a timely manner should be a key priority for eu legislators. second, we strongly welcome the intention of the legislator to give central banks of issue a role in the regulatory framework for ccps, commensurate with their responsibilities. as i have said, this is of crucial importance, considering the fundamental impact ccps can have on monetary policy. at the same time, the involvement of the central bank in the regulatory framework should 3 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches not put into question either its independence or its discretion to define the scope of its monetary policy. we are confident that the eu legislator will fully recognise this imperative. thank you for your attention. 4 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches

yves mersch : evolving regulatory environment for ccps - the perspective of a central bank speaking points by mr yves mersch, member of the executive board of the european central bank, at the cumberland lodge financial services summit, cumberland lodge, windsor, great park, 10 november 2017. * * * introduction i am delighted to return to this year ’ s summit. i spoke last year about the systemic importance of central counterparties, and their importance, in particular for monetary policy transmission. i spoke about how the growth of these infrastructures means that the existing regulatory framework will need to be enhanced, to address the increasing risks posed by ccps. i also spoke of how the prospect of the uk ’ s exit from the eu creates uncertainty regarding the future of the regulatory and supervisory framework for non - euro area ccps that clear significant amounts of euro currency. there have been very significant developments at eu level since i spoke about this topic last year. the most notable development has been the commission ’ s proposal from june of this year to amend the emir framework for the supervision and regulation of eu and third country ccps. we strongly welcome the proposals to strengthen the role played by the central banks of issue of the eu in the regulatory framework, as the authorities responsible for the implementation of monetary policy. this strengthening is necessary in light of two major trends of the past few years. first, since emir first entered into force there has been a continued growth of central clearing and resulting financial risk concentration in ccps. this has significantly increased the potential disruptive effects that ccps can have on the implementation of our monetary policy. second, the uk departure from the eu implies that a very large part of euro - denominated clearing activities across all asset classes may be performed from outside the eu in the future. while central clearing is undeniably a global industry, the range of euro - denominated asset cleared outside of its monetary zone is unparalleled for any other major currency around the world. this clearly points to the need to strengthen the eu regime for third country ccps and to enhance in this context also the role of the relevant central banks of issue. as distinct from the need to strengthen the role of the central banks of issue serving a monetary policy purpose, it is also fully justified to seek to strengthen the supervisory regime for ccps take the case of third country ccps : until now, the eu ’ s approach towards third country ccps, including those that are of systemic importance, has been