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banking. the liquidity offered by some shadow banks relies pretty well entirely, and more or less openly, on committed lines of credit from commercial banks. in these cases, the liquidity insurance offered by the shadow bank is “ derivative ” ; there is a real bank in the shadows. but for other shadow banks, liquidity services are offered without such back - up lines. in those cases, claims on the shadow bank have, in effect, become a monetary asset. examples probably include money market mutual funds and an element of the prime brokerage services offered by securities dealers to levered funds. see section 1, financial stability board, “ shadow banking : scoping the issues ”, april 2011 ; section 3, european commission, “ green paper on shadow banking ”, march 2011 ; and also turner, “ securitisation, shadow banking and the value of financial innovation ”, april 2012. my definition was : instruments, structures, firms or markets which, alone or in combination, replicate, to a greater or lesser degree, the core features of commercial banks : monetary or liquidity services, maturity mismatch and leverage. see tucker, p m w, “ shadow banking, financing markets and financial stability ”, january 2010. bis central bankers ’ speeches with that brief bit of scene setting, i will quickly set out my current thinking on policy. the objective should not be to curb non - bank finance in general, but to recognise where a form of intermediation is banking in substance or in the risks it creates for the system as a whole. shadow banks that are really part of banks many examples of shadow banking are sponsored by banks or are operated by them, or both. they are effectively part of their “ parent ” bank. in the run up to the present crisis, prominent examples were structured investment vehicles, abcp conduits, and money funds. many benefitted from financial support from their “ parent ” during 2007 – 08. for such situations, the following could usefully apply : shadow banking vehicles or funds that are sponsored or operated by banks should be consolidated on to bank balance sheets consolidation might require changes in accounting rules. that could take time. these vehicles and funds should nevertheless be treated as consolidated in the application of basel 3 regulatory capital requirements etc. if necessary, pillar 2 should be used to achieve that. ( the basel supervisors committee will, i hope, consider this in its contribution to the fsb work ). banks ’ provision of committed lines of credit to