create safe harbours for experimentation. a number of regulators have introduced regulatory sandboxes that have helped create a virtuous cycle of innovation and sensible regulation, while isolating risks. in malaysia, solutions tested in the bank ’ s regulatory sandbox enabled the bank to design regulatory safeguards that would allow the implementation of end - to - end electronic know - yourcustomer processes for the provision of remittance services. by dispensing with the need to conduct physical face - to - face verifications, this is expected to significantly expand access to remittance services for customers working and living in remote parts of malaysia, while effectively addressing money laundering and terrorist financing risks. bank negara malaysia also successfully collaborated with the world bank and the money services business industry in malaysia to pilot and adopt solutions that have expanded the reach and reduced the costs of formal remittances. second, policy life cycles will need to be managed more proactively, to allow for policies to be renewed when conditions change. while much is often said about policy stability, policies that fail to keep pace with conditions that are changing far more rapidly than we have experienced before, can be counterproductive at best, and at worst, create greater risks for the system. the sdgs are undeniably one of the most comprehensive attempts to capture the most important global challenges that we face. solutions to these challenges will invariably create new issues for policy makers to consider. this in turn will lead to shorter policy life cycles, and a need for faster policy responses to emerging issues. third, we need better remittance data. it is encouraging that efforts are being taken to ensure the availability of official global data sources on remittance flows. yet, challenges remain in ensuring that the data is both complete 4 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches and comparable. these challenges are compounded by an increasing need for data at a more granular and disaggregated level. for example, initiatives by the united nations capital development fund to survey remittance recipients in the mekong region helped develop a better understanding of relationships between gender and financial inclusion. yet such data is not available in many other countries. with the large and increasing size of intra - regional migration in this region, there are opportunities to collect and share remittance and migration data at the regional level to complement global datasets. this could be advanced through existing regional forums, including various forums at the asean level. without good data, we

for structural reforms. these reforms should expand the growth potential and adaptability of member states. measures to this end could focus on product markets, including the liberalization of the service sector. in many countries the quality of institutions also needs improvement. this includes the efficiency of the judicial system in settling disputes, protecting property rights and dealing with non - performing loans. the oecd estimates that the adoption of best practices in areas like these could increase gdp by four to seven percent. strenghtening emu further every country faces its own particular challenges. in addition, there are some common elements in the problems faced by euro area countries. indeed, part of the european growth problem is related to design flaws in the monetary union. much has already been done to tackle them. i ’ m referring to : - the strengthening of the european fiscal rules and the introduction of new rules aimed at preventing macroeconomic imbalances ; - launching the european stability mechanism, the esm, to provide financial assistance to countries in difficulties ; - and finally, establishing the banking union to unravel the sovereign - bank nexus. while these measures have reduced the risks of severe financial turbulence, the emu could still do with additional improvements. first and foremost, we need a better balance between liability and control. let me explain what i mean. in the long run, a monetary union is only politically stable if the countries that are liable for certain risks, also have the means to control and mitigate these risks. the original emu setup was thought to strike the right balance in this respect. policy coordination was relatively mild, with the european fiscal rules as the most binding element. in return, member states promised not to assume liability for other member states ’ debt, the so - called no - bailout clause. but during the sovereign debt crisis, adherence to the no - bailout clause proved too costly. both public risk - sharing and coordination increased since then, in a move towards the upper right - hand quarter of the charts. however, in practice the move has been larger in terms of risk sharing, than in terms of policy coordination. this is mainly because compliance with both new and existing rules is still lacking. compliance with fiscal recommendations is reasonable in bad times when budget deficits are above 3 %, but poor in good times when countries should balance their budgets. compliance with the macroeconomic imbalances procedure and the european semester should also improve. of the recommendations issued in 2015, only 4 % were implemented with any