samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
weathered these shocks reasonably well. inflation remains low by historical standards, and within the mandate to keep future inflation between 1 to 3 percent, on average, over the medium term. but this relative stability should not be taken for granted. good policy today does not necessarily guarantee good policy tomorrow, particularly when there is considerable uncertainty when confronting new shocks. new shocks can often necessitate new ways of confronting a dynamic economic landscape. many of these new challenges and associated price pressures can be linked to the growing role of china and other emerging market economies. globalisation and the increased interconnectedness this entails also implies that shocks to inflation ( and economic growth ) can be more easily and rapidly transmitted from place to place. indeed, the on - going financial market turbulence that began last august is a timely reminder of both the interconnected world we live in, and how quickly events can unfold. what began as difficulties in the us housing sector and the associated securitisation of mortgage - backed financial products, has developed into a re - pricing of risk more generally, increased global financial market volatility and tighter credit conditions. since the december monetary policy statement there has been ongoing turbulence in international financial markets and a deterioration in the outlook for the united states and european economies. we will be watching these developments closely, particularly their implications for the asian and australian economies and for world commodity prices. at a structural level, financial globalisation also highlights the possible limits to conducting monetary policy in a small open economy such as ours – particularly when our business cycle is out of synch with the rest of the world. relatively low global interest rates over the past five years have impacted on the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, essentially acting to delay the effects of reserve bank policy changes on household and firm behaviour, and ultimately on inflation. both current and longer - term factors act to test the limits of our monetary policy framework on a regular basis. nevertheless, new zealand ’ s policy framework remains well within the norms of international central banking practice. although there are, as always, challenges facing the conduct of monetary policy as we move forward, we are well - placed to take them on. references fitch ratings ( 2007 ) “ house prices and household debt – where are the risks? ” special report, 29 july. imf ( 2007 ) world economic outlook, october. imf ( 2006 ) world economic outlook, october. imf ( 2006 ) world economic outlook, april. rbnz ( 2007 ) finance and expenditure select committee inquiry

into the future monetary policy framework – submission by the reserve bank of new zealand, july. rbnz ( 2007 ) monetary policy statement, december. sill, k. ( 2007 ) “ the macroeconomics of oil shocks ” philadelphia federal reserve business review q1, p. 21 - 31. stock, j. and m. watson ( 2002 ) “ has the business cycle changed and why ”, nber working paper 9127.
##ances, i suppose most would nowadays agree that a balanced financial system with multiple, lively channels of financial intermediation is likely to provide both healthier competition and better resilience to shocks. research has shown that when banks are distressed frictions in credit provision have negative real effects ; 10 in countries that have well - developed markets, firms can borrow by issuing securities when banks tighten credit supply conditions. 11 on the other hand, banks can smooth temporary shocks affecting borrowers and somewhat shield them from financial market shocks by supporting financial flows, as suggested by the evidence from studies using microeconomic data on bank - firm relationships. 12 cross - country evidence on various stages of the recent financial crisis has r. levine, “ bank - based or market - based financial systems : which is better?, ” journal of financial intermediation 11 ( 4 ), 2002 ; for a review of the finance and growth literature see r. levine, “ finance and growth : theory and evidence, ” handbook of economic growth vol. 1, part a, 2005. a. demirguc - kunt, e. feyen, and r. levine, “ the evolving importance of banks and securities markets, ” world bank economic review, 27 ( 3 ). – as economies evolve, the benefit of further developing traditional financial institutions tends to decline whilst that of markets increases. moreover, an imf study shows that the relationship between financial development and growth is bell - shaped : financial development increases growth, but the effect weakens at higher levels of financial development, and eventually becomes negative. considering sub - indices of an overall financial development index, this bell - shaped relationship is due only to the “ depth ” components of the index ; “ access ” exhibits a positive linear relationship with growth, while “ efficiency ” has no robust association with longterm growth ( imf staff discussion note “ rethinking financial deepening : stability and growth in emerging markets, ” 15 / 08, may 2015 ).. g. dell ’ ariccia, e. detragiache, and r. rajan, “ the real effects of banking crises, ” journal of financial intermediation, 17 ( 1 ), 2008 ; r. krozner, l. laeven, d. klingebiel, “ banking crises, financial dependence, and growth, ” journal of financial economics 84, 2007. t. adrian, p. colla, and h. s. shin, “ which financial

