samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
mandates that will take effect for financial institutions next year, the data catalogue, improvements in climate governance, and ongoing work to advance capabilities in climate risk management, scenario analysis, and stress testing. we are by no means where we need to be on all these fronts, with much, much more that we need to do. but we are encouraged by the step change we have seen across financial institutions in recognising the importance of climate actions in their business and risk considerations. over the coming decades, we will see one of the biggest economic transformations globally, driven by the race towards net zero. the development of credible transition plans represents a crucial further step towards enabling banks to meet the financing needs for this transformation. you might say this is really where the rubber hits the road - turning climate ambition into action. i urge banks to approach transition plans thoughtfully - by understanding the impacts of climate change on the bank, setting interim and long - term science - based targets, working closely with existing and new customers to identify and support concrete climate actions and critically, taking a strategic view of transition planning through a clear enterprise - wide strategy and wellintegrated governance and operational framework for financing transition. let me end by noting just two more things that need to be said. first, with much at stake, transition plans cannot be static. already today, financial institutions are facing a challenge to steer their customers towards prioritising climate actions, given other seemingly more pressing priorities arising from challenging economic conditions. we can and should expect such challenges to persist going forward amid new shocks that may come. transition plans need to be able to adapt to unexpected changes to assumed scenarios with the aim of enabling banks to stay the course towards meeting climate targets. the default position in such circumstances cannot be to adjust targets, but rather adjusting strategies. 3 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches second, financial institutions must take individual responsibility for advancing climate actions, and in this light, a heavier responsibility must surely rest with the largest firms – like maybank and other large domestic banking groups. so your leadership matters greatly and is not only seen, but will increasingly be judged by stakeholders and counterparties against higher expectations. on that note, let me commend you for this initiative, for climate actions are never taken in isolation, and opportunities like this to cultivate a shared vision and alignment of purpose are so essential to our journey. thank you. 1 institute of international finance 2 global green growth institute, ilo, world bank, department of statistics

malaysia ( dosm ), bnm estimates 3 " esg insights from malaysian smes : building a better future together " by alliance bank in partnership with un global compact network malaysia & brunei ( ungcmyb ) and sme corporation malaysia ( sme corp ) 4 oecd 2022 guidance on transition finance 4 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches
steven vanackere : one year after the 2023 market turmoil - outlook for banks and key supervisory take - aways keynote speech by mr steven vanackere, vice - governor of the national bank of belgium, at the european association of cooperative banks ( eacb ) high - level roundtable on the occasion of the eurofi conference, gent, 21 february 2024. * * * distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, thank you for the opportunity to deliver this speech at the welcome dinner of the eacb high - level roundtable. i thought it might be a good idea, one year after the banking turmoil of march 2023, triggered by the failure of several us banks and of credit suisse, to give you my perspective on the current outlook for eu banks and more specifically on the lessons to be learnt from this global turmoil. last year, the combination of slow growth, high inflation, and a historically very rapid increase in monetary policy interest rates resulted in unrest in the financial markets, with significant impact on the banking sector. 1. the higher rates reduced the market value of fixed - rate, long - term assets and implied unrealised losses on banks'balance sheets. 2. they increased banks'funding costs and created expectations of higher interest rates on deposits, which added to worries about of a potential more volatile behavior of this stable funding source. 3. they impact the debt burden of households and corporates, especially in jurisdictions with more short - term maturity or variable rate loans. against this background, the quality of banks'credit portfolios and their interest rate and liquidity risks became important points of attention. investors viewed with suspicion the impact of interest rate increases on the profitability and solvency of financial institutions. in the united states, this led to an abrupt and large - scale outflow of deposits from several medium - sized regional credit institutions. these banks had a number of specific vulnerabilities in common, such as a business model focused on a single economic sector or activity ( e. g. start - ups in the tech sector, services related to crypto - assets or banking services for of high net worth individuals ) and a large share of uninsured deposits. even more importantly, inadequate management of interest rate and liquidity risks forced these institutions to recognize large losses in the profit and loss account, undermining depositor confidence. earlier deregulation under the trump administration no longer subjected these banks to the basel minimum standards. finally, it was recognized that

the level of ambition of fund surveillance and the cooperation of its members to a higher level than that exists now. today ’ s conference should advance our ambition. cfr. for instance the interview of professor reinhart published for the attention of the imf staff in november 2009. cfr. for instance raghuram rajan, fault lines, page 215.
so requires that the nbu operate in conjunction with you : banks, businesses, government agencies, the expert community, and the media. we can now talk about the challenges that lie ahead and how we can best meet them – in a joint effort. i wish you an interesting and fruitful discussion! 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches

