our demographics and investment level are not supportive. nevertheless, we are also in the economy where the downside is not that large. we are in the economy that is very resilient and has been able to withstand a lot of shocks. there are many reasons for that. i have mentioned with the context of the covid - 19 ; the timeliness and the size of policy responses with the help from the fiscal and monetary front. there are actually structural reasons why thailand is a safe place to do business and a place where risks of economic shock, economic downturn, or significant economic crisis are page 5 of 11 very low relative to almost any other countries in the region. if you look at the causes where a country typically experiences an economic crisis, what are those? a country sometimes might have the foreign exchange or balance of payments crisis as they run out of reserves and have too much external debt. yet, thailand, unlike other countries in the region, our vulnerability on this front is extremely low. we have a very low level of external debt relative to our foreign reserves which exceeds 200 billion dollars while our short - term external debt is significantly below that. our current account has been traditionally in very large surpluses. therefore, the risk of having a baht crisis, like what we had in 1997, remains extremely low. what are other kinds of crises? another kind of crisis that people experience is the fiscal crisis. if you look at the thai governments ’ balance sheet, it is relatively strong, the public debtto - gdp ratio is just over 50 percent and the fact that the government is able to borrow 10 - year money at only 1. 7 percent indicates that people are still willing and happy to finance the government. they do not see the government as having a very high risk. moreover, the fact that the borrowing rate of the thai government compares to other countries in the region is much lower reflects that our fiscal risks are much lower. thus, the risks of having the fiscal - type economic crisis are low as well. the third type of crisis that countries go through is the banking crisis. for us, if you look at our banking sector, it is still quite solid. the bis capital ratio is about 18 - 19 percent which is among the highest in the region. the banking sector both in terms of liquidity and capital positions is quite strong. the one area where we are weak in terms of balance sheets is in the household sector where household debt to gdp remains quite elevated and has increased

which i have mentioned on earlier occasions – is the creation of a permanent secretariat for the g20. this would help to stay focused and avoid proliferation of new topics, which each new g20 presidency introduces, often with limited results. it would also foster continuity on technical topics, especially on work streams which span over several years, such as financial regulation. these advantages would of course need to be weighed against the risks of increasing bureaucracy and less ownership by the countries participating in the g20, including the presidencies. but, learning from the experiences of other secretariats to international bodies or forums, i believe it should be possible to strike the right balance and reach agreement on a small, dedicated g20 office. a third idea i would like to advance is that the g20 should strive towards concrete and measurable objectives for policy action. achieving this goal would not only be helpful in order to reduce the scope for multiple interpretations and hence strengthen the consensus building, but it would also enhance the credibility of the g20 as well as its legitimacy via the channel of stronger output legitimacy to which i referred earlier. to give one obvious recent example, a more ambitious agreement at the st petersburg ’ s summit on how fiscal strategies of g20, notably advanced economies, should evolve in a post - toronto world ( which has no more deficit targets post - 2013 and hence no guideposts for medium - term public debt consolidation paths ) would have been particularly welcomed. i am aware that some of these suggestions might be difficult to implement quickly. but a discussion about their feasibility cannot come too soon. bis central bankers ’ speeches