samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
most severe problems that ageing will pose for public policies are likely to come in the form of a dramatic deterioration in fiscal positions – owing to mounting pension expenditure – and a considerable reduction in the rate of growth of the labour force. hence, sound fiscal policies are especially important in the face of the major shift in demographic structures that confronts us. in addition, the implementation of structural reforms is key to averting the trend decline in potential output growth in an ageing society, because the reduction in the size of the labour force needs to be compensated for by increases in labour productivity and labour market participation. as is always the case, the longer we wait to implement appropriate structural reforms, the more difficult it will be to counteract the possible adverse effects of population ageing on europe ’ s future growth and prosperity. thank you very much for your attention. references abel, a. b. ( 2001 ), “ will bequests attenuate the predicted meltdown in stock prices when baby boomers retire? ”, review of economics and statistics 83, pp. 589 - 595. abel, a. b. ( 2003 ), “ the effects of a baby boom on stock prices and capital accumulation in the presence of social security ”, econometrica 71, pp. 551 - 578. auerbach, a. j., l. j. kotlikoff, r. p. hagemann and g. nicoletti ( 1989 ), “ the economic dynamics of an ageing population : the case of four oecd countries ”, oecd department of economics and statistics working paper 62. bakshi, g., and z. chen ( 1994 ), “ baby boom, population ageing, and capital markets ”, journal of business 67, pp. 165 - 202. barro, r. j., and x. sala - i - martin ( 1990 ), “ world real interest rates ”, nber working paper no. 3317. batini, n., t. callen and w. mckibbin ( 2006 ), “ the global impact of demographic change ”, imf working paper 06 / 9. bean, c. ( 2004 ), “ global demographic change : some implications for central banks ”, overview panel, frb kansas city annual symposium, jackson hole, wyoming. becker, g. s., k. m. murphy and r. tamura ( 1990 ), “ human

70 - 90. siegel, j. ( 1998 ), “ stocks for the long run ”, mcgraw hill, 2nd ed. new york. weil, d. n. ( 2006 ), “ population ageing ”, nber working paper 12147. yoo, p. s. ( 1994 ), “ age dependent portfolio selection ”, federal reserve bank of st. louis working paper 94 - 003a. young, g. ( 2002 ), “ the implications of an ageing population for the uk economy ”, bank of england working paper 159.
monetary policy.

( the elderly population ratio ) is the highest in japan ( 23 percent ), followed by germany and italy ( 20. 6 percent each ). these levels are much higher than in france ( 17 percent ) and the united states ( 13 percent ). also, japan ’ s elderly population ratio is much higher than the aforementioned asian economies whose total fertility rates are low : hong kong ( 13 percent ), south korea ( 11 percent ), taiwan ( 11 percent ), and singapore ( 9 percent ). this is why aging issues tend to be regarded in asia ( excluding japan ) as being on the future structural agenda in spite of frequently reported articles and growing awareness. it is clear that the main issue for japan is how the society will cope with the rapidly declining rates of its working - age and total populations ( charts 16 and 17 ). though germany follows japan with regard to declining trends in working - age and total populations, those trends could be partially mitigated by net immigration flows. moreover, it has been noted that there is no sign of a decline in the working - age and total populations in the united states. in other words, it may not be appropriate to compare japan with the united states when the impact of demographic changes on the macroeconomic performance or the environment surrounding the conduct of monetary policy is being examined. b. why are structural issues so important for the conduct of monetary policy? the following question naturally occurs : how do demographic changes affect japan ’ s macroeconomic performance? in answering that question, let us first examine japan ’ s economic growth trend. demographic changes – especially the decline in the working - age population – have been depressing japan ’ s potential growth and thus its actual economic growth over the past decade ( chart 18 ). the impact of these changes occurs in various ways, including a direct decrease in the labor force, slow growth in labor productivity, and a shift in the consumption structure from manufacturing to nonmanufacturing. moreover, demographic changes affect the economic growth performance by contributing to sluggish expectations for economic growth ( namely, slow sales market growth expected domestically by firms and limited income growth expected by households ), and reduced demand for business and residential investment ( chart 19 ). 18 therefore, it is essential for japan to raise productivity growth ( namely, the rate of per - worker growth in real gdp ), which mitigates the negative impact of growth in the labor force ( chart 18 ) and, simultaneously, find ways to cope with the rapid pace of
rate that i just mentioned and transform the economy into one that people believe will achieve growth in the future. to address the first factor, the decline in the labor force, the very least is to make consistent efforts to raise the labor force participation rate of women and the elderly. to address the second factor underlying the decline in the growth rate, that is, the decline in productivity growth, a key point is how individual firms can tap new demand. the term “ rise in productivity ” carries the connotation of producing existing products at lower costs. of course, this aspect is important. however, when there are dynamic changes in customer needs, raising productivity also means tapping new demand and increasing sales by establishing a supply system that matches such new demand. due to economic globalization, the range of potential customers has rapidly increased also for japanese firms. the explosive spread of personal computers and the internet has rapidly reduced the distance between firms and customers, and, in this respect, the gap between large and small firms has shrunk. the low birth rate and population aging in advanced economies and major structural changes such as the shift to a low carbon economy bring with them new customer needs. while it is a difficult task to discover potential demand that cannot be easily discerned, transforming such potential demand into actual demand and linking this with a rise in productivity is something that firms should perceive as a challenge and that would provide one approach to innovation, as i will explain later. japan ’ s economic strengths unfortunately, through what mechanisms innovation takes place nobody can say for certain. however, innovation is not likely to take place unless there is sufficient energy to overcome the kind of pessimism many currently feel in japan with regard to the future. of course, when growth is actually sluggish and the reason for this is a decline in productivity growth, such pessimism is not entirely unfounded. on the other hand, however, i feel that there is also a tendency for the strength of japan ’ s economy to be underestimated and the pessimism to be overdone. with regard to well - founded pessimism, it is necessary to accurately recognize the essence of the underlying issues and squarely address them. at the same time, we cannot allow ourselves the luxury of indulging in groundless pessimism. it is important to calmly recognize the relative strengths of our country and utilize them to the maximum extent possible. earlier, i identified trends in the labor force and productivity growth as factors responsible

