samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
in the united states and in many of our trading partners, and materially worsen the recession our economy is enduring. to mitigate these risks, the treasury provided equity capital to aig and the federal reserve provided liquidity support backed by the assets of aig. the federal reserve's involvement in aig began in mid - september of 2008. aig's financial condition had been deteriorating for some time. the financial and credit markets were experiencing severe stress due to various economic problems arising out of the broad - based decline in home prices, rise in delinquencies and foreclosures, and substantial drop in values of mortgages as well as mortgage - backed securities and other instruments based on such assets. in short - term funding markets, very high spreads between lending rates and the target federal funds rate and very illiquid trading conditions in term money markets had come to prevail. aig was exposed to these problems because of the protection financial products had written on mortgage - related securities, because of investments aig had made in mortgage - related securities in connection with its securities lending program, and because its counterparties had begun to withdraw funding. these pressures mounted through september. the private sector worked through the weekend of september 13 - 14 to find a way for private firms to address aig's mounting liquidity strains. but that effort was unsuccessful in a deteriorating economic and financial environment in which firms were not willing to expose themselves to risks a€ “ a risk aversion that greatly increased following the collapse of lehman brothers on september 15. under these circumstances, on september 16, 2008, acting with the full support of the treasury, the board authorized the federal reserve bank of new york ( new york reserve bank ) pursuant to section 13 ( 3 ) to lend up to $ 85 billion to aig through a revolving credit facility ( revolving credit facility ) in order to ease the liquidity strain on aig. the liquidity pressures experienced by aig during that time of fragile economic markets threatened its ability to continue to operate, and the prospect of aig's disorderly failure posed considerable systemic risks in various ways as a consequence of its significant and wide - ranging operations. such a failure would also have further undermined business and household confidence and contributed to higher borrowing costs, reduced wealth, and general additional weakening of the economy. moreover, at the time the board extended the revolving credit facility, there was no federal entity that could provide capital to aig to help stabilize

to bordering countries. but the premises would appear to be in place for an extension of its international role in both trade and finance. the transatlantic link is extremely precious and must be cultivated at the policy level. new prospects will open up shortly. to overcome today ’ s challenges, it will be necessary for objectives to be shared and decision - making to be based on solidarity. the united states and europe, more closely united, are a guarantee for the world ’ s stability.
important that governments feel forced to rescue it from impending failure, fearing the economic costs such a failure would cause. possible solutions to the “ too big to fail ” issue are the creation of incentives to encourage banks to reduce their size or change their organisational structure.

thomas jordan : bank regulation – what went wrong? what will improve? summary of a speech by mr thomas jordan, vice - chairman of the governing board of the swiss national bank, at the forum fur universitat und gesellschaft, berne, 24 march 2010. the complete speech can be found in german on the swiss national bank ’ s website ( www. snb. ch ). * * * the financial crisis has caused enormous damage. massive losses were recorded in the global banking system. many countries have gone through the worst recession since the second world war. government rescue measures had to be implemented to stabilise the financial system. existing bank regulations were not able to prevent the crisis, nor were they able to at least contain the damage to such an extent that government rescue packages would not have become necessary. while before the financial crisis, there was considerable uncertainty about possible shortcomings in bank regulation, these have now become apparent and will have to be tackled. in addition, the provision of implicit state guarantees has made the need for action even more urgent. big banks – believing that they will receive government assistance if they run into problems – have even stronger incentives now to take on excessive risk. this increases the risk of another crisis and erodes the fundamental principle of the market economy – competition. once again, in the future, banks will have to bear their own risks. the failure of a bank should no longer jeopardise the stability of our financial system. only then, will our financial system become less prone to risk and will the extent of future crises clearly decrease. in order to achieve this goal, several measures have been decided on in switzerland. first, new capital adequacy requirements were enacted in 2008. big banks will have to double their risk - weighted capital. in addition, they will have to hold a minimum amount of equity capital, irrespective of the risk models they use internally. this is because the crisis has shown that internal risk models massively underestimated the risks taken. second, new liquidity regulations will be adopted. in the future, big banks will have to hold a sufficient amount of high - quality liquid funds to be able to cover unexpected liquidity losses for a period of at least 30 days. the reason for this is that, in the financial crisis, even solvent banks had liquidity problems. finally, measures to solve the “ too big to fail ” issue must be put into practice. no bank should be so systemically
##nce and obscurity. we are at that point. if this generation fails, then the work of those who were “ present at the creation ” will have been undone. it is our duty to re - create the institutional framework that we inherited. it will not be easy. but in case like alice you are tempted to think that, “ there ’ s no use trying ; one can ’ t believe impossible things ”, remember the queen ’ s reply : “ why, sometimes i ’ ve believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast ”.

