samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
the second reason is that the costs and benefits of participating in coordinated actions of this kind are not in fact evenly distributed across participants. some participants will benefit more than others from a given innovation, or may find it more costly than others, for reasons to do with their size or their business model. another factor is the timing of investment cycles : collective action has to be collective, but the timing of any given investment in payments technology will always be more advantageous to some than to others. a bank that is just about to undertake a regular technology upgrade may be quite receptive to aligning that with a general change in standards ; whereas a bank that has just completed a major round of investment may not be. these things can make it very hard for industry participants to agree on the timing of a systemic innovation, or on the pricing arrangements that will underpin it. the end result can be a degree of inertia, or a slower pace of innovation than would be socially efficient. i think this problem is inherent in any network that doesn ’ t operate as a kind of proprietary unit in the way that, for example, a credit card network does ( competing of course with other networks ). bis central bankers ’ speeches for the payments system as a whole, then, this points to the need for coordination mechanisms. what sorts of mechanisms might we be talking about? for a lot of issues, the appropriate coordination mechanism could be an industry body – especially where the issue is mainly technical in nature and where there are no strong proprietary interests at stake. an example would be routine updating of technical standards. but where there are significantly conflicting incentives that make coordinated decisionmaking more difficult, it may need a regulator to take a leadership role. in australia the payments system regulator is the central bank, and regulatory decisions are made by the reserve bank payments system board. we have a mandate to promote stability and efficiency, which i think we can view as including the efficient resolution of the coordination problems that i ’ ve just described. and we have significant powers that can be directed to that end. for these reasons, the rba has been increasing its focus on these coordination issues in recent times. as you may be aware, we announced a strategic review of innovation in the payments system in july 2010, and we are now in the finishing stages of that review. in the course of the review, we held two rounds of extensive consultation with service providers as well as with end - users of the payments system. broadly speaking, the

taken to identify and mitigate risks, still be used for ml / tf purposes. ’ unquote. we supervisors are fully aware that the perfect supervisory regime does not exist. it is, however, our duty to aim for optimal results by adopting methodologies that make full use of our supervisory resources and skills. ladies and gentlemen, i thank you for your attention and wish you all an enriching seminar.
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and early 2009, the world suffered the worst financial crisis since the great depression, a crisis which, had it been left unchecked, would have resulted in a global financial meltdown and an economic collapse. working with policymakers around the world, the federal reserve acted creatively and forcefully to help stabilize the financial system and halt the economic slide. our economy has been growing and adding jobs for more than two years now. but for a lot of people, i know, it doesn ’ t feel like the recession ever ended. the unemployment rate remains painfully high, and more than two - fifths of the unemployed have been out of work for longer than six months, by far the highest ratio since world war ii. these problems are very serious, and we at the federal reserve have been focusing intently on supporting job creation. supporting job creation is half of our marching orders, so to speak ; the other half is controlling inflation. or, in the language of the law that sets the mandate for monetary policy, the federal reserve is required to seek both maximum employment and price stability. we pursue those two important goals by influencing the level of interest rates and other financial conditions. my colleagues and i on the federal reserve ’ s monetary policymaking committee equate price stability with inflation being at 2 percent or a little less. that rate is bis central bankers ’ speeches low enough that people and businesses can make financial decisions without having to worry too much about rising costs, but high enough to keep the economy away from deflation – falling wages and prices – which is both a cause and a symptom of an extremely weak economy. although spikes in oil and food prices, and other transitory factors, pushed inflation up earlier this year, inflation appears to be moderating, and we expect, based on the best information that we have today, that it will remain reasonably close to our objective of 2 percent or a bit less for the foreseeable future. in the longer term, monetary policy is the main determinant of inflation, and so federal reserve policymakers have considerable latitude to choose our longer - term inflation goal. in contrast, “ maximum employment ” depends on many factors outside of the federal reserve ’ s control, such as the skills of the workforce and the pace of technological innovation. right now, my colleagues on the fed ’ s policymaking committee estimate that the u. s. economy could sustain an unemployment rate of somewhere between 5 and 6 percent without generating a buildup of inflation pressures.
and the international community is keenly aware of this need. * * * in my remarks today, i will focus on global governance and in particular on the lessons that can be drawn from the extraordinary events of the past two years. i will first elaborate on why we need a set of rules, institutions and international relations that we call “ global governance ”. second, i will analyse how, in hindsight, the existing global governance has see b. eichengreen and k. h. o ’ rourke ’ s three columns on voxeu ( including the one entitled “ what do the new data tell us? ” of 8 march 2010, http : / / www. voxeu. org / index. php? q = node / 3421 ). fared during the global financial crisis. finally, i will deal with the evolution of the system as a response to the crisis, and in particular i will discuss the rise of new key players in the world economy such as the g20 and the financial stability board. being in italy, i cannot resist mentioning the teachings of nicolo machiavelli. he has become known worldwide for his pessimistic and cynical attitude towards power, but in fact one of his main messages was that freedom is not possible without rules, i. e. without good institutions. for example, in his discorsi he admires the roman republic where rules and the respect for law allowed men to be free – in contrast with what he saw with his contemporaries, who were corrupt and unable to stick to rules and therefore needed a tyrant. a famous sentence of his is “ un principe che puo fare cio ch ’ ei vuole e pazzo ; un popolo che puo fare cio che vuole non e savio ”. 2 likewise, economic freedom is not possible without an adequate set of rules and this is valid both within countries as well as in the international realm. 1. why do we need global economic governance? let me begin by explaining what we mean by “ global economic governance ” and why we need it. by global economic governance we mean, at least in the economic sphere, the set of supra - national institutions and laws as well as the international relations between countries that have an effect on cross - border economic and financial transactions. indeed, no market, even the market in the back street, can survive without an institutional infrastructure, i. e. a set of rules and this is particularly

