. as of july, repayments will only be reinvested in part, and will no longer be reinvested from the end of the year. this means that we are accelerating the reduction in bond holdings gradually and in a predictable manner. a leaner central bank balance sheet is desirable. it creates additional space for the market mechanism to work and for resources to flow to productive uses. monetary policymakers also regain more room for manoeuvre. this is important as it enables us to continue taking all the measures necessary to safeguard price stability in future. 3. 3 conclusion to summarise : monetary policy has embarked on the right path. we have made great progress towards achieving price stability. but we are not there yet. we should not let ourselves stray away from the path we have embarked on. now it's a question of demonstrating perseverance even if the remainder of the journey sometimes seems to be dragging on. the effort is worth it. the road is leading us to more favourable territory. price stability lays the foundations for a prosperous and sustainable economy. 4 annual accounts ladies and gentlemen, the monetary policy stance of recent years is also reflected in the bundesbank's annual accounts. monetary policy developments from over a decade are having a combined effect in this context : the eurosystem's highly accommodative monetary policy following the financial and sovereign debt crisis up until the pandemic, along with the interest rate reversal since 2022. the former led to large holdings of securities for the central banks and large deposits from commercial banks. central banks are now paying higher interest rates on these deposits owing to the policy rate hikes. at the same time, income from the extensive 5 / 7 bis - central bankers'speeches bond portfolios will initially remain virtually unchanged at a low level. overall, the eurosystem central banks are recording lower net interest income. this also applies to the bundesbank especially, as it has bunds in its portfolio that have a particularly high credit rating and are therefore remunerated at a correspondingly low interest rate. in the 2016 annual accounts, the bundesbank had already started to make provisions to account for interest rate risk on its balance sheet. risk provisioning was the main reason why the bundesbank did not distribute any profit for 2020 and 2021. we have our provisions for general risks and reserves to absorb financial burdens. withdrawals from the provisions for general risks were already made in 2022. however,

we operate independently of our nationality. in the early phase of the currency union, the former president of the bundesbank, hans tietmeyer, whose picture hangs on the wall here, once refused to sit at a table on which name cards specifying the participants ’ respective institutions had been laid out. he said : “ clear them away, we are here in a personal capacity and not as envoys of our institution or country. ” this is the spirit of the ecb. even after the debt forgiveness, greece ’ s government debt will amount to 120 % of annual overall economic output. that is barely sustainable for a country with a sound economy, but much less so for a country in a poor competitive position. what is so terrible about the idea that greece might give up the euro? firstly there is no provision in the treaty for a country to leave or to be excluded from the euro. but even apart from that : do you think that by leaving the euro, printing a new currency and undergoing the subsequent adjustment, greece could avoid the structural reforms that are necessary? no, they remain necessary. but it would be easier to find agreement for the adjustment and, above all, the sheer possibility of an exit would improve the basis for the negotiations with greece. without this option, the rest of europe is signalling : whatever you do, whatever happens, we will fund you. that is not true, because member states and the imf would not finance a programme that lacked credibility. but if the greeks remain in the euro area, they must reduce their costs and, for example, cut the wage level by at least a third. will that succeed? there is no alternative, because even if a country has flexible exchange rates and devalues but make no other changes, it has not gained anything. it depends on the real lowering of wage costs. in the currency union, this occurs when nominal wage costs fall or remain contained, while prices remain stable. experiences in the 1970s show that this is the more sustainable method to regain competitiveness. otherwise we get inflation with high social costs over the long term. if greece keeps the euro, the adjustment will take many years. during that time, the country will import more than it exports. as this current account deficit will no longer be financed by private lenders, this task will fall to the central bank. that is correct, there will be deficits for a while. but greece is making progress. a part of the adjustment in wage costs that