extend possible between the competent prudential authorities, as advocated by alexandre lamfalussy. there is less and less talk of setting up an international financial framework for averting global financial crises. is it the case that there is no longer any systemic risk? we live in a world filled with opportunity and promise : advances in science and technology, international trade developments, a very broad consensus in favour of the market economy, and improved global governance in which developing countries are actively involved. however, risks also exist. to give just two examples, first i would mention precisely a certain tendency among financial markets to underestimate risks and, second, the issue of external imbalances at a global level. a moratorium on debt has been declared for certain countries affected by the tsunami. does this bode well for the cancellation of the debts of the poorest african countries, as recommended by the british government? i was extremely moved by the response, generosity and compassion shown globally in the wake of these tragic events. i have myself worked very closely on debt strategy, which has evolved considerably over the past 20 years to offer assistance to developing countries, and especially the poorest countries, in return for their efforts towards good governance. good debt strategy plays a crucial role in global financial stability. there is often controversy when you speak in english. do you really prefer the language of shakespeare to that of moliere? i am very attached to the french language and culture. over ten years ago, i founded the club of french - speaking central bankers whose members represent 59 countries and 45 central banks. i am called upon to speak as the representative of an institution which has international responsibilities. for this reason, i speak english and other languages. but everybody knows my passion for the french language.

yves mersch : “ ecb in between state rescue and monetary policy ” keynote speech by mr yves mersch, member of the executive board of the european central bank, at the “ welt ” wahrungskonferenz, berlin, 14 may 2014. * * * ladies and gentlemen, mutual trust is a precondition for effective cooperation between european institutions and between the national and european level – trust that each institution acts lawfully and within its area of responsibility. the separation of powers as well as checks and balances are fundamental achievements of modern democracies. but they do not mean that one authority acts vis - a - vis another in a spirit of mistrust and disrespect. even though the title of today ’ s discussion ( “ ecb in between state rescue and monetary policy ” ) may suggest otherwise, the ecb cannot, must not and will not “ save ” states. our actions are based on our monetary policy mandate, as defined in article 127 of the treaty on the functioning of the european union ( tfeu ) : the ecb is responsible for price stability in the euro area. like almost all central banks in the industrialised world, the ecb enjoys a high degree of independence. this independence is not a carte blanche for us central bankers. it provides protection, so that we can fulfil our mission free of political influence. at the same time, this privilege of political independence has a price : absolute respect for the limits of our mandate. the most effective way to be accountable to citizens as an independent institution is to assess if and to what extent we fulfil our price stability mission. and our results so far are beyond reproach. we have various instruments at our disposal to help us do justice to our mandate. the purchase of government bonds in the primary market is explicitly not among them because the monetary financing of governments is prohibited under the eu treaty. our mandate nevertheless includes the possibility of buying, under the appropriate conditions, government bonds on the secondary market ( so - called “ outright monetary transactions ” or omts ), should this be necessary from a monetary policy perspective. this option is explicitly stated in article 18. 1 of the escb / ecb statute. to illustrate this clear monetary policy orientation of omts, let me briefly recall the situation on the european capital markets in summer 2012. fears that the monetary union could break up had led to severe tensions on those markets. the government bond market was