that also minimise the burden on reporting institutions are essential. i hope you will be able to rise to the many challenges that lie ahead and ensure that these data are fit for the high purposes for which they are needed. i wish you a pleasant stay in madrid and a very fruitful conference. 6 / 6 bis - central bankers'speeches
understand the risks that are being taken, to query them, and to ensure that they are being appropriately managed. this is a point that i know my apra colleagues have been emphasising. a great deal of effort in recent years has gone into upgrading the prudential requirements on banks through revisions to the basel standards and other measures. as important as these things are, their effects around the world will be only as good as the quality of implementation and the quality of supervision that builds on them. bis central bankers ’ speeches

malcolm edey : macroprudential supervision and the role of central banks remarks by mr malcolm edey, assistant governor ( financial system ) of the reserve bank of australia, to the regional policy forum on financial stability and macroprudential supervision, hosted by the financial stability institute and the china banking regulatory commission, beijing, 28 september 2012. * * * one of the consequences of the financial crisis of recent years has been a re - examination of the role of central banks in financial stability policy, and the associated notion of “ macroprudential supervision ”. i ’ ve been asked to talk today about the interaction between micro and macroprudential supervision, and how we reflect that in the design of our regulatory institutions. the first thing to say is that the distinction is in my view somewhat artificial. in concept, the micro / macro distinction corresponds roughly to the difference between idiosyncratic risk and market risk in finance theory. one refers to risk specific to a firm and the other to risks affecting all firms. microprudential supervision might be thought of as the management of the first type of risk, and macro the second. but while that distinction is conceptually clear, i think it would be overly simplistic to try to build a supervisory structure around it in practice. certainly in australia we don ’ t try to do so. external observers sometimes use the shorthand that the rba is the macroprudential agency and apra the micro, but we wouldn ’ t ourselves see it as being so clear - cut. apra, as the bank supervisory agency, has a mandate to use its powers to promote financial stability for the system, not just to focus on the idiosyncratic risks faced by individual banks. and conversely the rba as the central bank can ’ t avoid taking some interest in individual institutions even though its financial stability mandate relates to the system as a whole. the more meaningful distinction, i think, is not between the objectives of the key regulatory agencies ( micro versus macro objectives ) but between the powers available to them. apra is the regulator of institutions – it supervises the banks, sets prudential standards and holds a wide range of directive and resolution powers. the rba is the liquidity provider to the financial system, it has regulatory powers of its own in respect of clearing and settlement facilities and the payments system, and it incorporates financial stability assessments in its monetary policy decision process. both agencies have a mandate for macro financial stability,
expertise and created a stable and efficient banking system. today, banks in croatia are profitable and capital adequacy ratios are well above requirements. this is fostering the development of financial intermediation in the wider economy though, thankfully, credit growth has not reached the exceptionally high rates seen elsewhere in central and eastern europe. administrative measures undertaken by the central bank to dampen credit growth appear to have had some impact. but it has been our experience that that these are circumvented over time and should be seen as buying time for fiscal policy to play a greater role in macroeconomic adjustment. i hope that i have provided some food for thought on economic development. i would like to end by emphasising that ireland firmly supports croatia ’ s objective to become a member of the eu and were delighted to see the start of accession negotiations last year. croatia can also act as a positive example to other countries in the region in terms of the willingness of the eu to help countries develop towards participation in european integration. i look forward to the day when croatia becomes a member of the eu.

