svb was much faster than expected – much faster than lcr calculations take into account. which raises the question : should the lcr be calibrated differently? should we assume higher outflow rates? and do we need to improve our stress tests? we might also ask ourselves if there are shortcomings in the way we look at interest rate risk and the mismatches banks have on their balance sheets. in europe, the basel standards for interest rate risk have been introduced through the institution - specific pillar 2 requirements, and they apply to all banks. the recent turmoil underlines the importance of this regulation, as well as the need for continued vigilance. are we sure that the underlying assumptions for customer behaviour and deposit duration are conservative enough in today's digital world? banks should monitor very closely the assumptions they make when managing interest rate risk and adjust those assumptions if there is reason to do so. 2 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches and finally, should unrealized losses – that is the difference between market value and the valuation based on historical cost – should those unrealized losses be better reflected in the capitalization of banks? and should we look at how instruments that are not marked to market daily are reflected in liquidity buffers? it would be for example useful to tighten the use of these assets as high - quality liquid assets. these are all valid questions that i think should be addressed. so that we can learn everything there is to learn from what happened at svb. let me now turn to this side of the atlantic, where we had our own shattered windshield. shattered by credit suisse, a bank that had suffered from a series of mismanagement problems in recent years, and that experienced previous outflows of deposits at the end of 2022. here, too, we witnessed a rapid succession of events. it took, almost literally, only one tweet to lead to the downfall of credit suisse. deposit outflows quickly followed, the share price fell and the cds spread spiked. in the end, the swiss national bank provided additional liquidity assistance, and credit suisse was sold to ubs. finma, the swiss supervisor, came with a write - down of credit suisse's at1 securities. the bank was not bailed out. instead capital providers contributed significantly to its restart, exactly as intended by the new legislation after the global financial crisis. at the same time, things did not go as smoothly as

growth in asset management will be lacklustre, weighed down by falling market valuations and fee compression. the payments services space should continue to thrive in line with continued expansion of e - commerce activities, both locally and in the region. fintech - related activities should also continue to grow handsomely, boosted by ongoing digital transformation across the financial sector. even more heartening than the growth numbers are the jobs numbers for financial services. there was a net increase of about 6, 900 jobs in financial services and fintech in 2018, driven mainly by the banking and insurance industries. 2 over the last three years ( 2016 – 18 ), we saw an average of 4, 900 financial services and fintech jobs created on a net basis per year. this is above our itm target of 4, 000 net jobs growth in financial services and fintech. 9 / 11 bis central bankers'speeches hiring in the financial sector remains healthy so far this year and job growth is on track to meet the itm target of 4, 000. sustaining this rate of job growth will not be easy in the face of technological change unless efforts are continually stepped up to upskill the workforce. as digitalisation and automation become more pervasive in the financial industry, jobs will be transformed. some will inevitably be displaced. mas, the financial industry, and our tripartite partners are taking this very seriously and undertaking a variety of measures to help prepare the financial sector workforce for a digital future. last year, more than 20, 000 individuals – or about one out of eight workers in the industry – went through mas / ibf - supported upskilling programmes. nineteen financial institutions have stepped forward and committed to re - skill close to 4, 000 finance professionals and redeploy them in new or expanded roles over the next two years. some 1, 700 of them have already started this journey, and 800 have successfully transited into new roles. conclusion let me wrap up. the global economy has weakened and this is already affecting singapore. downside risks have grown, and some of these risks may have prolonged effects. we need to be alert but there is no need to be alarmed. there are pockets of resilience that should provide a degree of support to the global economy. the singapore economy is in for a rougher ride but is well placed. our economic fundamentals are robust and policy buffers are healthy. asia ’ s growth, digital transformation, and the resilience in modern innovative services play