##ers and c willeke ( eds ), monetary analysis : tools and applications, ecb, pp 47 - 62. see swiss national bank : monetary policy decisions of the swiss national bank for 2000, snb quartalsheft 4 / 1999, pp 1923. see p gerlach - kristensen : a two - pillar phillips curve for switzerland, mimeo, 2006. see o issing : the role of macroeconomic projections within the monetary policy strategy of the ecb, economic modelling, vol. 21, 2004, p 725. in practice it has to date proved difficult to capture statistically, in a sufficiently reliable way, the longerterm price effects of monetary policy on the basis of available macroeconometric models. ” 8 in recent years, several papers have come to the conclusion that monetary and credit aggregates – or variables which rely heavily on money growth such as the so - called “ money gap ” – provide valuable information for future inflation in the euro area. this is particularly true for the longer forecasting horizon, confirming the claim that monetary development is key to understanding inflation in the long run. in a recent bundesbank discussion paper, boris hofmann shows that the relationship between money and prices seems to continue. 9 in my view, the two - pillar approach of the ecb does not only show that there is a special relationship between the choice of a strategy and the need for forecasts. the use of a particular concept for monetary policy also has consequences for the efforts a central bank makes to improve its forecasting abilities. for the ecb one possible extension might be found in a more strongly formalised combined assessment of the information included in both pillars for future inflation developments at various time horizons. when i point to the fact that different strategies in monetary policy require different forecasting approaches i don ’ t want to deny that all central banks face a lot of similar forecasting problems. they all want to reduce the limits of forecasting. i hope that our conference has made a contribution to this aim. see l papademos : macroeconomic theory and monetary policy : the contributions of franco modigliani and the ongoing debate, bnl quarterly review, vol. lviii, june - september 2005, pp 187 - 214. see b hofmann : do monetary indicators still predict euro area inflation?, bundesbank discussion paper, 2006, forthcoming.

sabine lautenschlager : the european sovereign debt crisis and its implications for the younger generation speech by ms sabine lautenschlager deputy president of the deutsche bundesbank, at the junger wirtschaftstag of the cdu. frankfurt am main, 26 october 2013. * 1. * * introduction ladies and gentlemen i am delighted to speak today, at the junger wirtschaftstag of the cdu, about a topic which i believe has not yet been adequately discussed in the chosen context, namely : what the european sovereign debt crisis means for the younger generation. not only should this question in particular be placed at the heart of many debates about the financial and sovereign debt crisis – the envisaged solutions, too, need to be measured in terms of their implications for young people. after all, they are the ones who will have to shoulder the burden if we delay resolving the crisis from the present to the future. allow me to begin my thoughts on the sovereign debt crisis and on its implications for the younger generation with the following quotation. “ the progress of the enormous debts which at present oppress, and will in the long - run probably ruin, all the great nations of europe, has been pretty uniform. ” if anyone here believes this to be an especially bleak description of the situation brought about by the european sovereign debt crisis that has persisted for more than three - and - ahalf years now, he or she is mistaken by 237 years. this quotation is not a recent one – it dates from the year 1766 and is taken from the most important piece of work by the famous scottish economist adam smith, who is considered the founder of classical economics. and yet today, much more than 200 years later, the transmission mechanisms of a sovereign debt crisis have seen very little change. yet to be precise, when considering the present - day situation in the euro area, we should really speak of crises in the plural, since what we experienced was the mutual reinforcement of a banking and a sovereign debt crisis. and only if we carefully analyse the causes and consequences of the crisis can we learn from past mistakes and find solutions. thus i would like to examine, briefly, the three main reasons for the crisis. 1. unsound developments that were home - grown persisted unchecked for years in individual euro - area member countries. the competitiveness of the present - day problem countries became eroded as a result, and the state of public finances deteriorated.