significant downside risks, financing, mainly of firms, is likely to remain under stress for the time being. given this situation, the bank decided at the june 2021 monetary policy meeting ( mpm ) to extend the duration of the special program until the end of march 2022, thereby continuing to support financing, mainly of firms. it will still closely monitor the impact of covid - 19 and not hesitate to take additional easing measures if necessary. besides extending the duration of the special program, the bank decided at the june mpm to introduce a new fund - provisioning measure to support private financial institutions ’ various efforts in fields related to climate change. at the july mpm, it made public the preliminary outline of the measure. the bank regards this monetary policy measure as part of its comprehensive strategy on climate change released in july. 2 the new fund - provisioning measure is in line with growing international awareness of climate change and the japanese government ’ s declaration on achieving carbon neutrality by 2050. chart 13 presents the essence of the preliminary outline of the new measure. through this measure, the bank will provide funds to financial institutions for investment or loans they make to address climate change based on their own decisions. it will request of financial institutions desiring provision of funds that they disclose a certain level of information on their efforts to address climate change so as to ensure that discipline can be exercised. while the interest rate will be 0 percent and funds will be provided for one year, 4 / 6 bis central bankers'speeches rollovers can be made until the end of march 2031, which is the end of the implementation period. the bank will work out the details through an exchange of opinions with financial institutions and will likely start its fund - provisioning within 2021. b. my view on the conduct of monetary policy of the monetary policy measures just outlined, i voted for the bank to take the actions in response to covid - 19 and to introduce the new fund - provisioning measure to support efforts in fields related to climate change. however, i continued to dissent from the majority decision on yield curve control and the bank ’ s commitment regarding the future conduct of monetary policy. this was based on my view that it is necessary not only to support financing and provide liquidity but also to implement measures to achieve the 2 percent price stability target at the earliest possible time and thereby support japan ’ s economy in returning to a powerful growth path. the spread of covid - 19 will lead to a tightening of public health

each policy board member in turn expresses his or her views, mainly on whether the bank should maintain or change the guideline for money market operations for the intermeeting period ahead, and the reasons. members also deliberate on the bank's conduct of monetary policy in the longer term, beyond the next mpm. occasionally in the discussions, members express their views on financial system problems and the conduct of overall economic policy including fiscal policy. members then exchange views freely to gain a better understanding of each other's views and differences in their views. on this basis, members proceed further with the discussion. through such active discussions, they formulate policy proposals relating to the guideline for money market operations for the intermeeting period ahead. e. remarks by government representatives next, the governor, who is the chairman of the policy board, provides an opportunity for government representatives to make remarks. as i mentioned earlier, the minister of finance and the minister of state for economic and fiscal policy or their designated delegates can attend mpms. these representatives can express the views of the ministry of finance and the cabinet office on the state of the economy, the government's conduct of economic policy, and the bank's conduct of monetary policy. in addition, the bank of japan law permits government representatives to request a postponement of the policy board members'vote on policy proposals to the next mpm. government representatives may also submit specific proposals for monetary policy measures to be decided by the policy board. in any case, it is up to the policy board to decide whether to accept such a request to postpone the vote on the policy board members'proposal or to adopt any proposal submitted by government representatives. some may say that this system of allowing government representatives to express their views and submit proposals at mpms threatens the bank's autonomy. needless to say, if the government tried to use this system to impair the bank's independence in conducting monetary policy, it would be contrary to the bank of japan law. however, the transparency of monetary policy is increased by the framework of mpms, in which the government expresses its views on monetary policy at the meetings and the bank decides on the conduct of monetary policy independently, and by the publication of the decision - making process in the minutes. therefore, i believe that mpms provide a very important opportunity for enhancing communication between the government and the bank. f. votes after thorough discussion, government representatives make remarks, and then policy board members take