##bly and in a way that recognizes the unique business of insurance companies. additionally, we will continue to advocate for international insurance standards that promote a global level playing field and work well for the u. s. insurance market. thank you again for the opportunity to speak with you today. 1 federal insurance office, department of the treasury, annual report on the insurance industry ( pdf ) ( september 2018 ), 65 – 70 ; see, for example, national association of insurance commissioners, state insurance regulation : key facts and market trends ( pdf ) ( 2018 ), 4. see also bureau of economic analysis, “ gross domestic product, third quarter 2018 ( advance estimate ) ( pdf ), ” news release, october 26, 2018, 9. 2 fio 2018 annual report, 65 – 70 ; see, for example, naic 2018 key facts and market trends, 4. 3 national association of insurance commissioners, capital markets special report, “ u. s. insurance industry ’ s cash and invested assets rise 5. 1 % in 2017 ( pdf ), ” ( august 16, 2018 ), 2. in 2017, the life insurance industry held approximately $ 7 trillion in total assets. fio 2018 annual report, 66 ; national association of insurance commissioners, 2017 life, a & h and fraternal insurance industry analysis report ( pdf ) ( 2018 ), 1. 4 2017 life, a & h and fraternal insurance industry analysis report ( 2018 ), 1 ; see also fio 2018 annual report, 80. 5 see anna paulson and richard j. rosen, “ the life insurance industry and systemic risk : a bond market perspective, ” working paper 2016 – 04 ( federal reserve bank of chicago, march 2016 ), 9 - 17. 6 fio 2018 annual report, 76. 7 see fio 2018 annual report, 66. 5 / 6 bis central bankers'speeches 8 capital requirements for supervised institutions significantly engaged in insurance activities, 81 fed. reg. 38, 631 ( june 14, 2016 ). 9 the so - called collins amendment ( section 171 ) of the dodd - frank act requires, among other things, that the board establish consolidated, minimum risk - based capital requirements that are not less than the current generally applicable capital requirements for insured depository institutions nor quantitatively lower than the generally applicable capital requirements for these institutions in effect at the time of the dodd frank act ’ s enactment. a 2014 amendment to this provision set out that, in applying these minimum capital requirements

jeremy c stein : dollar funding and global banks speech by mr jeremy c stein, member of the board of governors of the federal reserve system, at the global research forum “ international macroeconomics and finance ”, co - organised by the european central bank, the federal reserve board and the federal reserve bank of new york, frankfurt am main, 17 december 2012. * * * thanks very much. it ’ s a pleasure to be part of this panel on the future of financial globalization. i will focus my remarks on one important aspect of this issue – namely, the growing use of wholesale dollar funding by global financial institutions. i ’ ll begin by briefly discussing research i ’ ve been doing, along with my coauthors victoria ivashina and david scharfstein, which examines some of the consequences of this funding model during times of market stress. 1 i ’ ll then touch on the policy implications of this and related work. but first, the usual disclaimer : the views that follow are my own and do not necessarily reflect the thinking of my colleagues on the federal open market committee. by way of background, the dollar liabilities of foreign banks have grown rapidly in the past two decades and now stand at about $ 8 trillion, roughly on par with those of u. s. banks. 2 a significant proportion of foreign banks ’ dollar liabilities are raised via u. s. branches, most of which are legally precluded from raising deposits insured by the federal deposit insurance corporation. the main source of funding for these branches, therefore, comes from uninsured wholesale claims such as large time deposits, making the cost and availability of such dollar funding highly sensitive to changing perceptions of these banks ’ creditworthiness. in our work, we asked how shocks to the ability of foreign banks to raise dollar funding might lead to changes in their lending. we began with a simple conceptual model : imagine a european bank that lends in euros to european firms and in dollars to u. s. firms. to finance its euro - denominated lending, it funds itself by issuing insured euro deposits to its local retail deposit base. by contrast, to finance its dollar - denominated lending, it raises funds in the wholesale dollar market. because the bank ’ s dollar liabilities are uninsured, an adverse shock to the bank ’ s perceived creditworthiness will result in a spike in its dollar funding costs. at the same time, the cost to the bank of funding in