samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
modestly from the very high levels reached toward the end of 2006. this global outlook bodes well for canada. real gdp growth should average about 2 1 / 2 per cent in the first half of 2007, rising to about 2 3 / 4 per cent in the second half of the year. in 2008, growth is projected to stay in line with the growth of potential output, estimated to be 2. 8 per cent, keeping the economy operating near its full production capacity. the underlying trend of inflation, as measured by core cpi inflation, should be close to 2 per cent through 2008. total cpi inflation is expected to average just above 1 per cent in the first half of 2007, returning to the 2 per cent target in 2008. in line with this projection, in january we judged the current level of the policy rate to be consistent with achieving the 2 per cent inflation target over the medium term. the risks to this outlook for the canadian economy are reasonably well balanced. the biggest downside risk is sharper or more prolonged weakness in the u. s. economy, and the upside risk comes from the strength of the canadian housing market and credit growth putting upward pressure on demand and inflation. in addition, there remains a small possibility of a disorderly resolution of global imbalances, particularly if policy - makers fail to take appropriate actions. i'll conclude now, and then i'd be happy to hear your comments and answer your questions. conclusion the past five years have been a period of significant economic adjustment. canada is a wealthier country as a result of this change. we will continue to prosper, whether the external environment is favourable or not, provided that we learn the larger lesson – that it is essential to be flexible and adjust effectively to changes in economic circumstance. the current favourable outlook, for both canada and the global economy, should not lead to complacency. we all have a stake in meeting the challenge of adjustment. as citizens, business leaders, workers and policy - makers, we all have a role in ensuring that canada can respond effectively to changes in the economic landscape, and that canadians can seize the opportunities that such changes often bring.

our judgment at this time that the risks around achieving our inflation objective over a reasonable time frame are roughly balanced. accordingly, we believe that the current level of monetary stimulus remains appropriate. some of you may be wondering why we aren ’ t being more specific about the likely future stance of monetary policy. let me answer by saying that forward guidance remains a key element of the policy tool kit – but one that we will reserve for times when we believe there are net benefits to its use. there will no doubt come a day when we will offer forward guidance again – but not this day. and with that, carolyn and i would be pleased to answer your questions. bis central bankers ’ speeches
for leading the way in bringing insurance broking services to the people of mzuzu and the surrounding area. distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, i now have the pleasure to declare the mzuzu office of swift insurance brokers & consultants officially opened. thank you and god bless you all.

forward - looking notion that depends on our sense of how the forces of productivity and thrift will evolve over time as measured in decades. an understanding of a likely long - run level of the equilibrium real rate is useful, even though the level is not directly observable, because it provides a general sense of the level that would, over that longer period, allow aggregate supply and demand to move into balance, given the evaluation of secular forces such as productivity and population growth. such an understanding of the longer - term prospects for the real interest rate aids in identifying variations in the concept over the intermediate run that is relevant for setting monetary policy - a period of several years, when cyclical forces dominate. critically, such deviations in the intermediate run can be especially important for policy choice. for example, an unusual hesitancy on the part of businesses to hire and spend emerged in 2001 after the collapse of equity prices and was subsequently reinforced by corporate - governance concerns ; this hesitancy could be thought of as pulling the equilibrium real federal funds rate down temporarily below its longer - run value. in addition, other forces may also have weighed on growth, making it appropriate to move the real funds rate below the intermediate - run equilibrium for a time. from that perspective, the fomc ’ s reduction in the actual nominal federal funds rate over this period from the level of 6 - 1 / 2 percent that prevailed at the beginning of 2001 to the forty - five - year low of 1 percent by mid - 2003 had three components : ( 1 ) a reduction to match the decline in inflation expectations so as to prevent the real funds rate from rising inappropriately, ( 2 ) an effort to chase a downwardly moving equilibrium real rate given the pressures on aggregate demand, and ( 3 ) an effort to bring the actual real rate below its apparently lowered equilibrium to provide sufficient stimulus to cope with transitory adverse factors and to speed the recovery in production and employment. so while the real federal funds rate ultimately was pushed below zero, the extent of policy accommodation was less exceptional, in that many estimates of the equilibrium real rate had also fallen significantly. this is a tangible recent example of the need both to judge how the equilibrium real interest rate that is relevant for policy might have changed from a perceived long - run level and to set policy against the background of such an understanding. indeed, in my judgment, the lingering hesitancy of businesses to make commitments, the restraint imposed on domestic consumers from an increase in the cost
evolve. on that note, let me once again thank marim for the opportunity to share some thoughts with you today and i wish you a productive conference ahead. 5 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches

shortage of liquidity would emerge, which could lead to a new period of economic contraction. enhanced international monetary cooperation can provide a way out of this dilemma. certainly, the sdr allocations of 283 billion dollars, which multiplied the existing stock tenfold, have helped to complement many countries ’ international reserves and boost confidence. but other avenues need to be explored to reduce the demand for reserves. i believe that bilateral swap agreements such as those negotiated between the u. s. federal reserve and a number of other central banks could play a useful role in this regard. moreover, the imf should build on the success of the flexible credit line ( fcl ) and consider more instruments offering credible alternatives to self - insurance through reserve accumulation. indeed, the fund needs to design additional financial instruments to promote long ‐ term global stability and the proper functioning of the international monetary system.
increased the demands on the audit committee, which further affirms the separation of these committees as best practice in order to maintain a clear focus on both risk management and controls. within existing structures in the insurance industry, we observe common overlaps in membership between audit and risk committee members. we also observe varying degrees in which firms explicitly refer to coordination between the audit and risk committees in their respective charters. there is even greater variance in the actual practice of how the two committees interact with one another. these observations lead us to believe that there is room for greater clarity and improved coordination in responsibilities between these committees. bank negara malaysia is mindful of concerns expressed by the industry that we are adding too much responsibility to the board ’ s plate, and requiring boards to approve numerous policies and management actions may be distracting boards from being effective in performing their core oversight functions. the addition of new responsibilities to the board has also raised some questions within institutions on whether the separation between management and oversight is being appropriately preserved. in revising the existing framework on corporate governance, we intend to take the opportunity to address this issue by improving how we capture board roles and responsibilities at the organisational level, bis central bankers ’ speeches taking into account all the things that we currently ask boards to do. this will reduce the need for the bank to direct matters that boards must approve in specific business areas. it does not however, obviate the need for boards to be fully engaged in approving core policies such as risk and capital management strategies. in other areas, the board should determine matters that are reserved for its decision, and the bank will look to the quality of engagement with management, escalation of issues to the board and the means by which boards obtain assurance on matters that it does not specifically approve. this will be reflected in our assessment of the quality of oversight and risk control functions of the insurer. i hope that these insights to some of the bank ’ s current policy considerations will provoke reflections of your own on how your organisations are currently organised and positioned to cope with an environment that will only become more challenging on various fronts. we have much work still to do and over the course of the coming months, we will be seeking industry feedback on these issues. we also have our own expectations of the industry. a key expectation continues to be that the board collectively ensures that it has the requisite knowledge and competencies represented on the board to discharge its role effectively. our demands of insurers will increase in this

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experts. i would like to wish all parties involved the very best of luck.

2 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches 1. it is easy to understand the risk profile of some blended instruments such as guaranteed loans. but other blended instruments have more complex structures. it is difficult to create a universal framework for all blended instruments. 2. as i mentioned earlier, the risk does not disappear. it is shifted from one balance sheet to another. this other balance sheet sometimes sits in the domestic financial system and sometimes sits in another jurisdiction. for financial sector supervisors, this creates a significant level of complexity around how we think about the risk profile of blended finance. we need to understand the balance sheets of the institutions that we supervise but also of those institutions that provide risk insurance. many of our tools such as risk ratings and internal capacity adequacy are based on historical data. climate - related risks and those associated with new financial instruments require forward - looking analysis, which is often characterised by high levels of uncertainty. this often leads to a higher pricing of risk. global standard - setting bodies recognise this challenge and have prioritised climaterelated risks in their work plans. now to the last question. how do we mitigate against risks related to blended finance instruments? many efforts to improve climate - related information flows in financial markets and enhance reporting by financial institutions can help with scaling up blended finance by helping central banks to better understand the risks associated with these instruments and mitigate them more effectively. this, however, is impossible without greater international cooperation as risks shift from one jurisdiction to another. blended instruments will increase financial linkages and require a greater exchange of information across different jurisdictions. financial sector regulators need to develop new skills and research capabilities to understand the various implications of the climate transition on the financial system. more importantly, we need to understand how the combination of different structural changes is likely to impact financial stability. for example, the rapid deployment of artificial intelligence ( ai ), in addition to the climate transition, is likely to have profound effects on the financial system and generate significant financial innovation. scenario analysis and transition planning can help financial regulators in understanding future pathways and the associated risks. there have been advances and improvements but data quality and consistency need to be enhanced, particularly in emerging market and developing economies. in conclusion, we need a massive increase in financing for the climate transition but also to adjust to other structural challenges. central banks and financial regulators have an important role in ensuring that the financial system is resilient to shocks and scales up fundings. however, our efforts to increase blended
our monetary policy tools to address whatever situation arises, as we have done throughout these turbulent times. we know that canadians count on us to make the right decisions in the face of uncertainty and to navigate relentless change. and we will always work hard to be worthy of that confidence. thank you.

