samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
to the bank in resolution but may also be critical for clients. if there is doubt about continued access to clearing services from a bank in resolution, clients may look to migrate rapidly to another provider. these fsb, ( october 2014 ) key attributes of effective resolution regimes http : / / www. financialstabilityboard. org / 2014 / 10 / r _ 141015 /? page _ moved = 1 http : / / www. financialstabilityboard. org / wp - content / uploads / joint - ccp - workplan - for - 2015 - for - publication. pdf for financial institutions bis central bankers ’ speeches issues around continuity and portability will be the subject of work within the fsb over the course of the coming year. together, these initiatives to improve the resilience and recovery arrangements for ccps and their members will help to reduce the probability of ccp default. but while improvements to resilience are necessary they may not by themselves be sufficient. no institution is “ fail sfe ”. ultimately, we need to have a credible resolution approach for ccps. if we do, resolution should offer a continuing benefit in helping to incentivise recovery by removing expectations that the taxpayer will be compelled to step in. by contrast, if we do not have a credible regime in resolution, we run the risk of weakening the incentives both to manage a ccp prudently, as well as incentives for clearing members to contribute to a ccp ’ s recovery should it get into trouble. the benefits of resolution to market discipline and recovery are common to all financial institutions. but that is not the only insight from banks that is relevant to ccps. before going too far in talking up the similarities, i should note – although it should go without saying – that ccps are very different from their bank clearing members in many important respects, including their business models, legal structures and balance sheets. ccp recovery and resolution therefore poses some specific issues, some of which i will touch on today. however, at base there are principles that are common to the resolution of any systemically important institution. perhaps the most obvious similarity between the resolution of banks and ccps is in the common objective : resolution should deliver continuity of critical economic functions without reliance on solvency support from taxpayers to achieve it. for that continuity to be achieved it is not enough that the financial losses of the institution are fully absorbed ; the going - concern resources of the institution, or of

speculate as to how, precisely, the present imbalances within and between the major industrial economies will work themselves out, as they necessarily will over time. but, notwithstanding the current difficulties, i am convinced that the best prospect for a relatively happy ending is for all of us to persist in our attempts to achieve the macroeconomic stability and supply - side flexibility which i identified as our common goal at the outset of my remarks. i am very happy now to take your questions.
. 7 / 7 bis central bankers'speeches

the global economy is moving eastwards, to where it was 200 years ago, from which it was temporarily displaced by the industrial revolution and that ’ s a factor, one of many factors that we in israel have to take account of, as we think about how the rest of the world affects us. there was a european theory that you should get 1 – 2 countries out of the eurozone, so that the other countries would realize it could happen to them, but they ’ ve given that up for a very good reason – if you start a process like that it could really get out of hand. but they made that decision that they wanted to save the euro. mario draghi made the decision ; he said that the european central bank would do what it had to do to save the euro. well what it has to do is clear – provide some way of providing support directly to governments. find some way of keeping the finances of governments more or less whole. we should understand that greece in the end defaulted on its debt in a negotiated way. not every government has to be forgiven its debt, but it has to be guaranteed support in negotiations over its problems. in any case, europe is in a recession ; over the next year we ’ ll probably see slightly better growth than we were expecting to have in the second half of 2013. on the capital markets side, interest rates have been low for a very long time. that situation will continue until we begin to see signs of growth or signs of inflation. in 1994 the fed changed its monetary policy from being very expansionary, and it raised rates unexpectedly and caused a temporary slowdown in global growth, because people were simply caught bis central bankers ’ speeches unawares. that should not happen now. the fed has been telling everybody that it ’ s got to be ready for a change like this. by the beginning of 2015 interest rates should possibly begin to rise. i won ’ t go into the argument on currency wars, or if there aren ’ t currency wars. it is a simple fact, whatever the motivation, that interest rates are zero, it ’ s a simple fact that it ’ s harder for us to deal with an environment in which global interest rates, in countries which account for more than half of global gdp, are essentially zero, but that ’ s not a fact that we ’ re going to change by complaining. so what do we do in the israeli economy? at the ceremony when i got this job, in the house of the
of course, future economic shocks. consequently, the surrounding uncertainty can also be divided into similar parts. let me first shortly address the last point, something we can call the “ shocks ” uncertainty. it is necessary to admit that both today ’ s central bank forecast and today ’ s central bankers ’ decision are deterministic from this point of view. this means that no shock that the economy will face in the future is incorporated into both the forecast and the decision. in other words, there is no way of avoiding the last - mentioned uncertainty connected with future shocks and neither the central bank nor the markets have any superior information about them. the uncertainty surrounding the first two mentioned points – the current state of the economy and future monetary policy – will be the heart of my remarks tonight. being forecasters we all face uncertainty surrounding the knowledge about the current state of the economy. this current state should be thought of as a shortcut to all the inflationary determinants brought from the past, but due to the transmission lags having an impact on future developments. every forecaster, and of course also the central bank, has his own opinion about the economy ’ s current state. one question arises immediately : should the central bank look at market forecasts and use them as a source of information about the economy ’ s current state and for its decision - making? my answer is : market forecasts should not be neglected. on the other hand they cannot be the core for decision - making and the central bank must rely primarily on its own structural modelling. this implies that despite all the transparency and communication, the central bank will – from time to time – have to surprise other forecasters and the market. let me now briefly explain why this is the case. in their article “ inflation forecasts and monetary policy ”, ben bernanke and michael woodford discuss the case of the central bank fully relying on market forecasts for its decision - making. they conclude that relying only on the market inflation forecast the central bank cannot perfectly stabilise inflation on the target. in the economist ’ s technical jargon, it can be shown that the rational expectations equilibrium under such circumstances does not exist. although such a statement looks suspicious, there is quite a simple intuition behind it. let ’ s assume that the central bank can infer the current state of the economy only from the market forecasts. then, following the market forecasts, the central bank will clearly settle monetary policy in order to achieve its target

