of the policy. the conclusion : inflation didn ’ t change much, so the policy isn ’ t working. however, what is rational and essential is to examine what would have happened had the policy not been adopted in the first place. using several models, ecb staff estimated that, without our policies, inflation would have been a third of a percent negative in 2015 and would have stayed significantly negative throughout 2016, which would mean that we would have been in permanent deflation since last year. this is a significant result. recall that the final outcome was affected by the unexpected decline in the price of oil by 30 % from september to december. we estimate that two thirds of one percent of the registered growth in the past two years was due to our monetary policy. however, what we achieved in fostering internal demand was undone by the subsequent decrease of net exports in a decelerating world economy. these developments did not make our policy less effective, only ex - post insufficient for the desired outcome. bis central bankers ’ speeches naturally, all policies have limits. in the case of the instruments we are now using, this is particularly true of negative interest rates on our deposit facility. the reasons are more fundamental than just the effect on banks 1. despite negative rates throughout last year, the net interest income ( nii ) of euro area banks increased in percentage of assets, and their return on equity went up from 3. 5 % in 2014 to 5. 7 % in 2015 – which corresponds to a real return as inflation was zero. our policies also produced capital gains for banks, as securities ’ prices went up ( and yields down ), and impairment costs came down as the recovery reduced the amount of npls. more broadly, negative deposit facility rates have contributed to negative rates in the money market, reducing funding costs for banks. the whole yield curve has been lowered, which is the sole objective of using this particular monetary policy instrument. to normalise inflation in the euro area we urgently need higher growth that can reduce negative output and unemployment gaps, using all really available policies. if not monetary policy, then what? see cecchetti & schoenholtz ( 2016 ) how low can they go? bis central bankers ’ speeches

arrangements for allocating losses. the risks of eu ccps therefore mainly affect clearing participants, which are generally located throughout the eu. this needs to be reflected in the supervision of eu ccps through a greater role for the relevant authorities, including banking supervisors and central banks of issue, as potential providers of liquidity to clearing participants or ccps. our ability to address concerns arising from excessive exposures to third - country ccps is also critical. more than one - third of the total collateral posted by eu clearing members for centrally cleared derivative transactions is posted to third - country ccps. particular concerns arise in relation to euro - denominated interest rate swaps and short - term interest rate futures and options, which are relevant for the smooth implementation of monetary policy but are mostly cleared outside the eu. for instance, around 80 % of the total notional outstanding on euro - denominated interest rate swaps is cleared outside the eu [ 5 ]. and around 50 % of eu clients active in euro - denominated interest swaps do not clear these trades in the eu. eu authorities have less direct insight into – and ability to control – the risk management of ccps located outside the eu. current eu rules seek to reduce these gaps through the european securities and markets authority ’ s targeted direct supervision of systemically relevant third - country ccps – known as tier 2 ccps. but this framework would be powerless in severe circumstances where the resolution of a tier 2 ccp may be required. to deal with this vulnerability, i see two priorities. first, we need to accelerate efforts to develop resolution plans for all major cross - border ccps, in close cooperation with the relevant host authorities. international agreement to proceed in this direction was reached, in principle, back in 2014. [ 6 ] however, almost 10 years on, resolution plans have not been put in place for any of the major global ccps. we should not wait for a severe crisis in central clearing before closing this gap. second, while resolution plans play a significant role in reducing the potential fallout from ccp resolution, they cannot offer absolute guarantees, especially when the cross - border implications are considered. against this background, the ecb supports the european commission ’ s proposal that will require eu clearing participants to hold a so - called active account at eu ccps in the few market segments that are considered to be of substantial systemic importance to the eu. the objective of the active account is to build and sustain an appropriate level of