##rity and proportionality, it would be more appropriate to address recommendations to the national supervisory authorities only under the terms of the earlier consensus. as concerns the appropriate institutional settings, the structure of the new authorities should ensure a balance of full involvement and efficiency. with regard to the composition of the “ board of supervisors ” at the eba, it is important that supervisors and central banks are represented, fully reflecting their responsibilities at the national level. this is also important in order to create a close link between macroprudential and microprudential analysis. last but not least, even though strengthening supervisory powers at the eu level is important, these reforms absolutely must be aligned with global initiatives, given that major european banks are also acting globally. in this regard, it is essential to establish global supervisory colleges which can adapt their composition and procedures to the individual supervisory needs of each specific financial group. thank you for your attention. i am looking forward to your comments.

and responsibilities. for one thing, we have sovereign measures issued by the financial supervisor : regulatory measures concerning institutions, especially general decrees and administrative acts, including auditing orders. for another, the central bank is responsible for the ongoing monitoring of institutions, including the evaluation of documents submitted by institutions and external auditors ’ reports, as well as performing and evaluating audits of banking operations. but an efficient division of labour also needs additional guidelines or cooperation agreements which describe supervisory instruments in more detail and lay down procedures. such guidelines or agreements relate to, for example, supervisory planning, meetings with senior management, drawing up banks ’ risk profiles but also further details of reporting and notification systems. i think it is fair to say that this model of a formalised close cooperation worked pretty well in the crisis. still, there is a lingering debate in germany on a more far - reaching reform of banking supervision. as you may be aware, this will probably also be a topic for the new coalition government that is about to be formed. the bundesbank stands ready to assume greater responsibilities in supervision. therefore, the debate should be on how to design the supervisory framework for the future. i expect that the bundesbank would be closely involved in any reform initiative right from the outset and that we would be given the opportunity to provide our own input in designing a revised supervisory structure in germany. we are convinced that the independence of monetary policy and a more prominent role in the supervision of banks and insurance companies can be reconciled. any such reform must contribute to aligning further the national and european supervisory structures as they evolve. success factors for level 3 committees evolving towards 3 eu authorities? first, i would like to say that i explicitly welcome the commission proposals on the design of the new supervisory architecture in the eu. given the complexity of the whole matter, the proposals are a very helpful and crucial milestone. they now have to be analysed and discussed thoroughly. we have a unique opportunity to reshape the supervision of the financial system in order to make it more resilient. therefore, we have to be very careful to avoid blind spots as well as inefficient overlaps in the competencies and the practical work of the various institutions involved in the supervisory process, at the national as well as at the eu level. according to the ecofin conclusions, the “ european system of financial supervisors ” should be established as an operational network with shared and mutually reinforcing responsibilities. at the eu level, we