samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
, as a former commercial banker and now as a supervisor, that only if the industry and supervisors work together, each meeting our responsibilities and reinforcing the other, will we be able to successfully manage and supervise a modern financial system. while perspectives may differ from time to time, our objective is the same - to maintain a strong and vibrant financial system over the long term.

rates, and we should be humble about what we claim about understanding the importance of this distinction. for the period ahead, it seems likely that markets will remain focused on vulnerabilities they might have ignored a year ago. the greater premium on strong fundamentals, policy coherence and predictability will likely remain. there will be no one right answer in managing the trade - offs that come with the changed environment, and adjustment will sometimes be difficult. moreover, we will undoubtedly experience further bumps in the road. the renewed volatility we saw in january is proof enough of that. yet, i think we can remain generally optimistic on the outlook so long as market participants continue to appropriately discriminate across countries, rather than treating emes as a homogenous group. furthermore, many emes generally appear better equipped today to handle the fed ’ s prospective exit from its exceptional policy accommodation than they were in past tightening cycles. this reflects the fundamental reforms these emes have put in place over the past 15 years, as well as the hard lessons learned from past periods of market stress. among the positives are : • the absence of the type of fixed exchange rate peg regimes that often were undermined violently in the past during periods of stress ; • improved debt service ratios and generally moderate external debt levels ; • larger foreign exchange reserve liquidity cushions ; • clearer and more coherent monetary policy frameworks, supporting what are now generally low to moderate inflation rates ; • generally improved fiscal discipline ; and • better capitalized banking systems, supported by strengthened regulatory and supervisory frameworks. of course progress has not been uniform across emes and more work remains to strengthen institutional structures further in some countries. in particular, vulnerabilities have built up recently in several important emes. still, the fundamental improvements i ’ ve cited leave many emes better positioned than in the past to weather those times in the cycle when the external environment turns from welcoming to wary. the impact that changes in fed policy can have beyond our borders has led to calls for us to do more to internalize those impacts, or even that policymaking be internationally coordinated. as i ’ ve already noted, fed policies have significant effects internationally, given the central place of u. s. markets in the global financial system and the dollar ’ s status as the leading global reserve currency. in pursuing our policy responsibilities, we seek to conduct policy transparently and based on clear principles. we are mindful of the global effects of bis central
. this is intended to provide hosts with comfort that in the event of a resolution they will not be exposed as losses would be upstreamed to the holdco, enabling the hosted legal entity to continue to operate. hosts would therefore not need to take the sort of unilateral actions to ring - fence assets that were so damaging during the crisis and have tended to fragment the international financial system since. in short we need cross border resolution to work through structural changes like tlac for international banking to work. and we need this to be internalised by the market as well. i mentioned before disclosure for investors. but it is as important for liability holders that are unlikely to be bailed in to understand that too. part of the rationale for locating tlac at holdco in spe strategies is to keep the resolution away from the operating companies and to be able to give liability holders at opco a strong message that where losses and recap needs can be met within tlac they will not be bailed in. this way we maximise the chances of achieving continuity in the cefs of the firm and avoiding any amplification in adverse systemic consequences. to sum up, mrel or tlac is a watershed on the road to making resolution work. finalisation of the tlac proposal this year and joint decisions on mrel in resolution colleges for eu firms in early 2016 will clear the way for banks to engage investors on their capital planning and debt issuance for the year ahead. changes to existing liability structures may take time. but the clarity this will bring will mean that we have a regime that is not only feasible – after all we have the legal powers under bbrd to bail in the things we need – but credible. bis central bankers ’ speeches

we have seen with oil prices and world trade, and so there will be fluctuations in growth and unemployment, as well as in inflation. unemployment can be maintained at lower rates than in the past, even though there will inevitably be times when it will rise because no monetary policy can hope to prevent all fluctuations of demand, output, and hence employment. the nice decade we might expect to be followed by the not - so - bad decade. 1 moving from a nice to a not - so - bad decade would still represent a significant improvement in our economic fortunes compared with the period of high inflation. we must be conscious of the dangers of hubris. after all, starting from the garden of eden there can be only a fall from grace. ends for those looking for a suitable acronym let me suggest that the degree of stability to which we can reasonably aspire, in comparison with the nice decade, will be not of the same order but also desirable, or not - so - bad.
interest in the euro. thank you for your attention.