long - term economic growth, as i have argued. what a shame for the eu and for us. thank you for your attention.
framework, which was released in june last year. as you may be aware, basel ii has probably attracted more public attention than any other banking supervision reform. while i will not go into the details of the new framework, it is important to spend a few minutes talking about what the basel committee hopes to achieve with basel ii. any discussion of basel ii should probably start with the 1988 basel accord, which established the first internationally accepted definition and measure of bank regulatory capital. in many ways, the 1988 accord was a tremendous success story. it was adopted in over 100 countries, and contributed to the strengthening of bank capital at a time when a number of countries had experienced problems in their banking systems. it has become one of the benchmark measures of a bank ’ s financial health. while the simplicity of the 1988 accord helped to foster its widespread acceptance, that simplicity has become a liability for some banks and supervisors. almost 20 years later, industry developments in risk measurement and management have widened the gap between the regulatory capital measure under the 1988 accord and the internal capital measures used at many internationally active banks. more sophisticated technology and telecommunications, as well as market innovations, have enabled banks to better measure and manage their risks. as a result, the basel committee determined that a new capital framework was needed that would address these developments for the most complex and sophisticated banks, but that would also be appropriate for less complex banks. the committee also determined that the new capital framework should provide incentives for banks to improve their risk management practices without reducing the overall level of capital held in the banking system. basel ii, in my view, is fundamentally about better risk management and corporate governance on the part of banks, as well as improved banking supervision and greater transparency. it is also about increasing the stability of the global financial system, to the benefit not only of banks, but also consumers and businesses. the new capital framework attempts to achieve these objectives with three mutually reinforcing pillars. the first pillar aligns minimum capital requirements more closely with banks ’ actual underlying risks. qualifying banks may also rely partly on their own measures of those risks, which will help to create economic incentives to improve those measures. in concept the first pillar is similar to the existing capital framework in that it provides a measure of capital relative to risk. what is new are the second and third pillars. the second pillar – supervisory review – allows supervisors to evaluate a bank ’ s assessment of its own risks and determine whether that assessment seems reasonable. it is not enough for a

