europe, we must now complete the banking union. we must now resolutely work towards completing the european banking union. i would first like to explain why. the finalisation of the banking union should, alongside the capital markets union, contribute to improving private risk sharing within the euro area. private risk sharing fulfils an economic stabilisation function : in the united states, for example, private financial flows between the federal states are a more powerful damper than budget mechanisms involved in public risk sharing. furthermore, this private risk sharing should help to channel the euro area ’ s large savings surplus – eur 390 billion in 2017 – towards european companies, within a real financing union for investment and innovation at the european level. we have taken a step forward with the agreement of 25 may at the ecofin council meeting on the " banking reform package " set out in the commission's legislative proposal of 23 november 2016. even if we need to wait for the parliament's proposal and the outcome of the trialogue discussions, this agreement is overall positive. on the supervision side, it provides the european union with all the prudential ratios of the international framework. it also provides for the gradual introduction of the revised market risk framework, the fundamental review of the trading book ( frtb ), which is still being finalised in basel. in addition, a first step has been taken towards recognising the euro area as a single jurisdiction, in which cross - border exposures within the banking union are considered domestic exposures for measuring the systemic importance of european banks. on the resolution side, we have obtained an agreement to broaden the subordination requirement of the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities ( mrel ) to page 4 of 6 beyond global systemically important banks ( g - sibs ), thereby reducing the threshold effect between g - sibs and other banks. in addition, the text defines a subordinated debt ceiling, very close to the international total loss absorbing capacity ( tlac ) standard. however, this agreement contains a number of more problematic aspects about which we shall remain vigilant. to name but one, as regards the internal mrel, cross - border exemptions within the banking union similar to the methodology for calculating the capital surcharge for systemic banks would have been desirable. in addition, we are concerned about a reference to the threshold allowing access to the resolution fund being introduced into the calibration of the internal mr

eyes of europe and the world, which is extremely positive. lastly, in 2017 basel iii was finalised. bankers – largely represented this evening – had expressed, alongside others, serious concerns. the agreement of 7 december 2017 is the best possible agreement for our country and for europe, thanks to the particularly active commitment of french negotiators. we maintain, against all temptation of nilateralism or deregulation, our commitment to the multilateral rules of the game in place since 2009. and we are stabilising these rules once and for all : there will not be a basel iv. in sum, 2017 positively marked a turning point for both the united states and france. the beginning of 2018 has thus been characterised by a welcome optimism, but one which must not act as a disincentive : confidence yes, complacency no. we must not lie back and enjoy the return of blue skies ; we must take steps to ensure that this improvement is transformed into stronger and sustainable growth. to this end, i wish to make four collective wishes for the coming year. 2. four wishes for 2018 my first wish concerns europe. this does not so much concern our monetary policy, which has 1 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches entered a gradual normalisation phase, and which is a success ; i will not discuss it further this evening during the " silent period ". 2018 must above all be the year of economic union, which still largely remains to be built. we must now or never take advantage of the recovery to tackle the shortcomings of the euro area. because france and germany ’ s electoral calendars are aligned for the first time in 15 years, and since last friday, there is a prospect of a pro - european coalition in germany. and because now is the time to strengthen our economic instruments in order to deal with a future european recession, the day it comes. otherwise monetary policy may be overburdened. my second wish concerns our country. the french economy is in much better shape, but there are still major drags on growth. at around 1. 9 %, we are above our potential growth rate, which means that we are coming up against more structural limiters. there are at least two indications of this : a persistent negative growth differential vis - a - vis the euro area of around half a percentage point, and a current account deficit and hence a lack of competitiveness. in order to increase the speed of the french economy, we need