7 ( 2 ) of the eccb agreement states ( and i quote ) : " the council shall meet not less than twice each year to receive from the governor the bank's report on monetary and credit conditions and to provide directives and guidelines on matters of monetary and credit policy to the bank and for such other purposes as are prescribed under this agreement. " ( end of quote ) today, i confirm that our ec dollar remains strong with a current foreign reserves backing approaching 97 percent, up from 92 percent one year ago. the statutory requirement is a backing of 60 per cent. current reserves amount to $ 5. 2 billion. a call for building resilience ladies and gentlemen, the shocks keep coming. our planet is again on pace to experience the hottest year on record. according to copernicus climate change service ( the european union's earth observation programme ), the global average temperature for the past 12 months was 1. 64c above the 1850 - 1900 pre - industrial average. moreover, each of these months has been at least 1. 5c warmer than the pre - industrial average. indeed, the heat is truly on. on 01 july, several of our fair isles were pummeled by a major storm – hurricane beryl - leaving in its wake a trail of death, devastation and disruption of livelihoods in grenada and saint vincent and the grenadines. we again express our sympathy and strong solidarity for our affected members. we are committed to supporting them in their relief and recovery efforts. in this regard, i am pleased that our board and the monetary council swiftly approved a grant of $ 1million for each country. of necessity, each of us must commit ourselves to a relentless and lifelong pursuit of building resilience in our countries and currency union. as i have previously averred, resilience is the capacity to withstand and absorb shocks and to bounce forward – not back but forward. 2 / 5 bis - central bankers'speeches our resilience toolkit will evolve and expand but at this critical juncture should include : a growth mindset ( to build back better and bounce forward ) fiscal buffers ( on which to draw from in times of emergency ) financial protection ( including catastrophe risk insurance offered by ccrif spc, the caribbean catastrophe risk insurance facility ) climate adaptation ( to harden our physical and digital infrastructures ) psycho - social counselling and support ( to strengthen our coping capacities ) a time of uncertainty for our global economy the monetary council

as a potential serious obstacle to fulfilling our mandate and that we would therefore take appropriate action. the omt communication – unusual as it was in substance, for the ecb and probably for the entire community of central banks – was in fact strictly coherent with our general i am referring here to the buiter - issing debate. see buiter, w. ( 1999 ), “ alice in euroland ”, cepr policy paper no. 1 ; and issing, o. ( 1999 ), “ the eurosystem : transparent and accountable or ‘ willem in euroland ’. ” cepr policy paper no. 2. bis central bankers ’ speeches communication approach. it was a well - articulated frame of reference for our actions. and it was conditional. two elements stand out. first, the policy was specifically directed at pricing out that particular financial premium which was compensating for risks of a break - up of monetary union. the “ whatever it takes ” had its limits in this specific objective of the policy initiative. second, conditionality was intentionally an integral part of the design of the programme. any intervention by central banks which have been assigned a price stability mandate has to take place in an environment where the solvency of counterparts is ensured. when we lend to banks, the supervisory solvency framework applies to our counterparties. with omts, this solvency framework would not have applied, because the issuer of the securities is sovereign. so, making omt interventions conditional on a supranational surveillance framework that can monitor and safeguard the solvency of sovereigns – if and when this cannot be taken for granted – was a precondition for our action. omts have been effective in restoring market functioning and confidence in the integrity of the euro area. in the period following the omt announcement, tensions in sovereign bond markets subsided, supported also by policies at the national level. before omt there was a high dispersion in the response of lending rates to reduction in the mro rate. in some cases lending rates actually increased following cuts in the mro. after omt, the pass through has been more homogenous across countries and lending rates actually decreased. the response to the november cut may suggest more uniform passthrough. overall there is evidence that omt has favoured a reduction in financial fragmentation over time. a second instance that helps to illustrate the importance of enhanced communication was in the context of our fixed rate full allotment procedure. in