minds of bankers. a culture in which anything goes unless explicitly forbidden must not be allowed to be part of the future but should instead be banished to the past. we need a culture based on a quote from seneca : “ shame may restrain what the law does not prohibit. ” of course it was, in the end, only a few black sheep who gave an entire industry a bad name. however, we need a culture that transcends short - term yields to look at the bigger picture. banks have a responsibility to the economy and to society. once they fulfil this responsibility, they will regain public confidence. 6. conclusion ladies and gentlemen, the world of banks is changing. in my remarks, i have discussed various factors affecting the german banking industry ’ s path to the future. these include stricter regulation and european supervision, but also tougher competition. and it is not just competition within the banking market which is playing a role. technological progress is also creating competition entering the banking market from without. take, for instance, new electronic payment systems or crowdfunding. these are putting external pressure on banks ’ traditional business models. banks need to respond and to adapt their business models and it systems to the new environment. it is ultimately up to the banking industry to decide how far they wish to go in this situation. i am convinced that german banks have what it takes to prevail in future, as well, but they already have to begin today to address the challenges of tomorrow. we cannot regulate the banking industry ’ s path to a golden future ; this is where banks must assume a great deal of individual responsibility. bis central bankers ’ speeches let me close my remarks by quoting, alongside yogi berra, another famous american : “ change is the law of life. and those who look only to the past or the present are certain to miss the future. ” these words were spoken by john f kennedy. thank you very much! bis central bankers ’ speeches

common stance of this kind will undoubtedly be more difficult than for a traditional national currency area. whereas the currency will be supranational, it will generally remain the individual governments that will be taking the decisions on economic and social policy. that is all the more reason why the euro needs dominant patterns of preference which are common to all participants. that likewise implies the affirmation of major fundamental positions. firstly, maintaining the value of money is the best contribution that monetary policy can make to economic growth and employment. price stability is the foundation on which society and policy - makers can and must carry out the necessary adjustments. secondly, in the event of conflict, internal price stability must have priority over external exchange rate stability. thirdly, experience has shown that a central bank which is independent of the vagaries of dayto - day politics, and committed solely to the goal of price stability, helps to safeguard that indispensable price stability. by the way, that might be even more important in a supranational union than in a purely national context. these three basic convictions are essential to a durably stable currency. that is why they have rightly been enshrined in the maastricht treaty. article 107 lays down the european central bank ’ s independence of instructions. the statute of the european central bank requires it “ to maintain price stability ” as its primary objective. and article 109 ( 1 ) and ( 2 ) require the eu council to pursue external exchange - rate policy without prejudice to the objective of maintaining price stability. any calls for the political control of the european central bank or for different objectives were thus firmly rejected five years ago, when the treaty was signed. but it is, of course, not only the legal position created by the maastricht treaty which argues in favour of the primacy of price stability and its safeguarding by means of independent monetary policy. past experience and economic reason argue in its favour, too. it is important that this is perceived - and lastingly perceived - to be the case in all the participating countries. otherwise, political conflicts might impose a heavy burden on monetary union at a later date. the task of preserving a durably stable currency is, however, one which has to be faced in other policy areas, too. it cannot be a matter for the monetary policy of the european central bank alone - particularly since the ecb still has to establish its reputation and credibility in the first place. however great