area should reach at least 2. 2 % this year, reflecting a strong economic recovery. however, there are two major risks threatening growth : financial instability and protectionism. regarding financial instability, the continued rise in global public and private debt since the start of the 2000s – from 190 % of global gdp in 2001 to 230 % in 2016 [ slide ] – has become a subject of concern. the 2008 crisis stemmed from this, but this trend has unfortunately not slowed down since ; the private debt in emerging countries ( namely corporate debt ) has risen particularly rapidly. since the g20 summits of london and pittsburgh in 2009, the regulatory page 2 sur 6 effort that has been undertaken is unprecedented, in particular in the banking sector : by increasing both the quantity and quality of banking sector own funds, the basel iii reform has considerably enhanced the robustness of banks ; in addition, it ensures better account is now taken of the diverse risks to which banks are exposed, thanks to the introduction of two new liquidity ratios for bank cash levels. i am confident that we are about to finalise a fair and reasonable agreement at our ghos meeting next thursday. this would be very welcome for our international financial order. but beyond basel iii, we should finalise measures that target non - banks. we must ensure a balance between financing channels. the priority has now shifted from the solvency of banks, which has improved substantially, to the liquidity of the shadow banking sector, particularly funds and asset management companies that are exposed to the risks of sudden panic - driven runs. moreover, we have to make sure that this internationally agreed regulatory framework is implemented everywhere with consistency. unilateral deregulation would be nothing less than a lose - lose scenario with serious consequences for the stability of the global financial system – we would be paving the way for the next financial crisis – as well as the competitive landscape for us, japanese and european banks. the second risk is related to protectionist tendencies, namely in the united states. we, europeans and japanese, shoulder - to - shoulder with canada and others elsewhere, must resolutely defend international economic relations based on commonly respected rules and multilateral institutions : their deterioration would dampen world trade and economic activity. in a recent speech, the governor of the bank of japan, haruhiko kuroda, stressed “ the importance of multilateral cooperation ”. he said : “ economies must overcome their narrowly - defined self - interest so as to cooperate and coordinate from a

7 % [ slide ], and the disparities across countries have narrowed. besides, better controlled inflation means lower financing costs, because it reduces risk premia [ slide ]. all economic players benefit from lower interest rates : households, when they purchase a property, companies when they invest, but also governments and hence taxpayers. in addition, the euro has helped consolidate the european single market, by eliminating currency fluctuations for corporates, simplifying day - to - day life for citizens and promoting capital market integration. lastly, the economic size of the euro area and the stability of its currency have enabled the euro to play an important international role. today, the euro accounts for 20 % of international reserves, second only to the us dollar. an internationally recognised currency generates economic gains : financial markets are more attractive to domestic and foreign investors, more liquid, and thus more efficient. but it also carries a political weight : when mario draghi speaks at the g7 or g20, the whole world listens to europe attentively, just as when janet yellen speaks for the united states. page 4 sur 6 overall, this list of benefits is impressive, particularly when you think that the euro is only 19 years old. more importantly, we have come this far despite the global financial crisis, which triggered the deepest recession in three generations and despite the euro area sovereign debt crisis a few years later. the robust economic recovery in the euro - area now enables us to pursue a path of gradual normalisation of our monetary policy. on 26 october, the governing council of the ecb, dividing in half the volume of our monthly net asset purchases, took a decisive step towards possibly ending them, while maintaining with all our other instruments an ample degree of monetary accommodation. second, we in europe share a large single market. it removes all internal borders and regulatory obstacles to the free movement of goods, capital, services, and persons in the european union. it is a tremendous asset which belongs to us all – the 27 – and it is no coincidence that access to the single market lies at the heart of the brexit debate. we cannot foresee the outcome of the future negotiations and we don ’ t want to “ punish ” the united kingdom in any measure. but we must respect one consistency principle : access to the single market must continue to go hand - in - hand with strict acceptance of all its rules. there can be no cherry - picking or free - riding. for the financial services industry,