samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
policy frameworks, ” bis working paper 189. o. issing ( 2002 ) : “ central bank perspectives on stabilization policy, ” federal reserve bank of kansas city economic review, vol. 87, 4 ( fourth quarter ). j. m. keynes ( 1936 ) : “ the general theory of employment, interest and money ”, london : mc millan. s. kuroda and i. yamamoto ( 2003 ) “ the impact of downward nominal wage rigidity on the unemployment rate : quantitative evidence for japan, ” imes discussion paper no. 2003 - e - 12.

. incoming data, notably survey results, continue to point to solid, broadbased growth in the period ahead. the pass - through of our monetary policy measures has facilitated the deleveraging process and should continue to support domestic demand. in particular, the recovery in investment continues to benefit from very favourable financing conditions and improvements in corporate profitability. employment gains, which are also benefiting from past labour market reforms, are supporting real disposable income and private consumption. moreover, the global recovery is increasingly supporting trade and euro area exports. however, economic growth prospects continue to be dampened by a sluggish pace of implementation of structural reforms, in particular in product markets, and by remaining balance sheet adjustment needs in a number of sectors, notwithstanding ongoing improvements. this assessment is broadly reflected in the june 2017 eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, finalised in late may, which are conditional on the full implementation of all our monetary policy measures. these projections foresee annual real gdp increasing by 1. 9 % in 2017, by 1. 8 % in 2018 and by 1. 7 % in 2019. compared with the march 2017 ecb staff macroeconomic projections, the outlook for real gdp growth has been revised upwards over the projection horizon. 1 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches the risks surrounding the euro area growth outlook are considered to be broadly balanced. on the one hand, the current positive cyclical momentum increases the chances of a stronger than expected economic upswing. on the other hand, downside risks relating to predominantly global factors continue to exist. according to eurostat ’ s flash estimate, euro area annual hicp inflation was 1. 4 % in may, following 1. 9 % in april and 1. 5 % in march. as expected, the recent volatility in inflation rates was mainly due to energy prices and temporary increases in services prices over the easter period. looking ahead, on the basis of current futures prices for oil, headline inflation is likely to remain around current levels in the coming months. at the same time, measures of underlying inflation remain low and have yet to show convincing signs of a pick - up, as unutilised resources are still weighing on domestic price and wage formation. underlying inflation is expected to rise only gradually over the medium term, supported by our monetary policy measures, the continuing economic expansion and the corresponding gradual absorption of economic slack. this assessment is also broadly reflected in the june 2017 eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections
nina stoyanova : adaptation and management of digital portfolios, digital banking services and client contacts in a pandemic crisis speech by ms nina stoyanova, deputy governor and head of the banking department of the bulgarian national bank, at the opening of the videoconference " adaptation and management of digital portfolios, digital banking services and client contacts in a pandemic crisis ", organized by the banker newspaper, 17 november 2020. * * * i would like to welcome you to the video conference on “ adaptation and management of digital portfolios, digital banking services and customer contacts in a pandemic crisis ", organized by the banker newspaper. in its “ strategy for the digitalisation of eu financial services ", the european commission states that the future of finance is digital. however, we can safely say that not only the future but also the present of finance is inextricably linked to digitalisation. this was clearly seen in the unprecedented situation caused by the coronavirus, in which it was through digital technologies that the continuity of the provision of financial services to consumers and businesses was ensured. the pandemic is about to permanently change our way of life, accelerating the processes of digitalization in all spheres of life – work, entertainment, shopping, administrative services. we are witnessing the emergence of new business models, services and solutions that create value, save time and effort, but at the same time are accompanied by new risks and challenges – both technological, this trend in the development of the financial sector is particularly visible in the dynamic and customer - oriented area of payments. undoubtedly, the catalyst for these processes is the european legislation in this area, namely the second payment services directive, known as psd2. as the main innovations in it we can highlight two aspects – opening access to payment accounts ( the so - called “ open banking ” ) and increasing the requirements for the security of electronic payments. these were the areas in which in 2020 the efforts and attention of both the business and the regulator continued to be focused. as part of the first aspect, the directive introduced two new types of payment services provided entirely on the internet – payment initiation and account information services, and regulated the activities of providers offering them. the provision of new services requires interaction between payment service providers who maintain customer accounts ( most often banks ) and the respective providers that offer new services. most payment service providers holding accounts in our market have chosen to achieve this interaction by creating special interfaces for automated access to their managed payment

