pushing ahead with sor - sora transition in 2021 " - keynote speech by mr leong sing chiong, deputy managing director ( markets … [ 2 ] the steering committee for sor & sibor transition to sora or sc - sts is an industry - led steering committee tasked with overseeing the transition from sor to sora. the sc - sts is chaired by mr samuel tsien, group ceo of ocbc bank and abs chairman. [ 3 ] see relevant announcements here. [ 4 ] see “ response to feedback on sibor reform and the future landscape for sgd interest rate benchmarks ” here. [ 5 ] us agencies referred here are : federal reserve board of governors, the federal deposit insurance corporation and the [UNK] of the comptroller of the currency. [ 6 ] bilateral business loans and syndicated loans outstanding as of end september 2020. [ 7 ] by end april, all lenders and borrowers to cease issuance of sor - linked loans and securities that mature a er end 2021. to support this, all d - sibs should be ready to [UNK] a full - suite of sora - based products to their customers by end - february 2021, while all non - d - sib banks should be ready to [UNK] new sora - based products by end - april 2021. [ 8 ] see “ response to feedback on sibor reform and the future landscape for sgd interest rate benchmarks ” here. © 2021, government of singapore. https : / / www. mas. gov. sg / news / speeches / 2021 / pushing - ahead - with - sor - sora - transition - in - 2021 7 / 7

no doubt be added pressures for policy makers to aid and comfort the aggrieved. that help should be forthcoming does not address the question as to whether it is the institutional prerogative of the fed to provide it. even if the central bank can does not mean the central bank should. kevin warsh ( 2009 ), “ the panic of 2008 ”, speech delivered at the council of institutional investors 2009 spring meeting, washington, april 6. the fed ’ s role as liquidity provider in the term asset - backed securities loan facility ( talf ) exemplifies the challenge in drawing clear lines. the talf made loans to investors for the purchase of highly rated assets. the assets, in turn, served as collateral for the loans. first losses were borne by the investors, as the loan was never for the full value of the assets. the department of treasury took the second - loss position behind investors, thereby acting as a fiscal agent providing credit and taking some risk. the federal reserve was in a third - loss position, and thus aimed to serve the role of liquidity provider. mortgage finance deserves careful review. quasi - governmental entities, like fannie mae and freddie mac, are increasingly being deployed as fiscal agents. the federal reserve ’ s actions should not slow the impetus to implement fundamental reform in housing finance. other threats to independence and credibility there is no such thing as being a little bit independent or a little bit credible. so, central bankers must be constantly vigilant, especially during times of fiscal expansion. net global debt issuance in 2010 may be three to four times the average of the prior decade. 8 ratios of government debt to gross domestic product are growing rapidly among advanced economies. as i just discussed, the fed should steer clear of fiscal policy. but, the threats to independence do not stop there. in this environment, let me briefly comment on two other pressure points. and note that not all of the threats to central bank independence come from outside the walls of the federal reserve. some pressures, however wellintentioned, like in the cliched scary movie, may come from inside the house. first, governments may be tempted to influence the central bank to keep monetary policy looser longer to finance the debt and stimulate activity. in the more static short - run, the real burdens of nominal debt could be reduced by higher inflation. the consequences just over the horizon, however, would be most unwelcome. higher expected inflation would lead