, for example, thomas ( 1997 ). see fisher ( 2010 ) for a more detailed discussion of these operations. estimating the effects so far so what impact have our asset purchases had to date? that ’ s the two hundred billion pound question. unfortunately, it is hard to provide a definitive answer. to be clear this is no different from our inability to assess precisely the impact of the reduction in bank rate from 5 % to 0. 5 %. or indeed of any macroeconomic policy measure. without knowing what would have happened in the absence of a policy action, it is not possible to identify its incremental impact. but what is different is that this policy instrument is relatively untried and untested. so the demand to provide some insight into its impact is that much greater. this demand is quite understandable, but difficult to satisfy. one possible approach to assessing the impact of our asset purchases is to consider the growth of broad money. a key principle underlying the asset purchase programme is the belief in a causal mechanism running from increased money balances into higher asset prices and nominal spending. this mechanism can be expressed in terms of a process of portfolio rebalancing in which yields of different assets adjust in order for the higher level of money balances to be willingly held. but the same mechanism could be expressed in terms of a monetarist approach, in which asset purchases work through measures of money disequilibrium which in turn spur additional spending. these different frameworks are sometimes presented as conflicting models of the transmission of asset purchases. but i view them as essentially two sides of the same coin. importantly, they share the same fundamental assumption about why monetary policy at the zero bound can stimulate nominal spending : namely, imperfect substitutability between money and other assets. over the past year, despite money - financed asset purchases totalling £200 billion, broad money has increased by just £8 billion. 6 what should we make of this weakness? in part it speaks to the counterfactual. the falls in nominal spending and the desire by banks to reduce leverage means that, absent the monetary injection, broad money would have almost certainly been far weaker. but it is also symptomatic of the scale of the new equity and debt raised by uk banks over this period which, together with retained profits, totals more than £85 billion. given that the non - bank private sector is likely to have been the source for much of this funding, this is
how non - standard tools can be used to deliver monetary stimulus even without altering much the overnight rate, and produce equivalent effects. for example, the non - standard measures the ecb has taken since summer 2014 have produced a pass - through equivalent to a 100 basis point rate cut in “ normal ” conditions. so there is no reason for central banks to resign their mandates simply because we are all being affected by global disinflation. in fact, if all central banks submit to that logic then it becomes self - fulfilling. if, on the other hand, we all act to deliver our mandates, then global disinflationary forces can eventually be tamed. the costs of fighting too low inflation still, there are some that argue that even if central banks can lean against global disinflationary forces, in doing so they do more harm than good. in particular, expansionary monetary policies at home lead to the accumulation of excessive foreign currency debt or asset price bubbles abroad, especially in emerging markets. and when these financial imbalances eventually unwind, it weakens global growth and only adds to global disinflation. this is the third line of argument. but i ask, what would be the alternative? would it help emerging markets if advanced economy central banks failed on their mandates? would that be more likely to contribute to global growth? clearly, the answer is no. the stability of large economies is vital to their trading partners and to the global economy, and diverting monetary policy away from that aim when our economies are still fragile would not be in their interest. in the euro area that is especially true for our neighbouring economies, which export around 50 % of their goods and services to the euro area. in fact, when central banks have pursued the alternative course – i. e. an unduly tight monetary policy in a nascent recovery – the track record has not been encouraging. famously, the fed began raising reserve requirements in 1936 – 37, partially due to fear of a renewed stock bubble, but had to reverse course the next year as the economy fell back into recession. that has also been the experience of some central banks in recent years : raising rates to offset financial stability risks has undermined the primary mandate, and ultimately required rates to stay lower for longer. federal open market committee meeting, transcript, 21 march 1978. bis central bankers ’ speeches this suggests that the so - called “ assignment problem ” between monetary policy and financial stability at the domestic level should

