rate instrument. as a consequence, communicating exit strategies is more complex than in previous tightening cycles. at the ecb, the exit is made easier by the policy instruments used. security holdings of the smp will be held until maturity. excess liquidity is sterilised with reverse operations. banks can pay back long term loans before maturity as market conditions normalise. at the same time, the ecb remains ready to act if conditions deteriorate. the new role of central banks in preserving financial stability is another challenge. following the crisis, the prevailing view suggested to as - sign new powers to central banks, in the form of stronger involvement in bank supervision and macro - prudential policies. some observers argue that conflicts between financial stability functions and the primary goal of preserving price stability might emerge. to safeguard the credibility of the monetary policy function and of the supervisory function we will adopt a governance structure that strictly separates the two. and the hierarchy of goals is clearly set and communicated at the ecb : our primary objective is and will remain price stability. for example, a central bank might find itself in a difficult situation if an interest rate hike necessary to avert risks to price stability would at the same time impact adversely on some banks. allegedly, this could undermine the credibility of the central bank. in this context, communicating clearly and designing appropriate institutional frameworks is crucial. we in europe are very much aware of these challenges. at ecb, the preparation of the single supervisory mechanism ( ssm ) is progressing. the asset quality review of banks to be carried out before the ssm becomes operational will ensure that “ hot potatoes ” will not be handed over to the ssm. to complement the institutional architecture, we also need a strong commitment towards an effective single resolution mechanism, along with efficient and credible backstops. the latter two elements are a necessary complement to the ssm and will ultimately increase its credibility. bis central bankers ’ speeches finally, threats to credibility and independence might also make the job of central bankers more difficult. central banks have fulfilled their man - dates and proven successful through their measures and interventions. as a result of the earned credibility, politicians and the general public have now higher expectations as to central banks ’ ability to manage crisis and the economy. this might overburden central banks and make them more involved in sensitive areas. the new challenges and complexities of today ’ s environment make clear that communication strategies will play an increasingly important role in the dialogue between central banks and markets

##ntial supervision within the single supervisory mechanism, to the extent that it could be useful in establishing the eu - level aml / cft supervision. i would like to highlight that the criteria for identifying the selected entities that will be under the direct supervision of the future aml authority are relatively strict. the commission envisages that only between 12 and 20 obliged entities will meet these criteria. based on its experience, the ecb would strongly support amending these criteria such that a wider pool of obliged entities would be directly supervised by the aml authority, including entities headquartered in each member state. this would promote a common supervisory culture and convergence of aml / cft supervisory practices. also, considering the strict, risk - based nature of the selection criteria, the publication of the list of selected obliged entities would be tantamount to indirectly disclosing the high money laundering risk status of selected supervised entities, sending unintended signals to the markets or creating reputational issues for selected obliged entities directly supervised by the new aml authority. the most prominent element of the ecb opinions is the analysis of the proposed limit to cash payments. while the proposed limit of €10, 000 euro does not appear problematic, the ecb brings several considerations to the attention of the co - legislators with a view to protecting the legal tender status of euro banknotes, in line with the jurisprudence of the court of justice of the eu. let me now hand over to my colleagues who will present the ecb opinions in greater detail. 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches