samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
, is committed to supporting these efforts within our mandates for financial and monetary stability. on that note, i wish you productive discussions in the sessions ahead. we look forward to concrete outcomes from these discussions given the heavy and urgent responsibility we all bear to mitigate the devastating effects of climate change.

. our research assistants are typically recent college graduates and most are at least considering further study of economics. these are sought - after positions because our ras have the opportunity to work with the board ’ s leading economists on both research and work that 2 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches directly supports policymaking. for the summer program students here today, i would encourage you to explore the ra program. serving as an ra either at the federal reserve board or at one of the reserve banks has proven to be a good way to learn more about the profession and prepare for graduate school. i can report that five graduates of last year ’ s program are now working at the board as ras and several are working at reserve banks. for the federal reserve system, our recruitment of ras is a great opportunity to give a wide range of potential newcomers some exposure to what the career pathway of economics looks like. while not all ras go on to further economics education and training, a considerable share do, and thus our diversity efforts have the potential to significantly affect career pathways later on. indeed, at the highest levels of that process, the federal reserve under chair janet yellen and with the strong support of the governors and reserve bank presidents is committed to increasing diversity among the top - ranking staff at the board and among leaders of the reserve banks. in the tradition of the discipline of economics, i have cited empirical support for the argument that diversity is good for economics. i know from my own personal experience we can and must do better, and in that spirit i want to tell you about one of my experiences that might resonate with some of you here. when i served at the treasury department for president obama, one of my responsibilities was to represent the united states in the group of 20 ( g - 20 ) deputy ministers of finance and central bank officials. at one of our negotiating meetings, the nearly 50 officials gathered for a group photo. when this photo was distributed to each of us as a memento, it caused a bit of a stir. i remember a colleague from another delegation doing a double take when he looked at the photo. he turned to me and said “ did you realize you are the only woman in this group? ” i had indeed already noticed that. and i am happy to say that his delegation added a woman after that. since that time, we have seen some particularly noteworthy milestones. at the time, there had been only one woman among the g - 20 countries serving as head of a central bank,
memorable one. thank you all, ladies and gentlemen.

does not imply a value judgement. on the contrary, the reforms of taxation, regulations and so on have presumably played a crucial part in the good development in the 1990s, both in sweden and elsewhere. at the same time, recent developments bring out some of the problems we now face. markets are evidently liable to malfunction in the sense that prices deviate markedly from what is reasonable in the long term. stock markets have provided evidence of this in recent years and it is also very much the case with the krona ’ s exchange rate. the result can be considerable fluctuations not just in financial markets but in the real economy, too. it is here that i believe the major challenges lie today, both for economic theory and for us more practical decision - makers. i have already discussed the other two pillars. attempts to raise demand and employment in the short term entail considerable risks, as we saw in the three decades before 1990. the neo - classical theories, not least those based on rational expectations, have provided a number of explanations for this. but that hardly means that keynes is dead. within a policy framework for macroeconomic stability and given sound, long - term rules for the market economy, there ought to be room for cyclical stabilisation, though not for fine tuning. with a fixed exchange rate regime, monetary policy has to concentrate on maintaining the given rate and leave the stabilisation of demand mainly to fiscal instruments. in the first place that implies creating enough room – sufficiently large reserves – for the automatic stabilisers to be able to act in downward phases. the european community ’ s stability & growth pact is designed to this end, for example. it is also a question of economic agents being able to rely on inflation remaining low. with a flexible exchange rate, a large part of the responsibility for stabilisation policy rests in practice with the central bank. strong confidence in monetary policy and in the ability of the central bank to fulfil its objectives is of primary importance here. it will then normally be feasible to lower interest rates when economic downturns are imminent and vice versa. in that way, a policy focused on price stability will normally also help to stabilise economic activity. when opinions differ, it is now usually a question of practical judgements. are the budget reserves sufficiently large for the automatic stabilisers to be given their head? can one be sure that confidence in the inflation target will not weaken if the interest rate is lowered still more? perhaps
. moreover, both borrowers and lenders badly mispriced and misunderstood risks, which often became embedded in new, complex, financial instruments. neither was protected against a substantial decline in the price of houses. and that mispricing was not just confined to the housing sector. compensation for risk was too low across a broad array of credits. ironically, an important contributor to these misalignments in spending and lending was the long period of economic expansion and low inflation over the past 25 years, interrupted only a few times by mild recession. this good economic performance provided skewed data and bred complacency : house prices could only go up ; income interruptions and problems servicing debt were likely to be short lived ; financial markets would always be liquid. models based on theory and estimated with data from the 1990s and early 2000s fit well – too well. complacency, in turn, contributed to the unwillingness of many financial market participants to enhance their risk - management systems sufficiently to take full account of the new ( perhaps unknown ) risks they were taking on. in this environment, financial institutions stretched the amount of capital they were holding, building leverage. with better models, sophisticated contracts, and the belief that risks had been distributed more efficiently, many market participants believed that less capital was needed. because the amount of capital held by financial institutions on their balance sheets was so small, productivity in the financial sector looked as though it had increased dramatically when the amount of securitization and other off - balance - sheet activities ( for example, derivatives ) increased. but many of those off - balance - sheet instruments came back onto the balance sheet when markets started to seize up. finally, many market participants also had inadequate liquidity backstops, apparently because they ( wrongly ) assumed that markets would be sufficiently liquid to smoothly adjust risk profiles to new developments in markets and the broader economy. thus, capital and liquidity cushions fell short of what was needed for the complexity of instruments that were created, for the funding risks being incurred, and for the broad array of market and other risks to the firms and to the financial system more generally. systemic risk is an externality that results from exposures that cannot be diversified away. the financial turmoil that we have been experiencing for more than a year originated in the market for subprime mortgages, in which the combination of falling house prices and poor underwriting standards triggered a rapid rise in delinquencies. multilayered securiti

