be endorsed by the g 10 governors and heads of supervision before their publication at the end of june, i will be involved as well. last week the basel committee published a press release to announce that it had achieved consensus on the remaining issues so that i don ’ t expect that this endorsement could still prove problematic. the introduction of this new set of rules represents a milestone in the design of a more dynamic prudential environment, combining rules and discretion, supervisory monitoring and market discipline. this does however not mean that the work is now finished. the implementation of the new requirements will necessitate considerable efforts by the financial firms, the supervisory authorities and central banks. in order to facilitate that process the basel committee created an accord implementation group and european supervisors decided to cooperate more closely in order to achieve a greater convergence of supervisory practices. the legal work of implementing the new requirements in eu and national legislation will also be a huge task. it is therefore important that the closer interaction between the academic and regulator ’ s worlds which is one of the new features in the design of basel ii be maintained during the implementation phase. i hope that this conference will also contribute to this. other developments of our financial system i have mentioned before, such as the concentration process in the banking sector, the creation of financial conglomerates or bank - insurance companies and the development of cross - border activities, also call for a reassessment of our regulation mechanisms. however difficult it has proved to achieve a convergence between the national supervisory authorities in the banking sector, the next daunting challenge will most probably be, in my opinion, to enlarge that convergence to other segments of the financial system. i would like to thank all speakers and discussants taking part in this conference. i am also grateful to the belgian academic researchers and our own staff who have contributed to the research projects prior to this conference and, like all of you, i am looking forward to the presentations of their research results. finally, i would like to thank all of you for your attendance here today and i trust your participation in the discussions and question time will be very active. i hope this conference will help all of us to better understand the mechanisms underlying the recent financial developments as well as the policy responses which should accompany them.

time horizons. in parallel to this quantitative assessment, supervisors also examine the stress tests that each firm uses to make funding decisions and to determine its liquidity needs. recent clar work on the firms ’ own stress testing practices has focused, among other issues, on assumptions regarding liquidity needs for capital markets activity, such as prime brokerage services and derivatives trading. as with ccar, this analysis helps inform supervisors of the reliability of firms ’ own risk measurement and management. though similar to ccar in some respects, clar does not include a specific quantitative post - stress minimum. of course, liscc firms will be required to meet the lcr, which is itself a forward - looking requirement for a buffer against a potential stress on liquidity. in addition, firms with weak liquidity positions under clar ’ s liquidity metrics are directed to improve their practices and, as warranted, their liquidity positions, through supervisory direction, ratings downgrades, or enforcement actions. because clar assesses all liscc firms fbos with combined u. s. assets of $ 50 billion or more must meet liquidity risk - management standards and conduct internal liquidity stress tests. an fbo ’ s u. s. intermediate holding company must maintain a liquidity buffer in the united states based on the results of a 30 - day liquidity stress test. the u. s. branches and agencies of an fbo must maintain a liquidity buffer in the united states equal to the liquidity needs for 14 days, as determined by an internal liquidity stress test. in addition, the board has indicated that it intends to apply the basel iii liquidity rules to large u. s. operations of fbos. these requirements are comparable to local liquidity requirements imposed by the united kingdom prudential regulation authority, although the authority ’ s branch - level liquidity requirements are somewhat more flexible. similarly, the effective liquidity of short - term loans that a bank may count as an inflow under the lcr is in part dependent on the nature of the bank ’ s relationship with the borrower. a bank ’ s liquidity risk - management framework should recognize that, even under stress, it may be reluctant to refuse to roll over short - term credit to customers that it would like to retain in the longer run. see www. federalreserve. gov / bankinforeg / large - institution - supervision. htm for a current list of firms in the