legislative proposals, although there is no international consensus to achieve a more harmonized regime that could be relevant for cross - border institutions. all these measures seem to be useful and complement the other instruments already mentioned to rein in excessive growth and unduly risky behaviour of major institutions. the fourth and final problem that is not yet completely solved refers to crisis resolution of cross - border institutions in the european union. the creation of colleges of supervisors and the possible role of the esas in acting as mediators will make a contribution to find coordinated solutions to the problem. the main obstacle is related to the problem of burdensharing of costs in dealing with crisis resolution. as i wrote in my answers to your questionnaire : “ in my view, any potential move towards an even more integrated supervisory architecture in europe will therefore have to be preceded by the establishment of a european safety net ( including an ex - ante funded resolution fund ) ”. the commission has been doing good work in this area and the announcement made last friday by commissioner barrier goes in that direction and is very important. nevertheless, let me point out that a full solution and the operation of such a fund requires higher harmonization of national resolution regimes including bankruptcy laws, and this will prove to be difficult. nevertheless, i believe that full european financial integration requires a common european resolution regime. a final thought about the overall impact of all the envisaged regulatory reforms. some commentators make the criticism that all the measures at stake could amount to a sort of overkill that may possibly choke financial activity. in view of the extreme seriousness of the financial crisis engineered by the financial sector i think that there is no exaggeration in the re - regulating efforts being prepared even if they were fully implemented – something about which one may have doubts. there is nevertheless a risk to be avoided concerning the timing of the implementation. an immediate or quick implementation of all the measures, in particular those related with higher capital requirements, could generate credit supply restrictions detrimental to economic recovery. this implies that all authorities concerned should be as clear - headed and resolute regarding content of the reforms as they must be wise and prudent in timing their implementation.

mr ba¤ckstra ¶ m covers monetary policy in sweden from 1996 to 1998 opening remarks by mr urban ba¤ckstra ¶ m, governor of sveriges riksbank, the swedish central bank, before the standing committee on finance in stockholm on 18 may 1999. introduction in the period 1996a€ “ 98 the annual rates of inflation, measured with the cpi, were 0. 8, 0. 9 and 0. 4 per cent, respectively. this means that in each of these years the change in the cpi not only deviated from monetary policya€™s 2 per cent target for price stability but was also outside the lower tolerance limit of 1 per cent inflation. the riksbank has indeed made assessments that subsequently proved to be a bit off the mark. as a result we have also made decisions that, looking back when the outcome was known, could have been somewhat different. but on the whole, the result of monetary policy in this period seems to be acceptable. in my opening remarks i intend to give this appraisal more substance. one major reason why cpi inflation has been low in the past three years is that the price trend has been affected by some specific price movements that monetary policy neither can nor should aim to counter fully. if the riksbank attempts to counter such price movements, the result might be unnecessarily costly for the economy, that is, exaggerated fluctuations in economic activity as well as in the financial markets. it was against this background that the new executive board of the riksbank clarified the inflation target earlier this spring. to a large extent, the clarification tallies with how monetary period has actually been conducted in the period that the standing committee is now appraising. i therefore conclude that when inflation is measured with the cpi, deviations from the inflation target, upwards as well as downwards, in certain periods are something to which we unfortunately will have to grow accustomed. as a target variable, however, the cpi has many advantages, including being familiar and covering a large assortment of goods and services. deviations from the target may sometimes even be desirable and actually benefit real factors, such as production and employment, as well as financial market stability. this conclusion does of course presuppose that people in general expect that in the medium term inflation will be in line with the target. inflation in 1996, 1997 and 1998 i now want to look in more detail at the path of inflation in the three years 1996, 1997 and