for their insight and contributions over the years. thank you all, and have a great conference.
transparency also facilitates information sharing and international cooperation to combat cross - border financial crimes. all stakeholders, including financial institutions, have a crucial role to play in assisting this endeavour. compliance officers, in particular, are entrusted with the gate - keeping role of ensuring that your respective entities adopt and implement practical and effective policies and procedures that help to detect, prevent and mitigate money laundering and terrorism financing risks. i am therefore pleased to see the participation of compliance officers from the different entities supervised by the central bank in today's session. this is an opportunity to enhance your knowledge on various topics, such as beneficial ownership disclosure standards and your respective institutions'aml / cft obligations. more importantly, you will be presented with the beneficial ownership guidelines - a new tool that outlines best practices and approaches to identifying and verifying beneficial ownership information of your legal entity customers. i hope you make the most of this training and also take the opportunity to share your experiences, ask questions, and engage with the facilitators and representatives of the supervisory authorities to boost your capabilities to further strengthen the compliance of your respective financial institutions. only through our combined efforts and dedication can we achieve the goal of having a robust and effective legal framework that aligns with international standards and protects the integrity of the country's financial system. on this note, i wish you all a fruitful training session. thank you. 2 / 2 bis - central bankers'speeches

during the training and continue encouraging and supporting one another. i sincerely wish you all the very best on your leadership journey. thank you. 2 / 2 bis - central bankers'speeches
research. let me first shed some light in the darkness and explain what this means. according to rolf kreibich, a german physicist and future researcher, future research is “ the scientific study of possible, probable and desirable future developments, the options for shaping them, and their roots in past and present ". this is not about forecasting, which is predicting the future precisely. forecasting tends to derive short - term conclusions from developments and often assumes that developments from the recent past will continue. in our case, however, it is about foresight. so it ’ s about keeping the big picture in mind. taking an overall look at societal trends and keeping in mind that there are multitudes of possible future paths – and long - term consequences associated with these different paths. because, and you will know this from your own lives : depending on the path you take, the landscapes to the left and right can differ greatly. and your perspective is sometimes quite different depending on your position. thinking through these different paths and applying a broad mix of methods is an important part of future research. it is about strategic foresight and the creation of different scenarios for possible futures. you can imagine the future as being like a funnel. the further the time horizon is in the future, the more possibilities can occur. these may not necessarily be desirable but they must be plausible. alternatively, to paraphrase kreibich : scenarios can only be “ indicators of a spectrum of possibilities ”. we therefore need to consider more than one scenario in order to be prepared. with the knowledge gained in the scenarios, we can then take measures and decisions to steer the future in the desired direction. the insight into possible cash futures is thus intended to provide orientation for our actions today. 5 practical examples this may all sound very abstract at first. let me give you some practical examples where these foresight techniques are already being used. one of the pioneers from the private sector is shell, one of the world ’ s largest mineral oil and natural gas companies. shell has been developing possible visions of the future since the early 1970s. the challenge here is to create plausible and challenging descriptions of the future economic environment. especially in times of uncertainty and upheaval, energy and environmental issues play an important role for society as a whole. in the past, shell was prepared for crises and changes because decision - makers were already confronted with such items in future scenarios. in the meantime, strategic foresight is also used in public and political

