few years ago. the breakdown of extra - euro area exports also shows that the current synchronous expansion is fertile ground for a strong rebound in trade. you can see this on the left - hand side of my next slide. by the end of last year, euro area exporters had expanded their business with virtually all of our main trading partners. growing demand from china, and emerging asia more generally, as well as recovering demand from commodity exporters are once more contributing to, rather than subtracting from, export growth. one exception to this benign picture is the united kingdom, where brexit repercussions might already be showing through in the data. trade has also gained momentum within the euro area. you can see this on the right - hand side. although intra - euro area export growth is currently somewhat weaker than extra - area growth, we can see that exports are today contributing more evenly to growth across euro area countries. it 1 / 10 bis central bankers'speeches is no longer only a few member states that are benefitting from a booming global economy. in particular, structural reforms and internal devaluation in formerly stressed economies, together with a protracted period of weak domestic demand during the crisis years, have prompted more firms in these economies to improve their competitiveness and thereby profit from a rise in foreign demand, both inside and outside the currency union. this is perhaps best illustrated by the share of exports in gdp on the left - hand side of my next slide. last year, compared with the period 2000 to 2007, this share rose strongly in ireland and slovenia, while portugal, greece and cyprus also managed double - digit gains. this supported the economic recovery and helped to reduce unemployment. a natural side effect of these changes was a notable widening of the euro area ’ s current account surplus. you can see this on the right - hand side. almost all member states that entered the financial crisis with large current account deficits are today reporting current account surpluses. of the euro area ’ s 19 member states, 13 have current account surpluses. but the chart also illustrates clearly that the rebalancing has remained limited to formerly stressed economies. up until recently, current account surpluses have continued to rise in germany and in the netherlands, the two export powerhouses in the euro area. while these surpluses undoubtedly reflect strong underlying fundamentals in terms of competitiveness, they also reflect an imbalance between domestic savings and investment. higher domestic investment would therefore be a

, are temporary and linked to the pandemic, while the effective lower bound is likely to remain a recurring constraint in the future. ecb staff simulations suggest that, at current levels of the real equilibrium interest rate, the lower bound may become binding one - quarter of the time – about twice as often as estimated when the euro was introduced. the question, then, is how to ensure effective macroeconomic stabilisation in the euro area in the future. the pandemic holds two lessons, one for monetary and one for fiscal policy. first, monetary policy has to enable sustainable private and public spending. low rates do not mean that monetary policy no longer has a role to play. on the contrary, monetary support will remain an important pillar of macroeconomic stabilisation. but, in the vicinity of the lower bound, the central bank needs to weigh more carefully the evolving balance of the benefits and costs of lowering short - and long - term rates further. in this environment, when financing conditions are at a level that incentivises all sectors of the economy to consume and invest, monetary policy can best support the economy by shifting its focus away from instrument activism – that is, from the intensity with which it uses the available array of instruments – and towards the duration of policy support. by credibly promising to preserve favourable financing conditions for as long as needed central banks underscore their unwavering commitment to the achievement of their mandate and ensure that monetary policy does not itself become a source of uncertainty, both with respect to its short - term reaction function and the potential vulnerabilities that too negative yield curve constellations could create in the future. the horizon of policy support will then depend on the extent to which the private and the public sector make use of accommodative monetary conditions. the intensity of policy support, in turn, will evolve endogenously with the economic recovery. this means that changes in nominal rates have to be monitored closely and interpreted in the light of their driving forces. for example, a rise in nominal yields that reflects an increase in inflation expectations is a welcome sign that the policy measures are bearing fruit. even gradual increases in real yields may not necessarily be a cause of concern if they reflect improving growth prospects. however, a rise in real long - term rates at the early stages of the recovery, even if reflecting improved growth prospects, may withdraw vital policy support too early and too abruptly given the still fragile state of the economy. policy will then