and innovation held at the ecb two years ago, we established that despite the financial crisis, the retail payments business has been resilient, providing reliable and regular revenues. before the crisis, the fact that the retail payments business is a substantial source of revenue in banking, accounting for up to 25 % of total bank revenues, was often neglected. now, the observation that banks with a balanced business model have been in a better position to cope with the crisis has led to a better recognition of the importance of retail banking and retail payments. still, despite their resilience and stable nature, retail payments revenues cannot be taken for granted. they are under pressure from different directions : increasing competition, substantial investment needs to keep up with customer demands and technological progress, and a more decisive stance on the part of competition authorities. with regard to the pricing of payment products, payment service providers have to face the paradox that on the one hand, they are being pressurised to ensure more price transparency, and on the other, direct pricing would probably result in an increase in pricing that would neither be accepted by the customers nor by the regulators. the financial crisis has not only led to a better recognition of the importance of retail banking and retail payments : it has also sharpened the focus on banking governance. in recent years, many banks were giving increasing priority to the interests of the shareholders. consequently, it can be argued that the interests of the clients, and thereby of society as a whole, slipped too much into the background. in short, the public service function of banks, which is particularly relevant in the field of payments and loans, has been neglected. now, it is time for me to hand over to the panellists. i am interested to hear your views on the key issues relating to the transformation process of the banking business, in particular as regards retail payments. what are the prerequisites for and barriers to successful integration in the field of retail banking and payments? what does an efficient retail payments market look like? which governance models are appropriate to steer the retail payments market? bis central bankers ’ speeches

calls, partial tear - up or variation margin gains haircutting. such an assessment is critical in enabling a resolution authority to develop a credible ccp resolution strategy and in informing its decision on whether or not to place a ccp in resolution. a specific challenge in this context is the lack of granular data on central clearing interdependencies due to the strict confidentiality of data on the exposures of individual participants. while cross - ccp supervisory stress testing has proven helpful in gauging the systemic contagion risks arising from central clearing interdependencies, we have only seen a few such coordinated efforts so far. similarly, crisis simulation exercises to test the operational preparedness of authorities for potential stress events have been very limited. more also needs to be done to conceptualise non - default loss scenarios, reliable tools for absorbing the associated losses, and the roles and responsibilities of the various stakeholders. there are far fewer prefunded resources available for non - default losses than for default losses, so the risk of entering into ccp recovery or resolution for non - default related reasons may be higher than for default - related reasons. it is therefore critical to make progress in this area. in this context, we also need to reflect on how to ensure a fair loss allocation. while our choice can be guided by the basic premise that those taking the decisions should also be responsible for any losses, it is not always clear where we should draw this line. for example, the general principle that operational losses should be borne by ccps may not hold in the case of contagion risks emanating from a clearing member that has suffered a cyberattack. in addition, given the small amount of ccp capital, it is uncertain whether comprehensive loss absorption could be ensured in all circumstances. recourse to insurance or voluntary capital injections from parent companies may not be sufficient to ensure a reliable, timely and comprehensive response. in the area of client clearing, we currently see very diverse arrangements for sharing information and involving ccps in the relationships between clearing members and clients. this may result in uncertainties regarding ccps ’ ability to port client positions of a defaulting member in a timely manner, particularly as some clients hold very large directional positions. given the growth of client clearing and the increased degree of client clearing concentration in a few major clearing members, this may expose the financial system to unacceptable risks. joining forces to enhance coordination on risks in central clearing in order to address the problems i