you for your attention. 1 www. ecb. europa. eu / pub / economic - bulletin / articles / 2021 / html / ecb. ebart202103 _ 02 ~ 6612ab7923. en. html 4 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches
in some cases contributed to unethical and illegal behavior by banking organizations and their employees. the federal reserve has made improving risk management and internal controls a top priority. for example, the comprehensive capital analysis and review, which includes the stress tests that i mentioned, also involves an evaluation to ensure firms have a sound process in place for measuring and monitoring the risks they are taking and for matching their capital levels to those risks. also, supervisors from the fed and other agencies have pressed firms to improve their internal controls and to make their boards of directors more directly responsible for compensation decisions and employee conduct. changes to regulatory and supervisory focus as i noted, the financial crisis revealed weaknesses in our nation ’ s system for supervising and regulating the financial industry. prior to the crisis, regulatory agencies, including the federal reserve, focused on the safety and soundness of individual firms – as required by their legislative mandate at the time – rather than the stability of the financial system as a whole. our regulatory system did not provide any supervisory watchdog with responsibility for identifying and addressing risks associated with activities and institutions that were outside the regulatory perimeter. the rapid growth of the “ shadow ” nonbank financial sector left significant gaps in regulation. in response, the dodd - frank wall street reform and consumer protection act of 2010 ( doddfrank act ) expanded the mandate and authority of the federal reserve to allow it to consider risks to financial stability in supervising financial firms under its charge. within the federal reserve system, we have reorganized our supervision of the most systemically important institutions to emphasize what we call a “ horizontal perspective, ” which examines institutions as a group and in comparative terms, focusing on their interaction with the broader financial system. we also created a new office within the fed to identify emerging risks to stability in the broader financial system – both the bank and nonbank financial sectors – and to develop policies to mitigate systemic risk. the dodd - frank act created the interagency financial stability oversight council, chaired by the treasury secretary, and the federal reserve is a member. it is charged with identifying systemically important financial institutions and systemically risky activities that are not subject to consolidated supervision and designating those institutions and activities for appropriate supervision. and it is charged with encouraging greater information sharing and policy coordination across financial regulatory agencies. where we stand my topic is broad, and my time is short. let me end with three thoughts. first, i believe that we and other supervisory agencies have made significant progress in addressing incentive for a discussion of total

papers on economic activity, vol. 2, pp. 1 - 40. stock, james, and mark watson ( 2007 ). " why has u. s. inflation become harder to forecast? " journal of money, credit, and banking, vol. 39 ( february ), pp. 3 - 34.
of the reserve bank of new zealand ; and ( b ) promote the prosperity and well - being of new zealanders and contribute to a sustainable and productive economy. bank ’ s objectives 1. the bank ’ s main objectives are — economic objective a. the economic objective of achieving and maintaining stability in the general level of prices over the medium term ; and financial stability objective b. the financial stability objective of protecting and promoting the stability of new zealand ’ s financial system ; and central bank objective c. otherwise acting as new zealand ’ s central bank in a way that furthers the purposes of this act. deposit takers act 2023 purposes 1. the main purpose of this act is to promote the prosperity and well - being of new zealanders and contribute to a sustainable and productive economy by protecting and promoting the stability of the financial system. 2. to that end, this act has the following additional purposes : a. to promote the safety and soundness of each deposit taker : b. to promote public confidence in the financial system : resilience as a pathway to prosperity unclassified unclassified c. to the extent not inconsistent with subsection ( 1 ) and paragraphs ( a ), ( b ), and ( d ), to support new zealanders having reasonable access to financial products and services provided by the deposit - taking sector : d. to avoid or mitigate the adverse effects of the following risks : ii. risks to the stability of the financial system : iii. risks from the financial system that may damage the broader economy. insurance ( prudential supervision ) act 2010 purposes 1. the purposes of this act are to — a. promote the maintenance of a sound and efficient insurance sector ; and b. promote public confidence in the insurance sector. 2. those purposes are achieved by — a. establishing a system for licensing insurers ; and b. imposing prudential requirements on insurers ; and c. providing for the supervision by the reserve bank of new zealand ( the bank ) of compliance with those requirements ; and d. conferring certain powers on the bank to act in respect of insurers in financial distress or other difficulties. financial market infrastructures act 2021 purposes 1. the purposes of this act are to — a. promote the maintenance of a sound and efficient financial system ( including by responding to threats to the stability of, or confidence in, the whole or a significant part of the financial system ) ; and b. avoid significant damage to

