review 102, 60 – 93. 17 buch, c. m., eickmeier, s., prieto, e. ( 2014 ). “ in search for yield? survey - based evidence on bank risk taking ”, journal of economic dynamics and control 43, 12 – 30. 18 ueda, k., valencia, f. ( 2014 ). “ central bank independence and macro - prudential regula - tion ”, economics letters 125, 327 – 330. 19 adrian, t., “ stablecoins, central bank digital currencies, and cross - border payments : a new look at the international monetary system ”, remarks at the imf - swiss national bank conference, zurich, may 2019. 20 berg, s. o. ( 1971 ). “ sherlock holmes : father of scientific crime and detection ”, journal of law and criminology 61, 446 – 452. 21 doyle, a. c. ( 1891 ). “ a scandal in bohemia ”, the strand magazine. 7 / 7 bis central bankers'speeches

lending. 7 8 this, in turn, curtails investment and so worsens the economic contraction. 9 10 in the 1980s, rising bank credit also fuelled a surge in land prices in major cities in japan. this real estate bubble is often deemed to be the origin of the japanese financial crisis in the 1990s, 11 a period of time which gave rise to the term “ lost decade ” due to the economic stagnation it brought. mitsuhiro fukao will elaborate on the japanese experience in a few minutes. in germany, however, credit has not been the main driver of rising house prices in recent years. even though the growth rate of housing loans had accelerated to 4. 6 % year - on - year by the end of 2018, overall growth has been moderate, cumulating to 26 % within the last nine years. and in its last financial stability review, the bundesbank came to the conclusion that credit standards had not been relaxed considerably. thus, overall, the available evidence does not point to substantially heightened financial stability risks from new lending for housing. still, potentially overvalued property means potentially overvalued collateral. this is to say that, in an adverse scenario, if household income and house prices were to take a hit simultaneously, the share of non - performing loans could rise, while the value of the collateral could drop. in combination, this would cause bank losses to increase markedly, as housing lending makes up 45 % of total bank loans to private households and enterprises. exhibit c in the case for macroprudential action is heightened interest rate risk, of which mortgages are a good example. at present, 47 % of newly issued mortgages have an interest rate lock - in period of more than ten years, compared to 26 % in 2010. if interest rates were to quickly spike higher, this would instantly drive up the costs of funding for banks. but interest income would only increase with a time lag. and because many institutions would be affected simultaneously, other banks could not cushion the impact by stepping up new lending business. 2 / 7 bis central bankers'speeches the opposite scenario, a protracted continuation of very low interest rates, would not bode well for banks ’ earning capacity, either. in particular, it would increasingly burden those banks which rely on traditional retail deposit - taking and lending operations as their main source of income. so, banks find themselves in a sort of a diver ’ s dilemma. staying underwater for too long en