transactions ”, 14 october 2014. bis central bankers ’ speeches step in this direction6. while this is an ambitious project and will take some time, i hope we can propose a way forward at the g20 summit in september. finally, we will need to make substantial progress in understanding and assessing interdependencies between ccps and their participants, across the multiple relationships they have with each other. mapping the complex network of these interlinked exposures is crucial from a macroprudential standpoint. this work is currently being carried out by the fsb, and its success will depend on the full and timely availability of data from all jurisdictions involved in the exercise. the information - sharing framework and the methodology being developed for this analysis is a precondition for future work, such as supervisory stress testing. pooling risk in ccps brings benefits for market participants and generates positive externalities for the broader economy – provided that the propagation of risk is well understood and well regulated. as mark twain once said : “ put all your eggs in the one basket and – watch that basket! ” 7. the macroprudential framework for ccps is about making sure that we ’ re watching that basket. i will now hand over to our panellists. see esma report, “ eu - wide ccp stress test 2015 ”, 29 april 2016. “ behold, the fool saith, ‘ put not all thine eggs in the one basket ’ – which is but a manner of saying, ‘ scatter your money and your attention ’ ; but the wise man saith, ‘ put all your eggs in the one basket and – watch that basket! ’ ”, in twain, m., the tragedy of pudd ’ nhead wilson, chapter 15, 1894. bis central bankers ’ speeches

risks to eu systemic stability. to that end, a closer link between the financial stability assessment of central banks and the supervision of major cross - border banking groups undertaken by the colleges of supervisors would be helpful. it is also important to ensure an effective coordination of policy actions between central banks and supervisory authorities in case a systemic threat is identified. against this background, the eurosystem strongly supports the ecofin conclusions adopted in october 2007, whereby the council invites the commission to assess possible clarifications in the legal framework for the exchange of information between supervisors and central banks. fourth, in order to ensure effective crisis management and resolution at the eu level, it is crucial that all responsible authorities maintain a high degree of preparedness to handle the complexity of a cross - border crisis situation, while preserving the necessary flexibility of action. every crisis situation is unique and the arrangements for crisis management and resolution cannot anticipate the full range of causes, propagation channels and outcomes of financial disturbances. moreover, setting out ex - ante detailed arrangements on how to deal with and resolve crises can unduly constrain the flexibility of action of supervisors, central banks and also treasuries in a stress situation. instead, the emphasis should be on enhancing preparedness. this may be achieved, among other things, through stress - testing exercises aiming at verifying the resilience of the financial system under stress conditions and through financial crisis simulation exercises aiming at assessing the effectiveness of existing arrangements. in this respect, the periodic conduct of simulation exercises at the eu level is a positive aspect. also the eurosystem devotes particular efforts to this area. it has conducted already two simulations which tested the effectiveness of its own arrangements and plans to conduct others in the future. finally, i should emphasise that the eu arrangements should also take into account the global dimension of financial stability. i do not need to dwell much on this aspect, since the financial market turbulence provides a vivid reminder of how a disturbance in a particular market segment can propagate across many markets and countries. this entails that the eu arrangements should also include mechanisms which support the co - operation between authorities from the eu and from third - countries in addressing common concerns. in this respect central banks can claim a long - standing tradition of effective co - operation on a global basis. this has been illustrated recently by the joint initiatives of various central banks to address tensions in the money market. 4. conclusions let me conclude with the possible lessons from the present significant