2018. we will continue to work to ensure price and financial stability as a foundation for sustainable economic growth. we begin the year 2019 with a revolutionary currency liberalization the likes of which ukraine has never seen. in less than a month, the law on currency and currency operations and our new currency regulation will go into effect, significantly easing currency transactions for households and businesses. the new legislation is going to actually work in practice rather than remaining just words on paper. but with extended freedom comes extended responsibility. the more liberal the conditions that financial market participants, businesses, and households enjoy, the more attention we at the nbu have to pay to financial stability. 2 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches thus, we should devote the current year to the next important step without which no financial stability is possible within either the banking sector or the entire financial system. and by this i mean the “ split, ” which is something that stands to shape the future of the nonbank financial sector. it is not for nothing that the planned adoption of the bill on the “ split ” by the rada has become one of the structural milestones in the new program of cooperation between ukraine and the imf as a prerequisite for strengthening the financial sector. the new law will bring the nonbank financial market in alignment with european standards, enhance the quality of financial companies ’ operation, protect financial service consumers, and encourage the arrival of new international players in this market by creating the right conditions. in addition, 2019 should become an important year for a further recovery in lending. despite the progress made over the past two years, banks have yet to become fully operational, especially as regards working with large corporate borrowers and making mortgage loans to households. a more active recovery in lending is currently impeded by the high level of nonperforming loans. the market is waiting for the verkhovna rada to consider and adopt a bill on asset resolution activities that has been prepared by the ebrd. the new law will pave the way for the operation of asset resolution companies and ensure the creation of an adequate competitive environment in ukraine ’ s secondary market for loans. in addition, significant institutional risks are still there, and the reform of the judiciary is still pending implementation. completion of the reform would ensure the strict observance of laws and protection of creditor rights. it goes without saying that we cannot, on our own, travel all the way to a sustainable economy and a developed and stable financial system. doing
me touch on banking sector development : the banking sector recorded strong growth in the year to september 2007 against a backdrop of buoyant economic conditions. the highlights of the sector ’ s performance in the year to september 2007 were as follows : • the sector ’ s total assets expanded by 20 percent while deposit liabilities increased by 18 percent during the period. the increase in the deposit base was attributed to aggressive marketing campaigns for new deposits by some institutions and rapid expansion of branch network of banking institutions. the banking sector remained well capitalised with capital and reserves increasing by 22 per cent as a result of fresh capital injection and retention of profits. • as at september 2007 gross non - performing loans declined to 12. 7 % of total loans compared with 22. 7 % in 2006. the sharp reduction in the level of non - performing loans was attributed mainly to write - offs against provisions held and recoveries by some of the banks during the period under review. additionally, the resolution of non performing assets by the government in one of the leading banking institutions contributed greatly to this reduction in npls. • pre - tax profit for the nine months period ending september 2007 increased by 36. 4 per cent to stand at ksh 26. 6 billion compared with ksh 19. 5 billion in september 2006. the improved profitability was attributed to an increase in interest income on loans and advances, government securities and non - funded income, all attributable to the vibrancy in the sector. mr. chairman, allow me to commend your members for the excellent performance in the banking sector. on our part, we remain committed to fostering a stable market based financial system as mandated by law. we will continue to develop and enforce a legal and regulatory framework that fosters a safe, efficient and accessible financial system. you will agree with me that a sound financial system is indeed a catalyst for the high economic growth that the country needs to move to new development frontiers. let me also salute the commercial banks for the various innovative niche products introduced during the year. it is only through such new products that we can counter the “ negative innovation ” that saw the proliferation of pyramid schemes in 2007. at the cbk, we are consulting with other market players including the banking sector with a view to conducting sensitization and awareness programmes to enlighten kenyans about these unscrupulous schemes. one conclusion we have arrived at in cbk is that once barriers to entry and transaction costs of maintaining bank accounts are