2016 or speech before the committee on economic and monetary affairs of the european parliament on 28 september 2016. 10 w. churchill addressing the crowd on place kleber in strasbourg on 12th august 1949, day of the first session of the consultative assembly of the council of europe. 8 / 8 bis central bankers'speeches
rafael buenaventura : brief overview of inflation in the philippines opening remarks by mr rafael buenaventura, governor of bangko sentral ng pilipinas ( central bank of the philippines ), at the bsp inflation report press briefing, manila, 29 october 2004. * * * good morning, everyone. transparency is a hallmark of good monetary policy, and for this reason the bsp continually strives to bring across its policy message to the public and its reading of the outlook for inflation. this is the main reason why we publish a quarterly inflation report, and we would like to thank everyone here for joining us at this morning ’ s presentation. conducting monetary policy in the present economic environment is a considerable challenge for the bsp. the continued rise in inflation during the last few months has led to public concern over its likely effects on both the public ’ s purchasing power and economic activity. in our previous public statements on monetary policy, we have been careful to emphasize that the inflation uptrend over the past year has been driven mainly by supply - side factors arising in large part from a series of shocks coming from the sharp increases in oil prices, food and other key non - food commodities particularly fuel and transport. this view has led to the bsp ’ s prevailing policy stance of accommodating the supply shocks which are one, transitory in nature and two, if addressed by monetary action, could have adverse impact on growth and in turn inflation itself. the inflation report we will be presenting today outlines the reasons why we have kept our policy interest rates unchanged so far despite perceptions of a need to tighten monetary policy. we believe that supply - side developments continue to play a dominant role in the inflation outlook, and we find as yet no preponderant evidence of demand - driven inflationary pressures or second - order inflationary effects from the ongoing supply shocks. the expected path of future inflation continues to be hump - shaped, as supply factors push headline inflation above the 4 - 5 percent target in 2004 and 2005 before quickly tapering off and reverting to the 4 - 5 percent range by 2006. we find no compelling reason, therefore, to modify the settings for monetary policy at this time. in closing, let me emphasize that the bsp remains strongly committed to good monetary policymaking. we try to ensure our accountability by formally submitting ourselves to public judgment on the basis of how we go about achieving our inflation targets. we also make sure that the stance of monetary policy is

properly communicated to our constituency, the filipino public, through such documents as the inflation report and regular press statements. we welcome your comments on the contents of the report and hope that you will continue to actively participate in the public dialogue on the monetary policy process. thank you and good morning.
/ 12 bis - central bankers'speeches there is a balanced progress in commercial loans in line with the desired level of tightness. the corporate sector is provided with a healthy credit flow at sustainable rates, and we see that private banks now have a more active role regarding commercial loans in line with their total asset size. on the deposits side, there has been a strong shift to turkish lira time deposits since end - august amid monetary tightening. in the last five months : turkish lira deposits increased by 2. 4 trillion turkish liras, fx - protected deposits fell by 910 billion turkish liras, fx deposits declined by 1. 3 billion dollars, and in parity - and - price adjusted terms, by 3. 6 billion dollars. thus, the share of turkish lira deposits rose from 30 percent to 43 percent, while the share of fx - protected deposits fell to 16 percent. however, in january, the increase in the share of turkish lira deposits decelerated. we anticipate that our recent regulation will support the increase in the share of turkish lira deposits. deposit rates and turkish lira deposit share will remain essential components of our policy framework. our monetary tightening and simplification steps also reflected positively on the bond market, and aligned the yield curve with the monetary stance. accordingly, the yield curve exhibits normalization. it is also noteworthy that the negative slope has become more pronounced amid this process. the increase in our international reserves on the back of our monetary tightening steps has brought about a significant improvement in market - based risk indicators, despite escalating geopolitical risks in our region. having exceeded 700 basis points in may, the five - year cds premium, fell below 300 basis points, and is trading around 325 basis points as of this week despite the recent volatility in emerging markets. against this background, capital inflows posted a strong increase. the january - may 2023 period saw an average monthly capital outflow of 800 million dollars against a total inflow of 12. 6 billion dollars in the second half of the year. between june and october, the monthly average inflows rose to 600 million dollars. 9 / 12 bis - central bankers'speeches in november and december, inflows accelerated to over 4. 5 billion dollars on average. in january, capital flows lost momentum, but remained in positive territory. our international reserves showed a significant improvement on the back of the favorable trend in capital movements. having dropped to 98 billion dollars

