the management of state assets. 6th implementing a more focused policy for attracting foreign direct investment ( fdi ), as domestic savings are insufficient to meet the investment needs of the greek economy. emphasis should be placed on reducing the tax burden, improving public administration efficiency and removing major disincentives, such as bureaucracy, legislative and regulatory ambiguity, especially regarding land use, and the remaining capital controls. 7th maintaining labour market flexibility and pursuing structural reforms in the goods and services markets in order to boost competition and increase innovation and productivity growth. 8th improving the quality and safeguarding the independence of public institutions. independent and well - functioning institutions enhance long - term economic growth. in this context, a speedier delivery of justice, legal certainty and a clear and stable legal framework are essential conditions for strengthening the public ’ s sense of fairness and justice, for improving the investment climate and for accelerating economic growth. 9th enhancing the so - called “ knowledge triangle ”, i. e. education, research and innovation, as well as the digitalisation of the economy by adopting policies and reforms that support research, technology diffusion, entrepreneurship and foster closer ties between businesses, research centres and universities. this would contribute to further increasing r & d spending and the ict sector ’ s share in gdp. however, exploitation of ict calls for continuous development and training in new technologies, the adoption of innovative products and the enhancement of start - up entrepreneurship. overall, sustained efforts are required to foster innovation and r & d spending in order to boost greece ’ s digital transformation. 6. the emu dimension 6. 1 progress over the past 20 years the euro area was quite successful during its first ten years. real gdp per capita grew on average at par with the us, there was substantial nominal and real convergence, and the ecb was able to credibly bring inflation close to target. during the first decade of economic and monetary union ( emu ), the number of emu members increased from the original 11 to 15. moreover, the euro immediately became the second most important world currency. the euro ’ s share in foreign currency reserves has remained broadly stable at 20 % since its creation. the low interest rate environment and easy access to credit slowed down structural reforms and led to excessive public and private borrowing. the financial crisis of 2007 – 2009 and the euro area sovereign debt crisis that followed, brought to the surface the flaws in the initial design of emu. emu lacked the tools to avert and to contain the crisis. the

stability and growth pact ( sgp ) failed to control the build - up of public debt in the pre - crisis period. there was no sufficient monitoring and control over macroeconomic imbalances, such as the evolution of the current account and private debt. the sovereign - bank “ doom loop ” amplified the financial crisis and the 5 / 11 bis central bankers'speeches recession. euro area crisis management and resolution tools were poor or non - existent on account of concerns about moral hazard, and due to the lack of the appropriate institutional setting. there was no provision for risk - sharing in the initial emu architecture. in this context, the ecb forcefully stepped in to restore market confidence, to contain the sovereign debt crisis and to support the euro area economy, by safeguarding price and financial stability. the ecb ’ s response provided the time required for euro area governments to take the actions necessary to strengthen the emu. policy actions have focused on addressing institutional weaknesses, structural fragilities and excessive risk - taking that led to the sovereign debt crisis and the negative feedback loop between sovereigns and banks, which in turn undermined euro area stability. the key initiatives were the provision of intergovernmental loans to greece ; the establishment of the efsf, and its successor the esm ; the creation of a banking union with a single supervisory mechanism and a single resolution mechanism and the introduction of stricter rules on banking regulation and supervision ; the establishment of the european systemic risk board and the development of appropriate macro - prudential tools, which allowed greater emphasis on identifying and addressing system - wide risks ; the strengthening of the sgp ; the initiation of the macroeconomic imbalance procedure and the european semester. as a result of the above initiatives, all member states that received eu - imf assistance are back on their feet, macroeconomic imbalances have been corrected to a large extent, and growth has been restored. economic expansion in the euro area as a whole continues, albeit at a slower pace, and eu banks have become more resilient to financial shocks over the past two years, as reflected in the results of the recent eu - wide stress tests. moreover, emu admitted four additional member states in the course of the crisis years. notable progress was made in the june 2019 euro summit, where a broad agreement was reached a ) on the budgetary instrument for convergence and competitiveness ( bicc ) for the euro area ( and for erm ii member states on a voluntary basis