##ncy? a common denominator for all policy makers at the moment is the lingering uncertainty. many scenarios are in place, from smooth and orderly recovery, through strong rebound with price pressures, ending to stalled recovery amidst new and more virulent strains. from a central bank perspective, our advantage is that there is still policy room for maneuver, although narrowed. our policy rate is still in a positive territory at a level of 1. 25 %, alternative instruments are available for targeted actions, the level of foreign reserves remains comfortable and the banking system stable with npls ratio of only 3. 4 %, despite the pandemics shock and closure of a bank in the midst of the pandemics. of course we have to be vigilant, and not only of conventional side effects of " too loose for too long " stance, but also of the possible adverse feedback 1 / 2 bis - central bankers'speeches loop between real and financial sector, as well as of the so called " zombification " risk. as complacency is not an option, shielding against those risks asks for further strengthening of the financial safety net, which will remain one of our priorities. thus, although still overwhelmed with the current challenges and the need for further policy support, we must not remain oblivious to the pre – pandemic strivings to increase the potential to grow faster, but in a sustainable and inclusive way. this requires gradual shifting of the focus back to the pre - crisis structural bottlenecks such as the quality of institutions, strengthening the rule of law, investing in human capital and in the potential to innovate, as well as to new structural hurdles that will be left as a legacy of the pandemics, which might not be even well known at the current juncture. clearly, we as central banks cannot play a main role in these segments, but perhaps a supporting one. in this context, despite many burning issues, we have managed to keep the focus on more structural issues such as digitalization by working on the first national fintech strategy, and on green finance by becoming a member of the international network for greening the financial system and conducting the first survey on the current status of the green finance. all these should ensure sustainable and inclusive recovery, while confirming our strong commitment to adopting the eu standards and best practices that should enable faster convergence. thank you! 2 / 2 bis - central bankers'speeches

rasheed mohammed al maraj : impact of the current global financial crisis on bahrain ’ s economy address by his excellency rasheed mohammed al maraj, governor of the central bank of bahrain, at the bcci seminar “ impact of the current global financial crisis on bahrain ’ s economy ”, manama, 18 november 2008. * * * ladies and gentlemen : i would like to thank the chamber of commerce and industry for their kind invitation to speak to you at today ’ s seminar. the topic that they have chosen, “ impact of the current global crisis on bahrain ’ s economy ” is very timely. until only a month or so ago, many commentators and analysts believed that the economies of the gcc would be an oasis of calm in the on - going financial turmoil. we also tended to hear a great deal about the so - called “ decoupling ” thesis. this was the idea that the emerging economies would continue their recent strong growth despite the economic downturn in europe and the united states. however, since the collapse of lehman brothers in mid - september, it has become clear that no part of the world will be immune to the current crisis. what began in september of last year as a crisis in the us real estate market – the so - called “ sub - prime ” crisis – earlier in this year turned into what we began to call the “ credit crunch. ” the losses that us and european banks suffered as the result of their exposure to sub - prime assets reduced their capital and hence their ability to lend. this sharply reduced the availability of credit in europe and the us, while at the same time both corporate and household borrowers attempted to de - leverage – that is, to reduce the amount of debt outstanding on their balance sheets. this was the situation that the world economy and financial system was facing until the middle of september. it pointed to a global economic slowdown, but the worst effects would be concentrated in the developed markets. the emerging economies were expected to continue their recent strong growth. the collapse of lehman brothers in mid - september moved the financial crisis into a new and much more unpredictable phase. the immediate effect was a scramble for liquidity in the main international financial centres, and by the large international banks. there was a massive rise in risk aversion in financial markets, reflected in a variety of indicators, including a rise in risk premiums – the margin that financial intermediaries demand for holding riskier assets – and steep falls in global stock markets