dodd - frank codified a requirement for stress testing bis central bankers ’ speeches of the sort already in use by the federal reserve, which makes capital requirements more forward - looking by estimating the impact of an adverse economic scenario on a firm ’ s capital. as has long been recognized, no single capital requirement can capture all credit and market risks, much less other risks to which a banking organization may be exposed. but, when implemented fully, the various capital measures should complement one another and, together, provide considerable reassurance to investors, counterparties, regulators, and the public that our banks are well - capitalized. the banking agencies have been working simultaneously on all the implementing regulations so that we can take into account the interrelationships among the various rules and, as we publish proposed and final regulations in the coming months, banks will have a complete picture of the capital requirements to which they will be subject. a third reform, also related to capital, is directed specifically at the unusual systemic importance of certain institutions. the basel committee has released a framework for calibrating capital surcharges for banks of global systemic importance, an initiative consistent with the federal reserve ’ s obligation under section 165 of dodd - frank to impose more stringent capital standards on systemically important firms. it is important to note that this requirement has a motivation different from that of traditional capital standards : the failure of a systemically important firm would have substantially greater negative consequences for the entire financial system than the failure of other, even quite large, firms. the surcharges, to be phased in beginning in 2016, will be graduated based on criteria weighted toward size and interconnectedness with the financial system as a whole. thus, the more systemically important the institution, the greater the capital surcharge. a fourth reform, intended to ensure that no firm is too big to fail, was the creation by dodd - frank of orderly liquidation authority. under this authority, the fdic can impose losses on a failed institution ’ s shareholders and creditors and replace its management, while avoiding runs by short - term counterparties and preserving, to the degree feasible, the operations of sound, functioning parts of the firm. by granting this authority, the law gives the government a third alternative to the hobson ’ s choice of bailout or disorderly bankruptcy that authorities faced in 2008. further, the credible possibility of losses should enhance market discipline by diminishing expectations among shareholders and long - term creditors that they effectively

and usage, combined with high - quality user support, will reduce learning costs for users, lighten the question - and - answer workload for data providers, and promote the efficient allocation of resources. adequate documentation of data quality and the tracking of known data issues will help ensure that the data are properly used and will reduce the likelihood of user misunderstanding of the data, a risk that can lead to inappropriate data usage and erroneous results. our limited experience to date with data stewards who have been explicitly hired or assigned to this role has been very positive. this investment has helped accelerate data usage, ensure analytical quality, and maintain vendor contract compliance. importantly, it has significantly reduced the burden on senior staff in responding to data questions and requests for data or analyses. successful implementation of this model requires not only a formal recognition of the data steward role, but an appropriate level of resources to support data stewardship, including some training in the foundational disciplines of data management. incentives may be required to induce subject matter experts to take a formal data steward role. to provide these incentives requires thinking through career concerns of people, and may require a whole new career track for data stewardship, one that provides sufficient autonomy to provide the steward time and incentives to conduct data analysis and research. these investments are very worthwhile, because they unlock the potential in innovative datasets and make progress possible in answering crucial policy questions. learning from others before i close, i ’ d like to note that data innovation is challenging, but there is an effective and widely available way to achieve it, and that is to learn from others. over the past few years we at the new york fed have hosted and visited colleagues at the bank of england, bank of korea, bank of japan, and the bank of mexico to exchange ideas and discuss some of our data projects. much can be learned from sharing experiences in creating and managing new data products. the information uncovered in some countries ’ well - designed data collections can help other countries to direct their own data - gathering efforts. for example, other countries are very interested in what can be learned about the household sector from credit bureau data like the ccp. we have taken suggestions for particular questions from other countries ’ surveys. we can also benefit tremendously from learning through direct collaboration. in a new research project with the dutch central bank, we are investigating how the interview mode affects the survey response rate and response accuracy when asking people about financial issues. more specifically, we are evaluating whether sol