a set of aggregate integrated financial accounts that measures sources and uses of funds for major sectors as well as for the economy as a whole. 10 these accounts allow us to trace the flow of credit from its sources, such as banks or wholesale funding markets, to the household and business sectors that receive it. the federal reserve also now monitors detailed consumer - and business - level data suited for picking up changes in the nature of borrowing and lending, as well as for tracking financial conditions of those most exposed to a cyclical downturn or a reversal of fortunes. for example, during the housing boom, the aggregate data accurately showed the outsized pace of home mortgage borrowing, but it could not reveal the pervasive deterioration in underwriting that implied a substantial increase in the underlying credit risk from that activity. 11 more recently, gains in household net worth have been concentrated among wealthier households, while many households in the middle or lower parts of the distribution have experienced declines in wealth since the crisis. moreover, many homeowners remain “ underwater, ” with their homes worth less than the principal balances on their mortgages. thus, more detailed information clarifies that many households remain more financially fragile than might be inferred from the aggregate statistics alone. conclusion in closing, let me reiterate that while the effective regulation and supervision of individual financial institutions will always be crucial to ensuring a well - functioning financial system, the federal reserve is moving toward a more systemic approach that also pays close attention to the vulnerabilities of the financial system as a whole. toward that end, we are pursuing an active program of financial monitoring, supported by expanded research and data collection, often undertaken in conjunction with other u. s. financial regulatory agencies. our stepped - up monitoring and analysis is already providing important information for the board and the federal open market committee as well as for the broader regulatory community. we will continue to work toward improving our ability to detect and address vulnerabilities in our financial system. vol. 7 ( december ), pp. 189 – 240 ; and rochelle m. edge and ralf r. meisenzahl ( 2011 ), “ the unreliability of credit - to - gdp ratio gaps in real time : implications for countercyclical capital buffers, ” international journal of central banking, vol. 7 ( december ), pp. 261 – 98. the flow of funds data are available on the federal reserve board ’ s website. see matthew j. e

of deleveraging and further asset liquidation. to monitor intermediation by broker - dealers, the federal reserve in 2010 created a quarterly senior credit officer opinion survey on dealer financing terms, which asks dealers about the credit they provide. 6 modeled on the long - established senior loan officer opinion survey on bank lending practices sent to commercial banks, the survey of senior credit officers at dealers tracks conditions in markets such as those for securities financing, prime brokerage, and derivatives trading. 7 the credit officer survey is designed to monitor potential vulnerabilities stemming from the greater use of leverage by investors ( particularly through lending backed by less - liquid collateral ) or increased volumes of maturity transformation. before the financial crisis, we had only very limited information regarding such trends. we have other potential sources of information about shadow banking. the treasury department ’ s office of financial research and federal reserve staff are collaborating to construct data sets on triparty and bilateral repo transactions, which should facilitate the development of better monitoring metrics for repo activity and improve transparency in these markets. we also talk regularly to market participants about developments, paying particular attention to the creation of new financial vehicles that foster greater maturity transformation outside the regulated sector, provide funding for less - liquid assets, or transform risks from forms that are more easily measured to forms that are more opaque. a fair summary is that, while the shadow banking sector is smaller today than before the crisis and some of its least stable components have either disappeared or been reformed, regulators and the private sector need to address remaining vulnerabilities. for example, although money market funds were strengthened by reforms undertaken by the securities and exchange commission ( sec ) in 2010, the possibility of a run on these funds remains – for instance, if a fund should “ break the buck, ” or report a net asset value below 99. 5 cents, as the reserve primary fund did in 2008. the risk is increased by the fact that the treasury no longer has the power to guarantee investors'holdings in money funds, an authority that was critical for stopping the 2008 run. in november 2012, the fsoc proposed for public comment some alternative approaches for the reform of money funds. the sec is currently considering these and other possible steps. the senior credit officer opinion survey on dealer financing terms is available on the federal reserve board ’ s website. the senior loan officer opinion survey on bank lending practices is available on the federal reserve board ’ s website. bis central bankers ’ speeches with respect to the triparty