very limited. let me conclude by getting back from austria ’ s focal point of interest, central and eastern europe, to new york ’ s focal point of interest : the world economy. the increasing globalization of the world economy, with new players emerging on the world stage, has contributed to the very impressive expansion of the world economy in the recent past. yet, this dynamic growth has also spurred economic challenges, such as strongly rising commodity prices and significant current account imbalances. recently, global growth appears to be somewhat more even - footed, as growth in japan and the euro area has been picking up. the economic upswing recorded in the euro area can be attributed, at least partly, to improved economic structures and is based on the stability - orientated framework of emu. the ecb and the eurosystem respectively, will continue to support economic growth in the euro area by vigorously pursuing price stability. following this approach also guarantees that the euro can contribute most effectively to international stability. central -, eastern - and southeastern europe, excluding cis - countries.

of a member state or from any other body. likewise, rights of third parties to approve, suspend, annul or defer central bank decisions on escb - related tasks are incompatible with the eu treaty. the same is true of any rights to censor such decisions on legal grounds. personal independence is about ensuring tenure for members of the escb ’ s decision - making bodies by minimum terms of office and giving protection against arbitrary dismissal. to make this latter aspect more concrete, a central bank governor may be relieved from office only if he or she no longer fulfills the conditions required for the performance of his or her duties or if he or she has been guilty of serious misconduct, with the possibility of appeal to the european court of justice. financial independence, in essence, denotes that central banks have to be in a position to avail themselves of the appropriate means to ensure that they can properly fulfill their escb - related tasks. those applicant countries which engaged in accession talks with the european union in 1998 - among them the czech republic - already dealt, in detail, with the issue of central bank independence during the membership negotiations last fall, when the chapter “ economic and monetary union ” was on the agenda. progress in the candidate countries on this issue is being monitored very closely by the european union at large and by the european system of central banks in particular. let me now shortly sketch the second and the third step of the prospective monetary integration of the central and eastern european applicant countries. upon joining the european union, the new member states are bound to the fulfillment of a number of emu - specific obligations : they obligate themselves to orient their overall policies, and specifically their economic and monetary policies, toward the objectives of emu, and they must endeavour to make progress toward meeting the convergence criteria stipulated by the maastricht treaty. they participate in the economic policy coordination process within the eu, are compelled to avoid excessive budget deficits, and commit themselves to present convergence programs on a regular basis. with a view to their eventual participation in the euro area, these new members are expected to gradually adapt their monetary policy instruments to escb standards. eu membership also includes the obligation to treat exchange rate policy as a matter of common interest. among other things, this means that the newly acceding countries are expected to join the exchange rate mechanism of the eu. they need not necessarily participate in this exchange rate system immediately upon joining the european union, but, depending on the specific circumstances in the individual candidate