jointly or via the imf, to lend large sums to another country will always be difficult. in a world of nation states, it is unreasonable to suppose that political considerations will not enter the choice of recipient of such largesse. and the greater the political uncertainty about the willingness to act as an ilolr, the larger the amount of funding that will be required. in turn, the operation will appear less credible, and the authorities are caught in a vicious circle. the current resources of the imf – between $ 125 billion and $ 150 billion depending on how they are measured – are wholly inadequate for an ilolr. nor are resources on the appropriate scale likely to be forthcoming. moreover, serious moral hazard arises when the private sector ignores the risks of lending to a country because it believes that the country would be bailed out by the international community in the event of a liquidity crisis. and investors are encouraged to lend to emerging markets in forms – short - term debt – which are more likely to be bailed out. in the domestic context, the lolr ensures that neither the managers nor the equity holders of the institution receiving support are allowed to benefit. internationally, it is not easy for the imf to penalise those responsible for management of the economy, nor to distinguish between those citizens that have been responsible for excessive risk - taking and those who will be the innocent victims of the consequences of a financial crisis. it is the ordinary taxpayers in emerging market countries who will have to bear the burden of servicing loans from the imf. 5 fischer, s ( 1999 ), “ on the need for an international lender of last resort ”, imf. a point stressed by calomiris ( “ the imf ’ s imprudent role as lender of last resort ”, cato journal, vol. 17 no. 3 1998 ) although he underestimates, in my view, the possibility of liquidity runs as seen, for example, in korea in 1997. absent a world government, it is difficult to see a credible ilolr on the horizon. the reason is the simple maxim : “ it ’ s the politics, stupid ”. the second purist solution, at the opposite end of the spectrum, is the imposition of permanent capital controls. in other words, a return to the world in which the bretton woods institutions were created half a century ago. the advantage of capital controls is that they prevent the liquidity runs that result from currency

to give consumers control of their data. this would allow consumers to move their personal information from one platform to another and avoid lock - in effects, opening the door to new services. 19 to some extent, this is what open banking hopes to achieve. although to make this a success means establishing common off the - shelf api standards and operating platforms onto which developers can build. an open platform for sme lending would enable open banking and empower smes. it would help avoid lock - in on existing platforms and enable providers of finance to compete for sme lending, helping to broaden the products available to companies and offer more competitive rates, making access to finance quick, easy and cost effective. 20 it is not for the bank of england to build this platform but we can help lay some of groundwork. the messaging standards we are adopting in the new rtgs will also include tagging payments with a unique id called a legal entity identifier ( lei ). 21 this will be mandated for financial institutions and as a next step we are considering how to extend this to corporate payments. that could mean that the payment data sent via chaps of non - financial firms could be made available for inclusion in a portable credit file. the lei could see : furman, j ‘ unlocking digital competition ’ report of the digital competition expert panel ( march 2019 ). see : https : / / www. bankofengland. co. uk / research / future - finance. the introduction of legal entity identifiers ( leis ) will enable consistent and accurate identification of legal entities on a global basis. their introduction was pioneered by the financial stability board ( fsb ) following the financial crisis as a means of precisely identifying counterparty risks and exposures. the lei is linked to a publically available database about each registered entity. leis are not yet widely used in payments or supply chains. following a consultation, the bank is making leis mandatory for all payments initiated between financial entities. all speeches are available online at www. bankofengland. co. uk / news / speeches also act as the unique identifier for a digital id, which could help the two - step verification process required for a secure system. the bank will submit a formal response on how to develop an open platform for competitive sme finance to the smart data review referenced by the chancellor this evening. strengthen resilience in the face of new risks the city of london has maintained its pre - eminence