texan foreign direct investment, following only canada. 1 finally, mexico ’ s net labor migration to the united states and texas has been significant over the years. however, mexican net labor flows to the united states have diminished notably since 2008 and have been negative in some years. several factors may be behind this phenomenon, including falling fertility rates and cyclical factors, such as low growth in u. s. economic sectors which typically have been mexican labor absorbers – for example, construction – as well as rising employment in mexico. 2 see texas wide open for business ( 2016 ). texas foreign direct investment 2016. see pew research center ( 2015 ). more mexicans leaving than coming to the u. s., washington, d. c. : november ; and orrenius, p. m. ( 2016 ). “ the end of mass migration from mexico, ” presented at the political economy of texas - mexico : common bonds, shared challenges, april. bis central bankers ’ speeches worker remittances from the united states dropped amid the global financial crisis, and since 2010 have exhibited a discontinuous recovery, reaching nominal pre - crisis levels only recently. these money transfers contribute substantially to the standard of living of many families in mexico, helping them to meet basic needs, such as longer schooling and better housing. 3 going forward, it is only natural that social and economic integration between the two countries augment. an increasing array of opportunities will continue from the current reform agenda undertaken by mexico. telecom and energy reforms are already making themselves felt. the latter is especially important for an energy power house such as texas. 4 financial markets and challenges since the middle of 2014, risk aversion has increased, hitting emerging markets especially hard. a reflection of this has been a decline in the prices of many commodities and emerging - market financial assets, including some upward pressure on interest rates, but more persistently, widespread downward pressure on currency levels against the u. s. dollar. behind this shift are various factors, beginning with worries over the state of the chinese economy and policy moves there to handle any deterioration. also, geopolitical developments such as brexit may have had a part. however, the most important by far has been uncertainty over imminent u. s. monetary policy normalization. market expectations and the beginning of normalization have had significant implications for financial flows to emerging economies. around the world, u. s. monetary accommodation fueled the search for yield through significant portfolio capital

in line with our supervisory expectations. given the difficulties to assess the exposure to and the impact of climate - related risk we have not assigned to this exercise quantitative objectives, beyond providing participants and us with a first bottom up assessment of their exposure, based on common assumptions, assessment which appears to be moderate by 2050. in particular, we didn ’ t set as an objective to assess the extent to which the current regulatory framework is sufficient and well suited to absorb climate - related risks, and whether additional supervisory capital requirements would be legitimate. models, metrics and methodologies developed so far are still in their infancy and the data too sparse to allow drawing firm conclusions about the loss absorption capacity of current capital levels. nonetheless, we already see at the acpr these exercises as prudential tools, as they have proved helpful to us at incentivizing financial institutions to give the proper level 1 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches of priority and resources to the monitoring and management of climate - related risks. the publication in november 2020 of the ssm guide on climate and environmental - related risk was driven by the same logic and the preparation underway of an ssm stress test should provide an additional step at european level towards more supervisory scrutiny in the process of fully integrating these risks into the day - to - day risk management of banks. 2 - there are also a few lessons that can be drawn from our experience from a methodological standpoint, as the use of such scenario analysis by supervisors is likely to be repeated and is likely to spread among supervisors. i would like to highlight two of them. first, tremendous progresses have been made in the domain of climate risk scenarios under the aegis of the network of central banks and supervisors for the greening of the financial sector, the ngfss. thanks to this “ coalition of the willing ”, gathering today more than 90 central banks and supervisors across the world, high level scenarios were published in july last year, updated a couple of weeks ago by a set of 6 scenarios. this set of global reference scenarios provide a good basis for financial authorities. of course, the ngfs should continue to develop and refine those scenarios. however, there will remain the need to tailor those scenarios to the circumstances of each jurisdiction, for instance specifics of their climate policies, or more precise meteorological data at the national level. in addition, st may legitimately differ along other methodological dimensions. a case in point is the use or not of a dynamic balance sheet assumption