##te competitiveness. these do not need congressional approval, and we can mention such tasks as deregulating, promoting and fomenting business activity and improving security. for example, in accordance with recent studies, it is well known that in mexico the average time needed to open a new business is 90 days, while in canada it takes only two. the implementation of structural reforms requires previous political agreements. that happened in canada and in other countries that have successfully completed such reforms. so let me conclude by highlighting the importance of building such consensus in mexico. ladies and gentlemen : in 2002, latin america experienced its worst year in terms of economic growth since 1983, and the region has started to show what some are calling the reform fatigue syndrome. the argument that adjustment policies and structural reforms are counterproductive has also been given, wrongly citing the argentine case. however, this argument can be refuted with evidence from the chilean case. however, it seems to me more useful to concentrate on the mexican case. as i have tried to explain, our economy is stronger and more resistant to external shocks than before. the reason is simple but of great importance : we have implemented deep transformations in many of our institutions, modernizing them and making them more competitive and efficient. in particular, i would like to highlight in this important forum progress that has been achieved in maintaining a better capitalized, more efficient and viable banking system that operates under a modern regulatory framework. nonetheless, it is necessary for this progress to translate to in a balanced renewal of credit, to the end that the people worthy of receiving credit have that possibility. in what concerns the rest of the structural framework of the mexican economy, the road ahead should be traced with a clear understanding of these achievements. we have to take advantage of the opportunities that the openness of the mexican economy with the rest of the world offers. we should not be afraid of international competition ; instead, we should do our best to make mexico a more competitive country. the pending issues on the national agenda make up an ambitious program of economic modernization, tough but promising. we must promote that program without delay and with decision, moving away from regressive claims that only delay our strategic insertion in the xxi century.

” icer working paper 2 / 2014, february ; and tillman, p. ( 2014 ), “ unconventional monetary policy shocks and the spillovers to emerging markets, ” hkimr working paper 18 / 2014, august. see, for example, hofmann, b. and b. bogdanova ( 2012 ), “ taylor rules and monetary policy : a global ‘ great deviation ’? ” bis quarterly review, september. see, for example, forbes, k., et al. ( 2015 ), “ capital flow management measures : what are they good for? ” nber working paper no. 20860, january ; and alfaro, l., et al. ( 2014 ), “ the real effects of capital controls : financial constraints, exporters, and firm investment, ” nber working paper 20726, december. bis central bankers ’ speeches the rise in global risk aversion and the significant financial volatility triggered by the taper tantrum may be an indication of how markets could react to a surprising move by the fed. currently, a lot of speculation has centered on the date of the first hike, but this and other details on u. s. monetary unwinding cannot be known in advance, simply because, as the fed itself has stated, the whole process is data dependent. it seems reasonable to assume that the federal reserve will continue to use forward guidance as cautiously as possible, especially in light of its experience with the taper tantrum. in that sense, if monetary changes are anticipated and gradual, international volatility resulting from such actions may be contained. presumably, markets would price in those changes in advance, without much over - or undershooting of asset prices and, perhaps, of portfolio adjustment. indeed, the fed has revealed its preference for incremental moves, stating that the policy rate may stay at levels lower than those consistent with full achievement of its mandate for some time even after those goals have been attained. this expectation, along with the assumption that other advanced nations may further deepen their monetary expansion, could keep world liquidity conditions relatively ample for some time. however, gradualism cannot be assured. in the event of a surprise tightening of the u. s. labor market, for instance, the monetary authority may be forced to change gears more significantly than initially planned. also, other countries may end up taking monetary postures less loose than currently envisioned. for example, extreme unconventional monetary policies have resulted in negative