samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
safer by sharply reducing the market ’ s reliance on discretionary extensions of intraday credit by the clearing banks and fostering improvements in market participants ’ liquidity and credit risk - management practices. bis central bankers ’ speeches

the first half of 2023, when real gdp grew at a little more than a 2 percent pace. growth in consumer spending, which accounts for most of gdp, was strong in the third quarter. data on economic activity in october indicate that consumer spending is cooling from its pace in the third quarter. retail sales fell 0. 1 percent, the first drop since march. spending was down on motor vehicles, an interest - sensitive sector, which may be evidence that that the fomc's tightening of monetary policy is having some effect. spending was also down at gasoline stations, mostly because of a sizable decline in gas prices, often a larger factor for this segment of retail than shifts in demand. but 1 / 5 bis - central bankers'speeches even without motor vehicles and sales at gas stations, retail sales barely increased in october, which may reflect a broad - based moderation in demand. beyond consumer spending, there are indications that manufacturing and nonmanufacturing activity by businesses slowed in october. if we factor out a big drop in motor vehicle and parts production due to the united auto workers strike which ended october 30, manufacturing output edged up only 0. 1 percent last month. 2 surveys of purchasing managers by the institute for supply management indicated that both manufacturing and non - manufacturing activity slowed in october. nowcasting models that forecast gdp based on available data are predicting a significant moderation in economic activity in the fourth quarter. after the retail sales report for october, the atlanta fed's gdpnow model is forecasting a 2. 1 percent pace of increase for these three months, nearly identical with the actual growth rate for the first half of the year. something that significantly boosted gdp in the third quarter was a buildup in inventories, which are quite volatile from quarter to quarter. this volatility reflects how businesses manage their inventories by building them up and drawing them down at other times to manage cash flow and anticipate swings in demand. private inventory investment contributed 1. 3 percentage points to gdp in the third quarter and that likely won't be sustained. inventory swings could even subtract from gdp in future quarters. one thing to bear in mind is that the gdpnow estimate does not include the effects of the auto workers strike. a range of estimates suggest the strike will cut roughly half of a percentage point off the gdp growth rate in the fourth quarter and then boost gdp in the next quarter around the same amount, so i will tend to look through the strike
real economy. conclusion the headwinds holding back the uk economy over recent years have been predominately real ones : an ongoing crisis in our main export markets of europe ; the necessity of fiscal consolidation at home ; the need for rebalancing of the uk economy towards net exports ; and balance sheet repair across all sectors. the weak relative performance of the financial services sector following the crisis has also been a direct drag on output as well as hampering the supply of credit. the central expectation in the february inflation report was for growth to resume in 2013, albeit at a relatively modest pace. patience will be needed. meanwhile, the monetary policy committee remains committed to supporting the economy whilst aiming to keep inflation low and stable in the medium term, in line with our remit. monetary policy can help, even if it can ’ t solve all the challenges of restoring sustainable real growth. bis central bankers ’ speeches

