assessment of the migration efforts deemed necessary, the ecb preferred migration end date for the credit transfer scheme would be november 2012. as a logical consequence of this, the ecb would envisage an end date of november 2013 for the direct debit scheme. however, the actual end date for migration to sepa will be determined by the european council and the european parliament by means of the co - decision procedure. overall, not having a regulation is not an option. we all look forward to the upcoming draft legislative proposal by the european commission and we hope that the proposal is published as soon as possible. 2. towards a competitive european payment card market calls for an additional european card scheme the sepa card framework developed a few years ago presents three ways of establishing a card scheme that achieves the overall objective of citizens being able to use the scheme ’ s cards anywhere in the euro area. this could be achieved by : 1. replacing a national scheme with an international scheme ( assuming the latter complies with the principles of sepa ) ; 2. developing a payment card scheme covering the entire euro area, either by means of alliances with other card schemes or through expansion ; 3. co - branding with an international card scheme. the eurosystem expressed reservations regarding the first and third options. it was felt that the first option – the “ replacement strategy ” – would lead to a situation where visa europe and mastercard progressively became the sole providers of card payment services offered by banks in the euro area. the third option – “ co - branding ” – was deemed less favourable because it would perpetuate the existing situation, where schemes are protected from competition by national borders. if the majority of schemes were to opt for co - branding and this situation were to become permanent, the market would remain highly fragmented. sepa customers would not benefit from economies of scale or competition. national schemes would, in all probability, retain national business. cross - border transactions would be effected only through visa europe and mastercard. instead, the eurosystem expressed a preference for the emergence of an additional european card scheme. this was the position of the eurosystem four years ago, and it remains its position today. there is a clear risk of the vast majority of the national card schemes – some of them rather efficient as they are – leaving their market share to visa europe and mastercard and competition being reduced to a duopoly. this would mean less choice, less competition, and less european governance.

judge by looking at the section which is visible above the surface. this is in my view a useful metaphor, because as the crisis gradually unfolded, a chain of unexpected problems came to the surface and vulnerabilities that were previously underestimated became apparent. let us consider first the tip of the iceberg, namely the liquidity crisis. tensions in money markets erupted in august 2007 when the us mortgage market, which was at the epicentre of a complex network of financial derivative products held globally, started to un - ravel. liquidity in interbank markets worldwide dried up as market participants became paralysed by uncertainty. the key problem was that counterparty risk – which had hitherto remained bis central bankers ’ speeches limited – suddenly increased in great proportions because the distribution of risk exposures to us subprime mortgage markets was markedly opaque. this led some market segments to partially freeze and others to close completely. this is where the second layer of the iceberg comes onto the stage. the collapse of lehman brothers in the autumn of 2008 triggered an exceptionally abrupt re - pricing of risks globally. it led to a very significant intensification of the financial crisis ; to a temporary freeze in trade financing and a global trade decline ; to a curtailment of credit and domestic demand ; and, ultimately, to a severe decline in global demand and output. the main channels through which the crisis was transmitted internationally are now relatively well understood, although the extent and strength of the interconnectedness was quite surprising in real time. activity corrected most in countries where credit was booming prior to the crisis, with large current account deficits, high external debt and highly leveraged financial sectors, in particular. 1 in the euro area, a channel of particular importance was the fact that some banks had tapped us wholesale funding markets in large amounts to finance their activities. 2 some of these banks were in addition as heavily involved as us banks in the production of allegedly riskfree securities, such as asset - backed commercial paper, that aimed to meet the needs of us money markets funds. 3 they were severely hit when these markets froze. moreover, although the euro area ’ s current account was broadly balanced, it still had significant gross external assets and liabilities vis - a - vis the us, which acted as a powerful conduit of the crisis. challenges became more intricate still when the third layer of the iceberg – the sovereign debt crisis – surfaced towards the end of 2009. risk re - pricing intensified