i will now turn to the monetary measures of this cash shield. all over the world, the major central banks have taken bold measures to guarantee financing for businesses in the short term, through purchases of commercial paper, and in the medium term, through purchases of corporate bonds. in this respect, the ecb was among the first to lead the way. the ecb also stands out in that it has the capacity to provide banks with immediate and almost unlimited liquidity, so that the banks can in turn finance all the economic players : businesses, government and households. to do so, during the course of two successive meetings the ecb took some exceptional decisions. the decisions taken on 12 march, which were said to have missed their target, have often been compared unfavourably with the successful “ package ” of 18 march. however, i want to stress that they are complementary. on 12 march, the ecb decided to make almost eur 3, 000 billion – ¼ of euro area gdp – available to banks through “ tltro iii ” operations that provide refinancing at a negative interest rate ( that can be as low - 0. 75 % if banks at least maintain their stock of outstanding loans ) for an amount of up to 50 % of lending to the economy, essentially to ises and smes. on 18 march, we further decided to launch an exceptional asset purchase envelope of eur 750 billion for those that obtain their financing through the markets, namely governments and large corporations. this totally unprecedented pandemic emergency purchase programme ( pepp ) aims at avoiding a positive shock on long - term interest rates associated with the exceptional expense of the public health crisis. it also comes on top of the eur 300 billion of asset purchases that had already been planned. also unprecedented is that the ecb has thus accorded itself flexibility, where necessary, on three fronts : between public and private sector page 4 of 8 securities, between countries for public sector securities, and with regard to the issuer holdings limit of 33 % on each public sector security. the eurosystem also decided, quickly and forcefully, to activate its macro - and microprudential levers to help euro area financial institutions optimise their capacities to finance businesses. we have taken this step not because banks are weak but because they are in fact strong. unlike in 2008, the banks are not the weak link in a crisis which this time is of public health ; a crisis which is economic, but

? here again, let ’ s begin with what is most certain : inflation should remain weak during the period ; it had already fallen to 0. 6 % in france and 0. 7 % in the euro area in march. of course, supply is restricted ; but demand will only recover gradually, and oil prices are expected to remain low. therefore, over the long term the eurosystem will have to contend with, if not necessarily a risk of deflation, then at least inflation that is too low for the definition of price stability ( close to 2 % over the medium term ), especially given that annual inflation has been running at only 1. 3 % for a decade. this will thus mean that we not only have the possibility, but also the obligation to maintain very low interest rates and ample non - conventional instruments, including public and private sector purchase programmes, long into the future. this low inflation – particularly if it is persistent – is fuelling some far more speculative and complex thinking on post - crisis monetary policy. while page 8 of 8 monetary financing is prohibited by the european treaties, it would, for example, according to these theories, be possible to imagine the central bank creating money on a lasting basis to directly finance companies. in principle, nothing is excluded in intellectual debate. however, steps such as these could only be envisaged if there was a major “ downside ” risk for price stability. it would therefore be imperative to ensure that any such measures guide inflation towards its target. indeed, the two pillars that must remain in place come what may during these exceptional circumstances are the central bank ’ s mandate – ensuring price stability – and its independence – particularly from fiscal authorities. because these two pillars are set down in the treaty, and, above all, because they are the foundation of our most precious asset : the confidence of european citizens in their currency. * * i would like to conclude by saying a few words about the banque de france. we have mobilised our activities on five key fronts : our network ’ s support for vses and smes and households in difficulty ; needs with regard to paper money ; economic analysis and monetary policy ; close monitoring of the markets ; and the supervision of the financial resilience of banks and insurers. in this period of extraordinary uncertainty, you can count on the commitment of the women and men that make up the banque de france. and i see that as an illustration of a broader conviction : only through our unity and