samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
million us $ 12. 0 billion data not available but perhaps rising rs. 161 billion 8 % positive exports tax revenues rupee - dollar parity foreign direct investment foreign exchange reserves poverty incidence us $ 88 million per month us $ 7. 8 billion rs. 391 billion depreciating us $ 472 million us $ 1. 6 billion 33 % gdp growth rate inflation fiscal deficit / gdp current account / gdp public debt / gdp external debt / gdp interest payments / govt. revenues remittances positive positive positive positive positive negative positive negative note : all indicators in column 1 pertain to 1998 - 99 or october 1999. all indicators in column 2 pertain to 2004 - 05 or end october 2004.

. e. less negative, interest rates, which led to an upward drift in saron, shown by the black line in chart 4. these upward pressures on saron and other short - term money market rates, while anticipated, were not desirable from a monetary policy perspective. since last november, the snb has conducted a number of operations to keep secured shortterm money market rates close to the snb policy rate. between november 2019 and july 2020, and in particular since the end of march, we conducted several fine - tuning operations in the overnight segment of the repo market. these operations are shown as red diamonds in chart 4. in a fine - tuning operation, the snb places so - called ‘ cash provider quotes ’ directly on the repo trading platform, which any repo market participant can then ‘ hit ’ if they choose to do so. when the snb offers funds at a particular quote, cash takers have no reason to accept liquidity at a higher – that is, less attractive – interest rate. with these fine - tuning operations, the snb can cap repo rates and limit upward spikes. since july, we have further supported the gradual convergence of saron towards the snb policy rate by auctioning one - month funds on the repo platform. these auctions are depicted as blue triangles towards the right - hand edge of chart 4. unlike fine - tuning operations, with which the snb caps interest rates, the snb ’ s one - month auctions offer liquidity on a medium - term basis. banks can satisfy some of their demand for liquidity by participating in these auctions. as the participating banks are then no longer as dependent on the secured interbank market for obtaining the desired amount of liquidity, aggregate demand for overnight liquidity in the repo market falls, thereby reducing upward pressures on saron. we also wish to note that, over time, liquidity can be redistributed between banks via other channels than just the repo market. for instance, liquidity redistribution may take place via the transfer of customer deposits and longer - term deposits between banks. naturally, such adjustment processes take some time. let me summarise the key points we have made so far. the steering of short - term money market rates continues to work – even in negative territory. three interest rates play a key role page 10 / 13 here. the snb policy rate is used to communicate the monetary policy decision and, in
. even if the riksbank's assessment is that the most acute phase of the crisis may subside over the next few months, it will probably take time before conditions return to normal. confidence must be restored on several levels and that takes time.

left to its fate and there was rapidly growing concern that other institutions would follow suit. credit flows dried up almost completely and investors essentially dared to invest only in government bonds. companies had already experienced a tightening of credit terms ; opportunities for loan financing now essentially disappeared. in this phase of the crisis, around mid september this year, the effects on the swedish financial system became clear. when banks'access to liquidity dried up on every market, this hit all banks, including those that are financially strong, like the swedish banks. many central banks around the world had been taking measures for some time to strengthen liquidity in banking systems but the riksbank had not needed to act. the interbank market and other short - term markets had worked, though interest rates had climbed sharply. when the crisis had a more tangible impact on sweden, the riksbank also implemented a series of interventions. meanwhile, central banks in the rest of the world continued with their interventions and governments approved crisis packages to guarantee financial stability. against the backdrop of this summary of events in the financial sector over the past year, today i will speak about the effects of this financial crisis on the riksbank's work of maintaining a safe and effective payments system. but first i would like to briefly describe how we carry out this work under normal circumstances. i will also conclude with a comment on the crisis ’ effects on monetary policy. work with financial stability under normal circumstances the task of maintaining a safe and effective payments system includes the role of the riksbank as the banks'bank. this task includes maintaining the rix payment system for payments in swedish kronor. participants in the system may borrow during the day and overnight to cover temporary deficits. the task also includes continuous oversight of the financial system. for some time the riksbank has had a well - designed analytical apparatus for early detection of changes and vulnerabilities that could develop into a serious systemic crisis. above all, its purpose is the timely detection of vulnerabilities in banks that are of central importance for the payments system, which requires knowledge of the status of the various institutions and how the market functions. this in turn presumes continuous follow - up, where frequent contacts with financial market participants play an important role. these established contacts are essential in a crisis situation, both to determine the type of measure that is needed and to ensure timely implementation. ten years ago we began to publish stability reports twice a year. these reports provide a basic
, according to the plan and the agreements reached with our european partners. in 2019 we expect the positive trends in the banking sector to continue altogether, however with possible increased challenges associated with the general economic environment banks operate in. concurrently, in the coming months we will evidence processes of potentially long - term consequences directly impacting the sector, aimed at achieving a qualitatively higher degree of integration of bulgaria into the european financial and institutional infrastructure. 1 / 1 bis central bankers'speeches

