figures for the united kingdom prior to 1989 are based on the ons estimates. 2. in the right - hand chart, figures for the united states are the medians of the target ranges for the federal funds rate. those for the euro area are the rates on the deposit facility. sources : haver ; ons ; bloomberg. chart 7 i. economic developments labor market conditions and prices in the united states labor force participation rate job openings s. a., cy 2007 = 100 consumer prices in the united states s. a., % energy < 7 % > japan services < 63 % > united states goods < 30 % > cpi < 100 % > japan united states y / y % chg. - 1 cy 07 09 11 13 15 17 19 21 cy 07 09 11 13 15 17 19 21 - 2 cy 18 notes : 1. in the left - hand chart, figures for 2022 / q3 are those for july. 2. in the middle chart, the figure for 2022 / q3 for japan is that for july. that for the united states is the july - august average. 3. in the right - hand chart, figures are for the cpi for all items. figures in angular brackets show the share of each component. figures for 2022 / q3 are july - august averages. sources : ministry of health, labour and welfare ; haver. chart 8 i. economic developments global growth rate for 2022 ( imf forecast ) y / y % chg. forecast as of oct. 2021 + 4. 9 % downward revision forecast as of july 2022 + 3. 2 % oct. 20 apr. 21 oct. 21 apr. 22 forecast date source : imf. chart 9 ii. price developments consumer prices in japan ( less fresh food ) y / y % chg. temporary factors aug. 2022 : + 2. 8 % energy < 7 % > services < 50 % > goods < 40 % > cpi ( less fresh food ) < 100 % > - 1 - 2 cy note : figures for temporary factors are staff estimates and consist of mobile phone charges and the effects of the consumption tax hike, policies concerning the provision of free education, and the " go to travel " campaign, which covers a portion of domestic travel expenses. figures in angular brackets show the share of each component. figures for 2022 / q3 are july - august averages. source : ministry of internal affairs and communications. chart 10 ii. price developments inflation expectations

common to what japan had experienced during the post - 1990s period of deflation. although these disinflationary trends have exerted some effects on short - term inflation expectations so far, medium - to long - term inflation expectations remain intact. such expectations in the united states and the euro area seem to be stable at around 2 percent ( chart 6 ). in light of japan ’ s experiences, however, a persistently low inflation rate entails a risk that people ’ s expectations might change, leading to a decline in medium - to long - term inflation expectations in line with the actual inflation rate. concerns over deflation in the united states are not yet as high as those in the euro area, but i consider it necessary to keep in mind the risk that not only short - term inflation expectations but also medium - to longterm expectations for the united states might decline given that the actual inflation rate has recently been below the level in the federal reserve ’ s outlook, partly due to the declining trend in energy prices brought about by the so - called shale gas revolution. regarding the potential growth rates that i have raised as another concern for the medium term, it has been pointed out from various quarters that there is a possibility of potential growth rates in advanced economies being somewhat lower than those before the 1990s, in reflection of the slowdown in the pace of increase in labor input and in technological innovation. 1 the recent growth rates in emerging economies are lower than those prior to the lehman shock, and there is much argument on whether the low growth rates are caused by cyclical or structural factors. if the decline in the potential growth rates has not been particularly significant, the current disinflationary trends seen in the united states and the euro area are due to the slack persisting in production capacity and in the labor market. and thus it can be said that the disinflationary pressure will start to weaken as this slack dissolves. but another interpretation is that the recent decline in the potential growth rates caused not only a decline in the natural rate of interest, but also a decline in the inflation rate that is consistent with developments in the natural rate of interest. as i have stated, depending on how the potential growth rates are understood, the inflation outlook – and consequently the implications for macroeconomic policy – can change. in this sense, the change in the federal reserve ’ s communication regarding the aforementioned reduction in the pace of its asset purchases is noteworthy. let me explain this in detail. although