samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
bank of japan ’ s april report of recent economic and financial developments1 bank of japan, 9 april 2003 * the bank ’ s view * * economic activity remains flat as a whole, despite some signs of improvement, with greater uncertainty about the economic outlook partly due to iraq - related developments. with regard to final demand, although business fixed investment is starting to recover, private consumption continues to be weak. moreover, housing investment remains sluggish and public investment is declining. while domestic demand has not shown clear signs of recovery, both exports and imports are increasing at a very modest pace with net exports remaining virtually level. industrial production continues to be basically level in response to these developments in final demand. corporate profits continue to recover, but the improvement in business sentiment as a whole has come to a halt due mainly to substantial uncertainty regarding the economic outlook. as for the employment situation, new job offers are on a gradual rising trend. in addition, the number of employees, which covers various types of employees including non - regular employees such as temporary workers, appears to be declining at a slower pace. however, firms are still maintaining their stance on reducing personnel expenses, and household income continues to decrease with an ongoing decline in wages. the employment and income situation of households overall remains severe. turning to the economic outlook, a widely shared view of the prospect for overseas economies in 2003 is that, partly due to the continued firmness in asian economies, they will follow a gradual recovery path. however, their recovery is likely to be anemic, at least for the time being, given the recent weakness shown in economic indicators of the u. s. and european economies amid greater uncertainty regarding iraq - related developments. in this situation, the increase in japan ’ s exports is expected to remain very modest, and industrial production is likely to be more or less unchanged for the immediate future. with respect to domestic demand, public investment is projected to follow a declining trend, and private consumption is likely to remain weak for some time due to the severe employment and income situation. business fixed investment is likely to follow a clear uptrend if exports and production increase clearly again, but for the time being, the increase in business investment is expected to remain very modest. overall, assuming that overseas economies will recover in 2003, albeit only at a moderate pace, the increase in exports will accelerate and the uptrend in production will resume sooner or later, which in turn will initiate the momentum for a recovery. however, a self

centre aims to become a world financial cluster. the paris financial marketplace today offers to initiate closer cooperation and develop joint programs with the mumbai financial center. thank you very much for your attention.
building shanghai into an international financial center. thank you all. 4 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches

here and around the world, with a view to identifying the best ways to promote the goals the congress assigned to us. as such, we will be looking widely at our tools and strategies, assessing not just the various approaches that were undertaken, but also approaches that have been proposed but not tried. one of those is the idea that the federal reserve should explicitly promise to “ make up ” for the fact that interest rates can ’ t be cut as much as during past recessions. the federal reserve could hold interest rates lower after a recession is over, perhaps by promising not to raise interest rates until inflation or the unemployment rate have reached a particular level. a related idea is average inflation targeting, meaning the fed would aim to achieve its inflation objective on average over a longer period of time — perhaps over the business cycle. so if inflation fell short during a recession, the federal reserve would aim at inflation above target during the recovery and expansion. this approach would also have aspects of a make - up policy, as policy would likely be kept easier — that is, more accommodative — than otherwise during the period where inflation is above target. while such approaches sound quite appealing on their face, they have not yet been implemented in practice. there is some skepticism that a central bank would in fact prove able to support above - target inflation over a sustained period without becoming concerned that inflation might accelerate and inflation expectations might rise too high. another idea i would like to hear more about involves targeting the yield on specific securities so that once the short - term interest rates we traditionally target have hit zero, we might turn to targeting slightly longer - term interest rates — initially one - year interest rates, for example, and if more stimulus is needed, perhaps moving out the curve to two - year rates. under this policy, the federal reserve would stand ready to use its balance sheet to hit the targeted interest rate, but unlike the asset purchases that were undertaken in the recent recession, there would be no specific commitments with regard to purchases of treasury securities. similar to make - up policies, such an approach could help communicate publicly how long the federal reserve is planning to keep rates low. i should emphasize that these are just a few ideas ; there may be other good ideas, and part of 2 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches the process we are engaged in involves looking around for other ideas. most, if not all, of the ideas have both advantages and disadvantages, and we will have to consider them carefully as
' ve concluded today : financial inclusion is both urgent and important. we are working together to make progress on this issue. and if we set out a good timetable we will get there. i have every confidence that together we will prevail. and to that end, i have one last piece of eisenhower wisdom for you : " neither a wise man nor a brave man lies down on the tracks of history to wait for the train of the future to run over him. " what i see here is a room full of wise and brave men and women, not passively waiting to be overrun, but actively wanting to jump on that train to shape that future. a future for all. especially the most vulnerable, an inclusive future! * * *

. but it is not so easy on a national level. there is an obvious need to collect more data on productivity in fiji. let me turn to development. how does one measure development? development can be defined as an improvement in the standard of living. how does one measure living standards? remember that only human beings enjoy a living standard and not corporations and government. every person ’ s living standards is of course different and that is capitalism for you. one crude way of gauging an average standard of living is to look at the country ’ s per capita income. how do we fare on this measurement? this chart shows fiji ’ s gdp per head and as you can see it has been growing very slowly and in some years it has been stagnant or even declined. the average growth rate since 1996 is only 1. 6 percent. how do we fare against other developing countries? this international comparison shows that in 1978 fiji ’ s gdp per capita was higher than mauritius but lower than trinidad and tobago. however, inside eight years, mauritius had smartly zipped passed fiji and continues and it is now nearly four times higher than us. the growth in gdp per capita for trinidad is also impressive. in the pacific, fiji had a gdp per capita higher than western samoa ’ s and most other countries in the region. at a national level, the country ’ s economic growth rate can be used as another indicator of development. looking at our economic performance, in this chart, fiji ’ s gdp growth since 1996 has generally been positive with the exception of 1997 and 2000. however, our average growth rate since 1996 is only 2. 4 percent. this next slide compares fiji ’ s growth rates with some selected countries. as you can see, fiji ’ s growth trend has generally been stable, although it fell below the growth rates of mauritius, samoa and trinidad & tobago in 2001. let me show you another indicator of development - the un ’ s human development index. the higher you are on this ladder the better. you will note that fiji was ranked at the 81st position of all the countries on the world in 2002. this is about half way against all countries in the world. we are doing better than the average of all the developing countries and some neighbours like png, vanuatu and the solomon islands. samoa is however higher than us. but we also have lost grounds under this ranking over the years. for instance, in 1996 we were ranked 66th so we have slid down 15 positions
- term net - zero goal with the european green deal as well as medium - term targets with its " fit for 55 " package. our second economy - wide climate stress test has recently shown that a delayed or late - push transition would negatively affect banks'credit risk, which would rise by more than 100 % by 2030 compared with 2022. in an accelerated transition, on the other hand, this increase would be 40 % lower. 4 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches

##ence of the financial system, we are still failing to measure the goal or define an operational target. moreover, there remains a need to clarify the range of available tools, calibrate the balance between rules and discretion, and clarify governance arrangements, both nationally and internationally, as well as the potential interaction with other policy areas. many believe that central banks are best equipped to do this job. in pursuing their goal of preserving price stability, central banks are attentive to the evolution of real and financial markets, they are familiar with the credit and banking channel and their institutional independence shields them from political interference. however, as central bankers we have to perform our tasks with the utmost responsibility. before adjusting the conceptual framework underpinning possible policy action, we need tested, robust analyses. in macroprudential policy we still lack this certainty that would allow for a macroprudential stance that is similar but different to monetary policy. we have no consensus on the definition and measurement of the objective. so how can we identify clear and well - defined policy goals linked to metrics and potential target levels? in the absence of a proper understanding of the transmission channels of different instruments and their potential interactions and spillovers, how can we credibly discharge our accountability requirements? 4 / 6 bis central bankers'speeches at this stage, the conceptual foundations lack the robustness to pursue a standalone or nonquantified objective with instruments that have unknown consequences based on assumptions and models full of unobservable factors and multidimensional equilibria. another open question in the european context addresses the level of governance and decisionmaking. since we cannot measure risk or define resilience, how are we to distribute competence between the national level and the currency area level, or even the eu as a whole? currently, country - specific features of financial cycles certainly exist due to national financial systems and institutional, legal and fiscal frameworks. financial booms and asset price bubbles indeed often occur within national borders, in spite of a union - wide single monetary policy stance. but is deeper integration and banking union not around the corner? at the national level, the institutional architectures are a patchwork, the use of instruments a “ tower of babel ”. i doubt that adding an additional european layer without a clear view of who is in charge with what instruments and for what objective will advance the issue. while modesty is advisable in the context of macroprudential ambitions, monetary policy has the
maintain it and to withdraw any excess liquidity in case of upward risks to price stability. conclusion let me conclude these opening remarks. bis central bankers ’ speeches three elements are essential for understanding the policies of the ecb : immutable focus on price stability ; acting within our mandate ; and being fully independent. the ecb ’ s new measures help to ensure price stability across the euro area. they also contribute to improving the economic environment. but completing that task of economic renewal demands continuing action by the governments of the euro area. it is governments that must set right their public finances. it is governments that must reform their economies. and it is governments that must work together effectively to establish an institutional architecture for the euro area that best serves its citizens. we are already moving in the right direction. across the euro area, deficits are being cut. competitiveness is being improved. imbalances are closing. and governments are working seriously to complete economic and monetary union. it is important that europe ’ s leaders stay on course. in doing so, they will be able to unlock fully the enormous potential of the euro to improve living standards and carry forward the project of european integration. thank you for your attention – and i look forward to our discussion. bis central bankers ’ speeches

for a wellfunctioning monetary union. in four years, europe will be in a much healthier state than today. bis central bankers ’ speeches
do not decline to the same extent. however, with the bank ’ s introduction of the negative interest rate, a large part of the yield curve has declined by about 0. 2 percentage points, which is close to the decline in short - term yields, or more ( chart 4 ). this means that the extent of the decline in interest rates brought about by the negative interest rate policy is quite substantial. going forward, the bank will assess how the effects of the decline in interest rates permeate and spread through the real economy. doubt over firms ’ willingness to invest even with a decline in interest rates some argue that a decline in real interest rates will not produce the intended effects if firms are unwilling to borrow and invest. this is possible in the short term, while people are pessimistic. over a longer period of time, however, the decline in real interest rates will surely boost economic activity and inflation through the impact on financial institutions ’ behavior and financial markets. in fact, bank lending, which had been declining, has increased over the past three years at an annual rate of about 2 percent ( chart 5 ). stock prices have risen as well, and the excessive appreciation of the yen has been corrected. against the backdrop of such improvement in capital markets, economic growth and the underlying trend in inflation have increased. a decline in real interest rates will have no effect only when the expected growth rate, or natural rate of interest, is at such a low level that the central bank cannot produce a real interest rate that is lower than that. while this extreme case cannot be ruled out as a theoretical possibility, i am convinced it does not apply to japan. let me point out a couple of reasons. first, in the past three years, the decline in real interest rates has, as i just mentioned, produced actual effects. and second, looking at japan ’ s economy and japanese firms, i do not think the situation is as dire as that, given japan ’ s economic strengths such as its technological prowess and the skill - level of the labor force. it is implausible that the natural interest rate is so low that monetary policy would be ineffective. does volatility in global financial markets render monetary policy ineffective? the volatility recently observed in global financial markets certainly makes it more difficult to clearly see the effects of the negative interest rate policy. immediately after the introduction of the negative interest rate policy, stock prices rose, with the nikkei index adding 800 points in two days,

if we take an optimistic look at the future, our steady efforts may result in the formation of an open, flexible and surprisingly well - organized regional economic zone within the context of “ future globalization of complexity ”.
##pi on cdo equity principal protected notes lbo ’ d company real economy commercial paper conduit ( e. g. siv ) mezzanine bbbrated hel abs / cmbs or synthetic mezzanine ( often bbb - ) nim mortgages equity equity

