enhance the role of macro - prudential authorities in monitoring interconnectedness, deploying tools and ensuring cross - border coordination. there were no doubt many interesting contributions throughout the course of the day – but two comments stood out. firstly, elements of the macro - prudential debate and capital markets union are closely related given the importance of cross - border coordination and reciprocity. secondly, while policy makers have learnt important lessons from recent experiences, such as the archegos situation and ldi experience, nevertheless these events are very different in nature and the only common lesson that can be taken is that leverage can be dangerous when it is excessive. several episodes of stress in recent years have demonstrated how vulnerabilities in particular fund cohorts can act to amplify market - wide stresses. ensuring that the funds sector overall and key cohorts within it remain resilient in the face of adverse shocks and does not contribute to excessive risk - taking during market upswings is key for both monetary and financial stability. as you will be aware, the central bank has introduced macro - prudential measures in the funds sector on two occasions recently. 10 there will be time to more fully reflect on the lessons learnt from these experiences. however, already we know that some elements are critical for an effective macro - prudential toolkit. most prominent amongst these is the need for a mechanism to ensure close coordination and cooperation – on a cross border basis – to ensure these interventions are successful. conclusion 5 / 7 bis - central bankers'speeches the coming months and years ahead will see the pace of change continue to accelerate. this will impact on the european economy and society as a whole. but the impact on the asset management sector in particular will be profound. it will be incumbent on all of us – policy makers and market practitioners alike - to influence this change and the role the irish financial sector plays in it. if managed properly, better - developed capital markets in europe can boost the financing available for innovative and growing companies and provide the finance to support the green and digital transitions. greater cooperation across europe will enhance overall systemic resilience and cross - border risk sharing while reducing the cost of financing and increasing returns for the end investors. it will form an essential part in developing europe's overall strategic autonomy. this can all be delivered through well - regulated, high - quality products including funds that deliver value, choice and positive outcomes for investors. thank you. 1 world economic outlook, april

- value ( ltv ) and loan - to - income ( lti ) caps for residential mortgages. the last two - mentioned instruments are not governed by eu law and are a matter for local discretion. actually, in decades gone by, irish lenders followed mechanical rules on ltv and lti ratios which seemed to keep them out of trouble. evidently they are both fairly crude : the borrower ’ s income can change, and an ltv ceiling is less constraining the higher the level of the property purchase price. but given how badly banks misjudged risk - management in the post - millennial boom in ireland, it is hard to deny that having a rule constraining ltv and lti could avoid the re - emergence of this kind of problem in the future. even in the absence of a credit - driven bubble, there is much to be said for bringing back some rules of this type, limiting the share of their mortgage lending that is at high ltv and lti rates, now that the property market has stopped falling and has indeed turned around with a bit of a bang in dublin. the use of macroprudential tools is a national responsibility and falls within the remit of the central bank. we have been talking about this publicly for a while and have been working on developing appropriate measures. we will be announcing tomorrow our intention to introduce some measures along these lines and further detail on that will be available then. consumer protection and running the banks another task which has not migrated to the ssm is consumer protection. we will continue to devote resources in this area and, indeed to the extent some of the special prudential supervisory measures that we introduced in relation to the processing of mortgage arrears also conveyed a consumer protection function, as recently confirmed, we will not be reducing our engagement with the banks on that front. some observers find it tempting to imagine the central bank centrally monitoring and directing each distressed mortgage resolution on a case - by - case basis. that is not realistic or desirable ( and was not even done in the centrally - planned economies of eastern europe and the former soviet union ). it ’ s not desirable for several related reasons. the main reason is the need to assign clear responsibilities close to decisions. already, even though our regulations and codes of conduct in general prescribe minimum quality standards for the way in which banks deal with their retail customers and do not compel or ban specific products, we often find bankers bis central bankers ’