guidance for supervisory stress testing, which includes guidance on how multiple authorities can conduct stress tests. 6 testing a ccp ’ s recovery plan by authorities may help to assess the market conditions under which recovery – and potentially resolution – may be necessary, as well as the potential funding required. internationally coordinated stress - testing is essential to foster a better understanding of the aggregate amount and quality of committed funding that is available across major ccps. co - ordinating ccp and banking stress testing will provide additional understanding on how resolution plans would work in case of extreme scenarios. second, recent analysis of central clearing interdependencies carried out by the standard - setting committees has revealed the limited number of banking groups that are members of ccps across the world, thereby closely linking ccps themselves. 7 even without stress testing, it is easy to understand that a ccp under stress would send a 2 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches liquidity shockwave across its participants and beyond as it requires additional margins and / or passes on losses. this is especially important for central banks. with stress testing, potential funding strains can be further explored, and useful information for ccp and bank supervisors as well as resolution authorities can be gleaned. third, european arrangements for ccp recovery and resolution must be coordinated. the significant interdependencies between ccps globally are also present in the single market. resolution planning should therefore be coordinated across all european union ccps. 8 this is crucial to preserve financial stability within the union in the event of a crisis. critics of eu - wide coordination claim that the fiscal risks of central clearing arise primarily in ccps ’ respective home countries. but given that cross - border membership of eu banks in eu ccps is widespread, this argument is flawed. the losses faced by a ccp during default management and recovery and resolution are mostly borne by its clearing members, rather than by the ccp itself. even though a ccp ’ s home country may choose to provide temporary public funding during resolution, such support would be recouped from clearing members, in line with their obligations to contribute to comprehensive loss absorption. therefore, fiscal risks would in fact appear to arise in countries in which major ccp participants are located. domestic authorities may need to provide these participants with financial support if they are faced with large payment obligations due to ccp losses. thus, eu - wide coordination in resolution planning is necessary to ensure that system - wide risks are fully identified and mitigated in

are determined to ensure that inflation returns to our two per cent medium - term target in a timely manner. based on our current assessment, we consider that the key ecb interest rates are at levels that, maintained for a sufficiently long duration, will make a substantial contribution to this goal. our future decisions will ensure that our policy rates will be set at sufficiently restrictive levels for as long as necessary. we will continue to follow a data - dependent approach to determining the appropriate level and duration of restriction. in any case, we stand ready to adjust all of our instruments within our mandate to ensure that inflation returns to our medium - term target and to preserve the smooth functioning of monetary policy transmission. we are now ready to take your questions. 3 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches