within the range of historically comparable processes. also, since the crisis the banking system has become significantly more resilient to negative shocks. the banks have strengthened their capital base. the ecb, since becoming the banking supervisor under the single supervisory mechanism, has played a part in banks europe - wide complying with high and uniform standards. should problems arise however, macroprudential instruments are best positioned to counteract financial sector risks, enabling monetary policy to focus on its primary objective of maintaining price stability. the ecb ’ s measures are undoubtedly part of monetary policy traditionally, monetary policy works via changes in the key rates. in response to the financial crisis, the ecb, like other major central banks, has expanded its toolkit. the negative interest rate follows the traditional approach involving the key rate change, only with the special feature that it should make the holding of liquidity less attractive in order to stimulate bank lending in a targeted way. in addition to that, the asset purchase programmes are necessary for monetary policy. by influencing longer - term interest rates, which are particularly important for investments and the purchase of consumer durables, monetary policy can therefore preserve its room for manoeuvre – in an economic environment in which traditional monetary policy is reaching its limits. special attention was paid in the design of the asset purchase programme to avoiding market distortions. thus the purchases in that sense are market - neutral ; on average they are spread uniformly across assets in the market. we are also constantly monitoring liquidity in the markets where we make purchases. it is important as well that the ecb only buys up to 33 % of each bond to avoid having a market - dominant position in any security. market participants can then freely set their prices and market - oriented premia can be established for credit and liquidity risks. when, in january 2015, the governing council decided on the purchase of government bonds, there was consensus on the council that such purchases in principle represent a legitimate monetary policy instrument for ensuring price stability. bond purchases undoubtedly also have an influence on countries ’ refinancing costs. that, of course, changes nothing in respect of the monetary policy nature of the measures in the current situation of persistently too low inflation. and in any case, the traditional instrument of key rate changes influences countries ’ refinancing costs. bis central bankers ’ speeches what matters is that governments at national and european level also play their part against this background, however, it is all the more important that governments

time we have new projections, we obviously reconsider whether our stance is still appropriate. i would not be carried away by analysts in some institutions who want us to do what they would like, what they would consider as helpful. you can also say that they are lobbying. we are rather immune to these attempts. has the ecb played a role in fanning these hopes? i hope that we were able to explain in plain english what we meant. we review and possibly reconsider our monetary policy stance without giving any indication as to individual measures. now if some people want to sell their favorite measures, they create hype. but it is not the ecb that is creating hype in this respect. don ’ t forget that we have also very clearly said that by march we might see the necessity for technical corrections to our existing program. if it would be a little bit more looked at, what we have actually said, then we would not have been in the situation in december. and we certainly don ’ t want to be in this situation in march again. part of what is perceived as a communication blunder in december came bis central bankers ’ speeches from the fact that too much attention was attached to one or another statements. we are a collective decision - making body. so you cannot extrapolate one person onto 25 people. so if people interpreted the last press conference as signaling a strong increase in stimulus in march, that ’ s incorrect? again, this is misjudging the effects of what we decided in december which are still in the pipeline. after all it is €680 billion, which is more than a third of what we have announced at the beginning. yes, we will continue to have an accommodative monetary policy. yes, we have to reassess our monetary policy stance in view of the deterioration since our december analysis. does this reassessment of the analysis lead to the consequence that there will be the same, or different measures, or confidence that the existing measures will only have to be corrected? i think this is a policy decision that is ahead of us and i don ’ t want to deny that it is possible nor confirm that it has been decided. if the ecb were not to do anything in march and markets were disappointed again, does that pose questions about mr. draghi ’ s power to influence markets in the way that he wants to? you are hypothesizing that nothing will be done, which