they should lead to a permanently lower inflation rate. what matters is that central banks act within their mandates to fulfill their mandates. in the euro area, that might create different challenges than it does in other jurisdictions. but those challenges can be mitigated. they do not justify inaction. bis central bankers ’ speeches
many reforms over the last few years, the region – with some exceptions – now appears to be a much safer place financially. emerging asian countries – and to some extent also russia – have massively accumulated foreign exchange reserves, thereby providing self - insurance against financial crisis. in addition, proposals are again on the agenda for a closer monetary and financial cooperation in east asia, based on existing swap agreements under the chiang mai initiative. in view of improved fundamentals and the allegedly increasing role of regional assistance mechanism, the question has been raised as to whether the lending function of the fund is still needed. and this has led to the more provocative question : if imf lending is no longer needed, why do we need the fund at all? by contrast, other people have suggested a more active role for the fund before a crisis arises. they have suggested the introduction of new instruments for the fund which, if accepted, would transform the imf into an insurance arrangement with farreaching consequences. it is obvious from these highly controversial proposals that the fund is currently being extensively assessed internally as well as by its shareholders and by third parties. the fund ’ s appropriate future role and priorities have been vividly discussed, the design and effectiveness of its instruments have been reviewed and a discussion has been opened up to strengthen internal management, finances and governance. to be relevant, any discussion about the fund ’ s strategic direction must take into account the financial risk to the fund. recent patterns of imf loan exposures have triggered concerns about excessive credit and risk concentration in the imf ’ s balance sheet. exceptionally high access was often accompanied by prolonged use of fund resources. moreover, the imf ’ s share in some crisis countries ’ total external debt has reached unprecedented and systemically problematic levels. while the fund ’ s liquidity may not be constrained yet, its preferred creditor status is coming under increasing threat. thus a key issue for further discussion is : how can financial risks to the fund be reduced? as raghuram rajan has recently indicated, the discussion about the imf lending role is an issue about “ rules versus discretion ”. many countries are now aiming at well - functioning, rules - based market economies. why should the same principles not govern international financial relations as well? in view of the overarching rules of economic governance, it should be clear that fund financing must not distort the functioning of the market mechanism. fund policies should instead leave the market participants fully responsible for their own decisions. emergency

the economy ", world economic forum 2020. 4 " the economic case for nature ", world bank 2021. 5 https : / / www. eea. europa. eu / publications / water - resources - across - europe - confronting 4 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches
##1 and we host the third biggest funds jurisdiction in the world and the second biggest funds jurisdiction in europe2. global regulatory and supervisory standards are critical for effective oversight of the sector. this means we have very close financial relationships across the european union. we must lead and influence regulatory policy at both european and global levels. in this context, it gives me enormous pleasure to welcome european commissioner for financial stability, financial services and capital markets union, mairead mcguinness, who will be speaking shortly as the highlight of the evening. ireland and indeed europe is fortunate to have such a strong and influential leader at the helm of the financial services portfolio. in the uncertain and complex economic environment that has prevailed over the last few years, ireland's membership in the european union and its institutions has been a critical to the development of our economy and society. as we enter our sixth decade as a member of this union, i expect the bonds we have with our european peers to deepen further and the impact of our membership in the european union to continue to have a hugely positive impact on our economy and society. thank you for listening and i hope you will enjoy the discussion with commissioner mcguinness. i will now hand you over to the head of the european commission representation of ireland, barbara nolan to open proceedings. barbara, over to you. 1 insurance ireland 2 irish funds 2 / 2 bis - central bankers'speeches

