expected and is reasonable. we cannot ask banks to generate a double - digit return on equity when interest rates and the risk - free rate are so low and banks are indeed more resilient than they were. moreover, this improvement does not only concern the banks : it can also be seen in the non - banking sector and the financial markets, with particular progress made with regard to over - the - counter derivatives and the shadow banking system. regarding the economic consequences of the reforms, it is important first to remember the cost of the financial crisis : according to imf data, the total loss of global output from 2007 to 2014 amounts to 25 %. compared to this considerable loss, the potential cost of financial regulation is very small. and above all, no one can seriously claim that in france or more generally in the majority of advanced economies the supply of credit has been excessively constrained by banking regulations. on the contrary, lending to the economy remains robust, with housing loans in france up 5. 6 % year - on - year in april 2017 and loans to non - financial corporations up 5. 4 %. in the coming months, this strong overall growth may actually warrant general vigilance and closer scrutiny by the high council for financial stability, in which i participate. 1 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches * * * ii. nevertheless, we are still faced with a challenge for the future, which brings me to my second point : even if the achievement is now on solid foundations, there is clearly no room today for complacency or respite. although the risks of a future crisis have diminished, no one should believe that they have disappeared entirely. so what measures are required? for banks, the priority is to stabilise the regulatory framework and therefore we must finalise basel iii. here, it is useful to remember that, essentially – let ’ s say approximately 80 % – basel iii was already completed in 2011. in addition, there is now a broad consensus on risk measurement approaches. the main point that is still undecided and which continues to occupy the committee members is the setting of the so - called “ output floor ” for banks that apply internal models. let ’ s be clear : i read and hear the banking industry, and french banks in particular, giving its advice for negotiations on this point. a little restraint would not go amiss, and it is not our intention to defend corporate interests. if an output floor of 75 % is not acceptable, it

those ccps whose activities are “ super - systemic ” for the eu market establish themselves in the european union. they are a step in the right direction and represent the only viable mechanism to guarantee that european authorities and national central banks in particular, can control and manage the risks that ccps are likely to pose to the financial stability of the european union. once the provisions on the resolution of ccps have been finalised, the compensation framework within the eu will have been improved considerably. 2 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches * * * let me conclude with a general remark that concerns the economy : we need a system to assess, ex post, the economic effects of the reforms. france fully supports the work of the fsb to develop a structured analytical framework, which germany has rightly included in its priorities for its g20 presidency. europe, and germany and france in particular, now has a special duty to protect financial regulation – a regulation that is sensitive to risk, balanced in its treatment of banks and nonbanks and binds the entire international community. generally, that is what we ’ ve been doing well since 2009, and it is what continues to inspire us. thank you for your attention and i wish you an excellent conference. 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches