samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
that central banks are simply powerless in this crisis? no, but monetary policy cannot resolve this crisis on its own. we also need a strong fiscal response, ideally at european level. most economists agree that fiscal policy is currently the most important instrument with which to counter the crisis. why? the ecb can provide banks with liquidity, but that doesn ’ t necessarily mean that the banks will actually lend to companies that are struggling because of the virus. that ’ s where the government comes in. it can support the economy by issuing credit guarantees, for example. the package of measures adopted by the german government on friday contained guarantees of that kind. other member states have agreed on similar measures. the fiscal response at the international level hardly looks coordinated. is that a problem? absolutely. we need a strong, joint fiscal policy response in europe. this crisis is not limited to individual member states. everyone is affected, and events in one country affect all other countries too. i hope that this is clear to the decision - makers. in terms of monetary policy, we will do our part to prevent fragmentation in the euro area. the border closures and all the different national arrangements we ’ ve seen suggest that it is more like “ everyone for himself ” at the moment. 2 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches the primary goal has to be to contain the spread of the virus. it may be that closing borders is an appropriate step from that point of view. that ’ s something that virologists are best placed to judge. but it ’ s clear that all protective measures come at an economic cost. and that is precisely why we need coordinated action, so that we can avoid deepening the crisis. but not every country can afford that. that ’ s true, and that ’ s precisely why we need european cooperation. what we need now is european solidarity, also in financial terms. that is in the interest of all european countries. is it even possible now to prevent a recession as a result of the virus crisis? we are experiencing a very severe economic shock. supply chains are being disrupted and, at the same time, demand is contracting as governments introduce protective measures : people are travelling less than before and cannot go out to restaurants and bars. falling confidence may also dampen consumption and investment. and if people are not able to go to work, that has an impact on production, depending on the sector. so we are seeing many different effects emerge at the same time across the whole world.

( 1 ), pp. 21 – 48. 9 see carney, m. ( 2015 ), “ breaking the tragedy of the horizon – climate change and financial stability ”, speech given at lloyd ’ s of london, 29 september. 10 art. 173 - vi of the law on energy transition for green growth. 5 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches
benoit cœure : welcome remarks welcome remarks by mr benoit cœure, member of the executive board of the european central bank, at the foreign exchange contact group meeting, frankfurt am main, 28 november 2018. * * * i am very pleased to welcome you here today to the foreign exchange contact group ( fxcg ) meeting. thank you for coming to frankfurt to share your views and insights with us. in my short introductory remarks, i would like to address the importance of strengthening the foundations of the foreign exchange ( fx ) market. i will argue that we all have a role to play here, and that adopting and adhering to the fx global code ( “ the code ” ) is a powerful way to support change and engage non - signatories in the change process. let me start by briefly illustrating a few of the most notable changes to the fx market structure in recent years. since our market contact group was set up in 1999, the fx market landscape has undergone a deep and broad structural evolution, which has gained significant momentum in recent years. on the sell side, one of the most notable changes relates to the execution of trades. fx trading has become increasingly electronic and automated, reflecting technological advances. the share of spot fx trading that is conducted electronically has almost doubled in the past ten years and now constitutes a substantial majority of daily turnover. the process of growing digitalisation coincided with the emergence of new market participants, trading venues and innovative services. despite these developments, however, liquidity provision has become more concentrated. today, fewer market participants account for an increasing share of fx turnover. we have observed similar changes in market structure on the buy side. for instance, over the past few years asset managers have generally increased their activities in fx - related products and have, over time, collectively emerged as important players in the fx industry. together, these structural evolutions have had implications for how the market functions and how central banks monitor the fx market. on the monitoring side, one tangible implication was the need to broaden the fxcg ’ s outreach to appropriately reflect the new, and more diverse, investor landscape. the ecb ’ s market contact groups are open to all interested market participants that apply for membership. it is important for us to follow a transparent application and governance framework. this is why the fxcg terms of reference, application forms and meeting material, such as agendas, the list of participants, presentations and summaries of our and other ecb market

