samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
njuguna ndung ’ u : ongoing developments in the kenyan financial sector remarks by prof njuguna ndung ’ u, governor of the central bank of kenya, at the kenya institute of bankers national banking & finance conference, mombasa, 3 july 2012. * * * hon. robinson njeru githae, minister for finance ; hon. kenneth marende, speaker of the national assembly ; hon. justice willy mutunga, chief justice of the republic of kenya ; hon. prof. githu muigai, attorney general of the republic of kenya ; mr. richard etemesi, chairman, kenya bankers association ; mr. john waka, chairman, kenya institute of bankers ; chief executives of financial sector regulators here present ; distinguished guests ; ladies and gentlemen : i am delighted to join you this morning at the onset of this landmark conference. at the outset, i would like to thank the kenya institute of bankers for inviting me to this forum. i also applaud all those who participated in organising this conference for their commendable efforts. ladies and gentlemen : my task this morning is to invite the minister for finance to deliver his keynote address to this gathering and also officially open the forum. but before i do so, allow me to make some few remarks on the ongoing developments in the financial sector. over the last five years, the kenyan financial sector has witnessed significant transformational developments. the kenya institute of bankers has been on the driver ’ s seat to spearhead these developments. let me highlight a few of these developments : the growth of technologically enabled financial services, especially through the inter - linkage of mobile phone technology platforms and banking technology platforms ; increased regional and international expansion and connectivity of financial service players as well as increased market potential to the region ; increased market awareness of customer rights and the resultant emphasis on consumer protection ; and strengthening of oversight mechanisms to protect the integrity of financial systems. the operationalisation of the national payment systems act and the financial reporting centre amongst others will strengthen the integrity and stability of the financial system ; ladies and gentlemen : these developments present not only opportunities but also significant challenges. to be able to exploit the resultant opportunities and surmount the challenges, there is need to enhance the skills and competence of our human resources. it is therefore imperative that the kenya institute of bankers and other capacity building institutions continuously interact with the market for their programmes to remain relevant. ladies and gentlemen : kenyan banks have taken the lead in positioning themselves

. we should therefore come up with a holistic roadmap that incorporates the financial sector players, regulators, development partners and the government. let us also formulate clear deliverables, performance indicators and a roadmap that will facilitate kenya ’ s aspiration of being a green economy. with these remarks, ladies and gentlemen, i look forward to fruitful deliberations. thank you. bis central bankers ’ speeches
a cash rate of at least 4. 75 per cent. taking these considerations into account, it would be reasonable to conclude that the overall stance of monetary policy is now back in the normal range, though in the expansionary segment of that range. the appropriateness of this will be monitored by the reserve bank over the months ahead in the light of the data becoming available on economic activity and inflation.

ric battellino : mining booms and the australian economy address by mr ric battellino, deputy governor of the reserve bank of australia, to the sydney institute, sydney, 23 february 2010. * * * introduction the topic of my talk tonight is “ mining booms and the australian economy ”. i have chosen this topic because the australian economy is currently experiencing a surge in mining activity, one of a sequence of mining booms since the european settlement of australia. these have been a powerful force in shaping the australian economy. tonight i want to review the effects of these booms. of particular interest is the question of whether there are recurring themes from which we can draw lessons on how to manage the current episode. my talk is based on research by a couple of my colleagues from the bank which draws on the work of several economic historians. 1 i won ’ t take time to list these references now, but they are shown at the end of the version of my talk on the bank ’ s website. mining booms in australia the distinguishing features of a mining boom are significant increases in mining investment or mining output, usually both, which go on to have important macroeconomic consequences. on this basis, i think we can identify five major mining booms during the past two hundred years or so. these are : the 1850s gold rush ; the late 19th century mineral boom ; the 1960s / early 1970s mineral and energy boom ; the late 1970s / early 1980s energy boom ; and the current episode, which is again both a mineral and energy boom. i would like to thank ellis connolly and christine lewis for this work. the data underlying the graphs in this speech are drawn from multiple data sources, which may affect the comparability of series over time. there have also been quite a number of other mini booms in mining activity, but given the time available i am going to limit myself to the five episodes i have just noted. i will start with a brief summary of the causes, characteristics and consequences of each of the booms, and then provide a more general assessment of their macroeconomic implications. ( a ) the 1850s gold rush the 1850s gold rush was the first major mining boom in australia. economic historians note that the timing of these gold discoveries may have been related to international developments such as the california gold rush of the late 1840s, which had heightened general interest in gold exploration and mining. the first well publicised find of gold in australia, near bathurst in new south wales, was by a
by continuing to reduce the deficit so that debt falls and france is ready when growth slows down. and by making further cuts in public spending? it is not for the ecb to tell the french government what needs to be done in detail, but what we wish is for france to have the capacity to respond economically when growth slows down and for it not to depend completely on monetary policy. 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches

run potentially even easier. in taking deposits away from banks, it also reduces their ability to engage in maturity and liquidity transformation and make loans. a new technology therefore reopens an old debate in economics : does maturity transformation enhance welfare, or should banks be prevented from creating liquidity? once again, the riksbank is spearheading the debate. and, i am sure, we will all be richer for it. 5 conclusion ladies and gentlemen i ‘ ll leave it at that, as we are now looking forward to the last course, the dessert – and maybe even a piece of the by now famous birthday cake. some of you may have seen the video clip — after stefan has been tasked by the board with organizing the cake, he bargains with the cake shop over the lettering. and as each letter costs extra, the thrifty governor has the text cut down from “ sveriges riksbank 350 years ” to “ riksbank 350 ”. while this is certainly meant to illustrate the riksbank ‘ s responsible use of public money, the underlying self - irony also gives testament to the riksbank ’ s vitality and youthfulness, even at 350 years. the aforementioned johann nepomuk nestroy also said the following : “ everybody wants to live long, but nobody wants to get old. ” in my opinion, this sums up the riksbank perfectly. it has lived for 350 years, and it is going as strong and innovative as ever. so, to the next 350 years! 1 gunnar wetterberg ( 2009 ), “ money and power, from stockholm's banco 1656 to sveriges riksbank today ” 2 robert lucas ( 2003 ), macroeconomic priorities, american economic review, 2003, vol 93, issue 1, 1 - 14. 3 schularick, moritz, and alan m taylor. 2012. " credit booms gone bust : monetary policy, leverage cycles, and financial crises, 1870 - 2008. " american economic review, 102 ( 2 ) : 1029 - 61. 4 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches
’ s efforts in addressing the various weaknesses in the financial sector as well as to guide efforts for realising the vision of a stable, sound and market based financial system that would support the efficient mobilisation and allocation of resources necessary for economic diversification and sustainable growth. in the recent past, the government has adopted prudent fiscal policies that enabled the private sector to access more credit from the financial system. in line with this, the yields on government securities have drastically reduced with the 91 days treasury bill rate dropping to 7. 88 % in the latest auction while inflation has also trended downwards to 12. 3 % in october. some players have responded positively to these market movements by reducing their lending base rates. however, some are still dragging their feet and are yet to adjust their rates. while we commend the banks that have responded positively, we call upon those who have not done so to act in a positive and prompt manner in order to make credit more affordable to the majority of our people. this in turn will lead to the growth of the productive sector and in particular agriculture and the sme sectors, which are the engine for economic growth of our country. finally, let me extend my gratitude to the board of directors and the managing director of stanbic bank for inviting me to be with you on this auspicious occasion of the opening of this branch. it now gives me great pleasure and honour to declare mulungushi branch of stanbic bank zambia limited officially open and i thank you for your attention.

services. this will in part minimize the risks associated with such innovative products as people will only make better judgments about their financial affairs if they understand the risks and returns associated with the product and services at their disposal. it is also apparent that financial illiteracy is more costly as people who make poor financial decisions will inevitably end up with a far lower standard of living than was otherwise achievable. mr. chairman, i wish to conclude by applauding celpay ’ s initiative to host the first ever mobile conference in zambia. the deliberations and recommendations of this conference will be keenly followed as the need to leverage access to financial services through the mobile phone is of paramount importance. mobile banking will lead to increased outreach, increased efficiency and productivity as well as increased returns for businesses. let me once again assure you, mr. chairman that, the bank of zambia is committed to providing an enabling environment through appropriate regulation for banks and financial businesses that wish to promote financial inclusion. we appreciate the mobile banking initiative by celpay zambia limited and look forward to greater investment in financial inclusion in our beloved country. i thank you.
greek people had made to preserve the country ’ s hard - won place. i believe this is his greatest contribution, as far as we greeks are concerned. we owe him a lot. last, but not least, i want to thank prime minister kyriakos mitsotakis, who came here tonight almost directly from his flight back to greece from his trip to the united states, in order to honour our guest, president jean claude juncker. thank you.