. 8 % ; two out of three survey participants are expecting it to shrink. 5 see deutsche bundesbank, monthly report, february 2017, p 53. 6 loans with a rate fixation period of more than 10 years rose from 10 % of new loans in 2014 to 20 % in 2016. 7 these scenarios represent isolated shocks which test for the impact of falling prices and the resulting macroeconomic developments on the banks ’ residential property portfolios. 6 / 6 bis central bankers'speeches
crushed.

of this year will be hard. but i believe that from next year we will achieve high rates of growth - maybe spectacular rates of growth. interest rates interest rates will be kept high at first, but not for a long time. dollarisation i do not see any case for dollarisation in brazil. it is a little bit strange for a country to be without its own currency. there will come the day when the adoption of a single currency within the mercosur will be taken into account by its member countries. but then a common currency – 2 – of the region, not the dollar, will be agreed upon and the first step in this direction is to have a strong real. responsibility i have been in the government since the beginning of 1995. i feel myself responsible for what has been done during this whole period. pedro malan has a key role in the government. few brazilians have his international credentials. he has good relations with men that make this world of international finance. his continued presence is essential to consolidate this transition period. but we should care about policies rather than names. malan and i are carrying out a mission. devaluation of the real no economy in the world could sustain a devaluation in real terms of 40 %. the difficulty in maintaining a devaluation of that magnitude is that inflation would resume. the exchange rate has overshot, but it will come back, appreciating as time elapses. currency board i would like to stress my opposition to the idea of adopting a currency board in brazil. this subject has already been examined and the government has decided against it. the brazilian economy is not dollarised and i believe it would be a disastrous policy option. brazil tried a similar regime in 1906. nowadays, money supply in the expanded concept ( m4 ) comes to r $ 450 billion, while international reserves reach us $ 36 billion. to implement this regime we would have to dollarise and lengthen the maturity of these deposits. this government is definitely committed to avoid such measures. future the devaluation of the real will improve the fiscal balance, as it will permit interest rates to fall in the future. foreign investors will return, sustaining economic growth. my optimism is not foolish. the next six months will be very hard. i am optimistic on what will take place after that. unemployment i believe that the unemployment rate has to do more with the overvalued exchange rate than with the level of economic activity. enterprises were being
little, has been done. one paramount reason for this failure is that our technical product has not so far engaged sufficient political ownership. we need a stronger purpose, a more visible “ flag ”. let me suggest one : the implementation of the european green deal will require the reallocation of resources towards “ green ” activities, in a financing union for sustainable investment. to keep its leadership in the green transformation, europe must act as a united block in its financing. moving forward on the banking union requires effort, but the rewards will make it more than worthwhile. thank you for your attention. 4 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches

variety of instruments is necessary to allow supervisors to ensure that banks increase their loss - absorbing capacity. in particular, the experience of national supervisors should be taken into account. in france, for example, we adjusted, as permitted by basel ii, the ratios required of each institution based on its risk profile. the experiment was conclusive. the amounts that each bank had to raise from the state during the crisis proved consistent with the requirements that we had determined. other countries that have not had this experience are likely to implement automatic rules. le figaro – in the united states, some believe that european banks, and in particular french institutions, are undercapitalised relative to the size of their balance sheets... christian noyer – the idea that us banks all comply with basel iii and that efforts are only required in europe is false. those who believe this are victims of an accounting and prudential optical illusion. put simply, a balance sheet produced under us gaap is twice as small as its equivalent using international standards. and capital appears twice as high. this creates confusion. le figaro – will the united states implement basel iii? christian noyer – we ’ ll be monitoring developments very closely. i have no doubts about the commitment of the us administration and the fed.
the wheel ” but those who are generally more competent at what they do. this also means keeping the risks of digitalisation in check, what should also be the benchmark for institutions. it is not individual ideas we are talking about, but a bank ’ s overall package – including risk management. thank you. 5 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches

rules since 2000. 22 while the rules often diverged, all of them called for a substantial reduction in the federal funds rate around the time of the financial crisis, and all of them prescribed easing well below the effective lower bound ( elb ). 23 faced with the impossibility of providing more accommodation at the elb through deeply negative policy rates, the committee turned instead to two unconventional monetary policy tools - - large - scale securities purchases and forward guidance. figure 8 shows the taylor ( 1993 ) rule for different values of r * layered over the “ dots ” from the december 2016 sep, with a black horizontal line at the median value for each year. 24 the red solid line shows the rule prescriptions when the intercept is set equal to 2 percent, as in taylor ’ s original formulation. if we replace that intercept with the median of the longer - run r * from the december 2016 sep, which is 1 percent ( the blue dashed line ), we see that the rule prescribes policy interest rates lower than the unadjusted rule. however, many observers believe that the neutral real interest rate is currently well below its longer - run value. the language that has appeared in the committee ’ s postmeeting statement since december 2015 that “ the federal funds rate is likely to remain, for some time, below levels that are expected to prevail in the longer these are static simulations and do not incorporate feedback from the policy rule to real activity or inflation. ben bernanke finds that a “ balanced approach ” rule estimated using real - time data closely tracks the federal funds rate from 1996 through 2008. see ben s. bernanke ( 2015 ), “ the taylor rule : a benchmark for monetary policy? ” ben bernanke ’ s blog, april 28, https : / / www. brookings. edu / blog / benbernanke / 2015 / 04 / 28 / the - taylor - rule - a - benchmark - for - monetary - policy. figure 2 of the sep provides each individual fomc participant ’ s assessment of “ appropriate monetary policy ” in the form of a dot plot. “ appropriate monetary policy ” is defined as the future path of policy that each participant deems most likely to foster outcomes for economic activity and inflation that best satisfy his or her individual interpretation of the federal reserve ’ s objectives of maximum employment and price stability. the policy prescriptions are derived using the median projections for core pce price inflation, the
play an important role in amplifying or cutting down both. however, macroprudential authorities might not be among the best - suited institutions to deal with such phenomena. the evidence we have so far shows that, in the short term, macroprudential policies may reduce financial inclusion when implementing credit constraints, especially for borrowers that are more vulnerable to possible income or interest rate shocks ( generally, lower - income individuals ). macroprudential instruments like debt service - to - income ( dsti ) or loan - to - value ( ltv ) are very powerful in preserving financial stability, but the access to credit for households from the lower income percentile might be affected. however, in the long run, these macroprudential policies might have a positive contribution to preserving the wealth of borrowers, underpinning also financial inclusion. this is also the romanian experience. when we entered the european union in 2007, we had to get rid of all our macroprudential measures like ltv ( loan - to - value ) or dsti ( debt - service - to - income ), because at that time such instruments were considered to hinder the free movements of capital. we reintroduced these measures in 2009, after the outbreak of the crisis. the bulk of non - performing loans we witnessed came exactly from exposures dating back to the time when the above - mentioned measures had been lifted ( 2007 - 2008 ) and the most affected borrowers were from lower - income buckets. for these individuals, higher access to finance and better financial inclusion in the short run implied over the medium and long term difficulties in repaying debts and, in many cases, negative equity for their balance sheets. our lesson is that improving financial inclusion should take place in a sustainable manner. macroprudential instruments might hurt this inclusion in the short term, but they will support it in the medium and long run. our active involvement in raising the degree of financial education of the population is crucial for reaching the same objective. i am very interested to hear your views and experience on this matter. the first day of our seminar is dedicated to this topic. the second day of the seminar targets mainly the corporate sector. the small and medium enterprises ’ access to finance is also important for financial stability. small and medium enterprises constitute the overwhelming majority ( 99 percent ) of businesses at european level, with important contributions both in terms of value added generated by non - financial corporations ( 57 percent ) and employment ( 67 percent

reliability and efficiency of the payment system.