of inflation prospects and interest rate development did not differ significantly from their own assessments, but that the riksbank did not want to revise the interest rate forecast made in february by that much, for reasons of prestige. i do not know whether this could have been part of the explanation, but i believe and hope that it was not. we executive board members have always been careful to point out that the interest rate path we publish is a forecast, and like other forecasts is reconsidered each time we make a decision. if our analysis of the prospects for production and inflation shows that our repo rate path needs to be revised in a particular way so that monetary policy is well balanced, then we will do this. what lessons can we learn? so far we have only limited experience of the new system and it is difficult to draw any farreaching conclusions. but perhaps we can learn some lessons for the future already at this stage. to begin with, it is important to note that, apart from the differences between different market agents ’ expectations, there may also be differences between market agents ’ own forecasts for the repo rate and their forecasts for the interest rate path the riksbank will publish. it will be important for us to analyse what these differences are due to and how they should be interpreted in order to be able to predict the reactions at the times of the interest rate decisions. it is also important that we should constantly strive to become clearer in our communication to avoid it being interpreted in a way we did not intend. the decision to begin publishing interest rate forecasts in connection with each monetary policy meeting should be regarded in this context. there are some indications that certain market analysts interpreted a couple of speeches by executive board members during the spring in a way that was not intended. they appear to have drawn the conclusion that the interest rate path would be revised upwards less than had been assumed previously. the reasons for this could be a combination of unclear communication on our part and a willingness among some market agents to read too much into what was actually said. the more our new policy of not signalling between monetary policy meetings becomes established, the better the communication will work. we executive board members will of course assess new information continuously and have instantaneous opinions on where we are heading. all those who make forecasts know that one ’ s opinion of how the future will look like varies over time. but one day one must put one's foot down. it is mainly the

. economy operating at or close to our maximum - employment and price - stability goals, now is an especially opportune time to conduct this review. the unemployment rate is near a multidecade low, and inflation is running close to our 2 percent objective. by conducting this review, we want to ensure that we are well positioned to continue to meet our statutory goals in coming years. in addition, the federal reserve used new policy tools and enhanced its communication practices in response to the global financial crisis and the great recession, and the review will evaluate these changes. furthermore, u. s. and foreign economies have significantly evolved since the pre - crisis experience that informed much of the research that provided the foundation for our current approach. perhaps most significantly, neutral interest rates appear to have fallen in the united states and abroad. 2 moreover, this global decline in r * is widely expected to persist for years. the decline in neutral policy rates likely reflects several factors, including aging populations, changes in risk - taking behavior, and a slowdown in technology growth. these factors ’ contributions are highly uncertain, but irrespective of their precise role, the policy implications of the decline in neutral rates are important. all else being equal, a fall in neutral rates increases the likelihood that a central bank ’ s policy for evidence of a fall in neutral rates of interest in the united states and abroad, see, among several contributions, king and low ( 2014 ) ; holston, laubach, and williams ( 2017 ) ; rachel and smith ( 2017 ) ; and brand, bielecki, and penalver ( 2018 ). - 3rate will reach its effective lower bound ( elb ) in future economic downturns. that development, in turn, could make it more difficult during downturns for monetary policy to support spending and employment, and keep inflation from falling too low. 3 another key development in recent decades is that inflation appears less responsive to resource slack. that is, the short - run phillips curve appears to have flattened, implying a change in the dynamic relationship between inflation and employment. 4 a flatter phillips curve is, in a sense, a proverbial double - edged sword. it permits the federal reserve to support employment more aggressively during downturns - - as was the case during and after the great recession - - because a sustained inflation breakout is less likely when the phillips curve is flatter. 5 however, a flatter phillips curve also increases the cost, in terms of economic