on primary markets. this was reflected in the sharp reduction in funds requested by spanish banks from the eurosystem. at end - november 2010, funding from the ecb, which in july 2010 stood at €150 billion, fell back to €65 billion. this means that the spanish banking system absorbs 12 % of the loan from the european central bank, a proportion fully commensurate with its size and importance in the euro area and which represents 2. 5 % of its balance sheet. the immediate future : consolidating the measures taken and putting the reforms on a firm footing in recent weeks international financial market dynamics have continued to be influenced considerably by the high degree of risk aversion and by fragile confidence levels. there has been a resurgence of the doubts – first seen in the case of greece – about the solvency of euro area member states. the uncertainty over the euro area ’ s fiscal sustainability cannot be explained merely by the economic downturn and its impact on public finances. the measures taken by authorities to avoid the collapse of the financial system have involved, in the case of ireland, guaranteeing the funds lent to the banking system by depositors and wholesale investors. markets are suspicious about the ability of certain small states, with relatively large banking systems, to meet these commitments. the european union has come to the aid of ireland, which has experienced problems precisely because it used substantial amounts of public funds to shore up a banking system bloated with real estate assets, particularly offices and houses in the dublin area. in spain the situation is very different as regards both the public sector and the banking sector. despite the substantial rise in the budget deficit in 2008 and 2009, public debt as a percentage of gdp remains relatively small in comparison with the euro area average, which is 20 percentage points higher. furthermore, the spanish state is committed to ending next year with a deficit of 6 %, more than 5 percentage points lower than in 2009. as for the quality of bank balance sheets, it is well known that non - performing loans have increased in recent years, and also that lending to the construction and real estate development sector was excessive. however, the stress tests have shown not only that banks have the capacity to absorb potential losses arising from extreme and highly unlikely scenarios, but also that most balance sheets comprise healthy assets in the various consumption and investment segments of the spanish economy. despite these fundamental differences, the climate of uncertainty makes it advisable to reaffirm the adjustments promised by

of view, but also in terms of people ’ s mentality, which was not fully aligned with european values after four decades of communism. i was well aware of that, but i also knew that it was imperative to have a target date, that would act as a catalyst for the much needed reforms. indeed, much of the catching - up progress was obtained during the pre - accession years, as real gdp grew on average by more than 6 percent per year between 2000 and 2007. significant institutional reforms were implemented in areas such as governance, competition policy, labour markets, privatisation and enterprise restructuring. it is also true that, in order to comply with the accession preconditions, we had to take some measures a little bit faster than theory and other countries ’ experience would have advised. i am referring, for instance, to the liberalisation of capital flows while still having a significant inflation differential and, therefore, a significant interest rate differential. we learnt before long how challenging it is for monetary policy to manage aggregate demand and expectations in a small open economy amid a flood of capital, particularly when having to cover also for an excessively loose fiscal policy. some of the side - effects of liberalizing the capital flows are still haunting us today. i am referring here to the swiss franc loans, which have lately become a thorny issue, even if the scale of the problem is by far the smallest among peer countries – less than 5 percent of the outstanding loans and just 2 percent of the total number of individual debtors at the time the problem erupted in early 2015. its magnitude was from twofold to fivefold larger in croatia, poland or hungary. i dare say the macro - prudential action taken by the national bank of romania is not unrelated to this outcome. turning back to the eu entry in 2007, all things considered, i could say that we probably caught the last train, especially in the new post - crisis environment. i don ’ t think romania would have looked the way it does today had we remained outside the european project. i have already mentioned how important it was to have an anchor for domestic policies in a country where drifting from the set course tends to be the rule rather than the exception. if we add the contribution of eu membership to securing a more solid business environment, which allowed us to reap more fully the benefits of our competitive advantages, i guess it is pretty clear why i believe it was an inspired choice. foreign investors started to look more confidently