low and stable inflation would be monitored by its reporting to parliament and by its implementation of an inflation targeting regime which has proven to be an effective anchor for inflation expectations in a growing number of industrial and developing countries. it would retain responsibility for financial stability and would thus have the mandate and the wherewithal to respond to potential threats to stability before they arise and to support systemically significant entities where the need arises. such an institution would be of our making, could achieve all of the goals that we think are important to our collective well - being and would see us through the next 50 years proudly holding jamaican dollars in our wallets. thank you. bis central bankers ’ speeches

conditionality built into the new ecb programme : acting only when governments have initiated reforms. if one does choose to embark on a programme of that nature, credible and strict conditionality provides a certain degree of protection. is this a good way of sending the ball back into the politicians ’ court so that they finally do their homework? it would seem so at first glance – but we mustn ’ t overlook the risks involved. monetary policy is in danger of becoming dependent on political decisions, and it is unclear whether it will then be able to free itself from the clutches of fiscal policy. this ultimately binds monetary policy into the rescue packages. in addition, conditionality has to be credibly enforced ; that remains the main challenge. what about the risk of the ecb itself incurring losses as a result of the new government bond programme? that ’ s another problem. one of the principles of our monetary policy is that our transactions should entail the least risk possible. yet the eurosystem will take on substantial risks by making these purchases. the swiss national bank also took exceptional measures in exceptional circumstances by introducing a floor on the swiss franc ’ s exchange rate with the euro. it makes no sense to compare the snb ’ s exchange rate floor with the eurosystem ’ s government bond programme. the euro - franc floor does not, for example, spread risks among taxpayers of different countries, while the eurosystem ’ s programme does. the swiss are now debating how to exit the minimum rate regime. what is the ecb ’ s exit strategy for the government bond programme? that point will be crucial to ensuring credible conditionality and is currently under discussion. the ecb will probably soon be given an additional mandate for banking supervision. how do you view this development? in principle, the banking union – which encompasses european - level banking supervision – is a useful addition to european monetary union. its main aim is to ensure that the euro - area financial system is more stable in the future, and that will also benefit the euro area ’ s single monetary policy. however, i see the banking union as a project for the future and not as a solution to the current problems. a communitisation of legacy balance sheet burdens would be tantamount to a transfer payment and should not be concealed under the cloak of the banking union. but making the ecb responsible for banking supervision is not the only conceivable option. aren ’ t you concerned about the ec