samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
of the euro area ”, ecb occasional paper no. 97, september. ducaju p., gautier, e., momferatou, d. and m. ward - warmendiger ( 2008 ), “ institutional features of wage bargaining in 22 eu countries, the us and japan ”, ecb working paper no. 974, december. ecb ( 2008 ), “ monitoring labour cost developments across euro area countries ”, monthly bulletin, november, pp. 69 - 85. european commission ( 2006 ), “ the eu economy : 2006 review. adjustment dynamics in the euro area – experiences and challenges ”, european economy n. 6. melitz, m. and g. ottaviano ( 2008 ), “ market size, trade and productivity ”, review of economic studies, 75, pp. 295 - 316. ottaviano, g., d. taglioni and f. di mauro ( 2009 ), “ the euro and the competitiveness of european firms ”, economic policy, pp. 5 - 53, january.

6 current population survey numbers of temporary layoffs or the shed data support this finding. return to text 7 for example, see muriel dal pont legrand and harald hagemann ( 2017 ), “ do productive recessions show the recuperative powers of capitalism? schumpeter ’ s analysis of the cleansing effect, " journal of economic perspectives, vol. 31 ( winter ), pp. 245 – 56. return to text 8 see bureau of labor statistics ( 2021 ), “ 6. 2 million unable to work because employer closed or lost business due to the pandemic, june 2021, " economics daily, july 8. the number of people who did not work ( or worked less ) because of an employer closure or lost business — 6. 2 million — is down from 7. 9 million in may 2021 and from 49. 8 million in may 2020. return to text 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches
by the bank of albania. lastly, the supervisory council reiterates the need to continue and deepen structural reforms, which boost productivity and enhance the competitiveness of the albanian economy. these reforms pave the way for expanding the economic potential and should be seen as the main instrument supporting sustainable and long - term growth for albania. bis central bankers ’ speeches

gent sejko : the productivity slowdown and the secular stagnation hypothesis opening address by mr gent sejko, governor of the bank of albania, at the presentation by mr patrizio pagano, executive director for albania at the world bank group, tirana, 18 september 2019. * * * dear friends, colleagues and media representatives, thank you for your participation! i have the honour to launch today a presentation on “ the productivity slowdown and the secular stagnation hypothesis ”. the productivity and its role on economic growth is an argument, which, in the aftermath of the last global crisis, is at the centre stage in the agenda of researchers and decision - makers of the economy. the recent decades had never seen before such a duration, intensity and complexity of this crisis. the global economy experienced the longest and deepest economic slowdown and recession, since the great depression in 1930s. certainly, it was a real drama for the national economies, as well as enterprises and households. nevertheless, the crisis served as a catalyser to re - assess the economic ideas and a great laboratory to test them. the book titled “ international macroeconomics in the wake of the global financial crisis ” has been added to the existing vast body of economic literature that studies the challenges to various economies in detail. this book is a collection of research work by experts of the banque de france, banca d ’ italia and banco de espana on the major topics in the post - crisis period. through the systematic investigation of : structural problems in the economy, in more concrete terms, the correlation between advancements in technology, productivity, globalisation and potential growth ; problems incurred by the global trade and promotion of consumption and investments ; problems that the monetary policy has faced and continues to face, due to the heightened uncertainties, fall in the natural interest rate and the chronic low inflation ; and the increasing interdependence of global economies, due to the financial integration and the role of financial flows and interest rates in small and developing economies, the authors provide a precious contribution to the professional debate present in this field. we are honoured to have among us today one of the authors of this publication, mr patrizio pagano. he is present today as both the world bank group executive director for italy, albania, greece, malta, portugal, san marino and timor - leste and as an academic with a long - standing history of scientific publications while serving as the head of advanced economies and
harun r khan : taking on risk – the sensible way keynote address by mr harun r khan, deputy governor of the reserve bank of india, at the cii “ confederation of indian industry ” national risk management summit 2015 on “ de - risking the future of india inc. ”, mumbai, 10 february 2015. * * * the speaker deeply acknowledges the contributions of shri. r gurumurthy of the reserve bank of india. shri suresh senapaty, shri richard rekhy, shri deepak parekh, smt. greeta varughese other distinguished guests & invitees on and across the dais. this invitation to give an address at this important cii event gives me a great pleasure. cii seems to have chosen a very interesting theme for this national risk summit – “ de - risking the future of india inc. ” – i am, of course, wondering why cii is thinking of de - risking the future of india inc. though the participants here would appreciate the fact that de - risking would also mean that they have no business to be in “ business ”. risk - return - retribution in a vucap world all human enterprise, more so business activities essentially involve risk taking, in a bid to earn the “ reward ” or “ return ” according to the risk - return trade - off. this relationship is, however, far from simple as the reckless chasing of returns may result in unimaginable levels of risks not only for the individual enterprise but also for the whole system. the risks posing a threat to the financial and economic balance of the world today are far from being properly managed and controlled. i understand that the prevailing evidence of continuing, if not increasing, appetite, for fast returns is one of the major motivations behind the broad theme for this seminar. while developing my thoughts on the much used idea of the risk - return trade - off, i was led to think of a missing “ r ” – requital – in the risk - return conundrum. the tremendously forceful human fascination for reward and the almost irresistible tendency to take or overlook risks in that pursuit has, more often than not, resulted in inevitable retribution or requital, in the long term. in the present context, probably it is the zeitgeist that drives us crazy. having seen the massive impact of the global financial crisis, we may want to take a pledge to de - risk the future. peter bernstein, the american financial historian,

