, " unconventional monetary policies in the euro area, japan, and the united kingdom, " journal of economic perspectives, vol. 32, no. 4 ( 2018 ) : 147 - 72. wages. the number of job openings has increased significantly, with the active job openings - to - applicants ratio currently standing in the range of 1. 6 - 1. 7, a level that exceeds the peak of the bubble period in the late 1980s ( chart 3 ). labor market conditions have been tightening across japan, and the active job openings - to - applicants ratios recently have exceeded 1 in all prefectures, which was not observed even in the bubble period. at the same time, the unemployment rate has declined in a wide range of regions. an improvement in the labor market has been widespread across generations as well. for example, the unemployment rate of the younger generation aged 15 - 24 rose substantially amid the japanese financial crisis of the late 1990s, and declined only moderately for a long time after that ( chart 4 ). however, the situation has changed dramatically in the past few years. the youth unemployment rate has declined to a level below that of the bubble period, and labor market conditions for new graduates have created more of a seller's market than ever before. with the perception of labor shortage heightening further, the number of long - term unemployed workers - - those unemployed for over a year - - has been declining steadily, although it used to be considered quite difficult for them to find a job. in addition, improvement in the employment situation has contributed to providing new job opportunities for those who had not participated in the labor market before. the population aged 15 - 64 that has played a major role in the labor market, or the so - called working - age population, has been declining from the peak in around 2000. on the other hand, the number of employed persons recently has been increasing substantially ( chart 5 ). this is a result of labor participation by women and seniors promoted through improvement in employment together with the development of various labor - related measures by the government. in addition, the poverty rate, which has risen moderately since the 1990s, recently seems to have flattened or declined somewhat. the declines in the youth unemployment rate and long - term unemployment rate, as well as the increase in labor participation by women and seniors, are significant not only in terms of increasing the current employment and production but also strengthening the growth potential of the economy in the future. people acquire skills through actually working each day and thereby

pushed down real interest rates and hence the return on investments. low interest rates and compensation to take on risk led to a search for yield, increasing the inherent risk in the system. global trade imbalances have been reduced somewhat over the past two years, but there is a considerable risk that they will persist. they must be corrected through structural changes in the real economy. this may weaken growth in the world economy in the coming decade. asian economies, however, have fared well through the crisis. emerging economies are now sufficiently large for growth in their economies to provide impetus to production in other regions. the question has been raised, why didn ’ t we – the economists – see the crisis coming? as long as the credit system has existed, crises have struck with irregular intervals. still, we must strive to keep the intervals as large as possible. a poorly regulated financial sector is partly to blame for this crisis as for many others. in many countries, the capital requirements were reduced year by year before the crisis, to very low levels. the quality was gradually impaired. many banks issued large quantities of hybrid capital, but the investors were not ready to bear losses. bis central bankers ’ speeches in addition to low capital requirements, few countries had any macroprudential policies to speak of. spain was an important exception. to avoid the next crisis, or at least dampen the effect, better banking regulation is necessary. first, the financial crisis revealed that banks held insufficient capital, excessive short - term market funding and inadequate liquidity buffers. the new basel iii framework sets out stricter requirements. higher and better - quality capital will increase banks ’ resilience to pronounced fluctuations in the economy without their having to tighten lending abruptly. the new rules aim to moderate growth in banking in periods of expansion. second, the new framework includes macroprudential tools that can be applied as necessary. banks may be subject to additional capital requirements if credit growth in the wider economy is excessive. the requirement is intended to ensure that banks build up an extra capital buffer when systemic risk increases. loan - to - value ceilings on mortgage loans may also be imposed. on this point, the spanish model of statistical provisions, introduced by banco de espana as early as 2000, has proved valuable. at the end of 2007, spanish banks held as much as 1. 3 per cent of total assets in these provisions, nearly a fourth of total regulatory capital. third, the authorities must acquire tools that enable banks to be wound