at the zero lower bound, along with greater uncertainty about the policy reaction function, rather than differences in the underlying channels of transmission. when policy rates are in a range comfortably above the lower bound, most of the major central banks confront a relatively narrow range of options in a relatively familiar framework of decisionmaking and communications. by contrast, over the past six years, decisions by major central banks to initiate asset purchases have neither been seen nor communicated as incremental adjustments, but instead as bold new initiatives whose cumulative intended scale, duration, or objective were announced at the outset, often against the backdrop of a public debate about the efficacy and appropriateness of various policy options. for example, in its first two asset purchase programs the federal reserve committed to buying $ 1. 7 trillion and $ 600 billion of assets, respectively, while in the subsequent flowsbased program it committed to continuing monthly asset purchases until the outlook for the labor market had met a target for substantial improvement. cumulative asset purchases averaged a little over $ 1 trillion per program, which econometric estimates suggest contributed to sizable reductions in term premiums embedded in long - term yields and a downward shift in the expected path of the federal funds rate. similarly, in 2013, the bank of japan announced asset purchases at an annual pace of about 50 trillion yen and committed to continuing these purchases until inflation had moved up to 2 percent. the european central bank, at the beginning of this year, committed to buying 60 billion euros of assets each month at least through september of next year, or until inflation is on a path to get to close to 2 percent. in all of these cases, the policy actions themselves were large and designed to generate a significant easing in overall financial conditions, and the announcement effect likely was amplified because the policy reaction function around the zero lower bound was not well known and hence was difficult to anticipate. international coordination of unconventional monetary policy the intense debates over cross - border spillovers of unconventional monetary policy during the crisis naturally elicited calls for global coordination of monetary policy to avoid beggarthy - neighbor actions that could undermine growth globally. recognizing the practical limitations of such proposals, in 2013, the group of seven ( g - 7 ) instead adopted a more circumscribed but achievable set of commitments. each member committed that its monetary policy settings – unconventional as well as conventional – would be oriented to meeting its “ respective domestic objectives using domestic instruments, ” and “ not target [ ing ] exchange rates

william c dudley : the national and regional economy remarks by mr william c dudley, president and chief executive officer of the federal reserve bank of new york and chairman of the committee on the global financial system ( cgfs ), pace university, new york city, 29 november 2012. * * * good morning, i am pleased to be at pace university to address the university community of students, alumni, faculty and university supporters. it is always a pleasure to speak with academic audiences who i find to be particularly well - informed and attentive. i thank you for inviting me here today. in a timely note, i also want to commend pace university for fielding an excellent fed challenge team this year. as many of you know, pace won the second district college fed challenge this year and has just returned with an honorable mention from competing in the nationals at the board of governors in washington, d. c. today, i want to talk a bit about the fed – what we do and why we do it. then i ’ ll provide some thoughts about the national and local economic outlook and monetary policy. in covering the region and the nation, i will discuss the terrible impact of sandy on the region and the implications for the national economy. i know i will fall short in fully acknowledging all the hardship that our fellow citizens have endured – including devastating losses of loved ones, homes, communities and livelihoods – as well as widespread misery caused by flooding and disruptions to power, fuel, food, transportation and other services across the region. nor will i be able to fully commend the ways in which family members, neighbors, co - workers and strangers have helped those in need. i am deeply moved by the evidence of people reaching out and pulling together across the region. at the new york fed we are committed to supporting the recovery process. in addition to our economic analysis, we are convening our advisory groups and other regional contacts to receive first - hand accounts of the impact on communities, families and businesses and to assess other ways in which we may help. for example, we are holding a clinic in staten island to help people obtain information about different types of financial support that is available. we ’ re also encouraging banks to show appropriate flexibility when dealing with small business and other borrowers impacted by the storm. after my remarks, i ’ ll be happy to answer any questions you have about what the fed does and why, and about the economic outlook. but i won ’ t comment