as we now move on to further enhance the macroprudential policy strategy, regulatory data and instruments for addressing risks in non - bank financial sectors. i should mention that other work related to non - bank financial institutions has also been conducted, where the recently published annual esrb shadow banking monitor will hopefully provide important insights. the monitor provides an overview of developments in the shadow banking sector, with focus on assessing potential risks to financial stability. it is intended to foster progress of the debate on related issues and hence targets a broad readership. the overall mission is to eliminate potential blind spots on the macroprudential map and to connect all the dots. to achieve that, we need both an analytical framework underpinned by sufficiently high quality data, and a policy framework which enables us to target risks in different parts of the financial system in a consistent manner. the resilience of a specific part of the financial system needs to be linked to its potential impact in terms of the systemic risk it could generate for the financial system as a whole. we may also need to develop a wider financial stability toolkit. this would, for instance, include | 6 top - down stress tests for asset managers and central counterparties, and recovery and resolution frameworks for the insurance sector and central counterparties. the esrb is very well placed to play one of the leading roles here, due to its mandate, the broad expertise of its membership and its inclusive working methods with a wide range of the relevant stakeholders interacting. the long and winding road from global to national regulation i have been speaking about crr / crd on and off here for the past few minutes, but let me just elaborate a little bit more from another angle. the crr / crd started out after a global framework had been agreed in basel, and this eu level framework was in turn implemented at national level in the member states. in my day - to - day work i deal with financial stability issues on different levels if one will ; as chair of the basel committee for banking supervision the scope is global, while as governor of the swedish central bank i have a national perspective on financial stability although, admittedly, the international agenda and developments play a key role there, too. being chair of the advisory technical committee of the esrb and a member of its decision making body, the general board, of course provides an eu - level perspective on macroprudential policy and systemic risk. these levels or perspectives are in my view becoming increasingly inter

had calculated on was too low. it can also be noted that the credit rating agencies gave the new financial products too high ratings because they had not taken sufficient account of the risk that it would not be possible to sell these products in the market. at the same time, the supervision of the financial markets did not give sufficient consideration to the problems that can arise when a house price bubble bursts. the remuneration structure in the private sector has moreover encouraged short - term thinking and substantial risk - taking. however, all of these problems are partly related to the good access to venture capital that has been created by high saving in some parts of the world. credit granting has slowed down in a number of countries and the financial crisis has contributed to the recession in the world economy the problems in the housing market and the financial crisis that arose have led to credit terms being tightened in some of the world ’ s larger economies. the difficulties in obtaining loans have contributed to a number of companies experiencing difficulty in financing their investment, and have subdued household consumption. falling stock market prices and house prices have contributed to household wealth declining rapidly in many countries. this also slows down consumption and investment. the financial crisis has contributed to gdp in the world as a whole declining this year and to unemployment rising in most countries. the riksbank ’ s assessment is that the recession in the global economy in 2008 - 2009 will be the worst since the post - war period. extensive economic policy measures have been taken in contrast to the way that economic policy was conducted at the end of the 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s, the authorities have on this occasion acted quickly and forcefully. central banks have acted quickly in the united states the policy rate has been cut from 5. 25 per cent in autumn 2007 to 0. 25 per cent. the european central bank has cut its policy rate from 4. 25 per cent in autumn 2008 to 1. 25 per cent and the riksbank has cut the repo rate from 4. 75 per cent to 0. 5 per cent. a number of other central banks have implemented similar monetary policy easing with the aim of stimulating demand and alleviating the repercussions of the financial crisis on production and employment. in addition to the interest rate cuts, some central banks have implemented what is known as unconventional measures. the purpose has been to secure the supply of credit and to counteract the threats to financial and macroeconomic stability. the central banks have contributed large liquidity injections, that is