earlier data were released periodically through the reserve bank ’ s website and various publications. consolidated time - series data were made available through the annual publication of handbook of statistics on the indian economy ( hbs ). these data are now being made available on - line on almost on a real time basis on the rbi website. it will be desirable to aim at a single point of data storage and dissemination. the department can set an example by taking steps to migrate the entire macro - financial database into rbi ’ s data warehouse ( dbie ). bis central bankers ’ speeches third, in addition to the traditional statistical issues facing emerging economies like india, the global financial crisis has drawn attention to data gaps in the financial sector which needs to be addressed. the g - 20 has particularly emphasised the importance of data for better identification of the build - up of risks in the financial sector and of financial interconnectedness the proposal is to scale up sdds by including financial stability indicators ( fsis ). while the reserve bank has started providing data under this sdds - plus initiative, this process needs to be expanded further. the demands on statisticians is going to increase for which we should be prepared. fourth, macroeconomic models are important tools developed and used by major central banks for understanding the dynamics of growth, inflation, money, interest rates and other related variables in the context of formulating monetary policy. there is no unique way of macro - economic modelling. policy makers, therefore, tend to rely on a suite of modes to make their own judgements about policy action. the department should develop an independent policy model, to help understand the transmission of the policy signals to the real and financial sector. this will facilitate assessment of the medium - term impact of various policy variables and how they are informed by changes in macro - conditions. many countries have core dynamic stochastic general equilibrium ( dsge ) models for this purpose, which takes into account the micro foundations behind the macroeconomic behaviour of different sectors of the economy. the underlying microeconomic considerations could be quite complex for a rapidly growing economy like ours. there is, therefore, a need to make further progress towards development of a dsge model for indian economy. fifth, asset prices have become important to the conduct of monetary policy and maintenance of financial stability. one of the major data gaps on indian economy relates to asset prices, particularly commercial real estate and house prices. though initial efforts have been made to construct house price index ( hpi ) for seven cities

compounded these challenges. policy response to covid in india 4. historically, every crisis has forced us to rethink and has almost always brought out the best in us. in the context of our economy, we can safely say that the government and the reserve bank were closely monitoring the developments both globally and in india and have calibrated the fiscal, monetary, and regulatory responses depending upon the nature and intensity of the impact. while we all are aware about the monetary policy measures and liquidity support to the banking system along with targeted operations aimed towards supporting nbfcs, msmes, mfis, among others, let me focus a bit on the levers of the prudential regulations which became enablers for extending relief to a large spectrum of individuals, small business, and industries. calibrated prudential response 5. the prudential interventions had to be rolled out cautiously and in a phased manner. during the initial phase of the pandemic, the focus was more on enabling the borrowers and individuals to weather the immediate financial stress through the loan moratoriums. subsequently, even as the liquidity infusion mitigated the initial impact of the pandemic on the markets, the financial stress began to manifest as the borrowers started feeling the impact of business losses on their balance sheets. it was at this juncture, that the reserve bank decided to rollout targeted resolution frameworks. 6. while framing these measures there was a sense of deja vu, as the experience of similar dispensations extended during the earlier crisis periods were not very encouraging. it is now argued, albeit with the benefit of hindsight, that some of the regulatory dispensations on asset classification during the post - gfc period, contributed in part to the build - up of npas in the subsequent years. but again, the key lesson which was drawn from the experiences of that period was that the problem assets need to be ‘ recognized ’ and ‘ provided for ’ at the earliest through realistic assessments and also by building in sunset clauses for the regulatory schemes to the extent possible. 7. of course, the absence of credible insolvency regime at that point in time was also one of the key factors responsible for the problems cropping up later. just compare that situation with the current one, when there is a formal insolvency and bankruptcy code in place since 2016. with the legal issues around the ibc having been largely settled in a relatively