important for open trading nations like ours : sustainable fiscal policies, a monetary policy based on inflation targeting, a flexible exchange rate, and flexible markets that can respond to changing economic circumstances. by following these prescriptions, both australia and canada should be well placed to cope with whatever developments come about in the global economy. but we must also work hard to help shape that global economy. we need to do our utmost to ensure continued free trade in goods and services and to resist protectionism. and we must work together and with other countries to make the international financial system as efficient and effective as possible. an important part of that effort must be to modernize the imf. with a stronger international system and solid domestic policies, both australians and canadians can look forward to continued strong economic growth in the years ahead.
##ity requirements – ( mag report ) http : / / www. bis. org / publ / othp10. htm. bis central bankers ’ speeches

unemployment, particularly long - term unemployment, is exacerbating inequality. in the united states and the euro area combined, more than 11 million workers have been out of work for more than a year. the other side of the coin is that an efficient and resilient financial system is essential to growth, and financial development has proven an important ingredient to reducing inequality. a well - functioning financial system is a key enabler to growth, channelling savings to productive investments, and helping households and businesses manage risks. increasingly, cross - country evidence also suggests that financial development eases inequality by reducing transactions costs. this provides the opportunity to accumulate assets and smooth consumption, make financing accessible to local entrepreneurs, and promote inclusion in the formal economy. recent research finds that financial development, measured as the ratio of private credit to gdp, both raises growth and reduces inequality. for the poorest quintile, 60 per cent of the benefit of financial development comes from overall economic growth and 40 per cent from greater income equality. 7 in short, there is a virtuous circle of financial development, growth and reduced inequality. this points to the imperative of a dynamic and robust financial system. the excesses and abuses in the financial system that led to the crisis have been a lightning rod for public discontent. understandably so. but the answer is not to dismantle the financial system. it must be rebuilt. that process is well under way. 8 the g - 20 financial reform agenda, launched in the depth of the recession, is suitably sweeping. its key elements include : r. rajan, fault lines : how hidden fractures still threaten the world economy ( princeton, n. j. : princeton university press, 2010 ). s. jahan and b. mcdonald, “ a bigger slice of a growing pie, ” finance & development ( september 2011 ) : 16 – 19 ; r. levine, “ finance and growth : theory and evidence, ” in handbook of economic growth, edited by p. aghion and s. durlauf, vol. 1 ( elsevier, 2005 ) : 865 – 934 ; and t. beck, a. demirguc - kunt, and r. levine, “ finance, inequality, and poverty : cross - country evidence, ” national bureau of economic research working paper no. 10979, cambridge, 2004. t. macklem, “ raising the house of reform, ” speech to the rotman institute for international business
adequacy of capital and provisions. in view of the depth of the current problem, and the fact that it may be quite sometime before the global standards on these issues can be settled, regulators, in my view, must be ready to take the needed action to ensure that we address these risks in our financial systems systematically. this is why pillar ii is all the more important, because the essence of pillar ii is to ensure that financial institutions have adequate risk management process and capital, commensurate with their risk profiles. and this is why we are seeing increased vigilance by regulators and the financial institutions themselves, in terms of the rigour in the use of stresstests, which is essential in the environment of heightened volatility that superseded historical norm. the implementation of pillar ii is, however, a challenge, not only