might be feasible. along with changing the voting structure, we may also consider reforming the voting majority requirement on major policy decisions. the special majority requirement on some key policy issues, such as quota increase and revision of articles of agreements may be reduced from 85 percent to three fourths ( 75 percent ) or two thirds ( 66 percent ), thus no one single country being able to veto the related decisions. last but not least, it is also imperative to reform the management structure of the fund. in light of large number of developing countries only represented by 10 - 11 executive directors in the fund, adding another chair of ed elected from developing countries could be considered. as to the senior management, it is wise to consider increasing one to two dmd positions for developing countries over the next few years. furthermore, the diversification of staff is also very important. it may also be feasible to allocate proximately thirty percent of senior staff positions to qualified staff recruited from developing countries, thus greatly helping bring new perspectives to the fund and find out welltailored development path for member countries. mr. chairman, i clearly understand that the road towards a better governance of the imf may be as bumpy as it was in the past sixty years. but, this is an irreversible journey. the intensified economic globalization and rapid development of developing countries demand a significant improvement in the governance structure of the bretton woods institutions, under which nations realize common prosperity through mutual respect, equitable dialogue and interest sharing. it is my firm believe that, with persistent pursuit from the developing world, and deep insight, forward vision, political courage and concerted efforts of the international community, the imf will much better serve the interests for all of its members. thank you all. table 1 percentage of quota shares of member countries from 1945 to 20041 total quota ( billion sdr ) number of total membership quota share of industrial countries ( % ) number of industrial countries quota share of g - 7 ( % ) quota share of u. s. ( % ) ( original membership ) 7. 5 – – – ( 4th quinquennial review ) 20. 9 58. 0 ( 5th general review ) 28. 8 54. 5 ( 6th general review ) 39. 0 64. 7 50. 3 21. 5 35. 3 ( 7th general review ) 61. 1 63. 2 49. 2 21. 0 36. 8 ( 8th general review ) 90. 0 63. 1 48.

but a few from europe and north america. as table 1 and chart 1 show, over the past 60 years, the g - 7 countries have kept their quota share, as a group, above 45 percent and that of u. s. above 17 percent. although the quota share of developing countries increased from 30 percent to 36 percent, this more reflected the increasing memberships of developing countries. what is more, the basic vote has never been touched upon in every round of quota increase, resulting in a sharp drop of share of basic votes to 2. 1 percent of total votes today. what have been the negative implications of the main problem in the fund ’ s governance? first, the dominant voting powers of a small group of countries have kept the fund away from any policy initiative that may benefit the global community as a whole in the long run, but not in the interest of those countries in the short run. the issue of quota increase can serve as a vivid example. before 1990s, since the industrial countries had had demand for the fund resources for their balance of payments adjustment, especially in the 1970s, the initiatives of quota increase had been easily adopted. however, when these countries became creditors or concerned about their veto powers, their motives to promote quota increase have significantly lessened, except for those that had strong incentive to increase their quota shares. many people believe that these were the major reasons underlying the no - increase decisions in the tenth and twelfth reviews, though the share of quota against world trade was at a very low level in the 1990s and the international capital flows were increasingly volatile. the lack of resources to response to emerging markets crises finally forced the major stakeholders in the fund to agree a quota increase in 1998 through the eleventh quota review. second, developing countries have had enormous disadvantages in setting rules of games in the fund, which have weakened their ability to protect their own interests as well as their ownership to implement the fund ’ s programs. as mentioned earlier, single majority, which can be easily formed by a small group of countries, is required when many policy decisions are put for votes. in this vein, in not few cases, policy decisions were approved without fully engaging all member countries or even regardless of objection or abstention from developing countries. one unfair rule i would like to draw your attention to is the lack of diversity of representatives in the senior management, which developing countries have fought against for quite a long period of time. but up to now, only one deputy managing director is selected from