samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
joachim nagel : speech to mark the inauguration of the new president of the deutsche bundesbank speech by dr joachim nagel, member of the executive board of the deutsche bundesbank, at a virtual ceremony marking the change of office of the president of the bundesbank, 11 january 2022. * * * 1 welcome minister lindner, christine lagarde, jens weidmann, claudia buch, mr supplitt, colleagues joining us online, ladies and gentlemen, i, too, would like to extend a warm welcome to you. i am delighted that you are able to attend this virtual ceremony. it is a great honour for me to be able to stand here before you today as the new president of the bundesbank. there are numerous people that i would like to thank : mr lindner, and the entire federal government, for the trust placed in me. my fellow speakers, for the many kind words and best wishes. my colleagues both on the executive board and throughout the bank, for the warm welcome over the past few days. 2 a personal retrospective for me, it ’ s a bit like coming back home. i know lots of people at the bank, and lots of people know me. as you ’ ve already heard, i ’ m returning to the institution where i spent the longest part of my working life ; the institution which has shaped me the most. my professional journey took me to different parts of the bank ; at the former landeszentralbank, in the directorate general markets at central office and, in my last position, on the executive board, too. those were turbulent times. the bundesbank became part of the eurosystem and found its role there. the transition from deutsche mark to euro was no easy feat for the bundesbank as an institution, i won ’ t deny that. nonetheless, we resolutely embarked on this path and never lost sight of our target : a stable currency for the euro area. the bundesbank isn ’ t one for wallowing in nostalgia. it is forward - looking and very much hands on. it is an essential and competent part of the eurosystem, working together with its partners. it stands firm on its convictions and, i believe, presents them convincingly. this is the bundesbank that i met back then. and this is how i envisage the bundesbank continuing. as president, i will also feed on the experience that i gained

course, higher interest rates could choke off a recovery that is not well entrenched … and therein lies our dilemma.
were able and willing to fulfil their functions. for this to happen, the uncertainties about risk exposures and asset valuations, about developments in the real economy, about the strength of financial, corporate and household balance sheets need to be adequately addressed. this implies a central role for improved transparency as well as action by the private sector to repair balance sheets and strengthen the functioning of markets.

, dramatically reversing the trend of the second half of the 1990s. • the widening of global imbalances, recognised as unsustainable already in the late 1990s. starting in 1991, and with a sharp acceleration around 1996, the us current account deficit worsened steadily. initially its main counterpart was surpluses in europe and japan, but after 1997 the surpluses expanded mainly in asia ( in china since 2001 - 02 ) and in the oil exporting countries ( figure 4 ). the us international investment position deteriorated by less than the cumulated deficits would imply, thanks to favourable valuation effects ( figure 5 ). but these temporary effects masked a clearly unsustainable underlying trend. figure 4 current account balances ( in percent of world gdp ) - 1 - 2 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 united states euro area china em. asia excl. japan and china oil exporters japan source : world economic outlook, april 2009. figure 5 cumulated current account balances ( in percent of gdp ) 60. 00 japan 40. 00 china oil exporters ( 1 ), 20. 00 em. asia exc. china euro area 0. 00 - 20. 00 united states united states - 40. 00 - 60. 00 sources : imf, world economic outlook, april 2009 ; bureau of economic analysis. notes : ( 1 ) calculated as the cumulated current account balances, starting in 1980. ( 2 ) inludes only emerging and developing economies. ( 3 ) actual net foreign asset position ( at market values ). figure 6 total reserves minus gold ( usd billions ) 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 japan advanced economies excl. japan china, p. r. : mainland oil exporters other emerging & developing economies source : imf, international financial statistics. • an enormous increase in official reserves ( figure 6 ). initially driven by a desire to achieve greater resilience against capital outflows in the aftermath of the asian crisis, after 2002 the reserve accumulation grew far beyond any reasonable reserve needs. it was largely concentrated in emerging asia and the oil exporting countries, which pegged their currencies to the us dollar or in any case resisted their appreciation. figure 7 united states : fed funds target rate and 10 - year treasury bond yields ( percent ; monthly data ) federal funds target 10 - year government bond yield 1990 1991
well - stabilised financial environment shall provide the needed spaces for the growth of monetary stimulus in the economy.

