banks prosper to the extent that they can exploit the new opportunities that psd2 offers. supervisors and central banks will have to monitor these new risks and developments, both for individual banks and from a system perspective. this is not something new. but the playing field may become in a constant state of flux over the next decade, posing new challenges to the authorities. • as a central bank, dnb welcomes psd2 and the associated innovations. by increasing competition, psd2 can make the payment system more efficient. there are at least three unresolved issues, though, which will come to the fore sooner or later. first, banks are expected to maintain the infrastructure for payments, which the new players can access for free. then, the strategic question arises whether there will be sufficient incentives for banks to invest further in the infrastructure. second, the payment system as a whole may become more complex and more fragmented, due to a lack of standards. is this a problem that needs intervention by the competent authorities or can it be solved by the industry itself? it may serve as a warning here that, until now, european stakeholders have not been able to develop a standard interface for access to bank accounts. third, if bigtech penetrates into the european market, who should organize the countervailing power to prevent market dominance. and how could this be done? 4. concluding remarks • let me conclude. psd2 compels the payment industry to head for a new digital era. this may have major strategic consequences for online payments. in my address, i have raised a series of questions on privacy, on the potential role of bigtech and on the conceivable prospect of a fragmented payment system. while dnb welcomes psd2, these questions deserve ample further reflection in the coming years. • i thank you for your attention.

. 8 let me elaborate. the effectiveness of macroprudential policy depends importantly on its interaction with monetary policy. in particular, it hinges on the “ side effects ” that one policy has on the objectives of the other. on the one hand, monetary policy can thwart the intentions of macroprudential policy. we all agree that the monetary policy stance affects risk taking of the financial system as a whole. while macroprudential instruments typically target specific vulnerabilities, monetary policy affects the cost of finance for all financial institutions – including the shadow banking sector. as such, in the words of jeremy stein, it “ gets in all of the cracks and may reach into corners of the market that supervision and regulation cannot ”. 9 this is most evident in a crisis situation, such as the one we are still witnessing in the euro area. standard and non - standard monetary policies that provide ample liquidity may avoid a collapse of the banking sector. but they can come at the expense of reduced incentives for c. kindleberger and r. aliber ( 2015 ) manias, panics and crashes : a history of financial crises. palgrave macmillan. 7th edition. a. haldane ( 2011 ) risk off. speech delivered on 18 august. a. crockett ( 2000 ) marrying the micro - and macroprudential dimensions of financial stability. bis speeches, 21 september. p. hakkarainen ( 2016a ) capital - based macro - prudential instruments - what type of policy tools are needed to address macro - prudential risks in the banking sector? notes for the panel discussion on " capital - based macro - prudential instruments - what type of policy tools are needed to address macro - prudential risks in the banking sector? ” eu commission's public hearing on the review of the eu macro - prudential framework. brussels, 7 november. ibidem. p. hakkarainen ( 2016b ) monetary policy - which road ahead. notes for the session “ monetary policy : which road ahead? ”. frankfurt european banking congress, frankfurt am main, 18 november. j. stein ( 2013 ) overheating in credit markets : origins, measurement, and policy responses. speech at the federal reserve bank of st. louis research symposium on “ restoring household financial stability after the great recession : why household balance sheets matter ”, 7 february. bis central bankers ’ speeches banks to recapitalize and restructure