and the united states really that different? in april, inflation in the euro area is expected to have increased to a new record high of 7. 5 %, causing significant concern among firms and households. a large part of the rise in inflation reflects the exceptional surge in energy prices ( slide 2 ). over the past 12 months, energy accounted, on average, for around half of total headline inflation. 1 / 8 bis central bankers'speeches because the euro area is a net importer of energy, this surge in inflation is often referred to as “ imported inflation ” – in other words, inflation over which monetary policy has no, or very little, control. in this context, comparisons are often made with the united states, where energy is making a smaller contribution to headline inflation, suggesting that price pressures are predominately a result of domestic forces. and indeed, there is currently a large gap between the euro area and the united states when looking at measures of inflation that exclude energy and food ( slide 3, left - hand side ). for at least three reasons, however, such comparisons should be treated with caution. first, even if we exclude the impact of energy and food, inflation in the euro area is currently at levels never seen before in the history of the single currency. the prices of goods and services other than energy and food are currently increasing at an annual rate of 3. 5 %, more than twice as much as the pre - pandemic historical average. so, most people in the euro area are seeing a marked increase in their cost of living across the board. it gives them little comfort that inflation in other countries may be even higher. second, differences between the euro area and the united states have already existed previously. over the ten years preceding the pandemic, inflation excluding food and energy was, on average, about 50 % higher in the united states than in the euro area. so, inflation in the united states started from a visibly higher level. the rising gulf in this measure seems to suggest that these differences have been growing sharply over the past two years. however, year - on - year differences have largely been driven by a few months of extreme outliers, mainly in the spring of 2021. since then, the differences in month - on - month changes in inflation excluding energy and food have broadly returned to their pre - pandemic pattern ( slide 3, right - hand side ). the third, and perhaps most important, issue is that exclusion

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