to remain relatively weak for the time being. thereafter, however, it will return to a moderate recovery path as overseas economies gradually emerge from the deceleration phase. meanwhile, the year - on - year rate of change in the consumer price index ( cpi, all items less fresh food ) is expected to remain at around 0 percent for the time being and start rising gradually thereafter bis central bankers ’ speeches as the supply and demand balance improves in accordance with a pick - up in economic activity. in fiscal 2014, it appears likely that the cpi will move steadily closer toward the bank ’ s “ price stability goal in the medium to long term ” of 1 percent for the time being. whether developments in japan ’ s economy will follow the projected path, however, hinges on those developments in overseas economies. at international conferences that i have attended recently, the delegates from the united states, europe, and china have similarly pointed to developments in overseas economies as a factor exerting a considerable impact on their own economies. if these economies are considered in terms of the global economy as a whole, however, this overseas factor does not exist. put differently, it is important to grasp the global economy as a whole in an era that is witnessing significant progress in economic globalization. in this regard, we surely cannot forget that global economic expansion in the mid - 2000s – particularly from 2004 toward 2007 – was characterized by extraordinarily favorable economic conditions supported by an unprecedented credit bubble ( chart 8 ). as a consequence of the bursting of this bubble, even six years since the bursting of the u. s. housing bubble and four years since the lehman shock, and despite aggressive monetary easing in advanced economies, the pace of global economic recovery is extremely moderate ( chart 9 ). this suggests that it will be difficult for the global economy to return to a high growth path until adjustments of excess debt after the bursting of the bubble are completed. iii. recent conduct of monetary policy let me now move on to the conduct of monetary policy. 1 based on the aforementioned assessment of economic activity and prices, the bank of japan undertook further aggressive monetary easing for two months in a row, in september and october 2012. the bank ’ s decision can be summarized within the following two components. first, it decided to increase the size of the asset purchase program ( hereafter, the program ; chart 10 ). the program ’ s size was increased by about 21 trillion yen when adding together the decisions made in september and october. looking back

benoit coeure : interview in l ’ economie politique interview with mr benoit coeure, member of the executive board of the european central bank, in the issue # 66 of l ’ economie politique ( quarterly publication of alternatives economiques ), conducted by ms sandra moatti in april 2015. * * * extracts of the interview were published in the may 2015 issue of alternatives economiques. the ecb has thoroughly overhauled its practices over the last few years. when you joined back in january 2012, were the policies we have subsequently seen, such as outright monetary transactions ( omts ) and quantitative easing ( qe ) conceivable? the ecb has thoroughly overhauled its practices over the last few years. when you joined back in january 2012, were the policies we have subsequently seen, such as outright monetary transactions ( omts ) and quantitative easing ( qe ) conceivable? concerning the massive public asset purchase programme which was announced on 22 january, why did it come so late? the ecb ’ s balance sheet had been shrinking for months and inflation was moving steadily downwards. was the wait due to disagreements on the governing council? you have to see this decision in the historical sequence of successive decisions taken by the ecb to deal with the crisis. the issues changed pretty fundamentally in 2013 – 14. in 2011 – 12 we were facing a crisis of fragmentation in the euro area. the priority, both from a political and monetary perspective, was to ensure that the euro area remained intact and that monetary policy was transmitted to the countries in crisis. so in late 2011 the ecb decided on ltros to tackle the problems of interbank funding, since the risk of the euro area falling apart in summer 2012 led mario draghi to make his famous statement in london and prompted the ecb to come up with outright monetary transactions ( omts ), a tool intended to prevent self - fulfilling financial crises from pushing a country to leave the euro. this risk of break - up was overcome thanks both to the ecb and also to the will of the heads of state, who clearly expressed their desire to keep the euro area intact and create banking union. in 2013 the nature of the debate changed and became more traditional, applying to growth and inflation, which were too weak in the euro area as a whole. there must have been a moment in late 2013 / early 2014 when the euro area collectively felt the financial crisis was over and