spend, the ecb blog, 2 november 2023. 10 benigno, g. et al. ( 2024 ), quo vadis, r *? the natural rate of interest after the pandemic, bis quarterly review, march 2024, pp. 17 - 30 ; brand, c., n. lisack and f. mazelis ( 2024 ), estimates of the natural interest rate for the euro area : an update, published as part of the ecb economic bulletin, issue 1 / 2024 ; schnabel, i. ( 2024 ), r ( ising ) star?, speech at the ecb and its watchers xxiv conference, 20 march 2024 ; for a more sceptical view regarding a rising r *, see williams, j. c. ( 2024 ), r - star : a global perspective, remarks at the ecb forum on central banking, sintra, portugal. 11 benigno, g. et al. ( 2024 ), op. cit. 7 / 7 bis - central bankers'speeches

ecb in the service of the ex ante coordination of a specific policy mix, including monetary policy, must be rejected. the actions and decisions of monetary policy makers can only be judged in terms of their objective. under the treaty, that is unambiguously price stability. any attempts, especially by the european parliament, to “ reinterpret ” article 105 of the ec treaty in such a way as to suggest that price stability and growth are monetary policy objectives of equal status are quite misleading. on the one hand, that would impair the transparency of monetary policy, which would no longer be pursuing a single clear - cut objective, while, on the other hand, it would be dangerous in terms of democracy theory to leave the decision as to which of its two objectives it should pursue with priority to an independent institution. both in terms of constitutional law and in terms of democracy theory, the independence of the central bank can be justified only by setting an unambiguous objective. overloading monetary policy with several objectives would also be risky in macroeconomic terms. stability is the best contribution that monetary policy can make to fostering growth and employment. additional growth potentials can be opened up by further budget consolidation and structural reforms. independence must not be impaired by accountability. pursuant to article 108 of the ec treaty, the independence of the central bank is regulated unambiguously. that provision of the treaty also applies, of course, to the european parliament. the ecb must likewise be independent of the european parliament. the ecb ’ s ex post reporting requirements are regulated definitively by the ec treaty ( article 113 ( 3 ) ) : “ the ecb shall present to the european parliament, the council and the commission, and also to the european council, an annual report on the activities of the escb and on monetary policy in the previous and current year. the president of the ecb shall submit the report to the council and the european parliament, which may carry out a general review on that basis. the president of the ecb and the other members of the executive board may be consulted by the responsible committees of the european parliament at the request of the european parliament or on their own initiative. ” in practice, the eurosystem goes well beyond these treaty obligations. besides submitting the annual report to the plenary session of the european parliament, the ecb president appears before the european parliament ’ s committee on economic and monetary affairs at quarterly intervals in order to expound the euros