when and to the extent that our assistance is necessary and can be effective in addressing systemic risks and we are committed to protecting the interests of the u. s. government and taxpayer.
let us call it – “ pre - lehman ” levels. expecting “ pre - crisis ” - levels to make a comeback – the time when risk was significantly underestimated – is neither realistic nor desirable. however, sustainable relaxation in the inter - bank money markets requires a sustainable return of confidence in the financial markets. in order to achieve this aim, it is necessary that the process of restoring banks ’ balance sheets continues, supported by public stabilisation funds. emu and the financial crisis for european monetary union, the financial crisis is certainly posing the greatest challenge in its history. when we recently celebrated the tenth anniversary of the single currency ’ s inception, it was often stated that the first ten years of the euro were a success story with regard to price stability, trade and financial integration in europe. however, it was also stated that the years ahead are likely to become even more challenging. one could say that emu is reaching puberty – if you have children, you will know what i mean. nonetheless, the value of monetary union has never been greater than during the financial crisis. try to imagine what would have happened without the single currency! probably, foreign exchange markets within the single market would have been driven by speculative activities. think of what happened in the early 1990s. currency fluctuations would aggravate both the financial crisis and real economic tensions – and do not forget the political turbulence implied by such currency tensions. it has been clear from the beginning of monetary union that there has been a greater emphasis on the responsibility for fiscal policies, wage policies and structural policies, which remains at the national level. in a nutshell, monetary union requires flexible labour markets and sound public finances – this holds true especially during times of crisis. with regard to fiscal policy, respecting the provisions of the stability and growth pact is of the essence. what is needed is a credible and strong commitment to reducing excessive deficits and to returning to the path of consolidation. rising cds premia on sovereign bonds have induced speculation about potential defaults on the part of emu countries. any concerns in this regard are unfounded and only purely hypothetical. while it is in general welcome that financial markets punish unsustainable public finances, it has to be acknowledged that even euro area member states with high yield spreads are currently facing favourable refinancing conditions given the unprecedented low interest rates. it should be emphasised that the “ no - bail - out ” rule, as stipulated in the ec treaty, is an indispen

summarize the results of a cross - country research project on prudential spillovers through international bank lending. rey ( 2013 ) discusses the importance of prudential policy for global financial cycles. 7 / 7 bis central bankers'speeches
up demand. many loans were given to customers who, as it appeared later, were far from creditworthy and should not have passed a proper credit appraisal. the regulations had been abolished at the wrong time and without realising what an extended period of regulation had done to the ability of banks and supervisors to handle credit risk. what can be learnt from this? quite obviously, deregulating does not mean the abolishing of all rules according to which banks should behave. there are good and well documented reasons for regulating banks. deregulation means the adoption of a new legal structure that is consistent with a competitive market economy. the dilemma of regulation is to balance between having too little and too much. too much will stifle the banks, too little will lead to unsound risk taking. the traditional form of regulation was to set very strict rules or to forbid banks from conducting certain activities. the modern form is to be more flexible. regulations set the boundaries while allowing the banks to operate within these boundaries if they can prove that they have the skills and resources to do it in a sound manner. modern regulation puts much more responsibility on the banks themselves and their owners and management. in sweden, the former banking act actually prohibited the banks to engage in any activity that was not explicitly permitted in the law. the new banking act starts at the other end, permitting the banks to do whatever they find suitable except for certain activities that are explicitly forbidden. today ’ s financial institutions, instruments and markets are, of course, much more sophisticated than earlier. there is also much broader diversity in the sector. for example, the needs of customers are satisfied in many different ways and by many different actors, certainly not only by banks. as a consequence, modern regulation needs to be more flexible than in earlier days, when the market was more homogeneous. the regulation should encourage competition and innovation, but at the same time discourage unsound risk taking and generally unbecoming or even illegal behaviour. only when there are strong arguments should the regulator outright restrict or prohibit certain activities. instead, regulations should provide incentives for banks and others to behave in a sound manner. for instance, capital requirements do not prohibit risky exposures, but they make them expensive to the bank. before moving somewhat deeper into the questions of supervision, there are some things to say about risk management. risk management risk management systems are at the core of modern banks. banks must have consistent systems for identifying, monitoring, controlling and managing risks.

my first point that a high quality, risk - oriented and flexible supervision will create credibility for the financial sector and make it prosper. inadequate and old - fashioned supervision based on rigid regulations will do right the opposite. and supervision is a dynamic concept. the tools and art of supervision must, in all countries, continuously improve along with the development of markets and market technology.
will hence not come under pressure from across the atlantic to tighten monetary policy any time soon? i doubt that ms yellen fits into all the slots that people put her in. at the fed, too, decisions are taken by a committee. ms yellen is highly experienced and has an excellent professional and academic background. the good cooperation with the ecb will be continued. we, as the ecb, will fulfil our mandate in line with our established strategy for the euro area. bis central bankers ’ speeches

by the same methods. that is why we also have external consultants on board. moreover, the supervisory teams in the countries will be linked to each other. the benchmark will not be a capital gap, the capital requirement? what else will it be? we will have a benchmark for the balance sheet assessment. that will be derived from european regulations, the capital requirements regulation / capital requirements directive iv ( crr / crd iv ). those are the technical names. what do they refer to? the main issue is the definition of capital that a bank is required to keep on deposit. that is set down in the crd iv. … which is based on the basel iii guidelines. bis central bankers ’ speeches it contains a minimum percentage of common equity capital that banks, under basel iii, must keep in proportion to their risk - weighted assets. it also states that banks must maintain a capital conservation buffer as a further cushion against risks. and since we are dealing with the most important banks in all member states, the " significant credit institutions " require an extra buffer to reflect this significance in a european context. if you add that up, you arrive at the benchmark that we will use for orientation. in the final analysis, the most interesting point is the gap between a banks ’ capital adequacy requirement and the capital that it has available. we must apply uniform rules in europe. it may emerge that a bank does not have adequate reserves or has not made sufficient provisions. that gap may need to be filled with capital, but it may also be removed through balance sheet shrinking. how? the situation will improve if we restore confidence : a bank will find it easier to raise funds in the market if there is transparency and certainty about its balance sheet. it will be difficult if many banks turn to the markets all at once. most bankers are forward - looking and are already looking for capital. if private capital does not suffice, then the european guidelines state that the shortfall must be made up through a bail - in, with shareholders and creditors bearing losses. the state may not provide any funds before a bail - in has been carried out. before any public money flows, however, a decision must have been taken on whether a bank is viable or not. a bank that is only able to keep afloat with sustained public support does not belong in our concept of a market economy. if the bank, or perhaps just one part of it, does have a chance of survival,
credits, foreign direct investment and portfolio flows, have dropped significantly in the last few years. in the case of bank credits, total flows declined by about us $ 200 billion during the 1997 - 1998 period, although the decline has been at a more moderate pace in the last two years. in the light of this, it is important that the bank plays a catalytic role in mobilising resources within and outside of the region. one approach to this challenge would be for the bank to return to basics and improve the three channels of financial intermediation, namely, banking, equity and debt, through a number of measures. first, the bank could increase investment in the financial infrastructure in asia. just as physical infrastructure, such as airports and highways, facilitates the movement of people and goods, financial infrastructure, such as the payment and settlement systems for the banking and securities sectors, facilitates the safe and efficient movement of money. the importance of a robust payment and settlement system in this region is underscored by the events of 11 september. secondly, the bank could expand the technical assistance programme to assist economies in restructuring the banking sector. small and medium - sized enterprises employ the most workers in asia and they are mostly dependent on bank financing. the banking sector in asia, devastated by the asian financial crisis, has not fully recovered. banks understandably are adopting a very conservative lending strategy towards companies with a lower credit rating, such as small and medium - sized enterprises. the bank ’ s assistance in speeding up the banking sector reform would help smes to get back on their own feet, thereby reducing unemployment and poverty. thirdly, the bank could expand assistance in building up the institutional capacity of individual economies to improve corporate governance in the private sector. emphasis should also be made to improve the auditing, disclosure and transparency standards of publicly - listed companies. as seen in the asian crisis and again in the enron incident, good corporate governance is critical to restoring investor confidence in the equity markets. fourthly and lastly, the bank could assist with the development of the bond market in asia. clearly the financial intermediation process cannot be dominated by one or two intermediaries. earlier, in 1990, when it was the banks in the united states that seized up as a consequence of a collapse in the value of real estate collateral, the capital markets were able to substitute for the loss of bank intermediation. in asia, there is considerable room to develop a bond market to serve as a back - up in

