mario draghi : ecb press conference – introductory statement introductory statement by mr mario draghi, president of the european central bank, and mr vitor constancio, vice - president of the european central bank, frankfurt am main, 6 june 2013. * * * ladies and gentlemen, the vice - president and i are very pleased to welcome you to our press conference. we will now report on the outcome of today ’ s meeting of the governing council, which was also attended by the president of the eurogroup, finance minister dijsselbloem. based on our regular economic and monetary analyses, we decided to keep the key ecb interest rates unchanged. incoming information has confirmed our assessment which led to the cut in interest rates in early may. the underlying price pressure in the euro area is expected to remain subdued over the medium term. in keeping with this picture, monetary and, in particular, credit dynamics remain subdued. medium - term inflation expectations for the euro area continue to be firmly anchored in line with our aim of maintaining inflation rates below, but close to, 2 %. at the same time, recent economic sentiment survey data have shown some improvement from low levels. the accommodative stance of our monetary policy, together with the significant improvements in financial markets since mid - 2012, should contribute to support prospects for an economic recovery later in the year. against this overall background, our monetary policy stance will remain accommodative for as long as necessary. in the period ahead, we will monitor very closely all incoming information on economic and monetary developments and assess any impact on the outlook for price stability. let me now explain our assessment in greater detail, starting with the economic analysis. real gdp contracted by 0. 2 % in the first quarter of 2013, following a decline of 0. 6 % in the fourth quarter of 2012. output has thus declined for six consecutive quarters, with labour market conditions remaining weak. recent developments in economic sentiment survey data have shown some improvement from low levels. looking ahead to later in the year and to 2014, euro area export growth should benefit from a recovery in global demand, while domestic demand should be supported by the accommodative stance of our monetary policy and by the recent real income gains due to lower oil prices and generally lower inflation. furthermore, the significant improvements in financial markets seen since last summer should work their way through to the real economy, as should the progress made in fiscal consolidation. at the same time, the

was very low in the baltic countries prior to the changeover, but it is steadily increasing. in lithuania net support has increased by 23 percentage points in just one year. 1 moreover, the european public ’ s initial scepticism about centralised supervision of the banking system has faded away : according to the latest eurobarometer data 2, 65 % of respondents consider central supervision at eu level effective. this suggests that if politicians want europe to work for the well - being of its people, they might need to pluck up courage and seek to shape opinion rather than follow it. should that raise questions of legitimacy, these would need to be addressed by a supranational arbitrator. i think we can solve the issue of time - inconsistent preferences by simultaneously considering the spatial dimension of decision making : if decisions of common interest are taken at national level, rigid rules that leave no room for interpretation are needed to create a level playing field. if decisions are taken at supranational level, more flexible regulation is possible without creating distortions. supranational institutions can overcome the time inconsistency : they have credibility, as they are bound by a mandate ; and they can react to changing circumstances as they have flexibility in the decisions they take within this mandate. in the eu, we already partly take advantage of this approach : the commission has executive powers on competition policy and the ecb has executive powers on monetary policy and – since november last year – on the supervision of banks. i dare to add that in those areas where european institutions have been granted executive powers and a clear mandate, they use them reasonably well. when supranational institutions are assigned conflicting tasks, assessments of their performance become less clear - cut. recent decisions by the european commission on the stability and growth pact ( sgp ) and on the macroeconomic imbalance procedure ( mip ) are a case in point. in relation to the sgp, the commission decided, in late february : standard eurobarometer 81 and 82, http : / / ec. europa. eu / public _ opinion / archives / eb _ arch _ en. htm. http : / / ec. europa. eu / public _ opinion / archives / eb / eb82 / eb82 _ en. htm. bis central bankers ’ speeches • not to step up the excessive deficit procedure ( edp ) for france and to extend the edp deadline for that country