earlier speech, let me focus on the last two. 4 exit the macroeconomic argument for prolonged unconventional policy in industrial countries is that it has low costs, provided inflation stays quiescent. hence it is worth pursuing, even if the benefits are uncertain. a number of economists have, however, raised concerns about financial sector risks that may build with prolonged use of unconventional policy. 5 asset prices may not just revert to earlier levels on exit, but they may overshoot on the downside, and exit can cause significant collateral damage. one reason is that leverage may increase both in the financial sector and amongst borrowers as policy stays accommodative. 6 one channel seems to be that a boost to asset liquidity leads lenders to believe that asset sales will backstop loan recovery, leading them to increase loan to value ratios. when liquidity tightens, though, too many lenders rely on asset sales, causing asset prices and loan recovery to plummet. because lenders do not account for the effects of their lending on the “ fire sale ” price, and subsequently on lending by others, i was not a member of the fraternity at that time, so i do not feel a conflict in doling out praise! a step in the dark : unconventional monetary policy after the crisis ”, raghuram rajan, andrew crockett memorial lecture delivered at the bis on 23 june 2013. see borio ( 2014 ), borio and disyatat ( 2009 ), stein ( 2013 ), though see chodorow - reich ( 2014 ) for an alternative viewpoint. one question about chodorow - reich ’ s assessment that quantitative easing does not, by and large, prompt risk taking is that he uses market prices to estimate effects, even though these prices themselves could be distorted by risk taking. for evidence, see for example becker and ivashina ( 2013 ), bruno and shin ( 2014 a, b ), ioannidou, ongena and peydro ( 2009 ), maddaloni and peydro ( 2010 ). bis central bankers ’ speeches they may have an excessive incentive to build leverage. 7 these effects are exacerbated if, over time, lenders become reliant on asset sales for recovery, rather than on upfront project evaluation and due diligence. another possible channel is that banks themselves become more levered, or equivalently, acquire more illiquid balance sheets, if the central bank signals

financial stability. the disclosure of such information can hurt the bis central bankers ’ speeches economic interest and security of the state. other categories could be information related to exchange rate management, interest rates, information collected in a fiduciary capacity and information which could jeopardize the commercial interest of a third party. similarly, we also receive and hold a lot of personal information pertaining to our employees as well as other stake holders, such as whistleblowers, complainants, etc., and disclosure of such personal information would not only compromise the privacy of the concerned individuals, but, in some extreme cases, may also endanger their security / life. all the same, in respect of each and every application, a view is taken after a careful study of the nature of information being sought and the provisions of the rti act. the rbi has a positive bias for disclosure in all cases and this has been the guiding principle all along. we have been fortunate in receiving the understanding and support of the information commission in this respect through various rulings. let me now invite the attention of the learned information commissioner to certain issues. ( i ) as the first appellate authority, i often refer to the decisions given by central information commissioners on appeals. this gives considerable comfort. however, sometimes we do come across conflicting rulings on the same issue. if this matter could be addressed suitably by the commission and resolved, it would be a great help to the public authorities and the information seekers alike, as both would know what to expect. ( ii ) central information commission can consider bringing guidance notes on particular issues or disclosure principles, where there is unanimity among the information commissioners. this can be of immense help to the public in assessing the likely approach of the central information commission, in the event of a second appeal. ( iii ) i appreciate the convenience provided by cic, which hears appeals and arguments through video conferencing. technology is capable of extending this convenience further. i suggest that the video conferencing facility of cic be linked with those of public authorities directly, wherever the necessary infrastructure is available. finally, i would like to flag some concerns observed in some of the rti applications we receive. very often we receive applications with a multitude of queries relating to different areas / organisations. the number of queries crossed a century in a few cases, but it is quite common to get applications having over 20 queries. responding to such applications is a herculean