to the concerns of the public and to carefully evaluate whether and how they may be able, within their mandate, to respond to these concerns. accountability is the quid pro quo of independence. the ecb is doing this diligently as part of its ongoing monetary policy strategy review. we are analysing the effects and side effects of our unconventional monetary policy instruments in depth. and we are exploring if and how, within our mandate, we can contribute to the broader objectives of the union, including by taking measures that will help accelerate the transition towards a more sustainable economy, while firmly adhering to our primary objective of price stability. thank you for your attention. 1. see, for example, the deloitte global millennial survey 2020. 2. various listening events, both with experts and with the general public, were held by the ecb and the eurosystem ’ s national central banks between october 2020 and february 2021. an overview of the ncb ’ s listening events is provided on the ecb website. 3. see, for example, calomiris et al. ( 2016 ), " political foundations of the lender of last resort : a global historical narrative, " journal of financial intermediation, vol. 28 ( c ), pp. 48 - 65. 4. see also goodfriend, m. ( 2007 ), “ how the world achieved consensus on monetary policy ”, journal of economic perspectives, 21 ( 4 ) : pp. 47 - 68 5. treaster, j. ( 2005 ), “ paul volcker : the making of a financial legend ”, john wiley & sons. 6. see haldane, a. ( 2018 ), “ climbing the public engagement ladder ”, speech at the royal society for the encouragement of arts, manufactures and commerce ( rsa ), 6 march. 7. see also schnabel, i. ( 2020 ), “ narratives about the ecb ’ s monetary policy – reality or fiction? ”, speech at the juristische studiengesellschaft, karlsruhe, 11 february. 8. see, for example, christelis, d., georgarakos, d., jappelli, t. and van rooij, m. ( 2020 ), “ trust in the central bank and inflation expectation ”, working paper series, no 2375, european central bank ; mellina, s. and schmidt, t. ( 2018 ), “ the role of

risk boards are close to them on both sides of the atlantic. in other words, you trust ben bernanke will not risk a heavy depreciation of the dollar? on exchange rates i will say that excess volatility and disorderly movements in exchange rates always have adverse implications for economic and financial stability. and i consider it very important that the us authorities also recently confirmed their long - standing position that a strong dollar vis - a - vis the other major floating currencies is in the interests of the united states. but cooperation in the g20 is at a very low point. the united states will perhaps create even more liquidity ; china refuses a substantial appreciation of the yuan. between the selfish policies of the two great powers of today, europe risks the euro becoming too strong. i responded already on the united states. on the emerging economy currencies, i would say that at the toronto summit emerging economies agreed to undertake reforms to enhance exchange rate flexibility. it is the case for all of them, including for china, which has confirmed the will to engage in such reforms, as it signalled last june.