##louisfed. org / files / docs / publications / frb / 1970s / frb _ 081977. pdf. - 16 - carney, mark ( 2014 ). speech delivered at the lord mayor ’ s banquet for bankers and merchants of the city of london at the mansion house, london, june 12, www. bankofengland. co. uk / publications / documents / speeches / 2014 / speech736. pdf. - - - - - - - - ( 2016 ). letter from the governor of the bank of england to the chancellor of the exchequer, february 4, http : / / www. bankofengland. co. uk / monetarypolicy / documents / pdf / cpiletter040216. pdf. cecchetti, stephen g. ( 2009 ). “ crisis and responses : the federal reserve in the early stages of the financial crisis, ” journal of economic perspectives, vol. 23 ( winter ), pp. 51 - 75. crockett, andrew d. ( 1994 ). “ rules versus discretion in monetary policy, ” in j. onno de beaufort wijnholds, sylvester c. w. eiffinger, and lex h. hoogduin, eds., a framework for monetary stability : papers and proceedings of an international conference organised by de nederlandsche bank and the center for economic research at amsterdam. dordrecht, netherlands : springer, pp. 165 - 84. debelle, guy, and stanley fischer ( 1994 ). “ how independent should a central bank be? ” in goals, guidelines, and constraints facing monetary policymakers, proceedings of a conference held in north falmouth, massachusetts, in june 1994. boston : federal reserve bank of boston, pp. 195 - 221, http : / / www. bos. frb. org / economic / conf / conf38 / conf38f. pdf. dornbusch, rudiger, and stanley fischer ( 1978 ). macroeconomics. new york : mcgrawhill. eichengreen, barry, and peter m. garber ( 1991 ). “ before the accord : u. s. monetaryfinancial policy, 1945 - 51, ” in r. glenn hubbard, ed., financial markets and financial crises. chicago : university of chicago press, pp. 175 - 206. federal open market committee ( 2017 ). statement on longer - run

this group to submit your views and comments on these proposals. it is important for the federal reserve and other regulatory agencies to receive input directly from community bankers. one of these important proposals is to implement the community bank leverage ratio. while the community bank leverage ratio proposal would increase the minimum leverage ratio for banks that opt in to the new framework, the proposal would allow qualifying community banks to opt out of the more complicated risk - based capital framework. other proposals include raising to $ 400, 000 the threshold for determining when an appraisal is required for a residential real estate transaction, and excluding community banks from the volcker rule. the federal reserve also acted to raise the asset threshold from $ 1 billion to $ 3 billion of total consolidated assets for the small bank holding company and savings and loan holding company policy statement. this change allows more banking companies that have limited access to the capital markets to take advantage of using debt in bank acquisitions. this helps foster local ownership of small banks. the change also exempts eligible small holding companies from consolidated risk - based capital rules, a significant burden reduction. in december, the federal banking agencies issued a final rule allowing qualifying insured depository institutions with less than $ 3 billion in total assets to benefit from an extended 18month on - site examination cycle. this increases the former threshold of $ 1 billion and provides examination burden relief to a substantial number of community banks with relatively simple risk profiles. with respect to supervision, the federal reserve continues to tailor and reduce burden by conducting portions of community bank examinations offsite. however, we also understand the importance of face - to - face interaction and continue to be responsive to bankers ’ requests for onsite examinations. the federal reserve has also implemented a risk - focused supervisory program — the bank exams tailored to risk ( betr ) program — which aims to identify low - risk activities within state member banks and apply appropriately streamlined examination work programs to these activities, and conversely, to identify high - risk activities within state member banks for prompt supervisory attention. this enhanced tailoring of supervision minimizes regulatory burden for the many community banks that are well managed, and directs supervisory resources to higher - risk activities where they are most needed to contain the risks that can result from aggressive banking strategies. similarly, the federal reserve tailors its supervision of holding companies based on the size, complexity, and risk profile of each institution. closing remarks as i conclude, i would emphasize how crucial it is to balance effective regulation and supervision to ensure the safety and