flexibility to set their own monetary policy by leaning against movements in the capital account, as we have done here in iceland. in 2020, the central bank sold foreign currency in the amount of 144 b. kr. in order to prevent lower interest rates from causing excessive, unwarranted depreciation of the krona. it is also possible to imagine that, in the future, the central bank could absorb excess capital inflows into iceland if this should prove necessary. in the future, the central bank will need to use its balance sheet to ensure effective monetary policy transmission and ward off potential financial side effects. nevertheless, in the long run, the future of monetary policy lies in using a greater number of policy instruments and in coordination with macroprudential policy and financial supervision. here lie the opportunities for iceland ’ s tiny currency area. honoured guests : yet another anniversary is uppermost in my mind today : the one - year anniversary of the merger between the central bank and the financial supervisory authority – the reunification, we could say. the financial supervisory authority was once part of the central bank, called the banking supervision department. but in 1998 the banking supervision function was carved out of the 3 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches bank, right around the time the two state - owned banks were being prepared for privatisation. the senior management of the central bank protested vehemently against the separation, and i would like to quote from a letter on the topic, sent by the board of governors to the then minister of commerce in early 1998 : “ the board of governors is of the opinion that there are overwhelming arguments in favour of the central bank ’ s continued supervision of the activities of deposit institutions, other credit institutions, and securities market entities. the board of governors wishes to emphasise in particular that such supervision is a normal and appropriate part of the central bank ’ s activities. this supervisory role benefits just as much from its partnership with the central bank as various other bank activities do from partnering with banking supervision. ” if there is any single factor that foreign experts have identified as the main cause of the 2008 financial crisis, it is the fact that responsibility for and supervision of the financial system were spread across a large number of ministries and institutions, with the result that no single party had an all - encompassing overview, no single party was actually accountable, no single party had adequate power, and no single party had enough muscle to intervene. actually, in other countries where financial supervision had previously been hive

account of a recovery in exports and commodity prices, but also due to implementation of prudent policies by some of our economies prior to the global down turn. in addition, the effect of reduced foreign inflows from aid, foreign direct investments and remittances was far less than originally anticipated. the increase in global demand and hike in oil prices benefitted oil - producing african countries with nigeria and angola, the two largest oil producers experiencing strong growth of around 6 percent. in spite of the encouraging trends, risks to africa ’ s economic prospects remain, particularly given the faltering global economy. it was recognized that the crisis originated from the financial systems and this has underscored the need for a more robust and effective financial sector supervision framework in african countries that can withstand potential future shocks. at a meeting of the association of african central banks held in dakar, senegal, in august 2010, it was generally recognized that african central banks should adopt policies which should ensure a move towards macro prudential surveillance of the whole financial system and ensure that there are early warning signals and adequate remedial measures to deal with any crisis. sub regional financial developments your excellency, distinguished ladies and gentlemen, as you are aware, the west african monetary institute ( wami ) is spearheading efforts to establish the eco as the single currency, with a west african central bank and common monetary and financial policies for the zone. however, as a result of the recent financial crisis, member states could not meet the macroeconomic convergence criteria which are part of the requirements, and a decision was taken by heads of state and government to postpone the launch of the single currency and the establishment of a west african central bank to not later than 1st january 2015. in spite of these difficult conditions, the west african sub region has shown remarkable resilience to the onslaught of the crisis mainly due to the region ’ s low integration with global financial markets. however, in the post crisis period, indications are that economic growth would continue to remain robust, averaging around 7 percent for countries of the west bis central bankers ’ speeches african monetary zone. in spite of this, lessons should be learnt from the effects of the crisis in other regions and, going forward as a single monetary zone, policies are being designed and implemented to prepare us to cope better with any threats to our financial systems. we must also recognize that there are peculiar risks to our zonal financial sector which are being addressed through new initiatives. since the signing