stay on the supply - side now, let me go back to price stability. what is clear is that inflation - if you just look at the headline numbers and core inflation - is really much, much higher than normal. by the way, if you look at the short history of the philippine inflation - targeting central bank, the longest number of consecutive months where we missed our [ inflation ] target 1 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches on the high side is 15 months. so, what it really means is that supply shocks do not become self - perpetuating inflation. now, this [ current period ] is particularly a bad period because of a series of shocks. as shown by the green little bars at the bottom of the page, we were initially expecting to go back to 0. 3 percent per month inflation, but that was delayed by two months because of shortages of vegetables and, of course, the big news in the philippines - the shortage of onions. our policies are to prevent supply shocks from generating more inflation because [ we feared that ] inflationary expectations have gotten out of control. and, as you can see, this is one of the reasons why we are quite aggressive [ in tightening monetary policy ]. if you look at the chart on the right, we will see that private sector forecasts of inflation are much higher than our [ bsp's ] forecast. so, there is a risk that the supply shock can generate, what we all call, " second - order effects. " and that is the reason we have to be quite aggressive, and we are actually more aggressive than all our asian neighbors. inflation on a target - consistent future path by the way, we expect inflation to return to normal. last year's month - on - month [ figures ] are already quite consistent with it. but we need a series of month - on - month [ figures ] of 0. 3 percent [ for year - on - year inflation ] to be able to go back to the 2. 0 to 4. 0 percent inflation target by the late part of the third quarter or the early part of the fourth quarter [ of 2023 ] and for the rest of 2024. relief from foreign exchange pressures the biggest challenge, of course, was the pivot of the us [ federal reserve ] to tight money, [ which ] caused a large depreciation of the peso, just like many other currencies. and, actually, there are two stories : what you

rba in its normal operations. while a fee will be charged for this facility, i don ’ t see that affecting the relative demand for securities, other than cgs and semis, for the following reason. one can think of the current situation as an arrangement where a flat rate of zero is charged. banks currently hold a range of assets to satisfy their liquidity requirements, with each asset having different credit, maturity and market liquidity characteristics. our view of how much we are willing to lend against each asset under repo are based on these characteristics, and will continue to be so. in the future, we are moving to a world where there will be a formalised liquidity facility where a flat, positive fee is charged. so that should affect all asset classes equally and should not affect their relative attractiveness. so i would not expect this to change bank balance sheet ’ s demand for the non - government assets they hold in their liquidity portfolios. for example, to the extent they hold ssas today, they should still hold them in the future. for more details on the apra media release, see apra clarifies implementation of global liquidity standards in australia, 28 february 2011. for more details on the joint rba and apra media release, see joint media release : australian implementation of global liquidity standards, 17 december 2010. bis central bankers ’ speeches conclusions in my talk i have described the configuration of the bond market as it stands in early 2011. the structure of the market has changed noticeably after the events of recent years. some of the dynamics that have emerged from the crisis may continue to shape the bond market in the future. i have highlighted three here today : first, the relative growth of deposits and credit may be quite different from that observed over the previous fifteen years. this, together with regulatory and other pressures, will have a material effect on the composition of bank liabilities. second, while asset - backed issuance was most disrupted by the crisis, there are signs of a re - emergence. third, investors have a much stronger preference for high - quality assets than they did in the pre - crisis period. bis central bankers ’ speeches