objectives, institutional arrangements, and financial information, strong governance structures, internal controls, and operational and risk management systems and the need to respect host - country rules by complying with all applicable regulatory and disclosure requirements of the countries in which they invest. the prescriptions for the swf host countries stress on transparent inward investment rules, which are “ publicly available, clearly articulated, predictable, and supported by strong and consistent rule of law ” and favour non - discriminatory treatment for swfs vis - a - vis other foreign investors. of particular interest from a host country perspective, is the media release of the treasurer of the commonwealth of australia in february 2008, which illustratively lays down a set of principles to enhance the transparency of australia ’ s foreign investment screening regime. the principles set out the main factors that are considered during the screening, which include determining on a case by case basis and consistency with national interest ; while assessing the national interest in any given case, a balanced view against principles is proposed. the principles set out the additional factors that need to be considered in relation to investment proposals by foreign governments and their agencies, over and above those that apply to normal private sector proposals. while the australian government welcomes foreign investment, the purposes of australia ’ s foreign investment screening is to ensure consistency with their national interest. the treasurer can reject proposals that are deemed contrary to the national interest or impose conditions on them to address the national interest concerns. the concerns may relate to australia ’ s national security or economic development. the examination includes implications for other government policies, competition and operations of australia ’ s businesses. recent reports suggest that germany is contemplating a legislation which will enable it to block “ unwanted ” investments by swfs. the proposed law is expected to enable scrutiny of all investments where the investor ’ s stake in the investee entity is likely to exceed 25 per cent, even up to three months after the investment has been made. this concern seems to stem from the suspicion that some of the swfs may be driven by “ political and other motivations ” and not purely by economic and commercial considerations. india as a host country in india, the regulatory regime governing capital inflows does not recognise swfs as a distinct category. hence, their investments are subject to normal regulations governing capital flows under the category of foreign direct investment ( fdi ) and foreign institutional investments ( fii ). in regard to some sectors, such as banking and financial market infrastructure companies, there are limits on individual holdings

peter praet : creating an enabling environment for pan - european banks in the banking union remarks by mr peter praet, member of the executive board of the european central bank, at the eurofi financial forum 2018, vienna, 5 september 2018. * * * in recent years, the european union has achieved major progress towards financial integration. we now have a single supervisor and a single resolution authority, and banks are subject to the same european rulebook. the banking union contributes to providing effective mechanisms for cross - border risk - sharing and broadening the sources of funding within a country, thereby promoting macroeconomic stability and growth. however, we still observe a number of obstacles that hinder the fungibility of capital and liquidity of banking groups. very often, these obstacles relate to regulatory fragmentation and ring - fencing of national markets. further harmonisation would help to address many of the issues, while appropriate prudential safeguards can be put in place to address possible financial stability concerns by national authorities. first, a number of national options and discretions are hindering the practical application of cross - border liquidity waivers within the union. while such waivers are explicitly allowed by the crr, and already contain prudential safeguards, so far the ecb has received almost no application for their use from the banks it supervises. an important reason for this lack of applications is the existence of national large exposure limits on intragroup exposures in several european countries. these limits prevent institutions in these countries from transferring liquidity within the group in a flexible manner and thus represent practical obstacles to the use of liquidity waivers. effectively, they are hindering the free flow of liquidity in the banking union and should be harmonised further. second, the proposal to have cross - border capital waivers within the eu was not taken forward in the on - going review of the crr, which is a missed opportunity. such waivers would be consistent with the establishment of the ssm and the banking union and help to support the free flow of capital across the union. on the one hand, it is understandable that some national authorities are concerned about the possible financial stability implications of the proposal. on the other hand, such concerns could be addressed by making the waivers subject to additional prudential safeguards, and by putting in place appropriate transition arrangements that account for the planned further progress on the banking union. third, the major progress we have made in our banking union needs to be recognised also in the international