. in 2022, 50 % of our supervised entities were subject to at least one successful cyber attack, rising to 68 % percent in 2023 as the upcoming publication of our annual horizontal analysis will show. on an absolute basis the number of reports has also risen significantly. the number of cyber incident reports that we have received in 2023 was 77 % higher than in 2022, and we expect the total number of incident reports in 2024 to be similar to 2023. the imf also reports that the number of attacks has doubled since the pandemic. conclusion let me conclude. while the public debate on banking regulation may have shifted, we need to continue to uphold robust regulatory frameworks that balance safety with competitiveness. completing the banking union and the capital markets union remains a critical priority and one that can enhance the overall competitiveness of the sector. in addition, we must remain vigilant in addressing the emerging risks posed by the growing nbfi sector and rising geopolitical risks that threaten resilience. by staying committed to these priorities, we can build a stronger, more integrated european financial system that supports innovation, protects consumers and enhances the overall resilience of our economy for all europe's citizens. crises fading in the rearview mirror should not be a harbinger of shifting supervisory and regulatory priorities such that a weaker, less competitive and less resilient sector is the result. enria, a. ( 2023 ), " banking supervision beyond capital ", speech at the eurofi 2023 financial forum organised in association with the spanish presidency of the council of the eu, santiago de compostela, 14 september. 5 / 6 bis - central bankers'speeches 6 / 6 bis - central bankers'speeches

% today. bank profitability has increased considerably in recent quarters, benefiting from higher interest rates, and return on equity now stands at 10. 1 %. 2 / 6 bis - central bankers'speeches this resilience is also a result of the strengthened supervisory and regulatory framework after the global financial crisis, including the creation of european banking supervision. the limited repercussions from the march 2023 banking sector turmoil stand as a testament to the robustness of our banking union. however, while we have made significant strides to build a more resilient banking union, the journey is far from complete. without a european deposit insurance scheme, there cannot be a truly single banking system. depositors across the banking union should have a uniform level of confidence that their deposits are safeguarded during crises, irrespective of their member state or the location of their bank. we must also enhance the crisis management and deposit insurance ( cmdi ) framework to effectively manage the failures of small and medium - sized banks. it is crucial that authorities have the flexibility to act and that adequate funding is available for a diverse range of scenarios. losses from bank failures should primarily be borne by the bank's shareholders and creditors. nonetheless, the framework should also allow for the use of industry - funded safety nets when necessary to protect financial stability. in particular, deposit guarantee schemes should be equipped to support the use of crisis management tools, for example by contributing to meeting the bail - in conditions for gaining access to the single resolution fund. smaller banks, which often rely heavily on deposits as a funding source, may face challenges in issuing financial instruments that could be bailed in if the bank fails. this issue can be mitigated by clarifying and broadening the least cost test and introducing a general depositor preference based on an equal ranking of all deposits. the current review of the cmdi framework is an opportunity to bring durable fixes to the flaws i have just described. we hope the co - legislators will reach an ambitious agreement and not settle for small - scale tweaks that would largely preserve the current – and less than satisfactory – status quo. liquidity in resolution is another important aspect of crisis management where progress is needed. a resolved bank should primarily rely on market funding for liquidity, but a public liquidity backstop can be critical to maintain confidence in the resolution process, as demonstrated by recent crises in other jurisdictions. unlike other jurisdictions, however, the banking union lacks an effective public sector backs