economic recovery, while mitigating any potential impact on the stability of the financial and banking system in our country. i also wish to underline that the bank has consulted, and is keeping the imf fully briefed about all measures it is taking. we, at the bank, stand ready to put in place what is required, and we will do whatever it takes to save our economy. i thank you for your attention. 4 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches
a crucial step. the benefits of strengthening european integration far outweigh the alleged advantages of weakening it. choices must be made responsibly. we cannot fear only the risks of action and disregard those of inertia. bis central bankers ’ speeches

the cooperative banking groups formed just under a year ago are now in a position to face the challenges posed by the recession by reaping the benefits of integration. the ability to raise funds on the capital markets is vital today ; any steps backward from what has already been achieved would constitute a grave and costly regression. close ties to local communities and their mutualistic spirit do not remove the need for strong governance and skilled managers, both in the parent company and in the member cooperative credit banks. profitability must be sufficient to ensure that they are adequately capitalized, a precondition for the performance of their cooperative role. banca d ’ italia the governor ’ s concluding remarks annual report 2019 in financial intermediation, too, the public health emergency and the containment measures have made the advantages of digital solutions even more tangible. this will inevitably lead to an acceleration of investment in new technologies, which with the achievement of appropriate economies of scale can be made at a lower cost and to greater advantage. these savings, in turn, will make it easier to raise the resources necessary to support investment, including through access to the financial market. there are many areas that could benefit from technological innovation : service distribution, customer creditworthiness assessment and monitoring, and regulatory compliance processes. in the retail payments sector, a traditional incubator of innovation, the opportunities offered by technology can provide real benefits to users of the services. the supply of bank loans to firms through digital channels, which is still very limited in italy, can now make rapid and substantial progress. the bank of italy is active on a number of fronts to address the changes prompted by technological innovation in financial services. we have strengthened dialogue with operators through our innovation hub, our fintech channel, and through new procedures to authorize market access ; we are collaborating with the ministry of economy and finance in a forum for authorities on digital innovation and participating in the launch of a regulatory sandbox ; we support the development of system solutions designed to ensure the proper balance between the need for standardization and competition in innovative sectors, procedures for updating regulations and legal certainty, new investments and risk mitigation. we will soon establish a dedicated unit tasked with proposing and coordinating fintech initiatives, as well as monitoring retail payment services and instruments. this will allow us to capitalize on the synergies between banknote circulation, electronic payments and digital services, and strengthen our capacity to observe phenomena that could lead to the development of new products in the future. our efforts remain focused
comments to make on that matter, but let me say that governor georghadji is a trusted member of the governing council of the ecb and has worked hard for the well - being of cyprus. after reading what the government spokesman said on monday i am pleased to see that there is no disagreement between the governor and the government and that the issue is abating. bis central bankers ’ speeches

make banks ’ shareholders and investors more prudent and will better protect european taxpayers from any misbehaviour by banks. that said, the best way to prevent crises in the future is to make sure that our economies are prudently managed and that we don ’ t let financial imbalances develop, as was unfortunately the case before the crisis. 4. the biggest challenge that cypriot banks have to face today is how to manage and resolve the extremely difficult and sensitive issue of loan servicing … the cypriot economy needs a functioning banking sector which contributes to the economic recovery. that can only be achieved if the non - performing loan issue is addressed forcefully. for that, the structure of incentives would have to be changed, so that both borrowers and lenders have a common interest in finding a pragmatic solution to the debt problem. the data tell us that this is not happening. conversely, non - performing loan levels are continuing to increase. the reform of the foreclosure process is part of the change that has to come about. in this respect, i welcome the supreme court decision on the unconstitutionality of the four parliamentary bills concerning the foreclosure law. this will help to contribute to the reduction of non - performing loans in the banking system and recreate margins of manoeuvre for banks to extend loans to profitable projects supporting the recovery. bis central bankers ’ speeches 5. the cypriot economic adjustment programme was well on track until recently. however, when political decisions touch upon legal reforms, such as foreclosures and privatisation, delays arise amid reactions … the work of the cypriot authorities and their commitment to the programme has been commendable. those measures were painful and they have imposed a large short - term cost on the economy and cypriot society. but they have started to pay off. they have helped to stabilise the economy and to improve the confidence of international investors. institutional and legal reforms are fundamental to enhancing the business environment and boosting economic growth and job creation. this raises difficult political discussions in cyprus, as in any country, but such discussions are nonetheless indispensable, as this is about changing the business model of the cypriot economy, and we are in a democratic society. 6. policy in the euro area is characterised by the lack of a common approach, given that the ecb is willing to proceed, if necessary, with further monetary policy easing and has called on those governments that have room for manoeuvre to loosen
‘ irish agriculture : economic impact and current challenges ”, conefrey, thomas, economic letter vol. 2018, no. 8. 26 byrne, s and j rice : non - tariff barriers and goods trade : a brexit impact analysis, central bank of ireland research technical paper, vol. 2018, no. 7 27 central bank of ireland : the macroeconomic implications of a disorderly brexit, quarterly bulletin 1 8 / 8 bis central bankers'speeches

