: they are wrong. monetary policy is not conducted for any one country, be it germany, france or italy. the governing council takes its decisions collectively and independently, taking into consideration the euro area as a whole. that being said, let us simply acknowledge that belonging to the monetary union has provided italy with substantial financial relief in this crisis. the ecb has worked well for europe and for italy. our governing council took note last week of the judgement by the german federal constitutional court. let me be crystal - clear : we remain undeterred, as president lagarde said ; furthermore, we are definitely dedicated to and determined to deliver on our mandate as conferred by the treaty. as the page 5 sur 10 european court of justice has said, our past actions are indeed proportionate to that mandate. more broadly, i hear debates in our two countries shedding doubt on ( i ) the independence of the central bank – that should be brought “ under political control ” – and on ( ii ) its mandate – which should go beyond price stability, to include employment or the fight against the health crisis. criticising these two pillars is not only pointless, but is also dangerous : • pointless : the ecb was able, within its institutional framework and mandate, to be active, innovative and responsive … even more than some political institutions. damage the central bank ’ s independence and you undermine its strength and agility, the very things that protect an economy in a crisis. • dangerous : these two pillars, enshrined in the treaty, are the legal and democratic foundation of our legitimacy and capacity to act – and not only in “ northerners ” eyes. furthermore, they are the foundations of european ’ s trust in their currency. to give only one example : the eurosystem cannot cancel public debt, neither legally nor “ fiduciary ” : a suspicion of fiscal dominance would give rise to monetary distrust as seen in history and more recently in some emerging market economies. independence and the price stability mandate are not an obstacle to the ecb ’ s powerful action. on the contrary, they are its two best levers. i will come back to this. ii. what european policies for the gradual exit? talking about european solidarity, arguably, europe could have done more. but let us not forget that the glass is at least half full, thanks to the major support from the eurosystem, but also the sure framework of the european commission to help preserve jobs, and the welcome

banks that has gradually been built up, the banque de france and the bank of japan, in parallel, have been regional pivots of the central bank function. after the second world war in particular, our two institutions favoured co - operation with the central banks of economic regions undergoing reconstruction and newly emerging markets. finally, during the twentieth century, we carved out a place for ourselves in the world by adapting to the new international functions : the more dynamic the international markets were, like in the 1920s and in stages from the 1960s onwards, the more our two banks ’ international functions developed. this morning ’ s session, concerning the history of our economies and institutions, will enable us to shed light on all these aspects. the afternoon ’ s session will focus on developments in our economies and institutions in an increasingly globalised world. globalisation is not a new phenomenon. the past 150 years of diplomatic and economic relations between our two countries are proof of this. however, the scope and the speed of the current stage of globalisation have far outstripped anything experienced in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. in a globalised world, the french and japanese economies have found themselves in very different environments, with france and germany leading a very structured regional institutional construction with the european union, first in terms of trade, then at an economic and monetary level, while japan has been the economic leader of a de facto integrated area, with remarkable dynamism thanks to its productive, capacity and technological investment. growth of international capital flows has resulted from domestic policies and global factors, such as the increasing interdependence of economies. the french and japanese economies have benefited from this while experiencing an unprecedented boom in technical progress and productivity growth, mainly as a result of considerable investment in information and communication technologies. thanks to technological progress and financial globalisation, the efficiency of financial markets has strengthened over the decades. cross - border links between markets are closer than ever, yet the current crisis is revealing the persistent nature of the risks to financial stability. thus, the existence of trust - based relationships built on long - standing mutual experience is a particularly strong asset for central banks to help them respond to uncertainty. their network can enable them to find ad hoc solutions such as those adopted in a concerted and co - ordinated manner in december to facilitate market liquidity during a period of great uncertainty. relations between the banque de france and the bank of japan are particularly valuable in the analysis, comparison and understanding of differences in of