has been a formidable challenge, but formidable challenges make us stronger. it is not time to sit back in admiration ; it is time to use sepa. so, let ’ s rise to the challenge ; let ’ s use sepa, our key ; and let ’ s discover the great many opportunities that lie on the other side of that door.
regards this role in view of your positioning as important mediators between cash operations and operations carried out through the banking system. in this aspect, i could not help mentioning also the obligation you have in terms of more rigorous implementation of money laundering prevention law. as you may already know, presently albania applies the flexible exchange rate regime, which means that market forces are the ones that determine its level. your behaviour has constantly helped reflecting in this price the demand and supply for this commodity, preventing the risk of price mismatch to overall market conditions and to the macroeconomic climate of the country. in this framework, i would also like to highlight your positive behaviour, related to positioning future flows of the supply and demand for foreign currency, particularly during critical periods of the market, which relate to the seasonal exchange rate behaviour, as a rational behaviour that helps reducing exchange rate volatility. given the above, the bank of albania is highly interested in getting informed with your opinions about market operation, positive or negative changes having occurred recently, relationships between foreign exchange bureaus and commercial banks within the framework of competition and mutual benefit. the bank of albania expresses its willingness to provide trainings on various products that may be traded by the domestic foreign exchange market. as the first step in this regard, we plan to deal with forward operations, which will better serve the smoothing of seasonal effects of exchange rate behaviour and the hedging against undesirable foreign exchange movements. highlighting the general but very important nature of the above issues, we would also like to share opinions on current economic situation with you. psychological effects on foreign exchange rate performance are another extremely important factor. taking into consideration the current world crisis, the bank of albania, appreciating your position in generating information from both, businesses and the broad public, would be interested in your opinions ; moreover, it would welcome your suggestions about any possible forms of generating these opinions periodically. in conclusion, intending to leave more room for discussing and exchanging ideas, we welcome your opinions even about other issues, related to reporting to the bank of albania or implementation of money laundering prevention law.

once again for being a key partner and player in the financial inclusion game. i would like to encourage the fides bank to keep up this good work. your dream saver and other services are testimony to the fact that low - income people are not only bankable, but they also insurable. 10. through the dream saver, you have made a difference in the lives of many people now and for generations to come. with this product you have empowered our people. congratulations! i thank you for your kind attention. bis central bankers ’ speeches
come true, we also need to understand the forces behind the populist dissatisfaction with the union, and not dismiss them. the referendum debate in the united kingdom has been acrimonious. in striving to deliver a united europe, we need to be united in ourselves and build a shared eu - wide identity that delivers the necessary democratic legitimacy to the institutions. strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends. bis central bankers ’ speeches

yves mersch : opening remarks at the academy of european law opening remarks by mr yves mersch, member of the executive board of the european central bank, at the academy of european law, luxembourg, 29 june 2016. * * * ladies and gentlemen, for over 20 years the academy of european law ( era ) has provided a forum for law practitioners to debate european legal issues. and the need for such a forum remains strong today – maybe stronger than ever. shakespeare ’ s character tranio in taming of the shrew exhorts us to “ do as adversaries do in law – strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends ”. this is an appropriate sentiment for tonight ’ s event : the era is providing food and drink and has invited me to give you all something to argue about. this is a critical juncture for the european union ( eu ). a number of states have re - imposed border controls to stop the inflow of refugees, anti - eu parties are gaining popularity in many member states and one of the largest members has just voted in a referendum to leave the union. these factors provide a challenge to our institutions and legal frameworks at eu and at national level – a challenge that also legal professionals across europe need to engage with. i believe there are many reasons why the vision of a united europe is worth fighting for. let me mention just four : 1. to preserve peace ; 2. to improve economic prospects ; 3. to defend our values ; and 4. to increase personal options continent - wide. the founding fathers of the eu were willing to make political sacrifices to end bloodshed in europe, following two devastating wars just decades apart. let us not forget that we are here in a former prison in which every respected luxembourg family had relatives who stood up for these values. after 70 years of peace in western europe it is easy to be complacent that war will not happen again. yet the current situation in syria, iraq, ukraine and that of the balkans in the 1990s shows that peace is vulnerable, even on our doorstep. but defence and security have to be understood as a common endeavour. the economic benefits of the union are well documented : free trade, the removal of non - tariff barriers, the elimination of transactions costs of foreign exchange payments and the introduction of a single yield curve across the euro area to name but a few. these measures have reduced costs for businesses and households, and in turn generated higher income and created jobs. looking ahead
tightening of monetary policy. however, the comparison of inflation trends in croatia and those in the peer countries that have not adopted the euro ( e. g. hungary, the czech republic and poland ) shows that inflation in croatia was in fact lower. this fact, coupled with the already mentioned relatively lower borrowing costs, is a strong argument confirming that the decision to introduce the euro was good and timely and that the euro has contributed to the resilience of the croatian economy in such turbulent circumstances. it is not only our observation that the euro has had a positive effect on the croatian economy. last week i participated in a conference in riga, which marked the 10th anniversary of latvia's euro area membership. a great deal of discussion was devoted to resilience and the shield provided by the euro to a country in uncertain and insecure circumstances. this is certainly a common experience. i was glad to be able to share croatia's success story about euro adoption and confirm the same benefits of euro area membership as well as to show that the common currency, marking the 25th anniversary this year, was still very attractive. to conclude, the introduction of the euro has not been accompanied by any negative surprises. as i have elaborated in detail, the expected benefits have materialised and will continue to materialise given their permanent character. i would like to thank everyone involved in the euro introduction process, many of whom are present today. with this successful project croatia made a historical step in joining the group of the most advanced european countries and establishing ( financial ) conditions that will facilitate addressing numerous challenges waiting ahead, both those from the economic area and from the wider context. 3 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches

central banks would and have the obligation, to give priority to price stability and financial stability as their primary mandates. with today ’ s conference we, at the croatian national bank, are appealing to banks and other financial institutions to reflect on how to incorporate climate risks into their business strategies and make their business - making more robust and resilient to hazards connected with climate change. we would also like to encourage banks to seize the opportunities brought about by transition towards low - carbon and nature - neutral economy. finally, and equally important, we want to note that we do not save nature only by switching to low - energy lightbulbs or choosing a hybrid or electric car but also by investing consciously. banks could have a noticeable positive influence if they were to finance environmentally friendly projects and make green investments. i am aware that taking the climate and environment into consideration is quite new for the banks, but it is equally so for us. however, adapting to climate change has no alternative. as bob brown once said – “ the future will either be green or not at all ". 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches
the complete answer to this question, some elements of the explanation are becoming clear. part of the explanation lies in the extent to which developments in thailand have affected conditions in neighboring countries. for example, in expectation that the depreciation of the baht would erode the competitiveness of thailand ’ s trade competitors, their currencies also weakened. and as these currency slides acquired an almost self - perpetuating character, the debt service costs of the domestic private sector increased. uncertainty about how far these currencies would slide and how much debt service costs would increase encouraged a rush to hedge external liabilities that only intensified exchange rate and interest rate pressures. another factor is that problems in the thai economy prompted markets to take a closer look at the risks in other countries. and what they saw - - to different degrees in different places - - were many of the same problems affecting thailand : among them, overvalued real estate markets, weak and over - extended banking sectors, poor prudential supervision, and substantial private short - term borrowing in foreign currency. moreover, after thailand, markets began to look more critically at weaknesses they had previously considered minor, or at least manageable in an orderly way, given time. i see two other factors that hastened the stampede : one, the lack of transparency, and hence the increased uncertainty, about government and central bank operations, about the true state of financial sectors, about the links between banks, industry, and government and the impact these links might have on economic policy ; and two, the controls - - and threat of controls - - on market activity. given the tendency of financial markets participants to run with the herd, this was a sure - fire way to send the herd scrambling for safer pastures and set back efforts to restore confidence. ii. what lessons should we draw from all of this? the first lesson is the most obvious one : the necessity of taking early action to correct macroeconomic imbalances before they precipitate a crisis. this did not happen in thailand, despite timely and vigorous warnings. on the contrary, policymakers attacked the symptom of the crisis, the pressure on the baht, accumulating large reserve losses and forward foreign exchange liabilities in the process. this, together with delays in addressing thailand ’ s severe financial sector problems and lingering political uncertainties, clearly contributed to a deepening of the crisis and its spread to other economies in the region. the second lesson is that other countries can

( 2019 ), “ a bird ’ s - eye view of the resilience of the european banking system : results from the new macroprudential stress test framework ”, macroprudential bulletin, issue 7, ecb, march. 4 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches