they pleaded. and yet i still persist, i am still here because i have faith. and all the battles, hidden and public, all the battles with others and myself, are now a triumph of faith in myself and in people who were not consumed by selfishness, faith in people driven by the common good! in the past 12 years serbia has transformed from a country of monetary and fiscal instability and uncertainty into a country whose inflation is comparable to those of advanced countries, and which has a stable currency, a record high level of fx reserves and a stable financial system. 2 / 8 bis - central bankers'speeches exchange rate stability has become a new reality in serbia. we have changed the approach to implementing the exchange rate policy of the dinar against the euro. instead of allowing significant oscillations which boost inflationary pressures and result in business uncertainty, high exchange rate differences in the local economy and a rise in npls, which were the characteristics of the local market before august 2012, one of the main features of the nbs and the overall financial system since then and all the way until today is – the relative stability of the exchange rate. at that time, by pursuing an appropriate monetary policy we reduced inflation by 10 pp in a year – from 12. 2 % at end - 2012 to 2. 2 % at end - 2013. inflation was kept continuously low from end - 2013 until end - 2021 ( around eight years ), when global inflationary pressures escalated. thanks to the achieved and preserved price stability, we had several years of low interest rates on dinar loans ( the key policy rate was lowered from the inherited 11. 75 % in 2012 to 1 % at end - 2020 ), resulting in lower costs of borrowing for households and corporates. since december 2012, the nbs has conducted its main open market operations – reverse repo operations ( repo sale of treasury bills ) through which it mops up excess dinar liquidity on a weekly basis – according to the system of multiple variable rates. this system has allowed the nbs greater flexibility and efficiency in monetary policy implementation over 12 years. as a result of multiple global crises, inflation has been imported into serbia over the past few years in the wake of the pandemic and several global conflicts, and its different nature called for a different response of the government and the nbs – a continuous, but gradual response. in cooperation with other government institutions, the nbs did everything in its power to protect households '

##rs ’ competences only relate to oversight, they are obliged to refrain from any actions that go beyond these parameters. swift therefore remained solely responsible for its decisions concerning compliance with the us subpoenas. the question has recently been raised whether the oversight group should not have considered swift ’ s compliance with applicable data protection rules. however, the task of protecting personal data is outside the remit of the group ’ s oversight function, since it is unrelated to the functioning of market infrastructure and financial stability. if the oversight group were to assume this task, it would conflict with the competences assigned by the data protection directive to national and eu data protection authorities. in this regard, swift informed the oversight group that it had obtained significant protections and assurances from the us treasury to ensure that the data concerned were used exclusively for the purpose of antiterrorist investigations. an audit commissioned by swift also confirmed that there was no indication that the subpoenas and their implementation had any other purpose than the fight against terrorism. 2. professional confidentiality let me now turn to the second topic, that is, why the ecb was unable to use the information it received in the context of the oversight framework for other purposes or to share such information with other relevant authorities. first, swift has requested that the information it provides to the central banks in the context of oversight must only be used for oversight purposes. second, the memoranda of understanding concluded by the nbb, in its capacity as lead overseer, with each individual g10 central bank involved in the cooperative oversight of swift, including with the ecb, stipulate that all non - public information shared by the signatories, including information provided by swift, must be treated as confidential and must also be subject to the respective obligations of professional secrecy of the signatories, as applicable. third, the applicable obligations of the ecb, as referred to in the memorandum of understanding signed with the nbb, are laid down in article 38 of the statute of the escb, which imposes professional secrecy on the ecb. as i have explained, the swift oversight function is not based on a comprehensive legal framework including powers to impose sanctions, but on “ moral suasion ”. the tool of “ moral suasion ” can only work properly if there is a close dialogue and mutual trust between the overseers and swift. in this context, a strict confidentiality regime is of the essence. after all, the oversight role involves the sharing