samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
some way below its crisis level of 160 %. it dropped sharply after the crisis and has hovered around its current level for the last few years. but though it is below its pre - crisis level, it is again high by historical standards ; average household debt to income between 1990 and 2006 was 110 %. it also remains high by international standards ; household debt to income is around 85 % in germany, 110 % in the united states and 120 % in spain. putting all of these high - level aggregate indicators together, the level of credit in the economy is beginning to grow again. it is not at pre - crisis levels and indeed looks below averages that include the long build - up of credit in the economy before the crisis. but if you look further back, it is high by historical standards. and it is high by international standards. bis central bankers ’ speeches the high - level picture, of course, can only tell you so much. it is clear that important though they are, these high - level indicators cannot be linked mechanically to the assessment of risk or to action to address it. to build a fuller picture of how credit is affecting the level of risk in the financial system, it is necessary to drill down into the sectoral components of credit and their counterparts in the economy. household credit the largest component of bank credit in the uk economy is of course lending to households and within that the great bulk, around 90 %, is secured on dwellings. mortgage lending is the single largest asset class on lenders ’ balance sheets and stock of lending secured on dwellings is around 70 % of gdp. net secured lending to households is rising at nearly 3 % – the highest rate since the end of 2009. mortgage rates in the uk are now at very low levels – average quoted rates on two - year ( 75 % ltv ) fixed - rate mortgages are below 2 %. some of this of course is because the bank of england ’ s official bank rate has been close to zero since 2009. but over the past three years, as banks ’ funding costs have reduced and as competition in the mortgage market has intensified, on average mortgage interest rates have fallen by 2 percentage points. unsecured lending to households is a much smaller proportion of credit ; it accounts for only 12 % of lending to households and around 10 % of gdp. and the stock of consumer credit remains £30 billion below its peak in 2008. but it is growing at around 8 % a year, much faster than secured lending. again

, ” speech delivered at “ prospects for growth : reassessing the fundamentals, ” the 59th annual meeting of the national association for business economics, cleveland, ohio, september 26. 2 for october through december of this year, the decline in the federal reserve ’ s securities holdings will be capped at $ 6 billion per month for treasury securities and $ 4 billion per month for agency securities. these caps will gradually rise over the course of the following year to maximums of $ 30 billion per month for treasury securities and $ 20 billion per month for agency securities and will remain in place through the process of normalizing the size of our balance sheet. 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches
without it, i see no reliable way of breaking the sovereign - banking nexus. bis central bankers ’ speeches

it with capital markets - based funding. and in europe above all places there is ample room to do so. the european stock market is only 60 % the size of the us stock market when measured in relation to gdp. adrian, t ; shin, h s ( 2010 ), liquidity and leverage. in : journal of financial intermediation, vol 19 ( 3 ), pp 418 – 437. leroy, a ( 2014 ), credit procyclicality and financial structure in the eu ”. available at ssrn : http : / / ssrn. com / abstract = 2568112 or http : / / dx. doi. org / 10. 2139 / ssrn. 2568112. bis central bankers ’ speeches likewise, the european market for venture capital is 20 % the size of the us market, and for securitisation the percentage is even lower. 2 in the end, it comes down to the uncontested argument of diversification. increasing the share of capital markets will improve and broaden access to funding particularly for small and medium - sized enterprises. at the same time, it will improve the matching of investors to financial risk, thereby increasing the efficiency of the financial system. as a result, the financial system will be able to better support sustainable economic growth. 3. integration – forming a single capital market the second objective of the european capital markets union is to improve the integration of capital markets in the entire european union. what is it that integrated capital markets can deliver? one of the main arguments is that they can improve private risk sharing. the technical question is : to what degree does a shock to the economy affect consumption? empirical studies for the united states show that integrated capital markets cushion around 40 % of the cyclical fluctuations among the us federal states. a share of around 25 % is smoothed via the credit markets, while fiscal policy cushions 10 – 20 % of shocks. altogether, around 80 % of a given economic shock is absorbed before it can affect consumption 3 studies for canada yield similar results. 4 in europe, the picture looks different. here, it is mainly credit markets that cushion economic shocks – and they are not very effective in doing so. altogether, only around 40 % of a given shock is absorbed before it can affect consumption. 5 increasing the share of capital markets and integrating them across borders would therefore help improve risk sharing in europe and reduce the volatility of consumption. 4. how to get there
2. it must have a price performance that is sustainable and an average inflation rate that does not exceed by more than one and a half percentage points that of the three best - performing eu countries in terms of price stability ; 3. it must have had an average nominal long - term interest rate that does not exceed by more than two percentage points that of the three best - performing eu countries in terms of price stability ; 4. its national currency must have participated in the exchange rate mechanism ii for at least two years and thus have respected the defined fluctuation margins of the currency towards the euro ; 5. it should ensure that it meets the requirements of legal convergence. bis central bankers ’ speeches in its regular convergence reports, the european central bank has emphasised that these criteria be met in a sustainable manner. with regard to romania, achieving an environment conducive to sustainable convergence requires, inter alia, a stability - oriented monetary policy and the strict implementation of its fiscal consolidation plans. let me now return to the euro exhibition itself. the euro exhibition has been on display at many locations throughout the eu, so far including bratislava, barcelona, rome, berlin, frankfurt, luxembourg, warsaw and tallinn. after bucharest, it will continue its journey across europe to paris, sofia and athens. the main objective of the euro exhibition is to give citizens of all ages the opportunity to familiarise themselves with the euro. visitors will have the chance to explore subjects ranging from the history of money to the production of euro banknotes. in addition, they will be able to learn how to check the security features of euro banknotes through the many interactive displays. as you walk around the exhibition, you will no doubt recognise the images of bridges that feature on the back of the euro banknotes. these bridges symbolise communication between the people of europe, and between europe and the rest of the world. they also represent the connection between the past and present, and symbolise a common european future. the diversity of europe is also reflected on the national sides of the euro coins, which depict national icons and symbols representing the national heritage and culture of each euro area country. the euro exhibition also takes the younger generations into consideration. in the kids ’ corner, children can play the educational computer games, learn more about the features of euro banknotes from the interactive displays or follow the story of anna and alex as they catch counterfeiters. for those of you here who have children, this is a good opportunity for them to

