. i would like to conclude with a beautiful quote from albert camus :'true generosity toward the future consists in giving everything to the present '. not sacrificing the long term to the'tyranny of urgency ', but preparing for the future unencumbered by the present. this sums up the professional commitment of each and every one of you, and our responsibility. you can count on the banque de france to support these wishes of lucid esperance so that in 2025, more than ever, it can reduce uncertainty and act as a beacon of stability. happy new year to you all, and to our dear country! i eurostat, flash estimate - december 2024 ii insee, consumer price index – provisional results for december 2024 iii 18, 2 % for the third quarter of 2024 iv banque de france, macroeconomic projections, december 2024, 16 december 2024 v letta ( e. ), much more than a market, report published on 17 april 2024 vi draghi ( m. ), the future of european competitiveness, report published on 9 september 2024 4 / 5 bis - central bankers'speeches vii nagel ( j. ), villeroy de galhau ( f. ), a common call for a franco - german revival, tribune, 22 november 2024 viii villeroy de galhau ( f. ), " towards a realistic simplification : untying some of the knots in european banking regulations ", speech, 26 november 2024 ix camus ( a. ), the rebel, 1951 5 / 5 bis - central bankers'speeches

legislative proposals. iii the sooner an agreement is reached – hopefully by end - 2023 –, the faster we can build on these tools to regain control of debt dynamics. let me say upfront that the commission ’ s proposal is a step in the right direction. that said, the “ fiscal rules trilemma ” iv provides a useful matrix to analyse its merits relative to current rules. the trilemma states that it is impossible to fulfil simultaneously the following three objectives : ( i ) simplicity, which can also be understood as political intelligibility and ownership ( ii ) flexibility, i. e. the ability to adapt to specific economic situations or unforeseen developments, and ( iii ) enforcement, i. e. the extent to which the rule is binding. in practice, the current stability and growth pact includes too many – and too complex – flexibility provisions and escape clauses to compensate for the “ one size fits all principle ”, while efforts to improve its enforceability proved ineffective. the reform must strike a better balance between these three features – simplicity, flexibility and enforcement – in order to make the fiscal framework more effective and operational. as regards simplicity, the fact that the new framework is built around a single operational indicator, i. e. a net primary public expenditure aggregate, is a major improvement compared to structural deficits. in principle, this new indicator should be easier for governments to measure and oversee, and would entirely fall within their control. it is also simpler to use as a communication tool in the public debate, which would help to make the new rules politically intelligible and acceptable. on flexibility, the proposal goes a long way towards better tailoring the efforts required to country - specific circumstances. the expenditure path would be defined in a pragmatic process, based on a debt sustainability analysis and after a thorough discussion between the commission and member states. each country would commit to a national medium - term plan including structural reforms and public investment programmes. this process acknowledges that page 4 sur 4 debt heterogeneity is too high between member states to dictate a single debt reduction rule – 66 % of gdp in germany vs 144 % in italy in 2022 – while enhanced dialogue with national authorities should improve political ownership and hopefully compliance with the framework. but this brings me to enforcement. we should nevertheless seek to ensure that the national plans do not turn into political negotiations and result in insufficiently ambitious fiscal adjustments. i must admit that i do not 100