samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
in which we live, that desire is not consistent with the policy that would best achieve our objectives. we will strive to communicate as clearly as we can so you can think along with us and alter your expectations just as we do in response to incoming information. thank you for kind attention. i would be happy to take a few questions. bis central bankers ’ speeches

effective controls. i look forward to that time as we move to the next level. 3. developing the methodology to assess effectiveness i mentioned earlier one of the promising new tools to assess the effectiveness of ethics and compliance programs, and that is the pei, the program effectiveness index. the excellent report by the ethics resource center, the federal sentencing guidelines for organizations at twenty years, has drawn attention to standards for assessing program effectiveness. the report states : “ altogether, the lack of assessment standards and guidance on how the quality of a compliance / ethics program should influence the outcome of a matter create the impression, validated by the [ ethics resource center ] and conference board studies... that too many judgments are being made inside a black box. ” 2 while we seem to be on the cusp of a number of promising indicators, like the pei, the truth is that we are not there yet. we simply do not have a tool that will give us an accurate and reliable measure of program effectiveness. instead, we have a situation where enforcers ( including those agencies with civil enforcement authority, such as the banking agencies ) tend to be result oriented. when we see that a particular organization has experienced a major compliance failure, we tend to view the failure as evidence of the ineffectiveness of the ethics resource center, the federal sentencing guidelines for organizations at twenty years at 51 ( 2012 ). bis central bankers ’ speeches ethics and compliance program. we reason backward, “ if the program were effective, this would not have happened. ” i think this is natural and understandable for the enforcement community, but it is not necessarily good policy. to borrow an observation from senator ted kennedy concerning the federal sentencing guidelines, this creates “ a risk that companies without substantial compliance programs will get a free ride, and those with strong programs will not receive the credit that they deserve. ” 3 alternatively, if there were a reliable and acceptable measure of program effectiveness, this kind of backward reasoning would be replaced by reliance on the effective measure. institutions could use the measure when making arguments for leniency, again assuming that the measure demonstrated that their programs were effective. it might, of course, show just the opposite. and there are other, perhaps even more important, benefits. if an industry and its regulators came to have great confidence in a particular effectiveness measure, this might provide a foundation for building a program that could be used to on - board risk. put differently, a particular organization could have confidence that its ethics and compliance program
luis de guindos : interview in le monde interview with mr luis de guindos, vice - president of the european central bank, in le monde, conducted by ms marie charrel and published on 13 february 2019. * * * is the ecb sufficiently well equipped to deal with the slowing european economy? yes. but remember that monetary policy cannot do everything – its primary objective is to maintain price stability, which contributes to a strong economy. however, fiscal policy and structural reforms also have a significant role to play in supporting economic activity. the ecb still has a large range of tools at its disposal, including advance communication about its strategy ( forward guidance ), reinvesting the debt securities it holds as they mature, and targeted lending to banks – the tltros. we are currently analysing the causes of the economic slowdown in europe, some of which are temporary. we will not take a decision until we have conducted a thorough analysis. what are the causes of this slowdown? it is as much the result of international factors, which have weighed on exports – the slowdown of the global and chinese economies, the risks of protectionism, market volatility, difficulties in some emerging markets – as it is the result of internal factors, like the uncertainty surrounding brexit and the tensions over the italian budget at the end of last year. of course, the ecb ’ s ability to influence external factors is limited. when dealing with the crisis, we didn ’ t hesitate to implement unconventional measures, such as net purchases of public and private debt ( quantitative easing, or qe ). in the light of the recovery, we stopped qe. but our rates are still low and our monetary policy stance will remain accommodative for a long while yet, as we are going through a period of uncertainty. how are you preparing for brexit? the united kingdom leaving the eu is bad news for everyone, and for the uk economy in particular. we are participating in a working group with the bank of england to analyse the various markets that could be affected, like the derivatives market and the market for insurance contracts. if there is an orderly brexit, the effect on financial stability will be limited, as we think the private sector is sufficiently prepared. a disorderly brexit, on the other hand, would represent a significant macroeconomic shock at a time when the european economy is already weakened. the uk ’ s gdp could shrink by

