samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
, washington, march 26. pledged for transactions under the discount window, open market operations, and emergency lending facilities. to conclude, the dodd - frank act is an important step forward for financial regulation in the united states, and it is essential that the act be carried out expeditiously and effectively. the federal reserve will work closely with our fellow regulators, the congress, and the administration to ensure that the law is implemented in a manner that best protects the stability of our financial system and strengthens the u. s. economy.

occur in the shadow - banking sector – notably, short - term collateralized claims such as broker - dealer repurchase agreements ( repos ) – bank deposits are noteworthy because, in the modern institutional environment, they are highly sticky and not prone to run at the first sign of trouble. in its simplest terms, our story is as follows : there are different private technologies for creating safe money - like claims. the “ banking ” technology involves meaningful amounts of capital as well as deposit insurance and thus leads to deposits that are both safe and relatively stable. the “ shadow banking ” technology uses less capital and manufactures safety by, instead, giving repo investors collateral and the right to seize the collateral on a moment ’ s notice. so shadow banking money is much more run prone than bank money. given its relatively stable nature, the banking model is better suited to investing in assets that are illiquid and subject to interim price volatility – that is, to fire - sale risk. these assets can be loans that involve significant amounts of monitoring, or they can be securities that require less monitoring. what is essential is the synergy between issuing stable types of money claims and investing in assets that have some degree of exposure to fire - sale risk. that synergy, in our view, is at the heart of the business of traditional banking. we have developed a simple theoretical model that captures the main ingredients of this story and makes some further testable predictions. it ’ s probably ill - advised over lunch, but i will take a crack at sketching this model for you here. however, let me start with three stylized facts to motivate the theory. stylized facts the first fact, and the one that i suspect will surprise you the least, is the strong homogeneity of the liability side of banks ’ balance sheets : banks are almost always and everywhere largely deposit financed. for example, in the cross section, and using year - end 2012 data, a bank at the 10th percentile of the distribution had a ratio of deposits to assets of 73. 6 percent, while a bank at the 90th percentile had a ratio of 88. 9 percent. 6 a similar homogeneity is apparent in the time series : over the past 115 years, deposits have averaged 80 percent of bank assets, with a standard deviation of only 8 percent. these patterns are in sharp contrast to those for nonfinancial firms, for which capital structure tends to be much less determinate, both
hu xiaolian : a managed floating exchange rate regime is an established policy article by ms hu xiaolian, deputy governor of the people ’ s bank of china, 15 july 2010. * * * china ’ s has moved into a managed floating exchange rate regime based on market demand and supply with reference to a basket of currencies. as an important component of the socialist market system, this is a right choice based on china ’ s specific circumstances and development strategy and is also an established policy. i. a managed floating exchange rate regime has been in place since 1994 1. the unification of dual exchange rates in 1994 marked the official beginning of the managed floating exchange rate regime. establishing a managed floating exchange rate regime based on market supply and demand and a unified and well - functioning foreign exchange market is stipulated in the decision of the cpc central committee on several matters concerning the establishment of a socialist market economic system adopted at the 3rd plenary session of 14th cpc central committee in november 1993. on the first day of 1994, with the unification of rmb ’ s official exchange rate and swap market exchange rate, the single, managed floating exchange rate based on market supply and demand was officially adopted. the unification of dual exchange rates into a single exchange rate regime is worth mentioning because it put an end to the coexistence of official exchange rate and the swap market exchange rate which traded foreign exchange in the retention system. in 1994, the exchange rate reform marked the launch of the foreign exchange surrender system where enterprises are required to sell to the banks their foreign exchange receipts and buy foreign exchange from the banks when necessary, ended the practice of foreign exchange retention and submission, and simplified the procedures for banks and enterprises to use foreign exchange, thus giving exporting enterprises a lot of incentives to export and earn foreign exchange. meanwhile, with a unified inter - bank foreign exchange market being established, china began a new stage where the rmb exchange rate was based on market supply and demand. the rmb, as an important price tool, started to play a fundamental role in the allocation of foreign exchange resources. in 1994, when the dual exchange rates were unified, the rmb to dollar exchange rate adopted the swap market exchange rate of 8. 7 yuan to one dollar. this reflected market fundamentals and the need of supporting exports to mitigate the shortage of foreign exchange reserve. the nominal rmb to dollar exchange rate appreciated to 8. 3 yuan per dollar, or by about 5 percent between the beginning of 1994 and 1997

