structure. this, along with measures to strengthen large banks, would reduce the likelihood of sifi failure – but could not be relied upon to prevent all failures. would breaking up the largest banks end the need for future bailouts? that is not clear, for lehman brothers, although a large financial institution, was not one of the giants – except that it was connected with a very large number of other banks and financial institutions. similarly, the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s and 1990s was not a tbtf crisis but rather a failure involving many small firms that were behaving unwisely, and in some cases illegally. this case is consistent with the phrase, “ too many to fail. ” financial panics can be caused by herding and by contagion, as well as by big banks getting into trouble. in short, actively breaking up the largest banks would be a very complex task, with uncertain payoff. the bottom lines the united states is making significant progress in strengthening the financial system and reducing the probability of future financial crises. in particular • by raising capital and liquidity ratios for sifis, and through the active use of stress tests, regulators and supervisors have strengthened bank holding companies and thus reduced the probability of future bank failures. • work on the use of the resolution mechanisms set out in the dodd - frank act, based on the principle of a single point of entry, holds out the promise of making it possible to resolve banks in difficulty at no direct cost to the taxpayer – and in any event at a lower cost than was hitherto possible. however, work in this area is less advanced than the work on raising capital and liquidity ratios. see footnote 6 above. bis central bankers ’ speeches • although the bcbs and the fsb reached impressively rapid agreement on needed changes in regulation and supervision, progress in agreeing on the resolution of g - sifis and some other aspects of international coordination has been slow. • regulators almost everywhere need to do more research on the effectiveness of microprudential and other tools that could be used to deal with macroprudential problems. • it will be important to ensure that coordination among different regulators of the financial system is effective and, in particular, will be effective in the event of a crisis. • a great deal of progress has been made in dealing with the tbtf problem. while we must continue to work toward ending tbtf or the need for government financial intervention in crises, we should never

amando m tetangco, jr : the strength of retail – in a wider asean economy speech by mr amando m tetangco, jr, governor of bangko sentral ng pilipinas ( bsp, the central bank of the philippines ), at the chamber of thrift banks ( ctb ) annual convention, makati city, 19 march 2014. * * * every year, your industry comes together to exchange views on the prospects for the year ahead. with your theme this year “ thrift banks : preparing for 2015 asean integration ”, the thrift banking industry is recognizing a development that has quietly evolved through the years and will soon crystalize. asean integration – broadly through the asean financial integration framework or afif and more specifically through the asean banking integration framework or abif – will come to fruition in line with the asean 2020 vision that was enunciated way back in 2007. it is, in this sense, imminent and the chamber is being responsive by preparing for this eventuality. in fact, for this convention, the organizers have lined up experts to tackle different facets of integration. my role this morning is to describe the broad economic landscape, including the challenges and opportunities, that the thrift banking industry currently faces against the backdrop of asean integration. the chamber is being strategic in this way, for clearly, understanding one ’ s starting point and initial conditions is just as important as defining one ’ s final destination. the economy at large let me begin therefore with the economy at large. it is tempting to simply cite the array of indicators that show that the macro - economy is strong. in 2013, we again saw the convergence of high growth and stable prices as the country posted a real gross domestic product growth rate of 7. 2 percent amid an inflation of three percent. this is on top of the real gdp growth of 6. 8 percent and a 3. 2 percent inflation rate in 2012. we need to appreciate these numbers not just because they are better than the performance numbers that came out of 2011 ( which were 3. 6 % real gdp growth and 4. 6 % inflation rate ). instead, these are excellent numbers because of the calamities that befell us during the period. 1 on the external front, the balance of payments position was at usd5. 1 billion for 2013. and the gross international reserves at almost 12 months ’ worth of imports of goods and payments of services continues to provide ample cushion against external vulnerabilities