samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
journal of economic perspectives 20 ( 4 ) : 29 - 46. medina, j. p. and c. soto ( 2007 ), “ the chilean business cycles through the lens of a stochastic general equilibrium model, ” working paper n°457, central bank of chile. rajan, r. ( 2006 ), “ has financial development made the world riskier?, ” in the greenspan era : lessons for the future, proceedings of the jackson hole symposium 2005, federal reserve bank of kansas city. rose, a. and m. spiegel, ( 2009 ), “ cross - country causes and consequences of the 2008 crisis : early warning, ” cepr discussion paper n°7354.

weakness spread to the rest of the globe. there also was no clear way out of the room for the debt crisis in europe. market confidence ( and in some jurisdictions, even political confidence ) was very low, if not non - existent. during the gfc, major central banks had reached the zero bound of the policy curve. interest rates had gone so low, there was hardly any wiggle room to use interest rates for stimulating the economy. we could therefore no longer rely on the familiar channels of transmission of monetary policy. at the time, new transmission channels emerged such as the “ expectations channel ” and the “ risk - taking channel ”. so, advanced economy central banks needed to employ non - conventional monetary tools. even central banks in some emerging market economies had to deploy non - traditional tools because of contagion. as a result – asset purchase programs in all letters of the alphabet some of which you would normally throw away in a game of scrabble came into vogue. q - e - 1, qe2 ( with operation twist ) in the us, omt [ or outright monetary transactions ] and tltro [ or targetted longterm refinancing operations ] in europe, and q - q - e ( quantitative and qualitative easing – the three arrows ) in japan. bis central bankers ’ speeches furthermore, central banks needed to be sharper and more pointed in their communication of policy intent. as you now know, “ forward guidance ” has come to be a specific central bank technique for managing market expectations. in addition, financial stability and the systemic nature of risks became the driving forces for the global financial reform agenda. “ too big to fail ” was no longer going to be the bottom line. even as we speak, ladies and gentlemen, financial reforms are being put in place so that those defined to be “ systemically important institutions ” would not have to be bailed out by taxpayer money. these sifis would instead be mandated to meet a higher capital standard. sifis have to have more “ skin in the game ”, so to speak. and the game, ladies and gentlemen, has changed. micro prudential regulations, while necessary, are no longer sufficient. it may be recalled that micro prudential measures are meant to improve individual institutions ’ resilience to risks. central banks must now also have macroprudential measures in place. macroprudential measures look to address the interconnected nature of the system and
evidence that even good supervision can ’ t prevent all bank failures? improving our ability to do this diagnosis is critical. i am confident that today ’ s panels and paper discussions will help us move forward in this direction. thank you for participating in this conference. bis central bankers ’ speeches

consequently regulatory measures have been put in place to prevent crisis recurrence, but it is still hard to say for sure that there are no more crises to come. in order to prevent the eruption of a further crisis, we should prepare for a new, unpredictable crisis rather than looking back at the previous ones, and in this respect, we should make sure that the regulatory reforms not just reflect lessons from previous crises but preemptively identify potential factors triggering a crisis and prevent their occurrence. organizations carrying out macro - prudential policies need to have the abilities of a prophet to monitor on a constant basis and identify preemptively all the economic and social factors that could possibly give rise to systemic risks. this being the case, the policy authorities must be imbued with a sense of mission to shoulder the great national responsibilities that they bear. thank you for listening so attentively and i hope that what we have discussed today will give us a clue how to cope with the challenges we have in front of us. references kim, choongsoo, “ monetary policy after global financial crisis ( in korean ), ” 2013 economics joint conference, feb. 2013 adrian, t. and h. s. shin, “ financial intermediaries, financial stability, and monetary policy, ” frb ny staff report no. 346, 2008. blanchard, o., g. dell ’ ariccia and p. mauro, “ rethinking macroeconomic policy, ” imf staff position note, 2010. c. a. e. goodhart, “ the changing role of central banks, ” presentation at the 9th bis annual conference, lucerne, jun. 24, 2010. erlend w. nier, jacek osiski, luis i. jcome, and pamela madrid, “ towards effective macroprudential policy frameworks : an assessment of stylized institutional models, ” imf working paper no. 250, 2011. h. s. shin, “ imf financial stability & systemic risk forum, ” mar. 2013. itai agur and sunil sharma, “ rules, discretion, and macro - prudential policy, ” imf working paper no. 65, 2013. reinhart, c. m. and k. rogoff, “ shifting mandates : the federal reserve ’ s first centennial, ” presentation at the aea meetings, san diego, jan. 3, 2013. stijn claessens,
from using digital payments. as we embrace the changes around us, let us look beyond the convenience that e - payment services bring us. let ’ s keep in mind that for every digital payment we make, we contribute to transforming this 1 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches country to a cash - lite economy where we could reap enormous benefits such as greater efficiencies in funding flows, increased transparency and security of financial transactions, and more inclusive financial system, just to name a few. the road we traverse may be challenging but i have no doubt that together we will be able to overcome the challenges that will come our way. instead of letting the challenges blur our sights of the invaluable gains from our strong partnerships, let us be positive. let us look at the bright side of things and remaining focused on our shared vision of raising the volume of e - payments to the level we desire. with our concerted effort to deepen the penetration of electronic channels and instruments in this country, we will certainly achieve our ultimate goal of having an inclusive payment system where no adult filipino is left behind in terms of access to payment and other basic financial services. let ’ s do our share in uplifting the lives of ordinary juan and maria as we build a stronger philippine economy. i trust in all of you, our strategic partners, to take an active role in our challenging yet rewarding journey. now is not the time to stop. together, let ’ s initiate more electronic payment programs that touch the lives of the unserved and underserved filipinos. as we renew our commitment to boost digital payments, may i request everyone to please get hold of your mobile phones. and together let ’ s raise our mobile phones to seal the bond we have at this summit and cheer ‘ mabuhay ’. thank you very much for your generous support! 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches

that they plan to consolidate the fiscal deficit to no more than 3. 1 % of gdp for fiscal year 2003. this is a good gradual reduction from 3. 6 % last year. the overall government debt is currently still at 54 % of gdp, well under the cap of 60 % announced in 2001. the rapid recovery of the general economy also helped boost tax revenue collection by as much as 10 % in 2002, and looks set to repeat itself in 2003 as well, helping to narrow the budget deficit. ladies and gentlemen, no one can plan for 2003 with absolute certainty. we are all following the news minute by minute, and even the best laid out plan for this year must contain several scenarios to cover for contingencies. but the one certainty i can assure you is that the macro economic policies in thailand that aim for stability and sustainable growth will continue.
sectors, which will push up the hicp inﬂation rate by 0. 35 percentage point this year. the price of these certiﬁcates will be raised moderately over the next few years. the effects on inﬂation are therefore expected to be smaller from 2022 onwards, amounting to a total of between 0. 1 and 0. 2 percentage point per year. the “ green ” transformation of the economy is just one of a raft of other longer - term factors : the accelerating pace of digitalisation, possible de - globalisation trends, or aspects of demographic change, which will enter a new phase as the baby - boomer generation retires. it is important that we remain vigilant and keep a close eye on these developments. i have been saying for some time now that it would be reckless to rule out the possibility that we might have to contend with stronger inﬂationary forces again in the future. andy haldane, chief economist at the bank of england, recently made reference to a metaphor ﬁrst used by friedrich von hayek : inﬂation control is akin to trying to catch a tiger by its tail. while the “ inﬂationary tiger ” slept for many years, haldane says that the tiger has now been stirred from its slumber. he sees a clear risk of central bank complacency allowing the inﬂationary ( big ) cat out of the bag. whilst it is clear that the united kingdom ﬁnds itself in a different position and is facing quite another inﬂation outlook than the euro area, i believe that the sharp rise in government debt during the crisis also has a role to play. central banks could, as a result, ﬁnd it increasingly [UNK] to change their expansionary stance in a timely manner, [ 9 ] because they may come under growing political pressure to ensure the sustainability of government debt by maintaining an accommodative monetary policy for longer than is needed to safeguard medium - term price stability. monetary policy needs, then, to remain steadfast. and in order to avoid raising false expectations, we need to make one thing clear today : the emergency monetary policy measures must not be permitted to persist indeﬁnitely. they need to remain closely linked to the crisis and come to an end once the pandemic is over. the ecb governing council also needs to scale back its very expansionary monetary policy, on the whole, as soon as the inﬂation

