samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
as ours, public institutions function to serve the interest of the citizens, whereby public funds are spent or invested for the “ common good ”. the 2 / 6 bis central bankers'speeches comptroller and auditor general ( cag ) of india as the supreme audit institution of the country, serves as the critical link between the citizens and the parliament on the one hand and the public institutions / departments on the other. it subjects the practical conduct and operations of the public sector to regular and independent examination as well as review. with such immense responsibilities, the audit processes of the cag through financial, compliance and performance audits of public institutions, do enhance the accountability and legitimacy levels for the use of public funds which are sourced primarily from the taxpayers in the country. based on the feedback given by the cag, future decisions on allocation of public funds are taken through timely identification of implementation gaps for course correction or for replication if the outcomes are successful. financial sector experience and importance of auditors 14. i am sure you would be picking up the ropes of public finance and audit of government and public accounts in your regular induction curriculum. i would, therefore, like to give certain perspectives of the reserve bank as a financial sector regulator and supervisor on the audit function in banks, non - banking financial companies ( nbfcs ) and other financial entities. 15. stability and growth of an economy and financial markets are dependent upon trust among stakeholders. one cannot take trust for granted. with greater openness of the economy and faster transmission of information flows, thanks to the advent of technology, it has become paramount to ensure credibility and confidence in the system. statutory auditors play a vital role in maintaining market confidence on audited financial statements. in banking industry, this public role is particularly relevant for financial stability, given that banks hold public deposits. audit quality is key to the effectiveness of such public role. in addition, the statutory auditor has a duty to report directly to the supervisor ( rbi ) on matters of material significance arising from the audit of banks and other regulated entities. for these reasons, rbi as the supervisor of banks and nbfcs has a keen interest in the manner with which statutory auditors perform audits in the regulated entities. 16. the reserve bank ’ s supervision, therefore, specifically focuses on audit quality relating to identification of gaps, assessment of asset quality and the so - called innovative accounting practices, if any, which could have a major impact on the capital base of regulated entities and their viability

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to their listing - authority function. the rules for collective - investment schemes matter too. a good example, highlighted recently by the g20 financial stability board, is the development of the exchange - traded fund markets to include synthetic structures, leveraged funds, less liquid underlyings, and all three combined. 13 remind you of how securitisations ended up in cdo² and cpdos? in the eu, etfs are subject to the ucits rules for what are in effect mutual funds available to retail investors. securities regulators need to think about how to avoid mechanically applying a regime for vanilla investment schemes to the structuring and distribution of much more complex and sophisticated products. in the same spirit, recent etfs innovations underline the need for securities regulators to work closely with bank supervisors and macroprudential authorities on shadow banking and what i earlier called “ financing markets ”. for both physical and synthetic funds, the underlying collateral pools are being swapped to provide financing for dealers and banks. it is not clear whether bank supervisors have caught up with this, or whether the risk of the collateral swaps being called is treated appropriately in regulatory maturity - mismatch ladders. who would have guessed that vanilla collective investment schemes, could be turned to this purpose? the truth is that any pool of assets can be. while the fsb has already called for authorities to act to keep the evolution of etfs on a sustainable path, the broader lesson is that securities regulators need to be alive to the need securities and exchange commission, release no. 33 - 9117, asset - backed securities ( april 7, 2010 ). the fsb took a small step towards addressing this issue in its march 2011 publication, “ thematic review on risk disclosures practices : peer review report ”. this did not get much traction at the time, but the fsb ’ s vulnerabilities group, chaired by jaime caruana and on which i sit, plans to draw on that review in its own work programme. in the us, as noted, the sec has begun to grapple with this set of issues. its april 2010 notice proposed enhanced disclosures requirements for asset - backed securities sold privately as well as via the public ( registered ) transactions. “ potential financial stability issues arising from recent trends in exchange - traded funds ( etfs ) ”, published by the financial stability board, 12 april 2011. the bank of england covered similar issues in its june 2010 financial stability report, pages 40 – 41.

