a declining trend of the overall number of fund supported programs over time, i. e. fewer new and follow - up arrangements. to be clear, we do not object that there are legitimate cases which require access to the fund ’ s resources. however, the fund ’ s financing role should and can only be catalytic. in that respect we also have to enhance our efforts to involve the private sector in crises prevention and solution. the prolonged use of fund resources is hardly in line with the fund ’ s mandate, that speaks of “ making the general resources of the fund temporarily available ” ( imf articles of agreement, article i ( v ) ). countries that run imf supported programs over many years or even decades are probably not a demonstration of success. thus, the major role of the imf should be to prevent that imf financing becomes necessary and to make it redundant over time for countries. when performing the financing role, however, negative feedbacks on the intended international public good in the future must be avoided. there has been a controversial discussion to what extent large imf financing packages have caused moral hazard and thus undermined the functioning of the market mechanisms, i. e. whether the crisis solution in one case has actually prepared the ground for the next crises. to conclude : 1. official international organizations may play a well founded and systematically meaningful role, supplying public services, that are not profit - oriented and therefore would not be attractive to, or performed by, the private sector. thus, the imf and the world bank are also justified and have to be streamlined on this basis. 2. this does not mean, however, that international institutions should not be viewed very critically. they work with public money, and thus have to operate very efficiently – in the short - run as well as in the long - run. international organizations are responsible to the public, and thus are always part of an open and changing world. 3. international organizations – particularly the imf and the world bank – should refocus their respective mandates. otherwise we run the risk that while there is double work on some tasks, other crucial tasks for safeguarding international economic and financial stability are neglected. responsibilities would be blurred with yet unknown consequences for long - run international stability. i fully agree with the findings of an independent task force – sponsored by the council on foreign relations – on the future international architecture : the imf and the world bank have tried to do too much in recent years or were driven by their shareholders

flows or transportation as well as spill - over effects from national policy decisions – may call for some official regulation to prevent or limit adverse effects or to allow for scale effects. however, the question whether official intervention would be beneficial, and if so, what kind of intervention would be most adequate, has to be decided for the single case. there are also political considerations that support official international treaties and organizations. such considerations include benefits from the international exchange of information and consultations on a regular basis or from cooperation and dispute settlements within an existing and accepted framework. the existence of official international organizations, especially with a broad international membership, also facilitates and promotes the search for multilateral solutions to problems in areas such as trade policy, and limits the scope for bilateral or unilateral policies. such multilateral solutions which are developed and implemented within a rule - based framework might be more acceptable to the parties involved than other solutions, e. g. unilateral sanctions. „ international economic and financial stability ” is often referred to as an international public good, as a means to broadly shared global prosperity. evidence seems to support the view that adding rules for international transactions such as through the wto to ensure fair international trade or the bis to develop capital adequacy ratios for financial institutions have the potential effect of reducing the likelihood of severe international economic and financial instability. in this regard such rules and organizations limit the non - sanctioned room for manoeuvre of the single nation states to such measures which are supposed to be in line with international stability. this applies also to international organizations which have a mandate to promote sound domestic economic policies – such as the imf with its surveillance mandate. promoting sound policies aiming at internal and external stability in a country helps to avoid externalities or negative spillover effects to other countries, such as through beggar - thy - neighbor policies or inappropriate exchange rate policies. international economic and financial stability is dependent on economic stability at the national level and to the stability of international transactions. both factors can be and are being addressed through specific codes, rules and procedures, which are set by official international organizations, such as the imf, the wto or the bis. crucial is the implementation of all these codes, rules and procedures by individual countries. the implementation then has to be monitored very closely by the respective official international organizations. i would like to mention here especially the imf surveillance procedure in the context of its article iv consultations. this exercise should disclose macro - economic as well