, even if the ecb and the eurosystem do not take any initiatives to directly promote its use ( angeloni, sapir 2011 ). this neutral stance – neither foster nor hinder – is based on our conviction that the international use of currencies should be a by - product of autonomous market decisions driven by the aforementioned five determinants. turning to the chinese renminbi, one can observe that the use of the renminbi as an international currency has remained limited although china is now the third largest economy ( after the united states and the euro area ) and second largest exporter ( after the euro area ) of the world. the chinese authorities have launched several initiatives since march 2009 to promote a wider international use of the renminbi, e. g. in trade invoicing, in deepening the role of the offshore centre played by hong kong s. a. r., or in agreeing local currency swap agreements with several central banks. nevertheless, the full potential of the renminbi can ultimately only be achieved with the liberalisation of the capital account, accompanied by the reform of domestic financial markets. once these will be in place, a major internationalisation of the renminbi will happen as a by - product. for the time being, chinese authorities seem to be trying to prudently promote financial liberalization via experimenting with market - driven renminbi securities in hong kong s. a. r.. but this comes at the expense of increasing exposure to capital flows which poses challenges for the macro - prudential set - up, especially given the current bis central bankers ’ speeches undervaluation of the renminbi. hence, chinese authorities may also slow down the use of the renminbi abroad should tensions for domestic policy makers mount. all in all, the potential for the renminbi to upgrade as an international currency is clearly huge, but the timing is difficult to predict. the necessary reform of the adjustment mechanism i share kregel ’ s ( 2010 ) view that “ the basic problem [ with the current ims ] is not the particular national liability that serves as the international currency, but the failure of an efficient adjustment mechanism for global imbalances ”. indeed, one needs only to look at the problem of global payment imbalances to find weaknesses of the current ims, or rather “ non - system ”. the build up of increasingly large current account surpluses in some export - oriented economies, which rely on a

alone will not be sufficient to ensure stability. if the ims as such does not deliver the right incentives, the international community will have to eventually agree on enhanced adjustment mechanisms, e. g. in order to foster the traction of policy recommendations. it is to be hoped that we do not need another global crisis to instil the necessary incentives. references angeloni, benassy - quere, carton, darvas, destais, pisani - ferry, sapir and vallee ( 2011 ) : “ global currencies for tomorrow : a european perspective ”, bruegel blueprint series, vol. xiii. angeloni, i and sapir, a. ( 2011 ), the international monetary system is changing : what opportunities for europe?, paper for bruegel - piie conference the transatlantic relationship in an era of growing multipolarity, berlin, 27 september 2010. bini smaghi, l. ( 2011 ) : “ the triffin dilemma revisited ”, speech at the conference on the international monetary system : sustainability and reform proposals, marking the 100th anniversary of robert triffin ; the triffin international foundation, brussels, 3 october 2011. caballero, r. ( 2009 ), “ the ‘ other ’ imbalance and the financial crisis ”, paper for the baffi lecture delivered at the banca d ’ italia, 10 december. camdessus, m. ( 1999 ), “ international financial and monetary stability : a global public good? ”, remarks at the imf / research conference entitled “ key issues in reform of the international monetary and financial system ”, washington, d. c., 28 may. dorrucci, e. and mckay, j. ( 2011 ), the international monetary system after the financial crisis, occasional paper series, no 123, ecb, frankfurt am mai, february. dooley, m. p., folkerts - landau, d. and garber, p. ( 2003 ), “ an essay on the revived bretton woods system ”, nber working papers, no 9971, national bureau of economic research, september. eichengreen, b. ( 2010 ) “ exchange rate regimes and capital mobility : how much of the swoboda thesis survives? ” in charles wyplosz ( ed ) “ the new international monetary system ” routledge. eichengreen, b. ( 2011 ), exorbitant privilege – the decline