##piles monetary, financial, and foreign trade statistics. numerous datasets are also collected within the scope of its banking supervisory tasks. this information forms the basis for the monetary policy decision - making process, macroeconomic and financial stability analyses. the bundesbank is thus one of the largest “ data producers ” in germany. recently, it broadened its focus on aggregated statistics by adding an infrastructure for the provision and use of microdata. data collected by the bundesbank include information on banks, such as the monthly balance sheet statistics, securities holdings statistics, the anacredit credit registry as well as balance sheet data for non - financial corporations. in addition, banking supervision data and data obtained from bundesbank surveys of households ’ and firms ’ expectations are available for analysis. lastly, the bundesbank holds data collected under eu ( european union ) regulations on securities transactions. some of these datasets are available for scientific research projects and can be accessed via the bundesbank ’ s research data and service centre ( rdsc ( research data and service centre ) ). [ 11 ] the rdsc ( research data and service centre ) offers anonymised datasets on banks, securities, investment funds, firms and households, ensures compliance with data confidentiality requirements, and guarantees the quality of the data provided. moreover, numerous macroeconomic time series published in the bundesbank ’ s time series databases are freely available on the bundesbank ’ s statistics page. 3 understanding frictions in markets one important friction in financial markets that can endanger financial stability is the too - big - to - fail ( tbtf ) externality. financial institutions can become too big to fail because of their size, because of their complexity, or because of their interconnectedness with other parts of the financial system. the failure of such institutions can thus put the functioning of the entire financial system at risk. in a crisis, governments thus often stepped in to prevent the system from failing. this, in turn, created expectations of future bail - outs, thus incentivising systemically important financial institutions to take on excessive risk. since the global financial crisis, a number of reforms have been implemented to mitigate the tbtf problem and the underlying moral hazard. in a nutshell, large and systemically important banks have to meet higher capital requirements than smaller ones ; they are subject to more intensive supervision ; and new resolution regimes have been implemented that ensure that even a larger bank in distress

the legal and institutional infrastructure that undergird it. for nigeria, it will amount to naivete to envision sustained prosperity without thinking through the kind of legalinstitutional framework to underpin it. douglas north as one of the leading lights of the new institutional economics has the following to say on the centrality of institutions : the fundamental issue can be stated succinctly. successful development policy entails an understanding of the dynamics of economic change if the policies pursued are to have the desired consequences. and a dynamic model of economic change entails as an integral part of that model analysis of the polity since it is the polity that specifies and enforces the formal rules …. development economists have typically treated the state as either exogenous or as a benign actor in the development process. neoclassical economists have implicitly assumed that institutions ( economic as well as political ) don ’ t matter and that the static analysis embodied in allocative efficiency models should be the guide to policy ; that is, ‘ getting the prices right ’ by eliminating exchange and price controls. in fact the state can never be treated as an exogenous actor in development policy and getting the prices right only has the desired consequences when you already have in place a set of property rights and enforcement that will then produce the competitive market conditions. ( north, dc : 1993 : 5 ). north goes ahead to define institutions as the rules of the game of a society or more formally as the humanly - devised constraints that structure human interaction. they include formal rules ( statute law, common law, regulations ), informal constraints ( conventions, norms of behaviour, and self imposed codes of conduct ), and the enforcement characteristics of both. organizations, on the other hand, are the players - groups of individuals bound by a common purpose to achieve objectives and include political bodies ( political parties, the legislature, city council, a regulatory agency ) ; economic bodies ( firms, trade unions, cooperatives ) ; social bodies ( churches and religious organizations, social clubs, etc ) ; and educational bodies ( schools, colleges, universities, vocational training centres ). in this lecture, we focus on institutions, enforcement mechanisms and organizations that support market transactions and allocative efficiency of the state. at the outset, we make it clear that a market economy framework, where competition and private sector drive the process of economic development is the best framework to achieve rapid transformation of the economy, create wealth and reduce poverty. we are therefore concerned about the