like to thank once again all my colleagues who contributed to the writing of the report and the making of this press conference, primarily the members of the monetary policy committee and the staff of the research and monetary policy department. we can now move onto the question and answer session and our deputy governors will also be happy to answer your questions. 12 / 12 bis - central bankers'speeches
bis central bankers'speeches

into the industrialisation process as trade flows expanded at double - digit rates during most of this period. while the east asian economies benefited from this global trend, the economies have not however, been immune to external shocks arising from shifts in international demand. the economies were affected by factors such as swings in commodity prices, significant oil price adjustments, and the slowdown in the major economies. while the impact of these trade - related shocks on the domestic economies of the east asian countries involved costs, in terms of slower growth and dampened domestic economic activity, these economies were able to adjust to the sudden changes. in such an environment, there was also greater predictability in the direction of the economic trends, providing the basis on which appropriate policy responses were implemented to manage the economic adjustment process. emerging economies in particular, in the east asian region participated in this globalisation process and benefited from the enhanced trade activities. in the recent decade however, there has been a distinct change in the nature of the globalisation process. globalisation is no longer confined to trade and direct investment, but increasingly involves large cross - border financial flows. over the recent decade, these financial flows have dominated the global market place. an emerging concern is that this trend would result in a widening of the divide between the developed and emerging and developing economies. in a world in which the magnitude of the financial flows are significant, in which the financial transactions have instantaneous implications, in which the flows are unconstrained by any regulatory framework, then size, the degree of development and the degree of resilience of economies will matter. countries that are small, and have less developed economic and financial systems, are open and liberalized, and that do not have the range of policy options at their disposal, will be highly disadvantaged in this global market place. it is this globalisation process that will contribute towards widening the existing disparities between nations. against this trend, the current global economic and financial environment has been characterised by increased uncertainty. there is uncertainty in the global economic outlook, financial markets and geopolitical developments. the expected strengthening of recovery in the advanced economies has yet to occur. financial reporting irregularities and the weakening of the corporate sector has affected confidence, contributing to the increased volatility in the global equity markets. further risks also remain on the horizon, including those emanating from structural imbalances in some of the advanced economies. these developments have res ulted in unstable and highly volatile conditions in both the asset and
. the upshot of this is that government bond yields are close to their historical lows. volatility in equity and bond markets has itself been volatile. we have witnessed a number of pronounced spikes in volatility. in early august and again in early september, volatility was almost as high as it had been during major international financial crises such as the “ russian crisis ” four years ago. for the euro area, the equity market downturn arrived in the midst of an increasing capital market orientation on the part of financial investors and the corporate sector. should we now write off the markets in the same way as we have written off many of our investments in the past? no, i do not think so. disintermediation is an unbroken trend, as may be seen in corporate bond issuance, which has held up fairly well. furthermore, financial markets have proved they are fit to serve investors ’ needs. to some disappointed investors, this may seem cynical. but think of it in the context of the accounting cheats. once the true figures became known to investors, equity valuations were aligned to the correct fundamentals. once we had transparency, the markets worked their magic. the markets themselves cannot be blamed for the wrongdoings of some dishonest market participants. but we definitely need to adjust the incentives for better transparency. balance sheet fraud is a criminal offence, not a trivial one. tougher sentences might help to make that clear. strange as it may sound, market turbulence in the wake of faulty accounting is an indication of how effective financial markets are. iii. turmoil in financial markets is not confined to the equity markets of the advanced economies. emerging markets have suffered a host of financial crises during the past decade. the most recent crises occurred in turkey, argentina, uruguay and brazil. in contrast to earlier financial crises, today ’ s investors discriminate better between individual borrowers. emerging market economies can protect themselves to a certain extent from contagion by pursuing sound policies. when argentina defaulted last december, the vast majority of emerging market countries that had pursued better macroeconomic policies escaped unscathed. the stability – or instability – of international financial markets owes much to the framework for crisis prevention and crisis resolution. monetary policymakers have made a major contribution to the international financial community ’ s thoroughgoing approach to crisis prevention. with regard to crisis prevention, there exists a broad consensus. all necessary steps should be taken to get the incentives right — and that means the

