effectiveness and security of our financial system. because this nascent ecosystem is also a source of many risks. the international work of public authorities highlighted these issues from the risk of money laundering to the risk of the consumer or investor. i would like to highlight one of them : the risk related to the network effect. this risk was mentioned when some bigtechs considered creating supra - national “ currencies " : by offering to an extremely large customer base, these projects raised questions about monetary sovereignty of the states, as well as serious questions about the functioning of competition. users may de facto be captured by an ecosystem and have no choice of their payment service, or at least be 1 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches influenced by bigtechs to use their services at the expense of competitors. but the opposite risk exists : payment system fragmentation, which can lead to a deterioration in the service to users. central banks have a long experience with these issues, especially in the field of payments. in this respect, the balance of cooperation and competition between industry players, in other words “ co - opetition ”, has proven to be historically valuable. one of the challenges now is to maintain these “ co - opetition ” relationships over time, ensuring that they can include all players and coordinate effectively the payment systems ( and ecosystems ) – traditional or innovative. 2. the banque de france ’ s action to help meet these challenges, at the banque de france, we develop our actions along two lines : ( i ) the first one is to support and implement regulatory frameworks and supervisory practices that promote both innovation and the stability of our financial system most of the current regulatory framework was designed before the technological “ breaks ” that we now face. it therefore seems logical to adapt it to these technological changes and to the challenges and risks associated with them. the same applies, of course, to our supervisory framework and methods. in terms of regulating crypto - assets, france pioneered the establishment of a legal framework in 2019, with two objectives : creating legal certainty and trust to promote the development of a healthy and innovative ecosystem ; preserving innovation by being careful not to curtail further development opportunities and risk depriving the economy of beneficial innovations. with these two objectives in mind, we also support the european project for markets in cryptoassets ( mica ), which will, in particular, provide a first harmonised eu - wide regulatory framework for stablecoins. ( ii ) be involved

and as such, regulatory arbitrage must not become an option. * * * let me conclude. credibility for central bankers now rests on admitting that monetary policy and macroprudential policy are somewhat porous, especially in a situation where we could have an upward financial cycle associated with weak inflation. this calls for a consistent action by central banks that covers both areas : price and financial stability. moving away from an overly strict separation principle, let us try to be complete and consistent central bankers playing an active role in monetary policy as well as in macroprudential policies. 1 altavilla c., boucinha m., peydro jl, 2017, monetary policy and bank profitability in a low interest rate environment, ecb working paper series # 2105, october 2017. 2 ratio of non - financial agents ’ debt to gdp, first quarter 2017. source : eurostat, federal reserve, banque de france calculations. 3 “ the future of finance and the outlook for regulation ”, remarks by vitor constancio, vice - president of the ecb, at the financial regulatory outlook conference organised by the centre for international governance innovation and oliver wyman, rome, 9 november 2017. 4 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches