of confidential information between the ecb and the aml / cft supervisors was enabled in 2018 by an amendment to the capital requirements directive, the ecb, as a prudential supervisor, has concluded an agreement on information exchange with more than 50 aml / cft supervisory authorities across all members states of the european economic area. this cooperation was further enhanced by subsequent amendments to the directive in 2019, as well as by the establishment of aml / cft colleges, in which the ecb participates as an observer. over the past years the ecb has also been actively contributing to the work of the eba ’ s aml standing committee. good and efficient cooperation with aml / cft supervisory authorities is therefore an important priority for us. last year, following discussions in the council of the eu, the commission presented a set of legislative proposals for major changes to the eu aml / cft framework : the first substantial change consists in transforming most of the requirements addressed to 1 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches private entities from the aml directive to a directly applicable eu regulation. the second, and even more fundamental change is the establishment of a new authority at the eu level with a mandate for both direct and indirect aml / cft supervision across all eu member states. we see this as an important shift which has the potential to bring a more harmonised application of eu aml / cft requirements and convergence of practices in aml / cft supervision across the eu. the third and most prominent change, which concerns the ecb ’ s central banking activities, is the introduction of an eu - wide limit to payments in cash. this type of measure has so far only been implemented at the level of individual member states by means of national legislation. in the past the ecb has opined on a number of such national legislative measures. the legislative package published by the commission consists of four legislative acts. the ecb was consulted on most elements of the legislative package by the european parliament and the council in october 2021. the ecb governing council recently adopted and published its opinions on all four elements of the package. my colleagues will give more details on the main themes which the ecb opinions touch upon. most of the observations and suggestions in the ecb opinions seek to improve the framework of cooperation and information exchange with the future aml authority, as well as the national aml / cft authorities. the ecb incorporated in its opinions its experience from establishing eu - level prude

2 / 3 majority that it interferes with the objectives and tasks of the escb. since the provision of ela can interfere with implementation of the single monetary policy ( as it is a parallel source of liquidity to the single monetary policy ), the governing council needs to be informed of the ela operation in a timely manner. it will assess the situation and, if an interference with eurosystem tasks is indeed established, object to the granting of ela. the specific form of an eventual objection is at the discretion of the governing council. the governing council could, for instance, set certain limits or conditions on the provision of ela, like the preservation of the financial independence of the ncb. so central bank liquidity could be rolled over within the limits of the entity ’ s frozen access and through ela, but this is clearly not warranted in all scenarios for an entity determined as failing or likely to fail. at the time the entity is put into resolution i ’ ve talked about central banking funding at the time the bank is determined as failing or likely to fail. let us now examine what can happen later on in the process. first of all, there are some clear - cut situations where no liquidity can be provided by a central bank, be it under the monetary policy framework or ela. this is the case for entities put into insolvency or liquidation proceedings. second, let us take the example of an entity that is put in resolution following a “ failing or likely to fail ” determination. let us assume that it is no longer contributing to monetary policy transmission, because it no longer channels liquidity to the real economy and is in the process of being wound down. wind - down entities, whose main purpose is the gradual divestment of their assets and the cessation of their business, have been excluded from access to monetary policy credit operations. this applies for asset management vehicles, too. as regards their access to emergency liquidity assistance, the relevant central bank assesses the situation of each entity according to that central bank ’ s national framework. however, in most cases, such entities are unlikely to obtain access to ela if there are doubts as to their solvency, or if this would raise monetary financing concerns. third, let us take the situation where the application of one of the resolution tools will lead to the credit institution becoming financially sound again. this would happen through the sale of business tool, the bridge institution tool, the asset separation tool