family - run firms in different ways, amongst which i would highlight the development and provision of the “ family holding ” concept, as the legal expression of a centralised management model of the holdings of members of a single family. always taking on an optional and supplementary nature, this legal concept would be especially effective if provided with a simple statutory and tax regime that was stable and easily accessible. in order to understand the dynamics of the corporate sector fully and promote it with maximum effectiveness, aggregated information will never be enough. it is indispensable to know the microeconomic and sociocultural mechanisms that, on the ground, determine economic agents ’ decisions and how they interact with the environment and public policies. only then will it be possible to understand, for example, the reasons for death rates among firms in their third and fourth years of life ; the positive and negative impact of the business environment on a firm, or the management model a certain entrepreneur chooses for their business. 2 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches this is where the central balance - sheet database reveals its worth, not only for the answers it provides, but also for the questions it enables. based on information like that which will be presented today, it should certainly be possible to find socioeconomic and multidisciplinary lines of research for fieldwork, leading to the micro - and macroeconomic data that we see in our tables and charts. let me therefore finish by inviting you to get to know the information that banco de portugal is providing today, and searching it for answers and the questions that will lead us to an ever - more dynamic corporate sector. thank you very much. keep up the good work. 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches

of the second half of the 1990s were used to finance higher current public spending. following the introduction of the euro, interest rates stabilised as they had broadly converged to the best performers and tax revenue fell as a result of decelerating activity in the early 2000s, causing a sharp deterioration in the public accounts. large and persistent current account deficits translated into a sharp deterioration of the portuguese economy ’ s international investment position, which also went from being close to net zero in the mid - 1990s to almost – 90 % of gdp in 2007. the behaviour of gross external debt over the same period – growing from around 60 % to 195 % of gdp – is even more striking. 1 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches this rising external indebtedness was largely intermediated by the portuguese banking system. banks raised ( mostly short - term ) funds in the international financial markets and converted these into ( long - term ) loans to the private sector. the banking sector ’ s loan - to - deposit ratio increased from nearly 89 % in 1998 to around 156 % in 2007. the public sector also resorted to foreign finance extensively. 2. 2008 – 2010 – global crisis tackled through fiscal expansion disregarding accumulated imbalances these imbalances made the portuguese economy extremely vulnerable to the international financial crisis and its contagion effects. when the crisis hit, a highly expansionary fiscal policy was pursued, disregarding the existing imbalances and the lack of fiscal space. in 2010, the public budget deficit was above 11 % of gdp and gross public debt was around 96 % of gdp – of which, more than half was external debt. with potential output growing very slowly, rising external indebtedness fuelled investors ’ doubts about the country ’ s ability to service its debt. as a result, domestic banks and the government found it increasingly difficult to obtain external financing : banks had to turn to the eurosystem, whereas public debt was increasingly placed in domestic banks. a perfect doom loop embrace. investors ’ concerns eventually led the country to be shut out of the international financial markets in the first half of 2011, after the 10 - year yields had nearly doubled in the previous year. this led to a request for official financing under a financial assistance programme negotiated with the european union and the international monetary fund. 3. 2011 onwards – macroeconomic rebalancing and financial deleveraging : notable progress, but no room for complacency notable progress was achieved with the implementation of the financial