, m. ( 2018 ) “ the e - krona and the macro economy ” sveriges riksbank economic review no. 3, and juks, r. ( 2018 ) “ when a central bank digital currency meets private money : effects of an e - krona on banks ”. sveriges riksbank economic review, no. 3. sveriges riksbank. 6 see “ secure access to cash ”. interim report from the riksbank committee. sou 2018 : 42. 3 stricted the general public ’ s ability to use cash, but other factors such as technological progress, changed consumption patterns and the lack of legal requirements forcing traders to accept cash are probably more important. for example, in its report “ grundlaggande betaltjanster i en digitaliserad framtid ( essential payment services in a digitalised future ) ” 7, the swedish post and telecom authority ( pts ) writes that “ even if the cash infrastructure is maintained and cash is available, cash will not necessarily be fully usable in the future ”. the most recent results of the riksbank ’ s survey of payment patterns in sweden also show that the proportion paying in cash is continuing to decrease, while swish payments are increasing. so, even if the proposals of the riksbank inquiry were to be realised, there would be nothing to prevent shops and other establishments from refusing to accept cash. neither is there any way to induce consumers to use cash. this development seems to be steered at least as much by demand as by supply. 8 in other words, the tendencies that led us to start our analysis of the e - krona are continuing. and neither is the riksbank alone in analysing this issue. many other central banks are expending resources in investigating digital central bank money and a number have already conducted experiments or developed pilot versions. 9 the riksbank has met with many other central banks, politicians with responsibility in sweden and representatives of the private sector. reactions have varied from great enthusiasm to great scepticism. the banking sector in particular often argues that an e - krona is not needed and that launching one would be an intrusion into the private sector. but the riksbank ’ s presence on the market and competition with the private sector ’ s payment services are actually nothing new. when private banknotes were first issued in the 1830s, the riksbank had already been active in the issuance of banknotes for

is a major change compared with central bank history. monetary policy is assessed regularly in sweden. in 1999, the riksdag committee on finance made the assessment that the riksbank ’ s increased independence meant that there was a greater need to examine and assess monetary policy. since then, the committee has annually examined the monetary policy conducted over the past three years in connection with a more in - depth review of our activities. the main basis for these examinations is the appendix to the inflation report that i mentioned earlier. one might think that it would be even better if more, and independent, agents took an active part in serious assessment. from time to time, assessments or assessment reports are commissioned. for instance, the national institute of economic research 1 was given the task of producing background and facts prior to the committee on finance ’ s assessment in 2002. last year the committee on finance decided to commission an independent, in - depth assessment of swedish monetary policy during the period 19952005, that is, the ten - year period during which the inflation target has acted as official anchor for swedish monetary policy. this assessment is being made by two international experts in this field, and it will, for instance, illustrate whether the inflation target is correctly designed to ensure price stability, to what degree the monetary policy conducted has led to attaining the inflation target during this period and the background and forms for the monetary policy decisions. this is something that i and my colleagues in the executive board welcome and i look forward to the analyses and debates this assessment will lead to. of course, one can regard the general debate as an examination of our activities and as an indicator of how well we explain our monetary policy. however, it is rare that particularly thorough comparisons of, for instance, the forecasts published by the riksbank and others are made in the debate. the debate thus cannot replace systematic assessments. the development towards increasingly open central banks appears to be the same in other countries that work in similar ways, particularly in norway where the centre for monetary economics has the national institute of economic research ( nier ) is a public authority under the ministry of finance. the nier produces analyses and forecasts on the swedish and international economies and conducts research in these fields. it has an independent position and is responsible for the assessments it makes. organised an annual, independent evaluation of monetary policy for the past few years. as i said at the beginning, this openness and the possibilities for evaluation are necessary conditions for an independent central bank