and our presentation of monetary developments to the public are all consistent with this explanation of the role of the reference value in the overall monetary policy strategy. i would simply add – as i have done on several occasions in the past – that our interpretation of monetary developments is currently further complicated by the uncertainties surrounding the data itself that i alluded to a moment ago. however, i would like to take this opportunity to remind you that the uncertainties surrounding the monetary data are no greater than those surrounding other economic variables. in this respect, it is of interest to note that the ecb has even been criticised by some observers for not paying sufficient attention to money! the eurosystem has also been criticised for being a secretive institution that does not meet the required standards of transparency and clarity in its conduct of monetary policy. some criticise our strategy for not being sufficiently simple, arguing that we should focus only on one indicator, be it money or an inflation forecast. to these critics, i can say that our strategy is honest. it reflects the complex environment we are living in – an environment in which policy decisions cannot be simply related to one information variable. others argue that we do not release sufficient information about our analysis. these critics claim that the credibility of the single monetary policy has suffered as a result. i would agree that the effectiveness of the eurosystem ’ s policy actions will depend, in large part, on the credibility of the single monetary policy. transparent and accountable policy making can help to build reputation and hence credibility. in turn, transparency and accountability rely on clear and effective communication between the eurosystem and the public. in this regard, the eurosystem faces an especially formidable task. with each policy announcement or monthly bulletin, the eurosystem must speak to eleven audiences in all the different official languages of the european union. such a situation is unprecedented. moreover, each of the countries in the euro area has its own distinct monetary history and heritage. this diversity of language, history and culture across the euro area raises further communication challenges for the ecb. in contrast to the assertions of our critics, we think that we have risen well to this challenge. a key feature of the eurosystem ’ s communication policy is the monthly press conference given by the ecb vice - president and myself, usually immediately following the first governing council meeting of each month. during these press conferences, i make an introductory statement summarising the council ’ s discussions and conclusions before answering questions from journalists.

percent annual rate in the fourth quarter of 2008 as international trade collapsed, has rebounded decisively. it is interesting that, just a few years ago, strong countercyclical policy actions of the type taken by korea would not have been recommended for an emerging market country during a period of crisis, and might not even have been feasible. in earlier crises, foreign investors were not inclined to give emerging market policymakers the benefit of the doubt when they promised low inflation and sustainable fiscal policies. attempts to support economic activity through conventional expansionary policies thus risked a vicious circle of capital flight, exchange rate depreciation, higher inflation, a worsening balance of payments, and more capital flight. as a result, monetary policymakers in emerging markets often reacted to crises – such as the asian financial crisis of the late 1990s – by raising rather than lowering policy rates, in order to defend the value of the currency, slow capital flight, and bolster the credibility of monetary policy. likewise, the scope for fiscal expansion was severely limited by concerns about medium - term fiscal sustainability. why was this crisis different? in particular, why was the bank of korea able to respond in a countercyclical manner this time, reducing rather than raising the policy rate in response to the downturn? one important difference, of course, was that this crisis originated in advanced economies, not in the emerging market economies. financial institutions in korea and other emerging market economies had little direct exposure to structured credit products and other troubled securities and entered the crisis in relatively sound condition. in addition, following the asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, korea and a number of other countries in asia, latin america, and elsewhere took decisive steps to strengthen their macroeconomic frameworks and financial systems. on the macroeconomic side, these countries achieved strong economic growth through structural reforms and sound monetary and fiscal management. like a number of other emerging market nations, korea achieved fiscal and current account surpluses ; it also took out insurance against volatility in capital flows by accumulating a large stock of foreign exchange reserves. on the financial side, korea and other countries reformed their banking sectors and worked with banks to strengthen their balance sheets. currency and maturity mismatches were important problems for several countries during the asian crisis, as they made financial conditions in these countries vulnerable to a loss of confidence by investors. currency mismatches in particular – the fact that the assets of households, firms, and banks were largely denominated in the domestic currency