future adjustments to interest rates will be based on the evolution of the data, the economic outlook, and the risks to achieving our goals. we will continue to be data - dependent and attuned to the evolution of economic conditions in making our decisions. with monetary policy moving to a more neutral setting over time, i expect real gdp to grow between 2 - 1 / 4 and 2 - 1 / 2 percent this year and to average about 2 - 1 / 4 percent over the next two years. i anticipate the unemployment rate to edge up from its current level of about 4 percent to around 4 - 1 / 4 percent at the end of this year and stay around that level next year. with the economy in balance and inflation expectations well anchored, i expect overall pce inflation to be around 2 - 1 / 4 percent this year, and to be close to 2 percent next year. conclusion the economy has been on a remarkable journey. in two years, the red - hot labor market has normalized, and inflation has come within striking distance of our 2 percent longerrun goal - all while employment and the economy continue to grow. we instituted and maintained a very restrictive monetary policy stance until the data gave us confidence that inflation is sustainably on course to 2 percent. with this progress toward achieving price stability, moving toward a more neutral monetary policy stance will help maintain the strength of the economy and labor market. although the outlook remains uncertain, we are well positioned to achieve our dual mandate goals. 3 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches 1 see https : / / smokymountains. com / fall - foliage - map for the forecast of foliage in this area as well as across the nation. 2 john c. williams, a bedrock commitment to price stability, remarks at the 2022 u. s. hispanic chamber of commerce national conference, phoenix, arizona, october 3, 2022 ; john c. williams, peeling the inflation onion, remarks at the economic club of new york ( delivered via videoconference ), november 28, 2022 ; john c. williams, " peeling the inflation onion, revisited, " federal reserve bank of new york, the teller window, september 29, 2023. 3 federal reserve bank of new york, global supply chain pressure index ( september 2024 ). 4 in particular, the federal reserve bank of new york multivariate core trend inflation measure was 2. 6 % in august ( august 2024 report ), while the 6 - month change in

policy changes we use here might be a " noisy " one. if so, our approach would underestimate the effect of policy changes on the stock market. however, poole, rasche and thornton ( 2002, pp. 68 - 69 ) perform an analysis that suggests that the mismeasurement may be small in practice. further confirmation is provided by d'amico and farka ( 2002 ), who find results similar to ours using ten - minute windows around the announcement ; the benefit of a tight window is that the policy announcement is highly likely to dominate movements in the contract over that period. on march 20, 2001, was received less enthusiastically. even though the cut was more or less what the futures market had been anticipating, the financial press reported that many equity market participants were " disappointed " that the rate cut hadn't been an even larger 75 - basis - point action. in any event, the market lost more than 2 percent that day. to ensure that our results did not depend on a few unusual observations, or " outliers, " we re - ran our regression, omitting the days with the most extreme or unusual market moves. this more conservative analysis led to a smaller estimate of the effect of policy actions on the stock market, a stock price multiplier of about 2. 6 rather than 4. 7. however, the effect remains quite sharp in statistical terms. we considered other variations as well. for example, we investigated whether the magnitude of the effect on the stock market of a surprise policy tightening ( that is, an increase in interest rates ) differs from that of a surprise easing of comparable size. it does not. yet another experiment consisted of asking whether an unanticipated policy change has a larger effect if it is thought by the market to signal a longer - lasting change in policy. we measured the perceived permanence of policy changes by observing the effects of unanticipated policy changes on the expected federal funds rate three months in the future, as measured by the futures market. the stock market multiplier associated with unanticipated policy moves that are perceived to be more permanent is a bit higher, as would be expected ; its value is about 6. in short, the statistical evidence is strong for a stock price multiplier of monetary policy of something between 3 and 6, the higher values corresponding to policy changes that investors perceive to be relatively more permanent. that is, according to our findings,