current expectations of a sustained adjustment path. looking ahead, monetary policy will be firmly guided by the outlook for price stability and our stance will evolve in a data - dependent and time - consistent manner. our monetary policy will remain patient, persistent and prudent. the benign market reaction following the announcement of our decision supports the appropriateness of our current assessment. let me turn to today ’ s bond market contact group meeting. the topics on your agenda are as relevant to the ecb as ever, in particular given the updated guidance from the ecb governing council. i would like to present a few considerations that you may want to touch upon in your discussions. under your first agenda item, the bond market outlook, you will be holding an in - depth discussion on bond market developments and the outlook for the months ahead. euro area bond market developments in the past weeks were notably volatile. i hope your discussion will shed some additional light on the underlying drivers of this market turbulence. yes, political factors played an important role. however, were there other perspectives? has the market structure changed so much that it exacerbated the market reaction to the political events? could something be done from a structural perspective to prevent such a gapping in the market? how do you see the bond market outlook for the second half of 2018? what are the key factors that will drive markets during the rest of the year? the second item on your agenda, the global quantitative easing unwind and the implications for financial markets, is of particular importance. from my perspective, the reduction at the start of this year of the average net purchase volume under the expanded asset purchase programme from €60 billion to €30 billion had been well anticipated. similarly, the announcement that we will reduce the monthly pace of the net asset purchases to €15 billion until the end of december 2018 and then end net purchases, was also followed by a benign market reaction. nevertheless, i would be interested in your views on the implications for fixed income markets given that net asset purchases are likely to be coming to an end on a global scale – perhaps with the exception 2 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches of japan. looking at central bank communication, what is of particular importance to market participants as central banks wind down their net asset purchases? what were the main lessons from the us federal reserve ’ s experience? are there certain structural developments that could hinder a smooth end to net purchases? how do you foresee the reaction in fixed income segments that have benefited

olaf ) judgment [ 6 ], the european court of justice made it clear that, in principle, the ecb is bound by all regulations which bind the union. there is no distinction to be made between the different institutions, bodies, offices and agencies. all are equal under the law, so to say. however, the word “ relevant ” is ambiguous. does it refer to any institution, where relevant? that would mean that every eu institution should comply with the climate law, whenever it develops policy or takes action relevant to the objective of the law. or does it refer only to those institutions with competence to create policy relevant to achieving the objective of the climate law? the ecb would be directly bound by the law under the first interpretation but not under the second. the climate law is not crystal clear on this point. it does not define “ relevant institution ”. but there are a number of strong indications that the ecb is not a relevant institution under the climate law. let me explain why. the climate law does not contain many specific obligations. the law sets out a destination : climate neutrality. it does not tell us how to get there. how we do so will depend on environmental and economic policymaking. this is a union competence the ecb does not have. there are further arguments that support this interpretation. if the ecb is deemed to be a relevant institution, then it would have to submit its policies to the commission for assessment and the commission would monitor progress. that would be a fundamental change to the ecb ’ s accountability framework. under current law, the ecb is only directly accountable to the european parliament and the european court of auditors. a final reason for this view is institutional. if the ecb were deemed to be a relevant institution within the meaning of the climate law, this would be an implicit acceptance that the council of the eu and the parliament could set additional objectives for the ecb through the ordinary legislative procedure. however, the ecb ’ s objectives are laid down in the treaty on the functioning of the european union ( tfeu ) [ 8 ], and their scope cannot be changed by secondary legislation. that would be a violation of the treaty. changing the ecb ’ s objectives requires a special procedure. the ecb is – it seems – not directly bound by the climate law. so, can we ignore it? not at all. to do so would be a violation of the treaties. article 11 of the tfeu provides that