only in germany. we will keep explaining to our critics in germany – and also to german savers – that their country is one of the main beneficiaries of the euro. a stronger euro area, with inflation of below but close to 2 %, would be good for germany. as for the debate we may have from time to time with some academics in germany, i would say there is a certain irony in them taking us to task because we are focusing on our inflation target, since it is at germany ’ s insistence that the ecb was given that mandate – and that mandate only – in the euro ’ s founding treaties, and in my view rightly so. bis central bankers ’ speeches did the euro ’ s jump after your announcement on march 10 disappoint you? it doesn ’ t help your return - to - inflation goal … the ecb, as you know, doesn ’ t have a foreign exchange target. what i saw is that financial markets in general understood what we did, which is more important than the instant reaction of forex operators. the dollar / euro exchange rate is mostly driven by different monetary policies in the united states and europe. what would be more worrisome for us would be a further decline of emerging countries ’ currencies, and increased volatility of the pound sterling due to the eu referendum debate in the united kingdom. does the ecb have a plan for a possible “ brexit ”? i don ’ t want to meddle in a decision that is for the british people to make. however, as a citizen and a european, of course i want the united kingdom to remain in the european union, to which it brings so much. that said, it is normal for us to prepare for any possible scenario, and its impact on euro area banks. if the other scenario prevails and the united kingdom remains in europe, were you reassured by the results of the brexit negotiations between london and its partners? we had two main concerns. one was to make sure that the discussion would not make further euro area integration more difficult. the second was that it wouldn ’ t fragment the single market for financial services and strip the capital markets union project of its substance, notably the single rulebook for financial regulation. the final agreement is a balanced one and we have been reassured, even though ambiguities remain, of course. bis central bankers ’ speeches

##rb plays a key role in developing a toolkit of macro - prudential policy instruments that national authorities can use within the european legal framework. in this context, a major policy challenge europe is currently facing is the implementation of the basel iii standards in a way that would allow authorities to use policy tools for macroprudential purposes as well. i would like to highlight in this regard that basel iii already includes some elements of a specific macro - prudential toolkit, such as the counter - cyclical capital buffer, which requires banks to build up capital buffers in periods of excessive credit growth. these buffers can then be released in stress situations, which would help institutions to avoid becoming constrained by regulatory requirements and may thus enhance their ability to maintain lending activity. however, when having a closer look at the basel iii agreement, we have to acknowledge that most elements of the new framework are traditionally considered as micro - prudential in nature. the capital and liquidity rules are designed so as to address risks at the level of individual institutions. still, depending on how these instruments are calibrated, they could, in principle, be also used to address macro - prudential concerns and mitigate systemic risks. this is a topical issue from a policy perspective in europe, given that discussions are at their final phase on the implementation of basel iii through the so called “ crd iv ”, which includes a proposal for a directive and a regulation. importantly, the regulation will introduce a new feature in financial regulation, namely that the prudential standards laid down in this legislative proposal will be directly applicable in all eu member states. you may already be aware of the concerns that have recently been raised by some authorities and member states with regard to their ability to use the policy tools falling under the regulation for macro - prudential purposes. concretely, they claim that, if capital and liquidity rules and other micro - prudential instruments are introduced as elements of a “ single rulebook ”, this would imply a “ maximum harmonisation ” of prudential requirements. consequently, member states may be legally prevented from adopting more stringent rules, even if systemic risks would justify that. i share these concerns. however, i would also like to highlight some issues that i consider as a prerequisite for the conduct of efficient macro - prudential policy in a single market. first, as regards the “ single rulebook ”, the ecb has expressed on many occasions its support