joseph s tracy : a strategy for the 2011 economic recovery remarks by mr joseph s tracy, executive vice president of the federal reserve bank of new york, at dominican college, orangeburg, new york, 28 january 2011. * * * good morning. it is a pleasure to be with you this morning to look back on the tremendous events impacting the economy over the past several years, and to assess the outlook for the economy going forward. let me note that the views that i will discuss with you are my own and not necessarily those of the federal reserve bank of new york or the federal reserve system. on september 20, 2010, the national bureau of economic research ( nber ) determined that the “ great recession ” officially ended in june 2009. the great recession did not earn its moniker due to its length. at 18 months, the length of the great recession was only slightly longer than the average of 17. 5 months for the 33 recessions tracked by the nber since 1857. in fact, the longest recession was 65 months and lasted from october 1873 to march 1879. the great recession distinguished itself from earlier recessions in terms of its severity rather than its length. there was a decline in real output relative to trend of $ 1. 1 trillion or 8 percent ( chart 1 ). this contraction brought the level of real output back to its level in 2006. in most recessions, consumption growth slows but remains positive. in this recession, there was an actual decline in consumption rather than just a slowdown ( chart 2 ). when households need to cut back on their consumption, they typically do so first with durable goods – for example, by delaying the decision to replace a car or to trade up to a nicer house. it is no surprise then that auto sales dropped significantly ( chart 3 ). housing starts had been declining since late 2005, and the decline continued during the recession ( chart 4 ). producers reacted quickly to the sharp decline in consumer demand, but inventories still rose sharply relative to sales ( chart 5 ). in order to realign production to the declining level of demand, firms quickly cut their staffing levels, which resulted in a rapid rise in unemployment across all age groups ( chart 6 ). from the peak in december 2007 to the end of the recession, private non - farm payroll employment declined by 7. 3 million jobs – bringing employment below its level in january 2000 ( chart 7 ). the severity of the great recession is very apparent when you realize

thomas c baxter, jr : reflections on the new compliance landscape remarks by mr thomas c baxter, jr, executive vice president and general counsel of the federal reserve bank of new york, at “ the new compliance landscape : increasing roles – increasing risks ” conference, new york city, 23 july 2014. * * * the views expressed are the views of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the federal reserve bank of new york, or any component of the federal reserve system. let me begin by thanking the risk management association, pwc, debevoise & plimpton, and my friend paul lee for inviting me to participate in this conference. of course, i need to give what sometimes sounds like a miranda warning – my remarks are personal, and do not represent an official position of the federal reserve bank of new york, or any part of the federal reserve system. there is nothing i will say that can be used against them. i am going to address three specific compliance problems : economic sanctions, tax evasion, and foreign corrupt practices. i will use these three compliance problems to illustrate a larger point about organizational culture. if organizational values do not support the rules that organizations use to guide the behavior of employees, and worse, if organizational values actually conflict with those rules, the organization is headed for troubled territory. in my remaining time, i will elaborate on this fundamental point. let me start with economic sanctions. we have the recent case against bnpp for its conduct in evading u. s. sanctions related to iran, sudan and cuba. the case is noteworthy because the disposition involved pleas to federal and state criminal violations, and a record fine of nearly $ 9 billion. the bnpp case is not the only case against a financial institution for economic sanctions violations. there have been a series of others. every one of this series of cases concerns a foreign bank. observers ask, “ why are all of these economic sanctions cases against foreign banks? ” before offering my answer, let me start with some “ not ’ s ”. in my view, it is not that u. s. financial institutions are so much more compliant than foreign institutions. i will avoid an ugly name - and - shame ritual, where i would identify the u. s. financial institutions that violated u. s. law. it is not that u. s. prosecutors are xenophobic individuals who are bound and determined to target only foreign institutions. i know from personal knowledge that prosecutors have followed the evidence