to take a euro area, rather than national, perspective. the ecb does make additional efforts at communication of other kinds, including a regular press conference. clearly there are views on both sides of this question, which reflect the different institutional arrangements across countries. this is why we have argued over time that, in the pursuit of the optimal degree of transparency, it would not make sense to “ cherry pick ” the high transparency aspects of every other system and assume that they should simply be grafted onto the australian system. the nature of the reserve bank board – a majority of whom are part - time members, drawn from various parts of the australian community, but seeking to make decisions in the national interest as opposed to any industry, geographical or sectional interest – needs to be considered when thinking about disclosure practices. it is also important, i think, to articulate the point that there are reasonable limits to transparency in any system. it is not the case that releasing more material is always, by definition, going to lead to better informed public debate or better policy decisions. in contemplating the release of minutes of meetings in particular, and the form any such release might take, we need to balance a legitimate desire for information and accountability against the need to maintain a frank, open discussion at the meeting. at many meetings i have taken part in over the years, people have considered various arguments that ultimately were found to be unconvincing, but which did need to be examined in the interests of reaching a balanced decision. people also change their minds in the course of a meeting – and one would hope that that happens occasionally, since one of the key benefits of a having meeting is to learn from and respond to the views of the other participants. it is unlikely that these dynamics of a meeting could be sustained if every utterance were disclosed. the incentive could easily arise for people to be much more cautious in what they said, and to come to the meeting with a pre - written statement, rather than to engage in a genuinely interactive discussion. that would reduce the quality of the discussion and, ultimately, of the decision. and it is the quality of the decision, after all, which we should be seeking to maximise. what all of this means is that a decision to release minutes should not be taken lightly. such documents have to be written carefully, taking into account the institutional structure, including the nature of the board, and the need to preserve an environment of candid discussion. rba minutes that said,

glenn stevens : recent economic and financial developments in australia opening statement by mr glenn stevens, governor of the reserve bank of australia, to the house of representatives standing committee on economics, sydney, 14 august 2009. * * * mr chairman, thank you for the opportunity to meet once again with the house economics committee. when we last met with you in february, international financial markets were stabilising after the extreme turmoil of september and october 2008. but the fallout of the financial events for demand, production and trade flows in the global economy was only then starting to become apparent in hard data. household and business confidence around the world had been severely damaged. households had sharply pulled back their discretionary spending, were tending to try to save more and were looking to pay down debts. businesses had responded very quickly to a fall in demand by cutting production and costs, as well as shelving their plans for expansion. it was already fairly clear by february that the resulting contraction in economic activity in the december quarter was severe in many countries, and that global growth had suffered its biggest setback in decades. global trade was falling rapidly. central banks had eased monetary policy aggressively, including taking short - term interest rates to near zero in several cases, and some were considering or implementing “ unconventional ” measures to deliver additional stimulus. governments were putting in place fiscal stimulus packages. but these measures would take time to have their effect. in the short term, we worried that the march quarter outcomes for the global economy would be just as bad as occurred in the december quarter. for some months, the news from abroad indeed continued to be very poor and global demand contracted further in the march quarter. given the speed of the global deterioration, we believed that it would not be possible to avoid a period of weakness in the australian economy. we thought that australia had several advantages – a sound financial system, an absence of the worst of the problems afflicting some other countries, exposure to an emerging china, and scope to use macroeconomic policies to cushion the downturn. the exchange rate had declined, which would also assist in adapting to weak global conditions and lower commodity prices. so we could reasonably have expected to have a smaller downturn than others. but it is very rare for australia to escape an international downturn altogether, and it seemed quite unlikely that we could avoid one of this size completely, despite the advantages we had. for confidence here too had suffered a serious setback. this was clear in equity prices, in numerous surveys of