race to the bottom ". in addition, completing the single market would be a welcome contribution to structural reform in the euro area and the european union. speeding up the process of structural reform as well as deepening reforms are the key challenges facing the european union. only through reforms aimed at improving the functioning of the market mechanism will it be possible to bring the potential level of growth in the union to a structurally higher level. i should like to emphasise that although the euro will probably act as a catalyst for further european integration, this does not necessarily imply that further european integration is a prerequisite for a well - functioning monetary union. the current framework – laid down in the maastricht treaty – has so far proved to work well and will continue to do so in future. a key element of the institutional framework is the stability and growth pact. the pact provides a solid foundation for sound fiscal policies in individual countries as well as in the euro area as a whole. the ecb strongly supports the european commission in its sustained effort to apply the rules of the pact and exert peer pressure on governments, irrespective of the size of the countries in question. in addition, i am – of course – particularly happy with the treaty provisions regarding monetary policy. they provide the ecb and the national central banks of the euro area with a clear mandate – to maintain price stability – and clear independence from third parties to achieve this objective. in this way, the drafters of the maastricht treaty have taken into account the experiences of, especially, the 1970s and early 1980s and the empirical research carried out in this area, which clearly show that the best contribution a central bank can make to economic growth and welfare is to maintain price stability. i can assure you that some people in this room – in particular hans tietmeyer and cees maas – fought like lions for this " monetary statute ". ladies and gentlemen, i should now like to bring my remarks to a conclusion. the european central bank and the city of maastricht have something very important in common. both will forever be associated with the euro, our single currency. the decision of the maastricht university and the city of maastricht to initiate the research project " one money, one euregion " and to organise this conference, as well as the hospitality of the city of maastricht in receiving the governing council of the ecb, also bear witness to this city's continued
important channel for greater connectivity among emerging economies to not only enhance trade and investment flows but also international financial flows between nations and in so doing contribute towards an optimum allocation of resources across borders. these combined efforts will contribute to the stability of the international financial system and global economic prosperity.

areas, which were already the focus of central banks, have become increasingly important with the advent of the covid - 19 pandemic. an increasing number of cyber criminals are exploiting the current pandemic for their own objectives. as a central bank with a mandate to promote financial stability, it is our duty to ensure the safety of funds when they are most vulnerable, in particular once funds have left the bank. in response to these modern threats, central banks have strengthened risk management frameworks and implemented awareness programmes both internally and for the public. however, some of the risks we are addressing, while familiar, are beyond conventional central bank expertise. the complexity of the challenge requires public - private cooperation to strengthen mutual expertise and build solutions. some of the risks, such as cyber threats, also transcends national borders. solutions must involve international collaboration, such as the asean initiative on cybersecurity resilience and information sharing platform ( crisp ). this platform allows central banks within the region to share cyber - related information and encourage capacity building. it is a testament to the interconnected nature of financial services that national financial stability requires international cooperation. closing the pace of innovation in payment services combined with the economic effects of the pandemic are putting pressure on authorities to make progress on cross - border payment issues. in addressing these issues, we have to be mindful of the fact that not all central banks are progressing at the same pace. what is important is the common direction that central banks adapt to change to build a stronger and more robust financial system for all. with this in mind, there are questions that i hope the forum can attempt to answer. first, how can central banks create a safer environment to facilitate cross - border payments? second, how can central banks more broadly balance between supporting financial innovation whilst ensuring financial system safety and soundness? third, what can central banks collectively do to this end? in 1963, john f kennedy famously said “ change is the law of life. and those who look only to the past or present are certain to miss the future. ” on that note, let me thank you again for being here and i wish you productive discussions in the forum. 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches
in the eu ”, ifc bulletins chapters, in : bank for international settlements ( ed. ), data needs and statistics compilation for macroprudential analysis, volume 46 bank for international settlements. 7 esrb recommendation 2016 / 14 adopted on 31 october 2016. 4 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches

cre markets, statistical gaps are more pervasive, with even the available price data not being of sufficient quality. a study by the ecb and eurostat concluded that only nine eu countries have their own commercial property price statistics, six more obtain them from private sources, and 13 eu countries have no price data at all. where cre statistics from official sources are available, they are not derived using a harmonised methodology. there is similarly patchy coverage in statistics for rent indices and rent yields, vacancy rates, transaction numbers and values, and to a lesser extent, construction starts and construction completions. as a result, policymakers are often forced to rely on non - data information sources, such as surveys or market participants ’ reports. data on the financial system ’ s exposures to commercial real estate have comparable shortcomings, while information on lending standards is very limited. closing these data gaps would offer several advantages for policymakers. first, it would enhance the ability of macroprudential authorities to assess systemic risks exante. for rre, more granular data on lending standards would enable the identification of risks that may be building up in the tail of the distribution, risks that are typically hidden by average figures – for example, loans with high debt - to - income ( dti ), debt - service - to - income ( dsti ) or loan - to - value ( ltv ) ratios. in the cre segment, wider data coverage would provide a clearer picture of market developments and improve the assessment of potential vulnerabilities. data on rent indices and rent yields for cre, for example, would help indicate whether a given price level reflects realised returns, or inflated expectations of future returns. details on vacancy rates and building permits would help in assessing property supply and demand. and transaction numbers and values could serve as an indicator of market liquidity, conveying information on potential market overheating or on vulnerability to fire sales should banks or investors have to quickly recover their positions. more complete cre data would also help inform monetary policymakers of the impact of the policy stance on cre markets. decomposing the rental yield into the risk - free rate and the risk premium can help in identifying whether price developments reflect fundamentals. a highly compressed or negative spread between yields and the risk - free rate can indicate an overvalued property market. second, harmonising key definitions and concepts would facilitate cross - country comparisons of 2 / 4 bis central bankers
dun and bradstreet business world issue dated nov 19, 2012 – where are the angels? bis central bankers ’ speeches

the ball is in the court of the private sector and the euro area governments. so let me turn to how we can rethink the financial sector architecture in europe for longlasting stability and integration of the banking sector. missing elements in architecture : the banking union the path towards a more sustainable architecture of emu is still under - way. but much has been achieved. indeed, the crisis revealed the fragilities and flaws in the foundations of the european construction, especially in the financial sector. we understood that national laws and regulatory frameworks proved inadequate. the lack of harmonised policies and centralised provisions at european level caused a situation in which banks operated not on a level playing field. more importantly, there was no institutional framework to deal with systemic risks in the banking sector, be it domestic and cross - border. in fact, some of the biggest players virtually eluded any form of control or limits to their activity. the establishment of the banking union is therefore an important milestone towards genuine stability and integration of financial markets in the emu. just a few weeks ago the regulation establishing the single supervisory mechanism ( ssm ) entered into force and the construction of the single resolution mechanism is on its way. the establishment of the ssm is a fundamental step within the new emu architecture. not only because it will be vital for banking stability in the euro area, but because it will be housed in the ecb. this implies both major institutional and logistical consequences for our institution. just as for single monetary policy, common supervision must be built on solid institutional and legal footing. again, a stringently defined institutional framework will set out a clear mandate, but also provisions that specify the boundaries of the tasks and responsibilities needed for banks to operate in a system of effective supervision providing a level playing field across the euro area. article 127 ( 6 ) tfeu provides that the council may confer specific tasks upon the ecb concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and other financial institutions with the explicit exception of insurance undertakings. 4 let me mention the foundation stones on which we have built the ssm and which will serve to ensure effective supervision : first, the ecb should remain independent in carrying out all its tasks. this includes the supervisory tasks conferred to the ecb. independence is a key element to avoid leniency to any type of political pressures. such pressures would undermine the effectiveness of the supervisory actions, which should only be guided by economic and technical considerations. second
published on our website : 1. the so - called pafi project report on the market analysis on financial inclusion, which is implemented, in many other countries, and aims at reforming the retail payment systems and promoting financial inclusion ; 2. review of the market for remittances in albania, a component of retail payment systems ; 3. the study on measuring the costs of payment instruments. this study identified the costs for each element, finding that cash is the most costly means to the albanian economy. in addition, it sets out scenarios for the replacement with various innovative instruments, which reduce these costs. the findings from the market, needs assessment and scope for intervention were materialised 1 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches in a national strategy on the modernisation of retail payment 2018 – 2023 ) the strategy aims for improvements in the retail payment market to provide albanian citizens with more options to choose from for their daily transactions, more easily and more cost - effective, by supporting the objective for a broader - based financial inclusion. the strategy lays down concrete and measurable objectives, such as the doubling of the population having a bank account ( from 38 % in 2018 to 70 % in 2022 ), the increase in the number of electronic payments per capita, from 4. 3 % in 2016, to 10 in 2022 ( increase by 130 % ). the strategy aims also legal and regulatory improvements, which lay the foundations for innovative initiatives, and a level playing field. in this regard, the bank of albania finalised the drafting of the law “ on payment services in the republic of albania ”. the approval and implementation of this law will provide a crucial contribution to establishing services at low cost and easily accessible by the public, and promoting competition and innovation also based on a prudential consumer protection regime. this will be the theme of the first session of the conference. also, the strategy aims at infrastructural improvements. in this regard, a set of measures are envisaged to promote interaction among various actors from the infrastructural point of view, aiming at reducing costs, in particular, for end users. the establishment of a national platform for processing card payments - would to provide a direct impact on reducing high costs and improving the current card processing practices, due to the extended cycles and involvement of more actors in the process. such a platform would also support innovative services, such as mobile payments and e - wallet. the bank of albania is analysing the possibility