and the bank of england worked together to develop a “ middle - ground ” approach to crisis resolution. this approach, which was detailed in a joint paper published in 2001, was designed to provide the right incentives for debtors and creditors. it contained three basic elements. first, “ presumptive limits ” to official assistance, which would be known in advance. secondly, the possibility of exceptional official lending, but only in the unlikely event that a crisis threatened global financial stability. third, orderly standstills or temporary suspensions of debtservice payments to give distressed debtors some time to take steps, including debt rescheduling, to address their problems. since that time, the g - 7 finance ministers and central bank governors have adopted much of this approach in the context of their action plan for crisis prevention and resolution. what is important now is that we support that plan and enforce the rules that have been put in place. if we ignore the rules that have been established, we risk losing the trust that we are trying so hard to build. to conclude, i hope that i have been able to illustrate the importance of trust. by strengthening this trust, we can make the global financial system work better. and by doing so, we can deal with the changing fortunes of the world economy and find a more efficient means of financing world growth.
s fiscal rule. michel strawczynski and joseph zeira will examine the cyclicality of fiscal policy in a broad set of emerging market economies, and will analyze whether the dynamics they observe can be characterized using aguiar and gopinath ’ s distinction of permanent and temporary shocks. i would like to thank the organizers, jordi gali and luis felipe cespedes, for putting together this first - rate programme, and yan carriere - swallow and the department of institutional affairs for coordinating the logistics that have made this event possible. i look forward to two days of engaging presentations and fruitful discussions. thank you.

horizon. we are taking into account the different factors affecting the outlook, such as the behavior of the exchange rate, the strength of the expansion of demand and activity, and the perspectives of lower interest rates in the world, among others. two years into the crisis, the world economy has entered a new stage, in which fiscal policy is increasingly being discussed. the joint effects of monetary and fiscal policy have been central in averting a much deeper crisis. however, disentangling the effects of each one on the economy ’ s performance and determining the best course of action remains the topic of heated debate within academia and in policy circles, in particular, on the speed and timing of the fiscal retrenchment. this is largely dependent on the strength of each country ’ s fiscal accounts. the ten papers to be presented during the conference will be organized into three sections. the first will assess the effects of fiscal policy on macroeconomic outcomes. the first contribution to this section, by tommaso monacelli, roberto perotti and antonella trigari, will focus on the effects of tax cuts on the labor market. joachim voth will present work that analyzes the extent to which fiscal retrenchment can take place before civil unrest is provoked. rodrigo caputo and miguel fuentes will examine the long - run effects of fiscal transfers and investment on the real exchange rate in a broad panel of countries. mauricio villafuerte, pablo lopez - murphy, and rolando ossowski will close with an examination of fiscal policies among resource - exporters in latin america and the caribbean. the second section will investigate the interactions of fiscal and monetary policy. in the first presentation, gauti eggertsson will analyze how the fiscal multiplier is affected by the degree of coordination between the fiscal and monetary authorities. then, giancarlo corsetti will question the conventional wisdom that fiscal policy is more expansionary under a fixed exchange rate than under a floating regime. finally, luis felipe cespedes, jorge fornero, and jordi gali will present a paper that estimates the effects of chilean fiscal policy on consumption and income using a framework that relaxes the assumption of ricardian equivalence. the final section will focus on fiscal policy in emerging market economies. jeffrey frankel will discuss the structural fiscal spending rule implemented in chile in 2001. eduardo engel, christopher neilson, and rodrigo valdes will conduct a welfare analysis of the effects of chile ’
level of employment that is consistent with price stability was higher than most previous estimates. our flexible inflation - targeting framework contemplates seeking or probing for maximum sustainable employment in the right circumstances. when we do this, we will be transparent, communicating that we are probing and what we are seeing in our labour market and inflation indicators as we do so. communication is key this brings me to the final, and very important, point. we know that monetary policy works better when people understand it. this starts with a clear mandate. and it is enhanced by transparency. the move toward increased transparency by central banks over the past 30 years has increased the credibility and effectiveness of monetary policy. by explaining how our decisions link to our mandate and by delivering low inflation for 30 years, our monetary policy framework has earned the trust of canadians. to keep that trust, we will be clear about how we are implementing flexible inflation targeting. because monetary policy needs to be forward - looking, our decisions and our communication are anchored by our inflation forecast, our interpretation of incoming data relative to that forecast, and our assessment of the risks. 11 this will include how a broad set of labour market indicators are affecting our estimates of potential output and our assessment of inflationary pressures. we will continue to use the flexibility built into our framework when that flexibility will help us better manage risks and achieve our mandate. and when we use that flexibility, we will be clear about why and how we are using it. you will see it in our inflation forecast, and we will discuss it relative to incoming data and our assessment of the risks. 11 see bank of canada, “ box 10 : evolving communications, increased transparency, ” monetary policy framework renewal ( december 2021 ) : 72 – 74. conclusion it ’ s time to conclude. our monetary policy framework has delivered prosperity to canadians by keeping inflation very close to 2 percent, on average, for 30 years. flexible inflation targeting is well understood and broadly supported by canadians. and the credibility of the target helps to stabilize both inflation and output. this agreement reaffirms our commitment to price stability and the 2 percent target. this is the framework we need now as we face elevated inflation and the challenge of reopening the economy. looking beyond the pandemic, the renewed agreement also articulates clearly how we will continue using the flexibility in our framework to address future challenges confronting our economy. it explains how we will use our extended set of monetary policy tools when needed. and it outlines how we

