public comment on proposed principles providing a high - level framework for the safe and sound management of exposures to climate - related financial risks for large banking organizations, ” press release, december 2, https : / / www. federalreserve. gov / newsevents / pressreleases / other20221202b. htm. crowe, christopher, and ellen e. meade ( 2008 ). “ central bank independence and transparency : evolution and effectiveness, ” european journal of political economy, vol. 24 ( december ), pp. 763 – 77. debelle, guy, and stanley fischer ( 1994 ). “ how independent should a central bank be? ” in goals, guidelines, and constraints facing monetary policymakers, proceedings of a conference held in north falmouth, massachusetts, in june 1994. boston : federal reserve bank of boston, pp. 195−221, www. bostonfed. org / economic / conf / conf38 / conf38f. pdf. rogoff, kenneth ( 1985 ). “ the optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate monetary target, ” quarterly journal of economics, vol. 100 ( november ), pp. 1169−89. tucker, paul ( 2018 ). unelected power : the quest for legitimacy in central banking and the regulatory state. princeton, n. j. : princeton university press.

industries, regions, and nations. decisions about policies to directly address climate change should be made by the elected branches of government and thus reflect the public ’ s will as expressed through elections. at the same time, in my view, the fed does have narrow, but important, responsibilities regarding climate - related financial risks. these responsibilities are tightly linked to our responsibilities for bank supervision. 6 the public reasonably expects supervisors to require that banks understand, and appropriately manage, their material risks, including the financial risks of climate change. but without explicit congressional legislation, it would be inappropriate for us to use our monetary policy or supervisory tools to promote a greener economy or to achieve other climate - based goals. 7 we are not, and will not be, a “ climate policymaker. ” like our monetary policy independence, our independence in this area comes with a high level of transparency about our policies and procedures. for details, see board of governors ( 2022 ). while u. s. monetary policy has the dual mandate of maximum employment and price stability, some other central banks have somewhat more expansive mandates. the bank of england and the european central bank both have a primary mandate to maintain price stability but a secondary mandate to support the economic policies of the u. k. government and the european union, respectively ; see the bank of england act 1998, part ii ( 11 ), available from the u. k. national archives at https : / / www. legislation. gov. uk / ukpga / 1998 / 11 / contents, and the treaty on the functioning of the european union, article 127 ( 1 ), available from the european union at https : / / lexparency. org / eu / tfeu / art _ 127. - 4references alesina, alberto, and lawrence h. summers ( 1993 ). “ central bank independence and macroeconomic performance : some comparative evidence, ” journal of money, credit and banking, vol. 25 ( may ), pp. 151−62. bernanke, ben s. ( 2010 ). “ central bank independence, transparency, and accountability, ” speech delivered at the institute for monetary and economic studies international conference, bank of japan, tokyo, japan, may 25, https : / / www. federalreserve. gov / newsevents / speech / bernanke20100525a. htm. board of governors of the federal reserve system ( 2022 ). “ federal reserve board invites