speeches
objective increases the credibility of the rules and strengthens their governance. in this sense, the reform proposal by the commission suggests a simple expenditure rule together with a sustainability anchor, based on a debt sustainability analysis framework. yet the concept of debt sustainability is not easy to operationalise. debt sustainability analysis tools provide a way to organise our thinking on these issues and we have some experience using them - for example, within the international monetary fund programmes framework. but their practical application for informing policy decisions remains rather complex. in this sense, it is worth remembering that any framework aimed at providing the necessary adjustment to cyclical developments must rely on the use of unobservable variables. in the case of the debt sustainability analysis, it will be necessary to forecast medium - term nominal gdp growth, which will face problems similar to the measurement of the structural deficit. beetsma, r., x. debrun, x. fang, y. kim, v. lledo, s. mbaye, and x. zhang. ( 2019 ). independent fiscal councils : recent trends and performance. european journal of political economy, 57, 53 - 69. therefore, it seems that we may be shifting complexity away from the rule framework and moving it towards the analysis of debt sustainability. the reform proposal also addresses the possibility of redirecting additional public funds towards the climate and digital targets through the use of an extended period of adjustment. i believe this approach is better than the use of the so - called “ golden rules ” to finance green investment, which allow governments to exclude some types of expenditure from the calculation of the fiscal targets for several reasons. these rules would add complexity to an already very complicated system, would require negotiating and monitoring the list of expenditure items to be excluded, and would have to be implemented without endangering fiscal sustainability. in any case, the challenges of the green and digital transitions exceed by far the fiscal space of national governments. thus, a more efficient option would be to set up a common european financing instrument, covering the investments needed to meet common objectives, such as reaching net zero emissions and combating climate change. joint funding arrangements would allow us to undertake large - scale programmes subject to common quality standards and to assess their compliance in a homogeneous manner, avoiding any excessive or highly unequal impact on national public finances and any disruptions in the single market. lastly, the european commission ’ s orientations miss an element that i firmly believe is essential for the success of any reform of the

s motto : mens agitat molem ( minds move matter ).
and that requires millions of skilled people. yet finding even a crane operator is oftentimes a challenge. even as demand for skills increases, the supply side response is lagging far behind. india churns out 350, 000 engineers every year, but barely a quarter of them are employable. we have 7000 itis, but their curriculums are woefully outdated. 24. there is an incentive issue in skill training. skill development is a quintessentially merit good where the societal cost benefit calculus is higher than the individual cost - benefit calculation. the private sector will be reluctant to invest in skills since workers can migrate with their skills. this was the understanding that prompted the government to launch the ambitious national skill development programme as a ppp initiative to train 500 million people by 2022. several states are also allowing vocational training institutions to be set up as ppp initiatives as well as not - for - profit societies. 25. to conclude, we need to focus a lot more on improving productivity across a broad range of areas in order to raise the growth rate as well as the quality of growth. fourth challenge : managing urbanization 26. historically, there has been a strong correlation between urbanization and economic growth across countries and across time with the causation possibly running both ways. empirical studies show that middle income countries reach about 50 per cent urbanization and high income countries typically have 70 – 80 per cent urbanization. china ’ s rapid growth bis central bankers ’ speeches over the last two decades, for example, ran concurrently with an increase in urbanization rate from 32 per cent in 1997 to 50 per cent in 2010 consistent with its low middle income status. in india, we are behind on urbanization. in the twenty years since the start of reforms, the proportion of urban population increased from 26 per cent in 1991 to just about 31 per cent in 2011. 27. accelerating growth, therefore, presents two tasks from the urbanization perspective. first, the rate of urbanization has to pick up pace so as to move people up the productivity ladder, and second, we have to manage the pressures of urbanization proactively. 28. the costs of unplanned urbanization are already very visible in terms of the huge strains on infrastructure and sanitation, pressure on utilities and inadequate and low quality social service provision. our cities are clearly unprepared for the influx of migrants on the scale that it is occurring and the result is slums and squat

first instance that taking banking to the sections constituting “ the bottom of the pyramid ”, may not be profitable but it should always be remembered that even the relatively low margins on high volumes can be a very profitable proposition. financial inclusion can emerge as commercial profitable business. only the banks should be prepared to think outside the box!