in cannes in november of this year. 3. what remains to be done? notwithstanding the progress already made, there is still a long way to go in making the international financial system watertight. in my following remarks, i would like to point out three aspects of regulatory reform that will accompany us in the coming months. firstly, it is indispensable to finalise, and then implement without delay, the fsb framework for dealing with sifis. secondly, we have to introduce internationally compatible restructuring and resolution regimes for financial institutions to allow them to exit the market in an orderly bis central bankers ’ speeches fashion without causing a breakdown of the system. and finally, we must identify the so - called shadow banking system and expose it to supervision. let me now briefly discuss these three areas in more detail. 3. 1 dealing with sifis as already mentioned, the fsb is currently finalising its recommendations for dealing with sifis. one difficulty here lies in accurately identifying sifis based on criteria such as size, interconnectedness, substitutability and complexity. i would like to promote a rather pragmatic approach towards solving this problem : we should start with only those institutions that are indisputably of global systemic relevance. i expect this to be a group of some 25 to 30 banks – not more and not less. the composition of this group will surely change over time. as experience is gained, we might later extend the framework in an appropriate manner to other sifis, including financial institutions of domestic relevance, financial market infrastructures, insurance companies and other non - bank financial institutions. central to the fsb concept are systemic capital surcharges for sifis that go well beyond the requirements mandatory under basel iii. such capital add - ons do more than merely improve the resilience of a sifi, in other words reduce its probability of failure. they surely are also a suitable instrument with which to put a price tag on the implicit guarantee that sifis are deemed to enjoy. formal decisions have yet to be taken as to the exact application modalities of the sifi surcharge, especially its size. nevertheless, i expect that at the end of the day the amount of additional capital required from a sifi will be related to its systemic importance and will in all likelihood lie somewhere between two and three percent. what is also still being discussed is the choice of capital instruments acceptable for the surcharge. common

, even more so than the federal budget. iv today, with the huge financing needs stemming from the ageing population, the digital transformation and, above all, the green transition, the cmu re - emerges not so much as a stabilisation tool than as a key allocation policy, as recently noted by the governor of banque de france. v in a sense, the cmu becomes a " no - regret policy " : its usefulness for stabilisation purposes is conditional on future asymmetric shocks ; but its usefulness for minimising the cost of the transitions is not contingent, hence it should be a no - brainer. the climate and energy transformation is probably the most pressing structural challenge that we are now facing. the banque de france has undertaken scenariobased analyses regarding transition risks. vi the key takeaway is that we cannot preclude that the transition will be inflationary, however it is not certain yet, and it will crucially depend on the mix of instruments that will be used to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. for instance, a balanced - budget policy aiming at incentivising green private investment would be inflation - neutral during the first years, and then lead to lower inflation. as regards physical risks, another piece of research carried out at banque de france has focused on french overseas territories. this research suggests that more frequent climate events will likely increase the volatility of prices – rather than increase the inflation rate. vii however, both physical risks and transition risks could weigh on productivity growth, hence indirectly on inflation. the risk of " greenflation " should reinforce our determination to revive productivity growth in our economies, and more specifically in services sectors that form the " core of the core " of inflation. more efficiency in services will help keep headline inflation on track. i mention services for three reasons. 3 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches first, because this is where the single market remains largely incomplete, hence there is room for efficiency gains. second, the new technology revolution, with the arrival of artificial intelligence, provides an opportunity for the integration of services markets, in the single regulatory environment provided by the ai act. third, the completion of the single market for services is a complement to the completion of the cmu. indeed, the combination of the two will offer european tech companies the scope they need for their development both in terms of market and funding. in turn, productivity growth will simultaneously mitigate possible greenflation and provide