, frank and educated discussions, we need concrete examples, we need solid data, and we need to work together to gain a better understanding of a shared goal and how to get there. thank you for your attention. bis central bankers ’ speeches
other systemically important institutions with buffers of up to 2 %. systemic risk buffers have been activated in five countries, with a range of between 0. 5 % and 3 %, and the countercyclical capital buffers have been announced in seven countries ( belgium, france, germany, ireland, lithuania, luxembourg and slovakia ) with rates between 0. 25 % and 2 %. for more information, see “ macroprudential measures in countries subject to ecb banking supervision and notified to the ecb ” on the ecb website. [ 10 ] for a discussion of recent ccyb decisions, see babic, d. and fahr, s. ( 2019 ) “ shelter from the storm : recent countercyclical capital buffer ( ccyb ) decisions ”, macroprudential bulletin no. 7, ecb. [ 11 ] see, for example, “ refining the stress capital buffer ”, speech by the vice - chair for supervision, randal k. quarles, at the program on international financial systems conference, frankfurt, germany, 5 september 2019. european central bank directorate general communications sonnemannstrasse 20, 60314 frankfurt am main, germany tel. : + 49 69 1344 7455, e - mail : media @ ecb. europa. eu website : www. ecb. europa. eu reproduction is permitted provided that the source is acknowledged. media contacts copyright 2019, european central bank

the issue of raising productivity are of course people of the private firms. for such efforts, the bank is and will be of service through creating a stable economic and financial environment. thank you.
few remarks, it is now my honour and privilege to declare the bank of zambia unzabeca lecture series officially closed. i thank you.

caleb m fundanga : the role and operations of the bank of zambia closing remarks by dr caleb m fundanga, governor of the bank of zambia, at the end of the bank of zambia lecture series to members of the university of zambia business and economics association ( unzabeca ), lusaka, 24 november 2004. * * * chairperson bank of zambia directors members of unzabeca distinguished ladies and gentlemen as we come to the end of the series of lectures presented by the bank of zambia, it is my sincere hope that unzabeca members have now gained a better understanding and appreciation of central banking, in general, and the role and operations of the bank of zambia, in particular. ladies and gentlemen, as it has been amply explained during the course of the lecture series, i would also like to reiterate that a central bank plays a critical role in the monetary and financial operations of any country. through these lectures, you have learned that the primary responsibility of a central bank includes, among others : • issuance of currency ; • acts as banker to the government ; • banker to commercial banks ; • management of a country ’ s foreign exchange reserves ; • lender of last resort ; • management of public debt. although some central banks do not carry such responsibilities ; • collection and interpretation of statistics, in particular, financial and monetary statistics ; and • implementation of monetary and financial systems policies. through these lecture series, which have successfully ended today, it has been highlighted that the central bank, like the rest of the economy, adapts to changes in the market environment. in the case of the bank of zambia, prior to 1991, the bank had numerous roles, including the promotion of economic growth through the provision of credit to critical sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing, mining, etc, as well as issuance of export guarantees to exporters. as expected, the multiplicity of functions led to conflict of interest. for instance, on one hand, the bank was expected to control the growth of money supply while, on the other hand, it was required to inject money into the system through the provision of credit to the selected sectors. the introduction of economic reforms by the government beginning the end of 1991 therefore brought about enormous challenges for the bank of zambia. to meet the new challenges, the bank ’ s operations needed to be more focused. in this respect, the bank of zambia act was amended in 1996 to reflect the changed nature of the operating environment. by
and the size of financial markets are also useful. information vendors are planning to provide information relevant to the secondary markets for npls. bank loans have been the dominant means of corporate financing in japan. under the main bank system, borrower information has been shared only between the borrower and its main bank, and neither party has been especially averse to this arrangement. it is always difficult to change such established practices. for this reason, persistent efforts will be required not only to establish an infrastructure to facilitate the use of information, but also to convince market participants to change their thinking on this matter. second, the revitalization of credit markets using cutting - edge financial engineering techniques is indispensable. we see technological innovation in many industries but it is particularly rapid in the financial sector. a variety of statistical methods have been introduced which use information such as accounting data and bankruptcy ratios to obtain quantitative estimates of credit risk and also to evaluate the overall risk inherent in particular portfolios. these techniques have facilitated the rapid development of markets for syndicated loans, abss, and small - value business loans based on scoring models, as well as markets for non - recourse loans and credit derivatives. when arranging abss, these techniques enable the classification of cash flows from pooled assets into tranches, such as senior, mezzanine, and equity, reflecting different degrees of risks, enabling investors to select the tranche best suited to their individual risk preferences. v. expectations for syndicated loan market next, i would like to focus on syndicated loans in the context of reforming corporate finance in japan. syndicated loans are considered sophisticated because they incorporate devices for both producing and managing information efficiently. i believe that the development of this market will play a leading role in the reform of corporate finance in japan, and is likely to accelerate the establishment of a “ credit culture. ” there are two features of this market that are worth specific mention. first, contracts make clear stipulations regarding the relationships between borrowers and banks, and between agent banks and participating banks. they also stipulate precisely the obligations of contracting parties and the compensation to which they will be entitled. for example, the contract between a borrower and its bank includes covenants that establish certain conditions on profitability and asset quality to which the borrower agrees to be subject. such covenants allow borrowers more operational freedom, since they can prevent unnecessary intervention of banks. on the other hand, they also allow lenders to take necessary measures quickly

the key to taking advantage of these opportunities. thank you for listening and i would be very happy to answer any questions. bis central bankers ’ speeches
the lower part of the cycle. for some workers, especially those in the early years of their working life, its effects can be very persistent.

