firms ’ business models, as regulators we have a duty to consider our own impact on the sector. this is particularly relevant now that the pra has been assigned a new secondary objective by parliament to facilitate the uk ’ s economic growth and competitiveness, subject to aligning with international standards. at the same time, we should be clear that supervision and regulation cannot often fix broken business models. in any competitive market, some firms – particularly badly - run firms – will not prove viable for the long - run. that ’ s a normal part of life, and indeed we have enabled many firms to exit since the pra was set up, without major disturbance to the rest of the market. [ 15 ] but it reemphasises the need for robust, forward - looking supervision so that we are not often taken surprise by failures, and can contingency - plan appropriately. successful failure this brings me to the next area of lessons learned – making a success of bank failure. the introduction of an effective resolution regime has in my view been a major success of the post - crisis reform agenda. in essence, this regime is a set of tools that allow the authorities to deal with the failure of major banks in an orderly way, without either bringing down the financial system or bailing them out. those tools include : powers to restructure firms so that the economically important parts are preserved. provisions to ensure that private creditors, rather than taxpayers, bear the costs of failure ( this is often referred to as ‘ bail - in ’ as to distinguish it from a taxpayer ‘ bail - out ’ ). frameworks to plan in advance how a major firm ’ s failure would be managed. mechanisms to ensure resolutions are coordinated internationally. i've never been a purist about the resolution framework : every bank failure has idiosyncratic elements, and you cannot pre - ordain precisely which option will be most palatable and practicable in an inherently uncertain and fast - moving future scenario. the point is that the framework provides authorities with options – so that they can respond flexibly, rapidly and effectively to safeguard financial stability. and it does so while also minimising risks to the public purse. in both of the resolutions i was recently involved with ( svb uk and cs ), the authorities had fullyworked - up plans which allowed for more than one option to be executed at the point when the firm failed. none of these plans or options were perfect. all had costs.

news conference 22 september 2022, 10. 00 am introductory remarks by andrea m. maechler as thomas jordan has indicated, i will now discuss some important aspects of the implementation of our monetary policy in the money market. with today ’ s interest rate decision, we are bringing a period of a negative snb policy rate to an end. to ensure that the secured short - term swiss franc money market rates remain close to the snb policy rate in a positive interest rate environment, we are adjusting our implementation approach. our approach now consists of the following two elements. the first is a tiered remuneration of the sight deposits that banks and other financial market participants hold at the snb. we remunerate sight deposits up to an individual threshold at the snb policy rate. sight deposits above this threshold are remunerated at an interest rate of zero percent. the individual thresholds are based on the calculation of exemption thresholds in a negative interest rate environment used to date. 1 the tiered remuneration of sight deposits creates an incentive for account holders to carry out money market transactions with each other even in a situation of liquidity surplus. these transactions contribute to a robust basis for the calculation of saron. the second element is the absorption of liquidity by way of open market operations. with these operations, we reduce the sight deposits and thereby the liquidity supply in the money market. in this way, we ensure that saron and the other secured short - term money market rates remain close to the now positive snb policy rate. to absorb liquidity by way of open market operations, we will use two proven monetary policy instruments : snb bills and repo transactions. participants in the swiss franc money market are familiar with both instruments. we have used repo transactions regularly in previous years. snb bills are debt certificates issued by the snb, typically with a term of up further information is available in the ‘ instruction sheet governing interest on sight deposits ’. page 1 / 2 zurich, 22 september 2022 andrea m. maechler news conference to one year. we last used snb bills for the implementation of monetary policy in 2011 and have since conducted tests to ensure operational readiness. we expect the volume of snb bills issued to increase within a short period of time on the back of the weekly auctions. the new interest rates on sight deposits apply as of tomorrow. the open market operations to absorb liquidity are being conducted with immediate effect. to