, capital goods and intermediate goods. but since 2001, exports in all of these sectors ( including consumer goods ) have been growing more dynamically in germany than in france. if the traditional analysis explains very little in terms of the differences in export performance, what else accounts for these differences? are the worried voices right after all? no, they are not. first of all, intra - euro - area trade is more important for france than it is for germany. in france, the share of exported goods to other emu countries amounted to 48 % of all exports in 2005, whereas in germany it was 5 pp lower. consequently, france appears less dependent on the euro ’ s exchange rate than germany. however, the bdi ( the federation of german industries ) said last month that german industry could live with the strong euro, as long as it does not rise sharply. even more importantly, the wishful thinking behind a policy - driven weakening of the euro does not go to the core of the problem. all things considered, differences in export performance are linked to differences in competitiveness. as far as price competitiveness is concerned, it has increased in both germany and france since the start of emu. but in germany, the increase has been more pronounced. one reason for this has been wage policy moderation in germany. in addition to that – and unlike french firms – german firms have boosted their competitiveness by increasingly outsourcing their production processes to low - cost countries. so, to some extent, the recent weakness of french export performance compared to germany can be explained by stronger gains in german price competitiveness. but what is more important : overall export performance in france cannot adequately be explained by traditional factors. estimations usually contain a noteworthy residual term. what accounts for it? its reasons actually are more of a microeconomic nature, as has already been put forward by the french council of economic analysis 1. examples are product differentiation, technological progress, reputation, marketing, or the export readiness of smes. for instance, the figure for french firms that export is only 4 %, compared with 11 % in germany. moreover, french export firms are, on average, smaller than german ones. the upshot of this is that competitiveness is enhanced by firms, not in exchange rate markets. if politicians want to support domestic industries they should do so by increasing the flexibility of labour and product markets through structural reforms, not by interfering with market forces. but let me come back to my original theme

second, such research is only in its infancy ; at present, only a few models allow a simultaneous analysis of monetary and a range of tools aimed at curtailing both procyclicality and network risk is currently under discussion. see bis ( 2010 ), 80th annual report ; g galati and r moessner ( 2011 ), macroprudential policy : a literature review, bis working paper, no 337. see committee on the global financial system ( 2010 ), macroprudential instruments and frameworks : a stocktaking of issues and experiences, cgfs paper 38. see, for example, d beau, l clerc and b mojon ( 2011 ), macro - prudential policy and the conduct of monetary policy, banque de france, mimeo ; i christensen, c meh and k moran ( 2010 ), bank leverage regulation and macroeconomic dynamics, bank of canada, mimeo. see, for instance, p angelini, s neri and f panetta ( 2010 ), grafting macroprudential policies in a macroeconomic framework : choice of optimal instruments and interaction with monetary policy, banca d ’ italia, mimeo. see p angelini, s neri and f panetta ( 2010 ), op cit ; c bean, m paustian, a penalver and t taylor ( 2010 ), op cit. bis central bankers ’ speeches macroprudential policy. 12 nevertheless, the results confirm that there should be a clear allocation of objectives and tools in order to achieve the aims of both policies. assuming that there will be a satisfactory exchange of information between both monetary and macroprudential policymakers in the future, the existing studies give no cause to fear that the objective of price stability will have to be compromised. 2. 4 price stability should still be understood to mean low inflation rates even though the pre - crisis consensus regarding price stability as the primary objective of monetary policy remains valid, it can be asked whether experience of the crisis should have implications for the specific form that the objective of price stability takes. specifically, there have been concerns that the credible commitment to ensure a low rate of inflation might restrict the leeway for monetary policy stabilisation, since, in the event of the massive interest rate cuts, the lower bound for nominal interest rates would be hit quite quickly. two competing approaches have been suggested to deal with this alleged shortcoming : a higher inflation target, 13 and a switch