a declining trend of the overall number of fund supported programs over time, i. e. fewer new and follow - up arrangements. to be clear, we do not object that there are legitimate cases which require access to the fund ’ s resources. however, the fund ’ s financing role should and can only be catalytic. in that respect we also have to enhance our efforts to involve the private sector in crises prevention and solution. the prolonged use of fund resources is hardly in line with the fund ’ s mandate, that speaks of “ making the general resources of the fund temporarily available ” ( imf articles of agreement, article i ( v ) ). countries that run imf supported programs over many years or even decades are probably not a demonstration of success. thus, the major role of the imf should be to prevent that imf financing becomes necessary and to make it redundant over time for countries. when performing the financing role, however, negative feedbacks on the intended international public good in the future must be avoided. there has been a controversial discussion to what extent large imf financing packages have caused moral hazard and thus undermined the functioning of the market mechanisms, i. e. whether the crisis solution in one case has actually prepared the ground for the next crises. to conclude : 1. official international organizations may play a well founded and systematically meaningful role, supplying public services, that are not profit - oriented and therefore would not be attractive to, or performed by, the private sector. thus, the imf and the world bank are also justified and have to be streamlined on this basis. 2. this does not mean, however, that international institutions should not be viewed very critically. they work with public money, and thus have to operate very efficiently – in the short - run as well as in the long - run. international organizations are responsible to the public, and thus are always part of an open and changing world. 3. international organizations – particularly the imf and the world bank – should refocus their respective mandates. otherwise we run the risk that while there is double work on some tasks, other crucial tasks for safeguarding international economic and financial stability are neglected. responsibilities would be blurred with yet unknown consequences for long - run international stability. i fully agree with the findings of an independent task force – sponsored by the council on foreign relations – on the future international architecture : the imf and the world bank have tried to do too much in recent years or were driven by their shareholders
respect to timeliness, there has been promising progress. note that for a policy maker, timely information is as important as, or in some cases more important than, reliable and accurate information. according to this criterion, existing transaction - based property price indexes, though accurate, are not helpful in immediate policy making, since they inevitably lag far behind market movements. for example in japan ( chart 8 ), it typically takes 10 weeks from posting in the market to negotiation, 5. 5 weeks from negotiation to actual transaction, and 15. 5 weeks from transaction to being recorded in the government data base. in addition, extra weeks are needed for data collection and compilation, so that the lag is likely to amount to almost a year. first asking price data are timely but not accurate ( because they are biased ), while transaction price data are accurate but not timely, posing a dilemma. however, there is an important way around this dilemma. using previously - owned condominium prices in tokyo, my collaborators and i are able to show that if a hedonic quantile - regression procedure of quality adjustment is applied to both first asking price data and transaction price data, the resulting price distribution is almost identical ( chart 9 ). 13 this implies that if hedonic quantile - regression quality adjustment is appropriate, which is likely, we can use first asking not only does the conventional policy of controlling the overnight interbank rate turn out to be ineffective because of the zero lower bound, but the unconventional policy of asset purchases is also becoming less effective in altering firms ’ and households ’ financial conditions as the long rates themselves move down to a very low level. the bank of japan ’ s funding facilities for financing economic growth and the bank of england ’ s funding for lending scheme are new types of unconventional policy aimed at coping with this problem. see nishimura, k. g., “ funding for financing economic growth – a schumpeterian perspective, ” remarks at the global interdependence center conference on the global financial crisis : lessons from japan, tokyo december 3, 2012. http : / / epp. eurostat. ec. europa. eu / portal / page / portal / hicp / methodology / owner _ occupied _ housing _ hpi / rppi _ handbook. deng, y., j. gyourko, and j. wu, “ land and housing price measurement in china, ” in heath, et. al. ibid., 13

