samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
a profit of $ 15. 8 billion. • prior to that in fy2012 / 2013, recorded a loss of $ 10. 6 billion. 31. why so volatile? fluctuations in mas ’ profit figures from year to year is almost entirely due to currency translation effects, i. e. exchange rate fluctuations between s $ and major currencies. • when s $ appreciates against major currencies, there is translation loss when assets are reported in s $ • likewise, when s $ depreciates, there is translation gain • but these gains and losses mean little for international purchasing power of our ofr which is denominated in foreign currencies. 32. focusing on overall profit figure therefore misses larger point about mas ’ underlying investment performance. 33. investment gains on mas ’ foreign assets have in fact remained relatively stable for last five financial years. • holding s $ exchange rate constant to strip out translation effects, foreign investment gains amounted to s $ 10. 4 billion in fy2014 / 15, comparable to foreign investment gains of s $ 10. 6 billion in fy 2013 / 14. helping singaporeans manage their finances 34. a key area of focus for mas in last two years has been to help singaporeans better manage their finances. a multi - pronged effort : • encourage prudent borrowing • facilitate retail access to simple, low - cost investment products • spur competitive pricing for life insurance products • educate consumers on financial matters let me elaborate on each. first, mas has put in place various measures to encourage prudent borrowing 35. many safeguards already exist. bis central bankers ’ speeches • amount of unsecured credit that fi can extend is limited to four times monthly income of borrower. • limits on both loan - to - value and loan tenure for both housing and motor vehicle loans extended by fis. • individuals purchasing property are constrained on their total debt service ratio. 36. mas announced new unsecured credit rules two years ago. • fis will not be allowed to grant further unsecured credit to borrower whose aggregate unsecured debt exceeds borrowing limit for 3 consecutive months. • this limit has been set at 24 times borrower ’ s monthly income, and will be lowered to 18 times from 1 jun 2017 and 12 times from 1 jun 2019. 37. vast majority of singaporeans manage their debt well. • less than 2 % of unsecured credit users affected by industry - wide borrowing limit. • nonetheless

is one of being a clean, trusted and efficient financial centre supported by a talented workforce and strong rule of law. this reputation has been built over the years and must be protected diligently. 35. with the rise in ml / tf risks globally, singapore must be proactive in playing our part to combat these threats. to be effective, we need to forge a strong collective effort with every stakeholder doing its part. in this regard, a good regulator - industry partnership is one essential thrust of our aml / cft strategy. 36. on this note, i wish you a successful and fruitful conference. 5 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches
actions, to complete the transition that began over 30 years ago and to make our country a full - fledged and respected member of the european family. and before i finish, i want to say a few words about the specific challenges surrounding bulgaria's entry into the euro area. they go in three directions : the most important thing, as i already mentioned, is our example. in a situation of multiple crises, it is quite normal for the bulgarian citizens to be worried and easy to manipulate. it is our responsibility, by example and arguments, to reassure and guide them in the process of joining the euro area. education - in the short and long term. explain, elucidate, enlighten. every single day, among the people, in their language. we owe this effort to the bulgarian citizens so that they can feel at ease and make the right decisions for their future. involvement – just because we have the right arguments and messages does not mean that they have been heard by the people. succeeding in point 2 requires that we reach every person. and for that we need general mobilisation of efforts - of institutions, the business, non - governmental organizations. we must all work together to achieve the desired result. and in conclusion, an important lesson that i always try to convey to my students - good results always and everywhere come from our own efforts. contrary to what we are constantly told, a happy life is not a consequence of avoiding challenges and looking for the easiest way. on the contrary. it is a consequence of facing events free from selfinterest and taking difficult actions consistent with our values and our mission. are we ready to do it? i believe so and i am looking forward to being together in our quest for a better and fairer bulgaria as a full member of the big european family. 3 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches thank you for the attention! 4 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches

