motives were only slightly less important for cutting consumption than reasons linked to the pandemic. moreover, high - income households especially piled up their savings. varying consumption behaviour across households is also highlighted in a study by jeanne commault and her co - authors, which she will present in the ﬁrst session of our conference. [ 7 ] looking at consumption ﬂuctuations in old age, they ﬁnd, for example, that the overall response of consumption to an income shock is twice as large for low - wealth households as it is for the older population in general. such heterogeneity of households in their propensity to consume can inﬂuence, for instance, the effects of ﬁscal transfers, as sotirios saperas will argue, [ 8 ] or the transmission of monetary policy. [ 9 ] heterogeneity also has a bearing on the question of what will happen to the additional savings created during the pandemic. as this saving is not necessarily desired by households but rather induced by the pandemic, one can imagine at least a certain part of it will be spent when the health crisis is over. however, high - income households have a comparatively low propensity to consume. most of their additional savings are therefore likely to contribute to a build - up in wealth, which could aggravate wealth inequality to some extent. in line with this, our projection from december 2020 foresees that the saving rate will fall only slightly below its long - run average for some time. [ 10 ] still, this would be [UNK] to fuel rapid growth in private consumption, making it a major engine of the economic recovery, once the pandemic has been brought under control. 3 potential long - term effects of the coronavirus crisis overall, the economic outlook is highly dependent on the course of the pandemic and, thus, very ncertain the baseline scenario of o r december forecast ass med that a medical sol tion s ch as a uncertain. the baseline scenario of our december forecast assumed that a medical solution, such as a successful vaccination campaign, would allow all containment measures to be lifted by early 2022. in this scenario, the crisis will have only relatively little impact on potential output in germany. importantly, such an outcome also hinges on the success of extensive policy support in averting second - round effects. for instance, a broad wave of corporate insolvencies could crush functioning structures and cost a

are worth noting : ( i ) first, the traditional preferences for bananas and sugar are now practically at an end and the region still finds itself unable to compete with lower - cost producers ; ( ii ) second, foreign aid flows to the region ( with the exception of haiti ) have all be dried up ; ( iii ) third, while caribbean tourism continues to be a viable brand, the region is facing stiffer competition from asian destinations and will experience even greater competitive pressure when cuba is fully opened up ( as it could in the not too distant future ) ; and ( iv ) fourth, the prospect of continued high unemployment in the us and the uk for the next 2 – 3 years will have implications for workers ’ remittances which are very important to some caribbean economies. bis central bankers ’ speeches to add to these exogenous factors, most countries in the region already have unsustainably high debt burdens, which limit the extent to which government spending could lead the recovery. one could argue that trinidad and tobago represents an exception from this theme, given our energy resources, our stronger public finances and our much lower public debt burden which gives us more room to manoeuvre. we should be careful however of pushing that argument too far since ( i ) our proven energy reserves are fast dwindling ( though some experts think that prospects for new discoveries are high ) ; and ( ii ) our fiscal space is being steadily reduced, the more the private sector activity remains subdued and government steps in to lead the recovery. while public sector indebtedness is still at a comfortable level, it too is increasing rapidly to meet the high cost of the clf / clico bailout. let me put our ( trinidad and tobago ’ s ) challenge in another context which further underscores the problem. in the period 2002 – 2006, real gdp increased at an annual rate of close to 10 per cent based on an annual growth of 16. 7 per cent in the energy sector and 5. 6 per cent per year in the non - energy sector. energy sector growth was based on higher oil production and on the expansion of the downstream production capacity – particularly atlantic lng trains 2, 3 and the m5000 methanol plant. the current prospects are for a continued decline in oil production ( until there are new finds ) and except for planned melamine plant ( the aum ), no significant increase in downstream capacity is envisaged over the next few years, this would imply