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etc note. level as per cent of the value of gross output. source : national institute of economic research.

a year in 1998 – 2007 to 1. 0 per cent in 2010 – 2018. 2 but the structural changes affect the conditions for monetary policy. the low real interest rates have reduced the scope for monetary policy to manage economic fluctuations. policy rates in many countries cannot be cut much from the current levels. the possibilities to push down interest rates with further quantitative easing are limited. if policy cannot be made more expansionary in other ways, the structural changes, combined with a normal economic downturn may lead to the economies getting stuck in a situation with unnecessarily low growth. 4 fiscal policy will play a larger role in stabilisation policy in the debate, and especially internationally, many suggestions have been put forward on how to make monetary policy more expansionary with other means. there is talk of coordinating fiscal and monetary policy, “ helicopter money ”, “ modern monetary theory ” and the purchase of specific private assets. 5 what this means in more concrete terms, is that central banks should start giving out money to individual households, to the treasury, or that they should subsidise the private business sector, tasks which would usually fall to fiscal policy rather than monetary policy. to determine whether it is a good idea for central banks to step into the field of fiscal policy, we need to clarify the difference between the government ’ s and the central bank's finances. is there a difference between money issued by the central bank and bonds issued by the government? is there a difference between the central bank ’ s and the government ’ s access to liquid funds? although both central bank money and government bonds are a form of claim on the same counterpart in the same currency, there are nevertheless some differences that in certain situations can be important. the first difference concerns liquidity. central banks create liquidity on their own by issuing banknotes or by increasing the commercial banks ’ balances in their central bank accounts. a central bank can thus always “ pay ” if it wants to. however, in a country with an independent central bank, the government does not have access to a credit line that can be extended freely. to obtain access to more liquidity, the government must instead issue bonds and sell them on a market. the second difference concerns the exposure to credit risk when holding central bank money or government bonds. both the central bank and the central government can default on their payments in two ways : by not repaying the debt, or by inflating away the debt. it does happen that countries
significantly increased consumption. on the financial front, new types of transactions such as securitized products and derivatives prevailed, and leverage increased. such “ excess ” in real economic activity, asset prices and financial markets influenced each other to generate further “ excess. ” once the credit bubble burst, the unwinding of the leverage began, and liquidity in the global financial markets rapidly contracted. on the real economic activity front, firms were forced to curtail aggressively their production due to the pile up of inventories, and the global economy contracted significantly. second, as what is the other side of same coin of the macro aspects that i have just mentioned, the micro financial institution behavior also went too far under inadequate risk management or overconfidence. since the turn of the 2000s “ the originate - to - distribute model ” became common among major financial institutions in the united states and europe, and it has been said that, in such a process, loan screening lacked substance at financial institutions that were the originators of loans. financial institutions that were supposed to have transferred credit risk through distribution were forced to repurchase securitized products after the crisis occurred, and were reminded of a major misconception about their risk recognition at the time of distribution. even as for liquidity risk, in retrospect, it was revealed that financial institutions significantly underestimated the market liquidity, mainly of securitized products. such lack of proper risk management and others led to financial institutions ’ excessive risk - taking activity. however, once the unwinding of leverage began in tandem with the outbreak of a financial crisis, financial institutions in the united states and europe incurred massive losses, which made their risk - taking stance rapidly cautious. that was typically shown in the current decline in lending of financial institutions in the united states and europe. third, it cannot be denied that somewhat slow responses by the policy and supervisory authorities in the united states and europe to the generation of the credit bubble preceding the crisis also eventually amplified the current crisis. one reason for that was the difficulty the policy authorities and supervisory authorities had faced in identifying the location and the size of risks, due to the expansion of the so - called shadow banking by insurance firms, monoline companies, and hedge funds. that was one of the factors behind the recent review of regulatory and supervisory systems overseas. on the monetary policy front, it can be pointed out that central banks had not organized their thoughts with respect to the containment of the credit bubble, including how

, while still respecting the legal processes, i am of course more than willing to do so. my colleagues and i are here to respond to your questions. bis central bankers ’ speeches