looks as state bank remunerations are affected by considerations other than just how should directors be rewarded so that shareholders ’ value can be maximised. but all this is being done through sanctions and coercion, and in the new commercial bank act the authority will be explicit. my last words on commercial banks, the intervened banks might not yet be completely taken care of, but at least the cost of rescue can now be well estimated. the proper financing of the debt burden is probably one of the first jobs of the new government. temporary or provisional financing is better than none, but a clear - cut schedule on how the very large debt should be financed over the next ten or twenty years must be made if investors and trading partners are to have confidence or a clear idea of what they are dealing with, and i think that is essential. how central banking will be done is also important. the bank of thailand itself is being revolutionised. the pay system will change, the promotion system will change and career development has been instituted. risk management supervision will be instituted from the first of january next year. simple things such as a letter of transmittal of the supervision team to the manager of the bank will be required. this may seem trivial, but it will put responsibility firmly on the supervisors, which was never possible before because supervision missions went whenever they felt like it and did not tell anybody except the banks. it also makes job control of the supervisors impossible and it is very dangerous to allow people with criminal prosecution capabilities to work in this manner. the most important thing about the new central bank though is probably to keep it really independent. thailand is now quite a complicated place, a large economy with considerable sophistication. the role of the central bank in helping finance development and directing among the sectors of the economy will soon no longer be possible. if the central bank could keep the economy stable, that would be a major achievement. but most forces in the country, especially the political ones, are directed towards higher growth rather than the sustainability or stable growth, even if in the end stability would probably lead to a better and higher level of the economy than the roller coaster growth of the past. to do that, the central bank will have to go against the rest of the economy and the government from time to time as has been evident in the past year or two. if the central bank is not independent, it will be very difficult to do this. in my mind, the best model of central banking

central bank of barbados tom adams financial centre, spry street, bridgetown p. o. box 1016 telephone : ( 246 ) 436 - 6870 : fax. ( 246 ) 436 - 7836 e - mail address : info @ centralbank. org. bb website : www. centralbank. org. bb remarks by mr. cleviston haynes governor, central bank of barbados at “ debt exchange – risks and opportunities : leveraging the jamaican experience ” courtney blackman grande salle thursday, november 15, 2018 on behalf of the management and staff of the central bank, i welcome everyone to this workshop, which is geared towards sharing insights on the functioning of the money and capital markets in the aftermath of the restructuring of barbados ’ domestic debt. i take this opportunity to thank ncb capital markets barbados limited for its willingness to share with us their experience and knowledge gained from the jamaica debt restructuring exercise in 2013. on june 1, 2018, the newly - elected administration announced the unprecedented decision that barbados had decided to suspend the servicing of commercial foreign debt payments and restructure both domestic and external debt. the purpose was to limit foreign reserves outflows, while securing meaningful and gradual debt reduction, thereby reducing financing needs and restoring debt sustainability. the subsequent launch of a comprehensive domestic debt restructuring exercise on september 7 2018, as a critical component of the barbados economic recovery transformation ( bert ) programme, achieved near unanimous acceptance of the debt exchange proposals, with 97 % participation by creditors. the terms of the new instruments involve some sacrifice by all bondholders, as government seeks to balance the fiscal imperatives, including anchoring the bert programme through a reduction in the debt - to - gdp ratio to 60 % by 2033, against the need to preserve financial stability and protect the long - term interests of small bondholders. the restructuring comes in the intermediate aftermath of the adoption of the new accounting standard ifrs9. this will have implications for how financial institutions, regulators and auditors assess balance sheets going forward. from a capital market perspective, the fundamental question is how will the domestic capital market behave? will activity decline and, if so, for how long? will investors be predisposed to some instruments over others? these questions are relevant given the size and comprehensive nature of the restructuring and the limited availability of alternative investment instruments. at the same time, new instruments and institutional arrangements are likely to influence the functioning of the market. the new debt instruments are markedly different from those that existed before