dependent on insurance and takaful companies building strong internal underwriting and risk pricing practices to ensure the sustainability of the business, particularly in the highly competitive motor insurance segment. let me re - emphasis the importance this development to our market and the criticality to remove the current market distortions that undermine the long term sustainability of motor insurance. the industry cannot afford to take a short term view ; it must keep its sights on building the foundations for operating in a more diverse and mature market, with stronger value propositions for consumers. presently, with the high volume of vehicles referred to by the industry, the malaysian motor insurance pool has a life of its own and i was told the mmip is the 9th largest general insurer in malaysia. this was never the intent. let ’ s revert to its original mandate as a mechanism to insure the highest risks motor vehicles. in tandem with these developments, insurers and takaful operators must be fully accountable for the conduct of their intermediaries in ensuring that customers receive proper advice and quality service throughout the duration of the policy. it is important that adequate training is provided and the right remuneration and incentive structure is implemented to promote a committed and professional agency force. with this expectation there is increased demand for a full time and professional agency force. conduct issues are viewed seriously by the bank and we are fully committed to the responsibility entrusted to the bank to effectively enforce regulatory requirements on fair conduct towards consumers. the financial services act provides the bank with explicit and expanded enforcement powers which include monetary and non - monetary actions. in addition to private and public reprimand as well as direction to make restitution to aggrieved parties. as a result of supervisory interventions by the bank, more than rm30 million in premiums were refunded to the affected policyholders due to mis - selling practices in the sale of life insurance products in the past. bis central bankers ’ speeches the bank had also directed insurers to refund the premiums in more than 700, 000 cases involving the forced purchase of personal accident policies. in addition, insurers have been directed to modify or withdraw misleading advertisements, make call backs to consumers to confirm the products purchased without adhering to proper disclosure practices, as well as strengthen internal controls over sales and marketing practices with respect to bancassurance products. the enforcement measures undertaken signals the bank ’ s low level of tolerance for misconduct. it also serves to remind the industry of the bank ’ s

liquidity. to this end, measures enabling non - residents to undertake transactions with authorised dealer banks in india ; providing indian banks with access to offshore markets to undertake non - deliverable transactions etc., have been taken. for the benefits to accrue to pricing ( and therefore benchmarks ) it is necessary that price impulses move freely from onshore to offshore and vice versa. among other things, this may require linked and interoperable infrastructure, common market - makers across the segments and eventually a frictionless channel for investors to move from one market to the other. there is a strong case to work towards a long - term solution to this segmentation d. extra territoriality – a probably unintended consequence of the post - gfc drive towards de - risking otc derivatives markets has been the tendency of developed economies to contain the risk of their entities by attempting to maintain control of regulation and risk management practices of third countries. thus, for example, european banks may not be able to operate through indian financial infrastructure entities ( like ccps, benchmark administrators, etc. ), unless their home regulator accords “ equivalence ” treatment to the indian infrastructure entities or these entities are endorsed or recognized. such treatment involves ability to call for information, supervise, inspect and ( at least potentially ) impose penalty on indian entities. this amounts to an unfortunate interference in the regulatory architecture in india, especially given the fact that these indian entities meet relevant global best standards, set by committee on payments and market infrastructures ( cpmi ) - iosco. similar extrajurisdictional overreach is hanging over fbil as well. the potential disruption to forex markets, both onshore and ndf, can be rather serious. that such disruption flows from the action of regulators is not in alignment with the post - gfc global consensus on de - risking financial markets. all regulated entities understand the costs and constraints of compliance. it cannot be anyone ’ s argument that replicating such obligations for every regulator in every jurisdiction is an efficient arrangement. a satisfactory solution to this impending complication needs to be found quickly. 21. as we all understand, a benchmark is as good as the underlying market. developing good benchmarks is eventually dependent on developing deep and liquid financial markets, which is an ongoing and drawn - out process. meanwhile, effort can focus on improving the integrity and credibility of the benchmark process. this requires achieving a balance between good statistical techniques and realistic subjective judgement, of both market