deal with the breakdown of standard distribution channels for liquidity, both nationally and internationally. this was because the provision of sufficient liquidity to a small group of intermediaries no longer guaranteed that it would either flow through the system, or to those in need of funding in specific currencies, as stress in money markets spread to foreign exchange swap markets. secondly, some banks lacked direct access to open market operations ( omos ), either because they did not belong to the list of eligible counterparties, or lacked the eligible collateral. finally, central banks had to project liquidity demands at different time horizons, as demand patterns changed rapidly and unexpectedly, and the impact of factors such as year - end effects became increasingly unpredictable. the decision by central banks whether or not to provide additional liquidity to markets and to bail out failing banks has its own set of complexities. clearly central banks have to be concerned about systemic risk. the provision of overall liquidity is probably more clear cut, as such provision is generally done against appropriate collateral, although this requirement was relaxed in a number of instances. with regard to bailing out failing banks, there are more difficult issues. firstly, there is the issue of moral hazard to consider. should a central bank under all circumstances bail out a bank – even when it has been mismanaged? how does the central bank ensure that its lender - of - last - resort assistance doesn ’ t result in excessive risk taking and poor risk management by banks? secondly, the issue of timing and the degree of intervention required has to be considered. acting too soon can increase the risk of moral hazard and favour bad firms over good ones. acting too slowly can exacerbate the consequences. the bank of england, for example, was accused of delaying too long in attempting to save northern rock. in my view, there is no such thing as the perfect handling of a bank failure. a bank failure is a financial disaster, and the most central banks can do is damage control. it is a very difficult call to make whether or not to try and save a failing bank, when to intervene and to what extent to intervene. whatever decision is taken is normally criticised by some or other group of stakeholders. in addition, central banks can usually not disclose the information upon which their decisions were based. however, even central banks that focus primarily on price stability sometimes face possible conflicts of objectives. the most obvious one is probably the potential conflict between maintaining price stability and financial stability. the

rashad cassim : south african reserve bank's payments study report launch speaking notes by mr rashad cassim, deputy governor of the south african reserve bank, at the south african reserve bank's payments study report launch, sandton, johannesburg, 5 september 2024. * * * good afternoon, all. thank you for joining us today as we launch the south african reserve bank's ( sarb ) inaugural payments study report. this study is one of our initiatives to better understand the payment system landscape in south africa. it supports our current strategy, vision 2025, which identified a need for the sarb to collect more payments information. in pursuing that goal, we knew we already had extensive information about the supply side of payments. we get this from operating samos, 1 the core interbank payment, real - time gross settlement system. we also receive data from other payment service providers. the payments study report we are launching today, by contrast, is about the demand side of the payment system – the users thereof and their choice of payment methods, including their preferences, level of awareness, usage, reasons for adoption and barriers to entry. the study has two parts. one is a survey of about 45 minutes that just over 3 000 people completed. we call this the survey of consumer payment choice ( scpc ). in the second part of the study, about 4 600 respondents tracked their payment behaviour and payment method usage over a three - month period, using actual payments in a set period of days. this we call the diary of consumer payment choice ( dcpc ). here people documented, among other things, their preferred payment methods, the amounts paid and what the payments were for. the two surveys were conducted nationwide between april and december last year. they were designed to complement each other. indeed, this two - survey approach has also been adopted by other central banks, for instance in australia, poland, sweden and the united states ( us ). 2 and the results make for interesting reading. i do not want to steal the thunder of our next presenter, who will be walking us through the high - level results, but i was struck by several points. for instance, even though the usage of cash is not growing any more, it remains the most popular payment method. debit card usage is second and credit cards a distant third. 1 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches furthermore, while credit cards are mostly used by richer households, which you would expect, there