s operation. congressional oversight of the federal reserve goes back to the founding of the central bank in 1913. however, the nature and purpose of oversight has changed overtime. since 1978, the federal reserve has been subject to biannual oversight hearings before the senate and house banking committees. several other countries have similar arrangements where the central bank periodically appears before a committee of parliament. parliament in new zealand also has a role in monitoring the bank's conduct of policy. by statute, each monetary policy statement is referred to parliament's finance and expenditure committee. that committee, with the assistance of its own professional adviser, can choose to extensively scrutinise the extent to which policy was, and has been, conducted consistent with the policy targets agreement. additionally, the office of the auditor general – an agent of parliament, is also able to commission quite extensive investigations into the activities of the bank. similarly, the australian parliament undertakes particularly close scrutiny of interest - rate issues and associated economic policy through the reserve bank ’ s appearance before the house of representatives standing committee on economics, finance and public administration. this is the main mechanism through which the reserve bank is accountable to the people of australia. as with the case of the media, the central bank ’ s interface with the legislature needs to be managed strategically, so as to enhance the former ’ s credibility to the public which, as discussed earlier, is a necessary condition for effective transmission of monetary policy. mr. chairman, turning to zambia, some seven years ago we at the bank of zambia commenced media seminars in which we invited a cross - section of participants from media institutions to explain our monetary policy to them. we also used these seminars to educate members of the media on basic economic concepts. this exercise was to a great extent driven by our alarm at the level of misunderstanding of monetary policy issues and decisions by the media, and their failure to communicate discussions on monetary policy effectively to the public without simply copying or paraphrasing a press statement or simply printing opposing quotes from favoured commentators on economic issues. i must admit here that initially this seemed to cause more harm than good – a little knowledge truly did seem a dangerous thing now that we had opened ourselves up to the media. the greater access to central bank officials and information, e. g. through our website, without the full understanding of issues on the part of journalists seemed to fuel erroneous stories. however, our perseverance over time has meant that the level of understanding and quality of questions

tukiya kankasa - mabula : stakeholder ’ s workshop on the draft bank of zambia act opening remarks by dr tukiya kankasa - mabula, deputy governor of the bank of zambia, at the stakeholder ’ s workshop on the draft bank of zambia act, lusaka, 21 september 2010. * * * chief executive officers and representatives of stakeholder institutions ; distinguished invited guests ; directors and staff of the bank of zambia ; members of the press ; ladies and gentlemen. on behalf of the bank of zambia, and indeed on my own behalf, i welcome you to this workshop which is entitled “ the stakeholder ’ s workshop on the draft bank of zambia act ”. as the name rightly suggests, it is a workshop facilitating the meeting of minds of key stakeholders affected by the bank of zambia act. on the one hand we have those administering the act, the bank of zambia representatives and on the other hand those whose operations stand to be affected by the administration of the act, the financial service providers. we have also cast the net wide to include other key stakeholders such as government ministries, other regulatory entities and professional bodies representing lawyers, accountants and economists. the bank of zambia is charged with the responsibility of formulating and implementing monetary and supervisory policies that achieve and maintain price stability and promote financial system stability in the republic of zambia. to give you a brief background on the central bank legislation, since its inception in 1964 the bank has operated under 3 different bank of zambia acts ; the boz act of 1965, the boz act of 1985 and the current boz act of 1996. each of these acts has responded to the era of its time. for example, the acts of 1965 and 1985 were characterised by high government involvement in the operations of the bank. the bank administered exchange control regulations. it also determined and regulated the frequency and rates of fees, commissions and interest rates etc charged by financial institutions. the economic reforms that swept the country in the 1990 ’ s saw the ushering in of the current boz act of 1996 which supported the government ’ s free market policies. the bank ’ s mandate was made clearer, exchange control regulations were suspended and the bank ’ s regulation of interest rates etc was removed. there was also improved transparency and accountability. since the enactment of the boz act of 1996 two issues have precipitated the need to have the act reviewed again ; 1. in 2002, the imf and the world bank conducted a joint assessment