certain parts of the economy, especially in the services sector. this was dealt with by the slovene authorities and consumer associations, by means of the long dual pricing period and price monitoring teams, to name a few. let me stress that the citizens of slovenia play a very important role here : the consumers in a market economy have a major influence on price formation. consumers will be a major force in preventing any unjustified price increases. ladies and gentlemen, let me again congratulate to all the achievements of the process of euro adoption in slovenia and give my warm welcome to the new member in the family of the eurosystem. bravo, slovenija!

banks will participate in key ccps across the globe. it is essential that the financial institutions that participate in and rely on ccps are able to conduct effective due diligence to understand the risks they face as members and take appropriate steps to mitigate those risks. third, owing to mutualisation, losses and liquidity shortfalls in the event of a member default may spread to other participants. crisis propagation may be further driven by interdependencies of changing complexity. these can exist between ccps and other financial institutions, for example, through interoperability arrangements. note that the same large financial institutions, being clearing members of many ccps, increase interdependencies even in the absence of interoperability. finally, existing differences in regulation may lead to regulatory arbitrage and potentially to a race to the bottom. moreover, the use of a centralised infrastructure depends, in some instances, on exemptions from registration or the application of equivalence or substituted compliance with foreign infrastructures. where foreign ccps cannot be used, compliance with mandatory clearing under domestic laws may inhibit cross - border transactions. new risks related to central clearing the globalisation process has triggered a trend towards global clearing that in itself may lead to further unintended consequences and may create new risks [ slide 6 ]. the trend towards increasingly large global ccps is similar in nature to that of horizontal integration which the committee on payment and settlement systems ( cpss ) looked at in greater detail in a bis central bankers ’ speeches report of 20101, concluding that larger global ccps may have certain advantages, but may also lead to systemic risks, reduced benefits of central clearing, and regulatory frictions. moreover, it appears that for many banks, indirect access is their preferred way to get access to clearing services so as to comply with the clearing obligation. client clearing seems thus to be dominated by a few large global intermediaries. a factor contributing to this concentration may be higher compliance burdens, where only the very largest of firms are capable of taking on cross - border activity. this concentration creates a higher degree of dependency on this small group of firms. there are also concerns about client access to this limited number of firms offering client clearing services. for example, there is some evidence of clearing firms “ cherry picking ” clients, while other end - users are commercially unattractive customers and hence unable to access centrally cleared markets. these are all developments that i believe the international regulatory community may wish to carefully monitor and act