evidence from a markov - switching beveridge curve analysis ”, forthcoming. see oecd ( 2016 ) “ going for growth ”. chapter 2 of the report gives a good overview of the literature on reform priorities in a difficult macro context. see imf ( 2016a ), op. cit. a good example of the depth and detail of the greek reform programme is given in “ the second economic adjustment programme for greece fourth review – april 2014 ”, european commission occasional papers, 192, april 2014. see monteagudo et al. : “ the economic impact of the services directive : a first assessment following implementation, european commission economic papers 456 ”, june 2012. according to european commission ameco database. the latest observation is 2013. bis central bankers ’ speeches see imf ( 2016b ), " euro area : staff concluding statement of the 2016 article iv mission ", 16 june, and banerji, a. et al. ( 2015 ), " building a better union : incentivizing structural reform in the euro area ", imf working paper, wp / 15 / 201, september. bis central bankers ’ speeches

will hence not come under pressure from across the atlantic to tighten monetary policy any time soon? i doubt that ms yellen fits into all the slots that people put her in. at the fed, too, decisions are taken by a committee. ms yellen is highly experienced and has an excellent professional and academic background. the good cooperation with the ecb will be continued. we, as the ecb, will fulfil our mandate in line with our established strategy for the euro area. bis central bankers ’ speeches
quickly. buying in the secondary market also helps enhance the goc bond market ’ s functioning and liquidity. it gives participants more regular opportunities to trade and see pricing points for off - the - run securities that are less liquid than on - therun bonds. when we do become a regular buyer in these markets again, a couple of key principles will guide us to help ensure that our presence leans toward enhancing market functioning. first and foremost, we want to limit the market impact of our purchase operations. our bond purchase operations, for example, will be pricesensitive, and we won ’ t necessarily buy everything that dealers offer to us. and second, we will always aim to be as transparent and predictable as possible. for example, we will publish calls for tender ahead of our operations, as well as quarterly purchase schedules. so now you know what comes next once we ’ ve finished qt. where do recent repo market pressures fit? before i conclude, let me also take this opportunity to say a few words about the recent pressures in repo markets and how they fit into all this. i want to be clear that we will not be ending qt out of any concern about the functioning of repo markets. our assessment is that, for the most part, other factors are causing these pressures. i also want to be very clear that the pressures in repo markets are not a reflection or indication of broader financial system stress. last year, our analysis determined that upward pressure in repo markets was being caused primarily by positioning in bond and futures markets, largely by - 9hedge funds. 5 through our more recent monitoring and discussions, we can see that hedge fund activity and positioning continue to contribute to higher funding requirements sourced in the repo market. these have led to upward pressure on repo market rates — along with other factors, such as the transition to a one - day settlement period for trades, also known as t + 1 settlement. 6 we ’ ve also seen greater upward pressure on rates in overnight repo markets around regulatory reporting dates, such as at year - end or quarter - end for banks. this happens in many other major jurisdictions as well. 7 repo trading increases the size of a bank ’ s balance sheet and, in turn, its regulatory capital requirements. so as reporting dates approach, banks try to reduce their balance sheet to satisfy regulatory requirements. this tends to make them less willing to conduct repo transactions with clients and cash desks, due to the

##pranational guarantee ; – banking resolution ( crisis management ). bis central bankers ’ speeches of course, such a leap will require numerous steps and the elimination of a large number of substantial obstacles. but what it requires most is an unfailing political will from all euro area members to progress towards a stronger and more coherent economic and monetary union. after all, the greatest advances in the european project have always come in reaction to crises. and we should remember the prediction of jean monnet : “ europe was born out of crises and will be the solution to these crises. ” bis central bankers ’ speeches
at banco de mexico enthusiastically join president enrique pena nieto in thanking richard for all that he has done for mexico and to enhance mexico – us relationships, which i am sure he will continue to do. bis central bankers ’ speeches