learn about the euro in an entertaining and enjoyable way. ladies and gentlemen, i sincerely hope that you will enjoy your visit to the euro exhibition. it is a pleasure for me, on behalf of the european central bank, to declare the exhibition open. bis central bankers ’ speeches
degree of monetary policy accommodation will likely still be needed to keep inflation on target. the bank will continue to monitor the economy ’ s sensitivity to interest rate movements and the evolution of economic capacity. in this context, governing council will remain cautious with respect to future policy adjustments, guided by incoming data. with that, mr. chairman, senior deputy governor wilkins and i would be happy to answer questions. 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches

growth across all canadian regions. canada is not the only economy that has coped better with recent shocks. to varying degrees, other countries have as well - which partly explains why world economic growth has held up better this time around. clearly, many national economies have been able to respond more flexibly than in the past to unexpected developments. and this has helped to mitigate the impact of shocks, advance the adjustment, and support continued strong economic performance. this increased flexibility has been the product of economic policies and structural reforms that many countries, including canada, have undertaken over the years to strengthen their economies and make them more resilient to shocks. but this does not mean that we have nothing to worry about as we look ahead. we live in an era of rapid change, and we operate in a global environment that is constantly shifting. uncertainty, risks, and shocks are a constant feature of the economic landscape. for canada, this is particularly relevant given how open our economy is to international trade and capital flows. at the bank of canada, we believe that world economic prospects remain favourable as we look out over the medium term. but while this reflects our central expectation of how the world will unfold, there are important upside and downside risks around this scenario. on the downside, persistent global imbalances immediately come to mind, as does the lack of success in the doha round of trade talks. these risks could result in significantly slower global economic growth. at the same time, we cannot rule out the possibility of stronger growth, especially in asia. of course, we know that events can turn out very differently from our expectations today. so we must plan accordingly. in terms of potential risks and sudden developments, the best approach is to constantly ask ourselves what steps we can take to make our economy and domestic markets more flexible and thus better able to adapt. and we need to recognize that the pursuit of such an approach is a shared responsibility among firms, workers, and policy - makers. firms and their workers need to be able to respond quickly to technological advances and to various shocks that require significant changes in the way they conduct business, the type of goods and services they produce, and the markets they choose to develop. a well - functioning market - based economy and clear relative price signals are critical in this context. at the same time, policy - makers need to be wary of barriers to adjustment, such as labour regulations that inhibit the movement of workers from one type of job, or from one sector
, and i look forward to hearing many insightful ideas that will help us all to cope with the challenges that we now face. before closing, i would like to express once again my very deep gratitude to all participants, who have taken time from their busy schedules to be here, and especially to all staff members from our bank and from snu, who have worked so hard to make this conference possible. thank you. 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches

