once the mass media part of the campaign starts on 30 august 2001, after the unveiling of the final visual appearance of the euro banknotes and their security features. the eurosystem is fully aware of the importance the successful introduction of the euro banknotes and coins will have for overall confidence in the single currency, and the careful and comprehensive preparations being made by the eurosystem are commensurate with this task. we should all bear in mind the fact that the cash changeover is an unprecedented challenge and a huge logistical exercise and that all the parties involved will have to assume their part of the overall responsibility for making the introduction of the euro banknotes and coins a success. at this point, i should like to comment briefly on the issue of the sub - frontloading of euro banknotes to the general public, a matter on which i have reported to you in greater detail on previous occasions. let me remind you that the ecb's decisions have been taken in full respect of the general interest, and after a thorough assessment of all the aspects involved. no new elements have emerged which would justify a renewed reflection on this issue. issues related to banking supervision turning to issues related to banking supervision also raised in the draft resolution on the ecb's annual report, i should like to recall, at the outset, that the framework for financial stability in the eu relies on two building blocks : national competence and co - operation. it is our firm belief that the impressive changes in financial markets prompted by the introduction of the euro call for a substantial enhancement of the mechanisms for co - operation between national authorities and with the eurosystem. this is so because emu is changing the nature and scope of systemic risk. it is no longer possible to assess threats to financial stability or the potential channels for the spread of contagious risks only at the domestic level. i was therefore particularly glad to see that the contribution of the escb to improving the institutional framework for financial stability and, in particular, the development of macro - prudential analysis have been acknowledged and supported in the draft resolution. the draft resolution also refers to the need to avoid conflicts between supervisory responsibilities and the responsibilities of the monetary authorities. i should like to say, first, that the empirical evidence of potential conflicts between the objectives of financial stability and price stability is unclear and, second, there is no possibility for such a conflict to arise in the context of the institutional arrangements in the euro area. indeed, the introduction of

the euro has entailed an institutional separation between monetary policy decision - making, which is addressed to the euro area as a whole, and the exercise of supervisory tasks, which relates to domestic institutions and markets. the decision - making mechanisms for the two tasks no longer coincide, and the risk of conflict has been overcome by the institutional set - up. to conclude my statement, i should like to underscore that the introduction of the single currency has indeed reinforced the need for the strong involvement of central banks in prudential supervision and financial stability.