the stability and growth of the korean economy. thank you.
to review our forecasts. conclusion so, in summary there is no shortage of interesting issues to ponder over as we think about the future. the world economy is undergoing fundamental change as the weight of economic activity moves from the north atlantic economies to asia, and as the household sectors of many countries re - think their attitudes to spending and borrowing. these are important structural changes that are likely to shape the australian and the global economies over coming years. i wish you luck in incorporating these changes into your central forecasts and into the risks around those forecasts! thank you for your attention this evening and i wish you all the best for 2011.

philip lowe : forecasting in an uncertain world address by mr philip lowe, assistant governor ( economic ) of the reserve bank of australia, at the australian business economists annual forecasting conference dinner, sydney, 8 december 2010. * * * thank you for the invitation to join the australian business economists ( abe ) this evening. it is both an honour and pleasure to be able to speak at the abe ’ s annual dinner. this evening, i would like to talk about an issue that i know is close to the hearts of many of you. it is also one that you have been discussing all afternoon. and that is economic forecasting. as economists, forecasting is something we are required to do on a regular basis. as a policy adviser, as a business person or as an investor, one has no choice but to be forward looking. so for many of us, some form of forecasting – with all its difficulties and pitfalls – is the bread and butter of our professional lives. tonight, i would like to talk about three aspects of forecasting from the perspective of a central banker. the first is the general role that forecasts play in the setting of monetary policy. the second is the approach to forecasting that we use at the reserve bank. 1 and the third is some of the issues that we have been grappling with as we have put our current forecasts together. monetary policy and forecasting australia ’ s monetary policy framework is best described as a medium - term inflation target. over time, we want to ensure that inflation averages somewhere between 2 and 3 per cent. and this is exactly what has happened since this framework was put in place. since 1993, cpi inflation, excluding the effects of the introduction of the gst, has averaged exactly 2. 5 per cent. 2 this is in contrast to average inflation of 8. 7 per cent over the previous two decades ( graph 1 ). an important feature of inflation - targeting frameworks is that they are forward looking. we know that it takes time for changes in monetary policy to have their full effect on the economy, just as it takes time for changes in other variables – like the terms of trade or government spending – to have their full effects. this means that if we are to achieve our medium - term objective, and to avoid unnecessary swings in the economy, we need to be thinking about what might happen in the future. when inflation - targeting regimes were first established around the world, many observers characterised the appropriate policy
##uous circle. i am impressed by the extensive work carried out by the world bank in its flagship study, and i once again thank them for their contribution to the economic development in the region through this work. ladies and gentlemen, with these brief opening remarks i hope i have conveyed how important i believe the topic of our conference is, and how pleased i am to see you all here to participate in the event. i wish all participants productive discussion in the coming two days. thank you.

mr. carse speaks on banking supervision in hong kong and the lessons learned from the financial crisis in asia speech by the deputy chief executive of the hong kong monetary authority, mr. david carse, at the asian investment conference “ asia : meeting the challenge ” held in hong kong on 27 / 3 / 98. 1. i am pleased to be here this morning to speak to you on the topic of the supervisory lessons which hong kong can learn from the region and specifically from the crisis which has engulfed asia since july of last year. this is a drama that is still being played out and we have not yet reached the final act. but i do not think that it is too early to make some kind of judgment about what went wrong and the lessons that can be drawn for the future. the asian crisis 2. i think that it is fair to say that the asian crisis has surprised almost everyone by its speed and intensity and the ease with which it spread from country to country. even those who were sceptical about the asian miracle did not really expect anything like this. of course, there were warning signs such as the current account deficits in a number of countries such as thailand. but these could be regarded as the natural consequence of the heavy demand for investment in growing economies. the asian economies were certainly not fault - free, but in general they not exhibit the classic signs of gross macroeconomic weakness that normally lead to a balance of payments crisis. governments ran fairly prudent fiscal policies, savings were high and inflation rates reasonably low. even if policy mistakes were made, the punishment does not really seem to fit the crime. 3. why then have exchange rates fallen by as much as they have and why have economies in the region been so severely crippled? it is generally agreed that a large part of the answer lies in the weakness of financial and banking systems in the region, which have amplified the initial effects of external shocks and economic downturn. in essence, banking systems that were already in weak health before the crisis broke were not up to the task of intermediating large inflows of capital. they have been part of a vicious circle whereby loss of confidence in the currency leads to loss of confidence in the banking system that further undermines the currency. this is the “ run on the country ” syndrome. it therefore follows that strengthening of the banking system must be part of the cure of the asian disease and the means of preventing a recurrence. banking supervision has an important part
##est sovereign links. and only default remains. or, of course, a bail - out, i. e. shifting the debt burden from some countries to others. but, history seems to suggest quite clearly that without some form of debt reduction ( or default, if you wish ) it will be really hard to get sovereigns functioning normally again. are there any other alternatives? yes, either very fast growth or slow deleveraging. the first option is possible, but unlikely. the second option might mean not one, but two “ japanese ” lost decades. moreover, the second option might also endanger the strong economies. so, once again, without one form of debt reduction or another, it will be really hard to move forward. bis central bankers ’ speeches