strategies, the nps must consider not only micro - level aspects but also the macroeconomic impact on the foreign exchange market, ensuring an optimal portfolio strategy that accounts for these broader effects. the decision to hold the policy rate steady in august 2024 4 / 6 bis - central bankers'speeches next, i will explain the background behind the decision to hold the policy rate steady in august this year, as the second case of applying an ipf to monetary policy. looking at domestic and external conditions at the time, inflation was showing signs of stabilization in many countries, including in korea, creating sufficient conditions to adjust the degree of monetary tightening. in fact, some advanced economies had already started to reverse their policy stance, lowering interest rates ahead of korea. in particular, as expectations of a pivot at the federal reserve rose significantly, domestic market interest rates had already dropped faster and more substantially, even though the bok had not yet begun to reverse its monetary policy stance. this over - anticipation of interest rate cuts led to a preemptive easing of domestic financial conditions beyond what was intended. following this, from august onward, the previously subdued rise in household debt and real estate prices accelerated sharply, and financial imbalances began to expand. the monetary policy board assessed that, while conditions for an interest rate cut were developing in the real economy - such as inflation and private consumption - there were growing concerns that an interest rate cut would fuel rising real estate prices and exacerbate financial imbalances. therefore, it was deemed more prudent to recommend to the government that it strengthen macroprudential policies and to observe their effects before making any rate cuts, leading to the decision to keep the policy rate steady in august. another factor in the decision to hold the rate steady was that, despite sluggish domestic demand, economic growth was still projected to exceed the economy's potential growth at that time. the high level of household debt itself does not necessarily imply a risk to the financial system, as household debt is typically backed by collateral. more importantly, however, the economy's heavy reliance on real estate distorts resource allocation by expanding the credit supply to non - productive sectors like real estate, which could act as a constraint on consumption and growth in the medium to long term. korea's disproportionate focus on real estate within the household and financial sector balance sheets, compared to other countries, requires appropriate measures to mitigate this imbalance and credit misall
facilitate financing flows for the transition to a net - zero world. i encourage you to participate actively in today's workshop, so that we can collectively advance our understanding of the issues we need to tackle. i wish you fruitful and productive discussions. 5 / 5 bis - central bankers'speeches

excess liquidity in the banking system stood at rs9. 9 billion on friday 9 december. as part of the new monetary policy framework, the bank continued to issue the 7 - day bom bills to all banks, with a weekly average issuance of around rs8. 5 billion. the level of outstanding bom instruments, which stood at rs113. 1 billion on 28 september 2022, increased to rs118. 3 billion as at 9 december 2022. securities totalling rs129. 2 billion were issued against maturing securities to the tune of rs124. 0 billion, resulting in a net issuance of rs5. 2 billion. concurrently, sale of fx by the bank absorbed rupee excess liquidity equivalent to around rs18. 1 billion over the period 28 september 2022 to 13 december 2022. foreign exchange market the month of november was marked by the significant intervention amount of usd300 million, representing the highest amount sold by the bank in any given month. in the month of december, the bank has intervened for an amount of usd50 million. from january to 06 december 2022, the bank injected a total amount of usd1. 0 billion in the domestic market. activity on the fx market remained buoyant, with total turnover for the last eleven months hovering around usd8. 6 billion, a significant improvement of 21 per cent compared to the corresponding period of last year. fx turnover in november itself amounted to usd1. 2 billion. the evolution of the exchange rate continues to reflect domestic economic fundamentals as well as international exchange rate movements. since 28 september 2022, the rupee has appreciated by 3. 3 per cent against the us dollar. 3 / 6 bis - central bankers'speeches the gross official international reserves ( goir ) remains at a level sufficient to provide a buffer against adverse external conditions. the goir stood at us $ 6. 7 billion as at end - november 2022, representing 13. 9 months of imports. financial stability the banking sector continues to be resilient, sound and thriving. the normalisation of interest rates is not expected to undermine the soundness and stability of the banking sector. the capital buffer of the banking sector remained well above minimum regulatory limit, with the capital adequacy ratio at 19. 0 per cent as at end - september 2022. the banking system also held robust liquidity buffers. the aggregate liquidity coverage ratio ( lcr ) was 231 per
represents a solid foundation for macroeconomic stability. despite all the risks, i remain optimistic that we shall be successful in overcoming all of the above challenges.

