##repancies in different sub - components and interpret data pertaining to the third quarter accordingly. second quarter national accounts data confirm that the pick - up in private consumption demand stemmed mainly from fiscal stimulus - driven advanced demand for certain goods categories. meanwhile, the demand for goods that were not subject to tax reductions stayed almost constant ( figure 27 ). figure 26 : contribution to gdp growth figure 27 : consumption of resident and from spending by periods non - resident households ( percentage point ) ( seasonally adjusted, at 1998 prices, billion tl ) - 1 - 2 7. 1 5. 9 13. 5 3. 8 12. 5 11. 5 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 - 0. 1 gdp - 0. 4 - 1. 0 - 1. 1 p riv. stoc k expo rts public privat e imports cons. change spending inv. source : turkstat, cbrt. co nsumption co nsumption excl. furniture, housing goods and services, trans portatio n, communicat ion source : turkstat, cbrt. recently issued data indicate that this trend continued in the third quarter as well and consumption demand has adopted a weaker course following its marked increase during the second quarter. although private investment is expected to increase slightly in the third quarter, the low capacity utilization rate and the high uncertainty in demand is expected to hold back the recovery in investments. accordingly, total aggregate domestic demand is expected to stay flat in the third quarter, after increasing significantly in the second quarter ( figure 28 ). figure 28 : total aggregate domestic demand ( seasonally adjusted, at 1998 prices, billion tl ) 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 * * forecast. source : turkstat, cbrt. data pertaining to the third quarter indicate that external demand remained weak and the negative contribution of net exports to quarterly growth persisted. the course of external demand will be determined by the outlook of the speed and timing of global recovery. the medium - term outlook for global growth indicates that the gdps of developed countries would not reach the pre - crisis level for an extended period of time. within this framework, external demand is expected to continue to suppress aggregate demand for quite some time ( figure 29 ). figure 29 : actual and forecast gdp growth in developed countries ( seasonally adjusted, 2008q

will be implemented and further enhanced by structural measures that would strengthen fiscal discipline. in this respect, it is assumed that the fiscal stance will remain expansionary – but less so than the one in 2009throughout 2010, and fiscal tightening will gradually be adopted starting from 2011. moreover, in line with the mtp, it is envisaged that the rising debt - to - gdp ratios will reverse their course steadily starting from 2011, and hence the risk premium would not display any significant changes throughout the forecast horizon. table 1 : annual growth forecasts previous forecast new forecast previous forecast new forecast world - 1, 4 - 1, 1 2, 5 3, 1 developed economies - 3, 8 - 3, 4 0, 6 1, 3 united states - 2, 6 - 2, 7 0, 8 1, 5 euro area - 4, 8 - 4, 2 - 0, 3 0, 3 developing countries 1, 5 1, 7 4, 7 5, 1 all oecd - 4, 1 - 3, 7 0, 7 - united states - 2, 8 - 2, 8 0, 9 - euro area - 4, 8 - 3, 9 0, 0 - world - 2, 3 - 2, 3 2, 6 2, 7 united states - 2, 6 - 2, 5 2, 4 2, 6 euro area - 4, 4 - 3, 9 1, 0 1, 1 imf oecd consensus economics * source : imf world economic outlook, july and imf world economic outlook update, october. oecd economic outlook, june and oecd economic outlook, september. * consensus forecasts, september and october. against this background, assuming a limited amount of further easing and constant policy rate until the end of 2010, medium - term forecasts suggest that, with 70 percent probability, inflation will be between 5. 0 and 6. 0 percent with a mid - point of 5. 5 percent at the end of 2009, and between 3. 9 and 6. 9 percent with a mid - point of 5. 4 percent by the end of 2010. furthermore, inflation is expected to decline to 4. 9 percent by the end of 2011 and to 4. 8 percent by the third quarter of 2012 ( figure 35 ). figure 35 : inflation and output gap forecasts * ( percent ) output cık tı a cgap ıgı forecast tahm in a range * ralıgı