##ence in the cash system and its vulnerability to outages of power, data and roading networks. given the increased likelihood of extreme weather events in the future as a result of climate change, this resilience needs to be enhanced. we will continue to explore synergies between inclusion and stability as we develop our approach to financial inclusion. we are doing so in concert with our council of financial regulators partners, for which'financial inclusion'is one of 5 priority themes. 2 / 2 bis - central bankers'speeches
as regards, in particular, interbank operations and payment systems. banking supervisors must be vigilant to avoid any particular project bringing additional risks. risks can increase significantly should larger banks be tempted to conquer new markets. the risk of contagion may grow correspondingly, weakening the banking system as a whole. it is therefore imperative that banking supervisors remain vigilant with regard to increasingly complex operations. 8. closing remarks the reconstruction of a banking group, or mergers within a banking group, or the acquisition of subsidiaries, joint ventures and branch offices by banks or their controlling companies should be in the interest of stability of the banking system as a whole. it must, however, be stressed that there are no hard and fast rules, because special circumstances, such as the history of a group and certain practicalities, often necessitate a pragmatic approach. as mentioned earlier, it is not our role, as regulators, to judge the wisdom of management decisions and business strategies beyond ensuring that local and international best practice regarding supervision and regulation are met. the restructuring of the banking industry represents a challenge for bankers and for regulators. besides the strengthening of supervisory arrangements, it is up to the regulators to support the wave of restructuring by continuing to level the playing - field in the banking industry and by eliminating any competitive distortions. this condition needs to be met for restructuring to have its full effects in terms of economic efficiency and proper resource allocation.

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conclusion, i wish to thank you for finding time from your busy schedules to attend this workshop. i urge you to ask as many questions as you could possibly can, in order to get the best out of it, as well as make the workshop more lively and interactive. with these few remarks, it is now my honour and privilege to declare the workshop officially open. i thank you!

michael gondwe : enhancing access to financial services in zambia speech by dr michael gondwe, governor of the bank of zambia, at the launch of the mpongwe branch of the national savings and credit bank zambia limited ( natsave ), mpongwe, 28 june 2013. * * * the copperbelt province minister, hon mwenya musenge, mp the mpongwe area member of parliament and deputy minister of foreign affairs, hon gabriel namulambe, mp ; the copperbelt province permanent secretary, mr stanford msichili ; the permanent secretary, ministry of agriculture, dr shamulenge ; the permanent secretary ministry of agriculture, mr siazongo siakalenge ; your royal highnesses the chiefs present ; the mpongwe district commissioner ; the natsave chairman of the board, dr chiselebwe ngandwe ; the natsave managing director, mr cephas chabu ; distinguished natsave customers ; management and staff of natsave ; colleagues from bank of zambia ; members of the press ; distinguished guests ; ladies and gentlemen. it is my honour and privilege to officiate at this very important launch of the national savings and credit bank ( natsave ), mpongwe branch. let me begin by thanking the board of directors and management of natsave for inviting me to this momentous occasion, which marks the official opening of the mpongwe branch which is the first ever bank branch in this economically vibrant district. i commend the board and management of natsave for the effort in opening this branch which will go a long way in supporting the bank of zambia ’ s strategic objective of increasing financial inclusion. distinguished ladies and gentlemen, the role of financial services in economic development cannot be over - emphasized. it is generally accepted that financial services play an important role in improving income - generating opportunities and overall living conditions among households. furthermore, better access to finance not only increases economic growth, but also helps to fight poverty and reduces income inequality between the rich and the poor in society. it is for this reason that the role that financial services play in an economy is sometimes compared to the significant role that blood plays in the human body. it should be stressed that no economy can function efficiently, if at all, without financial products and services. the opening of this branch by natsave is therefore expected to spur economic growth and contribute to the ease of access to financial services which has for long time been a
good morning! back 4 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches

markets go through peaks and troughs. and like this marble hall – renovated, rehabilitated, now strong, beautiful and iconic... it is our taking action, our adoption of decisive policies and our welcoming of reforms through the years — that has helped strengthen our economies. our actions, our reforms, our regulations and our staunch commitment as policymakers, monetary authorities, central banks, regulators, public servants, have made them resilient. the ayuntamiento gives us a glimpse of the past. it also reminds us to continue to fortify our pillars and to build on the economic, financial and institutional reforms we initiated. it is when we gather together periodically and openly share our ideas, insights and experiences that we add to the strength and resilience we have. this is what today was about. our discussions will continue tomorrow. tonight, this dinner is about celebrating that collaboration. it is about fellowship. as your hosts, we are also proud to share our culture with you – to showcase our talents and also our cuisine which we arranged for you to enjoy tonight. 1 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches thank you very much and have a good evening. bon apetit. 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches
not deteriorated significantly. for the time being, bank profitability has only somewhat declined due to interest rate cuts, lower fees and higher provisions to weather such an adverse situation. however, it remains uncertain how the pandemic may affect credit portfolios in the most vulnerable sectors. 8 it is therefore particularly important to monitor the portfolio quality indicators for the various latin american banking systems, which in 2020 accounted for more than 50 % of profits at spain ’ s two largest banking groups, and which during the previous european sovereign debt crisis played a countercyclical role for the spanish banking system. the worsening of the pandemic in latin america since late 2020 points to heightened uncertainty in the short run. the next six months will be a race between new strains of the virus emerging and the vaccination campaigns, which in latin america are progressing but gradually. among the factors supporting the region ’ s continued recovery in activity is external demand, which may also benefit from new stimulus programmes passed in the united states and better price performances for certain commodities. the imf forecasts gdp growth for the region of 4. 1 % in 2021, albeit again with notable differences across the economies. 9 in the medium term, the crisis poses a series of significant risks and challenges, some global in scope and others more specific to latin america. mainly credit support programmes, moratoria on payments by the most vulnerable borrowers and government guarantees. for a more detailed analysis, see banco de espana ( 2020 ), “ recent developments in the most important latin american banking systems for spanish banks ”, box 2, “ report on the latin american economy. second half of 2020 ”, analytical articles, economic bulletin, 4 / 2020. for a stress test analysis of the 61 largest banks in latin america, see annex 4 of the imf ’ s regional economic outlook ( 2020 ), pandemic persistence clouds the recovery. see a. werner, a. ivanova and t. komatsuzaki ( 2021 ), latin america and caribbean ’ s winding road to recovery, imf blog. first, in addition to the human cost in lives, the effects on poverty and income distribution have been very severe. 10 indeed, during 2019, bouts of political tensions and social unrest in several countries, partly related to this situation, fuelled economic uncertainty ; this in a region where numerous elections are due to take place in the coming quarters. a second challenge is that posed by shrinking fiscal space following the increase in government debt in the

- de - pandemia - ideas - para - eldebate _ julio - 2020. pdf.
accessing this market and as such, entry as well as exit is unrestricted and ( b ) contracts are cash settled. in other words, it may be used for hedging, but it is also a perfect instrument for speculation for it makes trading in exchange rate just like trading in any other financial asset. the question that arises is : how can the two markets – the otc with the regulatory restrictions and the etd without – coexist? more importantly, will the restrictive measures in the otc market to control rupee volatility not be rendered completely ineffective if market participants are free to migrate to the etd segment? with this perspective, at the height of rupee volatility, we, and, at our request sebi, were constrained to take several measures in respect of the etd segment including putting a ceiling on individual positions / open interest, restricting arbitrage between the two markets through banks and increasing the margin requirements. here i would like to add that with return of stability in the exchange rate, we have already unwound some of the restrictive measures in the otc / etd market and, in fact, gone further for hedging in the otc markets ( e. g. permitting hedging up to us $ 250, 000 without any documentation requirements ). similarly some more relaxations in the etd segment, including permitting participation of foreign investors are under consideration. 23. the emergence and growth of ndf market as well as its possible impact on the domestic market poses two important questions. should attempts not be made to bring the offshore market in rupee onshore and thereby add depth to our markets and also possibly, bis central bankers ’ speeches income and employment? secondly, since ndf market is often seen to be affecting the domestic markets, implying thereby the possibility of arbitrage, should domestic banks be allowed to participate in this market? let me add here that in some countries, the central banks are reported to have intervened in the ndf market of their respective currencies to curb the volatility at its root. 24. if the answer to both questions is positive, it requires some fundamental rethinking on the regulatory framework for foreign exchange derivatives. already, as mentioned above, we are committed to allowing foreign investors access to the etd segment with minimal restrictions. but will this access be inviting enough to the investors if the futures prices are not tightly linked with the spot prices? but this is possible only