should focus on issues which are exclusively under our control. pleasant words, “ stunts ” from the past or delaying price increases cannot do the trick, not in the medium run, and even less in the long run. though we in the nbs are satisfied with the core inflation result achieved in the course of the current year despite the untimely elections and the related fiscal expansion, doubling of the price of oil, and the drought, on the eve of 2008 we are more than concerned and put a question to ourselves : should the prevailing tendencies persist, can the nbs reach its objectives with the instruments at its disposal or must there be new ones added? one thing is for sure, to achieve our objectives, we shall use all the instruments at our disposal, both old and new, but that shall not make us popular. that much i can tell in advance. • high exposure to foreign currency risk creates additional risks to the financial sector as confirmed by the developments during last two weeks. if arguments extended by the nbs on the need to borrow in dinars do not seem plausible enough, i sincerely hope that recent developments in the market shall force many to reconsider which currency they should borrow in, namely, how to minimize their exposure to the foreign currency risk. the role of banks is of the highest importance in terms of warning against foreign currency risk exposure, if not for the sake of their clients than for the sake of their own balance sheet results! • in the absence of adequate market competition, price signals are transferred slowly and inaccurately. this is most evident in the case of prolonged and high appreciation of the dinar which is transferred to retail prices with a significant delay. world practice points to the rigidity of prices, but it seems that they are practically “ cemented ” in serbia today. i sincerely hope that something shall be done in that respect, and done exclusively for economic reasons. all in all, from the macroeconomic point of view, both internal and external challenges require that banks, unless they have already done so, reassess which way and how to proceed. in his biography, alan greenspan says that market produces constant stress as in order for someone to gain, someone else has to lose. i fear that many are not yet aware that the market is not a guarantee, but a chance to make money! and finally, allow me to go back to where i started from. strong and stable banking sector, primarily in terms of high quality and reliable ownership structure,
rate policy when there are downside risks, but it is equally important to react quickly to upside risks. as can be seen in the minutes of the executive board meeting on 7 february 2002, i entered a reservation against the decision to leave the interest rate unchanged. i would rather have seen an increase in the interest rate of 0. 25 percentage points, which is not any severe tightening of policy, but should rather be seen as not stepping so hard on the gas.

expansionary, that is, if the repo rate is too low to ensure macroeconomic balance, in time the economy will be liable to overheat. demand then grows more rapidly than production capacity and this generates inflationary pressures. if, instead, the riksbank ’ s monetary stance is unduly restrictive, that is, if the repo rate is set too high, the result may be declining demand, a weaker price trend and unsatisfactory growth. the full effect of an interest rate adjustment takes between twelve and twenty - four months to materialise. this means that the interest rate has to be set on the basis of the riksbank ’ s assessment of the macroeconomic trend and inflation prospects in that period. however, the inflation assessments are subject to uncertainty and this risk spectrum has to be considered too. since december 1997 the riksbank ’ s inflation forecast includes what is known as an uncertainty interval. this interval represents the riksbank ’ s assessment of the uncertainties in the forecast. targeting cpi inflation, however, has certain drawbacks. at the beginning of this year the executive board of the riksbank therefore clarified the inflation target in some respects, stating that, under certain specific circumstances, the riksbank may have grounds for interpreting the cpi target more flexibly. price formation in the past three years, for example, has been affected by some clearly identifiable price movements that monetary policy neither can nor shall aim to counter in full. this applies mainly to decreased indirect taxes and the direct effects that the riksbank ’ s own interest rate adjustments exert on interest expenditure and thereby on cpi inflation. the economic situation in sweden labour market as i mentioned earlier, monetary policy ’ s primary contribution to the development of employment lies in creating conditions for a stable economic trend. a predictable monetary policy, focused on a clearly defined inflation target, provides good guidance for wage negotiations. one of the main reasons why wage formation did not function satisfactorily during most of the 1980s was probably that stabilisation policy did not work. inflation exceeded the official target on several occasions in that period and the labour market organisations had difficulty in discerning the rules of the game. one example of this is the government ambition of bringing inflation down in the mid - 1980s : a crisis package was presented in 1983, aimed at inflation rates of 4 % in 1994 and 3 % in 1995 ; when inflation exceeded these targets, the employee organisations considered that a 5 % ceiling on