look forward to our discussion. 1 these remarks represent my own views, which do not necessarily represent those of the federal reserve board or the federal open market committee. 2 the fed also used its open market operations authority to purchase agency residential and commercial mortgage - backed securities and conducted repo operations with an expanded set of global counterparties. some of the 13 ( 3 ) facilities were versions of those that had been used during the 2008 financial crisis and others were new, such as corporate credit facilities, which directly purchased corporate bonds to support the flow of credit to the economy. all 13 ( 3 ) lending facilities require the approval of the secretary of the treasury. for further details, see board of governors of the federal reserve system ( 2021 ), " funding, credit, liquidity, and loan facilities, " webpage. 2 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches 3 for a further description of these actions, see board of governors of the federal reserve system ( 2021 ), " supervisory and regulatory actions in response to covid19, " webpage. 4 for a discussion of the 13 ( 3 ) lending facilities and their usage, see board of governors of the federal reserve system ( 2020 ), financial stability report ( pdf ) ( washington : board of governors, november ). 5 this issue is most relevant when the assets purchases are those that the fed can purchase using its open market operations authority, including treasury and agency debt and agency - backed mortgage - backed securities. programs to purchase other types of debt would need the approval of the secretary of the treasury under section 13 ( 3 ) of the federal reserve act. 6 for a discussion of potential reforms, see inter - agency working group on treasury market surveillance ( 2021 ), recent disruptions and potential reforms in the u. s. treasury market : a staff progress report ( pdf ) ( washington : u. s. department of the treasury, november ) ; and inter - agency working group on treasury market surveillance ( 2022 ), enhancing the resilience of the u. s. treasury market : 2022 staff progress report ( pdf ) ( washington : u. s. department of the treasury, november ). 3 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches

the risk that liquidity may be more prone to disappearing at times when it is most needed, as it seemed to do on october 15. this concern is an important one. because u. s. treasury securities reflect the full faith and credit of our government, they are rightly considered risk - free. but the value of any security, even a u. s. treasury, will reflect not just its inherent credit risk but also investors ’ faith in the markets where it is traded. we need investors to have full faith in the structure and functioning of treasury markets themselves. treasury markets need to be as safe as the securities that trade on them. episodes such as october 15, in which treasury prices fluctuated wildly with no obvious reason, threaten to erode investor confidence. the growing list of similar events in equity and other markets underscores this concern. these remarks represent my own views, which do not necessarily represent those of the federal reserve board or the federal open market committee. references to the “ treasury markets ” refer to the interdealer cash and futures markets, unless otherwise specified. joint staff report : the u. s. treasury market on october 15, 2014 ( pdf ). bis central bankers ’ speeches confidence in treasury markets helps to support demand for treasury securities and keep our government ’ s financing costs low. households and firms and even foreign governments hold treasury securities as a key form of savings in no small part because of their trust in their safety and liquidity. financial firms have particular reasons to care about these markets. many types of financial firms are represented here today, with diverse roles within treasury markets. since before the financial crisis, one of the driving narratives within financial markets has been the growing demand for safe assets. many have argued that this demand helped to engender the crisis, as a variety of assets came to be accepted as risk - free when in fact they were anything but that. treasury bills and bonds are about the only freely tradeable dollar - denominated assets that really can be called safe. we have a shared interest in guarding against an outcome where the treasury market becomes a source of stress, rather than a safe haven in times of stress. and if declining market function did undermine confidence in treasury securities, we would be putting at risk a key source of credit creation. our financial system depends on high - quality liquid assets ( hqla ) for collateral that is used by banks, dealers, ccps, money market mutual funds, and countless others. if treasury