provided an example that everyone involved in the islamic financial industry should seek to follow. i am sure you will join me in expressing our appreciation of the deep and lasting contribution that professor archer has made to the development of islamic finance. thank you for your attention.
##c derivatives ’ risk - based capital and leverage requirements and by requiring banking firms to hold an additional buffer of highquality, liquid assets to address potential liquidity needs resulting from their derivatives portfolios. our proposal for margin imposes initial and variation margin requirements on the noncleared swaps held by swap dealers or major swap participants that have a prudential regulator. for swaps with a nonfinancial end - user counterparty, the proposed rule would not specify a minimum margin requirement. rather, it would allow a banking organization that is a dealer or major participant to establish a threshold, based on a credit exposure limit that is approved and monitored as part of the credit approval process, below which the end user would not have to post margin. for swaps with other counterparties, the proposal would cap the allowable threshold for unsecured credit exposure on noncleared swaps. in addition, the proposal would only apply a margin requirement to contracts entered into after the new requirement becomes effective. a much discussed part of the act is the requirement that banks push portions of their swap activity into affiliates or face restrictions on their access to the discount window or deposit insurance. under the push - out provisions, banking organizations with deposit insurance or access to the federal reserve ’ s discount window will have to reorganize some of their derivatives activity, pushing certain types of swaps out of subsidiary banks and into distinct legal entities that will require their own capitalization and separate documentation of trades with existing customers. the act permits domestic banks to continue to engage in derivatives activities that have been a traditional focus of banks, including hedging activities and dealing in interest rate swaps, currency swaps, certain cleared credit default swaps, and other swaps that reference assets that banks are eligible to hold. however, because of the specific language contained in the act, this exemption for traditional bank derivatives activities does not apply to u. s. branches of foreign banking firms that by law have access to the federal reserve ’ s discount window. a possibly unintended effect of the act ’ s push - out provision may be to require some foreign firms to reorganize their existing u. s. derivatives activities to a greater extent than u. s. firms. proposed rules to implement this section are still under development by the banking agencies. conclusion as the implementation process for the act continues, the challenge facing the board is to enhance supervision, oversight, and prudential standards of major derivatives

the doubling of the new arrangements to borrow, as well as the renewal of the bilateral borrowing agreements to meet the members ’ high and growing overall demand for fund resources and the shift towards uct arrangements. we welcome the work on the 16th general review of quotas and reaffirm our commitment to a strong, quota - based, and adequately resourced imf at the center of the global financial safety net. 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches
council ’ s inflation aim in a sustained manner. let me now explain our assessment in greater detail, starting with the economic analysis. euro area real gdp increased by 0. 2 %, quarter on quarter, in the third quarter of 2018, following growth of 0. 4 % in the previous two quarters. the latest data and survey results have been weaker than expected, reflecting a diminishing contribution from external demand and some country and sector - specific factors. while some of these factors are likely to unwind, this may suggest some slower growth momentum ahead. at the same time, domestic demand, also backed by our accommodative monetary policy stance, continues to underpin the economic expansion in the euro area. the strength of the labour market, as reflected in ongoing employment gains and rising wages, still supports private consumption. moreover, business investment is benefiting from domestic demand, favourable financing conditions and improving balance sheets. residential investment remains robust. in addition, the expansion in global activity is still expected to continue, supporting euro area exports, although at a slower pace. this assessment is broadly reflected in the december 2018 eurosystem staff macroeconomic 1 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches projections for the euro area. these projections foresee annual real gdp increasing by 1. 9 % in 2018, 1. 7 % in 2019, 1. 7 % in 2020 and 1. 5 % in 2021. compared with the september 2018 ecb staff macroeconomic projections, the outlook for real gdp growth has been revised slightly down in 2018 and 2019. the risks surrounding the euro area growth outlook can still be assessed as broadly balanced. however, the balance of risks is moving to the downside owing to the persistence of uncertainties related to geopolitical factors, the threat of protectionism, vulnerabilities in emerging markets and financial market volatility. according to eurostat ’ s flash estimate, euro area annual hicp inflation declined to 2. 0 % in november 2018, from 2. 2 % in october, reflecting mainly a decline in energy inflation. on the basis of current futures prices for oil, headline inflation is likely to decrease over the coming months. measures of underlying inflation remain generally muted, but domestic cost pressures are continuing to strengthen and broaden amid high levels of capacity utilisation and tightening labour markets, which is pushing up wage growth. looking ahead, underlying inflation is expected to increase over the medium term, supported by our monetary policy measures, the ongoing economic expansion and rising wage

