more clearly what i mean : the countercyclical capital buffer and the implementation of the tbtf regulations. the countercyclical capital buffer represents a capital requirement that can be adjusted over time. this buffer will be introduced within the framework of basel iii and has the important tasks of protecting the banking sector from the risks posed by excessive lending and of curbing the banking sector ’ s procyclical behaviour. in the event of excessive growth in lending, the capital requirement can be increased ; then when growth in lending is weak, it can be lowered again or even reduced to zero. the countercyclical capital buffer thus has a direct impact on banks ’ lending activities and can, as a result, strengthen or weaken the effect of the snb ’ s monetary policy significantly. therefore, whoever determines the level of this buffer also influences the effect of monetary policy. it is for this reason that – in our opinion – the responsibility for the countercyclical capital buffer for domestic lending must lie with the snb. the national bank must be able to decide when the buffer is activated and how high it should be. it goes without saying that it would do so within legally defined limits. the same should also apply to the activation of loan - to - value ratios and affordability criteria for mortgage loans. all of these instruments are closely linked to monetary policy. within the context of the implementation of the tbtf regulations, the systemically important banks will have to be determined. this is because the more rigorous capital and liquidity requirements are only intended for these banks. and because emergency liquidity assistance is also reserved for systemically important banks, the decision as to the systemic importance of a bank has a direct impact on the snb in its function as lender of last resort. these decision - making powers, too, must therefore be placed in the national bank ’ s hands. this proposed solution should give the snb the formal responsibilities it needs in order to fulfil its mandate in the area of financial stability in a preventative manner. in many countries, a transfer of banking supervision to the central bank is currently the subject of intensive discussion. in contrast, the national bank is by no means calling into question the separation of banking supervision and central bank activities with the solution presented here. this separation has worked for switzerland. the aim is not to infringe on finma ’ s jurisdiction. instead, finma and the snb need to clearly define how the new responsibilities and tasks arising

force financial intermediaries to cut back on their lending. the reduction in lending amplifies the negative effect on asset prices, causing intermediaries to reduce lending still further, and so on. because of such negative feedback loops, relatively small shocks can have large effects on the financial sector and the real economy. in recent years, markus has increasingly devoted his attention to new forms of digital currency. this is another area where economic theory lags behind real - world developments. in his work with joseph abadi and jonathan payne, markus studies competition between different cryptocurrencies and analyses how regulators should react when technology companies issue their own digital currencies. in an article jointly written with harold james and jean - pierre landau, markus describes a future in which privately issued digital currencies are used to settle transactions worldwide. against this backdrop, the three authors emphasise the importance of maintaining the official currency as the dominant unit of account. they posit that, in order to achieve this, central banks may have to issue their own digital currency. another paper, which markus co - authored with dirk niepelt, examines precisely how the introduction of central bank digital currencies, or cbdcs, might impact the real economy. they conclude that negative effects could be averted as long as banks can replace lost deposits with funding from the central bank. the pros and cons of cbdcs need to be considered carefully, and so far no consensus has formed among central banks. markus'contribution to this important debate is therefore most welcome. 2 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches while much of his research revolves around financial markets, markus is an economist with a broad intellectual horizon. his book the resilient society, which was published in 2021, exemplifies this. inspired by the coronavirus pandemic, the book analyses how societies can cope with crises. markus highlights that a society's ability to bounce back after shocks depends on many factors. social norms play a key role in driving people to cooperate in an emergency. free markets ensure fast and innovative solutions to new problems. economic policy also has an important role to play, for example by supporting otherwise healthy businesses in a crisis. in today's lecture, markus will focus on what central banks can contribute to societal resilience. i look forward to hearing more about this important and timely subject. ladies and gentlemen, please join me in welcoming markus brunnermeier with a big round of applause