of the eurogroup a permanent position could strengthen the institutional architecture of the euro area. how would the hypothetical independence of catalonia affect its relationship with the ecb? at the ecb we act according to regulations, and the treaties. we would adhere firmly to the legal provisions and we would not do anything that is not legal. what conditions would need to be met in order to gain a seat at the ecb? whether this is political fiction or not, i don ’ t know. but the ecb only acts on the basis of facts, not hypotheses. if the number of countries in the euro area were to increase then we would respect that, but there would be no shortcuts unless they are provided for by the treaty. the european commission has launched an investigation into the use of deferred tax assets ( dta ) in the banking sector in spain and various other countries. the ecb was very critical about dtas when it had to be evaluated during the banking stress tests. there are four countries that resorted to using these measures widely and the legislation that they adopted varies from one country to the next. i believe that we must look at each case separately and in context. personally i dislike the idea of resorting to attempts to create the impression that a balance sheet ’ s loss absorption capacity is greater than it is in reality. but in certain cases i believe that some tax claims can be of a higher value and more liquid than in others. in other countries, doubts about the situation in the public sector may be greater and the question arises as to whether or not tax claims are actually liquid or have the capacity to absorb losses in real time. because if you want them to be accepted as liquid assets, they must be immediately available. and call me old - fashioned, but i think that hard cash is the best form of capital. where does spain sit on the spectrum that you have described? the european commission will comment on that from the perspective of public aid in its evaluation. in our comprehensive assessment last year we were not very enthusiastic about it ( dtas ) but in the end we accepted it on legal grounds. but the most important thing for me is to have a level playing field and, as such, any legal clarification that arises as a result of the european commission ’ s assessment will be welcome. the spanish government states that this was designed in collaboration with the eu institutions, given that we were under the financial assistance programme for banks, and it

across economies. these conditions allowed japan to achieve the monetary easing effects necessary to sustain a moderate economic expansion by implementing monetary easing of a scale comparable to that of other central banks. since monetary easing through ycc is conducted mainly by controlling interest rates, ycc has the advantage that there is no crowding - out of fiscal stimulus measures, making it possible to maximize the effects of policy cooperation with fiscal policy. on the other hand, keeping interest rates at a low level has the side effect that it may impede the functioning of financial intermediation by reducing financial institutions'profitability through the narrowing of lending margins ( i. e., there may be a so - called " reversal interest rate " effect, where the impact of low interest rates is reversed ). therefore, it is important for central banks to conduct monetary policy while taking its impact on the financial system into account. looking back on the period since the introduction of ycc, japan's economy has continued to expand at a moderate pace, which implies that, at the least, the necessary degree of monetary easing was maintained. meanwhile, fluctuations in the u. s. dollar - yen exchange rate during this period remained within a narrow range. in other words, the direction and scale of monetary policies in the major economies have been quite similar, leading to a situation close to the fixed exchange rate regime shown in table 1. what is critically important is to understand that the fact that this situation came about is not a coincidence but is the result of the similarity of monetary policies of major economies. meanwhile, in most major economies, the expected acceleration in inflation so far has not occurred. given the increasingly complex mechanisms underlying general inflation, in order to avoid sudden market swings and achieve a gradual expansion of economic activity on a global basis, it seems desirable to prioritize full employment and avoid deflation ( i. e., maintain a positive rate of inflation ). this means that, even if the expected rise in inflation does not materialize, central banks should avoid implementing aggressive policy measures in the short run and instead respond gradually over time. v. the covid - 19 crisis and its policy implication japan's long experience with monetary easing, and in particular the three different regimes just described, provides important lessons. the experience of the 2008 - 2012 period suggests that monetary policy should be flexible, bold, and responsive to external shocks. moreover, the experience of the two policy regimes between 2013 and 2019 shows that, by applying the lessons of international