will further deploy additional measures to protect international reserves, as well as and to maintain control over inflation. today we are facing a perfect storm, but the nbu continues to stand strong to hold the financial frontline. we will keep taking decisions aimed at maintaining price and financial stability. this will enable ukraine to come out of this perfect storm stronger than before. thank you for your attention! 4 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches
permanent step - up in the cost of capital due to changes in attitudes towards risk among investors. these developments may also affect the rate of technological progress in the long run if, for example, they lessen the incentive to engage in innovative activities. and we cannot forget the risk of the observed increase in unemployment translating into a parallel increase in structural unemployment, an issue i will deal with later in my speech. therefore, structural reforms appear to be the only available tool to avert the risk of the crisis exerting more permanent effects on both the level of output and the growth rate of the economy. second, structural reforms cannot be seen in isolation from the other measures that are needed, in particular those stemming from the exit strategies, but rather as a necessary complement to them. as an example, the dramatic increase in fiscal deficits and government debt levels during the crisis, exacerbating fiscal sustainability concerns for a number of economies, would worsen if output losses were permanent and constrained government revenues and expenditures in the future. by the same token, growth - enhancing structural reforms may smooth acceptance of the fiscal adjustment or even reduce its magnitude if they prove to be effective. past experience shows that structural reforms are often adopted in times of economic crisis or prolonged episodes of slow or negative growth. this contrasts with the generalised view that it is easier to cope with these reforms, since their costs are generally less painful, and distributional effects less visible, when the economy is strong and income is growing rapidly. and the reasons for this cyclical pattern of structural reforms seem to be related to the fact that crises unmask weaknesses that were hidden by cyclical buoyancy, and these increase, at least partly, the social support for change. the labour market is clearly first among the structural reforms that are needed. for one thing, labour markets play a key role in the functioning of the economy, in particular as a mechanism for adjustment in the face of adverse shocks. and their functioning has implications for competitiveness and productivity, two variables crucial for the long - term growth of any economy and, in particular, for those countries participating in a monetary union, as is our case. likewise, there is sufficient evidence that labour market institutions play a key role as determinants of their sound functioning. in particular, we have evidence that labour markets have been pivotal in the response of the different economies to the current crisis. and they can play a central role in the persistence of the negative effects of the financial crisis

opening remarks. let me simply thank you once again for sharing your thoughts with us. here ’ s wishing every success for the conference. now professor blanchard will complete these introductory remarks. olivier, the floor is yours.