stability and realize quality and rapid growth of the economy.
inclusion may also pose risks to financial stability. as central bankers, we should promote greater financial inclusion but not without due care and caution. among the questions before us are : ( 1 ) what institutional structure and regulatory regime should we promote in order to maximize the benefits from financial innovations while minimizing the risks? ; ( 2 ) what mechanisms should be instituted to manage distressed institutions arising out of financial innovation? ; and 3 ) how should the public be protected from the associated risks including cyber - crime, among others? bis central bankers ’ speeches naturally, we would also be concerned to ensure reliable data management so as to monitor and appropriately adjust our monetary policy operations in tandem with the related structural changes. this symposium will help us to master the role of central banks in harnessing financial innovation so as to prudently maximize financial inclusion. it is now my pleasure to invite our eminent experts to make their presentations and to also encourage the active participation of every one of us in the deliberations. bis central bankers ’ speeches

continually strengthening and providing opportunities for our respective institutions, in order to share their best practices, implementation experiences, and novel proposals, to address the issues that emerge in this dynamic, evolving and challenging risk environment. for us, at banco de mexico, it is a privilege to be part of the international operational risk working group ( iorwg ) and i am sure that during these three days of work, in this space and platform, countless ideas and strategies will arise that will allow us to expand our vision to successfully address the challenges that we are all facing. once again, i welcome you all to banco de mexico and i thank you in advance for your valuable contributions to these topics of interest to all of us.
been combined into large, complex, and opaque trust companies that were not members of the nych. this resulted in runs on those trusts, which led to broader liquidity problems. although the nych had the ability to provide liquidity to those trusts, the provision of that liquidity was delayed. it appears that at the time, the nych was, reasonably, observing some form of bagehot's dictum when deciding whether to provide liquidity. under that dictum, you want to know that the institution to which you're providing liquidity is solvent. if it isn't, then the liquidity extension could be akin to throwing good money after bad. but because the trust companies at the time weren't member institutions, the clearinghouse didn't have a good enough understanding of their balance sheets to know whether they were solvent. 5 some banks refused to clear checks from other institutions, which led to an erosion of depositor confidence and more failures. this historical example points to another aspect of a payment system that is important - resilience of the system. these problems highlighted by the 1907 panic - coordination failures and a lack of resilience - could have been mitigated with the help of a central bank. paul warburg, an influential banker at the time, argued that such a central bank could " establish and maintain a perfect system of credit, enabling the general banks to transform cash credits into actual cash with such absolute ease and certainty that the use of cash credit, instead of actual cash, will not cease, no matter what may happen. " 6 in 1913, congress agreed and created the federal reserve. it positioned the federal reserve at the center of the banking system by establishing a nationwide check - 2 / 5 bis - central bankers'speeches clearing system and a telegraph wire transfer service that is now known as fedwire®. the fed was also intended to function as a lender of last resort so that suspension of payments would no longer be necessary. in the 1970s, the fed promoted more efficient check - clearing by adding the automated clearinghouse service. our job in providing these services and carrying out our responsibilities was and continues to be to make sure the payment system functions efficiently and resiliently, promoting the kind of confidence that is vital for a modern economy. the lesson from this history, as relevant now as ever, is that the payment system has been one of those areas in which the best efforts of the private sector have sometimes fallen short. the

city of new york, vol. 1 ( january ), pp. 302 – 42. 7 see bank for international settlements ( 2024 ), " private sector partners join project agora, " webpage, september 16. 5 / 5 bis - central bankers'speeches
, then the likelihood of problems arising in the first place is dramatically diminished. it was wholly appropriate that this was the focus of bagehot ’ s writings – at the time, the structure of the banking system meant that illiquidity was often the key problem. and central banks did not appreciate the importance of the role that they could play. bagehot ’ s whole purpose was to convince the bank of england to fulfil this role. but the changes in the banking system over the past fifty years mean that a much more diverse range of problems can strike today. in september 2007, everyone thought that the crisis was one of liquidity and as a result there was an expectation central banks could provide the solution. but it quickly became clear that it was in fact a crisis of solvency. diamond and dybvig ’ s analysis consciously omitted the fact that, in reality, banks ’ assets are risky. and not only are banks ’ assets risky, but banks are highly leveraged institutions. this leaves them heavily exposed – with very high debt - equity ratios, small movements in asset valuations are enough to wipe out their equity and leave banks insolvent. that means the distinction between illiquidity and solvency can be difficult in practice – the difference in timing might be just a few days. if a crisis is in fact one of insolvency, brought on by excessive leverage and risk, then central bank liquidity provision cannot provide the answer. central banks can offer liquidity insurance only to solvent institutions or as a bridge to a more permanent solution. it is this structure, in which risky long - term assets are funded by short - term deposits, that makes banks so hazardous. yet many treat loans to banks as if they were riskless. in isolation, this would be akin to a belief in alchemy – risk - free deposits can never be supported by long - term risky investments in isolation. to work, financial alchemy requires the implicit support of the tax payer. when all the functions of the financial system are heavily interconnected, any problems that arise can end up playing havoc with services vital to the functioning of the economy – the payments system, the services of money and the provision of working capital to industry. if such services are materially threatened, governments will never be able to sit idly by. institutions supplying such services are quite simply too important to fail. everyone knows it. so, highly risky banking institutions enjoy implicit public

