##ence goes beyond technology, it also encompasses governance, company culture and business processes. given the extensive interlinkages and interdependencies in the financial system, it is obvious that 1 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches markets ’ overall cyber resilience depends not only on the resilience of each individual market actor but also on that of interconnected market infrastructures, participants and service providers. the eurosystem cyber strategy for financial market infrastructures following the increase in both the frequency and severity of cyberattacks over the last few years, legislators, regulators and standard setters have issued legislation and guidance on cyber security at national and international level and at cross - sectoral as well as sector - specific level. let me briefly mention three initiatives. first, in 2016, the ec adopted the directive on security of network and information systems ( the nis directive ). its aim is to bring the cybersecurity capabilities of operators of essential services to the same level of development in all the eu member states and to ensure an efficient exchange of information and good cooperation on the topic throughout the eu. second, at international level, the g7 countries have drawn up a set of fundamental elements of cybersecurity for the financial sector, as well as three further recommendations on the effectiveness of cybersecurity assessments, third - party risks, and coordination with other critical sectors. third, with a key focus on financial stability, the cpmi - iosco published a principles - based “ guidance on cyber resilience for financial market infrastructures ” in june 2016. supplementing the “ principles for financial market infrastructures ”, it provides additional detail related to the preparations and measures that financial market infrastructures should undertake to enhance their cyber resilience. in recognition of the escalating cyber threats, the legislative and regulatory guidance and the required paradigm shift, the eurosystem ’ s overseers have launched a strategy for cyber resilience in relation to financial market infrastructures. this strategy – which will be explained in more detail at agenda item 3 – is built on three pillars. the first pillar refers to the cyber resilience of individual financial market infrastructures. the second pillar refers to the resilience of the financial sector as a whole. the third pillar highlights the importance of establishing a forum which brings together market actors, competent authorities and the cybersecurity service providers. this brings me to the third and final objective of today ’ s meeting. creation of a

instrument and ( 2 ) if the debt is denominated in a foreign currency, a fiscal and monetary regime that is presumed to be sufficiently responsible to ensure repayment in equivalent real resources. to be sure, one can borrow with these conditions less than fully satisfied, but only at interest rates that price the risk. too often these rates are at levels inconsistent with fiscal stability or ongoing debtraising capacity. at root, debt - raising capacity is not a technical issue ; it is a profoundly political one, which means that it is driven by the values and culture of the society. unless consensus exists within a society as to resource limits to which all must adhere, an adequate debt - capacity buffer will be difficult to achieve and maintain. the united states has benefited enormously from the opening up of international markets in the postwar period. we have access to a wide range of goods and services for consumption ; our industries produce and employ cutting - edge technologies ; and the opportunities created by these technologies have attracted capital inflows from abroad. these capital inflows, in turn, have reduced the costs of building our country's capital stock and added to the productivity of our workers. it would be a great tragedy if progress toward greater openness were stopped or reversed. rather than inhibiting international competition to assist those displaced by " creative destruction, " we should be directing our efforts at enhancing job skills and retraining workers - - a process in which the private market is already engaged. if necessary, selected income maintenance programs can be employed for those over a certain age, where retraining is problematic. protectionism will only slow the inevitable transition of our workforce to more productive endeavors. to be sure, an added few years on the job may enable some workers to reach retirement with reasonable security and dignity, but if we hinder competitive progress, we will almost certainly slow overall economic growth and keep frozen in place younger workers whose opportunities to secure jobs with better long - run prospects diminish with time. terrorism poses a challenge to the remarkable record of globalization. a global society reflects an ever more open economic environment in which participants are free to engage in commerce and finance wherever in the world the possibilities of increased value added arise. it fosters ever greater cross - border contact and further exploitation of the values of specialization but on a global scale. fear of terrorist acts, however, has the potential to induce disengagement from activities, both domestic and cross border. if we allow terrorism to undermine our freedom