in terms of the technical and quantitative expertise for reviewing internal capital adequacy assessment process, or icaap, but also on qualitative aspects such as how to foster an on - going two - way dialogue with the supervised institutions that would enhance the icaap process. to meet this challenge, regulators need to establish a strong credibility so as to strengthen the impact of their recommendations and requirement on icaap, and in some cases, increase capital requirement to ensure capital appropriate to the material risks, not yet covered in pillar i. also, there are challenges on the legal and institutional capacity aspects on how to handle the more principle - based, and therefore, more institution - specific regulatory requirement. as for the bank of thailand, our progress on pillar ii implementation is continuing. by working closely with all stakeholders especially thai bankers, association, we have issued three prudential guidelines for basel ii since 2006. pillar ii formally took effect the end of last year, while pillar iii will be implemented in june this year. as far as pillar ii is concerned, we expect thai banks to put in place the icaap within this year and establish the comprehensive process by the end of next year. overall, we are on track with the implementation of basel ii, thereby reaffirming our commitment to international best practice. with this brief initial remark, it is my hope that this seminar would provide the needed knowledge and skills to supervisors from seanza countries for the challenges posed by pillar ii.

disposal for questions.
it looked as if interest rates and inflation in jamaica were moving closer to convergence with that of the rest of the caribbean as well, but this changed sharply in early 2003 and the convergence for which we hoped was abruptly dislodged. we need to get back to that situation where economic convergence is a likelihood. capital markets need it. conclusion not only do authorities need to deliberately target economic convergence we also need to build incentives into our operational frameworks and to reward desired outcomes. this calls for more specific recommendations and for even closer interaction between market participants and the authorities. it also underscores the need for cooperative mechanisms in building our markets. thank you ladies and gentlemen.

. programming would make us creators of the technology rather than simply users. unfortunately, programming is attracting few graduates, despite the potential it offers for job creation, business development and economic wealth. the example of india is one we might wish to draw on. our students have the intelligence ; what is needed is the training, the exposure and the will. in closing, let me express my appreciation to all those who have played a part in transforming the bank ’ s environs, namely the frank collymore hall and the grande salle, into an it learning setting and especially to janice marshall who approached me with the idea, and to her staff who were intimately involved in the hosting of this fair. to the students who will be the focus of this fair over the next three days, i encourage you to be as open and as inquisitive as you wish to be as you move from booth to booth. i hope, too, that you see this event as a veritable investment in our future - yours, the bank ’ s and the country ’ s. i would especially like to thank novaline brewster for looking after the logistics of this event. i thank you all for being here today.
major central banks and supervisors are on the verge of applying. stephen hawking once famously said about the internet : “ we are all now connected [ … ] like neurons in a giant brain ”. this could also apply to the finance of tomorrow in an interconnected world. each of us – whether regulators or professionals – is at least a neuron ; we need to be connected to other neurons to produce innovative ideas. similarly, no country or financial institution can adequately respond to the challenges of this changing world on its own : we must definitely join our efforts to build our future. thank you for your attention. 1 acpr study on the digital revolution in the french banking and insurance sector, march 2018. 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches

