##e1 ”, launched in 2009, and “ qe3 ”, launched in 2012, had larger effects on us long - term interest rates than the 2010 “ qe2 ” program. another insightful result from this literature, which is presented this morning by simon gilchrist, is the differential effects of these policies on credit risk. lsap programmes have reduced the non - financial sector ’ s default risk, but they had a very limited impact, if any, on the default risk specific to the financial sector. taking a euro area perspective, these results are interesting in at least two respects. first, the level of us interest rates are an essential feature of the world economy and the economic and financial environment of the euro area. second, the experience of other major central banks is a natural benchmark for the design and the monitoring of our own policies, on which i would like to share with you a few thoughts. the predominant objective of our first wave of unconventional measures, which we have labelled the “ fixed rate full allotment ” supply of liquidity, was to ensure that liquidity shortages do not escalate into defaults, especially in the financial sector. this has mainly consisted in ensuring the correct provision of liquidity to the banking sector against the backdrop of a major confidence crisis. bis central bankers ’ speeches yet, by the end of 2010 the crisis had taken on a new form. the fiscal constraint became binding in a number of periphery countries. investors started to price in sovereign credit risks. by 2011, it appeared clear that investors were also factoring in the risk of a euro area break - up. this, in turn, entailed an increased degree of market fragmentation within the euro area, with borrowers facing different credit conditions depending on their country of origin. our outright monetary transactions ( omt ) programme was specifically designed to reaffirm the irreversibility of the euro. the omt allowed investors to discard a specific form of systemic risk. in addition, financial fragmentation, which exacerbates heterogeneity across countries and which may exist in part for fundamentally justified reasons, poses an obstacle to the smooth transmission of the ecb ’ monetary policy stance across the euro area. like the other unconventional measures implemented by the eurosystem, the omt programme contributes to overcome this obstacle. the omt has very significantly reduced spreads across euro area countries and we observe a partial reversal of target 2 balances. there are however evidence that

affect and already affects our present price stability mandate. this will be heavy work, both in terms of macro and micro economic research – we should enrich our models to integrate the effects of climate –, and in operational methodology – we should reassess our collateral including climate risks. 2. progress is needed on climate disclosures to allow for a consistent risk analysis there are many initiatives on disclosure – and let me pay a special tribute to the progress initiated by the tcfd ( task force on climate - related financial disclosures ) –. but the current lack of granular and comparable datasets in the field of climate risks, undermines our ability to operationalise the assessment of financial risks linked to climate change. 2. 1. many necessary data are still simply missing to foster data availability within the financial sector, in summer 2020, the ngfs launched an ambitious workstream to identify and map lacking data ( financial and non - financial ) relevant to climate risk analysis. we actively look forward to the publication of the preliminary results in the course of 2021 ( that is : a detailed list of data items that are currently lacking, but which are needed ). 2. 2. current disclosures are often hardly comparable however, the available data should also be comparable enough to be processed easily on a large scale, with reliable results. to solve this issue, regulations should be more specific and prescriptive towards climate - related reporting from financial firms as well as corporate firms, including smes ( with proportionality ). this is why we need harmonised and relatively granular reporting standards. france and the eu are at the leading edge and have already implemented targeted disclosure requirements ( art. 173 in france / upcoming “ disclosure regulation ” – sfdr –, to be implemented next march in europe ). however, this is still not enough, as the data disclosed currently lack homogeneity and comparability : this is a major loophole of the implementation of article 173 in france, for instance. we are not yet able to assess and compare the results of financial institutions in our public reports. 2 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches i strongly believe that the eu should keep its first - mover advantage in climate data standardisation. after the adoption, last december, of a sustainable taxonomy, sustainable reporting is actually the next critical step ahead of us to mainstream green finance. i am looking forward to the report the efrag is currently preparing to address this issue [ report to be published on 31