##ables could converge encompass the following three “ cs ” : climate, crypto - assets, cross - border payments. 1. of course, addressing climate change comes to mind first. in the wake of the ipcc ’ s january synthesis report, it is estimated that if emissions continue at current levels, the carbon budget to have a 50 % chance of limiting global warming to 1. 5°c with limited overshoot would run out in around six years. the latest ipcc report is the final warning from the scientific climate community to all of us policy makers. from a financial standpoint, the collective priority is to make green finance more mature. the path is clear : better data and better standards will allow us to shift from voluntary to mandatory climate - related disclosures, and still more developed climate stress - tests and transition plans for all financial institutions. at the international level, we must ensure the convergence, or at least the interoperability of the various disclosure standards currently under development. issb should be the international standard, and be assured the european standard – efrag – will be somewhat more demanding but fully compatible. 2. second, crypto - assets. in light of last year ’ s debacle, there is a broad consensus in international fora on the need to regulate them. but this consensus must now be leveraged and translated into concrete action. let us draw from the declaration of dramatic unities in classical theatre in order to catalyse our efforts : “ one action in one day and one place ” vi. ( i ) unity of action : the highest priority should be the swift finalisation of the fsb recommendations on cryptoassets, which could mean a further strengthening of the european mica regulation ; ( ii ) unity of time : more than a day, let ’ s make 2023 the decisive year of action ; ( iii ) unity of place : if crypto regulation is not implemented everywhere in the g20, it won ’ t be efficient anywhere. to that end, i suggest the fsb should closely monitor the implementation of its own recommendations on cryptos, just as the basel committee does with banking regulations. 3. the last “ c ” stands for cross - border payments. the momentum to improve and facilitate cross - border payments was strong a few years ago. in 2021, the page 7 sur 7 g20 set 11 ambitious yet achievable targets for 2027 within a dedicated taskforce i co - chaired with lesetja

rates needs to be augmented with a model to filter out the liquidity and risk premium components that place a wedge between inflation compensation and expected inflation. see thomas laubach and john williams ( 2003 ), “ measuring the natural rate of interest, ” review of economics and statistics, vol. 85 ( november ), pp. 1063 – 70. - 6it is again useful to compare estimates of expected inflation derived from breakeven inflation data with estimates of expected inflation obtained from surveys — for example, the expected inflation over the next 5 to 10 years from the university of michigan surveys of consumers. market - and survey - based estimates of expected inflation are correlated, but, again, when there is a divergence between the two, i place at least as much weight on the survey evidence as on the market - derived estimates. again, here i also consult time - series models of underlying inflation, such as stock and watson ( 2007 ) and cecchetti and others ( 2017 ), presented at the u. s. monetary policy forum in 2017. 7 at the fed, the staff have estimated a state - space model decomposition of the common factor that drives a number of different measures of inflation expectations. state - space econometrics is one formal way to do model averaging. as i look at all of this evidence from market signals, surveys, and econometric models, i judge that inflation expectations reside at the low end of the range i consider consistent with our price - stability goal of 2 percent personal consumption expenditure inflation in the long run. in both of the examples i have just discussed, the medium - frequency evolution of market - based, survey - based, and model - based estimates of r * and expected inflation have, over time, tended to move broadly together. when high - frequency market signals diverge from the survey - and model - based estimates, the potential benefit from increasing the weight on a signal derived from a forward - looking asset price versus backward see james h. stock and and mark w. watson ( 2007 ), “ why has u. s. inflation become harder to forecast? ” journal of money, credit and banking, vol. 39 ( s1, february ), pp. 3 – 33 ; and stephen g. cecchetti, michael e. feroli, peter hooper, anil k kashyap, and kermit l. schoenholtz ( 2017 ), deflating inflation expectations : the implications of inflation ’