##ted come from the outside. maybe inevitably, they come with a certain disinterested detachment. as if the outside “ spectators ” are not affected by what is happening. and they come with a dangerously narrow and exclusive perspective on the economics of the monetary union. but if the profound political commitment of eurozone countries to the historical project of “ ever closer union ” is neglected, the assessment remains superficial and partial. and the suggested policy responses may be biased or naive. why does it matter? because the discourse influences some of the most important financial markets for the eurozone. if expectations that have been built up are not fulfilled, if alleged certainties do not materialise, if actions from politicians or central bankers are not forthcoming as anticipated by the “ market consensus ”, the reaction can be grave : volatility, contagion, all the way to complete market dysfunction. the systemic impact can be major, driving financial institutions, as well as sovereign borrowers into real difficulties. the result is a situation where policy - makers – including the central bank – may feel compelled to react to market developments with ever more powerful responses, in order to contain the a systemic risk and avoid a meltdown. what is the lesson? central banks have to face up to the public and market discourse – especially because they are independent. we have to participate in this debate. we have to take on the critics, understand their points, and argue our case. we have to listen, explain, and convince. naturally, we will ultimately do what we judge to be the correct cause of action, in full independence and in line with our mandate. actions speak louder than words. especially when they are timely, measured and effective. this is what creates confidence. precisely for that reason, financial markets, as well as politicians, have been looking to the ecb as a kind of “ saviour of last resort ”. this creates maybe an even bigger communication bis central bankers ’ speeches challenge : we must explain what the limits of our powers and mandate are. the ecb cannot compensate for what others – notably political authorities – fail to do. there is no substitute for good policies. saying this is not always popular. but “ to be trusted is a greater compliment than being loved ” 6. when market pundits forecast the “ inevitable ”, they insinuate a degree of certainty about the future which is simply not there. this brings me to my last point – how to deal with uncertainty, with a world

. ownership and compliance will give credibility to debt relief, especially given the economic developments of the last ten to 12 months. wouldn ’ t it have made sense to have had this kind of debt relief at the beginning of the programme or when the primary surplus was achieved? there are two answers to this. first ‒ and i have been asked this question in respect of other programme countries that have faced similar situations in the past ‒ it is very difficult to look at a reality that existed four, five or six years ago with today ’ s eyes. at the time in question, circumstances were very different : for example, there was no crisis management framework, there was no banking union and the ecb shields were not in place. second, until a year ago, the rate of growth of the greek economy was such that debt sustainability was not completely out of the question. since then, things have changed ; some for the better and some for the worse – including the policy slippages and the resulting deterioration in the country ’ s economic outlook. how can greece return to growth? can we compare greece with ireland? greece will return to a growth path if it undertakes all of the structural reforms that have been discussed. i think that is the key point. when we speak of structural reforms, we are referring to a change in the structure of the economy that will make it more competitive. and more competitive does not necessarily mean just in terms of exports. it means that people who want to open up a new business should be free to do so, and without any problems. it means much greater competition in the product and services markets. it means perhaps a more flexible, more open and more competitive labour market. in a sense, that is the message from countries like spain and ireland. both countries have shown that, with the right reforms, it is possible for the economy to bounce back rapidly. so the bottom line is : yes, it is doable. so, do you think that greece could return to growth in 2016? remember that, in 2014, growth was positive and that, in the first half of 2015, the greek economy showed strong resilience to worsening business sentiment. this was partly a result of robust growth in the tourism sector and partly because of one - off factors. for 2015 as a whole, the outlook is less favourable and more uncertain. but i am quite confident that, if there is strong commitment to the programme, which aims at ensuring economic growth, fiscal sustainability and financial