, such as danske bank, denmark ’ s largest bank, have recently been hit by scandal … yes, it ’ s a major issue that has been brought to the fore by several very serious cases. the ecb doesn ’ t have a mandate in this area, but the european commission has taken action to strengthen the cooperation between the various national anti - money laundering authorities under the auspices of the european banking authority. this is the first step, and more needs to be done to achieve greater centralisation in this area. 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches
to take further measures at any time. bis central bankers ’ speeches

thomas jordan : discussions on the topic of the euro / swiss franc minimum exchange rate speech by mr thomas jordan, vice - chairman of the governing board of the swiss national bank, held at the swiss national bank, zurich, 10 april 2012. * * * ladies and gentlemen i would like to welcome you to this discussion on the topic of the euro / swiss franc minimum exchange rate and thank you for attending at such short notice. as you are aware, on thursday of last week a few of the transactions in the foreign exchange market for the euro were concluded at a rate below the minimum exchange rate set by the swiss national bank ( snb ). i consider it important that you are aware of the sequence of events, and also that i reaffirm the snb ’ s current policy. since this is a specifically market - related topic, we have chosen this rather special approach involving a discussion with news agencies. the fact that a few individual transactions at less than chf 1. 20 per euro were observed last thursday has led to some isolated doubts being raised about the snb ’ s resolve to enforce its minimum exchange rate. right from the start i want to make it quite clear that such doubts are misplaced. the swiss national bank is enforcing the minimum exchange rate with all the means at its disposal. we are prepared to buy foreign currency in unlimited quantities for this purpose. in this respect, our policies are totally unchanged. what precisely occurred last thursday? within just a few seconds, the euro / swiss franc exchange rate fell from 1. 2020 to 1. 2000. despite snb offers placed in the trading systems, a few isolated transactions occurred below chf 1. 20 per euro. however, at no time did the best available euro exchange rate in the market fall below the minimum exchange rate of chf 1. 20. thus, for a short time, what is known as a segmented market could be observed, in which transactions below the best price were concluded. this situation was remedied within very few seconds, however, by means of arbitrage. how could transactions take place on the foreign exchange market for below chf 1. 20 per euro despite the fact that the snb was at all times present in the market? the foreign exchange market is a decentralised market. rather than foreign exchange being traded on a bourse, forex transactions are made directly between market participants. each bank has its own individual group of counterparties, and, in particular
can attest after my eight years ’ experience, will continue to play a positive role. thank you for your attention. 1 see the annual report, box n. 4, page 36 4 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches

brought our economy to a screeching halt. during the second quarter of 2020, the unemployment rate jumped to a high of 14. 8 percent and gross domestic product plunged at a 28 percent annual pace. these dynamics hit some of the most vulnerable populations the most, though strong government responses helped to both ease the effects and make many households much more resilient. once the economy restarted, demand rebounded quickly, while supply was hampered by supply chain difficulties. these supply snags were compounded enormously by a shift in demand away from in - person services and toward goods, which generally have a larger exposure to shipping and supply chain problems. supply shocks to the global economy were subsequently compounded by russia ’ s war against ukraine, which severely disrupted food and energy markets. and labor markets were disrupted by the pandemic as well. employers could not find enough workers, and job - matching was impaired. an important component of post - pandemic healing has been the recovery of supply chains after the pandemic - induced bottlenecks in both goods production and distribution. recent shipping disruptions show supply chain conditions are still an issue, but compared to pandemic - era constraints, we are in a much better position. for example, the price to ship a 40 - foot container from china to the west coast has recently - 3risen to around $ 4, 000, about twice the pre - pandemic level, but it is far below the $ 20, 000 rate in 2021. another key component of the improvement in supply has been in the labor market. we have seen substantial improvements in the labor force through both stronger immigration and higher labor force participation rates, notably by women. as supply has improved, labor demand has cooled, but this cooling has manifested largely in a reduction in job vacancies, rather than layoffs. at the same time, we have seen the labor market working more efficiently — for example, with improved job matching after the large disruptions during the pandemic. the improvements in labor supply and labor market functioning have allowed the unemployment rate to hold steady at a low level. the strong labor market has broadly improved the lives of americans, and particularly so for groups that have long suffered significantly higher unemployment levels and whose jobless rates respond more forcefully to the business cycle. improvements in productivity another key part of the story in the post - pandemic healing of our economy has been the growth of productivity. while measures of productivity tend to be volatile
and revise macroeconomic policies. it is a long term undertaking, whose benefits will be realised over many decades. support for this project, among the public, politicians and technocrats, has started to gather momentum alongside a more widespread appreciation of its long term benefits. we must use this momentum of support to make monetary union in east africa a reality. to quote the words put into the mouth of brutus by shakespeare : “ there is a tide in the affairs of men, which taken at the flood, leads on to fortune ”. if we have the courage and foresight to grasp this opportunity to create a monetary union we can make a huge contribution to the future prosperity of our people in east africa.

