; bank of canada ( 2017 ), “ monetary policy framework issues : toward the 2021 inflation - target renewal, ” workshop held at the bank of canada, quebec, september 14, https : / / www. bankofcanada. ca / 2017 / 09 / monetary - policyframework - issues - toward - 2021 - inflation - target - renewal ; and mark carney ( 2020 ), “ a framework for all seasons? ” speech delivered at “ the future of inflation targeting, ” a research workshop held at the bank of england, london, january 9, https : / / www. bankofengland. co. uk / events / 2020 / january / the - future - ofinflation - targeting. the federal reserve ’ s review of its monetary policy strategies, tools, and communications is ongoing. see the board ’ s website at https : / / www. federalreserve. gov / monetarypolicy / review - of - monetary - policystrategy - tools - and - communications. htm ; richard h. clarida ( 2019 ), “ the federal reserve ’ s review of its monetary policy strategy, tools, and communication practices, ” speech delivered at the 2019 u. s. monetary policy forum, sponsored by the initiative on global markets at the university of chicago booth school of business, new york, february 22, https : / / www. federalreserve. gov / newsevents / speech / clarida20190222a. htm ; and jerome h. powell ( 2019 ), “ monetary policy : normalization and the road ahead, ” speech delivered at the 2019 siepr economic summit, stanford institute of economic policy research, stanford, calif., march 8, https : / / www. federalreserve. gov / newsevents / speech / powell20190308a. htm. - 2learned from earlier papers that have examined the performance of unconventional policy tools with respect to individual components of financial conditions — most notably, longterm sovereign yields, but also mortgage rates, equities, exchange rates, and corporate debt spreads. 3 empirically assessing the question in the report is not only important, but also challenging, as the report readily acknowledges. there are a host of difficult endogeneity and omitted - variable issues, which the authors endeavor to address. the authors conclude that unconventional monetary policies worked during the crisis but did not fully offset a

, credit and banking, vol. 46 ( august ), pp. 1057 – 71 ; michael t. kiley ( 2016 ), “ monetary policy statements, treasury yields, and private yields : before and after the zero lower bound, ” finance research letters, vol. 18 ( august ), pp. 285 – 90 ; and john h. rogers, chiara scotti, and jonathan h. wright ( 2014 ), “ evaluating asset - market effects of unconventional monetary policy : a multi - country review, ” economic policy, vol. 29 ( october ), pp. 749 – 99. - 3looking back at the international experience, the evidence suggests that forward guidance and balance sheet policies were broadly effective in providing accommodation following the financial crisis. but they were less effective when there were long delays in implementation or apparent inconsistencies among policy tools. it is important to distill key lessons from the past use of these tools in order to make them more effective in the future. 4 first, in some cases around the world, unconventional tools were implemented only after long delays and debate, which sapped confidence, tightened financial conditions, and weakened recovery. the delays often reflected concerns about the putative costs and risks of these policies, such as stoking high inflation and impairing market functioning. these costs and risks did not materialize or proved manageable, and i expect these tools to be deployed more forcefully and readily in the future. 5 second, forward guidance proved to be vital during the crisis, but it took some time to recognize the importance of conditioning forward guidance on specific outcomes or dates and to align the full set of policy tools. in several cases, the targeted outcomes set too low a bar, which in turn diminished market expectations regarding monetary for instance, analysis by ben bernanke suggests “ that a combination of asset purchases and forward guidance can add roughly 3 percentage points of policy space. ” see ben s. bernanke ( 2020 ), “ the new tools of monetary policy, ” presidential address to the american economic association, san diego, calif., january 4, p. 3, https : / / www. brookings. edu / wp - content / uploads / 2019 / 12 / bernanke _ assa _ lecture. pdf. this issue was discussed in the july 2019 federal open market committee meeting in the context of the framework review. as noted in the minutes of the meeting ( p. 3 )