not only page 2 sur 5 higher but also more widespread, not just imported but also domestic, not just linked to a transitory supply shock but also potentially persistent. in light of this, no one can deny that monetary policy can and must respond. here, i would like to emphasise not only our forecast, but also our commitment to bring inflation down to 2 % by the end of 2024 - 25. after the “ sprint ” to monetary normalisation started in july 2022, we are now entering a new phase of monetary policy that is more comparable to a longdistance race : it will be longer – above all we must not claim victory too rapidly -, but more gradual and more pragmatic in the pace of the next interest rate hikes. it is clearly too early to tell beyond the 3 % that we are expected to reach in march – which is well below the current rate of 4. 75 % in the united states, or 4 % in the united kingdom – at what " terminal " rate key rates will stabilise. but i believe it is possible to shed some light on the path that we should follow, in order to provide some degree of economic predictability. first, regarding the calendar, it seems to me desirable to reach this terminal rate by summer, i. e. by september at the latest. and our decisions will be guided by the economic data : our central criterion for deciding on monetary stabilisation should be the fairly certain turnaround in the underlying inflation trajectory. it is this underlying inflation that monetary policy can best treat, and which provides the best indication of the medium - term perspective of headline inflation. we have not yet reached that turnaround, that economic " threshold ". i would also like to dispel a fear : the disinflation that we are about to carry out will not lead to a recession, given the resilience of economic activity and employment. on the contrary, lasting inflation would be the worst enemy of growth. ii. financing conditions are therefore normalising, without weighing excessively on the situation of businesses the tightening of monetary policy has led to more restrictive financing conditions, after several exceptionally accommodative years. but the rise in page 3 sur 5 interest rates is being passed on to the real economy in a gradual and orderly manner, particularly in france. regarding businesses and smes, outstanding bank loans to businesses remained strong at + 6. 8 % in january, of which + 5 % for

saving. foreign capital inflows make up the gap. in this process, the foreign exchange value of the dollar plays an important equilibrating mechanism. if the domestic saving / investment imbalance is unchanged, then any reduction in the trade balance from higher trade barriers will be offset by lower exports. the domestic currency will appreciate to cause the trade deficit to widen to accommodate the desired capital inflows. thus, trade restrictions affect the composition of trade but not the gap between exports and imports, which is determined by the difference between domestic savings and investment. at the end of the day, the protectionist country would produce more goods in sectors protected by higher trade barriers but also fewer goods for export. the expectation that higher trade barriers would save jobs ignores these critical second - round effects. moreover, the story may not end there. what happens if another country that now faces higher trade barriers responds by raising its own barriers? that would push production even further out of high - value - added exports that are now deterred by the higher foreign trade barriers and into those exports that face lower trade barriers, or into the goods protected by the higher domestic trade barriers. raising trade barriers would risk setting off a trade war, which could damage economic growth prospects around the world. measures that raise trade barriers typically would protect lower - wage, import - competing jobs, but would also weigh on the prospects for jobs in the more efficient export sector, which tend to be higher - paying. the outcome would be countries producing more where they have a competitive disadvantage, and less where they have a competitive advantage — the exact opposite of what we should be aiming for. for example, in the united states, one of our largest manufacturing exports is aerospace parts ( which requires skilled labor ) and one of our largest imports is apparel ( which requires less skilled labor ). these second - round effects would also likely hurt productivity growth. scarce resources would be used less efficiently and trade protection would likely lessen the level of competitive pressure that helps drive innovation. moreover, lower productivity growth would likely lead to a slower improvement in a nation ’ s living standards over time. this negative consequence of higher trade barriers can be illustrated most starkly by the estimates of the costs per job saved through protectionist measures. researchers that have studied this closely estimate that the costs per job saved from protectionist measures in the united states typically run into the hundreds of thousands of dollars per year. to illustrate, consider the case of import restrictions on chinese tires. the cost