klaas knot : free trade and financial stability, containing the effects of geopolitical fragmentation speech by mr klaas knot, president of the netherlands bank, at the eurofi high level seminar, ghent, 23 february 2024. * * * chart to the speech thank you. it's always a pleasure to be at eurofi, a great meeting place to exchange views on finance and the economy. and could there be a more fitting place for this than the city of ghent? when you are in the city centre, and you walk from the magnificent belfry tower, past the st nicolas church, to the st michiels bridge and the korenlei, you cannot escape the impression that this is a city that not only has a rich history, but also a history of richness. and indeed, in the 13th and 14th centuries ghent was the silicon valley of europe. it was the first real industrialised city, where wool was transformed into very fine cloth,'laken'in dutch, which was in high demand in the rest of europe. this industry was so highly developed that wool was imported from scotland and england. thanks to innovation and trade, ghent was one of the biggest and most prosperous cities in europe. free trade, economic growth, prosperity : they often go together. and that is a fitting illustration of why we should be concerned also today about the growing geopolitical tensions and geo - economic fragmentation, and their impact on cross border trade and investment. let's have a look at the history of trade. as the chart shows, free trade has experienced periods of rise and fall throughout history. during much of the 19th century we saw an increase in trade, as measured by the global - trade - to - gdp ratio. this golden age of industrialisation and international trade came to an abrupt end with the outbreak of world war i. during the first half of the 20th century, world trade collapsed as a result of the great depression, nationalism and war. in the post - war decades, there was a prolonged period of growing world trade. of course, it was the period of the cold war, and trade between the eastern and western blocs was very limited. nonetheless, world trade increased, driven by the post - war recovery and policies of trade liberalisation. after the fall of the iron curtain, trade between east and west expanded rapidly. this coincided with a period of hyper - globalisation in the 1990s and 2000s. the itrevolu
lack of comparable historical data, so we should not overstate the precision of stress testing tools as of today, and be ready to examine multiple scenarios and assumptions and learn progressively. this would help to properly complement our regulatory and supervisory framework. 6 / 6

financial cost to this circumstance is sometimes invoked to explain why the mopping up approach was successful in the recession of 2001 – 02. bis central bankers ’ speeches the public sector. 13 in the case where a financial institution is insolvent, intervention to restructure it may cause a long - term financial cost to the public sector – although in several crises in which the central bank and the government intervened massively to deal with a panic, the public sector ended up making a profit from the intervention. 14 given that the profits of the central bank are generally sooner or later transferred to the government, almost every financial action that the central bank takes has fiscal implications for the government. this is particularly so when the central bank is involved in actions to support financial stability, such as providing emergency liquidity to specific banks or to the financial system as a whole. in principle the distinction between liquidity and solvency problems should guide the actions of the central bank and the government in a crisis. for instance, in israel, the law provides that the central bank can intervene on its own to deal with a liquidity problem but needs the authorization of the treasury and the government to take over an insolvent financial institution. however in practice the distinction between a liquidity problem and a solvency problem is rarely clear - cut during a crisis, and what initially appears to be a liquidity crisis can very rapidly become an insolvency crisis. in short, judgment is needed at every stage of a financial crisis – as it is in central banking in general. the too big to fail issue and the associated issue of moral hazard have been recurrent problems in dealing with financial crises. if a financial institution has what is purely a liquidity problem, then the central bank in its financial stability role should act as lender of last resort to that institution in case of need. special difficulties arise when the institution is “ too big ” or “ too interconnected ” to fail. that is to say, causing it to fail will significantly worsen the financial crisis, for instance – to put the issue dramatically – by turning a recession into a depression. ideally the regulatory and legal system should have developed a resolution mechanism whereby an institution judged to be insolvent can be allowed to fail and to be wound down in an orderly process. we have not yet seen such systems in operation for large financial institutions ( sifis ), though one of the key lessons drawn from the recent crisis has been the need to develop a framework of
it should also be ensured that the cost / benefit ratio of such an exercise remains adequate.