a priority. the governing council welcomes the ongoing work and urges further specific and decisive steps to complete the banking union and the capital 2 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches markets union. further information on the technical parameters of the reinvestments will be released at 15 : 30 cet on the ecb ’ s website. we are now at your disposal for questions. 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches
louis kasekende : overview of the bank of uganda ’ s activities and current concerns remarks by dr louis kasekende, deputy governor of the bank of uganda at the bank of uganda town hall meeting, jinja town, 17 april 2019. * * * hon ministers, the members of parliament, owek. katuukiro of obwa kyabazinga bwa busoga, dr. joseph muvawala, the jinja district leadership and leaders of other districts in busoga, all leaders in your respective capacities, members of the fourth estate ( the media ), ladies and gentlemen, good morning! let me start by thanking you all for honouring our invitation to this event. special gratitude is extended to the honourable ministers, members of parliament, deputy governor emeritus, mr bukumunhe, and dr. joseph muvawala, the katuukiro of busoga kingdom. today ’ s event is a continuation of a series of activities that were started in 2016 as part of the bank of uganda ’ s golden jubilee commemoration. over time, bank of uganda management and the board of directors had observed various misrepresentation / misunderstanding of its mandate and sometimes a clear lack of information about bou services by the public especially in our upcountry communities. therefore public outreach activities such as these were instituted as an avenue for the bank of uganda to explain its mandate and account to the public for its policies and actions. more importantly, it is an avenue to strengthen the linkage between the bank of uganda and the local area leadership, and the general population for both sensitization purposes and seeking feedback from all our stakeholders. in my remarks today, i will provide an overview of what the bank of uganda is set out to do and also address a few topical issues before i call upon my staff to deliver brief presentations on some selected areas of our mandate. one of the presentations shall be on the operations of the agricultural credit facility. first ; what is the role of the bank of uganda? article 161 and 162 of the constitution of the republic of uganda, 1995, clearly set out the bank of uganda as the “ only authority to issue the currency of uganda ” and to “ … promote and maintain the stability of the value of the currency of uganda ; regulate the currency system in the interest of the economic progress of uganda ; and ensure an effective and efficient operation of a banking and credit system.. ” the bank of uganda act, 1993 under section four goes further

event and i look forward to hearing your own perspectives and assessments of the bank of uganda ’ s mandate, policies and actions. we are here to listen to you! mwebale inho mwebalile ilala 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches
review ( summer ) : 19 - 29. bank of canada. 2006. renewal of the inflation - control target : background information – november 2006. binette, a. and s. martel. 2005. " inflation and relative price dispersion in canada : an empirical assessment ", bank of canada working paper no. 2005 - 28. cogley, t. 1998. " a simple adaptive measure of core inflation ", federal reserve bank of san francisco working paper no. 98 - 06. www. bankofcanada. ca / en / fellowship / highlights _ res08. html. crawford, a., j. - f. fillion, and t. lafleche. 1998. " is cpi a suitable measure for defining price stability ". in price stability, inflation targets, and monetary policy, 39 - 73. proceedings of a conference held by the bank of canada, may 1997. ottawa : bank of canada. hoddenbagh, j., m. johnson, and e. santor. 2008. " core and total inflation : recent international evidence. " preliminary draft. hogan, s., m. johnson, and t. lafleche. 2001. core inflation, bank of canada technical report no. 89 ( january ). lafleche, t. 1997. " statistical measures of the trend rate of inflation ", bank of canada review ( autumn ) : 29 - 47. lascelles, e. and pascal g. 2008. " the core argument against total cpi, " t - d economics. macklem, t. 2001. " a new measure of core inflation, " bank of canada review ( autumn ) : 3 - 12. martel, s. 2008. " a structural var approach to core inflation in canada ", bank of canada discussion paper no. 2008 - 10. parkin. m. 1984. " on core inflation by otto eckstein, " journal of monetary economics 14 : 251 - 64.

