inflation target of just below 2 % in 2017, as is currently conceivable, would you be in favour of a discussion to reduce purchases or to stop them earlier? let me say again : we have specified a course of action and we ’ ll be sticking to it. if we see that it is bringing us more quickly to our goal, we are of course not so tied to our decisions that we could not adjust our course of action. incidentally, that also applies should we do not come close to the target. we cannot in either instance turn our eyes from reality. some market participants are claiming that the ecb is putting its credibility at risk in the case of a reduction [ of the purchases ]. but wouldn ’ t it also be a problem if the forecast were to rise above 2 % and you were to continue with qe and not react? what you are mentioning plays into the discussion on price - level targeting...... in which a central bank specifies a certain price development which it has to achieve every year. if it doesn ’ t manage it, the bank has to steer towards it all the more resolutely in the following year. bis central bankers ’ speeches the proponents argue that we should declare this to be a new strategy. but in my view, that would be the wrong approach : it would be a fundamental change in an environment in which steadfastness and anchoring a proven strategy are very important. moreover, in theory and under certain conditions this approach may be clever, but in practice, it is a highly questionable experiment. so you don ’ t believe in allowing temporarily higher inflation in future, because inflation was significantly below the 2 % target in recent years? i don ’ t find this approach at all convincing. such a change in our strategy would, in my eyes, be incompatible with stability. the governing council ’ s decision refers to “ … a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation that is consistent with its aim of achieving inflation rates below, but close to, 2 % over the medium term ”. qe is ostensibly the answer to the long - lasting very low inflation. but is that really so dangerous if it is due to falling oil prices? i also distinguish between an undershooting of zero inflation, which is mainly attributable to temporary phenomena such as the price of oil, and on which we can effectively have no influence, and a general fall in the price level. before january, however, the

##es. the use of vcs at central counterparties ( ccp ) should also be monitored. the european market infrastructure regulation ( emir ) states that a ccp shall accept highly liquid collateral with minimal credit and market risk to cover its initial and ongoing exposure to its clearing members. while it is doubtful that a vc would meet such a requirement, clear guidelines ex ante would be helpful, and financial stability considerations will need to be taken into account by the relevant authorities. in my view, it should be examined whether any vc activity carried out by fmis must be ringfenced from their other activities. the enforcement of segregated accounts and liabilities could be discussed. fmis play an important role in financial markets, and any liquidity support offered by central banks should be to mitigate shocks emanating from the real economy, not from gambling in risky assets. certainly, fmis should not be obliged by legislation to provide settlement services for vcs and vc - related products. in the same vein, the eurosystem market infrastructure services – target2 and target2 - securities – cannot grant access to vc business according to their existing framework. regulating credit institutions finally, we need to look at the banking sector, whose profitability and stability might be impaired by vc activities. eu credit institutions are already required to have adequate frameworks in place to assess the capital they need to cover the nature and level of risks they are, or might be, exposed to. given the volatile nature of vcs, it could seem appropriate that any trading in vcs would be backed by adequate rates of capital, and segregated from their other trading and investment activity. any vc business of credit institutions needs to be rigorously supervised to ensure that risks emerging from such activities are contained. this includes ensuring that proper protocols are in place to meet obligations under aml and ctf regulations. furthermore, given the risks posed by leverage, credit institutions should not accept vcs as collateral, or only accept them with haircuts that appropriately reflect past volatility, liquidity, and market and operational risks. likewise, limits on leverage could be examined. 6 / 9 bis central bankers'speeches central bank issuance of digital currency the advent of vcs has triggered suggestions that central banks should provide central bank digital currency, or digital base money ( dbm ), as i have previously called it. 13 dbm already exists in terms of the reserves of the banking sector held at the central bank, but the more recent question is