would be for government - driven uncertainties to be addressed directly by governments, by removing the self - induced threats to world growth. failing that, a second answer is for fiscal policy to step in. fiscal stimulus from countries with fiscal space would both stimulate aggregate demand, and, with targeted, quality investment, increase long - term growth. iii wage increases in countries that have long relied on wage moderation could also help in bolstering aggregate demand and inflation. and pro - growth reforms would raise r *. monetary policy provides a third response. for the past ten years, there is little doubt that ecb monetary policy under mario draghi ’ s presidency has made a decisive contribution not only to safeguarding the euro in 2012, but also to the significant recovery of the euro area since 2013. over this period, more than 10 million jobs have been created. our unconventional measures are estimated to add almost 2 percentage points of growth and of inflation between 2016 and 2020. since i am talking to an audience of researchers i should of course emphasise that such numbers are subject to uncertainty. however, the most recent monetary policy decisions of the governing council have given rise to many comments. my rule of conduct has been to not add mine in the heat of the moment. two weeks later, let me only say that i supported many elements of the package, including the strengthening of the state - dependent forward guidance and the welcome introduction of a tiering system, similar to those in all other jurisdictions with negative interest rates. but i was not in favour of the resumption of net asset purchases at this time, because i thought that further purchases are unnecessary right now, given page 3 sur 11 the very low levels of both long - term interest rates and term premia, which have continued to decrease significantly since we stopped net purchases last december. the main purpose of qe is to extract more duration risk from the bond market ; indeed, term premia have already been successfully compressed – the term premium on a 10 - year ois is estimated to be significantly negative at around - 60 to - 100 bp. i also think that the significant strengthening of our forward guidance, the consequent prolongation of the reinvestment period for the very important stock of qe assets – 2600 billion euros –, and the dfr cut, were already a powerful and consistent combination. the forward guidance now states that we expect rates to remain at their present levels, or lower, until the inflation outlook robustly converge

variety of instruments is necessary to allow supervisors to ensure that banks increase their loss - absorbing capacity. in particular, the experience of national supervisors should be taken into account. in france, for example, we adjusted, as permitted by basel ii, the ratios required of each institution based on its risk profile. the experiment was conclusive. the amounts that each bank had to raise from the state during the crisis proved consistent with the requirements that we had determined. other countries that have not had this experience are likely to implement automatic rules. le figaro – in the united states, some believe that european banks, and in particular french institutions, are undercapitalised relative to the size of their balance sheets... christian noyer – the idea that us banks all comply with basel iii and that efforts are only required in europe is false. those who believe this are victims of an accounting and prudential optical illusion. put simply, a balance sheet produced under us gaap is twice as small as its equivalent using international standards. and capital appears twice as high. this creates confusion. le figaro – will the united states implement basel iii? christian noyer – we ’ ll be monitoring developments very closely. i have no doubts about the commitment of the us administration and the fed.