##lfil our monetary policy tasks. i also want to stress that, as a rule, the implementation of the regime for non - eu countries should continue to rely as much as possible on cooperation with, and deferral to, local authorities. let me also stress the crucial importance of finalising the adoption of key pieces of eu legislation – such as emir ii – well in advance of brexit, in order to be prepared for all possible contingencies, including a no - deal scenario. failing to do so could leave central banks and supervisors without the appropriate tools to handle the risks linked to systemic euro ccps operating outside the umbrella of eu regulation. naturally, we are available to provide any assistance in the context of these discussions. finally, we should not overlook the systemic cross - border implications of central clearing within the eu. we should therefore also strive to achieve enhanced supervisory convergence within the union. this would contribute to ensuring the integrity of the single market 3 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches and a level playing field, consistent with the objectives of the capital markets union. the european parliament can play a key role in furthering these objectives. conclusion let me conclude. our monetary policy measures have had tangible benefits for the euro area economy. further policy initiatives are however needed to reduce vulnerabilities, strengthen resilience in crisis situations and increase growth potential. only ambitious policies will deliver concrete benefits for the people of europe. this is also what our common history tells us. this year marks the 25th anniversary of the single market and of the maastricht treaty ’ s entry into force. those were bold decisions and we continue to benefit from them today : goods, people, services and capital can move freely and eu legislation ensures that commensurate rights and obligations apply throughout our union. with the creation of economic and monetary union ( emu ) we went further by adopting the single currency. it is in this spirit that i look forward to the coming months and the pivotal discussions we will have on reforming emu governance. thank you for your attention. i am at your disposal for questions. 1 www. ecb. europa. eu / press / key / date / 2018 / html / ecb. sp180205. en. html 2 see “ low inflation in the euro area : causes and consequences ”, ecb occasional paper series, no 181, january 2017. 3 see “ domestic and global drivers of inflation in the euro area ”, ecb economic bulletin

institutional framework, has not proceeded with the same speed and there continue to be clear differences according to the activity type. banking consolidation also raises sensitive moral hazard and crisis management questions, as painfully illustrated by the crisis. the securities markets showed strong growth in the years before the crisis and clear signs of integration, though not to the same extent as observed in the euro money markets. with the crisis, bond price indictors showed signs of more dispersion across countries in europe, but the question is whether this points to more segmented markets or rather increased risk awareness on the part of investors. very topical in this respect is also the cds market and its interaction with the underlying ( sovereign ) bond market. finally, the integration of a securities market depends to a large extent on the integration of the supporting market infrastructure. this is an area where the eurosystem and the european commission have taken significant measures, but integration continues to be affected by legal, fiscal and technical issues. an important set of issues on which the panellist may want to comment relate to the regulatory reform process, where the g20 provides the strategic impetus, the financial stability board ( fsb ) plays an important role in policy coordination, and the committees and working groups ( such as the basel committee on banking supervision, which is the emblematic global committee ) the review of specific international standards. important regulatory reforms are underway in europe, as well as in the united states, and i want to elaborate on them because they have important implications for the ecb. as you know, the proposed reform for the financial supervisory framework in the eu will be based on two pillars. the micro - prudential pillar, the european system of financial supervisors ( esfs ), will be composed of the national supervisors and three european supervisory authorities ( esas ). the european systemic risk board ( esrb ) will form the macro - prudential pillar. under the proposals of the european commission, the esas will carry out a range of activities, including the issuance of binding and non - binding rules which will provide the basis of a so - called “ single eu rulebook ”. the esas will further promote a consistent application of eu legislation and of a common supervisory culture, and provide for mediation in the case of disagreements between national supervisors. all this should lead to a more harmonised regulation and supervision across countries, and as a result also foster financial integration. for central bankers, the part of the reform which directly concerns them is the establishment