consumer price inflation has slowed in recent months, and despite the recent rise of gasoline prices, we expect inflation to moderate further in 2012. looking ahead, the key challenge for the long island economy will be to continue to prepare its residents for the best jobs being created here. expanding educational access and opportunity and the skills that go along with it will go a long way to broadening participation in the economy to all residents and bolstering long island in the future. thank you for your kind attention. i would be happy to take a few questions. for more information, see the new york fed ’ s consumer credit panel. bis central bankers ’ speeches
is rising, with the servicing cost of that debt representing a growing chunk of export earnings – a clear sign that there is no room for complacency. ‘ twin deficits ’ have become the norm across the region over the past decade. subsaharan africa ’ s government balance was in surplus, on average, between 2004 and 2008, but the region posted a deficit in excess of 4. 0 % of gdp from 2015 to 2017. admittedly, most of the countries have now taken steps towards fiscal consolidation, and official forecasters expect a narrowing of that public deficit. nonetheless, publicdebt ratios are projected to continue rising in 2018, and the imf has recently highlighted the concerning rising trend in debt - servicing costs as a percentage of national budgets. there are indications already that public deficits are, in some cases, starting to ‘ crowd out ’ financing for private - sector projects. the 2016 slowdown in the region ’ s economies was compounded by a broad - based depreciation in most of its free - floating currencies, which triggered faster inflation and forced central banks to raise rates, sometimes aggressively. thankfully, such negative forces largely reversed in 2017 : in an environment of rising global investor appetite for risk, recovering commodity prices and softness in the united states ( us ) dollar, most of the liquid, tradable african currencies either stabilised or recovered against the page 3 of 11 dollar. this improved performance, helped in some cases by a shift to a tight monetary stance – in particular, in the large oil exporters like angola and nigeria – allowed a broad - based decline in inflation rates. in fact, in most of the largest economies of the continent, inflation in the early part of 2018 has been close to central banks ’ targets, or within such targets, when the central bank targets an inflation range as opposed to an inflation point. this has allowed several central banks to reduce interest rates in the past year or so – in some cases by a moderate amount ( angola, kenya ), and in others more substantially ( ghana, mozambique, tanzania, uganda, zambia ). it is encouraging to note that many in the latter group of countries had in earlier years been forced to hike aggressively to combat inflation pressures ; this policy tightening thus appears to have borne fruit. the ongoing challenges of development several factors point to a moderately improved short - term growth, inflation and monetary outlook for sub - saharan africa. nonetheless, as i have mentioned earlier, the growth levels

) and its 2004 - 2005 focus on water, sanitation and related issues.
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these actions have sharply lowered money market spreads and encouraged some lending at longer maturities, conditions remain far from normal. bond issuance has been slow to return, which is putting greater pressure on banks as the sole source of lending growth. in tandem, financial institutions have curtailed their central roles as intermediaries and market - makers. this feeds illiquidity and volatility in financial markets and delays the return of confidence in the financial system. this could aggravate the adverse feedback loop between the financial system and the real economy. in essence, we have gone from one extreme – with overabundant liquidity leading to the misallocation of capital – to another – where, in some systemically important markets, capital is barely being allocated at all. the challenge for policy - makers is to provide transition support that effectively restarts rather than replaces markets. as i have argued elsewhere, this may require structural changes to some markets, including the greater use of clearing houses, and a re - thinking of the scale and frequency of central bank liquidity operations. 6 procyclical capital adequacy the second risk identified in the fsr is the procyclicality of bank capital. put simply, banks characteristically increase leverage in a boom, further feeding the expansion, before reducing leverage in a downturn, exacerbating the slowdown. regulation often reinforces these tendencies when it should lean against them. this is now a serious global problem. banks outside of canada are under enormous pressure to reduce leverage. given the scope of likely ultimate losses from structured products alone, it would take an enormous amount of capital to reduce average leverage ratios to canadian levels. bank of canada research estimates that u. s., u. k. and european banks would need to raise a combined us $ 1. 2 trillion to bring their leverage ratios down to canadian levels. these capital needs will rise linearly with any recession - induced writedowns. in this environment, banks are inclined to hoard capital, rather than deploy it. in a world with guarantees, liquidity and funding support, regulators should not reinforce this tendency. m. carney, " building continuous markets " ( speech to the canada - united kingdom chamber of commerce, london, england, 19 november 2008 ). in canada, our banks are not facing the same pressures to de - lever as their counterparts abroad. still, their loan portfolios would experience higher credit losses in a deep or prolonged downturn
a life in statistics ', bhvan - the mathematics magazine. 3 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches

