], and even the united states is beginning to page 3 of 10 suffer. faced with this situation, political leaders – and one of them in particular – have the most important role to play : it is up to them to restore the confidence they have undermined. monetary policies do their part by keeping interest rates low in the face of the slowdown, but they cannot tackle the underlying cause. for the euro area, these uncertainties are being compounded by a painful paradox : the causes of the slowdown are largely external, but the region is being acutely affected. this imbalance is attributable to the weight of germany, which is highly specialised in the manufacture of capital goods and “ overexposed ” to global trade. it nonetheless also illustrates the fact that europe needs to make greater use of the scope it has to respond : it has less public debt ( 81 % of gdp ) than the united states ( 106 % ) or the united kingdom ( 87 % ), but it makes less use of fiscal stimulus, especially in germany. in addition, the expansion of the euro ’ s international role would be a useful means of consolidating our economic sovereignty. the euro is 20 years old and it is our success : it ranks second in the international monetary system, but it still needs to increase its importance at the global level. the dollar remains a key pillar of america ’ s global power, and china is taking a greater interest in the internationalisation of the renminbi. the other major threat to europe ’ s sovereignty is technological. of the large digital corporations – the gafa and other bigtechs – whose power equals that of sovereign states, none is european. and europe is seriously lagging behind in investment : in 2015, the euro area ’ s stock of information and communication technology ( ict ) capital amounted to 7. 6 % of gdp compared with 10. 9 % in the united states. v yet europe has the advantage of having a single market : you can see what happens without it with brexit and the cost of a “ no deal ” for the british economy. but we need to be more bold. by taking full advantage of the size effect : there are still too many implicit borders and too much page 4 of 10 fragmentation. by using the power of standardisation, notably to direct innovation, as illustrated by the gdpr and data where europe is taking the lead. by daring to implement an industrial policy with public - private partnerships, as in

firms belonging to different segments of the financial industry. this implies that the traditional approach of specialised agencies is no longer perceived as satisfactory. on the other hand, the problems related to the creation and effective management of a universal agency are very complex. indeed, co - ordination remains necessary, be it between specialised agencies or between the organisational units within a universal agency. a second issue involves the role played by central banks. there are three main arguments in favour and three main arguments against the unification of prudential supervision and central banking. the arguments in favour are the following. first, there is a potential for exploiting synergies between the supervisory function and the core tasks of a central bank. a thorough understanding of the proper functioning of payment systems and of other market infrastructures is essential for the smooth conduct of monetary policy. information collected for supervisory purposes may play a significant role in this. the second argument concerns the need to focus on systemic risk. central banks have a privileged position from which to assess the impact of macroeconomic shocks and the financial stability of groups of intermediaries. the third argument concerns the independence from political interference and the technical expertise of central banks. similarly, we can identify three arguments supporting the establishment of a supervisory agency outside the central bank. the first one concerns the alleged conflict of interest between monetary policy and prudential supervision. many authors have argued that the body in charge of monetary policy cannot be entrusted with supervision, because the monetary policy stance would be affected and it would pose a threat to price stability. a second argument is based on the observation that no clear distinction is made between the different financial products and intermediaries belonging to distinct financial sectors. i already discussed this argument earlier when i talked of the technological advances. the third and final argument concerns the need to avoid an excessive concentration of power in the central bank. while it may be a difficult and controversial exercise to weigh up the pros and cons of the two solutions at a general level, without making allowances for the specific environment, in the particular context of the eurosystem the balance of the arguments leans in favour of maintaining a strong role for national central banks in prudential supervision. the reasons for this are twofold. first, the conflict of interest regarding monetary policy and concentration of power is no longer relevant given the structure of the eurosystem, since the introduction of the euro has implied an institutional separation between the monetary jurisdiction – the euro area – and the supervisory jurisdiction – domestically chartered institutions