credit. but above all this credit must be destined to productive sectors of the economy to make a difference to an allinclusive growth. with these few remarks, ladies and gentlemen, it is now my distinguished honour to declare the metropol crb consumer and sme bureau scores officially launched. thank you. bis central bankers ’ speeches
eastern european countries of achieving eu membership after a thorough transformation and rapid growth of living standards undoubtedly holds a lot of recommendations and lessons for the south eastern european countries. these countries had similar, maybe even more advanced starting positions than the other transition countries, but south eastern europe is now lagging far more behind in terms of progress towards the eu. however, we should bear in mind that the main reason for this is definitively the political instability and war conflicts in the region, which understandably prevented faster economic transformation and reforms. luckily, it appears that political support for eu accession and the determination to pursue eu membership, including all the necessary economic and political reforms, are strengthening. in analyzing the economic developments in the region of south eastern europe, some notable differences with the cee countries appear. south eastern europe has much lower pace of reforms and lower growth rates. related to this, capital inflows in the region have been much smaller and have shown a much bigger dispersion among countries, ranging from 834 usd per capita in albania to 3, 932 usd per capita in croatia, cumulatively in the period 1989 - 2007. 12 credit expansion has been high, but has still to reach rates and length of the one seen in more advanced transition countries. consequently, there have been less demand pressures as well as comparatively lower inflation than in the other countries, although inflation has been rising recently. exchange rate regimes in the region are various, ranging from currency board in bosnia and herzegovina to almost free float within inflation targeting in serbia. what is common is that during the transition process all these countries dedicated particular attention to their exchange rate regimes and they were mostly using fixed rates, which reflects their high trade openness and their efforts to establish strong monetary authority. regardless of the exchange rate regime, the real exchange rate appreciation in the countries in the region has been considerable, although maybe a bit lower when compared to the new eu member states. as a result, these countries have been suffering from competitiveness loss as well. this can be clearly seen in the movement of their current account deficits, which are considerable in all of these countries. for instance, current account deficits in 2007 range from 3. 1 % of gdp in macedonia to 36. 2 % of gdp in montenegro. 13 however, seeu source : ebrd transition report 2007 : november update and nbrm calculations. data pertain to fdi. data for 2007 are estimates. source : ebrd transition report 2007 : november

commitment to growing a well - regulated fund management industry, this makes singapore an ideal vantage point for asset managers to understand asia and to manage pan - asian investments. so it leaves me now to congratulate salt on its inaugural asian leg of the salt conference. i wish all of you a fruitful conference ahead. thank you. preqin / global arc study of asian institutional hedge fund investments 2012 bis central bankers ’ speeches
will hence not come under pressure from across the atlantic to tighten monetary policy any time soon? i doubt that ms yellen fits into all the slots that people put her in. at the fed, too, decisions are taken by a committee. ms yellen is highly experienced and has an excellent professional and academic background. the good cooperation with the ecb will be continued. we, as the ecb, will fulfil our mandate in line with our established strategy for the euro area. bis central bankers ’ speeches

some creditor countries this is challenging. it is difficult to ask voters in a country where average public sector wages are around €1000 per month, like in estonia or slovakia, to lend to a country where those wages are on average around €3000. the same holds true for emerging countries outside the euro area who participate in the financial assistance for greece via the imf. some of those even went through very painful but ultimately successful adjustment programmes themselves ; take brazil for example. if those countries help nonetheless, it is reasonable that, in return, they expect greece to stick to its promises. not because of any desire to control the greek economy. but because solidarity has to go both ways, and a precondition for solidarity is solidity. getting the programme back on track so my point is this : the new government should not lose precious time looking to avoid or loosen the programme. it should instead focus on how to maximise the effectiveness of reforms. and the key to this is much stronger programme ownership. we know from experience in latvia, ireland and portugal that ownership is a crucial ingredient for success. the new government, with a sufficient majority in parliament, has an opportunity to do this from “ day one ”. this would give the single biggest boost to growth by removing the uncertainty that is paralysing the economy. concretely, this means • identifying measures to close the large fiscal gap in 2013 – 14 ; • making up for delays in tax administration reform ; • resuming the stalled privatisation process ; • implementing the legislated labour market reforms ; and • revitalising reforms to liberalise product and services markets, starting with the full liberalisation of the closed professions and the complete implementation of the business friendly greece action plan. bis central bankers ’ speeches in other words, restoring confidence in greece has to begin at home. and to do this effectively, authorities have to make the case more strongly for reform. they have to be clear that it is not for the troika, or for any european leader, but for the good of greece and its future. this is a sine qua non for greece to restore fiscal sustainability and competitiveness. 2. what the rest of the euro area can do to restore confidence restoring confidence for the euro area is, of course, now a bigger challenge than resolving the greek crisis. other member states and the european institutions also have an important role to play. measures in other member states many euro area governments have avoided dealing with problems
the past at other defining moments in the history of our union. thank you for your attention. bis central bankers ’ speeches

