adequately supportive to growth. at the same time, we must not forget to chart a course towards the country ’ s long - term economic development. as the thai economy is in need to upgrade growth potentials and increase competitiveness, the bank of thailand will contribute to this process of economic transformation by taking a proactive role in the financial sector development policy. ongoing in this sphere, there are at least three development plans under implementation, namely, the financial sector master plan, the payment systems roadmap, and the capital account liberalization master plan. although the three plans have different objectives, they complement each other and together form a strong foundation for the country ’ s financial sector development. i will highlight a few key elements we hope to get out of these plans. the first one is the financial sector master plan ( fsmp ) phase iii. approved by the cabinet in march this year to set out strategic directions for the next five years ( 2016 – 2020 ), fsmp iii is aimed to promote a competitive thai financial sector, to support more diverse needs at fair and undistorted prices, as well as promote regional trades and investments, with proper supervision to ensure macroeconomic and financial stability. in short, this plan ’ s motto is to promote a “ competitive, inclusive, connected, and sustainable ” financial system. after five years, the bank of thailand expects to see growing financial innovation with more diverse players, both banks and non - banks, especially those offering digital financial services. these services will allow a new segment of customers to gain access to financial services through new channels. smes entrepreneurs, for example, could pitch their ideas to a wider group of investors, through crowd funding and peer - to - peer lending platforms. new ideas would have a higher chance of being translated into businesses, thus promoting innovative spirit among the thai entrepreneurs. financial innovation will also promote competition and drive higher efficiency in the banking sector. at the same time, we expect most thai individuals to have access to basic financial services at a fair price and have an appropriate level of financial literacy. financially deserved enterprises should receive adequate funding, using proper financial instruments. we expect to improve households ’ financial literacy, leading to more prudent financial management and lowered households ’ indebtedness. for financial institutions, we encourage them to improve the level of consumer protection and quality of financial professionals, and to incorporate more sustainability practices into their core business operation. on the road to enhancing regional connectivity, under the asean banking integration framework

the financial crisis has been stress testing – it is critical, and needs to be thorough and cannot be sidelined when the consequences may be awkward. but, there are some difficult issues surrounding how to set the parameters of stress tests – how much stress to assume? we tend to calibrate stress tests on the basis of history plus something, but the something can be hard to judge. as a case in point, this is what we did in the fpc's work on liability driven investment after 2018. now, we know that this sort of approach does not pass the black swan test, one in which the future is not implied by the past and thus not forecastable. on its own a stress test is very useful and an essential part of the toolkit. but we know that we cannot envisage and design tests that capture all possible future states of the world, and we should not pretend that we can. instead, we must stress up to the point where it is sensible for regulation to create the protection we want, and – this is crucial – we must have other approaches that cover the world of risks beyond that point. these approaches are bank resolution tools, and central bank intervention tools of the type we had to use last autumn. you will be mightily relieved to hear that we are into the home straight now, but it contains the small issue of non - bank finance. given the increase in bank regulation required in the aftermath of the financial crisis, it is not surprising that the last decade has seen a relative and absolute increase in non - bank finance. continuing the theme developed earlier, one important way to look at the bank versus non - bank world is that in the former there is assurance on the value of money as the main liability of banks, while in the latter the value of investments explicitly and deliberately is not assured. this is important, but we also have to recognise that the growth of non - bank finance has led to the significant expansion of the landscape of systemic risk since the crisis. in other words, we have seen that the non - bank world can transmit risk into the bank world, and other parts of the core of the financial system, like central counterparties. consequently, the relative focus of our financial stability work has shifted to the risks posed by non - bank financial institutions ( nbfis ). moreover, we have seen a common theme running through incidents that have occurred – the dash for cash in 2020, the archegos collapse, the ldi pension