resulted in a greater number of banks having direct access to rtgs. there is a question about whether we should go further and encourage or require a much larger number of banks to become direct members of major uk payment systems and have an rtgs settlement account, in order to spread the settlement risk benefits of rtgs more widely. the emergence of a new breed of on - bank payments service providers, regulated by the fca, has extended that debate further, since it is currently a requirement of a number of retail systems – in particular fps and bacs – that direct participants should have a settlement account at the bank. major changes to the access arrangements to settlement accounts raise both policy and practical questions for the bank – and could have implications for market participants and fellow regulators too – so it is right that they should be considered as part of the development see davey and gray ( 2014 ). further information on the planned extension of rtgs opening hours http : / / www. bankofengland. co. uk / markets / pages / paymentsystem / extending. aspx. the bank stands ready to act as a settlement agent for payment systems recognised under the banking act or whose access to settlement in central bank money is otherwise judged by the bank to be likely to reduce the risk of widespread disruption. there are currently 6 payment schemes for which the bank acts as settlement agent ( as well as the crest securities settlement system ) and there are around 40 settlement account holders in rtgs. bis central bankers ’ speeches can be found here : of a broader blueprint. targeted extensions in access could bring benefits in terms of innovation. but we need to think through the implications for stability, market structure and costs. the final theme of the blueprint is the role of the bank. the bank developed the rtgs infrastructure itself, and is responsible for the maintenance and development of all elements of its hardware and software. the bank is also responsible for the day - to - day operation of rtgs, although these running costs are in turn charged out to its users on a full cost recovery basis. the rules and procedures of the various payments systems that settle in rtgs – chaps, bacs, fps, link, cheque & credit, and visa europe – are maintained by their respective private sector members, though there is close cooperation between the schemes and the bank ’ s operational team. the recognised payments schemes are themselves supervised by the financial markets infrastructure directorate of the bank. we will want to examine the

basis that the stability of the financial system can be tomorrow ’ s objective, for the next person. but in order to achieve this, we need to be very clear on the benefits of financial stability. one of the questions i get asked most frequently is how we will ensure that the lessons of the crisis stick. we can only achieve this if the case for financial stability is well understood. there is a very clear parallel here with monetary policy. the success of monetary policy is founded on public acceptance of the benefits of sustained low inflation. that did not come easily, as the experiences of the 1970s taught. but once that public acceptance and interest started to become embedded, the task of monetary policy became easier – not easy, but easier. in this important sense, no such policy making apparatus can be independent of the will and interest of the public. and nor is the task of ensuring public acceptance ever finished. monetary policy has demonstrated that a firmly established and lasting institutional framework for policy making is a necessity. but exactly what is the public interest in financial stability? this can be a harder question to answer than for monetary policy, because financial stability cannot be so readily summarised in a statistical series. there is a temptation to generalise that you certainly know it when it isn ’ t there. i think there are at least four things that the public should want as part of the overall stability of the financial system. first, that they can have confidence in the safety and soundness of the institutions that hold their money and savings and write policies to protect them against risks. second, that those institutions have the capacity to undertake the stable and sound provision of financial services to the economy, including of course lending. third, that the system does not do business and exist on the basis of an implicit commitment that the state will have to use public money, the public ’ s money, to bail out firms that get into trouble. and fourth, that the public can place trust in firms and markets based on their reputations and the transparency of their dealings. regulation is important and it can help to foster that trust, but it cannot substitute for the trust that the public needs to have, in firms and markets. the state is not there to support the industry, and regulators are not there to substitute for trust in and the reputation of firms and markets. some important principles follow from the identification of the public interest in financial stability. first, a competitive financial system can only exist if it is rooted in stability : competition and stability