mojmir hampl : states as debtors speech by mr mojmir hampl, vice governor of the czech national bank, to the alpbach financial market symposium, alpbach, austria, 2 september 2011. * * * i would like to thank the organizers for inviting me to this wonderful and amazing place. and that is not a platitude ; i really mean it. it is my first time here in alpbach, and i can only hope that it is not the last after i finish my presentation. concerning the sovereign debt crisis, we are describing it as something absolutely fatal. but from a bird ’ s eye view – as was said by several speakers yesterday – sovereign debt problems and overindebtedness of nation states are nothing new. europe as a continent has a rich experience with such problems. the czechs share a long part of their history with austria, so many might remember from their textbooks the sovereign instabilities and crises of the 19th and 20th centuries, for instance the well - known crash of state finances in 1811, in the middle of the wars against napoleon. that crash was followed by a drastic monetary reform, default of the austrian empire and a search for a better way. this time is different, however, at least in the following respects : 1. we forgot that this can happen, that sovereigns can become perfectly insolvent just like any other debtor, and states behaved accordingly. 2. this is the first time in 60 years or so that a sovereign crisis has hit the developed world, the rich world, not the developing one, the hardest. to demonstrate that : almost 80 % of all the imf ’ s rescue loans have gone to europe! over 40 % have gone to the eurozone itself, and the share is going to rise. the developed world is not accustomed to this. 3. this time the problem of sovereign debt has appeared at a time of peace and prosperity. 4. moreover, the eurozone – a monetary union without a state – is a completely new, unprecedented arrangement. typically, the solution to such a crisis used to be : inflation, default or monetary reform, very often accompanied by currency devaluation, or a combination of all these. please note that typically when the imf organizes a programme for a developing country, it requires a partial default or devaluation to disburse funds. nothing like that is possible within the eurozone – monetary solutions are unavailable for the weak
ben s bernanke : financial education speech by mr ben s bernanke, chairman of the board of governors of the federal reserve system, at the conversation with the chairman : a teacher town hall meeting, federal reserve board, washington dc, 7 august 2012. * * * good afternoon and welcome. i am delighted to have the opportunity to speak today with educators throughout the country on the topic of financial education. thank you for your participation and for the important work you do. as an educator myself, i understand the profound effect that good teachers and a quality education have on the lives of our young people. today i hope you will learn from each other and share ways to best promote learning and, in particular, to help students achieve greater financial literacy. financial education supports not only individual well - being, but also the economic health of our nation. as the recent financial crisis illustrates, consumers who can make informed decisions about financial products and services not only serve their own best interests, but, collectively, they also help promote broader economic stability. smart financial planning – such as budgeting, saving for emergencies, and preparing for retirement – can help households enjoy better lives while weathering financial shocks. financial education can play a key role in getting to these outcomes. research by federal reserve board staff members on the effectiveness of financial education for young military personnel, for instance, found that those who had taken a high school financial education course were more likely to save regularly. 1 effective financial education is not just about teaching students about financial products or performing financial calculations. it also involves teaching them the essential skills and concepts they will need to make major financial choices. high school students might not recall specific information from a lesson about loans a year later when they go to get their first car loan or student loan. however, if they understand and remember some basic ideas – for instance, that it ’ s important to shop around for a loan to get the lowest interest rate, to review the fees charged, and to know how to contact financial counselors and advisers – they will be more likely to make a good decision. a particularly valuable lesson we can teach students is how to apply an economic way of thinking to their decisions. for instance, the topic of student loan debt and whether students are prepared to service that debt upon graduation has received increased attention lately. students with some exposure to economic thinking will be more likely to conceptualize their spending on postsecondary education as an investment in their own human capital and choose their school,

