the ecb ’ s perspective – for accomplishing its primary objective of price stability. for example, there is a financial stability exception from the general rule that a bank which needs extraordinary public financial support is deemed to be failing or likely to fail and thus has to be either resolved or liquidated. the eu resolution framework explicitly clarifies that the need for emergency liquidity assistance from a central bank, per se, does not necessarily trigger the resolution of a bank, and it acknowledges the role of central banks in providing liquidity to the financial system in times of stress. 2 euro area governments are also on the way to establishing a european public backstop for the single resolution mechanism. but significant further steps are still required to complete banking union, including the establishment of a common deposit guarantee scheme. a complete banking union would have beneficial macroeconomic effects, but it would also have positive implications for the central bank ’ s function as lender of last resort. conclusion please allow me to conclude. see recitals 2 and 41 and article 32 ( 4 ) ( d ) of the brrd. more specifically, access to liquidity facilities including ela by central banks does not constitute “ state aid ”, which is prohibited by our state aid framework, if the following cumulative conditions are met : the credit institution is temporarily illiquid but solvent at the moment of the liquidity provision, which occurs in exceptional circumstances and is not part of a larger aid package ; the facility is fully secured by collateral to which appropriate haircuts are applied, in function of its quality and market value ; the central bank charges a penal interest rate to the beneficiary ; the measure is taken at the central bank ’ s own initiative, and in particular is not backed by any counter - guarantee of the state. bis central bankers ’ speeches the severity and nature of the financial crisis resulted in an extraordinary response by central banks ; one which was very much in the spirit of thornton and bagehot. in a complex and incomplete institutional environment, the eurosystem has been able to adapt its set of interventions by using all the flexibility allowed by our instruments in a principled way to address both systemic and idiosyncratic liquidity problems. we will continue to do so. and we will be supported to a greater extent than in the past by a more complete and consistent institutional framework. references bagehot, w., lombard street : a description of the money market, london : h. s. king, 1873.

services, like wallets, that accompany them. in doing so, we will be guided by the principle of ‘ same risk, same regulatory outcome ’ set out above. in the case of stablecoins used as money to make payments, the regulatory outcome has been expressed by the financial policy committee of the bank as an expectation that stablecoins used in systemic payment chains should meet standards equivalent to those expected of commercial bank money. and that's in terms of stability of value, robustness of legal claim and the ability to redeem at par in fiat [ 8 ]. some of the likely foundational features of the regulatory regime on which we will consult are already clear. the fpc made clear last year that to deliver that regulatory outcome “ regulatory safeguards will be needed for a non - bank systemic stablecoin to ensure that the coin issuance is fully backed with high quality and liquid assets, alongside loss absorbing capital as necessary, to compensate coinholders in the event that the stablecoin fails ” [ 9 ]. it also made clear that in the absence of deposit protection for coinholders, other elements of the regime would need to be strengthened to deliver the necessary level of assurance. the consultation will set out in more detail how the coinholders ’ claims on the stablecoin issuer and wallets should be structured to deliver redemption at par in line with commercial bank money, how the backing assets should need to be managed to ensure they are always available to meet redemptions and, more generally the requirements for corporate structure, governance, accountability and transparency necessary to meet the standards we expect in other parts of the financial system that carry out the same functions. the ftx example underlines how important these aspects are. the legislation covers the use of crypto technologies for the payments function. the treasury intends to consult in the near future on extending the investor protection, market integrity and other regulatory frameworks that cover the promotion and trading of financial products to activities and entities involving crypto assets. at present, in the uk, it is, to a large extent, only the anti - monetary laundering regulatory framework which applies to these activities and entities. finally, let me turn to our work with the treasury on central bank digital currency, or, to put it more plainly on the issuance by the bank of england of a digitally native pound sterling. our plan remains to issue a consultative report around the end of year setting out the next steps that we propose. over the past few days, i