be the principal creditors in an insolvent liquidation. the technical issue is how to achieve that in a way that minimises disruption and value destruction and enables essential ccp services to be maintained. this is a key agenda item going forward. it will involve achieving greater clarity in the related area of the optimal “ waterfall ” of margin, default fund and ccp owncapital resources in absorbing losses. 4. margin requirements and macroprudential policy earlier this year, us treasury secretary geithner called for the world ’ s major financial authorities to agree minimum initial margin requirements for uncleared otc derivative contracts, on the grounds that we must avoid a race to the bottom and incentives that make it attractive to clear bilaterally rather than via a ccp. i agree. but, looking ahead, we must surely establish a system that can extend beyond that “ first base ”. first, we need policies that extend across markets. if we apply them only to otc contracts, exchange - traded contracts might be subject to different requirements. and if we applied such minima only to, say, futures, we could see the economic substance of futures synthesized via cash repo markets on looser terms. the same applies to other products and markets. generally, we should take care to avoid regimes that give market participants incentives to chose between economically equivalent transactions and post - trade processing on the basis of different margin or haircut requirements. secondly, we have to recognise that economic and financial conditions change – sometimes beyond our wildest dreams – so any minima set for one period may not be at all suitable for see tucker, p m w, “ clearing houses as system risk managers ”, june 2011. bis central bankers ’ speeches another. we need, therefore, to be able to vary any such minima as threats to stability evolve ( crudely, cyclically ). you will recognise in this an echo of the plans for varying bank capital requirements. this is all part of an evolving macroprudential toolkit. as a contribution to that, emir should make explicit provision for macroprudential tools. the initial text did not do so, i think mainly because macroprudential thinking has been advancing as the crisis has evolved, but i understand that the parliament ’ s text does take a step in this direction. it is not too late for europe to lead the world in this area on macroprudential policy generally, by providing a framework for national regimes co - operating with esrb

willem f duisenberg : presentation of the ecb ’ s annual report 2002 to the european parliament introductory statement by dr willem f duisenberg, president of the european central bank, at the presentation of the ecb ’ s annual report 2002 to the european parliament, strasbourg, 3 july 2003. * * * it is my pleasure to present to you today the ecb ’ s annual report for 2002, a year that was marked by significant progress on our path towards a more integrated europe. in particular, 2002 saw the successful introduction of the euro in its tangible form, as euro banknotes and coins have been swiftly accepted and embraced by the citizens of the euro area. moreover, heads of state or government, at their summit meeting in december last year, took the historic decision to invite ten countries to join the european union ( eu ) as of 1 may 2004. economic and monetary developments at the same time, the environment in which monetary policy was conducted in 2002 was one of considerable uncertainty. following the slowdown in economic activity throughout 2001, a moderate recovery of real gdp growth in the euro area was recorded at the beginning of 2002. however, as the year progressed, the recovery lost momentum, affected by renewed turbulence in financial markets and geopolitical tensions, which had consequences for oil prices and confidence. overall, annual real gdp growth in the euro area is estimated to have been only 0. 8 % in 2002, compared with 1. 4 % in 2001. despite the subdued pace of real economic growth, hicp inflation remained at 2. 3 % on average in 2002, unchanged from 2001, and slightly above the ecb ’ s definition of price stability. this was partly due to a number of temporary or one - off factors, including higher oil prices, indirect tax increases and adverse weather conditions. on top of this, there were some effects from the cash changeover. while the overall impact of the cash changeover on inflation was small, its perceived impact was much greater than its actual impact, probably due to comparatively strong price increases in some specific sectors. of greater concern for the medium - term outlook for price stability was the fact that nominal wage growth remained relatively strong despite the weakening of economic activity and a rise in unemployment, while productivity growth remained low. this development points to persistent structural rigidities in the labour markets of the euro area. monetary growth was strong in 2002. while this development was partly the result of high volatility in financial markets, which heightened investors ’ preference for