samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
as 0. 7 percentage point higher than the benchmark index. the executive board is prepared for wide variations in return from year to year, and applies the principle that performance must be assessed over time. from that perspective, the return of the gpfg has been good and higher than the return on the benchmark index. in the report to the storting on energy stocks, the government intends to remove exploration and production companies from the gpfg ’ s benchmark index and investment universe. that is in line with the intention in our advice from 2017 and will contribute to reducing the exposure of the state ’ s wealth to oil price risk. 1 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches the report to the storting on the government pension fund provides for among other things the possibility of investing in unlisted renewable energy infrastructure within the environmental mandates. as we have indicated previously, norges bank will approach investment opportunities and build expertise gradually. investments in unlisted infrastructure will be a topic for the executive board ’ s work on the new strategy plan to apply from 2020. on 10 april 2015, the central bank law commission was appointed. precisely four years later, the government put forth a proposal on a new central bank act. at that time, the storting had already endorsed retaining norges bank as the operational manager of the gpfg. for norges bank, the proposal on a new central bank act entails a number of changes, such as increasing the capacity of norges bank ’ s executive board in the area of capital management. norges bank has already made considerable strides in adapting the internal organisation to the changes ensuing from the new central bank act. the main exposures that are decisive for the gpfg ’ s long - term performance are decided by the ministry of finance and anchored in the storting. this year ’ s report to the storting on the gpfg includes several measures to further develop the investment strategy. but the objective remains firm : the highest possible return at an acceptable risk. within this framework, the gpfg should be managed in a responsible way. the report to the storting notes that there is broad political agreement that the gpfg should not be an instrument of foreign policy or climate policy, and it is important that this continue to be the case in the future. restrictions or instructions that have a significant impact on the trade - off between return and risk will limit the potential to achieve solid performance over time. 2

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ms. mary e barth bis central bankers ’ speeches

sabine lautenschlager : one year of ssm speech by ms sabine lautenschlager, member of the executive board of the european central bank, at an international conference on “ one year of ssm effective and efficient supervision in a volatile world? ”, organised by the institute of law and finance, frankfurt am main, 2 november 2015. * * * ladies and gentlemen, let me thank the organisers of this conference, and especially professor schneider, for their kind invitation. i very much welcome this opportunity to share our experience of one year single supervisory mechanism, in particular as our first year anniversary is only two days ahead of us. back in november 2014, in a speech for the start of the single supervisory mechanism ( ssm ), i compared the new system, the ssm, to an athlete at the start of his career. we only had a short period of training before going into our first competition. today, almost one year later, we have gained experience and won some contests. let me mention some figures to give you some insight into the sport we practice : the ssm directly supervises 122 banking groups. from january 2016 onwards this number will increase to 130. the balance sheets of these banks count for 25 trillion euro in assets and 82 % of the banking business done in the euro area. overall, the ecb issued more than 1. 200 supervisory decisions last year ; our planning cycle for the first year included more than 8. 000 activities. not only did we hire 1. 000 new staff members at the ecb, but we also integrated 5. 000 staff members from 26 national supervisory authorities, who were formerly responsible for supervision in their home country, into the ssm. since november 2014, the ssm is responsible for directly supervising 1200 individual banks, which until that point in time had been supervised according to 19 national interpretations of european law and according to specific national regulations, following a national supervisory tradition with varying degrees of quantitative and qualitative elements, with a historically grown reporting universe. it was a busy first year. and it was a successful first year as we made progress on many fronts. we achieved a lot regarding our main objective : we improved the resilience of 122 significant banking groups, of the 19 national banking systems, and of the european banking system as whole. the comprehensive assessment was the most publicly visible success, but many smaller and less visible steps followed and will still follow on our way to a safer and more sound banking system in
attract new capital inflows. in addition, a busy electoral calendar in europe will be another source of concern for investors in light of the recent rise of populist movements and euro scepticism as the european political agenda looks busy in 2017. as a result, the dollar ’ s strength is expected to remain with the euro against the dollar to move near to parity and could break it by year - end. figure 8. eur - usd and real yields source : bloomberg. • against the british pound : the brexit risk overshadows everything the us dollar rose against the pound by more than 16 % on a yearly basis last year. downside risks for sterling remain significant this year, while periods of spikes are expected considering the recent sterling behavior after prime minister theresa may $ announced the uk ’ s hard - line negotiating position. on tuesday, 17 january, right after prime minister may ’ s speech, the sterling rose by almost 3 % against the us dollar and by 2 % against the euro, recording its biggest gains against the us dollar since 1993, to above us $ 1. 24 ( figure 9 ). figure 9. gbp - usd spot exchange rate ( above ) and gbp - usd 3 - month atm implied volatility source : bloomberg. • against the yen : further appreciation ahead as the market is expecting a notably more restrictive us monetary policy, whereas the bank of japan will remain rather expansionary, the outlook for both usd - jpy and eur - jpy currencies is to appreciate during this year. • against cny : weakness abroad the cny has depreciated by more than 3 % against the us dollar since the sdr inclusion in october and by around 10 % on a yearly basis. a managed depreciation remains the key theme for the cny in the foreseeable future as one of the chinese authorities ’ priorities is the currency credibility due to china ’ s aspirations for the cny to become a global reserve currency. b. sovereign bonds : more than usual volatility / rebuilding term premia / steepening yield curves as the global policy mix is evolving towards more fiscal easing and less monetary easing, there is intrinsic uncertainty because effective implementation of such a policy shift is still very much an open issue. this would lead to higher yields, more volatility and higher term premia, especially on the long - end of the yield curve, which is overbought over the last few years due to

362 & list _ id = b2e9402e - db05 – 4166 – 9f09 - e1b26a1c6f1b stournaras, y. 2016, monetary policy report 2015 – 2016, speech to the standing committee on economic affairs of the hellenic parliament, athens, 11 july, 2016. w w w. bankofgreece. gr / pages / en / bank / new s / speeches / dispitem. aspx? item _ id = 373 & list _ id = b2e9402e - db05 – 4166 – 9f09 - e1b26a1c6f1b in ’ t veld, j. 2016, public investment stimulus in surplus countries and their euro area spillover, european economic, economic brief 016, august. 7 / 7 bis central bankers'speeches
fear of treaty change should not deter us from discussing what is necessary to put our economic and monetary union on a more solid footing. i remain convinced that european nations and citizens are willing to share more sovereignty in policy areas where national member states are increasingly less able to tackle the challenges on their own. but citizens rightly ask for a concrete roadmap in which policy fields sovereignty need to be shared and how such powers at the central level are controlled and legitimised. once we have convincing answers to these questions, treaty change will lose its trepidation. 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches

political discussion about financing the greek government. that discussion is taking place in brussels, not in frankfurt. would you say that qe is helping immunise the euro area against the risk of an exit by a member state, even if this is not its objective? i wouldn ’ t put it like that. it is certainly reducing the risk of contagion in the euro area, but the context right now is very different from 2012. the problem for countries such as portugal, spain and ireland is no longer an exit from the euro area, far from it. their main concern now is how to capitalise on the return of growth in order to step up the reduction in unemployment and return to normal as quickly as possible. i am leaving out greece, which is a very specific case in the light of the discussions ongoing at the moment. it was greece that i had in mind... isn ’ t qe making the euro area immune to the risk of an exit by greece? the exit of greece is not a scenario we are working on. all the efforts being made at the moment are aimed at updating the relationship with greece in the light of the new priorities of its government, within a framework which remains that of the euro area and which implies rights as well as the duty to respect the common rules. so we are not putting the question in those terms. on the question of risk - sharing, why does the ecb, through arrangements as the provision of emergency liquidity by the greek central bank or the public asset purchase programme, pass the risk onto the national central banks? isn ’ t this a sign of fragmentation of the euro area? i don ’ t think that ’ s at all the case. first of all, there is nothing new here : there have already been transactions where the risk was not entirely shared. for example, when we decided in 2011 to broaden the range of collateral by allowing corporate debt ( additional credit claims, as we call them ) to serve as a guarantee, the risk was not shared. furthermore, all parameters – the timetable, the volume, the intervention strategy, the maturities – are decided in frankfurt by the governing council. we opted for qe on account of the specific characteristics of the euro area. such questions did not arise in the united states. but we have to ask these questions because the european treaties clearly state that there needs to be a separation between fiscal and monetary policies, and that monetary policy must not fulfil fiscal objectives
of the u. s. financial system.

