infrastructure needs and investment bottlenecks in commodities production. fourth remark. we can identify two reasons for this situation : • the first is the general and exceptional uncertainty weighing on the global economy. uncertainty makes liquid and safe assets more attractive. it makes investment less attractive. it can therefore partly explain the phenomena that i have mentioned. • the second reason is more structural : a malfunctioning of our financial intermediation mechanisms. there are doubts about the solidity of banks in numerous countries. debt markets are profoundly disrupted and international movements of capital have been highly volatile over the last two years. fifth remark. the intervention capacities of central banks are of course limited. they can remedy temporary market disruptions and situations of illiquidity caused by uncertainty. recently they have intervened to an unprecedented extent, as reflected in their balance sheets. but they cannot permanently substitute financial markets and banks when financial intermediation malfunctions. likewise, low or zero interest rates can contribute to stabilising bis central bankers ’ speeches the economy in periods of crisis, but if maintained over a protracted period, they can create distortions, encourage the formation of bubbles and create risk for long - term investors. indeed, on this topic, i would like to make one observation. the question of monetary financing of deficits was raised by david thesmar. such financing cannot in any way resolve the problem of the dislocation between savings and investment, either at the national level or at the global level. some central banks have developed large - scale public debt acquisition programmes. they have done so for reasons relating to immediate macroeconomic stabilisation... to go beyond the zero - interest rate limit. the eurosystem as well intervened on a much smaller scale when malfunctioning debt markets prevented the effective transmission of monetary policy impulses. there is not a single central bank that is seriously considering the monetisation of deficits with the more or less declared intention of reducing the weight of debt via inflation. in my view, this notion is nothing more than a financial analyst ’ s fantasy. in fact, over the last six months, we have seen constant confirmation of the anti - inflationary stance of monetary policy with, for example, the fed actually establishing a quantitative definition of price stability for the first time ( in fact, identical to the one used by the eurosystem ). sixth remark. our immediate priority is therefore to construct or reconstruct the mechanisms and structures of a sound

negative shock on terms of trade. this geopolitical and economic environment weighs on the confidence of businesses and consumers. in particular, inflation has become the prime concern of our european citizens. the rise in consumer prices has amplified in recent months, reaching 10. 7 % in october – france displays the lowest rate in the euro area with 7. 1 %, thanks in particular to its " tariff 1 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches shield " which protects households from increases in energy prices. although such fiscal measures are politically needed, they should remain temporary, in addition to being targeted more precisely at consumers who need them the most, and targeted in keeping a " price signal " that provides an incentive to decrease energy consumption, in order to help minimise the risk of energy shortages. they should also be further coordinated at the european level. b. monetary policy will be efficient to bring inflation back towards 2 % let me clarify something fundamental : in the medium term, the real answer to inflation is not fiscal, it is monetary. in the euro area and elsewhere, although it retains a strong external component ( around half of headline figures in the euro ), inflation is becoming more " domestic " and broad - based. in october, core inflation ( which excludes energy and food ) stood at 5. 0 % in the euro area. monetary policy has a more direct impact on core inflation, and central banks cannot not let it get out of hand and persist. this our mandate, and our responsibility. therefore a normalisation in our stance has been clearly warranted over the last year. the ecb governing council decided on 27 october to raise its key rates by another 75 basis points, the third significant increase in a row, bringing the deposit facility rate to 1. 5 %. in doing so, we have removed a substantial part of our accommodative policy, and are clearly approaching the " normalisation range " which can be estimated at around 2 % in the euro area. we should reach this level by december. beyond this, we will probably continue to raise rates, but we may do so in a more flexible and possibly less rapid manner - " jumbo " rate hikes will not become a new habit. since july, we have been making decisions on a meeting - by - meeting basis. a favourable condition to interrupt rate hikes would be clear signs of a turnaround in the core inflation trend, i. e. excluding energy and food. one word about the comparison with the