to allow greek banks to continue financing the economy. currently, the central bank liquidity extended to greek banks amounts to around eur 118 billion, more than double the amount at end 2014. the current liquidity support represents around 66 % of greece ’ s gdp, the highest level as a share of gdp of any euro area country. last week, the governing council decided not to object to a further increase in the ela ceiling, by eur 2. 3 billion to eur to 83 billion. liquidity will continue to be extended as long as greek banks are solvent and have sufficient collateral. however, in a situation where the greek government does not have market access, this liquidity can not be used to circumvent the prohibition of monetary financing, as laid out in art. 123 of the treaty on the functioning of the european union. this, together with supervisory considerations, explains why there is a ceiling on the greek t - bills held by the greek banking sector. for the governing council to reconsider the t - bills ceiling, there should be a credible perspective for a successful conclusion of the current review and subsequent implementation which would imply the disbursement of programme funds by euro area member states. this would also significantly improve the outlook for future market access by the greek government. bis central bankers ’ speeches it should be absolutely clear that the decision on whether to conclude the review of the current programme and disburse further financial support to greece lies entirely with the eurogroup, so ultimately with euro area member states. hence this is a political decision that will have to be taken by elected policymakers, not by central bankers. in the meantime, we will continue to provide our advice on the adjustment programmes. it is within this context, that we need a strong and comprehensive agreement with greece, and we need this very soon. by strong and comprehensive i mean an agreement that produces growth, that has social fairness, but that is also fiscally sustainable, ensures competitiveness, and addresses the remaining sources of financial instability. i can assure you that the ecb is doing all it can to facilitate a successful outcome. such a strong and credible agreement with greece is needed, not only in the interest of greece, but also of the euro area as a whole. while all actors will now need to go the extra mile, the ball lies squarely in the camp of the greek government to take the necessary steps. conclusion the situation in greece reminds us again that the economic and monetary union

terms for borrowers replace old ones, financial accommodation reaches a growing number of consumers and investors. this incremental process has not yet run its course. it is still on - going. this being said, in the process of price adjustment, the term structure of the money market interest rates has come under intense upward pressure. the expected policy rate path implied by money market quotes has shifted up and steepened noticeably as a consequence. the very short end of the curve – because of expanding surpluses of liquidity – has remained well - anchored around levels that are broadly in line with our forward guidance over those horizons. we are closely monitoring conditions to detect signs of an unwarranted tightening of our stance, to which we would need to react. risks and side - effects of app engaging in a large - scale asset purchase programme is not without risks and side effects. let me focus here on the financial risks of our own balance sheet, on financial stability implications for the euro area, and on effects on income distribution. we monitor very closely the risks for the eurosystem ’ s balance sheet associated with our asset purchase programmes and we manage those risks to keep them at levels that do not threaten our capacity to fulfil our policy mandate to maintain price stability. in particular, we manage credit risk by exclusively purchasing assets of sufficient credit quality, by defining an asset allocation and a limit framework that ensures some degree of diversification, and by applying severe due diligence and monitoring processes. with regard to pspp, we also decided that the purchases of government bonds conducted by the eurosystem ncbs will not be risk - shared within the eurosystem. this does not hamper the effectiveness of the purchase programme and the singleness of our monetary policy. the governing council has full control over all the design features of the programme. the specific risk - sharing agreement takes into account the unique institutional structure of the euro area, in which a common currency and a single monetary policy coexist alongside 19 national fiscal policies. as regards possible financial stability risks, we assess these risks as rather contained for now. looking in particular at housing markets in the euro area, we don ’ t see any signs of general overvaluation. important indicators for increasing financial imbalances are real estate prices and credit growth, but so far we have witnessed low growth rates of both. for instance, the annual growth rate of prices for houses and apartments in the euro area bis central bankers ’ speeches increased on average by