so far unlikely – if the bulk of payments are made using digital wallets rather than bank deposits and are denominated in private digital currency with weak links to sovereign currency, monetary sovereignty could be weakened. in a digital world, consumers must have the possibility to pay with sovereign money. in china, for example, within a decade payments have shifted from cash to mobile payments, which are controlled by two large private technology firms. the planned introduction of a public digital currency can be seen as a means of managing the risks of this digital transition, in order to maintain trust in payments. state backing is essential for there to be trust in payments and money. money held in bank deposits can be seen as a form of private digital currency, but it is widely used because people trust that they can readily convert their deposits into central bank money. in the euro area, these deposits are also insured by guarantee schemes up to an amount of €100, 000, effectively making them public money. private digital currencies would not necessarily allow the same kind of convertibility and are unlikely to have the same state backing. without a monetary and regulatory anchor, the stability of payment systems would essentially depend on the safety of private money issuers. people are clearly aware of these risks. a recent survey by the official monetary and financial institutions forum shows that central banks enjoy a higher level of trust than commercial banks, credit card companies and technology firms, including as potential issuers of digital currency. 2. initiatives to strengthen european payments so what are the implications for european payments? first, we must ensure that how we pay, and the systems that support our payments, continue to modernise along with the people who use them – european consumers, in other words. here at the ecb, it is our duty to ensure that people have access to riskless, low - cost means of payment, as well as state - of - the - art payment services that reflect our changing economy. and second, given our size and influence, in europe we have a responsibility to ensure that our citizens have choice and cannot be excluded from the payments ecosystem due to the unilateral actions of others. we need to ensure that european payments are fit for a global digital economy so that, in the face of changing risks, we can preserve the autonomy of european payments. the eurosystem has already reacted to technological change by launching innovative back - end payment solutions with a pan - european reach, such as the target instant payment settlement ( tips

emerged related to stagnating earnings per worker, declining social and economic mobility, social dysfunctions such as drug abuse and distrust of political institutions. rectifying the situation requires interventionist policies, such as community re - development, infrastructure spending, job training and addiction programmes. for europe, bernanke recommended that the continuing labour market reforms that are necessary should be accompanied by training and other work force development ; that structural reforms should be accompanied by demand policies ; and that political legitimacy should be ensured through subsidiarity. whilst against the background of ever faster technical progress and structural change it was relatively uncontroversial that the traditional “ once - in - a - lifetime schooling strategy ” has to give way to continuous updating of knowledge and skills ( “ lifelong learning ” ), dietmar harhoff ( 2017 ) warned that so far there is little systematic implementation and institutional development. sergei guriev ( 2017, chart 1 ) presented “ elephant curves ” ( a la milanovic 2016 ), suggesting that the crisis recession acted in a regressive way in southern european countries ( see also buti 2017, chart 3 ), whereas in other euro area countries asset price declines implied that the recession ’ s cost were mostly borne by the better - off. but in terms of popular support for economic policies, guriev ( 2017, table 1 ) provided evidence that it is not inequality per se but perceived “ unfair ” inequality ( defined as uneven opportunities, such as parental background, gender, ethnicity or place of birth ) that leads to the rejection of a market economy ( and also 13 / 16 bis central bankers'speeches corruption ). other factors captured in the residuals of the estimation, such as lack of effort or bad luck, do not have this effect. agnes benassy - quere ( 2017 ) perceived an imbalance in europe between trade and competition policies being centralised at the area - wide level but social and tax policies being left at the national level. when the federal level promotes free trade and competitive markets, then member states are left to bear the social consequences. in her view member states could be better empowered by coordination in tax and social policies. one idea is to make the eu ’ s globalisation adjustment fund more effective ; another is to introduce us - style tttts ( timely, temporary, and targeted transfers ). references adler, g., duval, r., furceri, d., kilic celik, s.,