remains weak. so it is not really surprising that some are wondering if monetary policy has lost its power. low interest rates are actually doing a great deal to support the economy. to illustrate this point, if we were to raise interest rates to pre - crisis levels, say 3 to 4 per cent, there would be a significant contraction in the economy, and it is these contractionary forces that we are offsetting with low interest rates. but while monetary policy is still powerful, it is true that at the current setting, the impact of any interest rate reduction is less than it would be if rates were at historically normal levels. that is the case in a number of economies. in this environment, it is particularly important that all policies — monetary, fiscal and macroprudential — be working in a complementary way. this is why our agreement with the government is crucial. the government is making it clear that it also supports low, stable and predictable inflation, while leaving us the independence to pursue that goal as we see fit. it is a framework that has worked extraordinarily well for 25 years and, after looking at all the evidence, we could find no compelling reason to change it. with that, mr. chairman, carolyn and i would be happy to answer questions. 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches
to be relinquished. more flexibility in wage setting almost certainly entails a wider dispersion of wage rates - that is more wage inequality - and reform of unemployment benefits would place tougher conditions on the unemployed. it is understandable that many people are unwilling to make these changes and why they foresee such worrying phenomena as the “ working poor ”. most people in our society, in other words, see general fairness as a relevant criterion in choosing policy outcomes. as a result, we would not want to go completely down the us route, with such extreme differences in incomes between senior executives of companies and the shop floor. but we do not have to go as far as the united states - there is a happy medium in this, as in most things. all i am suggesting is that we should re - examine our labour market institutions to see whether they are protecting those in jobs at the expense of those looking for jobs. at the same time, while income inequality may not seem fair, unemployment is not very fair either. some of our labour market regulations, and many of our attitudes towards labour market outcomes, indeed some of our very ideas about fairness, stem from a time when the unemployment rate was 2 or 3 per cent. it was inconceivable then that unemployment would have an upward trend over twenty years, or that labour market regulation would have any significant role in that process. but the world has changed, and our ideas about what sorts of labour market arrangements are appropriate need to change too. this is already happening, as evidenced by recent reforms. my guess, however, is that this will not complete the process. conclusion i began by talking about the need to lengthen the economic expansion. this, achieved by keeping inflation at bay, is the best contribution monetary policy can make to the long - term health of the economy. that long - term focus does not mean that we are too cautious, that we never take a risk ; it simply means that we weigh the risks and rewards of policy actions over longer time horizons than many of the commentators on the economic scene which fill our newspapers and airwaves each day. we want an expanding economy, and low inflation. that offers the prospect that progress can be made in addressing the rate of unemployment, which remains too high by any standard in australia. we fear, however, that the debate about whether unemployment will or will not reach supposed “ targets ” over the next year is missing the main point. faster growth over the next year or two

will help reduce unemployment. but it would be a great shame if that decline obscured the longer - term aspect to unemployment, which endures beyond the business cycle.
, the current stance of monetary policy will likely remain appropriate. of course, policy is not on a preset course. if developments emerge that cause a material reassessment of our outlook, we would respond accordingly. taking a longer view, there has been a decline over the past quarter - century in the level of interest rates consistent with stable prices and the economy operating at its full potential. this low interest rate environment may limit the ability of central banks to reduce policy interest rates enough to support the economy during a downturn. with this concern in mind, we have been conducting a review of our monetary policy strategy, tools, and communication practices. public engagement is at the heart of this effort. through our fed listens events, we have been hearing from representatives of consumer, labor, business, community, and other groups. the february monetary policy report shares some of what we have learned. the insights we have gained from these events have informed our framework discussions, as reported in the minutes of our meetings. we will share our conclusions when we finish the review, likely around the middle of the year. the current low interest rate environment also means that it would be important for fiscal policy to help support the economy if it weakens. putting the federal budget on a sustainable path when the economy is strong would help ensure that policymakers have the space to use fiscal policy to assist in stabilizing the economy during a downturn. a more sustainable federal budget could also support the economy ’ s growth over the long term. finally, i will briefly review our planned technical operations to implement monetary policy. the february monetary policy report provides details of our operations to date. last october, the fomc announced a plan to purchase treasury bills and conduct repo operations. these actions have been successful in providing an ample supply of reserves to the banking system and effective control of the federal funds rate. as our bill purchases continue to build reserves toward levels that maintain ample conditions, we intend to gradually transition away from the active use of repo operations. also, as reserves reach durably ample levels, we intend to slow our purchases to a pace that will allow our balance sheet to grow in line with trend demand for our liabilities. all of these technical measures support the efficient and effective implementation of monetary policy. they are not intended to represent a change in the stance of monetary policy. as always, we stand ready to adjust the details of our technical operations as conditions warrant. thank you. i am happy to

reverse, at the appropriate time, the currently very high degree of monetary stimulus. we have full confidence that, when the time comes, we will be ready to do so.