could adjust in an abrupt way. second, it seems clear that the excess savings in asia could be put to better use in asia itself. and third, there is concern that imbalances are contributing to rising protectionist sentiment. so how can we achieve an orderly resolution of these imbalances? within domestic economies, savings flow across sectors and regions without much risk of disruption, because market - based mechanisms — such as changes in relative wages, prices, and returns on capital — are allowed to work. these market - based mechanisms should also be allowed to work internationally. unfortunately, a number of inappropriate national policies are preventing these mechanisms from working effectively, and so imbalances are growing unchecked. we know that u. s. external indebtedness — even with that country's reserve - currency status — cannot keep growing indefinitely as a share of its gdp. eventually, investors will balk at increasing their exposure to the united states. should that occur suddenly, we could see economic growth plummet and world financial markets become disorderly, threatening global financial stability. global imbalances are a global problem, and we need to think about them collectively. there is no simple solution to these saving - investment mismatches. but we must deal with the fact that the amount that citizens and businesses in the euro zone and much of asia currently want to save exceeds the amount that firms there want to invest. and with current policies, this situation may persist for some time. as well, most oil - exporting countries are now generating large net savings. at the same time, desired investment in the united states exceeds desired national savings by a considerable amount, although it is not certain that this situation will persist. thus, as we look out over the next decade or so, there is a risk that we will find ourselves in a situation of global excess supply. this could happen if policy - makers fail to take appropriate measures, and the risk will increase if policy - makers resort to protectionism. should these risks materialize, the global economy would then be headed for a period of very slow growth, perhaps punctuated by periods of outright recession. i hasten to add that this is not a prediction on my part. i am only saying that such an outcome would be the consequence of inappropriate policies in many economies. and this outcome would hurt us all — including canada and the united kingdom — even if in our own case we are following appropriate policies. so it is clearly in everyone's

, detailed guidance for ccp resilience, recovery and resolvability to the hamburg summit. by the 2018 g20 summit in argentina, the fsb will report whether any additional financial resources are required to resolve safely ccps. the financial system is fairer the system is fairer because of reforms that are ending the era of “ too big to fail ” banks and addressing the root causes of a torrent of misconduct. a decade ago, large complex banks operated in a “ heads i win tails you lose ” bubble. they privatised profits in the run - up to the crisis before socialising the losses when the music stopped. the loss of confidence in private finance that crystallised in the autumn of 2008 could only be arrested by public support over the following year that totalled $ 15 trillion in bail - outs, government guarantees of bank liabilities and special central bank liquidity schemes. to bring back the discipline of the market and end reliance on public funds, fsb members have agreed standards to ensure that major banks can fail safely in future. such collective investment vehicles with run risk now account for almost two - thirds of identified shadow banking up from about 40 % prior to the crisis. work on liquidity mismatches in open - ended funds is scheduled to be completed by end - 2017 and development of consistent leverage measures by the end - 2018. the fsb has now completed its work under the shadow banking roadmap. it has not identified new shadow banking risks that require additional regulatory action at global level. of course, since new forms of shadow banking activities are certain to develop in the future, fsb members will continue to monitor for emerging risks, and share data and analysis in order to support any future regulatory response. the data refer to the uk, the us and the euro area, as of june 2009 ( see bank of england financial stability report, june 2009 ). all speeches are available online at www. bankofengland. co. uk / publications / pages / speeches / default. aspx these include reforms to secure the tools and powers authorities need to deal decisively with failing banks. at the same time, major banks are required to make themselves easier to resolve, including by writing ‘ living wills ’. most importantly, global standards now require that banks hold sufficient debt in life such that, in the event one fails, its successor can be recapitalised to support the continued operation of its most important activities. the combination of these initiatives