crockett, to deliver the fourth hkma distinguished lecture. mr crockett, please.
us from a normalized economy and a normalized monetary policy by feeling the stones. we may slip on occasion, but you should not underestimate our intention to apply whatever talents we possess as policymakers to do what is right to advance economic prosperity while strictly adhering to our commitment of containing inflation and maintaining market stability. thank you ( [UNK] [UNK] ). richard fisher joined mario draghi, mark carney, joachim fels and others at a symposium on “ financial stability and the role of central banks, ” organized by jens weidmann and deutsche bundesbank in frankfurt am main on feb. 27 – 28, 2014. bis central bankers ’ speeches

an environment that will support sustained economic growth worldwide.
' speeches 7 / 7 bis - central bankers'speeches

billion, for instance, this would affect 82 % of all institutions in germany but only 14 % of aggregate total assets. however, an absolute threshold on its own could lead to a situation in some eu countries in which many or all institutions would then be subject to the simplified regime. to stop this from happening, a second, relative size criterion should probably be considered : namely that an institution is not bigger than a certain share of the gross domestic product or banking market of the member state in which it is domiciled. these criteria make it feasible to establish an initial sensible, workable definition of a small institution. but they are still not enough as they could, for example, result in institutions with risky business models also coming under the simplified rules. this needs to be avoided, which means that it would make sense for these criteria to be accompanied by a raft of tough secondary conditions as follows. first, only institutions that would be subject to insolvency proceedings in the event of resolution may be part of the box. second, candidates for the small banking box may not undertake any notable capital market or cross - border business. third, they should have, at most, a small trading book and only a small derivatives book. fourth, instead of internal models, they may only use the standardised approach. by adopting this list of requirements, institutions with riskier business models can be excluded from the very start. what ’ s more, we should not forget the systemic risks arising from the connectedness of many small institutions – that is to say, they are “ too many to fail ". in the end, the final decision should always rest with the supervisors. should they have serious misgivings, they can opt not to subject an institution to the simplified rules. incidentally, this ability to choose should be anything but a one - way street. i believe that credit institutions that would be considered eligible for the small banking box should also be given the option of opting to be supervised pursuant to the more complex rules. what i wanted to show to you is that it is perfectly feasible to establish a sensible, workable definition of institutions that are eligible for relief measures. but the second all - important question remains unanswered : what in the box actually needs to be simplified? in some areas, relief could be provided by completely exempting institutions in the small banking box from certain requirements. for instance, i can imagine small institutions being largely exempted from disclosure requirements and remuneration rules