federal reserve policymakers interpret it as a 2 percent longer - run inflation rate ( in the personal consumption expenditures price index ). in 2011, ben bernanke initiated the practice of postmeeting press conferences, which under chair powell ’ s leadership now follow every fomc meeting. in the summer of 2020, fomc participants released a revised consensus statement that further elaborated their interpretation of the dual - mandate goals of maximum employment and price stability and how the committee would pursue those objectives. the new statement explicitly recognized the policy tools of asset purchases and forward guidance on the federal funds rate. these tools were developed during the period, which started in late 2008, in which the federal funds rate was at the effective - 4lower bound ( elb ), and they were used again during the new elb episode that began in march 2020. as many observers have noted over the years, the introduction of the 2 percent inflation objective and other formalizations of the federal reserve ’ s monetary policy framework actually took place well after disinflation had been achieved under volcker and consolidated under greenspan. it might be asked why — with price stability secured by around the mid - 1990s — these formalizations were thought necessary. the answer lies in the fact that a well - understood monetary policy regime is needed to make price stability and anchored inflation expectations durable features of the economic environment. 3 communicating key characteristics of the regime — including the numerical inflation target and policymakers ’ reaction function — makes it concrete and transparent in the eyes of the general public while also enhancing the central bank ’ s credibility and the effectiveness of monetary policy. in this connection, the design of modern central bank policy regimes has drawn importantly on the literature on monetary policy rules. it is no coincidence that the period in the 1990s and 2000s of major strides in central bank transparency, frameworks, and communications took place alongside a resurgence of interest in research on monetary policy rules. the literature on monetary policy rules and on inflation targeting provided insights about how the u. s. monetary policy framework could achieve our dualmandate goals of maximum employment and stable prices. and we have made use of those insights. by setting out a long - run inflation goal, while indicating that we take paul volcker essentially recognized this point in congressional testimony of july 22, 1980, when he observed that “ we want to have a firm monetary standard... [ one that is ] tied to the general stability of prices ” ( volcker, 1980, p. 134

the decisions and responsibilities regarding public disclosure always remained, as it should, with the companies themselves. a related question is whether there should have been earlier disclosure of the aid provided by the u. s. government to bank of america. importantly, there was no commitment on the part of the government regarding the size or structure of the transaction until very late in the process. although we had indicated to bank of america in december that the government would provide assistance if necessary to keep the company from being destabilized, as it had done in other cases during this time of extraordinary stress in the financial markets, those december discussions were followed in january by significant and intense negotiations involving bank of america, the federal reserve, the treasury, the federal deposit insurance corporation, and the office of the comptroller of the currency regarding many key aspects of the assistance transaction, including the type of assistance to be provided, the size of the protection, the assets to be covered, the terms for payments, the fees, and the length of the facility. the agreement in principle on these items was reflected in a term sheet that was not finalized until just before its public release on january 16, 2009. the federal reserve board and the treasury completely and appropriately disclosed the information as required by the congress in the emergency economic stabilization act of 2008. in retrospect, i believe that our actions in this episode, including the development of an assistance package that facilitated the consummation of bank of america's acquisition of merrill lynch, were not only done with the highest integrity, but have strengthened both companies while enhancing the stability of the financial markets and protecting the taxpayers. these actions were taken under highly unusual circumstances in the face of grave threats to our financial system and our economy. to avoid such situations in the future, it is critical that the administration, the congress, and the regulatory agencies work together to develop a new framework that strengthens and expands supervisory oversight and includes a broader range of tools to promote financial stability. i would be pleased to take your questions.