##ltje ( 2014 ). foreign banks : trends and impact. journal of money, credit and banking, 46 ( s1 ), pp. 295 - 326. 4 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches
can learn from the international experience. the financial inclusion task force in uk has identified three priority areas for the purpose of financial inclusion, viz., access to banking, access to affordable credit and access to free face - to - face money advice. uk has established a financial inclusion fund to promote financial inclusion and assigned responsibility to banks and credit unions in removing financial exclusion. basic bank no frills accounts have been introduced. an enhanced legislative environment for credit unions has been established, accompanied by tighter regulations to ensure greater protection for investors. a post office card account ( poca ) has been created for those who are unable or unwilling to access a basic bank account. the concept of a savings gateway has been piloted. this offers those on low - income employment £1 from the state for every £1 they invest, up to a maximum of £25 per month. in addition the community finance learning initiatives ( cflis ) were also introduced with a view to promoting basic financial literacy among housing association tenants. a civil rights law, namely community reinvestment act ( cra ) in the united states prohibits discrimination by banks against low and moderate income neighborhoods. the cra imposes an affirmative and continuing obligations on banks to serve the needs for credit and banking services of all the communities in which they are chartered. in fact, numerous studies conducted by federal reserve and harvard university demonstrated that cra lending is a win - win proposition and profitable to banks. in this context, it is also interesting to know the other initiative taken by a state in the united states. apart from the cra experiment, armed with the sanction of banking law, the state of new york banking department, with the objective of making available the low cost banking services to consumers, made mandatory that each banking institution shall offer basic banking account and in case of credit unions the basic share draft account, which is in the nature of low cost account with minimum facilities. some key features of the basic banking account are worth - mentioning here. • the initial deposit amount required to open the account shall not exceed us $ 25 • the minimum balance, including any average balance, required to maintain such account shall not exceed us $ 0. 10 • the charge for periodic cycle for the maintenance of such accounts to be declared up front • the minimum number of withdrawal transactions which may be made during any periodic cycle at no charge to the account holder must at least be eight • a withdrawal shall be deemed to be made when recorded on the books of the account holder ’ s banking

first instance that taking banking to the sections constituting “ the bottom of the pyramid ”, may not be profitable but it should always be remembered that even the relatively low margins on high volumes can be a very profitable proposition. financial inclusion can emerge as commercial profitable business. only the banks should be prepared to think outside the box!
by continuing to reduce the deficit so that debt falls and france is ready when growth slows down. and by making further cuts in public spending? it is not for the ecb to tell the french government what needs to be done in detail, but what we wish is for france to have the capacity to respond economically when growth slows down and for it not to depend completely on monetary policy. 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches

authorities in this area and the need for strengthened governance structures. financial contagion and public policy since the writings of walter bagehot financial contagion has become an issue that is discussed widely in policy, market and academic research circles. 2 taking a broad w. bagehot ( 1873 ), lombard street – a description of the money market, pp. 129ff. emphases by the speaker. see, for example, the following surveys on the issue : g. kaufman ( 1994 ), “ bank contagion : a review of the theory and evidence ”, journal of financial services research, 7 ; e. p. davis ( 1995 ), debt, financial fragility and systemic risk, clarendon press, 2nd ed. ; o. de bandt and p. hartmann ( 2000 ), “ systemic risk : a survey ”, ecb working paper, no. 35, november ; s. claessens and k. forbes ( eds., 2001 ), international financial contagion, kluwer academic publishers ; ecb ( 2005 ), “ financial market contagion ”, financial stability review, december ; ecb ( 2009 ), “ the concept of systemic risk ”, financial stability review, bis central bankers ’ speeches perspective embracing different views and studies, contagion could be defined as a situation in which instability in a specific financial market, institution or country is transmitted to one or several other markets, institutions or countries. a first characteristic of contagion is that the spread of instability would usually not happen without an initial trigger event – which often appears to be a relatively contained event. a second characteristic is that the transmission of instability is in some way abnormal, for example, in terms of its speed, strength or scope. though spillovers are to be expected in an interconnected financial system, contagion is distinct in that it often reflects a market failure and a dangerously amplified transmission of instability. the underlying market failure consists of the fact that contagion often involves externalities. 3 as a result, the private costs of the initial financial market failure, that is the costs to the actor triggering contagion, are lower than the social costs. in the specific case of the sovereign debt crisis in europe, the trigger could, for example, be that a country in a precarious fiscal situation does not seriously implement the necessary fiscal consolidation measures. this could lead interest rates on this particular country ’ s government debt to rise
and not for derivative products and investment banking. at mezzanine finance level, banks also need sensitivity to default rates. they require an estimation of extent of losses, loss given default our message is that financial inclusion bis central bankers ’ speeches should be viewed nether from the prophet or the profit motive but as a pragmatic business opportunity by the banks. i would do well to sum up with dr p chidambarams enunciation dr chidambaram stated the reforms since 1991 have changed the face of the indian economy india is slowly but surely being recognised. economic reforms have led to a sharp decline in people below the poverty line sustainability of the reform process demands that all sections of society stand to gain from it only if the poorer sections of society also perceive a visible change in quality of their life will the reform process continue in our vibrant democracy. i thank you for a patient hearing and wish your deliberations all success. annex bis central bankers ’ speeches 1. progress in modes of fi delivery 2. progress in kccs and gccs bis central bankers ’ speeches 3. progress in number of accounts 4. progress in o / d facility availed bis central bankers ’ speeches

international debt securities ( i. e. securities either issued outside the respective currency area or issued within the currency area and targeted at the international financial markets ), the euro account for a global share of 47 percent compared with a share of 37 percent for the us dollar. the euro's share has risen by 18 percentage points since january 1999. the high share of the international market compared to the size of the national segment reflects the high relative importance of the international financial markets for the euro ( see slide 13 ). the establishment of well functioning european government bond markets is an important contribution to the european single market supporting an efficient allocation of resources and economic growth. the contribution from the government bond market in the euro area should therefore not be underestimated.
the woods as recent events attest. moreover, we have not yet put in place the strengthening of the international financial architecture that would enable us in the future to place less reliance on the imf to deal with potential systemic crises. thus it is better to have the imf fully equipped if a quick response to a pending crisis is essential.

, an increasing awareness, bordering in some cases on shock, that their economic model was incomplete, or worse, has arguably emerged in the region. as a consequence, many of the leaders of these countries and their economic advisors are endeavoring to move their economies much more rapidly toward the type of economic system that we have in the united states. the imf, whatever one might say about its policy advice in the past, has played an important role in this process, providing advice and incentives that promote sound money and long - term stability. the imf ’ s current approach in asia is fully supportive of the views of those in the west who understand the importance of greater reliance on market forces, reduced government controls, scaling back of government - directed investment, and embracing greater transparency - - the publication of all the data that are relevant to the activities of the central bank, the government, financial institutions, and private companies. it is a reasonable question to ask how long this conversion to embracing market capitalism in all its details will last in countries once temporary imf financial support has come to an end. we are, after all, dealing with sovereign nations with long traditions, not always consonant with market capitalism. but my sense is that there is a growing understanding and appreciation of the benefits of market capitalism as we practice it, and that what is being prescribed in imf - supported programs fosters their own interests. similarly, it is a reasonable question to ask whether the us authorities should not seek greater assurance that the ongoing process of reform in the imf ’ s policies and operations will produce additional concrete results before we agree to augment the imf ’ s resources. i have reason to believe that the management and staff of the imf are committed to a process of change. we face a somewhat more difficult task in convincing the imf ’ s membership as a whole of the need for change. however, i am confident that our leverage in this regard would be reduced if the united states failed to agree promptly to the proposed increases in the imf ’ s resources. accordingly, i continue fully to back the administration ’ s request to augment the financial resources of the imf by approving as quickly as possible us participation in the new arrangements to borrow and an increase in the us quota in the imf. hopefully, neither will turn out to be needed, and no funds will be drawn. although the tendency in recent months toward stabilization in the east asian economies is encouraging, clearly those economies are not out of