particular, it might be advisable, at least for the systemically important financial institutions, to add to the ex - post minimum global 8 % bail - in threshold an ex - ante minimum amount of specific instruments that could be readily converted into equity immediately after the point of non - viability is achieved, e. g. through specific clauses in the subscription contracts of those instruments. this ex - ante requirement – which is now being discussed at the level of the fsb under the concept of minimum gone concern loss absorbing capacity ( glac ) – may indeed be a useful complement to the eu directive that already permits competent authorities to instruct banks to adjust their balance sheets to facilitate bail - in pre - emptively. that minimum requirement must however be well - parametrised to take into account the special nature of the different institutions while preserving a level playing field both nationally and internationally. the european case let me now expand a bit more on the european resolution framework which has played a key role in the policy response to the financial and institutional crisis in the eu and is subject to relevant specific challenges. the involvement of national governments in the resolution of the financial crisis established a perverse destabilising link between sovereign and financial risks which was at the root of the severe turmoil in public debt markets that started in 2010. that turmoil challenged the very existence of the single currency as it caused the reemergence of a country risk component in all relevant asset prices and impaired the correct functioning of the monetary union. the reaction by the authorities was to adopt an ambitious common framework not only for the prevention of banking crises – through the creation of the single supervisory mechanism ( ssm ) – but also for the resolution of those crisis through the newly founded single resolution mechanism ( srm ). the srm ensures not only that the resolution framework will be harmonised in the euro area – as provided by the brrd – but also that resolution policy, at least for ssm countries, will be managed centrally by a single resolution board ( srb ), which will enjoy a high degree of bis central bankers ’ speeches autonomy. moreover, this board will manage a common resolution fund – funded by the industry – that over time would become a common backstop to cover resolution costs for all significant banks in all participating countries. arguably, the envisaged system is relatively complex. major resolution actions may involve not only the single resolution board but also the european central bank, as a supervisor, the national

that i will be watching for closely. here are some of things i will be following : labor force participation. given long - standing demographic trends, it would seem a heavy lift to expect labor force growth to contribute much to a pickup in gdp growth. however, it is encouraging that the downward movement in labor force participation has recently been on hiatus, a development that could possibly be prolonged by the recent tax legislation — which could, for example, give some workers an incentive to remain in or enter the workforce. capital investment. as i mentioned, the recent data on investment have been encouraging, with a noticeable pickup in capital equipment spending. as businesses become more confident in the sustainability of the upturn, investment could be further boosted. while the tax act is multifaceted and complex, lower corporate tax rates and other incentives will also likely boost investment and increase the capital stock. productivity. though the quarterly numbers are volatile and should be treated cautiously, the nearly 1 percent decline in labor productivity recorded in the fourth quarter of 2017 would imply that a productivity turnaround is not yet upon us. moreover, for 2017 as a whole, productivity increased only 3 / 4 percent, about the same as the average annual pace since 2011. that said, with no consensus on what has caused the productivity slowdown, a turnaround could come suddenly. there are those who argue a more optimistic take on the prospects for technology developments to boost productivity growth. 11 for example, a number of new technologies, including artificial intelligence and genetic sequencing, appear on the cusp of breaking out, with widespread effects on economic activity. 12 also, it might be true that productivity growth will be nudged higher by the pace of economic activity. tight labor markets might induce firms to invest more in robotics and other labor - saving technology. external developments. with global growth picking up steam, the external environment is more favorable for u. s. growth than it has been in quite some time. in 2017, for example, the contribution of real exports to growth picked up markedly following two years in which exports provided no support to growth at all. what are the consequences of higher growth? again, i think it is too soon to call a turning point in the long - run growth prospects of the economy, notwithstanding some encouraging signs that i have highlighted. all the same, i think it is worthwhile to acknowledge that there are some upside risks to the forecast and to think through what the consequences of those risks materializing might be. one consequence might be that