some more significant changes in light of developments and lessons learned in recent years. and most importantly, it positions us for success in achieving our maximum employment and price stability goals in the future. 1 see board of governors of the federal reserve system, statement on longer - run goals and monetary policy strategy, as amended effective august 27, 2020. 2 longer - run forecasts of interest rates can be found in blue chip financial forecasts ( wolters kluwer ). for the decline these forecasts over this period, see the june 2012 and june 2020 issues. 3 see john c. williams, three questions on r - star, frbsf economic letter, 2017 – 05 ( february 21, 2017 ), for a discussion of the decline in the natural rate of interest. estimates of the natural rate for the united states, canada, the united kingdom, and the euro area are available at federal reserve bank of new york, measuring the natural rate of interest. 4 jerome h. powell, new economic challenges and the fed ’ s monetary policy review, speech at “ navigating the decade ahead : implications for monetary policy, ” an economic policy symposium sponsored by the federal reserve bank of kansas city, jackson hole, wyoming ( via webcast ) ( august 27, 2020 ). 5 richard h. clarida, the federal reserve ’ s new monetary policy framework : a robust evolution, speech at the peterson institute for international economics, washington, d. c. ( via webcast ) ( august 31, 2020 ). 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches

against it, but he also has the ultimate prerogative of resigning from the governorship ”. dr. puey ungphakorn was an outstanding governor who gave great importance to the bank of thailand to carry out its functions as an independent institution free from political and governmental domination, undaunted by any influential powers - that - be. for the sake of his country - and using the delicate art of being a central banker, dr. puey protested against the government whenever it did not act righteously. dr. puey believed that the government must have faith in the central bank in providing benefits for the country as a whole. the governor and senior management should have enough courage to voice their critical, even dissenting opinion when such an action is necessary. his view was that the governor and his senior management cannot be saints, but must carry out their work adhering to the principles of honesty and integrity. neither can they act indifferently, because when it is necessary to reprimand the government, they must do so. dr. puey was determined to protect its officials from political interference. he issued regulations prohibiting bank of thailand officials to stand for political office or write articles on politics, which are still in force today. i totally agree with what dr. puey had thus said and practiced without fail. however, since governor puey left the office at his own will to concentrate on another job which he loved dearly, that is, rector of thammasart university, we have had nine governors over a period of almost 30 years. out of this nine, only two retired from the office, the other seven were either fired or pressured to leave the post by the government for some reason or another and in most cases the causes of removal had nothing to do with their performance in conducting monetary policy. how could this have happened? the answer lies in the current bank of thailand act which does not spell out or lay down mechanism for the central bank to achieve its independence. governor and deputy governor are political appointees. they are appointed by his majesty the king upon the recommendation of the minister of finance and approved by the cabinet. there is no definite term of office. there are no protective clauses in the act which clearly spell out causes for removal. the most popular reason given by the government when firing governors was one of “ suitability ”. none of the nine governors had the chance to resign from the office in protest of the government policies as advocated by dr. puey. in