problem for some swiss banks is likely to have been the inability to act of a major correspondence bank in new york that was hit by a simultaneous power failure in the main supply and the backup system. in such cases, liquidity requirements soar. the fed's generous supply of usd liquidity to the market also benefited swiss banks. we did not, however, observe a similarly higher demand for swiss franc liquidity. nevertheless, the swiss national bank was, of course, present in the chf money market. ( cf. the remarks of bruno gehrig. ) for the time being, i would sum up the situation as follows : 1. the terror attacks of 11 september 2001 did not succeed in destabilising either the us part of the international financial system or those of the rest of the world. 2. the banks and financial markets have overcome the shock of the terror attacks with impressive flexibility, creativity and with a measure of solidarity that commands respect. 3. the central banks, i. e. the us fed, the european central bank and all the other central banks including the swiss national bank fulfilled their task as lenders of last resort in times of crisis. 4. the crisis management was facilitated by the fact that the banks, the markets and financial market infrastructures in general were in a sound condition at the time of the terror attack. their liquidity and solvency provided them with a good basis for successfully passing the extreme " stress test " to which the international banking and financial systems were subjected. 5. this underlines the significance of banking and financial market supervision on both levels of intervention assigned to them, i. e. both in the micro - prudential as well as in the macro - prudential field. while the former primarily serves to secure the banks'solvency, the latter has the task of upholding the liquidity and functioning capacity of the payment systems and of financial market infrastructures in general. 6. the next step is to work through all the events of 11 september and their consequences rapidly and carefully. even though we have obtained proof of the stability of the global financial system, we cannot simply carry on as though nothing had happened. lessons must be learned and defensive measures, both on the financial industry and central bank levels, i. e. in banking and financial market supervision, must be further improved. 7. the events of 11 september have strengthened all the parties'awareness of the extent of international integration in a crisis situation. while

the proper price signals don't reach the end - users and thereby impede an efficient choice of payment instrument. so if we want to speed up development in payment services, we need to increase competition in the market and reduce the disincentives. based on our past finnish experiences in major payment innovations, i predict that the implementation and penetration of mobile payments among the general public will take its time following the introduction of a general and user - friendly mobile payment solution. our payment habits are deeply rooted. merchants need time to adapt their systems. banks want to be assured that the business model of the new payment instrument is a sufficiently rewarding opportunity for them. here too we face the traditional chicken - and - egg situation. still, i am convinced that recent developments in ict in general and in mobile technology in particular have provided a solid platform for building a new generation of payment technology. my forecast is that the convenience and efficiency of mobile payments will have general appeal among advanced users of mobile phones.