making markets operate more freely, reducing obstacles to private investment and increasing competition. 6 among other changes, with the new labor legislation, temporary hiring is allowed, and wages can be determined by productivity rather than seniority. also, mandatory back wages after labor disputes have been capped, and the “ closed shop clause ” for unions was repealed, meaning that if a worker leaves a union, the employer does not have to terminate the labor relationship anymore. the education reform enforces hiring and promotion based on qualifications and performance for teachers in public education at all levels before college. an autonomous evaluation institute is in charge of the process, open not only to candidates from teachers ’ schools. in telecommunications all operators are allowed to provide triple play services subject to restrictions for dominant firms, and limits on foreign direct investment ( fdi ) are reduced. new licenses for tv frequencies will be auctioned to form at least two new national - coverage tv companies. a new regulatory authority is now in place. the financial reform pursues stronger protection for creditors ’ property rights, by closing legal loopholes used by debtors to prolong the debt resolution process, and reducing obstacles to expediency in the judicial process to recover collateral. more competition is encouraged through the facilitation of loan substitution by debtors across banks and the prohibition of bundled sales of financial products. regulation and supervision are strengthened, and a new banking resolution mechanism has been established. of particular interest is the energy reform. before the reform, production and most other activities in this sector were open only to government monopolies. the reform has modified the mexican constitution to allow wide access to the energy sector to private participants. major changes include contracts in exploration and extraction for oil and hydrocarbons ; permits in gas processing and oil refining, transportation, storage, distribution, and commercialization ; and participation in electricity generation and sales. the depth of the benefits the reforms could eventually bring depends greatly on how they are implemented. additionally, to more profoundly transform mexico ’ s economy, other policy measures would help, such as strengthening the rule of law, enhancing physical infrastructure, and improving public security. meanwhile, the reforms undertaken offer great scope for further u. s. investment in mexico, thus further binding the two economies. mexico ’ s economic outlook after a year and a half of deceleration, during 2014 mexico ’ s economy has been gaining steam. higher momentum has been supported by stronger manufacturing output which, in turn, has been linked to increasing external demand, notably

olaf ) judgment [ 6 ], the european court of justice made it clear that, in principle, the ecb is bound by all regulations which bind the union. there is no distinction to be made between the different institutions, bodies, offices and agencies. all are equal under the law, so to say. however, the word “ relevant ” is ambiguous. does it refer to any institution, where relevant? that would mean that every eu institution should comply with the climate law, whenever it develops policy or takes action relevant to the objective of the law. or does it refer only to those institutions with competence to create policy relevant to achieving the objective of the climate law? the ecb would be directly bound by the law under the first interpretation but not under the second. the climate law is not crystal clear on this point. it does not define “ relevant institution ”. but there are a number of strong indications that the ecb is not a relevant institution under the climate law. let me explain why. the climate law does not contain many specific obligations. the law sets out a destination : climate neutrality. it does not tell us how to get there. how we do so will depend on environmental and economic policymaking. this is a union competence the ecb does not have. there are further arguments that support this interpretation. if the ecb is deemed to be a relevant institution, then it would have to submit its policies to the commission for assessment and the commission would monitor progress. that would be a fundamental change to the ecb ’ s accountability framework. under current law, the ecb is only directly accountable to the european parliament and the european court of auditors. a final reason for this view is institutional. if the ecb were deemed to be a relevant institution within the meaning of the climate law, this would be an implicit acceptance that the council of the eu and the parliament could set additional objectives for the ecb through the ordinary legislative procedure. however, the ecb ’ s objectives are laid down in the treaty on the functioning of the european union ( tfeu ) [ 8 ], and their scope cannot be changed by secondary legislation. that would be a violation of the treaty. changing the ecb ’ s objectives requires a special procedure. the ecb is – it seems – not directly bound by the climate law. so, can we ignore it? not at all. to do so would be a violation of the treaties. article 11 of the tfeu provides that