the uncertainty surrounding the level of success of the “ common framework ” for debt restructuring, both initiatives represent an unquestionable improvement on the part of multilateral coordination in sovereign debt resolution. third, the main multilateral development banks ( such as the world bank, the european 2 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches investment bank and the african development bank, among others ) are also playing an important role in this crisis. throughout the pandemic, these institutions have deployed a series of emergency measures in line with their mandates and spheres of influence. for instance, their fresh financial support to the middle east and north africa ( mena ) region since the outset of the pandemic amounts to over usd 8 billion, adding to the usd 4. 3 billion of imf emergency financing and usd 7. 2 billion of imf financing provided through regular programmes. finally, the recent g7 agreement to back a new global minimum tax rate for multinational companies is a step in the right direction to address the tax challenges arising from globalisation and the increasing digitalisation of economies. undoubtedly, major steps have been taken in this crisis to strengthen international cooperation, but much ground has still to be covered. on this path, coordination between multilateral and regional institutions is also important, insofar as the latter may complement the support measures provided by international financial institutions. in this setting, the eu should play a leading role in seeking to attain reinforced and inclusive multilateralism, and an area of cooperation governed by international rules. the strengthening of the european project as a support for multilateralism let me conclude these remarks by focusing on the european policy response to the crisis and on the tasks still pending on the european policy and institutional agenda. on this occasion, we have seen a genuinely common european response, in which the ecb ’ s monetary policy has not been the only game in town. the creation of the ngeu fund stands out as a decisive tool to support the recovery of european economies at the current juncture. this fund incorporates elements of solidarity and allows us to strengthen the possibilities for countries to transform their economies in light of the challenges ahead. some of these elements, such as the issuance of large - scale european supra - national public debt to finance reforms and investments in the countries most affected by the pandemic, are unprecedented in the history of the eu. however, the ngeu fund is not – and therefore should not be seen as – the stabilisation mechanism that the euro zone needs

sector. it can take time before such a deterioration translates into lower output and employment. but when the turnaround does occur, it tends to be swift and hard - hitting. it now appears that a new period of downscaling is under way. several factors point to this : first, productivity growth is higher in manufacturing than in other industries. this has resulted in a trend decline in the numbers employed in manufacturing in norway, as it has in other oecd countries. second, manufacturing costs have increased sharply since 1998. up to the summer of 2000, this cost increase was to some extent offset by a weaker krone. the appreciation of the krone has highlighted and exacerbated the deterioration in cost competitiveness. on balance, it appears that cumulative wage growth in norway will be a good 15 per cent higher than in other countries from 1998 to 2003. the krone is now about 7 per cent stronger than the average for the 1990s. third, as a result of the fiscal guideline, the internationally exposed sector is subject to additional pressure. over time, the phasing in of petroleum revenues will lead to restructuring and the transfer of resources from the exposed to the sheltered sector. fourth, the response patterns in stabilisation policy function in a different way from previously. under the “ solidarity alternative ”, the response pattern consisted of countering labour market pressures and strong wage growth by reducing growth in public spending ( or, if appropriate, by strengthening government revenues ). this had a beneficial impact on manufacturing industry. today, monetary policy shoulders more of the burden. this may sometimes result in a strong krone exchange rate. fifth, growth in the global economy is sluggish while, at the same time, oil prices are high. the fall in share prices curbs economic growth among our trading partners. markets for norway ’ s export industries are stagnating, but at the same time high oil prices are providing a stimulus for some sectors of the norwegian economy. interest rates were assessed by the executive board of norges bank yesterday. interest rates were left unchanged. norges bank ’ s key interest rate, the sight deposit rate, therefore remains at 7 per cent. according to norges bank ’ s assessment, with an unchanged interest rate, the probability that inflation two years ahead will be higher than 2½ per cent is the same as the probability that it will be lower. a sharp rise in labour costs is contributing to a relatively high rise in prices for goods and services