low profitability for banking as overriding factors. a recurring theme that has surfaced through my discussions with bankers and other industry stakeholders is the regulatory burden imposed upon de novo banks. in particular, community bankers noted the challenges in raising the capital required to establish a new bank. the 2014 board study noted that the states ’ statutory capital requirements for a new statechartered bank could be as low as $ 10 million, but in practice could be as high as $ 30 million. 9 given the high initial capital requirement, a de novo bank has a small margin of error in implementing its business strategy and meeting profit projections. in establishing a new bank, bank executives explained the challenges in developing a business plan and risk - management framework that addresses how the bank can generate a sufficient profit to provide an adequate return to shareholders. for a de novo bank, the cost and burden of starting from ground zero in establishing their risk - management and internal controls are high. de novo banks make strategic decisions in establishing risk - management processes adams and gramlich, “ where are all the new banks? ” matt hanauer, brent lytle, chris summers, and stephanie ziadeh. “ community banks ’ ongoing role in the u. s. economy, ” federal reserve bank of kansas city, economic review 106, no. 2 ( june 24, 2021 ), https : / / www. kansascityfed. org / research / economic - review / community - banks - ongoing - role - in - the - us - economy /. adams and gramlich, “ where are all the new banks? ” and controls that may delay the launch of revenue - generating products and services. further, a de novo bank faces the pressure to grow quickly, which in turn, may lead to riskier lending and other activities. indeed, experience has shown that pronounced problems often surface in the early years of a de novo bank ’ s operations, which explains the elevated capital and supervisory expectations for these banks. the federal reserve and the other banking agencies generally expect a de novo bank to maintain a tier 1 leverage ratio of at least 8 percent for the first three years of its existence and they examine the bank on a more frequent schedule. 10 for a de novo bank, there is a heightened need to hire experienced staff who are quickly able to establish the bank and show progress in meeting the operating goals and profit projections in the business plan. as we all know, difficulty in finding skilled workers is an issue more broadly in the economy, but
the chiang mai initiative. if asia succeeds in strengthening its own financial system, it can play an even more important role globally in designing new international financial architecture and discussing governance systems. 5. conclusion : how can japan contribute? to conclude, i would like to address the question, what can japan do to contribute to the realization of the asian century? the answer to this question is not singular. as i mentioned earlier, japan can contribute through trade, investment, and financial cooperation. japan can also assert its identity as a member of the asian region, to participate in the stronger regional ties and cooperation, through which japan can achieve higher growth. this would be mutually beneficial for both japan and other asian economies. in its early - april monetary policy meeting, the bank of japan introduced a new policy framework, quantitative and qualitative easing ( qqe ), with the aim of achieving the price stability target of 2 percent in terms of the year - on - year rate of change in the consumer price index ( cpi ) at the earliest possible time, with a time horizon of about two years. the bank believes this will lead japan ’ s economy to overcome the deflation that has lasted for nearly 15 years, and reinvigorate the economy, adding substance to japan ’ s efforts to contribute to the realization of the asian century. bis central bankers ’ speeches

