and for facilitating the accumulation of excessive debt. while increasing financial inclusion is a laudable and important goal, a fine balance needs to be struck between protecting consumers from exploitation and extending credit in such a manner that the stability and soundness of the financial system as a whole is not undermined. the market conduct regulators, including the national credit regulator and the financial services board, are responsible for preventing reckless lending, and the role of the south african reserve bank in the context of promoting financial inclusion is to ensure the stability of banks and the financial system. there is a view that giving too much discretion to central banks in some of the areas i have highlighted could politicise the central bank unduly. this brings us to the issue of central bank independence. the main argument for independence is that it minimises the politicisation of monetary policy decision - making and avoids what is known as the “ political interest rate cycle ”. this refers to the incentive of politicians to lower interest rates in advance of elections. the argument is that an operationally independent central bank does not have to bow to such pressures. that is not to say that central banks are not pressurised by political and other elements in society to act in a particular way, and monetary policy in south africa has not been without its domestic critics and political economy challenges. the monetary policy framework has been criticised, and, not surprisingly, opposition has tended to intensify during the upward phases of the interest rate cycle. but the south african reserve bank has been able to resist such pressures, as its operational independence is entrenched in the constitution. the inflation - targeting framework lends itself well to the separation of goal and instrument independence : generally, central banks do not have goal independence as the target is usually, but not always, set by government, but, in order to prevent the so - called “ political interest rate cycle ”, central banks do have instrument and operational independence to pursue the mandate given to them. however, the global crisis has created challenges for central banks that could undermine this seemingly comfortable insulation from the political arena. the expanded mandate of financial stability in itself may have implications for their independence, while the other possible objectives – such as financial inclusion and direct finance – imply political decisions being made by unelected officials. compared to financial stability decisions, decisions on monetary policy, while not easy, are more straightforward and better understood by the public. they usually involve the use of bis central bankers ’ speeches one tool, namely the

anita angelovska - bezoska : workshop on fintech - opening remarks opening remarks by ms anita angelovska - bezoska, governor of the national bank of the republic of macedonia, at the nbrm workshop on fintech, skopje, 28 may 2018. * * * dear mr. jay tikam, dear colleagues, it is my great pleasure to open the nbrm workshop on a topic that has been attracting a rising interest by regulators, supervisors and central bankers, i. e. a workshop on fintech organizations that, by combining new business models and innovative technology, gradually change the shape of the financial services segment. the main idea of this workshop is to become better acquainted with this rather new but very important topic. it has been organized with the support of the european fund for southeast europe, for which we are thankful. although in continental europe, fintech companies account for just a small share of the markets for banking, payment services and asset management, still they are on the rise as they are rapidly entering the markets and competing with banks. according to ernst & young ’ s fintech adoption index, one - third of the consumers utilize at least two or more fintech services and they are increasingly aware of fintech as part of their day - to - day activities. the fintech adoption index for services offered by fintech organizations, divided into five broad categories – money transfers and payment services, financial planning tools, savings and investments, borrowing and insurance, indicates that money transfers and payment services are continuing to lead the fintech charge with adoption standing at 50 % in 2017 and 88 % of consumers anticipating of doing so in the future. this rapid rise in fintech organizations has posed many dilemmas : what are the benefits that fintechs bring to the society, on the one hand, and what are the risks that they create, on the other? is it the end of banking or are banks going to team up with the newcomers? one of the main concerns in this regard is that while fintech companies increase financial inclusion, facilitate the access to finance and lead to more competitive markets, they can also be conducive to cutting costs and rising risks in the traditional banking segment. against this background, the fintech topic has received an increasing attention in the central banking community, including our central bank. we have been closely monitoring the fintech developments, evaluating the benefits and risks that they bring and trying to strike a right balance given the local context. an