and regulatory policies were either unavailable or had been shown to be ineffective. but, of course, we should all be working to improve our state of knowledge, so as to better understand economic and financial behavior and to further expand the range of policy tools that can be employed to enhance macroeconomic performance. that objective is one that governor brimmer has worked hard to promote.
know the security features and make the checking of money second nature. the security features on south african rands are only useful if people use them. it is every user ’ s responsibility to get to know the upgraded banknotes and check the security features. may we also take the opportunity to thank the team and their collaborators for their energy and effort in ensuring the success of the project as a whole and ensuring that the banknotes are distributed on time and for the efforts in ensuring public confidence in our banknotes. thank you for coming here today and for your participation in this process and we wish to encourage all of you to spread the message about these very important changes to our banknotes. thank you.

an annualised rate of – 2, 8 per cent ), far more than expected, and remains in recession ; the us economy grew at an annualised rate of 1, 5 per cent in the second quarter, about half its potential growth rate, and is in danger of falling over its selfinduced fiscal cliff ; german business confidence declined for the third successive month, far more than expected, to its lowest level in two years ; eurozone business declined to a three year low in july, while almost half of the members countries are experiencing negative growth ; unemployment in the eurozone reached new euro - era highs at 11, 1 per cent in may, with youth unemployment in excess of 22 per cent ; spreads on spanish and italian sovereign debt have reached new and unsustainable highs ; the global pmi is now indicating a global contraction ; and systemically important emerging markets, until recently the main ray of hope in a dismal world, are also slowing markedly, particularly china, india and brazil. the litany is almost endless. if you were hoping for some countervailing good news, it has been hard to find. perhaps we can point to remarks by the ecb chairman, mario draghi, that the ecb would “ do what it takes ” to safeguard the euro generated a relief rally in global financial markets late last week. but we would be fooling ourselves if we think that the problems are over. verbal intervention by central banks can have an impact, but the sustainability of these effects will be dependent bis central bankers ’ speeches on evidence that their words can be backed up with deeds. until the substance of such assurances materialise, we are likely to see continued volatility as markets react to good news, more in hope than anything else, only to be disappointed and to revise their assessment soon after. the ecb is a central part of the solution, but it cannot act unilaterally to extend its mandate, and getting agreement on these issues at a political level is far more complex. perhaps some other relatively good news is that the downward revisions in july by the international monetary fund ( imf ) to its global growth forecasts were relatively modest - by 0, 1 and 0, 2 for this year and next year respectively. but we can take cold comfort from the size of the revision. of concern is that the downside risks are seen to “ loom large ”, as the forecasts are predicated on a number of conditions,
by reminding players in the banking sector that as new products and services emerge, different or heightened levels of risk also emerge. the challenges that financial innovation poses for public policy and the regulatory framework in ensuring financial stability are enormous and cannot be over looked. in this regard, let me call upon the management of indo - zambia bank to not only look at the benefits, but more also on the risks that accompany financial innovation. from the bank of zambia ’ s point of view, the objective of financial stability remains key in all our activities. financial stability depends to a large extent on the existence of robust risk management systems of financial institutions. it is therefore, important that risk management systems should keep pace with financial innovation. i have no doubt that the banking sector will rise to this challenge. once again, thank you for the opportunity to witness this important event.

the promotion of data sharing by g20 economies, which includes an increase in “ the sharing and accessibility of granular data, if needed by revisiting existing confidentiality constraints ”. bis central bankers ’ speeches