. the oecd put it well, when saying governments " stand at a critical juncture, steering environmental and digital transitions while facing increased polarisation within their countries, heightened geopolitical tensions as well as the social consequences of economic developments ". 8 you could swap " public bodies " for governments and the sentence would remain fully accurate. add the fact that we are in an era of misinformation – which ai will turbocharge – and it's clear how challenging the course will be. but in the central bank, we know what it is to lose trust – we're acutely conscious of the regulatory failings that contributed to the financial crisis – and how hard it is to regain it. we also know that trust in central banks can decline even when they are implementing policy ostensibly in 3 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches line with their mandates. which makes it all the more necessary that we fight for trust. in a world that is growing ever - more complex, the policy solutions will increasingly involve trade - offs. as agustin carstens, general manager of the bank for international settlements, has noted : " - trust fuels the legitimacy of policies. with trust, the public will be more willing to accept actions that involve short - term costs in exchange for long - term benefits. in sum, trust is vital for policy effectiveness. " 9 our next steps are to continue to implement our open & engaged approach to stakeholders, and to continue our empirical work with others on the subject of trust in central banks and regulatory bodies. we held a seminar in may with the academics who led peritia, an eu - funded research project on trust in public expertise, and we anticipate doing further work with those academics, as well as determining how best we can apply oecd drivers. thank you. 1 link to strategy is here 2 for more information on the production of euro banknotes, see : https : / / www. ecb. europa. eu / euro / banknotes / production / html / index. en. html 3 see : https : / / www. centralbank. ie / publication / corporate - reports / strategic - plan 4 https : / / www. centralbank. ie / publication / behaviour - and - culture - report 5 see : https : / / paschaldonohoe. ie / central - banktcd - conference - culture - diversity - the - way - forward - for - corporate - governance - in - ireland / 6
whole. our work in response to the fpc ’ s recommendation typifies this ; but we will continue to work with firms, government and cyber experts to learn and evolve our approach. http : / / www. bankofengland. co. uk / financialstability / fsc / documents / wakingshark2report. pdf. bis central bankers ’ speeches

high average residual maturity of the public debt, low household debt, reduced business debt, and the fact that banks are sounder and have only limited exposure to the effects of any interest rate rises, will make it possible to contain the risks connected with the structural fragilities of italy ’ s economy. the achievement of a satisfactory and stable growth rate is, however, hampered by continued weak productivity growth, the inefficiencies and rigidities of the business environment and the high debt - to - gdp ratio. addressing these vulnerabilities means continuing to implement systematic reforms and balanced fiscal policies, which are also necessary to maintain the confidence of households, firms and investors. recent tensions in the italian financial market demonstrate the importance of a prudent and balanced economic policy stance. between mid - may and early june, with very low market liquidity, yields on government securities increased across all maturities. yields on ten - year bonds surpassed 3 per cent for a few days and the spread with respect to the equivalent german bond rose above 300 basis points, while the spreads vis - a - vis the government bonds of the other euro - area countries also widened. the performance of premiums on credit default swaps on government securities shows there were moments when fears of a redenomination of italy ’ s debt grew among financial operators. contrary to what happened at the height of the sovereign debt crisis in 2011 - 12, the markets did not perceive this to be associated with an increase in the risk of a euro break - up. pressures eased in the following weeks, when the sharp rise in volatility partially subsided and short - term yields declined, restoring the more usual, positive slope of the term structure. the spread between yields on ten - year italian and german government bonds has fallen to around 240 basis points ; however, it is still more than 100 points higher than the levels prevailing in the first half of may. maintaining orderly conditions on the government bond market is essential to defend the stability of the financial system and effectively protect the savings of italians. during the tensions at the end of may, share prices in the banking sector declined sharply. the financial situation of the public sector can influence that of the banking sector through multiple channels. the reduction in the value of government securities held by banks directly affects their assets ; it also diminishes the amount of collateral that banks can use in eurosystem refinancing operations. the challenges for the public finances can lead to an overall deterioration in the