was hard for the public to tell whether a change in the calendar date reflected a shift in policy or a change in the committee ’ s economic forecast. to help provide greater clarity about the committee ’ s objectives, in january 2012, the fomc adopted and released a statement of its longer - run goals and monetary policy strategy. 10 this statement laid out, for the first time, the rates of inflation and unemployment that the fomc considers consistent with the dual mandate. specifically, it stated that the longer - run inflation goal most consistent with the fomc ’ s price stability mandate is 2 percent, and that the central tendency of fomc participants ’ estimates of the longer - run normal rate of unemployment ranged from 5. 2 to 6 percent. as the statement also made clear, economic developments may cause inflation and unemployment to temporarily move away from the objectives, and the committee will use a balanced approach to return both, over time, to the longer - run goals. on the one hand, for example, the current rate of unemployment, at 7. 7 percent, is far above the 5. 2 to 6 percent range in the statement and is expected to decline only gradually. inflation, on the other hand, has been running at or below 2 percent and is expected to remain at similar levels for several years. in this circumstance, both legs of the dual mandate call for a highly accommodative monetary policy. with unemployment so far from its longer - run normal level, i believe progress on reducing unemployment should take center stage for the fomc, even if maintaining that progress might result in inflation slightly and temporarily exceeding 2 percent. the committee reaffirmed this statement in january 2013, and i expect it to remain a valuable roadmap for many years to come, indicating how monetary policy will respond to changes in economic conditions. 11 meanwhile, the fomc has continued to enhance its communication about how it would use the federal funds rate to return inflation and unemployment to its longer - run objectives. last december, the committee replaced its calendar guidance for the federal funds rate with quantitative measures of economic conditions that would warrant continuing that rate at its current very low level. specifically, the committee said it anticipates that exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate will be appropriate “ at least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6 – 1 / 2 percent, inflation between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than a half percentage point above the committee ’

for a smooth cross - border resolution process, we cannot always be certain of the circumstances under which host authorities may choose to take or be required to take actions such as unilateral “ ring - fencing ” that might disrupt the implementation of the single point of entry approach. thus, we need to continue to work with foreign regulators to iron out any issues ahead of time so that the resolution regime will work well for global, systemically important firms. the smooth operation of a resolution proceeding also depends on the existence of adequate liquidity in the early days of the process. one of the key pillars of title ii is that, unlike a bankruptcy proceeding, the fdic will have access to liquidity from the u. s. treasury to help ensure an effective resolution. while this access provides significant support for an effective resolution, it will still be important for the resolution authorities to provide clarity about the timing and the amount of liquidity resources that will be made available after a firm enters into resolution. this clarity will likely be necessary in order to calm creditors and markets at the time of resolution. under the single point of entry framework, the intent is to create a highly capitalized bridge entity so that counterparties will be willing to stay engaged based upon the improved creditworthiness of the bridge parent and its recapitalized subsidiaries. if successful, this will reduce the need for the up - front provision of external liquidity resources. nevertheless, to make the viability of the bridge entity fully credible, market participants must believe that the bridge company has access in a timely way to whatever additional liquidity resources might prove necessary. in addition, under the dodd - frank act, title ii is not the baseline or preferred approach for dealing with the failure of a large complex firm. for a firm to go through title ii, a determination must first be made that the failure of the firm and its resolution would have serious adverse effects on u. s. financial stability under the insolvency law that would otherwise apply. because market participants will not know for certain which path u. s. authorities will ultimately take – allowing resolution under ordinary insolvency law, as contemplated under title i, or instead initiating a title ii resolution – this uncertainty in and of itself could cause investors in short - term obligations that are likely to be protected under title ii to run. several other issues are also worthy of note. first, for the title ii single point of entry strategy to work properly, there needs to be a sufficient