approach best suited to systematically easing the operational burdens placed on banks and savings banks. and that is why i ’ m also so pleased to see that this debate is gaining momentum and has even given rise to specific projects. in germany, we at the bundesbank have already worked in collaboration with bafin and the federal ministry of finance to draw up a concrete draft. this took place with the close involvement of the relevant associations. the federal ministry of finance is pulling out all the stops to promote the project in the eu, while we at the bundesbank are making the case for the small banking box wherever we can – setting our sights, first and foremost, on our fellow central bankers. the next step needs to be to gain broad support for the project – which, while undoubtedly a challenge, is by no means impossible. i have a clear goal in mind here : a set of rules that makes demands on small banks without placing an unnecessary burden on them. by unnecessary burden, i mean provisions such as farreaching reporting requirements or a framework for rules on remuneration. of course, it will be impossible to fit all of the rules on the back of an envelope – but at least the list of requirements would be much shorter and considerably easier to understand, and complying with the rules would become a much less time - consuming exercise for small institutions. 5. simple, but effective : the small banking box this is what the small banking box sets out to achieve. but what form might this box take? it sounds as though it would be necessary to establish an entirely new set of rules. but it doesn ’ t need to be all that difficult – a separate, short passage in the crr would suffice. the two cornerstones of the box are establishing a definition of those institutions to which a simplified set of rules could apply and, of course, determining the areas in which the rules would be eased. 4 / 6 bis central bankers'speeches let ’ s start by establishing a definition. i previously spoke of a set of rules for small institutions. an initial criterion for determining whether a bank or savings bank would be subject to simplified rules would therefore be a comparatively low level of total assets. a reasonable threshold under which simpler rules could be applied to an institution would be around the low single - digit billion range, although the level at which this threshold should ultimately be set is up for debate for the time being. still, if the threshold were set at total assets of €3

addition, the money from the swedish national debt office ’ s extra issues of treasury bills is mainly being invested in mortgage bonds. to increase access to credit also for non - financial companies, the riksbank has introduced a new temporary possibility for the banks to borrow against collateral consisting of more commercial paper than before. this means that the companies can obtain financing by issuing commercial paper and selling to the banks, which can in turn use this as collateral to borrow from the riksbank. the interest on the loans provides compensation for risk and time to maturity and the banks can only use the credit facility if they buy new commercial paper. if large companies outside of the financial sector gain greater access to credit, then the banks should have more scope to lend more money to small and medium - sized enterprises as well. liquidity assistance on special terms the riksbank has also provided special liquidity assistance to two swedish financial institutions, namely kaupthing bank sverige ab and carnegie investment bank ab. these loans have been granted against collateral and at an interest rate that is higher than the normal borrowing cost. although neither of these two market participants has a dominant position in the swedish market, the riksbank chose in both cases in the current turbulent market situation to grant liquidity assistance to prevent serious disruptions to the financial system and to maintain confidence in sweden ’ s credit and payment systems. the decisions were based on assessments that the participants were solvent, but that they nevertheless were unable to acquire the necessary liquidity themselves to meet their payment obligations. with regard to this type of loan, liquidity assistance on special terms, it is important to remember why they are being granted. the issue is to safeguard the financial system and important social values. it is not a case of rescuing banks and bank management for their own sake or that of the shareholders or of “ giving away taxpayers ’ money ” as it is sometimes wrongly described in the debate. in the long term we need a well - developed system for managing insolvent institutions the riksbank ’ s possibility to provide liquidity assistance to a financial institution when financial stability is threatened assumes that the institution is solvent and able to continue to pursue its operations. in the case of carnegie, finansinspektionen withdrew the institution ’ s licence to conduct banking operations on monday this week. the riksbank then withdrew its liquidity assistance to the bank, is it no longer met the criteria for being granted this type of credit. the riksbank ’