##al principles and core features series of reports. ’ ( 2020 ) and the on digital currency aspects ( e. g. financial stability, system design ) published in 2021. 17. these are likely to involve testing individual components of the digital pound architecture ( against standards built on the considerations set out in our technology working paper ). project rosalind, being run out of the london centre of the bis innovation hub is one example of the kind of work we envisage. that project is currently running a tech sprint and expressions of interest are open until 10 february.

is under no such compulsion ”. and ever since then, the absence of an effective symmetric framework of obligations on both debtor and creditor countries has led to periodic crises. the obstacle to the creation of a binding framework is clear. governments know whether they are debtors or creditors today. so a framework that has economic and indeed moral force when seen from behind the “ veil of ignorance ”, as suggested by john rawls, is unlikely to appeal to governments. should we conclude, therefore, that in the absence of a world government, the identification of “ new rules of the game ” is likely to be no more than a theoretical exercise? certainly, the fate of keynes ’ proposal for an international clearing union is not encouraging. but the experience of the past twenty years shows that large imbalances mean that everyone suffers when there is a sharp adjustment. so there is scope, if not for formal international policy coordination, then for an international conversation about how to improve a system that is fragile. central banks were able to ensure, for a while, that the paths of output were sustainable – consistent with low and stable inflation. but the patterns of demand were far from sustainable. and when the sharp adjustment to demand eventually came, it inevitably had implications for the level of output. reform of the imfs, and of our domestic financial systems, is a necessary complement to the domestic price stability oriented policy frameworks of central banks. the immediate issue of how to move to a more sustainable position requires a resolution of different countries ’ economic strategies for rebalancing. there can be only one path for rebalancing – with rebalancing in the deficit economies, by definition, just a mirror of that in the surplus countries. but the path that would be chosen by high - saving economies differs from that which the more indebted industrialised economies would prefer. their need to deleverage and reduce borrowing means that if another abrupt adjustment is to be avoided, they cannot risk taking too long to rebalance their economies. in contrast, many of the emerging economies continue to require rapid economic growth and abundant employment opportunities in their export industries to ensure adequate levels of employment for their vast populations. as a result, policymakers in countries like china quite simply see limits to the extent and speed at which they should expand the share of domestic demand in their economies. they do not want to rebalance their economies too quickly. of course, ex post there must be consistency between these two strategies as demand in