i, xi ; convivio, iv ). seen through modern eyes, this argument can only leave us somewhat sceptical. like the market, democracy can only prosper in a framework of rules that are sufficiently certain, protective and observed. whatever incipient popular government dante saw around him seemed to be a harbinger of unrest and bloody factional battles, or at best, of unwarranted, even laughable ambitions ( “ i ’ mi sobbarco! ”, “ i ’ ll take it on ” ) and of a pathologically unstable legislative framework ( “ a mezzo novembre non giunge cio che tu d ’ ottobre fili ”, “ what you spin in october does not reach to mid - november ” : purgatorio, vi, 135 ; 143 - 144 ). this was clearly not just an abstract idea : the violence of the clashes between factions left a profound mark on his life, as he was exiled, theoretically sentenced to death and his goods were confiscated when his political faction fell from power. this dense fog of public ills and personal suffering prevented him from seeing further ahead. after all, nobody can judge dante while taking for granted the constitutional guarantees typical of a modern liberal democracy. inferno, iv, 131. however, dante had another intuition that was ahead of its time, namely the advantages of the division of powers, 29 but that is a conversation for another day ). i do not know whether we should hope for a universal empire to be established one day ; we can certainly hope that common solutions to common problems are found in time and in good faith. the second thought is that, when we think about bigger problems, it helps to rely on broader visions. no one viewpoint allows us to see the full picture ; no single discipline has the final say. so, as has happened this evening, it is a good thing for economists not to lose sight of literature and for literary scholars not to lose sight of economics. purgatorio, xvi, 106 - 108, where marco lombardo condemns the end of the separation between spiritual and temporal power, with arguments that would be called ” checks and balances ” in modern parlance. the topic of the relationship between the two powers is broadly covered in the third book of monarchia. dante was certainly not the first to discuss it ; this intellectual dispute had provided theoretical weapons for the struggle between papacy and empire for at least two centuries ; he did

aggregate demand and consumer price inflation. in the us, gdp returned to its pre - crisis trend at the end of last year, but aggregate data hid a somewhat elevated degree of heterogeneity between sectors : while demand in the service sector was ( and still is ) restrained by pandemic - related factors, the goods sector increasingly showed signs of overheating ( figure 2 ). in the spring of 2021, for example, personal consumption expenditure in the durable goods sector was already more than 30 per cent higher than its pre - crisis level. even in the euro area, goods purchases were less affected by lockdowns and fears of contagion, but their growth rates remained relatively contained and, at end - 2021, consumption expenditure in this sector was still lower than its modest pre - pandemic trend. pressures on consumer prices have been intensifying in the us since the spring of last year, with headline inflation peaking at 7. 9 per cent last february ( figure 3 ) ; core inflation played a key role throughout this process : in april 2021 it had already risen to 3 per cent and, last month, it had reached 6. 4 per cent, the highest in 40 years ( the picture remains essentially the same if we look at the personal consumption expenditure price index, which rose to above 6 per cent in january, with its core component increasing to 5. 2 per cent ). headline inflation also rose in the euro area, to 5. 8 per cent in february, but energy and food took the lion ’ s share, as the growth of the “ core ” component was more than 3 percentage points lower ( 2. 7 per cent ). * * * before the russian invasion of ukraine, to understand the economic outlook on both sides of the atlantic and how the policy mix should have evolved accordingly, three key factors were especially important. the first factor is related to the developments in the energy market. oil prices rose, gradually but steadily, at the global level from the lows of the most acute phase of the health emergency : on the eve of the war, they were 60 per cent higher than in january 2020 ( for both the us and europe ). gas prices in the us recorded similar dynamics, almost doubling with respect to january 2020 ( figure 4 ). but it was the cost of european gas, strongly dependent on supply from russia, that really skyrocketed : between september 2021 and february 2022 it averaged at over 8 times the value of january 2020