f - loans as well. following this change, we now have a system resembling those of many other countries, particularly in europe. however, the government paper market in norway is small compared with other countries - which is, for that matter, an advantage - but it also requires us to make better use of available collateral than other countries. when measured in october of this year, the ratio of total turnover to security furnished in the norwegian settlement system was roughly 5. 12 this is on a par with the situation in stockholm, but far below london, where daily turnover is around gbp 125bn - with highs of almost twice that amount while collateral requirements are at a mere gbp 8bn, i. e. a ratio of about 16. when measured in this way, efficiency is thus at least three times greater in london than in oslo or stockholm - and we find nothing to indicate that the system in london is less secure. this indicates that there is room for improvement in the norwegian system. what areas can we improve? first of all, the retail netting system. the present system is cumbersome and both banks and norges bank would like to see some changes. it should be possible to develop better routines to reduce the need for collateral. a review of traffic patterns ( in particular, for government payments ) combined with other appropriate measures ( such as exposure limits and collective collateral ) should make it possible to reduce the collateral requirement substantially. changes in the rules for collateralisation are the other promising area for achieving noticeable gains. present regulations hamper ongoing changes in the amount that can be pledged in favour of norges bank. banks are unable to alter the collateral which has already been furnished ( the previous day ) in favour of norges bank. if it turns out on the day of settlement that too little collateral has been furnished, banks are not able to increase the amount of collateral - even though they have securities available in the vps. 13 this sluggish system - resulting from the act relating to the norwegian central securities depository - prevents banks from adjusting their collateral throughout the day. it goes without saying that this is not an optimal situation, which we have already pointed out. the matter is under consideration in the vps legal commission, and we are hoping that a solution is imminent. let me now turn to the responsibilities and roles of the central bank and the banks in the payment system. 4. responsibilities and roles in the payment system the primary responsibility for the development of the payment system lies with

latter. notwithstanding central bank efforts at anchoring long - term rate expectations, it seems difficult to imagine that a reduction in global liquidity – at a time when non - resident demand for us bonds, in particular, has been waning – would have no significant impact on us or core european yields. international estimates of “ term premiums ” embedded in longer - term bond yields did suggest that quantitative easing policies had compressed these premiums to unusually low levels ; in turn, as prospects for an unwinding of quantitative easing emerged, they started to normalize. furthermore, term bis central bankers ’ speeches premiums have shown some correlation across both developed and emerging bond markets, in particular since they began to rise from may 2013 onwards. 4. the case for ( still ) investing in emerging markets risks hanging over emerging market assets, however, do not mean that the case for investing in such assets is closed. first of all, while the growth out - performance of emerging countries relative to the developed world has been dwindling, this should not obscure the fact that the gap, while narrowing, remains positive, and that emerging markets remain the biggest contributors to global growth. demographic trends, productivity gains, increases in the stock of capital remain conducive to a stronger growth performance of emerging market countries in the medium to long term. even countries that have shown a relatively strong degree of convergence with living standards of the developed world can still out - perform the latter, as the case of korea and taiwan shows. similarly, emerging countries continue to display, on balance, better fiscal or external metrics than their developed world counterparts, whether one looks at current account balances, public deficits or ratios of public and private debt to gdp. rather than the developments following mr bernanke ’ s comments in may 2013 representing an “ emerging market crisis ”, as some may want us to believe, what is probably a more correct characterization of the developments is a correction or re - pricing in the wake of expected normalization of global monetary policy and uncertainty around the speed of such normalization. what seems to further underpin the emerging markets investment case is much stronger fundamentals when compared to previous episodes of emerging markets coming under pressure, such as in the late 1990s, or even more recently in 2008. substantial progress has been made in the last two decades towards more flexible exchange rates, reserves have been accumulated on a grand scale, fiscal positions are healthier than in many advanced economies, all of these making emerging markets overall