liquidity at fixed rates ; • the further expansion of the list of assets accepted as collateral in our operations ; • the lengthening of the maturity of our operations that now go up to one year ; • the provision of liquidity in foreign currencies, notably us dollars ; and • finally, direct purchases of covered bank bonds in order to revive this market segment, which is important in europe. let me briefly recall the rationale underlying these five specific measures. the first motivation for introducing enhanced credit support was to address the seizing up of the money market. if left unaddressed, this seizing up would have rendered the refinancing of many bank assets impossible, risking a massive and disorderly deleveraging by credit institutions. this, in turn, would have seriously hampered the monetary policy transmission mechanism and ultimately curtailed the expansion of credit to firms and households in the euro area. the core of the measures that we introduced in october was the “ fixed - rate fullallotment ” tender procedure. banks were granted access to essentially unlimited liquidity at our policy interest rate in our regular open market operations. this support enabled them to maintain their crucial role in financing the real economy. see the speech “ the ecb ’ s enhanced credit support ” ( munich, 13 july 2009 ). as a second measure, we expanded the collateral eligible in our liquidity providing operations. this offered an opportunity for banks to refinance assets that had become less liquid in the wake of the market turmoil. while the quantitative impact of this measure was not large in aggregate terms, it was important as it gave reassurance to banks that a larger share of their balance sheet could be refinanced at any time in case of need. a third motivation was to give banks a more medium - term perspective in their liquidity planning, making them less vulnerable to short - term shocks and attenuating the maturity mismatch on their balance sheet. by giving banks a longer planning horizon we could further support their credit provision to the economy. a fourth issue we needed to address was the currency mismatch in banks ’ balance sheets and the malfunctioning of the international swap market. this was particularly relevant for us dollars, given the need of european banks to fund their dollar assets. we therefore began to supply liquidity to european banks in us dollars, backed by a swap facility established with the fed. finally, the eurosystem acted in financial markets directly. the governing council chose covered bonds

has refrained from purchasing government bonds is in line with this institutional framework. this approach avoids any possibly intricate interaction with other policy actors on decisions relevant for exit, and maintains a clear separation of responsibilities between the central bank and fiscal authorities. 4. reputation to act when appropriate any strategy will only be credible if there is no doubt about the ex ante determination of the institution to implement the required actions. this is the fourth cornerstone. from this perspective, the ecb ’ s determination to act in a consistent way is beyond any doubt. over the past decade, our institution has established a clear track record of vigilance and reputation for acting in a timely fashion. let me give only two examples : in december 2005 the governing council, on the basis of its monetary policy strategy, acted promptly to address mounting risks to price stability. although many ecb watchers at the time favoured holding or reducing rates, on the basis of subsequent events it is widely recognised that this decision was appropriate and served to anchor longer - term private inflation expectations securely. a second example that underscores the ability to take decisions in difficult circumstances is the rise in interest rates in july 2008. it is now often put aside because subsequent developments were overtaken by the eruption of the crisis, but there is no doubt that inflation expectations were rising noticeably at the time. the decision of the governing council at the time demonstrated its determination to continue solidly anchoring inflation expectations including in difficult circumstances. at the height of the financial crisis, this reputation has helped to stabilise inflation expectations, including contributing to guard the euro area against the materialisation of the risk of deflation. iv. concluding remarks allow me to conclude. this morning, i have outlined four main cornerstones of the exit strategy from our nonstandard monetary policy measures. they reflect : our reputation for swift and decisive action when it is required ; our technical and institutional ability to act ; the forward - looking initial design of the measures ; and, above all, the link to our monetary policy strategy and the primary objective of securing price stability in the euro area over the medium and longer term. stressing the importance of the exit strategy should not be confused with its implementation. notwithstanding some recent signs of improvement in the economic outlook, it is premature to declare the financial crisis over. from today ’ s perspective, the need for enhanced credit support remains. therefore, for the time being central bank liquidity is likely to remain abundant. this does not mean, however, that