between financial conditions and our dualmandate goals. this work is complemented by the efforts of our domestic and international partners through the financial stability oversight council and the federal financial institutions examination council here at home and through the financial stability board and the international monetary fund internationally. 1 in this work agenda, the federal reserve cooperates closely with other regulators to facilitate joint responsibility for financial stability while respecting that each independent agency has its own specific statutory mandate and governing body. 2 in addition to cyclical vulnerabilities, structural vulnerabilities, such as those that arise from the complexity and interconnectedness of large financial institutions, also remain potential sources of risk to the financial system. the federal reserve assesses structural vulnerabilities in support of its financial stability and supervision and regulation responsibilities. for instance, cybersecurity is the subject of ongoing monitoring and policy efforts. 3 for example, the price - to - rent ratios in los angeles, miami, and denver are 10 to 20 percent above their long - run trends, compared with 4 percent at the national level. 4 similar volatility was seen in some other cryptocurrencies, such as ether, xrp, and litecoin. 5 these statistics are for the 18 bank holding companies that participated in both the 2009 and 2017 stress tests. the risk - based capital statistics for 2009 report tier 1 common equity, and for 2017 report basel iii common equity tier 1. 6 these statistics reflect the 18 advanced approaches bank holding companies subject to the standard lcr. 7 see board of governors of the federal reserve system ( 2017 ), “ policy statement on the scenario design framework for stress testing, ” proposed rule ( docket no. op - 1588 ), federal register, vol. 82 ( december 15 ), pp. 59533 – 59547. 8 over the years, our adverse scenarios, which are not designed to be the binding scenario for capital planning purposes, have featured large increases in treasury yields across the maturity curve. 6 / 7 bis central bankers'speeches 9 see the box “ developments related to financial stability ” in board of governors of the federal reserve system ( 2018 ), monetary policy report ( washington : board of governors, february ), pp. 24 – 26. 10 for the most recent statement, see board of governors of the federal reserve system ( 2018 ), “ federal open market committee reaffirms its ‘ statement on longer - run goals and monetary policy strategy,'“ press release

durmus yılmaz : global crisis, restructuring and national transformation speech by mr durmus yılmaz, governor of the central bank of the republic of turkey, at the forum istanbul, istanbul, 20 may 2010. * * * his excellency deputy prime minister babacan, distinguished guests, at the outset, i would like to thank mr. canevi for his kind invitation. it is a great pleasure for me to participate in this conference where we will discuss the future of turkey in a global context. i will start my talk with a brief review of imbalances in the global economy, which have ultimately led to the recent global crisis. then i will discuss the evolution of the main mandates of central banks from a historical perspective. finally, i will conclude my speech with some remarks on the future of central banking in the post crisis period. dear participants, any elaboration on a new global story must start with an understanding of the roots of the current crisis. i believe it would be appropriate to analyze these factors under three headings. the first one is the global macroeconomic imbalances. in the pre - crisis period, the consumption in the us and several advanced economies was excessively high, which was matched by high savings rate in the south east asia ( due to capital controls and downward pressure on wages ) and also in oil rich countries ( due to low public investment on infrastructure ). one striking consequence of these macro imbalances was the financing of the private spending in rich countries by households in relatively poor emerging economies. to put it another way, excessive reserves accumulated in emerging economies through high current account surpluses flowed back to financial markets of advanced economies, which enabled households in these countries borrow beyond their means. despite rapid growing domestic demand and acceleration of commodity prices, global inflation remained subdued for a considerable period of time since surplus countries kept their labor cost under control to sustain their competitiveness in global markets. therefore, price stability oriented central banks in advanced economies saw no reason for a strong monetary tightening and stayed idle as their economies dangerously overheated. second reason for the global crisis was the unprecedented amount of liquidity created in the global financial system. innovations in financial engineering and technological advances facilitated the emergence of new and complex financial products, which in turn led to a massive growth in liquidity in advanced economies, well beyond the intention or control of central banks. high leverage ratios in financial institutions also played a significant role, thanks to creative accounting practices and