intrigued by inflation targeting and went on to co - author a book and several other pieces about this approach. as i continue to follow developments in the area, i must say, however, that discussions of inflation targeting in the american media remind me of the way some americans deal with the metric system - - they don't really know what it is, but they think of it as foreign, impenetrable, and possibly slightly subversive. so, in the hope of cutting through some of the fog, today i will offer my own, perhaps somewhat idiosyncratic, view of inflation targeting and its potential benefits, at least in what i consider to be its best - practice form. i will also try to dispel what i feel are a few misconceptions about inflation targeting that have gained some currency. finally, i will end with a few words, and one modest suggestion, about the implications of the experience with inflation targeting for the practice of monetary policymaking at the federal reserve. my main objective today, however, is to clarify, not to the interpretation of the bundesbank as a proto - inflation targeter is not universally accepted. certainly, the bundesbank did not put the same emphasis on communication and transparency that modern inflation - targeting central banks do. mishkin and jonas ( forthcoming ) describe the experiences of the three transition economies with inflation targets. a few countries that used inflation targeting in the transition to european monetary union are a partial exception. the european central bank itself has an inflation objective ( a ceiling of 2 percent ) but does not refer to itself as an inflationtargeting central bank, largely on the grounds that ( officially, at least ) it also puts some weight on money growth in its policy decisions. as a newly created central bank presiding over a monetary union, the ecb is unique in more fundamental ways as well ; hence, the lessons from the ecb experience for the federal reserve and other established central banks may be somewhat limited. see in particular bernanke and mishkin ( 1997 ) and bernanke, laubach, mishkin, and posen ( 1999 ). by focusing on what i call “ best practice ” inflation targeting, i must necessarily be somewhat subjective ; but then my goal today is largely normative, not descriptive. for a more detailed exposition of the case for inflation targeting in the united states, see goodfriend ( forthcoming ). advocate. of course, my comments today reflect

still low. ukraine is below the top one hundred countries in an ilo ranking of countries by productivity. in 2019, labor productivity in ukraine was lower not only compared to eu member states, but also relative to several former soviet countries. • third, population decline and aging. ukraine ranks 12th in the world in terms of population decline, according to world bank data. overall, ukraine has 11 pensioners per 10 employees. as a result, the pension fund needs constant additional contributions from the state budget. this diverts public funds from being spent on investment and education, and weighs on potential gdp growth. the high workload on employed individuals further increases the already elevated levels of informal employment. in 2019, one in five workers in ukraine was employed informally. according to the ilo forecast, by 2024, the burden on the working population by dependent people will increase compared to 2019 even more – by 6 %. • fourth, labor migration, as i have mentioned already. there are no exact data on the number of ukrainians working abroad. however, according to various estimates, it is about 3 million people. some of them are seasonal workers. last year, an average of approximately 2. 5 million of our citizens were abroad at a given point in time, according to nbu estimates. for us, this presents a double challenge. not only does labor migration affect the quantity and quality of labor resources and labor productivity in ukraine, but also it makes our economy heavily dependent on remittances. ukraine ranks 12th globally in terms of total incoming remittances and is in the top 15 countries by the remittances to gdp ratio ( not counting island states ). • fifth, low labor force participation. in particular, the labor force participation of women in ukraine is insufficient compared to europe. while the labor force participation of men in the population aged 15 and older is 65 %, that of women is 49 %. this is due to difficulties with accessing childcare services, and the low availability of part - time employment. in its turn, low labor force participation puts a drag on potential gdp growth. how can monetary policy help in such cases? a dual mandate whereby a central bank pursues both price stability and full employment is not particularly commonplace in today ’ s world. the reserve bank of australia and the u. s. federal reserve have pursued dual mandates since post - war times, as has the reserve bank of new zealand since a year ago. however, making monetary policy decisions