lines at each of the 19 firms, making unprecedented efforts to achieve methodological consistency across firms, portfolios, and supervisors. through it all, we tried to be as transparent as possible. the assumptions, processes, and results of the capital assessment program have been communicated in detail, taking into account legitimate supervisory and firm confidentiality concerns. we released a white paper on april 24 describing the process and methodology. 1 on may 6, we provided more information on the measures used to size the required capital buffer, as well as a preview of the information that would be disclosed. 2 the final release of results, this past thursday, may 7, included the supervisory - determined indicative loss rates that were used in evaluating firm submissions, and, most importantly, aggregate and firm - specific estimates for losses, loss rates, resources to absorb losses, and the resulting capital buffer needs. 3 finally, as i have noted, the assessment was forward - looking. to project losses and offsetting resources two to three years in the future under the adverse scenario, we analyzed the historical relationships of losses and earnings to macroeconomic conditions and other determinants, and we dug deeply into cross - firm differences in portfolio compositions and vulnerabilities. the process began in earnest in early march when each firm submitted its estimate of losses and earnings over a two - year scenario, under two alternative assumed paths for the u. s. economy. the baseline scenario reflected the consensus expectation for the economy among professional forecasters as of february 2009, and the more adverse scenario incorporated the possibility that the recession could be more severe than the consensus expectation and that house prices could fall even more sharply. although we began the process by asking the firms to submit their own estimates of expected losses and revenues, we by no means accepted these submissions uncritically. senior supervisors and on - site examiners evaluated the firms'estimates to identify methodological weaknesses, missing information, over - optimistic assumptions, and other problems. examiners had detailed conversations with bank managers, which led to numerous corrections to and modifications of the firms'submissions, including sensitivity analyses based on alternative assumptions. as a second step, supervisors made judgmental adjustments to the firms'loss and revenue estimates. this process used both firm - specific and comparative analyses. for example, supervisors sometimes disagreed with the technical assumptions underlying a firm's loss forecast. in these cases, they adjusted the loss rates based on sensitivity analyses performed by the firm, results from other firms, and the supervisors'own

advanced economies, the ecb ’ s response was fully comparable with that of the other major central banks. thanks to its independence, the ecb has been able to adapt its policy response and reaction function. preserving this key asset will allow the ecb to adapt to future circumstances and ensure the effectiveness of its measures. this is all the more important considering that the desirability and relevance of central bank independence are increasingly being challenged around the world. as i argued in my introduction, the best way to preserve the ecb ’ s independence is to ensure a commensurate degree of central bank accountability. during the past eight years, our accountability practices have evolved and intensified in response to the quest for scrutiny that emerged from the crisis. 2 i have always appreciated the ability of this parliament to react to citizens ’ demands, support, concerns and channel them in a constructive manner during our discussions here. and i would like to personally thank you for this. i am confident that this parliament – and this committee in particular – will continue the good work it has done during my term as ecb president. this, in turn, will further strengthen the effectiveness of the ecb ’ s actions and citizens ’ trust in the eu project. thank you for your attention. i am now at your disposal for questions. 1 see draghi, m. ( 2011 ), “ hearing at the committee on economic and monetary affairs of the european parliament ”, brussels, 19 december. 2 see fraccaroli, n., giovannini, a. and jamet, j. - f. ( 2018 ), “ the evolution of the ecb ’ s accountability practices during the crisis ”, economic bulletin, issue 5, ecb. 5 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches