relevance. yes, low interest rates are holding back banks ’ profitability, but our monetary policy is stimulating the volume and strengthening the quality of bank lending so well that its overall impact on banks is, for the time being, positive. if growth is to rise significantly and interest rates return progressively to levels more favourable to savings, economic policies must make a more active contribution. what does that mean in practice? budgetary margins for manoeuvre can be used, where they exist. but in most countries of the euro area they are limited or non - existent. in france, for example, where public debt is verging on 100 % of gdp, another delay in reducing deficits would mean taking an unconsidered risk with business and household confidence. in all of our countries, however, the mix of revenues and expenditure could be made friendlier to investment. and a comparison of current growth rates in the euro area shows a clear advantage for countries that have implemented the most ambitious structural reforms, most notably in their labour markets. 1 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches weak growth, high unemployment and low rates are not inevitable. they reflect the legacy of the crisis but are also a consequence of economic policies that are lacking in ambition. the ecb will continue to protect the euro area from financial shocks, but the monetary climate will not always be so favourable. and the global economy could present new risks. it ’ s time to draw – and act on – the appropriate conclusions. 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches

but if the ecb thinks that this doesn ’ t go far enough, it can take charge and impose additional requirements at the european level, something that has so far never been done. the area where no tools exist – and this is a matter of concern – is nonbank activity. since the financial crisis, there has been a shift towards the non - bank sector. banks have shrunk their balance sheets while investment funds, money market funds and asset managers continue to grow and are effectively financing the economy. so, if an investment fund buys a portfolio of loans from a bank, it becomes a creditor to firms and households. yet there is much less supervision and fewer prudential tools in this sector. this is where major work will be needed in the coming years – we need to develop a macroprudential approach for non - bank activity so that credit conditions can be tightened if necessary. since you started at the ecb in january 2012, the institution has undergone a fundamental transformation. it used to be much like the bundesbank, but now it acts more like the us federal reserve. the existential crises we went through, first with spain and italy in summer 2012 and then with greece in summer 2015, and the actions of one man, mario draghi, who was president of the ecb until november this year, gave us the necessary maturity to make full use of the instruments granted to us by the treaties. does this mean that we have become like the federal reserve? in a certain sense, yes, because we are equipped with a comprehensive toolbox to support the euro area economy at all times, using tools like quantitative easing inspired by the us model, and the capacity to intervene in the markets. but there are also significant differences. for a start, we don ’ t have the same mandate – the federal reserve has a dual mandate that gives equal weighting to price stability and full employment, while the ecb ’ s mandate prioritises price stability. and our financial markets are not the same – bond markets in the united states are very deep and liquid, which gives the federal reserve an almost unlimited capacity for intervention. in europe, there is no capital markets union – bond markets are fragmented across 19 countries, which limits the capacity of monetary policy. are you proud of what has been accomplished? there are three things i take pride in. first, mario draghi ’ s speech in july 2012, when he said that the ecb, within its mandate, would