the subsequent fall in prices did not affect these sellers : their gains were “ in the bag ”. in contrast, the purchasers at bubble prices experienced losses when prices fell. as most of the purchases were funded by debt accumulation, many of these borrowers – whether household or corporate – found themselves with negative equity and, in the wider downturn, many soon also became unable to service their debt. when borrowers defaulted, these transactions ultimately resulted in losses also for the banks ’ shareholders ( and sub debt holders ), and – notoriously – for the government which stepped in to prevent other creditors of the banks losing. naturally, much attention has rightly focused on the €40 billion or so of ultimate losses assumed by the government under that heading. a broadly similar amount was lost by bank shareholders, etc. and there are two other big categories of capital gain and loss : i think the aggregate gains by irish property sellers are plausibly of the same order of magnitude, as are the aggregate losses being nursed by borrowers. but, large though these four categories of winnings and losses from property transactions at bubble prices are, they need to be considered alongside the even larger and still growing bis central bankers ’ speeches accumulated difference between income in the actual irish economy and that in the counterfactual scenario. i won ’ t pretend to have precise figures on how aggregate income and employment would have panned out in the counterfactual scenario of no property bubble, but the broad outlines are clear. the counterfactual no - bubble irish economy would have grown much more slowly than actual in the period up to 2007, and much faster in the post - crisis years. for example ( according to one simulation ) some 130, 000 fewer houses would have been completed over that period, with total employment about 60, 000 smaller by 2007, and despite less migration into ireland, the unemployment rate would have drifted more than 2 percentage points higher than actual. lower revenue would have pushed the government accounts into deficit and a higher debt ratio at the outset of the global financial crisis. household incomes would have been much lower too, with per capita personal consumption running about 8 per cent lower than actual in 2007. of course, different households were affected in differing degrees, resulting in large distributional shifts which are the subject of important ongoing research. heading into the global recession, then, the irish economy would have been smaller, with more moderate wage rates and a somewhat higher government debt and deficit. it would have
, our monetary policy projections and the actions we take cannot be static. if economic circumstances change, then monetary policy needs to change too. otherwise, we will not be able to achieve our objectives. thank you for your kind attention. i would be happy to take a few questions. bis central bankers ’ speeches

, because they affect the saving and investment decisions of households and firms. the dollar is but one component of these financial conditions. the level of short - and long - term rates, credit spreads, and equity prices are also important components of the financial conditions that we closely monitor. if international developments shift u. s. financial market conditions – including the dollar – then we need to take this into consideration in our u. s. monetary policy decisions. third, i have found that market participants broadly appreciate that the fomc needs to take a risk management approach in its conduct of monetary policy. there are at least two important aspects of this approach. the first is whether the balance of risks to the outlooks for either economic growth or inflation are skewed to the upside or downside. the second is whether the efficacy of monetary policy itself is asymmetric when monetary policy is at, or close to, the zero lower bound for interest rates. in this situation, it may be easier to implement a tighter monetary policy through raising rates, than it would be to implement a looser policy using unconventional tools. also, the effects of a policy of raising rates may be more predictable compared to the effects from using unconventional tools. as i noted earlier, i think the medium - term risks to the u. s. economic growth outlook are somewhat skewed to the down side. thus, this needs to be taken into consideration in terms of the appropriate stance for u. s. monetary policy. with respect to the efficacy of monetary policy, given how close we remain to the zero lower bound for interest rates, i also think the risks are asymmetric. therefore, we need to be a bit more careful about the risk of tightening monetary policy in a manner that proves to be premature, as compared to the alternative risk of being a little late. if we were to realize that we were slightly late, policy can be adjusted by raising short - term interest rates more quickly. 2 all three of these reasons – evidence that u. s. monetary policy is currently only moderately accommodative, the fact that u. s. financial conditions have been influenced by economic and financial market developments abroad, and risk management considerations – argue, at the moment, for caution in raising u. s. short - term interest rates. so, directionally, the movement in investor expectations towards a flatter path for u. s. short - term interest rates seems broadly appropriate. that said, to my eye