markets, and their dynamism has to a large extent offset slower growth elsewhere. in my view this is not a flash in the pan, but a structural feature of the world economy that we are now living in, and we should expect a continuing impetus to global growth from this direction. however, as we saw in the mid - 2000s, there is also the associated risk of upward pressure on inflation from global energy and other commodity prices, if the momentum of world growth becomes too strong. fourth, the high degree of stimulus provided by fiscal and monetary policy to combat the recession will need to be withdrawn over a period of time. returning budget deficits to a more sustainable level will require a prolonged tightening of fiscal policy in many countries, including the uk. monetary policy can provide an offset by continuing to support the growth of private spending – though the appropriate degree of monetary stimulus will need to be continually reassessed in the light of the progress of the recovery at home and abroad and its impact on inflationary pressures. given the turbulence we have seen in the major economies of the world over the last two years, it is very natural to worry about setbacks to the recovery, both in the uk and overseas. in the past, economic recoveries have not been smooth and linear. so we should expect to see some variability in growth rates, both at home and abroad, as this recovery develops. however, looking through this data volatility, there are also good grounds for expecting the growth of the world economy to continue to provide a healthy support to the uk ’ s economic recovery over the years ahead. and, over time, that is likely to bring a different set of policy challenges to the ones we have been facing over the course of the recession.
lending programs were designed to wind themselves down as market conditions improve, and they are doing so. when conditions are no longer unusual and exigent, those programs not focused on depository institutions will be terminated, and, with a few exceptions such as the term asset - backed securities loan facility, they will leave no residual on our balance sheet. 2 the long - term securities we are buying will not run off so rapidly. but the effects of our holdings of mortgage - backed and agency securities on spreads nonetheless should decline even if they remain on our balance sheet. for one, some of the spread compression may result from the flow of our purchases, as well as our stock of holdings, and as we already announced, we will be tapering down our purchases. moreover, the stock of assets we own will become an ever smaller share of a growing market. finally, as confidence returns, asset demands will become less focused on particular classes of highly safe and liquid assets and more sensitive to relative interest rates, and private participants will arbitrage away at least some of any remaining spread distortions. nonetheless, if, in the course of removing accommodation, the federal open market committee ( fomc ) perceives spreads to be distorted or longer - term interest rates to be not responding appropriately, it could consider sales of these assets. communication about exit the unusual nature of our actions and the uncertainty about when and how they will be unwound suggest an even greater payoff than usual from being as clear as possible in our communications with the public. i already noted the importance of the public's understanding that we can and will exit from these policies when that is necessary to achieve our objectives for stable prices and maximum employment. in addition, we will need to explain especially lending in support of the orderly resolution of individual systemically important institutions will run down more slowly. the administration has agreed to seek to remove the so - called maiden lane facilities from the federal reserve's balance sheet. carefully – in our policy announcements, the minutes of our meetings, and our quarterly forecasts – the evolution of our assessment of the economic situation and the risks associated with achieving our goals. finally, we will need to be sure our rate guidance evolves along with our assessment of the probability that the exit is drawing closer. conclusion although economic conditions have apparently begun to improve – partly in response to the extraordinary steps the federal reserve and other authorities have taken – resource utilization is quite low, inflation is subdued, and continuing restraints on credit

are likely to constrain the speed of recovery. for that reason, as the fomc stated last week, exceptionally low interest rates are likely to be warranted for an extended period. given the highly unusual economic and financial circumstances, judging when the time is appropriate to remove policy accommodation, and then calibrating that removal, will be challenging. still, we need to be ready to take the necessary actions when the time comes, and we will be.
outlook for the u. s. economy ”, speech 85, federal reserve bank of san francisco. bis central bankers ’ speeches

do not happen by side stepping the importance of robust risk management practices. i also would like to highlight here that the nbfcs operate in a dynamic and challenging environment, facing a multitude of risks that can impact their stability and operational resilience. let me highlight just three of these which i believe deserve heightened attention. cybersecurity and operational risks 1 / 5 bis - central bankers'speeches in today's digital age, cybersecurity threats represent a significant operational risk. the stark reality is that a cybercriminal needs to succeed only once, while organisations must always remain vigilant and resilient. one of the primary cybersecurity risks faced by nbfcs is the threat of data breaches and unauthorized access to sensitive information. there are also other forms of cyberattacks, including malware infections, phishing scams, and ransomware attacks. these attacks can disrupt operations, compromise systems and data integrity, and lead to financial extortion or loss of critical information. to mitigate cybersecurity risks, nbfcs must adopt a proactive and comprehensive approach to cybersecurity. this includes implementing robust cybersecurity policies and procedures, conducting regular risk assessments and vulnerability scans. deploying advanced security technology tools such as firewalls, encryption, and intrusion detection systems are non - negotiable. further, providing cybersecurity training and awareness programs for employees, on an ongoing basis, should become a way of life. risk management and internal audit functions have to urgently build on their skill sets so that they are able to assess periodically, the it and cyber security stance and preparedness of their entities. credit risks from rule - based credit models many nbfcs are increasingly turning to rule - based credit engines to accelerate the growth of their lending portfolios. while automation can enhance efficiency and scalability, nbfcs should not allow themselves to be blinded by these models. it is crucial to recognize that rule - based credit engines are only as effective as the data and criteria upon which they are built. overreliance on historical data or algorithms may lead to oversights or inaccuracies in credit assessment, particularly in dynamic or evolving market conditions. therefore, nbfcs must maintain a clear - eyed perspective on their capabilities and limitations, supplemented by continuous monitoring and validation of credit scoring models. it is incumbent upon the supervised entities to keep the rule engines and models calibrated from time to time
– despite the narrative about cheap russian gas. over the past two years, but especially as russia ’ s war played out, energy costs then skyrocketed at times. and the years to come will probably see them persist at above pre - war levels here in germany. partly as a probable knock - on effect of decarbonisation, because the price of carbon is likely to rise. and investment will have to be made in order to become climate neutral by 2045. the third challenge is demographic change. the german population is shrinking and getting older overall. that ’ s putting a strain on the labour supply and on trend economic growth. reflecting on these major challenges, the “ economist ” magazine observed in an article nearly three months ago that “ germany needs an economic - policy zeitenwende ( an epochal turning - point ) as much as it requires the one mr scholz has promised in its military and foreign policy ”. [ 2 ] so is germany – is the domestic economy – in need of fundamental structural change? i will use my speech today to share my view on this with you. and i am fully aware that i am speaking here in bochum before a seasoned audience of experts. and not only because many of you have studied, are studying, or even lecture in business and economics. but also because bochum has been no stranger to the notion of structural change for decades now. how else could bochum rank today as a hub for it ( informationstechnologie ) security and a popular location for healthcare firms – 50 years on from the closure of the last coal mine. 2 industry key to germany ’ s “ business model ” let me kick off by highlighting one particular feature in germany. the huge importance of the manufacturing sector ( see chart 2 ). in germany, the manufacturing sector accounts for a distinctly higher share of gross value added than it does in most other advanced economies. manufacturing contributes just under 20 % to german gross domestic product ; the equivalent share in the united kingdom is not even half as high. only in japan is the share slightly higher than in germany. what is particularly striking, however, is that this share has remained more or less steady in germany since the 1990s. the other advanced economies, by contrast, have seen that percentage decline notably, with a shift towards services. as we can see, ladies and gentlemen, the manufacturing sector is hugely important in germany. that is a key aspect of what has been called, for the