for the practical preparations for the implementation, if necessary, of the new rules and procedures. hence, our immediate efforts are aimed at making arrangements and developing solutions that would be valid and efficient in the medium and long term. 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches
fiat money and discretionary monetary policy. from a monetary angle, it was the consequence of the spread of deposit banking, which ultimately resulted in bank money accounting for the bulk of the money stock. runs on deposits can be seen as collapses of confidence about the stability of the rate of exchange between a unit of central bank money and a unit of commercial bank money. commercial banks had to have sound fundamentals if one - to - one convertibility was to be preserved hence, the need for bank supervision. in the short run interventions, i. e. lending of last resort, could be - and was - used to support the rate. but, as in the more familiar case of foreign exchange interventions, they were no substitute for sound policies ; credit provided too easily and too generously could even generate the risk it was meant to avoid ; today we call it moral hazard. the ambivalent relationship between supervising banks and lending to them ( surveillance and conditional lending, in imf language ) explains why there is no clear - cut answer to the question whether the central bank or a separate agency should be responsible for supervision. seven of the twelve basle committee countries have a separate agency, as against about 10 per cent of countries in the world as a whole. more importantly, even where this solution has been adopted, the centrality of the banking system, and of its money creation prerogatives, in the monetary policy transmission mechanism means that no central bank disregards the “ state of health ” of its banks or completely rules out lending of last resort in extreme circumstances. 7. the other, perhaps more important, change concerns the context of central banking. this can be seen in terms of both time and space. i began my career in a world of annual accounts and quarterly or monthly statistics, in which paper was the medium and mail the carrier. for the bulk of financial transactions the two parties, the intermediary, the currency of denomination, the relevant laws and courts, and the central bank all belonged to the same jurisdiction. and that jurisdiction was not only economic, as it included the political jurisdiction from which public institutions derive their legitimacy through the democratic process. this simple description never fully coincided with the state of the world, of course, but twenty - five years ago it was still a workable approximation. today, that is no longer true. the advance of data processing and telecommunications technology has been the most powerful single driving force of this change. but the low cost of transportation, the evolution

cent ) bis central bankers ’ speeches figure 5 loan - to - deposit ratio in selected countries ( per cent ) bis central bankers ’ speeches
do remember, two years ago, on december, 5th, when aspen institute romania celebrated five years of operations, i was presented with the “ values - based leadership ” award on behalf of aspen network of international partners. i cherish that memory and what this award stands for. i would like to thank each and every one of you for joining us. bis central bankers ’ speeches

mugur isarescu : the transatlantic renaissance – romania as a faithful partner and ambitious player opening speech by mr mugur isarescu, governor of the national bank of romania, at the conference “ the transatlantic renaissance : romania as a faithful partner and ambitious player ”, bucharest, 9 december 2013. * * * prime minister ponta, mr. kennedy, your excellences, ladies and gentlemen, it is a great pleasure for the national bank of romania, and an honor for me and the board members, to welcome such a distinguished audience. i salute the presence of victor ponta, prime minister of romania, who will be the keynote speaker today and that of craig kennedy, the president of german marshall fund of the united states. allow me to greet their excellences, members of the diplomatic corps, as well as the other notable guests who represent an important array of successful domains of activity. a special welcome to mircea geoana, president of aspen institute romania and his team of young, talented and hardworking professionals. today ’ s gathering has a challenging topic : “ the transatlantic renaissance : romania as a faithful partner and ambitious player ”. here, at the national bank of romania, we take pride in having always been a forum for debating, in an open and profound manner, the themes and trends defining our age. thus, it is the perfect venue to host such a conference as this one, which encourages individuals to reflect on ideals and ideas that define good society through leadership, dialogue, entrepreneurship and regional stability. i have read two papers prepared by aspen institute and the german marshall fund : the report “ dialogues on the national interest. recommendations of public policies ” and the program “ east - west gateway ”. they generate the object of the forthcoming debates. allow me to make some remarks regarding the national interest and the transformations within the financial sector that are currently taking place in europe. the national interest goes beyond its economic dimension, although it is also true that the smooth functioning of the economy is not only an objective per se, but also a means to achieve the other objectives subordinated to the national interest. as any other european central bank we are focused on price and financial stability. obviously, monetary and financial stability is an essential ingredient of economic performance. this is all the more relevant for a catching - up economy, such as romania. on the one hand, progress towards convergence is impossible to imagine without capital accumulation from local and external sources alike, and it cannot be achieved in the absence of a
rate guidance. this is particularly important because, as the chairman stressed in september, the committee views rate policy as its stronger and more reliable tool. to wrap up, let me emphasize that what matters is the overall stance of policy, not the pace of asset purchases. in all likelihood, policy will remain highly accommodative for quite a while longer – as long as needed to support an economy that still struggles to shake off the lingering effects of the financial crisis. thank you. bis central bankers ’ speeches

