from overcharging as a result of the application of incorrect interest rates up to loss of ownership of mortgaged properties. where home or property loss has occurred, a lender is further required to conduct a causation analysis to determine whether loss of ownership resulted from its failings. to date, lenders have reported that as a result of their failings, loss of ownership has occurred in respect of 23 homes and 79 buy to let properties. as these analyses by lenders continue, we anticipate that more such cases of home and property loss will be identified. similarly, as the overall reviews by lenders are subject to ongoing assurance work and challenge by the central bank, it is possible that more accounts may be identified as the examination 3 / 8 bis central bankers'speeches progresses. we will publish a further update in early 2018. our assurance work involves challenging the findings of the reviews by each lender through onsite inspections, reviewing materials and meeting with the directors of these banks. we also receive information from customers which has informed our approach and focus in particular institutions. while assurance work is ongoing in a number of lenders, the central bank is concerned from the assurance work completed to date that two lenders may have failed to identify populations of impacted customers or failed to recognise that certain groups of their customers have been affected by their failures. we are of the view that some of these customers have in fact been affected and, accordingly, are entitled to redress and compensation. we have challenged the two lenders on these issues and they will report back to us by end - october. as the central bank progresses this work, other lenders will be similarly challenged. where we believe there are customers who may have been wrongly excluded by lenders, we will require the lenders to inform these customers of their decision and customers ’ recourse options, using statutory powers as appropriate. the framework has been designed so that the phases of the examination can run concurrently within a lender and at different times across lenders, meaning that phases 3 and 4 ( the calculation and payment, respectively, of redress and compensation ) can commence while assurance work continues. tracker redress and compensation while the central bank does not have the statutory power to compel lenders to implement redress and compensation in respect of failures that occurred prior to 1 august 2013, we have made our expectations very clear to lenders and published “ principles for redress ” so that people are aware of what is expected of

united states continued. the us congress passed an omnibus trade bill 6 in 1988 and the following year japan was identified by the us government as one of the countries conducting unfair trade practices. 7 in 1989, the structural impediments initiative began between the us and japanese governments. a joint report was finalised in june 1990 and the japanese government committed to instituting a public investment program totaling as much as jpy 430 trillion ( roughly 100 % of nominal gdp ) over a ten year period. 8 japan ’ s current account surplus dropped to 1. 4 % of gdp in 1990, but as the bubble burst and economic growth slowed, the ratio of current account surplus to gdp rose once again and averaged 2. 4 % during the 1990s. more recently japan ’ s current surplus has averaged 3. 3 % of gdp since 2000. however, its composition has changed significantly. in the past, japan ’ s current account surplus was generally a reflection of its trade surplus ( chart 2 ). but during this decade, the share of the trade surplus has declined and in recent years three - quarters of the current account surplus is taken up by the income account surplus. the large income account surplus is to a large extent predetermined by japan ’ s accumulation of external assets over the years through portfolio and direct investments. due in part to the initial j - curve effect, there was a time lag before the surplus began to actually decrease. “ statement of the g6 finance ministers and central bank governors ” ( february 22, 1987 ). the average year - on - year change in cpi between 1986 and 1988 was 0. 5 %. the bundesbank reduced its discount rate from 3. 0 % to 2. 5 % in december 1987 and raised it again to 3. 0 % in july 1988. by the time the bank of japan raised its discount rate to 3. 0 % in may 1989, the policy rate in germany was 4. 5 %. “ omnibus foreign trade and competitiveness act of 1988 ”. brazil and india were also designated. according to the report ( japan structural impediments initiatives joint report ), public investment during the previous decade ( fiscal 1981 to 1990 ) was estimated at jpy 263 trillion. bis central bankers ’ speeches chart 2 trade balance of japan ratio to nominal gdp what does the japanese experience tell us? first, how effective were exchange rate adjustments and other macroeconomic policies in reducing current account imbalances? they surely helped in bringing about a reduction in the