##virus disease ) - 19 crisis, monthly report, september 2022, p. 55. 17. deutsche bundesbank ( 2022 ), productivity effects of reallocation in the corporate sector during the covid ( coronavirus disease ) - 19 crisis, monthly report, september 2022, p. 55. presentation is germany ’ s “ business model ” at risk? talk followed by a panel discussion ikf institut fur kredit - und finanzwirtschaft e. v., ruhr university bochum 05. 06. 2023 | 2 mb, pdf [ / resource / blob / 810028 / d8854b10efeeac203918dc3ef7d83794 / ml / 2023 - 06 - 05 - nagelpraesentation - data. pdf ]
mario draghi : unveiling of the new €20 banknote speech by mr mario draghi, president of the european central bank, at the ecb ’ s unveiling of the new €20 banknote, frankfurt am main, 24 february 2015. * * * ladies and gentlemen, welcome to the unveiling of the new €20 banknote. before i put my signature on the new note, allow me to say a few words about the importance of euro banknotes. in total, there are now 17. 5 billion euro banknotes in circulation ; the total value of these banknotes reached €1, 000 billion for the first time in december 2014. the euro notes that we use every day are the most tangible symbols of european integration. the introduction of a new banknote serves as a reminder that this integration is an ongoing process. euro banknotes touch the lives of every one of us. as such, they bring us all closer together. as you saw in the video highlighting the new security features, the inclusion of the mythological figure europa, who gave her name to our continent, shows how europe draws on its shared history. introducing a new banknote isn ’ t just change for the sake of change. every central bank needs to upgrade its banknotes periodically to benefit from advances in banknote technology and to maintain their integrity. the new note includes a feature which you won ’ t have seen before. it is called the “ portrait window ” and is a real innovation in banknote technology. it is the outcome of the eurosystem ’ s work to ensure that the euro notes continue to be resilient against counterfeiting. this will reinforce the trust that the 338 million citizens across the euro area place in their banknotes. the new €20 notes will enter into circulation on 25 november this year. by the date of the launch, the eurosystem will have printed more than 4. 3 billion such banknotes. the €20 note is important because it is one of the most frequently used denominations across the euro area. it is widely distributed via atms, it is accepted by many vending and ticketing machines, and it is often checked for authenticity by retailers using small devices at their counters. to further support the producers and owners of banknote handling machines and authentication devices, the eurosystem is putting in place a number of measures. one major step is to make new €20 banknotes available for testing purposes – as was done with the new