the previous month. using these averages, very short - term variations in the krone exchange rate will have less effect on the exchange rate assumption. a more long - lasting change in the krone exchange rate will, on the other hand, be taken into account over time and will gradually have an effect on the inflation projection and on interest rate setting. norges bank ’ s executive board sets the interest rate with a view to achieving the inflation target of 2½ per cent. the inflation target also provides a framework for stabilising output and employment. when setting the interest rate, the executive board seeks to strike a balance. on the one hand is the consideration of bringing inflation up to target and stimulating growth in the norwegian economy. on the other hand, we must consider the risk of new pressures in the norwegian economy when looking further ahead. since december 2002, we have found it appropriate to reduce the interest rate to a low level. at the last monetary policy meeting on 17 september, it was decided to reduce the interest rate to 2. 5 per cent. according to norges bank ’ s assessment, with an interest rate of 2. 5 per cent, the probability that inflation two years ahead will be higher than 2½ per cent is the same as the probability that it will be lower. thank you for your attention.
that economic stability and financial stability are safeguarded as singapore navigates this new landscape. we are well placed to deal with the risks ahead. • our exchange rate - centred monetary policy remains fit for purpose and will continue to focus on keeping inflation contained. • our macroprudential policies will complement monetary policy and financial supervisory policies to secure sustainable asset prices and financial stability. bis central bankers ’ speeches • most of all, singapore ’ s fundamentals remain sound. fiscal prudence, financial discipline, minimising debt and living within our means, will provide us policy space and buffer to weather whatever comes ahead. this is an advantage most countries do not have. i wish you a successful and enlightening conference. thank you. bis central bankers ’ speeches

outstanding sukuk and takaful. singapore has had nearly 30 sukuk issuances to - date, with seven in 2013 alone. the prospects for islamic finance in singapore look bright. • more funds continue to be established here, to meet demand from clients in asia as well as from the middle east. • several corporations have established sukuk programmes in singapore to tap the market over the next few years. bis central bankers ’ speeches we can grow faster when we grow together. wibc asia provides a valuable platform to bring together stakeholders in islamic finance, from asia and the middle east, to foster stronger collaboration for sustained industry growth. i wish you fruitful discussions. thank you. bis central bankers ’ speeches
. at the same time, activities like reforestation, mangrove restoration, and the early retirement of coal - fired power plants can potentially generate good carbon credits. we will showcase efforts by singapore to work with global stakeholders to foster a sound and vibrant voluntary carbon credit market in asia. this pavilion is a result of the close partnerships among singapore businesses, ngos, academics, civil society groups, and the government. please also join me in expressing appreciation to the organising team. i wish you a fruitful time at the singapore pavilion and at cop27. 3 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches

population. looking back, people used to be concerned about overpopulation. for example, in the first edition of an essay on the principle of population ( 1798 ), thomas r. malthus argued that, even though a population increases geometrically, food increases only arithmetically, and thus population growth constrains an enhancement in the living standard per capita. overpopulation also had been a concern in japan for a long period until recently. 10 in fact, economic growth can be achieved even under a declining population, which might be a headwind for the economy. taking the case of ehime prefecture as an example, gross prefectural product has increased moderately in recent years despite a continuing decline in the following argues that economic growth leads to openness, generosity, mobility, and democracy in a society : friedman, b. m., the moral consequences of economic growth ( new york : knopf, 2005 ). 9 there are arguments that dematerialization has progressed in advanced economies, whereby, despite the economic growth, the consumption of such items as energy and mineral resources as well as the emissions of carbon dioxide have declined. see mcafee, a., more from less ( london : simon & schuster, 2019 ). 10 tadokoro, m., " jinkoron no hensen " [ overpopulation or underpopulation? : japan's discourses on demography in retrospect ], hogaku kenkyu, vol. 84, issue 1 ( january 2011 ) : 63 - 90. total population in the prefecture ( chart 15 ). an international comparison shows that there is no correlation between the real gdp growth rate per capita and the population growth rate ( chart 16 ). aside from that, there is no correlation between the inflation rate and the population growth rate either. looking from the supply side, sources of economic growth roughly can be divided into three elements : capital, labor, and knowledge in a broad sense, including technologies and skills. among these, knowledge is definitely important in achieving economic growth. in the first place, before we use capital and labor, we need a certain level of knowledge to decide what kind of goods and services to produce and consume. even during the post - war rapid economic growth period in japan, the contribution of labor input was small while that of capital and knowledge was large ( chart 17 ). with regard to labor, the current increase in labor force that reflects a decline in the number of unemployed and an increase