crises in 1997, and the devaluation of the russian rouble in 1998. but they were not cost - free : in the absence of using the exchange rate as a shock absorber, the burden of adjustment in the economy under a currency board agreement necessarily falls on wages and prices. in the case of argentina, the rigidity of the hard peg came to the forefront in the wake of a series of external shocks in early 1999 – notably the higher cost of financing to emerging markets, the sharp devaluation of the brazilian real, the rapidly appreciating us dollar, and falling commodity prices. the straitjacket imposed by the currency board cast doubts on argentina ’ s medium - term economic performance and concerns about its ability to service and refinance debt were further compounded by the relative fiscal laxity in previous years. as the credibility of the currency board came under increasing pressure, the country required policy adjustments but also sustained signs of support from the official sector. yet argentina ’ s misfortune is that, as its need for official financing was increasing, opinions about how multilateral agencies should act when faced with emerging market crises were changing – in particular, with regards to the need of engaging private creditors ( particularly bondholders ) in the resolution of debt problems. the last imf package in support of argentina ( september 2001 ), for example, contained specific provisions to this end. in the subsequent months, fund officials publicly encouraged the argentinean authorities to reach an agreement with private sector agents over debt - exchange operations. and in december 2001, the fund suspended its loan programmes with the country. while private sector involvement in crisis resolution should be welcome, one may wonder if it should be the sole instrument to deal with such circumstances. many feel that the official sector was rather unkind to argentina. after all, its macroeconomic indicators – particularly its fiscal accounts, which were the main source of concern – were broadly the same ( or better ) than other countries which had received large imf funding in recent years, such as turkey or brazil. argentina ’ s central government debt in 2001 was less than 55 per cent of gdp, and its government deficit ( including the provinces ) amounted to less than 6 per cent of gdp in the same year. in contrast, turkey posted a 57. 4 per cent debt - to - gdp ratio and a government deficit of 11. 6 per cent of gdp in 2000, right before its currency and banking crises. brazil had a government deficit of 7.

for all other sources of risk that we supervise. an approach that will be here to stay. our interactions with the banks we supervise show that they are also making progress, and they have finally started to put in place the basic infrastructure needed to identify, monitor, assess and control climate - related and environmental risks. 1 / 2 bis - central bankers'speeches all progress should be celebrated. for the banks under our supervision, we are contributing to this by proactively sharing the good practices we see. but let me be clear that all progress is ultimately a means to an end. and that end can be one thing only : practices and policies that are fully aligned with a paris - compatible transition path. this is why, when taking the first set of climate - related actions in our monetary policy, we committed to regularly reviewing all the relevant measures to ensure that they continue to support the decarbonisation path to reach the goals of the paris agreement and the eu's climate neutrality objectives. this is also why last week ecb banking supervision communicated deadlines by which we expect banks'risk management strategies to be fully aligned with our supervisory expectations in the area of climaterelated and environmental risks. this is why, despite the progress we have seen, i will continue to stress that the banks under our supervision need to step up their game and truly manage climate - related and environmental risks in the same way we expect them to manage any other material risk. this is why we support the european commission's proposal that banks should be legally required to put in place prudential transition plans which enable them to assess their risk exposures and the effectiveness of their risk controls in a world that is transitioning to net zero. this is why we ourselves will soon start to disclose data on climate risk exposure and the carbon footprint of our own asset portfolios, a commitment that covers all national central banks in the eurosystem. and this is why we urgently need to continue moving ahead. our road to sharm el - sheikh has been productive. but we cannot assess the success of our actions based on our point of departure. we need to judge our progress based on what is necessary to reach our destination in time. and we unfortunately cannot say that we are ahead of schedule. droughts, floods, heatwaves, and biodiversity loss are undeniably on the rise as very real manifestations of the climate and environmental crises. at the same time, in the eu, we are seeing that governments are all