€10 – more than nine months ahead of the launch. this should allow sufficient time for the machines to be adapted by 25 november. in addition, the ecb and the national central banks will conduct an information campaign addressing everyone who handles banknotes so that they will be able to recognise the new note and its security features. the new €20 note is the third denomination in the europa series that is gradually replacing the original euro banknotes introduced in 2002. it will be followed, over time, by new versions of the €50, €100, €200 and €500 notes. thank you for your attention. i now have the pleasure of signing the new €20 banknote. bis central bankers ’ speeches
towards a fiscal capacity will most likely be a long one. history shows that budgets have rarely been created for the general purpose of stabilisation, but rather to deliver specific goals in the public interest. in the us, it was the need to overcome the great depression that led to the expansion of the federal budget in the 1930s. perhaps, for europe, it will require an urgent cause such as mitigating climate change to bring about such collective focus. whichever path is taken, it is plain to see that now is the time for more europe, not less. i mean this not in an axiomatic way, but in the truest traditions of federalism. where results can best be delivered by national policies, let it stay that way. but where we can only deliver on the legitimate concerns of the public by working together, we need europe to be stronger. for us europeans, in a globalised world, a true sovereignty that meets people ’ s needs for security and prosperity can be achieved only by working together. 6 as chancellor merkel has said, “ we europeans have to take our destiny into our own hands if we want to survive as a community ”. 7 working together allows us to protect our interests in the world economy, to resist the pressures of foreign powers, to influence global rules to reflect our standards, and to enforce our values on global corporations. none of these can be achieved to the same degree by countries acting alone. in a globalised world, sharing sovereignty is a way to regain sovereignty. but recognising that we need to exercise what president macron has termed “ european sovereignty ” 8 to be effective does not mean that we already have the political infrastructures to do so today. awareness of their necessity is growing quickly, however. we saw this emerging in the most recent european parliament election, which was perhaps the first such election fought mainly on european questions. even those who were seeking to slow down european integration did so by contesting the eu institutions rather than rejecting their legitimacy outright. this is only a start, but it suggests our union is moving in the right direction. i am confident that it will continue to do so, because it is ultimately the self - interest of individual countries that lays out our future path towards a european sovereign. the actions of many committed europeans, at both the national and eu levels, have helped us to reach this point. there are three groups whose contributions i would like to single out. the first is the staff of the ec

at national plans ”, bruegel, 29 april. 8 european commission ( 2021 ), “ the euro area ”, flash eurobarometer 488, may. 80 % of thosesurveyed believe that having the euro is a good thing for the eu and 70 % say the same aboutthe euro and their country. 4 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches
however, this was due to many other accompanying measures, not just the separation of the currency. in other words, the currency was only as strong as the foundations of the set of economic policies in place at the time. as you all know, we tried a currency separation again in february 1993. again we had nothing to be ashamed of, as not a single drop of blood was shed in the process. savings started to spill over from slovakia into banks in the czech republic as soon as the former federation broke up. the general level of uncertainty also increased, affecting the foreign exchange market. but despite all that, the excellent organisational preparations for this step, stared secretly in the middle of the previous year, allowed the operation to be conducted quickly and efficiently. the architects of this currency separation deserve great recognition, because everything began to return to normal soon afterwards and the previous uncertainty quickly faded away. it is no secret that they were inspired primarily by rasin ’ s separation and its success, and they themselves later became a source of inspiration for currency separations in other economies gaining independence. all this tells us that the czech nation is reasonably good at running its own macroeconomic, monetary and financial affairs. it has never had to resort to an exchange rate arrangement such as a currency board, and it has enjoyed the benefits of relative economic and monetary independence. although at times the exchange rate of the koruna has been a source of domestic economic volatility, at other times it has done a great job of absorbing external shocks. until quite recently, we were also using the koruna exchange rate as an unconventional monetary policy instrument to help us achieve the inflation target. our ability to conduct our own monetary policy successfully is one reason why the czech republic is not currently seeking to adopt the euro any time soon. to sum up, the past 100 years have not been a series of random economic events. despite all the discontinuities, there has been some continuity. in the same way that we inherit various physical and personality traits from our forebears, economists learn their craft from those that came before them and pave the way for those that come after. i am sure this conference will bear me out on that. i wish you an interesting debate. thank you for listening. 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches

. before i do that, though, i would like to welcome you once again and thank all of you for accepting our invitation to this event.