##gilant in following the array of indicators i have mentioned. we must not undermine the solid basis of low inflation and low interest rates that has been established in canada.
, i must recognize and thank president harker for his forward - looking leadership. the third district and the federal reserve system are both better for his service. pat, thank you! to close, thank you again for allowing me these few moments to start the day. i look forward to today's discussion and to our conversations. 1 these remarks represent my own views and are not necessarily those of my colleagues on the federal reserve board or the federal open market committee. 2 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches 2 michelle w. bowman, " innovation in the financial system " ( speech at the salzburg global seminar on financial technology innovation, social impact, and regulation : do we need new paradigms?, salzburg, austria, june 17, 2024 ). 3 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches

my next subject. 42. most of us here can remember when basic online banking was a novelty, and how we faced new challenges in cybersecurity. in the years to come, we are going to see continued transformation. we have already issued licences for eight virtual banks. 43. i believe we are only just starting to see the beginning of this. the future could be one where physical bank branches are just a memory – like public telephones on the street. artificial intelligence ( ai ) will lead to all sorts of possibilities in terms of client - behaviour and data analytics, and probably in areas we do not even anticipate. 44. the potential is in some ways very exciting, but it also raises all sorts of concerns. cybersecurity and data privacy are ones we all already face. but what about the possible implications for risk management? we do not know where new technology might lead us – so by definition we cannot predict what the risks will be. and what about the human factor in the relations between banks and customers? an ai system may be very smart, efficient and accurate – but will it have an understanding of morality? can it make the right ethical judgement? can it have a sense of fairness or decency? 45. i must be honest and say i cannot answer these questions. but it is clear that new capabilities for technology will require new capabilities from people. the industry could be entering a very different dynamic, where what is now a decade of change takes place in a year. culture 46. this is going to put new burdens on all of us. i believe that, more than ever, we will need a basic sense of purpose to help us keep everything in perspective. that brings me to my last subject – that of culture. 47. such qualities as integrity and respect are essential to maintain the community ’ s trust in the financial system. and, to be honest, this is one area where the hkma cannot impose its will 4 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches on banks. we can push banks to do many things – but cannot enforce morality. 48. i am always reminded of the words of baroness onora o ’ neill – the british academic and philosopher. she said, i quote, that “ overuse of regulation leads to the formula ‘ legal equals right ’ ”. in other words, if the industry focuses only on complying with hkma rules and statutory laws, it will assume all other possible behaviour is legitimate and acceptable. in