jerome h powell : communications challenges and quantitative easing speech by mr jerome h powell, member of the board of governors of the federal reserve system, at the 2013 institute of international finance annual membership meeting, washington dc, 11 october 2013. * * * it is an honor to be here today with such distinguished panelists to discuss the communications challenges associated with quantitative easing. i should say at the outset that the views i express here today are my own and may not reflect those of other federal open market committee ( fomc ) members. i'll start with the fomc's commitment, when the current asset purchase program was launched in september 2012, to continue purchases until the committee sees a substantial improvement in the outlook for the labor market, a term the committee left undefined. 1 this commitment was powerful precisely because it was open ended. but “ open ended ” does not mean unending. as time passed and labor market conditions improved, it would be important for the committee to clarify the meaning of the term substantial improvement. and given the lack of precedent, it was likely that this transition to more - specific guidance would involve some short - run volatility. economic conditions have improved since the program was launched. consumer and business confidence moved higher, and sectors such as housing and autos have performed well. despite strong, ongoing headwinds from fiscal policy, there has been significant progress in the labor market. from september 2012 through august of this year, the private sector created 2. 3 million new jobs. the unemployment rate declined from 8. 1 percent to 7. 3 percent. it ’ s unclear how much of this improvement was due to the program, but i think there is evidence that it played a role, lowering long - term interest rates and raising equity prices and home prices, effects that have supported household and business spending. in march 2013, the committee began noting in its postmeeting statement that it would consider “ the extent of progress toward its economic objectives ” in judging “ the size, pace, and composition of its asset purchases. ” 2 in late may, the chairman stated, in response to a question during a congressional hearing, that the committee might begin to reduce the pace of asset purchases “ over the next few meetings. ” 3 a few weeks later, at his press conference after the june 2013 fomc meeting, the chairman noted that the substantial improvement test might well be met over the coming year, and he therefore set forth a framework designed to clarify the
dimitar radev : eurozone slowdown likely temporary publication in the mni based on an interview with mr dimitar radev, governor of the bulgarian national bank, conducted by mr luke heighton and published on 17 may 2019. * * * the eurozone slowdown may prove temporary, the governor of the bulgarian national bank told mni, but whether europe emerges from the current soft patch by the second half of 2019 is uncertain. " the euro area ’ s economy beat many economists ’ expectations in the first quarter. but the pace and direction of the economy over the coming months and quarters are yet to be seen, ” said dimitar radev, a member of the european central bank ’ s general council since his 2015 appointment, noting the persistence of global trade tensions and “ political developments ” in europe. " recent data may be interpreted as signs that the region ’ s slowdown may be temporary, ” he said in an emailed response this week to questions. asked whether slow eurozone growth pointed to ‘ japanification ', he replied : “ comparisons with previous historical episodes and other economies do come to mind when we observe prolonged periods of slow growth, very low interest rates and aging population in europe. " " policy responses may be effective only as long as they target structural areas, such as education, labour market and pension reforms. the focus needs to remain clear : to stimulate productivity and competitiveness, ” he said, calling for more growth - oriented fiscal policies. " this does not necessarily mean higher spending. moreover, higher spending would be counterproductive in countries with no fiscal space. " — policy review radev, was circumspect regarding recent calls for a review of the ecb ’ s monetary policy strategy. he also expressed caution in response to suggestions the institution should lower its mandated medium - term inflation rate target from close to but below 2 % to around 1 %. " there may be reasons to start thinking if an overhaul needs to be considered, ” he said. but he added : “ whatever, if anything, the ecb decides in this regard should be shaped into a carefully communicated process. i cannot but fully agree with a recent comment by peter praet who warned that such public announcements may be misread and, furthermore, interpreted as the ecb admitting to having failed on its mandate, which is not the case. " the ecb has “ plenty of instruments ” at its disposal in the event of a severe economic down

is a strong pre - condition for full integration into the european structures and for making maximum use of the potential of our country's participation in the single european market, including by eliminating the need to convert levs to euro and eliminating transaction costs. the data and experience of the countries that joined the euro area earlier show that the introduction of the euro accelerates sustainable development and the convergence with the average european incomes. in conclusion, i would like to once again welcome the guests at this high forum and the speakers participating in it, and i wish interesting and productive discussions to all participants in today's conference. 2 / 2 bis - central bankers'speeches
source : ecb.

