% in 2015, 1. 5 % in 2016 and 1. 8 % in 2017. in comparison with the december 2014 eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections, the inflation projection for 2015 has been revised downwards, mainly reflecting the fall in oil prices. in contrast, the inflation projection for 2016 has been revised slightly upwards, also reflecting the expected impact of our recent monetary policy measures. the governing council will continue to closely monitor the risks to the outlook for price developments over the medium term. in this context, we will focus in particular on the passthrough of our monetary policy measures, geopolitical developments, and exchange rate and energy price developments. when discussing the economic outlook and the new projections, the governing council acknowledged that the staff projections are conditional on the full implementation of all our policy measures. moreover, the march staff projections extend the horizon to 2017. in this context, the governing council again stressed that the degree of forecast uncertainty tends to increase with the length of the projection horizon. turning to the monetary analysis, recent data confirm the gradual increase in underlying growth in broad money ( m3 ). the annual growth rate of m3 increased to 4. 1 % in january 2015, up from 3. 8 % in december 2014. annual growth in m3 continues to be supported by its most liquid components, with the narrow monetary aggregate m1 growing at an annual rate of 9. 0 % in january. the annual rate of change of loans to non - financial corporations ( adjusted for loan sales and securitisation ) was – 0. 9 % in january 2015, after – 1. 1 % in december 2014, continuing its gradual recovery from a trough of – 3. 2 % in february 2014. the three - month cumulated net lending flows were positive in january for the second consecutive month, compared with sizeable net redemptions still recorded a year ago. despite these improvements, the dynamics of loans to non - financial corporations remain subdued and continue to reflect the lagged relationship with the business cycle, credit risk, credit supply factors and the ongoing adjustment of financial and non - financial sector balance sheets. the annual growth rate of loans to households ( adjusted for loan sales and securitisation ) increased further to 0. 9 % in january 2015, after 0. 8 % in december 2014. our recent monetary policy measures should support a further improvement in credit flows. to sum up, a cross - check of the outcome of the economic analysis with the signals coming from the monetary analysis confirms the appropriateness

in the treaty. if all policy areas concerned respect the aforementioned allocation of objectives and responsibilities and act accordingly, they will already be making the best possible contribution to the community objectives. 3. a sound institutional arrangement a clear allocation of responsibilities is essential for well - designed policy - making, especially in a complex institutional set - up as the one governing monetary union in europe. at the same time, a continuous dialogue between different policy actors on the basis of the allocation of tasks is also important for effective governance. an open exchange of views and information between individual policy actors - without any commitment or mandate to take and implement joint decisions - will strengthen economic governance if it manages to improve the common understanding of the objectives and responsibilities of the respective policy areas and does not dilute accountability. the central legal basis for economic policy co - ordination among member states within monetary union is specified in article 99 ( ex 103 ) of the maastricht treaty, which states that “ member states shall regard their economic policies as a matter of common concern and shall co - ordinate them within the council. ” on the basis of this principle, the framework for the definition of economic policy priorities is provided by the “ broad economic policy guidelines ” adopted by the council each year. these channels for policy co - ordination among member states do not involve the independent monetary policy of the ecb. any form of exchange of views and information, however, should clearly be distinguished from an attempt to co - ordinate macro - economic policies ex ante, which would give rise to serious information, incentive and enforcement problems. ex ante co - ordination among different policy actors would blur the fundamental responsibilities of the respective policy areas under the treaty. this, in turn would reduce accountability of individual policy actors and ultimately increase uncertainty about the policy framework. given the eurosystem ’ s monetary policy strategy, there should be no ambiguity how the single monetary policy will respond to developments in fiscal policies and wage settlements to the extent that they will affect the maintenance of price stability. as a result, national governments and wage setters alike should be able to design and implement the policies under their responsibility in a manner that allows for the interdependencies of these policies with the single monetary policy. obviously, if they take the single monetary policy ’ s credible commitment to maintain price stability as given, this will help to align expectations and condition their behaviour in a favourable way. national governments and wage setters, in turn, are reassured that monetary policy will respond