do anything about the current account deficit or about the lack of savings from government policy or private choices. our manipulation of the overnight interest rate helps to keep the overall economy in balance - promoting price stability and production at the economy ’ s potential. but on the federal open market committee jack and i can do nothing to promote savings other than to provide a stable backdrop for private decisions. promoting savings is a job for fiscal and tax policy. if our trade and current account deficits move toward balance, foreign economies will face the questions of how to replace the demand that will no longer be coming from the united states and to reallocate production to a new mix of spending. the u. s. current account will not correct in isolation. the united states has been, in effect, exporting its demand overseas, supporting economic activity in foreign economies by importing more goods and services than we export. if our imports fall and exports rise, just the opposite will occur in the rest of the world. as our domestic demand is restrained relative to production, demand elsewhere will have to increase to foster global high employment. how that is to be achieved is an open question : structural reforms that improve the flexibility of the labor force and production and that foster growth abroad are a desirable way to contribute to better global balance, but macroeconomic policy adjustments to promote more domestic demand may also be required. it is simply not possible for all countries to enjoy stimulus from net exports ; some countries will need to be net importers, especially if the united states no longer fills that role. and so my two issues become related. the development strategies of countries such as china and other asian nations, to be successful, must be compatible with the pattern of adjustment in global demand that is required by the consumption, saving, and investment decisions made by market participants everywhere. conclusion the global economy seems to be facing major adjustments in several dimensions simultaneously. successful adaptation to changing circumstances will require flexibility on several fronts. no one can anticipate how events will unfold - the evolving geography and technology of the production of goods and services, the shifting balances between spending and producing as current accounts change. my fear is that poorly formed diagnoses and incorrect policy prescriptions will have unintended adverse consequences for our economy. any elements of rigidity - in exchange rates, in labor and product markets, in quotas and tariffs on international trade - limit the channels through which the adjustment process can work. rigidity concentrates stresses, increases the risk of
the promotion of data sharing by g20 economies, which includes an increase in “ the sharing and accessibility of granular data, if needed by revisiting existing confidentiality constraints ”. bis central bankers ’ speeches

. stronger coordination will, over time, facilitate the integration of data, which are often requested on the basis of a stovepipe approach and governed by separate legal frameworks. as a result, underlying concepts, definitions and standards can all vary from dataset to dataset, making the combining of data very labour - intensive and subject to all kinds of misinterpretation and overlaps. this see financial stability board, „ feasibility study on approaches to aggregate otc derivatives data “, september 2014, and the consultative report by the cpmi and the board of iosco on „ harmonisation of key otc derivatives data elements ( other than uti and upi ) – first batch “, september 2015. bis central bankers ’ speeches endeavour requires political commitment from all stakeholders. it also requires that authorities collecting data share relevant information with other authorities. i fully acknowledge the existing constraints and barriers that may currently hamper data sharing between authorities, such as data confidentiality and the different mandates of market supervisors, regulators and central banks. however, i think that sharing data among policy - makers and supervisory authorities is essential. understanding interconnectedness in the global financial system and identifying sources of systemic risk were key motivations for establishing the financial stability forum in 1999. 4 sixteen year after the tietmeyer report, and one crisis later, we ’ re still not there. we need to establish a “ circle of trust ” bringing together certain authorities among which data should be shared more easily. 5 authorities have a duty to overcome the obstacles that are currently preventing the sharing of data and endeavour to use harmonised data wherever possible. i am sure the panel will explore these issues in more detail during our discussions. „ while the national authorities, the ifis, the international regulatory bodies and the central bank groupings each gather and assess data on segments or the whole of the international financial system, and regularly monitor aspects of financial system stability, none has the breadth of information or the capacity to formulate a complete assessment of evolving risks. in view of the many sources from which systemic risk can arise, better procedures are needed for systematically pooling and efficiently using the information available to these bodies in their assessment of domestic financial vulnerabilities and global conditions. “ in tietmeyer, h. “ report on international cooperation and coordination in the area of financial market supervision and surveillance ”, bank for international settlements, 11 february 1999. the recommendations for the second phase of the g20 data gaps initiative include recommendation ii. 20 on
food items. the pattern for pulses appears to conform to perceptions about sensitivity to monsoons. at least in the most recent months, the inflation rate for pulses has dropped significantly – in fact, below the overall rate of food inflation. however, the inflation rates for the other two items continue to be above the overall food inflation rate. the rate for eggs, meat and fish has dropped a bit, but the rate for milk appears to have its own dynamic. slide 2 inflation rates of proteins of course, this is not sufficient to draw any inferences about the structural nature of protein price inflation. slide 3 presents the results of the decomposition of the three price level series. the red lines capture the structural components and the picture is unmistakable ; the prices of all three protein sources are on a strong upward trajectory, which, is occasionally offset by favourable cyclical factors, particularly in the case of pulses, given the direct impact of monsoon performance on pulse production. slide 3 structural components demand drivers the 61st round ( 2004 – 05 ) of the national sample survey is the most recent large sample data available for consumer expenditure. though dated, it provides a basis for analyzing the relationship between household affluence and expenditure on various items. in the course of this project, we have estimated price and income elasticities for a variety of food products, including the three categories on which this presentation is focused, at several levels of disaggregation – by item, by state and by income fractile. the results will eventually be published in a detailed report, but given the occasion and time constraints, i would just like to convey a sense of what we are attempting to do. essentially, it is the analysis of inflection points : what is the threshold level of income ( or, in this case, household expenditure ) at which the composition of the diet changes significantly. a national aggregate is not a very precise way of doing this, given the enormous variations in factors that drive consumer behavior across the country, but it serves to illustrate the approach. slide 4 presents the relationship between monthly per capita expenditure ( mpce ), which is of course a proxy for household affluence and the level of spending on the three protein sources that we are discussing. interestingly, the expenditure on milk and milk products is higher than that on pulses in all expenditure fractiles of the urban population, while it begins to dominate pulses at a fairly low fractile in the rural population. eggs, meat and

