several card scheme initiatives which have the potential to make competition in the european cards market livelier. eaps follows an interlinking model of national card schemes and a number of countries and a large number of ( savings ) banks are participating. the monnet initiative investigates the creation of a new scheme and is – for the time being – driven by german and french banks. payfair is a private initiative. the ecb welcomes all initiatives and praises the effort and dynamism of the driving entities. but i should emphasise that the ecb is neutral towards these initiatives and towards any new initiative that may appear. some features of the existing initiatives are positive – some nonetheless would need further enhancement – as, for example, a clear commitment of eaps for a future integration and the involvement of more euro area countries in the monnet project, and if not now than definitely in a future phase of the project. all these initiatives follow different concepts and models adding to choice and innovation which characterises a dynamic market. let ’ s assume for the moment an additional scheme will emerge : first, this will increase competition, especially if the new scheme follows an economical model without a strong card brand preponderance and without the features offered by international credit cards, such instant free credit, miles, bonuses, and insurance. this will naturally imply downward pressure on costs and fees, also for banks. second, an additional scheme will offer an additional opportunity to substitute cash by cards through wider acceptance, especially if the new scheme follows a cost - efficient model. looking forward, as a first step, an additional card scheme could start as a basic offering, before becoming a more sophisticated model at a later stage. whether the scheme is debit or credit and the various additional offerings to cardholders and merchants should be an issue of each issuing and acquiring bank. overall, i am however convinced that the benefits of an additional card scheme clearly outweigh the costs and i can reassure you that the continuation of any initiative in the way i outlined will continue to have our support. sepa for cards : implementation challenges certainly, on the way towards new schemes – whatever their origin is – and the realisation of sepa for cards, some challenges persist. knowing that examples of scheme rules already exist and that the epc is working on the card standards, the most challenging phase for the creation of a new scheme seems to achieve a clear commitment and co - ordination among members. in this context it is worthwhile to mention

by central banks and governments today account for approximately ten times the annual worldwide production of gold. prospects of official gold sales therefore have an inherent ability to destabilize the gold market. the initial washington agreement and the follow up agreement have demonstrated that official sales are best conducted in the context of a clear and transparent overall framework. while the terms of the agreement were not rigid in their nature, they provided sufficient guidance to the gold market to prevent excessive market volatility. in the event that official gold sales continue to be meaningful beyond the current central bank agreement, a new set of parameters will have to be established upon its expiry. moreover, should the imf or any other official institution decide to sell substantial gold reserves during the next couple of year, it strikes me as essential that such additional sales get incorporated into the existing framework. even within a broad international framework, national sales are best conducted on the basis of a clear and transparent sales strategy. in the case of the snb, the specific sales programs evolved over time but the principles of regularity and transparency were maintained throughout. market participants knew at all times what the snb was doing with regard to its gold sales. moreover, the market knew how the sales were conducted. finally, while there were a number of adjustments over the five and a half year period, the snb never departed from the principle of regular and transparent sales. as a result, market rumors and price volatility associated with snb ’ s sales practices were virtually non - existent. in a similar light, the snb ’ s experience as a gold seller suggests that it is best to consider ex - ante to what extent performance considerations should play a role in how the sales are conducted. in the case of the snb, the governing board made a number of key performance related decisions at the outset : to limit the foreign exchange risk associated with the dollar proceeds of the sales, to allow clearly defined active trading around the daily sales quotas, to use a conservative option strategy to achieve a modest outperformance and to assure competitive pricing from the dealer community. once these parameters were set, little room was left for discretion by the governing board or the snb ’ s trading desk. human nature being what it is, we all know that too much discretion can quickly turn into room for judgmental error, particularly at times of heightened market pressure. a central bank in particular has every incentive to minimize such room for error in all its activities as its all