reduce the short - term interest rate volatility. in this framework, in 2007, the bank of albania will start the application of a new regulation “ on repurchase and reverse repurchase agreements ” which will bring about a novelty on interventions for a more effective distribution of banking system liquidity. this development of the regulatory framework will foster the repo market among commercial banks. it will contribute to the establishment of a more active inter - bank liquidity market and more active liquidity management by commercial banks. not only the information but also the real time of its transmission is of unquestionable importance to the financial market. in this context, i would like to emphasize that though the central bank has the necessary statistics to estimate the banks ’ positions and their operations, we expect from them to work more for enhancing the transparency in this regard. to encourage banks in terms of enhancing the transparency, the bank of albania has provided to the system the regulation “ on calculating fixed interest in interbank currency market ”, whose application shall be of importance not only to the bank of albania, but also to commercial banks for active liquidity management. in the same line, the central bank, through its active participation in the “ dealers association ” is supporting even the creation of a code of conduct for interbank relationships, which is deemed to lay another stone to market development in albania. as i mentioned above, the political decision - making of the bank of albania is forward - looking. from this viewpoint, i would require from the banking system to adopt the same philosophy : “ react today to prevent undesirable events in the future! as alain blinder has stated : “ frequently the decisionmakers only look through the window and make case decisions, based on current circumstances ”. therefore, the banking system should adopt the same philosophy for assimilating and factorising the bank of albania ’ s decisions into the short - and long - term operational strategy. another issue is an argument, which given the importance and the current stage of the economicfinancial development of the country, assumes an extremely high importance. the financial stability has become a central topic of current practical - academic debate. i would like to bring to your memory the regional conference of the bank of albania organised in october of the last year related to this issue. while the debate continues for determining a number of qualitative and quantitative indicators to measure the vulnerability of the economy, i would like to attract your attention to a higher attention we jointly should

often move significantly in response to foreign factors. since the united states is both a large exporter of some commodities and a large importer of some other commodities, the overall implications for u. s. activity are likely to be mixed. in particular, the effects of oil prices on the u. s. economy have been quite extensively studied. for example, kilian ( 2008 ) and kilian and vigfusson ( 2017 ) present evidence on how increases in oil prices have historically adversely affected u. s. economic performance, as the united states is a net importer of oil. more recently, as outlined in board of governors ( 2018, pp. 16 – 17 ), with the net oil import share trending lower in the united states, the drag on u. s. gdp from higher oil prices has likely declined. 6 most studies discussing contagion effects of the mexican peso crisis focus on effects on other latin american countries and do not highlight effects on u. s. growth. studies on the effects of the asian financial crisis on u. s. activity generally find from modest adverse to even slightly positive effects ( see, for example, duca, gould, and taylor, 1998 ; harrigan, 2000 ; and van wincoop and yi, 2000 ). duca, gould, and taylor ( 1998 ) called the effect on the united states “ more of a swell rather than a tsunami ” ( p. 1 ). one study, pollard and coughlin ( 1999 ), found significant negative effects of the asian crisis on u. s. exports in certain industries, but it also concluded that this effect did not translate into much of an effect on industry outputs. 7 support provided by the official international financial community also helped mute global market disruptions during these eme crises. 8 dell ’ ariccia, zettelmeyer, and schnabel ( 2002 ) argue that the more - substantial response of global financial markets to the russian default was because investors were expecting russia to be rescued from having to default by the international monetary fund, and there was a global retreat from risk when that did not happen. 9 media commentary from 2015 and 2016 is replete with descriptions of the rout in global financial markets resulting from financial turbulence in china. see, for example, economist ( 2015 ). 10 in may 2012, i gave an interview at the council on foreign relations highlighting the potential risks to the fragile u. s. economic recovery posed by the euro -