, wage moderation was central to improve the financial health of the private sector. that would lay the foundations for an improved investment climate, supporting labour demand. here, the central bank had little more instruments than to use its weight and try to influence the private sector. the famous wassenaar agreement of 1982, was supported by dnb, because it offered scope for restoring profitability of the business sector. at the end of duisenberg's presidency, some concluded, rather optimistically, that a dutch miracle had replaced the dutch disease. the dutch economy had experienced a successful recovery that can be ascribed to many factors : monetary and budgetary stability, as well as wage moderation and structural changes in labour and product markets. it is safe to say that duisenberg contributed to all of these factors. when one would try to summarize the legacy of duisenberg's dnb presidency, i think the first central theme is his aim for stability. he achieved that stability by a persistent policy and staying the course. frequently, he had to defend this kind of policy line, for example regarding interest rate adjustments in view of the exchange rate. in dutch he described this kind of policy as “ stug ”, translated as stiff or tough. “ stug ” has the subtle connotation that he did not expect much initial cooperation in his policy line towards stability. another central theme for duisenberg was his relentless focus on the benefit of the dutch society. this may sound self - evident for a policymaker, but duisenberg interpreted this differently from a politician. he demonstrated that a central banker should look at the long term costs and benefits. to give an example, at the time when politicians were celebrating the proceeds of natural gas production – 6 % of gdp in 1981 – duisenberg stressed that this was only temporary and warned that painful adjustments would be necessary in the long term. the last central theme that characterizes duisenberg's presidency is his european focus. with respect to economic policy, duisenberg continuously stressed that an “ alleingang ” would be catastrophic for the economic well - being of nations. an integrating world, with all its complexities and risks, required international cooperation and coordination. duisenberg was aware as well, that a single monetary policy would not always match with local developments. his message is that the remaining channels to adapt to country - specific shocks should be safeguarded and strengthened. that is the main reason for his strong support for

survey indicators suggest that real gdp growth remained positive. the euro area benefited from a steady recovery in global demand throughout 2009, driven in part by the monetary and fiscal policy stimuli in most of the world ’ s regions since the beginning of the recession, as well as by modest improvements in confidence. activity has also been boosted by a reversal of the inventory cycle. but growth remains sluggish, reflecting the ongoing balance sheet adjustments in the euro area and elsewhere. this process has not only affected the financial sector, but also households, which have cut back consumption and increased their savings, and firms, which have restrained their investment spending. the key question now concerns the economic recovery, its strength and fragilities. let me start with a comment of a general nature. i have the impression that many people, whether in the business sector, the financial markets, or in academic and political circles, think that the post - crisis world will be quite similar to the pre - crisis one in 2006 – 2007. in other words, they expect the economic recovery to bring us back to where we were before the crisis. my feeling is that those who think like that are deluding themselves. the pre - crisis situation was not in equilibrium. it was not sustainable. the crisis occurred precisely because the situation was unsustainable, both within certain countries and globally. if the world economy were to return to the pre - crisis situation, within a short time span a new crisis would be likely to occur because the same imbalances that led to the crisis would build up again. considering some recent developments and behaviour, and considering the way certain policies are being discussed and the thinking of some key players, such a scenario does not seem that unlikely. i think that it would be a big mistake to regard the recession we experienced in 2008 and 2009 as just a somewhat sharper cyclical downturn. there has been a major structural shift in our economies. once the crisis is over, the world economy will look very different. this is true not only for the overall aggregates, but also for individual enterprises. the longer people take to recognise it, the more difficult it will be to recover. some would say that it is useless to make forecasts under the current circumstances, given the state of uncertainty. i don ’ t think so. after all, economic agents – individuals, households, companies, financial institutions – have to have some idea about the future in order to take their day - to - day decisions on investment,