seems less likely today. from a financial stability perspective, this is a positive development indeed. however, the greater the stability of the financial markets, the greater the risk appetite of market participants tends to be. this in turn can increase the likelihood of a crisis and, in the event of one occurring, the extent of the damage. the greater concentration and interconnectedness in the global financial system may also have increased the magnitude of a potential crisis. the greater risk tolerance of market players is ultimately a logical consequence of the exceptionally long and stable period of calm in the financial markets. market participants have had no reason of late to keep their risk - taking in check. basically, anyone who held back felt they were missing the opportunity to generate high returns. even the short - term corrections in the financial markets in february of this year and may of the previous year did not result in a change of attitude in this regard. on the contrary, the low impact made by these corrections and the ability of the markets to absorb them may have served as a confirmation for those operating a high - risk strategy to continue, and as an indication for the more risk - averse to take greater risks. the risk appetite is also fairly high in the swiss banking sector at present. in our financial stability report, we indicate for instance that the domestically oriented banks – raiffeisen, cantonal and regional banks – are currently incurring a relatively high interest rate risk. at the same time, the big banks have also exhibited an increased risk tolerance in recent years. although credit suisse group ’ s overall risk has declined in the past year, following the sale of winterthur, both big banks have significantly increased their risk - taking in the banking business ; particularly their exposure in trading and in foreign lending business. as a result, their trading books have virtually doubled since 2003 and are now clearly in excess of chf 1, 000 billion. this accounts for roughly two - thirds of the assets managed by the entire hedge fund industry. the fact that market participants take more risks in a stable environment is in itself not a problem. what is important is that they correctly assess their ability to bear risks and are able to handle poorer conditions. driving 120 km / h along an empty motorway in good weather conditions is generally not dangerous for an experienced driver. it is a different story, however, if visibility is poor and traffic is heavy. if the speed is not adjusted accordingly, the chances of having an accident increase. driving fast becomes dangerous
the mpc ’ s forward guidance builds on the clarity and credibility of the inflation target to address some of the exceptional challenges currently facing our economy. and in so doing it should help to increase the effectiveness of monetary policy. bis central bankers ’ speeches references bean, c ( 2011 ) “ the economic outlook ”, speech to the northern ireland chamber of commerce. http : / / www. bankofengland. co. uk / publications / documents / speeches / 2011 / speech497. pdf broadbent, b ( 2011 ) “ rebalancing and the real exchange rate ”, speech at thompson reuters, london. http : / / www. bankofengland. co. uk / publications / pages / speeches / 2011 / 520. aspx broadbent, b ( 2012 ) “ productivity and the allocation of resources ”, speech at the durham business schoolhttp : / / www. bankofengland. co. uk / publications / pages / speeches / 2012 / 599. aspx broadbent, b ( 2013 ) “ conditional guidance as a response to supply uncertainty ”, speech at the london business school. http : / / www. bankofengland. co. uk / publications / pages / speeches / 2013 / 678. aspx fisher, p ( 2013 ) “ the outlook for the uk economy ”, speech to the cardiff breakfast club. http : / / www. bankofengland. co. uk / publications / documents / speeches / 2013 / speech659. pdf maule, b and pugh, a ( 2013 ) “ do inflation expectations currently pose a risk to the economy? ”, bank of england quarterly bulletin, 2013 q2. mccafferty, i ( 2013 ) “ monetary policy in a changing economy ”, speech at bloomberg, london http : / / www. bankofengland. co. uk / publications / pages / speeches / 2013 / 627. aspx miles, d ( 2012 ) “ monetary policy and the damaged economy ”, speech at the society of business economists annual conference. http : / / www. bankofengland. co. uk / publications / pages / speeches / 2012 / 576. aspx miles, d ( 2013 ) “ monetary policy and forward guidance in the uk ”, speech at northumbria university. http : / / www. bankofengland. co. uk / publications / pages / speeches / 2013

actions taken in one country in response to a crisis can have effects on banks in other countries that do not choose to introduce the same resolution actions. for instance, issuance of government guarantees in one country can weaken banks in neighboring countries without such guarantees ( since government guarantees provide an incentive to move deposits to banks in these countries ). this shows the importance of international coordination also when it comes to crisis resolution. thank you for your attention.