affordability and availability, and, as we have seen, can threaten financial stability. as with banks, the goal should be to ensure that our housing finance system can continue to function even in the face of significant house price declines and severe economic conditions. changing the system to attract large amounts of private capital would be a major step toward that goal. the question of the government ’ s role in the new system is a challenging one for congress. many of the well - known reform proposals include some role for government. some argue that government cannot avoid bearing the deep - in - the - tail risk of a catastrophic housing crisis. a number of proposals incorporate a government guarantee to cover this risk, to take effect after a significant stack of private capital is wiped out. that brings me to my second principle : if congress chooses to go in this direction, any such guarantee should be explicit and transparent, and should apply to securities, not to institutions. reform should not leave us with any institutions that are so important as to be candidates for too - big - to - fail. 4 / 6 bis central bankers'speeches third, we should promote greater competition in this market. the economics of securitization do not require a duopoly. yet there is no way for private firms to acquire a gse charter and enter the industry. this is akin to having only two banks with federal deposit insurance, which would make competition by other banks very difficult. greater competition would help to reduce the systemic importance of the gses, and spur more innovation. greater competition also requires a level playing field, allowing secondary market access to a wide - range of lenders and thereby giving homebuyers a choice among many potential mortgage lenders and products. fourth, it is worth considering simple approaches that restructure and repurpose parts of the existing architecture of our housing finance system. we know that housing reform is difficult ; completely redrawing the system may not be necessary and could complicate the search for a solution. using the existing architecture would allow for a continued smooth, gradual transition. fifth and last, we need to identify and build upon areas of bipartisan agreement. in my view, at this late stage we should not be holding out for the perfect answer. we should be looking for the best feasible plan to escape the unacceptable status quo. conclusion i see two reasons why this is a good time to address the housing finance system ’ s shortcomings. first, the economy and the housing sector are

success of this venture. in closing, i wish to thank all those who have helped us in getting to where we are today, and seek your continued assistance as we traverse this very difficult terrain. in this regard, i wish to make special mention of the stock exchange technical committee ( setc ) first initiative, the commonwealth secretariat, the west african institute for financial and economic management, the team of local lawyers headed by mr eke halloway, as well as market practitioners in neighbouring countries who have been unrelenting in sharing their experiences and expertise with us. naming people in these situations can be invidious, but let me crave your indulgence to mention mr maroof matin, the resident consultant provided by first initiative, mr jacob kanu of first discount house, mr melvin tucker, former deputy governor and other members of the stock exchange technical committee. to all of these, i say thank you very much and please let us continue to work together for a more prosperous sierra leone. thank you for your attention.