to tear down balkan barriers and raise, instead, a comprehensive functional infrastructure, a regional payments system, a regional energy system, a regional market of financial products and lastly but may be most importantly a regional market of production factors. in martin luther king ’ s words “ we may have all come on different ships, but we ’ re in the same boat now ”. dwelling a little longer on the regional theme, i would like to briefly touch on another problem. the experience of the past year shows that as a result of regulatory capital requirements imposed by euro area supervisors, various bank groups reduced their participation not only in the euro area markets but also in our region. this process, known as deleverage, yielded negative consequences. to prevent such phenomena, policymakers and supervisors of partner economies need to cooperate more closely. in this regard, the vienna initiative is a good but limited cooperation platform. it is conceptualised as an instrument to address emergency crisis situations, whereas the current situation requires platforms for dialogue to enable effective and persistent communication among policymakers. this dialogue should aim at preventing undesired mutual effects ; a more ambitious programme, on the other hand, would aim at drafting and implementing coordinated initiatives of mutual interest. nonetheless, potential emergencies arising from contamination from euro area partners would create additional difficulties and huge effective costs for the economies of the region. therefore, we call for the establishment of appropriate mechanisms and instruments for liquidity provision by the european union to peripheral euro area countries. i believe that the financial integration makes this common defence more urgent, through the right understanding of the common fate of our trade partner economies. i take the opportunity, given the presence of many central bank officials from the region, to call for an en bloc coordinated position in this regard. the experience of the latest crisis showed that the countries which had more space to react, in the form of healthier fiscal balances or the financial system, and in the form of more reliable public institutions, were able to cope better with the consequences of the crisis. this lesson should not be neglected. among other things, it implies timely measures and, through counter - cyclical policies, establishment of the necessary space to buffer potential shocks. likewise, it implies ongoing efforts by macro and micro - prudential policies to minimise financial misbalances across all the sectors of the economy and the financial market. these policies, which are often known as “ leaning against the wind ”, have been and will continue to be part in the logics behind
stay committed and work together collectively, with our focus remain firmly on the common goal of ensuring a smooth and timely transition. 21. given the limited amount of time today, i could only briefly touch on what the hkma has been and will be doing for being the region ’ s sustainable financing hub. i look forward to sharing more updates and views with you on other occasions. i would also urge you to stay engaged for further benefitting from the unfolding opportunities in the sustainable financing space in hong kong! thank you. 1 hkma analysis of the volumes of asian international green and sustainable bonds arranged in hong kong 4 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches

important libor transition. urgency of the libor transition 10. as we all know, time is running short, and end - 2021 is fast approaching. now, with a clear and certain timetable for libor cessation, we should all work together with a sense of urgency. although certain us dollar libor settings will continue to be published until endjune 2023, this 18 - month extension is intended to allow time for more legacy us dollar libor contracts to mature. and, this won ’ t alter the fact that – libor will come to an end. it is therefore vital for us to continue our preparation that is currently underway, and avoid any further build - up of libor - related exposures going forward. with that in mind and to smoothen the transition process, we expect banks in hong kong to cease to issue new libor - linked contracts by the end of this year. development of the hkd overnight index average ( honia ) linked market 11. as we have stepped into the fourth quarter, we will soon move into a post - libor world. as we look ahead, libor transition also brings with it markets relating to the new risk - free rates ( rfrs ), like secured overnight financing rate ( sofr ). according to isda ’ s transition to rfrs review published in august, trading activity in sofr - linked otc interest rate derivatives ( ird ) continued to grow in q2 this year, with the traded notional of sofr - linked ird increased by 22 % to us $ 932 billion from us $ 762 billion in q1 2021. going forward, these new market segments will no doubt have further room to grow. 12. closer to home in hong kong, we are adopting a multiple - rate approach, under which both hong kong interbank offered rate ( hibor ) and honia are expected to co - exist. in line with the market development efforts across the world, we are taking active steps in promoting the further development of the honia - linked market. to facilitate the adoption and usage of honia, we are planning to issue honia - indexed floating rate notes ( frns ) under the government bond programme later this year. we hope the proposed frn issuance could encourage the private sector to consider issuing similar products in the future, and provide further impetus for the development of other honia - linked instruments in hong kong. 2 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches sustainable finance
bruno gehrig : global economic trends and their implications for financial market infrastructures speech by prof bruno gehrig, vice - chairman of the governing board of the swiss national bank, at the 11th international securities services association ( issa ) at the ubs executive development center, wolfsberg, 12 june 2002. * * * ladies and gentlemen, th it is an honour and a pleasure for me to have the opportunity to give the opening speech at the 11 issa symposium. i am delighted that you have chosen switzerland as a venue for your conference and hope that you feel comfortable and relaxed in this beautiful spot on the lake of constance. i gladly accepted your invitation although i am not an expert in your professional field. but i was, and still am, using your services rather intensively : in the 1980s as head of securities sales and trading at ubs, later on as ceo of an asset management bank, and now as investor of the currency reserves of the swiss national bank ( snb ). i would like to use the time allocated to me to reflect on global economic trends and their implications for financial market infrastructures. afterwards, i will outline the consequences these changes have on oversight authorities, which face similar challenges as you in your capacity as commercial service providers. global economic trends what are the global economic trends that we all perceive in our daily business? let me focus on some of the most prominent ones : the alleviation of barriers to trade in goods and financial assets, and factors affecting the overall demand and supply of securities. alleviation of barriers to trade in goods and financial assets barriers to trade in goods, services and financial assets have been progressively lifted during the last few decades, leading to a growing interaction among national economic systems. this growing interaction and connectedness is what people commonly refer to as globalisation. countries participating in this process have seen their domestic financial markets become more integrated with markets abroad. two factors shape and characterise this process. first, technological innovation has sharply reduced transportation and telecommunication costs. some figures taken from an imf study illustrate this impressive change. table 1 communication and computer costs, 1960 - 2000 cost of a 3 - minute phone call, new york to london ( in 2000, usd ) price of computers and peripheral equipment relative to gdp deflator ( year 2000 = 1000 ) 60. 42 41. 61 6. 32 4. 37 0. 40 1, 869, 004 199, 983 27, 938 7, 275 1,

june 21, 2016 ), www. federalreserve. gov / monetarypolicy / files / 20160621 _ mprfullreport. pdf. 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches
than 25 percent of the soma agency mbs portfolio is in 20 individual securities. 10 / 10 bis central bankers'speeches

of exports of products that are in high demand. second change : the advent of new players in international trade of goods and services and international division of labour. of course, this is not an unprecedented development – it has occurred several times since the second world war, with japan and also with the newly industrialised asian countries. it has nevertheless taken on a new dimension due to the newcomers ’ size and competitive edge, the liberalisation of capital flows and the decrease in transport and communication costs. the new international division of labour thus affects every stage of the production process ; it influences the localisation of added value and raises the question of the financing of the external imbalances of economies that focus on the design and marketing of products rather than their manufacture. the second session will deal with the impact of trends in productivity and competitiveness on international capital allocation and global imbalances. these trends may have contributed to the increase in global imbalances reflected in current account balances, and highlight several paradoxes. the first paradox is that of the us economy, which combines the structural surge in its productivity with a possible loss in competitiveness illustrated by the increase in its external deficit. this paradox is perhaps only apparent if we consider that the improvement in the us ’ relative productivity performance is mainly in the non - tradable sector and as compared to the industrialised rather than the emerging economies. in addition, while this pick - up in productivity does boost the profitability of investments, logically, it goes hand in hand with an excess of investment over national savings that calls for increasing foreign capital inflows. however, the predominant nature of capital inflows to the united states changed at the start of the 2000s, switching from mainly purchases of equities and foreign direct investment by the private sector to purchases of government securities by central banks, which are not motivated by the search for increased profitability. this leads us to the second paradox, a twin to the first, i. e. financing mature economies ’ expenditure with world savings. does this situation correspond to the efficient allocation of capital and if not how do we explain it? more generally, is there any likelihood that a chain that hinders balancing mechanisms has been established? the foreign exchange intervention operations carried out by several central banks help to finance the us budget and external deficits. in the united states, the corresponding maintenance of long - term interest rates at a low level fosters the us domestic savings - investment imbalance. in the asian countries,
any case. in terms of the restructuring of payments in emu and the rearrangement of business relationships - in other words, including acquisitions - fairness should take priority over everything else. what matters, after all, is successfully realising the joint project of monetary union on an enduring basis.

would agree that no monetary policy strategy should be set in stone. instead, it should adapt to changing circumstances, and circumstances have certainly changed over the past 18 years. in this sense, our current review should translate this strategy to the challenges of our time. 3 personal relationship otmar, with your firm commitment to monetary stability and central bank independence, based on your strong academic reasoning, you should serve as a role model for every central banker. and you have personally given me guidance and advice on numerous occasions as well. 1 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches even in my days as a student, i became well acquainted with your perspective by studying your textbooks. i preferred your books to others because they offered better explanations of the intricate interrelations of monetary policy and also introduced the reader to the challenges and issues of practical monetary policymaking. many years later, i had the privilege of working together with you personally. in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, you chaired the working group neue finanzmarktarchitektur. this working group was convened by chancellor angela merkel and was better known as the issingkommission. its task was to prepare the german agenda for dealing with the financial crisis for a packed series of g20 summits over the subsequent years. it was a very intensive and productive time that i remember vividly. today, i enjoy being able to exchange ideas about monetary policy and central banking with you – sometimes as a sparring partner. when we converse over the phone, i feel that we see many things from a very similar perspective, but what makes these exchanges so valuable and engaging is the sharpness of your intellect. and for this i offer my sincerest thanks. 4 conclusion although you already celebrated your 85th birthday a few weeks ago, i would nevertheless like to take this opportunity to wish you many happy returns as well as continued good health and vitality. your word carries weight beyond our country ’ s borders, even to this day. i hope that we will continue to hear your clear, credible, and authoritative voice in policy debate for many years to come. thank you and all the best! 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches
may also borrow. for mixed evidence of the countercyclical behaviour of u. k. pension funds during the crisis, see a. haldane, “ the age of asset management? ” ( speech delivered at the london business school, london, u. k., 4 april 2014 ). www. bankofengland. co. uk / publications / documents / speeches / 2014 / speech723. pdf. recent increases in long - term interest rates have also improved solvency ratios. also see k. ambachtsheer et al., “ risks of a prolonged low - interest - rate environment for the pension sector ”. report submitted to the global risk institute, rotman school of management, university of toronto. ( september 2013 ). in their search for yield, pension funds should avoid taking in “ crowded ” positions and taking other common exposures that reduce market diversity and their contribution to financial stability. canadian pensioners ’ mortality, canadian institute of actuaries, final report, february 2014. www. ciaica. ca / docs / default - source / 2014 / 214013e. pdf? sfvrsn = 4. outside of canada, some pension plans have transferred longevity risk to insurance companies, for example. bis central bankers ’ speeches a third challenge has been the introduction of fair - value accounting for pension promises and the interaction with regulatory solvency requirements. the new accounting rules, which use the yield of aa corporate bonds to discount liabilities while valuing assets at current market prices, have led to an increase in balance sheet volatility. in response, many funds have attempted to “ de - risk ” their plans with higher allocations to long - term bonds, which provide a better hedge against the impact of interest rate fluctuations on their liabilities. however, to compensate for the opportunity cost of a smaller equity weight, some funds have also leveraged their bond portfolios. while the use of leverage may help to raise returns, it also increases risk, because such a position may be difficult to roll over in stressed markets. 14 the pressure to minimize the volatility created by fair - value accounting and solvency rules may also entice some funds to favour strategies that shorten their investment horizons. 15 however, such “ short - termism ” may be costly, since it could detract from the contribution that pension funds can make to financial stability. fortunately, most funds are committed to disciplined rebalancing, which will

but we also know that persistently high inflation would be harder. our decision yesterday to raise the policy rate was not taken lightly. it was something we felt was necessary, based on the accumulation of evidence that i outlined for you today. we are committed to restoring price stability for the benefit of all canadians. thank you for your time. i am ready for your questions. see d. h. autor, d. dorn and g. h. hanson, “ the china shock : learning from labor - market adjustment to large changes in trade, ” annual review of economics 8 ( 2016 ) : 205 – 240.