. bank of thailand has experience in employing several macroprudential tools since 2002 to prevent financial instability that may stem from, for example, excessive credit card loans to sub - par debtors, excessive foreign exchange speculation, and a formation of real estate bubble. i would like to refer to another of our policies to maintain financial stability. to ensure capital flows and exchange rate stabilities, the bank of thailand uses a managed float on exchange rates. the policy allows the thai baht to adjust via market mechanism, helping to stabilize against volatile capital flows. it also allows flexibility for the bank of thailand to influence the exchange rate in extreme events in order to avoid excessive volatility. all the mentioned policies have helped to keep the current economy in good balance. today, capital flows, private sector balance sheets, as well as real estate values remain healthy, which should allow private spending to return with confidence and enable fast recovery. however, there are risks we must closely monitor over next year. as the u. s. economy continues to recover strongly, earlier timing of the u. s. interest rate normalization is anticipated, which could result in capital flow volatility. at the same time, household debt, at 83 % of income, is also a factor to be monitored with caution. we have now covered growth, price, and financial stability. the central bank aims to maintain all three facets of stability for continuity in order to support growth potential. with a promising recovery prospect, minding the future risks to financial stability and being equipped with stability tools tested and refined over time, the monetary policy committee will carefully weigh the tradeoff between short - term gains and longer - term risks and ensure that the economy will be provided with enough financial ease to recover sustainably to its potential. ladies and gentlemen, apart from the deviation from potential i mentioned earlier, the current economy shows symptoms that potential growth, which depends on labor, productivity and infrastructure development, may have reached its limit. at this stage of our discussion, let me refer to some prominent symptoms. thai labor supply has started to gradually decrease due to the trend of aging society. research has shown that increasing labor supply by increasing retirement age and reliance on foreign labor will not be sufficient. since we must accept the aging workforce trend, we must rely on increasing productivity and efficiency through structural changes to lift growth potential, a task which requires supply - side policies. thailand ’ s productivity growth has declined since the asian financial crisis due to the misall
collaboration with commercial banks and other financial institutions, government agencies, other central banks, and most importantly, the public. we owe kenya a new beginning, a newly reborn and prosperous kenya, building an economy devoid of corruption. this is a call for each and every kenyan. the writer is the governor of the central bank of kenya

monetized. during the year, the national economic and social council developed a vision for kenya. vision 2030 seeks to transform kenya into a globally competitive middle - income country with a high quality of life by the year 2030. to realize this vision, the kenyan economy requires a sustained annual growth of 10 % during this period. this will require maximum contribution of each and every key sector of the economy, including the banking and financial sector. the banking and financial sector, for instance, is expected to increase the savings rates to 30 % of gdp which will be achieved by increasing bank deposits and increasing the pool of funds through reforms of the pension industry and the capital markets. this may require transformation of banking institutions into larger, stronger banks with attractive savings products and extension of credit referencing services. the insurance services sector will also require reforms to make the players stronger and able to support a larger economy. ladies and gentlemen : one of my objectives when i joined the central bank as governor this year, was to oversee an effective monetary policy that is consistent with the development agenda of the country and the development of an appropriate financial sector in which you play a key role. during the year, the central bank pursued a monetary policy designed to support economic growth projections of the economy, contain underlying inflation at below 5 %, and refine monetary policy operating procedures to enhance the efficiency of the monetary policy instruments. these developments have worked, but there are challenges on the inflation front brought about by the external shocks arising from increasing pass through effect of oil prices and sometimes domestic food prices. the monetary policy also facilitated adequate credit expansion to the private sector which grew by 15 % on average over the last 3 years. short term interest rates remained stable with a gradual upward trend in 2007, and are expected to continue to remain stable in the medium term on account of continued government commitment to fiscal discipline, inflation expectations anchored on continued low and stable underlying inflation and an independent monetary policy guaranteed by a flexible exchange rate. interest rate spreads also narrowed from 9. 4 % in january 2007 to 8. 5 % by september 2007. i wish to commend the banks for their effort in reducing the lending rates though we believe we can still do more to bring the spread to much lower levels. perhaps we will have time to share our survey and analytical results on factors sustaining large spreads in kenya. a challenge for us all – deposits have remained low and most of the time negative in real terms. this is not a good way to attract savings. let