lead to an improvement in the aggregate supply and demand balance and further to the strengthening of the economy ’ s growth potential. the recent enhancement of the two facilities, and the extension of their application period, will likely promote such movements. the corporate sector has accumulated 230 trillion yen worth of cash and deposits amid firms ’ persistent tendency to invest only as much as their cash flow allows. recently, however, firms have increasingly shown a willingness to take the opportunity to start new investment using external funds. through the measures i have just explained, the bank will continue to provide firm support enabling them to meet their challenges. i hope that these measures, together with steady progress in the implementation of the japan revitalization strategy – aimed at strengthening the government ’ s competitiveness – will prompt financial institutions to take a more active lending stance and stimulate firms ’ and households ’ demand for credit, with a view to encouraging banks ’ lending and strengthening the foundations for economic growth. bis central bankers ’ speeches
opaque and complex financial products playing a major role in the financial system. there were, therefore, huge “ black holes ”, including what has been called a “ shadow banking system ” where most of the excesses of securitization took place. regulation was not reaching far enough and when it applied it did not always ensure an adequate risk capture. the g20 has fostered coordinated efforts by industrialized and emerging countries to bring the most important financial actors under the umbrella of supervision, while rating agencies and hedge funds were receiving closer attention. beyond these actions, the g20 and the financial stability board ( fsb ) have focused their efforts on the systemic importance of certain institutions or markets, due to their size or their interconnection. one example is the necessary reform of otc derivatives markets that has gained traction with a clear roadmap designed by the g20. efforts aimed at integrating these markets into regulated and supervised market infrastructures are an essential policy response to monitor the risks accumulated in these markets. 21. the second problem highlighted by the crisis is the procyclicality generated by the interplay between prudential and accounting rules. some of this procyclicality can be trimmed through prudential regulation. i therefore strongly believe that our first line of defense against procyclicality should be the accounting framework. we, at banque de france, firmly support the current focus on reducing the scope of mark - to - market accounting and moving from an incurred loss model to a forward - looking model for provisioning. we expect that accounting standards will converge but this should not come at the expenses of these two dimensions. 22. thirdly, the crisis also raised questions about the nature of our regulatory frameworks. there is a trend towards complementing the micro - prudential supervision with macro - prudential oversight. in europe we are putting in place a systemic risk board at the european union level that will combine expertise from central bank governors and supervisors in charge of banks, insurance companies and securities markets. in the us, the financial stability oversight council is also a landmark in the overhaul of the financial supervision architecture. 23. soon, the european council will grant the ecb a special assignment regarding financial stability with the responsibility to run the european systemic risk board. this should not be seen as constituting an additional objective of monetary policy. rather, the creation of this board does not change the clear allocation of responsibilities enshrined in the treaty. the

my home county, i can say that having both monetary policy and financial stability responsibilities under the same roof has proved rather useful. 40. this expanded role reminds us that the monitoring responsibility of a central bank is crucial. our dedication to stability and our forward looking approach in a globalised financial world is a challenging task. long lasting cooperation among central banks and stimulating conferences like this one largely contribute to this achievement. thank you for your attention.
supply of liquidity has reduced swiss franc interbank rates. as can be seen in chart 2, risk premia on the swiss franc interbank market have also declined. they fell by more than a half in may while, during the same period, us dollar risk premia on the interbank market in the us rose again. alongside the uncertainty, investor risk aversion has grown over the last few months. as a result, there has been a movement of capital in the direction of investments that are considered to be more secure ( flight to quality ). this is reflected, for example, in a rise in the gold price since february 2010. in may 2010, the gold price in swiss francs reached new heights. the flight to quality has also had consequences for switzerland, since our country has traditionally been regarded as a safe haven for investors. this situation has been reinforced by the fact that, until now, the swiss economy has withstood the crisis better than most developed countries. this has resulted in upward pressure on the swiss franc, which has led to repeated interventions on the foreign exchange market. the liquidity injected into the market in the course of these interventions has reduced swiss franc interest rates, in particular for short term maturities. in addition, the yield on 10 - year swiss confederation bonds fell to below 1. 50 % in may 2010. for the sake of completeness, it should be pointed out that the swiss franc has not been the only currency to appreciate. the yen, the us dollar and the currencies of the nordic countries have also strengthened against the euro. investing foreign exchange reserves as already mentioned by philipp hildebrand, the snb had to implement unconventional monetary policies in order to combat the financial crisis and avert deflation risks. this resulted in an expansion in the snb balance sheet, which took place in two stages. in the first stage, during the crisis, the snb made use of eur / chf swaps, while in the second stage, when it was confronted with the appreciation of the swiss franc, it intervened on the foreign exchange market. as part of these unconventional measures, the snb purchased swiss franc bonds issued by private sector swiss borrowers and temporarily extended the terms of its repo operations. today i am going to focus on the impact that the snb ’ s interventions have on its balance sheet. in these interventions, the snb purchased euros as well as, to a lesser extent

r ( ising ) star? speech presented at the ecb and its watchers xxiv conference session on : geopolitics and structural change : implications for real activity, inflation and monetary policy, frankfurt.