re - channel at least usd 100 billion of sdr to the countries that need it most. the majority of these reallocations will be redirected towards the resilience and sustainability trust ( rst ) and the poverty reduction and growth trust ( prgt ) funds, to the benefit of low - income countries. still on the imf, progress can hopefully be achieved on two fronts. first, we still have to find additional resources to finance the prgt ’ s subsidy account in a context of growing demand and higher interest rates. second, the ongoing 16th general review of quotas should give the fund more firepower, by leading to an increase in overall quotas of at least 35 %. furthermore, the fund ’ s governance would be improved if, as is currently discussed, a 25th chair at the board for african countries is created. looking beyond the imf, we have to move on to modernise as swiftly as possible the multilateral development banks ( mdbs ). the g20 leaders ’ declaration iii rightly called to enhance the financial capacity of the world bank, and more generally to foster “ better, bigger and more effective mdbs ”. the g20 endorsed a dedicated roadmap which could provide mdbs with an additional capacity of around usd 200 billion over the next decade : progress will need to be closely monitored to ensure concrete implementation of the capital adequacy framework recommendations so as to maximise the leverage effect of potential capital increases. these advances should be implemented effectively and as soon as possible : there have been too many broken promises in the past. restoring everyone ’ s confidence in multilateralism, particularly in the south, means first and foremost, today and at long last, “ walking our talk ”. b2. the next step is to go beyond these measures to truly reinvigorate multilateral cooperation and address the flaws in the current system. multilateralism is at a crossroads, or let ’ s say at a “ darwinian ” moment : iv it must page 5 sur 8 evolve in order to survive or else it may die. to this end, why not start by creating a special taskforce, as an amplifier of the 2017 eminent persons group, with balanced representation of the international community. this independent group would be charged with suggesting more ambitious avenues for reforms of the international financial system. let me dream somewhat and provide some food for thought, building on the lessons of the european experience. first, we need to move towards un

the worst outcomes, as we have done in preparing for a no - deal brexit. and sometimes you need to be bold to avoid truly bad outcomes, exactly as mario draghi did when he said that the eurosystem would do “ whatever it takes ”. third, how should we respond to uncertainty about structural relationships? uncertainty about the transmission mechanism is often used to justify acting gradually. sometimes described as “ tiptoeing in a dark room ”, a central banker following the brainard principle attenuates his response to inflationary shocks if he is uncertain about the precise sensitivity of inflation to monetary policy. but the more cautious he is in the first step, the more ready he should be to take several additional steps : gradualism is not inaction. structural shifts in the economy are also constantly changing economic dynamics and equilibrium relationships, such as r * ( the natural rate of interest ) and u * ( the natural rate of unemployment ). but as john williams of the new york fed has pointed out, these stars are today more a fuzzy blur than a single bright point of light. so whilst they can help with the broad orientation of monetary policy, uncertainty about these stars is too wide to permit precise navigation. overall, therefore, the theoretical guidance on how to respond to uncertainty is itself open, to say the least. my understanding of the present debates leads me to the following four pragmatic suggestions that i hope can stimulate your discussions : 1. remain very clear about your objectives – uncertain times are not the right ones to create additional doubts about, say, your inflation target – and about your capacity and determination to use your tools in a predicable sequence. 2. but, whilst being consistent with your guidance, be very flexible in the precise calendar and calibration of your implementation. in short, be as predictable as possible, but never be precommitted. 3. act to prevent the worst outcomes occurring but without supplying complete insurance, which would create moral hazard. 4. never base policy on only one expected path for the economy. in conclusion, we cannot seek to control, or avoid, uncertainty ; instead we must implement strategies that are the most robust to it. the french philosopher edgar morin put it nicely : “ la connaissance progresse en integrant l ’ incertitude, non en l ’ exorcisant ” – “ knowledge advances by integrating uncertainty, not by exorcising it ”. with that in mind