they are not older than 45 years of age. • they are professionally active in switzerland. • they are familiar with the essential printing procedures. • they have already demonstrated their creative and graphic skills. • they dispose of adequate resources in terms of infrastructure and staff to ensure continuity, or are willing to build up such resources. • they are willing to commit themselves to a long - term engagement. in april 2005, a banknote seminar will be held for these designers to expand their knowledge of the subject matter. the seminar will also mark the beginning of the competition. the participants have to submit their drafts by 31 october 2005. a jury will assess the drafts and award prizes. at the end of november 2005, the drafts will be presented in a public exhibition. the jury will be chaired by 2 / 3 jean - christophe ammann, an art historian, exhibition organiser and former director of the museum of modern art in frankfurt / main, germany, and will be composed of art and design experts. the national bank may decide at its own discretion, however, with which designer it wishes to collaborate in the future. he or she may, but must not necessarily be one of the prize winners. 3 / 3

that are too low for too long can eventually lead to distortions. in particular : • to a misallocation of resources, which ultimately leads to lower potential growth, • to excessive capital inflows into a number of emerging economies with exchange rate effects and credit risks, • and to reduced incentives for governments, banks, and corporates to adjust. these costs of very low interest rates are real, and they rise over time. of course, these costs have to be weighed against the need for exceptional monetary policy measures in a crisis. these transmission problems bring me to the third dimension : we have to recognise the limits to what monetary policy can achieve in current conditions. the ecb can and has addressed bank funding problems. but there are other barriers holding back bank lending, like heightened risk aversion, a lack of loan demand and insufficient capital. and above all, bank lending will only fully come back when the bank balance sheet repair is completed in all member states. the ecb cannot remove these constraints. this is where our responsibility ends and that of governments or other eu institutions begins. monetary policy is not an all - purpose weapon for any kind of economic illness. how can we overcome the political challenges to adjustment? some of you might react to this that governments are already being asked to do too much. that the costs of adjustment are too high in some countries, and at some point, people will simply not take anymore. this links to my second question : how can we overcome the political challenges to adjustment? bis central bankers ’ speeches let me be clear : every policy - maker in the euro area understands that the process of rebalancing within the euro area is painful. we are deeply concerned by the levels of unemployment we are seeing, in particular for young people. in spain, more than 5 in 10 young people currently cannot find work. in greece, the figure is almost 6 in 10. this is unacceptable – and it is also dangerous. but the political challenge, i believe, comes not from the process of adjustment itself. people can accept a period of hardship if it is necessary. it comes from the belief that there are better alternatives available that are being denied. this is what causes people to reject adjustment, or to blame others at home or abroad for their predicament. this is fine as far as it goes : we are democracies and we need a robust public debate. but it becomes a problem when the debate does not contain all the facts. if politicians