is a necessary element in the interaction with fiscal policy. it is important that the government and the storting know the central bank ’ s response pattern when the size of government budgets is decided. it is also an advantage for the social partners take this into account. our view on transparency and good communication is inspired by wim duisenberg, the first president of the european central bank. his definition of transparency was that “ the external communication should reflect the internal deliberations ”. 24 we have all experienced that memory is imperfect. the easiest approach is therefore to employ the same narrative everywhere. what we say in the executive board is also what we say to the minister of finance, at press conferences and in speeches. earlier we asked ourselves : are there any particular reasons to release this information? now we ask ourselves whether there are any particular reasons not to be open. the duisenberg principle is a practice guideline for us. some studies show that transparency about the monetary policy target helps anchor inflation expectations. 25 the more credible monetary policy is, the more effective the interest rate will be in stabilising output and employment. 26 transparency provides good incentives. when we publish our analyses, we tend to make an even greater effort to ensure the quality of the analysis. open external communication also see for example michael woodford ( 2005 ) : “ central - bank communication and policy effectiveness ”, in the greenspan era : lessons for the future, federal reserve bank of kansas city, pp. 399 - 474. willem f. duisenberg ( 2001 ) : “ the ecb's monetary policy strategy and the quantitative definition of price stability ”, letter of dr. w. f. duisenberg, president of the ecb to the chairperson of the committee on economic and monetary affairs, 13 december 2001. see for example georgios chortareas, david stasavage and gabriel sterne ( 2002 ) : “ monetary policy transparency, inflation and the sacrifice ratio ” in international journal of finance & economics, 7, pp. 141155, and nergiz dincer and barry eichengreen ( 2009 ) : “ central bank transparency : causes, consequences and updates ”, nber working paper 14791. openness about how the interest rate is set also seems to generate less volatility in financial markets at the time of monetary policy meetings, resulting in more stable market rates. see for example richild moessner and william r. nelson

to a less favourable outcome. 15 4. groups often make better decisions than individuals so what steps can we take to ensure that important decisions are the best they can be, even if they have to be made under uncertainty? in his novel l, erlend loe discusses advantages and drawbacks of different decision systems. the author - narrator has embarked on an expedition to a south pacific island with six companions. on the island they experiment with different forms of social organisation. after the group tries despotism, anarchy, democracy, etc., loe concludes that enlightened despotism has much to recommend it : “ of course it very much depends on who the ruler is and how enlightened he or she is, but at its best this is probably one of the more sensible forms of government. ” 16 martin, one of the other members of the expedition, also thinks that this system might work well. he stresses, however, that the form of despotism must be a truly enlightened one : “ not just moderately enlightened, but ultra - enlightened. the ruler needs to be highly educated, plus be well travelled and have lots and lots of varied interests ( … ) just find an exceedingly likeable individual, someone you trust, someone who is warm - hearted and good - natured, and ask him or her to manage things as best they can. ” 17 most people would probably argue that despite certain benefits, enlightened despotism would not be very robust. as you may have noted, a number of assumptions underlie martin ’ s conclusion, and these assumptions are not always satisfied. delegating decisionmaking responsibility to a group may help to guard against situations where the individual ’ s weaknesses and vested interests come to dominate. it can also provide some insurance attending the imf meeting ). the business card revealed the date and magnitude of the british devaluation. it was a busy night. jahn sent a telegram to brofoss where he recommended that norway devalue the krone to the same extent as the uk. by then the ministry of trade and industry had already been informed of the uk decision through official channels. then, without first consulting with the other members of the government, brofoss decided that the norwegian krone should be devalued by 30. 5 per cent. after being instructed by brofoss, gunnar jahn informed the imf of the decision on behalf of the norwegian government