factors now need to be brought to bear on the goal of ensuring protein security for the indian economy. once again, my best wishes to prof. parikh and thank you all for listening to me.
you agree to our terms of use and privacy statement. you can learn more about how we use cookies by reviewing our privacy statement. specifically, i currently expect real gdp growth in the united states to be below one percent this year, and then to rebound slightly to around 1 - 1 / 2 percent next year. with overall growth slowing to below its trend level, i expect the unemployment rate to move up from its very low current level, reaching somewhat above 4 percent next year. economic conditions in puerto rico similar to the mainland, employment in puerto rico has rebounded quickly and strongly. before the pandemic, the economy was just showing signs of emerging from a decade - and - a - half - long economic slump, during which both the population and employment had fallen by about 16 percent. then, in the spring of 2020, employment tumbled another 14 percent, a far steeper decline than after hurricane maria in 2017. the subsequent turnaround has been astounding. today, total employment is up 5 percent from pre - pandemic levels and is at a nine - year high, and the unemployment rate is at a record low. the recovery has been broad - based, but we've seen particular strength in certain industries like professional business services, transportation and warehousing, and manufacturing. tourism rebounded significantly too, with hotel occupancy rates reaching above 75 percent. soaring inflation all in all, maximum employment has been achieved. but inflation remains unacceptably high, and we are far from the fed's longer - run inflation goal of 2 percent. since early last year, inflation has increased rapidly to levels many of you have not seen in your lifetimes. this experience is not unique to the united states ; nearly all countries around the world are seeing rising costs, and central banks everywhere are working to contain them. the rise in inflation has been extraordinary. in december 2020, overall inflation, as measured by the 12 - month percent change in the personal consumption expenditures ( pce ) price index, was 1. 3 percent. in may of this year, it was 6. 3 percent. a significant portion of this sharp rise reflects global increases in food and energy prices. but, even excluding those costs, the " core " inflation rate has increased from 1. 5 percent a year and a half ago to 4. 7 percent today. it's more than just numbers. high inflation is incredibly harmful, especially to those that can least afford to shoulder the escala

of new york, “ regional economy profiles : puerto rico ; " federal reserve bank of new york, “ puerto rico economic indicators. " 2 ruchi avtar, rajashri chakrabarti, and maxim pinkovskiy, “ was the 2021 - 22 rise in inflation equitable?, " federal reserve bank of new york liberty street economics, june 20, 2022. 3 board of governors of the federal reserve system, federal reserve issues fomc statement, june 15, 2022.
sides ” like mario draghi or, more recently, jorg kukies – after all, i ’ m one of that ilk, too. if you ask me, what we need is more interaction and more dialogue – and never more so than in times like these in the face of increasingly complex topics. taking on an official post for the res publica is always something of a commitment, and i do hope that many more bankers will offer to take a public position. rest assured : the experience of working in an official capacity for the common good is far more rewarding than advocating the interests of the few. and who is better placed to say that than me, having lived in both worlds? the work that piled up on my desk these past eight years encompassed a wide variety of topics. the term of office of carl - ludwig thiele and myself was undoubtedly an era marked by substantial change, and events kicked off during our very first weekend in office, when the first 2 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches greek rescue package needed to be assembled in basel amid intense political and time pressure. carl - ludwig thiele and i spent our first week at the bundesbank attending two meetings a day of the bundesbank's financial crisis team – believe you me : that was a particularly intense way to get started back in may 2010. much has changed since then. the period of low interest rates is posing an entirely new set of challenges for the banking and central banking communities. supervision of large institutions has now evolved into european supervision. structural change in the banking world, sparked by the triple whammy of low interest rates, digitalisation and regulatory reforms, is something we all need to get to grips with – credit institutions, central banks, banking supervisors and not least consumers and bank customers. i would not be exaggerating if i said these were the stiffest challenges in decades. looking to the future, i dare say that geopolitical risk might prove to be more significant than economic risk. let ’ s hope i ’ m wrong. just as times have changed, so, too, has the agenda. ask me to select the headlines for my term of office at the bundesbank and i would pick out topics like the capital markets union, of which i was an early advocate in spite of some resistance. there are other subjects such as the profitability of credit institutions in germany, brexit and everything it involves, and not forgetting the emergence of new fin

of the ing - finex cfo of the year! who will it be? is she or he in this room? a member of finex or not? let ’ s wait and see. again, congratulations to finex and ing! thank you all and good evening. mabuhay po ang bansang pilipinas!