what is more, tightening in the credit supply conditions for corporate lending receded in this period ( chart 11 ). chart 10. chart 11. tl loan rates commercial loan standards * ( 4 - week average, percent ) ( net change ) source : brsa, cbrt. * banks are requested to state the change in the demand for credit. net percentage change of indexed responses indicates the direction of the change in credit demand. the index is calculated as [ the sum of percentages for ( increased somewhat + increased considerably ) ] – [ the sum of the percentages for ( decreased somewhat + decreased considerably ) ] + 100. index values greater than 100 signify increase in credit demand. source : cbrt. as a result of these developments, credit growth gained pace in the last quarter of the year ( chart 12 ). accordingly, annual rate of growth in total credit stock materialized around 16 percent at the end of the year, slightly higher than the 15 percent benchmark level for the medium term ( chart 13 ). total credit growth proved robust in early 2013, and the uptrend of 13 weeks in credit volume stood close to the past years ’ average. chart 12. chart 13. loan growth rates annual growth rate of loans ( adjusted for exchange rate, 13 - week average, annualized, percent ) ( percent ) source : cbrt. source : cbrt. bis central bankers ’ speeches there is a risk of further acceleration in credit in the forthcoming period. financial conditions index continued to ease with rapid capital inflows, improving credit supply conditions, and accommodative liquidity policy ( chart 14 ). this outlook necessitates a cautious stance against macro financial risks. given these evaluations, i would like to remind that in its first monthly meeting of 2013, the committee highlighted the faster - than - expected credit growth and signaled that macroprudential measures might be continued should this trend persist. chart 14. financial conditions index * for further details on financial conditions index, see cbrt economic notes no. 12 / 31 and report 2012 - iv, box 5. 2. source : cbrt. 2. macroeconomic developments and assumptions now, i will talk about the macroeconomic outlook and our assumptions which constitute the basis for our forecasts. first, i will summarize the recent inflation developments, and then compare the short term forecasts in the october inflation report with the actual year - end inflation data in 2012. then, i will continue
have also seen in the united states, where in the past there was a general absence of confidence, which was rectified by the publication of such stress tests. q : is greater fiscal integration necessary to avoid a repeat crisis of this nature? a : we must, in particular, be able to go as far as possible, without necessarily changing immediately the treaty, notably with regard to very early surveillance, almost automatic sanctions, and the strengthening and extension of sanctions so that the euro area has the equivalent of what we would have if we were in a fiscal federation. q : but wouldn ’ t a federal budget be the ideal solution? a : a federal solution would require a huge leap forward at the institutional level. it seems to me that a fully fledged political federation is not, at present, wanted by the countries themselves, speaking as a citizen, it is a matter of regret to me that the chance to take further steps was not seized in the 1990s. in the meantime, responsibility for the economic union itself – as part of the economic and monetary union, the emu – rests with the member states themselves. they, of course, fulfil this responsibility within the framework of their own national institutions. that being said, the “ peers ”, namely the other governments, duly guided by the european commission in liaison with the ecb, should not hesitate to meet all their own responsibilities : they should ensure that none of them adopts policies that could undermine the stability of the euro area as a whole. they have just seen for themselves the extent to which they share a common destiny. q : why not jointly manage some of the debt of european states? a : we have always been opposed to merging treasury operations, because this would strip states of their responsibilities and they would lose the financial incentive for sound governance. q : do the austerity plans announced amid monumental disarray by the member states pose the risk of killing off the first green shoots of growth? a : it is an error to think that fiscal austerity is a threat to growth and job creation. at present, a major problem is the lack of confidence on the part of households, firms, savers and investors who feel that fiscal policies are not sound and sustainable. in a number of economies, it is this lack of confidence that poses a threat to the consolidation of the recovery. economies embarking on austerity policies that lend credibility to their fiscal policy strengthen confidence, growth and job creation. q : should a

european rating agency be created, since the anglo - saxon agencies have added fuel to the flames during this crisis? a : rating agencies in general have had a pro - cyclical impact. they tend to amplify upward and downward swings in the financial markets. this is still obvious today. this runs counter to financial stability. it is probably advisable to put an end to a global oligopoly of three agencies. but the fundamental problem is to reduce, or eliminate, this amplifying effect that the rating agencies contribute to.