in the ecb http : / / www. ecb. europa. eu / press / key / date / 2017 / html / sp170330. en. html [ 03. 04. 2017 15 : 53 : 14 ] central bank independence revisited decision on the appointment of representatives of the ecb to the supervisory board ( ecb / 2014 / 4 ) where the appointing body – the ecb governing council – define a non - renewable term of office of five years ( article 1 ( 2 ) ) and lists the only two specific cases under which they can be dismissed from office by the appointing authority. [ 31 ] on the principle of separation between the monetary policy and supervisory functions, see article 25 of the ssm regulation and the decision of the ecb on the implementation of separation between the monetary policy and supervision functions of the european central bank ( ecb / 2014 / 39 ), oj l 300, 18. 10. 2014, p. 57. [ 32 ] article 284 tfeu and article 15 ( 3 ) of the statute of the escb. [ 33 ] articles 20 and 21 of the ssm regulation. [ 34 ] interinstitutional agreement between the european parliament and the ecb on the practical modalities of the exercise of democratic accountability and oversight over the exercise of the tasks conferred on the ecb within the framework of the single supervisory mechanism, oj l 320, 30. 11. 2013, p. 2. [ 35 ] memorandum of understanding between the council of the european union and the ecb on the cooperation on procedures related to the single supervisory mechanism ( ssm ), 11. 12. 2013. [ 36 ] the governing council ’ s quantitative definition of price stability adopted in 1998 is as follows : " price stability is defined as a year - on - year increase in the harmonised index of consumer prices ( hicp ) for the euro area of below 2 %. " in 2003 the governing council clarified that in the pursuit of price stability, the ecb aims at maintaining inflation rates below, but close to, 2 % over the medium term. [ 37 ] article 1, first paragraph, of the ssm regulation stipulates that the supervisory tasks of the ecb should contribute “ to the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system within the union and each member state ”. [ 38 ] as was done in article 20 of the ssm regulation in respect of the audit. [

christine lagarde : welcome address - tenth anniversary of the single supervisory mechanism welcome address by ms christine lagarde, president of the european central bank, at the event celebrating the tenth anniversary of the single supervisory mechanism, frankfurt am main, 6 november 2024. * * * it is a pleasure to welcome you to this event celebrating the tenth anniversary of the single supervisory mechanism ( ssm ). the ssm became operational ten years ago, almost to the day, on 4 november 2014. it was the most significant step forward in european integration since the introduction of the euro. if we think back to how the banking sector was faring a decade ago, we can see just how much has changed. the euro crisis had exposed significant weaknesses : low equity buffers, high levels of non - performing loans and deep exposures to domestic sovereigns. our challenge, as daniele nouy said at the time, was to " help rebuild confidence in the balance sheets of ssm area banks " amid a fragmented supervisory landscape. 1 today, however, the situation is vastly different. despite the major shocks that have hit the euro area in recent years, our banking sector is resilient. the aggregate common equity tier 1 ( cet1 ) ratio rose from 12. 7 % in 2015 to 15. 8 % in mid - 2024, while the liquidity coverage ratio increased from 138 % to 159 % over the same period. the main risks we face today no longer stem from the banks themselves, but from an increasingly volatile external environment. and single supervision allows us to address these risks through a common, forward - looking approach. so, have we achieved the initial aims of this single supervision? the achievements of single supervision if we consider the tumultuous events of the past few years, it is clear that european supervision has exceeded expectations. european banks have become considerably more resilient, providing critical stabilisation during the recent periods of disruption. in essence, european supervision has successfully addressed what herman van rompuy identified in 2012 as the need to " correct the weakness of the policy infrastructure of the common currency ". 2 1 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches first, more rigorous and more uniform supervision has bolstered public confidence, ensuring that bank deposits are seen as equally safe across the euro area, thereby preserving the integrity of our monetary union. since the start of single supervision, household's cross - border deposits have more than doubled to €151 billion today.