the commitments made will be honoured ; they are convinced that the necessary measures will be taken in order to release the pledged funds. the ecb does not take a political stance on the matter. it follows rules which are transparent and public. portugal, for its part, has plunged into a political crisis following the ousting of the pro - austerity government. could it become a new greece? those two countries can't be compared. each has its own experiences. at the ecb, we respect all existing governments, as long as they implement the commitments they have made on behalf of their countries. that applies to portugal and to all the other euro area countries. bis central bankers ’ speeches is france going far enough when it comes to reforms? france is committed to implementing reforms, although i must say that the laws which have passed through parliament are often somewhat removed from what was originally announced. the macron reforms, for example, concern a much lower number of professions than initially envisaged. it's noteworthy that other european countries which are also on the path to economic reform, such as italy, are implementing institutional reforms in parallel with structural reform. is the situation in the euro area fragile enough to justify new measures by the ecb? we are waiting to see the outlook for 2017 in the updated eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections. at the last meeting in october, the governing council of the ecb agreed on the need to re - examine, in december, the degree of monetary policy accommodation. we will examine the effects of measures taken so far and decide if there is a need for further action or not. the discussion will be very detailed, and it is important that proper preparations are made. that work is currently being done by several committees made up of representatives of the national central banks and of the ecb. those experts are studying all the options. it is possible that their work could lead to recommendations being made. however, the governing council is independent and has sole authority. several central bank governors have spoken in favour of the adoption of new measures. of course, but nothing has been decided on! the discussion will take place within the governing council, not in the public arena. it is conceivable that one of the recommendations for supporting growth and inflation would be to expand the asset purchase programme launched in march, in other words, qe – a measure which can by nature be extended. however, it seems that the governing council is divided on the subject.

regulatory framework sets safe boundaries for banks, enabling them to fulfil their role of lending to the real economy. let me take this traffic metaphor even further. there are countless studies showing that speed limits not only reduce danger but also minimise congestion, thereby reducing the overall travel time. it's a fallacy to think that higher speed limits mean faster travel, just as laxer regulation does not lead to more sustainable growth. similarly, regulatory competition between jurisdictions is more likely to lead to a race to the bottom than to a robust regulatory framework. research consistently shows that well - capitalised banks are better positioned to support the real economy thanks to their enhanced capacity to absorb losses and maintain stability, even under financial stress. specifically, impact assessments for the basel reforms have demonstrated that while there may be short - term economic costs, these are far outweighed by the long - term benefits, most notably increased economic resilience. as for concerns over competitive advantages or disadvantages, i am not convinced that eu banks are at a disadvantage. in fact, the notion that regulatory requirements are more stringent in the eu than in the united states does not hold up to scrutiny. evidence shows that global systemically important banks ( g - sibs ) in the united states face slightly higher capital requirements than their eu counterparts. furthermore, when we account for differences in how banks calculate risk - weighted assets, it becomes clear that average capital requirements for significant institutions in the banking union would be somewhat higher under us rules. this directly challenges some of the industry reports that suggest otherwise. 1 completing the banking union and the capital markets union let me now move to my second point : the need to complete the banking union and the capital markets union. in recent years, europe's banking sector has demonstrated resilience amid unforeseen challenges, including the coronavirus pandemic, the energy supply shock following russia's invasion of ukraine and high inflation. this resilience is reflected in the numbers : in 2015 the average ratio of non - performing loans ( npls ) for significant banks in the banking union was 7. 5 %, at a time when some banking systems had ratios close to 50 %. at the end of the second quarter of this year, this ratio had decreased to 2. 3 %, driven mainly by the reduction of npls in high - npl banks. similarly, the common equity tier 1 ratio for significant banks has risen from 12. 7 % in 2015 to 15. 8