conditions and interest rates that can reach over 1, 000 percent a year. with the csf providing guarantees to banks for loans extended to their coop members, msmes gain access to bank loans at much lower interest rates. as monitored by the bangko sentral ng pilipinas, loans granted under the csf program range from 8 – 12 % a year, a fraction of the cost of borrowing from informal lenders! this is the reason why the bsp has been working on promoting financial inclusion across the country for over ten years now. in july this year, the bsp and 12 other government agencies launched the national strategy for financial inclusion ( or nsfi ). our objective is to avoid duplication and to ensure optimum results from our collective efforts and deployment of resources in extending the reach of our financial system to the unserved and the underserved. this milestone event was also highlighted by the visit of queen maxima of the netherlands who attended the launching with a commitment of assistance and partnership not only from the netherlands, but also from the united nations, in her capacity as the designated un secretary general ’ s special advocate for inclusive finance for development. as described by queen maxima, “ the philippines should be the voice on financial inclusion. ” indeed, our bis central bankers ’ speeches financial inclusion program is considered an international best practice model. through the nsfi, we envision a regionally - responsive, development - oriented and inclusive financial system that provides for the evolving needs of a diverse filipino public. one of the priority areas of concern in the nsfi is access to credit, which is being addressed through this csf program. our survey early this year indicated that about 47 percent of filipino adults borrow money and most of them access loans from informal sources such as family members and informal lenders. only a few obtained credit from formal institutions such as lending / financing companies ( 12 % ), cooperatives ( 10. 5 % ), microfinance non - government organizations ( ngos ) ( 9. 9 % ), and banks ( 4. 4 % ). nevertheless, more than 85 % of respondents indicate that they want to access financial services from formal financial institutions. one restrictive consideration in borrowing money is the lack of collaterals. this can now be addressed through the credit surety fund, which serves as an alternative security in place of conventional collaterals. you will be pleased to know that our csf program is on the agenda of the apec summit. during the

, has been necessary to ensure sufficient liquidity in the system as weak bank balance sheets suppress intermediation. but excess liquidity remaining in the system longer than necessary is in turn a recipe for inflation into the medium term. the mechanisms for mopping up the excess liquidity need to be put in place early. meanwhile, the scale of fiscal stimulus, and funding needed to support this, has raised the spectre of destabilised sovereign bond markets and the crowding out of private borrowings. this does not bode well for private capital formation, and could create stresses downstream for corporations which do not have the advantage of sovereign backing. further, if deficits are seen to be structural, market reaction could negate much of the effect of fiscal stimulus. there is also the issue of how to restore private - sector driven intermediation of credit in due course. while government support for businesses ’ access to credit is necessary now, it cannot continue indefinitely. in other words, even as we take unconventional measures, we need to have an eye on medium - term sustainability, and make clear our " exit " strategy and timing. just as we must not be behind the curve in taking action to stabilise markets, we need to anticipate what lies ahead and plan accordingly. this is crucial because that later - stage " exit " action represents not just the end of this phase but a crucial transition into another set of conditions with totally different policy demands. third, we need to consider the global dimension of our responses, and the impact on other economies. for instance, the bank deposit guarantee scheme that first started in ireland triggered a domino effect and made its way to this region. to minimise uncertainty, some degree of coordination to remove these guarantee would be necessary. as governments in the developed economies inject huge sums of public funds to shore up banks, the instinct is to place demands on these banks to lend domestically. this may seem sensible individually. but collectively, this'abandon - thy - neighbour'policy can trigger a big reduction of credit, and undermine economic recovery that eventually hurts the developed economies. protectionist measures hurt emerging economies most, and they can trigger a backlash that sets the world back. we must resist such regression. asia ’ s responses let me now turn to the impact of the crisis on asia, and responses to that. asian economies will slow considerably. those that are more highly dependent on external demand will contract more sharply than the rest. but unlike during the asian financial