, we have adequate institutions at the global level to fulfill these tasks, so currently i do not see the need to create new authorities for that purpose. thank you for your attention! bis central bankers ’ speeches
eva srejber : frameworks and stabilisation policy in a monetary union speech by ms eva srejber, first deputy governor of the sveriges riksbank, at the bank of uganda, kampala, 17 august 2006. * * * let me begin by thanking you for the invitation to come here and speak today on the occasion of bank of uganda ’ s 40th anniversary. on several occasions the members of the executive board of the swedish central bank, including myself, have had reason to address the interesting topic of monetary unions. besides being a stimulating theoretical exercise, it has been of great practical importance with the creation of the euro. also, from a swedish point of view, because of the national referendum in 2003 when a majority of swedish voters said no to adopting the euro. another reason, from an international point of view, is the trend in exchange rate policies towards corner solutions, of which membership in a monetary union is one. although the east african community ( eac ) – with member states uganda, kenya and tanzania – aims at eventually forming a political federation, and not only a monetary union, i am convinced that the experiences from other monetary unions, for instance the cfa zone, will prove valuable to you in your efforts. however, since my comparative advantage concerns the swedish and european experience i will discuss monetary unions from that perspective and i hope that this might be of some value. hopefully, it can also shed some light on how the bank of uganda ’ s role will transform over the coming decades. optimum currency areas – an illusive concept when discussing whether or not to join or form a monetary union, concerns are usually expressed that the countries in the union at some point will have different needs in terms of stabilisation policy. consequently, this then casts doubts on the appropriateness of a common, supranational monetary policy. if one country experiences rapid growth while the neighbouring country is in a pronounced downturn, how should monetary policy respond? on the other hand, this type of problem does exist within countries as well, as different regions ’ business cycles usually are not perfectly synchronised. given these two observations, should we strive to create larger or smaller economic entities? in his famous article published almost half a century ago, nobel laureate robert mundell concludes that “ [ t ] he optimum currency area is not the world ” ( mundell, 1961 ). trying to establish what area would be optimal, it is from a practical

that “ they do not have enough technical resources to deliver their ifrs 9 project ” and almost 25 per cent of the respondents did not think that “ there will be sufficient skills available in the market to cover shortfalls. ” the worst case scenario is that the bank ends up, after 1 january 2018, with the subsidiaries and branches of international banks successfully implementing ifrs9 while the domestic and smaller banks are unable to do so. thank you for your attention. 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches
varying extents of macroeconomic imbalances amid the exceptionally low interest rate environment in recent years. 5. to consider what may lie ahead for emes, it is perhaps useful to look back at past episodes of us monetary tightening. on the positive effects, fed rate hikes were mostly associated with a pick - up in us growth momentum which could benefit emes ’ exports, although we have observed that the strength of this support has weakened considerably after the global financial crisis. but, on the other hand, a tightening of us monetary policy and the resulting us dollar strength could expose the macroeconomic vulnerabilities of emes and potentially trigger financial instability. experience of the mexican peso crisis in 1994, the asian financial crisis in 1997, the brazilian currency crisis in 1999 and the argentine economic crisis in the early 2000s clearly indicates emes that had accumulated significant macro - financial imbalances could be vulnerable during a strong us dollar cycle. 6. in fact, broadly speaking, most instances of financial turbulence in emes could be considered to be some form of balance of payments crisis, which were usually preceded by heavy capital inflows to emes that led to the build - up of macroeconomic imbalances, such as asset price inflation, strong credit growth and current account balance deterioration. these problems were particularly serious in the past when some emes violated the “ impossible bis central bankers ’ speeches trinity ” by pursuing at the same time, a de facto dollar peg, free movement of capital and an independent monetary policy. these conditions tend to encourage an accumulation of significant short - term external debts in the emes. eventually, a combination of us rate hikes and strengthening us dollar generated momentum for capital outflows from the emes, exposing their fault lines and macroeconomic vulnerabilities as domestic liquidity conditions tightened. those with weak fundamentals and significant external imbalances could face speculative attacks, sharp currency depreciation, a surge in value of their us dollar denominated debts leading to a financial crisis. 7. would history necessarily repeat itself? some have rightly pointed out that the economic fundamentals of asian emes are now much more robust than two decades ago, with improved current account balances and better coverage of short - term external debts by sizable foreign reserves. and currency and maturity mismatch in foreign liabilities are no longer a serious issue. moreover, the more flexible exchange rate regimes adopted by many asian economies should give regional currencies more flexibility to

important issues. 11. thank you. bis central bankers ’ speeches