shaktikanta das : inaugural address - 18th statistics day conference inaugural address by mr shaktikanta das, governor of the reserve bank of india, at the 18th statistics day conference, organised by the department of statistics and information management, mumbai, 28 june 2024. * * * i am happy to inaugurate the eighteenth statistics day conference of the reserve bank. this annual event provides us with an opportunity to reflect on the current and evolving state of statistical system. it also helps us to take stock of the refinements in application of statistical methods and technologies in the realm of public policy. the use of statistics has been ever growing as a preferred tool for drawing inferences in diverse fields. the discipline has moved beyond collection of facts to focusing more on interpretation and drawing inferences, taking into account the level of uncertainty. this shift has allowed statistics to become an integral part of other major disciplines. the surge in computing power is being increasingly harnessed in combination with statistical methods to improve efficiency in decision making and enrich end - user experience in various fields of human knowledge. the celebration of the statistics day in india coincides with the birth anniversary of professor prasanta chandra mahalanobis. his contributions in laying the foundations of modern day official statistics in india have been pioneering. inspired by his work, indian statisticians are making their presence felt - both domestically and globally in traditional as well as in newer applications of statistics. against this backdrop, let me highlight the areas in which the reserve bank's cutting edge information management is contributing to the formulation of public policies and the overall economic development in india. one year ago, we launched our next generation data warehouse, i. e., the centralised information management system ( cims ) at the statistics day conference. several new features1 were introduced in the new system2. scheduled commercial banks ( scbs ), urban co - operative banks ( ucbs ) and non - banking financial companies ( nbfcs ) have already been onboarded for reporting on the new portal. the reserve bank has provided training to over 15, 000 personnel from regulated entities. many one - to - one handholding sessions have also been organised. i would like to congratulate the department of statistics and information management in the reserve bank for undertaking these initiatives. all regular statistical publications are now generated from the cims. going forward, we intend to augment and refine the cims further as an integral part of our mission to constantly improve
we conduct monetary policy for the euro area. the diverging monetary policies of europe and the united states will be a major issue in 2016. how do you see this divergence, however slowly it may develop? we don ’ t coordinate our actions, but that doesn ’ t mean that we don ’ t talk to each other. the occasional additional phone call may be made in such a situation. in any case, the united states will continue to pursue a very accommodative monetary policy which adapts to the circumstances. there can be no talk of tight monetary policy even there. the divergence reflects the different cycles. bis central bankers ’ speeches what risks do you see coming from china? i am very confident that china is well aware of its global responsibility. china ’ s economy is on a manageable path, and we do not anticipate a crash. has the ecb changed you? you were known as a hawk, but that no longer seems to be the case. i have never said that i ’ m a hawk. i was always stability - oriented, and i still am today. it ’ s always a question of how you can best exert influence : sulking in the corner or actively shaping policy. it ’ s also a question of being loyal and committed to an institution. bis central bankers ’ speeches

i would count myself, and remember also as executive board members we are collectively responsible for the ecb. we have a lot of fantastic staff working for us and they ’ re working for the board collectively. i happen to have the lead responsibility for economics and monetary policy, but absolutely i can only imagine scenarios where in any scenario, the person holding my position and the president will always work in a close working relationship. i should say, peter praet was also admirable, at least from our perspective, of the transparency with which he talked to journalists and to economists. i hope this is the 7 / 8 bis central bankers'speeches beginning of continuing that tradition. thank you very much for the event. 8 / 8 bis central bankers'speeches