the balance sheet of the banking sector itself. only the latter shows the interaction with the real economy. and this is captured by monetary data and bis central bankers ’ speeches credit data which, as i have mentioned, are still very subdued. you can rest assured that the governing council will use all the instruments at its disposal to counter possible upside risks to price stability should they materialise. we also hear concerns that the eurosystem is exposing itself to excessive risks. i would like to underscore that the expansion of our balance sheet is being managed with extreme prudence. we continually review collateral eligibility and our risk control framework. furthermore, the application of conservative risk control measures, such as haircuts, in all monetary policy operations protects the soundness of the eurosystem ’ s financial position. let me conclude this point by recalling that all non - standard measures are temporary in nature. moreover, liquidity support cannot substitute for capital or for sound fiscal and structural policies that bring about sustainable growth and stability in the european economy. dealing with macroeconomic imbalances in a currency union now, i would like to discuss the second topic selected for our exchange of views, namely macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area. of course, divergences of economic developments are a normal feature within a monetary union. such divergences can also be observed on the other side of the atlantic. but they should not become of a persistent and structural nature. unfortunately, very large imbalances were allowed to accumulate over recent years in several european countries. these imbalances stemmed from different sources : insufficient fiscal discipline, financial excesses, failure to implement structural reforms especially, but not exclusively, in the labour and product markets and significant competitiveness losses. all of this necessitates urgent and resolute adjustment. clearly, it cannot be the responsibility of the ecb to address these imbalances. from the perspective of monetary policy, our primary objective is to maintain price stability in the euro area as a whole. for that purpose, the ecb continuously monitors all relevant information from the countries and various business sectors of the euro area. but the monetary policy stance of the ecb has to be focused on the entire euro area. it cannot address divergences among individual euro area countries. that is the task of governments : they must undertake determined policy actions to address major weaknesses in the fiscal, financial and structural domains. we note that progress is being made in many countries. these measures need
to our common realizations. thank you for your attention. 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches

however, the rapid increase in the volume of financial flows was accompanied by a rise in their volatility, which represents a new source of risk. the sudden withdrawals of international capital have played a major role in triggering and spreading financial crises over the past fifteen years. this is the main concern of the french presidency of the g - 20 and it appears crucial to me to examine it, not only from the narrow perspective of the management of capital flows, but also from the wider perspective of global liquidity. indeed, the increase in global imbalances is not confined to current account positions. in addition to the growth in net international capital flows, the very sharp rise in gross positions in international portfolios, not exclusively but largely linked to the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves by the major emerging economies, is one of the most significant developments of the past few years. the striking synchronisation of the recent economic crisis across the major economies is certainly in large part a result of this. bis central bankers ’ speeches in any case, the issue of the appropriate level for the supply of safe and liquid international assets and the international monetary and financial system best able to provide this has yet to be resolved. as you know, this issue is at the heart of france ’ s presidency of the g - 20. the second major topic is international economic and financial coordination and i will briefly touch on its two main components. the first component concerns the framework for strong, sustainable and balanced growth. this initiative has been given wide media coverage since its adoption at the g - 20 summit in pittsburgh in september 2009. however, i am inclined to think that it has sometimes been distorted and that its scope has been underestimated. this initiative is indeed a promising and ambitious one : promising as it could be the impetus for genuinely enhancing international economic cooperation through the combination of economic policies taking greater account of externalities and structural reforms, in order to achieve the jointly defined global objectives. ambitious, of course, as it involves countries making explicit commitments on measures to be taken and discussing the outcomes with their peers, as part of what is known in g - 20 jargon as the mutual assessment process ( map ). under the korean presidency, whose efficacy and vision i would like to praise, an initial exercise resulted, in late 2010 in seoul, in the adoption of a detailed country - by - country action plan and the commitment to tackle more specifically the global imbalances identified by the indicative guidelines. far from me the idea of