, olivier j., and lawrence h. summers ( 1987 ). “ hysteresis in unemployment, ” european economic review, vol. 31 ( february – march ), pp. 288 – 95. board of governors of the federal reserve system ( 2019 ), 2 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches report on the economic well - being of u. s. households in 2018 ( pdf ). washington : board of governors, may. davis, steven j., and till von wachter ( 2011 ). “ recessions and the costs of job loss ( pdf ), ” brookings papers on economic activity, fall, pp. 1 – 72. martin, robert f., teyanna munyan, and beth anne wilson ( 2014 ). “ potential output and recessions : are we fooling ourselves? ” ifdp notes. washington : board of governors of the federal reserve system, november 12. — — — ( 2015 ). “ potential output and recessions : are we fooling ourselves? ( pdf ) ” international finance discussion papers 1145. washington : board of governors of the federal reserve system, september. reifschneider, dave, william wascher, and david wilcox ( 2015 ). “ aggregate supply in the united states : recent developments and implications for the conduct of monetary policy, ” imf economic review, vol. 63 ( may ), pp. 71 – 109. romer, christina d., and david h. romer ( 1989 ). “ does monetary policy matter? a new test in the spirit of friedman and schwartz ( pdf ), ” in olivier j. blanchard and stanley fischer, eds., nber macroeconomics annual 1989, vol. 4. cambridge, mass. : mit press, pp. 121 – 84. 1 board of governors, 2019. also see the federal reserve ’ s survey of household economics and decisionmaking ( forthcoming ) and its report on the economic well - being of u. s. households in 2019, featuring supplemental data from april 2020 ( forthcoming ). 2 romer and romer, 1989. 3 for example, see reifschneider, wascher, and wilcox, 2015 ; blanchard and summers, 1987 ; and martin, munyan, and wilson, 2014, 2015. 4 davis and von wachter, 2011. 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches

involves additional operating complexity to ensure a smooth shift of transaction and supporting data from one site to the other. i see this model as best suited for certain types of business activities that require as close to real - time information as possible, although i recognize that it dilutes internal synergy, which is particularly critical for trading operations. as a result, firms need to balance all the competing factors in determining how to achieve an appropriately high degree of resilience for particular operations. some functions may require more than one level of backup ( for example, an active site with secondary hot and tertiary cold back up sites ). at this point, activities that need real - time backup, such as the transferral of transaction information from a front office, are constrained geographically by existing technology. but the technology is rapidly evolving and, over time, will significantly expand the range of business - continuity strategies and change their relative costs and benefits. the extensive interdependence among participants requires better coordination in identifying best practices and sharing information. various trade associations ( the securities industry association, banking industry technology secretariat, and the new york - based payment risk committee ) have created industry - specific business - resumption work groups, and they are starting to meet. i trust that these coordination efforts will include the development of a plan for coordinated testing of backup sites by firms across the financial sector similar to the testing that took place in preparation for y2k. initiatives by the federal reserve and bank supervisors to facilitate financial system resiliency at the federal reserve, we are into evaluating and strengthening our business - resumption plans. as you may know, we were forced to evacuate the federal reserve bank of new york for several days, and we relocated staff and operations to several backup sites. we are expanding our plans to ensure that critical central bank operations, supervisory functions, and financial products and services offices have sufficient redundancy in facilities and staff. one step that may be of particular interest is our plan to insure that if a reserve bank cannot operate, another reserve bank will be able to step in quickly to meet the discount needs of banks from the affected district. as policymakers, we are evaluating our authority and flexibility in responding to situations that temporarily affect a bank's financial condition. i believe that our central bank tools were flexible and effective in providing the liquidity necessary to stabilize the markets in the days immediately after 9 / 11. we bought a record number of repurchase agreements, injecting approximately $