however, divisions could arise on what exactly these standards and practices should be ; whether they are driven by the specific conditions prevailing in the worst hit financial systems and, therefore, inappropriate and burdensome for the relatively healthy ones ; and, the knowledge and human capital requirements to implement them effectively across a diverse set of countries. i have tried to provide some examples of potential dividing lines, drawing on my experience and observations of the process in the finance track. let me conclude this segment of the presentation by reiterating the point on which it began. this is an extremely differentiated and heterogeneous set of countries, whose conditions and priorities differ both in the short term and over the long run. it would be extremely naive to expect that such a group would be able to reach agreement on anything beyond the immediate crisis at hand, despite their ambition to tackle structural issues. from this perspective, any consensus on any issue is an achievement. it reflects the recognition that, notwithstanding differences between countries, global integration is a process that can be chaotic and disruptive if not handled in a collective and coordinated way. what is true for crisis management is also valid for the range of structural issues that the g20, as well as those which other multilateral processes are dealing with. an emerging market economy / indian perspective against this backdrop, let me now attempt to articulate what i would call an “ emerging market economy ” perspective, but which also reflects my characterization of the indian perspective. an important premise in this perspective is the point i concluded the last segment with. the process of globalization has enormous potential benefits for emes in all its forms. but, it also brings with it significant risks, such as the vulnerability to shocks which emanate outside their sphere of control. the best way to optimize on the “ risk - return ” tradeoff from globalization is to adhere to a common set of standards and rules, which, as i said earlier, forces the process to be driven by fundamental factors rather than by regulatory arbitrage, broadly speaking. on the basis of this argument, emes will see a clear benefit from engaging in any process that can develop and enforce such common standards and practices. the g20 is one such process, with the distinct advantage that, being a relatively small group, reaching consensus where it can be found is not too difficult a task. however, emes have significant domestic objectives and challenges and these must take priority in their policy decisions. many are dealing with the critical challenge of providing

subir gokarn : g20 after the crisis – an indian perspective keynote address by dr subir gokarn, deputy governor of the reserve bank of india, at the indian council for research on international economic relations / inwent / german development institute ( icrier / inwent / die ) conference on “ policies for growth and financial stability beyond the crisis – the scope for global cooperation ”, mumbai, 27 october 2010. * * * introduction i would like to thank the organizers of this event for inviting me to deliver this keynote address. while the title of the session is “ what india expects from the g20 ”, i think it would be extremely presumptuous of me to speak on behalf of the country as a whole. i have, of course, been involved with the g20 process as the central bank deputy and, in that capacity have had the opportunity to contribute to the shaping of the indian position on various issues. so, rather than assert a national position, i would prefer to share some of the thinking that underlies the stance that is taken at various g20 forums. with this in mind, my presentation is divided into three broad segments. first, i look at what the g20 did to avert a potentially severe crisis a couple of years ago, which essentially provides the context to whatever role it may play in more “ normal ” circumstances. second, i explore the inherent differences within the group, which will naturally impose limits on what it can realistically hope to achieve by way of global co - ordination on structural issues. third, i build on these two foundations to try and articulate a general “ emerging market economy ” position, which, i think, would be reflective of the indian stance on a range of issues. the context of crisis the g20 had its origins in a previous crisis that also began in the financial sector and which threatened to spill over from one country to the next. this was the east asian crisis of 1997 – 98, the roots of which lay in the increasing presence of foreign capital in economies that perhaps didn ’ t quite have the capabilities to handle it. the fact that one of the factors underlying the crisis – foreign capital – linked the advanced and emerging economies provided the basis for countries from both groups coming together to look for ways to minimize the vulnerability of emerging economies on the one hand and global financial institutions domiciled in advanced economies on the other. of course, the east asian crisis wound down, with the affected countries showing