central banks. all central banks must have the same interest : to reduce the risk stemming from our operations. if there is a loss it is a loss for all of us. moreover, the governing council of the ecb regularly reviews the adequacy of the risk control measures in the collateral framework. but critics say that it is not only market players trying to circumvent rules but also national central banks using loopholes to support their domestic banks. cœure : i wouldn ’ t cast the blame on national central banks. one proof of the common will of the governing council is the fact that it has agreed unanimously to create a compliance unit at the ecb and a network of collateral experts to check any inconsistency and any factual error in the eligible asset database, and report back. nagel : there are around 40. 000 items of eligible collateral in our database which have to be valued on a daily basis. there are also historical reasons for this : the idea behind a broad collateral framework was to ensure that banks from all participating countries could participate in the eurosystem ’ s refinancing operations. it is not a big secret that this is a big challenge. especially in a crisis this might become extremely difficult. however, i still think our track record over that period is good – with a very few exceptions. and what about simplifying the system? cœure : in the future we should aim at simplifying it to the extent possible, not forgetting, that good availability of collateral to our counterparties across the euro area allows proper implementation of our monetary policy. this is why the system became even more complex during the crisis times. bis central bankers ’ speeches so for the time being there will be errors? cœure : we will do what we can to avoid errors. what is important to know is that none of these errors have led the eurosystem to lending too much to financial institutions. all operations are over - collateralised. nagel : in cases where errors were made, we have eliminated them. in cases where loopholes emerged, we have closed them. we are constantly learning lessons from our experiences. on lessons : what will the collateral framework and the framework for monetary policy operations in general look like after the crisis? cœure : it is too early to say. on one hand, we are not yet in the exit mode. on the other hand, we have to see how markets and regulation will look like in the

the country has and will have specific financing needs over the next 18 months. is a new programme for greece a scenario that ’ s being considered? the eurogroup has outlined a clear sequence. when the current review is concluded successfully, and if the greek authorities so wish, a follow - up arrangement will be discussed with the eurogroup. but it is first and foremost the responsibility of the greek government to create growth and regain financial independence. this requires in my view a clear resolve to boost economic reforms, a prudent fiscal path and an unequivocal confirmation that greece will honour its international commitments. doubts about the country ’ s creditworthiness will then recede and foreign investors will return to greece. the new government is negotiating with the european commission, the ecb and the imf in full awareness of the fundamental hypothesis that in the end no one would want a grexit. if that is true, why didn ’ t europe realise earlier that the greek programme was not working effectively? the recession and unemployment in greece cannot be compared with the recession and unemployment in cyprus, ireland, portugal and spain. my question is : would a failure of the programme eventually undermine the future of the euro area? from a very difficult starting position, and through painful efforts, greece has made good progress in restoring fiscal and external sustainability, as well as in putting banks on a sound footing and strengthening the basis for growth and job creation. by the end of 2014, economic indicators were clearly pointing to positive growth and better prospects ahead. indeed, in its forecast released one month ago, the european commission expected greece to grow by 2. 5 % in 2015 and 3. 6 % in 2016, one of the highest growth rates in the euro area. and the arduous efforts of the greek people need to be recognised here. but let ’ s not fool ourselves : adjustment was inevitable and, believe me, it would have been much worse without european and international support. that said, we should always learn from the past. for instance, i believe that the programme should have put more emphasis, at an earlier stage, on reducing rents – in the economic sense – and fighting vested interests in the greek economy, to allow for a fairer sharing of the adjustment burden. also, in its crisis - fighting toolbox, europe did not have at its disposal instruments available to institutions such as the world bank, which supports social safety nets when countries undertake structural adjustment. according to some rumours, the ecb played a