beginning of the year, and the smi, switzerland ’ s leading index, has lost more than 15 % over the same period ( cf. chart 3 ). foreign exchange markets were likewise heavily shaped by the shift in monetary policy : the us dollar, for instance, has appreciated more than 7 % on a trade - weighted basis since the beginning of the year. the trade - weighted euro, on the other hand, has lost around 1. 5 % and the japanese yen has actually depreciated by more than 10 % on a trade - weighted basis over the same period. the swiss franc temporarily appreciated immediately following the outbreak of the war in ukraine. the trade - weighted swiss franc exchange rate, however, was recently below its level at the beginning of the year ( cf. chart 4 ). adjustment of the threshold factor i would now like to discuss the lowering of the threshold factor from 30 to 28 as mentioned earlier by thomas jordan. with this technical adjustment, which will take effect from 1 july 2022, we will ensure that sufficient amounts of sight deposits are subject to negative interest, and that the latter is being passed on to the money market as intended. from march 2022, upward pressure built up on the short - term rates on the secured money market. this stemmed from the fact that the exemption thresholds had risen over time due to the dynamic calculation model, which meant that there were no longer sufficient amounts of sight deposits subject to negative interest. to keep the secured short - term money market rates close to the snb policy rate, the snb provided additional liquidity to the money market via repo transactions as a temporary measure. however, given that the increase in exemption thresholds is structural in nature, it is appropriate that we lower the threshold factor. this will result in the secured short - term money market rates being close to the snb policy rate again without the snb having to regularly provide larger amounts of liquidity. the snb will continue to regularly review the basis for calculating the exemption threshold and adjust it as necessary. page 2 / 4 berne, 16 june 2022 andrea m. maechler news conference charts page 3 / 4 berne, 16 june 2022 andrea m. maechler news conference page 4 / 4

), fannie mae and freddie mac, for example, were given license and direction to take excessive risks. they were granted conflicting missions and governed by competing masters. and their funding backstop was predicated on “ constructive ambiguity, ” which turned out to be neither constructive nor ambiguous. money market mutual funds, too, managed their liquidity risks in an environment of unclear support. ultimately, if the diagnosis of the crisis fails to account for some of the broader failings of public policy, of which the gses are just one part, the prescription is unlikely to be effective. second, the regulatory reform discussion of the past year seems overly preoccupied with questions of institutional design. there are doubtless efficiencies to be gained in sharing best practices, integrating operations, and minimizing regulatory gaps among regulators. but, it is far from obvious that real regulatory reform hinges on figuring the optimal number of regulators, or the precise composition of an oversight council. i happen to believe that the federal reserve should play a critical role in the supervision of financial firms, but that should not obfuscate the larger point. if real reform were chiefly about the number of financial regulators in washington – or even the precise relationships between financial regulation and the role of the central bank – we should find an institutional design among major financial centers around the world that lived up to its promise. we find no such example. policymakers, in my view, should be more focused on what constitutes effective prudential supervision, rather than be diverted to the less consequential discussion as to who should perform it. third, some of the reform measures advocated over the past year could risk re - creating the status quo ante. but the status quo ante will no longer do. there is no going home again. if policymakers had gone into the crisis with the resolution authority to shut down non - banks and complex bank holding companies quickly, we might well have had better options to ensure an orderly disposition of failing firms. placing this arrow in our quiver now, however, is not enough to arm us for the challenges ahead. granting new powers to resolve failing firms in the discretionary hands of regulators is unlikely, in the near - term, to drive the market discipline required to avoid the recurrence of financial crises. to be clear : new resolution authority is a welcome step forward, but its efficacy should not be overstated. and this authority could be made more credible by replicating, as much as practicable