built on the belief moral hazard was better managed through constructive ambiguity. it is fair to say that this did not work out so well. the new paradigm is for authorities to be clear ex ante as to how resolution will work and to ensure it can. clear with the market, so shareholders and creditors are under no illusion as to the risks they are taking. and clear as authorities with each other to confront the obstacles and difficult questions around firm failure upfront and find answers to them. resolution planning will be a constant from here for firms and authorities. cmgs held annually or semi - annually have been central to this effort. incrementally, resolution plans for g - sibs have come into focus in cmgs. the resulting plans have then been endorsed by senior policymakers from the authorities around the table in cmgs in the resolvability assessment process ( rap ). in raps for each firm, the plans have been reviewed, barriers financial stability board ( 2015 ) ‘ principles on loss - absorbing and recapitalisation capacity of g - sibs in resolution : total loss - absorbing capacity ( tlac ) term sheet ’. financial stability board ( 2014 ) ‘ key attributes of effective resolution regimes for financial institutions ’. bis central bankers ’ speeches to resolvability identified and agreement reached on how, and on what timeframe, they will be removed. this way commitment has been secured from all the authorities in cmgs to the plan ex ante. but perhaps more importantly, there is a network of people who have worked through these questions together and have a degree of mutual trust and reliance that will enable us to get to a co - operative outcome cross - border in a way that has often failed us as authorities in the past. we will need to continue to ensure that these contacts are maintained and deepened. ultimately they are what will make resolution work for international banks. this answers to the call that often comes from industry that we should nail down everything in cooperation agreements ( coags ) or work towards some kind of global treaty. i do not think this is necessary to ensure resolution will work effectively. there is a level of detail and complexity in the resolution plans that does not lend itself to a quasi - legal document like a coag. but more importantly emphasis on coags misses how the process has evolved. the metaphor originally conceived for resolution plans was living wills. this was powerful, comprehensible by all. it captured the notion that the failure of large banks

in place. for example, that between the g - sib, share registrar and the relevant central securities depositories ( csds ) or international csds, as resolution authorities we have worked out the plumbing to find a way to distribute the shares already in issue ( or new equity ) to the bondholders that will take ownership of the firm via the bail - in. most of this is a matter of building on existing technology and market conventions that are used in liability management exercises and sovereign or other debt restructurings. a difference perhaps is that as regulators we need to ensure shareholder control thresholds are observed and that we are comfortable with any resulting change in control. equally important is the question of how and when we will carry out valuations for the purpose of the bail - in and how we will comply with listing and disclosure requirements through the process. in the event of a g - sib failure we are unlikely to be in a position to fix bail - in amounts at the resolution weekend. rather, come monday morning, we will announce, first the universe of debt that has been immobilised ( and thus the solvency we can put back into the balance sheet of the bank in resolution ) ; and second the independent valuation process that will ensue. valuation and setting the terms of the bail - in might take several months. we may have suspended listings on the equity or debt we have immobilised – in some jurisdictions instruments and listings might be cancelled altogether – but it does not mean we can escape making some disclosure on the condition of the firm in the intervening period. we want, at fsb level, to think this through so as to have a path for bail - in execution, that works domestically and cross - border, meets securities law requirements and is transparent to shape and manage market expectations. the uk ’ s consultation on the minimum requirement for eligible funds and liabilities, through which the uk will implement the tlac standard for relevant firms, was published on 11 december 2015. see bank of england ( 2015 ) ‘ the bank of england ’ s approach to setting a minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities ( mrel ) ’. bis central bankers ’ speeches i have described how, on the monday morning of the resolution, by pointing to the debt that we have available to bail in, we can communicate that the g - sib has sufficient resources to be recapped and carry on. indeed part of the monday morning announcement will be confirmation by relevant regulators