jurgen stark : the global financial crisis and the role of central banking speech by mr jurgen stark, member of the executive board of the european central bank, at a meeting hosted by the institute of regulation & risk, north asia, hong kong, 12 april 2011. * * * it is a pleasure for me to address this distinguished audience. in my remarks today, i would like to share some thoughts with you on how the global financial crisis could shape central banking in the future. crises are often associated with deep - seated changes in both the mandates and functions of central banks – this is a well - established regularity in contemporary economic history. for example, central bank inaction was widely held responsible for worsening the economic downturn during the great depression of the 1930s. the result was that monetary policy was placed under the control of fiscal authorities for nearly two decades afterwards. the great inflation of the 1970s had the opposite effect. the failure of weak monetary regimes to reign in high inflation led to the establishment, in the early 1980s, of monetary policy frameworks solidly anchored by price stability mandates, and safeguarded by independent and autonomous central bankers. will this crisis – which is still ongoing – have any implications for the tasks of central banks in the future? to shed light on this question, i will, first of all, look back on the salient features of the monetary policy paradigm prevailing before the crisis. then i will review how central banks responded in practice to the crisis, focusing on the ecb ’ s policy actions in this regard. and finally, i will discuss whether certain aspects of the pre - crisis monetary policy paradigm need to be reassessed on the basis of the recent experience, and outline the likely challenges for central banks that lie ahead. * * * 1. the monetary policy paradigm before the crisis we do not know yet to what extent the pre - crisis consensus macroeconomic framework has been de - constructed by the crisis. but we do know that the “ hubris ” of the intellectual paradigm on which that framework was erected has completely vanished. some aspects of the framework, in my view, will undoubtedly survive the crisis. one is the great and increasingly shared emphasis on central bank independence. another is the centrality of price stability for monetary policy. these were the twin foundations of the dominant monetary policy paradigm before the crisis, and the crisis has not challenged or discredited either of them. i will return to the issue of price stability towards the end of my remarks. beyond these
policy action ; 6. public authorities play a role in three fields : removing obstacles to consolidation, setting standards, and ensuring an integrated regulatory and oversight framework.

big, complicated, and interconnected, because they reap any benefits – for example, in terms of economies of scale and scope – but don ’ t bear all the social costs. how can we do better? some have argued that the current policy path is not working, and that we need to take a fundamentally different approach. 4 such an alternative approach might include, for example, outright caps on the size of individual banks, or a return to glasssteagall - type activity limits. my own view is somewhat different. while i agree that we have a long way to go, i believe that the way to get there is not by abandoning the current reform agenda, but rather by sticking to its broad contours and ratcheting up its forcefulness on a number of dimensions. in this spirit, two ideas merit consideration : ( 1 ) an increase in the slope of the capitalsurcharge schedule that is applied to large complex firms, and ( 2 ) the imposition at the holding company level of a substantial senior debt requirement to facilitate resolution under title ii of dodd - frank. in parallel with the approach to capital surcharges, a senior debt requirement could also potentially be made a function of an institution ’ s systemic footprint. to illustrate my argument, let us take as given the central premise of those who favor size limits : namely, that society would be better off if the distribution of banks were not so skewed toward a handful of very large institutions. ( to be clear, i am using the word “ size ” as shorthand for the broader concept of an institution ’ s systemic footprint, which in addition to size, might reflect complexity, interconnectedness, and global span of operations. ) in other words, let ’ s simply posit that a goal of regulation should be to lean against bank size, and ask : what are the best regulatory tools for accomplishing that goal? as in many other regulatory settings, this question can be mapped into the “ prices - versus - quantities ” framework laid out by martin weitzman nearly 40 years ago. 5 here a size cap is a form of for example, in june of 2012, moody ’ s described its ratings process for bank of america, citigroup, and jp morgan chase as follows : “ [ their ] ratings benefit from three notches of uplift from the standalone credit assessment at the bank level, and from two notches of uplift at the holding company, reflecting moody ’ s assumptions