only to solvent banks. this was something that mario draghi stressed once again at the press conference of the last meeting of the governing council of the ecb. since banks and central government in greece are very closely intertwined, however, the situation of the banks depends very heavily on whether the greek government is solvent. the eurosystem should pay careful attention to whether the greek banks do not worsen their liquidity position by acquiring greek government bonds for which there is de facto still no market. otherwise, there might arise the suspicion that the eurosystem does not take the prohibition of monetary financing so seriously. that was something mario draghi clearly pointed out, too. given the government ’ s and banks ’ lack of market access, financing of the greek government via banks that, in turn, avail themselves of the monetary policy financing opportunities or the granting of ela by the bank of greece, also raises obvious concerns with regard to the prohibition of monetary financing. in this specific situation, governments and parliaments must decide whether they are prepared to go on extending the greek risks and cover the funding needs of the greek government despite the tangible uncertainty with regard to the government ’ s will to reform. i see this less than ever as a task within the remit of the eurosystem. first and foremost, of course, the onus is on the greek government. by means of credible and also quantifiable reform commitments, it must lay the foundation for a continuation of the support provided by the available assistance mechanisms. in this respect, a lot of confidence has been lost recently. allow me to make one thing absolutely clear. the composition of the euro area is a political decision. every country that has joined the monetary union also bears the responsibility to bis central bankers ’ speeches contribute to the stability of the single currency with its policy and by compliance with the rules. this is also a matter of the general public ’ s confidence in the single currency and its institutions and, at the end of the day, the promise that the monetary union is a community of stability. 3. liability principle and commitment to fiscal rules ladies and gentlemen, it is not just the current situation in greece but the sovereign debt crisis as a whole which demonstrates how quickly a situation can develop in which the eurosystem comes under pressure to take on fiscal risks. in order to protect monetary policy from such risks, the euro area ’ s founders relied on sound public finances, which were to be ensured through the adoption of fiscal rules,

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